

The broad-appeal strategy and policy representation

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Appendix A.1: Summary statistics

Table A.1.1: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev (overall)	Std. Dev (within countries)	Min	Max	Obs.
Δ Welfare generosity	0.11	0.83	0.82	-3.64	7.15	850
Gvt. welfare position	10.76	11.05	10.03	-37.37	45.28	850
Gvt. Broad appeal (ENGA)	0.28	0.17	0.15	0	0.96	850
Gvt. Broad appeal (ENMI)	18.74	5.11	3.74	4.57	27.87	850
Gvt. Broad appeal (Voter disagreement)	0.42	0.07	0.05	0.28	0.64	200
Gvt. Broad appeal (Expert disagreement)	1.00	0.56	0.54	0.52	4.36	179

Note: Summary statistics for the variables used in Table 1 in the main paper.

Table A.1.2: Correlation matrix

	ENGA	ENMI	Voter disagreement	Expert disagreement
ENGA	1.00	0.31	0.13	0.14
ENMI	0.31	1.00	-0.19	0.17
Voter disagreement	0.13	-0.19	1.00	-0.07
Expert disagreement	0.14	0.17	-0.07	1.00

Note: The variables are demeaned by country prior to calculating the coefficients such that cell entries represent Pearson correlations within countries.

Appendix A.2: Additive measure of coalition broad appeals

This appendix uses an additive measure of how broadly coalition governments appeal instead of the weighted average used in the main paper. This is done to account for the possibility that a government coalition can appeal broadly even if the individual government parties do not. In models A.2.1.3, A.2.1.4, and A.2.1.5 this simply means taking the sum (instead of the weighted average) of the government parties' broad appeal score. For model A.2.1.2 we first calculate an ENGA score for the government as a whole, and then, for each government, we multiply the ENGA value with the sum of the manifesto space that the government parties dedicated to making the group appeals. The results do not change in terms of either statistical significance or substance.

Table A.2.1: Replication of Table 1 with additive broad appeals measure

Independent variables	Model A.2.1.1 Baseline model	Model A.2.1.2 ENGA	Model A.2.1.3 ENMI	Model A.2.1.4 Voter disagreement	Model A.2.1.5 Expert disagreement
Gvt. welfare position _{t-1}	0.009** (0.003)	0.011** (0.004)	0.009 (0.005)	-0.009 (0.011)	0.004 (0.011)
Gvt. Broad appeal _{t-1}	-0.0003 (0.0008)	0.0001 (0.001)	-0.0004 (0.002)	0.061 (0.208)	-0.078 (0.107)
Gvt. welfare position _{t-1} *	-	-0.00005 (0.00005)	-0.00002 (0.0001)	0.008 0.012	-0.003 (0.005)
Gvt. broad appeal _{t-1}					
Constant	0.032 (0.067)	0.008 (0.073)	0.029 (0.101)	-0.083 (0.192)	0.216 (0.205)
R ²	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.002	0.01
Obs	850	850	850	200	179

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, two-tailed test. Linear regression with country fixed effects. The gvt. broad appeal measure in the baseline model (Model A.2.1.1) is the ENGA measure. **This models underlying this table apply an additive measure of broad appeals instead of the weighted average measure used in the main paper.**

Appendix A.3: The country-cabinet period as the unit of analysis

This appendix uses the country-cabinet period as the unit of analysis instead of the country-year. This does not change the results in terms of either statistical significance or substance.

Table A.3.1: Replication of Table 1 with the country-election as unit of analysis

Independent variables	Model A.3.1.1 Baseline model	Model A.3.1.2 ENGA	Model A.3.1.3 ENMI	Model A.3.1.4 Voter disagreement	Model A.3.1.5 Expert disagreement
Gvt. welfare position _{t-1}	0.021** (0.007)	0.028* (0.012)	0.030 (0.022)	-0.035 (0.010)	0.021 (0.067)
Gvt. Broad appeal _{t-1}	0.101 (0.507)	0.412 (0.652)	0.003 (0.026)	-1.883 (3.417)	-1.761 (1.457)
Gvt. welfare position _{t-1} *	-	-0.030	-0.001	0.079	-0.031
Gvt. broad appeal _{t-1}		(0.040)	(0.001)	(0.236)	(0.094)
Constant	-0.017 (0.177)	-0.092 (0.203)	-0.034 (0.473)	0.696 (1.441)	1.392 (1.013)
R ²	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.12
Obs	345	345	345	67	69

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, two-tailed test. Linear regression with country fixed effects. The gvt. broad appeal measure in the baseline model (Model 3.1.1) is the ENGA measure. **This models underlying this table use the the country-election period as the unit of analysis.**

Appendix A.4: Models with control variables

In this appendix, we replicate Table 1 from the main paper using various control variables that could potentially influence social policy outputs. These include a number of economic variables (the level of unemployment, GDP growth, inflation, and the import/export ratio). We also control for the share of the population that is 65 or older since this makes redistributive policy (particularly in the area of pensions) more expensive. Finally, we control for the number of cabinet parties because more coalition parties may lead to a larger public sector (Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006). The coefficients on the control variables are either statistically insignificant, or significant and in the expected direction (unemployment in Models A.4.1.2 and Model A.4.1.3 and the number of cabinet parties in Model A.4.1.4 and Model A.4.1.5). The main results still suggest that the governments' welfare positions are related to the outputs they produce (Model A.4.1.1) and that the relationship between government positions and outputs is not conditional on how broadly the government appeals.

Table A.4.1: Replication of Table 1 with control variables

Independent variables	Model A.4.1.1 Baseline model	Model A.4.1.2 ENGA	Model A.4.1.3 ENMI	Model A.4.1.4 Voter disagreement	Model A.4.1.5 Expert disagreement
Gvt. welfare position _{t-1}	0.006* (0.003)	0.009 (0.005)	0.013 (0.009)	-0.047 (0.030)	0.016 (0.025)
Gvt. Broad appeal _{t-1}	-0.088 (0.191)	0.009 (0.238)	0.010 (0.010)	0.431 (1.283)	-0.221 (0.557)
Gvt. welfare position _{t-1} *	-	-0.011	-0.0004	0.092	-0.030
Gvt. broad appeal _{t-1}		(0.016)	(0.0005)	(0.066)	(0.034)
Unemployment	-0.028* (0.012)	-0.029* (0.012)	-0.028 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.016)	-0.049 (0.028)
Number of cabinet parties	-0.002 (0.043)	-0.004 (0.043)	0.0003 (0.043)	0.228** (0.083)	0.129* (0.063)
GDP growth	-0.013 (0.013)	-0.014 (0.013)	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.019)	-0.003 (0.016)
Inflation	0.012 (0.009)	0.011 (0.009)	0.011 (0.009)	-0.018 (0.035)	-0.027 (0.044)
Import/export ratio	0.319 (0.182)	0.330 (0.183)	0.306 (0.181)	-0.885 (0.469)	-0.542 (0.657)
% Population 65 and above	-0.017 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.015)	0.018 (0.025)	-0.025 (0.036)
Constant	0.152 (0.341)	0.120 (0.344)	-0.031 (0.376)	0.070 (1.025)	1.410 (0.958)
R ²	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.02
Obs	800	800	800	167	163

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, two-tailed test. Linear regression with country fixed effects. The gvt. broad appeal measure in the baseline model (Model A.4.1.1) is the ENGA measure.

Appendix A.5: Welfare state measure of broad appeals

This appendix replicates Model 1.5 from the main paper using a welfare state related measure of how broadly the government appeals. Specifically, it uses expert uncertainty about the (weighted) government parties' position on the tax versus spending dimension in the Chapel Hill dataset. This measure is only available from 2006 forward, so the number of observations is smaller than the one used in the main paper.

Table A.5.1: Replication of Model 1.5 with welfare state related broad appeals measure

Independent variables	Model A.5.1.5 Expert disagreement
Gvt. welfare position _{t-1}	0.037 (0.027)
Gvt. Broad appeal _{t-1}	-0.941* (0.386)
Gvt. welfare position_{t-1} *	-0.026
Gvt. broad appeal_{t-1}	(0.023)
Constant	0.939* (0.455)
R ²	0.14
Obs	64

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, two-tailed test. Linear regression with country fixed effects. **The model uses a measure of broad appeals that is based on expert uncertainty about government party positions on a welfare state related topic.**