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A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem

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journal contribution
posted on 2015-05-26, 08:49 authored by Y. Chun, M. Mitra, Suresh Mutuswami
We characterize the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem using the axioms of outcome efficiency, budget balance, equal treatment of equals, Pareto indifference, together with a weakening of strategy-proofness, upward-invariance.

Funding

Chun’s work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF- 2013S1A3A2055391) and the Center for Distributive Justice, Seoul National University

History

Citation

Games and Economic Behavior

Author affiliation

/Organisation/COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE/Department of Economics

Version

  • AM (Accepted Manuscript)

Published in

Games and Economic Behavior

Publisher

Elsevier

issn

0899-8256

Available date

2016-10-15

Publisher DOI

Publisher version

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825615000652

Notes

JEL classification C72; D63; D82

Language

en

Administrator link

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    University of Leicester Publications

    Categories

    Keywords

    Queueing problemsymmetrically balanced VCG ruleaxiomatic characterizationsimple proof

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    All Rights Reserved

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