

Supporting Information (SI)

Grist to the Mill of Subversion: Strikes and Coups in Counterinsurgencies

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Table of contents

Descriptive statistics	2
Additional visualization of substantive effects	5
Robustness checks: Additional control variables	6
Robustness checks: Model choice	12
Robustness checks: Interaction effects	13
Robustness checks: Selection effects	16

Descriptive statistics

Table SI.1 shows descriptive statistics for all variables used in the main analysis. The sample includes observations from counterinsurgencies. Table SI.2 shows descriptive statistics for all country-years between 1950 and 2005, that is observations for peace and counterinsurgency years, used in the robustness checks on conditional and selection effects. Figure SI.1 shows the percentage of years in counterinsurgencies, which experienced at least one coup attempt and one organized resistance event (by resistance type).

Table SI.1. Summary statistics for main analysis

	Type	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Coup attempt	Binary	1149	0.08	0.27	0.00	1.00
Strikes	Binary	1149	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00
Demonstrations	Binary	1150	0.34	0.47	0.00	1.00
Guerrilla attacks	Binary	1149	0.54	0.50	0.00	1.00
Riots	Binary	1149	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00
Strikes	Count	1149	0.23	0.70	0.00	7.00
Demonstrations	Count	1150	1.14	2.85	0.00	37.00
Guerrilla attacks	Count	1149	0.76	1.52	0.00	34.00
Riots	Count	1149	1.12	3.50	0.00	55.00
Strikes ^a	Count	1149	0.13	0.34	0.00	2.08
Demonstrations ^a	Count	1150	0.43	0.69	0.00	3.64
Guerrilla attacks ^a	Count	1149	0.43	0.46	0.00	3.56
Riots ^a	Count	1149	0.37	0.69	0.00	4.03
GDP <i>real</i> growth	Continuous	1145	1.33	13.84	-66.29	189.74
Troop funding ^a	Continuous	1118	8.49	1.28	0.00	12.73
Repressive capacity ^a	Continuous	1111	3.13	1.50	0.00	7.66
Democracy (Cheibub et al.)	Binary	1153	0.37	0.48	0.00	1.00
Civilian dictatorship (Cheibub et al.)	Binary	1153	0.38	0.49	0.00	1.00
Military dictatorship (Cheibub et al.)	Binary	1153	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00
Royal dictatorship (Cheibub et al.)	Binary	1153	0.02	0.15	0.00	1.00
Democracy (Geddes et al.)	Binary	1156	0.31	0.46	0.00	1.00
Personalist regime (Geddes et al.)	Binary	1156	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
Party regime (Geddes et al.)	Binary	1156	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00
Military regime (Geddes et al.)	Binary	1156	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00
Monarchical regime (Geddes et al.)	Binary	1156	0.03	0.18	0.00	1.00
Distance from capital ^a	Continuous	1177	3.94	3.33	0.00	9.54
Multiple insurgencies	Binary	1177	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00
Occupation	Binary	1177	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00
Cold War	Binary	1177	0.62	0.49	0.00	1.00
War duration	Count	1177	10.98	10.27	1.00	58.00
War duration ²	Count	1177	225.84	421.99	1.00	3364.00
Middle East	Binary	1177	0.10	0.30	0.00	1.00
Asia	Binary	1177	0.32	0.47	0.00	1.00
Africa	Binary	1177	0.32	0.47	0.00	1.00
Americas	Binary	1177	0.14	0.34	0.00	1.00
Time	Count	1149	15.69	14.77	1.00	56.00
Time ²	Count	1149	464.06	725.99	1.00	3136.00
Time ³	Count	1149	17.56	35.31	0.00	175.62

^a Variable logarithmized.

Table SI.2. Summary statistics for conditional and selection effects

	Type	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Coup attempt	Binary	7695	0.05	0.22	0.00	1.00
Strikes	Binary	7628	0.08	0.27	0.00	1.00
Demonstrations	Binary	7627	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
Guerrilla attacks	Binary	7628	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00
Riots	Binary	7628	0.17	0.38	0.00	1.00
Strikes	Count	7628	0.13	0.53	0.00	13.00
Demonstrations	Count	7627	0.52	1.81	0.00	60.00
Guerrilla attacks	Count	7628	0.21	0.80	0.00	34.00
Riots	Count	7628	0.47	1.81	0.00	55.00
Strikes ^a	Count	7628	0.07	0.26	0.00	2.64
Demonstrations ^a	Count	7627	0.22	0.50	0.00	4.11
Guerrilla attacks ^a	Count	7628	0.12	0.31	0.00	3.56
Riots ^a	Count	7628	0.19	0.47	0.00	4.03
Insurgency	Binary	7913	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00
GDP <i>real</i> per capita ^a	Continuous	7755	8.23	1.19	4.90	13.36
GDP <i>real</i> growth	Continuous	7578	2.41	27.29	-79.69	2079.41
Population size ^a	Continuous	7755	8.86	1.65	4.70	14.07
Troop funding ^a	Continuous	7111	8.58	1.59	0.00	14.70
Democracy (Cheibub et al.)	Binary	7838	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00
Mountainous terrain ^a (Fearon & Laitin)	Continuous	7025	2.20	1.39	0.00	4.42
Ethnic grievances (Buhaug et al.)	Continuous	7781	1.23	0.55	1.00	6.05
Oil abundance ^a (Buhaug et al.)	Continuous	7025	4.12	4.49	0.00	13.32
Noncontiguous state (Fearon & Laitin)	Binary	7005	0.17	0.37	0.00	1.00
Distance from capital ^a	Continuous	1177	3.94	3.33	0.00	9.54
Multiple insurgencies	Binary	1177	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00
Occupation	Binary	1177	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00
Middle East	Binary	7913	0.10	0.30	0.00	1.00
Asia	Binary	7913	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
Africa	Binary	7913	0.27	0.44	0.00	1.00
Americas	Binary	7913	0.19	0.40	0.00	1.00
Time since coup	Count	7695	16.70	14.38	1.00	56.00
Time since coup ²	Count	7695	485.74	708.56	1.00	3136.00
Time since coup ³	Count	7695	17.85	34.58	0.00	175.62
Time since insurgency	Count	7913	18.12	15.62	1.00	58.00
Time since insurgency ²	Count	7913	572.32	779.63	1.00	3364.00
Time since insurgency ³	Count	7913	21.97	39.20	0.00	195.11

^a Variable logarithmized.




Figure SI.1. Distribution of coup and resistance events in the data

Additional visualization of substantive effects

Figure SI.2 visualizes predicted probabilities for the full empirical range of the key independent variables. Only strikes have a substantive and significant effect on the probability of coup attempts.




Figure SI.2. Predicted probabilities for full range of resistance events during insurgencies

Robustness checks: Additional control variables

1. Controlling for repressive capacity.

This check controls for repressive capacity. The variable accounts for the state's resources to suppress domestic dissent and captures the relative size of the pool from which potential coup plotters might originate. It measures the number of soldiers per citizen based on data from CoW (2010) and Gleditsch (2002). As the variable is highly correlated with *Troop funding* ($p=0.8$), we only include one variable in the statistical models at a time. Results in Table SI.3 remain unchanged when we include a state's repressive capacity.

2. Controlling for regime types.

In this check we control for the full set of regime types. We draw on data from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) and Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). The latter dataset has the advantage that it codes regime types in the year that follows a regime change, alleviating problems with reverse causality for cases with successful coups. Results in Table SI.4 and Table SI.5 show that results remain stable when we control for regime types irrespective of the data source in use.

3. Controlling for Cold War.

This check controls for the Cold War period. Table SI.6 shows that including the binary variable *Cold War* does not change the results.

4. Controlling for counterinsurgency duration.

This focuses on the potentially confounding effect of counterinsurgency duration. Counterinsurgencies are conflicts in which rebels try to achieve their political goals through an exhausting, protracted struggle. This may increase the government's willingness to offer concessions over time as it grows fatigued and impatient among citizens, elites, and soldiers to end the conflict. Table SI.7 shows that our results remain stable to the control of *War duration* and *War duration²*, which counts the number of years in each conflict spell.

Table SI.3. Effects of resistance types on coup risk controlling for repressive capacity

	Dummy		Count		ln(Count)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Strikes	0.978** (0.354)	0.925** (0.343)	0.468** (0.169)	0.439** (0.168)	0.837* (0.367)	0.792* (0.359)
Demonstrations	0.197 (0.287)	0.118 (0.309)	0.076 (0.048)	0.063 (0.050)	0.260 (0.227)	0.209 (0.246)
Guerrilla attacks	0.242 (0.236)	0.126 (0.251)	0.110* (0.046)	0.096* (0.047)	0.345 (0.257)	0.247 (0.276)
Riots	0.173 (0.280)	0.173 (0.284)	0.009 (0.037)	0.008 (0.036)	0.219 (0.204)	0.217 (0.205)
GDP <i>real</i> growth	-0.030** (0.009)	-0.032** (0.009)	-0.030** (0.009)	-0.032** (0.009)	-0.030** (0.009)	-0.031** (0.009)
Repressive capacity	-0.341** (0.122)	-0.355** (0.116)	-0.335** (0.123)	-0.371** (0.121)	-0.324** (0.119)	-0.350** (0.117)
Democracy	-1.052** (0.341)	-1.157** (0.411)	-1.028** (0.354)	-1.151** (0.435)	-1.087** (0.358)	-1.188** (0.438)
Distance from capital	-0.046 (0.046)	-0.048 (0.059)	-0.053 (0.045)	-0.044 (0.061)	-0.055 (0.047)	-0.051 (0.061)
Multiple insurgencies	0.035 (0.351)	0.058 (0.402)	0.119 (0.345)	0.143 (0.399)	0.050 (0.348)	0.075 (0.398)
Occupation	0.214 (0.385)	0.616 (0.395)	0.131 (0.386)	0.441 (0.360)	0.143 (0.396)	0.485 (0.394)
Time	-0.247 [†] (0.142)	-0.234 [†] (0.137)	-0.248 [†] (0.131)	-0.234 [†] (0.128)	-0.244 [†] (0.136)	-0.232 [†] (0.133)
Time ²	0.016 (0.014)	0.015 (0.014)	0.016 (0.013)	0.015 (0.013)	0.016 (0.014)	0.015 (0.013)
Time ³	-0.362 (0.351)	-0.344 (0.345)	-0.354 (0.306)	-0.335 (0.307)	-0.351 (0.326)	-0.336 (0.326)
Constant	-0.434 (0.423)	-0.834 (0.844)	-0.299 (0.387)	-0.623 (0.821)	-0.465 (0.422)	-0.791 (0.814)
Region FE	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓
Wald χ^2	75.25**	85.69**	87.92**	99.85**	88.19**	98.65**
Pseudo R ²	0.16	0.17	0.16	0.17	0.16	0.17
Pseudo Log-Likelihood	-241.48	-239.35	-239.83	-237.96	-239.70	-238.03
Number of clusters	70	70	70	70	70	70
Number of observations	1068	1068	1068	1068	1068	1068

Coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered on countries.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table SI.4. Effects of resistance types on coup risk controlling for regime types from Cheibub et al. (2010) (Reference category: royal dictatorships)

	Dummy		Count		ln(Count)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Strikes	0.906** (0.336)	0.875** (0.329)	0.456** (0.150)	0.444** (0.152)	0.803* (0.335)	0.782* (0.327)
Demonstrations	0.154 (0.301)	0.096 (0.323)	0.055 (0.049)	0.044 (0.051)	0.195 (0.237)	0.150 (0.249)
Guerrilla attacks	0.147 (0.247)	0.065 (0.254)	0.126 (0.091)	0.116 (0.080)	0.328 (0.292)	0.278 (0.293)
Riots	0.156 (0.320)	0.169 (0.318)	0.008 (0.037)	0.010 (0.036)	0.210 (0.227)	0.223 (0.226)
GDP <i>real</i> growth	-0.036** (0.009)	-0.036** (0.009)	-0.036** (0.010)	-0.037** (0.009)	-0.035** (0.010)	-0.036** (0.010)
Troop funding	-0.279† (0.146)	-0.267 (0.165)	-0.255† (0.148)	-0.265 (0.167)	-0.261† (0.148)	-0.263 (0.168)
Democracy	12.491** (0.780)	12.813** (0.784)	13.329** (0.983)	12.937** (1.077)	13.262** (0.772)	13.276** (0.845)
Civilian dictatorship	12.647** (0.765)	13.033** (0.718)	13.457** (0.878)	13.129** (0.934)	13.447** (0.725)	13.509** (0.722)
Military dictatorship	13.977** (0.771)	14.381** (0.742)	14.812** (0.978)	14.511** (1.029)	14.787** (0.745)	14.874** (0.766)
Distance from capital	-0.053 (0.048)	-0.058 (0.072)	-0.058 (0.048)	-0.053 (0.076)	-0.059 (0.050)	-0.059 (0.074)
Multiple insurgencies	-0.207 (0.414)	-0.185 (0.427)	-0.141 (0.419)	-0.118 (0.437)	-0.192 (0.415)	-0.174 (0.429)
Occupation	0.044 (0.440)	0.343 (0.489)	-0.041 (0.438)	0.124 (0.447)	-0.015 (0.449)	0.183 (0.476)
Time	-0.266* (0.133)	-0.261* (0.124)	-0.261* (0.118)	-0.258* (0.110)	-0.261* (0.125)	-0.258* (0.118)
Time ²	0.019 (0.014)	0.018 (0.014)	0.018 (0.012)	0.017 (0.012)	0.018 (0.013)	0.018 (0.013)
Time ³	-0.400 (0.360)	-0.388 (0.342)	-0.382 (0.305)	-0.373 (0.291)	-0.386 (0.330)	-0.378 (0.319)
Constant	-12.374** (1.532)	-13.143** (1.822)	-13.338** (1.860)	-13.106** (2.170)	-13.385** (1.613)	-13.605** (1.920)
Region FE	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓
Wald χ^2	498.21**	589.68**	520.10**	464.57**	608.63**	662.64**
Pseudo R ²	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.21	0.20	0.21
Pseudo Log-Likelihood	-227.59	-226.40	-225.85	-224.80	-225.81	-224.88
Number of clusters	70	70	70	70	70	70
Number of observations	1056	1056	1056	1056	1056	1056

Coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered on countries.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table SI.5. Effects of resistance types on coup risk controlling for regime types from Geddes et al. (2014) (Reference category: transitional/provisional regimes)

	Dummy		Count		ln(Count)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Strikes	0.740*	0.739*	0.357*	0.373*	0.599*	0.621*
	(0.302)	(0.300)	(0.146)	(0.145)	(0.305)	(0.306)
Demonstrations	0.068	0.093	0.059	0.058	0.142	0.171
	(0.285)	(0.312)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.216)	(0.235)
Guerrilla attacks	0.240	0.183	0.078	0.078	0.240	0.206
	(0.240)	(0.235)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.256)	(0.263)
Riots	0.241	0.262	0.005	-0.000	0.264	0.249
	(0.267)	(0.269)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.225)	(0.224)
GDP <i>real</i> growth	-0.032**	-0.031**	-0.032**	-0.031**	-0.031**	-0.031**
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Troop funding	-0.361**	-0.336*	-0.359**	-0.354*	-0.340**	-0.336*
	(0.126)	(0.152)	(0.127)	(0.148)	(0.131)	(0.158)
Democracy	-0.219	-0.139	-0.028	0.054	-0.176	-0.087
	(0.601)	(0.660)	(0.602)	(0.667)	(0.597)	(0.665)
Personalist regime	0.190	0.273	0.324	0.403	0.254	0.331
	(0.478)	(0.503)	(0.475)	(0.510)	(0.471)	(0.506)
Party regime	-0.951	-0.919	-0.791	-0.762	-0.862	-0.835
	(0.665)	(0.696)	(0.674)	(0.707)	(0.656)	(0.692)
Military regime	0.139	0.116	0.270	0.248	0.200	0.185
	(0.486)	(0.547)	(0.513)	(0.571)	(0.488)	(0.557)
Distance from capital	-0.019	-0.020	-0.026	-0.022	-0.030	-0.027
	(0.041)	(0.048)	(0.040)	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.049)
Multiple insurgencies	-0.064	0.036	0.010	0.111	-0.041	0.061
	(0.358)	(0.391)	(0.353)	(0.385)	(0.354)	(0.389)
Occupation	-0.098	0.447	-0.180	0.268	-0.135	0.319
	(0.373)	(0.423)	(0.380)	(0.385)	(0.390)	(0.434)
Time	-0.301*	-0.294*	-0.297*	-0.293*	-0.293*	-0.288*
	(0.133)	(0.130)	(0.127)	(0.125)	(0.129)	(0.128)
Time ²	0.020	0.019	0.020	0.019	0.019	0.019
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Time ³	-0.415	-0.397	-0.405	-0.390	-0.401	-0.385
	(0.331)	(0.318)	(0.304)	(0.293)	(0.312)	(0.303)
Constant	1.484	0.231	1.492	0.498	1.299	0.297
	(1.001)	(1.434)	(1.079)	(1.460)	(1.107)	(1.516)
Region FE	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓
Wald χ^2	111.22**	136.38**	125.29**	170.41**	144.50**	164.11**
Pseudo R ²	0.16	0.17	0.16	0.17	0.16	0.17
Pseudo Log-Likelihood	-243.94	-242.60	-243.24	-242.12	-242.81	-241.58
Number of clusters	69	69	69	69	69	69
Number of observations	1056	1056	1056	1056	1056	1056

Coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered on countries.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table SI.6. Effects of resistance types on coup risk controlling for cold war

	Dummy		Count		ln(Count)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Strikes	0.970** (0.354)	0.932** (0.344)	0.496** (0.171)	0.483** (0.172)	0.869* (0.368)	0.847* (0.362)
Demonstrations	0.196 (0.290)	0.147 (0.323)	0.074 (0.048)	0.060 (0.051)	0.257 (0.231)	0.217 (0.251)
Guerrilla attacks	0.073 (0.256)	0.001 (0.257)	0.081 (0.051)	0.077 (0.050)	0.187 (0.289)	0.133 (0.294)
Riots	0.152 (0.292)	0.178 (0.292)	0.002 (0.035)	0.002 (0.034)	0.205 (0.222)	0.217 (0.217)
GDP <i>real</i> growth	-0.031** (0.009)	-0.032** (0.008)	-0.031** (0.009)	-0.032** (0.008)	-0.030** (0.009)	-0.031** (0.008)
Troop funding	-0.311* (0.127)	-0.289 [†] (0.166)	-0.297* (0.126)	-0.291 [†] (0.166)	-0.301* (0.126)	-0.294 [†] (0.168)
Democracy	-0.973** (0.375)	-1.027* (0.441)	-0.951* (0.388)	-1.015* (0.461)	-1.012** (0.391)	-1.067* (0.467)
Distance from capital	-0.043 (0.042)	-0.039 (0.056)	-0.046 (0.042)	-0.034 (0.059)	-0.050 (0.044)	-0.041 (0.058)
Multiple insurgencies	-0.026 (0.373)	0.031 (0.400)	0.040 (0.372)	0.090 (0.401)	-0.021 (0.369)	0.038 (0.397)
Occupation	-0.125 (0.359)	0.354 (0.435)	-0.194 (0.350)	0.164 (0.389)	-0.164 (0.362)	0.226 (0.424)
Cold War	0.396 (0.310)	0.279 (0.366)	0.381 (0.306)	0.264 (0.366)	0.346 (0.323)	0.238 (0.373)
Time	-0.303* (0.151)	-0.285* (0.143)	-0.304* (0.139)	-0.289* (0.131)	-0.298* (0.145)	-0.283* (0.137)
Time ²	0.021 (0.016)	0.019 (0.015)	0.020 (0.014)	0.019 (0.013)	0.020 (0.015)	0.019 (0.014)
Time ³	-0.441 (0.379)	-0.408 (0.357)	-0.433 (0.327)	-0.405 (0.313)	-0.427 (0.351)	-0.400 (0.335)
Constant	1.143 (1.115)	0.240 (1.596)	1.092 (1.125)	0.440 (1.606)	1.063 (1.130)	0.369 (1.602)
Region FE	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓
Wald χ^2	83.05**	125.69**	88.46**	124.24**	105.40**	130.15**
Pseudo R ²	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17
Pseudo Log-Likelihood	-237.54	-236.48	-236.27	-235.54	-236.06	-235.28
Number of clusters	70	70	70	70	70	70
Number of observations	1056	1056	1056	1056	1056	1056

Coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered on countries.

[†] p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table SI.7. Effects of resistance types on coup risk controlling for counterinsurgency duration

	Dummy		Count		ln(Count)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Strikes	0.994** (0.354)	0.938** (0.341)	0.503** (0.174)	0.481** (0.174)	0.877* (0.372)	0.845* (0.365)
Demonstrations	0.207 (0.300)	0.144 (0.320)	0.081 (0.051)	0.065 (0.053)	0.283 (0.247)	0.235 (0.261)
Guerrilla attacks	0.188 (0.227)	0.065 (0.240)	0.093 [†] (0.051)	0.080 (0.051)	0.268 (0.263)	0.168 (0.285)
Riots	0.167 (0.300)	0.153 (0.295)	0.002 (0.036)	-0.002 (0.033)	0.220 (0.225)	0.203 (0.219)
GDP <i>real</i> growth	-0.029** (0.008)	-0.030** (0.008)	-0.029** (0.008)	-0.031** (0.009)	-0.028** (0.008)	-0.030** (0.009)
Troop funding	-0.349** (0.114)	-0.295 [†] (0.151)	-0.333** (0.114)	-0.299* (0.151)	-0.333** (0.115)	-0.299 [†] (0.153)
Democracy	-0.976** (0.371)	-1.086* (0.449)	-0.964* (0.390)	-1.082* (0.469)	-1.033** (0.390)	-1.133* (0.474)
Distance from capital	-0.026 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.057)	-0.031 (0.043)	-0.020 (0.059)	-0.035 (0.045)	-0.027 (0.059)
Multiple insurgencies	0.054 (0.382)	0.212 (0.423)	0.135 (0.389)	0.273 (0.421)	0.053 (0.385)	0.196 (0.425)
Occupation	-0.175 (0.362)	0.405 (0.410)	-0.267 (0.354)	0.202 (0.367)	-0.230 (0.364)	0.255 (0.404)
War duration	0.017 (0.042)	0.009 (0.043)	0.024 (0.043)	0.016 (0.044)	0.027 (0.042)	0.020 (0.043)
War duration ²	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Time	-0.287 [†] (0.147)	-0.257 [†] (0.144)	-0.287* (0.138)	-0.259 [†] (0.136)	-0.283* (0.142)	-0.256 [†] (0.139)
Time ²	0.019 (0.015)	0.017 (0.014)	0.019 (0.013)	0.017 (0.013)	0.018 (0.014)	0.016 (0.014)
Time ³	-0.407 (0.359)	-0.362 (0.349)	-0.398 (0.311)	-0.356 (0.306)	-0.393 (0.329)	-0.355 (0.323)
Constant	1.535 (1.007)	0.189 (1.521)	1.507 (1.028)	0.385 (1.507)	1.373 (1.045)	0.282 (1.517)
Region FE	x	✓	x	✓	x	✓
Wald χ^2	81.10**	92.92**	92.96**	108.91**	98.32**	108.53**
Pseudo R ²	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17
Pseudo Log-Likelihood	-237.72	-235.73	-236.29	-234.67	-235.92	-234.42
Number of clusters	70	70	70	70	70	70
Number of observations	1056	1056	1056	1056	1056	1056

Coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered on countries.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Robustness checks: Model choice

This robustness check replicates the main results using linear regression models to ensure that our results are not driven by the chosen statistical method. We rely on the Prais-Winston AR(1) transformation to account for serial correlation in the dependent variable. Results in Table SI.8 show that our results replicate across all models. Strikes are positively correlated with the risk of coups. The original Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics also indicate that the dependent variable is serially correlated but that this is accounted for by the Prais-Winston transformation. Values for the transformed DW statistic are close to the value of 2, indicating the absence of serial correlation in the residuals.

Table SI.8. Effects of resistance types on coup risk with linear probability models and Prais-Winston transformation

	Dummy		Count		ln(Count)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Strikes	0.062*	0.061*	0.026*	0.026*	0.057*	0.057*
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Demonstrations	0.020	0.016	0.001	0.000	0.009	0.005
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Guerrilla attacks	0.014	0.010	0.016*	0.015*	0.025	0.020
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Riots	0.003	0.005	0.001	0.002	0.013	0.015
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.016)
GDP _{real} growth	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Troop funding	-0.030**	-0.031**	-0.028**	-0.029**	-0.029**	-0.030**
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Democracy	-0.097**	-0.117**	-0.093**	-0.114**	-0.097**	-0.117**
	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.031)
Distance from capital	-0.002	-0.000	-0.002	-0.000	-0.002	-0.000
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Multiple insurgencies	-0.009	-0.010	-0.007	-0.007	-0.010	-0.011
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.029)
Occupation	0.014	0.016	0.009	0.010	0.010	0.011
	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.034)
Constant	0.361**	0.363**	0.345**	0.350**	0.354**	0.361**
	(0.087)	(0.098)	(0.085)	(0.098)	(0.086)	(0.099)
Region FE	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓
F statistic	3.90**	2.86**	4.25**	3.07**	3.95**	2.87**
R ²	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.06
Number of observations	1056	1056	1056	1056	1056	1056
Correlation parameter ρ	0.35	0.35	0.34	0.34	0.35	0.35
DW statistic (original)	1.33	1.33	1.34	1.34	1.33	1.33
DW statistic (transformed)	1.90	1.90	1.90	1.90	1.90	1.90

Coefficients with robust standard errors.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Robustness checks: Interaction effects

This robustness check investigates the differential effect of strikes within and outside counterinsurgencies. Expanding our analysis to all country-years between 1950 and 2005, we introduce interactions terms between each resistance type and a binary insurgency variable to the statistical analysis. This allows us to assess how each resistance type influences the risk of coup attempts conditional on the presence of counterinsurgencies. Based on our theory we should observe that during insurgencies the effect of strikes on coup attempts is significantly larger than the effect of any other resistance type. In contrast, during peace times the effects of all resistance types should be not significantly different from each other. Note that statistical significance levels are uninformative for assessing the overall magnitude and statistical significance of interaction terms in non-linear regression models (Berry, DeMeritt and Esarey 2010), which is why we caution against the direct interpretation of the presented results in the Tables and refer readers to Figure 4 in the article. We offer two sets of models:

1. Conditional effects in main analysis.

Table SI.9 shows results from the main analysis with interactions terms and the constituent variables. As can be seen, only the interaction terms between strikes and insurgencies have positive signs. All other interaction terms show negative signs. The results therefore offer indicative evidence that only strikes increase the risk of coup attempts during insurgencies. This is validated by the calculated substantive effects presented in Figure 4 in the article.

2. Conditional effects in extended analysis.

Table SI.10 shows results for an extended analysis. O'Donnell (1973, 1988) argues that modernization and economic crises play a crucial role in the establishment of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. Building on this argument, we extend our model. Apart from the original specification to which we add interactions terms and the constituent variables, the models also include control variables for both the overall level of economic development and economic growth. Results remain unchanged, closely resembling the findings of Table SI.9.

Table SI.9. Conditional effects of resistance types on coup risk within and outside insurrections

	Dummy		Count		ln(Count)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Strikes	0.736** (0.227)	0.645** (0.234)	0.233* (0.099)	0.184 (0.117)	0.625** (0.189)	0.538** (0.195)
Demonstrations	0.245 (0.231)	0.285 (0.220)	0.022 (0.028)	0.022 (0.027)	0.140 (0.158)	0.196 (0.158)
Guerrilla attacks	0.440** (0.148)	0.461** (0.143)	0.138* (0.064)	0.132* (0.059)	0.413** (0.151)	0.388** (0.149)
Riots	0.550** (0.192)	0.512** (0.185)	0.083† (0.044)	0.086* (0.041)	0.430** (0.164)	0.407* (0.165)
Insurgency	0.373† (0.213)	0.526* (0.232)	0.287† (0.153)	0.399** (0.154)	0.238 (0.209)	0.371 (0.231)
Strikes * Insurgency	0.331 (0.393)	0.283 (0.424)	0.256 (0.188)	0.299 (0.210)	0.290 (0.371)	0.300 (0.400)
Demonstrations * Insurgency	-0.136 (0.402)	-0.075 (0.412)	0.028 (0.057)	0.031 (0.051)	0.012 (0.292)	0.024 (0.298)
Guerrilla attacks * Insurgency	-0.215 (0.264)	-0.387 (0.266)	-0.018 (0.072)	-0.012 (0.068)	-0.036 (0.278)	-0.118 (0.304)
Riots * Insurgency	-0.301 (0.334)	-0.172 (0.311)	-0.073 (0.059)	-0.078 (0.053)	-0.166 (0.265)	-0.098 (0.250)
GDP _{real} growth	-0.021** (0.005)	-0.019** (0.006)	-0.020** (0.005)	-0.020** (0.006)	-0.020** (0.005)	-0.019** (0.006)
Troop funding	-0.174** (0.045)	-0.196** (0.047)	-0.177** (0.044)	-0.195** (0.047)	-0.172** (0.045)	-0.197** (0.048)
Democracy	-1.031** (0.170)	-0.930** (0.165)	-0.913** (0.181)	-0.878** (0.172)	-0.997** (0.174)	-0.922** (0.169)
Time	-0.314** (0.050)	-0.285** (0.050)	-0.324** (0.053)	-0.289** (0.051)	-0.317** (0.052)	-0.287** (0.051)
Time ²	0.016** (0.004)	0.014** (0.004)	0.016** (0.004)	0.015** (0.004)	0.016** (0.004)	0.014** (0.004)
Time ³	-0.270** (0.085)	-0.249** (0.081)	-0.278** (0.089)	-0.249** (0.084)	-0.271** (0.087)	-0.249** (0.084)
Constant	-0.051 (0.370)	-1.643** (0.557)	0.180 (0.372)	-1.430* (0.565)	0.023 (0.371)	-1.549** (0.563)
Region FE	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓
Wald χ^2	328.02**	399.45**	303.28**	348.39**	343.81**	426.40**
Pseudo R ²	0.17	0.19	0.16	0.18	0.17	0.19
Pseudo Log-Likelihood	-1114.74	-1082.92	-1127.56	-1093.26	-1117.26	-1084.26
Number of clusters	170	170	170	170	170	170
Number of observations	6736	6736	6736	6736	6736	6736

Coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered on countries.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table SI.10. Conditional effects of resistance types on coup risk within and outside insurgencies, controlling for level of development

	Dummy		Count		ln(Count)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Strikes	0.739** (0.230)	0.636** (0.237)	0.232* (0.099)	0.176 (0.116)	0.621** (0.189)	0.521** (0.199)
Demonstrations	0.268 (0.231)	0.288 (0.218)	0.028 (0.028)	0.025 (0.027)	0.164 (0.158)	0.202 (0.157)
Guerrilla attacks	0.454** (0.150)	0.453** (0.144)	0.147* (0.064)	0.131* (0.059)	0.436** (0.153)	0.383* (0.149)
Riots	0.557** (0.192)	0.512** (0.184)	0.081† (0.046)	0.085* (0.042)	0.431** (0.166)	0.407* (0.164)
Insurgency	0.307 (0.219)	0.496* (0.235)	0.225 (0.159)	0.366* (0.157)	0.172 (0.214)	0.339 (0.234)
Strikes * Insurgency	0.292 (0.401)	0.270 (0.429)	0.236 (0.193)	0.291 (0.211)	0.242 (0.381)	0.276 (0.404)
Demonstrations * Insurgency	-0.137 (0.407)	-0.077 (0.414)	0.031 (0.056)	0.032 (0.052)	0.010 (0.294)	0.021 (0.299)
Guerrilla attacks * Insurgency	-0.236 (0.267)	-0.385 (0.269)	-0.025 (0.072)	-0.012 (0.068)	-0.057 (0.280)	-0.117 (0.306)
Riots * Insurgency	-0.283 (0.339)	-0.155 (0.311)	-0.073 (0.062)	-0.076 (0.055)	-0.160 (0.273)	-0.081 (0.254)
GDP _{real} per capita	-0.172† (0.089)	-0.109 (0.098)	-0.152† (0.082)	-0.115 (0.095)	-0.167† (0.087)	-0.115 (0.097)
GDP _{real} growth	-0.019** (0.005)	-0.019** (0.006)	-0.019** (0.005)	-0.019** (0.006)	-0.019** (0.005)	-0.018** (0.006)
Troop funding	-0.134** (0.050)	-0.173** (0.051)	-0.141** (0.049)	-0.171** (0.052)	-0.132** (0.051)	-0.173** (0.052)
Democracy	-0.937** (0.178)	-0.904** (0.167)	-0.823** (0.187)	-0.848** (0.174)	-0.904** (0.182)	-0.895** (0.171)
Time	-0.314** (0.051)	-0.284** (0.050)	-0.323** (0.054)	-0.287** (0.051)	-0.317** (0.053)	-0.285** (0.051)
Time ²	0.016** (0.004)	0.015** (0.004)	0.016** (0.004)	0.015** (0.004)	0.016** (0.004)	0.015** (0.004)
Time ³	-0.275** (0.086)	-0.251** (0.082)	-0.281** (0.090)	-0.251** (0.085)	-0.276** (0.088)	-0.251** (0.085)
Constant	0.924 (0.641)	-0.899 (0.870)	1.043† (0.587)	-0.652 (0.845)	0.967 (0.622)	-0.768 (0.870)
Region FE	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓
Wald χ^2	320.53**	401.30**	305.47**	340.05**	350.15**	443.63**
Pseudo R ²	0.17	0.19	0.16	0.19	0.17	0.19
Pseudo Log-Likelihood	-1111.79	-1082.06	-1125.14	-1092.27	-1114.42	-1083.30
Number of clusters	170	170	170	170	170	170
Number of observations	6736	6736	6736	6736	6736	6736

Coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered on countries.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Robustness checks: Selection effects

This robustness check offers additional support for our argument by modeling the process through which countries transition from peace to insurgencies and then experience coups during an ongoing insurgency. We employ a two-stage probit model with Heckman sample selection. The model allows us to first assess how resistance types influence insurgency risk and second, once an insurgency is ongoing, how such events are correlated with coup attempts. The model specification is as follows:

1. Insurgency risk during peace (1st stage).

In contrast to the interaction effects analysis, the first stage predicts the outbreak of insurgencies. Apart from the resistance variables, this modeling stage includes variables commonly found to explain the occurrence of insurgent conflicts. We follow seminal contributions by Buhaug, Cederman and Gleditsch (2014) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) and include variables measuring population size, economic development, democracy, mountainous terrain, ethnic grievances, resource abundance, and noncontiguous territory. Data is taken from the respective sources.

As we would expect, results of the first modeling stage show that only genuinely political dissent increases the risk of insurgencies. Guerrilla attacks and demonstrations are correlated with the occurrence of insurgencies whereas strikes and riots are not. These findings corroborate the larger point of our theoretical argument that the political effects of resistance types depend on the context in which they occur. Moreover, countries with large populations, low economic output, ethnic grievances, and noncontiguous territory are more likely to experience insurgencies. Regime type and the abundance of oil do not seem to be correlated with insurgency onset.

2. Coup risk during insurgency (2nd stage).

The second stage predicts the occurrence of coup attempts during insurgencies. This model stage includes all variables of the main analysis (Table 1). Like our theoretical argument suggests, among all resistance types only strikes is positively and significantly correlated with coup risk. Coefficient estimates for demonstrations, guerrilla attacks, and riots fail to reach any conventional level of statistical significance or are not robustly correlated with coup attempts. Moreover, the estimates for the control variables resemble those from main analysis. Taken together, this check adds further evidence to our original finding that only strikes lead to coups in counterinsurgencies.

Table SI.11. Effects of resistance types on onset of insurgencies and on coup risk during insurgencies using probit models with Heckman sample selection

	Dummy		Count		ln(Count)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>During Peace: Insurgency</i>						
Strikes	0.093 (0.118)	0.129 (0.121)	0.006 (0.055)	0.025 (0.058)	0.040 (0.117)	0.094 (0.122)
Demonstrations	0.287** (0.085)	0.310** (0.084)	0.034** (0.011)	0.037** (0.013)	0.196** (0.058)	0.219** (0.061)
Guerrilla attacks	0.780** (0.085)	0.794** (0.086)	0.268** (0.049)	0.270** (0.048)	0.864** (0.100)	0.885** (0.100)
Riots	-0.030 (0.087)	-0.033 (0.087)	0.014 (0.020)	0.007 (0.019)	0.017 (0.073)	-0.008 (0.071)
Population size	0.207** (0.042)	0.220** (0.041)	0.212** (0.045)	0.221** (0.042)	0.207** (0.043)	0.217** (0.041)
GDP _{real} per capita	-0.135* (0.055)	-0.052 (0.054)	-0.141* (0.058)	-0.054 (0.057)	-0.143** (0.056)	-0.056 (0.055)
Democracy	0.003 (0.106)	0.086 (0.116)	0.059 (0.106)	0.135 (0.115)	0.030 (0.106)	0.119 (0.117)
Mountainous terrain	0.035 (0.036)	0.050 (0.038)	0.058 (0.036)	0.065† (0.038)	0.039 (0.036)	0.054 (0.038)
Ethnic grievances	0.061 (0.062)	0.117* (0.060)	0.063 (0.067)	0.131* (0.064)	0.059 (0.063)	0.118† (0.061)
Oil abundance	-0.013 (0.014)	-0.021 (0.015)	-0.013 (0.015)	-0.022 (0.015)	-0.012 (0.015)	-0.019 (0.015)
Noncontiguous state	0.195 (0.141)	0.342* (0.147)	0.190 (0.147)	0.338* (0.154)	0.178 (0.143)	0.322* (0.149)
Constant	-0.115 (0.574)	-1.497* (0.603)	0.050 (0.591)	-1.348* (0.643)	-0.002 (0.575)	-1.415* (0.606)
<i>During Insurgency: Coup</i>						
Strikes	0.484** (0.175)	0.465** (0.170)	0.245** (0.079)	0.237** (0.079)	0.431* (0.177)	0.424* (0.173)
Demonstrations	0.129 (0.150)	0.106 (0.164)	0.042 (0.027)	0.033 (0.028)	0.150 (0.124)	0.127 (0.133)
Guerrilla attacks	0.159 (0.136)	0.108 (0.138)	0.062* (0.029)	0.057† (0.029)	0.189 (0.137)	0.150 (0.141)
Riots	0.086 (0.145)	0.085 (0.146)	-0.002 (0.022)	-0.002 (0.020)	0.097 (0.118)	0.095 (0.117)
GDP _{real} growth	-0.016** (0.005)	-0.016** (0.005)	-0.015** (0.005)	-0.016** (0.005)	-0.015** (0.005)	-0.016** (0.005)
Troop funding	-0.189** (0.060)	-0.160* (0.072)	-0.183** (0.059)	-0.161* (0.069)	-0.183** (0.061)	-0.162* (0.073)
Democracy	-0.429** (0.160)	-0.469* (0.188)	-0.421* (0.167)	-0.465* (0.194)	-0.452** (0.167)	-0.488* (0.196)
Distance from capital	-0.013 (0.022)	-0.011 (0.027)	-0.017 (0.021)	-0.012 (0.027)	-0.018 (0.022)	-0.014 (0.028)
Multiple insurgencies	0.022 (0.190)	0.063 (0.208)	0.047 (0.188)	0.083 (0.206)	0.018 (0.187)	0.059 (0.206)
Occupation	-0.088 (0.185)	0.193 (0.197)	-0.123 (0.186)	0.118 (0.188)	-0.114 (0.190)	0.129 (0.203)
Constant	0.575 (0.484)	-0.134 (0.676)	0.649 (0.480)	0.027 (0.659)	0.572 (0.496)	-0.038 (0.680)
<i>Correlation Parameter</i>						
atanh ρ	0.203* (0.095)	0.227* (0.102)	0.161† (0.094)	0.185† (0.099)	0.172† (0.095)	0.198† (0.102)
Region FE	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓
Insurgency & coup time polynomials	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Wald χ^2	87.44**	102.96**	97.67**	113.00**	104.40**	114.75**
Log-Likelihood	-1165.21	-1145.94	-1187.10	-1168.29	-1163.40	-1144.04
Number of clusters	151	151	151	151	151	151
Number of observations	6585	6585	6585	6585	6585	6585
Selected observations	1052	1052	1052	1052	1052	1052

Coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered on countries.

† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

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