Towards the meta-fundamental: introducing intercontextual invariants

Abstract:

The pursuit of knowledge often leads downwards and outwards: towards the lowest-level phenomenon (fundamental) and the largest number of like-minds (intersubjectivity). According to this view, a scientific phenomenon is reduced to its lowest common denominator, and eventually leads to a consensus-like view. Yet this may not be the only set of paths to and from fundamental knowledge, as this implies an inherently reductionist approach to the creation and exploration of knowledge. In this essay, we will explore how fundamental levels of analysis relate to larger frameworks of knowledge and discovery. Rather than framing the fundamental as a mechanistic necessity or a lower-level enabler of emergence, I propose that an alternative (the nonlinear intercontextual view) leads to a number of important benefits. The proposed viewpoint allows for fundamental components of a body of knowledge to be identified and characterized in a broader historical, intellectual, and mechanistic context. This view can be distinguished from the intersubjective view of knowledge-sharing, which implies many implicit assumptions and encourages unnecessary constraints of thought. A nonlinear intercontextual view also provides a way to reconsider what constitutes a fundamental unit in a body of knowledge. This leads us to new conclusions about the underpinnings of our scientific fields, our theoretical assumptions, and a set of meta-fundamentals that can redefine the manner in which scientific knowledge is set forward into the world.