Ambition without democracy: when the cautious seek office

When studying the erosion of democratic institutions – such as elections – researchers often focus on elite co-optation or regime dynamics. Yet changes in political selection may also have long-term effects on the types of individuals seeking a political career, defining the dominant features of decision-makers down the road. I design a lab experiment to explore the effects of changes in political selection that accompanied authoritarian backsliding in Russia. Using a series of experiments, I show that creating an unfair playing field in elections and replacing elections with appointments for the local offices leads to self-selection of the risk-averse individuals into political careers. This happens because selection features like low costs of running (for regime candidates) and the absence of public evaluation for the appointees attract individuals who are more risk averse. This study demonstrates a causal mechanism connecting elements of authoritarian backsliding with citizen political ambition and contributes to our understanding of the long-term effects these changes may have on political participation, elite quality, and regime functioning.