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Strategic Consequences of Emotional Misrepresentation in Negotiation: The Blowback Effect

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Recent research indicates that expressing anger elicits concession making from negotiating counterparts. When emotions are conveyed either by a computer program or by a confederate, results appear to affirm a long-standing notion that feigning anger is an effective bargaining tactic. We hypothesize this tactic actually jeopardizes postnegotiation deal implementation and subsequent exchange. Four studies directly test both tactical and strategic consequences of emotional misrepresentation. False representations of anger generated little tactical benefit but produced considerable and persistent strategic disadvantage. This disadvantage is because of an effect we call “blowback.” A negotiator’s misrepresented anger creates an action-reaction cycle that results in genuine anger and diminishes trust in *both* the negotiator and counterpart. Our findings highlight the importance of considering the strategic implications of emotional misrepresentation for negotiators interested in claiming value. We discuss the benefits of researching reciprocal interdependence between 2 or more negotiating parties and of modeling value creation beyond deal construction to include implementation of terms.

Keywords: negotiation, emotion, emotional contagion, contract implementation, trust

Making misleading or false statements about alternatives and preferences may enable negotiators to gain a material advantage over their counterparts. Providing false information about one’s bargaining limits can be an effective tactic for extracting concessions (Chertkoff & Baird, 1971). Stating or implying conflicts of interest on issues that, unbeknownst to the counterpart, are actually shared preferences (so-called “compatible issues”) yields concessions on issues where the differences are real (O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997). Although ethically (Robinson, Lewicki, & Donahue, 2000) and even legally (Shell, 1991) problematic, fact or value misrepresentations can enable a negotiator to claim value at the expense of their counterparts.

Some theorists (Frank, 1987) and practitioners (e.g., Hutson, 2015; Machiavelli, 1519/1987; Pacelle & Schmitt, 2002; Sagan & Suri, 2003) believe that analogous advantages can also be gained through *emotional misrepresentations*—the deliberate expression of an emotion that is different from the one genuinely felt by the negotiator. Such falsity might take the form of a person, feeling little affect, attempting to display expressions consistent with genuine happiness or anger. A stream of recent experiments has established that sending angry expressions generates, under certain circumstances, increased concession making from the recipient (Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008; van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004; Wang, Northcraft, & Van Kleef, 2012). In these studies, subjects were paired with a confederate or a preprogrammed computer that sent a stream of emotional messages the subjects were led to believe came from a negotiating counterpart. Those receiving an angry stream inferred that their seemingly angry “counterpart” was tougher and had a higher limit for settling the negotiation than did those who received an affectively neutral or happy stream. Some appeared to conclude that the only way to reach any agreement with this angry negotiator would be to yield further on the issues, resulting in steeper concession curves. This widely replicated finding appears to validate the notion that a form of emotional misrepresentation—feigning anger—can be deployed to help a negotiator claim more value in the agreements they reach (Hutson, 2015).

However, fully understanding the efficacy of these and other bargaining moves requires further analysis. More preferable

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terms of agreement may leave the “angry” negotiator with a perceived *tactical advantage*. This refers to an advantage based on the negotiator’s expected value for the terms of the deal at the time of agreement. These expectations of value may later prove accurate, optimistic, or even pessimistic when the parties implement the terms. Negotiated terms represent promises to undertake specified actions, which actually generate the value. Apparent advantages that accrue during the negotiation process can disappear or even reverse after the parties leave the bargaining table. Because misrepresenting anger to elicit concessions may make the counterpart truly angry (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010) and less trusting (Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010), the anger tactic may backfire (Van Dijk et al., 2008) by undermining implementation. Without considering this broadened context, researchers cannot measure the negotiation’s *strategic consequences*. These reflect the flow of financial and other benefits generated during the implementation stage. Examining the strategic implications of effective tactics through the implementation process may reveal diminished financial benefits, relative to initial expectations, or quite possibly no benefit at all.

The purpose of this research is to examine the strategic consequences of misrepresented emotions on postnegotiation behaviors (see Figure 1). Such consequences reflect the fundamental reciprocal interdependence between negotiators. The whole process comprises an action-reaction cycle with the output of one party becoming the input of the other (Thompson, 1967). This cycle may cause a blowback effect when the negotiator’s misrepresented anger causes both parties to become genuinely angry and less

trusting of each other. Exposure to angry messages prompts the counterpart to react, quite possibly making him or her truly angry (Van Kleef et al., 2010) and less trusting (Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010). Extending the cycle one additional step, the counterpart’s reaction to the negotiator’s misrepresentation will also affect the negotiator who initially misrepresented. The consequences may include a counterpart becoming intent on postnegotiation retaliation (Wang et al., 2012). Retaliatory motives increase the likelihood that the counterpart will default on aspects of the agreement, translating into losses or foregone gains for the negotiator who misrepresented anger.

If negotiators are to fully understand the economic consequences of costly contract implementation and postnegotiation cooperation, they must look beyond tactical advantages associated with concession patterns to consider the strategic implications of emotional misrepresentation after the deal. Understanding the trusting relationship between negotiators is essential to predicting implementation behaviors and the strategic consequences of negotiation tactics.

We extend the developing literature on emotion expression in negotiations by measuring strategic implications of emotional misrepresentation on the emotions, perceptions, and actions of *both* parties in the wider exchange context. We first present theoretical background on the primary effects of misrepresented emotions, examining how these emotional displays evoke congruent emotional reactions (Elfenbein, 2014; Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994) that affect the counterpart’s trust in the negotiator. We examine how misrepresented emotions blowback to affect the negotiator’s genuine emotions, then




Figure 1. Conceptual framework of the blowback effect of negotiator emotion misrepresentation on strategic implications after the negotiation. Although genuine emotional exchange perpetuates the blowback effect, the lasting effects of trust affect the strategic implications for each party.

consider dynamics of this recursive exchange (Lemay, Overall, & Clark, 2012). Across four laboratory studies, we examine the strategic implications of misrepresented emotions on postnegotiation implementation behaviors and the costs of motivating contract implementation.

Primary Effects of Misrepresented Emotions

Negotiation is an exchange process that facilitates the future transfer of financial obligations and real economic goods or services, as well as intrinsic goods that include courtesy and affection (Kong, Dirks, & Ferrin, 2014). Emotions are inherent in this exchange. Those expressed by one party communicate information to a counterpart that can in turn impact that person's emotions, cognitions, and behaviors (Elfenbein, 2014; Van Kleef et al., 2010), as well as the quality of the relationship between the parties (Barry & Oliver, 1996; Lemay et al., 2012).

Impact of Misrepresented Emotions on Counterpart's Felt Emotions and Trust

Emotions serve a social function by helping individuals understand the expresser's motives and intentions (Van Kleef et al., 2010). These emotional expressions motivate behaviors through two mechanisms: emotional contagion and inferential processes (Van Kleef et al., 2010). Emotional contagion occurs when an individual's emotional displays impact the recipient of the expression by evoking congruent emotional reactions. This psychological reaction to emotion expression has been likened to the counterpart "catching" an expressed emotion (Elfenbein, 2014; Hatfield et al., 1994). Kopelman, Rosette, and Thompson (2006), for example, found that negotiators who strategically expressed happiness "infected" counterparts who also reported higher levels of happiness. Negotiators who expressed anger had counterparts who expressed higher levels of anger. Moreover, Kopelman et al. (2006) found that counterparts who interacted with an angry negotiator became angrier themselves. They later expressed less interest in pursuing a future business relationship with the negotiator.

Emotional contagion may arise from behavior mimicry in face-to-face settings, or through conditioning and perspective-taking that does not involve mimicry (Elfenbein, 2014; Hatfield et al., 1994). Emotions expressed via text in computer-mediated contexts have been found to result in similar consequences as those in face-to-face settings (e.g., Cheshin, Rafaeli, & Bos, 2011; Van Kleef et al., 2004). In the absence of face-to-face interactions, one person can still transfer emotions to another through interpretive processing (Elfenbein, 2014). According to Elfenbein (2014), the negotiator's angry communication serves as a stimulus that ignites emotional contagion. The counterpart first registers this stimulus, resulting in an emotional experience (i.e., felt emotions), and then expresses his or her felt emotions through nonverbal cues or text messages. The process may sometimes prove weaker than direct interaction with full access to nonverbal signals but can still spiral quickly (Brotheridge & Lee, 2002).

Emotional expressions can also affect behaviors through a second mechanism, the triggering of inferential processes that provide information about the expresser's relational orientation (Van Kleef et al., 2010). Relational emotions, such as happiness, affect overall positive connection between parties (Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishii, & O'Brien, 2006), in particular perceptions of trust (Dunn & Schweitzer,

2005). Trust is "a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another" (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p. 395). Certain beliefs—that the counterpart has integrity, benevolence, and ability—determine intentions to trust (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). We focus on benevolence and integrity perceptions in the current research because they are more relevant to the laboratory task we examine here (Bottom, Holloway, Miller, Mislin, & Whitford, 2006).¹ Benevolence refers to the counterpart's perceptions of the negotiator's cooperative motives, conveyed by caring and considerate behaviors. Integrity perceptions represent the counterpart's perceptions of the negotiator's consistency, honesty, and credibility (Mayer et al., 1995). Although these factors are distinct, a person need not be perceived as high in both benevolence and integrity to be perceived as trustworthy (Mayer et al., 1995). Following previous research (e.g., Bottom et al., 2006; Kong et al., 2014), we refer to these particular beliefs as trust.

Emotions convey important information to the counterpart about the negotiator's character and social motives (de Melo, Carnevale, Read, & Gratch, 2014; Van Dijk et al., 2008), including the willingness to cooperate (de Melo et al., 2014). For example, in some studies, the counterpart perceived the negotiator's angry messages as threats, which in turn motivated the counterpart's increased concessions (van Kleef et al., 2004; Sinaceur, Van Kleef, Neale, Adam, & Haag, 2011). In such situations, the counterpart's trust for the negotiator will also be affected; angry expressions convey the negotiator's intention to attack (Van Kleef et al., 2010) or hurt the counterpart, which affects the counterpart's trust in the negotiator. We predict that misrepresented anger will have a negative impact on emotions and trust. Positive emotions, in contrast, tend to broaden the range of people's thoughts and actions (Fredrickson, 2001), leading them to make more favorable evaluations of others (Forgas & Bower, 1987). Happy emotions have been shown to promote expectations of trustworthiness and intentions to engage in trusting behaviors (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). Further, research has found that the link between happiness and trust attitudes extends to motivating more trusting behaviors (Mislin, Williams, & Shaughnessy, 2015). Therefore, we expect misrepresented happiness to increase both happiness felt by the counterpart and trust in the negotiator.²

Hypothesis 1: A negotiator's misrepresented anger (happiness):

- (a) Increases the counterpart's genuine anger (happiness) and

¹ The widely used New Recruit negotiation game (Neale, 1997) equates ability perceptions across negotiators to better illuminate other directly observable tradeoffs. Similar homogeneity in ability characterizes other bargaining setups including the "three issue game" published by Pruitt and Lewis (1975). By following that convention we limit relevant variance in "ability" leaving trusting beliefs to depend on integrity and benevolence.

² Prior research has found that emotion expressions perceived as inauthentic can undermine trust (Côté, Hideg, & Van Kleef, 2013) under certain circumstances (Grandey, Fisk, Mattila, Jansen, & Sideman, 2005). That is, misrepresented emotions are more effective for negotiators' tactical outcomes when they are perceived as authentic rather than as misrepresented and inauthentic (Kopelman et al., 2006). Happiness misrepresentations were consistently perceived as authentic across our studies, and we, therefore, develop our predictions under the assumption that the emotion expression is perceived as authentic.

- (b) Decreases (increases) the counterpart's trust in him or her.

Blowback Effect of Misrepresented Emotion

The reciprocal influence between negotiators predicts strategic consequences, because negotiators sequence their behaviors in response to their counterpart's (Adair & Brett, 2005). Negotiators perceived to be more competitive might elicit a similar competitive stance from their counterpart (Rhoades & Carnevale, 1999). Research in social psychology (Lemay et al., 2012) has found that individuals communicating legitimate anger made their counterparts angry, which in turn negatively affected the individuals' responses. The blowback effect led angry individuals to become angrier, more destructive, and to experience a greater desire for retaliation.

A full examination of the dynamics of this recursive process reveals the mechanism for the blowback effect of misrepresenting emotion. In business deals, negotiators who tactically misrepresent anger might implicitly assume they will be able to control their own experienced emotion (despite their angry counterpart's resulting rage). But they may not adequately account for this task's difficulty (Schroth, 2008). The deliberate decision to falsely express anger may, by process of reciprocity and emotional contagion, generate the same emotion in the emotion-misrepresenting negotiator (who comes to genuinely feel anger, rather than simply feign the emotion). The expressively angry negotiator then becomes truly angry during the heated exchange (Kopelman, Gewurz, & Sacharin, 2008; Schroth, 2008). This reciprocal influence of anger diminishes liking, cooperation, and information sharing between the negotiation parties (Brett, Olekalns, Friedman, Goates, Anderson, & Lisco, 2007). These dynamics may further result in a "downward spiral" of weakened trust and noncooperative behaviors from both parties (Ferrin, Bligh, & Kohles, 2008, p. 13). Such recursive forces may impede negotiated agreement. Should agreement be reached, this downward spiral jeopardizes strategic outcomes.

Blowback from false positive emotional expressions is expected, in contrast, to increase positive emotions experienced by the negotiator who initiated the deception. The counterpart receiving feigned happiness expressions is likely to also become happier. Through the emotional contagion effect, the counterpart's genuine happiness in turn will enhance the actual happiness of the negotiator who started off feigning the emotion. By promoting trust and cooperation between parties (Ferrin et al., 2008), happiness may enhance strategic outcomes.

Hypothesis 2: A negotiator's misrepresented anger (happiness) will blowback to:

- (a) Increase his or her genuine anger (happiness) and
- (b) Decrease (increase) his or her trust in the counterpart.

Strategic Implications of Misrepresented Emotion

Negotiators misrepresenting anger initiate a spiraling deterioration of trust (Ferrin et al., 2008), jeopardizing the cooperation needed for any agreement's implementation. Although emotions produce the blowback effect, the specific experience may be

short-lived (Forgas & George, 2001). Trust, by contrast, has an enduring impact (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996), because it facilitates interpersonal cooperation in various forms of interactions (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001), including the processes of negotiating agreements (Kong et al., 2014) and subsequent implementation (Mislin, Campagna, & Bottom, 2011).

Agreement implementation. It is generally impossible to stipulate, or contract for, all aspects pertaining to an agreement's implementation (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991; Salanié, 1997). Although the contract terms may provide implementation incentives (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991), individual motivations combined with perceptions of the counterpart can also impact how a deal is implemented (Bottom et al., 2006; Mislin et al., 2011). Negotiator effectiveness reflects more than the terms of a deal extending through to successful implementation. Poorly implemented deals prove costly, creating a strategic disadvantage.

Although implementation poses risks to negotiators because of the inability to perfectly monitor or forecast actions occurring away from the bargaining table (Bottom et al., 2006; Mislin et al., 2011), such strategic risk has been absent from studies of emotion expression in negotiation. Successful implementation hinges on trust (Bottom et al., 2006; Mislin et al., 2011), which influences the willingness to accept the risks inherent in the continued relationship (Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998). This risk assessment may be based on the uncertainty of the counterpart's motivations, intentions, and anticipated noncooperative behaviors during deal implementation. The uncertainty might include whether the negotiator will follow through with promises implied in the contract, implement the deal with integrity, or feel care and concern for the negotiator's outcomes.

The counterpart's perception of strategic risks may alter the motivation to follow through with agreement implementation commitments. Counterparts who trust the negotiator may perceive the relational or emotional benefits of implementing an agreement to outweigh the risks. On the other hand, a low level of trust in the negotiator increases perceptions of risk, which motivates the counterpart to reduce or entirely avoid risk. Counterparts who perceive the negotiator as untrustworthy may instead choose to either halfheartedly implement an agreement, or neglect to implement altogether, instead pursuing opportunities to do business with others. Lost business compels a negotiator to develop new contracts with alternative counterparts, resulting in almost certain strategic losses. We expect misrepresented anger to decrease a counterpart's trust in the negotiator, reducing the likelihood of agreement implementation. We expect misrepresented happy emotions to signal greater trust and to increase the likelihood that an agreement will be implemented.³

Hypothesis 3: A negotiator's misrepresented anger (happiness):

- (a) Decreases (increases) the likelihood of the counterpart's agreement implementation.

³ Although we focus exclusively on the counterpart's agreement implementation, our theoretical framework supports a parallel effect on the negotiator's agreement implementation.

- (b) This effect is mediated by the counterpart's trust in the negotiator.

Postnegotiation cooperation. In recent studies of agreement implementation (e.g., Bottom et al., 2006; Mislin et al., 2011; Whitford, Bottom, & Miller, 2013), outcome-contingent contracting and trust building proved to be distinct routes to vigorous implementation. Although an agreement may cover some explicit obligations, other aspects of the contract might be implied, including an expectation of cooperative behavior in later interactions. Employment contracts, for example, stipulate payment of certain compensation and benefits at some future point in time, but generally do not spell out all relevant circumstances that may arise. Employees might choose to work extra hours or take on additional responsibilities not expressly defined under the agreement. Such cooperative behaviors yield greater profits to the employer, by contributing resources above and beyond what the employment contract requires (Lawler, 2001). Enhancing goodwill through positive emotions and trust building should increase cooperation during the negotiation (Bottom et al., 2006; Ferrin et al., 2008; Mislin et al., 2011) while spilling over to influence cooperation during implementation.

Noncontractual cooperative behavior may include expending greater effort during implementation. Vigor of effort is determined by relational factors emerging from the negotiation process (Mislin et al., 2011) or prior exchange (Lawler, 2001). Positive emotion and trust may incentivize future reward behaviors. Individuals who trust their counterparts exert more effort when implementing their contract terms (Mislin et al., 2011), which may help explain why trust has also been associated with higher workplace performance (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001). Noncooperation and self-interest associated with distrust may incite future punishment or retaliatory action (Morris & Keltner, 2000). Employers financially benefit downstream from any candidate trust that accrues during the negotiation, if it increases discretionary cooperative behaviors.

Because of diminished trust, we expect that a negotiator's misrepresented anger will result in less cooperative behavior after the negotiation. Happy expressions are expected to increase implementation effort through an improved relationship between the parties. We expect trust to mediate misrepresented emotion's effect on cooperative behavior.

Hypothesis 4: A negotiator's misrepresented anger (happiness):

- (a) Decreases (increases) the counterpart's cooperative behavior after the negotiation.
- (b) This effect is mediated by the counterpart's trust in the negotiator.

Implementation costs. Contract theory (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991; Salanié, 1997) models the problem of implementation by focusing on how one party (e.g., an employer) motivates a self-interested, expected utility-maximizing counterpart (e.g., an employee) to vigorously execute an agreement. When negotiators do not trust or fully monitor the counterpart's implementation behavior, a rational contracting party will set up a contingent agreement linking financial compensation to the counterpart's observable actions (Salanié, 1997). Therefore, negotiators must

offer sufficient incentives to mitigate the effects of low trust in their counterpart on project success and profitability. These additional incentives will be deducted from the negotiator's profits realized after agreement implementation, reducing any strategic advantage.

Negotiators who feign happiness to build trust in prior negotiations may be able to profit, or at least not incur as much additional cost associated with allocating resources, to offset the distrust. The positive blowback effect should further build trust necessary for the employer to benefit from the employee's positive, cooperative postnegotiation behavior. Trust represents stored value, convertible into greater realized postimplementation profits. Relative to those conveying anger, negotiators misrepresenting happiness will gain a strategic advantage (i.e., long run economic value).

Hypothesis 5: A negotiator's misrepresented anger (happiness):

- (a) Increases (decreases) the negotiator's costs associated with ensuring implementation.
- (b) This effect is mediated by the negotiator's trust in the counterpart.

Overview of Studies

Four studies empirically examined the primary and blowback effects of misrepresenting emotion in employment contexts, while measuring their strategic consequences. In these experiments, we assign the negotiator misrepresenting his or her emotional expression the role of "employer." The counterpart is assigned the role of job "candidate." To avoid confusion associated with switching labels for the same person, we continue to refer to the latter as "the candidate" even during deal implementation when the person could more properly be called an employee.

Although prior studies have examined only one factor of trust such as benevolence (e.g., Bottom et al., 2006; Larzelere & Huston, 1980) or integrity (e.g., Ring & Van de Ven, 1992), we take the approach of other recent work (e.g., Dirks et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2004; Kong, 2015) that has measured more than one trust factor. Following Mayer and Davis (1999) we treat benevolence and integrity as two related indicators of trusting beliefs:

How these factors are combined into trustworthiness is idiosyncratic, both between individuals and between situations. In some situations, the trustee's ability may be much more important than the other two factors. Other situations may be composed of tasks that are technical simpler but politically sensitive. In these cases, the trustee's integrity may have a greater impact on trust than ability. Furthermore, one particular trustor may place a greater amount of weight on one of the factors across various situations than does another trustor (Mayer & Davis, 1999, p. 124).

Study 1 tests the effect of happy and angry expressions on postnegotiation perceptions and behavior (Hypotheses 1 and 3) by using preprogrammed expressions of emotion ostensibly sent by another negotiator. Studies 2–4 use more complex experimental designs with two human negotiators (i.e., two-sided design) to test for blowback effects on the negotiator misrepresenting the emotion (i.e., the employer). We use two-sided designs to account for the reciprocal interdependence between negotiators, as well as a two-

phased design to establish strategic risk with further opportunities for cooperative exchange after the negotiation ends. Study 2 focuses on the blowback effects of the negotiator's misrepresented anger and happiness by examining the influence on the counterpart's (i.e., candidate's) behavior in subsequent exchange without contractual safeguards (Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4). The objective of Studies 3 and 4 is to further examine the blowback effects' strategic consequences by testing how they influence the negotiator's actions as well as the counterpart's willingness to cooperate when parties negotiate again. Study 3 considers the strategic consequences of the blowback effect by examining the cost of motivating agreement implementation (Hypotheses 1, 2, and 5). Study 4 examines the strategic consequences of the blowback effect on behaviors after a delay (testing the robustness of Hypotheses 1b–4b after a delay). An overview of our hypotheses, studies in which they were tested, and results are provided in Table 1.

Study 1

Method

Participants. There were 140 adults, including 66 females, who agreed to participate in the study in exchange for the oppor-

tunity to earn money. Participants, averaging 37.21 years in age ($SD = 12.44$) were recruited through Amazon's Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011).

Procedure. General instructions informed participants they were assigned the role of job candidate (candidate) and would be exchanging messages with another person (employer). Messages they received were actually generated in a prespecified sequence delivered by the computer program. Participants were instructed that the employer was interested in hiring them to complete a task. To ensure task comprehension, we administered a short quiz to the participants, who were not permitted to proceed until they correctly answered every item.

Participants, all assigned to the candidate role, exchanged text messages with the programmed employer before any decisions were made. Messages from the employer were programmed to include angry, happy, or neutral expressions. We informed participants that the employer, endowed with \$50, would offer the candidate some portion of this money as payment. After receiving the employer's offer, the candidate could either accept or reject it. By accepting the offer, the candidate agreed to employment for the payment offered; the employer retained the remaining endowment. By rejecting the offer, the candidate refused employment so nei-

Table 1
Overview of Hypotheses, Studies in Which They Were Tested, and Results

Hypothesis	Tested	Results support hypothesis?
<i>Hypothesis 1: A negotiator's misrepresented anger (happiness):</i>		
(a) Increases the counterpart's genuine anger (happiness)	Study 1 Study 2 Study 3	✓ ✓ Anger (<i>not</i> Happiness) ✓
(b) Decreases (increases) the counterpart's trust in him or her.	Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4	✓ Anger: Benevolence, Integrity (<i>not</i> Happiness) ✓ Anger: Benevolence ✓ ✓
<i>Hypothesis 2: A negotiator's misrepresented anger (happiness) will blowback to:</i>		
(a) Increase his or her genuine anger (happiness)	Study 2 Study 3	✓ ✓
(b) Decrease (increase) his or her trust in the counterpart.	Study 2 Study 3 Study 4	✓ Anger: Integrity (Happiness: Benevolence) ✓ Anger: Integrity (Happiness: Benevolence, Integrity) ✓ Anger: Integrity (Happiness: Integrity)
<i>Hypothesis 3: A negotiator's misrepresented anger (happiness):</i>		
(a) Decreases (increases) the likelihood of the counterpart's agreement implementation.	Study 1	✓
(b) This effect is mediated by the counterpart's trust in the negotiator.	Study 1 Study 4	✓ Anger: Integrity (Happiness: Integrity) ✓ Anger: Integrity, Benevolence (<i>not</i> Happiness)
<i>Hypothesis 4: A negotiator's misrepresented anger (happiness):</i>		
(a) Decreases (increases) the counterpart's cooperative behavior after the negotiation.	Study 2	✓
(b) This effect is mediated by the counterpart's trust in the negotiator.	Study 2 Study 4	✓ Anger: Benevolence (Happiness: Benevolence) ✓ Anger: Benevolence (<i>not</i> Happiness)
<i>Hypothesis 5: A negotiator's misrepresented anger (happiness):</i>		
(a) Increases (decreases) the negotiator's costs associated with ensuring implementation.	Study 3	✓
(b) This effect is mediated by the negotiator's trust in the counterpart.	Study 3	✓ Anger: Integrity (happiness: integrity)

ther party received any payment. After a brief exchange the employer sent the final preprogrammed offer of \$25, which the candidate could accept or reject. This setup models a situation in which business discussions conducted via distance communications end with a verbal agreement that has not yet been formally signed.

Candidates who rejected the first offer proceeded to answer surveys about the interaction. Those who accepted the offer were informed that an alternative employer ("employer2") was offering them \$25 to work on the same task. This event added counterparty risk to the negotiation structure. Subjects could either confirm the original contract with the first employer (thereby declining employer2's offer), or accept employer2's new employment offer. Accepting employer2's offer meant reneging on (i.e., failing to implement) their agreement with the first employer, because accepting the offer from employer2 rendered null and void the understanding reached with the first employer. Providing this second-stage task enabled us to separate agreement at the bargaining table from the implementation of that agreement after the parties left the table.

Emotional expression manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to receive a stream of messages from the employer conveying angry, happy, or no/neutral emotion expression. Although the ostensible employer's statements were preprogrammed by the experimenters, the candidates responded in real time through messages delivered via an online interface.

We adapted Van Kleef et al.'s (2004) procedure by presenting three modified statements ostensibly made by the employer to participants in the candidate role. The employer began by asking the candidate "What are your payment expectations for this task?" Subsequent angry statements presented by the employer were (a) "this offer really pisses me off," (b) "this is really getting on my nerves," and (c) "I am going to offer \$25. This negotiation makes me angry." Subsequent neutral statements were (a) "\$25," (b) "I am going to offer \$25," and (c) "I am offering \$25." Happy messages were: (a) "this offer makes me happy!" followed by (b) "this is going well," and (c) "I am going to offer \$25. This negotiation makes me happy!"

Measures.

Implementation of agreement. Implementation was measured in binary form by the participant's response to the second decision task. If they elected to follow through with the original agreement, then the initial deal was successfully implemented. If they elected to renege on the original deal by accepting employer2's offer, then the agreement with the first employer was not implemented.

Trust. Candidates rated their employer's benevolence and integrity on a 5-point scale, adapted from Mayer and Davis (1999). The scale ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). Examples of items included: "The [employer/candidate] is very concerned about my welfare," and "I never have to wonder whether the [employer/candidate] will stick to his/her word." The internal consistencies of the benevolence and integrity scales were .96 and .92, respectively.

Emotions. Afterward, participants self-reported emotions they felt during the negotiation on a 9-point scale ranging from 0 (*none*) to 8 (*a great deal*). We measured felt anger using four items regarding their feelings toward the other party, including: "How angry do you feel?" "How outraged do you feel?" "How furious do

you feel?" and, "How offended do you feel?" ($\alpha = .93$). We measured felt happiness with three items, including: "How happy do you feel?" "How much joy do you feel?" and, "How content do you feel?" ($\alpha = .90$).

Results

Univariate and bivariate statistics are reported in Table 2.

Manipulation check. We compared candidates' judgments of the employer's expressed anger and happiness.⁴ Summaries of the results are reported in Table 3. Candidates paired with an employer from each misrepresented emotion condition perceived their employer to be expressing more of the target emotion than the alternative emotion or no emotion. Therefore, our manipulation of the employer's statements shifted the candidates' perceptions of the employers' state of anger and happiness.⁵

Hypothesis tests. Summary statistics for hypothesis tests and effect sizes are reported in Table 4. Twenty-one candidates (6 neutral, 7 angry, and 8 happy) rejected the employers' offer. The emotion condition had no effect on rejection rate, $\chi^2(2, N = 140) = .20, p = .90$.

Primary effects of misrepresented emotion. Candidates in the angry expression condition reported being angrier after the exchange than those in the neutral condition, $t(90) = -3.90, p < .001$. Candidates in the happy expression condition reported greater happiness than those in the neutral condition, $t(91) = -2.09, p = .05$. Hypothesis 1a was supported for both anger and happiness.

Candidates assigned to the angry expression condition trusted the employer significantly less than those in the neutral condition (benevolence: $t(90) = 6.80, p < .001$; integrity: $t(90) = 7.98, p < .001$; see Table 4). However, candidates assigned to the happy expression condition reported no greater trust for the employer than those in the neutral condition (benevolence: $t(91) = -.66, p = .51$; integrity: $t(91) = .27, p = .79$). However, they were more trusting than candidates in the angry expression condition (benevolence: $t(93) = 7.55, p < .001$; integrity: $t(93) = 6.66, p < .001$). Hypothesis 1b was supported for anger but not happiness.

Strategic implications of misrepresented emotion. Candidates receiving angry messages from the initial employer were more likely to renege on the deal, $\chi^2(2, N = 119) = 22.44, p < .001$, thus,

⁴ To ensure that participants exerted effort in answering our survey, we included a question at the conclusion of our study to determine whether they paid attention. The multiple-choice question instructs participants to review the options listed, to select "other," and to type "trust" into the blank field. Ten subjects failed to answer this question correctly, indicating that they were not putting forth effort to appropriately read and answer our survey and were omitted.

⁵ We asked candidates (counterparts) whether the employer (negotiator) was authentically displaying emotion. We adapted two items measuring emotion authenticity from Grandey and colleagues (Grandey et al., 2005): "My counterpart seemed to be faking how he or she felt during the negotiation" and "My counterpart seemed to be pretending or putting on an act during the negotiation" (1 = *strongly disagree* to 5 = *strongly agree*; $\alpha = .94$). We found that compared with the neutral condition, the candidates perceived the employer's happy expression to be authentic ($M_{Happy} = 2.60, SD = 1.22$; $M_{Neutral} = 2.44, SD = .99$; $t(91) = -.69, p = .49$). This is important to demonstrate, as prior research (e.g., Côté et al., 2013; Grandey et al., 2005) has indicated that inauthentic display of happiness may negatively impact trust producing different effects than our hypothesized primary effects.

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Study 1)

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5
1. Emotion expression condition	1.01	.81	1.00				
2. Candidate agreement implementation	1.72	.45	-.32**	1.00			
3. Candidate trust (benevolence)	3.28	1.72	-.46**	.28**	1.00		
4. Candidate trust (integrity)	3.80	1.56	-.50**	.40**	.88**	1.00	
5. Candidate felt anger	1.84	1.32	.32**	-.41**	-.36**	-.40**	1.00
6. Candidate felt happiness	3.62	1.78	-.19*	.37**	.64**	.65**	-.32**

Note. $N = 140$; emotion expression condition: 1 = neutral (45 participants), 2 = happy (48 participants), 3 = angry (47 participants); we refer to the hypothesized “counterpart” as the “candidate” within our scenario.
* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

supporting Hypothesis 3a. Only 18% of the candidates in the neutral condition and 17% in the happy condition failed to implement the deal. Over half of those in the angry condition failed to implement it (55%).

We estimated our mediation model using PROCESS for SPSS with 10,000 resamples because Hayes and Preacher (2014) recommend this approach for estimating mediations with a multicategorical independent variable and a dichotomous dependent variable. Following their recommendation, we ran PROCESS two times using the independent variable coded as two dummy variables with the control condition as the reference category (Hayes & Preacher, 2014, Appendix p. 4). We used the dummy variable to compare the mean of each treatment group (happy or anger misrepresentation) to the mean of a control group (neutral misrepresentation; West, Aiken, & Krull, 1996).⁶

We found support for Hypothesis 3b; trust mediated the effect of misrepresented emotion on implementation. Results revealed a significant indirect effect of the integrity factor of trust, which mediated both happy (indirect effect = .82, 95% confidence interval [CI] [.13, 1.79]) and angry conditions (indirect effect = -.89, 95% CI [-1.90, -.10]) conditions. Benevolence was not a significant mediator (happy: indirect effect = .12, 95% CI [-.50, .77]; angry: indirect effect = -.15, CI 95% [-.87, .61]).

Discussion

Both happy and angry expressions affected candidates (counterparts) by altering genuine emotion and trust for the employer (negotiator). Candidates used this information to infer that the employer had low integrity (e.g., honesty, credibility), leading them to lose trust for employers expressing anger.⁷ The loss of perceived integrity increased the likelihood that candidates reneged on the agreement by switching to a comparable deal offered by another party.

Recursive effects imply strategic disadvantages caused by the display of anger. A limitation of Study 1 was the use of the one-subject decision-making design with a computer-simulated agent rather than a real person (i.e., one-sided design) as counterpart. Substituting and manipulating a preprogrammed flow of offer-message combinations from the employer in these exchanges, the nearly universal practice in negotiator emotion studies, enabled us to limit extraneous variance sources yielding more precise measurement of the impact on individual behavior. However, one-sided designs eliminate reciprocal interdependence and reactions to strategic risk within a dyadic system. Both are necessary components to understanding the development of

trust. In the subsequent experiments, we use two-sided two phased designs to test the strategic impact of emotion misrepresentation. Study 2 tests the blowback effects of emotion misrepresentation (Hypotheses 1 and 2) and strategic impact on downstream cooperative behavior (Hypothesis 4).

Study 2

Method

Previous emotion expression studies generally compensated participants with symbolic payments: points with no transferable value beyond the experiment. However, business is characterized by the exchange of resources that motivate behavior. To enhance generalizability by studying how negotiators make tradeoffs between genuine values, experiments measuring social preferences should include meaningful payment structures (Levitt & List, 2007). We provide incentive-compatible payments to study how negotiators trade off financial with social values.

Participants. There were 186 undergraduate students (93 dyads; 57 females) who enrolled in a U.S. Midwestern university participated in the study. Averaging 20.93 years of age ($SD = 3.11$), they were recruited through advertisements offering an opportunity to earn money for participation in a 1-hr experiment.

Procedure. After arrival and consent, participants were randomly assigned to a computer terminal that determined role, condition, and counterpart. General instructions informed them they would be working with another person in the same room over a computer-mediated chat terminal. Role-specific directives included a video tutorial instructing each person how to navigate the negotiation interface. The interface presented users with the payoff chart for their role, coupled with a log of offers and messages.

⁶ Researchers may consider the Bonferroni adjustment for Type I error correction when using a multicategorical independent variable (see Hayes & Preacher, 2014). Because Bonferroni can increase the risk of Type II errors we decided against using it to adjust our confidence intervals to 97.5%, the Bonferroni corrected range for an independent variable with three categories. However, we determined the threshold under which our hypotheses would be significant, ranging from 95 to 97.5%. These results are available upon request.

⁷ Although only the integrity factor of trust influenced implementation decisions in this study, this finding supports our prediction that trust motivates cooperation since Mayer and colleagues (1995) posit that one factor of trust alone, such as high perceptions of integrity, is sufficient for motivating trust.

Table 3
Summary of Results, Manipulation Checks, and Effect Sizes (Studies 1–4)

Study	Misrepresented emotion condition						Effect size			p-value contrast		
	(1) Angry		(2) Neutral		(3) Happy		1 and 2	1 and 3	2 and 3	1 and 2	1 and 3	2 and 3
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD						
Study 1												
Counterpart (candidate) perceptions												
Employer is angry	3.96	(1.20)	1.44	(.69)	1.42	(.99)	2.57	2.31	.02	***	***	n.s.
Employer is unemotional	1.68	(1.18)	2.84	(1.19)	1.71	(.97)	−.98	−.03	1.04	***	n.s.	***
Employer is happy	1.28	(.68)	2.29	(1.16)	3.23	(1.36)	−1.06	−1.81	−.74	***	***	***
Study 2												
Counterpart (candidate) perceptions												
Employer is angry	6.91	(2.04)	2.50	(1.69)	2.64	(2.01)	2.35	2.11	−.08	***	***	n.s.
Employer is unemotional	3.83	(2.57)	6.53	(2.13)	4.45	(2.28)	−1.14	−.26	.94	***	n.s.	**
Employer is happy	3.48	(2.12)	4.53	(1.91)	6.14	(1.78)	−.52	−1.36	−.87	*	***	**
Study 3												
Counterpart (candidate) perceptions												
Employer is angry	6.84	(2.38)	3.04	(2.53)	1.87	(1.49)	1.55	2.50	.56	***	***	†
Employer is unemotional	2.92	(2.57)	5.43	(2.17)	5.65	(2.21)	−1.06	−1.14	−.10	***	***	n.s.
Employer is happy	3.32	(1.75)	4.75	(2.49)	6.39	(1.92)	−.66	−1.67	−.74	*	***	*
Study 4												
Counterpart (candidate) perceptions												
Employer is angry	5.40	(1.73)	1.22	(1.39)	1.03	(1.52)	2.66	2.68	.13	***	***	n.s.
Employer is unemotional	3.20	(2.78)	3.50	(2.37)	2.55	(2.80)	−.12	.23	.37	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Employer is happy	2.70	(2.00)	3.69	(2.09)	5.17	(1.42)	−.48	−1.42	−.83	†	***	**

Note. We refer to the hypothesized “counterpart” as the “candidate” within our scenario, and “focal negotiator” as the employer. Effect size is calculated as Cohen’s *d* (difference between the means divided by the pooled *SD*). Moderate ($\geq .50$) and larger effect sizes ($\geq .80$) are bolded. n.s. = not significant.

† $p \leq .10$. * $p \leq .05$. ** $p \leq .01$. *** $p \leq .001$.

They learned that the conversion rate between payoff chart points and money would be 1,000 points to one U.S. dollar. They were given no information about their counterpart’s payoff chart. Experimenters administered an online quiz providing guidance and clarification to those who incorrectly responded to any question.

The first stage involved an employment negotiation (Neale, 1997) between a job candidate and an employer. The task included: compatible issues, in which both sides prefer the same terms of agreement; distributive issues, in which concessions leading to one party’s point gain correspond to an analogous point loss for the other; and integrative issues, in which the party’s preferences were opposed, but trades across issues enabled mutual gains. Those assigned to the role of employer (the negotiator) received one of three randomly assigned emotion expression instructions. We gave employers and their job candidates (the counterpart) 30

min to negotiate a settlement; a clock on the screen informed them how much time remained. To successfully conclude a deal, pairs had to reach agreement on all eight issues presented in the task. Once the negotiation ended, each person answered a set of questions about the process, then learned about the second-stage decision task, which involved a variation of the two-person Investment Game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). If they reached no deal in the first stage, participants never confronted the second-stage task. Instead they answered questions about their experiences and perceptions.

Second-stage task. We tested the impact of false emotion expression on informal postcontract cooperation by providing participants with a further exchange opportunity. In this task the “sender” (i.e., the candidate) must determine how much money to risk on the choice the “receiver” (i.e., the employer) will make. We

Table 4
Summary of Results (Study 1): Means (SDs) and Comparisons Across Conditions

Hypothesis	Misrepresented emotion condition			Effect sizes			p-value contrast		
	(1) Angry	(2) Neutral	(3) Happy	1 and 2	1 and 3	2 and 3	1 and 2	1 and 3	2 and 3
Counterpart (candidate)									
Hypothesis 1a									
Angry	2.43 (1.56)	1.40 (.85)	1.65 (1.23)	.82	.56	−.24	***	**	n.s.
Happy	2.89 (1.58)	3.77 (1.69)	4.68 (1.90)	−.54	−1.02	−.51	*	***	*
Hypothesis 1b									
Trust (benevolence)	1.93 (1.10)	3.85 (1.56)	4.06 (1.56)	−1.42	−1.58	−.13	***	***	n.s.
Trust (integrity)	2.56 (1.16)	4.47 (1.15)	4.40 (1.52)	−1.65	−1.36	.05	***	***	n.s.

Note. Effect size is calculated as Cohen’s *d* (difference between the means divided by the pooled *SD*). Moderate ($\geq .50$) and larger effect sizes ($\geq .80$) are bolded. n.s. = not significant.

* $p \leq .05$. ** $p \leq .01$. *** $p \leq .001$.

endowed candidates with \$10, instructing them to choose a fraction x of their endowment ($0 \leq x \leq 10$) to pass to the employer, while keeping the remainder, $10 - x$. The experimenter tripled the value of x before passing this product to the employer, who then chose an amount y from this product ($0 \leq y \leq 3x$) to be returned to the candidate. The candidate's profit from this stage equaled $(\$10 - x) + y$, whereas employer profit equaled $\$3x - y$. Added to the dollar value of the contract terms negotiated in the first stage, these amounts determined total earnings from the experiment.

Berg and colleagues (1995) interpreted the amount passed by the sender (i.e., the candidate/counterpart) as the degree of trust the sender has toward the receiver (i.e., the employer/negotiator), because it reflects "a willingness to bet that another person will reciprocate a risky move at a cost to themselves;" the amount returned to the candidate by the employer indicates the employer's trustworthiness (Camerer, 2003, p. 85). A narrowly self-interested, rational, and calculating individual would pass nothing to an anonymous stranger. Over many replications across different cultures, first movers have actually passed an average of 50% of their initial endowment (Johnson & Mislin, 2011). This second-stage interaction enabled us to measure blowback effects on subsequent cooperation not explicitly covered by contract.

Emotion misrepresentation manipulation. Employers (i.e., negotiators) were instructed to conduct the negotiation in a manner consistent with their firm's stated policies. In one condition, the policy stressed the tactical benefits of demonstrating anger. In a second condition, it stressed the benefits of conveying no emotion of any kind. The remaining condition instructed employers to convey happiness during the negotiation. Statements from Van Kleef et al. (2004) were provided as illustrations of each assigned approach. To motivate misrepresentation, employers learned that their firm provided an incentive payment to those who conveyed the proper affective tone during their negotiations. At the end of the experiment, the candidate (i.e., the counterpart) rated their perception of the employer's emotional state on a scale from 0 (*no affective tone*) to 8 (*very strong affective tone*). Employers learned that payments would be determined by this rating's alignment with corporate policy. These ratings served both as a manipulation check for the emotion misrepresentation, and a means of determining whether the employer had earned their emotion expression bonus. We offered a bonus of \$2.50 to employers who strongly conveyed the assigned affective tone (i.e., rated "6–8" by their candidates), or \$1.00 if they conveyed a moderate level of the intended tone (i.e., rated "3–5" by their candidates). We penalized employers –\$1.00 if they failed altogether to convey the assigned tone (i.e., rated as a "0–2" by their candidates).

Measures. *Postnegotiation cooperative behavior* was measured by money the counterpart sent to the employer in the second-stage Investment Game. We used the same items as in Study 1 to assess trust via perceptions of benevolence ($\alpha = .89$) and integrity ($\alpha = .85$). The same items as in Study 1 were again used to assess felt emotions: anger ($\alpha = .90$) and happiness ($\alpha = .86$).

Results

Univariate and bivariate statistics are reported in Table 5.

Manipulation check. Participants in the candidate role reported that the negotiator expressed more of the targeted emotion in each condition than alternative or no emotions (see Table 3). The manipulation effectively shifted the candidate's perception of the employer's expressed emotion.⁸

Perceived authenticity of emotional display may influence reactions to emotion misrepresentation (Côté et al., 2013). Two assistants, blind to the hypotheses, coded electronic messages sent by the parties during the negotiation's two stages to determine perceived authenticity of the employer's display of anger and happiness. They were coded on a scale from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*extremely*) based on how angry (happy) the employer genuinely appeared. Employers in the anger misrepresentation condition were rated as communicating anger more authentically ($M = 3.55$, $SD = .93$) than those in the happiness ($M = 3.09$, $SD = .25$, $t(53) = -2.23$, $p < .05$) or neutral ($M = 3.03$, $SD = .22$, $t(63) = -3.05$, $p < .01$) conditions. Employers in the happiness misrepresentation condition were rated as more authentic in conveying happiness ($M = 4.00$, $SD = .62$) than they were in the anger ($M = 3.09$, $SD = .40$, $t(53) = 6.11$, $p < .011$) or neutral ($M = 2.30$, $SD = .40$, $t(52) = 5.09$, $p < .001$) conditions.

Tactical implications of misrepresented emotion. All dyads successfully negotiated an agreement. Employers who feigned happiness earned a slightly higher average amount from the negotiated contract than those who faked anger or no emotion, but the difference was not significant ($M_{\text{anger}} = \$7.42$, $SD = \$1.19$ vs. $M_{\text{happiness}} = \$7.63$, $SD = \$1.39$ vs. $M_{\text{neutral}} = \$7.23$, $SD = \$1.33$; $F(2, 86) = .57$, $p = .57$).

Hypothesis tests. Summary statistics for hypothesis tests and effect sizes are reported in Table 6.

Primary effects of misrepresented emotion. Candidates (counterparts) paired with employers (negotiators) who misrepresented anger were angrier than those paired with employers in the neutral condition, $t(63) = -3.22$, $p < .01$. Candidates paired with employers who misrepresented happiness, reported no greater happiness than those in the neutral, $t(52) = .67$, $p = .50$ or angry, $t(53) = .96$, $p = .34$ conditions. Thus, we replicated support for Hypothesis 1a for misrepresented anger but not happiness.

Candidates trusted less those employers who misrepresented anger than those who expressed neutral emotions (benevolence: $t(63) = 2.39$, $p < .05$; integrity: $t(63) = 3.47$, $p = .001$). Candidates paired with employers misrepresenting happy emotions perceived the employer as less benevolent than when expressing neutral emotions, though no lower in integrity (benevolence: $t(52) = 2.11$, $p < .05$; integrity: $t(52) = 1.62$, $p = .11$). This provides support for Hypothesis 1b.

Blowback effect. Hypotheses 2a and 2b predicted a blowback effect of the misrepresented emotion onto employer emotion and trust in the counterpart. Employers who misrepresented anger felt angrier than employers in the neutral emotion expression condition, $t(63) = -4.41$, $p < .001$. Employers in the misrepresented happy condition felt no happier than those in the neutral expression

⁸ Although these tests confirmed the successful manipulation of perceptions, 11 participants neglected to follow instructions. Nine recruiters assigned to the anger condition sent no messages conveying emotion. Two employers assigned to the happy condition sent no messages at all. In a computer-mediated conversation, emotion could not be conveyed without messages, so these dyads were omitted from further analysis.

Table 5
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Study 2)

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Emotion expression condition	2.13	.79	1.00								
2. Candidate cooperation (second stage)	2.90	1.85	-.26*	1.00							
3. Candidate felt anger	2.66	1.84	.33**	-.26*	1.00						
4. Candidate felt happiness	4.71	1.52	-.02	.15	-.14	1.00					
5. Employer felt anger	2.78	1.86	.44**	-.12	.22*	-.05	1.00				
6. Employer felt happiness	3.75	2.4	-.14	-.10	-.03	-.22	.03	1.00			
7. Candidate trust (benevolence)	2.81	.89	-.25*	.32**	-.26*	.30**	-.06	.04	1.00		
8. Candidate trust (integrity)	3.26	.81	-.37**	.27*	-.32**	.17	-.21	.02	.78**	1.00	
9. Employer trust (benevolence)	2.77	.8	-.08	.28**	-.11	.16	-.21*	.01	.10	.04	1.00
10. Employer trust (integrity)	3.39	.56	-.23*	.17	-.15	.03	-.35**	-.15	.05	.07	.40**

Note. $N = 87$ dyads; emotion expression condition: 1 = neutral (32 dyads), 2 = happy (22 dyads), 3 = angry (33 dyads); we refer to the hypothesized “counterpart” as the “candidate” within our scenario, and “negotiator” as the “employer.”

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

condition (see Table 6), but felt happier than those in the angry condition $t(63) = 2.39, p < .05$. Misrepresented anger diminished employers’ integrity perceptions when compared with employers in the neutral expression condition (integrity: $t(63) = 2.15, p < .05$; benevolence: $t(63) = .76, p = .45$), and benevolence perceptions compared with employers who misrepresented happiness (benevolence: $t(63) = 2.36, p < .05$; integrity: $t(63) = 1.14, p = .26$). Thus, we found support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b.

Strategic implications. In the potentially lucrative exchange after the negotiation, candidates sent less money to employers who misrepresented anger during the negotiation than those who misrepresented happiness, $t(53) = 2.49, p < .05$, or those who expressed neutral feelings, $t(63) = 2.43, p < .05$, thus supporting Hypothesis 4a.

We estimated mediation models using MEDIANTE for SPSS with 10,000 resamples. Hayes and Preacher (2014) recommend this approach for estimating mediations with a multicategorical independent variable and a continuous dependent variable. Similar

to Study 1, we used indicator coding as our coding strategy to represent the misrepresented emotion condition. We used indicator coding because we have a meaningful reference group, the neutral condition, and it makes most sense in this context to compare our anger and happiness conditions to this reference group (West et al., 1996). MEDIANTE codes category membership to mutually exclusive groups, with the smallest numerical code treated as the reference category (see Hayes MEDIANTE documentation). We coded our emotion conditions so that the neutral misrepresentation condition would serve as the reference group (coded as “1”) to which we compare the happy (coded as “2”) and angry (coded as “3”) misrepresentation conditions. MEDIANTE then produces $k-1$ new variables coding membership in one of k mutually exclusive groups.

Our results revealed that the effect of misrepresented emotion on cooperative behavior after the negotiation was mediated by perceptions of trust (benevolence factor only) for both happy and angry conditions (happy: indirect effect = .22, 95% CI [.01, .68];

Table 6
Summary of Results (Study 2): Means (SDs) and Comparisons Across Conditions

Hypothesis	Misrepresented emotion condition			Effect size			<i>p</i> -value contrast		
	(1) Angry	(2) Neutral	(3) Happy	1 and 2	1 and 3	2 and 3	1 and 2	1 and 3	2 and 3
Counterpart (candidate)									
Hypothesis 1a									
Angry	3.64 (1.80)	2.25 (1.52)	1.80 (1.52)	.83	1.10	.30	**	***	n.s.
Happy	4.59 (1.40)	4.67 (1.65)	4.97 (1.52)	-.05	-.26	-.19	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Hypothesis 1b									
Trust (benevolence)	2.37 (.80)	2.89 (.94)	3.34 (.62)	-.60	-1.36	-.57	***	***	*
Trust (integrity)	2.77 (.80)	3.45 (.77)	3.72 (.43)	-.87	-1.48	-.43	***	***	n.s.
Negotiator (employer)									
Hypothesis 2a									
Angry	3.9 (2.09)	2.25 (1.67)	3.04 (2.17)	.87	.40	-.41	***	***	n.s.
Happy	1.8 (1.52)	3.76 (2.43)	4.76 (2.46)	-.97	-1.45	-.41	n.s.	*	n.s.
Hypothesis 2b									
Trust (benevolence)	2.58 (.78)	2.73 (.74)	3.10 (.82)	-.20	-.65	-.47	n.s.	*	†
Trust (integrity)	3.23 (.66)	3.53 (.42)	3.42 (.54)	-.54	-.32	.23	*	n.s.	n.s.
Hypothesis 4a									
Strategic implication (cooperation)	2.18 (1.92)	3.28 (1.72)	3.43 (1.66)	-.60	-.70	-.09	*	*	n.s.

Note. Effect size is calculated as Cohen’s d (difference between the means divided by the pooled SD). Moderate ($\geq .50$) and larger effect sizes ($\geq .80$) are bolded. n.s. = not significant.

† $p \leq .10$. * $p \leq .05$. ** $p \leq .01$. *** $p \leq .001$.

angry: indirect effect = $-.25$, 95% CI $[-.79, -.01]$) although not for the integrity factor (happy: indirect effect = $.19$, 95% CI $[-.03, .43]$; angry: indirect effect = $-.25$, 95% CI $[-.81, .11]$). Hypothesis 4b was supported.

Discussion

Misrepresenting anger proved strategically disadvantageous, ultimately reducing the candidate's cooperation in downstream exchange. Employers' profits diminished because of the blowback of the tactic on the employer. By damaging trust, specifically perceived benevolence, misrepresented anger decreased the candidates' willingness to expend scarce resources that could have generated mutual benefit. Although misrepresented happiness was not contagious, it did cause candidates to perceive employers as more benevolent. Here the trust relationship based on benevolence played a more prominent role in motivating cooperation than inferences made about the employer's integrity during the negotiation process.

The shifting emphasis from integrity-based trust in Study 1 to benevolence-based trust in Study 2 could be because of the lengthier, less constrained communication open to the participants in this study. The opportunity to gather more information about the counterpart, coupled with a second-stage structured so that parties could choose to work together (cooperate) in the future, may have enhanced effects of benevolence (see Mayer et al., 1995).

What began as deliberately feigned anger by employers proved contagious, increasing their counterpart's anger. This reaction altered the messages sent to and from the candidate. Blowback from less-friendly messages induced real anger in the employer, decreasing the candidate's trust and ultimately the employers' total net profit. Employers who misrepresented anger earned less overall ($M = \$9.61$, $SD = \$2.24$) than those who misrepresented happiness ($M = \$11.07$, $SD = \$1.70$; $t(53) = 3.33$, $p < .05$), though earnings between employers in the angry and neutral misrepresentation condition ($M = \$10.56$, $SD = \$2.31$; $t(63) = 1.68$, $p = .10$) did not differ significantly. Trust damage reflects the recursive nature of emotion misrepresentation.

Although negotiators generally do not confront the considerable "strategic risk" (Bottom, 1998) of lost profits in social psychology experiments, they do in practice. Downside strategic risk is realized when the expected value of a contract, formed at the time of agreement, fails to materialize during implementation. In Study 2, candidates were guaranteed to receive the earnings expected at the time of agreement. However, businesses generally have few guarantees of profit, so actions may differ when individuals are confronted with the risk of unrealized expected profit. Strategic risk is magnified in relationships in which employers cannot precisely monitor or control the effort expended by their hires. Contracts may provide financial incentives to motivate desired effort during agreement implementation for which project success is not guaranteed (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991; Salanié, 1997). However, the degree of effort expended by the employee will generally depend on both the relationship and the employment contract. Study 3 incorporates the strategic risk associated with employment contracts. An employer who does not trust their new employee to perform at this level may be compelled to provide further compensation. We examine the primary (Hypothesis 1) and blowback (Hypothesis 2) effects of misrepresented anger on the negotiator's (employer's) compensation offer

(i.e., implementation costs) in the second task, and how the negotiator's trust in the counterpart influences this effect (Hypothesis 5).

Study 3

Method

Participants. There were 142 students, including 63 females, participated (71 dyads) in the study. They were recruited through advertisements offering an opportunity to earn money. Their average age was 23.79 ($SD = 6.00$).

Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to a computer terminal that determined their roles (either employer or candidate), conditions, and negotiation partners. Following the experimenter's general instructions, participants read the appropriate role-specific instructions, and then watched a video on how to navigate the interface. Employers (the negotiator) received the same emotion expression instructions as in Study 2. They were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (anger, neutral, or happiness misrepresentation). Again, an online quiz was administered to ensure participants' comprehension of the instructions.

The experiment again took a two-stage design in which the first used a simplified version of Study 2's payoff chart. The issue of salary and bonus were dropped from the payoff table so first stage negotiation reflected work conditions and benefits. Compensation determination, both salary and bonus, comprised the second stage task. This is a bargaining problem previously used to test contract theory predictions (Bottom et al., 2006; Mislin et al., 2011; Whitford et al., 2013). Participants were allowed 8 min to agree on salary and/or outcome contingent bonus payments. Instructions explained that the newly hired employee (the counterpart, or candidate in the first-stage negotiation) would subsequently be asked to make a one-time, private decision about how much effort to invest (understanding that effort cost money) when implementing the deal. Effort costs were positively, linearly related to the firm's probability of earning profit, ranging from 50% (for a \$5.00 effort cost to candidate) up to 80% (for an \$8.50 effort cost to candidate). Higher firm profits yielded employers \$30, whereas lower firm profits rendered employers \$10. The employer paid out this outcome contingent bonus only if he or she earned the highest profit possible (\$30). Regardless of firm profits, employers paid the agreed salary. They retained profits left after paying out labor costs. Thus, employer's profit depended on both candidate effort choice and chance. Because of the chance element, the employer could never know the candidate's choice.

Information negotiated in the second-stage task was common to both parties, except the implementation investment. This task design captures the strategic risk and essential interdependence of working relationships in organizations where employers' earnings depend in part on imperfectly observable candidate effort.

Emotion misrepresentation manipulation. We used the same emotion manipulation and employer incentive as in Study 2.

Measures. We again measured trust perceptions ($\alpha = .86$ for benevolence and $\alpha = .90$ for integrity), felt anger ($\alpha = .89$), and felt happiness ($\alpha = .92$) during the first negotiation. Costly effort choice provided a measure of postnegotiation cooperative behavior that ranged from 50% (costing \$5.00) to 80% (costing \$8.50). Implementation costs were measured as the total compensation package (wage and bonus) the employer offered to the candidate.

Table 7
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Study 3)

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Emotion expression condition	2.03	.83	1									
2. Employer implementation costs	13.62	5.17	.13	1								
3. Candidate cooperation (effort)	7.24	1.24	.15	.15	1							
4. Candidate felt anger	2.56	1.81	.25*	.22	-.17	1						
5. Candidate felt happiness	5.11	1.71	.14	-.12	.12	-.13	1					
6. Employer felt anger	2.69	2.06	.27*	.20	-.13	.65**	-.18	1				
7. Employer felt happiness	5.31	1.57	-.02	-.09	.08	.02	.16	-.24*	1			
8. Candidate trust (benevolence)	2.96	.94	-.36**	-.26*	.07	-.29*	.34**	-.32**	-.01	1		
9. Candidate trust (integrity)	3.33	.81	-.43**	-.10	.07	-.24*	.26*	-.32**	.03	.81**	1	
10. Employer trust (benevolence)	3.03	.73	-.19	-.10	.17	-.28*	.26*	-.49**	.41**	.37**	.40**	1
11. Employer trust (integrity)	3.46	.61	-.26*	-.21	.13	-.45**	.10	-.57**	.31**	.31**	.29*	.49**

Note. *N* = 71 dyads; emotion expression condition: 1 = neutral (23 dyads), 2 = happy (23 dyads); 3 = angry (25 dyads); we refer to the hypothesized “counterpart” as the “candidate” within our scenario, and “negotiator” as the employer.

p* < .05. *p* < .01.

Results

Univariate and bivariate statistics are reported in Table 7.

Manipulation check. Candidates perceived employers in the anger misrepresentation condition to be angrier than those in the neutral misrepresentation condition, $t(46) = -5.36, p < .001$, as Table 3 shows. Candidates perceived employers in the happiness misrepresentation condition to be happier than those in the neutral condition, $t(44) = 2.52, p < .05$. Employers in the neutral condition were perceived as more nonemotional than those in the angry condition, $t(46) = 4.23, p < .01$, but not more than those in the happy condition, $t(44) = 1.22, p = .23$.

Tactical implications of misrepresented emotion. All dyads reached agreement. Emotion misrepresentation did not affect the value of the employer’s agreement in the first stage ($M_{\text{anger}} = \$4.36, SD = .98$ vs. $M_{\text{happiness}} = \$4.12, SD = .83$; $t(46) = -.92, p = .30$).

Hypothesis tests. Summary statistics for hypothesis tests and effect sizes are reported in Table 8.

Primary effects of misrepresented emotion. Candidates felt angrier when negotiating with employers who misrepresented anger than with those who misrepresented neutral emotions, $t(46) = -1.98, p = .05$. Candidates facing happy employers were happier than those facing the employer in the neutral misrepresentation condition, $t(47) = -2.45, p < .05$. Hypothesis 1a was supported. Although not differing from the neutral condition (see Table 8), candidates reported lower trust in employers who misrepresented anger versus happiness (benevolence: $t(47) = 25.63, p < .001$; integrity: $t(47) = 28.67, p < .001$), providing support for Hypothesis 1b.

Blowback effect. Employers in the happy misrepresentation condition were no happier than those in the neutral, $t(44) = -.27, p = .79$ or anger, $t(46) = .39, p = .69$ misrepresentation condi-

Table 8
Summary of Results (Study 3): Means (SDs) and Comparisons Across Conditions

Hypothesis	Misrepresented emotion condition			Effect size			<i>p</i> -value contrast		
	(1) Angry	(2) Neutral	(3) Happy	1 and 2	1 and 3	2 and 3	1 and 2	1 and 3	2 and 3
Counterpart (candidate)									
Hypothesis 1a									
Angry	3.34 (1.86)	2.23 (1.56)	1.96 (1.39)	.65	.84	.18	*	**	n.s.
Happy	5.09 (1.54)	4.49 (1.94)	5.74 (1.48)	.34	-.43	-.72	n.s.	n.s.	*
Hypothesis 1b									
Trust (benevolence)	2.33 (.86)	3.13 (.88)	3.48 (.70)	-.92	-1.47	-.44	**	***	n.s.
Trust (integrity)	2.72 (.80)	3.54 (.68)	3.78 (.52)	-1.10	-1.57	-.40	***	***	n.s.
Negotiator (employer)									
Hypothesis 2a									
Angry	3.34 (1.86)	2.61 (1.56)	2.44 (1.34)	.43	.56	.12	*	*	n.s.
Happy	5.23 (1.71)	5.3 (1.54)	5.41 (1.50)	-.04	-.11	-.07	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Hypothesis 2b									
Trust (benevolence)	2.73 (.84)	3.05 (.54)	3.32 (.66)	-.47	-.79	-.45	n.s.	**	n.s.
Trust (integrity)	3.21 (.69)	3.59 (.48)	3.12 (.69)	-.64	.13	.79	*	*	n.s.
Hypothesis 5a									
Strategic implication (implementation costs)	16.76 (6.73)	14.9 (6.04)	13.34 (4.81)	.29	.58	.29	n.s.	*	n.s.

Note. Effect size is calculated as Cohen’s *d* (difference between the means divided by the pooled *SD*). Moderate ($\geq .50$) and larger effect sizes ($\geq .80$) are bolded. n.s. = not significant.

p* ≤ .05. *p* ≤ .01. ****p* ≤ .001.

tions. Although not less trusting than those in the neutral condition (see Table 8), employers in the happy condition were more trusting than those in the anger condition (benevolence: $t(46) = 2.73, p = .01$; integrity: $t(46) = 2.05, p < .05$). Employers in the anger misrepresentation condition became genuinely angrier than those in the neutral misrepresentation condition, $t(46) = -2.05, p < .05$; they trusted their candidate counterparts less than those misrepresenting neutral emotions, but only for the integrity factor (benevolence: $t(46) = 1.57, p = .12$; integrity: $t(46) = 2.19, p < .05$). Therefore, Hypotheses 2a and 2b were both supported.

Strategic implications. Employers who misrepresented anger during the first-stage benefits negotiation paid their candidate more compensation overall in the second stage than those who misrepresented happiness, $t(46) = -2.04, p < .05$, thereby supporting Hypothesis 5a.

We tested Hypothesis 5b using *MEDIATE* with 10,000 resamples. The effect of misrepresented emotion on implementation costs was mediated by the employer's trust in the candidate via integrity for both happy and angry conditions (happy: indirect effect = $-.80$, 95% CI $[-2.67, -.08]$; angry: indirect effect = $.90$, 95% CI $[-.08, 2.63]$) but not for benevolence (happy: indirect effect = $-.23$, 95% CI $[-1.70, .78]$; angry: indirect effect = $.30$, 95% CI $[-.75, 1.66]$). Hypothesis 5b was supported.

Post hoc analysis of second-stage behaviors. Two assistants, blind to the hypotheses, coded the electronic messages exchanged during the two negotiations. Employers who misrepresented anger adjusted their behavior dramatically from the first to the second stage, compared with employers who misrepresented happiness. Angry employers were more polite and asked more questions during the second-stage compensation negotiation ($M_{politeness} = 4.70, SD = .92$ and $M_{questions} = 2.26, SD = 1.39$) than during the first-stage benefits negotiation ($M_{politeness} = 1.90, SD = .99, t(46) = 9.70, p < .001$ and $M_{questions} = 1.26, SD = 1.01, t(46) = 6.23, p < .001$, respectively). They also expressed greater interest in their candidate's preferences (Stage 2: $M = 2.38, SD = .92$; Stage 1: $M = 1.68, SD = .75; t(25) = 12.99, p < .001$).

Discussion

Because of contagion and blowback, anger misrepresentation proved financially disadvantageous to employers, who paid more generous compensation for similar levels of effort as compared to those who misrepresented happiness. Because of this blowback, employers did not trust their candidates to vigorously implement the contract terms as much as those who misrepresented happiness. The enhanced compensation packages used to motivate high effort appeared to work but were more expensive to procure.

Compared with employers who misrepresented anger, those who misrepresented happiness built greater trust, leaving less need to rely on pay premiums to guarantee effort. Misrepresenting anger in the first stage compelled a subsequent premium payment, perhaps to repair damaged trust (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002). Although employers perceived the candidate as benevolent, this did not motivate their implementation behaviors. Instead, integrity played a more prominent role in determining implementation behavior. By enhancing perceptions of integrity, feigned happiness enabled employers to secure high effort toward deal implementation without providing a pay premium. Trusted

negotiators gained strategic advantage by foregoing labor costs premiums.

Post hoc analysis revealed a shift in angry employers' behaviors. Foregoing further anger, employers appeared to be attempting to repair damaged trust through polite behavior that also demonstrated greater interest in the candidates' interests. Coupled with the compensation premium, this solicitous strategy was evidently effective. Employers appeared aware of the need for both trust and financial incentives to motivate vigorous implementation.

Of the two forms of misrepresentation, feigning happiness proved strategically wiser. Although not particularly contagious, the former safeguarded trust. Because employers who misrepresented happiness were seen as more trustworthy, they paid less to get the same effort from their candidate. This finding indicates an efficient human resource management practice, since paying less for the same level of productivity benefits the firm.

Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated that employer anger blows back to genuinely affect their own emotion and trust. Trust proved to be the mechanism ensuring productive implementation and beneficial strategic implications for both parties. It facilitated cooperative behaviors eliciting risk taking during implementation. However, employment contracts in particular are implemented at a physical remove from the counterpart after some period of delay. Although Studies 1–3 demonstrated immediate blowback effects on implementation, we conducted Study 4 to better gauge the impact of a delay between the negotiation of terms and their implementation.⁹

Study 4

Although emotional experiences are typically short-lived and fade over time (Forgas & George, 2001), damaged trust resulting from exchange continues to affect behavior during implementation (Mislin et al., 2011). We predict spirals of negotiator distrust will continue to impact subsequent cooperation (Ferrin et al., 2008). We examine whether the blowback effects of misrepresented emotions on trust between parties will endure a delay (Hypotheses 1b and 2b). After that delay, we predict the counterpart's trust in the negotiator will continue to mediate the effect of misrepresented emotion on agreement implementation (Hypothesis 3b) as well as postnegotiation cooperation (Hypothesis 4b).

Method

We designed a two-part experiment in which: (a) participants negotiated over an employment opportunity, then (b) 1 day later, counterparts (candidates) made a costly implementation decision with implications for their negotiator (employer). To determine that a time delay will not diminish the blowback effect we observed in previous studies, we focus our measures and analysis on behaviors and perceptions during the second stage task.

Participants. Our final sample consisted of 162 undergraduate students (81 dyads) from a northeastern United States university. They participated in this experiment in exchange for credit toward a management course research participation requirement and the opportunity to earn money. Forty-nine percent of partici-

⁹ We thank Mo Wang and an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this novel experimental extension.

pants were female. Participants averaged 18.59 years in age ($SD = 1.35$).

Procedure. We tested our predictions using an employment contract negotiation simulation. One day later, hired candidates made a costly implementation decision with implications for their employer. We advised employers to communicate with their candidate using one of three affective tones: “happy,” “angry,” or “neutral.” All participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions. Again, instructions were provided via computer terminal.

Negotiation task. Task and process followed the description from Study 2. Participants read instructions indicating that they would be participating in an employment interview with a randomly assigned counterpart. They had 25 min to reach an agreement on eight issues.

Second-stage task. To measure the persistence of the blowback effect, the second-stage implementation task was emailed to candidates approximately 24 hr after they participated in Stage I. They had 24 more hours to complete the new task. After recalling whether they reached agreement during the negotiation and briefly describing the exchange, candidates were asked to invest effort in a project they would be working on with the employer described as the same person they negotiated with in Stage 1. If the candidate trusts the employer, then he or she will not engage in behaviors that might hurt him or her (that will increase their costs). Presumably, candidates who do not trust the employer will invest less effort in the second-stage task (that will decrease their costs).

We endowed candidates with \$5, instructing them to invest a portion of their endowment in the effort task. Effort costs were related to the candidates' profits. The more costly “effort” candidates expended, the greater the probability the project would succeed (ranging from 50%, costing the candidate \$2.50, to 80%, costing the candidate \$5). We also gave them the option to invest nothing, which would cost them nothing, but eliminate any chance of project success. If the project succeeded, the candidates kept the remainder of their effort investment and the employer received a bonus. If the project failed, candidates kept their endowment and the employer did not earn a bonus payment. Candidates' investment decision was private; their choice was concealed from the employer. After making their private effort investment decision, candidates were given the option to renege on the entire negotiated agreement by accepting an alternative deal of equal value from another employer. Reneging on the deal meant that the employer would earn \$0.

Emotion misrepresentation manipulation. Emotion was manipulated in the same way as in Study 2, with one modification. To enhance the effectiveness of the emotion manipulation on the contagion and blowback effects, we changed the framing of the employer's incentive to communicate in the appropriate tone. We informed employers that they would receive an upfront payment of \$4, and would be able to keep their \$4 payment if they succeeded in strongly and consistently conveying the proper tone during the negotiation (e.g., rated “6–8” by their candidates). They would lose \$3 if they only conveyed some of the message (e.g., rated “3–5” by their candidates) and \$5 if they completely failed to convey this assigned tone (e.g., rated “0–2” by their candidates).

Measures

The same trust measures were used as in the previous studies (benevolence $\alpha = .94$; integrity $\alpha = .93$). Postnegotiation cooperative behavior (effort) was again measured as a costly effort choice from 50% (\$2.50 investment) to 80% (\$5.00 investment) from the candidates' second-stage \$5.00 endowments. The likelihood of reneging on the agreement was measured in binary form by the candidates' response to the second decision task. If they elected to follow through with the original agreement with the employer, then the initial deal was deemed successfully implemented. If they elected to renege on the original deal, then the original agreement was not implemented so the candidate would earn nothing.

Results

Univariate and bivariate statistics are reported in Table 9.

Manipulation check. Candidates reported that their employers (negotiators) expressed more of the target emotion condition than alternative or neutral emotions (see Table 3). Although our manipulation effectively shifted the employer's expressed emotion, perceptions of unemotional expressions across the three conditions did not differ significantly.¹⁰

Candidates also rated whether they perceived the employer as authentically expressing emotion. We adapted two items measuring emotion authenticity from Grandey and colleagues (Grandey et al., 2005) for this purpose: “My counterpart seemed to be faking how he or she felt during the negotiation” and “My counterpart seemed to be pretending or putting on an act during the negotiation” (1 = strongly *disagree* to 5 = strongly *agree*; $\alpha = .90$). We examined whether participants assigned to the misrepresented anger or happiness condition were perceived as less authentic in their expressions than those assigned to the neutral condition. Our findings confirmed that those assigned to the neutral condition were perceived to be just as authentic ($M = 2.42$, $SD = 1.03$) as those assigned to misrepresent happiness ($M = 2.46$, $SD = .78$; $t(57) = .19$, $p = .85$) and those assigned to misrepresent anger ($M = 3.00$, $SD = 1.14$; $t(47) = -1.79$, $p = .08$).

Hypothesis tests. Summary statistics for hypothesis tests and effect sizes are reported in Table 10.

Blowback effect. Candidate trust in their employer remained significantly lower after a time delay for candidates who had interacted with angry employers as compared with candidates in the neutral condition (benevolence: $t(47) = 3.21$, $p < .01$; integrity: $t(47) = 2.74$, $p = .01$). Although candidates in the happy condition did not trust their employers any more than those in the neutral condition (see Table 10), they trusted them more than those in the angry condition (benevolence: $t(44) = 4.25$, $p < .001$; integrity: $t(44) = 3.53$, $p = .001$). Thus, Hypothesis 1b was supported.

Employers who misrepresented anger were less trusting (via the integrity factor, not the benevolence factor) after a delay, compared to those in the happy misrepresentation condition (benevo-

¹⁰ Although these tests confirmed the successful manipulation, 34 participants neglected to follow instructions. Twenty employers assigned to the anger condition sent no messages that conveyed any emotion. Thirteen employers assigned to the happy condition sent no messages at all. In this computer mediated conversation, emotion could not be conveyed without messages, so these dyads were omitted from further analysis.

Table 9
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Study 4)

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Emotion expression condition	.85	.79	1					
2. Candidate cooperation (effort)	2.39	1.83	-.14	1				
3. Candidate agreement implementation	1.23	.43	.08	-.41**	1			
4. Candidate delayed trust (benevolence)	3.43	1.54	-.27*	.24*	-.45**	1		
5. Candidate delayed trust (integrity)	4.15	1.31	-.25*	.21	-.44**	.85**	1	
6. Employer delayed trust (benevolence)	3.46	1.24	-.20	.12	-.21	.26*	.25*	1
7. Employer delayed trust (integrity)	4.47	1.03	-.13	.18	-.06	.15	.17	.54**

Note. $N = 81$ dyads; emotion expression condition: 1 = neutral (32 dyads), 2 = happy (29 dyads), 3 = angry (20 dyads); agreement implementation: 0 = implement; 1 = fail to implement; we refer to the hypothesized "counterpart" as the "candidate" within our scenario, and "negotiator" as the employer.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

lence: $t(44) = 1.71, p = .09$; integrity: $t(44) = 2.67, p = .01$), but not compared with those in the neutral misrepresentation condition (see Table 10). Employers misrepresenting happiness trusted their candidates more via the integrity factor than those in the angry condition, but not compared with those in the neutral condition (see Table 10). This supports Hypothesis 2b.

Strategic implications. The emotion conditions had no discernible effect on the candidates' decision to renege on the deal, $\chi^2(2, N = 77) = 1.48, p = .48$. However, when a direct effect is absent, a significant indirect effect still provides evidence of mediation (Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010). The effect of misrepresented anger on the likelihood of reneging on the deal after a delay was mediated by the candidate's trust for both benevolence ($\beta = 1.12$, 95% CI [.31, 2.63]) and integrity factors ($\beta = .93$, 95% CI [.17, 2.54]). The results were not significant for the happy condition (benevolence: $\beta = .84$, 95% CI [-.35, 2.94]; integrity: $\beta = .67$, 95% CI [-.35, 2.73]). Hypothesis 3b was supported for anger but not for happiness.

Although we did not find a significant direct effect of misrepresented emotion on the candidate's effort after a delay (see Table 10, Hypothesis 4a), we found a significant indirect one. The effect of misrepresented emotion on postnegotiation effort after a delay was mediated by the candidate's trust via perceptions of benevolence. This was significant for the angry (benevolence: indirect effect = $-.18$, 95% CI [-.78, -.15]; integrity: indirect effect = $-.12$, 95% CI [-.66, .20]), but not happy (benevolence: indirect effect = $.05$, 95% CI [-.06, .39]; integrity: indirect effect = $.03$, 95% CI [-.06, .35]), misrepresentation condition. Hypothesis 4b was supported for anger.¹¹

Discussion

Misrepresenting anger again proved strategically disadvantageous, even when implementation was delayed. Although we did not find a direct effect of the emotion condition on the candidates' effort investment, we found that, as in Study 2, the candidates' perceptions of the employers' benevolence mediated the effect of misrepresented anger on effort when implementing the negotiated agreement. The candidates' decision to renege on the deal was motivated by both the benevolence- and integrity-based trust. Benevolence-based trust likely became more important for motivating decisions to renege on the agreement in this study because participants were given the opportunity to communicate with their

counterpart for a longer period of time than in Study 1. This enabled them to collect more relevant information about benevolence (Mayer et al., 1995). The impact of the emotion conditions on strategic implications occurred through trust, indicating that trust building or trust erosion from the negotiation process continues to affect behavior during implementation even as time passes between the phases.

General Discussion

Various practitioners and theorists (e.g., Hutson, 2015; Machiavelli, 1519/1987; Pacelle & Schmitt, 2002) have asserted that misrepresenting emotions can yield material benefits for negotiators. Although recent experiments showed that expressing anger increases a counterpart's concession making, across four studies we found little evidence that such expressions translated into improved terms of agreement. Rather, we found that expressing anger generated significant and consistent strategic disadvantages. Our studies incorporated strategic risk and reciprocal interdependence absent from the majority of work on emotional expressions in negotiation. Adding these two elements enabled us to separate short-term tactical consequences from longer-term strategic ones.

We found the blowback effect responsible for the strategic disadvantages experienced by the negotiator misrepresenting anger. In Study 1, negotiators expressing anger both angered and diminished their counterpart's trust. Reflecting counterparty risk, angry subjects tended to renege on their agreement. To better examine the blowback effect we established reciprocal interdependence through two-sided designs in the subsequent studies. Providing financial incentives induced negotiators to convey emotion-laden messages to their counterparts. The initially false expressions again triggered genuine anger in the counterpart, but also led them to return affect laden messages to the misrepresenting party. Through this cycle the negotiator misrepresenting anger became genuinely angry in a spiral of diminishing trust. The loss of trust impaired agreement

¹¹ Based on the advice from an anonymous reviewer, we tested our hypotheses controlling for participants' elapsed time between completing the negotiation and the second stage task. This allowed us to enhance experimenter control by accounting for time variances in completing part 2. Our results remained the same when controlling for elapsed time, and these results are available upon request.

Table 10
Summary of Results (Study 4): Means (SDs) and Comparisons Across Conditions

Hypothesis	Misrepresented emotion condition			Effect sizes			p-value contrast		
	(1) Angry	(2) Neutral	(3) Happy	1 and 2	1 and 3	2 and 3	1 and 2	1 and 3	2 and 3
Counterpart (candidate)									
Hypothesis 1b									
Delayed trust (benevolence)	2.35 (1.13)	3.61 (1.62)	3.93 (1.37)	-.90	-1.26	-.21	**	***	n.s.
Delayed trust (integrity)	3.30 (1.19)	4.28 (1.29)	4.56 (1.19)	-.79	-1.06	-.23	**	***	n.s.
Negotiator (employer)									
Hypothesis 2b									
Delayed trust (benevolence)	2.96 (1.46)	3.63 (1.16)	3.61 (1.12)	-.51	-.50	.02	†	†	n.s.
Delayed trust (integrity)	4.04 (1.03)	4.47 (1.07)	4.77 (1.09)	-.41	-.69	-.28	n.s.	**	n.s.
Hypothesis 4a									
Strategic implication (cooperation)	2.02 (2.12)	2.66 (1.81)	2.35 (1.68)	-.32	-.17	.18	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

Note. Effect size is calculated as Cohen's *d* (difference between the means divided by the pooled *SD*). Moderate ($\geq .50$) and larger effect sizes ($\geq .80$) are bolded. n.s. = not significant.

† $p \leq .10$. * $p \leq .05$. ** $p \leq .01$. *** $p \leq .001$.

implementation and increased rates of outright reneging. These dampening effects persisted even after a time delay, demonstrating that untrustworthy conduct is not quickly forgotten.

Misrepresentation of happiness produced a different response pattern. The emotion was not very contagious but elevated trust. This positive impact on trust failed to translate into negotiators' tactical advantage; the terms of agreements reached by happy negotiators were no more lucrative than those reached by neutral or angry expressive negotiators. However, elevated trust motivated agreement implementation and diminished the likelihood of reneging on the agreement. These effects persisted over time.

Theoretical Implications

These research implications extend beyond simply better understanding the emotion expression dynamics in negotiations. Our findings highlight the need for negotiation research to examine settings that have both strategic risk as well as reciprocal interdependence. The multiple-issue, integrative bargaining task (Neale, 1997; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975) has proven to be a worthy staple of negotiation research by providing a simple, flexible negotiation model with direct, quantifiable outcome measures. However, the appraised value of any negotiation agreement only translates into financial and relational benefits during the implementation phase that follows bargaining. Without understanding how emotions and trust influence agreement implementation, researchers may proffer biased or even misleading suggestions for negotiation practice.

The distrust spirals generated by the reciprocal exchange of anger communication also illustrates the need for additional two-sided research designs. While one-sided experimental designs with immediate, deterministic payoffs can yield insight into negotiators' perceptions and concession-making patterns (e.g., Côté et al., 2013; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010), they do not capture the counterpart risk and reciprocal interdependence that characterizes important negotiations. Injecting those features enabled us to distinguish tactical from strategic consequences. Our more complex designs in Studies 2–4 identified factors influencing implementation behaviors, as well as the trust generated by the process.

Study 4 introduced a novel element into the two-sided design by inviting participants to make decisions after considerable time delay. While negotiations rarely end after one interaction, past research in this domain has focused on the immediate agreement implications of the negotiation process. The present findings extend our understanding of the implications of actions that occur during the negotiation process on future exchange by measuring perceptions and behaviors after a delay.

Researchers may also benefit from reconsidering the simple demarcation of negotiation outcomes into primary "economic outcomes" and secondary "social psychological outcomes" measured at the time of agreement in negotiation experiments. This narrowly conceived convention impedes the understanding of the wider processes occurring in business, public administration, and international relations. Although expectations of value creation and claiming may form at the time of agreement, no actual value materializes until later if and when the agreement is executed. The social psychology of trust-building directly shapes the vigor of implementation as well as the temptations to renege. Thus, projecting forward from the facts of agreement, a wise negotiator will incorporate these social psychological factors into sound predictions of economic outcomes.

Practical Implications

Practitioners considering the tactical benefits of anger misrepresentation should think carefully about the wider strategic disadvantages. With the increasingly networked nature of business, any tactical advantages are unlikely to justify the strategic loss of trust. Indeed, losses may encompass much more than foregone future gains (e.g., Pacelle & Schmitt, 2002; Sagan & Suri, 2003). Negotiation researchers need to reconceive the importance of social capital in determining long-term strategic advantage. In a densely networked global economy, social capital is critical to realizing real economic benefits over time, and forms of misrepresentation that diminish social capital are destructive (Labianca & Brass, 2006). By actively modeling the link between social capital and outcomes realized through implementation, researchers can develop a science of negotiation that complements the wider field of organizational science.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

The findings from our research also raise a number of questions for future research. For example, it may be interesting for future research to examine the strategic implications of misrepresenting other emotions such as sadness, anxiety, or fear. Further research might also consider how emotional misrepresentation compares to, undermines, or complements other negotiating behavior, and whether different settings outside the employment setting that we focused our research on might produce different types of reactions.

Moreover, we infer in Study 3 that the counterpart's shift in trust results from the observed changes in the negotiator's genuine felt anger. However, it is possible that the negotiator misrepresenting anger accurately forecasted how the tactic would impact the counterpart's trust and implementation behavior. Future research should measure the negotiator's meta-awareness (Olekalns & Smith, 2009) of the counterpart's perceptions, both anticipated and following the negotiation process, and investigate the extent to which this knowledge motivates implementation behaviors.¹²

Furthermore, while the two-sided design in Study 4 invites participants to interact again after a time delay, we lost some experimental control by allowing participants to complete the second part of our study within a 24-hr window after a delay. Although our results were robust despite the variance in response times, our design did not allow us to control for other issues, such as the potential impact of confounds outside a laboratory. Future research might investigate whether our findings are robust to replications within a more controlled environment.

In some instances, we found that the benevolence or integrity factor of trust played a more prominent role during implementation. Although empirical research is sparse, we speculate our results are due in part to the idiosyncratic nature of how each factor develops. For example, Mayer et al. (1995) propose that integrity-based trust is more salient before relationships form. Benevolence-based trust becomes increasing important for motivating behavior as the relationship develops.¹³ In Study 1, participants briefly exchanged with a computer posed as the employer. Such limited communication may have caused integrity-based trust to become more relevant to the candidate's decision to renege. In Studies 2 and 4, implementing a design that provided participants enhanced, longer communication, may have led benevolence to become more important for motivating the counterpart's implementation and decision to renege.

Another possible reason for benevolence and integrity to have different effects on postnegotiation behavior is the nature of the second stage task. We find that integrity-based trust, the belief that the counterpart will follow through with his or her commitments (Mayer & Davis, 1999; Mayer et al., 1995), is more salient for negotiators (employers) making investment decisions designed to motivate counterpart (candidate) cooperation (Study 3). However, benevolence-based trust, based on perceptions of positive intentions or a desire to help the counterpart (Mayer et al., 1995), may be more relevant when motivating cooperation during implementation (Studies 2 and 4). We believe that including these two related but distinctive indicators of trust in our studies contributes to building a more complete understanding of the role of trust in negotiations, even if the different roles of these trust factors remain somewhat unclear. Future research should further explore the

dynamics of these trust factors in motivating negotiation behaviors.

Our mixed results differentiating neutral from happiness and anger misrepresentation conditions also present a future research opportunity. Because the neutral condition was not perceived as being significantly different from the happy (Study 3) or happy and angry (Study 4) conditions, it appears that participants had difficulty expressing no emotion during their interactions. This may in part be attributable to the fact that deal making is inherently a positive sum game, and thus, a tendency toward some degree of positive affect is inevitable—both sides are together creating something of value. However, despite the incentives to communicate in a neutral tone, employers in this condition seemed to have expressed a degree of positivity or anger.

Conclusion

The misrepresentation of anger yielded few discernible tactical benefits in negotiation, but generated clear and persistent strategic disadvantages. Understanding relationships is essential to predicting implementation behaviors and the economic consequences of negotiation behavior. By using two-sided experimental designs, we accounted for the effect of reciprocal interdependence between negotiation parties on implementation behavior. Our results suggest the need for great caution in extrapolating negotiator practice prescriptions from experiments that neglect to measure implementation behavior, because advantages that accrue during the negotiation process may disappear or even reverse after the parties leave the negotiation table. Without genuine trust, winning battles may not translate into winning wars.

¹² We thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this interesting avenue for potential future research.

¹³ We thank an anonymous reviewer for encouraging us to consider how benevolence and integrity may operate differentially over time.

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