2016RIGOSAPHD.pdf (2.72 MB)
Essays in Game Theory
thesis
posted on 2016-05-12, 11:18 authored by Alexandros RigosThis thesis explores interactions among agents whose rationality is bounded in distinct
ways. It consists of three self-contained chapters/papers. Chapters 2 and 3
consider myopic and hard-wired strategy revisions based on evolutionary game dynamics,
while Chapter 4 deals with rationally inattentive agents who acquire costly
information in a flexible manner. The thesis, thus, spans two extremes of the range
of models with boundedly rational agents.
The first paper proposes a novel way to formalize matching mechanisms in evolutionary
games. The proposed formalization nests group selection models such
as the haystack (Maynard Smith, 1964) and trait-group models (Wilson, 1975). It is
shown that evolutionary optima can be obtained as Nash equilibria under appropriately
defined matching rules.
In the second paper matching rules are endogenized and the co-evolution of
cooperation and matching is studied in social dilemma situations. It turns out that
only full-or-null assortativity levels are evolutionarily stable. The extent to which
efficient outcomes are achieved by this endogenization process is evaluated, which
crucially depends on the structure of the particular interaction considered.
The third paper extends recent models of flexible information acquisition to an
uncountable-action-space setting: a beauty contest coordination game. Necessary
conditions for the existence of equilibria with well-behaved strategies are derived.
It is established that affine equilibria exist only if the fundamental is normally distributed.
A higher coordination motive, a more concentrated prior distribution of
the fundamental and higher information costs lead to less attention being paid to
the fundamental. Moreover, flexible information acquisition technology is shown
to result in equilibrium multiplicity under certain parameter combinations.
History
Supervisor(s)
Jensen, Martin; Wallace, ChristopherDate of award
2016-03-03Author affiliation
Department of EconomicsAwarding institution
University of LeicesterQualification level
- Doctoral
Qualification name
- PhD