Online Appendix

Appendix

|  |
| --- |
| Table A1: Determinants of Pledge Fulfillment: 1994-2015 in Quebec (Binary Logit Model with 603 observations) |
|  | Coefficients (Standard Errors) | Odds Ratios |
| Federal jurisdiction | -0.244 (0.289) | 0.783 |
| Federal Transfers | 0.122\* (0.048) | 1.130 |
| Budget Balance | -0.000\* (0.000) | 0.999 |
| Pledge Type (Reference=Status Quo) |  |  |
|    Expand Spending/Cut Taxes | -0.479 (0.333) | 0.619 |
|    Contract Spending/Increase Taxes | -0.962 (0.497) | 0.382 |
|    Other Change | -0.457 (0.345) | 0.633 |
|    Outcome | -0.265 (0.381) | 0.767 |
| Party: PQ | 1.398\*\*\* (0.349) | 4.049 |
| Interparty Agreement | 0.383\* (0.191) | 1.466 |
| Majority Government | 0.278 (0.222) | 1.320 |
| Newly Elected Government | -0.162 (0.206) | 0.850 |
| Intercept | -1.268 (0.736) |  |
| N | 603 | 603 |
| Log-likelihood | -387.532 | -387.532 |

**End notes**

 According to conventional wisdom, minority governments have a smaller capacity to make policy in general, and less freedom to carry out their campaign pledges than majority governments. However, the argument that the lack of freedom incapacitates minority governments is overstated (Strøm 1990, Godbout and Høyland 2011). There is evidence that single party minority governments are capable of fulfilling as many if not more pledges as single party majority governments while they last (Artés and Bustos 2008, Mansergh and Thomson 2007). In final analysis, the reason why majority governments fulfill more pledges is that they last longer.

 To avoid co-linearity problems, our statistical model does not include a government duration variable.

 We also examined GDP growth as a predictor in our exploratory analyses. In line with results from past studies in national settings (Praprotnik 2017, Thomson et al. 2017) we expect that pledges are more likely to be redeemed during periods of GDP growth. However, the coefficient for GDP growth is significantly negative in the model. This unexpected result indicates the presence of multicolinearity with other explanatory variables, including federal transfers and budget balance, that is confirmed by tolerance tests.

 Space constraints prevent us from discussing at length the BTSCS methodology and its application to the analysis of pledge fulfillment. For more details on the application of the methodology to pledge fulfilment, see Duval and Pétry (2018).

 To assess the effect of introducing multiple time points for each pledge in Model 1, we also ran a conventional model without the time variable. The results for the conventional multivariate additive model with 603 observations are displayed in Model A1 in Appendix 1. Most coefficients in the conventional model have the correct sign although they often fail the test of statistical significance.

 To illustrate, the federal government could not comply with the 1994 PQ pledge to “establish the timetable and modalities for the transfer of powers from the federal government” because the pledge was stepping outside the bounds of the Canadian Constitution. The pledge remained unfulfilled. The 2012 PQ pledge to “demand the repatriation of employment insurance” could not be accepted by the federal government because it was stepping outside the bounds of federal provincial power distribution based on current legislation. The pledge remained unfulfilled. In both cases, the interaction between the center and the regional party could be characterized formally as a non-cooperative game with a Nash equilibrium. In this game, the regional party has two strategies : Either make a pledge that is acceptable by the center (cooperate) or make a pledge that is not acceptable (defect). A dominant strategy to defect emerges each time the regional party’s payoff for defecting is higher than its payoff for cooperating, irrespective of the strategy that is chosen by the center.

 Before the NDP-Green coalition came to power in 2017 in British Columbia, there had been no provincial coalition government since the Conservative-Liberal coalition of the 1940s also in British Columbia.

 For the distinction between “shared-cost” federalism and “joint-decision” federalism see Banting (2008).

 For the distinction between “national” and “pluralist” federations see Smiley and Watts (1985) and McGarry, O’Leary and Simeon (2008).

 For the distinction between “regional national parties” and “mainstream parties” in Western Europe see Toubeau (2011).