## The Spanish electoral cycle of 2019: A tale of two countries

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## Online Appendix

Table A: Determinants of vote choice - multinomial model

|  | Vote choice (PSOE ref category) |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | PP | UP | Cs | Vox |
|  | $(1)$ | $(2)$ | $(3)$ | $(4)$ |
| Catalan events influenced my vote | $0.82^{* *}$ | $-0.12^{* *}$ | $1.00^{* *}$ | $1.59^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.08)$ | $(0.002)$ | $(0.02)$ | $(0.06)$ |
| LR self-placement | $2.00^{* *}$ | $-0.60^{* *}$ | $1.32^{* *}$ | $2.16^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.07)$ | $(0.05)$ | $(0.07)$ | $(0.07)$ |
| Employment status (employed RC) |  |  |  |  |
| Retired | $-0.45^{* *}$ | $-0.11^{* *}$ | $0.01^{* *}$ | $-0.50^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.01)$ | $(0.01)$ | $(0.004)$ | $(0.01)$ |
| Unemployed | $-0.33^{* *}$ | $0.15^{* *}$ | $-0.46^{* *}$ | $-0.22^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.01)$ | $(0.01)$ | $(0.003)$ | $(0.01)$ |
| Student | $0.89^{* *}$ | $0.34^{* *}$ | $0.14^{* *}$ | $0.13^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.01)$ | $(0.01)$ | $(0.004)$ | $(0.005)$ |
| Men | -0.05 | $0.23^{* *}$ | $-0.07+$ | $0.69^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.09)$ | $(0.12)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.05)$ |
| Age | $0.11^{* *}$ | $0.04^{* *}$ | $0.08^{* *}$ | $0.10^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.02)$ | $(0.01)$ | $(0.02)$ | $(0.02)$ |
| Age sq. | $-0.001^{* *}$ | $-0.001^{* *}$ | $-0.001^{* *}$ | $-0.001^{* *}$ |
| Size of the municipality | $(0.0002)$ | $(0.0001)$ | $(0.0002)$ | $(0.0002)$ |
|  | 0.05 | $0.13^{* *}$ | $0.21^{* *}$ | 0.08 |
| Authoritarian government is | $(0.05)$ | $(0.04)$ | $(0.05)$ | $(0.06)$ |
| sometimes preferred | $-0.26^{* *}$ | $-0.19^{* *}$ | $0.24^{* *}$ | $1.19^{* *}$ |
| Constant | $(0.002)$ | $(0.001)$ | $(0.002)$ | $(0.01)$ |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | $-14.45^{* *}$ | $0.85^{* *}$ | $-9.98^{* *}$ | $-15.51^{* *}$ |
| N=2,708 | $(0.005)$ | $(0.004)$ | $(0.003)$ | $(0.005)$ |
|  | $4,926.72$ | $4,926.72$ | $4,926.72$ | $4,926.72$ |
|  |  |  |  | ${ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.1^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.05^{* *}<0.01$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |

Figure B: The effect of the Catalan events, R's Left-Right self-placement, gender and Authoritarian government is preferred on the probability to vote for each of the Spanish parties


Note: Coefficients extracted from Table A.

Figure C: Average marginal effects of voting for each party when moving from 'Catalan events did not matter to decide whom to vote for' to 'Catalan events mattered'


Note: Calculations are based on Table A. All the other variables have been set at their mean.

Figure D: Average marginal effects of voting for each party across gender


Note: Calculations are based on Table A. All the other variables have been set at their mean.

