What role for environmental cooperatives in collective agri-environmental schemes?

The collective action dilemma inherent to environmental quality problems implies that agri-environmental contracts are best managed collectively. Such collective contracts need to be coordinated, a complex process that in some countries is chaperoned through an associative structure. This research assesses the potential of environmental cooperatives (EC) for the governance of collective agri-environmental contracts. The context in which ECs historically emerged is presented, followed by an analysis across case studies of the factors that can facilitate the role of ECs. These factors are compared to a recent case study on a newly emerged French EC, for which a series of interviews are analysed. This investigation highlights that the role of the EC is above all a facilitating one, mediating between the different interest groups by ensuring three important contract criteria: (1) place-based targets and locally specific measures, (2) a participatory process to contract design, (3) flexibility in the measure’s adaptation.


Introduction
A single farmer alone cannot have sufficient impact on the ecosystem to reach the often spatially defined threshold inherent to resource and environmental management situations.Rather, a focus on relevant areas of ecological concern across multiple farms and inclusive of the local socio-ecosystem would allow for tailoring agri-environmental management to the inherent threshold dynamics.Therefore, designing and implementing agri-environmental schemes (AES) on landscape rather than on farm scale, is thought to assure the provision of threshold public goods, such as environmental quality, more effectively (H€ afner and Piorr 2021;Mills et al. 2011;Westerink et al. 2017).Consequently, being essentially a spatially defined collective action dilemma, appropriate collective agri-environmental management approaches are needed.
This need for agri-environmental policy to direct incentives towards landscape scale management has been formally recognized through the conception of collective AES (cAES).These collective contracts are specified for groups of farmers on a shared territory and remunerate them for a certain rate of conversion to defined agri-environmental practices at the group level.Such cAES were first introduced with the CAP reform for the period 2014-2020 for which applications by groups of farmers for collective AES were made possible (cf.Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013, article 28) (Prager 2015;Kuhfuss et al. 2016).Given the development toward cAES, the question arises as to which institutional concept best accompanies and facilitates the collective environmental management by farmers.Prager (2015) notices that coordination is more straightforward to organize from a government point of view, which may explain the traditional centralized top-down approach to AES.While centralized governance arrangements may eliminate most costs related to communication, it is exactly a lack of communication among individual farmers that seems to constitute the main barrier to coordinated agri-environmental efforts (H€ afner and Piorr 2021).An external, third party could initiate communication among farmers and accompany collaboration, but this process is likely to increase transaction costs for everyone.The policy challenge thus consists of providing a facilitating institution for collective AES that can moderate communication in a cost-efficient way with respect to the existing territorial and cultural conditions.
This work seeks to clarify the role of Environmental Cooperatives (EC) for the coordination of farmers participating in collective contracts.Environmental Cooperatives are local associations of farmers and sometimes other rural stakeholders (e.g.environmental organizations, local authorities, and animal welfare groups) for the collective management of agri-environmental issues and that assure the intermediation to local and national government entities (van Dijk et al. 2015;Wiskerke et al. 2003).The EC pursues a longterm aim of integrating environment, nature and landscape objectives into the regional farming culture and of building collaborative relationships with agricultural stakeholders at all governance levels (Glasbergen 2000;Wiskerke et al. 2003).The interlinkage between farmer associations and territorially bound, collective contracts seems self-evident: because they are inevitably involved with the agricultural territory of their communities, local farmer cooperatives can provide more detailed insight into, and assessment of, environmental questions concerning their territory.By being the principal modulators of their land, ECs allow for extending efforts across all actors on a common territory, as well as for including other stakeholders on matters of shared responsibility (Daniel 2012).In light of this, Franks (2011) finds that farmer associations play a key role in making (cAES) more cost and time efficient, as compared to conventional, individual AES.
Although the link between farmers' associations and collective contracts has been established, a clearer understanding of their role in steering cAES needs to be developed.Specifically, this study seeks to identify: what is the potential role of the EC for the governance of cAES?Through a case study approach, the complex and context-specific nature of a relatively recent EC is discussed.The relevance of this type of farmer association for the specific aim of coordinating collective AES is investigated by (i) identifying the factors that facilitate the role of the EC for collective agri-environmental management across cases from the literature and (ii) discussing these factors with respect to a case study from France.This study, thereby, contributes to the scarce literature on collaborative governance arrangements for AES (Westerink et al. 2017).
The paper is constructed as follows: Section 2 illustrates the evolution of collective agri-environmental initiatives; Section 3 presents the methodology and analytical framework, and the selection of the case study.Section 4 describes (i) the results from the literature review with respect to the facilitating factors for the role of the EC in governing cAES and (ii) examines how these facilitating factors are applied and structurally integrated into the emergence of the French EC.Section 5 provides a discussion of these findings and concludes.

Collective agri-environmental management
The evolution of agri-environmental farmer collectives is contrasted based on (i) the emergence of ECs in the Netherlands as a farmer movement and following (ii) the more recent creation of the first EC in France for the explicit purpose of cAES management.

History and presentation of different agri-environmental farmer collectives
Environmental cooperatives first emerged in 1991 in the Netherlands as a response to farmers' concerns about the government's agricultural policy.Rather than being driven by concern for environmental problems, the cooperative primarily sought the form of an independent and autonomous representation of the agricultural profession towards local and national authorities (Daniel 2011a).In response to a loss of influence after the liberalization of the CAP during the 1980s, the EC allowed farmers to innovate a new form of solidarity 1 (Daniel 2012).The approach was to deliberately rebuild a consensus among the community of Dutch farmers in order to overcome internal divergence on the political positioning and changing financial modes of the agricultural council (Daniel 2011a(Daniel , 2012)).
Disadvantages that were sought to be rectified were (1) a lack of representation of farmers' opinions within the policy framework at the time, (2) attributing environmental outcomes to a lack of goodwill among farmers, (3) the government's top-down approach, and (4) farmers' alleged lack of responsibility for the environment (Van Dijk et al. 2015).The spread of ECs was facilitated through their contribution to environmental politics and through funding opportunities (Daniel 2011b).The Dutch 'Programma Beheer' in 1997 attributed questions of environmental management to ECs.In the scope of the Dutch Agri-environmental program from 2000, ECs were given the opportunity to apply for regional agri-environmental schemes for the restoration of ecological focus areas and species protection.As these schemes involved territories of over 100 hectares of farmland, the role of ECs shifted towards the facilitation of contract management among several farmers, thereby strengthening its intermediary position and influence with the government.Having initiated this opportunity for collective funds, the role of cooperatives inherits a degree of endogeneity vis-a-vis the emergence of landscape scale AES.While the contemporary perspective identifies farmer cooperatives as a management tool for collective agri-environmental contracts, it was really the creation of ECs that stimulated the political development towards collective and place-based contracts in the first place.By 2006, collective contracts covered 39% of the total Dutch AES territory (Van Dijk et al. 2015) and by 2012, ECs were present in almost all areas of the Netherlands (Westerink, Termeer, and Manhoudt 2020).Some were relatively large and well-institutionalized bodies with professional staff, while others had started only recently (Westerink, Termeer, and Manhoudt 2020).ECs are organized as associations rather than under cooperative law, but are nevertheless required to submit a formal constitution with named officers and declare annual accounts (Van Dijk et al. 2015).With the goal to 'professionalise' the EC, the Dutch ministry of agriculture pushed towards the establishment of collective AES to cover all of the country's agricultural area, to be managed by larger 'agri-environmental collectives' in the absence of government intervention (Westerink, Termeer, and Manhoudt 2020, 394).
Although the Dutch model of exclusively implementing AES through collective contracts managed by ECs is unique in Europe, it has been shown capable of reducing drawbacks of individual AES (Franks 2011).ECs act as a forum to discuss members' intentions, increasing the predictability for others' decisions and thus circumventing the 'assurance problem' by eliciting a credible signal for own and others' contributions to the collective contract goal (Franks 2011).Table A.2 in the online Appendix [online suplementary file] provides an overview of the benefits that ECs can generate for its members.However, ECs impose costs as the work must be coordinated.Here, EU funding acts partially to compensate those coordination costs, next to transfer and expert consultation expenses.
In parallel to the Dutch model of an EC, farmer associations have developed independently in other countries, of which England's Environmental Stewardship and Australia's Landcare are the most prominent examples in the literature (Emery and Franks 2012;van Dijk et al. 2015;Prager and Vanclay 2010).In the EU, farmers have been eligible to group contracts since the 2013 CAP reform 2 (Westerink et al. 2017).The EU's promotion of 'agroecological practices and systems' has led to a flourishing of Environmental and Economic Interest Groups (GIEE 3 ) in France, from 135 groups in 2015 to 250 in mid-2016 (Hermon 2015;Westerink et al. 2017).Given the status of a legal personality under French law, the GIEE can associate farmers with several other interested parties such as public entities (these may be local authorities, but also public establishments such as water public institutions, such as water agencies, the coastal conservatory or national parks) or private entities (such as consumer or environmental protection associations, processing or marketing companies).Its objective is defined by article L. 315-1 al. 1 of the Rural Code, "the members collectively carry out a multi-year project to modify or consolidate their agricultural production systems or methods and their agronomic practices, aiming at economic, social and environmental performance."As a recognition for the collaborative effort, farmers engaged in a GIEE are eligible for higher levels of public subsidies (Lucas 2021).While an EC does not necessarily need to have the legal status of a GIEE, the environmental objective is common to both.Table A.1 in the online Appendix provides an overview of collective agri-environmental arrangements from various European countries, Australia and New Zealand.Most of these governance arrangements are hybrid; they constitute a mix of top-down government involvement and bottom-up farmer initiatives, often proposing individual contracts or a combination of individual and collective dimensions.Exceptions constitute the cases from the Netherlands, Wales and England, where reported governance arrangements are purely farmer driven for exclusively collective contracts.

Case study of a French agri-environmental farmer collective
The first French EC was created as an official association in 2013 in response to the start of a collective AES in favour of habitat protection for the locally endemic European hamster.Having been considered a farmyard pest up until the 1960s, the European hamster population in Alsace had been driven close to extinction.From 1993 onwards the species was legally protected under the Berne Convention and via the Habitat Framework Directive that has declared the European hamster as an endangered species subject to strict protection (listed in Annex IV to Directive 92/43/EEC "habitats, fauna, flora").According to Franks' (2011) framework, the hamster's habitat is characterized by high asset specificity (high conservation value) and low separability (high perimeter of dispersion) over a large foraging area.Therefore, the hamster population is best managed jointly over an interconnected territory.In response to this "place-based priority conservation target" (Franks 2011, 649), three Strict Protection Zones (SPZ) have been created to preserve the last nuclei of this emblematic species.These SPZ incorporate around twenty Alsatian municipalities and extend over approximately 9,000 hectares.The restoration of a viable population size requires the implementation of a set of agri-environmental measures to reinstate favourable habitat.An environment suitable for the European hamster consists of a diversity in plant cultures and crop cover throughout the active period (March to September) to accommodate its biological needs for foraging space, nutrition intake and shelter from predators.As long as a permanent cover of non-harvested cereal crops is maintained, reproduction rates for female hamsters are around 50%, while plots of alfalfa have shown a survival rate of 100% in the first 16 days for freshly released lab-bred hamsters (Villemey et al. 2013).A cAES has been defined to incentivize the provision of favourable habitat through the adoption of such specific agri-environmental measures (cf.Virion 2018;DGPAAT 2014).Farmers, whose land lies within the SPZ, apply in groups of smaller Collective Zones (CZ) to the cAES.Within the CZ, the group of farmers then needs to collectively provide a favourable crop rate (straw cereals, alfalfa, winter legumes and winter metes) of at least 24% (26% since 2018), in particular on plots where burrows are located, and ensure continuous crop cover until October.The cAES compensates these specific agro-ecological practices with subsidy payments proportional to the size of the area of favourable crops provided by the group of farmers within their CZ.All farmers contracted to the cAES are required to join the EC.
The territorial organization of this EC is defined by the three SPZs within which farmers are coordinated according to 9 CZs.Table 1 shows the evolution in the number of farms joining the association and contracting to the cAES over the years.While the total number of EC members is increasing across years, the ratio to non-member farms in the region seems to decline.This is due to the widening of the protection perimeter throughout the early years 2013-2015.New zones have been included and thus more farms were eligible to contract.One EC is representative of the management of one cAES that can involve multiple CZs but, in order to facilitate communication and coordination, is likely located within one region (Figure 1).Within each CZ, a group of farmers are responsible for ensuring compliance with the collective contract.The group declares the land to be contracted directly to the EC and is eligible for compensation payments through the cAES.The EC is the principal beneficiary of these compensation payments which it then redistributes between its members according to the individual surfaces contracted to the collective scheme.Although, in some cases, individual AES may be implemented in parallel to cAES, individual contracts do not achieve the necessary degree of spatial coordination, as illustrated in Figure 1.Unlike the traditional top- down approach of individual AES, the presence of an EC allows for a bilateral exchange concerning cAES design and implementation.

Methods
This section presents (i) the selection procedure for studies included in the literature review, (ii) the rationale underlying the analytical framework as well as (iii) the reason for the choice of case study.

Literature review
The screening for relevant literature followed the steps of a typical selection procedure.The sources cited were found in January 2021 using a keyword search (i.e.combinations of 'collective agri-environmental management', 'farmer', 'association', 'environmental cooperative') on two search engines, Web of Science and Google Scholar as well as in the bibliography of already identified scientific articles.Results were then filtered by title and abstract.Only studies that dealt with farmer collectives in the scope of agri-environmental management were retained.This selection resulted in the analyses of 31 articles.Among those retained publications are case studies, literature reviews as well as combinations of conceptual and empirical studies.The aim was to include a broad range of social science approaches to studying farmer collectives in order to gain a good overview of the available empirical evidence and the state-of-the-art conceptual advancements.

Analytical framework
Before turning to the complexities of the empirical case study, the review of the literature aimed to systematically identify factors that are repeatedly described as beneficial to collective governance in the context of agri-environmental management.This built the foundation for a framework to structure the study of a complexity of factors active in the dynamics of farmer collectives.
The basis for such a structural framework was found in the factors beneficial to collective action that have been intensively studied by Ostrom and colleagues (e.g. Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003;Ostrom 2010), particularly in the context of common pool resources (non-excludable and rival).Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern (2003), for example, describe five components to adaptive governance of environmental resources that include (i) provide information on rules that are congruent with ecological conditions, (ii) manage conflict over boundaries to resource use, (iii) allocate authority and install accountability mechanisms to ensure compliance, (iv) provide a mix of institutions for stakeholder dialogue, and (v) favour designs that facilitate experimentation, learning, and change.However, agri-environmental management refers mostly to threshold public goods (nonexcludable but non-rival), so that differences in factors promoting collective action in the agri-environmental context can be expected.Measures of cAES prescribe mostly land management practices that make more efficient use of commonly shared resources, rather than necessarily restraining access to it (Mills et al. 2011).Nevertheless, the concept of adaptive governance, broadly defined as "flexible and learning-based collaborations and decision-making processes involving both state and non-state actors, often at multiple levels, with the aim to adaptively negotiate and coordinate management of social-ecological systems" (Schultz et al. 2015, 7369), seems relevant.Adaptive governance contributes to understanding complex and diverse systems that are undergoing major transformations including the evolution of formal and informal institutions for the management and use of shared assets, such as the agri-environment and its ecosystem services (Hatfield-Dodds, Nelson, and Cook 2007).In recognizing the need to govern environmental stakes as complex social-ecological systems, the interplay of various actors embedded in social networks, organizations and institutions, each with different constraints and objectives, is the focal point to adaptive governance (Schultz et al. 2015).In light of this, the general tendency for collective action can still hold: "the context within which individuals face social dilemmas is more important in explaining levels of collective action than relying on a single model of rational behaviour" (Ostrom 2010, 160).We can, thus, stipulate that the regrouping of farmers and other actors in an EC facilitates the construction of favourable contextual factors through, for example, the building of social capital and the emergence of solidarity via shared norms and aims among like-minded individuals.At the same time, these structural variables can help mitigate the transaction costs associated with enrolment in cAES through, among others, mutual learning, shared risks and the transmission of best practices.However, a comprehensive framework that relates the factors active in the dynamics of farmer collectives to the management of collective AES is lacking.During the literature review, a wide range of relevant variables influencing the functioning of farmer collectives for agri-environmental management were retained.In a first step, broadly based on the framework for adaptive governance for common pool resources (Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003), the recurring themes from the literature analysis were adapted into a structural framework that represents the identified socio-psychological and economic-institutional dynamics.These related themes were grouped into 5 categories: (i) Adaptive governance, (ii) Participatory contract design, (iii) Social capital, (iv) Group characteristics and (v) Information.While these 5 categories show some correspondence to the components of Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern (2003), they provide a better fit to the group context of a farmer association and the contractual aspect of cAES.Moreover, while the components of Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern are rather prescriptive towards desired governance actions, the 5 categories of this structural framework allow to first group variables and to then determine their effect on the functioning of ECs with respect to cAES.In a second step, existing frameworks (e.g.Franks 2011;Mills et al. 2011) have helped to confirm the identification of facilitating factors for each of the framework's categories.

Case study
To assess which processes and factors are decisive for a successful farmer collective, empirical evidence has been collected in the form of interviews.Due to strong confidentiality constraints and the sanitary crisis, not all farmers from the different zones could be contacted.However, through the agricultural chamber, telephone interviews with a handful of participating farmers, as well as with the chamber's representative, could be arranged.First-hand statements are available from the interviews with a French EC president and four local farmers; all members of the EC.These first-hand data are cross referenced with second-hand data from the translation and reproduction of interviews with French farmers, as presented in M echin ( 2013), as well as on the program websites (both sources in French).The case study from France is unique as this is the first EC in France that has been explicitly created in 2013 for the management of a new cAES.The French discovery of the EC allows us to trace the processes that led to the governance design.Farmers' roles in the creation of the EC are thus relatively recent and the processes were not only witnessed but actively influenced throughout the past years by those interviewed.In light of the preceding literature analysis, the case study is contrasted with the findings from the literature and factors relevant to the success of the EC are corroborated, where possible, or otherwise amended.

Results: facilitating factors for environmental cooperatives
The results are divided into (i) the literature review on the facilitating factors influencing the EC's success in governing cAES and (ii) the application of these factors to the case study.

Literature review
The factors facilitating the role of ECs in managing cAES are described according to five categories: Adaptive governance, Participatory Contract Design, Social Capital, Group Characteristics, and Information, as described above.This section presents an illustration of a subset of factors for each category, while the complete list of factors is summarized in Table 2.This means that not all references in the tables are discussed in the text to keep the latter concise.A complete overview also on factors that increase transaction costs is provided in Table A.4 of the online Appendix.

Adaptive governance
Social, economic and political settings, the resource system, the governance system and the actors themselves all influence the transaction costs to collective action (Amblard 2021).In the scope of AES, transaction costs for both the farmer and the regulator may  2015).As the EC traditionally operates bottom-up, imposed top-down support is likely to be perceived as intrusive and might encounter resistance (H€ afner and Piorr 2021).
Rather, the role of the EC in cAES can be understood as that of a 'bridging organization' that lowers the cost of collaboration (Prager 2015).The factors retained for the category Adaptive Governance are: local facilitator to assist in group development process, access to high quality advice and support, group product marketing, offer financial support in 2 stages (planning and management), conflict resolution mechanisms.

Participatory contract design
The interlinkage between farmer cooperatives and geographically bound, collective contracts seem self-evident: because they are inevitably involved with the agricultural territory of their communities, local farmer cooperatives can provide more detailed insight into, and assessment of, environmental questions concerning their territory.By being the principal modulators of their land, collectives play a key role for making cAES more cost and time efficient (Franks 2011) as well as for including other stakeholders on matters of shared responsibility (Daniel 2012).Whereas, traditionally, governance for collective action in agriculture used to be either imposed by the government or completely left to self-initiation (Villamayor-Tomas et al. 2019), hybrid approaches may enable governments to promote self-organization through the establishment of new rules adapted to the local collective action situation.Rather than leaving the farmer alone in figuring out a way to provide ecosystem services, these hybrid arrangements could lead to shared responsibilities and to the participatory design of measures.In a role-playing game with French farmers, Hardy et al. (2020) find that the less constraining agroecological practices are and the more freedom to choose among them, the more likely farmers are to contract, as the risk of non-compliance and additional costs are reduced.This may explain why inertia to adopt more challenging sustainable practices is so widespread.Other studies have confirmed the principal motivation to join AES is support for shortcomings in revenue (Daniel 2011b; H€ afner and Piorr 2021; Dessart, Barreiro-Hurl e, and van Bavel 2019; Batary et al. 2015).
Incentive compatibility is thus an important factor in scheme design, as has been emphasized for the CAP 2020 reform: the mobilization of financial support for farmers' collectives and cooperative dynamics is seen as decisive in the construction of agroecological knowledge for the promotion of sustainable practices (Slimi et al. 2021).Through experience sharing, peer-to-peer farmer networks are considered as the creators of a knowledge base that is results-based and adapted to the local context (Blesh and Wolf 2014;Slimi et al. 2021).Integrating this collective learning process in scheme design is thought to establish a connectedness to the "wider sustainable agriculture movement" by establishing shared values, aims and norms (Slimi et al. 2021, 269).The factors retained for the category Participatory Contract Design are: adapt engagement strategies to local features and resources, allow farmers to submit own landscape-scale environmental plans, allow groups to develop own solutions and implementation rules, offer single payment to properly constituted group to distribute, clearly defined boundaries and responsibilities, financial incentive compatibility, perceived behavioural control.

Social capital
According to Slimi et al (2021), the peer-to-peer network of ECs has the potential to substantially alter the farmers' value system.They describe three processes relevant to the individuals' agroecological transition: (1) the shift in criteria for peer recognition, (2) relevant skills acquisition through social learning, (3) construction of meaning through an emotionally evaluated experience.An initially negative attitude towards cAES is found to be due to farmers' scepticism about others' willingness to cooperate (Villamayor-Tomas et al. 2019;H€ afner and Piorr 2021).Instead of being driven by a fear of high transaction costs, reluctance to contract under collective schemes seems to be a trust issue.While external institutions do have the potential to facilitate coordination between farmers (e.g. by providing advice, resolving conflicts, building trust, raising awareness and providing a platform for dialogue) their role needs to be carefully delimited.Otherwise, the risk is high that by unburdening farmers from communication and coordination efforts, most of the benefits related to social capital and group solidarity are excluded (H€ afner and Piorr 2021; Westerink et al. 2017).Here, the 'power of collectives' is recognized as a key factor in support of transition dynamics to agri-environmental sustainability (Slimi et al. 2021, 275).By steering the distal 4 decision environment (

Group characteristics
Group characteristics such as group size, heterogeneity of attitudes and objectives, as well as the level of education can moderate the transaction costs imposed by collective action (Amblard 2021;Boncinelli et al. 2016).Moreover, like-minded members (e.g.environmental attitudes) who are willing to cooperate, circulate information and engage in mutual monitoring while endorsed by a stable, trust-building organization, are supposed to increase the functionality of an EC (Franks 2011).Group size is a strong mediator for the degree of heterogeneity within the group.Smaller groups achieve a higher degree of homogeneity, which reduces monitoring costs due to social conformity (Boncinelli et al. 2016;Prager 2015).When self-governing groups grow large, nested structures are considered to facilitate the collaborative effort (Ostrom, 1990;Westerink et al. 2017).Franks (2011) notices that creating one EC for each protection zone would be a cumbersome organizational enterprise that would most likely lead farmers to adhere to multiple ECs depending on which zones their farmland touches upon.This could easily imply several memberships for the same cAES, which clearly does not strike as the most efficient organization of collective efforts.On the other hand, collectives too large in number in terms of adhering farmers introduce increasing heterogeneity of preferences, which may imply complications for reaching agreements and for coordination among members (Franks 2011).However, having one cAES managed by a single EC can centralize organizational and informational efforts and keep bureaucratic procedures to a minimum.Centralized EC management can oversee and homogenize the recruitment of participants, contract management, monitoring and payment without interference by government (Westerink et al. 2017).Next to gaining leverage in negotiations with government authorities, a larger scope is also likely to increase fairness, as the same rules and procedures are applied coherently to all members.Thus, a trade-off between group size and efficiency seems to arbitrate the appropriate size for an EC.Preferences for the role of the EC also differ across farm types and farmers' characteristics (H€ afner and Piorr 2021).Accordingly, part-time farmers and those without formal agricultural training value support for cooperation.Full-time farmers with formal agricultural training tended to reject support for cooperation.Nevertheless, this heterogeneity in farm types is considered as given while analysing the social dynamics at work in collaborative arrangements.Rather, the facilitating characteristics of the larger community of farmers are investigated here.The factors retained for the category Group Characteristics are: limit group size, nested structures, self-correction, members with common aims and objectives, members known to each other.

Information
As ecosystems and social systems are recognized to be continuously evolving, their management must involve flexible and adaptive procedures that are responsive to constant change (Prager, Reed, and Scott 2012).Learning through social comparison, adaptation to injunctive norms and imitation of peers require feedback processes, flexibility and monitoring of results from agri-environmental management practices (Westerink et  ) have all previously been found to support the collective adoption of agroecological practices.However, communication and feedback processes have to be actively managed and explicitly encouraged to create a basis for joint monitoring, learning, and scheme adjustments (Prager, Reed, and Scott 2012).Therefore, integrative feedback loops need to produce comprehensive and understandable information about results achieved through the AES.Only then can the design and impacts of the AES reflect local needs in its administrative arrangements (Prager, Reed, and Scott 2012).The factors retained for the category Information are: knowledge of the local ecological system, predictability of system dynamics, awareness and availability of conservation options, provide group training and learning opportunities, feedback on results achieved, monitoring of measurable indicators of ecological efforts made.

Case study findings: an application of the facilitating factors
In order to examine how the facilitating factors are applied and structurally integrated into the emergence of the French EC, interview evidence is presented that aims to develop a comprehensive position of ECs in the management of collective agri-environmental contracts.The facilitating factors identified in the literature review are compared according to the 5 categories of the structural framework to those found in the case study.
All facilitating factors from Table 2 that are confirmed in the case study are listed in the text as are newly identified factors.Table A.3 in the online Appendix summarizes whether a factor is confirmed or not confirmed and lists new factors that have been identified in the case study.

Adaptive governance
As described in Figure the EC is managing one collective contract for this region by coordinating several SPZ that comprise multiple CZ.The president of the EC is a local farmer who has been elected by the farmers contracting under the cAES.In governing the implementation of the cAES, the EC works with a number of relevant institutions.
Next to the chamber of agriculture (CA), those comprise the National Biodiversity Office (OFB), the Departmental Directorate of Territories (DDT), the Regional Directorate for the Environment, Planning and Housing (DREAL) and the French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS).Before a new contract for the cAES is set up, all stakeholders meet and discuss the measure specifications in detail (factor: access to high quality advice and support).From the outset, the EC took over the management of the collective contract in order to gain autonomy and locus of control for its members.What becomes very clear from the following statement, is that this EC is certainly not a government-imposed contract condition.Rather, it is a bottom-up farmer initiative, as it was the farmers who preferred the creation of an EC to an external coordinator for the collective contract.
It's a 'loi 1901' association, 5 so it's a basic association to begin with, like any other French association.And so, we created this association because at one point there was a question why the CA would not animate the measure 100%.And finally, since the CA already manages a lot of measures, what was important for us was that the money that is paid by the state is paid in full to the farmers.And so that's why we really wanted to separate even if the CA with [the representative of the CA] in particular is following the measure.Therefore, [to improve] clarity at the farmer level I think it was the right solution.(Local EC president) Control over the payment process seems to be a central driver to the mission of the EC (new factor: control over payment process).This system is largely preferred by the participating farmers who previously experienced long delays and sometimes incorrect compensation amounts with the government-led remuneration system.
Several focus committees, organized by the chamber of agriculture and the EC, take place in autumn to determine needs and engagements for the following year's cAES contributions for each zone.This means that farmers declare their favourable surface to the chamber of agriculture up to 5 months prior to actual crop sowing in spring.The meeting in autumn does not end before farmers of the respective CZ have declared sufficient surfaces in order to reach at least the contribution threshold.
The meetings held at the occasion of focus committees are a formal means of declaring officially to the community of contracting farmers the administrative changes for the next year.The need for a platform for communication is demonstrated nicely by a farmer stating that "at the [EC] meeting, with the head of the [OFB], it takes an hour [to explain his point of view], and behind it we discuss everything that is going on."(M echin 2013, 35).Well beyond those formal focus committees, farmers are also exchanging informally over implementation and concerns with the cAES within their communities (see the online Appendix, quote Q1).This informal exchange of communication further strengthens the sense of collectivism and helps farmers to gather and present concerns and needs to the respective authorities, such as the president of the EC who works in close contact with a representative from the CA.The EC provides farmers with a platform fostered by understanding of the agricultural profession and eye-to-eye communication where controversy is possible (new factor: platform for formal and informal exchange).For instance, together with advice from the OFB, the location of plots for favourable habitat proximity to the burrows is determined (Q2).
The collective contract also requires additional time investment in the management of the measures' application.Especially, the president of the EC has a quantifiable management role at the interface of farmers, government authorities and biodiversity associations (factor: local facilitator).While the representative from the chamber of agriculture commits up to 50% of his full-time position to the coordination of the collective contract, the president could not make a precise estimation of the hours devoted to the management of the EC.Although the workload associated with the management of the EC may vary across periods over the year, the president seems to have integrated this role as a regular evening occupation next to his full-time farm work.This time commitment seems to be a considerable part of his activities (Q3).
Since 2020, a marketing initiative for the wheat produced in compliance with the collective measure is being created. 6Funding has been made available by regional authorities for initial marketing and production activities (factor: support group product marketing).First, in 2020, the potential for marketing the agricultural produce with a hamster label has been evaluated in interviews with producers and local supply chain operators.From 2021 onwards, the first produce including wheat, bread, biscuits, and granola have entered the local market under the brand 'Grand Hamster d'Alsace'.In 2023, the product range is supposed to increase further to include malt produce such as beer.In July 2022, a GIE 7 has been formed between the EC, the CA and local food processing companies for the management and communication of the brand.Although the marketing of the hamster brand encounters some difficulties (logistics of small quantities, upfront investment and cost management for local producers, unknown market response), the brand provides an outlet for farmers' responsibly produced harvest and social recognition for their efforts.This initiative spurs farmers not only with enthusiasm and purpose but also with pride for their work.
Nevertheless, several challenges have been encountered in the management of the collective contract.First, although the measure set out to circumvent variations in perimeter by engaging the participating farmers over a 5-year period, not all disruptive events can be prevented.For example, in 2015, a farmer stopped participating in the collective scheme and has since refused to declare his areas or to cultivate favourable crops. 8Similarly, administrative practicalities and logistical problems can arise that may not be transparent to outside authorities. 9Such disruptions inhibit the continuity of the measure on the same area of farmland, which most likely comes at the expense of ecosystem improvement.Second, the changes made to the AES specifications are not always justified to the farmers who have to work with the constraints.This can cause frustration and reluctance to renew the contract (Q4).Third, navigating between the interests of different stakeholder groups can be challenging (Q5).Fourth, although the participation in the cAES is voluntary, freeriding still exists to some degree under the collective approach (Q6).
The above challenges require a significant amount of coordination, as well as sensible insight and problem-solving capacities in direct contact with the farmers (factor: conflict resolution mechanisms).In tackling these challenges, the EC takes the role of a central and coordinating institution.The president confirms that the role of the EC is, above all, a facilitating one, mediating between the different stakeholder groups (Q7).In case of conflict, the president of the EC mediates between farmers (Q3).Together with the CA solutions or alternative arrangements are sought (Q17).Farmers appreciate the help with cooperation, the EC allows them to synergies and to learn from each other's experiences (Q8).

Participatory contract design
The joint meetings among EC members, the CA and the OFB allow for discussions that highlight all aspects of the agri-environmental situation at stake and thereby make deliberate incremental shifts in decision-making at all possible.The latest insights from teams of researchers who study the hamsters' habitat, nutrition and reproductive requirements (e.g.Tissier et al. 2018) are incorporated at the time of revisions of the contract specifications.Farmers see this collaboration as an opportunity to experiment with innovative agricultural practices (Q9).This results in context-specific solutions that reflect the local ecosystem needs and constraints (factor: adapt engagement strategies to local features and resources).
Many of the farmers had already contracted under the individual AES (crop rotation for habitat protection) but have come to find the collective contract more advantageous, despite the increased coordination effort.The farmers explained that the collective measures' specifications are evolving with recent experiences and that the collective contract allows them to be more flexible within their CZ, while the collective efforts are generally more structured (factor: allow groups to develop own solutions and implementation rules).For instance, when rotating cultures across plots, some favourable crops, such as wheat, can only be cultivated every three years on the same plot.The collective measure allows them to alternate between different plots, which would not have been possible with an individual AES that is strictly bound to specific plots.
Remuneration is handled directly by the EC.The EC distributes subsidy payments to its members in proportion to individual surface contributions (offer single payment to a properly constituted group to distribute).Farmers place more confidence in the distribution of payments through the EC and find reassurance in their group when payments are (sometimes substantially) delayed by the government.Next to control over the payment process, financial incentive compatibility clearly is key in getting farmers on board for the cAES.Although only some farmers' motivation for participating under the collective contract is exclusively financial, even among the organic farmers it becomes clear that the cAES payments are an important compensation for transaction costs (factor: financial incentive compatibility).Some farmers noticed that the subsidy payments did not cover the loss in income due to the plummeting market prices for cereals (Q10).Others stated that they could almost exactly cover their transaction costs with the subsidy payments (Q11).However, additional working hours for scheme compliance were almost never counted nor officially remunerated.While some farmers wish for higher payments per hectare (Q12), all of them, even the most pro-environmental farmers, agree that if there were no payments at all, the efforts would not be sustained (Q13, Q14).Even though some farmers set out with purely economic motives, they soon come to recognize the ecological and social benefits provided through the cAES (Q14).Overall, the farmers seem to place more confidence in the collectively managed measure, accounting for social conformity and self-monitoring.This newly found collective goal seems to reassure farmers among themselves that they are doing the right thing (Q15).
While individual contracts were perceived as being constraining and imposed with pressure, the cAES allows farmers to collectively find a solution (Q16, Q17).In an approach of 'participatory democracy' farmers are encouraged to agree among themselves on the environmental management effort each farmer can contribute (M echin 2013, 35).In those cases, the EC can help homogenize efforts to integrate all in a dynamic community exposed to structural changes (Q18).The gain in participation and inclusive decision making through the EC is particularly important to the farmers (factor: perceived behavioural control): [ … ] this is very important, to the whole hamster project we were ready to commit on one condition: that nothing was imposed on us.(EC president) Together with the other stakeholders (teams of researchers, government authorities), new management practices are first discussed and then amended to the practical needs of the agricultural conditions, before eventually being adopted by the farmers (Q19, new factor: iterative process between farmers, researchers and authorities).
The EC practices self-monitoring among its members.Each group of farmers oversees the application of measures (or lack thereof) in their CZ.Usually, farmers stick to the surfaces that were agreed upon in the focus meeting (factor: clearly defined boundaries and responsibilities).However, there have been rare cases where individual farmers did not continue with the cAES, in spite of their 5-year engagement.This was either due to severe illness, farm succession or unresolvable interpersonal conflict.Noteworthy is the existence of a competition between groups of farmers in the different CZs.Each CZ tries to outcompete the others in terms of contracting more land and in accommodating the highest number of burrows (Q20).

Social capital
Some farmers reported to have found more social interaction and community inclusion through the collective scheme.Although most farmers are aware that some of their group members may not hold up their contributions to the collective contract, they are confident that together they can find a solution (factors: shared awareness, norms of trust and reciprocity).
Next to solidarity among each other, farmers reported that they had found a collective spirit for the environment, together with a stronger voice towards authorities (factor: good communication).The farmers further stated that the social dimension made them want to represent a good example to other farmers and helped them to develop best practices with regards to the measure's application as they could learn from each other's successes and frustrations (Q7, Q8, factor: reciprocal learning and cooperative spirit).In some CZs leadership was very pronounced, with a core of around three motivated farmers that had started out under the cAES and later on also convinced their neighbours to join (Q22, factor: strong, local leadership).However, the leadership role is not understood in the same way across groups.While some leaders seek to maximize the collective subsidy payments, others seem to want to spread best practices in the interest of environmental improvements (Q23).The differences in leadership roles seem to be strongly connected to whether farmers act on intrinsic or extrinsic motivations.Farmer 1 recognizes the social benefit of bringing even the most isolated farmers into a collective project and re-establishing a sense of community (Q24).Farmer 4, on the contrary, is very pragmatic in using the collective setting for the channelling of payments towards the co-financing of required purchases for the measure (Q25).These different intentions among the unofficial leaders translate into different motivations for the entire CZ, influencing the groups' norms and broader functioning.The EC in a position to harmonize among the different groups' values and to direct all towards the common goal.

Group characteristics
As can be seen from Figure 1, the EC is managing one collective contract that includes several zones in one region.This includes the governance of three SPZs within which the EC coordinates nine CZs that can each vary in size from 6 to 27 members (factors: nested structures, limit group size).Members of each CZ are neighbours and likely have a shared history (factor: members known to each other).Through the reciprocal monitoring and the common goal, deviations from the measure's specification are usually noticed immediately and either directly resolved or compensated through another farmer (Q21, factor: self-correction).Around 18 farms across CZs have joined a CUMA 10 to facilitate the purchase of equipment needed for the implementation of this cAES (Q26).A CUMA is a shared arrangement for the collective purchase and use of agricultural machinery.Farmers of the CUMA can be considered as experienced in integrating collective arrangements into their way of working.They demonstrate an ability to align their aims and objectives with the members of their shared work arrangement to foster collaboration and to work towards a higher goal (factor: members with common aims and objectives, new factor: experience with shared arrangements).The CUMA helped farmers to avoid pesticide use and to apply innovative farming practices in favour of the environment.

Information
Through meetings, and in collaboration with the biologists from the CNRS and ecologists from the OFB, farmers have learned about the needs and habits of the species (Q2, Q7).They gained a better understanding of their impact on the hamster and the related ecosystem through training and dialogue with the involved environmental and scientific organizations (factors: provide group training and learning opportunities, predictability of system dynamics, awareness and availability of conservation options).While the hamster used to be perceived as a farmland pest up until the 1960s, it is now understood to be a bioindicator for soil and ecosystem quality such as oxygenated and fertile loess soils and the presence of numerous useful invertebrates (factor: knowledge of the local ecosystem).
Feedback on the environmental outcomes that are achieved through the farmers' efforts is highly appreciated and vital in keeping farmers' intrinsic motivation up (factor: feedback on results achieved).Hamster burrows are counted every year in spring and serve as a proxy for estimating the population size in each CZ (factor: monitoring of measurable indicators of ecological efforts made).Similar to the farmers in Hardy et al.'s (2020) role-playing game, the groups of neighbouring CZs are in competition with each other over their achievements (Q20).
Yet, there seems to be scope for more information on the practices defined by the measure.It may be that some theoretical solutions or findings from the laboratory do not translate exactly onto the field.Farmers can find it impertinent to comply with imposed methods from organizations outside of the agricultural profession, especially if they feel that understanding for their professional techniques is lacking (Q27).

Discussion and conclusion
The comparison between findings from literature and the case study confirmed most of the facilitating factors from the analytical framework.Only two factors could not be confirmed for the case study: financial support in two stages is not mentioned in the interviews, and farmers are not allowed to submit their own landscape-scale environmental plans, but rather contribute to the conception of the cAES through feedback and dialogue.Four new facilitating factors are identified through the case study.First, the adaptive governance dimension requires for the EC to be conceived explicitly as a platform for formal and informal exchange.This facilitating factor has, so far, been treated as implicit to the workings of a farmer association.However, as expressed by Daniel (2011aDaniel ( , 2012)), the EC is in a position to foster solidarity within the local farmer community but also within the wider social system.In this sense, the EC provides the foundation for uniting agricultural interests and representing those in its contact and cooperation with actors from beyond the farming profession.Therefore, conceiving the EC as a central hub for multilateral communication seems to be decisive for its role as a facilitator for collective agri-environmental management.Second, control over the payment process turned out to be a central factor for facilitating trust among the farmers who participate in the cAES.Third, the participatory contract design is led as an iterative process between farmers, researchers and authorities.Rather than letting farmers develop environmental objectives and plans on their own, the consultation among the different stakeholders ensures that all aspects of the cAES undertaking are considered, including social, economic, and administrative dimensions.Moreover, this dynamic process allows for improvements and alterations to the contract specifications along the way.Fourth, concerning the group characteristics, members who bring experience to the group, with shared arrangements such as CUMA or GIE, can provide guidance for establishing functional collaboration within the EC.
Although the case study shows that an EC can be explicitly conceived for the governance of collaborative agri-environmental management, it also highlighted that this does imply additional challenges for adaptive governance.Participatory contract design has to be flexible enough to be adapted along the route according to conditions arising with time or that have been neglected at the initial outset of the contract period.This is particularly important as only contracts specified in accordance with practical farming requirements and local ecosystem constraints will be supported.This finding is coherent with those of others who state that among cAES participants, only the least invasive measures were considered for adoption (Hardy et al. 2020;Emery and Franks 2012).
The information exchange between the EC and the contract authorities concerning the measure's specification in line with ecosystem requirements and administrative matters show need for improvement.While collective measures need to be adapted to locally specific environmental situations, they also have to take the practical requirements of farming into account.Here, it would be helpful to include farmers' perspectives on the proposed practices beforehand or to incorporate pilot trials that can then be approved if useful.Farmers highlight that sufficient flexibility in the application of measures would allow them to make better use of their local and context-specific knowledge.Essentially, workshops or feedback sessions that ensure the integration of improved practices into the measures' specification would be helpful.
Group characteristics, such as the shared history and degree of conflict, do influence the degree of functionality the EC can achieve.Establishing a sound basis of social capital dimension is key in facilitating collaborative efforts.As expressed by Mills et al. (2011), being based on the principle of cooperation, EC can be understood as a counterbalance to the individualistic farming style.Roles of shared cognition, group identity, fairness, transparency, and feedback emerge in the construction of social capital through the EC and serve in homogenizing norms and objectives for the collaborative effort.
Therefore, social capital is an integral part of the EC and can be seen as its key feature, as it is both facilitating the functioning of the EC and evolving with the EC's institutional setting.For instance, the different intentions among the unofficial leaders, as cited in Sec. 4, are likely to translate into different dynamics within the groups.The intrinsically motivated leader may install a dynamic of trust in doing the right thing for the environment and foster solidarity among group members.This likely reinforces all the benefits to social capital, such as mutual learning and support.The extrinsically focused leader may create a dynamic of economic efficiency, focusing mostly on the financial aspects of the measure and maximizing business interests across the collective aim.This likely neglects most of the benefits to social capital, as only little or no informal bonds between farmers are formed.
Moreover, the interviewed farmers mentioned a competition between zones in meeting the measures' objectives.This inter-group competition could be used in smart contract design.By providing inter-group comparisons of environmental outcomes achieved in the previous year (such as hamster burrows per CZ), the EC could spur the involvement of participating farmers.The contest could facilitate the success of the EC by increasing intrinsic motivation to participate, raising pride among participants and fostering awareness within the wider community.On the other hand, it depends on the EC's institutional ability to ensure that the inter-group competition stays positive and does not result in groups undermining or distorting each other's efforts.As such, the EC goes beyond the governance of a collective contract, intertwining the collective spirit into the broader farming culture.This is confirmed by research that recognizes the EC to provide a "sense of a wider purpose, [ … ] bigger than just farming" (Mills et al. 2011, 73), to lend a 'collective insurance' (Hardy et al. 2020) and to create a 'feeling of belonging' (Prager 2015).
Together, these points underline the importance of an accompanying facilitator for the cAES.In the form of a farmer association in close cooperation with other stakeholders, the current EC versions propose a promising tool for collective management of environmental challenges under AES.As a democratic and participatory organization, the EC grants farmers the opportunity to participate in the design of collective AES and even beyond the implementation phase.This analysis has shown that the EC can be explicitly conceived as an institution for the complex process of coordinating individual farmers in a collective AES contract.Therefore, its role is above all a facilitating one, mediating between the different interest groups and helping farmers to cooperate for a coherent agri-environmental effort.Future work can determine which organizational form is best suited for the role of ECs as cAES facilitators and how ECs compare to other forms of intermediaries.Westerink, Termeer, and Manhoudt (2020) have studied the boundaries of self-governance in the context of an increasing professionalization of ECs in the Netherlands.However, while the historical development of farmer collectives leads back to the 1980s, they are still voluntarily assembled according to the mechanics of informal, autonomous associations.The study of organizational differences in the formation and governance among ECs that are created explicitly for cAES governance would shed further light on the need for institutionalizing the EC as a formal and mandatory body for joint AES governance.
In this study, a literature review on the role of ECs led to the of an analytical framework to categorize the factors facilitating the governance of cAES through the EC.Confronting the recent spreading of collective farmer initiatives in Europe by contributing a new case study from France, the workings of this type of EC that is explicitly conceived for the governance of collective contracts could be highlighted in detail.The analytical framework allows for comparing the factors from the case study to those identified in the existing literature.Next to a general need for adaptive and participatory governance, social capital has shown to be the most important dimension for value creation through the EC.Through its central position, the EC may exert a paradigm shift, therefore altering perceptions and eventually harmonizing attitudes and prevailing norms among its members.By increasing coherence among farmers' value systems, by reducing uncertainty about others' efforts and by synchronizing spatial coordination, ECs can constitute a transparent, cost-efficient and reliable instrument indispensable to successful collective agri-environmental contracts.Beyond that, the central and modulating capacity of ECs essentially represents a holistic approach to unifying and empowering farmers as the key actors in the management of agri-environmental governance.defined by an agreement under which at least two people decide to share their knowledge and / or their activity for a purpose other than profit sharing or profit seeking.This text provides that the association is, in principle, non-profit.Thus, it differs from a traditional company and is relatively uncomplicated to be declared.6.Source: Dossier-de-presse-Lancement-de-fili ere-GHAVF.pdf(biograndest.org).7. GIE: Groupement d'int erêt economique.8. Source: interview with a representative of the chamber of agriculture, conducted on 19 December 2019.9.For example, it may happen that a previously included farm identification is not included in the subsidy request for a subsequent year if the farmer has not declared areas that year, there is a change of the farm's registry, or there is a change of ownership.Also, if there are non-EC members who maintain small plots of favorable surface, they often are included in the count of the total surface per CZ, however not remunerated.10.CUMA: Coop erative d'Utilisation de Mat eriel Agricole.The CUMA belongs to the family of service cooperatives.Its members subscribe to shares of the social capital which allows the acquisition of the equipment necessary for the activity of the cooperative and to guarantee the loans used to finance the machinery.Any natural or legal person with agricultural interests in the territorial area of the cooperative can become a member while the number of members is limited by the working capacity of the machines.

Figure 1 .
Figure 1.Schematic representation of collective AES as organized, e.g. in France, under European Common Agricultural Policy.

Notes 1 .
Daniel (2012) defines solidarity as the set of reciprocal links which, in an organization, mark the stability of the relationships between individuals and allow for a collective project to be sustainable.2. See consideration 29 of the Regulation (EU) 1305/2013.3. GIEE: Groupement d'int erêt economique et environnemental.4. The distal decision environment of the farmer consists of generalized principles that are applied over a wider spectrum of specific decision situations and thus steer multiple behaviors.Examples are attitudes towards risk or the environment and social preferences.5. Loi 1901 association: The law of 1 July, 1901 sets the legal framework for an association

Table 1 .
Eligible farms in the protection area and association members per year.

Table 2 .
Mills et al. (2011)2016r the governance of cAES through an environmental cooperative.By targeting specific regions and by setting local environmental priorities, adaptive governance can increase the probability of a measure's success and the profitability for contracting farmers(Boncinelli et al. 2016).However,Mills et al. (2011)advocate that participatory approaches can only supplement, but not replace, government implication in AES.They recommend an increase in trust between government and farmers accompanied by a cultural change in governance arrangements.
(Westerink et al. 2017;H€ afner and Piorr 2021;Mills et al. 2011)on and contracting costs and (iii) monitoring, enforcement and compliance costs(Amblard 2021;Bartolini et al. 2021;Burton and Schwarz 2013; Quill erou and Fraser 2010).Adaptive governance is needed for cAES that takes into account the scope of such transaction costs, as well as the economic uncertainty relative to the collaborative outcome(Hardy et al. 2020;Westerink et al. 2017;Boncinelli et al. 2016).Sufficient financial means and support structures are essential in accompanying farmer communities in the transition and application of agroecological practices.centralizedrepresentation of a community of farmers is considered to lend legitimacy and negotiation leverage to the agroecological movement which is relevant for farmers' participation in the design of cAES(Westerink et al. 2017;H€ afner and Piorr 2021;Mills et al. 2011).In fact, it is already the mere presence of a facilitating body representative of farmers' interests that increases their intention to participate in cAES (van Dijk et al.

Table 2
Dessart,  Barreiro-Hurl e, and van Bavel 2019)of the individual farmer (i.e.attitudes, values, core beliefs), ECs have the capacity to create norms of trust and reciprocity that align cooperative intentions and foster social learning.Moreover, the collective contract and presence of the EC imply a certain degree of risk sharing for participants.This 'collective insurance' was found to be considered as preferable to individual contracts (Hardy et al. Mills et al. 2011)tutional settings, however, the importance of strong local leadership for landscape scale inter-farm cooperation is unanimously advocated (e.g.Amblard 2021;Mills et al. 2011).The factors retained for the category Social Capital are: norms of trust and reciprocity, shared awareness of common problem or threat, reciprocal learning and cooperative spirit, strong, local leadership, good communication.