Metascience and the Philosophy of Science

I doubt that I am the only speaker who was attracted to this meeting, at least in part, because it promises to bring two groups into dialogue who should be speaking to one another, but who largely have not: scholars working on metascience or quantitative studies of science, and scholars working in the philosophy of science. In this talk, I want to consider both general philosophical perspectives and some examples from recent work in my research group to try to explore the differences in perspective that might have led to this kind of separation. In part, I’ll claim, this relates to differing stances about the normative and social purposes to which the study of science could be put; implicated as well are a host of issues involving conceptions of “naturalism” and the scope of “empirical” or “practice-driven” philosophy of science. I hope, at least in outline, to sketch some ways in which resolutions to these questions might encourage more fruitful dialogue.