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A Treatise on God, and The Related

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Chapter 1

Introduction

In this text to develop the knowledge we have upon God we will define God as a being which possesses all perfection (positive properties) which is the following, $[P(\varphi)]$ means " φ is positive"]

$$G(x) \Leftrightarrow \forall \varphi[P(\varphi) \Rightarrow \varphi(x)]$$

Also there is the another one which is synonymous with this one, because a being with all perfections is maximally great, and a maximally great being has all perfections so this other definition is

$$G(x) \Leftrightarrow \forall y [(y \neq x) \Rightarrow x \succ y]$$

"x has the property of maximal greatness if and only if for-all other things which are not x, x is greater than those things."

Or in other words "x is maximally great if all other things which are not x are less great than x". [Note: By greatness I mean metaphysical greatness which I will introduce in the next chapter.]

Although I wont be using this definition in formal language I just wanted to Inform that in any case one can swap these definitions.

And although we will show proofs of God, to describe God's attributes we will need to start with the Underlying assumption that if God exists he would Necessarily exists. ($\Box \exists x G(x)$).

And as a note to the reader $\triangle x$ means "non-contingent x", $\neg \triangle x$ means "contingent

x", and C(x) means "cause of x". Also, chg(x) means "change in x", and lastly Cmp(x) stands for "composition of x", \lor means "or(sometimes also)" and \land means "and(but/however)".

What is the Goal for This Treatise?

The Goal of this text is to provide strong arguments for the existence of God, try to describe at least a little bit of what God is like, show the philosophy of such, then to provide a model to try to show creations Relation to God. Also another goal for this text is that all the arguments for God are consistent with each other, and hence the philosophy and modals developed would also apply for the entire treatise. This would be because throughout the treatise God is considered to be maximally Great.

Also for the entirety of the book, whenever I say substance or essence I use them as synonyms. So you will read things like, essence, substance, or substance/essence, maybe even ousia. However these all share the same meaning.

And any time I say The Good or The "Form" of The Good, I mean the same thing. So sometimes you will see me simply write The Good, sometimes The "Form" of The Good, and(or) sometimes The Good(The "Form" of The Good), but all these share the same meaning too.

Chapter 2

God's Divine Attributes

If God existed what would 'his' attributes be? This is what this chapter is means to answer.

Also once these attributes are discussed and shown to be reasonable to the substance/essence of God, these will be taken as fact in all other chapters.

2.1 Coherence and Logical Derivation of the Divine Attributes

Classically God's Divine Attributes are the following,

God's Transcendence & Uniqueness, God's Immutability, God's Divine Simplicity, God's Aesity, God's Person-Hood .

God is a maximally Great being (being with all perfections).

$$G(x) \Leftrightarrow \forall \varphi[P(\varphi) \Rightarrow \varphi(x)]$$

God's Transcendence & Uniqueness refers to God's Property of being above all things, beyond infinity. His uniqueness means that there is one and only of such being.[Note: $x \succ y$ means "x is metaphysically greater than y", which in just the aspect of power, would mean more powerful. However I will write a proper definition for 'metaphysically greater than', which will be the following,

$$x \succ y \Leftrightarrow \Sigma_x > \Sigma_y$$

Now what does Σ_x and Σ_y mean? Well it means the domain of x or y which means the amount of power(hence also perfections). For example Omnipotence is much greater(more powerful) than simple perfections such as(sometimes) happiness. And power is merely the amount of potential which can be actualized from a system with potentiality. For example, nothingness has the potentiality to change into a universe, hence the act to be able to create a universe from nothing is an act of power, and hence whatever thing which can do that is metaphysically greater than those which cannot.

It could be said that uniqueness is a positive property, because there is no Challenger to whatever you are unique in, and hence More greatness, and greatness is a positive property, let Υ mean "uniqueness" [$\Upsilon = \exists ! x$], so I will write

 $P(\Upsilon)$

Now it can finally be written.

$$D_f G(x) \Rightarrow [\Box(\nexists(\Pi; \Pi(x) \succ G(x))) \land \Box \exists ! G(x)]$$

Which states "The definition of G(x) implies that necessarily there does not exists a property Π such that if x was ever to possessed Π , $\Pi(x)$ would be metaphysically greater than G(x), and there exists one and only one G(x)".

God's Immutability means God's inability to change, this is showed by the expression, [Note: chg(x) means change in x.]

$$\Box \nexists chg(P(\varphi)) \Rightarrow [_{Df}G(x) \Rightarrow \Box \nexists chg(x)]$$

This states "Necessarily positive properties don't change, which implies that by definition necessarily the maximally great object x does not change."

All objects with a cause, depend(or at least depended) on their cause and(or) vise versa, therefore the following statement will be written a such. $\forall x[(\exists C(x) \Rightarrow \neg \Delta x) \lor (\neg \Delta x \Rightarrow \exists C(x))]$, This and states "For all x the existence of a cause of x implies that x is contingent, or the contingency of an object x implies that there exists a cause of x". However this can be rewritten as, $\forall x[\exists C(x) \Leftrightarrow \neg \Delta x]$ Now this states that for all x the exists a cause of x if and only of x is contingent, this statement will be called. HoweverIf something has a composition other than itself it means that it is dependent of what it is composed of, which implies that is is the negation

of non-contingent (contingent), this can be written as, $\forall x [Cmp(x) \neq x \Leftrightarrow \neg \Delta x]$ This expression states, "For all x, the composition of x is not x if and only if, if x is contingent". I will call it the axiom of composition.

Now if one combines the 2 statements above one gets the following statement which I will call "The Axiom of Global Dependence", It is written as,

$$\forall x [\neg \triangle x \Leftrightarrow (\exists C(x) \lor Cmp(x) \neq x)]$$

Which means "For all x, x is contingent if and only if there exists a cause of x or(also) the composition of x is not equal to x". This will be useful in further writing.

If an object is non-contingent then its existence is guaranteed and hence necessary, but if it is contingent then its existence is not necessary, therefore non-contingency is a positive property. This is the reasoning behind the statement,

$$P(\triangle)$$

"Non-contingency is a positive property"

God's Aseity refers to God's non-contingency. This concept is rather easy to formulate and derive with the following expression,

$$(_{Df}G(x) \land P(\triangle)) \Rightarrow \Box[\triangle x \land \nexists C(x)]$$

This expression states "The definition of G(x) and "non-contingency is a positive property", implies that necessarily G(x) is non-contingent and hence also there does not exist a cause of G(x) or composition (Because if it did then it would depend in such cause or composition by the Axiom of Global Dependence).

God's Divine simplicity, means that God is made of only himself, or in other words God is only composed of itself. This can be proved by the axiom(principle) of Global Dependence, and the proof that G(x) is non-contingent.[Note: (Cmp(x) = x) = S(x)So if the composition of x is x then x is simple]

$$[\forall x [\neg \triangle x \Leftrightarrow (\exists C(x) \lor Cmp(x) \neq x)] \land \Box \triangle G(x)] \Rightarrow \Box [S(x)]$$

This simply says, "The axiom of Global Dependence and G(x) is non-contingent' implies that the composition of x is simply x. (i.e God is only made of Himself (i.e God is simple))".

God's Person-hood refers to God's property of being personal (i.e having intellect, consciousness, rationality and will), this would be true if being a personal being is a positive property. The property of being personal seems like a positive property because a non-personal being can't love, and loving is a positive property so I can write will Write,

$$[(\rho(x) \Leftrightarrow L(x)) \land P(L)] \Rightarrow P(\rho)$$

This states that "x is personal if and only if x has the property of being able to love (i.e x can love), and the capacity to love is a positive property, which itself implies being personal is a positive property". Therefore, the definition of G(x) and $P(\rho)$ implies G(x) is $\rho(x)$, which can be written as.

$$(D_f G(x) \land P(\rho)) \Rightarrow \rho(x)$$

This states "The Definition of God and "Being Personal Is a positive Property" imply that God is personal". This is the last of God's main Divine Properties.

2.2 Simplicity & Implications

What type of simplicity do I refer to?

Knowing the type of simplicity I refer to is extremely important because the axiom of global dependence depends highly on it.

So: There are two types of simplicity, the Western conception of simplicity, and the eastern conception of simplicity.

I will present the eastern conception because it is more easy to understand in the following example, "Imagine there is a collection of metaphysical water, this water has no parts like molecules or atoms, it is simply water. Yet, has properties"

In the Eastern conception of simplicity this would classify as a simple substance, but not in the western conception of simplicity. This is because although it seems relatively easy to see why you depends on what your made of, it does not seem very easy to understand why you depend on your properties; one must remember that a property of an object is just a thing which can be said about the object. Now is an object exists it has the property of existence, and since an existence object in a sense needs the property of existence so this really doesn't imply non-contingency. So the water from the example would not be non-contingent even though considered simple by the eastern conception.

This of course means that the type of simplicity I am referring to is the western conception of simplicity, which implies that it must FULLY be simple, metaphysically, onto-logically and etc. Everything which an be said about or belong to the object is the object, this is basically the western conception of simplicity. Now this is compatible, because if one images the a simple substance (from the western conception) it's property of existing would be itself and all its other properties yet there would be only one of such. Which implies the following statement, "x is absolutely simple if and only if for all properties, x possessing that property implies x is that property" i.e. "x is simple if and only if it is all of its properties/attributes".

$$S(x) \Rightarrow \forall \varphi[\varphi(x) \Rightarrow \varphi = x]$$

So from here on out, when I say simple, I mean the western conception of simple.

Implications

Implication 1: If God exists 'he' would be his own existence. God is his existence, God is his being. God is being, not just a being. However since God exist, it must also be proper to 'him' to be a being, thence one could also refer to God as "A being which is being itself", which means that God still holds a transcendent position yet can still in a sense be called a beingThis can be proven with the following argument. Which will be presented in two ways, The Verbal Way and the Formal Way, First I will Present the Verbal Way

Verbal Way

God is Simple

God's Simplicity Implies that 'he' must be every one of 'his' properties/attributes. (Note: One God yet each property fully God)

God has the property of Existing

Therefore God is 'his' own existence (hence God is being itself).

Formal Way

[Note: \mathcal{G} means God, and, God possesses all(and only) positive properties (i.e perfections).]

$$\begin{split} S(\mathcal{G}) \\ S(\mathcal{G}) &\Rightarrow \forall \varphi[\varphi(\mathcal{G}) \Rightarrow \varphi = \mathcal{G}] \\ \exists \mathcal{G} \\ \mathcal{G} &= \exists \end{split}$$

Implication 2: God is(because 'he' has properties) "One Substance in various persons, each one fully God, yet only one God", and this is not illogical, it is simply a consequence of God's nature(as a simple being). God is identical to the properties of God and anything else which belong to 'his' nature. Which seems oddly similar to the Christian view of God. We may accepts this but the plurality of our language and nature will always introduce impurities in the attempt to explain God's substance/essence. So we cannot hope to fully understand the Divine

Note 1: One may ask "Aren't we supposed to say God is identical to his attributes not properties?" And I respond, a property is something which can be predicated on things, or in other words can be attributed. So to posses a property is the act of being attributed something. Thence since God is 'his' properties 'he' is 'his' act, and 'his' attributes, which is of course what is commonly accepted in the doctrine of Divine simplicity.

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 $^{^{1}}$ Leibniz's monads are simple in the eastern conception for they are distinct from their properties, except God which is simple in the western conception.

Chapter 3

Contingency Argument

The various versions of the contingency arguments are considered by many some of the most powerful arguments for God, so in this section I will develop one of such arguments. Now the reason why I will not adapt a cosmological argument is because the cosmological argument usually denies the possibly of s past eternal universe, now to me this could be solved if one takes in the view that God's act of creation is timeless and hence even in eternity past it is still necessary.

3.1 Causes & Substances \odot

We will first have to remember the axiom of global dependence from the chapter "God's attributes", this axiom or principle is the foundational axiom(premise) of this chapter, and argument which will be provided from it.

$$\forall x [\neg \triangle x \Leftrightarrow (\exists C(x) \lor Cmp(x) \neq x)]$$

Ok now lets begin describing substances and their properties

A substance is an fundamental essence of an object or being, they are still contingent, however it seems very clear to me that a proper-substance should have the unique property of being necessarily non-contingent (and hence necessary has no cause) and of course being necessarily simple (indivisible, of only one essence). So I will write such definition.

$$\bigcirc(x) \Leftrightarrow [(\Box \triangle x \land \Box \nexists C(x)) \land \Box(S(x))]$$

In the chapter "God's Divine Attributes" is say God is simple, non-contingent, and hence has no cause. So it could easily be said that God is a Proper-Substance, but does this mean God is unconscious's? Well no, the property of being a substance doesn't imply such, for example the humans soul is the the true being of the human, it is also its substance, however the human is clearly conscious and if the human is essentially juts a substance then this means that substances can be conscious.

God as the Ultimate Cause

First before I begin I want to define $\mathfrak{C}(x)$ to be "x with the property of being the Ultimate Cause". An Ultimate Cause to some is the source of everything, the first cause, the Actus Purus, the Necessary One, and so on but in General the Ultimate Cause can be defined as "That which to which there is no cause and depends on none".

$$\mathfrak{C}(x) \Leftrightarrow \forall y [(y \neq x) \Rightarrow \Box(\neg \triangle y)]$$

This although doesn't at all include the statement ultimate cause, it is the same thing because if all objects but itself are excluded are contingent, by the axiom of global dependence they must have a cause, and since by definition this Ultimate cause would not be contingent henc have no cause, it would by necessity have to be the cause of all (but itself). Hence the definition.

Also the reason why I said the Ultimate cause instead of just the source of all things is because, every cause has an effect, and everything but this Ultimate cause is an effect or a cause, therefore it would technically still be the "source" of everything. Let's say The Ultimate cause (primary cause, "cause" of all causes, source of all) (God), caused/created free will and humans, but the human caused evil, That wouldn't imply that God is evil, it simply means the effect of a something God caused is evil, but not because of an imperfection, but because this effect(humans) although originally perfect themselves too by design, decided to become imperfect through they're own fault. And even if someone interprets this incorrectly, evil really isn't a thing, it is just the absence of Good, just like silence isn't itself a sound but the absence of it, or nothing isn't a thing but the absence of something.

The definition of the ultimate cause, implies that x is necessarily non-contingent and necessarily x has no cause that. Also it implies that "for all x there doesn't exist a cause of x if and only if x has the property of being the ultimate Cause. Hence the following"

$${}_{Df}\mathfrak{C}(x) \Rightarrow [(\Box \bigtriangleup x \land \Box \nexists C(x)) \land \forall x [\bigtriangleup x \Leftrightarrow \mathfrak{C}(x)]]$$

Now this implies that everything but this entity is contingent, and the collection of all contingent things have a non-contingent necessary cause, which is of course $\mathfrak{C}(x)$. This implies that there necessarily exists one and only one x with the property \mathfrak{C} .

$$\Box \exists ! x \mathfrak{C}(x)$$

Also due to the axiom of Global Dependence since this entity is non-contingent it has no composition and no cause, which implies it is also Proper-Substance

$$\mathfrak{C}(x) \wedge \mathfrak{O}(x)$$

However, $P(\Delta)$ and the definition of G(x) imply that God also possesses the property of being non-contingent and hence the Ultimate Cause and hence also has the property of of being a proper-substance. Written as

$$[P(\triangle) \land (D_f G(x) \Rightarrow (G(x) \land \triangle x))] \Rightarrow [G(x) \land \mathfrak{C}(x) \land \bigodot(x)]$$

Therefore There necessarily exists one and only one God.

$$\Box \exists ! x G(x)$$

[Note: statements such as $\mathfrak{C}(x) \land \mathfrak{O}(x)$ are meant to be read as "x possesses the property \mathfrak{C} and also the property \mathfrak{O} ".]

3.2 Proper Contingency Argument

Although I technically have just made one, I haven't presented it in a formal way all I have done was explain the development and its conclusion but the formal argument itself so that's is what I will do in this section. Now there are two ways I will formally Present this argument.

- 1. In the expression using the symbols of logic and modal logic.
- 2. In a verbal way.

The reason why this is useful is because the verbal way is easier to understand but the way which uses symbols, although more concrete it is also harder to understand.

Verbal Way

God is a being with all positive properties

Something is contingent if it has a cause or composition

A proper-substance is non-contingent, uncaused and indivisible

A being is the Ultimate cause if and only if all other things but itself are necessarily contingent.

The definition of an ultimate cause implies that it is necessarily uncaused, noncontingent and that soemthing is non-contingent if and only if it is the Ultimate cause.

Therefore there necessarily exists one and only one Ultimate cause of all.

"A thing a be non-contingent if and only if it is the Ultimate Cause" and the definition of the Ultimate Cause imply that this cause to a proper substance.

Non-contingency is a positive property.

"Non-contingency is a positive property" and "the definition of God implies God is non-contingent" implies that God is the Ultimate Cause, hence also a propersubstance

Therefore there necessarily exists one and only one God.

Argument In logical Notation

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$$G(x) \Leftrightarrow \forall \varphi [P(\varphi) \Rightarrow \varphi(x)]$$

$$\forall x [\neg \Delta x \Leftrightarrow (\exists C(x) \lor Cmp(x) \neq x)]$$

$$\bigcirc (x) \Leftrightarrow [(\Box \Delta x \land \Box \nexists C(x)) \land \Box (S(x))]$$

$$\mathfrak{C}(x) \Leftrightarrow \forall y [(y \neq x) \Rightarrow \Box (\neg \Delta y)]$$

$$D_f \mathfrak{C}(x) \Rightarrow [(\Box \Delta x \land \Box \nexists C(x)) \land \forall x [\Delta x \Leftrightarrow \mathfrak{C}(x)]]$$

$$\Box \exists ! x \mathfrak{C}(x)$$

$$[\forall x [\Delta x \Leftrightarrow \mathfrak{C}(x)] \land D_f \mathfrak{C}(x)] \Rightarrow [\mathfrak{C}(x) \land \bigodot (x)]$$

$$P(\Delta)$$

$$[P(\Delta) \land (D_f G(x) \Rightarrow (G(x) \land \Delta x))] \Rightarrow [G(x) \land \mathfrak{C}(x) \land \bigodot (x)]$$

$$\Box \exists ! x G(x)$$

3.3 My Modal Contingency Argument

Argument

If something is contingent it has a cause for its existence

If all the elements in a collection are contingent then the collection itself must be contingent

Every Possible world is contingent

Therefore the totality of possible worlds must be contingent

The totality of possible worlds must contain the entirety of all contingent objects

Therefore there must be a non-contingent necessary cause for the totality of possible worlds, and this everyone calls God.

Thoughts

Now if you don't want to call this cause God you could just call it the following,

The Non-Contingent, Necessary, Transcendent, All-Powerful, Causeless, Immaterial, Space-less, Timeless, and Eternal Source of All

Now the main reason why I say All-Powerful is because by being the source of the totality of all possible worlds it is capable of doing anything logical. And remember that the actual world is a possible world.

Objection: Why should every possible world be contingent, it seems rather arbitrary to say that? And if this is true, the entire argument fails.

Response to Objection: By definition possible worlds are ways the world could have been, which in itself implies this world could have been different, hence contingent, and that all other possible worlds could have also been, hence are also contingent. Therefore this is not an arbitrary choice but a logical conclusion stated as a premise. Therefore the argument does not fail.

Chapter 4

Ontological Argument for God

4.1 Ontological Argument

The Ontological Argument Originated with Anselm in the 11th century A.D and he developed it as the following,

Anselm's Ontological Argument

By definition, God is a "that than which none greater can be conceived".

Something that necessarily exists in reality is greater than a being that does not necessarily exist.

Thus, by definition, if God exists as an idea in the mind but does not necessarily exist in reality, then we can imagine something that is greater than God.

But we cannot imagine something that is greater than God. Thus, if God exists in the mind as an idea, then God necessarily exists in reality.

God exists in the mind as an idea.

Therefore, God necessarily exists in reality.

Does the Word 'Conceive' Limit God?

If God is "that than which none greater can be conceived", then does this mean that God's greatness is limited by our capabilities?

No: Because even if we said "God is that greater than anything conceivable" the mere fact that we can even say such implies that we can conceive of such hence "that greater than anything conceivable" doesn't exist, and if we simply say "God is the greatest thing" this means that we can conceive of such, hence all we can say is "God is that than which none greater can be conceived". And there is a big difference from conceiving and understanding, because if we said "God is that which we cannot understand" THEN we would be limiting God, for example I can say "Y is incomprehensible", so I cant comprehend it(it is beyond my understanding) yet it is not limited by my conception. So no, Anselm's definition of God does not limit God.

Other Ontological Arguments

Now Anselm's ontological argument is considered my many to fail because it "begs the question" this is because Anselm, to avoid parody arguments said "the argument works only for necessary beings" However this means that Anselm already implies that God is necessary even before completing the argument. Now this may or may not be a problem because technically speaking if God where to exist he would have to be necessary and under S5 (i.e., $\diamond \Box \eta \Rightarrow \Box \eta$). Hence If God possibly exists then God must exist. So since S5 fixed the common Objection. This is because Anselm's ontological argument works because "If God existed, 'he' would exist necessarily" and also because which solves the problem of begging the question.

Then Gaunilo of Marmoutiers came up with an objection which is somewhat like the following, "Imagine I have the greatest island possible. It is greater to exist in reality and the mind than to only exist in the mind, but there cannot be anything greater than this island therefore this island must exist, but it clearly doesn't and the same applies to anything else". However there is a huge fallacy in this thinking and that is that we are still defining such things as maximally great. For example take the following.

Person 1: This island is that than none greater can be conceived

Person 2: Oh if this island is so great, it must be omnipotent

Person 1: Better yet, this island must be omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, omni-temporal, immaterial, immutable, eternal, necessary, and indestructible for all of these are great.

Person 2: Even better, this island must posses all perfections such as the properties we have named earlier.

Person 1: Yes indeed

Person 2: But wouldn't then this island just be God in the form of an Island?

Person 1: I guess for God can take any form 'he' wishes why wouldn't he take the form of an Island in some possible world.

Now you can clearly see my point; It doesn't matter what form you say this maximally great object has, because in the end it will just be a form God would(could) take in some possible world. Shape/form doesn't matter, what matters is substance/essence and properties; yet God keeps his immutability and simplicity and substance/essence. However "Does this mean there are many Gods?".

No: For it is greater to be substantially-unique(only one such substance) than to have various(or one) nonidentical-substantial equal(s) which could become a rival. Not only that but to be the greatest implies to the THE greatest, not to be the greatest nonidentical-substantial equal. For if you have an nonidentical-substantial then you are not the greatest. To have a nonidentical-substantial equal is to have an equal which has a distinct substance/essence than your own. Take the Trinity for example, the idea that there are three equal persons does not imply that the Christian God is not maximally great, because these are not equal in the sense nonidentical-substantial equal, but are substantially-equal (equal because of the same substance).

In short this means that God is present in every possible world yet there is only one God, not multiple copies of God (which would be polytheism). [i.e necessary] [Note: substance and essence are used(can be used) as synonyms]

Thence Anselm's argument is sound.

Then people came up with a new objection which is by many called the reverse ontological argument which states that it is possible for God not to exist. And since it cannot be possible for God to both exist in some worlds and not exist in other Worlds, one must choose one option. But since this would imply God is maximally great in all positive attributes except the attribute of necessary existence this (the statement "Necessarily God doesn't exist") seems like a very arbitrary choice made purely to try to object to this argument. So to avoid arbitrary choices or "begging the question", Descartes made his own version of the Ontological Argument in which God is a being with all perfections. Now since maximal greatness implies possessing all perfections Anselm's argument is still sound. Yet: Descartes argument will be presented formally.

4.2 Other Ontological Arguments

Descartes's argument is the following,

Descartes's Ontological Argument

God is supremely perfect i.e has all perfections Necessary existence is a perfection Therefore God necessarily exists

This later inspired Leibniz to make his own ontological Argument which is the following,

Leibniz's Ontological Argument

God is a being possessing all perfectionsA perfection is a simple and absolute propertyExistence is a perfectionIf existence is part of the essence of a thing, then it is a necessary being.If it is possible for a necessary being to exist, then a necessary being does exist.It is possible for a being to have all perfectionsTherefore, a necessary being with all perfections (God) does exist.

Thoughts: Since these Ontological argument avoid the arbitrary definitions of beings formulated by parody arguments, and since it only works for perfect beings thence doesn't "beg the question, and it also avoids those parody arguments in a very easy manner. Even though Anselm's argument could still do such things, It avoids having to go so deep into the philosophy just to respond to those objections. This Ontological argument could perhaps be said to be the argument which inspired Gödel's version of the ontological argument which is the following.

Gödel's Argument In Notation

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\begin{split} & [P(\varphi) \land \Box \forall (\varphi(x) \Rightarrow \psi(x))) \Rightarrow P(\psi)) \\ & P(\neg \varphi) \Leftrightarrow \neg P(\varphi) \\ & P(\varphi) \Rightarrow \diamond \exists x \varphi(x) \\ & G(x) \Leftrightarrow \forall \varphi [P(\varphi) \Rightarrow \varphi(x)] \\ & P(G) \\ & \diamond \exists x G(x) \\ & \varphi \ ess \ x \Leftrightarrow \varphi(x) \land \forall \psi [\psi(x) \Rightarrow \Box \forall y (\varphi(y) \Rightarrow \psi(y))] \\ & P(\varphi) \Rightarrow \Box P(\varphi) \\ & G(x) \Rightarrow G \ ess \ x \\ & E(x) \Leftrightarrow \forall \varphi [\varphi \ ess \ x \Rightarrow \Box \exists y \varphi(y)] \\ & P(E) \\ & \Box \exists x G(x) \end{split}
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Verbal Form of The Argument

If phi is positive property and it is necessary that fir every x if x has the property psi, then psi is a positive property.

Not-phi is a positive property if and only if phi is not a positive property.

If property phi is a positive property then it is possible that there exists an x such that x has property phi.

Object x has the property of being maximally great if and only if for every property phi, if phi is a positive property, then x has property phi.

The property is being maximally great is a positive property.

It is possible that there exists an object x that has the maximally great property.

Phi is an essential property of x if and only if object x has the property phi and for every psi, if object x has property psi then it is necessary that for every y if object y has property phi then object y has property psi.

If the property phi is a positive property then it is necessary that phi is a positive property.

If object x has the maximally great property then the maximally great property is the essential property of object x. Object x has necessary existence if and only if for every property phi, if phi is an essential property of x then it is necessary that there exists an object y that has property phi.

Necessary existence is a positive property.

It is necessary that there exists an object x that has the maximally great property.

My Ontological Argument 0.0

Now My version of the ontological argument is inspired by Descartes ontological argument and Alvin Plantinga's modal ontological argument. It is the following,

My Ontological Argument

 $\begin{array}{ll} \mathrm{Df.1} & G(x) \Leftrightarrow \forall \varphi [P(\varphi) \Rightarrow \varphi(x)] \\ \mathrm{Df.2} & \mathcal{E}(x) \Leftrightarrow \Box \exists x \\ \mathrm{Ax.1} & P(\mathcal{E}) \\ \mathrm{Th.1} & \Box \exists x G(x) \end{array}$

Chapter 5

God, Omniscience And Free Will

5.1 God's Omniscience

Paradox of Omniscience

Josh Rasmussen's omniscience paradox is mainly cause by the idea of in and out knowledge, for example God's complex knowledge is itself complex, so God's complex knowledge is in knowledge, God's knowledge of cats is not in knowledge hence it is out knowledge. All knowledge falls into these two categories of out and in knowledge. So now imagine you have the knowledge k_{out} which contains all out knowledge. Well is k_{out} out knowledge or in knowledge, well it would be reasonable to assume it is out-knowledge, but if it is then it contains itself and would be in knowledge, but if it is in knowledge then it must be out knowledge because if not it would not be the collection of all out-knowledge. Hence there doesn't exist k_{out} , and hence there doesn't exist a k_{All} so it is impossible for God to know everything.

Rasmussen's Solution

Josh Rasmussen's solution to this paradox is by something he calls "The Dynamic Model of Omniscience". Now what is this theory, well it depends on something called divine conceptualism which states that a propositions being true is equivalent to God's awareness of such proposition. Now Josh believes that at any Moment God can expand "his" knowledge as much as he wants, and since God's awareness of a proposition is equivalent to the proposition being true, At any Given moment God is aware of 100% of all true proposition, however what propositions there are can vary.

Now I personally see a few problems with this view. First, omniscience should be considered awareness of **all** propositions and belief in only true propositions. So Josh's view of omniscience seems to only be a slice of true omniscience. And the second problem is that this implies that God's knowledge changes in time which implies that God is not timeless even if "he" created time, which seems slightly unreasonable.

Ways to "solve" the paradox

One of, if not the best way to solve the paradox is by thinking of God's knowledge as simple, not as divided in a countless amount of propositions. What I mean by this is God know all by simply knowing Himself, because by such he would know himself perfectly and hence know all which "he" would create because of the fact "he" would create it. In God's mind there are ideas, and God models the created from such. The way in which such things are modeled is best explained by Thomas Aquinas's saying,

"God knows his essence as so imitable by such a creature and knows it as the particular model and ideal of that creature."

Summa Theologiae la Q.15, a.2

For example, God creates all things, and since God is his own existence and know his essence so perfectly that once he creates all, he makes all exists and hence sees himself as a model to all which exists. Or as Christians believe that God made all things good, and since God is Good, God sees himself as the model of all creation. The same could be said about all creations/creatures which Love, think, act, and much more. Therefore Thomas Aquinas's explanation makes sense.

But One may say, "But this is only what has been created, what about what could be?". Well by knowing what will be, God must hence know that what isn't non-existence or what will be must be what could of been, should of or can be, hence God knows all in one simple gaze upon himself. Contradiction Avoided

However one must also look at this from the platonic perspective, for what the Platonist would say is That God knows his essence as the ideal to the Form, and the Form is the ideal to the particular, so God is still the main model yet in a more platonic perspective. For example take the Form of Dogness, God know his essence as the ideal to such Form, yet the Form itself is the ideal to the particular(the individual dog). So it could be restated in a platonic way that,

"God know his essence as so imitable by such a Form, and knows it as the model and ideal of that Form. Furthermore the Form is the model and ideal of the particular(s)."

In this way God is still kept as distinct from the Forms and beyond them, yet still technically the model and Ideal of All. I this sense God is equated with The Good(The "Form" of The Good). And the same about God's knowledge is still conserved.

Why Should One prefer this solution?; well God is the highest/greatest/most perfect being, there can be nothing more perfect/great/high, therefore even the thoughts of God must be perfect. However a thought has a subject, so for a maximally perfect thought the subject of that thought must be maximally perfect, but the only such subject which would fit that description would be God himself. But does this mean God is selfish? No, this is simply God's way of keeping perfection, perfection is a good and God is Good, but selfishness is evil, so God constantly thinking of himself is simply Good. Does this mean God doesn't care about us? No, as I explained how God knows all, by knowing an thinking of himself he sees creation, God is Good, and hence must care about creation to. And since God loves himself, and knows himself as the model of all, when something imitates(for example by loving, or caring and so on, NOT imitating in the evil way) God loves that thing.

5.2 Omniscience Argument For God

Verbal form of The Argument.

God is a being with all Positive properties To be omniscient means to know all true propositions. Knowledge is good, as a result possessing knowledge is a positive property Therefore Omniscience Is a Positive Property Therefore God is Omniscient God knows everything and If God believes something then it is true Therefore If God doesn't know something, that something does not exist Assume the statement God does not exist is true Therefore technically God would know he does not exist and believe such and hence it would be true. But if God doesn't exists this proposition cannot be known by God,

Therefore The proposition "God does not exist" is wrong

If The proposition "God does not exist" is wrong, then God does exist Therefore God exists,

Argument In Notation

Let x_bp mean "x believes p", x_kp "x knows p". x possesses the property of omniscience if and only if x knows all propositions, $K(x) \Leftrightarrow \forall p[x_kp]$. Lastly let $\top(p)$ mean "proposition p is necessarily true", and if something omniscient believes in p then p is necessarily true, $\top(p) \Leftrightarrow K(x)_bp$. [Note: $\hat{p} := \Box \nexists x G(x)$]

$$\begin{split} G(x) &\Leftrightarrow \forall \varphi[P(\varphi) \Rightarrow \varphi(x)] \\ K(x) &\Leftrightarrow \forall p[x_k p] \\ P(k) &\Rightarrow P(K) \\ [G(x) \wedge K(x)] \\ [G(x)_b p \Rightarrow \top(p)] \wedge [G(x)_{\neg k} p \Rightarrow \nexists p] \wedge [G(x)_{\neg k} p \Rightarrow G(x)_{\neg b} p] \\ \top(\hat{p}) &\Rightarrow G(x)_b \hat{p} \\ \hat{p} \Rightarrow G(x)_{\neg k} \hat{p} \Rightarrow G(x)_{\neg b} p \\ \top(\neg \hat{p}) \\ \top(\neg \hat{p}) \Rightarrow \Box \exists x G(x) \\ \Box \exists x G(x) \end{split}$$

5.3 Free Will

The most common objection to free will and omniscience coexisting is the classical question, "If God Knows all do we Have free will?" Now many philosopher say that this cannot be possible because they say "If God knows everything we will do in our lives, do we really have the right to choose", and one may say no and such skeptic would respond as "Well, what if something God believed something which was wrong, according to you this must be true because God believes in it, so then everything is predetermined." And I want to respond to this by saying the following statement

"If God Knows all do we Have free will?"

Answer; The mere fact that God knows what will happen exactly docent imply God predetermined such, it simply means God know it because it is(in this case will be). For example I know that I will dies, but does this mean that my knowledge of such an event causes me to die? No, of course not, the same applies to God, the mere fact he knows what will happen doesn't mean he caused it to happen.

"Well, what if something God believed something which was wrong, according to you this must be true because God believes in it, so then everything is predetermined."

Answer; Implying the possibility of an omniscient being believing an untrue statement, is literally implying that it is possible that a being which by definition knows all, and only believes in what is true can believe something untrue. This is like asking for the sound of silence, or for something which has no wight to have wight. It is incorrect to assume(believe) that illogical statements can be taken seriously as meaningful and coherent objections to certain properties.

Chapter 6

God and Creation

6.1 Omnipotence Paradox

The Classical Omnipotence paradox goes like the following,

"God is Omnipotent, hence God can do all things, but can God create a stone so heavy even he cannot lift? If God can do such, then he isn't powerful enough to lift it. However if God can lift it, then he isn't powerful enough to create such. Hence Omnipotence is impossible." However there is a huge problem with this paradox, and that is that you are asking for a being which can do anything to do something he cannot do, its like asking "What is the sound of silence?", or "Make a square circle". Illogical Impossibilities are not limitations on Omnipotence. Hence the Paradox is wrong. To Quote C.S Lewis,

"His Omnipotence means power to do all that is intrinsically possible, not to do the intrinsically impossible. You may attribute miracles to Him, but not nonsense. This is no limit to His power. If you choose to say, 'God can give a creature free will and at the same time withhold free will from it,' you have not succeeded in saying anything about God: meaningless combinations of words do not suddenly acquire meaning simply because we prefix to them the two other words, 'God can.' It remains true that all things are possible with God: the intrinsic impossibilities are not things but nonentities. It is no more possible for God than for the weakest of His creatures to carry out both of two mutually exclusive alternatives; not because His power meets an obstacle, but because nonsense remains nonsense even when we talk it about God."

C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain

The ability to do all the logically possible is the ability to do all, for what is logically impossible is not a thing. Therefore God is Still Omnipotent. But does this mean that God is bound by logic? Well this is something for the following section(s).

6.2 God's Relationship To Logic, and Concepts

All concepts can be derived from Logic, like mathematics, philosophy and so on because they are byproducts of logical and "necessary" truths. Yet: What is their relationship to God? To avoid things like logical absurdities, or a limitation on God. We must accept that Logic is part of God's nature, hence is also God.

Now in Christianity this position is clearly stated in the opening chapter of the Gospel of John,

In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with God, And the Logos was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things came to be through him, And without him nothing came to be.

John 1:1-3

Now some of you may know this as saying "Word" however the original translation says "Logos". So, what does **Logos** mean here?

Well it means God's Reason, Truth and sometimes the Word. However It can Also be understood as logic for Reason approaches logic however a being which does not posses the perfection of perfect Divine knowledge can only hope for their reason to be identical to logic, but since God possesses all perfections including divine Knowledge, God's Reason is identical to logic. Hence the Logos is also Logic.

This position is perhaps the most likely because it is the only position In which God is not limited by logic, yet acts within it. Because If we did take the position that God is not bound by logic, and logic is not part of his nature, then it would just be a simple creation irrelevant to "him" hence no-one could make logical arguments describing such a being beyond logic and "his" existence would also be non-existence. But if one takes God as not bound by logic, yet logic is part of "his" substance(essence), one can describe God in logical Arguments without having to take away his transcendent property(i.e without "God being bound by logic"). Logic proceeds from God, it God's Reason; similar to the neoplatonic Nous/logos, which is the Divine Mind and proceeds from God, however in here we accept that since the Logos is of the same simple substance it must be God.

Conclusion

God is limited by nothing but 'his' own substance; God is limited by nothing but 'himself'. Thence God can do all which 'he' allows himself to do; God is limitless. God is the Logos; hence also Logic. Therefore God can do all which Logic allows him to do.

[Note 1: Substance is synonymous with essence. Note 2: Logic is not the same as the laws of logic, logic is simple the laws Of logic are complex byproducts of logic.]

6.3 Is This Coherent with Christianity?

And since we came to the conclusion that the Logos proceeds from God yet is God, and in the Christian perspective the Son is the Logos it is the same as saying The Son Proceeds from God(The Father) Just as the Nicene Creed states,

"God from God, Light From Light, True God From True God. Begotten, Not made, Consubstantial With the Father"

And since God possesses the property of love, God loves infinitely hence God loves God, but since God is a proper-substance, God is his properties and his attribute, God must be his love shared trough himself and whatever else he love's this is what Christians Call the Holy Spirit.

Also is seems that these "persons" of the God's substance/essence proceed from God himself, so these are uncreated however do have a principle(not as cause, but as that whence something proceeds), in fact they all share the the same Ultimate Principle, now since this Ultimate Principle must be itself fully God and Principle without Principle, this person of God's substance/essence would in a sense be a(The) "Father". Now in Christian Belief God reveals 'himself' through a Trinity, but The Father is still the principle of such. As Augustine says,

"The Father is The Principle of the Whole Deity" De Trin.iv,20

Now this doesn't mean The Father is More God per say, but simply that the Trinity proceeds from The Father, The Father is still equal in every other way to the other Persons of the Trinity, the only deference is (again) that The Father is 'Principle Without Principle'. It is logical to think that Intellect precedes love, so the Love of God must proceed from the Logos, but since the Love is also God it must also proceed from The Father, and as established earlier The Logos also proceeds from The Father. So we have a logical reason to believe that The Love proceeds from The Father and The Logos, The Logos proceeds from The Father, each one is fully God yet there is only one God .So by accepting God's relationship to Logic and 'his' Divine Simplicity the Doctrine of The Trinity comes forth.

So The Trinity still stands in this view.

Also, is we remember that earlier said that God is 'his' own being (or God is being), since this must be one of the attributes proceeding from The Father (Which 'again' is also God), The Father must be(is) the principle of being itself. So God is not only being itself but the principle of being.

"God is a being which is being itself and the principle of being."

[Note: 'Again' I will remind you that the reason 'we' can still call God a being is because 'he' IS (i.e also has spirit, existence, and substance/essence)]

Objection 1; "So if the attributes of God are God and there is an infinite number of Them, wouldn't that mean that God isn't just a trinity But an infinite number of "persons" each fully God yet only One God"

Objection 2; It is greater to be non-contingent than to not be, since The Son and The Holy Spirit proceed from The Father, then they are contingent and hence The Son and The Holy Spirit are less Great than The Father

Response To Objection 1; The Persons of the Trinity aren't just one attribute of God each but whole categories of attributes God. Thence God is just a Trinity, not an infinitude of Persons. The Son for example isn't just one attribute but is the Logos, the Glory of God, the Wisdom of God, and etc; even though The Son and the spirit as usually just described with one attribute, The Son corresponding to the Intellect, and The Love corresponding with The Holy Spirit. So for reasons God only knows, 'he' is like that.

Response To Objection 2; The Son and The Holy Spirit Are not less great the The Father. To have a principle yet still be of the same substance/essence as such principle is not to be contingent, for it would be as absurd as saying "My substance proceeded from my substance therefore although my substance is non-contingent my substance is contingent." which is a contradiction. Therefore The Son and The Holy Spirit are not less great than The Father because they are of the same substance and hence are also non-contingent yet still proceed from The Father. One must remember the axiom of global dependence which states that x is contingent if x has a cause or is composite, now the cause is simply the principle which has a different substance/essence; The Father is a principle of the same substance/essence as The Son and The Holy Spirit are not contingent, yet still proceed from The Father. Thence The Son and The Holy Spirit are not less great than The Father is great than The Father for they are of the same substance/essence. The only way The Father is by authority of the Giver,

not by substance/essence.

Note; The language being used may seems to convey composition within God, this is just a limitation due to our inability to comprehend God and the limits brought upon us by our language.

6.4 God, Platonism, and Creation

God, The Good, and Forms

So according to Plato, a form is an ideal abstracta which necessarily exists as an non-contingent immaterial, eternal object which is an archetype for the world of becoming. However this seems to contradict the argument in the section before, which comes to the conclusion that the only non-contingent object/being is the one which has no cause and the only such object/being is God, therefore this Platonism idea seems to contradict God's position of the ultimate cause, however when speaking about concepts like mathematics, truth, beauty and so on one comes to the idea that those are independent of the physical world, and hence seem to truly exist in ways which cant be altered, for example the equation "2+2=4" is true therefore it is part of the form of truth and "2+2=4" is true independent of human interaction or creation, so then is God not the ultimate cause and hence either Normal Platonism is true, or is God the ultimate cause of all things?

I want to proposes that these Forms although necessary are still contingent, now this would mean that things like "2+2=4" would still be true independent of humans of Creation, however they would still come from God.

These forms would come to be in a neoplatonic sense because they would come from the Divine Mind, the Nous, the Logos. However although the Logos does proceed from God, it is of the same substance as God and hence is God. So since the Logos is also logic, and all idea-Forms come from Logic hence come from God and depend on God. God is their cause. [cause: principle from different substance. This because the Father is the principle of the Logos from the same substance hence is not the Logo's cause only the Logo's principle. However the Logos is the principle of the ideal-Forms from different substance hence the Logos is the cause of these. This is a very important distinction to avoid heresy.] For example take the form of mathematics, such form comes of the Logos because it comes from truth and logic, and we could call mathematics a "necessary byproduct" of the Logos, so although mathematics would still be necessary, it would be necessary however it would depend of the Logos and hence be Contingent. Now since the forms are ideals, they must be necessary byproducts of the Good, hence of course necessary yet contingent.

Now this seems great however there is one form which is usually called the Form of Forms, and all other participate in and have their and being, this is non other than Plato's "Form" of The Good. The "Form" of the Good seems to posses the same role God played in the argument for the contingency of forms. The "Form" of the Good also possesses all positive properties and is truly the ultimate object, this seems to match perfectly with the description of God/G(x). Also If one sees the Form of Logic as proceeding from God (which is the conclusion we arrived at "God's Relationship to Logic, and Concepts), one must by the nature of God as a simple-substance have to accept that God is his properties and what proceeds from him which is of the same substance. And since there is none greater than God, but none can defy Truth for all must abide by Truth's law there can be none greater than Truth which means truth must also be God, yet only one God.

However if this is accepted one should not think of Truth and similar "Forms" as "lower" or less than the Good, one should think of these as of the same substance/essence. One should think of these as various "persons" of God's substance/essence. Hence equal, and non-divided, each one fully God, but only one God. [Note: Forms of the same substance as God are described as "Forms" (with double quotation marks), and Forms which are not of the same substance/essence as God are described as simply Forms(without quotation marks).]

New Modal axiom/theorem

S7 is simply an axiom/theorem which has been developed throughout, which simply states "non-contingency implies necessity and(but) necessity does not imply non-contingency", it is the following

S7 :
$$(\bigtriangleup \eta \Rightarrow \Box \eta) \land (\Box \eta \Rightarrow \bigtriangleup \eta)$$

The best non-religious justification for this axiom/theorem/law is the following.

"Imagine 2 necessary things, A and B. Now one could imagine that B is caused by A by nature not by will hence the existence of A would imply the existence of B. Just like life implies the possibility of death not by will but by nature, by necessity. However since the existence of B depends on A, for A is the cause of B, B is contingent yet still necessary. Therefore non-contingency implies necessity yet necessity does not imply non-contingency."

Also since God is non-contingent you could not write $\Box \exists x G(x)$, but you could also say $\Delta \exists x G(x)$

Objection: Something cannot exist necessarily and simultaneously be contingent for that is a contradiction. Hence **S7** is false.

Response To Objection: Since most of the time causes cause things by will and not by necessity, it has often be wrongly said that contingent simply means to possibly not have been. Yet the original definition of contingent is the following, "To be contingent is to depend on another substance/essence than one's own for one's existence", now SOMETIMES this means that such could of not existed, but it is not the general case. Therefore since certain necessary things depend on other necessary things for their existence, they are contingent yet still necessary for they couldn't have not-existed. Hence **S7** is right.

Categorization of Creation

Creation can first be tough of as the physical universe, however is this the entirety of the possible world God chose to actualize, well since God is immaterial it would make sense for there to be a immaterial part of the world(actualized world) outside the physical universe, these two parts together would make up the actualized word. Then one could take into consideration all that could have been, which wasn't actualized but exists as potentiality, hence one could say the actualized world is contained in the collection of all possible worlds. Lastly since there are necessary things which are contingent and hence are not God, like "2+2=4" or the Forms(NOT "Forms") and so on, these would still be inside the possible worlds, yet for every possible world it would be in the part outside of the physical world, it would be the immaterial realm. Diagram 1



This diagram represents the idea of this theory which could be called a metaphysical theory of everything (specifically creation). It shows that there exists the physical part of the actualized world called Actualized physik (what humans know as the universe). Then there is a spiritual(immaterial) realm that is the part of the actualized world which is not in the physical part. Then surrounding that is the collection of all possible worlds of which the actualized world is a part of. Then the diagram can be misleading because it can lead one to think that creation is withing God, and this would be wrong, therefore there is a dark bold line showing the distinction between God and creation. The reason it is reasonable to think God is distinct from creation is because God is simple and creation is composite, so if God where to contain creation "he" would be composite and hence not simple, and God being the Ultimate Cause, makes creation eternally dependent on "him". Also I do not place a boundary on God because God is boundless and creation is not, even if it is infinite. Lastly, the reason why all the other lines are dashed is because each category contains the other category, for example the Possible worlds contain the actual world. But bold lines represent an actual distinction.

6.5 Why Did God Create?

Hypothesis 1; God Created as an Act of Love

Hypothesis 2; God Created to actualize the potentiality to be God

Hypothesis 3; God Created Because He was alone, bored, sad

Thoughts and Implications; It seems to me rather obvious that Hypothesis 3 must be wrong, because sadness, loneliness, and boredom are voids of the perfections of love, and happiness. However God has all perfections to their greatest extent hence it is impossible for God to feel lonely, sad, or bored hence also impossible that Hypothesis 3 is correct. Hypothesis 2 seems plausible at first because being God is a perfection in of itself hence God would want to be God, but this not only implies that God ha potentiality but that his essence is mutable. This we know to be incorrect for God is immutable, and changeless, God is also (as Thomas Aquinas put it) Pure Actuality, Pure Act (Latin: *Actus Purus*) hence there is no potentiality withing God. Hence Hypothesis 2 seems to be incorrect. Hypothesis 3 states that God Created as an act of Love, But what does this even mean? Well it means that In the Infinite Goodness of God, God created the world and s creatures to admire the Glory and Greatness of God, this seems very likely for God (in his Goodness) would want other beings but himself to be able to admire such greatness which itself is Good. Hence Hypothesis 1 seems as the most probable answer.

Objection 1; Isn't Creating beings only for the Sake of Admiring, and Worshipping you an act of selfishness and hence evil. And since God cannot be evil, hypothesis 3 must be wrong.

Objection 2; A being no matter how great, cannot posses the title of God if it did not create all, which means that "before" God created he was not God hence hypothesis 2 must be right.

Response to Objection 1; For an imperfect being to create only for such creation to worship and admire is an act of selfishness, however for a perfect being (God) which is Goodness itself, creating for the sake of such creations to admire and worship is the same as creating for creation to receive perfect Good, and Greatness. Hence for God to create for creation to admire and worship is not an act of selfishness but an act of selflessness, and act of love.

Response to Objection 2; This is a change in title hence not a perfection, therefore God would not aspire for such a title, and in the case it is not just a change in title but a change in essence(substance) it would still be wrong because God is immutable.

6.6 My Version of the Augustinian Argument

The reason why I call it "My version" is because the original version of the Argument Focuses only on Truth, but my version focuses not only on Truth, but also logic and reason, in other words The Logos, and has slightly different reasoning.

Reasoning on the Argument

"What can be or is greater than that which allows things to exist, what can be greater than which cannot be defeated, or overruled? What can be greater than the truth of such? What Can be Greater than the reason of such? What can be greater than that which is so transcendental that if something is beyond it, that something doesn't exists?"

This is a legitimate question, but as it can be seen and reasoned the answer is Nothing. But what is this thing to which there is no greater? It is reasoning and that which allows perfect reasoning, Logic, but truth it also the greatest thing for none can go against it, hence this "object" is also truth. What "object" is logic(and(or) perfect reasoning) and truth? Simple, The Logos is such. The Logos must noncontingently(hence also necessarily) exist because without it nothing would exist, for without Logic and Truth nothing would exist. Our existence, the existence of all depends on the Logos.

"What is Greater than that which by definition is that to which there is no greater? What is Greater than that which possesses all greatness?"

Well the answer is Nothing, just Like the Logos. These both fit the description "That which there is no greater". Therefore the Logos must be God, and since the Logos necessarily exists, God necessarily exists. This is the reasoning behind the Augustinian Argument for God.

Argument in Verbal Form

- Df.1 God is a maximally great being
- Pr.1 There is nothing greater than God
- Pr.2 There is nothing greater than the Logos
- Th.1 Therefore the Logos is God
- Pr.3 The Logos exists necessarily
- Th.2 Therefore God exists necessarily.

Argument in Notation

 $\mathcal{L}(x)$ is "x with the property of being the logos" (i.e. "The Logos").

- Df.1 $G(x) \Leftrightarrow \forall y [(y \neq x) \Rightarrow x \succ y]$
- Pr.1 $\Box \nexists y [y \succ G(x)]$
- $\Pr.2 \quad \Box \nexists y [y \succ \mathcal{L}(x)]$
- Th.1 $G(x) = \mathcal{L}(x)$
- Pr.3 $\Box \exists x \mathcal{L}(x)$
- Th.2 $\Box \exists x G(x)$

Now although this definition for G(x) is seems different from the usual one, in Chapter 9 section 2 I show that the two definitions are identical just phrased differently. So in reality this is still the exact same God we have been describing all along.

Objections and Responses

With this argument there will generally be one objection, and that is, "So aren't you just forcing the definition of God to a specific definition so that it will match your conclusion?" and the answer is that for weaker versions of this argument yes, however in here we are actually developing an individual definition to God and then realizing that God is the Logos.

The second objection would be, "What's the point of calling this being God if it is so much beyond us and creation and matches no classical attributes of God?" And the Answer to that would be, since God is a maximally great being, by the axiom of global dependence one must accept that God is simple, God is also by the description non-contingent, and hence uncaused, which in general implies that God is a proper-substance. Also, the description which shows God has properties, and the fact that God is a proper-substance imply that God can be (and has to because "he" has attributes) that God has to be in Various "Persons" yet Undivided. This Matches the idea of the Christian Trinity . And since loving is Good, God loves, since one cannot love unless one is personal God must be personal (in the sense that God has a will and an ability to think). Uniqueness is a positive property so God is unique.And of course God must have t he Omni properties such as Omnipotence, Omniscience, Omni-Benevolence, Omnipresence and all other positive(good) Omni Properties.

The mere fact that God is a maximally Great being we came to the same conclusion on God's Divine Attributes. Even though we said God is the Logos. This is why the Augustinian argument is stable and doesn't just defined God to fit our properties, or describe a God which has nothing to do with the Classical View of God. This also means that the Logos has all properties said above.

Therefore Even In this "simple" Argument God is a logical argument for the existence of God with sturdy philosophical reasoning, and its conclusion still matches the religious idea of God, specifically Christianity.

Chapter 7

Life

7.1 Is Loving God above all rational?

Hypothesis 1; It is not rational to love God above all things because in our lives we do not meet God but we do meet other thing.

Hypothesis 2; We should only love and focus on ourselves to try to reach perfection.

Hypothesis 3; One should Love God above all things for God is not only the source of all but the only one which simply IS, and in finding and Loving God we will also find happiness.

Thoughts and Implications; Hypothesis one seems to be completely ungrateful and unreasonable because not only would you be in a sense not thanking your Creator but if the soul lives forever and is immaterial, it is very likely that you could have seen the creator if you had Loved God in life not just in death. So it seems that hypothesis 1 is wrong. Hypothesis 2 seems to have fallacy because not only does it assume that a perfect being can achieve perfection as that of God (which seems as heresy for there can be none like God but God himself) but it also assumes that the human can even in the slightest posses a good attribute without The Good itself. Hence Hypothesis 2 seems wrong too. Now hypothesis 3 seems to be the most likely for the following reason, "Imagine you love your partner you marry you partner and have a house and family with them, you children will bear the responsibility of keeping your legacy and name, so since you have loved this more than anything and have built you identity upon it, the moment it is gone you will feel meaningless, without purpose without reason to live you will feel from the inside as indistinguishable from nothing. All because of what? Loving family to much? No, loving family is great but since the physical parishes so will your family, you should have Loved that which is everlasting above that, built you identity upon that." But what is 'That'? It seems to be that things which come to be are not of the highest degree, hence if you love something above all and build you identity upon that, that something must be eternal, non-contingent, necessary, and of the highest degree of being, the highest being, God. All but God is contingent and imperfect in comparison, God never dies, never leaves, God is always there. Therefore If you love God above all and Build you identity upon him, you will always be happy and you will also please God. Now this doesn't mean that you shouldn't love other things, but you should keep loving God more than anything else. To Love God not only allows us to be happy and fulfilled, but it allows up to love even more, not just God but family, friendship and etc. Hence hypothesis 3 seems to me to be the most likely hypothesis.

7.2 Purpose of Life

Hypothesis 1; There is no purpose to life

Hypothesis 2; The Purpose of Life is to pleasure ourselves until we die

Hypothesis 3; The Purpose of Life is Whatever we want it to be

Hypothesis 4; The Purpose of Life is to find God; the purpose of life is God.

Thoughts and Implications; First of All I want to say that although the meaning of life and the purpose of life are two distinct things, finding the purpose of life helps in finding the meaning of life. Purpose is the Principle to Meaning, hence finding the purpose of life is crucial to finding the meaning of life. Hypothesis 1 seems to be wrong for if there is a Greatest Good (God), there must be a Good purpose set upon us, this is because Good wants all things to have at least some Good withing them. So hypothesis 1 is wrong. Hypothesis 2 seems to also be wrong because to pleasure oneself until one dies refers to carnal pleasures, now carnal pleasures are pleasure mainly driven by the body as an instinct to loose all responsibly or to reproduce, however these when controlled are good, but without control these become voids of goods, such as the desire for justice, the desire for equality, the desire for peace. Now even if this is not the since the human is imperfect in comparison to God pleasuring humans(specially their carnal instinct) endlessly is to pleasure the imperfect endlessly, now Pleasuring the Perfect is a perfection in of itself for keeping perfections perfect is a good, but keeping imperfections imperfect is a void of good, and as discussed earlier since God is Good, he must have a Good purpose, and since hypothesis 2 is not a good purpose it seems to be that this is not the purpose of life. Hypothesis three fall under the same fallacy, because since humans are imperfect and corruptible , it is very possible for a human to desire to do evil and an end goal, but evil is the void of Goodness, hence The purpose of life seems unlikely to be hypothesis 3. Lastly hypothesis 4 seems to be the most likely mainly because believer and even a non-believer can(and should) aspire to find Goods such as, Knowledge, Truth, Wisdom, Life, Love, and Goodness itself. However since all of these are perfections/goods and God possesses all perfections, and because he is his very act, and his properties(which includes attributes), God is all of these. Therefore in technicality believer and non-believer can(should) aspire to find God, this is the purpose of life.

Note: As I have said before, God is not composite, God is simple.

A life of a thousand achievements will not be remembered in the presence of one mistake. No matter how much good you bring to this world the only things people will remember of you in the long run is the failures and 'evils' you had. No matter how close to perfection you are, people will always judge the imperfections. But this world was not meant to satisfy the finite, it was mean to satisfy that which is eternal

and everlasting not what will itself be forgotten. The purpose of this life in physicality is too reproduce. However in spirituality, rationality, morality and all other goods, the purpose is to find The Good, to find God. That is the only thing which really matters, we humans should not worry for what will come after death or in life, for as long as we love and seek God (The Good) we will be satisfied, we Will be happy. And why should we be arrogant enough to feel necessity in thinking we need to live eternally. If such is true, let it be, but if it isn't, then let it be. All that really matters is God. Live as there is no tomorrow as if what you have you will not have the next day, be happy with all the goods you have, for when the day comes, they will all vanish. All in this physical world will die, not matter how young or old, how great or how small. The physical is destined to die, but the immaterial will forever live on. So live well, seek God, be wise, be good, be just, and remember 'Meaning proceeds from purpose'.

7.3 Should Reason Be Considered a Divine Gift?

Hypothesis 1; The capability of proper reasoning is a divine gift for it leads to truth, but improper reasoning us nothing more than mere opinions.

Hypothesis 2; No because reason is something even the least capable of beings with intellects can achieve.

Thoughts and Implications; Hypothesis 1 seems to be correct for proper reasoning can allow the individual to explore the immaterial those truths which cannot be found within the physical realm, for example mathematical truths could be tough of as an infinite number of immaterial truths beyond the physical realm yet by careful proper-reasoning one can explore the entirety of such with rather 'simple' formulae. Now there are many more truths beyond mathematical truths, even truths about nothingness seems to be found outside the immaterial for one cannot explore nothingness is they are in a state of something (in this case material things), proper reasoning leads to truth and, but truth cannot be things which could change into false things, truth is eternal and unchaining what is true remain true "2+2=4" will always be true, truth is perfect, so whatever lead to finding it must be perfect-reasoning. Now as we discussed in the earlier chapter Perfect reasoning is Logic itself, but God's reasoning is THE perfect reasoning hence God's reasoning is Logic, but it proper-reasoning leads to truth, Logic leads to truth, and since the Logos is God, God leads to truth itself. Now a divine gift is a gift which itself it divine and is given by a divine being. Now since God is obviously divine, The gift for us to be able to explore truth by reason is obviously divine. But of course only proper-reasoning for improper reasoning itself is meaningless and can be given to anyone by anyone. So yes indeed the ability to be beings which have (proper)reason is a Divine Gift that should not be taken for granted but that should be used and be thanked for. And since hypothesis 1 is true, hypothesis 2 must be wrong.

Objection; Why should truth be eternal and unchanging, if seemingly we define what is true?

Response to Objection; We do not define what is true we merely find what it true, and if one thinks that we define things like two plus two to be four they might think such because they only looks at the word and the symbol but not the concept itself, one civilization may represent the number four with a symbol like this \mathcal{J} and

the number two like S, call four "clerk" and call two "ska" but the concept would remain the same that 'clerk' things would still be four thing even if the symbol and word representing it change. So the conceptual absolute Truths cannot be changed, but the words and symbols for such (i.e the representation) can change. Hence Truth is unchanging and eternal.

7.4 God, Kant, and Morality

Theory 1: This first theory basically says that "Morality is determined by the actions of the greatest thing (God)". I will try to explain this theory with the following example(s).

Imagine you are the only artist in the universe, and you make a painting, there is no universal standard but yours, and hence you cannot do anything but a good painting because you approve of it. However if there where a perfect universal standard for art, then you might come short of such and hence be a less good painter. So this means that how good or bad something, how perfect or imperfect something is, is defined by greater more perfect goods, now I you are the greatest being, the most perfect being, and there can be none other like you, you are also the greatest Good, and there is no greater standard for you but if by nature you act in a specific way and are changeless (as show sin the chapter "God's Divine Attributes"), then you cannot do anything but perfect Good, and all others will not only be imperfect compared to you, but have to abide by you eternal universal standard of Good and perfection. Hence if you are God, and are changeless then they way you are defines morality, it is in your nature and all other beings have to abide by it. The implication that God is changeless adds to the fact that morality doesn't change and hence is not subjective it is merely in the nature of God. Which also means God is not bound by morality however he abides by it because it is his nature. For example when one says that God cannot do but Good, this is because it is in "his" nature and is changeless because of God's nature".

Theory 2: Now apart from theory one, Thomas Aquinas proposed a natural law theory which basically states that "morality comes from us but only because God preloaded us with such sensibilities". However one famous philosopher which thought that morality and God have no real relation was Immmanuel Kant, because he noticed that depending on your religious beliefs your view of morality would change, however Kant viewed morality as a constant just like 2 + 2 = 4 or in other words a necessary constant, it cannot be any different not matter your religious belief. This seems perfectly rational because I morality exists (which it does), then is must be constant. So "How did Kant believe humans could know moral law?", well he believed morality could be derived from reason by categorical imperatives, and the most popular formulation of this categorical imperative is the universalizability principle which is the following; "To act morally is to act only according to that maxim which can at the same time will that it should become a universal law without contradiction". One example is the following,

Imagine that you steal a diamond from a jewelry store, well since you acted according to that maxim, then everyone should be able to do it to, so now someone can steal the diamond back and you can do it again to infinity. Now this implies a contradiction because if one assumes that at the ∞ th turn you will have stolen the diamond back this means that at the $(\infty + 1)$ th turn the other person will have taken it back. However since $\infty + 1 = \infty$, this would be implying that you both have an don't have the diamond which is a contradiction, thence immoral.

Now given this 'law/principle' one could go on and on defining morality without bringing God up once. This is true and false because the reason why something implies contradiction is because it isn't logical, and since we know that 'God is logic(or more generally THE Logos)' then even without wanting to bring up God we are indirectly using God to define the absolute morality. Thence even Kant's Godless definition of morality needs God to work. But in a sense this is just a modified version of Natural Law theory because we use our reason to define morality, yet this is because God gave us reason(as it is a divine gift); In a sense theory 2 is just a slightly modified version of Natural Law theory.

And since Theory 2 brings a more objective definition of morality than Theory 1, and morality must be objective, then it logically follows that theory 2 must be correct. But what about justice? because without perfect justice there would be no objective morality, for if there is no perfect justice one could violate the moral law, which we know cant be. So let's discuss justice on the next section.

7.5 On Justice

Physical Justice: The justice which we live with every day is not the ideal justice, but it might be the best type of justice we can get in this physical world. Now the two most common types of justice in this world are "An Eye for an Eye, A tooth for A tooth" and "Punish the one who has done wrong in the price of torture". But none of these can truly be the best type of justice as I will show in the following,

"An Eye for an Eye, A tooth for A tooth"

These words echo in the minds of common people, for if justice is good it must be equal. But I ask, "For the man which kills another mans daughter, why must the innocent daughter of the murderer suffer?". For this might seem just, but immoral, and justice must be moral, hence, "An Eye for an Eye, A tooth for A tooth" cannot be true justice. So "Shall we murder the murderer itself?", no for what will that achieve? All it will bring is more death, In the act of murdering the murderer one is no more closer to bringing the man's daughter to life than for the purest of evils to become the purest of goods. "Then shall we imprison the man, or torture but not murder?" Maybe, but maybe not, for the same above applies to this. "Then shall we do nothing to the man?" No for this would be immoral and hence unjust. "Then what shall we do?" All we can do is to hope for Divine justice after death, for only God can control all aspects of reality, but we men can only aspire to do such. "So then should we wait for such" Yes, but also no. For not acting in the face of

injustice is an act of evil, we can only aspire to to the best possible Justice in this physical world. "The what shall we do in this life?" I don't know, I all know is that such justice exists in the physical world, but it will never be perfect. This is the incompleteness of Justice

Due to the incompleteness of this physical justice it is best to simply not do injustice, to not do wrong. However it is much easier to speak than to act: one may say "I shall do no more evil-doings!", yet the very next day lie to their own parents. Nearly every man and women which has walked on this earth has does an evil act at least once, but I ask "Has there been justice for that". Justice isn't simply to go to court and sentence someone; it is to punish the wrong, of course not every crime is equal thence not every punishment should be equal either. What is the best justice in this physical world? I do not know.

Divine Justice: If If were to claim I perfectly knew how divine justice worked I'd might as well be blasphemous enough to say any sort of nonsense. Since God is perfect so must also be 'his' aspect of Justice, but weather this means eternity in torment or destructing of the soul, I do not know; although I do have my beliefs on such, I will not write them down in fear of being wrong. However I do know one thing "Divine Justice perfectly punishes evil acts". So in order to even try to picture divine justice we may first answer the question "What is evil?".

7.6 What is Evil?

Hypothesis 1: Evil is whatever we say it isHypothesis 2: Evil Is to that which is against the common goodHypothesis 3: Evil is the absence of the Good

Thoughts: Let's assume that Hypothesis 1 is correct, if it is then murder is not evil, prostitution is not an impure act, and lying is not evil deceit. However if this is true than one may say that evil is subjective, but I ask "What child thinks that someone murdering their father or mother is not evil, even if not educated in the law, moral, or ethics?" Now, unless such child is a psychopath(or Mentally III) the answer will be none; if evil was purely subjective by law, moral and ethic then the uneducated in such(young children) would answer all sorts of nonsense, but they don't. Hence hypothesis 1 seems to be incorrect.

Hypothesis 2 is partially correct because the common good will always be to help society in good manners, hence whatever tries to destroy or go against such would be evil. However this cannot be the whole picture because it might not be in the common good to take care of the man outside the society/community but what if this man is a man in need crying out for help, since not helping this man is not against the common good 'not helping the man' would not be considered evil, but it clearly is especially if the man is crying out for help. So hypothesis 2 cannot be fully correct even if it is partially correct.

Hypothesis 3 seems to be correct because the absence of the common good is the

absence of good which is absence of good which itself is evil(i.e hypothesis 3 agrees with hypothesis 2). However not helping the man in need is the absence of good and hence evil(i.e hypothesis 3 generalizes hypothesis 2). So it seems most reasonable to say, *Evil is the absence of the Good*. Thence hypothesis 3 is correct.

Implications:

Evil is the Absence of the Good; but what form does it take? Well God is the Good, Pure Act and 'his' own Existence. Then Evil is the total absence of God It takes the form of Pure potentiality, and non-existence. This is the form of Evil The Only form which does not come from God, for it does not exists, it is non-existence(nonbeing), it is the 0th plane; outside of the structure of creation. Thence all which God made is good, for God made all(the totality of existence), not non-existence itself; non-existence is not Something

Now all God made is good, God is the Good, and God is greater than Creation does this mean Creation is within God; does this mean panentheism is true?

No: Because as I discussed elsewhere If God contains creation and creation is composite then God is composite even though he is simple which is a contradiction. We know creation is composite because if it wasn't them we ourselves would be fully God and hence also been Omnipotent and more, which we clearly aren't. Thence panentheism cannot be correct. And the same applies to pantheism.

This means that God must be immanent in creation yet transcendent and distinct of/from creation. This is of course classical theism. So God's presence is everywhere in creation, yet God is distinct and wholly transcendent of the world.

This definition of evil also means that it is possible for a world to be created perfectly Good yet there still is evil, for evil is just the absence of good. In a sense this solves the problem of evil.

7.7 Moral Argument

In the past three sections (God, Kant, and Morality, On Justice, and What is Evil?) we have been discussing morality justice so let's discuss the moral argument.

Argument

Logic is absolute

Morality proceeds from logic

Therefore Morality is absolute

For there to be morality there must be perfect justice

Therefore there is perfect-justice

For there to be justice there must be a judge whose perfection is proportional to the perfection of justice

Physical justice is imperfect-justice

Therefore perfect justice is non-physical and there is a Perfect Judge

The perfect Judge must have the ability to do anything which justice would need to do to be just, must perfectly know all possible scenarios and all things within such scenarios.

God is the Perfect Judge Therefore God exists

Objection: Why should there only be one perfect-judge and not many?

Response to Objection: The reason there can only be only one perfect-judge and not many is because the rule of many allows possible disagreement and this would imply moral-incoherence which itself would me incoherent, and since this is would be impossible there can only be one Perfect-Judge. And also to be perfect also implies to be the greatest, and there cannot be multiple greatest, so there is only one greatest; There is only one Perfect-Judge.

[Note: For there to be many, it means for there to be many distinct substances/essences which are perfect judges, not for there to be one substance/essence in many persons. Hence the Trinity is still allowed because it is really just one substance/essence.]

7.8 On Death

Physical Death: Physical Death is the death which all the physical has to pass, rational or irrational. It is the death we and even the inanimate matter experiences. This type of death is the one we usually just call 'Death'.

Spiritual Death: Spiritual death is the lack of God(The Good)'s presence in the soul. This is most likely the death which leads one to hell both on death and after life.

Absolute Death: This is the death which completely destroys the existence of a being, it destroys their ousia (The substance/essence); simply the transformation from existence to non existence, being to non-being. Now absolute death is the most evil type of death for it turns something good(which exists) to something purely evil (non-existence/nothingness). Now if the soul is immortal and God constantly will that such will be true, no human soul will ever have to experience this type of death.

Final Thoughts on Death: For someone who doesn't believe in the afterlife, or in the immortal soul, physical death and absolute death will be the same. For the believer in the immortal soul yet atheist, they would either worry only about the spiritual death or about none. Yet: For the Christian, they should worry mainly about the Spiritual Death, and Physical Death.

Lastly I will say my inner feelings on the subject in the following,

If you Give Death Death, then Death will still exist. If you Give Death Life, Death will still be. Even If you give Death nothing, Death will remain. As long as there is Life, the concept of Death will always exist; even if nothing else actually dies; Death has no independent existence. This is a Truth which cannot be Avoided. So Live with God, For Death lurks at the threshold. All the physical will have a physical death(unless God says otherwise); all the evil ones will experience spiritual death, unless such repents and returns to God; I doubt God will ever allow such evil as absolute death.

Yet: I long and wish that Death never was.

7.9 Final Thoughts on Life

We have seen the significance of death, the infinitesimal length of our lives in comparison with eternity. Life from a cosmic perspective is insignificant. If you think you have a hold on life by your mere wisdom, you are wrong. As Ecclesiastes states, 'Life is like smoke', for it is beautifully yet impossible to grasp, confusing, and random. So I will complete this section in the following,

We must first remember that Life is a gift even if you don't recognize it as such, now we may proceed.

In Life we may never fully find justice if we ignore God; there will always be a fundamental incompleteness of such if we do not seek for divine justice. Morality can be achieved through reason, yet only because God allows such; we will always misinterpret it, so must search for God. We must seek Truth, Love, Happiness and in general the Good; we must seek God. God's wisdom guides all, yet one must abide

by it at all times to live following it. Living following God's wisdom is great and Good. Yet Life is like smoke, you think you have a hold of it and it vanishes, you think you can predict its movements by your own knowledge, and it moves randomly. It constantly changes form, it is unexpected, short, and cosmically insignificant. We will be forgotten in the long run, and if remembered, will only be remembered by our mistakes, no matter how good you were; no other human in the long run cares about

your acts, yet will always criticize your way of life. Our physical existence guarantees that we will all physically die in seeming an instant of eternity. Yet: The purpose of life remains; search for God. With God you wont care about the depressions of life; you will only admire him and in doing so get closer and closer to Goodness itself. Once in the presence of God, you may know that you found God, that you will forevermore be happy, be well, be humble, be wise and more. We should ember even in this we will still be humans, nothing in comparison to God. And remember, purpose is the principle to meaning.

This is Life

Chapter 8

Aristotle's & Aquinas's Argument

The reason why I placed this chapter last was because to establish clear implications I needed to first describe all which I have described in the earlier chapters.

8.1 On Infinite Regress

These arguments rely heavily on the impossibility of an infinite really however one can imagine an infinite amount of actualized motions with a beginning, just imagine a line segment such that at every point a motion occurred, yet at the beginning there must have been a first mover. So even though there was an infinite regress of things to get to the first mover there was still a cause; thence an infinite regress is logical(specifically this kind). This means that even if the world were to be eternal(which it most likely isn't) it would still require a first cause, a beginning. Now I want to introduce the type of regress Aquinas and Aristotle were really referring to, the Neinitionian Regress which is defined as the following,

Neinitionian Regress: An infinite regress with no beginning, no first motion.

This type of regress although technically still an infinite regress, would have no beginning, no point of first motion. If one imagines a chain or gears which have a Neinitionian regress of motions, it would be the same as saying there is no first gear which moves them. Or if one imagines a series of falling dominoes in a Neinitionian regress, it would be the same as saying "there was never a first falling domino, the dominoes simply fall", which is absurd if the chain is a chain of motion. So the type of infinite regress which is impossible(also the type the argument refers to) is the Neinitionian regress. Also the ordering of the causal series (series of motion) is ordered in a *per se* manner, or in other words it is ordered in a hierarchical way such that every motion depends(in contingent on) the past motion.

Now we shall begin with the Argument

8.2 Argument

All motion physical or non-physical, is motion if and only if there is a conversion from potentiality to actuality.

For motion to occur, there must be an actualized thing which actualizes the potentiality.

It is not possible for something to be in actuality and potentiality simultaneously.

Therefore it is impossible that simultaneously a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself.

Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another.

If there is no beginning to this series this series is a Neinitionian regress.

A Neinitionian regress is a logical absurdity

Therefore there must be an unmoved mover, which is pure actuality (Actus Purus).

8.3 Attributes of the Actus Purus & Implications

The Actus Purus must be purely actual yet this would be actualizing all Good, yet it would also be actualizing Evil, now this is a contradiction. Thence we must either decide that actualizing potentiality can be only good, and not evil(which would imply there can be no potential to do evil because evil would not classify as something(it would classify as nothing).) or vise versa. Now, it must be true that we must choose "actualizing potentiality can be only good, and not evil; thence there can be no potential to do evil because evil would not classify as something; evil would classify as nothing. This would be because Good precedes evil; 'again'– this is because evil is the absence of good. So this means the Following,

To be good: To actualize potential; for no potential can be evil; Evil is the absence of Good; evil is nothingness, potential is something. Now, since how much power one has is it how much potential they can actualize, the amount of power one has is simply how much good they can do, and vise versa.

Now there is one main objection "How is it impossible to actualize evil if it is clearly possible to do an evil act?" Here's the thing, since evil is nothingness, to 'actualize' nothingness, is simply to act on nothingness, but this is the same as doing nothing, and doing nothing is not to act. Therefore to 'act' in an evil way is not really to act; to 'act' in a evil way is to do nothing, yet be destructive. Think about it, to 'actualize' nothingness is a destructive 'act'. This is because you turn something into nothing. For example to kill is to turn the life of someone into nothing, to steal is to turn someone's possession of something into nothing. So to be evil is to do the opposite(the absence) of actualizing potential, it is to turn actuality to potentiality. Thence the definition of being good(i.e To actualize potential) still stands.

Implication: Now, not only is the *Actus Purus* pure Actuality, but it also actualizes all potentiality. So the *Actus Purus* must be The Good (or The "Form" of the Good). And since The Good is possesses all perfections and is the *Actus Purus*, the *Actus Purus* possesses all perfections. And since the Divine attributes in 2.1(chapter 2, section 1) apply to the being which possesses all perfections, the *Actus Purus* must be at the very least Transcendent and Unique, Immutable, Simple, Non-Contingent, have Intellect/be Rational, therefore also conscious and have will.

Implication: All things besides the *Actus Purus* must actualize some potentiality even if such thing is inanimate. For example the purpose of heat it to worm stuff up or burn it it, it depends. Organs purpose is to keep the human alive, the animal's purpose is to live, the objects the which are used to live (rocks to make weapons, trees to make homes and etc.) also have a purpose which is to help the living keep living.

Therefore all things have a *telos*/purpose. Thence all things actualize the potentiality of purpose as their purpose; all things do good living or inanimate. And since all goods strive towards The Good (i.e have The Good as their final cause; as their *telos*); all things have the *Actus Purus* as their final cause(because the *Actus Purus* is The Good). Or simply; All Things Strive to Perfection, all Things look towards God.

However since The Good is The Form of the Good and according to Plato all things came from The Good(Plato specified all good things. However here we have seen that evil takes the shape/form of nothingness we can simply say the source of all.); All things Must Come from God. Yet: All things go back to the *Actus Purus* because it is their final cause; All Things go back to the *Actus Purus* for they exist only for its sake. As a conclusion since the *Actus Purus* is The Good, and God is The Good the following is true,

All Comes from and Returns to God; God is the Beginning and The End; The Alpha and The Omega

This mirrors a Classical Christian description of God which comes from the Book of Revelation which describes God as Alpha and Omega, Beginning and End, the First and the Last, who Was, Is, and Is to Come.

Chapter 9

Extra

9.1 Implications of S7

Classically there are two modal categories contingent and necessary. However since, "To be contingent is to depend on another substance/essence than one's own for one's existence" and **S7** asserts that, "Non-contingency implies necessity and/but necessity doesn't imply non-contingency" the classical modal categories cannot be it, the categories must really be contingent and non-contingent i.e everything but God, and God. However this seems like sort of useless, so I will rephrase it in a better way, the modal categories are, "non-necessary, necessary, and non-contingent". Non-necessary things are things like you and me which simply could of not existed, necessary things are things like "2+2=4" and a(i.e the only) non-contingent thing is God(of course this means that God is also necessary by **S7**)

9.2 On $G(x) \Leftrightarrow \forall y[(y \neq x) \Rightarrow x \succ y]$

I need to show that this is an Identical Definition to $G(x) \Leftrightarrow \forall \varphi[P(\varphi) \Rightarrow \varphi(x)]$, because it is crucial to the Augustinian Argument.

If one remembers the original definition of metaphysical greatness you will remember that it mainly means the amount of power one has. Now if x has more power than anything it must be All-Powerful, and hence must be able to turn any potentiality to actuality, hence must itself be the *Actus Purus*, therefore must also be The Good(The "Form" of The Good), and hence must posses all positive properties which therefore means that $\forall y[(y \neq x) \Rightarrow x \succ y] \equiv \forall \varphi[P(\varphi) \Rightarrow \varphi(x)]$, which if course means that The two definitions are equal.

9.3 On The Perfect Judge

The perfect judge must have the ability to do any and all needed to complete justice. Now since being just is to be moral and to be moral is to be good. The perfect Judge must have the ability to do any and all Good, and since to do good is to actualize potential, the perfect just must have the ability to actualize any and all potential. This implies two things.

1. Since to have power is to be able to turn potentiality to actuality, the Perfect Judge must be All-Powerful (Omnipotent).

2. Since potential cannot be actualized by something which is not itself actualized, that which can actualize any and all potential must be Pure Actuality (The Actus Purus)

And since the Perfect Judge is the *Actus Purus* and the *Actus Purus* is The Good(The "Form" of The Good), the Perfect Judge must be The Good(The "Form" of The Good), which means–'again' that the Perfect Judge must be at the very least Transcendent and Unique, Immutable, Simple, Non-Contingent, have Intellect/be Rational, therefore also conscious and have will.

And this itself is a reason why there must only be one Perfect Judge because as discussed elsewhere it is greater to be unique(only one such substance/essence) than to have many(or just one) nonidentical-substantial equal(s). Yet also because by definition there can only be one *Summum bonum* (i.e There can only be one "Form" of The Good), there can only be one Perfect Judge for the Perfect Judge is The Good

9.4 On The Ultimate Cause

The Ultimate Cause it the source of all which was described in Chapter 3 section 3. And in there it was shown that this Ultimate Cause was all powerful, but to be all powerful this cause must have the ability to actualize all potentiality, which means this being must be able to be All-Good and since to actualize potentiality one must be itself actual, this ultimate cause must be Purely Actual (*Actus Purus*), and hence be The Good(The "Form" of The Good), which means– 'again' that the Ultimate Cause must be at the very least Transcendent and Unique, Immutable, Simple, Non-Contingent, have Intellect/be Rational, therefore also conscious and have will.

Now this solves a possible objection which could be stated as the following "Why should this cause be one only, instead of a council?", and to this I say the same as I said in the section "On The Perfect Judge", which was that because by definition there can only be one *Summum bonum* (i.e There can only be one "Form" of The Good), there can only be one Ultimate Cause for the Ultimate Cause is The Good.

Also: As said before when I mean many I don't refer to many persons, I refer to many(or just one) nonidentical-substantial equal(s), not as the trinity which is Just one substance/essence in which the persons are Substantial-Equal, so are really just one. (i.e The Trinity still stands even though there can only be one Ultimate Cause, for the Trinity is Just one God.)

9.5 On The Totality of Possible Worlds

OK, so I have talked about the totality of possible worlds and how it must contain the Forms (Since I'm saying Forms instead of "Forms", this means I am really talking about the platonic-Forms which are not of the same substance/essence as God.) Now, this totality we know must be contingent, but this doesn't mean non-necessary. This is because since the totality would contain the Forms which are necessary, the totality would at least partially be necessary, yet the Forms are contingent(Not the "Forms" for they are of the same substance/essence as God who is non-contingent; each one fully God yet only one God, and God is still just a Trinity). Yet not only would the "Forms" not be withing such, but the totality itself would be a Form which is not withing such. Think about it, the totality is a necessary (but contingent in the sense that it depends on something/someone), an archetype for the world(s), immaterial, ideal, and it is the substance/essence of the world. So it fits the description of a Form(not a "Form"), and since it is the archetype of the (actual)world, I will call it, The Form of The World. Now that we have shown that The Totality of Possible Worlds is simply The Form of The World, it is the Form which contains all Forms(NOT "Forms"). Yet, this Form still comes from God, remember **S7**, which stated "Non-Contingency implies necessity, yet necessity does not imply non-contingency". And although God is present everywhere (in every possible world), 'he' is not IN the possible worlds in the same way everything else is. Also: The Form of The World could be said to be the greatest Form(Not "Form"). Many modal-panentheist/pantheists confuse the Form of The World with God, this is because they ignore(or simply are not aware of) the contingency of this Form, which implies that it must have a cause for its existence even if necessary.

God is the cause of The Form of The World; God is the only Non-Contingent Thing.

God's position as the cause of The Form of The World supports God's position as the cause of all Forms(NOT "Forms").

[Note: PLEASE DO NOT confuse "Forms" with Forms. Forms of the same substance as God are described as "Forms" (with double quotation marks), and Forms which are not of the same substance/essence as God are described as simply Forms(without quotation marks). The Good, and Truth are "Forms"; the Forms of Horseness or Dogness are simply Forms, NOT "Forms".]

9.6 God and Infinity

The Modern conception of Infinity is purely mathematical, and mathematics itself is developed suing set theory which is itself developed using the laws of logic. So since the laws of logic are complex things which come from Logic(which is simple) it could be said that Logic is the Father of Infinity. However God is The Logos(hence also Logic), therefore God is The Father of Infinity. When we describe God as infinite we must think of something so beyond, that it goes beyond the nameless infinities of mathematics. For example certain infinities in mathematics are so large that they aren't even called sizes/cardinals (these are the infinities of proper classes and 'larger' types of classes), for they are simply too infinite, yet those are still less than God's infinite. Anytime we call God infinite we must remember that God's infinite is Absolute Infinite, the source of all infinities. Never assume God's infinity is limited by mathematical infinity. So I say the following,

"God is The Father of Infinity, when we call 'him' Infinite, we mean Absolute Infinite: The Source of all Infinities. God's infinity is boundless unlike mathematical infinity. God is beyond and above All."

This is why I have commonly said in the text that even though the totality of possible worlds is infinite, God is boundless, limitless, i.e The Totality is still nothing compared to God.

Seeing that God is The Father of Infinity, I do not know how any man, woman or in general creature can think they are God. The Created will never be the Creator. Only God has, is, and will always be Supreme. God loves creation, and creation should aspire to love and find God. I have not completed the journey, I would be arrogant and blasphemous if I said such. I hope one day I may find God, but to find God I first need to Truly love God above All. I accept that I should Love God above all, but things are much easier said than done.

Author's Note

Thanks for reading, Hopefully I answered some questions, strengthened your faith in God, and have given a good philosophy of Life. This book is inspired by the motto,

"Quaero Veritatem, Veritas pulchra"

That's is my message to the reader.