THE POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF MOROCCANS IN EUROPE

An Analysis of the Attitudinal and Behavioural Engagement of Moroccan-origin Residents in Politics in Five European Cities

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Abstract

In this dissertation I focus on the political integration of the people of migrant-origin from Morocco. The main objective is to explore how contextual factors shape the political engagement of this group. In addition, the varying migration trajectories and histories of settlement in Europe of this large, heterogeneous, stigmatised, and understudied group are made visible. I begin by advancing my own conception of political integration, adding to work that seeks to fill a gap in the literature on migrant integration, which has predominantly focused on the social and economic aspects. Using this concept, I analyse the attitudinal and behavioural forms of political engagement expressed by the members of the Moroccan-origin communities residing in Brussels, Lyon, Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid. I use survey data from the LOCALMULTIDEM project, a sister project, and an original survey in Turin that I designed and conducted. I investigated how contextual factors—the presence of local voting rights in favour of non-European nationals and the strength of the anti-discrimination policies implemented in the countries of residence—can shape the way Moroccan-origin individuals engage in their countries of residence. I conducted a series of multivariate analyses whilst controlling for the influence of individual attributes, like gender, age, and education. The results produced do not provide evidence in support of the argument that the extension of local voting rights in favour of migrant-origin individuals can stimulate their political engagement. The Moroccan-origin individuals residing in Brussels, the only city where non-European nationals can take part in local elections, do not have a higher chance to be engaged in politics. However, the findings suggest that the Moroccan-origin communities residing in countries implementing stronger and intermediate anti-discrimination policies (Belgium, France, and Italy) can express their voice through a wider set of political acts.

This thesis is dedicated to my mother Fatima

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These last five years spent working on this project have been a life-changing experience. A rite of passage. A large number of people contributed in their own way to the realisation of this dissertation.

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INTRODUCTION: STUDYING POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS IN CONTEXT

The idea of this project originated from reflections on my personal condition as a Moroccan-origin migrant residing in Italy since the age of 7. Continuous reflections on my status as a non-European migrant in Italy led me to ask myself: how would have been my process of inclusion into a new society had my parents decided to migrate to Canada, as initially planned, rather than Italy? How does the context someone lives in contribute to promote or hinder their chance to engage fully in the social, economic, and political life of the country of residence?

In this dissertation I focus on what Spencer and Charsley (2016) call *effectors*, namely the factors that impact on the process of inclusion of migrant-origin individuals in their country of residence.[1] In particular, with this

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[1]The concept of 'migrant-origin' individuals refers to migrants and their descendants (see

project I aim to make a contribution to the study of migrant-origin integration, by investigating how contextual factors, specifically the presence of local voting rights in favour of third country nationals (TCNs) and the strength of anti-discrimination policies in place in the country of residence can shape the modes of attitudinal and behavioural engagement of migrant-origin residents in the political sphere of their country of residence.[2]

This dissertation revolves around the initial intuition that the process of inclusion of migrant-origin individuals is driven not only by the individual characteristics of the migrants and their descendants, but also, if not mainly, by the context in which they reside. My focus here on voting rights and anti-discrimination policies stems from real-life concerns that are fundamentally connected to my personal experience as a member of one of the largest, and most stigmatised, migrant-origin communities in Europe. These personal reflections and concerns have been then elaborated and developed in this dissertation.

In particular, I decided to focus on the presence of voting rights because in the field of migrant integration it is one of the most debated issues along with the rules governing the naturalisation of TCNs. My attention to anti-discrimination policies, is instead motivated by the devastating effects that visible and subtle forms of oppression can have on the quality of life of the members of stigmatised migrant-origin communities and their involvement in the political affairs of their countries of residence. Hence, I focus on anti-discrimination measures not because it is a matter of debate today in academia or in the political panorama, but because oppressive phenomena are a reality these individuals must cope with in their daily-lives, and anti-discrimination measures are built exactly with the declared objective to combat these forms of oppression.[3]

Though a certain degree of agreement has been achieved over the years in relation to the importance of including TCNs in the political process, agreement on how this objective can be achieved is much less defined. The existence of different national traditions with their particular and opposing modes of integration, and the vagueness that still surrounds the concept of migrant political integration, contribute to generate widely divergent views

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e.g. Maxwell, 2013a).

[2]The term 'third country nationals' is generally used in the EU lexicon to refer to the migrants coming from countries outside the EU and not holding the citizenship of any EU member state (see for example European Commission, 2011).

[3]See section 7.2 for an in-depth discussion on the notion of "oppression".

on what are the most effective ways to promote the political inclusion of migrant-origin residents, and combat their exclusion from full participation in the life of the community.

In this sense, the issue of granting *local voting rights* to TCNs—the first effector—exemplifies these challenges. At present, two views can be distinguished among EU member states. One, supported by countries like Sweden, the Netherlands, and Belgium considers voting rights for non-EU migrants as a tool to ease their inclusion into their society of residence. The second and more predominant view in the EU, regards recognition of voting rights for TCNs as a reward for prior successful economic and social integration (Penninx, 2009). Debates about the potential benefits or shortcomings of introducing legal reforms that would entitle non-EU residents with local voting rights are periodically revived in European countries and cities. Nonetheless, these debates are conducted with little knowledge about the actual impact that local voting rights have on migrants' political integration.

The second effector that pertains to the category of policy interventions aimed at opening up opportunities for participation and countering obstacles to migrants' political involvement is represented by the *anti-discrimination policies* that are implemented in the country of residence.[4] As in the case of voting rights, EU member states are characterised by different traditions in the measures developed to fight discrimination. Although all member states have transposed the two major anti-discrimination directives, significant discrepancies persist in the national anti-discrimination policies in place (European Union, 2016). Yet again, as I will show, there has been little development with respect to the actual mechanisms through which the strength of anti-discrimination can influence migrant-origin residents' engagement in the political affairs of their country of residence.

As I discuss more in detail in sections 6.3.2 and 7.4.3 of the empirical chapters of this thesis, whilst unveiling the role played by these two effectors was the primary objective undertaken by this PhD, the discussion in the viva has highlighted some challenges in the multivariate analyses conducted, which ultimately weakens the argument constructed.

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[4]The notion of 'migrants' political involvement' refers to the different forms of attitudinal and behavioural political engagement expressed by the members of the Moroccan-origin communities in their contexts of residence (for more details see sections 6.3.1, and 7.4.1).

1.1. Background

The inclusion of migrant-origin residents in the social, economic, and political affairs of the countries of residence has become a priority in Europe. A number of steps have been taken by EU institutions and the Member States to increase the overall quality of life of TCNs in their countries of residence.

As I will discuss in chapter 7, the EU has played a pivotal role in the fight against discrimination and the promotion of the integration of migrant-origin residents. In particular, with the entry in force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, the integration of TCNs has become for the first time an issue of shared EU competences. Since then the EU has implemented measures to combat discrimination, including forms of oppression based on ethnic or religious identity, and set up the basis for a common immigration policy with the so-called Tampere Programme. Through this programme, Member States agreed that the main objective of this policy was to grant rights and obligations that are comparable to those of EU residents.

The Common Agenda for Integration presented then by the Commission in 2005, was until 2010 the main strategy document providing a road-map for the implementation of the EU integration policy. This document was at the basis of the first measures aiming at coordinating national integration strategies through knowledge exchange between integration actors.

From 2011, migrant integration issues were guided by the European Agenda for Integration of Third-Country Nationals. The Agenda, covering the period 2011-2015, focused on fighting discrimination and strengthening economic, social, and political participation of migrant-origin residents, with a particular emphasis on local actions. This Agenda was also pivotal for the large number of funding opportunities made available in these last years.

Finally, the 2016 Action Plan on the integration of third country nationals is the latest step of how the EU has been shaping over the past years the integration of TCNs. This provides a holistic framework to support Member States' efforts in developing and strengthening migrant integration policies, and describes the concrete measures the Commission will be implementing.

1.2. Significance

Demographic trends are indeed pushing academics and policy makers to display more interest in the political integration of migrants and their progeny

(Bloemraad, 2006). Undoubtedly, one of the factors that has led to an increased focus on this topic in Europe is the recognition that migration will be a permanent part of Europe's future, and that most of the migrants and their descendants are in Europe to stay. Also, the competition among states for the "brightest" cannot part from considerations about the quality of life migrants and their descendants will find in their new countries of residence. Potential migrants must feel confident that they and their offspring will be able to engage in all domains of the country of residence—including its political sphere—without facing phenomena of discrimination, exclusion, and marginalisation (Spencer, 2003).

Beyond these pragmatic considerations, are also more normative reflections on why the political inclusion of migrant-origin individuals matters. The marginalisation of a significant and increasing portion of residents from political voice is seen also as detrimental to the process of democratic representation and accountability (Groenendijk, 2008, 2011). The exclusion of immigrants and their offspring might also perpetuate the view of them as outsiders to that community; this can lead to their social and economic exclusion as the policy process will fail to address properly their demands in those fields (Jones-Correa, 1998). Moreover, excluding migrants from the political process could be seen in conflict also with normative convictions about democratic equality (Bloemraad, 2006). In other words, as de Rooij (2011, 16) put it, "[t]he fact that we should care about the political integration of immigrants is not hard to sell. Equality in participation is key to political equality, one of the main principles of democracy."

Scholars initially approached the study of migrant integration from a sociological perspective focusing on the cultural and social integration of immigrants, and often disregarding the economic and political sphere of the phenomenon (see e.g. Thomas and Znaniecki, 1984). Subsequently, social scientists with more economic backgrounds partially addressed this gap by considering also how immigrants fare in the country of residence in terms of their labour force participation and remuneration (see e.g. Borjas, 1985; Carmon, 1981; Chiswick, 1978, 1991; Constant and Zimmermann, 2009; Rivera-Batiz, 1990).

Today, the large body of work on the integration of migrants and their offspring is a valid indicator of the valuable effort made by scholars to understand the process that drives the economic and social inclusion of migrant-origin individuals in their new societies of residence. Yet, much

less elaboration can be found on the political dimension of migrants' integration (Marrow, 2005; Morales and Giugni, 2011c). General overviews on the subject of immigrant integration tend to fail to address the political component of migrants' integration at all (see e.g. Alba and Nee, 1997, 2003a; Dustmann, 1996; Eisenstadt, 1953). In this sense Marrow's review of the three major fields of research in migrant integration—economic, sociocultural, and political—is certainly one of the exceptions in the literature (see also Heath et al. 2013 and Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009a). In fact, a large number of studies still focuses exclusively on the socio-cultural and economic integration of migrants leaving aside the political dimension of the phenomenon (see e.g. Algan et al., 2012a; Offer, 2004; Veenman et al., 2003).

In this dissertation I build upon the work of the scholars that successfully included the political dimension in the study of the process and issues involved in the inclusion of migrant-origin groups (see e.g. Berger et al., 2004; Garbaye, 2005; Morales and Giugni, 2011c; Tillie, 2004; Heath et al., 2013). In particular, I attempt to extend the work of these scholars by investigating whether, how, and to what extent the political involvement of TCNs can be shaped by contextual factors, specifically the presence of local voting rights in their favour and the strength of the anti-discrimination policies implemented in their countries of residence.

As mentioned above, the importance of involving migrant-origin residents in the political sphere of their country of residence is increasingly acknowledged by political actors at the European level such as the Council of Europe[5] and European Union institutions. This is undertaken through the promotion of measures like the Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at the Local level,[6] and, as seen above, the launch of the European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals by the Commission in 2011 (see also European Union Agency for Fundamental

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[5]See for instance the Recommendation 1500 by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe passed in 2001.

[6]The Convention was adopted by the Council of Europe in 1992. This entered into force in 1997, however, one must admit that this has only a marginal impact as it has been ratified by only seven of the 47 member states. Among the current EU member states, only Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden and United Kingdom have signed the Convention. The group of EU members which are legally bound by the Convention is even smaller as it includes only Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Sweden and Italy. It is worth noting that Italy did not sign Chapter C on the right to vote in local authority elections. For more details please see: `http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=144&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG`.

Rights, 2017).

As shown in previous work, the type and degree of political engagement expressed by migrant-origin residents is undoubtedly influenced by individual features, like their education degree, age, and income. Yet, with this project I aim to shift the focus away from migrants' individual characteristics and socio-economic situations, by exploring whether the degree and modes of political involvement they show in their countries of residence is sensitive to contextual factors such as the presence of local voting rights in their favour, and the strength of the anti-discrimination policy implemented in the country of residence.

In order to do this, I focus on the modes of attitudinal and behavioural engagement expressed by one of largest group of TCNs in Europe (i.e. Moroccan-origin residents). In particular, I direct my attention on the members of five of the largest Moroccan-origin communities residing in Europe, namely the communities of Brussels, Lyon, Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid. For the cities of Lyon, Barcelona, and Madrid I employ survey data generated between 2006 and 2009 by an EU-funded study (LOCALMULTIDEM). For the community of Brussels I employ the data collected between 2010 and 2011 within the scope of a sister project to the LOCALMULTIDEM study that used a very similar questionnaire (Herman, 2015). The data on the Moroccan-origin community of Turin, were generated through fieldwork conducted in the city of Turin in 2014, by using a shorter version of the original LOCALMULTIDEM questionnaire (Sajir, 2017).[7]

I assess the impact of the contextual factors under consideration through a series of multivariate analyses (probit models in chapter 6 and count models in chapter 7), whilst taking into account the effect that individual and social level factors have on the modes and degree of political engagement of the members of the Moroccan-origin communities under consideration.

In general, as I will discuss later, institutional interventions like voting rights and anti-discrimination policies are implicitly, and sometimes also explicitly, assumed to have positive effects on the involvement of migrant-origin in the political sphere of their countries of residence. In this dissertation I explicitly assess these assumptions. In particular, I expect the mem-

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[7]The Moroccans residing in the Netherlands, notably in the cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht are also very significant communities of Moroccans in Europe (El Bardai, 2007; Refass, 2014). Unfortunately, lack of comparable survey data on these communities prevented me from including samples of Dutch Moroccans in this study.

bers of the Moroccan-origin communities residing in contexts where voting rights are granted also to TCNs (i.e. Brussels) and those where relatively strong or intermediate anti-discrimination policies are in place (i.e. Brussels, Lyon, and Turin) to engage more in the political sphere of their countries of residence.

1.3. Outline

To develop my thesis I have structured this study as follows: in **Chapter 2** I start by reviewing the approaches to the study of migrants' political integration and discussing the current theory and practice in this field. In this initial chapter, I define the conceptual and theoretical framework of the dissertation. This contains three different sections: firstly, I present some of the main sources of tension found in the literature on political integration, comparing and discussing the various labels, conceptualisations, and operationalisations of migrant political integration that have been put forward over the years by scholars in this field. Secondly, I clarify my position in the field by developing my own conception of political integration. Thirdly, I lay out the main theoretical perspectives (i.e. human capital theory, social capital theory, and political capital theory), and I finally derive the research hypotheses that will be then tested in chapters 6 and 7.

In **Chapter 3** I discuss the research design as well as the methodology undertaken to collect and analyse the data. In the first part of the chapter, I explain in full detail how this study compares the modes of engagement of the members of the same migrant-origin group residing in different contexts. I then define more clearly the characteristics of the target population, and stress and justify the importance of developing a local perspective in this study. In the second part of this chapter, I clarify which methods and data are used. In particular, I present the details about all the surveys used here, by specifying sampling methods, sample sizes, and interviewing methods, that were employed within the scope of the LOCALMULTIDEM project, the 'sister' project conducted in Brussels, and the fieldwork I conducted in Turin.

In **Chapter 4** I provide the historical background of the dissertation and lay the foundations for understanding the conditions of the group in each context. In particular, I use this chapter to present the key characteristics

of the Moroccan-origin communities abroad, the migration career paths to different destinations, and the spatial distributions in each country of destination. This chapter is composed of three sections: in the first one, I put emphasis on the degree of ethnic and cultural heterogeneity that characterises the Moroccan community. Secondly, I describe the different phases of migration flow that led to the creation of Moroccan-origin communities abroad. Finally, I discuss the specific connections that have been built throughout the process of migration from Morocco to Europe, between specific Moroccan regions of emigration and certain European regions in the main countries of destination. For each destination, I show how the Moroccan communities are distributed in the territory and concentrated in specific regions.

Chapters 5 to 7 constitute the empirical part of the dissertation. In **Chapter 5** I introduce the survey data on the Moroccan-origin communities under consideration. In the first part, I delineate the main demographic and socio-economic profile of each community, by providing some descriptives about factors like gender and age, civil status, migration causes, years since arrival in the country of residence, education level, language proficiency, and subjective experiences of discrimination. In the second part, I give an overview of the associational and political patterns of engagement expressed by each community.

Chapter 6 on voting rights asks whether the enfranchisement of TCNs at the local level can promote their attitudinal and behavioural engagement in the political affairs of country of residence. I compare the probability of being engaged in politics of the five Moroccan-origin communities residing in Brussels, Lyon, Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid. The findings produced in this chapter do not support the argument that the enfranchisement of TCNs is an effective measure to stimulate their political engagement in the country of residence. In particular, the chapter shows that the members of the Moroccan-origin community residing in Brussels—that is the only city in the study where TCNs are allowed to vote in municipal elections—do not show more interest in the political affairs of the country of residence and do not express a higher chance to be involved in political acts in comparison to their counterparts residing in cities where TCNs do not enjoy the right to vote.

Chapter 7 on anti-discrimination policies explores whether the strength of the policies implemented by the country of residence to combat discrimina-

tion can impact on the way migrant-origin residents express their political voice. Using the survey data on the different modes of political participation, this chapter produces some evidence in support of the argument that members of disadvantaged migrant-origin communities residing in countries with stronger anti-discrimination policies can express their voice through a wider set of political acts. More specifically, this chapter shows that the members of the Moroccan-origin communities residing in Lyon (France), Brussels (Belgium), and to some extent Turin (Italy)—namely the contexts where relatively strong and intermediate anti-discrimination policies are implemented—display a wider political action repertoire in comparison to their counterparts residing in the Spanish cities of Madrid and Barcelona, where relatively weak anti-discrimination measures are in place.

As mentioned before, the initial intention of chapters 6 and 7 consisted in an ambitious attempt to isolate the effect that these two contextual factors have on the way the members of the five Moroccan-origin communities engage in the political affairs of their countries of residence. The conclusions, however, had to be re-written in light of the discussion had in the viva.

Chapter 8 provides a summary of the whole dissertation and discusses the main findings based on the literature review presented in chapter 2 and the discussion during the viva. In this final chapter I also highlight the main contributions I made through this research, reflect on the implications that the findings produced have for the political inclusion of migrant-origin individuals, and outline future developments on the basis of this work.

CHAPTER

2

THE POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Social scientists—notably sociologists of immigration—have devoted a great part of their efforts to the study of the main mechanisms of socio-economic integration, while remaining relatively silent on the political dimension of the phenomenon (Bloemraad, 2007; Minnite, 2009; Morales, 2011).

Migrant political integration studies have generated in the last years a highly diversified set of approaches, which however still lack a well-defined theoretical and conceptual framework (Morales, 2011).

Even though scholars share the same interest in migrant-origin individuals' inclusion in the political sphere of the countries of residence, their narratives differ on important points. Various, albeit not necessarily incompatible, answers are provided to key questions like: how do we establish whether migrants and their offspring have become part of the political system? What are the main elements that favour or hinder their inclusion in the political system?

Martin Shefter (1986, 90), for instance, defines successful political integration as the condition resulting from the act of "gain[inig] a position in the regime that is secure." In this approach the concept of political integration relates to the concepts of political representation and political power of a specific migrant-origin group.[1]

Other scholars prefer to employ policy responsiveness as their main measure of successful inclusion in the political system. "[T]he promulgation and implementation of policies" that meet migrants' interests and goals is a clear indication of their integration in the political system (Hochschild and Mollenkopf, 2009b, 23). David Plotke instead, stresses another aspect, that is the process of naturalisation through which migrants become full democratic citizens and legal subjects. Hence, according to the author, the entry of migrants in the political system is essentially determined by the rules of citizenship acquisition. "A citizen [...] is incorporated when legal and political obstacles do not prevent him or her from routinely performing the characteristic main activities of current citizens, and then he or she is recognized as a citizen (1999, 298)."

Yet, in the literature, naturalisation rates are not only used as a prerequisite of inclusion in the political system. For example, Morjé Howard (2009, 8), among others, considers citizenship acquisitions as "a rough measure of integration" (Bloemraad 2007, 322; see also Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009b, 2009, 9).

As I will show in detail, in this study I conceive migrant-origin political integration as the condition resulting from the integrative mechanisms of a double process of incorporation that is characterised on one side by will and ability of migrant-origin individuals to self-actively engage in the political sphere of their countries of residence, and on the other side by the society of residence's will and ability to include migrants and their descendants

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[1] Though the author employs the concept of 'political incorporation' rather an 'political integration' one of the main merits of his approach is to clearly identify the "good opposite" of political integration that is the concept of political exclusion (see for example, Sartori 1987, 182), for definitions *a contrario*). The second main contribution of his work consists in pointing at the important role played by political parties in the process of political incorporation of ethnic minorities in the political system. Hence, (Shefter, 1986, 90) stresses that political incorporation is not simply the result of political representation within the system but also and foremost whether migrants and their descendants are included within political coalitions that enjoy power. In the author's own words: "[i]f a group is to move from obtaining representation in a political system to achieving full incorporation [...] it must be integrated into the system in a manner consistent with the interest of other members of the regime's dominant political coalition."

within the political sphere (see for example Sartori 1987, 113; and Bauböck 1994, 37, for similar conceptualisations).

As I will explain in detail in the coming parts, the *willed taking part* of migrant-origin will be measured in terms of their attitudinal and behavioural engagement in the political affairs of the country of residence (see section 2.2.1, and empirical chapters 6 and 7). Conversely, the society's ability and willingness to include migrants and their descendants within its political sphere relates instead to the promotion of formal equality before the law between citizens and non-citizens, for example by granting local voting rights in favour of foreign residents (chapter 6), or through the implementation of strong anti-discrimination policies aimed at combating the daily-life obstacles that migrant-origin individuals must face in their countries of residence (chapter 7).

2.1. The Main Debates in the Literature on Political Integration

A thorough review of the literature on migrants' political integration immediately reveals the complexities and current 'fogginess' that still surrounds this field. As I will show in this section, scholars in this area have proposed conceptualizations of political integration that differ not only in the definition or label used to describe the phenomenon, but also in a whole set of key elements, such as the link with the other dimensions of integration, the unit of analysis (i.e. individuals, groups, organisations), and the level of analysis (i.e. local, regional, national).

In the coming sections I show where the conceptualisation I adopted for this study fits within the relevant literature. For this purpose, I will be focusing on seven of the main sources of tension found in the literature on migrant-origin political integration: (1) the relationship between the concepts of political integration and citizenship; (2) the use of different terms to refer to the inclusion of migrants and descendants in the political sphere of the country of residence; (3) the focus on political outcomes rather than political engagement of migrants to assess their levels of inclusion; (4) the conception of integration as a condition of inclusion rather than a process; (5) group-driven studies in relation to individual-driven studies; (6) the role given to autochthonous levels of engagement in the establishment of mi-

grants' degree of inclusion (see also Morales 2011, 23); and (7) the use of the concepts of 'ethnicity', 'race', and considerations of faith, specifically Islam.

2.1.1. Political integration and citizenship

In order to achieve a full understanding and use of the concept of political integration it is necessary to clarify the relationship between the concepts of political integration and citizenship.

In general terms, the concept of citizenship is closely intertwined with the concept of political integration or incorporation; both relate to how the polity includes the newcomers (i.e. descendants of other citizens, or the migrant residents and their progeny). In other words, they are both concerned with the question of what it means to be a member of the society. Moreover, both concepts are to a large extent associated with the idea of political democracy. The notions of citizenship and political integration are in fact commonly called upon to convey a state of democratic belonging or inclusion.

Citizenship is certainly one of the typical essentially contested concepts in social sciences (Collier et al., 2006). Scholars have generated substantially different answers to the question of what citizenship is. The complexity and the contested nature of this field of study has continued to increase over the years as scholars look for new or re-visited meanings of the concepts to suit their analytic purposes.[2]

As a result of this state of affairs we can distinguish two approaches within migrant political integration studies. In the first approach the concepts of 'citizenship' and 'integration' are used as *quasi*-synonyms. Conversely, in the second approach citizenship is "devalued as a simple tool of integration"(Hansen, 2003a, 87).

The first group is composed of those studies where the acquisition of citizenship is considered as the principal measure of political integration (see e.g. Howard, 2009; Mollenkopf and Hochschild, 2009; Bloemraad, 2006). In these studies, the condition of political integration is related to the will and ability of an individual to be successfully included in the citizenry through the process of naturalization. Irene Bloemraad (2006, 235), for instance, in

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[2]The literature on this subject includes concepts like civic citizenship (Bloemraad, 2007), post-national citizenship (Soysal, 1994), substantive and formal citizenship (Brubaker 1992; Kivisto and Faist 2007).

her comparative study on Canada and the United States uses principally the difference in naturalization rates among immigrants to depict a picture characterized by diverging patterns of political incorporation between the two North American countries. The concept of citizenship plays here a central role since political incorporation is mainly defined in terms of naturalization rates and is intended as the process of inclusion of "diverse people into a common citizenry."

The second group of scholars is composed of what Hansen (2003a, 89) calls post-nationalists, as integration can occur independently of national citizenship. The focus here is on how different models of citizenship regimes can shape the paths of political incorporation and the degree of political integration (see e.g. Cinalli and Giugni, 2011; González-Ferrer and Morales, 2013). As I will show also in the following chapters, according to this perspective, the concept of citizenship takes a more instrumental, if not secondary role. In particular, in chapter 5 I will consider the citizenship composition within each community under consideration. Subsequently in chapter 6 and 7 I will compare, for each community, the level of political engagement of the Moroccan-origin residents with the citizenship of the country of resident and those without. And I will also investigate whether being a citizen of the country residence influences significantly the chance of being involved in the political sphere.

2.1.2. Assimilation, integration, incorporation. Simply a matter of labels?

The second main tension in the literature relates to the different terms used to indicate the phenomenon of inclusion of migrants and their descendants in the political sphere (see Minnite 2009, 49ff; see also Morales 2011). A further element of complexity is represented by the extensive use of overlapping terms such as 'assimilation,' 'absorption,' 'incorporation,' 'accommodation,' and the like. Are these concepts interchangeable or do they describe similar, albeit distinct phenomena?

A quick review of the literature on this topic immediately unveils disagreement among academics on which term is more appropriate to describe the conditions and processes of inclusion of migrants and their descendants in the political affairs of their society of residence. This lack of consensus over what integration and other concepts entail is not a mere stylistic is-

sue, but rather than essential problem that affects the comparability of these studies.

As far as the use of the concept of 'assimilation' is concerned, a review of the literature suggests that in most situations and for most scholars this concept refers to specific patterns of inclusion in the political system of the host-society, rather than being a politically in-correct version of political integration as implied by some scholars (see e.g. Schuck, 2009). The concept of 'assimilation' generally implies that the behaviours and attitudes of the immigrants approximate those of the natives; it has historically been considered as the last stage of a linear process (Gordon, 1964; Thomas and Znaniecki, 1918) and as "apparently progressive and irreversible" (Park, 1950, 138).

This does not necessarily hold true for the concept of 'integration.' These assumptions have been firmly criticised and reviewed over the years and more emphasis has been placed on the non-linearity of the integrative process, and support has built for 'segmented' notions of assimilation, where immigrants face multiple integrative trajectories (Portes and Zhou, 1993). Today, the notion of 'assimilation' does not necessarily entail linear convergence of the newcomers to the mainstream, but can also take the form of a mutual convergence of newcomers and the mainstream. This conceptual progress is at the basis of the current and accepted idea that integration is a two-way process where "the interaction between immigrants and receiving societies generates transnational forms of citizenship [...] which go beyond the existing national ones" (Bauböck, 1994). As I will show the conceptualisation of political integration I employ in this dissertation revolves around the notion of two-way process.

Yet, not so long ago, some sociologists, notably Richard Alba and Victor Nee (2003b) tried to revive the legacy of the Chicago school of sociology by offering a "new" assimilation model. This reviewed approach tries to avoid the determinism and ethnocentric drifts of old linear models, while keeping the key notion that, over the generations, immigrant-origin individuals reduce the gap with respect to the cultural, social and economic mainstream group.

However, as previously stated, these works tend to focus on cultural and economic integrative dynamics, without specifying how politics fit in the whole process and leaving it as a secondary concern. Dynamics of political integration are somehow unclear, if not ambiguous (Bloemraad, 2007).

As a result of this state of affairs, the concept of 'political assimilation' is

prevalently treated in the literature as referring to a particular type of immigrant integration in the political system, where the immigrant and/or their descendants become indistinguishable from the autochthonous group (Bean and Stevens, 2003; Bloemraad, 2007; Tillie and Slijper, 2007). However, in a significant number of works—notably within the American scholarship—the absence of a clear-cut difference between assimilation and integration appears to suggest that these terms are to some extent used interchangeably (Ireland, 2010). Schuck (2009, 170), for example, goes even further by overtly stating this case of synonymity between the two terms, where 'integration' is "no more than an euphemism" for 'assimilation.'

The necessity of gaining greater clarity in this field is also related to the confusion around the concepts of 'political incorporation' and 'political integration'. In this case, a thorough literature review confirms that the two concepts are de facto carrying the same meaning and choosing between the two concepts pertains more to a matter of personal taste rather than actual semantic differences (Morales, 2011, 20).

Yet, reasons for debate are found also in this field as some scholars consider political incorporation as the process through which immigrants and their descendants become part of the political context (see for example, Plotke 1999; see also, Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009b). The concept of political integration identifies instead the result of the integrative process (see Morales, 2011).

Conversely, Irene Bloemraad (2006, 2007) suggests in her work that political incorporation—along with political assimilation—reflects particular models of political integration. According to the author, political assimilation relates to individual-level integrative dynamics, whereas political incorporation is a better term to describe group-based paths to political integration. In brief, political incorporation denotes a specific type of political integration rather than a mere synonym.

Despite the limitations of her view,[3] this approach has the merit to bring a further nuance in the study of political integration highlighting another main tension within this scholarship—that is, whether immigrant political integration should be approached from an individual or group perspective

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[3]As pointed out by Morales (2011, 23-24), the work of Bloemraad (2006, 2007) fails to recognise situations in which migrant-origin individuals are politically mobilised as a group, for instance in the form of a protest, but are not willing or able to engage individually in the political affairs of the country of residence.

(Jones-Correa 2005; for more details see section 2.1.4).

Even though academics are still debating the most appropriate terms to describe the conditions and processes of inclusion of migrants and their descendants in the political affairs of the receiving society, authorities at the local, national and European level have unanimously opted for the label of 'integration' in their official publications, affirmative action programs, and official rhetoric (see e.g. Council of the European Union, 2004; Commission of the European Communities, 2003). Certain circles within civil society, instead, notably pro-migrant organisations, still refrain from using 'integration', as it is seen to be charged with ethnocentric connotations. For this reason, other terms like *interaction* or *dialogue*, which emphasise negotiation, are proposed and used instead.[4] In this dissertation, although I still employ the concept of 'integration', in the conceptualisation of 'political integration' I develop, I take into account the criticism expressed with regard to some of the terms reviewed above. As I show in section 2.2, I make clear effort to depart from simplistic and ethnocentric conceptualisations in describing the process and condition of inclusion of migrant-origin individuals in the political sphere of their countries of residence.

2.1.3. Process, condition, or both?

A further reason for dispute in the literature is between studies that conceive of political integration as process or as a condition (see e.g. Minnite, 2009; Morales, 2011, 56-57).

There are many studies that refer and put more emphasis on the processual nature of political integration. According to Garcia (1987, 373) for example, the concept of political integration refers to the "*process* whereby an individual eventually becomes a participant in various phases of the political process (i.e. communal activities, campaigning, etc.)" (italics added). This 'processual' understanding of political integration is supported by a significant number of scholars, notably in the United States (see e.g. Anil, 2010; Ireland, 2010; Hochschild and Mollenkopf, 2009b; Lee et al., 2007). Jennifer Hochschild and John Mollenkopf (2009b, 16) for instance, define it as "a process in which individuals or groups move from less to more (or vice versa) or from early stages to later ones rather than a particular moment or

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[4]This meaning is close to what Zolberg and Woon (1999, 8ff) call "boundary blurring", one of the three patterns of negotiation existing between insiders and outsiders.

threshold." Patrick Ireland (2010, 34) has emphasized in his work the necessity to adopt a more realistic view on integration by recognizing it as an "ongoing, multilevel process of social learning" rather than an endpoint or goal.

Yet the difference between political integration as process or condition is not always posited in such clear terms within the scholarship. An example is represented by the work conducted by Kurthen and Schmitter Heisler (2009, 142) where integration is defined as: "a *process* leading to parity between foreign-born newcomers [...] and established populations [...] where the *end result*—integration—is the economic and social congruence between those groups in terms of statistically measurable empirical indicator averages"(italics added).

Some scholars propose to disentangle this situation by clearly distinguishing between the dynamic component of inclusion into the political process (i.e. political incorporation) and the static notion of the phenomenon (i.e. political integration) (Morales, 2011, 23). In this sense, as I will show also in my conceptualisation of political integration (see section 2.2), the condition of integration can be considered as a particular snap-shot of the inclusive process that reflects a given point in time and space. As noted by Spencer and Charsley (2016, 4),"[t]here is thus no integration 'end-state', no 'integrated society' but rather an ever evolving process. Outcomes measured at any one time are a snap-shot, not a permanent feature."

2.1.4. Group-driven approach *versus* individual-driven approach

A further bone of contention is related to the object of the analysis. From a macro perspective the concept of political integration might refer to a characteristic of the social system. Hence, the more a society is integrated the more its members relate to one another. In this sense the concept of integration is employed as a synonym of *social cohesion* (Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003). For example, according to James Lamare (1982, 169ff) the concept of political integration refers to the degree of *cohesiveness* or *coalescence* among members of a political community. Following this way of thinking, political integration is a necessary element for the political stability of polities. Hence, the concept of political integration is applied to the entire political system. Some political systems have more "integrative capabilities" than

others, and "constant flows of migrants into a country [...] could possibly strain the integrative capabilities of a political system." A fascinating, albeit rather idealistic, conception of political integration is provided by Bo Bengtsson (2008, 3) who defines "a politically integrated *society* [as] characterised by all its members, including immigrants, having their proper share of those political rights and resources that are seen as appropriate for full members of the political community. In consequence, a politically integrated *individual* is seen, by him/herself as by others, as having the right to take part in the political community on the same terms as other citizens" (italics in original).[5]

Yet, as I show in the following chapters of this dissertation, the concept of integration can be perceived also from the perspective of groups and individuals (Jones-Correa, 2005). It is relevant to note that in the literature most of the studies depart from Lamare's or Bengtsson's conceptualisation of political integration (cf. Garcia, 1987). Hence, scholars generally apply the concept of political integration to specific groups or individuals rather than to the whole society. The focus is shifted directly towards migrants and their descendants, and the main focus is whether and how these become part of the political system. In some of these works, migrants are primarily seen as individuals (see e.g. DeSipio, 2001), whilst in others they are conceived of as groups or communities (see e.g. van Tubergen, 2006; Maxwell, 2013b). This is certainly one of the main divides in migrants' political integration studies (Anil, 2010; Morales, 2011; Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003) and as noted by Morales (2011, 25) it boils down to the simple, albeit challenging, question of whether: "it is individual or collective processes that drive the inclusion of migrants in political life." Bloemraad's works adequately summarise this cleavage (see e.g. Bloemraad, 2007, 327). The author isolates two distinct and alternative paths to inclusion in the political sphere: an individual-level political assimilation and a group-based political incorporation. In this dissertation, as I will show in the analysis conducted in chapters 6 and 7, my approach consists in investigating to what extent the Moroccan-origin individuals of each local community engage in major forms of political actions, and whether they develop as individuals forms of attitudinal engagement (i.e. interest in politics) within their countries of residence (see also section

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[5]Conceptualisations of political integration generally employed in the literature do not put emphasis on the concept of equality between citizens and non-citizens in the political sphere as in Bengtsson's definition.

3.1.1).

It is relevant to note that this divide is also reflected in some of the main measures aimed at promoting migrants' inclusion in the political sphere, like voting rights, consultative institutions, migrant associations, and naturalisation regimes (Entzinger, 1999, 13ff). We can distinguish two approaches to migrants' inclusion in the political sphere: one is more centred on the single individual and relies on individual rights, whilst the second is more focused on the group and can be divided in two variants: a corporativist model *versus* a multicultural model (see also Soysal, 1994).

The individual approach is typical of those political contexts that aim at stimulating the involvement of migrants directly at the individual level, for example through easier naturalisation procedures or voting rights. Hence, migrants in countries with easier naturalisation procedures and voting rights for TCNs have more possibilities for political participation *at the individual level* compared to their counterparts residing in countries with strict procedures and where they cannot vote.

Conversely, group approaches focus more on including ethnic and cultural diversity within the political system through group-oriented-measures. Hence more room is given here to ethnic intermediate structures like migrant associations and consultative councils that mediate between the autochthonous society and the individual migrants (see for example, Vermeulen 2006).

It is relevant to note that these are ideal types, hence in reality countries present elements of both approaches. Countries promoting migrants' inclusion at the individual level will obviously grant group rights and allow migrants to associate, yet migrant associations will not be taken as 'powerful partners'. An example in this sense is represented by the Belgian case, where Flemish authorities and Francophone authorities display different approaches towards migrants. The first seem to encourage more collective mobilisation, hence are included in the system as groups, whilst the latter tend to opt more for an individual approach by promoting instead individual insertion into the political system (see e.g. Jacobs et al., 2006, 157).

Furthermore this distinction should not be taken as fixed, because constant interchanges exist between the two paths. Hence, a country can move from a group approach towards an individual approach.[6] Entzinger (2003,

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[6]According to DeSipio (2001, 69) for example, the contemporary process of migrant political integration has "shifted from a group focus to an individual focus."

69ff) for example, describes how integration policies in the Netherlands have started to shift since the early 1990s from a group-based approach—in line with the traditional philosophy of 'pillarization'—to a new approach more focused on the individual. Even though the new approach places emphasis on the individual level, the author notes, the results of the policy can still only be evaluated at the *group* level.

In the light of these considerations, we can conclude here that establishing whether migrants follow primarily an individual or collective path highly depends on the conditions set by the single political contexts.

2.1.5. **Political outcomes** *versus* **political engagement**

The fifth divide considered here relates to the exact meaning of political integration and how it can be transposed into a measurable concept. On the basis of which elements can we state that an individual is politically more integrated than another one? When is it possible to speak of lack of political integration?

These questions are connected to the issue of how to measure the level of political integration. Much of the empirical work on political integration is based on different quantitative measures. Establishing levels of political integration has entailed assessments of rates of naturalizations and dual citizenship, levels of engagement in political life and degree of representation in the political arena. Differences in the measurement criteria will inevitably produce differences in the integrative conditions.

In this sense, the literature seems to be divided into two main groups in the measurement criteria of immigrant political integration. The first group is composed of scholars who measure the level of political integration in terms of policy and political outcomes (Browning et al., 1984; Hochschild and Mollenkopf, 2009a; Jones-Correa, 2005; Bloemraad, 2006). Conversely, the second group tends to stress the role of agency and self-organization over policy responsiveness as the best measure of immigrant integration (see e.g. Ong and Meyer, 2008; Morales, 2011). I will now outline both approaches and situate my own. This, as I show in detail in rest of the dissertation consists in conceiving of the condition of political integration of migrant-origin individuals on one hand, in terms of their will and ability to engage in the political sphere, and on the other, in terms of the will and ability of the society of residence to implement measures aimed at promoting

their involvement in the political affairs.

Political integration as political outcomes

As far as the first group is concerned, certainly one of the most influential theories of political integration stems from the work of Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984, 25). In this seminal work, the authors define political integration as the "extent to which group interests are effectively represented in policy making" or as "responsiveness of the system to the interest of inclusion and substantial authority and influence." More recent studies, notably in the American scholarship, have picked up on this definition and employed policy responsiveness as an essential element to measure the levels of political integration of the migrant-origin community (see Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009b; see also Jones-Correa 2005). For example, Ramírez and Fraga (2008, 64) describe political integration as the "extent to which self-identified group interests are articulated, represented, and met in public policymaking." A similar focus on political outcomes, notably on political representation, has been employed by McClain and Karnig (1990) in their study on the political competition between African-Americans and Hispanic groups in about 50 U.S. cities. The special attention devoted to policy responsiveness and ethnic representation is, though understandable, highly problematic as it assumes that policies and political changes favourable to immigrant-origin minorities are a direct reflection of their condition of inclusion in the political sphere.

In this sense, some authors have pointed out how favourable policy-changes might be—more realistically—the result of complex political negotiations that involve the minorities and the population at large rather than being an expression of immigrants being integrated in the political sphere. Accordingly, 'responsiveness of the political system' can be hardly conceived of as a valid indicator of immigrants' political integration, once we consider that favourable changes often coexist with immigrant political exclusion at the individual level. Hence, taking levels of ethnic representation—measured in terms of number of immigrant co-ethnics elected to office, appointed to administrative positions or simply employed in government—and naturalization rates as core indicators of integration is somewhat problematic (see for example, Morales 2011, 24). I therefore argue in this thesis that it is fundamental to focus primarily on the patterns of political engage-

ment expressed by migrant-origin individuals.

Political integration as political engagement

Scholars writing from a social movement perspective tend instead to prefer the role of agency rather than policy and political outcomes, as the most appropriate measure of immigrant integration. In this sense, political integration is the direct expression of individual participation in electoral politics (DeSipio, 1996) and non-electoral forms of politics (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Jones-Correa, 1998). For example Ong and Meyer (2004, 4) define political integration as "*the development of the capacity to mobilize effective political action in response to perceived political opportunities in a host country*" (italics in original). Laura Morales and Marco Giugni (2011c) further expand the scope of the political by including in their conception of political integration also attitudinal forms of political engagement.

As I will show in the remaining part of this chapter, in this study I will define the degree of inclusion of the members of Moroccan-origin communities in the political sphere of their country of residence on the basis of their different modes of political engagement (see also chapters 6 and 7).

2.1.6. The autochthonous group as the 'Gold Standard'

Another aspect hinges around the role of the autochthonous group as 'gold standard' in assessing the degree of integration of migrant-origin individuals in the political affairs of their country of residence.

A significant amount of quantitative research on migrants' integration in residence country in fact relies on the comparison between the migrant-origin individuals and their autochthonous counterparts to infer to what extent the members of the migrant-origin group are included in the society of residence (see for example, Kurthen and Schmitter Heisler 2009). This perspective is sometimes referred to as the *relative notion* of political integration as the degree of inclusion of migrants is determined in relation to the autochthonous group (see for example Morales, 2011, 29).

The relative notion of political integration can be put in contra-position to an *absolute notion* of the concept. The latter consists in establishing a priori some sort of ideal reference lines that are independent from the political engagement of the autochthonous population. In this sense, migrant-origin

individuals will not be considered integrated in the political sphere of the society of residence only because they express no significant gaps with the native group, but rather because there is an ideal level of engagement below which migrants are not to be considered integrated and above which are instead to be considered as integrated individuals (see Bengtsson, 2008; Bengtsson et al., 2010). Although, intriguing in its nature, in my study, I intentionally refrain from using this more idealistic and normative conception of migrant political integration, since this fails to acknowledge the dynamic and ever changing nature of the phenomenon. In my conceptualisation, the condition of integration is the result of a dynamic and constantly changing process of interaction between migrants and host-society, where no reference line finds any place to be (see for example, Mancini 2010 or Spencer and Charsley 2016, for a similar understanding).

The immediate advantage of *the relative approach* consists of its simplicity, as it provides a clear and straightforward picture of the condition of the migrant-origin members in a specific context by comparing quantitative data, like the rate of employment of the migrant-origin groups, their earnings, and turnout to a population of reference, which is the autochthonous group. Hence, following this approach, the levels of inclusion of migrant-origin individuals in the socio-economic and political life of their countries of residence are determined by the gap that exists between the autochthonous and the migrant-origin group.

For example, in their study of the current level of cultural integration of immigrants in France, (Algan et al., 2012c, 67), after comparing the French native population to migrant-origin groups on the basis of a key set of indicators (i.e. fertility rates, divorce rates, marriage rates, inter-ethnic marriage rates, female employment rates, educational attainment, language use and religious attachment), conclude that "there is a fast integration process between first and second-generation immigrants", since the second-generation shows a smaller gap with respect to the levels expressed by the autochthonous population on the basis of the indicators used (see also Constant et al., 2012). Similarly, migrants' *economic* integration is generally framed as the condition resulting from the process by which the gap between the income of the native group and those of the migrant group is reduced (see for example, Chiswick 1978; OECD 2005).

A similar approach is frequently used also in the field of *political* integration studies. For example, a study conducted by Berger et al. (2004, 498)

on Turks, Russians, and Italians residing in the city of Berlin draws similar conclusions: "Italians are fully integrated in the German society, as their participation resembles that of the Germans." Furthermore, according to González-Ferrer (2011, 80ff) naturalised migrants are the most integrated because they are "the most similar to their autochthonous counterparts."

Yet, in my study I intentionally refrain from using this approach for different reasons. A first element of concern is represented by the fact that relative approaches, by using the autochthonous group as a gold standard to assess the final condition of integration of the migrant-origin group, are implicitly conceiving the members of the autochthonous group as integrated in the political sphere by default (cf. Cesareo 2009, 23). This point of concern relates to the relationship between migrants' condition of integration and the functioning of the democratic process. In general the importance of conducing research on migrants' political integration is often justified in terms of the necessity to contain forms of political exclusion or marginalisation of migrants; these phenomena are increasingly recognised as detrimental to democratic process (Groenendijk, 2008, 2011; Jones-Correa, 1998; Lamare, 1982). Following an approach where the autochthonous group is used as the gold standard, migrant-origin individuals would still be considered 'politically integrated' also with trifling levels of political engagement, only because they show patterns of political engagement that are as low as those shown by the autochthonous population. Yet, it remains unclear, how in a similar case, migrant-origin individuals with low level of political engagement, hence without any meaningful contribution to the democratic process can still be considered politically integrated in their society of residence, exclusively because they display no gaps with the patterns of engagement of the autochthonous group.[7] Secondly, relative approaches are better suited to explain common and frequent cases where the immigrant group shows a negative gap with respect to the autochthonous one. Yet these approaches fail to engage conceptually with the situations where the migrant-origin individuals express more engagement than the autochthonous group. Even though these situations are not frequent at an empirical level, nonetheless at the conceptual level should be taken into account.

As I will discuss in detail in the following section, one of the main reasons for not using the autochthonous group as gold standard relates to the con-

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[7]In this case, political integration stops being the opposite of political exclusion an marginalisation, to be *de facto* a mere synonym of assimilation.

ception of political integration I have chosen to adopt in this study. I argue that the condition of integration of migrant-origin individuals in the political affairs of their country of residence strictly depends on society's willingness and capacity to include the new members on one side, and on their will and ability to get involved in the political sphere. Hence, even though the autochthonous population is an important component of the society of residence,[8] the degree of inclusion of migrants and their descendants cannot be inferred by simply comparing the engagement patterns of these two groups, as these enjoy very different rules of access to the political sphere in the very same context of residence.

My point can be further clarified through the following example: if we were to conduct a comparison between two groups along gender lines, rather than ethnic ones, and to use one specific group as the 'Gold Standard' (men) to determine the levels of political inclusion of the other one (women). This comparison, if conducted in a context where women cannot vote, like for example Switzerland before the 1971 reform, would certainly end up resulting in a grim picture of women's political integration. Conversely, I argue that a men-women comparison in a post 1971 Switzerland for example, where the two groups enjoy the same formal rules of access to the political arena, would certainly be more informative of the actual state of affairs.

In short, the decision to employ the ethnic-native comparison to infer the degree of integration of migrants and their descendants in the social, economic, and political life of the society of residence finally should take into account the equality of access to that specific arena. For this reason, a relative approach would certainly make more sense to be used to gauge the degree of integration of migrants in the labour market for example, rather than the political arena, as inequality of access between autochthonous and non-autochthonous to the political sphere is indisputably higher in relation to the economic sphere.

2.1.7. The exploration of ethnicity, race, and Islam

A final reason for debate is represented by the use of the concepts of 'ethnicity', 'race', and considerations about faith, notably Islam, in the study of

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[8]Inclusion in the political sphere is generally described as a process that is largely affected by the type of stance—acceptance, mistrust, outright rejection—taken by the members of the autochthonous towards the newcomers and their descendants (see for example Blangiardo and Cesareo, 2013, 17)

migrants' integration.

In this study I refer to the target population as a migrant-origin group, rather than ethnic or racial minority group (see also Maxwell 2013a). The Moroccan-origin communities residing in Europe are defined on the basis of the citizenship and country of birth of the survey respondents and their parents.

In particular, I refrain from using the concepts of ethnicity and race in my work for two interconnected reasons. The first has to do with the general use of the concepts of the ethnicity and race in scientific productions. The second refers instead to their use in the particular case of Moroccan communities.

Although I recognise the rationale behind the use of the concepts of ethnicity and race in an enormous body of literature focusing on the political inclusion of Black, Latino, and Asian minorities established in Europe and the United States (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; Shingles, 1981; Uhlaner et al., 1989; Barreto et al., 2004; de Rooij, 2011), I believe that by categorising Moroccans residing in Europe as an ethnic/racial minority, we would be framing the topic of political integration exclusively through racial/ethnic lenses. This would then evoke particular kind of answers that are not necessarily reflecting the complex experiences of the members of this migrant-origin community. Hence, I believe that the political attitudes and behaviours expressed by Moroccan-origin residents in Europe can be explained without the explicit use of this concept. This is not to deny the experiences of racism in the Moroccan communities: indeed I focus on the role of anti-discrimination policies for this very reason. However, more finely-grained tools are required in conjunction with the methods I have chosen to study 'race' effectively and appropriately.[9]

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[9]The concept of 'ethnic minority' reflects a very Anglo-Saxon perspective on the study of migrant integration in the countries of settlement (Font and Méndez, 2013a, 19). The concepts of ethnicity and race are also very popular within Dutch academia (see for example, Fennema and Tillie 2001; Severiens et al. 2006; Scholten and Holzhacker 2009). Whilst, the notion of 'migrant origin', to include not only recent immigrants but also their descendants, is influenced by the process of data collection that have been conducted in France since the 1990s (for more details see Cusset 2006; and see also Font and Méndez 2013a). I recognise that the construction of these categories is not only a technical matter, but it has also a very pronounced political dimension. As pointed out Jacobs and Rea (2012, 43) "[t]he construction of these categories is influenced by ideologies, visions about nations and visions about interrelations between social groups. An additional element that further complicates the debate is that they are also per- formative: the use of ethnic categories reinforces the ethnicisation of society. Once they are socially constructed, these categories gain their own life."

Secondly, even if we still wanted to use ethnicity/race as analytical tool, in the case of the Moroccan communities residing in Europe I believe that it is more appropriate to refer to these as a migrant-origin groups or immigrant minorities for the following reasons: Moroccan-origin residents in Europe are not part of one single ethnic group (see detailed discussion in chapter 4). The use of the concept of ethnic minority in the case of the Moroccan communities in Europe, would wrongly suggest that its members recognise themselves as making up some sort of unit. Far from it. The Moroccan communities in Europe represent an ethnically heterogeneous national group. As I explain in detail in chapter 4, over the years migration waves of Moroccan Jews, Moroccan Berbers, and Moroccan Arabs have contributed to create the Moroccan-origin communities in Europe.

I recognise the value of previous research based on the concepts of ethnicity and race. Unfortunately, the complexities inherent in the use of these categories and the limits of what I could do here, prevented me from developing a deeper analysis of these concepts. With the appropriate data (e.g. comparison between several ethnic groups) I believe that it would be interesting to adopt this approach in future research.

Another omission from my work is the exclusion of Islam, as an analytical concept. Islam, like ethnicity/race, is another concept that is prone to reductionism because it flattens the differences that exist within a migrant-origin community, once it is labelled as a religious minority. Yet, differently from ethnicity, I believe that Islam is by far a more useful analytical concept in the case of the Moroccan communities.

Islam is the default faith of most Moroccans, as I show in detail in chapter 5. Furthermore, most of its members do recognise themselves as making up a unitary group on the basis of their faith, despite their levels of religiosity (for more details, see section 5.1.9). Moreover, they are also perceived as some sort of unit by the external observers, notably when their faith is made visible (e.g. clothing, daily rituals). For this reasons I consider past research efforts on Muslim integration—notably cultural and social integration—in the United States and Europe a valuable addition to the literature on migrants' integration (Jamal, 2005; Adida et al., 2016; Sniderman and Hagedoorn, 2007; Phalet et al., 2013; Fleischmann and Phalet, 2012; Traunmüller and Helbling, 2017; Dancygier, 2017) and welcome future research projects

working on this direction.[10]

Hence, the reason for not engaging analytically with the concept of 'Islam' or 'Muslim minority' is more pragmatic in this case. As in the case for the concepts of race and ethnicity, addressing adequately the issue of Islam and its relation with the concept of political integration could be in itself the subject of another PhD dissertation or larger research projects. Understandably, this would have gone well beyond the scope of this PhD. Nevertheless, it would certainly be interesting to work in this direction in future studies, by adopting for example a different research design that includes not only a single national group, as in the case of this PhD thesis, but multi-national and multi-faith groups to control more effectively for the importance of the Islam factor in the integration process of migrant-origin communities.

In the next section I build upon the debates reviewed above to develop my conception of political integration, which places the focus on the nature of integrative mechanisms that exist between migrants themselves and the context in which these are embedded.

2.2. My conception of migrant political integration

I conceive migrant political integration as the condition resulting from a complex process that concerns principally two parts. One side is represented by the society of residence, which has the responsibility to include the new residents (i.e. migrants and their descendants) within its political sphere. This responsibility is met by providing equal access to the political arena between the autochthonous and non-autochthonous residents and lifting the legal and social barriers to this access (see discussions on the presence of local voting rights in chapter 6, and strength of anti-discrimination policies in chapter 7). The other side of the integrative mechanism is represented by migrant-origin individuals. These have the responsibility to seize the opportunities provided by actively engaging in the society of residence.

Hence, the condition of inclusion in the political affairs is defined by the will—and ability—of the receiving society to provide opportunities and lift

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[10]See for example the research project recently funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) titled "Is the Integration of Muslim Migrants More Difficult? Unpacking the Differences of the Social, Economic, Civic and Political Integration of Muslim and Non-Muslim Migrants in Switzerland in Comparative Perspective".

barriers to the involvement of migrants and their descendants on one side, and the ability and willingness of migrants to seize these opportunities through their direct involvement in the society on the other side (see for example, Bauböck 1994, 37; Sartori 1987, 1987).

A very similar understanding of the concept is expressed in some official policy papers, like the "*Kansen krijgen kansen pakken*" written in 1998 by Roger van Boxtel, a former Dutch Minister for Urban Policy and Integration of Ethnic Minorities (quoted in Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003, 74). In this document the concept of integration is defined as:

> a two-way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally resident third country nationals and the host society which provides for full participation of the immigrants. This implies on the one hand that it is the responsibility of the host society to ensure that the formal rights of immigrants are in place in such a way that the individual has the possibility of participating in economic, social and civil life and on the other, that immigrants respect the fundamental norms and values of the host society and participate actively in the integration process, without having to relinquish their own identity.

Similar reflections are also contained in the conclusions of the Council of the European Union (2004) and other EU official documents, such as the European Commission's Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment (2003, 17-18).

Accordingly, migrant political engagement in itself does not guarantee political integration for two main reasons. Firstly not all forms of political engagement are indicative of migrants' willingness and capacity to be part of the society of residence, but can rather be expressions of rejection. Secondly, political engagement in the absence of response from the society of residence would only produce sterile forms of engagement, because it is only one component of the integrative process (see for example, Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009b, 26; Martiniello 1999, 82; Junn 1999, 1434).

As I explained in the introduction, in my dissertation I will focus on the side of the integrative mechanism that pertains to the migrant-origin group, to understand how the modes of political engagement of the migrant-origin population under consideration are influenced by two integrative measures on the side of the societies of residence: the presence of local voting rights

(chapter 6), and the strength of anti-discrimination policies (chapter 7).

In the next section I further develop my conception of political integration, by presenting in more detail the concept of political engagement. Once, this concept is fully developed, in the final section I will provide further conceptual tools relating to political engagement which I use to operationalise my research, and will finally derive the main research hypotheses that will be tested in the empirical chapters.

2.2.1. Migrant political engagement

The general concept of political engagement can be divided into two forms of engagement: behavioural and attitudinal. The first denotes the actual acts in which migrants and their descendants are involved, whilst the attitudinal component relates to non-behavioural and less visible forms of engagement in the society (see e.g. Schildkraut, 2005).

Behavioural forms of engagement in the political sphere, like protest and strikes are indeed more visible forms of engagement than political interest. Yet this distinction should be understood not only in terms of visibility but also in terms of degrees and costs. Being engaged behaviourally in the polity engenders higher costs than attitudinal forms of engagement. For this reason attitudinal forms of engagement are often treated in the literature either as forms of engagement that require minimal effort compared to political behaviours that require higher commitments of time and contact with others (see e.g. Chui et al., 1991, 392), or as preconditions for more visible ways of engaging in the political sphere. In addition, certain political attitudes as I will show in the next sections are key in establishing the ability as well as the will of migrant-origin individuals to take part in the society of residence.

Attitudinal engagement

As mentioned earlier, migrant-origin individuals' attitudinal engagement in the society of residence is one of the way through which migrants could express their will to get involved in the political affairs of the society of residence.

Attitude measurement has become a common practice in the field of soci-

ology and social psychology since the pioneering works conducted by Thurstone (1928). However attitudes, are often more problematic to capture and rely on with respect to behaviours (see for example, Robinson et al. 1991 for a more detailed discussion). As Algan et al. (2012b, 23-24) put it, "attitudes are just expressive manifestations, reflecting what 'one does or intends to do' and one's expectations of 'what is socially acceptable to say in public'."

In this study the concept of 'attitudinal political engagement' is defined as a compound of different attitudes. As shown in the statistical analyses conducted in chapter 6 and 7, in study I will focus on five aspects of attitudinal engagement: (1) political interest, (2) feelings of belonging, (3) internal efficacy, (4) external efficacy, and (5) social trust.[11]

Behavioural engagement

The political acts performed by migrant-origin individuals represent another clear way through which they express their involvement in the political affairs of the country of residence.

The literature shows how the concept of political participation can be 'sliced' in different ways: along the famous 'conventional' versus 'non-conventional' forms of political participation (Zapata-Barrero et al., 2013); 'electoral' versus 'non-electoral' (Wong, 2006); 'national' versus 'transnational' (Martiniello, 2009); 'system-directed' activities versus 'direct' activities (Junn, 1999); or also 'online' versus 'offline' (Vissers and Stolle, 2014).[12]

Although behavioural forms of political engagement do not pose the same problems of measurement that are specific to the attitudinal forms of engagement, I recognise the ambiguous role played by political participation as indicator of political inclusion. For example, Junn (1999, 1434) in reflecting on this aspect notes that:

> advocating more participation does not necessarily empower or
> emancipate those who have been previously dominated. Under
> such circumstances, more participation can work in exactly the

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[11]In the appendix I show in detail how each concept has been transformed into an empirical object. These specific attitudinal traits were selected for their importance in the literature and their availability across the five Moroccan-origin communities under consideration. Yet, a variety of other relevant attitudes, including political trust, knowledge of public affairs, acceptance of democratic values are also critical to examine, but fall beyond the scope of the current study (see for example, Pilati 2010, 100).

[12]See also van Deth et al. (2006), for a more detailed discussion on the concept of political participation.

opposite direction form which it is intended. Instead of eradicating domination and encouraging justice, equality, individual political development, and regime legitimacy, more participation amid institutions of democracy that replicate the domination present in society and economy will only reinforce and legitimate the inequality.[13]

In brief, as noted by Morales (2011, 25), "it is not always straightforward to point to the political mobilization patterns that are unequivocally indicative of integration and those that indicate marginalization or exclusion."

As I will show more in detail in chapters 6 and 7, in this thesis I will focus on 13 forms of political action: (1) contacted a politician; (2) contacted a government or local government official; (3) worked in a political party; (4) worked in a political action group; (5) worn or displayed a badge, sticker or poster; (6) signed a petition; (7) taken part in a public demonstration; (8) boycotted certain products; (9) deliberately bought certain products for political reasons; (10) donated money to a political organisation or group; (11) taken part in a strike; (12) contacted the media; (13) contacted a solicitor or a judicial body for non-personal reasons. I specify how I have operationalised the concept of 'political participation' in each chapter (see sections 6.3.1 and 7.4.1; see also section D in appendix for more details).

I now show how different theoretical perspectives have been developed to explain why people engaged in politics. In particular, in the section below I shift the focus from what political participation means to present how various theories explain political participation.

2.3. The Main Theoretical Perspectives and Hypotheses

The literature on the political inclusion of immigrants can be divided roughly into three theoretical strands depending on the nature of the factors used to explain variation in the degree of migrant political inclusion: *micro*-level factors, basically individual resources and characteristics, *meso*-level factors,

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[13]For a similar point see also Hochschild and Mollenkopf (2009a, 26).

such as the participation in ethnic and cross-ethnic associational life; *macro-level* factors, most importantly the institutional and discursive context in which migrants live (Diehl and Blohm, 2001).

I first clarify how the above-mentioned theoretical strands have been used to account for migrants' levels of political engagement. In brief, the study of the political integration of immigrants can be approached from three different, albeit interconnected, levels with their own explanatory factors. As I will show in detail in chapter 6 and 7, in this study I employ an integrated approach that considers simultaneously the individual characteristics of migrant-origin individuals, their involvement in voluntary associations, and political opportunities (see e.g. Morales and Giugni, 2011c). I therefore control for the effect of non-contextual factors so as to isolate and assess the influence of structural or environmental factors on the political orientations and behaviour of the migrant-origin communities under consideration.

2.3.1. Micro-level factors: human capital theory

The first approach derives from the seminal work of Verba and Nie (1972), in which the authors investigated the correlation between socio-economic status and political participation.[14] This strand puts stress on the unequal distribution of those individual qualities—motivation, skills and resources—that lead an individual to choose to participate. In other words, the central factors influencing political participation are found in individual resources relevant to participation—time, money, civic skills, education—and in other forms of personal engagement such as political interest and political efficacy (Verba et al., 1995).

The human capital theory has been successfully brought into the study of the political integration of migrants (Anduiza and San Martín, 2011; Diehl and Blohm, 2001; Jacobs et al., 2004). According to this model, migrants' degree of political engagement is primarily shaped by their individual resources (e.g. time, income, and language skills) and political orientations, defined as the set of attitudes that individuals have towards the political system and the autochthonous and origin group, which prompt them to po-

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[14]For this reason, this theoretical model is often referred to with the terms 'socioeconomic status model' (Leighley, 1995) or SES model (Junn, 1999) (see also chapter 7).

litical action.[15] To put it simply, migrant-origin individuals holding a higher status are more likely to be politically engaged than are their less endowed counterparts, as the former are placed in specific social milieux that promote the development of civic skills as well as positive participatory and attitudinal norms (see also chapter 7).

A large number of studies have confirmed that migrants with higher levels of education are more likely to participate politically in the host country compared to those with a lower education degree (Diehl and Blohm, 2001, 421).[16] Focusing on electoral participation, some studies have shown that educational attainment is an important predictor of voting participation (see e.g. Espenshade and Ramakrishnan, 2001; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; González-Ferrer, 2011).

Moreover, language proficiency has also been found to be a key factor in explaining variation in migrants' political involvement as it provides migrant-origin individuals with the necessary tools for decoding what is occurring in the social and political environment of their societies of residence (Garcia, 1987; Uhlaner et al., 1989; Jacobs and Tillie, 2004; Cho, 1999; Jacobs et al., 2004)

Similarly, the length of residence, though in a less systematic fashion, plays a role (Morales and Giugni, 2011a; Cho, 1999; Uhlaner et al., 1989); migrant-origin individuals who resided for a longer time in the country are more likely to participate in its political life, and develop also a stronger attachment with the neighbourhood and the city (Espenshade and Ramakrishnan, 2001; González-Ferrer, 2011). Conversely, other factors such as gender and religiosity have an ambiguous and less defined effect on the level of political inclusion of immigrants (see e.g. Morales and Giugni, 2011a).[17]

Nonetheless, micro-level factors are not the only way to explain variation in migrants' political inclusion, as other dimensions might also play an important role in determining their levels of political engagement. In this regard, some scholars note that the increases in age, education, and income that characterized Europe and the United States in these last years, and

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[15]Some studies refer to these attitudes also as "civic" orientations (see e.g. Leighley, 1995, 183).

[16]Interestingly, Uhlaner et al. (1989, 212) found that certain migrant groups (i.e. United States-born Asian citizens) do not follow this rule, hence higher levels of education do not lead to higher political engagement.

[17]The use of gender as a predictor of the degree of participation is questioned also in studies focusing on the mainstream population, rather than the migrant groups (see Leighley 1995, 184 for overviews).

the concomitant reduction in electoral turnout have generated a 'participation puzzle' that cannot be resolved through the usual socio-demographic predictors (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Cho, 1999).[18] Numerous studies have shown that the level of political engagement of immigrants is heavily influenced also by meso and macro-level factors, and that micro-level factors do not have the same explanatory power when used to account for migrants' political engagement.[19] This study therefore tries to go beyond the individual characteristics by considering also the role other factors in explaining the involvement of migrant-origin individuals in the political sphere.

2.3.2. Meso-level factors: social capital theory

A second strand of research on political participation of migrant-origin individuals derives from the wide literature on social capital (Bourdieu, 1980; Coleman, 1988; Lin, 2001; Putnam, 1993). Since the work of Robert Putnam (1993) the concept of social capital has received new prominence in the social science community and has been employed as a crucial explanatory factor for political trust and political participation.

Fennema and Tillie (1999, 2001) successfully adapted Putnam's ideas to the study of migrants' political inclusion in Amsterdam. In doing so, they demonstrated that variations in political participation between groups can be explained by different levels of '*ethnic* civic community', and more specifically by different levels of participation in associational life at the aggregate level. This pioneering work stimulated further research on the explanatory power of civic community in different settings and pushed scholars to develop this perspective by addressing its initial limitations.[20]

A significant number of works, for example, have demonstrated that not only ethnic organizations but also cross-ethnic and non-ethnic organizations might play an important and distinct role on the political participation of

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[18]Richard Brody (1978) refers for the first time to this puzzle in the book "The New American Political System."

[19]Starting from a socialisation perspective, Cho (1999), for example notes that although age has a positive, curvilinear relationship to autochthonous individuals as well as subsequent generations of migrant-origin individuals, this trend is not present in the case of foreign-born migrants. According to the author, socio-economic factors merely provide the skills that are necessary for political activity, yet socialisation is what determines how the skills will be employed (see also Junn, 1999, 1421).

[20]See the special issue of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies edited and introduced by Jacobs and Tillie (2004).

immigrants (see e.g., Eggert and Giugni, 2010; Jacobs et al., 2004; Jacobs and Tillie, 2004; Morales and Pilati, 2011; Pilati and Morales, 2016). Moreover, various studies considered the social capital stemming from organizational networks and density as well as the capital deriving from the individual involvement of immigrants in associational life (see e.g., Berger et al., 2004; Jacobs et al., 2004).

In brief, following this approach scholars were able to explain why some groups, despite few individual resources, express high level of participation, and why certain groups are more politically integrated in the political process (Fennema and Tillie, 1999; Togeby, 1999). Nonetheless, some authors pointed out that additional explanatory factors have to be considered in order to achieve a proper understanding of the processes that drive the political inclusion of immigrants. For example, Anja van Heelsum (2005), in her study on three ethnic groups residing in four different Dutch cities, highlights some limitations in the explanatory power of the civic community perspective and argues in favour of the necessity to take into account also the effect of the political context.

Similarly, Jacobs et al. (2006), in their study on political participation and associational life of Turkish residents in Brussels, show that even though Turks have an active associational life, they do not perform well in the elected political arena. The authors suggest that this can be explained by the fact that the political context in Brussels favours the inclusion of migrants in the form of single individuals rather than entire organisations or strong communities. In brief, political contexts matter in explaining variation for political inclusion (Bühlmann and Freitag, 2006). Therefore in this PhD dissertation I consider also the role played by associational involvement in explaining variation in the patterns of attitudinal and behavioural engagement in political affairs.

2.3.3. Macro-level factors: political capital theory

The third strand of research on migrant political participation and inclusion has stressed the crucial role of contextual factors. This approach has its origin in the literature on social movements and contentious politics, and hinges on the concept of 'political opportunity structure'.

In this regard, it is worth noting that the concept of political opportunity structure is a very broad one that cannot be exhaustively defined here. Var-

ious scholars have included different items in their definition of the term (see for example, Eisinger 1973; Tarrow 1996; see also Koopmans 1999 and Meyer 2004 for overviews).

In the field of immigration and ethnic relations, this perspective has been brought to the fore by Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, and Passy (2005) and further developed by other scholars (see e.g. Morales and Giugni, 2011c). Subsequent research has then fruitfully applied the concept of political opportunity structure to the study of the political participation and integration of immigrants by including in the analysis also specific features of the political context, like the openness of the citizenship acquisition regime, which impact the way migrant-origin residents engage in the political affairs of their country of residence (see e.g. González-Ferrer, 2011; Morales and Pilati, 2011).

Beside the openness or closure of the institutional setting or the policies implemented by political authorities, scholars took into account also the impact of the discursive context faced by migrants, demonstrating that the discursive context in which people of migrant-origin individuals are embedded matters (Morales and Giugni 2011a, 270; Cinalli and Giugni 2011). Moreover, research studies showed that institutional and discursive opportunities can be successfully explored to explain not only collective mobilizations but also the individual political participation and inclusion of migrants (see for example Morales and Giugni, 2011c).

In brief, the main idea here is that forms of migrants' political engagement are mainly shaped by the structure of political opportunities that is present in the receiving society. As Martiniello (2006, 88) put it: "[b]y granting or denying voting rights to foreigners, by facilitating or impeding access to citizenship and nationality, by granting or constraining freedom of association, by ensuring or blocking the representation of migrants' interests, by establishing or not establishing arenas and institutions for consultative politics, states open or close avenues of political participation for migrants and provide them with more or less opportunities to participate in the management of collective affairs."

As I mentioned in the introduction, in this dissertation I am interested in investigating the impact of two distinctive aspects of the context of residence: the presence of local voting rights in favour of third country nationals (chapter 6), and the strength of the anti-discrimination policies implemented in the country of residence (chapter 7).

2.3.4. Research hypotheses

Drawing on the theoretical perspectives reviewed above, my initial objective was to test the following hypotheses through multi-variate analyses. Two hypotheses were tested in chapter 6, and one in chapter 7. Yet, the discussion in the viva has raised a number of concerns in relation to the actual power of the analysis conducted in testing these hypotheses (for more details on this point see sections 6.3.2 and 7.4.3) which I begin to consider here and will pursue in my future work.

Hypothesis 1 and 2: Voting Rights

As I will discuss more in detail in chapter 6, a large number of studies have shown political interest to be a fundamental precondition of electoral participation (see for example, Leighley and Vedlitz 1999, and see also Nie et al. 1996 for a review). Hence, by being eligible to cast a vote, the Moroccan-origin residents in Brussels are stimulated to develop a higher level of interest in the political affairs of their country of residence with respect to their counterparts, because being members of the electorate constitutes a greater stake in the society of residence.

In particular, failing to develop interest in the political affairs of the country of residence, for the Moroccan-origin residents in Brussels entails higher costs with respect to the members of the other Moroccan-origin communities, as they would miss out on their unique opportunity to contribute to shape and have an impact on politics and political affairs via electoral channels. Conversely, developing political interest for the Moroccan-origin residents in Brussels engenders higher benefits with respect to their counterparts residing in cities where TCNs are not eligible to vote, because it will increase their chances to express their desiderata through electoral participation.

Secondly, as members of the electorate, migrant-origin residents are also more likely to be subject to mechanisms of external and internal mobilisation, as shown by a number of studies.[21] Given this body of scholarship, the first hypothesis that will be examined in this study is formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 1: Considering that Brussels is the only city in this study, where

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[21]See for example Jacobs et al. (2006) and Luconi (2015). For more details on this causal mechanism see chapter 6.

Moroccan-origin residents without the citizenship of the country of residence can cast a vote in local elections, the members of this community will express a higher level of interest in the politics of the country of residence in comparison to the other Moroccan-origin communities residing in Lyon, Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid.

Studies focusing on mechanisms of mobilisation have shown also that the dynamics of political recruitment, do not merely stimulate the interest for political affairs but increase also the likelihood to engage in behavioural forms of engagement, like contacting a government official or taking part in a community activity (see for example Verba et al. 1995; and see also detailed discussions in chapters 6 and 7).

Furthermore, the inclusion of migrant-origin residents in the electorate of their country of residence is believed in the literature to be an effective way to stimulate their political participation since it will increase their sense of legitimisation to be involved in the political affairs of the country of residence (see for example Giugni 2010; and see also discussion in chapter 6). On the basis of these studies, the second hypothesis can be presented in the following terms:

Hypothesis 2: the Moroccan-origin residents in Brussels will be more likely to engage in behavioural forms of political participation, such as contacting a politician or governmental official, engaging in party activities, or forms of protest, with respect to their counterparts residing in Lyon, Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid.

Hypothesis 3: Anti-discrimination policies

In chapter 7 I will shift the focus to consider whether the strength of the anti-discrimination policies implemented in the country of residence can shape the modes of political participation of members of disadvantaged and stigmatised migrant-origin communities, specifically in the case of Moroccan-origin residents in Europe.

As I will discuss more in detail in chapter 7, the anti-discrimination structure in place within each country of residence can be conceived as a direct response to the oppressive phenomena endured in daily life in the society of residence by members of vulnerable groups as a result of their visible identity traits. More specifically, these policies can combat the disruptive

effects that oppressive phenomena have directly and indirectly on the ability of oppressed and stigmatised groups to express their political and social views through the most appropriate channels of political action. Following these considerations, the third hypothesis that will be tested in this study is formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 3: the Moroccan-origin individuals residing in countries with relatively stronger anti-discrimination policies (i.e. France and Belgium) will be able to express their voice through a broader range of political acts in comparison to their counterparts residing in countries characterised by relatively weaker anti-discrimination policies (i.e. Italy and Spain).

2.4. Conclusion

In this chapter I have critically engaged with some of the main works on migrants' political integration, by discussing some of the main tensions in this study field, introducing the main concepts that I will be using throughout the study, as well as the theories and practices that have been developed within this field of study. I also proposed my own conceptualisation of political integration. This will guide my empirical work in chapters 6 and 7.

I have situated my approach within the relevant literature, and introduced the research hypotheses that will be tested in the empirical chapters. In particular, I have developed a conception of political integration that revolves around the attitudinal and behavioural political engagement of migrant-origin residents. In the second part of the chapter, I have then shown how variation in political engagement is generally explained by isolating the main theoretical strands in this study field.

In the next chapter I will present the research design that has been used for this work to test the hypotheses introduced in this chapter. Detailed information will be provided in relation to the decisions that guide the whole research as well as the methodological aspects of the research.

CHAPTER

3

THE RESEARCH APPROACH

In this third chapter I provide a detailed account of the entire research procedure that I employed to answer the research questions and test the hypotheses presented in the previous chapter. In the first section I will present the underlying structure of the enquiry. This consists of all decisions that guide the execution of the research process (i.e. research design decision and operationalisation choices). In the second section of this chapter I will discuss in detail the methodology used to collect and analyse the data. More specifically, in this final part I will provide detailed information on the data collection methods, the sampling frames, and the interviewing procedure that have been used to collect the data that will then be presented and analysed in chapters 5, 6, and 7.

3.1. Formulating the Research Design

In the social sciences, comparativists whose main research objective consists in investigating the causes of variation in migrants' economic, political, or social position within their societies of residence, are always confronted with an initial important question: which *type* of comparison to opt for? In

other words, what are the objects of the comparisons?

According to Tubergen et al. (2004), in this case researchers can select between two types of *research design*: one option consists in comparing multiple-origin groups in a single destination. Studies following this sort of research design have confirmed that the same context can have different effects on different origin groups (see e.g., Berger et al., 2004; Tillie and Slijper, 2007).

The second design-option follows a different logic: a single-origin group is observed in multiple destinations in order to isolate the effect of the destination on culturally similar migrants. For example, Irena Kogan (2003) adopts this design to assess the degree of labour market integration of former Yugoslav migrants in Austria and Sweden. Her findings show significant differences between the two groups and indicate that the context plays a crucial role in determining the type and degree of integration in the society of residence, when relevant factors are controlled for (e.g., migration period). Morales and Pilati (2014), in their study on the transnational political engagement of the Ecuadorian-origin communities residing in Barcelona, Madrid, and Milan, found that differences in the political context are important, notably when accounting for the level of participation in Ecuadorian elections. Vermeulen (2006), in comparing the organising process of the Turkish communities residing in Berlin and Amsterdam, found that in light of the more positive political opportunity structure introduced since the early 1980s in Amsterdam through minority policies, the number of new organisations created after 1980 by the Turkish community in Amsterdam was significantly higher in comparison to their counterparts residing in Berlin.[1]

In this study I adopt a similar research design: "a single-origin multiple-destination design". In order to answer the questions posed in the first chapter, I compare the conditions of inclusion in the political sphere of migrant-origin individuals across different contexts. Strictly speaking, the comparison is conducted between different 'configurations of variables' that cohabit within the same contexts (Schmitter, 2008). In the next two sections I provide more details on the genre of contexts and the target population on which I will be focusing.

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[1]In some studies the two types of research designs are combined in order to take advantage of both (see e.g., van Tubergen, 2006; Morales and Giugni, 2011c; Bloemraad, 2006; Tubergen et al., 2004)

3.1.1. A local perspective

"Integration is a process that takes place primarily at the local level."
– Council of the European Union (2004)

Studies on the political engagement of migrants have traditionally privileged focusing on the national context since the essence of the citizenship and immigration policies is defined at the national level (see e.g., Brubaker, 1992; Koopmans et al., 2005). Yet, more and more scholars started to direct their focus at the local level (see e.g., Garbaye, 2002; Morales and Giugni, 2011c; Penninx, 2009) and strongly claimed a space for 'locality' within the study of migrants' integration (see e.g., Schiller and Çalar, 2009; Cinalli and Giugni, 2011; Vermeulen, 2006).

In this study I focus on the Moroccan-origin communities residing in five different European cities, namely: Brussels, Lyon, Turin, Madrid, and Barcelona. Pragmatic considerations of data availability are the basis of the choice to focus on the Moroccan-origin communities of Brussels, Lyon, Madrid, and Barcelona. However my choice to collect data on the Moroccan-origin community of Turin is related to the importance of this community in Italy. This is the largest Moroccan-origin community in Italy and the largest TCNs community in Turin (see 4.3.3).

The inclusion in this study of the Moroccan-origin communities residing in Lyon, Madrid, and Barcelona is also related to the degree of variation on the explanatory factors that these cities can guarantee (Morales and Giugni 2011b, 11-12; see also King et al. 1994, 137). One of the main objectives sought after through this selection of cities was to maximise the range of different institutional political contexts that migrants and their descendants have to face in their countries of residence (e.g. the presence of local voting rights in chapter 6 and the strength of anti-discrimination policies in chapter 7).

The subsequent integration of data on the Moroccan-origin communities residing in the cities of Turin and Brussels enlarges the field of comparison by including different local contexts and additional 'configurations of variables'. For example, by including Brussels I introduced in the analysis a context where TCNs are allowed to take part in local elections (chapter 6).

The inclusion of the cities of Brussels and Turin increases also the degree of variation that exists between the different types of anti-discrimination policies implemented in the contexts of residence, by adding contexts with relatively strong and intermediate anti-discrimination policies (chapter 7).

The local level is deemed here as better suited to capture the extent of political inclusion of migrant populations and their descendants. The focus on the *local* level is also supported by the member states of the European Union, and clearly included among the Common Basic Principles of immigrant integration policy in the EU: "[t]he participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures, *especially at the local level*, supports their integration"(Council of the European Union, 2004, 18)(italics added).

In this sense, the city level is conceived of as "more easily accessible for migrants than the national political arena" (Koopmans, 2004, 467), or as Schönwälder and Bloemraad (2013) put it: the city level is the locus where migrants and their descendants face the smallest hurdles to participation and office holding (cf. Hochschild and Mollenkopf, 2009b, 22).

In the literature, the local level is important also for its symbolic value. Garbaye (2005, 2) for example, has defined the local level as "the forefront of attempts [...] to participate in urban politics"; according to Morales and Giugni (2011b, 11) it is the space where "the integration of migrants is at stake". In brief, the choice I have made to adopt a local perspective is motivated by the belief that the process of inclusion of migrants and their descendants is mainly driven by decisive factors operating locally, at the city level (see e.g., Odmalm, 2005).

Nonetheless, the choice to adopt a local perspective has entailed some challenges, notably in the measurement of the contextual factors selected (i.e. local voting rights and anti-discrimination policies). Arguably, the same country's anti-discrimination policies can 'translate' into different forms in different cities, depending on local politics. In particular, I recognised from the start that using an indicator of anti-discrimination policy at the national level from MIPEX could have been problematic.

This point was particularly relevant for the two Spanish cities selected (i.e. Barcelona and Madrid). An in-depth analysis of the local contexts in the period of time in which the surveys were conducted (i.e. 2007-2008) would have certainly provided a clear picture of the local politics at that time. Yet, although ideal, this type of retrospective and local contextual analy-

sis, would have been costly in terms of resources, considering the number of cases at hand and nature of the analysis.

A pragmatic way to take on this challenge was focusing on the most problematic cases only, namely the local contexts of Barcelona and Madrid. Differences might exist in the overall anti-discrimination structures developed in these two different local contexts, as a result of the different strategies and plans enacted locally. Yet, after conducting an analysis of these contexts and reviewing experts' research in the field of anti-discrimination (see e.g. Ballester Pastor 2016) it became clear that significant differences between these two local contexts seemed to regard exclusively the discrimination in the field of sexual orientation, with a stronger protection in the Catalan region.[2]

It is worth noting that the increased protection from discrimination in the field of sexual orientation that is available to Moroccan-origin residents in Barcelona is not relevant for the purpose of this study because the survey data for the Moroccan communities residing in Madrid and Barcelona date back to the 2007-2008 period.

After taking into account the local politics that were strictly more problematic, I decided to consider the two local contexts on a similar level in terms of the protection granted to its residents against discrimination. Yet, I still believe that a more in-depth analysis of the local contexts (e.g. role of political parties, social movements organisations, and voluntary groups) would have provided a richer picture of the local contexts (see e.g. Penninx et al. 2004; Garbaye 2002; but see also discussion on the role of NGOs in section 7.3).

3.1.2. The survey design

As I previously mentioned, in order to answer the research questions and test the hypotheses reported in the previous chapter I opted for a cross-sectional design. This research draws a great extent on data provided by surveys conducted within the scope of interconnected research projects, and on a survey I personally conducted *ad hoc* in the city of Turin (for more details on all surveys employed in this study see section 3.2.1).

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[2]Notwithstanding the abrupt stop in social dialogue about discrimination that occurred in Spain after 2010, as described by Cachón (2015), in 2014 the Parliament of Catalonia has approved for the first time an integral law on the rights of gay and lesbian persons that applies only to the region of Catalonia.

In particular, most of the individual-level data employed in this thesis are taken from a survey of individual Moroccans—born either in Morocco or with at least one parent born there—conducted within the framework of the LOCALMULTIDEM project and through other 'sister' projects that constitutes the Multicultural Democracy in Europe (MDE) research network.

The LOCALMULTIDEM project is a comparative research project funded by the 6th Framework Programme of the European Commission that run from the 1st February 2006 to the 30th April 2009. It aimed to contribute to the knowledge about the level of political inclusion of migrant-origin residents in the local life of their cities of residence in Europe, the differences that exists among the different migrant groups examined, and the main factors that can explain variations in their degree of political inclusion.

The use of surveys has been subjected to considerable criticism in the past years, notably in relation to the issue of reliability of verbal behaviour (see e.g., Cicourel 1964, for an overview see: Corbetta 2003, 117-158). Nonetheless, when a study—as in this case—is striving for uniformity and generality rather than individuality or complexity of social reality, surveys represent the most appropriate instrument for investigation. These in fact provide quantitative and quantifiable data that are amenable to statistical analysis which can be later used to establish variation between different cases as well as examine patterns of associations between variables.

The data analysed in the empirical chapters of this study (i.e. chapters 5,6, and 7) originates predominantly from surveys. Hence, in all the five cities under consideration, random samples of the target population (see section 3.1.3) were questioned by means of standardized procedures. In the following section I define more clearly the target population of this dissertation.

3.1.3. The target population: who is Moroccan?

As mentioned earlier, in this study I focus on a single migrant group: Moroccans.[3] How do we establish who is part of this specific migrant-origin group? In this regard ethnic statistics in Europe are divided in two main

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[3]Beyond the reasons mentioned in the introductory chapter in support of my decision to focus on this particular migrant group, in chapter 4 I provide further details on the specific characteristics of this migrant-origin community, namely the differences that exists in the ethnic composition of this group, the various waves of migration that led throughout the years to the creation of some of the main Moroccan-origin communities in Europe, and finally their concentration in the countries of destination under consideration in this study.

traditions (for more details, see for example Jacobs et al. 2009). A group of countries, such as Italy and France, distinguish individuals on the basis of their nationality; this will generate two categories: nationals and foreigners. The second group is composed of those countries—regions of countries—like the Netherlands and the Flemish region in Belgium, that segment their population on the basis of the country of birth of the parents of its residents. This tradition has created two categories: 'autochthones' and 'allochthones'. The first category is already widely employed in academia and it indicates the *native origin* part of the population; to the second category belong all residents of which at least one of the parents was born abroad (for an overview, see Jacobs and Rea 2012).

In this study the concept of 'Moroccan community' includes first generation Moroccans as well as their descendants. Hence, a mix of both criteria was used (i.e. place of birth and citizenship at birth). To be included in the Moroccan sample, respondents were asked to specify their country of birth and their citizenship at birth. In order to include also the descendants of Moroccan migrants, respondents were asked to specify the place of birth and citizenship at birth of their parents.[4]

Although I acknowledge that the inclusion in a specific migrant-origin group can be ascribed also to more 'subjective' aspects, such as the feelings of identity that individuals necessarily develop throughout their lives (see e.g., Erens, 2013), as explained earlier, in this study I deliberately decide to focus on more 'objective' criteria. My choice here is motivated by the necessity to rely on unequivocal and quantifiable information to define the target population. To be more specific, using 'subjective' criteria might reduce and conceal the variation observed on some of the key variables of this study (e.g. personal experience of discrimination, feelings of belonging).

As I will show in more detail in chapter 7, one of the main factors used to explain variation in the type of political engagement of this group is based on the different kinds of feelings of belonging their members have developed in their country of residence, and the explanatory factor derived from the interaction of their feelings of belonging and their personal experiences of discrimination (see Méndez and Font 2013, 273ff, for a more

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[4]In some particular cases, using only the place of birth of parents would create some distortions, including in the sample people who do not actually belong to the Moroccan community. This is notably the case of Spanish individuals whose parents were born in the areas of Morocco that were occupied by Spain at the time (see e.g., Morales and Ros, 2013, 158).

detailed discussion). Consequently, this means that even though some survey respondents—for the purpose of this study—fall within the population of interest, they may not actually identify with this group.[5]

A couple of additional guiding criteria are used to further define the target population: their age and their period of residence in the city. As far as the first is concerned, the research teams that conducted the fieldwork in Lyon, Barcelona, and Madrid decided to include in the sample all individuals who were at least 15 years old at the time of the survey was conducted. In the cities of Brussels and Turin, the sample includes only Moroccan-origin individuals who already attained the age of majority at the time they were interviewed (i.e. 18 years old).

This difference is however not very important, since the percentage of minors that were actually interviewed represent approx. 1% of the sample generated the surveys conducted in Barcelona and Madrid, and the sample of Moroccan-origin residents extracted by the French research team in Lyon does not include any minors.

A significant difference is represented by the second criterion. All research teams used six months of residence in the city as a threshold, with the only exception being the Belgian team, which imposed a more restrictive criterion by doubling the required period of residence to be included in the sample.

3.2. Methods and Data

In this section I look at the methodological procedure undertaken to collect the data. In particular, for each survey employed here, I provide details on the sampling frame adopted, the period in which the survey was conducted, the target area, the length of the typical interview, the type of interviewing method used, the sample size, the number of interviewers involved in the data collection process, and the response rate obtained.

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[5]Even though I used objective guiding criteria to define who belongs to the migrant group of interest, the questionnaire used by the research teams allow to take into account also this subjective component, as respondents were asked to express the ethnic group to which they feel a stronger sense of belonging (see chapter 7).

3.2.1. The data collection method: the surveys

As noted by Font and Méndez (2013a, 11), surveys have become one of the most important tools for collecting data on migrant-origin populations. Nonetheless, producing good survey data is not straightforward, especially when dealing with parts of the population that are not formally registered or accounted for in official statistics, are difficult to reach because of their lifestyles or their lack of trust in surveys, and are not always able to cope with the language spoken in the country of residence.

In order to deal with these methodological challenges, researchers often openly share their fieldwork strategies and good practices. For example, it is a widely held view that immigrant surveys should include a control autochthonous group in the sample, in order to get a sense of how being a migrant affects their state of inclusion (see e.g., Méndez and Font 2013, 276; but see also the discussion on the use of autochthonous groups as gold standard in section 2.1.6).

All surveys used in this study had a control group in their sample, with the exception of the survey which I conducted in Turin. In this case, constraints resulting from limited time and funds did not allow to extend the data-collection to the autochthonous group. During the very first planning phases of the fieldwork conducted in Turin, I decided to direct all resources only towards the members of the migrant-origin group under consideration, rather than spreading the few material and human resources available on two different groups. Although this choice takes away useful information that could enable comparing autochthonous groups and the Moroccan-origin communities residing in the same cities, it does not hinder the overall objective of this study, which is comparing the modes of political engagement of the five Moroccan-origin communities, and investigating how voting rights and anti-discrimination policies can shape the way these engage in the political sphere. This is in line with the conceptualisation of migrant-origin political integration I have adopted in this dissertation. As I have explained in section 2.1.6, this conceptualisation does not employ the autochthonous group as 'gold standard'.

In addition, I decided to reduce the overall number of questions in the questionnaire: the typical interview lasted 20 minutes, rather than 50-60 minutes. Lack of resources, also meant that I could not offer any monetary incentives to respondents—as had been done in the survey conducted

in Brussels—nor externalise the interviewing to a survey agency or employ a group of graduate students as occurred respectively for the surveys conducted in Lyon (Cinalli, 2009), and in Madrid and Barcelona (Palacios and Morales, 2013). Hence, the interviews were entirely conducted by me with the support a volunteer doctoral student with a strong background in social sciences.

Notwithstanding these constraints, I could implement several measures which increase the overall quality of data. Firstly, I translated the questionnaire into French and Arabic to allow Moroccan-origin respondents with limited knowledge of Italian to fully understand the questions asked (Myrberg, 2013, 133). Secondly, I provided the respondents with bi-lingual show cards in case of long multiple option items (see e.g., Méndez and Font, 2013, 275).[6] Finally, in the attempt to attain higher cooperation rates, I tried to match some attributes, notably the gender, of the interviewers and the respondents, whenever this was possible (Durrant et al., 2010).[7]

In the next section I will examine the sampling methods and fieldwork strategies employed by all research teams.

3.2.2. Sampling procedures and interviewing methods

One of the principal concerns in any quantitative research is producing results that can be generalised to different situations from those observed in the study. The generalizability of the results is often discussed in association with the concept of *external validity* (Corbetta, 2003, 87). This objective was pursued by all research teams through the use of statistically representative samples.

Although the data analysed in the next chapters all originate from surveys that shared the same type of concerns, these did not necessarily have the same resources, nor employed the exact same sampling technique. In addition, these surveys were not conducted in the same period of time.

As highlighted by Méndez and Font (2013, 276) choosing the most appropriate sampling method largely depends on how information on migrant-

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[6]Throughout the pilot test conducted in Turin I realised that it was absolutely necessary to use questionnaires and show cards translated in Arabic and French as some individuals were not able to cope with a survey exclusively in Italian.

[7]I acknowledge that at present, the advantages of ethnic matching are complex to ascertain and far from incontrovertible (see Font and Méndez 2013b; and see also van Heelsum 2013, for an overview).

origin individuals is collected in the contexts of interest. In some countries for instance it is possible to draw a random sample of regular and irregular migrants from the population register, in others this is not possible, hence other sampling strategies need to be devised. As a consequence of this state of things, different sampling methods were employed by the various research teams.

Deciding which interviewing method to adopt is, to a great extent, also conditioned by a number of practical factors, such as the time, and the financial and human resources available. Almost all the surveys included in this study were conducted face to face (Turin, Madrid, Barcelona, Brussels). However, in Lyon the questionnaire was administered by telephone.

As I will discuss below, there are some significant differences even within the group of cities where the face to face mode was preferred. These are reflected in the number of interviewers employed, their socio-demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, level of education and ethnicity), and their level of training.

In the following paragraphs I sum up the main differences in relation to the sampling procedure associated with each context.

Brussels

The survey conducted in Belgium focused on migrants from Morocco, Turkey and Congo (DRC) who resided in the Brussels-Capital Region for at least one year (Herman, 2015).[8] All three countries represent important countries of migration to Belgium and the Brussels Region. The survey produced a total sample of 1,708 individuals aged 18 years and older, divided as follows: 455 Moroccans, 448 Turks, 460 Congolese respondents, and 203 autochthonous individuals.[9]

In the absence of an exhaustive population register from which to extract a random sample, the researchers opted for a sampling procedure known

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[8]The region includes 19 municipalities (e.g., Anderlecht, Bruxelles-Ville, Saint-Josse-ten-Noode).

[9]The initial objective was reaching a sample of 1650, composed of 450 individuals for each migrant group and 300 autochthonous individuals. However, miscomunication between the research team and the interviewers led to a smaller 'control' group; interviewers included in the sample not only autochthonous individuals (born in Belgium and whose two parents were born in Belgium) but also any other individual who is not part of the selected migrant groups. As a result 142 individuals in the sample are not autochthonous and do not belong to any of the three selected migrant groups.

as *random walking technique* (for an overview see: Graffigna et al., 2010). Between October 2010 and February 2011 a team of 76 interviewers— part of the survey agency *Ipsos Belgium* —walked throughout specific districts in the region garnering interest in participation from every *n* household encountered in the walk.[10] Although this procedure is appropriate for exacting samples from the general population, in the case of migrant population, this method engenders high costs in terms of time and other material resources due to the low probability of selecting migrant-origin households (Herman, 2015). To adapt this sampling procedure to migrant populations, a number of adjustments were implemented. The random walking technique was restricted to those geographical areas with high concentration of the ethnic groups chosen (i.e. focus on areas where 90 of the members of the target group are residing). These selected districts were then divided into five different strata per each migrant group, that were then crossed in order to remain with only 20 strata that were significant for both ethnic groups. A different procedure was used for Congolese migrants (i.e. Focused Enumeration) (for more details see: Herman, 2015).[11]

Survey in Brussels

- Fieldwork period: October 2010 to February 2011

- Target group: Individuals aged 18 years or older

- Target area: Brussels-Capital Region

- Response rate: 31.3% overall

- Number of interviewers: 76

- Survey agency: yes (Ipsos Belgium)

- Sample size: 455 Moroccans (1,708 in total)

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[10]Within each household the interviewer questioned only the person who is part of the target and had his/her birthday closer to the date of the interview.

[11]As pointed out by Herman (2015), this procedure entails some drawbacks: firstly, the deliberate exclusion of 10% of the migrant group from the sampling procedure. Secondly, the source used to gain information on the level of territorial concentration of a specific ethnic group exclude people with Belgian citizenship but Moroccan origins. Thirdly, the data used to select the specific districts are not up to date, as they date back to the 2001 Census.

- Respondent incentives: yes (4.5 Euro per completed interview)

- Administration technique: CAPI (Computer-assisted personal interviewing)

- Sampling technique: Random walking with Focused Enumeration

- Duration of interview: not specified

Lyon

The survey in France targeted Maghrebi-origin individuals[12] and a control group composed of autochthonous individuals residing in the city of Lyon and some of the conterminous 'villes', like Vaulx-en-Velin and Villeurbanne. These municipalities are administratively distinct from the main city but constitute part of the 'banlieue lyonnaise'. The main justification provided by the French research team for including also peripheral suburbs of Lyon relates to the recent developments in France and the prominent role played by migrant-origin French residing in some of these peripheral neighbourhoods (see Cinalli, 2009, 68).

Although the questionnaire is very similar to the ones employed in the other LOCALMULTIDEM and MDE migrant surveys, the research team here decided to leave the sampling and interviewing phase to a survey agency (TNS Sofrès). Interviews in France were undertaken by landline telephone numbers between January 2008 and April 2008; these had to be necessarily shorter and lasted on average 37 minutes (see Cinalli 2009; see Morales and Giugni 2011b, 13,14; see also Palacios and Morales 2013, 17-19).

As far as the sampling procedure is concerned, the lack of an adequate sampling frame, led the French team to opt for a stratified sampling procedure: firstly, a geographical stratification, then a random selection through landline telephone. The respondents were screened through a short list of questions about their nationalities, their country of birth, and those of their parents and grandparents.[13] Through these sampling and fieldwork strate-

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[12]Individuals born in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, and French born individuals with at least a parent or grand-parent born in one of these three countries.

[13]Respondents were posed the following screening questions: RS0: Quelle est votre nationalité ? [What is your nationality?] and RS3: Est-ce que l'un de vos parents ou grand

gies, the French research team generated a total sample of 1,106 respondents, 114 of which are part of the Moroccan-origin community residing in Lyon.

Survey in Lyon

- Fieldwork period: January 2008 to April 2008

- Target group: Individuals aged 16 years or older

- Target area: Municipality of Lyon, Venissieux, Villeurbanne, and Vaulx-en-Velin

- Response rate: 45% in the first phase, 31% in the second phase

- Number of interviewers: not specified

- Survey agency: yes (TNS Sofrès)

- Sample size: 114 Moroccans (1,106 in total)

- Respondent incentives: no

- Administration technique: CATI (Computer-assisted telephone interviewing)

- Sampling technique: Stratified sampling

- Duration of interview: 37 minutes

Turin

Italy, like France, is generally described in the literature as a problematic country that lacks appropriate sampling frames (Méndez and Font 2013, 277; Morales and Giugni 2011b, 13-14). It has been continuously pointed out how difficult it is for the researchers operating in this field to obtain reliable information on the migrant phenomenon in a context characterised

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parents a ou avait la nationalité de l'un des pays suivants ? [Does one of your parents or grandparents have or had the nationality of one of the following countries?], and RS4: Qui était originaire de ce pays ? [Who was native of this country?].

by significant volumes of irregular migrants.[14]

In the light of this situation, Blangiardo (1996) developed the Centre Sampling Technique (CS), which has some similarities with location sampling (see Kalton and Sudman, 1986, 424). The CS starts from the assumption that migrants tend to congregate in specific places (i.e. aggregation centres) for social contacts, like a mosque, a police office or language centres and that the members of the target population can be found with a certain degree of regularity in these centres of aggregation.

This sampling technique is treated in a large number of methodological in-depth studies (Baio et al., 2011; Blangiardo, 2004; Blangiardo et al., 2004; Mecatti and Migliorati, 2003), and today it is widely used in the field of migrant surveys carried out in the Italian context (see e.g., Pilati, 2010; Ires Piemonte, 2008, 187).

I started my fieldwork by testing this sampling technique, between May 7, 2014 and June 8, 2014. In this lapse of time, I conducted 31 pilot interviews by using a shorter version of the questionnaire used within the framework of the LOCALMULTIDEM and MDE individual survey.

Firstly, I identified a number of different types of aggregation centres (see table 3.1) that were regularly visited by the members of the Moroccan community residing in Turin. The aggregation centres listed in table 3.1 have been identified through an analysis of the local environment. They were updated throughout the pilot test on the basis of the information collected through the interviews I conducted with a number of 'insiders'—i.e. practitioners, key informants, and policy makers—with a privileged knowledge of the context (see table A.1 in the appendix for more details on the evolution of the different types of aggregation centres used for the Moroccan-origin community residing in Turin).

Secondly, in order to generate a sample that is adequately representative of the whole Moroccan population in Turin and avoid basic sources of sampling bias like *convenience sample* or *voluntary response*, after I had selected a list of specific centres for each type of aggregation centre throughout the whole municipal territory, I then reshuffled the lists through a randomisation device, to make sure that all aggregation centres were selected accord-

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[14]The term *irregular* migrants refers to people without a residence permit who illegally reside in the country of destination. In this study the adjective *illegal* is used exclusively to denote an act rather than people (for a similar approach see for example, Bommes and Sciortino 2011).

ing to a standard random procedure.[15]

Finally, for the actual selection of the respondents within each centre I opted for a random sampling strategy known as sequential or systematic sampling. Hence, every *nth* individual was selected from the specific centre selected. This strategy is generally used in airport surveys, to select passengers in a check-in queue (see e.g., Airport Cooperative Research Program, 2009).[16]

Table 3.1.: Proportion of Attendance per Aggregation Centre

Aggregation Centres	Proportion
(C1) Mosques and praying rooms	0.80
(C2) Training centres	0.31
(C3) Places of entertainment and restaurants	0.75
(C4) Assistance centres	0.43
(C5) Ethnic shops	0.95
(C6) Centres for management of certificates	0.61
(C7) Kindergartens	0.48
(C8) Outdoor meeting points	0.86
(C9) Outdoor markets	0.97
(C10) University study rooms	0.16

a. Note: The table refers to the fieldwork conducted by the author in the city of Turin from May 2014 to October 2014 (Sajir, 2017).

At the end of the pilot test I could engage in the definitive survey. From the last week of June 2014 until the end of October 2014 I conducted face-to-face interviews with individuals residing within the borders of the municipalities of Turin, aged 18 or older, who were born in Morocco or born in Italy and with at least one parent from Morocco. This fieldwork produced a net sample of 200 individuals and 20 individuals were interviewed per each type of aggregation centre (see tables 3.1-3.2).

As established by this sampling method, a weighting operation was required. In order to 'restore' the importance of each aggregation centre on the basis of how frequently these are visited by the members of the Moroccan-origin community I applied a proportion to every centre (see table 3.1). In this way I could take into account the different probabilities of inclusion

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[15]A simple Excel randomisation formula: = *Rand*().

[16]It is worth noting that the 3-step procedure I described in detail above has been discussed and approved by the supervisors of this research project as well as the authors who originally devised and developed this sampling method (Prof. Gian Carlo Blangiardo and Dr. Gianluca Baio).

that exist for the members selected in the different aggregation centres. This operation is similar to what is called *post-stratification* (Corbetta, 2003, 226). However, the main difference here is that the weight is not applied to the individuals on the basis of variables (e.g., gender) whose distribution in the population is known, but it is instead applied to the individuals in the sample on the basis of the proportion of attendance of each aggregation centre.

As shown in detail in table 3.2, throughout the fieldwork, 277 individuals were contacted, 200 of these completed the interview whilst 77 refused (40 men and 37 women) to take part in the study. This equates to an overall response rate of 72%. An analysis of the response rates reveals significant variation between the aggregation centres. In reaching the objective of interviewing 20 individuals in the most cooperative contexts (e.g., praying rooms, training centres, assistance centres, and university study rooms) the number of refusals did not go beyond 4 refusals. In the other contexts, this figure oscillates instead between 8 and 21 refusals. A closer look at the non-response trends reported in table 3.2 reveals other interesting facts: men show a higher response rate differently from the gender pattern found in previous migrant surveys (Myrberg, 2013). However, most of the refusals obtained from women were recorded in the kindergartens and were related to the lack of time at their disposal rather than any particular predisposition to not take part in the study.[17] Finally, a small part of individuals refused to participate in the survey due to confidentiality concerns. Though men are more likely to express their dislike for the overall topic of the study, these individuals do not represent a significant portion of the group of people contacted.

The lack of a strict division between who was in charge of the phases of theoretical elaboration and data-analysis on one side and who had to carry out the phase of data-collection on the other, sheltered the fieldwork in Turin from some of the worrying trends that characterise larger surveys where there is a clear separation of roles between the interviewers and the researcher. These include for example, the absence of direct contact between the researcher and the interviewer when data collection is carried out by a survey agency, or the lack of direct control over the interviewer's expertise and motivation.

Moreover, in spite of the paucity of resources, the lack of a clear distinc-

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[17]Most women contacted in the selected kindergartens had to take their other children from a primary school after a quick visit to the kindergarten.

Table 3.2.: Analysis of Response Rates, Percentages

Reason of refusal	Men	Women
Not capable due to disease or mental handicap	0.6	-
Language difficulties	0.6	-
Too busy	6.4	12.4
Cannot be bothered/voluntariness	8.3	9.9
Never participates in surveys	1.3	2.5
Disliked survey topic	4.5	1.7
Concerns about confidentiality	1.3	-
Refused to participate for other reasons	2.6	4.1
Total non-response	**20.6**	**30.6**
Completed interview	**74.4**	**69.4**
Total contacted (N)	**156**	**121**

a. Note: Table refers to fieldwork conducted in Turin, May 2014 - October 2014.

tion of roles allowed me to overcome some of these negative tendencies. Continuous briefings were used to identify practical questions and sort out unforeseen problems, as well as to ensure that the research objectives were always clear. It was certainly easier to keep a direct and constant control on the implementation of the design of the research in terms of sampling techniques, the selection rules of the subjects from each aggregation centre, and the interview modality. Ultimately, by keeping a direct and constant control on the phase of data collection, it was relatively easier to judge the overall quality of the data generated.

Survey in Turin

- Fieldwork period: May 2014 to October 2014

- Target group: Individuals aged 18 years or older

- Target area: Municipality of Turin

- Response rate: 72%

- Number of interviewers: 2

- Survey agency: no (in-house fieldwork organisation set up by the author)

- Sample size: 200 Moroccans

- Economic incentives: no

- Administration technique: PAPI (Paper and pencil interviewing)

- Sampling technique: Centre sampling

- Duration of interview: 20 minutes

Barcelona and Madrid

The survey in the cities of Barcelona and Madrid were conducted between January 2007 and February 2008.[18] In these studies, Moroccan, Ecuadorian migrants and a mixed group of migrants from the Andean countries (i.e. Bolivia, Colombia and Peru) were selected as target groups, along with a control group composed of autochthonous individuals (Morales et al., 2010). As in all surveys listed here, the selection of the groups to be surveyed was mainly driven by practical considerations regarding the specific contexts where the survey was administered: in each survey the target groups under consideration originate from countries that represent an important source of migration.

As mentioned earlier, sampling strategies highly depend on the presence of a good sampling frame. In this regard, Spain is usually regarded as a favourable context for researchers as they can rely on accurate local population registers (i.e. Padrón) that allow the random extraction of nominal individual samples (Méndez and Font, 2013).

Nonetheless, several mishaps, technical difficulties, and bureaucratic delays obliged the research teams to adopt different sampling strategies (for more details see: Morales and Ros 2013, 156ff). In particular, for the Moroccan group some significant adaptations in strategy and sampling methods were required, once the research team discovered that approximately 20-25% of the respondents included were not effectively Moroccans, but rather Spaniards who were born in the formerly occupied cities in Morocco.[19] A

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[18]The survey conducted in Barcelona was part of the CAPSOCINMIG project, a sister project of the LOCALMULTIDEM, funded by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (Palacios and Morales, 2013; Morales et al., 2010).

[19]The reasons behind this discrepancy are explained by the authors in the following terms:

spatial sampling—similar to the strategy employed in the city of Turin—was used to complement the sample. These sampling strategies generated in Barcelona and Madrid an overall sample of respectively 224 and 298 Moroccans (Palacios and Morales, 2013).

The fieldwork was mostly organised in-house by a fieldwork network set up *ad hoc* by the Autonomous University of Barcelona and the University of Murcia (Palacios and Morales, 2013; Morales et al., 2010). As I show in the summary boxes below, the surveys carried out in Madrid and Barcelona adopted identical fieldwork procedures: firstly, all interviews were conducted face-to-face by a team of professional interviewers for the interviews with the control group, and an indeterminate number of trained post-graduate university students was employed for the interviews with migrant background respondents. Secondly, the typical interview was completed in approximately 50-60 minutes (Morales and Ros, 2013; Palacios and Morales, 2013, 157)[20]

Survey in Barcelona

- Period: January 2007 to February 2008

- Target group: Individuals aged 15 years or older

- Target area: Municipality of Barcelona

- Response rate: 44%

- Number of interviewers: not specified

- Survey agency: no (in-house fieldwork organisation set up by the Autonomous University of Barcelona and the University of Murcia)

- Sample size: 224 Moroccans (1,045 in total)

"we believe that in many cases this is due to malpractice by the local population registers, as back then these areas were part of Spain and, hence, the country of birth should have been registered as Spain and not Morocco" (Morales and Ros, 2013, 170).

[20] As pointed out by Morales and Ros (2013, 159), the fieldwork in Madrid was characterised by a high interviewer turnover and limited experience with the nominal random sampling procedure.

- Respondent incentives: no

- Administration technique: PAPI (Paper and pencil interviewing)

- Sampling technique: Nominal random sampling and Spatial sampling

- Duration of interview: 50 minutes

Survey in Madrid

- Fieldwork period: January 2007 to February 2008

- Target group: Individuals aged 15 years or older

- Target area: Municipality of Madrid

- Response rate: 42%

- Number of interviewers: not specified

- Survey agency: no (in-house fieldwork organisation set up by the University of Murcia)

- Sample size: 298 Moroccans (1,173 in total)

- Economic incentives: no

- Administration technique: PAPI (Paper and pencil interviewing)

- Sampling technique: Nominal random sampling and Spatial sampling

- Duration of interview: 50 minutes

3.3. Conclusion

In this chapter I have provided details on the research design that I will be employing throughout the study. Detailed information has been provided here about the decisions that guided the research process and on the methodology employed for the collection and analysis of the data.

In the first section of the chapter, I explained the principal reasons behind my choice to study the causes generating different patterns of political engagement of migrant-origin individuals by employing a research design where the focus is placed on the political engagement of the members of one single migrant-origin group that reside in different European cities. This research design is the most appropriate for the type of questions raised in this dissertation.

In the second section of the chapter, I presented details about the source of data, and the process of data collection, by specifying for each survey the sampling frame employed, the interviewing methods employed in the surveys, and their sample size. In this section I also discussed how the data collected in occasion of the survey conducted in the city of Turin further enlarge the scope of this comparative study. Fewer resources were available in comparison to the other surveys. However, a constant and direct control on the various research phases allowed me to generate survey data on the Moroccan-origin community of Turin that compares relatively well to the other surveys used.

In the following chapter, I will provide a background profile of the migrant-origin community under consideration in this study by building upon some of the points already raised in this chapter.

CHAPTER

4

THE MOROCCAN COMMUNITIES OF EUROPE

"Je suis venu dans ton pays du coeur, expulsé du mien, un peu volontairement beaucoup par besoin."
– Tahar Ben Jelloun (1976)

Moroccans residing abroad (MRA) hold, along with other migrant groups, an important position within the field of immigration and ethnic relations. Among the factors that can explain this particular state of affairs are certainly the size and the importance that this community has within the main countries of residence as well as its ethnic and cultural heterogeneity, its geographical dispersion within the European continent, and the links that have created between the country of origin and the countries of destination through the various migration phases.

Much of the literature on MRA pays particular attention to the development of the Moroccan migration process and other main features of the phenomenon. Yet relatively fewer studies have focused on the conditions of

settlement and engagement of the members of this community in the social, political, and economic life of the countries of residence. Predictably, these two areas of enquiry are strictly interconnected. Some scholars for instance believe that grasping the trait of the initial stages of emigration to Europe is a necessary condition for understanding not only the more recent migration flows but also the engagement of the 'primo-migrants' and their descendants in the countries of residence. To be more specific, according to this perspective, the intensive exploitation of Moroccan labour by the colonial powers—an aspect that was specific to the initial phase of migration—may be associated to the massive migration that followed in the post-colonial phase but also to the deep and irreversible deracination of the Moroccan population (see e.g. Atouf, 2005, 63).

In this study I attempt to seal the gap by bringing together these complementary fields of research. More specifically, through this chapter, I attempt to show how the specificities of the country of origin, namely its history as well as the characteristics of its principal population groups, are of paramount importance in the understanding not only the migration trajectories developed over the years by this migrant-origin community with specific European destinations, but also the type of settlement that its members built in their new countries of residence.

For sake of clarity I wish to point out that the use of the notion of 'community' in this study does not necessarily assume that the members of a particular migrant group constitute a homogeneous and cohesive entity. As briefly mentioned above, migrants and descendants ascribed to the same migrant group on the basis of objective criteria like their citizenship and country of birth of parents, might in fact fail to develop any feelings of belonging to that specific group. This is clearly shown in the descriptive analysis of the communities under consideration that I present in chapter 5. Furthermore, significant differences might exist between the members of the same migrant group who settled in different countries. The term 'communities' is used to reflect these inner-group differences.[1]

In the light of all these considerations, in the first section of this chapter

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[1]In this study I do not delve into the debate regarding the use of the term 'diaspora' in relation to the Moroccans who reside abroad and their descendants (for a discussion of 'diaspora' see: Brubaker 2005; Vertovec 1997, de Haas 2014b, 76; Vertovec 2010, 93 and cf. Bousetta and Martiniello 2003, 101.)

I examine the ethnic composition of the Moroccan community. In the second section I provide a description of the migration flows that have been directed to Europe. In the third section, I explain how these migration trajectories have created stable links between specific areas in the country of origin and the destination countries in Europe. The final section consists of a picture of the current situation in Europe, notably in the countries and cities that are taken under consideration in the whole study. All these sections constitutes the historical background of this dissertation and provide the necessary context for understanding the conditions of inclusion of the members of the various Moroccan-origin communities under consideration.

4.1. The Peoples of Morocco

The first element of interest of the Moroccan community is represented by its degree of ethnic and cultural heterogeneity. Morocco is often portrayed in the literature as a multi-lingual and multi-ethnic country (see e.g. Dellal and Sellam, 2013; Ennaji, 2010b, 2005).

The multi-cultural character of the Moroccan society certainly stems from the different cultural groups that have historically inhabited the country. These include the manifold Imazighen tribes (Berbers), the different Jewish Moroccan communities that settled in Morocco as well as the Arabs who migrated from the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula since the 7th century. In addition to this, relatively recent European invasions have also contributed to shape today's multifaceted Moroccan cultural identity, as well as people's values, feelings, beliefs, and aspirations.[2]

Although the cultural groups that settled in Morocco have distinctive

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[2]Earlier occupations were carried out by Portugal in the 14th century (García-Arenal, 2014, 291). However for the purpose of this study it is more useful to focus on the most recent invasions, which date back to 19th and 20th century. In 1860 Spain occupied the northern cities of Tetouan, Nador, El Hoceima and the Sahara. Later in 1912, the signature of Treaty of Fez ended officially the 1911 Agadir Crisis by reaching an agreement on the division of the African continent into spheres of influence to be controlled, managed and exploited by European countries (for more details see the 1912 "Treaty Between France and Spain Regarding Morocco"). As a result of this agreement, from 1912 until 1956, Morocco was divided in two halves that were administrated by two European countries: Spain occupied the Western Sahara in the South and the Northern region of Rif, whilst France controlled the central plains and coastal cities, Morocco's heartland. Throughout this period of colonisation, both French and Spanish languages and culture were imposed on the Moroccan people. Signs of this are still visible today in Morocco's educational system and also in the administration (Ennaji, 2005, 13).

characteristics, these have been historically permeable to various forms of cultural mingling—some more than others. In fact centuries of coalescence and mixed marriages have contributed to reduce the initial differences (see e.g., Landau 1956, 27; see also Kossmann 2013). Yet, this constant inter-mingling has also further increased the level of cultural and linguistic complexity within the country (Aubin, 1906; Ben-Ami, 1998; Ennaji, 2005; Landau, 1956).

I therefore argue that overstating rigid differences between these groups would be erroneous, however minimising them or overlooking the constant inter-change that occurred among these different cultural groups would certainly result in a misrepresentation of the diversity and complexity of Moroccan contemporary society. These elements of cultural complexity and diversity have to be conceived of as a specificity of the Moroccan society, whose ramifications can significantly influence Moroccans' individual migration biographies (see Ennaji, 2005, 7-24).

In the next sections I start building a portrait of the 'Moroccan specificity' by highlighting some of the elements of cultural, linguistic and religious diversity and complexity that characterise this country. To do this, I briefly present the three main cultural groups that have historically inhabited the country (i.e. Imazighen, Jews, and Arabs).

Although clear-cut divisions of the Moroccan society made on the basis of cultural, linguistic or religious traits are difficult—if not impossible—to make, notably in today's urban contexts, the tripartite division of the Moroccan society that I adopt here will help to make sense of the various migration flows that throughout the years contributed to build the five communities under consideration in this dissertation.

4.1.1. The Berber-Moroccan community

Berbers, or Imazighen/Imazighin (translation: *free people*) as they generally refer to themselves, are the first inhabitants of the country.[3]

The presence of this autochthonous non-Arab ethnic group in Morocco goes back to the pre-Islamic-Arab period, and perhaps is the first element

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[3]Ironically, the Berber community in Morocco—as suggested by Ennaji (2005, 177)—has been perhaps officially recognised for the first time in history by a foreign state through the *Dahir Berbère*, a decree enacted by the French colonial authorities in 1930 with the attempt to thwart the Moroccan nationalist movement for independence by separating Morocco into Berber and Arab zones (for more details see: Landau, 1956, 142-148).

that distinguishes North Africa from the rest of the Arab World (Hoffman, 2007, 14). In consideration of their peculiarities (i.e., volume, geographical concentration, and internal differences) Berbers also constitute one of the building stones of Morocco's specificity in the Maghreb (Ennaji, 2005, 44).[4]

Several Berber tribes are scattered across the country: Chleuhs in the region of south-west of Souss, Zayanes in the Middle Atlas, and the Rifians in the Northern region of Rif. These groups do not speak one language, but rather three different varieties of Berber (see map 4.1) (Ennaji, 2005, 43). As I will show later in the chapter, each of these groups has established over the years specific links with certain regions in Europe. For example, they are particularly present in France, Spain, and Belgium—where this research is based—and much less in Italy.

The Berberophone Moroccan population played a pioneering role in the process of migration to Europe. In particular, the Berbers from the central and southern regions were the first Moroccans who migrated to France. French authorities, and later the Moroccan government, encouraged the process of emigration from the Berberophones regions, not only because they were believed to be more suited to military career compared to their Arab fellow countrymen (Maghraoui, 2002, 89), but also because Berbers were perceived as a potential menace by the central authority (de Haas, 2014b, 83).[5]

Notwithstanding the subsequent migration waves of Arabophone Moroccans, this group has kept for years a prominent position within the Moroccan community in France. In the 1930s most of the Moroccans employed as temporary workers in France came from the southern region of Souss (Ennaji, 2005, 18), and in the 1960s this group still represented around three quarters of the Moroccan community in France (Lefébure, 2005, 30).

As I explain more in detail in section 4.2.1, in the initial phases of migration, Moroccans were employed not only as workers but also recruited in the colonial armies and sent to the front. Also in this case, Berberophone Moroccans were the *primo-migrants*. Berbers from the Middle Atlas and High Atlas were employed as soldiers by the French authorities during Word War

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[4]Nowadays the Berber-Moroccan community totals approximately 15 million people, which represents almost half of the Moroccan population (Ennaji, 2005, 72).

[5]Pre-colonial Morocco was in fact divided into two complementary and conflicting halves: *bled el Makhzen* which literally means 'the land of the state', of law and order; and *bled es siba*, 'the land of dissidence.' For more details see (for more details see Alaoui 2009; Landau 1956; Le Chatelier 1902; Bimberg 1999.)

I (Ennaji 2014, 18). Interestingly, the Spanish Nationalist Movement also relied heavily on the support of the northern Berber Moroccan soldiers from the Rif region throughout the civil war (de Haas 2014b, 69).

After the independence of Morocco, as I will explain below, the Moroccan government signed different labour agreements with West European countries and encouraged the emigration of Rifians to Belgium, and other European countries like the Netherlands and Germany, in order to reduce the economic and political pressure coming from the Rif (de Haas, 2014b, 83).[6] Although Morocco and Spain did not sign any labour agreement, the geographical proximity and the historical links between the two countries led a sizeable portion of the Rifian Berbers to migrate to Spain, notably in the region of Catalonia (Moreras, 2004). Most of these Rifian migrants today do not normally speak Arabic, but rather Tarifit Berber (Alaoui 2009, 165; Crul and Doomernik 2003, 1058; Schüttler 2007, 11). In Italy instead, as I will show, Berberphone Moroccans represent a negligible part of the Moroccan community. This is confirmed also by the survey data presented in section 5.1.7 in the next chapter.

4.1.2. The Jewish-Moroccan community

Jewish Moroccans constitute the second community with regard to their arrival. The settlement of Jewish migrants in Morocco precedes the arrival of the Arabs: the first signs of their presence in the country date back to the third century B.C. (Landau, 1956, 27). The Jewish Moroccan community was for many centuries one of the most important settlements of Jews in the whole Mediterranean region (see e.g., Atouf, 2005).[7]

Historically, Morocco played a very important role for the European Jewish community, notably in the 14th and 15th century when thousands were expelled from Europe.[8] The arrival of the Jewish people banished from

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[6]German employers, for instance, preferred to recruit only from the North-East of Morocco in order to prevent any sort of clash between conflicting groups from different regions in Morocco (see Schüttler, 2007, 6). Not surprisingly, most of the 125,000 Moroccan migrants who settled in Germany were from the Rif region (Ennaji, 2005, 121).

[7]According to the historian Rom Landau (1956, 30) it is more appropriate to use the term 'Jewish Moroccan' rather than 'Moroccan Jew' because Morocco's attitudes towards religious minorities was certainly more tolerant when compared with European standards (but see also, Aubin, 1906, 287).

[8]Between the 14th and 17th century, the Jewish communities that had previously settled in Europe were subjected to collective expulsions: Italy in 1348, Holland in 1380, France in 1403, England in 1422, Portugal in 1496, and Spain in 1391, 1414, 1492, and 1610 (see

Europe, notably in occasion of the expulsion from Spain in 1492 (de Haas, 2005), increased significantly the size of this group (for more details see Donath 1964; Aubin 1906; Landau 1956).

According to Aubin (1906, 286,294), at the beginning of the 20th century, the Jewish Moroccan community was composed of approximately 200,000 individuals. The most important Jewish *mellahs* were in Marrakesh, Fez and Essaouira, formerly known as Mogador). Before the creation of Israel in 1948, Jewish Moroccan emigration was insignificant (Atouf, 2005, 68), and concerned almost exclusively the elite of the community (cf. Atouf, 2003). At the beginning of the 20th century, in fact, the wealthiest families of Essaouira and Fez migrated respectively to England (London, Manchester), and Senegal or Algeria (Aubin 1906, 288; see also: de Haas 2009, 2; Ennaji 2014, 21; Cherti 2014b, 420-421).

The importance of the Moroccan group of Jewish faith does not stem from its volume, which is certainly lower when compared to the other two communities, but rather from the specificity of its migration process. As I will show in detail in section 4.2, whilst in the first phases of the migration process Moroccan migration to Europe was predominantly temporary and male dominated, the first Jewish Moroccans migrants who left Morocco had more permanent migration projects compared to their compatriots and emigrated directly with their families (Atouf 2003, 123). An interesting example is represented by the Jewish Moroccan families (i.e., Aich Aknin, Ben Attar and Bitton) native of the cities of Marrakesh and Essaouira who constituted the first migration waves directed to France between 1914 and 1919 (see Atouf, 2005, 68). In the 1970s a similar process of family migration was directed to Spain. In this lapse of time, hundreds of Jewish Moroccans from the cities of Casablanca, Essaouira, Tetuan and Tangier migrated to Madrid, Barcelona and Malaga (López García and Berriane 2004, 213).

Throughout the years, persistent massive emigration to North America (Montreal, New York) and Europe, notably France, left Morocco impoverished of its Jewish Moroccan community (for more details see e.g. de Haas 2014b; Donath 1964; Deguigné 2012; Cotler et al. 2007; Atouf 2005). Between 1961 and 1965, 120,000 Jewish Moroccans migrated to Israel by transiting from France.[9] Many of these however decided to remain in France. It is

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e.g., Landau, 1956, 27).

[9]It is estimated that approximately 270,000 Jewish Moroccans migrated to Israel between 1948 and 2003 (de Haas, 2014b, 75) approximately. As a result of this migration flows,

estimated that in 1965, the volume of Jewish Moroccans in France reached 32,000 individuals (Atouf, 2005, 70).[10]

4.1.3. The Arab-Moroccan community

The Arab-Moroccans constitute the largest component of Moroccan society. Today's Arab-Moroccan community was created through different migration waves. The first group of Arab settlers in Morocco arrived in the 7th century and was mainly composed of military and religious people originating from urban centres in the Middle East. The influx of Arabs from the Middle East continued until the 14th century (Landau 1956, 26; Ennaji 2005, 10). The second main wave of Arab migrants is represented by Bedouins, nomad tribes that came from the Arabian Peninsula and settled in the Moroccan plains (Ennaji, 2005, 58). The third and last wave is composed of Moorish Andalusian refugees who emigrated from the South of the Iberian peninsula to the North of Africa in the 13th century. These migrants settled mainly in the coastal area and in the cities of Fez and Meknes (Ennaji, 2005, 59).

These waves of Arab migration contributed to enrich the cultural distinctiveness of the country and have shaped dramatically the character of today's Moroccan society. According to Ennaji (2005, 58-59), these three groups brought and developed three different forms of spoken Moroccan Arabic, which can be employed as an interpretative frame of the Moroccan emigration to Europe.

As I show in greater detail in section 4.3, the members of the Moroccan community residing today in Europe reflect to a large extent, these levels of linguistic and cultural heterogeneity. For instance, most of the Moroccans in Italy tend to speak a rural Arabic and are native to the rural areas and small towns in the Plain of Chaouia or had recently migrated to big cities like Casablanca, before carrying out their trans-national migration projects (Mghari and Fassi Fhiri, 2010, 21). Conversely, a significant number among those who emigrated to France in the 60s speak a urban regional variety

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approximately 700,000 people of Moroccan ancestry reside today in Israel (de Haas, 2009, 3).

[10] As a result of these massive departures, the Jewish Moroccan community decreased from 250,000 to today's 5,000 individuals (Atouf 2005, 69; Ennaji 2014, 21; de Haas 2014b, 75; cf. Charef 2014, 313). Nowadays Jewish Moroccans residing in Morocco are mainly present in the cities of Casablanca and Marrakesh (Ennaji 2005, 70; Ennaji 2014, 21).

known as Agadiri dialect, which is significantly influenced by Tashelhit Berber (Berrada and Hamdouch, 2000, 24).

Figure 4.1.: Map of Morocco

Source: United Nations Cartographic Section, 2005.

4.2. A Three-Phase Migration Flow to Europe

The migration of Moroccans to Europe started during the colonial period with the French occupation of the Maghreb (Ennaji, 2014, 18).[11] Since then the migration process has gone through a series of considerable changes.

To be more specific, the migration flow to Europe can be divided into three different phases: a) a colonial and bellic phase, b) a reconstruction phase, and c) a post-reconstruction phase. These phases responded to very different needs, involved different migrant profiles, and created more or less stable migration trajectories that have linked Morocco to different destinations in the European continent.

Throughout the 'colonial and bellic' phase (1912 - early 1950s), migration of Moroccans was mainly driven by the needs of the colonial powers. Moroccans were regularly sent to France, to replace autochthonous workers, or directly employed in the front by France and Spain. With the end of the conflicts and the regained independence, bilateral guest-worker agreements were signed between Morocco and a number of West European countries in order to satisfy labour shortages created by a booming European economy (Hansen, 2003b). The early 1970s marked the end of the guest-worker schemes and the beginning of a new phase. The migration projects turned increasingly into permanent family and individual investments that concerned also the female portion of the Moroccan population. In this third phase, Moroccan migrants have continued to enter Europe through the family reunion channels, notwithstanding the stop imposed on labour migration.

Hence, the different Moroccan communities residing today in Europe have been built through different waves of migration. Whilst in the initial stages of migration to Europe, the typical Moroccan migrant was a Berber male of working age from rural areas employed in France (see e.g. Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2004; Ennaji, 2014), later waves of migration have significantly changed this state of things, firstly by dispersing the Moroccan community across the European continent and by provoking far-reaching transformations in the socio-demographic structure of the different Moroccan communities residing abroad. This means that as the migration process evolved, France

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[11]Emigration flows were initially stimulated by the demand of labour raised after the occupation of Algeria in 1830 (see e.g. Charef, 2005; Aziza, 2005; de Haas, 2005, 2014b; Berriane, 2004b), and escalated in 1912, when Morocco became *de facto* a French-Spanish colony.

stopped being the primary destination of Moroccan migrants, and progressively all social strata, age and gender profiles, as well as regions and ethnic groups in Morocco have been directly involved in the migration to Europe (see e.g. Simon, 2005).

4.2.1. First phase: colonial and bellic era

The account of Moroccans' migration to Europe generally starts in the early 1960s when European economies in expansion were in demand of cheap labour force (see e.g. European Training Foundation 2013, 19ff; Ennaji 2010a, 14ff; Khachani 2004, 1ff). Yet, the migration flow of Moroccan workers towards Europe started well before the 1960s (see e.g., Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2004; de Haas, 2005). To be more specific, mass migration from Morocco to Europe initiated at the time of the colonial occupation by France, around 1912, and increased in concomitance with World War I and World War II (Belbah and Veglia, 2005; Atouf, 2005).[12]

Certainly, all statistics on the migration process that regard this specific phase are less reliable when compared to today's accounts (Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2004, 61).[13] However the different sources that exist on the phenomenon can be employed to form at least an idea of its size, and get a sense of the ethnic and demographic characteristics of the Moroccans who migrated to Europe in this first phase.

Although French colonial officers in Morocco had a clear preference for recruiting soldiers among the Berbers, as I mentioned in section 4.1.1, the continuation of the war led to an increase in the demand of foreign workers and soldiers, and it also contributed to diversify the ethnic composition of the Moroccan community in Europe (Charef, 2005, 17). For example, the military archival material presented by *de communication et de production audiovisuelle de la défense*, (ECPAD), shows that more than 40,000 Moroccan *tirailleurs* were moved to Europe and employed in the during the battles of World War I, notably in the German front (see also de Haas, 2005; Ennaji, 2014). In the 1918 alone, France recruited approximately 35,000 Moroccans

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[12]The first cases of modern-age migration to Europe date back to 1909 when temporary workers were recruited in the Souss region and sent to work in the sugar refineries of Nantes (European Training Foundation, 2013, 17).

[13]Statistics on the early stages of the migration process are obtained through direct accounts on specific aspects and particular regions in the countries of destination. For this reason, often these cannot be employed to produce general considerations on the migration process (Bousetta and Martiniello, 2003, 95-96).

for this purpose (Frémeaux, 2004). In total, it is estimated that approximately 85,000 Moroccan soldiers and workers were sent to France between 1914 and 1918. Even though more than 87,000 Moroccan soldiers from the northern region participated in the Spanish Civil War, the number of Moroccan work force sent to Spain was negligible (see e.g. Atouf, 2005, 63).[14] This is explained by the fact that Spain itself was at that time a source of cheap labour to be exported to other European countries.

The volume of Moroccans sent to Europe throughout World War II was certainly larger: according to the historical records, 126,000 Moroccans were recruited by the French army (de Haas, 2005, 2014b). Moroccans continued to be employed as soldiers in the front or as replacement workers. It is estimated that between 70,000 and 90,000 Moroccan soldiers, which represented approximately 1.6 per cent of the total population residing in the French-controlled zone, migrated to France in that specific period (see e.g., Belbah and Veglia 2005, 38; see also, Atouf 2005, 63). At the beginning of World War II around 28,000 Moroccan workers were sent to France to replace autochthonous workers in key sectors like agriculture, mining, and arms industry; 12,000 soldiers were sent to battlefields, and many of these contributed to the construction of the *ligne Maginot* (Belbah and Veglia, 2005, 38).

Whilst throughout World War I Moroccans were mostly employed in France at the German border during World War II, Moroccan migrants were scattered across the European continent (Frémeaux, 2004).[15]

In this first phase of Moroccan emigration to Europe, the migration flow had rural origins and was characterised by remarkable fluctuations (Berriane and Aderghal, 2014, 44). Throughout this period Moroccan workers were subjected to high rotation rates.[16] For instance, between 1914 and 1918

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[14]The Moroccan migrants sent to Spain were substantially soldiers. The Moroccan contingent employed in the Spanish Civil War was composed of approximately 40,000 soldiers according to de Haas (2014b, 69).

[15]In 1943 more than 12,000 Moroccans took part in the the conquest of Corsica and the Italian campaigns of Garigliano and Petralla, and were part of the expedition to the Island of Elba. Finally they marched on Rome in June 1944 (Landau, 1956; Frémeaux, 2004; Bimberg, 1999). In 1945, the 6,000 Moroccan *goumiers* played a pivotal role in the liberation of the city of Marseille (Landau, 1956; Bimberg, 1999) and participated in the spring expedition to Germany (Bimberg, 1999). According to historical records, 924 *moquaddem* (sergeants), 1,683 *maoun* (corporals) and 9,963 goumiers (Bimberg, 1999, 50) joined the 5th Army under the command of Lieutenant-General Clark (Landau, 1956; Frémeaux, 2004; Bimberg, 1999).

[16]As noted by Bousetta and Martiniello (2003, 95), in this migration phase, workers were frequently repatriated on the pretext of public health and public order.

the number of Moroccan workers in France climbed rapidly from 700 to 20,000 individuals. However, after 1919 the volume plummeted to 3,000 individuals only (Belbah and Veglia, 2005, 37). Although in the interwar period the number of Moroccans remained constant, with approximately 20,000 workers (Belbah and Veglia, 2005; Atouf, 2005), significant fluctuations were recorded also during World War II. At the end of the war, the volume of Moroccans in France fell from 44,000 recorded in 1945 to 16,458 one year later (Belbah and Veglia, 2005).

To sum up, in this first phase, Moroccan migration was substantially temporary (Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2004), and unlike more recent flows, it was principally directed to France and responded exclusively to the needs of the coloniser country (Ennaji, 2005, 13). Furthermore, the protectorate state in which Morocco fell between 1912 and 1956, makes it difficult to establish with certainty to what extent migration flows, in this phase, were voluntary. Ennaji (2014, 18), for instance, suggests that emigration to Europe in these early phases was imposed by colonial authorities. Although Moroccans officially volunteered to participate in the conflicts, often *"pressions administratives"* were employed to convince these pioneer migrants to leave Morocco for Europe and take part in the conflicts (Frémeaux, 2004, 217).[17]

The next section shows how the Moroccan migration process to Europe evolved from this initial phase to a very different type of emigration.

4.2.2. Second phase: reconstruction era

The second stage coincides with the end of the conflicts and is mainly driven by the necessity of labour force for the reconstruction of Europe, the fast growing economies of West-European countries (Khachani, 2004),[18] and the societal agitation into which Morocco collapsed in the years that preceded and followed the proclamation of independence (Bouras, 2013, 1223).

Moroccan migrant workers played an important role in this phase by supplying West European countries with cheap labour. After the end of World War II many of the migrants employed throughout the conflict took part in

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[17]The recruitment of Moroccan workers was conducted through the *Office de la main-d'oeuvre agricole*, the *Service des travailleurs coloniaux* and the *Service de la main d'oeuvre étrangère* (Belbah and Veglia, 2005, 38).

[18]Throughout this positive economic cycle Western European countries were enjoying an average annual growth rate of GDP estimated between 3% and 8%, depending on the specific country considered (Bossard, 1978, 61).

the first stages of the reconstruction. It is estimated that by the mid 1950s, about 25,000 Moroccans were in France (Guennouni 2004, 25; Ennaji 2014, 17-18). Yet, the migration flow towards Europe did not take on immediately. European countries looked to Morocco only from the 1960s.[19]

In the first part of this phase, notably in the early years of the 1950s, the whole country was convulsed by a set of acute crises (Belbah and Veglia, 2005, 39). These conditions pushed a large number of Moroccans to leave their country. The response given by the French authorities to the growing impatience and despair that large sectors of the Moroccan society repeatedly expressed towards the Protectorate and its last developments certainly contributed to exacerbating this situation (see e.g., Landau, 1956, 249ff).

Throughout these agitated times, the Moroccan migration process was still under control of the French National Office of Immigration (Office national de l'immigration - ONI).[20] The independence formally regained in 1956 contributed to bring the migration process under the control of the Moroccan government (Belbah and Veglia, 2005, 39). After the independence, and notably in the early years of 1960s, the migration process to Europe was not only relaunched but it also went through some significant changes (Ennaji, 2014, 19). The volume and destination of the migration flow to Europe were formally set through a number of labour migration agreements (see table 4.1) between the independent Morocco and a number of Western European countries which were eager to satisfy the labour shortages created by a booming economy (Hansen, 2003b, 25).

To be more specific, whilst the state of societal agitation predisposed Moroccans to leave their country of origin and settle in Europe, the labour agreements dictated the destination of Moroccan migrants (Belbah and Veglia 2005, 40; Atouf 2005, 65), contributing in this way to the progressive dis-

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[19]European policy-makers initially avoided turning to the colonies to satisfy labour shortages by setting up recruiting offices exclusively in southern Europe. Nevertheless, the inability to secure sufficient volumes of workers led Western European countries to rely progressively on colonial migrants. Among them were the Moroccans (Hansen 2003b, 27; Ennaji 2014, 17). For instance, the Belgian government relied heavily on Italian migrants until the 1956 Marcinelle mine catastrophe in which 262 men died, 136 of which were Italian miners. After the event the labour agreement between Italy and Belgium was broken, and Belgian authorities had to look elsewhere. New labour agreements were initially signed with Spain and Greece. And finally it was the turn of Morocco and Turkey (see Attar 2003, 93; see also Perrin 2003, 70; Rilke 2014, 222).

[20]ONI controlled and promoted the emigration to France of seasonal workers and regularised the status of workers who migrated on a more voluntary basis (Belbah and Veglia, 2005, 38).

Table 4.1.: Migration Agreements (AGTs) between Morocco and the Main European Destination Countries

European country	Labour AGTs	Social Security AGTs
Federal Republic of Germany	21 May 1963	25 Mar 1981
France	1 Jun 1963	9 Jul 1965
Belgium	17 Feb 1964	24 Jun 1968
The Netherlands	14 May 1969	14 Feb 1972

Source: Directorate of Consular and Social Affairs.

persal of the Moroccan communities across the European continent (Charef, 2014, 311).

As a result the number of Moroccans in France went up sharply: from 3,000 per year in 1959 to 17,000 in 1963 to 30,000 in the mid-1970s (see Ennaji, 2014, 19). In the five year period 1960-1965 the volume almost trebled by going from 30,000 individuals to 87,000 (see Atouf, 2005, 64). A similar trend occurred also in other less traditional countries of destination. For example until the beginning of the 1960s, Moroccan migration to Belgium was essentially non-existent, after the signature of the 1964 labour agreement, migration waves rapidly developed (see Perrin, 2003, 70), and by 1974 the *Institut National des Statistiques* recorded the presence of around 40,000 Moroccans in the Belgian territory (Rilke, 2014, 222).

The 1973 oil crisis determined for West-European countries a period of stagnation and costly economic reorganisation that temporarily increased the levels of unemployment and signalled a drastic reduction in the demand for cheap unqualified labour. Accordingly, in the early 1970s the traditional countries of destination imposed some restrictive measures towards new flows of migrants, and introduced the obligation of visas for Moroccan migrants (see de Haas 2014b, 70; see also Rilke 2014, 222).[21] This series of restrictive migration policies undoubtedly represents a turning point in the process of migration which marks the beginning of a different migration phase (Schmidt di Friedberg, 2003).

As we will see more in detail in the next section, the stop to labour migration did not have the expected impact on the volume of Moroccan migration

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[21]The introduction of the obligation of visas has been to a large extent counterbalanced by Morocco's simplified policy on the access to the passport. As noted by de Haas (2014b, 83), whilst it has become more difficult to enter Europe through regular and legal channels, it has certainly become easier to leave Morocco.

process. The introduction of policies to stop the import of labour had in fact the unintended effect of locking in Europe this community and promoting new forms of migration (Hansen, 2003b; Charef, 2005; Belbah and Veglia, 2005).

To sum up, this second phase presents some similarities with the previous one. Firstly, the profile of the Moroccan migrants in Europe was essentially unvaried: low qualified male workers prevalently coming from the rural areas of the country were still predominant. Moreover, the migration process preserved in this phase its temporary character, hence Moroccan workers migrated to Europe only to save some money and then return to the country of origin.

Yet, this phase is also characterised by the introduction of new aspects. The first, and most obvious specificity of this phase is represented by the size and scope of the migration wave, which was certainly more important compared to the first colonial migrations. In the decade 1962-1972, in which the guest-worker machine was working at full capacity, the Moroccan community abroad dispersed across the European continent and grew dramatically (de Haas, 2014b, 69,70).

A second distinctive aspect of this phase is the increased degree of concern for the overall quality of life of the Moroccan migrants in the countries of destination. Although Moroccans were still considered only as a temporary presence, destination countries like France and Belgium signed in a relatively early stage with Morocco agreements that went beyond mere economic considerations, in order to include also aspects related to the social security of Moroccan workers in these countries (see table 4.1).[22]

Finally, contrary to what is often believed, irregular forms of migration are not a specificity of today's migration flows (de Haas 2014b, 70; cf. Alaoui 2009, 58). The first 'spontaneous' waves of migration, in fact, date back to this phase (see Khachani 2005; see also Bianco 2012, 208). Yet, as noted by Bossard (1978, 9,64), in a time in which reconstruction and growth were the main priorities, border controls posed few obstacles to clandestine move-

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[22]Social security agreements between Morocco and the main destination countries did not enter immediately into force, but generally after a couple of years. The agreement with France entered into force in 1967 (CLEISS, 2009), the Belgian-Moroccan agreement entered into force in 1971 (Sécurité Sociale, 1968). The agreement with the Netherlands entered into force in 1973 (Treaty Database, 1972). Yet it is worth noting that the agreement with Germany, which was signed in 1981, entered into force only in 1986 (see United Nations 1987; cf. Bianco 2012, 205).

ments.[23]

4.2.3. Third phase: post-reconstruction Era

As anticipated in the previous section, the last and current phase of Moroccan flow towards Europe is not characterised by the same levels of expansion of the economy enjoyed by the traditional European destinations of Moroccans.

Not surprisingly the main cause for migration to Europe has been the desire of each individual and family in Morocco to build a better life in the more prosperous Europe, rather than the demand of cheap labour. In this current phase, migration stops being an affair regulated through bilateral agreements to become predominantly a spontaneous family and individual project (Charef 2014, 312; cf.Sadiqi and Ennaji 2004, 65). This however does not exclude the permanence in this last phase of migration flows based on the demand of cheap labour from the countries of destination, as in the case of the Moroccans who started migrating in the 2000s to Spain to work as agricultural labourers (for more details see Arango and Martin 2005, 267-268).

The process of individualisation of the migration project has certainly contributed to transfer further control from the destination countries to the country of origin. In this phase, the process of migration has been often used by the Moroccan government at the internal level as an effective policy instrument to control unemployment rates and stimulate the economy through the transfer of remittances (see e.g., Schüttler 2007, 3; Sadiqi and Ennaji 2004, 75; Ennaji 2010a, 14,19).[24] At the international level, the increased control of the migration process has allowed Morocco to play an important role also in the dialogue with the European Union on migration,

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[23]Hansen (2003b, 27) points out how in France for example, Moroccan workers were recruited *sur place* by French companies established in Morocco, their status was later regularised through the ONI (see also Atouf, 2005, 66). In Belgium, as noted by Rilke (2014, 222), Moroccans recruited through the official procedures envisaged by the Moroccan-Belgian convention represented only a small portion of those who migrated to Belgium. And the convention had also the objective to regularise the status of the spontaneous migrants who entered Belgium before the signature of the 1964 labour agreement. Hasty post-regularisations were normal procedures through which most Moroccan migrants went (Bousetta and Martiniello, 2003, 96).

[24]It is estimated that in 2012, approximately 6.9 billion dollars, that is 7% of the Moroccan Gross Domestic Product, were transferred to Morocco from the community residing abroad. Note that this figure does not include informal transfers nor transfer of goods from the countries of destination to Morocco (de Haas, 2014b, 62,78).

mobility and security issues.[25]

As I mentioned in the previous section, restrictive measures towards migration were introduced in the early 1970s. The UK was the first to act in 1971, France and Germany followed in 1972 and 1973, all other major importers of foreign labour did the same within a year or two (Hansen, 2003b, 27). The absence of a guarantee of an easy return to Europe meant that most Moroccan temporary workers did not opt for repatriation, notwithstanding the pecuniary incentives offered to encourage their departure (see e.g. Attar 2003,94; see also Bouras 2013, 1224ff). Throughout this phase, the migration process lost its temporary character to become permanent. Moroccans were in Europe to stay (Berriane and Aderghal, 2014, 27).

Although all countries ended or drastically reduced labour migration recruiting schemes, the migration flow continued and in some cases it also increased (de Haas, 2014b, 61). For example the number of Moroccans in France went up by 90 per cent between 1974 and 1986, jumping from approximately 300,000 individuals to more than 575,000. In 1974, Moroccans represented around 7.7 per cent of the foreign population, ten years later Moroccans were 12.6 per cent (Belbah and Veglia, 2005, 40). Similarly in Netherlands, after the measures introduced in 1973, Moroccans entered the country in the period included between 1974 and 1987 at an average rate of 6,000 new migrants per year (Refass, 2014, 372).

Restrictions did not affect Moroccan migration to Europe compared to migration flows from other countries.[26] After the recruitment stop was put in place, ending circular migration, the temporary workers in France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany made intensive use of their right to have their family members join them (see e.g., Rilke, 2014, 222).[27]

The closure of borders represented for many an incentive to transform their own migration projects into permanent plans, and an opportunity to bring their families with them (Schüttler, 2007). In brief, the process of Mo-

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[25]The cooperation between the EU and Morocco has gone through a number of official stages (for a detailed review of the EU-Morocco cooperation road-map see European External Action Service 2016).

[26]For example, it is estimated that more than 70% of the Spanish labour migrants who temporarily settled in the Netherlands decided to return to Spain at the end of the 1960s (Refass 2014, 372; El Bardai 2007, 182).

[27]Even though European governments initially discouraged these practices, domestic constitutions rendered these efforts futile (Joppke 1998, 292; Hansen 2003b, 27). Note however that throughout the years, European countries have put in place a number of measures aimed specifically at reducing the volume of migrants entering through the family reunification/formation channel (see for example, Rilke, 2014, 249)

roccan migration to Europe in the first part of this phase (1970s-1980s) was mainly driven by dynamics of family reunification and family formation (see e.g., Attar, 2003, 96).

Since mid 1980s, these new massive arrivals contributed to the progressive rejuvenation and 'feminisation' of the Moroccan community in Europe (Khachani, 2004; Bilgili and Weyel, 2012; Khachani, 2011). Hence, the typical Moroccan migrant in Europe stopped being the male of working age who migrated as a single man or after leaving his family in the country of origin (Rilke 2014, 223; Schmidt di Friedberg 2003, 14).[28]

The transition from a circular labour migration to new forms of migration based on family reunification and formation, meant that since then European authorities have had to face the increased visibility of the Moroccan presence in their territory and provide a response to the demands and needs of these new residents. In these new conditions, the immigration of Moroccans was no longer a mere economic affair to be regulated through circles of temporary recruitments and repatriations, as in the previous migration phases. Since the early 1970s it became increasingly clear that migrants were in Europe to stay (Schmitter, 1980).

Even though not all countries in Europe came immediately to terms with this novelty, in general during this phase there was a shift from the simple recruitment of labour migrants to an increased attention to the societal consequences of their presence. Hence the migration process has become more and more a social phenomenon that concerns the whole population and therefore has to be addressed through social policies and policies of integration (see e.g. Crul and Doomernik, 2003, 1043).[29]

As noted by Hansen (2003b, 29), as it became clear that migrants were there to stay, the migration issue has grown to become a politicised internal issue that could be regularly exploited by political entrepreneurs (see also Bousetta and Martiniello 2003, 97ff; Aderghal 2014, 141).[30]

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[28] According to recent studies Moroccan migrants are still prevalently males (see European Training Foundation, 2013, 6).

[29] In the Netherlands for instance, specific national minority policies were implemented since 1983 to target the inclusion of the members of the Moroccan community in the societal sphere (Bousetta 2010, 366; Bouras 2013, 1224-1229).

[30] In the previous phase, the migration process was only marginally a social issue, as it concerned directly only autochthonous labour union movements (see e.g., Veglia, 2005, 51), without much contact with the rest of the autochthonous population. As Hansen (2003b, 28) put it, in that phase "their arrival was for the most part not a national political issue."

In this phase significant waves of Moroccan migrants embarked on new alternative migration trajectories. From the 1980s onward, new migration chains have been created by pioneer migrants linking specific areas in Morocco to unexplored new destinations, mainly in Spain and Italy (Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2004; Aziza, 2005) (for more details see sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4). These destinations—historically countries of emigration—have been chosen by Moroccan migrants for different reasons. Firstly, the rules of entry imposed by these countries were more lenient; [31] secondly, for their positive economic performances (see Khaldi, 2014, 265); and certainly, the geographical proximity of the Iberian peninsula has been a decisive factor at least for Moroccans directed to Spain.

Similarly to what occurred in the 1970s and 1980s in North-West European countries, the implementation of restrictive measures at the entrance, in the early 1990s in Spain and Italy, led many Moroccans to transform their migration projects from temporary and circular to permanent, and to rely heavily on the schemes of family reunification and formation offered by these countries (de Haas, 2014b, 72). As a result, according to the censuses conducted by the ISTAT, the Moroccan community residing in Italy increased in the period 1991-2011 from approximately 39,900 individuals to about 407,100 individuals. According to the data collected by the INED in Spain, in the same period of reference, the Moroccan community increased from 31,400 to approx. 774,000 individuals.

To sum up, some of the main characteristics of the current phase are represented by the progressive process of demographic normalisation of the Moroccan community, and the increased focus on the integration of the migrants and their descendants (see Cherti 2014a; but see e.g., de Haas 2014b, 85; Khaldi 2014, 273), and the success of anti-migration platforms, as well as the diffusion of labels like 'clandestine migrants', 'unwanted migrants' and 'illegal migrants' not only in everyday language but also in official policy documents and academic works (see e.g., Sadiqi and Ennaji, 2004; Ennaji, 2014).

In the next section I will examine the regional background of the Moroccan-origin communities under consideration in this study. This is an aspect that is generally neglected but certainly deserves more attention, as pointed out

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[31]The introduction of the visa as requirement for entry into Italy and Spain was imposed relatively late, respectively in 1990 and 1991 (de Haas 2014a, 72; Khaldi 2014, 265).

by Schmidt di Friedberg (2003, 15). In particular, this section will provide a clear picture of the differences in the migration processes that lead to creation of these five Moroccan-origin communities.

4.3. Regional Backgrounds of the Moroccan Communities Studied

As I have shown in the previous section, initially the vast majority of Moroccans migrated exclusively to France. In the subsequent migration phases, however, Moroccan migrants started spreading across the European continent.

The main purpose of this third section is to look more closely at how the 'geography of the Moroccan migratory flows' evolved in the countries and the regions of the cities under consideration in this study (see Simon, 2005, 9). In this third section I focus on specific connections—which I refer to as *geographic specialisations* (see Hamdouch et al., 2000)—that have been built throughout the process of migration from Morocco to Europe, between certain Moroccan regions of emigration and specific European regions in the main countries of destination.

It is well known for instance that Moroccans from Larache have tended to migrate to Spain. In Khenifra, France and Italy are the preferred countries of destination. The Moroccans native of the northern provinces of Al Hoceïma and Nador have instead expressed a less marked preference by emigrating primarily to Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain (see e.g., Berriane, 2014a, 161). The Moroccan-origin community in Italy has been built through years of migration from the the city of Khouribga and the small towns like Mrirt, Fkih Ben Salah, Beni Mellal, or Tiznit (see e.g., Schmidt di Friedberg 2003, 15). Thus, it is safe to say that the preferred country of destination is also strongly linked to the region of origin (Ennaji, 2014, 21).

As Wegge (1998, 958) observes: "a community's or country's emigration history is path-dependant because current migration depends on the past history of migrants." Among the factors that determine migrants' preferred destination country are certainly the presence of colonial links, language barriers, geographical proximity, and obviously the opportunities offered in the specific country of destination. Studies show that chain migration is another crucial factor in the decision to migrate to a specific country or

city (see e.g. Wegge, 1998). This means that the choice of a specific destination in Europe also depends on the presence of previous family or friends networks on which the would-be migrant can rely. Hence, chain migration patterns have an important effect on the process of developing communities in specific locales.[32]

In order to unveil these geographic specialisations, in the sections below I will initially clarify what are principal ethnic and geographic profiles of the members of the Moroccan-origin community residing in each European country under consideration.[33] Secondly, I will zoom in to describe the levels of concentrations of each community in these countries of destination. For each country I will include a graphical representation of the concentration of the Moroccan community, in the form of a choropleth map.[34]

4.3.1. Belgium

Traditionally most of the Moroccans in Belgium come from the urban regions in the North of Morocco (see Cherti, 2014a, 113), in particular from the provinces of Nador and Al Hoceïma. Yet subsequent waves of migration from other regions like the prefectures of Tangier, Meknes, and Marrakesh have progressively diluted the importance of the traditional regions of origin (see map 4.1; see also Berrada and Hamdouch 2000, 24).

The first signs of Moroccan migration to Belgium date back to the interwar period (Bousetta et al. 2005, 11; Bousetta and Martiniello 2003, 95) however, as we have seen in section 4.2.2, mass migration to Belgium started only in the early 1960s as a result of the labour agreement signed between the independent Morocco and the Belgian authorities in 1964 (Attar, 2003,

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[32]Migration scholars distinguish two types of chain migration: chain migration patterns that are stimulated by the presence of laws promoting family reunification or formation; and those that occur in a condition of 'free migration', hence without the influence of incentives or obstructive laws (see e.g. Wegge, 1998).

[33]Most of the information on the origins of the Moroccan residents in Europe are based on a study conducted by a research team of the Institut National de Statistique et d'Economie Appliquée (INSEA) (Hamdouch et al., 2000). Between July 1998 and September 1998, a team of researchers interviewed a random sample of 1,239 Moroccan migrants transiting on the ferry trip Tangier- Algeciras-Tangier. 54% of the sample was resident in France, 19% in Italy, 10.7% in Spain, and 7.2% in Belgium. The origin of the migrants was inferred from the questions on the place of birth and the place of residence before emigrating to Europe.

[34]The maps are drawn on the basis of the concept of citizenship. Hence these maps do not reflect the geographical concentration of the whole Moroccan community, but only its foreign component.

93).

Belgian recruitment offices set up in Casablanca and other cities sent thousands of Moroccan workers to Belgium. In these early stages of the migration process, Moroccans were exclusively employed in the mining, metallurgical, and construction industry—key sectors in which Belgian men refused to work and for which European work force was not sufficient (see de Haas, 2014b, 84). Not surprisingly, the Moroccan community in Belgium was mainly concentrated in the industrial Walloon provinces of the country, like Borinage and Liege (Bousetta and Martiniello, 2003, 95).

Although, at the present time the Wallonia region is no longer the main area of immigration, as it is shown in map 4.2, today's concentration of the Moroccan community on the Belgian territory still reflects to some extent the dynamics of these first waves of migration. Moroccan communities can still be found in the Arrondissements of Liege and Charleroi, which take up respectively about 7% and more than 4% of the overall Moroccan community (see also Perrin 2003, 75; and Rilke 2014, 234).

However, looking at map 4.2, we can see that nowadays the bulk of the Moroccan community is primarily concentrated in the urban agglomeration of the city capital Brussels: 48% of the whole Moroccan-origin community live today in the Region of Brussels (see also Berriane 2014b, 15; Rilke 2014, 232). A secondary point of concentration of the Moroccan community is the urban agglomeration of Antwerp (16%).[35] Smaller communities are present in the Flemish cities of Gand and Limbourg (Perrin 2003, 75; Rilke 2014, 232-235).[36]

The Moroccan Community of Brussels

As mentioned above, one of the historical destinations of Moroccan migrants is the Region of Brussels-Capital. Within this region, Moroccans are mainly concentrated in the municipalities of Brussels, Schaarbeek, Molenbeek-

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[35]Recent studies seem to confirm that the Moroccan-origin community in Europe is far from being an homogeneous group. This consideration applies not only to the whole community in Europe but also the Moroccan community within the same country of destination; for instance, Rilke (2014, 237) points out that the Moroccan migrants who settled in the region of Brussels were generally more qualified than their compatriots who settled in other parts of the country, notably in the agglomeration of Antwerp.

[36]Data on the spatial concentration of the Moroccan community are available only for the foreign segment of the community, that is the portion of population who did not acquire Belgian citizenship. As suggested by (Rilke, 2014, 232), naturalised Moroccans might express a preference for other regions in Belgium.

Figure 4.2.: Concentration of the Moroccan Community in Belgium

Legend

Arrondissement Concentration
Moroccan Residents

☐ 0.01 - 0.60
☐ 0.60 - 2.00
☐ 2.00 - 4.31
☐ 4.31 - 16.00
☐ 16.00 - 48.96

Source: Personal collection, based on SPF Economie, 2008. European NUTS 3 level, version 2013.

Note: the percentage-intervals reported in the legend are calculated on the basis of the Moroccan foreign population.

Saint-Jean and Anderlecht (Attar 2003, 107-108; Rilke 2014, 234; Bousetta and Martiniello 2003, 99). Similarly to what occurs in other European cities (e.g., Turin), this particular concentration within the region is to a large extent related the configuration of the housing market found by Moroccan migrants and their descendants at the time of their settlement (Attar, 2003, 108). In table 4.2 I show the relative importance of the Moroccan community in the region of Brussels with respect to the main migrant communities. As shown in the table, with over 39,000 Moroccans residing in the Region of Brussels, these individuals currently constitute the region's second largest foreign community after the French community.

Table 4.2.: Composition of Foreign Population in the Region of Brussels (Main Countries of Origin)

Country of origin	Number of foreign residents	% over foreign population	% over total population
France	46,006	15.59	4.39
Morocco	*39,101*	*13.25*	*3.73*
Italy	26,695	9.05	2.55
Spain	19,210	6.51	1.83
Portugal	16,128	5.47	1.54
Poland	15,697	5.32	1.50
Turkey	10,667	3.62	1.02
Germany	8,886	3.01	0.85
Foreign population	295,043	100	28.14
Total population	1,048,491	-	100

a. Source: SPF Economie, 2008.

4.3.2. France

The first Moroccan migrants who migrated to France came from the Berber region of Souss, in the south-west of Morocco (Lefébure, 2005, 30) and were employed in the first decade of the 20th century in the sugar refineries in Nantes and Marseilles (Simon, 2005; Ennaji, 2014; Bousetta and Martiniello, 2003; European Training Foundation, 2013). Undoubtedly there is a special connection between France and the Berberphone region of the South. Emigration from this specific part of Morocco was promoted by the first French Resident-General, Lyautey between 1912 and 1925 (Atouf, 2005, 64). As a result of the French colonial policy and the chain migration process that then followed, the current Moroccan community in France, differently from its homologous communities in Europe, is constituted for a significant part of Berber Moroccans from the southern region of Souss (see map 4.1).

Yet, Berber Moroccans were not the only ones to migrate to France. As I mentioned in section 4.1.2, among the first Moroccan migrants were also the Jewish Moroccans native of the cities of Essaouira and Marrakesh. Subsequent migration waves from other regions in Morocco have contributed to further reduce the relative importance of the Southern Berber component in France (Lefébure, 2005, 30).[37]

As a result of this, all Moroccan regions and provinces have been to some extent directly involved in the process of migration directed to France.[38] For example, a study conducted by Berrada and Hamdouch (2000, 24,30), found that most of the Moroccan residents in France came from not only the southern region of the country, but also from the central regions (i.e. Meknès-Tafilalet and Taza-Al Hoceïma-Taounate), notably from the provinces of Taza and Errachidia as well as the Prefecture of Meknes (see map 4.1).

As for the Moroccans directed to other European countries, the geographic concentration of the Moroccan community in France has been to a large extent shaped by the historical links that have been created throughout more than a century of migration, as well as the different employment opportu-

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[37]According to Atouf (2005, 64) in the early 1940s, more than 90 % were native of the South of Morocco, notably of province of Agadir. This figure went down to 80% in the period 1942-1956, and in the midst of the 1960s slighly more than 70% of the Moroccans came from the South (cf. Ennaji, 2014, 18).

[38]France has been the favourite destination of Moroccans coming from very different regions, with the exception of the northern region. It is worth noting that the absence of a colonial link between the northern region of Morocco and France pushed initially a large number of Rifians, to migrate initially to the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and more recently to Spain (Schüttler 2007, 11; de Haas 2014b, 82).

nities available on the French territory (Charef, 2014, 327). The Moroccans who migrated to the Île-de-France where employed in the French automotive industry, notably in the car factories of Renualt-Flins, Talbot-Poissy and Citroën-Aulnay (Lefébure, 2005, 34). Historically, a large part of the community residing in France was concentrated in the three departments surrounding the French capital and forming the ring known as *Petite Couronne*, with a particular preference for the towns of Gennevilliers and Clichy (see Atouf, 2005, 64). A smaller portion was directed to work in the coalfield in the northern region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais.[39] Further opportunities were created also in the agricultural sector with the signature of the 1963 labour agreement. This attracted migrants towards the Mediterranean littoral and the Garonne Valley (Belbah and Veglia, 2005, 39-40).

Whilst the volume of Moroccans in historical regions of immigration, like Nord-Pas-de-Calais have progressively dwindled, the Parisian region and the Southern region of the country, notably the Languedoc-Roussillon, have instead attracted most of the recent migration waves from Morocco (Schmidt di Friedberg 2003, 13; Charef 2014, 327).

As a result of the migration process described above, as I show in map 4.3, nowadays the Moroccan community is mainly concentrated in the Parisian region, with more than 31% of the whole Moroccan population residing in France. Significant concentrations can be found also in the northern region of Nord-Pas de Calais (6.5%), notably in the Nord department (5%); but also along the Mediterranean littoral, in particular in the department of Hérault (5.5%) and the three departments of Vaucluse, Gard and Bouches-du-Rhne, which make up approximately 10% of the Moroccan community. Smaller concentrations can be found in the region of Rhône-Alpes, notably in the Rhône department and within the Metropolitan Lyon (Meyer, 2008). In particular, the Moroccan residents in this French department—which constitutes one of the five Moroccan-origin communities under consideration in this study—represent about 2% of the whole Moroccan community residing in France. Finally, as shown in the map below, similar concentrations are found also in the main cities in the the south-west, south-east of the country (see also Berriane, 2014b, 15).

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[39]Between 1964 and 1965 around 11,000 were employed in the coal mines (Lefébure, 2005, 34).

Figure 4.3.: Concentration of the Moroccan Community in Metropolitan France

Source: Personal collection, based on Insee, RP2011 IMG1B. European NUTS 3 level, version 2013.

Note: the percentage-intervals reported in the legend are calculated on the basis of the Moroccan foreign population.

The Moroccan Community of Lyon

The region of Lyon has been in fact one of the historical destinations of the Moroccan community. As I mentioned in section 4.1.2, among the first Moroccan migrants were the Jewish Moroccans native of the cities of Essaouira and Marrakesh. A significant portion of these pioneer migrants settled in Saint-Fons, a small industrial town situated 5 km south of Lyon (see Atouf, 2003, 2005).[40] As mentioned above, one of the favourite destinations of the Moroccan community residing in France is the department of Rhône, which takes up approximately 2% of the whole Moroccan community. Today, 94% of these, reside in the Greater Lyon.

As shown in table 4.3, within this intercommunal structure, which gathers

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[40]Censuses conducted in the inter-war period confirm the rapid evolution of this community. Between 1921 and 1936 the number of Jewish Moroccans went up from only 15 to 282 individuals (Atouf, 2003, 122); yet the growth of the Jewish Moroccan community of Saint-Fons underwent an abrupt stop as a result of the persecutions conducted throughout the Second World War (Atouf, 2003, 127-128).

the city of Lyon and some of its suburbs (e.g. Villeurbanne and Vénissieux), Moroccan residents are among the most predominant foreign communities, along with Algerian, Portuguese and Tunisian nationals, according to the 2011 census.

Table 4.3.: Composition of Foreign Population in Greater Lyon (Main Countries of Origin)

Country of origin	Number of foreign residents	% over foreign population	% over total population
Algeria	30,598	24.88	1.98
Portugal	12,893	10.48	0.83
Tunisia	11,852	9.64	0.77
Morocco	*7,344*	*5.97*	*0.47*
Italy	6,741	5.48	0.44
Turkey	6,676	5.43	0.43
Spain	4,215	3.43	0.27
Foreign population	122,988	100	7.95
Total population	1,546,210	-	100

a. Source: Insee, 2011.

4.3.3. Italy

Migration to Italy is relatively recent, when compared to more traditional countries of destination in North-West Europe. The first signs of Moroccan migrants date back to the mid-1970s, after traditional countries of destination introduced restrictive measures. Yet, significant waves of migration started only in the 1990s (Bianco 2012, 11; for a general overview of the migration process to Italy see: Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS 2013 and Mghari and Fassi Fhiri 2010).

The settlement of Moroccans in Italy is a particularly interesting phenomenon that is distinct from the processes treated so far in this chapter. Moroccan migration to Italy has developed out of the loop of bilateral agreements and cannot be explained by any sort of considerations based on colonial links or geographical proximity, as could be done for the migration waves directed to all other favourite destinations in Europe.

A study commissioned by the EU agency European Training Foundation (ETF) shows that, in contrast to other Moroccan communities in Europe,

most of the members of the Moroccan community residing today in Italy come from the rural or peripheral regions of Morocco.[41]

Traditionally, most of the Moroccans in Italy are from the Chaouia-Ouardigha Region, in particular from the province of Khouribga (Mghari and Fassi Fhiri 2010, 40).[42] On the basis of the consular data, today the members of this region constitute approximately 25% of the whole community residing in Italy. 22% of these are from the Greater Casablanca Region and 16% come from the Tadla-Azilal Region (see map 4.1; see also Mghari and Fassi Fhiri 2010, 21; Bianco 2012, 219).

From the 1990s the size of the Moroccan community has increased by virtue of new waves of migration from the region of Tadla-Azilal, in particular from the rural provinces of Fkih Ben Salah and Beni Mellal (see Cherti, 2014a, 109), the province of Settat (Mghari and Fassi Fhiri, 2010, 21), and also from the province of Khenifra (see de Haas, 2014b, 82), notably from the little town of M'Rirt (Ennaji, 2014, 21).

These links are confirmed to a large extent also by the findings of the study conducted by Berrada and Hamdouch (2000, 24). Approximately 70% of the Moroccans in the sample who reside in Italy traditionally come from the provinces of Beni Mellal, Khouribga and Settat, but also from other regions, notably the provinces of Klaat Sraghna and the larger Prefectures of Marrakesh and Casablanca (see also Mghari and Fassi Fhiri, 2010, 21).[43]

The spontaneous character of the migration project has led the first Moroccan migrants in Italy to work as temporary workers in the agricultural sector in the southern regions of Sicilia, Campania and Puglia, or work in the informal sectors of the main urban centres as street vendors of carpets and handicrafts (see Bianco 2012, 218; see also Ennaji 2014; Mghari and Fassi Fhiri 2010, 22). Yet, better employment opportunities available in the northern regions of the country, progressively attracted a large part of Moroccan community. By the 1990s, most of the Moroccans were directed to the

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[41]The study 'Migration et compétences' was conducted between 2011 and 2012. The research team interviewed 4,000 Moroccans (2,600 potential migrants and 1,400 returnee migrants). For more details see European Training Foundation (2013, 34ff).

[42]Bianco's doctoral thesis focuses on the link between the migration process directed to Italy and the intensive exploitation of the territory in the phosphate-rich province of Khouribga (see also Sahnoun, 2012).

[43]The cities of Beni Mellal, Khouribga along with Klaat Sraghna (Bianco 2012, 235-236) or Fkih Ben Salah (Alaoui 2009, 71,79) are the vertices of what local wisdom calls "the triangle of death" in relation to the dangerous transnational criminal activities and irregular migration attempts conducted by the young migrants in these areas.

northern regions (Schmidt di Friedberg, 2003, 14). Subsequent dynamics of chain migration contributed to consolidate the presence of Moroccans in the northern region of the country (Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS, 2013, 12).

As shown in map 4.4, this strong preference for the North is still visible to-day. Nowadays, approximately two thirds of the community are residing in the northern regions of Lombardia, Piemonte, Emilia Romagna, and Veneto (Mghari and Fassi Fhiri, 2010, 23). At the provincial level, on the basis of the ISTAT data relative to 2014, the provinces that are more attractive for the members of the Moroccan community are the provinces of Turin, which absorb approximately 6% of the whole community, Bergamo (5%), Brescia (4%) and Milan (4%) (Ennaji 2014, 24; Mghari and Fassi Fhiri 2010, 25).

Figure 4.4.: Concentration of the Moroccan Community in Italy

Source: Personal collection, based on ISTAT, 2014. European NUTS 3 level, version 2013.

Note: the percentage-intervals reported in the legend are calculated on the basis of the Moroccan foreign population.

The Moroccan Community of Turin

As seen in the previous section, the bulk of the Moroccan-origin community residing in Italy is concentrated in four regions in the North of the country.

In particular, the northern region of Piemonte, notably the province and city of Turin are among of the favourite destinations of the Moroccan community, especially for the Moroccans who come from the region of Chaouia-Ouardigha (see Mghari and Fassi Fhiri 2010, 40; see also Bianco 2012, 221).

As shown in table 4.4, the first two most predominant foreign groups are represented by the Romanians and the Moroccans, which alone represent more than 30% of the whole foreign community in the city of Turin. In particular, this Moroccan community, with about 19,000 individuals, is the largest Moroccan community in the whole country, and it is also the largest community of TCNs in the municipality of Turin.

Table 4.4.: Composition of the Foreign Population in Turin (Main Countries of Origin)

Country of origin	Number of foreign residents	% over foreign population	% over total population
Romania	54,205	39.22	6.01
Morocco	*18,856*	*13.64*	*2.09*
Peru	9,584	6.93	1.06
China	7,594	5.49	0.84
Albania	6,174	4.47	0.68
Moldova	5,089	3.68	0.56
Nigeria	4,238	3.07	0.47
Foreign population	138,214	100	15.32
Total population	902,137	-	100

a. Source: ISTAT, 2014.

4.3.4. Spain

Although the first signs of Moroccan migrants in Spain date back to the colonial period, when approximately 40,000 Moroccans from the Rif joined General Franco in the Spanish civil war (1936-1939) (Ennaji 2014, 21), migration to Spain is a relatively recent phenomenon, which started to increase only in the mid-1980s (Aziza 2005, 75; Ennaji 2014, 21). Certainly one of the peculiarities of the phenomenon of Moroccan migration to Spain consists in its rapid growth (Khaldi, 2014, 266).

A significant part of the Moroccan community residing in Spain is composed of Moroccans from the North of Morocco, notably from the regions of Yebala, Rif-Oriental, and the Atlantic region (Schmidt di Friedberg 2003,

15, Khaldi 2007, 101, Bravo et al. 2004, 30). Approximately 77% of the Moroccans who registered in a consulate between 1975 and 1990 were from the Northern region, notably from the prefecture of Tanger, the provinces Tetouan and Larache (see Khaldi, 2014, 264), as well as the province of Al Hoceïma (Berrada and Hamdouch, 2000, 24). In the period included between 1991 and 2001, approximately 65.6% of the Moroccan migrants residing in Spain came from the two northern regional conglomerations of the Rif-Oriental (38.6%), and the Tingitan Peninsula (27%) (Berriane, 2004a, 128).

The link between the northern region of Morocco and Spain can be explained by geographical proximity, but also by the close links built throughout the Spanish occupation of the Moroccan territory. While the process of migration to more traditional countries has been mainly developed within the scope of formal bilateral agreements between Morocco and the destination countries, in the case of Spain this process was certainly more spontaneous (Khaldi, 2014, 265).

Since the early 1990s, Moroccans from other regions started to migrate to Spain, contributing in this way to increase the diversity of this community (Khaldi, 2014, 265). In the decade 1991-2001, about 28% of the Moroccans residing in Spain were native of the Atlantic regional conglomeration, which includes the regions of Gharb-Chrarda-Bni Hssen, Chaouia-Ouardigha, Rabat-Sal-Zemmour-Zaer, Greater Casablanca, Marrakech-Tensift-El Haouz, Tadla-Azilal and Doukkala-Abda (see map 4.1; see also European Training Foundation 2013, 20; Berriane 2004a, 128). Within these regions, the provinces of El Jadida and Beni Mellal stand out as the most important sources of Moroccan migrants directed to Spain (Berrada and Hamdouch, 2000, 24). Also the province of Khenifra has recently sent a large number of migrants to Spain (de Haas, 2014b, 82).

Similarly to what occurred in the other main destination countries in Europe, the concentration of the Moroccan community on the Spanish territory reflects to a large extent the types of employment opportunities available in the regions of destination (Khaldi 2007, 102; for more details see Pérez et al. 2004, 227-234 and also Arango and Martin 2005). After restrictive measures were introduced by the traditional countries of migration in the early 1970s, a significant number of Moroccan workers were attracted by the dynamic economic sector of the Catalan region but also by the need for cheap labour in the Basque Country, the region of Madrid, Andalusia, and the Canary

Islands (Khaldi, 2014, 265).[44] More recent waves of migration have caused the growth of the Moroccan community in the rural areas of the country, notably in the regions of Murcia and Valencia. Concomitantly, the relative size of the community residing in the region of Madrid has decreased (Schmidt di Friedberg 2003, 14).

As a result of this, today the Moroccan community of Spain appears to be more dispersed compared to the other communities in Europe (Berriane 2014b, 15; see also López 2004). Focusing on the older regions of immigration of the 17 regions that constitute the country, Moroccan-origin residents are mainly concentrated in the regions of Catalonia (29.3%), Andalusia (16.3%), and the region of Madrid (10.5%). The 'younger' component of the Moroccan community—which is represented by those who migrated from the early 2000s—has mainly settled in the regions of Murcia and Valencia (19.5%) (see also Khaldi, 2014, 278-279). This means that approximately 75.7% of the Moroccan community in Spain resides in five different regions. At the provincial level, as shown in map 4.5, approximately 62% of the whole Moroccan community is concentrated in the provinces of Barcelona (17.2%), Madrid (10.5%), Murcia (9.7%), Almeria (5.9%), Gerona (5%), Tarragona (5%), Alicante (4.7%) and Malaga (4%).

The Moroccan Communities of Madrid and Barcelona

As I have discussed in section 4.3.4, among the favourite destinations of the Moroccans residing in Spain are the Province of Barcelona and Madrid, which take up respectively 27.7% of the whole Moroccan community. About 10% of the Moroccans residing in the Province of Barcelona are concentrated in the municipality of Barcelona according to the Spanish Statistical Office. Approximately 28% of the Moroccans residing in the region of Madrid are concentrated in the capital city. This means that the Moroccans in the Catalan province are more dispersed in the territory in comparison to their compatriots residing in the Madrid region.

As shown in table 4.5, with over 13,000 Moroccans residing in the city of Barcelona, Moroccans currently constitute the third-largest foreign group, after the Italian and Chinese communities. Conversely, in the larger city

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[44]The massive presence of Moroccans in the region of Catalonia imposed the opening of a Moroccan consulate in Barcelona in 1972 (López García and Berriane 2004, 214). In 1976 a consulate was opened also in Las Palmas (Moreras, 2004, 305).

Figure 4.5.: Concentration of the Moroccan Community in Spain

Source: Personal collection, based on INE, 2014. European NUTS 3 level, version 2013.

Note: the percentage-intervals reported in the legend are calculated on the basis of the Moroccan foreign population.

of Madrid, as I show in table 4.6, Moroccans represent only the 4th largest foreign community, with about 22,700 individuals.

Table 4.5.: Composition of Foreign Population in the City of Barcelona (Main Countries of Origin)

Country of origin	Number of foreign residents	% over foreign population	% over total population
Italy	25,016	9.16	1.56
China	16,435	6.02	1.03
Morocco	*13,064*	*4.78*	*0.82*
France	13,061	4.78	0.82
Bolivia	12,299	4.50	0.77
Ecuador	11,807	4.32	0.74
Peru	11,012	4.03	0.69
Foreign population	273,121	100	17.04
Total population	1,602,386	-	100

a. Source: INE, 2014.

Table 4.6.: Composition of Foreign Population in the City of Madrid (Main Countries of Origin)

Country of origin	Number of foreign residents	% over foreign population	% over total population
Romania	48,252	11.55	1.52
Ecuador	39,623	9.49	1.25
China	31,283	7.49	0.99
Bolivia	24,242	5.80	0.77
Morocco	*22,719*	*5.44*	*0.72*
Peru	21,978	5.26	0.69
Colombia	21,071	5.04	0.67
Foreign population	417,731	100	13.20
Total population	3,165,235	-	100

Source: INE, 2014.

4.4. Conclusion

In this chapter I have built a historical background of the Moroccan-origin communities under consideration in this dissertation. The Moroccan communities of Europe represent a particularly interesting case study in the field of immigration and ethnic relations.

In general, the background information presented in this chapter will be useful when interpreting the survey data presented in the next chapter, and when trying to make sense of the similarities and differences that exists in the socio-demographic profile of the five communities considered, as well as their patterns of involvement in the political affairs of the country of residence. In particular, in chapter 5, I will build a profile for the Moroccan-origin communities residing in Brussels, Lyon, Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid, which takes advantage of the information provided in this chapter.

To highlight the main specificities of these communities I have drawn on historical accounts, the studies of Moroccan migration experts in Europe and Morocco, and the official data of the national statistical bureaux.

In particular, one of the main points raised in this chapter relates to the volume of this community and its importance in the countries of residence in relation to other migrant communities. As seen in the last section of this chapter, Moroccans are one of the largest migrant groups in Europe. Interestingly, Moroccan migrants and their descendants constitute one of the most predominant and stable non-autochthonous groups in the regions of Brussels and Lyon, and the municipalities of Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid.

A second important point I raise in this chapter pertains to the intrinsic characteristics of this community. As I have shown in the first section of this chapter, the Moroccan-origin community—as occurs also with other foreign communities studied in the field of immigration and ethnic relations—is far from forming a monolithic group, for its ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity. For this reason the notion of Moroccan *communities* appears to be more appropriate. As shown in detail, these different communities have taken part in the migration process at different phases and in different ways, contributing thus to establish stable connections between their regions of origin and specific regions in the European countries of destination.

In connection to this last point, another important consideration raised in this chapter concerns the evolution of the Moroccan migration process and

its repercussions on the policies implemented vis-à-vis migrant groups in the countries of destination. In particular, as I have shown in the second section of this chapter, throughout its different phases, the process of Moroccan migration to Europe has increased in volume and moved from being a temporary and circular phenomenon that involved essentially single males of working age to become progressively a more permanent investment, which has led to the settlement of numerous families in the main countries of emigration and contributed to the emergence of different socio-demographic profiles, as I will show more in detail in the next chapter.

This process of demographic 'normalisation', along with the settlement and increased visibility of the Moroccan communities in Europe, has pushed the countries of residence to adapt their political offer and progressively abandon the traditional approach to migration and migrants. To be more specific, over years of migration, there has been a progressive move from an approach principally concerned about how foreign workers can be put at the service of the needs of the economy or how the migration flow can be better controlled, towards an approach concerned *also* about the living conditions of those residing permanently in the country, and how these new residents can engage in the social and political life of the countries of settlement (see for example, Vermeulen 2006). This makes the questions of political integration I study all the more significant. And it goes in line with the dual character of the process of political integration I want to highlight though the conception of the concept of 'integration' developed in chapter 2.

In the next chapter, I look more closely at these aspects, by examining the different socio-demographic and economic profiles of all five Moroccan communities examined here, and by describing their different patterns of involvement in the social and political fabric of their countries of residence.

CHAPTER

5

MOROCCAN-ORIGIN COMMUNITIES IN EUROPE: COMPARING THEIR OUTLOOK AND PATTERNS OF ENGAGEMENT

In this chapter I start presenting the survey data that will be analysed more in detail in the two following chapters. Here I undertake univariate analyses to present graphically and non-graphically the main variables—predictor and outcome variables—that I will then employ in chapters 6 and 7. I also conduct a series of bivariate analyses to explore relationships between specific groups of predictors as well as associations between certain predictors and outcome variables.

I delineate the most significant demographic, socio-economic, and political traits of the five Moroccan-origin communities under consideration in this dissertation. The results of the analysis conducted here reflect to a large

extent some of the points I made in chapter 4 and anticipates some of the main results presented in chapters 6 and 7. The main purpose of this chapter is to act as bridge between the theoretical and historical part of this dissertation and the empirical chapters that follow. In particular, through the presentation of the main traits, I create a profile of each community and underline some of the similarities and differences that exist between the 'older' Moroccan-origin communities in Lyon and Brussels and the 'younger' communities in Barcelona, Madrid, and Turin.

This chapter is composed of three main sections: in section 5.1 I present some of main demographic and socio-economic factors that will be employed in chapters 6 and 7 as predictors of political engagement. In section 5.2 I present the different forms of attitudinal and behavioural political engagement performed by the members of the five communities under consideration. These patterns of engagement will be then discussed more in detail in chapters 6 and 7, through a series of multivariate analyses. In the final section I provide a short discussion of the findings presented throughout the chapter.

5.1. The Demographic and Socio-Economic Profile

In this first section, I provide a rich description of the similarities and difference that exist in the main demographic and socio-economic profile of the five Moroccan-origin communities. For clarity of exposition, I have grouped the main demographic and socio-economic factors into the following groups: (1) gender and age; (2) marital/partnership status and partner's presence in the country; (3) migration cause and modes of migration; (4) years since arrival in the country of residence and migrant generations; (5) administrative situation and citizenship; (6) education; (7) native languages, and language proficiency; (8) employment status, household monthly income, and ethnic composition of the household; (9) religious affiliation and religiosity; (10) subjective experiences of discrimination.[1]

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[1]For some of these aspects I also highlight the gender and generational disparities that exist within the five communities and I explore some of the relationships between attitudinal and behavioural forms of political engagement. More details are presented in appendix B.

5.1.1. Gender and age

Table 5.1 shows how the proportion of women and men is more balanced in the Belgian and French cities—respectively 48% and 55%—with respect to the Moroccan-origin communities of more recent migration residing in the Italian and Spanish cities. The percentage of women is comprised between 30% in Barcelona and approximately 40% in Turin and Madrid. These figures represent a first indication of the different stages in the process of demographic 'normalisation' that characterise these five communities. As mentioned in chapter 4, the communities residing in France and Belgium are older with respect to those residing in Spain and Italy. In table 5.7, I will provide more direct support of this claim by presenting the predominant generation of migration in all the five communities under consideration.

Table 5.1.: Gender Distribution by City, Percentages

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Female	48.1	55.3	41.2	29.5	38.9
Male	51.9	44.7	58.8	70.5	61.1
N	455	114	200	224	298

Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

In figure 5.1 I examine more closely the age of the members of these Moroccan-origin communities. Firstly, all five communities under consideration are relatively young. The average age oscillates between approx. 33 in Brussels and 36 years old in Barcelona. In particular, as I show in the figure, the largest part of the sample is concentrated in the three youngest age groups (18-25, 26-35, and 36-45). Not surprisingly, the older age groups, in particular those who reached at least 56 years of age, constitute a more significant component in the communities residing in Brussels and Lyon, respectively 8% and 12%. Conversely, in the other less established communities in Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid, these groups of individuals represent 5% to 3% of the whole community.

Figure 5.2 shows the gender-group differences that exists within all five Moroccan-origin communities considered. Both gender groups are relatively young: more than 80% of the sample is included within the first three younger age groups, and an average age of only 34 years old. Nonetheless, between the female and male component of this community there are some significant differences across the six age-groups. As shown in the figure, the

Figure 5.1.: Age Groups by City

female group is almost equally distributed among the first three younger cohorts, with a percentage that comprised between 27% and 30% of the whole female sample. In contrast the male group shows a clear peak value in relation to the 26-35 years old age group: the individuals falling within this age group only, represent more than 40% of the total male sample.

In the next figures, I examine whether these gender differences and similarities are found also within each single Moroccan-origin community.

As shown in figure 5.3, the gender distribution across the six age groups within the Moroccan-origin community residing in Brussels reflects to some extent the general trend described above. The female component of the community presents a more balanced distribution in comparison with their male counterparts. Whilst women are gradually distributed across the different age cohorts, with the older cohorts becoming gradually less and less predominant, among the male group we can still find a peak in correspondence to the 26-35 group (41%), that is followed by a fall, with the next age group (36-45) representing only 13% of the sample.

Figure 5.2.: Age Groups - Moroccan-Origin Communities in All 5 Cities

Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

Figure 5.3.: Age Groups of the Moroccan-Origin Community of Brussels, by Gender

Source: Herman (2015).

In contrast, within the community residing in Lyon, the predominant age-group is represented by the youngest cohort of individuals aged 18 to 25 years old. This pertains to the female as well as the male component of the community, with 43% and 37% of the female and male samples, respectively falling into this age group. For both gender groups, all other age-groups remain below the 20% threshold, with a more balanced distribution for the male component. The female component, instead presents a predominance in relation to the 26-35 and 36-45 age cohorts with respect to the older age cohorts (see figure 5.4).

Figure 5.4.: Age Groups of the Moroccan-Origin Community of Lyon, by Gender

Source: Morales et al. (2014).

As shown in figure 5.5 the Moroccan-origin community residing in Turin for both gender groups is characterised by two distinct peaks for the second and third youngest age cohort (i.e. 26-35 and 36-45). For the female component, the individuals falling within these two categories represent about 73% of the whole female sample, whilst for the male group approx. 70% belongs to these two age cohorts. For both gender groups, most of the older three age cohorts composed of individuals who go from 46 years old to 65+, remain below the 5% threshold. Nevertheless, the 46-55 group is more important within the male component of the community, representing almost 15% of the whole male sample, in contrast with the female group where this constitutes only 4% of the sample of women.

The female component of the community residing in Barcelona, as shown

Figure 5.5.: Age Groups of the Moroccan-Origin Community of Turin, by Gender

Source: Sajir (2017).

in figure 5.6, is characterised by a bell-shaped distribution across the different age-cohorts, with a peak in correspondence with the 36-45 age group (approx. 38%). Conversely, within the male component of this community, the most predominant age group is represented by the 26-35 years old individuals (approx. 42%). The three oldest age cohorts constitute 24% of the female sample, whilst 11% only of the male sample falls within these older age categories.

As shown in figure 5.7, the female component of the Moroccan-origin community residing in Madrid represents two clear peaks at the level of the 26-35 and 36-45 age groups. Individuals falling within these two age groups represent about 72% of the whole female sample. In contrast the male component distribution is characterised by a single peak in correspondence with the 26-35 age group, with half of the male sample falling into this age group.

Figure 5.6.: Age Groups of the Moroccan-Origin Community of Barcelona, by Gender

Source: Morales et al. (2014).

Figure 5.7.: Age Groups of the Moroccan-Origin Community of Madrid, by Gender

Source: Morales et al. (2014).

5.1.2. Civil status and partner's presence in the country

In this second section I compare the five different Moroccan-origin communities on the basis of the civil status of its members, and report one of the main aspects relative to their partners, that is the presence of the partners of respondents in the country of residence.

As shown in table 5.2, among the five different civil statuses, individuals in a civil union or common-law marriage and those who never married constitute the two most represented categories across all communities considered. In particular, in the communities of Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid the 'married' category is the most predominant, with a percentage comprised between 45% in Madrid and approx. 60% in Turin. In the communities of Lyon and Madrid the 'never married' group represents an almost equally important with about 39% and 42% of the sample respectively falling in this category. Conversely, within the communities of Turin and Barcelona, only 34% and 28% of the sample respectively has never married. Interestingly, within the community of Brussels the trend is reversed: the 'never married' group represents about half of the whole sample, whilst the 'married' group constitutes about 40% of the sample. The individuals who reside in the country of residence in cohabitation with their partners constitute about 11% and 9% of the samples in the Moroccan-origin communities of Lyon and Barcelona, yet their counterparts in Brussels, Turin, and Madrid constitute only 4% to 1% of the whole sample. Divorced individuals are more represented in both communities in Spain (13% and 10%), as well as Lyon (10%). In Brussels and Turin they constitute only 8% and 6% of the whole sample, respectively.

Table 5.2.: Civil Status by City, Percentages

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Married	39.7	40.4	58.8	48.2	45.3
Cohabiting with partner	3.6	11.4	1.4	8.9	1.7
Never married	48.3	38.6	33.7	28.1	42.2
Divorced	7.5	9.7	5.8	13.0	10.1
Widowed	0.9	-	0.4	1.8	0.7
N	451	114	197	224	296

Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

Focusing only on the group of individuals who are married or live with

their partners, table 5.3 shows three different situations when comparing the five communities: within the Moroccan-origin communities residing in Brussels and Lyon, almost all partners reside in the country of residence. Within the Moroccan community of Turin this configuration concerns about 90%, whilst in the two Spanish cities of Barcelona and Madrid, 83% and 79% of the respondents live with their partners in the country of residence.

Table 5.3.: Presence of Partner in the Country of Residence by City, Percentages

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Partner lives in country	98.5	98.3	90.5	83.3	78.7
Partner lives elsewhere	1.5	1.7	9.5	16.7	21.3
N	194	59	118	102	122

Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

5.1.3. Migration causes and modes of migration

In this section I present more details regarding the migration process that led to the creation of some of these communities. As I discussed in chapter 4, the differences and similarities that exists today between the Moroccan-origin communities under consideration reflect longer historical patterns. In particular, in table 5.4 I show what are the predominant reasons of migration within the communities of Brussels, Barcelona, and Madrid. And in table 5.5, I compare the different modes of migration that led to the settlement in Barcelona and Madrid.

As shown in table 5.4, behind the creation of the Moroccan-origin community of Brussels are processes that are distinct from those that led to the emigration to Barcelona and Madrid. Within the community of Brussels, the predominant reason for migrating is represented by interpersonal ties (46%), whilst only 21% and 16% of the respondents in Barcelona and Madrid migrated for the same reasons. Within the Spanish cities, most individuals migrated following job-related opportunities (approx. 64% and 76%). In Brussels, their counterparts represent only 24% of the whole sample. Interestingly, student migration concerns about 17% of the community in Brussels, but this process is less important in Barcelona and Madrid, where only 7% and 5% of the sample considered their studies as the main reason that led them to migrate to Spain. A final significant difference between the com-

munity established in Brussels and those residing in Spain is represented by the percentage of individuals who migrated to seek asylum/protection in the country of destination. Whilst none of the respondents in Spain selected this as their main cause for migrating, in Brussels, about 4% of the respondents fall into this category.

Table 5.4.: Reasons for Migrating to the Country of Residence by City, Percentages

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Job related opportunities	24.3	N/A	N/A	63.8	75.8
Family reasons/love	46.0	N/A	N/A	20.6	16.2
Study	16.9	N/A	N/A	6.9	4.7
Seeking asylum/protect.	4.1	N/A	N/A	-	-
Quality of life in general	8.1	N/A	N/A	5.5	2.4
Other	0.7	N/A	N/A	3.2	1.0
N	148	N/A	N/A	218	297

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015).
b. Note: this question was not asked in the surveys conducted in Lyon and Turin.

As shown in table 5.5, a significant part of the respondents emigrated alone to Barcelona and Madrid, respectively 63% and 51%. The remaining part emigrated with family members (30% and 43%). Only a marginal portion of the respondents migrated to Barcelona and Madrid through other arrangements.

Table 5.5.: Mode of Migration to the Country of Residence by City, Percentages

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Alone	N/A	N/A	N/A	63.3	50.8
With family	N/A	N/A	N/A	30.1	42.8
With friends	N/A	N/A	N/A	3.2	4.4
With other people (*)	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.9	2.0
Other	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.5	-
N	N/A	N/A	N/A	218	297

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014).
b. Note: this question was not asked in the surveys conducted in Brussels, Lyon, and Turin.
c. Note: (*) neither friends nor relatives.

5.1.4. Years since arrival in the country of residence and migrant generations

In this section I provide further details on the differences and similarities that exist between the five Moroccan-origin communities under consideration, by looking at some of the main indicators of their longevity: the time spent by its members in the country of residence (see table 5.6 and figures 5.8-5.12), and the most preponderant migrant generations in each community (see table 5.7).

Table 5.6 shows the percentage of individuals for each community according to the number of years spent in the country of residence. As shown below there are significant differences between the two Moroccan communities in France and Belgium and the communities in Italy and Spain. In particular, if we focus on the individuals who migrated to the country of residence within the last five years it is possible to see how the percentage of "new" migrants is comprised between 3.5% and approx. 5% respectively for the communities in Lyon and Brussels. Conversely, in the communities residing in Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid, the new arrivals represent a more predominant component of the community: approximately 20% in Turin and Barcelona, and about 40% in Madrid.

Another clear indication of the difference between the 'older' Moroccan-origin communities in Lyon and Brussels, and the 'younger' communities in Barcelona, Madrid, and Turin is represented by the percentage of individuals born in the country of residence. In Lyon and Brussels more than 45% of the whole community was born directly in the country of residence. In the other communities the percentage of individuals that were born in the country of residence is below 4% as in the case of the community in Barcelona, or it is still of negligible importance as in the case of the communities in Turin and Madrid.

Table 5.6.: Years Since Arrival in Country of Residence by City, Percentages

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Two years or less	1.3	1.8	9.8	3.6	17.1
3-5 years	4.0	1.8	11.6	15.2	24.8
6-10 years	7.0	5.3	34.5	41.5	39.9
More than 10 years	26.8	45.6	43.6	36.6	18.1
Born in country of resid.	60.9	45.6	0.5	3.1	-
Mean value	8.5	14.7	10.6	11.3	7.4
N	455	114	200	224	298

Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

In figures 5.8-5.12 I add more details to this comparative description, by considering also the gender level similarities and differences that exist between these five Moroccan-origin communities.

As shown in the figures 5.8 and 5.9, the communities of Brussels and Lyon present a distinct double peak in correspondence of the categories of individuals who resided in the country for more than 10 years and the individuals who were born in the country of residence. These categories represents respectively for the female and male group about 90% and 85% of the community in Brussels, and approx. 89% and 94% in the Moroccan community of Lyon.

In contrast, as shown in figures 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12, within communities in Barcelona, Turin, and Madrid the category of those born in the country remain marginal for both gender groups, with two distinct peaks in the categories of individuals who resides 6 to 10 years and those that lived in the country of residence for more than 10 years. These two categories alone represent for both gender groups almost the entire sample, as in the case of the communities in Brussels and Lyon, with the other categories playing a less prominent role.

Noteworthily, whilst the gender groups within the Moroccan-origin communities of Brussels, Lyon, and Madrid are fairly balanced in terms of the years spent in the country of destination, the figures below highlight significant gender differences for the communities of Turin and Barcelona. In particular, in Turin most of the male migrants have lived for more than 10 years in the country of residence, whilst their most of their female counterparts have resided between 6 to 10 years in country of destination. In

Barcelona, this trend is reversed, suggesting that the pioneering role in the migration process has been instead taken on by women in this community.

To sum up, on average the female component of the Moroccan-origin communities residing in Brussels, Barcelona, and Madrid has lived longer in the country of residence in comparison to their male counterparts. The gap between the two groups is of approximately 4 and 5 years in Brussels and Barcelona respectively, and about 1 year on average in Madrid. Conversely, in Lyon and Turin, the male component has lived on average 3 years longer in the country of residence, with respect to the female group.

Figure 5.8.: Years Since Arrival in Country of Residence - Moroccan-Origin Community of Brussels

Source: Herman (2015).

Figure 5.9.: Years Since Arrival in Country of Residence - Moroccan-Origin Community of Lyon

Source: Morales et al. (2014).

Figure 5.10.: Years Since Arrival in Country of Residence - Moroccan-Origin Community of Turin

Source: Sajir (2017).

Figure 5.11.: Years Since Arrival in Country of Residence - Moroccan-Origin Community of Barcelona

Source: Morales et al. (2014).

Figure 5.12.: Years Since Arrival in Country of Residence - Moroccan-Origin Community of Madrid

Source: Morales et al. (2014).

In table 5.7 I compare the five communities under consideration by looking more closely at the most predominant migrant generation in each community.

The first generation includes all individuals who migrated for any reason (e.g. employment seekers, refugees, reunion with own family members) from Morocco to the new country of residence in Europe. As shown in the table below, a large part of the Moroccan community residing in Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid, is constituted mainly of first generation migrants, respectively 92%, 85%, and 95%. In contrast the first generation migrants represent only 29% in Brussels, and 30% in Lyon.

The second generation consists of all individuals who are born in the country of their parents' settlement. This category is predominant within the Moroccan-origin communities of Brussels and Lyon, representing more than 60% of the sample in Brussels, and almost half of the community residing in Lyon. Conversely, second-generation migrants still constitute a marginal part of the community in the cities of Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid.

Table 5.7.: Migrant Generation by City, Percentages

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
First generation (†)	28.6	29.9	92.4	85.1	94.9
1.5 generation	10.5	21.5	7.0	12.2	4.75
Second generation	60.9	48.6	0.6	2.7	0.3
N	440	107	200	222	295

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).
b. (†) the first generation in this table includes only individuals who migrated at 15 years old or older.

The division into first and second generation however conceals an underlying sub-population, which is known in the literature as '1.5 generation' (see e.g. Togeby, 2004). This refers to the individuals who migrated with their relatives at in or before their early teens. For this reason it is considered as an intermediate generation that like the members of the first generation experienced directly the migration from the country of origin to the country of destination, but similarly to the subsequent generations underwent most of their primary socialisation in the new country of residence.

In this regard, the cut-off point used in the literature to distinguish between 1st generation and 1.5 generation is not fixed, but it generally starts at 9 years old (Aparicio, 2007) or 11 years old (Kurthen and Schmitter Heisler,

2009; Van Hook and Balistreri, 2007) and may be extended to include also 14 years old (Morales and Giugni, 2011c) or 18 years old individuals (Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2011). In this dissertation I have considered as members of the 1.5 those who migrated at the latest in their early teens. These are individuals who still had to undergo compulsory schooling in the new country of residence. For this reason I opted for using the same cut-off point employed within the LOCALMULTIDEM project (i.e. 14 years old).

As shown in table 5.7, among the group of individuals who were directly involved in the process of migration to the country of residence, those who belong to the 1.5 generation represent approximately 11% in Brussels, about 22% in Lyon, approx. 12% in Barcelona, and only 7% and 5% respectively in Turin and Madrid.

5.1.5. Administrative situation and citizenship

In this section I present the different administrative conditions of the Moroccan communities under consideration, and look closely at the citizenship composition of each community.

As shown in table 5.8, the individuals with the most precarious administrative situations, which includes those with short term permits of stay and also those who do not have any permit of stay, represent a significant component of the Moroccan-origin communities residing in Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid, respectively 57%, 43%, and 72%. On the contrary, in Brussels and Lyon, this precarious state concerns respectively only 7% and 8% of the community.

Notwithstanding all the similarities that I mentioned so far between the communities in Spain and Italy, and the differences that exist with their counterparts in France and Belgium, it is worth noting how the group of long-term permits holders is more predominant only in Turin (29%) and Barcelona (30%). It remains under 10% in the city of Madrid. This is in line with the proportions found in Lyon (13%) and Brussels (7%).

Table 5.8.: Administrative Situation by City, Percentages

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Short-term permit (*)	4.4	3.5	52.0	37.5	62.1
Long-term permit (†)	6.6	13.2	29.0	29.9	9.1
Renovating expired perm.	1.3	-	1.5	4.5	6.7
Never had a permit	2.4	4.4	4.5	5.4	9.7
N	455	114	200	224	298

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).
b. (*) 5 years or less. (†) more than 5 years.

In table 5.9 I show the most predominant citizenships of the members of each Moroccan community. The differences and similarities discussed above are reflected also in the percentage of individuals who possess the citizenship of the country of residence. Within the most established Moroccan communities of Brussels and Lyon, most of the individuals hold Belgian and French citizenship. In particular, in Brussels about 82% of the respondents holds Belgian citizenship; in Lyon about 78% of the sample holds French citizenship.

Conversely, in the less established Moroccan origin communities of Italy and Spain, those who hold Italian and Spanish citizenship still represent a minority. In particular, in Turin about 13% hold Italian citizenship. In Barcelona and Madrid, about 17% and 11% respectively of the whole sample hold Spanish citizenship.

Table 5.9.: Citizenship Composition by City, Percentages

		First citizenship	Second citizenship
Brussels			
	Belgian	82.0	-
	Moroccan	15.8	97.7
	Other	2.2	2.3
	N	455	133
		First citizenship	Second citizenship
Lyon			
	French	78.1	-
	Moroccan	21.9	100
	Other	-	-

Table 5.9 continued from previous page

	N	114	2
		First citizenship	Second citizenship
Turin			
	Italian	13.2	-
	Moroccan	86.8	97.0
	Other	-	3.0
	N	199	26
		First citizenship	Second citizenship
Barcelona			
	Spanish	16.5	-
	Moroccan	82.1	94.1
	Other	1.3	5.9
	N	224	17
		First citizenship	Second citizenship
Madrid			
	Spanish	10.7	-
	Moroccan	89.3	-
	Other	-	100
	N	298	1

Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

5.1.6. Education level

In this section I show the level of education of each Moroccan-origin community, divided into five different categories: 1) illiterate or primary not completed; 2) primary completed; 3) secondary completed; 4) post-secondary (non tertiary) completed; 5) tertiary completed.

As shown in table 5.10, the community in Lyon is characterised by a higher level of education in comparison with the other communities: approximately 70% of the community declared having completed at least a post-secondary degree in Lyon. Conversely, their counterparts with the same level of education represent about 30% of the total sample in Brussels, approx. 25% in Barcelona, 22% in Turin, and only 9% in Madrid. Significant differences between the communities are found also in relation to the two lowest categories of education: in the two Spanish cities

approximately 35% of the sample is without a degree or did not go beyond the primary school degree. This specific group of individuals represent approximately 26% in the community residing in Brussels, and about 11% in Turin and Lyon.

Table 5.10.: Education Level by City, Percentages

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Illiterate (*)	11.8	6.2	5.0	14.3	17.9
Primary completed	14.1	5.3	5.5	20.5	19.2
Secondary completed	43.8	18.6	67.0	39.3	53.5
Post-secondary (†)	16.1	26.6	12.0	9.4	1.4
Tertiary completed	14.3	43.4	10.5	16.5	8.1
N	448	113	200	224	297

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).
b. (*) Illiterate or primary not completed. (†) post-secondary (non tertiary) completed.

In table 5.11, I compare the level of education of the female and male components of each community. As shown below, within the community of Brussels and Turin, the female group includes more individuals with no degree or primary school degree only, in comparison to their male counterparts. In particular, in Brussels about 29% of the female group is illiterate or reached only the first stage of the educational path. The less educated group represents about 24% of the whole male component. Within the community of Turin, 13% of the female group hold only a primary school degree at best, within the male group this percentage falls to 9%. However, when comparing the two highest levels of education the two gender groups within these communities are more balanced in the proportions. In the community of Lyon the female component in comparison to the male group is less represented among the lowest levels of education. In particular, 14% of the male component of this community has no education or only the lowest education degree, in comparison to approx. 10% of the their female counterparts. Furthermore, about 72% of women in this community has completed at least the post-secondary cycle of their studies, in comparison to 68% of the men.

Table 5.11.: Education Level by Gender in the Five Cities, Percentages

	Female	Male
Brussels		
Illiterate or primary not completed	14.9	9.0
Primary completed	14.0	14.2
Secondary completed	40.5	46.8
Post-secondary (non tertiary) completed	17.2	15.0

Table 5.11 continued from previous page

		Female	Male
	Tertiary completed	13.5	15.0
	N	215	233

Lyon		Female	Male
	Illiterate or primary not completed	3.2	10.0
	Primary completed	6.4	4.0
	Secondary completed	19.1	18.0
	Post-secondary (non tertiary) completed	27.0	26.0
	Tertiary completed	44.4	42.0
	N	63	50

Turin		Female	Male
	Illiterate or primary not completed	7.1	3.5
	Primary completed	6.0	5.2
	Secondary completed	64.3	69.0
	Post-secondary (non tertiary) completed	13.1	11.2
	Tertiary completed	9.5	11.2
	N	84	116

Barcelona		Female	Male
	Illiterate or primary not completed	19.7	12.0
	Primary completed	15.2	22.8
	Secondary completed	42.4	38.0
	Post-secondary (non tertiary) completed	10.6	8.9
	Tertiary completed	12.1	18.4
	N	66	158

Madrid		Female	Male
	Illiterate or primary not completed	22.4	14.9
	Primary completed	15.5	21.6
	Secondary completed	51.7	54.7
	Post-secondary (non tertiary) completed	0.9	1.7
	Tertiary completed	9.5	7.2

Table 5.11 continued from previous page

N		116	181

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

b. Brussels: χ^2= 4.80, p=0.309; Lyon: χ^2= 12.04, p=0.007; Turin: χ^2= 1.82, p=0.769; Barcelona: 3.36, p=0.499; Madrid: χ^2= 4.56, p=0.335.

In the two Spanish cities the main gender differences are found in the extreme education categories. Within the female component those without education degree are about 20% and 22% in Barcelona and Madrid respectively. Within the male group only 12% and 15% has reached no education degree. Focusing on the highest level of education, in Barcelona about 12% of the female group has completed the tertiary cycle of their studies, in comparison to approx. 18% of the male component of this community. In Madrid, the trend is reversed: about 10% of the women reached the highest degree of education, whilst only 7% of men reached an equal level of education.

5.1.7. Native languages and language proficiency

In this section I compare the different Moroccan-origin communities by presenting data on the languages spoken by their members, and their language proficiency.

As shown in table 5.12, in the more established Moroccan-origin communities of Brussels and Lyon, 74% to 65% of the respondents consider French their first native language, whilst Arabic and Berber are the first language only for 26% and 35% of the respondents in Brussels and Lyon, respectively. Within the most recent communities of Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid, this trend is reversed; in these communities approx. 1% only consider Italian and Spanish as their first native language. As shown in detail in chapter 4, Berber and Arabic speaking Moroccans emigrated throughout the years from different areas in the country of origin to settle in different European countries. This trend is to some extent reflected in these tables. As shown below, the proportion of individuals who considers Berber, as their first language varies significantly among the different communities: 8% in Barcelona, 4% in Madrid and Lyon, 3% in Brussels.

Table 5.12.: Native Languages by City, Percentages

Brussels		First language	Second language	Third language
	Arab	22.7	74.9	21.4
	Berber	3.3	11.7	59.5
	French	73.5	-	-
	Dutch	0.4	8.1	-
	Other	0.2	5.4	19.0
	N	454	223	42

Lyon		First language	Second language	Third language
	Arab	30.7	80.0	-
	Berber	4.4	8.0	-
	French	64.9	-	-
	Other	-	12.0	-
	N	114	25	-

Turin		First language	Second language	Third language
	Arab	99.2	-	-
	Berber	0.3	-	-

Table 5.12 continued from previous page

Italian	0.6	-	-
Other	-	100.0	-
N	200	3	-

	First language	Second language	Third language
Barcelona			
Arab	88.8	7.3	-
Berber	8.0	16.4	-
Spanish	0.9	3.6	-
Other	2.2	72.7	100.0
N	224	55	1

	First language	Second language	Third language
Madrid			
Arab	94.3	18.8	50.0
Berber	4.4	25.0	50.0
Spanish	0.7	12.5	-
Other	0.7	43.8	-
N	298	32	2

Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

As shown in table 5.13 the percentage of individuals who are proficient in the language of the country of residence is particularly high among the communities residing in Brussels and Lyon; the group of proficient speakers constitutes instead about 67% of the Moroccan-origin community in Barcelona, 36% in Turin, and only 26% in Madrid.

Table 5.13.: Language Proficiency by City, Percentages

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Lower language profi.	-	5.3	63.6	33.5	73.7
Higher language profi.	100.0	94.7	36.4	66.5	26.3
N	455	114	200	221	293

Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

In table 5.14 I look closely at the differences that exist among the members of the different migrant generations. As shown in the tables below, not surprisingly the level of proficiency in all communities under considera-tion—with the exception

of the community of Brussels—is higher among the members of the 1.5 generation, and even higher within the second-generation group. Interestingly, the level of language proficiency of the first generation migrants tends to vary greatly across the different communities, reflecting the differences already mentioned for the whole community. In particular, in the communities of Brussels and Lyon, 100% and 84% of the group has a high level of language proficiency. Within the community of Barcelona about 63% has the same level of language proficiency, whilst in Turin and Madrid, only 34% and 23% of the first-generation migrants have a high level of language proficiency. Within the group of 1.5 generation individuals, the proportion of proficient speakers oscillates between 100% and 96% in Brussels and Lyon, to 85% in Barcelona.

Table 5.14.: Language Proficiency by Migrant Generation in the Five Cities, Percentages

		First gen. (†)	1.5 gen.	Second gen.
Brussels				
	Lower language proficiency	-	-	-
	Higher language proficiency	100.0	100.0	100.0
	N	126	46	268
		First gen. (†)	1.5 gen.	Second gen.
Lyon				
	Lower language proficiency	15.2	4.4	-
	Higher language proficiency	84.4	95.7	100.0
	N	32	23	52
		First gen. (†)	1.5 gen.	Second gen.
Turin				
	Lower language proficiency	66.5	5.6	-
	Higher language proficiency	33.5	94.4	100.0
	N	179	18	2
		First gen. (†)	1.5 gen.	Second gen.
Barcelona				
	Lower language proficiency	36.7	15.4	-
	Higher language proficiency	63.3	84.6	100.0
	N	188	26	1
		First gen. (†)	1.5 gen.	Second gen.
Madrid				

Table 5.14 continued from previous page

Lower language proficiency	36.7	15.4	-
Higher language proficiency	63.3	84.6	100.0
N	188	26	6

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

b. (†) the first generation in this table includes only individuals who migrated at 15 years old or older.

c. Lyon: χ^2= 88.70, p< 0.001; Turin: χ^2= 28.43, p< 0.001; Barcelona: χ^2= 0.78, p=0.68; Madrid: χ^2= 18.65, p< 0.001.

5.1.8. Employment status and household monthly income

In this section I first provide information on the employment status of the members of the different Moroccan-origin communities. I then present detailed information on the household monthly income for each community under consideration.

As shown in table 5.15, most of the individuals residing in Barcelona and Madrid were employed at the time at which the survey was conducted, respectively 67% and 74% of the sample. Their counterparts residing in Brussels, Lyon, and Turin represent instead only 40%, 48%, and 43% respectively of the sample. These findings are influenced by the year in which the different fieldworks associated to each survey were conducted and the specific economic situation that characterised the country in that particular moment (for more details see chapter 3).

Table 5.15.: Employment Status by City, Percentages

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Not employed	60.2	51.8	57.5	33.5	25.8
Employed	39.8	48.3	42.5	66.5	74.2
N	455	114	200	224	298

Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

In table 5.16 I show how the employment status varies when the gender and migrant generation of the member of each community are taken into account. As shown in the tables below, the proportion of the male component in each community that declared to be employed is generally higher across all migrant generations. In particular, within the Moroccan-origin community of Brussels, whilst the proportion of employed men is respectively 48%, 76%, and 46% for the first generation, 1.5 generation, and second generation individuals, the percentage of employed women represent only 15%, 33%, and 35%. A similar gender gap can be found also in the communities of Lyon and Turin. A more gender-balanced participation in the labour market is found within the Moroccan-origin communities that settled in Barcelona and Madrid. In particular, focusing on the largest group of first-generation migrants, approx. 72% of the male component is employed in comparison. Whilst their female counterparts represent about 60% of the whole female first-generation group within the community of Barcelona. Within the community of Madrid, about 78% of the first-generation male migrants are employed, whilst the female component employed represents about 69% of the whole first-generation female group.

Table 5.16.: Employment Status by Gender and Migrant Generation in the Five Cities, Percentages

Brussels

		First gen. (†)		1.5 gen.		Second gen.	
		Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
	Not empl.	84.9**	52.1**	66.7**	24.0**	64.7	53.8
	Employed	15.1**	48.0**	33.3**	76.0*	35.3	46.2
	N	53	73	21	25	136	132

Lyon

		First gen. (†)		1.5 gen.		Second gen.	
		Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
	Not empl.	57.1	33.3	52.6	25.0	78.6	37.5
	Employed	42.9	66.7	47.4	75.0	21.4	62.5
	N	14	18	19	4	28	24

Turin

		First gen. (†)		1.5 gen.		Second gen.	
		Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
	Not empl.	67.6*	52.4*	50.0	60.0	-	100.0
	Employed	32.4*	47.6*	50.0	40.0	100.0	-
	N	74	105	8	10	1	1

Barcelona

		First gen. (†)		1.5 gen.		Second gen.	
		Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
	Not empl.	39.6	28.5	37.5	36.8	75.0	50.0
	Employed	60.4	71.5	62.5	63.2	25.0	50.0
	N	53	137	8	19	4	2

Madrid

		First gen. (†)		1.5 gen.		Second gen.	
		Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
	Not empl.	30.8	21.8	28.6	28.6	-	-
	Employed	69.2	78.2	71.4	71.4	100.0	-

Table 5.16 continued from previous page

N	107	174	7	7	1	-

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

b. (†) the first generation in this table includes only individuals who migrated at 15 years old or older.

c. * and ** indicate that the gender cross-group differences within each migrant generation are significant at 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.

Table 5.17 shows how in comparison to the communities of Brussels and Lyon, the percentage of individuals who live in lower income households is higher within the less established Moroccan-origin communities of Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid with respectively 80%, 70%, and 84% living in households where the average monthly income is below 1,500 euros. Within the communities of Brussels and Lyon, this component represent respectively 60% and 52% of the whole community.

Table 5.17.: Household Monthly Income, Percentages

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Less than 1,500 euros	66.2	59.1	79.9	69.9	84.3
From 1,500 euros	33.9	41.0	20.1	30.1	15.7
N	455	105	190	133	204

Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

In table 5.18 I show how the household monthly income within each community varies according to the size of the household. As shown below, in the community of Lyon the individuals living within larger households tend to have a higher monthly income. In particular, in the households composed of only one or two people, approx. 22% and 28% respectively declared earning at least 1,500 euros per month. 47% of the individuals living in households of 3 and 4 people earn the same income. Approx. 63% of the individuals living in larger households composed of 5 or more people, earn from 1,500 euros monthly. In all other Moroccan-origin communities an increased size of the households does not seem influence the monthly income.

Table 5.18.: Household Monthly Income by Household Size in the Five Cities, Percentages

		1	2	3	4	5+
Brussels						
	Less than 1,500 euros	64.6	61.9	60.3	72.0	67.9
	From 1,500 euros	35.4	38.1	39.7	28.1	32.1
	N	79	63	63	82	168
		1	2	3	4	5+
Lyon						
	Less than 1,500 euros	77.8	72.4	53.3	52.6	37.5
	From 1,500 euros	22.2	27.6	46.7	47.4	62.5
	N	18	29	15	19	24
		1	2	3	4	5+
Barcelona						
	Less than 1,500 euros	66.7	75.0	75.0	62.1	65.2
	From 1,500 euros	33.3	25.0	25.0	37.9	34.8
	N	12	32	36	29	23
		1	2	3	4	5+
Madrid						
	Less than 1,500 euros	85.7	83.3	91.8	84.8	78.0
	From 1,500 euros	14.3	16.7	8.2	15.3	22.0
	N	7	30	49	59	59

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).
b. Brussels: χ^2= 3.00, p= 0.557; Lyon: χ^2= 9.89, p= 0.042; Barcelona: χ^2= 1.98, p= 0.740; Madrid: χ^2= 3.93, p= 0.415.

In table 5.19 I present the monthly income within each community whilst taking into account the gender of the respondents. As shown below, the income distribution within the Moroccan communities of Brussels, Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid seem to be fairly balanced between the two gender groups.

Yet, within the community of Lyon it is clear from this table that the male component in the community earns a higher monthly income in comparison to their female counterparts: whilst approx. 57% of the male respondents earn at least 1,500 euros per month, only 29% of the female respondents in this community earn a similar level of income (in tables B.1-B.5 in the appendix I present more tabulated

Table 5.19.: Household Monthly Income by Gender, Percentages

	Brussels		Lyon		Turin		Barcelona		Madrid	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Less than 1,500 euros	68.0	64.4	71.2	43.5	74.1	83.7	68.8	70.3	84.0	84.5
From 1,500 euros	32.0	35.6	28.8	56.5	25.9	16.3	31.3	29.7	16.0	15.5
N	219	236	59	46	75	115	32	101	75	129

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).
b. Brussels: χ^2= 0.67, p= 0.414; Lyon: χ^2= 8.21, p= 0.004; Turin: χ^2= 2.82, p= 0.093; Barcelona: χ^2= 0.03, p= 0.868; Madrid: χ^2= 0.01, p= 0.925.

data on the degree of household monthly income of each community by dividing these into various subgroups).

5.1.9. Religious affiliation and religiosity

As shown in table 5.20, Moroccans are mainly Muslim: this percentage oscillates between 63% for the community residing in Lyon to about 99% for the community in Madrid. About 8% and 6% of the respondents in Lyon are respectively Jewish and Catholic.[2] As shown in the table, the percentage of those who do not affiliate to any religion is included between a minimum of 0.3% and 0.7% found respectively in Madrid and Turin, to a maximum of about 23% in Lyon (for more details see table B.6 in the appendix).

Table 5.20.: Religious Affiliation by City, Percentages

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Muslim	92.0	62.5	98.1	93.8	98.7
Jewish	-	8.0	-	-	0.7
Catholic	-	6.3	-	0.9	0.3
Protestant	-	-	0.6	-	-
Atheist or agnostic	8.0	23.2	0.7	5.4	0.3
Other	-	0.9	0.6	-	-
N	449	112	199	224	298

Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

In table 5.21 I show how often the members of each community practise their religion, for example by attending religious gatherings. The communities of Turin and Brussels display a higher degree of religiosity with respect to the other communities. Approximately 83% of the respondents residing in Turin practise at least once a week. In comparison, their counterparts residing in Brussels, Barcelona, and Lyon constitute respectively about 47%, 29%, and 19% of the total sample. Only 5% of the Moroccan-origin residents in Madrid declared practising at least once a week. The intermediate group, which is represented by those individuals who practise their religion at least once a year, constitutes nearly 13% and 16% of the community residing respectively in Turin and Barcelona. The relative size of this intermediate group is larger in Lyon, Brussels, and Madrid, representing respectively about 28%, 42%, and 57% of the community. Finally, by examining the

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[2]As I mentioned in section 4.3.2 in the previous chapter, among the first Moroccan migrants who migrated to France, were the Jewish Moroccans native of the cities of Essaouira and Marrakesh. A significant portion of these pioneer migrants settled in Saint-Fons, a small industrial town situated 5 km south of Lyon (see Atouf, 2003, 2005).

relative size of the last group (i.e. individuals who never practises their religion), it is possible to confirm that the communities residing in Brussels and Turin are characterised by a higher level of religiosity in comparison with the other communities, where the percentage of individuals not practising their religion oscillates between about 40% in Madrid and 56% in Barcelona.

Table 5.21.: Religious Attendance by City, Percentages

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
At least once a week	47.4	19.3	83.4	28.5	4.5
At least once a year	41.6	28.1	12.8	15.5	57.2
Never practises	11.0	52.6	3.8	56.0	38.3
N	399	114	197	207	290

Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

In table 5.22 I present data on the level of religiosity by segmenting each community according to gender and migration generation lines.

As shown in the table, the first generation female and male components of the community residing in Brussels are substantially more balanced in terms of their religious attendance, in comparison to the subsequent generations. In particular, within the 1.5 generation sub-group 60% of men practice their religion at least once a week, whilst only 20% of women who belong to the same migrant generation practise their religion with the same frequency. Focusing on the other extreme category (i.e. never practises), whilst only 10% of men declared to never practise their religion, for women this percentage concerns 35% of the sub-group. A similar result is found for the second generation. For the female component of this community we can see a clear trend whereby the members of the older generations are more religious in comparison to the younger generations, the same can be seen for the male component but to a lesser degree.

Compared to the community of Brussels, the Moroccan community residing in Lyon is more balanced along gender and generation lines in terms of the religious attendance of its members. Within the second generation sub-group, in contrast with the trend described in Brussels, in Lyon about 63% of men belong to the category of individuals who never practices their religion, whilst their female counterparts represent only 39% of their second generation sub-group.

It is worth remembering that for the most recent communities residing in Italy and Spain, meaningful comparisons between gender groups will mostly be limited to the first generation group. Inter-generational comparisons based on these samples will not be overly informative, in the light of the low number of 1.5 and second generation individuals within these communities.

Within the community of Moroccans in Turin, compared to the other communities seen so far, the percentage of women who practises their religion at least once a week is significantly higher: about 89% and 75% respectively for the first and 1.5 generation sub-groups. The male component of this community is substantially in line with the levels of religiosity shown by the female group.

In Barcelona and Madrid, focusing on the first and 1.5 generations, we can see a significant difference in the level of religiosity between the two gender groups. The table below shows that about 39% of first-generation men practises their religion at least once a week, whilst their female counterpart represent only 10% of the female first-generation group. This difference is reflected also in the category of those who never practice: whilst only 44% of men do not practise their religion, this concerns about 79% of the female group of first-generation migrants. Within the community of Madrid, the gender difference is reversed. In this community the female component in the first and 1.5 generation shows higher levels of religiosity compared to their male counterparts. In particular, whilst 73% of first-generation women practise at least once a year their religion, only 48% of the male group show the same level of religiosity. Focusing on the group of individuals who never practise, first-generation and 1.5 generation men who fall into this category represent respectively 48% and 71% of their sub-group. The percentage of first-generation women remains instead about 24% of the group, whilst all 1.5 generation women practise their religion at least once a week or once a year.

Table 5.22.: Religious Attendance by Gender and Migrant Generation in the Five Cities, Percentages

		First gen. (†)		1.5 gen.		Second gen.	
		Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Brussels							
	At least once a week	53.1	70.8	20.0	60.0	33.3	50.5
	At least once a year	40.8	27.7	45.0	30.0	50.4	42.2
	Never practises	6.1	1.5	35.0	10.0	16.3	7.3
	N	49	65	20	20	123	109
		First gen. (†)		1.5 gen.		Second gen.	
		Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Lyon							
	At least once a week	28.6	35.3	5.3	25.0	17.9	16.7
	At least once a year	7.1	11.8	36.8	50.0	42.9	20.8
	Never practices	64.3	52.9	57.9	25.0	39.3	62.5

Table 5.22 continued from previous page

	N	14	17	19	4	28	24
		First gen. (†)		1.5 gen.		Second gen.	
		Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Turin							
	At least once a week	89.2	80.4	75.0	70.0	100.0	100.0
	At least once a year	10.8	14.7	12.5	20.0	-	-
	Never practises	-	4.9	12.5	10.0	-	-
	N	74	102	8	10	1	1
		First gen. (†)		1.5 gen.		Second gen.	
		Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Barcelona							
	At least once a week	10.4	38.6	-	15.8	33.3	50.0
	At least once a year	10.4	17.3	14.3	21.0	-	-
	Never practices	79.2	44.1	85.7	63.2	66.7	50.0
	N	48	127	7	19	3	2
		First gen. (†)		1.5 gen.		Second gen.	
		Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Madrid							
	At least once a week	2.9	4.8	14.3	14.3	-	-
	At least once a year	73.3	47.6	85.7	14.3	100.0	-
	Never practices	23.8	47.6	-	71.4	-	-
	N	105	168	7	7	1	-

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

b. (†) the first generation in this table includes only individuals who migrated at 15 years old or older.

c. Chi-square test between gender and religious attendance. Brussels: χ^2=4.50 p=0.105 (first generation); χ^2=7.38 p=0.025 (1.5 generation); χ^2=8.74 p=0.013 (second generation). Lyon: χ^2=0.45 p=0.800 (first generation); χ^2=2.31 p=0.315 (1.5 generation); χ^2=3.32 p=0.190 (second generation). Turin: χ^2=4.52 p=0.104 (first generation); χ^2=0.19 p=0.909 (1.5 generation). Barcelona: χ^2=18.01 p<0.001 (first generation); χ^2=1.60 p=0.449 (1.5 generation); χ^2=0.14 p=0.709 (second generation). Madrid: χ^2=17.53 p<0.001 (first generation); χ^2=8.57 p=0.014 (1.5 generation).

d. Chi-square test between migration generation and religious attendance. Brussels: χ^2=13.80 p=0.008 (female); χ^2=8.65 p=0.070 (male). Lyon: χ^2=7.93 p=0.094 (female); χ^2=4.70 p=0.320

(male). Turin: χ^2=9.69 p=0.046 (female); χ^2=1.00 p=0.910 (male). Barcelona: χ^2=2.77 p=0.598 (female); χ^2=4.29 p=0.368 (male). Madrid: χ^2=4.59 p=0.332 (female); χ^2=3.58 p=0.167 (male).

5.1.10. Subjective experiences of discrimination

In the previous sections I delineated a profile of each community on the basis of objective factors like the civil and employment status, level of education, language proficiency and religious affiliation of its members. In the final section I present some data on the subjective experiences of discrimination faced by the members of each community under consideration (see section D in the appendix for a definition of the concept of 'individual perceived discrimination'). As I will show in chapter 7, this factor is central in the analysis conducted on the role of anti-discrimination policies.

In particular, in table 5.23 I show the percentage of individuals who felt discriminated in the country of residence for reason of their ethnic origin. In table 5.24, I look more closely at the experiences of discrimination, separately for each gender group. Finally, in table 5.25, I show in which circumstances (e.g. work, immigration office, police, university) these experiences of discrimination are more frequent for each community (tables B.7-B.11, in the appendix, present more data on the experiences of discrimination by considering the gender, the migration generation, and the age-cohort of the members of each Moroccan-origin community).

As shown in table 5.23, the percentage of individuals who felt discriminated against in reason of their ethnic origin varies greatly between the communities under consideration. In particular, three different cases can be isolated: on one side, the community of Brussels is characterised by a high percentage of individuals who perceived discrimination (approx. 67%), whilst on the opposite side are the communities of Lyon and Madrid, where respectively 32% and 22% felt discriminated for their ethnic origin. Finally, an intermediate case is represented by the communities of Turin and Barcelona, where about 42% of the sample declared to have gone through an episode of discrimination.

Table 5.23.: Perceived Discrimination by City, Percentages

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Not discriminated	32.8	67.9	58.6	57.7	78.5
Discriminated	67.3	32.1	41.4	42.3	21.5
N	455	112	198	222	298

Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

Table 5.24 shows how the experiences of perceived discrimination within each community are substantially balanced between the two gender groups. The percentage of men who felt discriminated is comprised between 70% in the community of Brussels to about 23% in Madrid. For the female component this percentage

oscillates between 62% in Brussels and 20% in Madrid. However, within all communities, with the exception of Barcelona, the male component is more likely to perceive discrimination with respect to their female counterparts; the highest gap is found within the community of Lyon, where about 41% of men felt discriminated, in comparison to only 25% of the female group.

Table 5.25 shows in which circumstances exactly these experiences of discrimination are more frequent for each community. First of all, the table below shows how in general across all communities, individuals are more likely to face discrimination episodes in certain circumstances, for example at work, whilst looking for a job, or in dealing with the police; in comparison, in other circumstances, for example in dealing with the personnel and accessing services within the health care system or at the immigration office, the likelihood of perceiving discriminated is reduced, in general.

Focusing on the environments where perceived discrimination is more likely to occur, we can see that within the group of individuals who felt discriminated in reason of their ethnic origins, the percentage of those who experienced these episodes within their work environment oscillates between 28% within the community of Madrid to about 55% in Turin. When looking for a job, 56% and 62% of the members of the Moroccan communities of Brussels and Lyon felt episodes of discrimination towards them. This type of discrimination is felt by 31%, 16%, and 22% respectively within the community of Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid. Within the group of those who perceived discrimination, 40% to 20% across all communities, felt discriminated in interacting with the police. Episodes of discrimination perceived in the streets of the country of residence represent another particular circumstance where individuals are more likely to feel discriminated. Within the group of individuals who felt discriminated, the percentage of those who felt this in the streets is relatively high across all communities: it oscillates between 40% within Madrid, and 57% in Barcelona.

Interestingly, some communities present some peculiarities with respect to the others. For example, this is the case of the communities of Turin and Barcelona with respect to the experiences of discrimination encountered within the immigration office. Whilst in Brussels, Lyon, and Madrid, the percentage of those who felt discriminated in these circumstances remain below 5%, in Barcelona and Turin, 14% and 21% respectively, have felt discriminated whilst dealing with personnel in the immigration office. Furthermore, within the community of Lyon, the percentage of individuals who felt discrimination within the university environments (39%) is particularly high with respect to the other communities, where it involves approx. 17%, 13%, and 6% of the group in Brussels, Turin, and Barcelona, respectively. Furthermore, in comparison to their counterparts residing in Belgium, Italy,

Table 5.24.: Perceived Discrimination by Gender, Percentages

	Brussels		Lyon		Turin		Barcelona		Madrid	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Not discriminated	38.4	30.1	74.6	59.2	62.2	56.2	56.9	58.6	80.2	77.5
Discriminated	61.6	69.9	25.4	40.8	37.8	43.8	43.1	41.4	19.8	22.5
N	219	236	63	49	81	118	65	157	116	182

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).
b. χ^2= 2.74, p= 0.098 (Brussels); χ^2= 3.00, p= 0.083 (Lyon); χ^2= 0.64, p= 0.423 (Turin); χ^2= 0.19, p= 0.659 (Barcelona); χ^2= 0.30, p= 0.580 (Madrid).

and Spain, the members of the community of Lyon are particularly sensitive to episodes of discrimination perceived within restaurants, bars, and shops, where more than half of those who felt discriminated, experienced this within these particular contexts. This type of discrimination is less likely to be perceived in the other communities, involving a percentage of the group that remains below 30%, and reaching the low point of 8% in Madrid.

Table 5.25.: Environments of Perceived Discrimination, Percentages

University

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Yes	17.4	39.3	12.9	6.1	-
No	82.6	60.7	87.1	93.9	100.0
N	109	28	31	49	45

Work

	Brussles	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Yes	34.9	54.5	48.7	42.9	28.0
No	65.1	45.5	51.3	57.1	72.0
N	109	33	78	49	50

Health care system

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Yes	18.3	13.9	11.5	10.2	2.0
No	81.7	86.1	88.5	89.8	98.0
N	109	36	78	49	50

Immigration office

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Yes	2.8	3.7	20.8	14.3	4.0
No	97.2	96.3	79.2	85.7	96.0
N	108	27	77	49	50

Police

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Yes	35.8	40.0	20.5	32.7	18.0
No	64.2	60.0	79.5	67.3	82.0

Table 5.25 continued from previous page

N	109	35	78	49	50

Looking for a job

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Yes	56.0	61.8	30.8	16.3	22.0
No	44.0	38.2	69.2	83.7	78.0
N	109	34	78	49	50

Looking for an apartment

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Yes	39.4	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
No	60.6	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
N	109	-	-	-	-

Restaurant and bars

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Yes	27.3	53.1	16.7	16.3	8.0
No	72.7	46.9	83.3	83.7	92.0
N	110	32	78	49	50

Street

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Yes	40.9	52.8	41.8	57.1	40.0
No	59.1	47.2	58.2	42.9	60.0
N	110	36	79	49	50

Neighbourhood

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Yes	10.0	30.6	17.7	16.7	14.0
No	90.0	69.4	82.3	83.3	86.0
N	110	36	79	48	50

Shops

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Yes	17.4	52.8	15.4	24.5	8.0

Table 5.25 continued from previous page

No	82.6	47.2	84.6	75.5	92.0
N	109	36	78	49	50

Public transportation

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Yes	19.3	24.2	40.5	24.5	10.0
No	80.7	75.8	59.5	75.5	90.0
N	109	33	79	49	50

Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

5.2. Associational and Political Patterns of Engagement

After I have delineated the socio-demographic and economic profile of the five communities under comparison in sections 5.1.1-5.1.9, and presented for each community the subjective experiences of discrimination (see section 5.1.10), in this second part of the chapter, I focus on the associational and political modes of engagement of the members of these communities.

In section 5.2.1 I present the overall level of associational involvement within each community (see table 5.26), and subsequently break this down by gender groups (see table 5.27) and the various types of associations (see table 5.28).

In sections 5.2.2-5.2.5, I focus on the indicators of political engagement that I will use in the multivariate analyses presented in chapters 6 and 7. The indicators of attitudinal engagement on which I focus here are the level of political interest and the feelings of belonging that Moroccan-origin residents have developed in their countries of residence. Behavioural engagement is instead composed of nine different political acts.

5.2.1. Associational involvement

In table 5.26, I show the percentage of individuals who were involved in the last 12 months in at least one the 18 different types of associations listed in the survey (see section C in the appendix, for more details on the operationalisation of the concept of 'associational involvement').

As shown in the table, about half of the community in Lyon is involved in an association. Their counterparts in Brussels, Turin, and Barcelona represent respectively 35%, 37%, and 25% of the community. Only 6% of the members of the Moroccan-origin community residing in Madrid is involved in any of the listed associations.

Table 5.26.: Associational Involvement by City, Percentages

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Non involved	64.6	50.9	75.5	63.4	93.6
Involved	35.4	49.1	24.5	36.6	6.4
N		455	114	200	224	298

Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

In table 5.27 I look more closely at the gender differences in the level of associational involvement within each community. The table shows that the male compo-

nent of all communities, with the exception of the Moroccan community of Madrid, tend to be more involved in associations compared to their female counterparts. The gap within the community of Turin is particularly high: whilst 35% of men declared to be involved in at least one of the 18 different types of associations listed in the questionnaire, only 16% of women where involved in an association.

In table 5.28 I compare the level of involvement in various types of associations. As shown in the table, within the Moroccan communities considered in this study, some associations are more popular than others. This is the case, for example, of sport clubs within the communities of Brussels, Lyon, and Barcelona, where respectively 14%, 23%, and 15% of the sample was involved in this type of association. Involvement in cultural organisations is relatively high within the communities of Turin and Barcelona, where it concerns about 13% of the communities. Involvement in trade unions is higher in the Moroccan communities of Brussels and Lyon, with respectively 11% and 10% of these communities involved in this specific type of associations. The level of associational involvement of the members of the community of Madrid remains particularly low across all types of associations. Finally, the table below also shows that the involvement within the communities of Brussels and Barcelona is dispersed across a wider number of associations, compared to the other communities.

Table 5.27.: Associational Involvement by Gender, Percentages

	Brussels		Lyon		Turin		Barcelona		Madrid	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Not involved	69.9	59.8	52.4	49.0	84.5	64.7	66.7	62.0	91.4	95.0
Involved	30.1	40.3	47.6	51.0	15.5	35.4	33.3	38.0	8.6	5.0
N	219	236	63	51	84	116	66	158	116	182

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).
b. $\chi^2 = 5.09$, p= 0.024 (Brussels); $\chi^2 = 0.13$, p= 0.721 (Lyon); $\chi^2 = 9.76$, p= 0.002 (Turin); $\chi^2 = 0.43$, p= 0.511 (Barcelona); $\chi^2 = 1.60$, p= 0.205 (Madrid).

Table 5.28.: Associational Involvement by Type of Association, Percentages

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Sport club	14.1 (64)	22.8 (26)	6.9 (14)	15.2 (34)	1.3 (4)
Cultural organisation	6.2 (28)	7.3 (15)	13.2 (15)	12.5 (28)	0.7 (2)
Political party	1.8 (8)	3.5 (4)	1.3 (3)	0.9 (2)	-
Trade union	10.5 (48)	9.6 (11)	6.0 (12)	4.9 (11)	0.3 (1)
Professional organisation	0.9 (4)	-	-	2.2 (5)	-
Humanitarian aid	3.1 (14)	11.4 (13)	2.1 (4)	3.6 (8)	1.3 (4)
Environmental protection association	0.2 (1)	-	0.6 (1)	1.3 (3)	-
Human rights or peace organisation	1.5 (7)	1.8 (2)	1.7 (3)	1.3 (3)	-
Religious organisation	2.9 (13)	7.0 (8)	5.1 (10)	1.8 (4)	0.3 (1)
Immigrants organisation	-	1.8 (2)	1.3 (3)	3.6 (8)	1.0 (3)
Ethnic group organisation	0.7 (3)	-	4.4 (9)	1.3 (3)	2.0 (6)
Anti-racism organisation	1.1 (5)	3.5 (4)	-	0.9 (2)	-
Educational organisation	4.6 (21)	8.8 (10)	1.4 (3)	3.6 (8)	0.7 (2)
Youth organisation	5.1 (23)	6.1 (7)	1.0 (2)	0.4 (1)	-
Organisation for retired	0.4 (2)	0.9 (1)	-	0.4 (1)	-
Women organisation	1.3 (6)	0.9 (1)	1.6 (3)	0.9 (2)	0.7 (2)
Neighbour organisation	1.5 (7)	3.5 (4)	0.7 (1)	1.3 (3)	-
Other association	1.5 (7)	4.4 (5)	-	0.4 (1)	0.3 (1)

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).
b. The figures in brackets are frequencies.

5.2.2. Feelings of belonging

In this section, I explore the types of feelings developed by the members of these Moroccan-origin communities in their countries of residence throughout their stay. As I will show later, this is an aspect of their attitudinal involvement that will be central in the analysis conducted in chapter 7.

Each Moroccan-origin community is broken down into four different groups, according to the type of feelings of belonging developed (see section D in the appendix for a detailed description of the operationalisation of the concept of 'feelings of belonging'). As shown in figure 5.13, one of the four groups is composed of individuals who developed strong feelings of belonging primarily towards their own ethnic community (i.e. 'Ethnic' group). A second group is composed instead of individuals with strong feelings of belonging for the members of the autochthonous community primarily (i.e. 'National' group). A third group is composed of individuals who developed strong feelings of belonging for their own ethnic community as well as the autochthonous community (i.e. 'Double' group). The last group is composed of individuals who did not develop strong feelings of belonging for either of the two communities (i.e. 'None' group)

Focusing on the 'Ethnic' group—that is the group of individuals within each Moroccan-origin community that has developed primarily strong feelings for their own ethnic group—the figure shows how this component is more significant within the communities residing in the newer cities of immigration compared to the more established Moroccan origin communities. In particular, the Ethnic group represents approx. 27% in Turin, about 19% in Barcelona, and 18% in Madrid. Conversely, in Brussels and Lyon, this group constitutes respectively 11% and 5% of the whole sample.

The opposite trend is found once we focus on the 'National' group, which is composed of individuals who have developed feelings of belonging mainly towards the autochthonous group. Not surprisingly, this component is more important in Brussels and Lyon, with respectively 23% and 32% of the respondents declaring feeling a strong attachment exclusively for the autochthonous community. This component is also significant in Barcelona, with a similar proportion as to that found within the community residing in Brussels. Their counterparts in Turin and Madrid, represent instead 14% and 15% respectively.

The individuals who developed strong feelings of belonging towards their own ethnic group as well as the autochthonous community, constitute the most important component of the Moroccan communities residing in Brussels, Lyon, Barcelona, and Madrid. In these cities, this component represent respectively 41%, 36%, 37%, and 51% of whole sample. It is worth noting that in Turin instead, this group con-

stitutes only 26% of the sample. Most of the individuals in Turin are found among those who did not develop strong feelings of belonging either for the ethnic group or for the autochthonous group (approx. 34%).

Figure 5.13.: Feelings of Belonging by City

Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

Table 5.29.: Feelings of Belonging by Gender, Percentages

	Brussels		Lyon		Turin		Barcelona		Madrid	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
No feelings of belonging	28.8	31.8	17.5	27.5	22.8	45.7	25.8	21.7	17.2	15.5
Double feelings of belonging	33.8	37.7	46.0	35.3	31.8	17.4	37.9	36.3	53.5	49.2
Ethnic feelings of belonging	12.8	9.3	3.2	7.8	28.2	28.5	12.1	19.8	13.8	21.6
National feelings of belonging	24.7	21.2	33.3	29.4	17.2	8.4	24.2	22.3	15.5	13.8
N	219	236	63	51	82	118	66	157	116	181

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

b. χ^2= 2.67, p= 0.446 (Brussels); χ^2= 3.38, p= 0.337 (Lyon); χ^2= 10.58, p= 0.032 (Turin); χ^2= 2.42, p= 0.659 (Barcelona); χ^2= 3.47, p= 0.482 (Madrid).

In table 5.30 I look more closely at the feelings of belonging developed by the members of the communities of Brussels and Lyon by taking into account the different migrant generation groups. The table shows no clear difference between the generation groups within the community of Brussels.

Yet, within the community of Lyon the members of the second generation are composed by a relatively higher percentage of individuals (27%) who do not identify strongly with any of the groups. For the first and 1.5 generations, this concerns respectively 19% and 17% of the group. The percentage of individuals who instead developed strong feelings of belonging for the autochthonous and Moroccan group is relatively more important within the members who migrated at an early age (57%), and to some extent also among first generation migrants (47%). Conversely, only 31% of the second-generation individuals developed a dual form of belonging.

Also in the communities of Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid, the 1.5 generation is composed of a higher percentage of individuals who developed strong feelings of belonging for both groups.

Table 5.30.: Feelings of Belonging by Migrant Generation in the Five Cities, Percentages

		First gen.	1.5 gen.	Second gen.
Brussels				
	None	27.8	23.9	32.8
	Ethnic	13.5	8.7	9.7
	National	20.6	32.6	23.1
	Double	38.1	34.8	34.3
	N	126	46	268
		First generation	1.5 generation	Second generation
Lyon				
	None	18.8	17.4	26.9
	Ethnic	3.1	4.4	7.7
	National	31.3	21.7	34.6
	Double	46.9	56.5	30.8
	N	32	23	52
		First generation	1.5 generation	Second generation
Turin				
	None	35.4	16.7	50.0
	Ethnic	27.0	16.7	50.0
	National	12.4	27.8	-
	Double	25.3	38.9	-
	N	178	18	2

Table 5.30 continued from previous page

		First generation	1.5 generation	Second generation
Barcelona				
	None	24.9	11.1	-
	Ethnic	17.5	18.5	16.7
	National	21.7	22.2	66.7
	Double	36.0	48.1	16.7
	N	189	27	6
		First generation	1.5 generation	Second generation
Madrid				
	None	16.1	14.3	-
	Ethnic	19.3	7.1	-
	National	14.3	21.4	-
	Double	50.4	57.1	-
	N	280	14	-

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

b. (†) the first generation in this table includes only individuals who migrated at 15 years old or older.

c. Brussels: χ^2= 5.21, p= 0.516. Lyon: χ^2= 5.54, p= 0.477. Turin: χ^2= 7.90, p= 0.443. Barcelona: χ^2= 10.37, p= 0.240. Madrid: χ^2= 2.70, p= 0.952.

5.2.3. Interest in politics

As shown in table 5.31, in general the percentage of individuals who declared to be fairly or very interested in politics oscillates between 40% and approx. 80%. The Moroccan-origin communities residing in the cities of Brussels, Turin, and Barcelona, present on average a similar level of interest in politics (60%). The highest and lowest degrees of interest in politics are expressed respectively by the more established community of Lyon and the relatively new community in Madrid (see section C in the appendix for a detailed description of operationalisation of the concept of 'political interest').

Table 5.31.: Interest in Politics by City, Percentages

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Not interested	39.7	20.2	37.0	39.9	59.6
Interested	60.3	79.8	63.1	60.1	40.4
N	453	114	192	223	292

Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

As shown in table 5.32, within all communities, with the exception of those residing in Turin, the male component shows a relatively higher degree of interest in politics. The gender gap is particularly high in Madrid: 45% of men expressed interest in politics, whilst only 33% of women falls in the same group (in tables B.12-B.25, in the appendix, I present more tabulated data on the degree of political interest of each community by dividing these into various subgroups).

Table 5.32.: Interest in Politics by Gender, Percentages

		Female	Male
Brussels			
	Not interested	41.5	38.1
	Interested	58.5	61.9
	N	217	236
		Female	Male
Lyon			
	Not interested	22.2	17.4
	Interested	77.8	82.4
	N	63	51

Table 5.32 continued from previous page

		Female	Male
Turin			
	Not interested	33.4	39.5
	Interested	66.6	60.5
	N	81	112

		Female	Male
Barcelona			
	Not interested	44.6	38.0
	Interested	17.5	62.0
	N	65	158

		Female	Male
Madrid			
	Not interested	67.0	55.0
	Interested	33.0	45.0
	N	112	180

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

b. (†) the first generation in this table includes only individuals who migrated at 15 years old or older.

c. Brussels: χ^2= 0.53, p= 0.468. Lyon: χ^2= 0.37, p= 0.545. Turin: χ^2= 1.57, p= 0.211. Barcelona: χ^2= 0.85, p= 0.357. Madrid: χ^2= 4.10, p= 0.043.

5.2.4. Political acts

In table 5.33 I present nine different forms of political acts in which the respondents could have engaged within the year prior to the survey. These include the following acts: (1) contacting a politician, government official, media or solicitor; (2) working in a political party or action group; (3) wearing or displaying a badge, sticker or poster; (4) signing a petition; (5) taking part in a public demonstration; (6) boycotting certain products; (7) buying certain products for political reasons; (8) donating money to a political organisation or group; (9) taking part in a strike.

The table shows three different patterns of engagement within the communities considered. The community of Moroccans residing in the city of Madrid is characterised by a low pattern of engagement in political acts compared to all the other communities. In this city, the most prominent form of engagement—the donation of money to political organisations or groups—concerns less than 4% of the sample. The only other forms of political action in which they are engaged are contacting politicians, governmental officials, media, or solicitors, signing petitions, boycotting, and taking part in strikes, with a percentage that ranges between 0.3% and 2.4%. Relative to the Moroccans residing in Madrid, the communities in Brussels and Lyon express a high degree of political engagement. As shown in the table, in Lyon and Brussels the acts of signing a petition, taking part in public demonstrations, and boycotting represent some of the most prominent forms of political participation, with percentages of individuals concerned that are between 40% and approx. 20%. In Lyon, differently from Brussels, the act of taking part in strikes plays a more important role, concerning about 25% of the sample, with respect to the 7% in Brussels. The communities residing in Turin and Barcelona are in an intermediate position with respect to the other communities. As in Brussels and Lyon, the respondents engaged in all nine forms of political actions considered here. However, as shown in the table, the peaks are lower compared to those reached in Brussels and Lyon. In Turin and Barcelona, the most prominent forms of political action—taking part in public demonstrations and signing petitions—concern respectively 15% and approx. 12% of the sample.

Table 5.33.: Types of Political Acts, Percentages

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Contacted a politician, government official, media or solicitor	12.8 (58)	14.0 (16)	4.3 (9)	10.7 (24)	1.7 (5)
Worked in a political party or action group	5.2 (19)	5.3 (6)	1.5 (3)	0.9 (2)	-
Worn or displayed a badge, sticker or poster	9.0 (34)	13.3 (15)	4.0 (8)	8.0 (18)	-
Signed a petition	26.1 (101)	40.4 (46)	2.6 (5)	11.6 (26)	1.4 (4)
Taken part in a public demonstration	22.1 (85)	26.3 (30)	14.8 (30)	9.0 (20)	2.4 (7)
Boycotted certain products	24.9 (96)	18.6 (21)	4.6 (9)	3.6 (8)	0.3 (1)
Bought certain products for political reasons	6.2 (23)	8.8 (10)	1.0 (2)	4.9 (11)	-
Donated money to a political organisation or group	10.2 (38)	6.1 (7)	4.3 (9)	6.7 (15)	3.7 (11)
Taken part in a strike	7.3 (27)	25.4 (29)	5.0 (10)	2.2 (5)	0.3 (1)
Participating in any of the above	27.3 (124)	55.3 (63)	18.9 (38)	26.8 (60)	3.4 (10)
Participating in none of the above	49.1 (201)	36.8 (42)	74.2 (148)	65.2 (146)	92.3 (274)
Participating in only 1 of the above	21.8 (89)	23.7 (27)	18.0 (36)	22.8 (51)	6.1 (18)
Participating in 2 of the above	11.7 (48)	14.0 (16)	3.7 (7)	5.8 (13)	1.4 (4)
Participating in 3 or more of the above	17.4 (71)	25.4 (29)	4.1 (8)	6.3 (14)	0.3 (1)

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).
b. The figures in brackets are frequencies.

In table 5.34 I look more closely at the patterns of political participation of both gender groups for each community under consideration here. As mentioned above, the community of Madrid shows very low levels of engagement in the political sphere of the country of residence, and this concerns both groups, although the male component is slightly more active, through the acts like donating money (5%) and taking part in demonstrations (3%). The community of Brussels does not present important gender differences in relation to political participation. The gaps exist but are relatively small and are not always in favour of the male group.

As shown in the table, the community of Lyon is characterised by some significant gender gaps in relation to specific political acts, like contacting and donating money. Within the community of Turin, the male component is certainly more engaged in politics in comparison to their female counterparts. A significant difference relates to the act of taking part in strikes: whilst 9% of men took part in a strike, no women declared having joined one in the last year. Finally, the community of Barcelona shows a more balanced gender pattern with respect to Turin. The women residing in Barcelona are significantly more engaged in acts like wearing or displaying badges, stickers, or posters compared to their male counterparts (see section B.25 in the appendix for more tabulated data on the distribution of political participation by various subgroups).

Table 5.34.: Types of Political Acts by Gender, Percentages

	Brussels		Lyon		Turin		Barcelona		Madrid	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Contacted a government official (†)	17.1 (29)	14.2 (29)	6.4** (4)	23.53** (12)	2.0 (2)	6.0 (7)	9.1 (6)	11.4 (18)	1.7 (2)	1.7 (3)
Worked in a political party or action group	4.1 (7)	6.03 (12)	3.2 (2)	7.9 (4)	-	2.5 (3)	1.5 (1)	0.6 (1)	-	-
Worn or displayed a badge, sticker or poster	10.0 (17)	8.2 (17)	9.5 (6)	18.00 (9)	0.9 (1)	6.1 (7)	13.6* (9)	5.7* (9)	-	-
Signed a petition	30.7 (55)	22.1 (46)	44.4 (28)	35.3 (18)	0.8 (1)	3.9 (5)	10.6 (7)	12.0 (19)	-	2.2 (4)
Taken part in a public demonstration	25.8 (46)	18.8 (39)	23.8 (15)	29.4 (15)	10.0 (8)	18.1 (21)	6.1 (4)	10.1 (16)	1.7 (2)	2.8 (5)
Boycotted certain products	28.65 (51)	21.63 (45)	16.1 (10)	21.6 (11)	-	0.6 (1)	6.1 (4)	2.5 (4)	-	0.6 (1)
Bought certain products for political reasons	7.0 (12)	5.5 (11)	9.5 (6)	7.8 (4)	-	1.7 (2)	4.6 (3)	5.1 (8)	-	-
Donated money to a political organisation (‡)	12.7 (22)	8.0 (16)	1.6* (1)	11.8* (6)	3.2 (3)	5.1 (6)	9.1 (6)	5.7 (9)	1.7 (2)	5.0 (9)
Taken part in a strike	8.3 (14)	6.5 (13)	25.4 (16)	25.5 (13)	-	8.6** (10)	-	3.2 (5)	0.9 (1)	-

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

b. The figures in brackets are frequencies. (†) Contacted a politician, government official, media or solicitor. (‡) Donated money to a political organisation or group.

c. * and ** indicate that the gender cross-group differences within each migrant generation are significant at 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.

5.2.5. Electoral participation

As mentioned earlier, among the different forms of behavioural political engagement I do not include the political act of voting. For the nature of the act of voting, migrant-origin individuals, and in particular first generation TCNs like Moroccans, have very limited access to electoral politics compared to their national or EU citizen counterparts. This reduced access is reflected also in the survey data used in this work.

As shown in tables 5.35-5.36 the percentage of respondents who are not eligible to participate in local and national election oscillates between approx. 86% and 95% of the sample. A noticeable exception is represented by the communities residing in Brussels and Lyon where 87% and 78% of sample is eligible to take part in local and national elections, respectively.

Since the objective of this study consists in focusing on the different activities in which members of the Moroccan-origin communities decide to engage to channel their desiderata, it seems more appropriate to focus on forms of political engagement that are not precluded by law to a large part of these communities, like the political acts listed in table 5.33.

The tables below show also differences in the overall turnout for those eligible. Voter turnout is higher within the more established Moroccan-origin communities residing in Brussels and Lyon, where 87% and 70% of those eligible to vote took part in local and national elections, respectively. In contrast, in the younger communities residing in Spain and Italy, voter turnout is significantly lower, and is between 33% and 61%.

Table 5.35.: Local Level Electoral Participation by City, Percentages

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Eligible	86.8	N/A	12.0	13.6	5.4
Not eligible	13.2	N/A	88.0	86.4	94.6
N	438	N/A	200	220	296
Turnout	87.4	N/A	60.9	33.3	50.0

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).
b. In the survey conducted in Lyon the question on local level electoral participation was not asked.

Voter turnout is similar across the municipal and national level for the Moroccan-origin communities residing in Turin and Madrid, whilst the community in Barcelona shows a significantly lower voter turnout in municipal elections (33%), compared to national level elections (50%).

Table 5.36.: National Level Electoral Participation by City, Percentages

	Brussels	Lyon	Turin	Barcelona	Madrid
Eligible	N/A	77.7	12.3	15.2	5.7
Not eligible	N/A	22.3	87.7	84.8	94.3
N	N/A	112	200	223	298
Turnout	N/A	70.1	59.5	50.0	52.9

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Sajir (2017).
b. In the survey conducted in the Brussels region the question on national level electoral participation was not asked.

5.3. Conclusion

In this chapter I have produced a report on the surveys described in chapter 3 in which I have delineated the demographic, socio-economic, and political profile of each community under consideration. The objective of this chapter consisted in acting as bridge between the theoretical part of this thesis and the empirical chapters that follow.

In this chapter I presented all the variables that are employed in the multivariate analyses that will be conducted in chapters 6 and 7. The factors presented have been selected not only because they contribute to delineate the profile of each Moroccan-origin community, but also because in the literature on migrants' involvement they are factors that are generally taken into account in explaining the political engagement of migrant-origin residents (see section 2.3).

As shown in this chapter, the five communities under consideration here vary significantly in relation to their demographic and socio-economic profile (see section 5.1). In general, for almost all factors considered here, it is possible to distinguish between the more established Moroccan-origin communities residing in Brussels and Lyon, and the relatively new communities that were created in Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid. These findings are consistent with the discussion on the emigration process from Morocco to Europe in the previous chapter.

In the second part of this chapter I presented the different modes of behavioural and attitudinal engagement in politics that will be investigated more in detail in the following chapters. Again the descriptive analysis conducted on the political modes of engagement of these communities have highlighted some of the similarities and differences that exist between the different Moroccan-origin communities in Europe (see section 5.2). Overall, the members of the communities of Brussels and Lyon appears to be more engaged in the political affairs of their countries of residence; the communities of Turin and Barcelona display interesting similarities

in their patterns of political engagement, notably in the degree of interest in politics expressed by its members (see table 5.31) and the level of involvement in the various forms of political participation considered here (see table 5.33). The members of the community of Madrid express the lowest levels of attitudinal and behavioural involvement.

In the next chapters I will employ more refined tools of investigation to show to what extent the similarities and differences highlighted in this chapter can explain variations in the modes of political engagement.

CHAPTER

6

CAN VOTING RIGHTS PROMOTE THE POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT OF MIGRANT-ORIGIN INDIVIDUALS?

The extension of voting rights in favour of third-country nationals (TCNs) residing permanently in the country of residence represents, along with the access to citizenship, one of the two main pathways through which this group of residents can be incorporated in the *demos* (Blatter et al., 2016). The extension of the franchise to TCNs has been always a contested issue, in light of the symbolic and historic implications that voting rights evoke (Łodziński et al., 2014).

Voting rights can refer to an active right, that is the right to be able to vote for a candidate in an election and other consultations of the electorate, like referenda, and a passive right, which refers to the right to stand as a candidate in an election. In addition, voting rights can refer to various representative bodies, depending on the territorial level for which votes are cast (i.e. European, national, regional and municipal). In this discussion I will focus only on the active voting rights that are granted at the municipal level to TCNs, more specifically Moroccan-origin

residents.

Today, of the 28 EU member states, 16 allow some or all categories of TCNs residents to take part in municipal elections. The remaining 12 member states do not grant any voting privileges to non-EU residents, hence reserve the right to vote to their nationals and EU citizens only (for a more detailed review see Arrighi et al. 2013, ch.4).

The debate about the possibility to extend voting rights to TCNs in the countries where this right is limited to nationals and European citizens has been on the European political agenda since the 60s-70s. Periodically, this issue is again brought to the fore by some local or national-level initiative. If it is not stopped at its embryonic state by lack of political will or absence of a consensus cutting across party lines, constitutional courts can deny the introduction of local voting rights for TCNs as occurred in Austria, Germany, and Italy.[1] In most of the cases as noted by Arrighi et al. (2013), political and legal obstacles act together to prevent the extension of the franchise to TCNs.

As pointed out by González-Ferrer (2011, 63), in this debate on TCNs' voting rights, two predominant views can be isolated: one, in which voting rights are conceived as a sort of reward or privilege that is obtained at the end of the integration process, which culminates with the acquisition of the citizenship of the country. From the other perspective, voting rights are instead conceived as a tool to promote integration. The first perspective is the predominant view that has been vehemently put forward by the conservative decisions of the constitutional courts in countries like Germany, Austria, and Italy, as mentioned above. The second perspective has been championed in Europe by Sweden and later adopted by other European countries (Garbaye, 2005). Sweden in fact pioneered the extension of the franchise to foreign residents in 1976, with the clear goal to increase the political influence and interest of this specific group of residents in the social and political affairs of the country (Bevelander and Pendakur, 2008, 2011; Arrighi et al., 2013; Bernitz, 2013).[2]

It is well known in the literature that whenever the right to vote exists in the country of residence, migrant-origin residents tend to make less use of this right, in

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[1] Austrian Constitutional Court VfSlg 17.264/2004; German Constitutional Court BVerfG 63, 37 (Schleswig-Holstein); BVerfG 63,60 (Hamburg) decisions of 31 October; Italian Constitutional Court judgements 196/2003, 2/2004. 372/2004, 379/2004.

[2] Ireland extended voting rights to foreigners earlier in 1963. However, as pointed out by different scholars, at the basis of this decision were political considerations connected to the situation in Northern Ireland and the previous recognition in the UK of local voting rights for Irish citizens, rather than the specific objective of promoting foreign residents inclusion in social and political affairs (see e.g. Łodziński et al., 2014; Starr, 2008; SpaŁng, 2014).

comparison to their autochthonous counterparts (Groenendijk, 2014; Tung, 1985).[3] Yet, as noted by Groenendijk (2014), lower turnouts in comparison with the autochthonous group is not necessarily an expression of less interest in politics but could rather be the result of bureaucratic hurdles, like strict voter registration requirements.[4]

In this debate, it remains unclear whether the extension of the franchise in favour of TCNs is an effective tool that can stimulate their interest and participation in the political sphere of the country of residence, as claimed by the supporters of the extension of the franchise.

As I will mention in more in detail in the central part of this chapter, some empirical studies have started exploring more in detail this question (see Giugni, 2010). In this chapter, I build upon the considerations developed in this work, to try to investigate whether the extension of voting rights at the municipal level in favour of TCNs is effectively associated with an increased chance of being more involved in the political affairs of the country of residence by this group of residents.

To do this, I have considered the case of the Moroccan-origin communities residing in the five European cities I have discussed: Brussels, Lyon, Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid—with Brussels as the only city where TCNs are granted the right to vote. While controlling for the effect of socio-demographic characteristics (e.g. having the citizenship of the country of residence), and other individual aspects (e.g. associational involvement, efficacy, social trust), I compare their probability of being involved in politics, by taking as indicator of their political engagement, firstly their interest in politics, and secondly their non-electoral participation.

The city of Lyon falls in the same category of the cities of Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid, because in these cities Moroccan-origin residents cannot engage in electoral politics without having the citizenship of the country of residence. However, at the individual level, as I have also shown in detail in section 5.1.5 of chapter 5, the Moroccan-origin community residing in Lyon is more similar to its counterpart residing in Brussels. In Lyon the majority of the sample (i.e. approx. 80%) is in possession of the citizenship of country of residence—hence can engage in electoral politics notwithstanding the contextual rules about voting—whilst in the

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[3]Togeby (1999, 673) and Fennema and Tillie (1999, 709), among others, however have shown that in countries where TCNs are granted voting rights, the extent to which they make use of these rights varies significantly within and between ethnic groups. Bevelander and Pendakur (2008), for example, focusing on the Swedish case, have found that naturalised citizens are more likely to exercise their voting rights with respect to non-citizens. Yet, González-Ferrer (2011) has shown that naturalised citizens still tend to vote less than comparable autochthonous citizens.

[4]For example, the 2004 Belgian law granting foreigners the right to vote in municipal elections impose on this category of residents very strict registration procedures, contributing to extend the difference between EU-residents and Non-EU residents (Lafleur, 2013).

other communities the "citizens" represent between 11% and 17% of the samples. In table 6.4 I compare more in detail the groups of Moroccan-origin citizens and non-citizens within each community according to their degree of attitudinal and behavioural involvement in politics.

The results show that although TCNs are provided with the right to vote in municipal elections in Belgium, the Moroccan community residing in Brussels does not show a higher probability of being interested in politics in comparison with the other communities of Moroccan-origin individuals residing in Lyon, Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid. Furthermore, the community residing in Brussels does not present a probability of being engaged in political action that is significantly higher with respect to the other communities. Hence it is difficult with these results to conclude that the extension of the franchise in favour of TCNs can effectively stimulate their attitudinal or behavioural involvement in the political affairs of the country of residence.

My argument will be developed in full detail in the following 5 main sections of this chapter. In section 6.1 I will briefly review the main theoretical approaches used as framework in this chapter. In section 6.2, I present the debate on the expansion of the franchise in favour of TCNs, isolate some of the arguments in support of extending voting rights to TCNs, and finally outline the main research hypotheses. Section 6.3 will present the methods used in this chapter. In section 6.4 I present the results of my analysis, and finally in section 6.5 I discuss the findings obtained.[5]

6.1. Theory

As discussed more in detail in chapter 3, the literature has shown that different factors need to be considered in order to understand patterns of political engagement.

Individual resources represent the first group of factors that are considered to be crucial in influencing migrant political engagement in the country of residence. For example, drawing on the considerations developed within the scope of the SES (socio-economic status) model, various scholars have shown how individual-level variables like education and income are some of the most significant ones affecting political engagement (Verba and Nie, 1972). In addition to these individual resources, socio-demographic factors like gender, age, marital status, have also been found to be good predictors of individuals' political engagement (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). As shown in section 6.4, to estimate the probability that Moroccan-origin individuals have of being politically engaged across different cities, in this

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[5]As I will explain in detail in section 6.3.2, the discussion in the viva has raised important concerns in relation to the ability of the research methods used here to test this argument.

chapter I take into consideration a variety of individual-level factors (for more details on the operationalisation of these factors see section in the appendix).

Nonetheless, as pointed out by González-Ferrer (2011, 65), individuals of similar socio-economic status and socio-demographic characteristics may differ in their propensity to engage in politics due to the differences in their psychological characteristics and previous socialisation experiences. Not only does the extent to which individuals believe that their involvement in politics matters (i.e. external efficacy) or the extent to which they understand politics (i.e. internal efficacy) vary between individuals of the same socio-economic and demographic group, but so does the extent to which they trust other people (i.e. social trust). Empirical studies have given support to the idea that the degree of internal and external efficacy developed by individuals throughout their life cycles provides information about their propensity to be involved in politics (Verba et al. 1995, 344). Social trust also is conceived of in the literature as an important pre-condition to political involvement. For example, Fennema and Tillie (1999), drawing on the argument built by Putnam (1993), place the concept of social trust at the very centre of the causal mechanism they develop to explain variations in the degree of political engagement of migrant-origin individuals in the city of Amsterdam. In addition, Kaase (1999, 17-18), finds out a positive relationship between interpersonal trust and non-institutionalised political participation. In this chapter, as I show in section 6.4.2, I control for the effect of these three different factors.

Another aspect scholars have found to matter in attempting to understand patterns of political engagement is the involvement of migrant-origin individuals in organisational structures. As mentioned in more detail in chapter 3, over the years, a number of explanations have emerged for the link between associational involvement and political engagement, and solid evidence has been presented in support of the positive relationship existing between involvement in voluntary associations and political engagement (see e.g. Diani, 2015; Verba et al., 1995; Kwak et al., 2004; Fennema and Tillie, 1999).

In this chapter, I try to capture this factor by taking into account the membership and participation in various types of voluntary associations (see appendix for details on the operationalisation of this factor).

Finally, the context in which migrant-origin individuals live also contributes to influence the likelihood of being politically engaged, by providing opportunities or placing constraints to their inclusion. Scholars have highlighted how migrants' exclusion from the political sphere of the country of residence is particularly significant in closed political contexts, that is contexts of residence characterised by cultural and structural constraints on migrant inclusion (see e.g. Cinalli and Giugni, 2011; Koopmans et al., 2005; Calavita, 2005). For example, González-Ferrer and

Morales (2013) have shown that different citizenship regimes can shape the patterns of local voting behaviour of migrant-origin individuals. As I mentioned in the introduction, in this chapter I direct my attention to a single aspect of the political context, that is the enfranchisement at the local level of TCNs. In the next section I look more closely at this aspect, before presenting the main research hypotheses.

6.2. Voting Rights: Different Contexts, Different Rules

As I mentioned in the introduction, in this chapter, my main goal is to investigate whether the extension of the franchise at the local level in favour of third-country nationals could promote a higher degree of political involvement by the members of this group. It is worth noting that although I recognise that different factors contribute to determine the *inclusiveness* of voting rights (Arrighi and Bauböck, 2017, 622), for the purpose of this chapter, I consider only the eligibility for the franchise at the local level, leaving out for example differences in the voter registration or voting methods, or how votes are transposed into seats after the elections (for a discussion on these issues see for example Blatter, Schmid, and Blättler, 2016).

The countries under consideration in this study—Belgium, France, Italy, and Spain—fall into two different categories. Belgium is since 2004 part of the 12 countries in the EU that have extended the local suffrage to all categories of long-term residents (Arrighi and Bauböck, 2017, 626).[6]

Conversely, France and Italy do not extend the franchise to non-citizens beyond the requirements derived from EU law, hence third country national residents do not enjoy electoral rights, notwithstanding the periodic attempts to introduce a more general local franchise for this category (Arrighi et al., 2013). In France, a prominent role in the extension of the franchise has been historically played by the Socialist party. Although this issue was part of Mitterand's list of *110 propositions for France*, the party was never able to mobilise a two-thirds parliamentary majority, hence the reform was never carried out (Arrighi, 2014; Arrighi and Bauböck, 2017). In Italy, the extension of the local franchise has been since the mid-1990s an issue recurrently put forward by a number of municipal and regional councils (ASGI, 2005).

Yet all these 'local' initiatives, as well as the last general true attempt to pass a

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[6]For more details on the process that led to the extension of the franchise in favour of third-country nationals in Belgium, see e.g. Jacobs (1999), Martiniello (2005). For a more detailed treatment of the voter registration rules, voting methods, and the mechanisms of representations see e.g. Groenendijk (2014), Bousetta and Martiniello (2003), and Lafleur (2013).

law on this matter through the Amato-Ferrero bill in 2007, were all struck down by the conservative decisions of the Council of State and Constitutional Courts, and declared either unconstitutional or conceived as an invasion of central state competences (Tintori, 2013).[7]

Spain falls into the same category as France and Italy, since third country national residents do not generally enjoy electoral rights. However, Spain is an interesting case as the ratification of bilateral electoral agreements with a number of states allows a restricted number of third country national residents to enjoy voting rights on the basis of the principle of reciprocity (Arrighi et al., 2013, 64-65). The number of electoral agreements signed by Spain with non-EU countries has changed over the years. For example, as reported in a note of the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2014), in the municipal elections held in May 2015, voting rights could be granted also to citizens of Bolivia, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, South Korea, Ecuador, Paraguay, Iceland, Norway, New Zealand, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago. However, there is no reciprocal electoral agreement currently in force between Spain and Morocco, hence Moroccans residing in Spain, even if they are long term residents, do not enjoy local voting rights (see El Farah, 2008).

Consequently, as shown in the table below, Belgium is the only country where Moroccan-origin residents, which are not nationals of the country of residence, are allowed to take part in municipal elections, differently from France, Italy, and Spain.

Beyond the normative rationale (i.e. 'principle of all affected interests', 'principle of all subjected to political coercion') for re-shaping the boundaries of the *demos*,[8] are also the more prosaic motives put forward by the scholars who have focused specifically on the conditions of migrant-origin individuals in the country of residence (see e.g. Hayduk, 2004, 2006); Groenendijk (2008) for example found five main arguments that are generally used in favour of extending voting rights to non-national residents. First, the 'No taxation without representation' argument: all members of the community paying taxes need to be represented in government bodies taking decision on how public funds are spent. Second, equal treatment over time: the longer non-nationals are regular residents the more is difficult it is to

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[7]Interestingly, Italy is the only country under consideration in this study—and among the few EU Member States—that ratified the 1992 Council of Europe Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level. However, even though the Treaty came into force in 1997, Italy confined the application of the Treaty to Chapters A (i.e. "Freedom of expression, assembly and association) and B (i.e. "Consultative bodies to represent foreign residents at local level"), excluding Chapter C, which relates to the issue of "Right to vote in local authority elections".

[8]The concept of *demos* relates to the definition of who are 'the people' provided with full political equality and who are entitled to govern themselves (Dahl 1970; see also Song 2012). For a detailed review on the normative grounds for extending the franchise to non-citizens at the local level see for example Bauböck (2015) and also Beckman (2006).

justify their exclusion from the public decision-making processes. Third, pathway to citizenship: having voting rights at the local level encourages non-nationals to become naturalised in order to obtain also the right to vote in national elections and gain access to public service jobs. Fourth, immigrants are permanent members of society: providing the right to vote to non-national residents send a clear message to the majority of the population, that is, long-term resident immigrant are staying. Fifth, more political participation of the whole society: granting voting rights stimulates the political participation of immigrants and their integration in the society of residence (see also ASGI 2005, Bauböck 2003, Groenendijk 2011, and Bevelander and Pendakur 2008).

In this chapter, as mentioned before, I am interested in the last argument, which sees the extension of the franchise to migrant-origin individuals as a valid instrument for stimulating the involvement of migrants and their descendants in the political affairs of the country of residence. Although this argument derives its strength from the strong normative principles of justice and democratic legitimacy (Bauböck, 2003; Arrighi and Bauböck, 2017), it remains somewhat vague as to the specific mechanisms through which the extension of the franchise can promote the political involvement of migrant-origin residents (see e.g. Groenendijk 2014, 6; see also Giugni 2010).

In the section below I attempt to make more explicit some of the causal mechanisms that may explain why the extension of the franchise at the local level in favour of third country nationals could potentially promote their engagement in the political affairs of the country of residence. In particular, the first research hypothesis focuses on an attitudinal form of political engagement, that is, political interest, which is generally understood as an essential condition for political inclusion (Jacobs and Tillie, 2004), and more specifically, an important prerequisite to electoral participation (Verba et al., 1995, 361). In the second hypothesis, I develop instead a causal path linking the presence of voting rights of migrant-origin residents at the local level and their increased chances to be engaged in non-electoral forms of political participation.

As mentioned in section 2.3.4, the following hypotheses must be read with caution, bearing in mind that the analysis presented in the remaining part of the chapter will not provide a substantial test of the hypotheses formulated (more details on the challenges and limitations of the methods used to analyse the data are provided in section 6.3).

Hypotheses

The inclusion in the electorate can stimulate migrant-origin residents' interest in the politics of the country of residence for two reasons: firstly, being a member of the electorate represents a greater 'stake' in the society of residence. In light of the fact that political interest is an essential precondition of electoral participation (see for example, Valdez 2011; Vázquez et al. 2013; and see Nie et al. 1996 for a review), by being eligible to cast a vote, migrant-origin individuals can express their preferences and needs, and have the opportunity to contribute to the policy-making process and have their say in the relevant political debates.

In brief, inclusion in the electorate can stimulate their interest in political affairs because when migrant-origin residents are provided with the right to vote, developing higher interest in the politics of the country of residence engenders higher benefits in comparison to their counterparts who are not part of the electorate, as they are more likely to be able to express through the electoral channel their preferences, and shape relevant policies. Conversely, failing to develop interest in the political affairs of the country of residence when they are members of the electorate engenders for this group of individuals higher costs with respect to their counterparts who cannot cast a vote, because they would lose their unique opportunity to contribute to shape and have an impact on politics and political affairs of the country of residence (see for example, White et al. 2000).

Secondly, as members of the electorate, individuals are more likely to be subject to mechanisms of external mobilisation. It is generally argued that political parties, candidates, and elected officials can stimulate migrants' involvement in host country politics, in cities where TCNs are part of the electorate. In cities where migrants do not enjoy voting rights, the *machina politica* has less interest in activating migrants' involvement in political affairs (see for example Groenendijk 2014, 6; Mollenkopf and Logan 2003; Hayduk 2006). For example, in their study on political participation of Turkish residents in Brussels, Jacobs et al. (2006) argue that political campaign activities are particularly lively and intense in the neighbourhoods with high concentrations of migrants (see also Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 36; Tung 1985; Geyer 2007; Fennema and Tillie 2001, 38; Marrow 2005, 787). Similarly, mechanisms of mobilisation that are internal to the migrant-group, have been found to stimulate the political engagement of migrant-origin groups, through the action of "ethnic entrepreneurs". For example, Luconi (2015) looked at the key role played by community leaders of Italian origins in the electoral mobilisation of Italian-origin residents in the United States and Argentina in the late 19th century and early 20th century (see also Tintori 2005).

Following these considerations, I expect Moroccan-origin residents in the Bel-

gian city of Brussels—where local voting rights are granted in favour of TCNs—to be more likely to express a higher level of interest in politics with respect to their counterparts residing in cities where TCNs are not granted with the right to cast a vote in local elections (i.e. Lyon, Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid).

Assessing how the extension of the local franchise in favour of TCNs can promote their involvement in the political affairs of the country of residence, can also refer to the behavioural side of political engagement, in particular non-electoral forms of political participation. It is often assumed in the literature that the extension of the franchise can stimulate the degree of political participation of migrant-origin individuals (see e.g. Martiniello, 2006, 87), yet no evidence is generally presented in support of this claim (but see e.g. Giugni 2010).

Among the main arguments found in the literature for the extension of the franchise, authors often mention the fact that the beneficial effect of voting rights for TCNs will not be visible only in electoral politics, but will spill over into other forms of political participation (see e.g. Groenendijk, 2011, 2008).

According to political theorists like Rainer Bauböck and Jean-Thomas Arrighi (2013, 95), the extension of the electoral rights in favour of third country nationals would strengthen their overall political participation and integration in the country of residence. The specific mechanisms through which the extension of the franchise can promote their political participation revolves around two main factors. The first factor relates to the dynamics of external and internal political mobilisation in the political affairs of the country of residence. As shown in a number of works, individuals who are subject to dynamics of political mobilisation tend to increase not only their interest in politics, but also be more likely to be involved in forms of behavioural engagement, like contacting a politician, or joining a demonstration (see for example, Verba et al. 1995, and see also discussion in chapter 7). The second main factor revolves instead around the psychological and emotional effects that are triggered within the community of migrant-origin residents by the inclusion in the electorate of the country of residence. As pointed out by Giugni (2010, 233, 251), the extension of the franchise in favour of third country nationals can stimulate their behavioural engagement in politics through the increased sense of legitimacy to participate in the political affairs of the country of residence that these would feel as a result of their inclusion in the electorate.

Even though this *spill-over argument* can only be verified through systemic and comparative analyses, a recent study conducted by Giugni (2010, 244ff) on Italian-origin residents of three Swiss cities (i.e. Zurich, Geneva and Neuchâtel) seems to provide some initial evidence in favour of this argument. This 'provisional evaluation' of the impact of voting right on migrants' political participation shows that the Italians residing in Neuchâtel—a canton that re-introduced voting rights for

foreigners in 1875—are more likely to engage in non-electoral political activities in comparison to their compatriots living in Geneva and Zurich, where foreigner residents did not enjoy the right to vote at the time the study was conducted (Groenendijk, 2008, 8).[9]

Following these considerations, and the empirical evidence produced by Giugni (2010), I expect Moroccan-origin residents in Brussels to be more likely to engage in non-electoral forms of participation, such as contacting a politician or governmental official, engaging in party activities or forms of protest, with respect to their counterparts residing in Lyon, Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid.

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[9]Foreigners who have resided in the canton of Geneva for at least 8 years can vote at the local level since 2006.

6.3. Methods and Data

In this section I explain how I wanted to test the two hypotheses presented above, prior to the discussion in the viva. Firstly, I clarify how the main concept of attitudinal and behavioural political engagement is operationalised. Secondly, I briefly discuss the method of analysis used in this chapter.

6.3.1. Outcome variables: attitudinal and behavioural political engagement

The concept of political engagement—as I mentioned in chapter 3—can be conceptualised in various ways (e.g. conventional vs non conventional, behavioural vs attitudinal). Relevant to this chapter is the division into behavioural and attitudinal forms of political engagement. In particular, here I consider a single indicator of attitudinal engagement—political interests—along with various forms of behavioural engagement.

Political interest

In the literature, the political interest of individuals has been transformed into a measurable object in different ways. For example, Almond and Verba (1963, ch.4) use measures of following politics and paying attention to political campaigns. Verba and Nie (1972) create a composite measure based on the expressed level of interest and the frequency of political discussion and media attention. Beyond the degree of expressed interest in politics, Menon and Daftary (2010, 87) consider also the level of importance politics has for each individual (see also Berger et al., 2004; Fennema and Tillie, 1999; Jacobs et al., 2004; Eggert and Giugni, 2010).

The measure I employ in this chapter is simple and straightforward: it is a binary variable of expressed interest—(0) not very or not at all interested and (1) very or fairly interested—in national and local politics and affairs. More precisely,through the operationalisation I used here, individuals are considered as very or fairly interested in politics if they declare to be interested in national or local politics (for more details see the appendix).[10]

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[10]This is a measure of self-defined political interest in the political sphere of the country of residence, which like the behavioural measure of political engagement below does not distinguish between local-level or national-level politics. In fact, in this study I do not assume that the increased degree of interest in politics that result from the mechanisms described above will have an effect exclusively on individuals' interest for local-level politics, but rather it is expected to stimulate the general interest in the political affairs of the country of residence, regardless of whether individuals express a preferences for local and/or national political affairs. The same discourse applies to the behavioural side of the political engagement. Moreover, the survey used does not keep distinct local

Political participation

The concept of behavioural engagement can also be operationalised in many different ways. For example, Verba et al. (1995, 188), start from a list of eight different forms of political activities and create an additive index ranging from 0 to 8 (for more details see chapter 7). Pilati (2016, 38-42) instead follows a different approach by initially segmenting the concept of political participation into four measures of political behaviour through two criteria (1. conventional vs unconventional political participation; 2. immigration-related vs mainstream). Finally, each measure is transformed into a dichotomous variable, indicating whether the individuals have engaged in at least one of the list of political activities considered.

In this chapter I employ an overall measure of political participation that takes into account 13 different forms of political participation.[11] The outcome variable is a binary variable indicating whether the individual has participated in any of the 13 types of political activities (for more details on the operationalisation see the appendix). This is a simple and clear measure of political participation that is often found in the literature on migrants' political engagement (see e.g. Cinalli and Giugni, 2011). Although through this measure the difference between all different political activities is collapsed into a dichotomy, it gives an immediate idea of the overall degree of behavioural involvement of the communities under consideration (see table 6.2).

6.3.2. A brief on the method used in this chapter

As mentioned above, the discussion in the viva pointed out how the methods used to analyse the data in chapters 6 and 7 are not suitable to test the influence of the contextual factors selected on the political engagement of the Moroccan-origin communities considered. In particular, the comments received from the examiners have stressed two main points: firstly, none of the models used include measures of the main explanatory variables. An analysis of all cities together in a pooled analysis and a subsequent clustering of standard errors by city was preferred by the examiners, who also suggested consultations with specialised social statisticians (who in turn have indicated other possibilities for analysis that I am now

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and national in the case of non-electoral political acts.

[11](1) contacted a politician; (2) contacted a government or local government official; (3) worked in a political party; (4) worked in a political action group; (5) worn or displayed a badge, sticker or poster; (6) signed a petition; (7) taken part in a public demonstration; (8) boycotted certain products; (9) deliberately bought certain products for political reasons; (10) donated money to a political organisation or group; (11) taken part in a strike; (12) contacted the media; (13) contacted a solicitor or a judicial body for non-personal reasons.

exploring). Finally, even after implementing the previous point, it would be still a considerable leap to suggest that there is a meaningful link between the two contextual factors considered and the political involvement of Moroccans in the five cities. This relates to the difficulty of isolating the effect of single factors from the effect that other important unobserved contextual factors (e.g. wave of migration or region of migration) have on migrants' political engagement. The following empirical chapters must be read bearing in mind these caveats, and I further explore the implications of these critiques in my ongoing work.

To answer my research questions, I conduct a multivariate analysis of survey data. In particular, for each Moroccan-origin community I pick up a number of variables that are the same across all samples considered, and are commonly used in the literature to explain variations in the degree of political engagement (e.g. gender, age, education, proportion of lifetime spent in the country of residence).[12] The main advantage of this technique is allowing to control simultaneously for the effect of different explanatory factors.

In order to model the probability of being interested in politics and participating in any form of political activity for each Moroccan-origin community under consideration, I use a series of binomial probit regression models. As explained in more in detail by Agresti (2007, 70-72), probit and logit models are both used to model binary dependent variables, and tend in practice to provide similar fits. More specifically, the estimated coefficients from logit to probit tend to differ by a factor of approximately 1.7 (for more details see Long and Freese, 2001, 107). Ultimately, as noted by the UCLA Idre (2017), "the choice of probit versus logit depends largely on individual preferences."

Yet, as pointed out by Long and Freese (2001, 70), in a situation in which the correct model is a binary logit model and a binary probit model is used instead, it is preferable to use sandwich or robust standard errors. For this reason, I report robust standard errors instead of the traditional standard errors in all regression tables presented below.

Finally, in order to obtain indications on the effect of the extension of voting rights in favour of TCNs on the chances of being engaged in the political affairs of the country of residence, I then computed the predicted probability at fixed values of the predictor variables, for each Moroccan-origin community considered, as shown by Torres-Reyna (2014). Finally, I compare them across the five cities under consideration (but see caveats mentioned at the beginning of this section).[13]

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[12]All details on the computation of the predictor variables used are included in the appendix.

[13]For each regression equation I computed the predicted probability of being interested in politics and of having engaged in at least one form of political action for each Moroccan-origin community, on the basis of an hypothetical non-national 34-year-old single male

6.4. Results

In section 7.5.1, I describe the main dependent variables (i.e. political interest and political participation). In section 7.5.2, I turn to the assessment of the determinants of political interest and political participation.

6.4.1. Descriptive evidence

As shown in table 6.1, contrary to what I expected, the Moroccan-origin community residing in Brussels is not relatively more interested in the political affairs of the country of residence, when compared with the other Moroccan-origin community residing in countries where TCNs do not enjoy the right to vote in municipal elections. In fact, the percentage of individuals who declared during the survey conducted in Brussels to be fairly or highly interested in politics is approximately 60% of the sample. A similar proportion is found also in the cities of Turin and Barcelona. The two extreme cases are represented by the communities residing in Lyon and Madrid, where approximately 80% and 40% of the sample declared to be interested in politics, respectively.

Table 6.1.: Political Interest by City, Percentages

	Low/No Interest	Fair/High Interest
Right to vote in local elections		
Brussels	39.7 (180)	60.3 (273)
No right to vote in local elections		
Lyon	20.2 (23)	79.8 (91)
Turin	37.0 (71)	63.1 (121)
Barcelona	39.9 (89)	60.1 (134)
Madrid	59.6 (174)	40.4 (118)
All cities	42.1 (537)	57.9 (737)

Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

In table 6.2 the focus is shifted towards behavioural forms of political engagement instead. In contrast to what I expected, again the percentage of individuals who declared, in occasion of the survey conducted in Brussels, to have engaged in at least one of the forms of political participation under consideration, is not larger when compared to the communities residing in cities where TCNs are not allowed to engage in municipal elections.

respondent who is employed and whose household earn less than 1,500 euros per month, with a secondary level of education, who has lived in the country for approximately a third of his life, and is not involved in any association (see figures 6.1 to 6.4).

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As shown in the table, only 27% of the Moroccan-origin community in Brussels declared having engaged in any form of political act. This is a larger proportion when compared to the communities residing in Turin (19%) and Madrid (3%), but it is in line with percentage of active individuals found in the city of Barcelona (27%) and well below the proportion of Lyon, where approximately 55% of the sample declared having engaged in at least one of the nine forms of political act considered.

Table 6.2.: Political Participation by City, Percentages

	No Participation	Participation
Right to vote in local elections		
Brussels	72.8 (331)	27.3 (124)
No right to vote in local elections		
Lyon	44.7 (51)	55.3 (63)
Turin	81.1 (162)	18.9 (38)
Barcelona	73.2 (164)	26.8 (60)
Madrid	96.6 (288)	3.4 (10)
All cities	77.2 (996)	22.8 (295)

Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

In table 6.3 and table 6.4, I compare the proportion of individuals who engage in politics, respectively from an attitudinal and behavioural perspective, by employing key factors of their socio-demographic profile. In particular, table 6.3 shows that individuals with higher education, residing in Lyon, Barcelona, Madrid, tend to be significantly more engaged in politics than their less educated counterparts. A significant difference is found also in relation to behavioural forms of political engagement between these two groups in the cities of Brussels and Madrid, as shown in table 6.4. The tables also show that respondents with higher household incomes tend to be significantly more interested in politics and more active in politics respectively in the cities of Brussels and Lyon.

Conversely, the comparison between higher income groups and lower income groups does not elicit any significant difference in the other cities. Interestingly, across all cities considered in this study, Moroccan-origin individuals who acquired the citizenship of the country of residence and those without, do not differ significantly in terms of their interest in politics. This result applies also to behavioural political engagement, with the exception of the group residing in Madrid. In this city, 13% of the nationals has engaged in at least a form of political action, in comparison with only 2% of those without citizenship. Comparisons based on the associational involvement of the respondents, show that in the cities of Brussels, Turin,

Barcelona, and Madrid, the proportion of individuals involved in associations who are engaged in politics is significantly higher in comparison to those who are not involved in associations.

Finally, as shown in the tables below, comparisons based on the other factors provide differences that are significant only for some samples or not significant at all. More precisely, comparisons based on gender show significant differences only in Madrid and Turin in favour of the male group, in relation to their interest in politics and their behavioural engagement, respectively. A significant difference is found only in the city of Brussels between the groups living in partnership (66%) and those not living in partnership (56%), in relation to their level of interest in politics. Interestingly, the comparison between residents who declared having a legal residence permit and their undocumented counterparts shows a significant difference only in the sample of Lyon, with about 82% of the documented group declaring to be fairly or very interest in politics in comparison to only 40% of the undocumented group.

Table 6.3.: Percentage of individuals fairly or very interested in politics by demographic characteristics and associational involvement

	BRUSSELS			LYON			TURIN			BARCELONA			MADRID		
	%	sd	N	%	sd	N	%	sd	N	%	sd	N	%	sd	N
GENDER															
Female	58%	0.03	217	77%	0.05	63	71%	0.05	82	55%	0.06	65	33%*	0.04	112
Male	62%	0.03	236	82%	0.05	51	62%	0.05	108	62%	0.04	158	45%*	0.04	180
EDUCATION															
No Post-secondary or tertiary education	57%*	0.03	310	72%*	0.06	64	63%	0.04	145	56%*	0.04	165	38%**	0.03	263
Post-secondary or higher	67%*	0.04	136	90%*	0.04	49	76%	0.06	45	72%*	0.06	58	64%**	0.09	28
FAMILY INCOME															
Less than €1,500	56%**	0.03	299	79%	0.05	62	65%	0.04	144	64%	0.05	92	36%	0.04	166
From €1,500	70%**	0.04	154	79%	0.06	43	66%	0.08	35	70%	0.07	40	53%	0.09	32
EMPLOYMENT STATUS															
Unemployed	57%	0.03	273	76%	0.06	59	63%	0.05	112	53%	0.06	74	41%	0.06	74
Employed	66%	0.04	180	84%	0.05	55	69%	0.05	78	64%	0.04	149	40%	0.03	218
PARTNERSHIP STATUS															
Not in partnership	56%*	0.03	258	82%	0.05	55	66%	0.05	88	59%	0.05	95	41%	0.04	155
In partnership	66%*	0.03	195	78%	0.05	59	66%	0.04	102	61%	0.04	128	39%	0.04	137
CITIZENSHIP STATUS															
Not national	55%	0.06	82	68%	0.09	25	68%	0.04	161	63%	0.04	186	39%	0.03	260
National	62%	0.03	371	83%	0.04	89	55%	0.09	29	46%	0.08	37	56%	0.09	32
RESIDENCE STATUS															
Undocumented	36%	0.15	11	40%*	0.219	5	40%	0.22	5	58%	0.14	12	29%	0.09	28
Documented	61%	0.02	442	82%*	0.04	109	67%	0.04	185	60%	0.03	211	42%	0.03	264
ASSOCIATIONAL INVOLVEMENT															
Not involved	58%	0.03	293	74%	0.06	58	65%	0.04	138	53%**	0.04	142	39%	0.03	273
Involved	64%	0.04	160	86%	0.05	56	69%	0.06	52	73%**	0.05	81	58%	0.11	19

a. * and ** indicate that the cross-group differences are significant at 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.

Table 6.4.: Percentage of Individuals Who Engaged in Any Form of political Action by Demographic Characteristics and Associational Involvement

	BRUSSELS			LYON			TURIN			BARCELONA			MADRID		
	%	sd	N	%	sd	N	%	sd	N	%	sd	N	%	sd	N
GENDER															
Female	28%	0.03	219	54%	0.06	63	10%**	0.03	84	24%	0.05	66	4%	0.02	116
Male	26%	0.03	236	57%	0.07	51	26%**	0.04	116	28%	0.04	158	3%	0.01	182
EDUCATION															
No Post-secondary or tertiary education	25%*	0.02	312	52%	0.06	64	16%	0.03	155	25%	0.03	166	3%*	0.01	269
Post-secondary or higher	34%*	0.04	136	61%	0.07	49	29%	0.07	45	31%	0.06	58	11%*	0.06	28
FAMILY INCOME															
Less than €1,500	29%	0.03	301	44%**	0.06	62	22%	0.03	152	24%	0.04	93	4%	0.01	172
From €1,500	25%	0.04	154	74%**	0.07	43	14%	0.06	36	30%	0.07	40	6%	0.04	32
EMPLOYMENT STATUS															
Unemployed	26%	0.03	274	54%	0.07	59	15%	0.03	117	29%	0.05	75	3%	0.02	77
Employed	30%	0.03	181	56%	0.07	55	25%	0.05	83	26%	0.04	149	4%	0.01	221
PARTNERTHISHIP STATUS															
Not in partnership	28%	0.03	260	51%	0.07	55	19%	0.04	93	23%	0.04	96	4%	0.01	159
In partnership	26%	0.03	195	59%	0.06	59	19%	0.04	107	30%	0.04	128	3%	0.01	139
CITIZENSHIP STATUS															
Not national	24%	0.05	82	44%	0.10	25	18%	0.03	170	26%	0.03	187	2%**	0.01	266
National	28%	0.02	373	58%	0.05	89	23%	0.08	30	30%	0.08	37	13%**	0.06	32
RESIDENCE STATUS															
Undocumented	36%	0.145	11	40%	0.22	5	17%	0.15	6	17%	0.11	12	0%	0.00	29
Documented	27%	0.02	444	56%	0.05	109	19%	0.03	194	27%	0.03	212	4%	0.01	269
ASSOCIATIONAL INVOLVEMENT															
Not involved	20%**	0.02	294	50%	0.07	58	12%**	0.03	146	21%*	0.03	142	3%**	0.009	279
Involved	41%**	0.04	161	61%	0.07	56	37%**	0.07	54	37%*	0.05	82	16%**	0.08	19

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).
b. * and ** indicate that the cross-group differences are significant at 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.

6.4.2. Multivariate evidence

In order to assess and answer the research question of how the extension of the franchise relates to attitudinal and behavioural forms of political engagement, the tables below display the results from a series of probit regression models conducted separately for each community. As mentioned before, the predictor variables are added to the model in two steps.

Model 1 introduces base model factors that relates to the demographic and socio-economic profile of the respondents, which includes factors like education, employment status, and involvement in associational life. Model 2 includes also factors related to the individual predisposition of individuals, that is their level of social trust, internal and external efficacy.[14]

The interpretation of individual probit regression coefficients is limited: positive coefficients indicate that an increase in the predictor leads to an increase in the predicted probability of being engaged in politics. Conversely, a negative coefficient means that an increase in the predictor leads to a decrease in the predicted probability of being politically involved (UCLA Statistical Consulting Group, 2017). Focusing on table 6.5, it is clear that education is a factor that tends to increase the probability of being interested in politics in all communities considered. Conversely, to explain the probability of being engaged in at least one form of political act, the educational degree of the respondents play a less prominent role. In comparison, the involvement in associations appears to be the main explanatory factor for all communities considered, with the exception of the Moroccan-origin community residing in Lyon. As shown in the tables below, other factors play important roles in explaining the probability of being politically engaged in some specific communities. For example, as shown in table 6.5 for the Moroccan-origin community residing in Barcelona, the involvement in associations increases the probability of being interested in politics. Surprisingly, the acquisition of the citizenship of the country of residence is associated with a decrease in the probability of being interested in the political affairs of the country of residence. The table also shows that for the community residing in Turin, being a male, rather than female, and being employed rather than being without a job is associated with an increase in the probability of being involved in at least a political act.

The effect of these factors is resilient in some cases to the introduction of the efficacy factors and social trust, in Model 2, as shown in table 6.6. Focusing on the group of factors introduced in the second model, a higher degree of internal efficacy is associated with an increase in the probability of being interested in poli-

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[14]Turin is excluded from Model 2, because the survey conducted in this city did not include questions on the efficacy and social trust of the respondents.

tics, only for the Moroccan-origin communities residing in Brussels and Barcelona. Apart from this specific case, all the factors introduced in Model 2 do not play any significant role in explaining the probability of being interested in politics in any of the other communities considered. Concerning the probability of being engaged in at least one form of political action, again internal efficacy appears to be a significant factor for the community residing in Brussels, but not for the Moroccan-origin community in Barcelona (see table 6.8).

I summarise the main results in the figures below, which depicts the predicted probability (the solid circle) of being interested in politics (see figures 6.1 and 6.2) and the predicted probability of being engaged in at least one form of political action (see figures 6.3 and 6.4) for each Moroccan-origin community under consideration, and the 95% confidence intervals of the estimation of the probabilities (the bars).

The results shown in figures 6.1, 6.2 and figures 6.3, 6.4 have to be interpreted with caution. In fact, on the basis of the information provided by the Wald test, the models reported in tables 6.5, 6.6, and tables 6.7, 6.8, specifically for the Moroccan-origin sample residing in Lyon and Turin, as a whole are not significant. In other words, there is insufficient evidence in the data used for these communities to reject the null hypothesis, according to which, all coefficients except the constant are equal to 0.

If we exclude from the final reading of the findings the cases mentioned above, the overall result is that the probability of being interested in politics (see figures 6.1 and 6.2) or being involved in at least one form of political action (see figures 6.3 and 6.4) of the Moroccan-origin community residing in Brussels is not different in comparison with their counterparts residing in cities where TCNs are not provided with the right to vote. In fact, as shown in figure 6.1, for the socio-demographic profile set (model 1), the probability of being interested in politics is approximately 55% for the Moroccan-origin residents of Brussels, 63% in Barcelona, and 56% in Madrid. The overall picture does not change for model 2; as shown in figure 6.2, the probability of being interested in politics is 55% in Brussels, 63% in Barcelona, and 56% in Madrid.

Concerning the results found for behavioural forms of political engagement, again the difference between the community in Brussels and the other communities in the probability of being politically active is not important. Figure 6.3 shows in fact that the probability of being involved in at least one form of political action is approximately 22% for the Moroccan-origin respondents residing in Brussels. This probability goes down only to 20% in Turin, reaching the lowest point of 8% and 5% in Barcelona and Madrid, respectively. The predictions based on model 2 are in line with those generated through model 1; figure 6.4 shows that the probability

of being politically active rather than not being engaged in any form of political action, is 24% for the community residing in Brussels, 8% in Barcelona, and only 6% in Madrid.

Table 6.5.: Regression Coefficients Predicting the Political Interest of Moroccan-Origin Residents (Model 1)

	BRUSSELS		LYON		TURIN		BARCELONA		MADRID	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Gender (ref. Female)	0.061	0.127	0.194	0.336	-0.256	0.222	0.032	0.281	0.316	0.203
Age	0.014+	0.007	0.013	0.013	-0.008	0.012	0.019	0.013	0.015	0.013
Education	0.553*	0.238	1.387*	0.545	1.073*	0.487	1.304**	0.441	1.112**	0.403
Proportion of lifetime in country of residence	-0.400	0.249	-0.153	0.529	-0.003	0.671	1.069	0.833	1.589+	0.871
In paid job (ref. No)	0.111	0.136	0.191	0.330	0.278	0.204	0.180	0.277	0.212	0.264
Household income (ref. Less than €1,500)	0.247+	0.138	-0.346	0.329	-0.056	0.266	-0.098	0.276	0.216	0.284
With citizenship of country of residence (ref. No)	0.020	0.177	0.103	0.392	-0.303	0.322	-0.938*	0.468	0.238	0.401
With partner (ref. No)	0.180	0.147	-0.480	0.403	0.227	0.230	0.099	0.252	-0.228	0.211
Without documents (ref. No)	-0.223	0.441	-0.952	0.808	-0.477	0.615	0.454	0.482	-0.418	0.345
Involved in any organisation (ref. Not involved)	0.096	0.132	0.052	0.313	0.171	0.241	0.631*	0.270	0.025	0.455
Internal efficacy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
External efficacy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Social trust	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Constant	-0.683*	0.319	-0.264	0.797	0.036	0.587	-1.496*	0.493	-1.904**	0.591
Cox & Snell R2	0.050		0.113		0.067		0.132		0.109	
N	439		105		178		132		196	

a. + p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001, two-tailed test.

Table 6.6.: Regression Coefficients Predicting the Political Interest of Moroccan-Origin Residents (Model 2)

	BRUSSELS		LYON		BARCELONA		MADRID	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Gender (ref. Female)	0.043	0.134	0.146	0.348	-0.013	0.292	0.337	0.236
Age	0.011	0.008	0.011	0.012	0.019	0.015	0.011	0.015
Education	0.327	0.259	1.561**	0.501	1.446**	0.464	0.686	0.450
Proportion of lifetime in country of residence	-0.196	0.261	-0.095	0.541	1.700+	0.945	1.426	1.098
In paid job (ref. No)	0.119	0.142	0.108	0.349	0.234	0.286	0.190	0.295
Household income (ref. Less than Euro 1,500)	0.246	0.143	-0.352	0.331	-0.178	0.286	0.334	0.321
With citizenship of country of residence (ref. No)	-0.081	0.191	0.063	0.402	-1.058*	0.492	0.303	0.450
With partner (ref. No)	0.259	0.159	-0.600	0.390	0.168	0.289	-0.233	0.243
Without documents (ref. No)	-0.316	0.451	-0.748	0.839	0.665	0.496	-0.004	0.403
Involved in any organisation (ref. Not involved)	0.17	0.139	0.146	0.313	0.631*	0.295	0.039	0.488
Internal efficacy	0.307***	0.073	0.243+	0.144	0.263*	0.129	0.082	0.110
External efficacy	-0.055	0.07	0.237	0.210	-0.069	0.138	0.087	0.111
Social trust	0.301	0.261	0.545	0.519	0.045	0.506	0.153	0.534
Constant	-1.092*	0.452	-1.324	0.957	-2.270**	0.831	-1.961**	0.795
Cox & Snell R2	0.110		0.150		0.185		0.103	
N	422		104		124		153	

a. + p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001, two-tailed test.

Figure 6.1.: Predicted Probability of Being Interested in Politics by City (model 1)

Figure 6.2.: Predicted Probability of Being Interested in Politics by City (model 2)

Table 6.7.: Regression Coefficients Predicting the Political Participation of Moroccan-Origin Residents (Model 1)

	BRUSSELS		LYON		TURIN		BARCELONA		MADRID	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Gender (ref. Female)	-0.173	0.135	0.100	0.255	0.616*	0.277	0.023	0.214	0.146	0.273
Age	0.008	0.009	0.001	0.012	0.004	0.017	-0.032*	0.014	-0.026	0.018
Education	0.418+	0.252	0.448	0.458	1.303*	0.518	-0.012	0.320	-0.004	0.566
Proportion of lifetime in country of residence	0.273	0.265	0.516	0.458	0.089	1.112	-1.562*	0.762	0.662	0.904
In paid job (ref. No)	0.007	0.008	0.015	0.011	-0.007	0.037	0.029	0.020	0.058+	0.035
Household income (ref. Less than Euro 1,500)	0.049	0.139	-0.007	0.265	0.495*	0.250	-0.153	0.202	0.339	0.414
With citizenship of country of residence (ref. No)	-0.027	0.207	0.141	0.319	0.233	0.336	0.323	0.306	0.439	0.491
With partner (ref. No)	-0.194	0.157	0.091	0.303	0.269	0.287	0.409*	0.203	-0.280	0.308
Involved in any organisation (ref. Not involved)	0.617***	0.137	0.273	0.681	0.831**	0.254	0.536**	0.202	0.849*	0.346
Internal efficacy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
External efficacy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Social trust	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Constant	-1.385***	0.342	-1.152+	0.681	-2.818***	0.722	0.310	0.592	-2.058***	0.505
Cox & Snell R2	0.071		0.065		0.171		0.071		0.053	
N	431		113		199		222		292	

a. + p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001, two-tailed test.
b. the predictor "Without documents" [undoc], used to predict the chance of being interested in politics, have been omitted from model 1 and model 2 predicting the chance of being involved in at least one of the nine forms of political participation [allpolaction] under consideration because for the Moroccan-origin community of Madrid [undoc] predicts failure to participate perfectly. In other words, when [undoc] is 1, [allpolaction] is 0.

Table 6.8.: Regression Coefficients Predicting the Political Participation of Moroccan-Origin Residents (Model 2)

	BRUSSELS		LYON		BARCELONA		MADRID	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Gender (ref. Female)	-0.189	0.141	0.161	0.262	-0.052	0.235	0.166	0.320
Age	0.008	0.009	0.000	0.012	-0.034*	0.015	-0.028	0.019
Education	0.218	0.264	0.269	0.477	-0.240	0.347	-0.350	0.616
Proportion of lifetime in country of residence	0.264	0.285	0.482	0.465	-1.424+	0.798	0.669	0.882
In paid job (ref. No)	0.004	0.008	0.016	0.011	0.033	0.022	0.071+	0.037
Household income (ref. Less than Euro 1,500)	0.039	0.142	0.048	0.267	-0.129	0.210	0.289	0.389
With citizenship of country of residence (ref. No)	-0.051	0.208	0.097	0.327	0.373	0.315	0.444	0.481
With partner (ref. No)	-0.186	0.165	0.126	0.307	0.364	0.227	-0.244	0.326
Involved in any organisation (ref. Not involved)	.658***	0.142	0.252	0.266	0.453	0.210	0.542	0.385
Internal efficacy	0.170*	0.073	-0.004	0.125	0.270**	0.099	-0.119	0.127
External efficacy	0.077	0.076	-0.344+	0.180	-0.025	0.097	0.011	0.153
Social trust	0.480+	0.267	-0.192	0.466	0.262	0.377	-0.383	0.814
Constant	-1.997	0.486	-0.347	0.784	-0.274	0.651	-1.395+	0.791
Cox & Snell R2	0.09		0.093		0.106		0.06	
N	414		112		205		215	

a. + p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001, two-tailed test.

**Figure 6.3.:** Predicted Probability of Being Engaged in at least a Political Act by City (Model 1)

Figure 6.4.: Predicted Probability of Being Engaged in at least a Political Act by City (Model 2)

6.5. Conclusion

The initial objective of this chapter was to unveil the effect of the presence of local voting rights on the modes of political engagement of the five communities.Yes, as explained above, after consulting with the examiners during the viva, a number of limitations in the analysis of the data became clear. For this reason, the results here do not test the initial hypotheses formulated, but they can still provide a detailed picture of the effect of individual and organisational factors on the modes of engagement in politics for each Moroccan-origin community considered.

In fact, the Moroccans residing in Brussels do not show a higher probability of being interested in politics in comparison to their counterparts residing in cities where TCNs cannot take part in local elections. Interestingly, the Moroccan residents in Lyon shows the highest probability of being interested in politics, even after controlling for the citizenship in possession by the respondents. Yet, as mentioned before, the results for the community of Lyon must be interpreted with caution, on the basis of the information provided by the Wald test.[15]

At a behavioural level, I have found a similar pattern. Even though the Moroccan-origin community in Brussels is more likely to be politically active in comparison to the other communities, model 1 also shows reduced difference with the communities in Lyon and Turin. Furthermore, as in the case of political interest, the members of the Moroccan-origin community in Lyon are more likely to have engaged in at least a political act with respect to all communities under consideration (model 2). This might suggest that other underlying factors—that have not been included in this study—might be responsible for these results.

Although these results do not test the claim that the extension of the franchise in favour of TCNs can stimulate their political involvement, they have certainly generated some new lines of investigation that could be carried out through larger samples including different TCNs communities and by using more sophisticated methods of analysis. These results seem to suggest the presence of different dynamics in the political sphere in relation to attitudinal and behavioural forms of political engagement. Interest in the politics of the country of residence might in fact be a form of demand for political rights rather than a consequence of the offer of political rights. In this sense, the case of the Moroccan community residing in Madrid is the clearest example in the analysis. This community, although expresses the lowest probability of being active in politics (i.e. 6%), it is characterised by a high probability of being interested in politics (i.e. 56%), indicating that different

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[15]For all models using the data on the Moroccan-origin community in Lyon—including the two models predicting behavioural engagement—the p-value is higher than the generally used criterion of 0.05, hence as mentioned above, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.

underlying mechanisms might be in place in the processes leading migrant-origin residents to express interest in politics, versus getting involved in political acts.

As mentioned before, these overall results also suggest that other contextual factors might be at play in shaping the probability of being engaged in politics, such as the more general rules of access to voting rights (e.g. voter registration) (see for example, Arrighi and Bauböck 2017; Blatter et al. 2016). Certainly a more refined test of this argument does not consist only in enlarging the sample or adopting more re-fined methods of analysis. The analysis would benefit also from the inclusion of a larger number of contextual cases where TCNs are provided with the right to vote, and where this right is not granted, in order to take into account the variability existing between different contexts of residence. Finally, instead of developing a comparison of one single TCN group across different contexts, as I have done here, an alternative research design could be centred around comparisons between TCNs and EU foreign residents within the same context.

On the basis of all these considerations, this chapter ought to be considered as an initial step in the research on the role of the extension of the franchise in the political involvement of non-autochthonous groups, upon which future work might be built.

CHAPTER

7

HOW ANTI-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES SHAPE THE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF MOROCCAN-ORIGIN RESIDENTS

"Interesting factors tend to be ones
that are less proximate to that which is to be explained"
– Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 274).

Autochthonous as well as migrant-origin residents develop complex sets of pref-
erences, needs, and concerns across different issues in the country of residence.
These groups of individuals can give public expression to their political and social
view points by engaging in different political acts. The alternative means through

which migrant-origin residents can participate in the public sphere constitute their *political voice* (Wiley et al. 2013, 310; Keeter et al. 2002).

Paraphrasing what Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001, 62) expressed in relation to women's political voice, and extending it to the particular case of migrant-origin residents, it is possible to affirm that "if we really want to understand [migrant-origin individual's] political activities, we should think not only in terms of 'more or less' but also in terms of 'different'." In other words, we need to expand the scope of political participation to account for the diversity through which migrant-origin residents can express their social and political view within their countries of residence. As Keeter et al. (2002, 13) put it,"[p]eople sing a variety of songs to make their voices heard."

As we shall see, every "song" is intrinsically different from the others, for one type of political act is more appropriate than others to achieve a specific objective. Furthermore, every political act entails specific challenges to the individual that are defined by the peculiarities of the act itself and also by the resources, motivations, and recruitment networks on which each individual can rely (Verba et al., 1995). To stay in the song metaphor, depending on the objective one wants to achieve it is more appropriate to sing a certain song rather than another; and since not all songs are equally difficult, one is more likely to sing certain songs and not others. For this reason, it is important to consider how diversified is the way in which individuals engage in the political sphere.

Students of political participation, notably those who developed the Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM) in the early 1990s, have extensively demonstrated through their studies the extent to which political activity is embedded in non-political institutions of the civil society like family, school, work-place, voluntary-organisations, and churches; hence, individuals' political life and social life are closely linked (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). In particular, by virtue of the studies conducted within the scope of the CVM, we know for example that the key social institutions through which an individual is associated as she moves through life—the family in which she is born, the school she attends, the jobs she takes, and the non-political organisations, and religious institutions with which she becomes affiliated—produce the requisite resources (i.e. time, money, and civic skills) that foster her participation in the political sphere (Schlozman et al. 1994; Verba et al. 1995; Burns et al. 2001).

Yet, a large and growing body of work on discrimination, racism, xenophobia, and other related prejudiced forms of intolerance, have shown that social institutions like families, schools, and work-places are the very same place where multiple forms of oppression—based on visible identity characters such as gender, skin color, race, nationality, ethnicity, and religion—take the toll on the members of op-

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pressed group, by imposing additional constraints on their process of accumulation of the resources that they can later devote to politics (see e.g. Essed 1991; Allasino et al. 2004; Meurs and Pailhé 2010; Grelet 2004; Fredman 2016; cf. Collins 2000).

As shown in the recent report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2014), the implementation of a strong anti-discrimination structure is often included among the most important steps to overcome the factors that impede members of oppressed groups to freely express their political voice. However, although the development of strong anti-discrimination measures is often connected to an increased political voice of disadvantaged groups, it is not yet clear whether anti-discrimination structures can in reality help these specific groups of individuals to overcome the barriers they encounter in their daily lives and ultimately allow them to express more freely their political and social views through the most appropriate channels of action.

In this chapter, I will try to shed light on this gap by developing the following argument: I will demonstrate how the phenomena of oppression endured in daily life hinders the effective political choice of migrant-origin individuals, by disrupting the process of accumulation of political factors that they can later bring to the political arena to express their voice through the most appropriate channel of action. I then situate anti-discrimination structure that have been developed in each Member State as the direct response to these phenomena of oppression, in order to explore my hypothesis: countries with stronger anti-discrimination structures are the context where members of vulnerable groups willing to engage in certain forms of political action to express their voice are more effectively protected from the exclusive dynamics of oppression.

I start by drawing on the findings and assumptions that have been generated within the scope of the CVM theoretical approach, which stresses the importance of social institutions in fostering political activities; and link then this body of literature to the findings that have been produced by studies that focused on the processes of interlocking oppression based on visible and sensitive identity traits like gender, religion, race and ethnicity, and nationality. In creating the link between these two bodies of work, I argue that daily oppressive phenomena that manifest themselves in the form of stereotypes, discrimination, and racism, ultimately prevent stigmatised and disadvantaged groups of people from profiting of the informative, mobilising, and training effects that social institutions have on the general population. Rather, these institutions (e.g. schools and work-places)—as will show in the rest of the chapter—are the places where members of these groups must confront oppressive attitudes and behaviours in connection to their visible identity features.

Finally, I consider the not-so-implicit argument that has been often expressed

over the years in official documents and made more explicit by some academic works. According to this argument, in order to allow the members of stigmatised and disadvantaged groups to express more freely their political and social views in their country of residence, each State should adopt and fully develop anti-discrimination measures to tackle the peculiar barriers that members of these social categories must cope with on a daily-basis in reason of their visible identity traits. In drawing on this perspective, I argue that the anti-discrimination structures developed in each State, in the form of laws, specialised bodies, and networks with the civil society, have the potential to act on the disruption created by oppressive phenomena and contribute to "restore" the positive role that social institutions like schools, families, work-places have in fostering individuals' propensity to be politically active.

As I argue more in detail in the central part of the chapter, this can be achieved because anti-discrimination laws are designed to impose higher costs on oppressive behaviours and attitudes, through socio-normative and legal sanctions. Importantly, the oppressive barriers that clog up the different channels through which members of disadvantaged groups can express their political and social views in the country of residence are tackled not only by the sanctions imposed on perpetrators, but also through the actions of information, support, and recruitment carried out in favour of disadvantaged groups, by equality bodies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) within the scope of the anti-discrimination structure.

To test this argument, I have focused on the political participation of the members of one of the most stigmatised communities in Europe, Moroccan-origin residents, across different European cities (i.e. Brussels, Lyon, Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid). As I show in more detail, the context in which these communities reside, differ significantly in terms of the strength of the anti-discrimination policies implemented. In particular, three different degrees of strength can be found: countries like France and Belgium have developed over the last years stronger anti-discrimination policies with respect to the other countries under consideration. The set of anti-discrimination implemented in Italy falls instead into an intermediate category with respect to the weaker anti-discrimination measures in Spain.

To anticipate my main results, by comparing the mode of political participation of the Moroccan communities across these different contexts, I found that on average individuals tend to express their political and social views through a wider set of political acts when they reside in contexts characterised by stronger and intermediate anti-discrimination policies like France, Belgium, and Italy. Conversely, their counterparts residing in Spain, a country with weaker anti-discrimination policies, engage on average in less forms of political participation.

The overall structure of this chapter takes the form of 6 sections. In section 7.1

I define the concept of political action repertoire, provide reasons for why it is important to develop a conception of political participation that takes into account also how diversified are the channels of action of migrant-origin individuals, and briefly review the main theoretical approach employed in this chapter. In section 7.2 I explain why and how the phenomena of oppression that migrant-origin individuals must cope with in their daily lives limit the breadth of political action of these groups. Section 7.3 constitutes the last step of my argument. Here, I provide a short review of the development of the European anti-discrimination structure, and highlight why anti-discrimination laws along with the actions of institutional and civil society bodies can help overcome the detrimental effects that oppression has on migrants' political participation. And finally I will provide the main research hypothesis. Section 7.4 presents the data sources used along with the methods employed in this chapter. In section 7.5 I briefly present my main results, and finally in section 7.6 I provide a short discussion of the findings of the research in relation to the considerations made throughout the whole chapter.[1]

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[1]As I will explain in detail in section 7.4.3, the discussion in the viva raised concerns in relation to suitability of the methods used to test the argument presented in this chapter.

7.1. Political Participation and Its Explanatory Factors

Voting is the "most basic citizen act", but this is only one of the channels through which individuals' desiderata can be expressed (Verba et al., 1995, 9). As pointed out by different political scientists voting, for its characteristics, is a unique form of political action (Verba et al. 1995, 358-359). For example, according to Milbrath and Goel (1977, 12), "voting is more an act by which the citizen affirms his loyalty to the system rather than an act by which he makes demands on the political system." What is more, migrant-origin individuals generally have a limited access to electoral politics with respect to their autochthonous counterparts.[2] Because of this peculiar situation, scholars have highlighted how other forms of political engagement such as contacting a politician or a newspaper, signing a petition or taking part in a public demonstration, might in fact play a more important role in channelling the desiderata of this specific group of residents (Wiley et al. 2013, 310; Bloemraad and Trost 2008; Lopez and Marcelo 2008; Morales 2011, 32-40).

The same point has been reiterated also by Maina Kiai, the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, in the following terms: "[a]n individuals' lack of citizenship or legal status does not mean that she or he should have no voice whatsoever in the political, economic or political affairs of her or his country of residence...groups that are disenfranchised from mainstream political activities, such as voting and holding office, have an even greater need for *alternative means to participate* in the public sphere" (see United Nations, 2014, A/HRC/26/29, para. 25, emphasis added).

There is a wide literature that focused on electoral participation as well as the various alternative means to participate. Over the years, numerous typologies of the different political activities have been created (see e.g. Milbrath and Goel 1977; Milbrath 1965; Verba and Nie 1972; Teorell et al. 2007). As I mentioned in the previous chapters, political involvement can be segmented according to various criteria (e.g. attitudinal vs behavioural; individual vs collective). In this chapter I focus on behavioural forms of engagement only, and I refer to two criteria set out by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) to distinguish political acts.[3]

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[2]Restricted access to this form of political participation applies also to a significant part of the sample of Moroccan-origin individuals that I consider in this study. Tables 5.35-5.36 in chapter 5, show more in detail the percentage of Moroccan-origin respondents who were not eligible to take part in municipal and national electoral politics, for each city under consideration.

[3]In this chapter I do not consider a third criteria that is central to the analysis of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 45-46): volume of activity. The authors point out that political acts can be distinguished also in relation to the extent to which it is possible to

Firstly, political acts differ in terms of the resource that matter most (i.e. time, money, and civic skills): most political acts—taking part in a strike, being involved in a public demonstration—require time. Donating money or buying certain products for political reasons, obviously demand mainly money. Also, there is variation in relation to the amount of skills required: going to the polls or attending a demonstration does not require individuals to be especially articulate or well-organised, as pointed out by Verba et al. (1995, 44, 359), whilst, individuals who contact public officials, work for a political party during a campaign will require certain skills.[4] Hence on the basis of their particular characteristics and the resources that individuals accumulate throughout their life cycles, some acts are more challenging than others.

Secondly, political acts vary in relation to the extent of information they convey about circumstances and preferences of the participants. For example, the act of voting is a quite blunt tool for communication of what is on people's mind; in contrast, a direct contact with the media allow the participants to transmit detailed information about their preferences, as well as the type of background and implications that are associated to such participatory acts. Hence, depending on the specific objective an individual wants to attain, some political acts are more appropriate than others. Both criteria represent an important touchstone of my argument.

In short, political acts are not substitutes, neither in their main generating factors nor in their consequences (Verba et al., 1995, 363-368). As pointed out by Huntington and Nelson (1976, 14), "the concept of political participation is nothing more than an umbrella concept which accommodates very different forms of action constituting differentiated phenomena, and for which it is necessary to look for explanations of different nature." Hence, all political acts should be conceived of as alternative channels through which individuals can convey their desiderata, depending on the resources on which they can rely (i.e. time, money, and civic skills) and the objectives individuals set up for themselves. Following this reasoning, as I discuss in detail in section 7.1, through the resources accumulated throughout their life cycles in the form of money, time, and civic skills, individuals have at their disposal different channels through which their preferences, needs, and concerns can

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multiply the amount of participatory input (i.e. money and time) one dedicates to a particular act. The *volume* of activity, that is how much they engage in specific political acts, rather that simply whether they do or not, provide indications on the extent certain political activities apply pressure on policy-makers (Verba et al., 1995, 37,38). The survey at hand does not allow to gauge the volume of behavioural forms of engagement, as no questions were asked on the amount of time or money devoted to each political acts, unlike previous work (cf. Spaiser 2011; also, Schlozman et al. 1994).

[4]Moreover, the individuals who possess the requisite organisational and communication skills are in a better position to engage in these political acts and profit from these (Verba et al., 1995, 270-271).

be publicly expressed; for example, when the need arise, they can use their money to voice their desiderata by engaging in donating money to a political organisation; if the needs manifest, they can use the civic skills (i.e. communication and organisational skills) they developed for example at school or in their workplace, to contact a politician. And if need be, they can use their free time to engage in public demonstrations.

As noted by Teorell et al. (2007, 334), "[t]hrough participation [residents] voice their grievances and make their demands heard to the larger public; they also make governments accountable and politicians responsive. The venues open for such activities are multiple." Although all individuals have the right to engage in multiple forms of participatory acts to voice their desiderata; it is important to note that, what contribute significantly to determine which venues are *de facto* open for activity is ultimately the amount of resources individuals accumulate during their lives; individuals with more resources will have a wider *political choice*, that is more venues through which they can express their social and political views. In contrast, a narrower political choice is imposed on individuals that lack the requisite resources to engage in certain political acts.

In this chapter, I investigate whether individuals engaged, or not, in nine different political acts: 1) contacted a politician, media or solicitor; 2) worked in a political party; 3) worn or displayed a badge, sticker or poster; 4) signed a petition; 5) taken part in a public demonstration; 6) boycotted certain products; 7) bought certain products for political reasons; 8) donated money to a political organisation or group; 9) took part in a strike. All these modes of political involvement represents only some of the channels through which migrant-origin individuals could funnel their needs, preference and concerns, and contribute to define what I refer here as *political action repertoire*.[5] A wider repertoire means that migrant-origin individuals' political voice can travel through different channels. Conversely, a narrower political action repertoire indicates a reduced ability to make public their own political and social views, since engaging in fewer acts, will allow them to "bring to the public table" only a smaller portion of their original needs, preferences, and concerns.

In order to examine whether anti-discrimination structures play the role that has implicitly been ascribed to them in official documents, and academic works, as I

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[5]As I discuss more in detail in the final chapter of this dissertation, one of the areas of improvement of studies on political participation—which regards also this work—consists in taking into account the effect of recent technological advancements on political participation, and consider also the forms of political participation that are taken on the Internet (see e.g. Teorell et al. 2007) or more specifically, the new forms of online political participation (e.g. writing a political blog, tweeting, joining virtual sit-ins), which generally go under the label of *e-participation* (see e.g. Spaiser 2011; Freelon et al. 2013).

show more in detail in section 7.4.1, I will create a summary measure of all these 9 participatory acts.

How is political participation explained? Below I provide a short review of the Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM), an explanatory model of political activity, on which I draw significantly to develop the argument briefly presented in the introduction.

A considerable amount of literature has been published over the years on the role of socio-economic resources, like education, income, and occupation, in accounting for variations in political participation (see e.g., Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; for a review see Leighley 1995). According to the socio-economic status (SES) model, individuals with higher levels of socio-economic resources are more likely to adopt positive orientations that motivate their participation in the political sphere. Importantly, these studies have shown that SES matters in predicting levels of voting participation as well as other forms of political participation (Pilati, 2010, 46), and this holds not only for the autochthonous group but also to the members of migrant-origin groups (for a review of SES see, Leighley 1995, 183-188; and Leighley and Vedlitz 1999, 1094). In brief, by virtue of the work developed within this perspective, we know that generally, people with higher levels of education, income, and occupational status tend to vote more, campaign more, contact more, organise more in comparison to those with lower socio-economic status (Leighley and Vedlitz, 1999).

Yet the SES model, although strong on empirical ground, fails at a theoretical level to specify the mechanism linking socioeconomic status to political participation (Junn, 1999, 1420-1421). The CVM can be conceived of as a specification of the SES model because it lays down explicitly the mechanisms linking social statuses to activity (Pilati 2016, 18; Verba et al. 1995, 280).

This theoretical approach is particularly useful in explaining how stronger anti-discrimination structures can help individuals who belong to disadvantaged groups to express more freely their political and social views thr-ough the most appropriate political act. In particular, the CVM is useful for developing in more clear terms my argument for three main reasons: firstly because it shows how individuals' decision to participate in politics is strictly linked to the resources that can be accumulated throughout their life cycles (Verba et al., 1995; Strate et al., 1989; Burns et al., 2001). Secondly because it clearly shows how the stockpile of resources an individual has accumulated in her life cycle in the form of money, time, and civic skills, define certain real costs, which ultimately shape the breadth of the political choice available to her to express her political and social views in the society. Hence, for lack of sufficient resources, some political acts are just too costly to engage in. And, in this

case, the individual prefers to direct these few resources towards more pressing needs (e.g. house tasks, child-care, leisure, sleep). Or since, certain political acts are felt to require particular communication and organisation skills that the individual feels not having developed in her life cycle, she remains barred from engaging in these specific acts. This approach is finally useful because it shows also that money and time are not the only resources available. In fact, the necessary civic skills can be acquired through exercise in key social institutions: family, schools, workplace, churches, and voluntary associations. And these institutions are important also because they work for individuals as recruitment centres, where they receive demands to engage in political acts, and place them in contact with political messages and cues, that can stimulate their political participation (Verba et al., 1995, 389). In the sections that follow I will consider briefly these three points.

Resources: time, money, and civic skills

The CVM like the SES model put particular emphasis on the importance of resources for participation: money, time, and civic skills (i.e. organisational and communication capacities); and these resources, as pointed out Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 282), are differently available to individuals on the basis of their socioeconomic status, and interestingly, their effect is not the same across all forms of political participation.

The CVM however, goes beyond the SES model by focusing not only on the resources themselves, but also on the processes through which resources are acquired. In particular, the origin of these resources is identified into the involvement of individuals into major social institutions like family, schools, work-place, and churches. Experiences within these institutions affect the stockpile of time, money, and civic skills on which individuals can rely to engage in political acts. Importantly, as demonstrated by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995), being involved into these institutions can have a compensative effect on the imbalance that exists between individuals with high socio-economic status and those with low socio-economic status (see Verba et al. 1995, 281-283).

Furthermore, the authors build-up upon the basic cost-benefit logic of the rational choice theory to develop an approach that takes into account also the real costs that entails for individuals when they deviate their resources (i.e. time and money) away from other purposes to engage in political acts.[6]

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[6]Civic skills are more ambiguous in comparison to time and money, as the stockpile of skills might actually increase through use. As noted by Verba et al. (1995, 284), skills are related to costs in the sense that they reduce the effort that one needs for political activity: the more skills one acquires throughout her life, the less costly is engaging in political acts, notably time-based acts like contacting, protesting or working for a

By developing a resource-centred explanations that links rational choice theory and SES approach, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 287) were able to show how stratification along socioeconomic lines and other demographic cleavages shape individual resources, and constrain individual choices about political participation. Hence, less resources does not mean merely less participation in terms of volume; fewer resources to bring to politics hinder also individual choice to participate; meaning that less options are viable to resource-lacking individuals to express their political and social views. As I shall argue in section 7.2, my argument revolves around the *limits to choice* that are peculiar to the members of socio-economically disadvantaged groups; and ultimately on the necessity to focus on the different forms through which they can express their political voice in their country of residence (i.e. political action repertoire).

Resources, are yet only one of three main participatory factors of the CVM. According to this perspective, individuals may fail to engage in politics, not only because they cannot engage for lack of resources, but also because they do not want to (i.e. individual psychological predispositions), or because were not asked by anyone to engage in any political act (i.e. social networks).[7]

Psychological predispositions

The second main component of CVM is represented by the variety of psychological predispositions, such as interest in politics or sense of political efficacy that individuals develop throughout their life cycles.[8] According to this perspective, this wide variety of political motivations predispose individuals to be active in politics. Although these explanations of political participation are recognised to be not terribly interesting, psychological predispositions like individuals' political interest and political efficacy are certainly a powerful predictor of participation (Verba et al. 1995, 274; Morales and Giugni 2011a, 264; Pilati 2016, 16).

However, the addition of attitudinal engagement raises different sorts of issues that go well beyond the challenges related to their transformation into measurable

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campaign (Verba et al., 1995, 360).

[7]In this chapter, I use only a single resource measure: income. The survey used does not contain information on individuals' free time and civic skills. I will however include related variables such as individuals' educational levels, language proficiency, and occupational status (for more details on the operationalisation of these concepts see section D in the appendix).

[8]In this dissertation I have used the concept of *attitudinal* engagement to refer to these psychological forms of engagement with politics to distinguish them from *behavioural* modes of engagement. In other works, these are grouped under the rubric of *engagement* (see e.g., Verba et al. 1995, 272; Burns et al. 2001).

objects.[9] Firstly, the relationship between behavioural forms of political engagement and attitudinal forms of political engagement entails some difficulties in relation to the direction of the causal link: presumably, being politically interested, informed, or efficacious enhances the likelihood to be political active; but equally, as argued by theorists like Pateman (1970) and Barber (1984), it is fair to expect that being active may increase attitudinal engagement as participants become more interested, more informed, and more efficacious (see e.g. Finkel 1985; Bowler and Donovan 2002). Even so, I believe that a certain amount of subjective motivation is required to individuals to take part in political acts (Verba et al. 1995, 345); or as Coleman (1988, 96) put it, actors have an internal "engine of action", hence are not merely shaped by the environment, in the form of social norms, rules, and obligations, but have also "internal springs of action" that give them purpose and direction. Hence, some individuals might be intrinsically motivated to care more about politics, and perhaps this can reflect a more general engagement with what happens in the world; or feel that they can influence political outcomes, which might indicate a more general feeling of self-confidence (Verba et al. 1995, 345).[10]

The further issue raised by the addition of attitudinal forms of engagement is not trivial and relates to the specific types of psychological predispositions that researchers should consider to explain individuals' political participation. As I have mentioned in chapter 3, there are numerous measures of attitudinal forms of engagement; many of these are overlapping in meaning as noted by (Verba et al., 1995), and have an ambiguous relationship with individuals' propensity to be active in politics, as in the case of trust (for example, for a discussion on the ambiguous relationship between trust and political participation, see, Aitken 2012). It is important to note that there is no consensus around the types of psychological predispositions that should figure significantly in the bundle of attitudinal engagements. For example, notwithstanding the vast literature on the importance of social and political forms of trust in promoting political participation, some works do not include this factor in their analysis, opting instead for other forms of attitudinal engagement, like, group consciousness, party identification, political information, political interest, and political efficacy; and interestingly the inclusion and exclusion of these factors is often followed by some hesitation by the authors (see e.g., Verba et al. 1995, 347; Burns et al. 2001, 101). Others, like Burns, Schlozman, and

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[9]For a discussion on the dilemmas raised by the operationalisations of attitudinal forms of engagements, see for example, Abramson (1983), *Political Attitudes in America*.

[10]Verba et al. (1995) have shown that psychological predispositions are causally prior to political activity. In order to exclude the possibility that attitudinal engagement (e.g. political interest) is actually the result rather than the cause of behavioural engagement, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 337,354) used a technique called 'two-stage least squares' (2SLS). This, however, does not mean that behavioural and attitudinal forms of engagement cannot mutually reinforce each other.

Verba (2001), have instead excluded strength of individuals' party ties, and controlled only for the fact that some individuals might be intrinsically more motivated to take part in politics because they are more politically interested, informed, or efficacious.

Although I recognise the importance of this debate, this is not an issue that I can properly address within this chapter. I am, however, persuaded by the findings produced by Verba et al. (1995, 367): psychological predispositions like individuals' interest in politics are potent predictors of political activity, even when difference in individuals' resources is taken into account.[11]

Exposure to political stimuli

The final component of the model is constituted by the recruitment/mobilisation processes and nurture of individuals' attitudinal engagement that take place within key social institutions.[12]

Social institutions—like the workplaces, voluntary associations, and churches—are important to enhance political action also because these are the settings where individuals are exposed to political stimuli; in the sense that in these settings, individuals can engage in informal discussions on political issues, for example during the weekly sermon at church, individuals might be exposed to political messages. Or on their jobs, can develop networks of friends and acquaintances from which requests for political involvement emerge (Verba et al., 1995, 309).[13]

Descriptive evidence produced by Verba et al. (1995, 133-159) shows how requests for participation that are directed to individuals at work, in church, or in organisations, often lead to participation, especially when requests come from friends, relatives, or acquaintances (see also Burns et al. 2001). The same applies to exposure to political communication in these key social institutions, notably within churches and jobs (Verba et al., 1995, 375). Interestingly, by investigating the phenomenon

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[11] As I show more in detail in section 7.4, a measure of attitudinal engagement I consider in this chapter is individuals' interest in the political affairs of the country of residence.

[12] In this study I employ the terms "mobilisation" and "recruitment" in an interchangeable way, although I recognise that the concept of mobilisation can be used to refer to all other sort of phenomena (Verba et al. see 1995, 133; but see Brady et al. 1999).

[13] In the study conducted by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995), these aspects were operationalised through survey items that asked respondents whether they were requested to vote for or against a candidate, or take some other action on a political issue (e.g. signing a petition, or contacting a public official); Although this additional component of the CVM constitute an important step in my argument, it will not be taken into consideration in the empirical section, because I do not have information on the requests and political messages to which individuals were exposed within social institutions. It is only included here because it is key piece of the CVM and I use it to clarify the causal mechanisms whereby the strength of anti-discrimination structures developed in a country can influence the political participation of the individuals residing in it.

of recruitment across a variety of activities in several institutional settings in the United States, the authors have also demonstrated how solicitation mechanisms are significantly embedded into the socio-demographic structure of the population: men, individuals with higher income, and Anglo-Whites are more likely to receive requests for political participation in comparison to women, individuals with lower income, and Blacks, respectively; and members of these groups are not only more likely to receive requests for political activity but are also those who make more requests for activity (Verba et al. 1995, 151-152, 376-377; see also, Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).

Again, participatory factors differ in their effect depending upon the mode of political participation. Their study in fact shows that requests for participation concern more frequently some specific forms of political participation over others, and that the success rate of these mechanisms is not constant across the different forms of political actions.[14]

It is worth noting that accounting for this component in multivariate analysis entails a problem analogous to that posed by the relationship between attitudinal and behavioural forms of engagement (see also Brady et al., 1999, 153); more specifically, when it comes to the exposure to political cues and requests for participation, direction of causality may be ambiguous. Those who are more exposed to political conversations are more likely to be active in politics, yet it is also fair to expect that those who are more active in politics are also more likely to discuss political matters in these situations. Similarly, with respect to requests for political activity, people do undertake political activities because they are asked, but it is also true that past activities attracts subsequent requests (Verba et al. 1995, 371; Burns et al. 2001, 216).[15] In spite of the problems of causal direction, multivariate evidence confirms the crucial role of key social institutions in enhancing political participation, by acting as a source for political recruitment (Verba et al., 1995, 389).

Although it is widely recognised that these political factors are highly stratified by race, ethnicity, and gender, what is still missing here is the other side of the story: what reproduces these social stratifications?[16]

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[14]Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 143-144) show how in the United States, the mechanisms of political solicitation are more successful if the efforts at recruiting others are directed towards political activities such as contacting a government official or taking part in a community activity rather than giving a campaign contribution or attending a demonstration or a protest.

[15]The authors deals with this dilemma by creating a measure of political stimuli that relies exclusively on direct requests for political activity rather than exposure to political conversations (see Verba et al., 1995, 388).

[16]This same point has been raised also by Wrench (1996, 143-144) when discussing the position of members of socially disadvantaged groups within the education and em-

Scholars who put at the basis of their enquiries this question, consider oppressive phenomena such as multiple practices of discrimination that are based on individuals' race, ethnicity, gender, and religion, and are suffered for example in the labour market's selection process, certainly as one of the main *sources* contributing to reproduce stratifications of political factors like education and income. In contrast, scholars who are more interested in studying patterns of political engagement, generally refer to the *outcome* of these stratifications (e.g. gap in education; gap in income) to explain for example, why migrant-origin individuals are less active in politics with respect to autochthonous individuals. By isolating these two groups of scholarship I do not imply that one group of students *cares more* than the other about the oppressive phenomena suffered by disadvantaged categories like migrant-origin individuals. I rather suggest that these two scholarships seem to develop in parallel, not only for the different questions raised but often for the methods used, and not surprisingly struggle to fully profit from their reciprocal advancements.

This chapter is to be considered as an attempt to bridge these two strands; and I will try to do so by developing in the following section a discussion that starts from the following questions:

How can oppressive phenomena disrupt the process of resource accumulation and psychological engagement with politics that migrant-origin individuals can develop throughout their life cycle? And how can these phenomena limit their political choice?

7.2. Oppression: Racism, Discrimination, Prejudice and Other Related Forms of Intolerance

A recent report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights notes that "[i]ntersecting and multiple forms of discrimination have an especially dev-

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ployment market, in the following terms: "[i]t is clear from previous research that a conventional "human capital" approach is inadequate in itself in explaining the labour market exclusion of young migrants. Instead the processes of labour market integration and exclusion are multiple, diverse and highly complex. For example, it is not necessarily the case that the greater level of unemployment found in one social group reflects simply and directly the lack of human capital skills achieved through education. It can also work the other way round - a perception of poor opportunities and a lack of fairness in the labour market for ethnic minorities reduces educational motivation and performance and the desire for vocational training after school. Young people from these groups lose faith in the advantages of further education for themselves and simply opt out."

astating effect on the free exercise of participatory rights" (A/HRC/27/29, para. 44).

In political science, students interested in explaining variations in the way migrant-origin individuals or ethnic minorities engage in politics, have certainly tried to make sense of the additional obstacles that are peculiar to the living conditions of the members of these groups. One of these obstacles is represented by the personal experiences of discrimination that members of specific migrant-origin and ethnic minority groups must cope with, in reason, for example, of their skin colour, religion, gender, and nationality. Yet the literature has produced contradictory and ambiguous expectations in relation to the consequences that perceived experiences of discrimination have on participation (see also Burns et al., 2001, 250).

In my review I have found three different groups of studies, that vary in relation to the initial assumptions made and the evidence produced. According to the first group, perceptions of discrimination are detrimental to the general process of inclusion of migrant-origin individuals in the political sphere, and depress their political activity. This happens either because discrimination has psychological repercussions that ultimately push victims to feel less efficacious, or because victims of discrimination are barred directly from engaging in political activities. Perceptions of discrimination can have a detrimental effect on their involvement of this category in the political sphere also indirectly by impairing the kinds of opportunities that allow the development of civic kills or inclusion into patterns of recruitment (Tung, 1985; Castles, 2002).

Conversely, according to the second, feelings of perceived discrimination are believed to promote engagement in the political sphere of the country of residence. This argument usually goes under the label of "reactive ethnicity". Following this perspective, the feelings of anger and injustice engendered by an experience of perceived discrimination would have a mobilising effect, thus generating political activity (Rumbaut, 2008).

The final group includes instead works that produced ambiguous evidence—but were not able to make sense of their findings, as well as those that, apparently, found no evidence in support of the role of experience of discrimination (see e.g. González-Ferrer 2011, 75; Myrberg and Rogstad 2011, 194; Morales and Giugni 2011a, 266; Giugni and Morariu 2007, 12,19; Morales and Morariu 2011, 159).

This brief review confirms that the mechanisms through which individual experiences discrimination affect migrant-origin political engagement in their country of residence remains an open empirical question.

As pointed out Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001), reports of experiences of discrimination are neither entirely objective nor entirely subjective. These experiences are objective in the sense that some categories of people vary in relation to

their exposure to discrimination: some people are just more likely than others to be discriminated in reason of their visible identity traits. Experiences of perceived discrimination are subjective because also within the same category, individuals vary in their way of interpreting the same experience as discriminatory. For example, Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001) have shown that individuals who stray away from the path of traditional gender-role expectations, like women in full-time jobs or men in part-time jobs, were more likely to report experiences with discrimination. It is however not clear whether this is the result of context, meaning that these groups are more likely to feel discriminated because they choose less conventional roles, or the effect of their subjectivity, in the sense that these groups of people are more sensitive to potentially discriminatory acts—or both.

Drawing on the subjective characteristic of these experiences, some recent works have contributed to move things forward in the understanding of how perceptions of discrimination could affect the participation of migrant-origin individuals. These works have found that a crucial map of interpretation of these experiences is represented by the type of of self-identification individuals develop in their country of residence (Berry and Sabatier, 2010; Berry et al., 2006; Simon and Klandermans, 2001). Drawing on this literature, Fischer-Neumann (2014), found for example that the interaction between the type of identification developed in the country of residence along with the experience of discrimination can influence the levels of political interest expressed by the members of different ethnic groups in Germany. In particular, the results show that in the face of perceived discrimination the individuals of Turkish origin in Germany who developed a strong identification for the autochthonous as well as their ethnic community had higher levels of political involvement, in the form of higher degrees of interest in the political affairs of the country of residence. However, as pointed out by the author herself, the exact mechanisms explaining why and how individuals with double feelings of identification show higher levels of political involvement cannot yet be fully disentangled through the research conducted so far. More conceptual and methodological effort is certainly needed in the future to address this issue.

As I shall discuss more in detail, in my attempt to show how anti-discrimination structures can influence participation, I draw on these considerations, in order to take into account in my analysis also the role played by individual experiences of perceived discrimination and the interaction of these with the different types of self-identification or feelings of belonging developed by individuals with migrant-origins. In particular, by following the approach used by Fischer-Neumann (2014), each community of Moroccans is divided into four mutually exclusive groups: (1) respondents who developed stronger feelings of belonging with the autochthonous community; (2) respondents who developed stronger feelings of belonging with the

ethnic community; (3) respondents who developed stronger feelings of belonging with neither the autochthonous nor the ethnic community; and (4) respondents who developed stronger feelings of belonging with both the autochthonous and the ethnic community (see for more details on the operationalisation of these concepts see section D in the appendix).

Yet, I also recognise that the feeling of being discriminated (or not being discriminated) against that an individual might have in the country of residence—in reason of her religion, gender, nationality, race or ethnicity, and any other relevant identity trait—constitute only the tip of the larger phenomenon of oppression. In other words, all oppressive dynamics that members of socio-economically disadvantaged migrant-groups encounter throughout their life cycle in the country of residence cannot certainly be reduced to a subset of a much more complex phenomenon (see e.g. Crenshaw, 1989).[17]

In order to fully develop my argument, I try to go beyond the single experience of discrimination, and embrace the theoretical and conceptual advancements produced within the literature on oppression, notably on the considerations developed by Black feminist thought. By doing so I can more clearly underline the link that exist between the more general, complex, and multiple phenomena of oppression endured by disadvantaged categories of people and their real chances to make use of the different channels of actions at their disposal to voice their concerns and publicly express their social and political views.

In particular, the works I refer to in the coming sections show clearly why and how the phenomena of oppression that migrant-origin individuals must face throughout their lives, impose on the member of these groups additional and significant constraints, and disrupt the three sets of participatory factors—resources, orientations to politics, and recruitment—that are found essential in fostering individuals' political voice.

Additional constraints on political choice

As pointed out Cudd (2006), oppression is an institutionally structured harm imposed on vulnerable social groups by other groups using direct and indirect ma-

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[17]In this chapter I use the concept of "oppression" to refer to all those multiple forms of discrimination and dominance based on race, religion, gender, nationality, sexual orientation, class, and other visible traits of the identity. Although I acknowledge the differences that exists between the different manifestations of this phenomena, it certainly goes beyond the scope of this chapter to enter into the conceptualisations of these different terms. I will refer to all these aspects with the expressions of 'oppressive phenomena', 'oppressive dynamics' or simply 'oppression'. A review of the Black feminist thought goes beyond the scope of this study. However, for a more detailed discussion of these phenomena see for example: Purdie-Vaughns and Eibach (2008); Hancock (2007); Fredman (2016); Cudd (2006).

terial, economic, and psychological force. The *direct* as well as *indirect* constraints that stems from oppressive mechanisms ultimately limit the political choice available to members of disadvantaged groups, like Maghrebians in Europe, to express their political voice, through the most appropriate forms of political action.[18]

Direct constraints to political choice relates to the presence of additional obstacles that stems from prejudice, discrimination or other related forms of intolerance towards individuals' visible identity traits, on which members of disadvantaged migrant-groups are more likely to stumble upon in reason of the colour of their skin, their religion, their ethnicity, their nationality or any other sensitive identity characteristic.

I argue that the choice of political acts in which they can engage is directly limited by oppressive phenomena because the channels through which members of disadvantage migrant-groups could express their political voice (e.g. joining a political party or contacting a newspaper) are more likely to be clogged-up with additional constraints as a result of aversive and everyday racism, direct and indirect discriminatory practices, prejudiced ideas about their role in the society and stereotype threats, and other related forms of intolerance, which migrants and their progeny must regularly face in various sectors of their societies of residence, in reason of their visible identities. The recent practices of poll monitoring as well as the restrictive voting laws enacted in some American states to intimidate, dissuade, and suppress Black voters, in particular, constitute vivid examples of these sort of direct additional barriers to participation (Lemieux, 2016; Green, 2016).

I am also conscious that these direct constraints have a different impact on political participation that depends on the specific kind of political acts in which the individual is willing to engage; also I recognise that these types of obstacles would be more important for political acts that require co-operation on the part of other individuals, in order to succeed. For example, the political acts of wearing a badge, buying or boycotting a product for political reasons are (far) less likely to be susceptible to these direct constraints in comparison to political acts like working in a political party or contacting a politician or the media (see e.g. Adida et al., 2016, 152).

Oppressive phenomena based on visible identity traits can affect also *indirectly* the political choices available to migrant-origin individuals, because they disrupt the political factors—resources, psychological engagement, and recruitment networks—that generally spur individuals to political actions, as I mentioned in section 7.1. In particular, oppressive phenomena affect the resources that members of migrant-origin groups can most directly spend in political activity: money and

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[18]In this chapter, I refer to the concepts of 'choice' or 'political choice' as quasi-synonyms of the concept of 'political action repertoire', already defined in section 7.1.

time. As pointed out Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 289), "[i]t is impossible to contribute to a campaign or other political cause without some discretionary income. Similarly, it is impossible to write a letter to a public official, attend community meetings, or work in a campaign without the free time to do so."

Constraints on resources (i.e. time and money) limit choice (Verba et al., 1995, 285-286), as mentioned before. Since time and money are limited resources, when these are devoted to politics they are taken away from other purposes, like family, work, recreation, or sleep; for this reason the use of time and money entail real costs, that differ according to the amount of resource available to each individual. Additional constraints imposed by oppressive practices on migrants' time and money, in the form of employment discrimination or housing market discrimination for example, limit their *political choice* because some forms of political action remain or become just too costly, in terms of time and/or money, to engage in (Lister, 1997; Silberman and Fournier, 2006).

There is strong and growing evidence that members of stigmatised groups like Africans (i.e. Maghrebians and Blacks) in Europe face interlocking phenomena of discrimination in reason of their visible identities, at school, in the housing market, employment market, and leisure. These process of oppression ultimately hinders the quantity and quality of resources (i.e. time and money) they can accumulate throughout their life cycles (see e.g. Allasino et al. 2004).[19]

Disrupted civic skill development

As mentioned earlier, what is important for my argument is the role that key social institutions play in incubating these civic skills. As we have seen in section 7.1, a third resource for politics is constituted by the civic skills of each individual. These refer to the communication and organisational abilities, that individual develop throughout their life cycle, beginning at home, developing at school, and continuing in adult life in non-political settings such as the workplace, voluntary associations, and church.[20] These skills are important for political participation because who possess them can compensate for the lack of other resources, and generally

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[19]Although labour market factors remain the main explanation for the higher unemployment rate of African migrant-origin migrants in Europe and United States, there is a vast literature on the role of housing in determining people's opportunities in the field of education or employment (see e.g. Meurs and Pailhé 2010, 139; Grelet 2004).

[20]Civic skills are transformed into measurable objects by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995), by relying on individuals' vocabulary, individuals' ability to communicate in English, and experiences in exercising communications and organisational skills on the job, in voluntary organisations, and churches (see, Verba et al. 1995, ch.11). In this chapter, as I shall show more in detail in section 7.4, I capture through the survey data I use only one of these aspects by measuring individual's ability to communicate using the language of the country of residence.

find political activities less difficult and less costly, hence should be more likely to take part (Verba et al. 1995, 304; Burns et al. 2001, 201).

I argue that phenomena of oppression, as defined above, hinder the development of civic skills that are germane to political activity, by affecting the *selection into* social institutions, as well as the *treatment within* these institutions. In other words, I argue that the probability of socio-economically disadvantaged groups—like are Moroccans and their progeny in Europe—to develop the necessary civic skills that could then allow them to perceive political participation as less daunting and allow them also to engage in more skill-demanding political acts, in order to express their views, is not influenced only by the selection into social institutions that offer less opportunities to acquire, or improve, organisational or communications skills, that can later be used to engage in politics, but also by the type of treatment they receive within these institutions. Firstly I consider the process of selection into key social institutions. I then focus on the treatment members of these groups receive within these social institutions.

Selection into social institutions

Selection into social institutions matters because the amount of civic skills that can be developed and later used to engage in more skill-demanding political acts depend on the specific *kinds* of jobs, schools, religious institutions, and non-political organisations in which individuals are involved. For example, a job in a public relation agency rather than a hairdressing salon is more likely to provide opportunities to acquire the relevant resources to political participation. Schooling in itself produces civic skills. With higher education attainments come more opportunities for jobs that are not only more financially rewarding but also provide more chances to train civic skills (Verba et al., 1995, 310-315).

Yet access to good schools and high-level jobs is highly stratified on the basis of socio-demographic features like class, gender, and ethnicity. Hence, resources for participation accumulate, as the advantages of family income pass to education attainment and later transfer to better positions in the employment market. Conversely, as pointed out Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001, 366), "[t]hose who are born to parents of limited educational attainment begin life with a participatory disadvantage that is difficult to overcome; and any educational deficit upon entering adulthood will be magnified thereafter by the institutions of everyday life." Generally, Moroccan residents and their descendants in Europe fall into this category. The works conducted on this group, in different European countries, show clearly that its members tend to be concentrated in poor areas that are characterised by higher levels of unemployment, away from where their jobs are located. They

are generally involved in poor schooling, they drop-out of school more often than their autochthonous counterparts, and leave the school with lower levels of education (see e.g. Brinbaum and Guégnard 2012a; Algava and Lhommeau 2013; Schneider and Crul 2012, 22; Lessard-Phillips and Ross 2012, 85,92; Crul et al. 2012, 122). What is more, even when their families invest on their education, as in the notorious case of female Moroccan students, this investment does not pay off: the success at school of their daughters does not lead to the better opportunities in the job market, rather they are disproportionately hit by underemployment and unemployment levels that nullify the efforts they made at school (see e.g. Brinbaum and Guégnard 2012b; Meurs and Pailhé 2010).

Although, phenomena of oppression—as I defined them in section 7.2—might not account straightforwardly for all the reasons why members of disadvantaged groups are found in greater numbers in social institutions endowed with poor-skill-creating aspects, it is however indisputable that oppressive phenomena work as a conservative power, which contribute significantly to maintain access to quality education, quality housing, and quality employment, segmented along gender, ethnic, and race lines (see also COSPE, 2013; Favilli, 2015).

Behavioural data collected through field experimentation confirms that Moroccans and their descendants are one of the most discriminated groups in Europe.[21] For example, findings provided by a CNRS research examining discrimination in the access to the French private schools, shows that emails are less likely to receive a response if signed by applicants with Muslim North-African-sounding names compared to Christian French-sounding names; furthermore, responses to queries coming from applicants with Muslim North-African-sounding names are less likely to receive a positive response and more likely to be followed by a request of meeting (Du Parquet et al., 2013).[22]

In the employment market, for example, an analysis conducted by Allasino et al. (2004) within the scope of an international ILO study on labour market discrimination, confirms that Moroccan-origin workers in Italy, must face a state of objective and systematic disadvantage, when trying to access a job; and the authors acknowl-

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[21]'Situation testing'—or 'Audit testing' in the Anglo-Saxon world—is a research methodology aimed at bringing to light cases of discrimination in the different areas of life; applied to work-related fields, this consists of sending fictitious job applications from different individuals endowed with the same productive characteristics (e.g. education, age, language command) in response to real job openings. The ethnic/religious origin of the applicants is typically signalled through their first and last name (for more details see for instance, Bovenkerk 2000).

[22]Despite the long debate on the quality of private schools with respect to public schools, and the reasons why parents put their children in one or another, an interesting study conducted by Valdenaire (2011) shows that the benefit in attending a private school is maximised for students coming from disadvantaged milieux, with respect to students with more well-heeled origins.

edge that these can realistically frustrate their legitimate aspirations and limit their propensity to invest in training, pushing them in the long run to settle down for low-level jobs. This ultimately will feed into the stereotyped images they suffer from, in the society of residence.[23] These oppressive dynamics are not peculiar to the Italian employment market. Studies conducted in other countries confirm this pattern (see e.g. Bunel et al. 2016; Duguet et al. 2007; Le Défenseur des droits 2012; Smeesters et al. 2000; De Prada et al. 2000).

The phenomena of oppression, members of socio-economically disadvantaged groups must face in their life cycles in reason of their visible characteristics (e.g. gender, religion, nationality, ethnicity, and race) contribute significantly to shrink their probability to be part of education and employment environments where civic skills can be exercised, developed, and later brought to the political sphere. Concentration in these types of schools and jobs determine the stockpile of civic skills an individual can acquire and develop throughout her life cycle. Fewer organisational and communication skills means that the individual will find more daunting to engage in certain political acts, and this will ultimately shape the breadth of political acts through which they can express their political and social views.[24]

Experience within social institutions

The peculiar experience within social institutions is another aspect that is important to consider when studying groups that are highly stigmatised in reason of their visible identities. The disruption of the process of civic-skills development undergone by Moroccan-origin migrants stems not only for the anomalous concentration in poor-skill building social institutions, but also from the specific treatment reserved to the members of these groups within these institutions. This argument is presented by Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001, 216-218) in relation to the gender differences in participation. According to the authors, the source of difference is located both in the selection processes that bring men and women into work force as well as in the allocation of participatory factors once there. Interestingly, the study also shows that the male advantage in terms of political factors accumulated is greatest in top jobs, "the very jobs that provide the greatest enhancement of par-

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[23]The International Migration Branch of the International Labour Organization (ILO) initiated in the early 1990s, a research project entitled "Combating Discrimination Against Migrant and Ethnic Minority Workers in The World of Work"(for more details see, Zegers de Beijl 2000a).

[24]It is well-known in political science, that some political acts are *objectively* more difficult than others (Milbrath and Goel 1977, 11; Verba et al. 1995, 82). Yet, to determine the overall degree of difficulty of a political act it is necessary to consider also the role played by subjectivity. The amount of civic skills an individual has acquired throughout her life, along with traits of the personality contribute to define the perceived level of difficulty of certain political acts, and ultimately, the likelihood to engage in them.

ticipatory capacity".

Similar indications have been provided also in relation to racial discrimination in the education and employment field (see e.g. The Economist 2015; Alexander and Arday 2015). For example, focusing on Moroccan-origin pupils in a school in the province of Barcelona, the ethnographic research conducted by Serra i Salamé (2004) shows how students of Moroccan origins represented a particularly victimised group, target of discriminatory treatment and exclusion (Serra i Salamé, 2004, 444). The author concludes that "Moroccan students were the object of sick jokes, they were pushed in the corridors, and they suffered social isolation (particularly the girls) and constant gibing."(Serra i Salamé, 2004, 442). Similar results were found in other European countries (see e.g. Vandezande et al. 2010; Notarangelo 2012).

In reason of the various forms of oppression mentioned above, it occurs more often than it is readily recognised that members of these stigmatised groups are confronted with additional forms of 'penalisation' within key social institutions, which compromise their overall experience and disrupt the process of development of civic skills they can undergo within these key social institutions (see e.g. Amadieu, 2008, 91). Similarly to what I argued in the section before, oppressive treatment *within* key social institutions, and not only the biased process of selection *into* these institutions, ultimately shape the breadth of their participation, because it determines their real ability to make use of the various channels of action available to express their social and political views. For the amount of communication and organisational skills required by some political acts, and the stockpile of civic skills members of these groups were not allowed to exercise and develop, in reason of the multiple forms of oppression, some channels of action remain just too costly or daunting to effectively be even taken into consideration by members of these groups to publicly express their voice.

Stratified political stimuli

As I mentioned in section 7.1, social institutions—like the workplaces, voluntary associations, and churches—are important to enhance political action also because they constitute the settings where individuals are more likely to be exposed to political stimuli. In these settings, individuals can engage in informal discussions on political issues, for example during the weekly sermon at church, or might be exposed to political messages. And on their jobs, they can develop networks of friends and acquaintances from which requests for political involvement emerge.

As shown earlier, different studies have demonstrated that a significant portion of individuals engage in political activities because they are asked to do so. As

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Verba et al. (1995, 390) put it, "those who are *recruited* often say yes when asked."

Yet, some people tend to receive less requests for activity than others. As I mentioned before, recruitment to politics is significantly stratified along visible identity features like gender and ethnicity (Burns et al. 2001, 272; Fox and Lawless 2010). Although most work on recruitment patterns have focused on the mechanisms of candidate recruitment and selection in parliamentary politics, rather than overall forms of participation, these studies, by looking more closely into this phenomenon, have found that at the basis of this stratification are interlocking dynamics of stereotyped prejudice, subtle discriminatory practices, and other forms of more direct oppression, which ultimately leave some categories of people at the margins of the recruitment patterns (see e.g. Mügge, 2016; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Murray, 2016).

Hence, as we have seen political participation is largely conditioned by the political factors—resources and psychological involvement—individuals manage to accumulate throughout their life cycles. Yet, oppressive dynamics play a non-negligible role also in shaping recruitment patterns—another crucial political factor—making it harder for members of disadvantaged groups to participate.

It is worth noting that in order to express my argument in the most clear way, I highlighted the effects that oppressive phenomena have on the main participatory factors—resources, psychological involvement, and recruit-ment—that individuals make use of to participate in politics, one by one as if the impact of oppression was working independently on each single group of factors. Yet, in real life, the disruptive effect that oppression has on one political factor influences also the other political factors, and its overall effects are transmitted across generations, creating a vicious circle from which only very few members of these disadvantaged communities can get themselves out (for more details see for example, Verba et al. 1995, ch.15, 513-514; Zegers de Beijl 2000b).

So, what can contribute to stop the reproduction of these vicious dynamics?

7.3. The Anti-Discrimination Architecture

The answer to the question I posed above is constituted by the anti-discrimi-nation structure developed in each member State of the European Union, in the reform of anti-discrimination laws, transposed from the EU directives, as well as the bodies and programs that have been established and strengthen over the years within the European anti-discrimination framework. In particular, the anti-discrimination structure of each country can potentially help migrant-origin individuals to un-clog the channels through which their political and social views can be expressed.

By drawing on the theoretical considerations made above, and recalling the findings generated within the CVM approach and the discrimination studies, I will finally be able to link all the dots, and show more clearly how anti-discrimination structures can widen up migrant-origin individuals' political choice, allowing members of these groups to express their desiderata through a wider set of channels of action.

Anti-discrimination policies are conceived of as being one of the aspects of the political context that contribute to define to what extent the access to citizenship rights is colour-blind in a specific context; hence anti-discrimination policy along with the extension of rights to foreign residents and the rules governing nationality acquisition are decisive factors that shape the political opportunities of migrant-origin individuals; these aspects all contribute to define the degree of 'openness' or 'closure' of the political system of the country of residence (see Koopmans et al. 2005, 34,50; see also, Cinalli and Giugni 2011, 46).

In particular, anti-discrimination policies are crucial in the fight against oppression, and the detrimental effects that oppressive phenomena—as I described above—have on the living conditions of disadvantaged categories of people, and ultimately their chances to make effective use of the different channels available to voice their concerns and express their preferences in the political arena.

Anti-discrimination policies work through two different mechanisms: the first acts on potential perpetrators and is based on the principle of deterrence, whilst the second acts on victims and potential victims and it is based on the provision of services of assistance and protection. Hence anti-discrimi-nation policies on one side act on the potential perpetrators by increasing the costs of unequal treatment and by implementing a set of sanctions against discriminatory practices (deterrence mechanism); on the other side they act on victims and potential victims by raising awareness of discrimination and by providing measures to assist potential victims against experiences of discrimination and hostility, and by providing victims with the opportunity to voice their concerns and denouncing these experiences (awareness-raising mechanism) (Ziller, 2014).

As Zegers de Beijl (2000c, 99) put it, "[c]omprehensive anti-discrimination legislation can send a clear signal to employers and to society as a whole that not only is discrimination morally and socially unacceptable, it also has potential costs. By outlawing discriminatory conduct [...], the state not only informs everyone that discrimination will not be tolerated, it also encourages victims to seek redress. Thus, legislation can have both a preventing and curative effect. But in order to fulfil these roles, legislation must be adequate and enforceable. Legislation that is incomplete, vague or inaccessible is of little use."

As I shall show, legislation is in fact only one element of the national institutional

architecture for equality. In this section, I focus on the three main components of the anti-discrimination architecture: the legislation that has developed from the EU 'Equality Directives', the national bodies established to combat discrimination and promote equality, and the civil society involved at the grassroot level in the fight against oppressive phenomena.

The EU anti-discrimination legislation: a top-down development

Today most EU Member States have favourable laws prohibiting unequal treatment practices based on group characteristics, including gender, race, ethnicity, religion, and other grounds of discrimination (Huddleston et al., 2015, 14).

The EU has played a prominent role in the development of the recent anti-discrimination legislation in all Member States, by launching several directives focusing on the enactment, application, and implementation of anti-discrimination measures (Ziller, 2014; Geddes and Guiraudon, 2004). As pointed out by Koopmans (2013, 700), this process "was often not motivated or justified by the need to promote the equal rights of [vulnerable groups], but by the need to, often belatedly and half-heartedly, comply with EU directives or to fulfil the acquis criteria for EU membership."

The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force on 1st May 1999, introduced legislative competence for the European Community (EC) in the area of non-discrimination and equality. On the basis of Article 13 of the Treaty, the Council adopted directives covering different grounds of discrimination.[25] These acts established the basis for a legislative system covering both direct and indirect forms of discrimination (for a more detailed review see, Ziller, 2014; Amiraux and Guiraudon, 2010; Solanke, 2009; Howard, 2009).

Over the last years, as a result of this top-down approach there has been an increase in the anti-discrimination legislation across the EU, and countries' positions have progressively converged over time, as shown by Koopmans et al. (2012, 1222-1224).

Yet the nature itself of EU Directives has allowed each EU country to decide to what extent and how to reach the established goals set in the directives. Hence, differences among EU Member States remain still visible. Different studies indicate that the impact of EU anti-discrimination legislation has been diminished by slow

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[25]On the ground of race and ethnic origin within and outside working life (Racial Equality Directive, 2000/43/EC). On grounds of religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation in employment and occupation, as well as in vocational training (Employment Equality Directive, 2000/78/EC). And on grounds of sex with and outside working life (Gender Equality Directive on Goods and Services, 2004/113/EC.

and faulty implementation (Solanke, 2009). For example, as shown in the findings published within the scope of the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), Baltic countries have only done the minimum required by the EU to fight discrimination and promote equality (Huddleston et al., 2011, 24). Or as pointed out Chiara Favilli (2015, 11,58), the Italian member of the European Network of independent experts in gender equality and non-discrimination, "the lack of a clear policy against discrimination is also reflected in the lack of positive actions in favour of vulnerable groups". The Decrees used to transpose Directive 2000/43 and Directive 2000/78 into national law did not expressly implement Article 5 and 7 of both directives.

For the purpose of this chapter, however, legislation on discrimination grounds is not enough to establish a causal link between the strength of anti-discrimination policies and migrant political action repertoire. Even though implementation of the EU anti-discrimination directives has triggered a new impetus in anti-discrimination law across the European Union, oppressive phenomena cannot be eliminated by legislation alone (Zegers de Beijl, 2000c, 104). As noted by Huddleston et al. (2015, 14), "[n]otwithstanding these major legal gains, people might not know and use these rights in practice because these laws are rather new and often poorly supported by weak equality bodies and policies". The implementation of these legislation requires effective independent institutions that can provide assistance to victims of discrimination, develop a knowledge base on discrimination, build and raise awareness of rights, and support good practice by those with obligations under the law. These institutions are the focus of the next section.

Equality bodies: agencies for promoting equality and combating structural discrimination

A study commissioned by the European Commission, and conducted by the Human European Consultancy in partnership with the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights (2010) identified 48 different equality bodies in all 27 EU Member States and the EFTA countries.

Equality bodies are independent national agencies that play an important role in the development of knowledge on discrimination, rights and obligations in various sectors of the society. Their degree of independence and effectiveness has a crucial impact on the quality of the functioning of the overall architecture for equality and anti-discrimination (Equinet, 2014).

The Directive 2000/43/EC specifies that, in order to be effective, an equality body has to have at least these three functions: providing independent assistance to victims of discrimination in pursuing their complaints about discrimination, conducting independent surveys concerning discrimination, and publishing indepen-

dent reports and making recommendations on any issue relating to such discrimination.

Following the requirements of the EU equal treatment legislation, Member States set up equality bodies, either by designating some existing institution or by setting up new bodies to carry out the functions assigned by the new legislation. Yet, as noted by Ammer et al. (2010), the Equal Treatment Directives, mentioned above, specify that equality bodies are agencies for the promotion of equal treatment of all persons, but provide minimum direction for the arrangements of these bodies; hence their structures, competences, and powers varies in relation to the national context under consideration.[26]

The European anti-discrimination law only requires that equality bodies are set up in the field of race and ethnic origin, and gender. Yet the grounds of discrimination covered by equality bodies vary considerably across the EU. A large number of countries have gone beyond the requirements of the Directives in establishing their equality bodies, and set up agencies that deal also with other grounds of discrimination (i.e. age, sexual orientation, religion/belief, disability), as in the case of Belgium and France. In contrast, countries like Spain and Italy do not cover additional grounds; what is more, Italy has established an equality body responsible only for racial/ethnic origin (Ammer et al., 2010).[27] The grounds of discrimination covered by a national equality body are of particular importance, in light of the considerations I made earlier on the multiple nature of oppressive phenomena (Ammer et al. 2010, 48; see for example the discussion in Fredman 2016).

Across the EU, two different types of equality bodies have developed as was originally identified by the study commissioned by the European Commission: tribunal type equality bodies, and promotion type equality bodies (Ammer et al., 2010, 43-45). Tribunal type equality bodies as in the case of the National Office for the Fight against Racial Discrimination (UNAR) in Italy and the Defender of Rights in France, spend most of their time and resources on hearing, investigating, and deciding on individual instances of discrimination brought before them (Favilli, 2015; Latraverse, 2015). Conversely, promotion type bodies focus primarily on supporting good practices in organisations, raising awareness of rights, developing a knowledge base on equality, providing legal advice, and assistance to victims of discrimination. In this category falls for example, the Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition against against Racism (CEOOR) as well as the Institute

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[26]This variation will be reflected also in the final score that represent the overall strength of the anti-discrimination policy of each country considered in this chapter (see section 7.4.2 for more details).

[27]As pointed out by Favilli (2015), during 2014 UNAR extended the grounds of discrimination by covering also nationality, gender, religion or personal belief, disability, age, and sexual orientation.

for Equality of Women and Men in Belgium, the Office for the Promotion of Equal Treatment in Access to and Supply of Goods and Services in Italy, and the Council for Promotion of Equal Treatment of all Persons without Discrimination and the Womens Institute—now the Institute for Women and Equal Opportunities—in Spain (Favilli, 2015; Cachón, 2015; Bribosia and Rorive, 2016).[28]

The functioning and factual status of independence of equality bodies is often threatened by a lack of resources. In order to carry out their activities, equality bodies have often to rely on transfers from national authorities and also on the projects financed by the EU. A broad range of external support is in fact essential for equality bodies to fulfil their mandates (Ammer et al., 2010).

In order to enhance their independence and concrete exercise of power, equality bodies cooperate among themselves within the framework of Equi-net; peer cooperation allow single equality bodies to exchange good practices and profit from expertise, reducing the costs of accessing key information. As pointed out by the Equinet (2014, 6), "[t]he institutional architecture for equality bodies includes the full range of organisations involved in combating discrimination and promoting equality in the country...Parliaments, government ministries, state agencies, local authorities, other bodies concerned with individual rights, courts, tribunals, labour and other inspectorates, trade unions, and NGOs." In particular, over the years, equality bodies have established strong ties to civil society organisations and other stakeholders for the implementation and development of initiatives. For example, a number of equality bodies cooperate with trade unions to promote workplace practices for equality and non-discrimination and provide assistance to victims of discrimination to pursue cases. NGOs also, constitute another important partner of equality bodies, in the fight against oppressive phenomena. As I shall discuss more in detail in the next section, NGOs play a range of roles that can support the work of equality bodies.

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[28]The report commissioned by the European Commission shows that among the equality bodies assessed, only five are also National human rights institutions (NHRIs), hence meet the requirements of the Paris Principles. The Paris Principles are the principal source of normative standards of NHRIs and establish minimum requirements for their effective functioning (for more details see Ammer et al. 2010, 54-55 and see also, Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions (The Paris Principles) adopted by General Assembly Resolution 48/134 of 20 December 1993.) At the time the study was conducted, within the group of countries considered in this thesis, only the CEOOR in Belgium was an equality body with a B-status awarded (i.e. not fully in compliance with every principle or insufficient information provided). In the rest of the countries, either no accredited NHRI existed al all (Italy) or the equality bodies and the accredited NHRI were separate bodies (France, Spain).

NGOs: key players in civil society

The creation of an anti-discrimination structure has been supported also from below by the engagement of a number of organisations of the civil society, like the European Network Against Racism (ENAR), composed of over 100 NGOs working to combat oppression and promote equality in Europe.

In their review, Geddes and Guiraudon (2004) have shown how NGOs were important in pushing for the passage of extended EU anti-discrimination provisions (see also Ammer et al., 2010, 14). In France, for example, anti-discrimination organisations like *SOS racisme* and *Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l'amitié entre les peuples* have been considerably more engaged than public authorities and researchers in setting up and conducting situation testing to establish discrimination in accessing housing services, employment market, and different recreational activities. Apart from being used to mainstream these issues, the results have been also used as evidence of discrimination in legal proceedings (Amadieu, 2008, 93).

The Equality Treatment Directives have provided also NGOs with the possibility to engage on behalf or in support of victims of oppression. In investigating the living conditions of Roma communities in Eastern Europe, Kostadinova (2006) has underscored how NGOs have been crucial in supporting Roma victims of discrimination in their personal fights against oppression.

The role of NGOs is important also because it mobilises vulnerable groups at the grassroot level. Anti-discrimination NGOs and human rights groups have played an important role in mobilising the public opinion around these issues, and also in recruiting members of disadvantaged groups in the fight against oppressive phenomena and promotion of equality. This is clearly visible for example, in the ENAR's community mobilisation programme, which aims at empowering ethnic and religious minorities and migrants to express their voice and concerns by providing them with the structure in which they can exert relevant political pressure in support of all those who are discriminated against in Europe. Through community mobilisation and community organisation, victims and potential victims of oppression are hence included in milieu that encourage and enforce positive attitudinal and participatory norms as well as civic skills (i.e. organisation and communication skills). For example, in occasion of the 2014 campaign "Torino si sveglia antirazzista", as noted by Claudio Tocchi (2014), "[m]any young people got involved in associations or NGOs, where they had the chance to improve their skills and their CVs, and eventually got involved in the topics as well." Similarly, Tara Dickman (2011), community organiser and trainer, explained how the campaign to end discriminatory stop and search by police in France—Stop le contrôle au faciès—has relied heavily on the involvement of members of vulnerable groups through

strategies of community organising, and other supports, like legal education on the street, local events, web-series, social media tools, and photo-ops on the streets.

As I mentioned in section 7.1, organisational and communication skills are essential resources for taking part in the political affairs of the country of residence. Furthermore, the inclusion into these social environments provide members of vulnerable groups with the opportunity, in the form of formal institutional mobilisation (e.g. forum, campaign) or informal social mobilisation (e.g. political discussions) to exercise these resources to engage in political behaviour.

Hence, involving victims and potential victims of discrimination at the grass-root level in the fight against oppression place them within a social context where participation opportunities are abundant, and has the potential effect of creating a migrant-origin vanguard. In this regard, for example Ram (2007, 512) in assessing the impact of the EU's Anti-Discrimination Policy on the Roma people in Europe, concludes that although "the changes in the actual situation of the majority of Roma appear to be relatively small [...] it should not be discounted that there has been a major impact on the development of a Roma elite".

Hypotheses I expect countries with stronger anti-discrimination policies to be the context where vulnerable people can express their voice through a broader range of political acts for the following reasons:[29]

- countries with stronger anti-discrimination policies have in place effective deterrence mechanisms. These will make more costly for perpetrators to discriminate, and this will in turn reduce the probability of members of vulnerable groups willing to express their preference through certain channels of action to stumble upon additional constraints stemming from prejudice, sexism, racism or any other related form of oppression.

    Moreover, by effectively outlawing discriminatory conduct, a clear signal is sent to employers and to the whole society: discriminatory selection and treatment at work, school and other key sectors of society are morally, socially unacceptable, and have potential costs for the economy of the country.

    The increase in the cost of discriminating against members of vulnerable groups will reduce the disruptive impact that oppressive phenomena have on the process of accumulation of participatory factors like civic skills and money, and increase the probability of members of vulnerable groups to accumulate larger stockpiles of participatory factors at work or at school that

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[29]The following hypothesis must be read with caution, bearing in mind that the analysis presented in the remaining part of the chapter will not provide a substantial test of this hypothesis (more details on the limitations of the methods used to analyse the data are provided in section 7.4.3).

would allow them to express their voice in the political arena also through participation acts that would for example require more communication skills or money.

- Through the activities conducted by NGOs, members of vulnerable groups are more likely to be involved in the general fight against oppression, and be assisted in their personal fights against oppressive phenomena. Since anti-oppressive organisations for their nature as well as the people who run and staff them themselves, take strong stands on public issues, they will seek to promote political activity. For this reason, these organisations will incubate frequent requests for political participation and provide political cues from which members of vulnerable groups will benefit by meeting people and broadening the networks through which requests for involvement are filtered. These organisations will also act as the institutional setting where members of vulnerable groups can acquire, develop, and exercise their civic skills, within the scope of the fight against oppression. The increased exposure to political cues and request for political activity as well as the opportunity to develop and train communication and organisation skills will stimulate their political participation and broaden the channels of action through which members of vulnerable groups can effectively express their voice.

This will ultimately result into the creation of an elite that has a leading role in the fight against oppression within the vulnerable group; the vanguard group will mobilise larger portions of the community through secondary networks of political recruitment based on personal circles of acquaintanceship.

7.4. Data and Methods

In this section I show how the argument developed in the sections above will be tested. Firstly, I clarify how the main concepts introduced above (i.e. political action repertoire and strength of anti-discrimination policy) are transformed into measurable objects. Secondly, I provide a short discussion on the method of analysis used in this chapter.

7.4.1. Outcome variable: political action repertoire

As mentioned in section 7.1, political participation variables may include measures of the *level*, as well as the particular *type*, of participation individuals report (Leighley and Vedlitz, 1999). An important difference with respect to the previous chapter, is represented by the indicator of political participation used here.

Unfortunately, the survey data on which I rely here can only be used to investigate whether respondents engaged or not in a variety of political acts.[30] The outcome variable consists of an additive index, which indicates how many political activities the respondent reported engaging in over the past 12 months. The overall participation score ranges from 0 (for a respondent who reported no political action) to 9 (for a respondent who reported engaging in all types of political activities).[31]

Hence, rather than using a binary outcome variable and simply looking at whether the individuals engaged in at least one of the different forms of political action available, I consider all the different forms of political action on which migrant-origin individuals are free to engage in to express their voice.

Although no explicit reference has been made so far to the breadth of political action that characterised individual's political participation, a significant number of studies have relied on identical summary measures of political participation, instead of opting for binary indicators of political participation (e.g. individual does or does not participate in any of the different political acts) or unidimensional indicators of political engagement (e.g. individual voted or did not vote). For example, Verba et al. (1995, 188) rely on a count variable that ranges from 0 to

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[30]Conversely, in the case of attitudinal involvement (e.g. political interest), as has been shown in the previous chapters, it is possible to create also a measure of the *level* of political involvement.

[31]1. Contacted a politician, media or solicitor; 2. Worked in a political party or action group; 3. Worn or displayed a badge, sticker or poster; 4. Signed a petition; 5. Taken part in a public demonstration; 6. Boycotted certain products; 7. Bought certain products for political reasons; 8. Donated money to a political organisation or group; 9. Taken part in a strike. It is worth noting that the original questionnaire displayed a larger number of forms of political participation (more details on the construction of this index are provided in section D in the appendix).

8 to compare the mean number of political acts by family income. Calhoun-Brown (1996, 939), employs an additive index of 10 different forms of political participation, to investigate the role of African American churches in stimulating Black political activism. Pilati (2010, 109) employs a summary measure based on 13 different political acts to compare the general degree of political participation of the autochthonous groups and three different migrant-origin groups in Milan. Similarly, in their attempt to shed light on the role that individual resources (i.e. time, money, and civic skills) have in explaining gender participation gap in the United States, Schlozman, Burns, and Verba (1994, 969), employed an index composed of eight different forms of political participation. In particular, the participatory gap between these two groups was computed by using a summary measure that took into account the different forms of political available to men and women to express their political and social views. This allowed the authors to present synthetic indications of this gap and conclude that on average women engage in 2.0 acts, whilst men engage in an average of 2.3 acts. In this chapter, I employ the same type of outcome variable, but I use a different research design: I compare the participatory gap of the members of the same migrant-origin group (i.e. Moroccan origin residents) across different contexts (Brussels vs Lyon vs Turin vs Barcelona vs Madrid); in contrast, the authors compare the members of different groups (men vs women) within the same context (i.e. United States).

Yet, as pointed out Verba et al. (1995), one of the pitfalls of an overall scale created in this way is that it tends to mask the differences that exists across the different political acts. One way to take into account the specificity of each form of political action would be creating as many binary variables as is the number of political activities, as done by Verba et al. (1995, 446), or by computing a multi-category variable. In this way it would be possible to investigate whether the argument presented hold for all types of political participation, or whether certain forms of political action are more responsive than others to the dynamics of oppression and the effect of anti-discrimination policies.

Although interesting, this discussion goes beyond the objectives of this chapter; here I am interested in obtaining some solid indications on whether individuals of vulnerable groups residing in countries with stronger anti-discrimination policies are better placed to overcome the detrimental effects that oppressive phenomena have on their opportunities to engage in political activity and develop the resources necessary to engage in political activity. Hence the focus in this chapter remains primarily on how many channels of actions individuals of vulnerable groups effectively make use of to express their voice in the country of residence.

In brief, the index of overall participation, notwithstanding its limitations, it is widely used in political science and remains a very useful and simple summary

measure of political participation. When data about the individual political acts are aggregated into a scale it is possible for everyone to build a quick idea of how many political acts Moroccan-origin residents perform, on average, in relation to their country of residence, and more specifically in relation to the strength of the anti-discrimination policy in that specific country.

7.4.2. The MIPEX data

One of the most extensive endeavours to evaluate integration practices and programmes is represented by the MIPEX; this is a key component of the project "Integration policies: Who benefits? The development and use of indicators in integration debates", led by the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) and the Migration Policy Group (MPG) (for more details see e.g. Huddleston et al., 2015).

MIPEX covers eight policy areas that shape integration process: labour market mobility, family reunion, education, health, political participation, permanent residence, access to nationality, and anti-discrimination. Each of these areas is composed of 4 different dimensions. Overall, the MIPEX includes 167 policy indicators on migrant integration. For each indicator there are 3 options, and the maximum of 3 points is given when policies meet the highest standards for equal treatment drawn from Council of Europe Conventions, European Union Directives and international conventions, through consultations with top scholars and leading institutions in the relevant fields. The final score for each policy area ranges from 0 (most restrictive) to 100 (most liberal) and it is obtained by averaging together all scores given in the 4 dimensions and then by converting the initial 1, 2, 3 scale into a 0, 50, 100 scale for dimensions and policy areas, where 100 is the top score (for more details see MIPEX methodology).

Anti-discrimination policy   The communities of Moroccan-origin individuals examined here reside in four different European countries: Belgium, France, Italy, and Spain.

Table 7.1 shows the MIPEX scores given from 2007 to 2014 in the anti-discrimination policy area to these four countries (for more details see MIPEX 2007-2014 scores). As mentioned above, every MIPEX policy area is divided into four policy dimensions. the anti-discrimination policy area is composed of the following dimensions: (1) definition and concepts, (2) fields of application, (3) enforcement mechanisms, and (4) equality policies.[32]

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[32]In section D in the appendix, I provide more details on the scoring of each policy dimension for the period 2007-2014. Tables D.1, D.2, D.3, and D.4 presents the score for each

The order in which each country is presented in table 7.1 reflects the strength of the anti-discrimination policy in place in the countries under consideration; it is clear from the table below that between 2007 and 2014, these countries exhibited only very limited variance over-time. On the basis of these scores, it is possible to divide these countries into 3 different groups: Belgium (78/100) and France (77/100) appears to have stronger anti-discrimination policy in comparison to Italy and Spain; Italy (61/100) however, falls into an intermediate position, whilst Spain (49/100) is characterised by a weaker anti-discrimination policy.[33]

Table 7.1.: MIPEX scores from 2007 to 2014

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Belgium	78	78	78	78	78	78	78	78
France	77	77	76	76	76	76	76	77
Italy	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61
Spain	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49

Source: MIPEX.

Importantly, the data on anti-discrimination policy are collected at the country level, whilst the survey data on individual socio-demographic characteristics and political participation are collected only in certain cities of these countries. As explained in section 3.1.1, a potential source of concern that might arise from this level mismatch can be represented by the two Spanish cities of Madrid and Barcelona. Even though Spain recognises a certain degree of legislative autonomy to the Autonomous Communities in the execution of legislation, I consider the anti-discrimination policy implemented in Madrid and Barcelona as identical because anti-discrimination legislation remains an exclusive task of the central Government, as highlighted by Ballester Pastor (2016), the Spanish member of the European Network of independent experts in gender equality and non-discrimination.

7.4.3. A brief note on the method employed in this chapter

As mentioned in more detail in section 6.3.2, the discussion in the viva raised concerns about the utility of the methods of data analysis used in the empirical chapters 6 and 7 in unveiling the role played by the contextual factors considered in this PhD. In particular, the discussion pointed out how the lack of contextual variables in the models prevents any comparisons between contexts based on the role

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dimension from 2007 to 2014, for all four countries under consideration.

[33] According to the group division used in the MIPEX, the Belgian, French, and Italian anti-discrimination policy would be classified as *slightly favourable*, whilst the Spanish would be labelled as *halfway favourable* (for more details see e.g. Huddleston et al., 2015, 8).

that anti-discrimination policies might have on the modes of political engagement of these five communities. Yet, the regression models presented here can be still considered individually for each community. Each model provides a detailed picture of the effect that micro and meso factors (e.g. gender, age, organisation involvement) have on the propensity of engaging in politics for each Moroccan-origin community.

Inquiring about the mechanisms linking the type of political behaviour of migrant-origin residents to the strength of the anti-discrimination policy implemented in their country of residence obliges to review different fields of scholarship. As shown in section 7.1, my approach to these issues bears an obvious debt to the theoretical strands developed by researchers in the social sciences who investigated the different determinants of political involvement, as well as the quantitative techniques they used to test them. My approach bears an equally important debt to the theories and concepts developed within the framework of oppression studies, that examined the economic, social, and psychological causes and effects of multiple oppressive phenomena (see section 7.2).

As explained in more detail in chapter 3, my principal method is multivariate analysis of survey data. This was chosen because it allows systematic analysis of data, and because it is a technique that allows to consider many potential causal factors that influence the way people engage in politics, and to assess the relative weight of these factors in fostering political participation.

As I mentioned before, political action repertoire is the main outcome variable in this chapter. It is a count variable that ranges from 0 to 9 political acts in which respondents could engage in the year before the survey. Figure 7.1 shows the distribution of the count variable for all five Moroccan-origin communities under consideration, as well as the distribution for the combined sample.

I modelled the probability to engage in 0 to 9 political acts through a number of count models. The regressions that estimate the probability that a specific event has occurred a certain number of times are all based on the Poisson distribution (Long, 1997; Long and Freese, 2014; Hilbe, 2014).

As shown in more detail in the appendix (see figures D.1 to D.5), in order to model the count variable 'political action repertoire' for each Moroccan-origin community under consideration, I chose between several count models (i.e. Poisson, negative binomial, zero-inflated Poisson, zero-inflated negative binomial).

I then conducted separate regression equations for the different Moroccan-origin communities residing in Brussels, Lyon, Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid. In particular, as shown in more detail in the next section, I run five separate regression models—one per each city—with the same control and interaction variables: gender, age (also in quadratic form), employment status, highest educational level at-

Figure 7.1.: Distribution of Observed Number of Political Acts by City

Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

tained, partnership status, proportion of years spent in the country, language proficiency, type of citizenship, level associational involvement, degree of political interest in residence country politics, and experience of discrimination for each type of feelings of belonging developed by the respondent (see section 5.1.10 for a detailed discussion on the individual experiences of discrimination).[34]

Finally, in order to obtain indications on the effect that anti-discrimination policies have on the political action repertoire of Moroccan-origin individuals, I then computed the average predicted of counts at a given level of the predictors variables, for each Moroccan-origin community considered, as explained by Long and Freese (2014, 141-153).[35]

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[34] All details on the computation of these variables are in appendix D.

[35] For each regression equation I computed the average predicted number of political acts for each Moroccan-origin community, on the basis of an hypothetical non-national 34-year-old single male respondent who is employed and whose household earn less than €1,500 per month, with a secondary level of education, who has lived in the country for approximately a third of his life, is fluent in the country/city language, who is not involved in any association, did not feel any relevant form of discrimination, and declared to have at least a fair interest in the political affairs of the country of residence.

The average predicted counts computed after controlling for predictor variables, is then compared across the different cities, in order to investigate whether the Moroccan-origin communities residing in countries with stronger anti-discrimination policies tend on average to express their voice through more action channels, as expected.

It is worth noting that the choice of this method is the result of a compromise between the questions raised in this chapter and the number of contextual cases analysed. In fact, it could be argued that other methods, in particular multi-level analysis, might be more appropriate in capturing simultaneously the effect that individual level variables play on the outcome variable while taking into account the effect played by country level variables (see e.g. Snijders, 2005). Yet the small sample size at the country level (i.e. Belgium, France, Italy, and Spain) prevents from developing a multi-level model.

7.5. Results

In section 7.5.1, I present the average participation levels for all Moroccan-origin communities under consideration, by taking into account singularly some of the most relevant individual features. In section 7.5.2, I consider simultaneously the effect of all predictor variables mentioned earlier, and compute the predicted average number of political activities that characterises each Moroccan-origin community.

7.5.1. Descriptive evidence

Table 7.2 presents the mean number of political acts (i.e. political action repertorie) of the five Moroccan-origin communities under consideration. Summing across all 9 acts on the scale of activity created, we find that Moroccan-origin individuals residing in Lyon and Brussels—two cities situated in countries that have stronger anti-discrimination policies—engage in an average of 1.6 acts and 1.2 acts respectively. Whilst those residing in Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid engage in an average of 0.4, 0.6, and 0.1 acts respectively. As expected, Moroccan-origin individuals residing in countries with stronger anti-discrimination policies like France and Belgium tend to channel their political voice through a larger number of political acts with respect to those residing in countries with weaker anti-discrimination policies, such as Spain and Italy. Interestingly, however, Moroccan-origin individuals in Barcelona engage in a higher average of acts with respect not only to their counterparts in Madrid but also those who reside in Turin, a city situated in a country with an intermediate anti-discrimination policy. Nevertheless, some of these differences between the different communities might vary once other individual factors,

such as gender, education, and political interest, are taken into account. For this reason I conducted regression models for each city to estimate the average number of political acts once key characteristics associated with political participation are controlled for (see section 7.5.2).

Table 7.2.: Mean number of political acts in entire population by city

	Mean	sd	N
Stronger anti-discrimination policy			
LYON	1.579	1.83	114
BRUSSELS	1.176	1.59	409
Intermediate anti-discrimination policy			
TURIN	0.421	0.957	200
Weaker anti-discrimination policy			
BARCELONA	0.575	1.02	224
MADRID	0.098	0.368	297
Total	0.726	1.322	1244

Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

Before delving into the multivariate analysis, table 7.3 presents the average number of political acts for each Moroccan-origin community by different subgroups, based on their key socio-demographic characteristics, their political orientation, and individual experiences of discrimination. Table 7.3 provides some initial indications on the important role that associational involvement, education, political interest, and individual experience of discrimination play in influencing political participation. In particular, in all cities considered, individuals who are involved in associations express their voice through a wider set of political acts with respect to those who are not involved in any association. Individuals with higher degrees tend to participate in average in more political acts; this applies to all Moroccan-origin communities, with the exception of those residing in Brussels. There is no significant difference along gender lines, except in Turin, where there is a gap of 0.4 between male and female, in favour of the former. Interestingly, the subgroup of individuals who perceived experiences of discrimination tend to engage in a wider set of political acts in relation to those who perceived no discriminatory experience; this occurs in all cities. Table 7.3 shows that there is a significant gap between these two subgroups in all cities, except Turin and Barcelona. As expected, individuals

who declare to be more interested in politics express their voice through a large number of political acts; a significant gap exist within the communities residing in Lyon, Barcelona, and Madrid. Finally, individuals who have the citizenship of the country of residence engage in more political acts in average with respect to those without; a significant gap has been found in the cities of Lyon, Brussels, and Madrid.

Table 7.3.: Mean Number of Political Acts by Demographic Characteristics, Associational Involvement, Political Interest, and Experience of Discrimination

	LYON			BRUSSELS			TURIN			BARCELONA			MADRID		
	Mean	sd	N	Mean	sd	N	Mean	sd	N	Mean	sd	N	Mean	sd	N
GENDER															
Female	1.397	1.530	63	1.332	1.617	190	0.214**	0.713	84	0.606	1.093	66	0.609	0.193	115
Male	1.804	2.145	51	1.041	1.558	219	0.603**	1.078	116	0.563	0.993	158	0.121	0.300	182
EDUCATION															
No Post-secondary or tertiary education	1.266*	1.546	64	1.164	1.635	281	0.342**	0.841	155	0.458**	0.857	166	0.075**	0.278	268
Post-secondary or higher	2.020*	2.097	49	1.210	1.483	124	0.778**	1.242	45	0.913**	1.341	58	0.321**	0.819	28
MONTHLY FAMILY INCOME															
Less than €1,500	1.387	1.859	62	1.139	1.564	266	0.447	0.933	152	0.114	1.100	93	0.081*	0.022	172
From €1,500	1.977	1.883	43	1.245	1.641	143	0.472	1.158	36	0.169	1.071	40	0.219*	0.108	32
EMPLOYMENT STATUS															
Unemployed	1.373	1.751	59	1.199	1.610	241	0.427	1.028	117	0.613	0.957	75	0.104	0.447	77
Employed	1.800	1.909	55	1.143	1.564	168	0.458	0.860	83	0.557	1.055	149	0.095	0.338	220
PARTNERSHIP STATUS															
Not in partnership	1.418	1.641	55	1.254	1.602	236	0.688**	1.242	93	0.698	1.266	96	0.107	0.383	159
In partnership	1.729	1.999	59	1.069	1.572	173	0.224**	0.537	107	0.484	0.784	128	0.087	0.352	138
CITIZENSHIP STATUS															
Not national	0.920*	1.222	25	0.808*	1.309	73	0.418	0.977	170	0.561	1.011	187	0.083*	0.327	265
National	1.764*	1.937	89	1.256*	1.635	336	0.567	0.858	30	0.649	1.086	37	0.219*	0.608	32
ASSOCIATIONAL INVOLVEMENT															
Not involved	1.190*	1.480	58	0.872**	1.345	258	0.226**	0.630	146	0.345**	0.664	142	0.072**	0.272	278
Involved	1.982*	2.076	56	1.695**	1.829	151	1.019**	1.380	54	0.976**	1.361	82	0.474**	0.964	19
POLITICAL INTEREST															
Not very or not at all interested	0.609**	0.783	23	1.019	1.491	158	0.400	0.997	65	0.292**	0.568	89	0.058*	0.258	173
Fairly or very interested	1.824**	1.941	91	1.281	1.649	249	0.496	0.972	125	0.769**	1.201	134	0.161*	0.489	118
EXPERIENCE OF DISCRIMINATION															
Not discriminated	1.329*	1.570	76	0.875**	1.285	136	0.403	0.942	119	0.523	0.930	128	0.068**	0.300	234
Discriminated	2.167*	2.236	36	1.326**	1.704	273	0.506	0.998	79	0.649	1.143	94	0.206**	0.544	63

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).
b. * and ** indicate that the cross-group differences are significant at 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.

7.5.2. Multivariate evidence

In order to assess whether the strength of anti-discrimination policies influence political participation, I take into account simultaneously the effect of the different key factors mentioned in the section before. For each Moroccan-origin community I conduct a series of regressions. The predictor variables are added to the model in three steps.

The first step, for each city under consideration, introduces base model factors, like gender, age, socio-economic status, measured by the degree of education and level of household income, proportion of life spent in the country of residence, citizenship and partnership status, associational involvement and political interest. In the second step, I add to the model, the perceived experience of discrimination, along with the type of group self-identification or feelings of belonging individuals developed in the country of residence. Finally, in the third step I place the experience of discrimination in interaction with the type of group self-identification.

Multivariate analysis confirms to a large extent the important role of associational involvement, and political interest in increasing political participation. Gender instead plays an ambiguous role across the communities under consideration. Surprisingly, education is not a strong predictor, with the exception of the Moroccan-origin community in Barcelona. All other predictors do not play a significant role across any of the communities under consideration, or play only a marginal role in explaining variation in political participation, as in the case of partnership status and proportion of lifetime spent the country of residence. It worth noting that the full model conveys a significant parameter estimate for perceived discrimination, yet only for the Moroccan-origin communities residing in Brussels and Madrid. The types of feelings of belonging do not generate any significant results; however, interestingly, the respondents residing in Brussels who declared to have no particular feelings of belonging either for national group or for their own community of origin, engage in a larger number of political acts, also when other relevant factors are taken into account. Conversely, in Madrid this process regards individuals who developed stronger feelings toward the national group. Finally, as shown in all regression tables, the interaction of type of self-identification and experiences of individual discrimination did not produce any significant parameter estimate.

Table 7.4: Regression coefficients predicting the political action repertoire of Moroccan-origin residents in Brussels

BRUSSELS

	Step 1		Step 2		Step 3	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Control variables						
Gender (ref. Female)	-0.358**	0.142	-0.382**	0.140	-0.366**	0.140
Age	0.008	0.008	0.006	0.008	0.005	0.008
Education	-0.231	0.271	-0.199	0.268	-0.178	0.268
In paid job (ref. No)	0.014	0.153	-0.008	0.152	-0.008	0.151
Proportion of lifetime in country of residence	0.041	0.263	0.128	0.262	0.175	0.262
With citizenship of country of residence (ref. No)	0.393+	0.201	0.306	0.203	0.362+	0.206
With partner (ref. No)	-0.328*	0.163	-0.284+	0.161	-0.271+	0.160
Household income (ref. Less than €1,500)	0.051	0.148	0.013	0.147	-0.024	0.147
Involved in any organisation (ref. Not involved)	0.683***	0.141	0.636***	0.140	0.646***	0.141
Political interest (ref. No or low interest)	0.278+	0.149	0.355*	0.151	0.325*	0.152
Perceived Discrimination (ref. No)			0.302+	0.157	0.470*	0.210
National feelings of belonging (ref. Else)			0.272	0.233	0.056	0.512
Ethnic feelings of belonging (ref. Else)			-0.018	0.202	0.452	0.387
No feelings of belonging (ref. Else)			0.362*	0.169	0.674*	0.326
Double feelings of belonging (ref. Else)			-	-	-	-
Interaction variables						
National feelings of belonging × Perceived Discrimination					0.234	0.577
Ethnic feelings of belonging × Perceived Discrimination					-0.641	0.450
No feelings of belonging × Perceived Discrimination					-0.431	0.381
Constant	-0.488	0.352	-0.752*	0.377	-0.891*	0.391
Ln alpha (NBRM vs PRM)	-.081***	0.171	-0.163***	0.178	-0.190***	0.181
Cragg-Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2		0.095		0.121		0.128
N	398		398		398	

a. + p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001, two-tailed test.
b. Although ZINB is better at predicting lower counts 0 to 3 as shown in figure D.1, the Vuong test comparing NBRM and ZINB is not significant. Furthermore, AIC and BIC prefers NBRM to ZINB.

Table 7.5.: Regression Coefficients Predicting the Political Action Repertoire of Moroccan-Origin Residents in Lyon

LYON

	Step 1		Step 2		Step 3	
Control variables						
Gender (ref. Female)	0.258	0.233	0.086	0.226	0.037	0.230
Age	-0.004	0.009	0.002	0.009	0.003	0.009
Education	0.400	0.448	0.417	0.436	0.377	0.459
In paid job (ref. No)	0.062	0.231	0.037	0.221	-0.004	0.233
Proportion of lifetime in country of residence	0.512	0.399	0.496	0.384	0.491	0.384
With citizenship of country of residence (ref. No)	0.252	0.317	0.267	0.308	0.311	0.310
With partner (ref. No)	0.036	0.272	0.093	0.254	0.009	0.265
Household income (ref. Less than 1500)	0.334	0.235	0.414+	0.227	0.498*	0.244
Involved in any organisation (ref. Not involved)	0.386+	0.228	0.345	0.219	0.362+	0.218
Political interest (ref. No or low interest)	0.951**	0.339	0.942**	0.329	0.946**	0.329
Perceived Discrimination (ref. No)			0.416*	0.210	0.558+	0.304
National feelings of belonging (ref. Else)			0.188	0.272	0.330	0.323
Ethnic feelings of belonging (ref. Else)			0.772+	0.394	0.419	0.627
No feelings of belonging (ref. Else)			0.443+	0.268	0.674+	0.349
Double feelings of belonging (ref. Else)			-		-	
Interaction variables						
National feelings of belonging × Perceived Discrimination					-0.315	0.534
Ethnic feelings of belonging × Perceived Discrimination					0.608	0.836
No feelings of belonging × Perceived Discrimination					-0.528	0.559
Constant	-1.656*	0.691	-2.155**	0.698	-2.238**	0.712
Ln alpha (NBRM vs PRM)	-0.809***	0.394	-1.207**	0.508	-1.242**	0.511
Cragg-Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2		0.216		0.278		0.293
N	105		104		104	

a. + p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001, two-tailed test.
b. ZINB and NBRM models are overall the best fit to the data as shown in figure D.2. However, NBRM is preferred by AIC and BIC. Furthermore the Vuong test comparing ZINB to NBRM is not significant.

Table 7.6.: Regression Coefficients Predicting the Political Action Repertoire of Moroccan-Origin Residents in Turin

TURIN	Step 1		Step 2		Step 3	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Control variables						
Gender (ref. Female)	0.626+	0.331	0.754*	0.349	0.813*	0.372
Age	-0.018	0.020	-0.017	0.019	-0.016	0.020
Education	0.612	0.699	0.605	0.713	0.586	0.729
In paid job (ref. No)	0.325	0.319	0.429	0.318	0.438	0.319
Proportion of lifetime in country of residence	0.144	1.030	0.164	1.082	-0.003	1.113
With citizenship of country of residence (ref. No)	0.449	0.473	0.469	0.467	0.496	0.492
With partner (ref. No)	-0.724*	0.345	-0.641+	0.354	-0.709+	0.369
Household income (ref. Less than 1500)	-0.423	0.401	-0.342	0.412	-0.347	0.426
Involved in any organisation (ref. Not involved)	1.313***	0.310	1.431***	0.315	1.441***	0.314
Political interest (ref. No or low interest)	0.419	0.319	0.354	0.321	0.456	0.333
Perceived Discrimination (ref. No)			0.031	0.305	0.380	0.566
National feelings of belonging (ref. Else)			-0.807	0.654	-0.583	0.745
Ethnic feelings of belonging (ref. Else)			0.142	0.394	0.465	0.489
No feelings of belonging (ref. Else)			-0.662	0.432	-0.727	0.579
Double feelings of belonging (ref. Else)			-		-	
Interaction variables						
National feelings of belonging × Perceived Discrimination					-0.757	1.345
Ethnic feelings of belonging × Perceived Discrimination					-0.781	0.742
No feelings of belonging × Perceived Discrimination					-0.016	0.809
Constant	-1.626+	0.884	-1.700+	0.965	-1.887+	0.991
Ln alpha (NBRM vs PRM)	-0.208***	0.429	-0.425**	0.480	-0.469**	0.489
Cragg-Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2		0.271		0.303		0.312
N	178		178		178	

a. + p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001, two-tailed test.
b. NBRM performs as ZIB in predicting lower counts 0 to 3 as shown in figure D.3, however, NBRM is preferred by AIC and BIC. Furthermore the Vuong test comparing ZINB to NBRM is not significant.

Table 7.7.: Regression Coefficients Predicting the Political Action Repertoire of Moroccan-Origin Residents in Barcelona

BARCELONA	Step 1		Step 2		Step 3	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Control variables						
Gender (ref. Female)	-0.402	0.355	-0.426	0.361	-0.438	0.360
Age	-0.005	0.015	-0.001	0.017	-0.002	0.017
Education	1.18*	0.551	1.276*	0.561	1.219*	0.560
In paid job (ref. No)	-0.066	0.355	0.020	0.358	-0.030	0.374
Proportion of lifetime in country of residence	0.387	1.018	0.887	1.034	0.915	1.112
With citizenship of country of residence (ref. No)	0.231	0.579	0.409	0.575	0.348	0.630
With partner (ref. No)	-0.591+	0.321	-0.626+	0.327	-0.584+	0.331
Household income (ref. Less than €1,500)	-0.047	0.341	-0.132	0.353	-0.187	0.362
Involved in any organisation (ref. Not involved)	0.777*	0.332	0.732*	0.341	0.743*	0.343
Political interest (ref. No or low interest)	0.831+	0.427	0.877*	0.443	0.895*	0.453
Perceived Discrimination (ref. No)			-0.134	0.320	0.023	0.564
National feelings of belonging (ref. Else)			-0.150	0.477	-0.041	0.650
Ethnic feelings of belonging (ref. Else)			0.293	0.446	0.244	0.627
No feelings of belonging (ref. Else)			0.760+	0.400	0.972+	0.539
Double feelings of belonging (ref. Else)			-		-	
Interaction variables						
National feelings of belonging × Perceived Discrimination					-0.145	1.010
Ethnic feelings of belonging × Perceived Discrimination					0.087	0.892
No feelings of belonging × Perceived Discrimination					-0.508	0.823
Constant	-1.681+	0.897	-2.233*	1.037	-2.232*	1.083
Ln alpha (NBRM vs PRM)	-0.440*	0.651	-0.614*	0.695	-0.697*	0.752
Cragg-Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2		0.233		0.273		0.277
N	132		130		130	

a. + p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001, two-tailed test.
b. As shown in figure D.4, ZIP is slightly better at predicting lower counts (i.e. 0 to 3). Yet, both AIC and BIC prefers NBRM to ZIP. Furthermore, as shown in the regression table, the overdispersion parameter alpha suggests that NBRM is preferable to a standard Poisson model.

Table 7.8.: Regression Coefficients Predicting the Political Action Repertoire of Moroccan-Origin Residents in Madrid

MADRID	Step 1 B	Step 1 SE	Step 2 B	Step 2 SE	Step 3 B	Step 3 SE
Control variables						
Gender (ref. Female)	0.546	0.539	0.483	0.560	0.607	0.571
Age	-0.024	0.031	-0.030	0.036	-0.034	0.036
Education	1.657+	0.955	1.760+	0.996	1.479	0.984
In paid job (ref. No)	0.154	0.648	0.599	0.753	0.009	0.773
Proportion of lifetime in country of residence	3.347+	1.756	3.496+	1.908	4.212*	2.057
With citizenship of country of residence (ref. No)	0.247	0.840	0.291	0.888	0.116	0.904
With partner (ref. No)	-0.551	0.547	-0.440	0.577	-0.504	0.590
Household income (ref. Less than 1500)	-0.587	0.738	-0.800	0.777	-0.278	0.795
Involved in any organisation (ref. Not involved)	1.882**	0.733	1.853*	0.765	2.043**	0.787
Political interest (ref. No or low interest)	1.345**	0.549	1.132*	0.557	1.301*	0.582
Perceived Discrimination (ref. No)			0.631	0.542	1.838*	0.827
National feelings of belonging (ref. Else)			0.851	0.599	1.705*	0.807
Ethnic feelings of belonging (ref. Else)			0.165	0.677	0.732	0.930
No feelings of belonging (ref. Else)			0.071	0.880	1.357	1.205
Double feelings of belonging (ref. Else)			-		-	
Interaction variables						
National feelings of belonging × Perceived Discrimination					-2.548	1.553
Ethnic feelings of belonging × Perceived Discrimination					-1.534	1.362
No feelings of belonging × Perceived Discrimination					-3.050	1.996
Constant	-4.324**	1.538	-4.835**	1.844	-4.890**	1.803
Vuong Test (PRM vs ZIP)	0.080		0.270		0.160	
Cragg-Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2	0.271		0.309		0.338	
N	196		196		196	

a. + p <0.10, * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001, two-tailed test.
b. As shown in figure D.5), standard Poisson (PRM) and ZIP are the only models that can be fitted to the data. PRM is preferred by BIC and AIC. Furthermore, as shown in the regression table Vuong Test, comparing PRM and ZIP, is not significant.

I summarise the main results in figure 7.2, which depicts the average predicted number of political acts (the solid diamond) for each Moroccan-origin community under consideration, and the 95% confidence intervals of the estimation of the average count (the bars). The first overall result is that, the average number of political acts in which Moroccan-origin individuals engage, across all cities considered, is rather low (less than one political act).

Figure 7.2 shows also that there are differences across the Moroccan communities considered; the individuals residing in cities with stronger and intermediate anti-discrimination policies tend to engage in a wider set of political acts (approx. 0.6 in Brussels, Lyon, and Turin) to express their political voice compared to their counterparts residing in cities with weaker anti-discrimination policies (0.5 in Barcelona and 0.2 in Madrid). A difference of 0.1 or 0.4 of a political act may seem very small, but as pointed out by Burns et al. (2001, 2), we need to place this gap in relation to the size of the population under consideration, and consider how this participatory deficit translates into concrete terms over time. This overall result is in line with my initial expectation, whereby individuals who belongs to oppressed groups and reside in contexts where stronger anti-discrimination policies are in place, are able to express their voice through a wider set of political acts, with respect to those residing in contexts with a weaker anti-discrimination structure.

However, figure 7.2 also provides results that go beyond the expectations. In particular, the reduced gap between the members of the communities in Turin, Lyon and Brussels, and the clear gap that exists between the individuals residing in Barcelona and those in Madrid, seems to indicate that the strength of the anti-discrimination policy—at least, as it has been measured in this chapter—does not capture the whole process through which members of oppressed groups express their political voice in the country of residence. Other contextual and/or individual factors ought to be considered as well.

These results represent an important preliminary step in understanding the role that anti-discrimination structures play in influencing the way members of oppressed groups can engage in politics. Future work can build upon this contribution to shed more light on this relationship.

Figure 7.2.: Predicted Number of Political Acts by City

Predicted Number of Political Acts with 95% CIs

245

7.6. Conclusion

The present chapter was initially designed to test whether the mode of political participation of members of disadvantaged and stigmatised migrant-origin communities can be shaped by the strength of the anti-discrimination policies implemented in the country of residence.

As explained above, the methods used in this chapter have been found in occasion of the viva, not suitable to isolate the effect of this single contextual factor and compare its effect across the different communities considered.

Even though it is not possible to assume that the results obtained are exclusively the effect of the anti-discrimination policies, the findings obtained remain interesting, because they show differences in the way of engaging in politics between the different communities, also when other crucial individual-level factors like education and political interest are taken into account. In particular, the chapter shows how the Moroccan-origin communities in Lyon and Brussels are able to express their voice through a wider set of channels of action, with respect to their counterparts residing in the cities of Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid.

The discussion in this chapter has started from the various ways through which individuals can communicate their preferences and concerns within the political sphere. Subsequently, I have developed a three-step argument. Firstly, I have drawn on the theoretical considerations and evidence produced within the framework of the civic voluntarism model; political activity is embedded in the non-political institutions of civil society. The involvement into key social institutions like school and work-place allow individuals to acquire participatory factors—resources, recruitment, and political orientations—that are crucial to channel their preferences and concerns in the political sphere. Secondly, I have pointed out how the process of acquisition of these participatory factors is constantly disrupted by the multiple forms of oppression faced by members of disadvantaged migrant-origin communities within key social institutions like schools, work places, trade unions and sports clubs, and in the act of accessing them. By affecting the stockpile of resources and the chances of being recruited for political action, oppressive phenomena influence the political choice available in reality to these oppressed groups, limiting the ways through which they can more effectively voice their concerns and express their preferences. I have finally considered the anti-discrimination structure developed in the countries of residence as a potential remedy to this state of things.

The findings suggest that in general, members of disadvantaged migrant-origin communities residing in countries that developed stronger anti-discrimination policies can express their voice through a wider set of political acts. Yet, for the type of

analyses conducted, it is impossible to distinguish the effect of anti-discrimination policies from the effect of other confounding factors.

Although key socio-economic factors are controlled for, the results of this investigation show also significant differences between the migrant-origin communities residing in the same country. Taken together, these results suggest that further factors that might play an important role in shaping the way migrant-origin residents participate in politics, need also to be taken into account.

CHAPTER

8

CONCLUSIONS

Through this study I aimed to contribute to the field of the political integration of migrant-origin individuals. As I mentioned in the opening chapters, the concepts and theories developed in literature around the political dimension of migrant-origin integration is lagging behind in comparison to the focus traditionally devoted to the cultural, social, and economic dimensions of these processes (Morales, 2011, 19). Whenever the political dimension is placed at centre of the analysis, the literature shows not only a lack of consensus among authors in this field, but a general state of 'fogginess' in relation to the conceptual, theoretical, and methodological directions to follow.

In this dissertation I explored the dual character of the process of political inclusion of migrant-origin individuals in their country of residence, by investigating how and to what extent their political engagement differ in relation to their context of residence.

I started by providing the conceptual and theoretical framework of this study (chapter 2). In particular, in this chapter I reviewed different conceptualisations of political integration, isolated some of the main conceptual and methodological debates found within the literature, and subsequently put forward a conception of political integration that is centred around the attitudinal and behavioural forms of political engagement that migrant-origin residents perform in their countries of residence. In the second part of this chapter, I reviewed some of the principal

theories in this field of study.

In Chapter 3, I provided details on the research design employed in the study and the methodological steps undertaken to collect and analyse the data. In the first section of the chapter, I illustrated the reasons behind my choice to answer the main research questions by comparing the modes of engagement of the Moroccan-origin communities residing in five different cities (i.e. Brussels, Lyon, Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid). I then defined the characteristics of the target population, and explained my decision to adopt a local perspective in this study. In the second section of the chapter, I presented details about the various source of data used and the process of data collection, by specifying the sampling frame employed and the interviewing methods adopted in each survey.

Chapter 4 outlined the historical background. To build this background, I drew on historical accounts, previous studies of Moroccan migration experts in Europe and Morocco, as well as the official data of the national statistical bureaux. The Moroccan communities of Europe constitute a particularly interesting case study in this subject area. Firstly, Moroccan-origin individuals residing abroad are one of the most important migrant groups in Europe, in relation to their general volume, concentration, and distribution in the continent. More specifically, the communities that settled in the regions of Brussels and Lyon, and the municipalities of Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid, constitute some of the largest and longstanding migrant-origin groups.

Secondly, the Moroccan-origin community share with other important migrant-origin groups, a significant degree of heterogeneity as respects to the ethnic, linguistic, and cultural background of its members. In this chapter I also highlighted the stable links that have been built throughout years of migration between specific regions of origin in Morocco and particular regions in the countries of destination. In the final part of this chapter, I pointed at the dual character of the integrative process of migrant-origin, by highlighting how the demographic 'normalisation' of the Moroccan communities in Europe, along with their increased visibility and engagement in the affairs of their new countries of residence, had been mirrored on the side of the country of residence by a progressive shift in policies, away from an approach concerned mainly in putting foreign workers at the service of the economy, towards an approach concerned also with the overall quality of life and their inclusion in the social and political life of their countries of settlement (see for example, Vermeulen 2006).

In Chapter 5 I presented a detailed report on the survey data used. This chapter delineated the demographic, socio-economic, and political profile of all the five Moroccan-origin communities under consideration. Chapter 5 acted as a bridge between the material presented in the background chapters (i.e. chapters 2, 3, and

4) and the empirical chapters of this study (i.e. chapters 6 and 7). In particular, in this chapter, I presented all explanatory factors used in the multivariate analyses conducted in chapters 6 and 7, as well as the different modes of behavioural and attitudinal engagement in politics for each community. The findings presented in this chapter are accordant with the discussion conducted in the previous chapter: the five communities under consideration vary significantly according to their demographic and socio-economic profile. Particularly significant are the differences found between the more established Moroccan-origin communities residing in Brussels and Lyon, and the relatively new communities that settled in Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid.

Chapters 6 and 7 brought the comparison between Moroccan-origin communities to another level, by exploring through a series of multivariate analyses the effects that individual and organisational factors have on the way Moroccan-origin individuals engage in the political sphere in the different contexts of residence.[1]

In particular, in Chapter 6 I looked at the effect of a number of individual and organisational factors on the propensity to be interest in the political affairs of the country of residence, and the likelihood to engage in non-electoral forms of participation. Summarising the main findings I produced in this chapter: (1) the members of the Moroccan-origin community of Brussels are more likely to be politically active in comparison to the other communities. The communities in Lyon and Turin present the smallest gap with the Moroccan-origin community residing in Brussels. (2) interestingly, the Moroccan-origin individuals residing in Brussels do not show a higher probability of being interested in politics in comparison to their counterparts. Hence, an increased behavioural engagement in the political affairs of the country of residence does not equate to more attitudinal engagement. These findings seems to suggest that migrants' behavioural and attitudinal engagement in the political affairs of the country of residence develop at different rates and through different mechanisms.

In Chapter 7 I investigated the impact of a number of individual and organisational predictors on the political action repertoire of the five Moroccan-origin communities considered. In other words, this chapter looked at how broad is the range of political acts through which Moroccan-origin individuals can express their political voice in the different context of residence.

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[1]As explained in sections 6.3.2 and 7.4.3, the initial objective of these chapters was to unveil the effect of two contextual factors (i.e. the presence of local voting rights in favour of TCNs and the strength of anti-discrimination policies). Yet the discussion had in the viva with the examiners raised important concerns firstly in relation to the overall attempt to isolate the effect of single contextual factors from other confounding elements of the context, and secondly, on the type of data analysis used to achieve this objective.

In summary, the results produced in this chapter show that the Moroccan-origin communities residing in Brussels, Lyon, and Turin Moroccan-origin individuals can express their voice through a wider set of political acts with respect to their counterparts residing in Barcelona and Madrid. Nonetheless, there are significant differences between the Moroccan-origin communities of Barcelona and Madrid.

Contributions

My study makes three main contributions. The first contribution I make through this PhD dissertation bears on the new data generated on the largest Moroccan-origin community residing in Italy (see chapter 3 for more details). Between May and October 2014 I personally designed and collected a quantitative random sample survey in the city of Turin, on the basis of the individual level survey used within the framework of the LOCALMULTIDEM project. Once I concluded the process of data collection, I merged and pooled together datasets that were not initially consolidated (i.e. the dataset of Lyon, Barcelona, and Madrid, with the dataset of Brussels, and the newly generated dataset of Turin).

The amount of information gathered further expands our knowledge on this key migrant-origin community in Europe (i.e. socio-demographics, associational involvement, and modes and degree of political engagement). With the future public release of the dataset, more analyses can be conducted to support case studies and comparative studies revolving around this specific migrant-origin community. The process of data collection has been conducted in accordance with the high methodological standard set by the LOCALMULTIDEM project for the study of migrants' political integration, which represents an added value for the coming studies on migrant-origin political integration, notably those interested in this migrant-origin group and those interested in emphasising the importance of the local context in the mechanisms of political integration.

The second main contribution I make through this dissertation relates to the target population on which I chose to focus. Moroccan-origin individuals in Europe, as I explained in chapter 4, constitute one of the largest communities of TCNs in the continent. Through this dissertation I contribute to expanding the understanding of the dynamics and conditions of integration of one of the migrant-origin groups in Europe that is most often euphemistically labelled as "challenging" or "problematic" (Michon and Vermeulen, 2013), or straightforwardly as "lagging integration" (van Gorp, 2012, 48).

In particular, the descriptive and multivariate evidence presented in the three empirical chapters of this dissertation (i.e. chapters 5, 6, and 7) provide new comparative information on the modes of political engagement of the members of five

of the most prominent Moroccan communities in Europe (i.e. the Moroccan communities of Brussels, Lyon, Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid).

The main take-home message here is the significant difference I found between the five Moroccan-origin communities under consideration. The data show a clear difference in the modes and degree of political engagement between the more established communities residing in Brussels and Lyon, whose members seem to be more invested in the political affairs of the country of residence, in comparison with the younger communities established in the cities of Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid. Differences are found also within the most recent communities: the members of the Moroccan-origin communities of Turin and Barcelona are more engaged in the political sphere in relation to the Moroccan-origin individuals who settled in Madrid. Chapters 5, 6, 7 show with clarity how the Moroccan-origin communities residing in the different contexts are at a different stage in their process of integration in the political affairs of their countries of residence. Chapters 6 and 7 in particular, underline the complexity of this process and the need to investigate how the contexts of reception shape this process..

More work is certainly needed to unveil the effect of that contexts of reception have on the way migrant-origin communities engage in political affairs. The initial ambition of this PhD went exactly in this direction by firstly isolating two contextual effectors (i.e. presence of local voting rights and strength of anti-discrimination policies) and then developing causal mechanisms through which these effectors could shape migrant-origin residents' engagement in the political affairs of their country of residence. Yet, as explained above, limitations in the methods of analysis—brought up in occasion of the viva discussion—obliged me to tone down the initial conclusions and postpone the testing of these arguments to future research.

Finally, through this dissertation, I contribute to the ongoing debates about the conceptualisation and theorisation of migrant-origin political integration. In particular, in this study I interrogated seven of the main conceptual debates that characterise this field of study. Following the reflections presented for each debate, I embraced a conceptualisation of political integration that highlights the dual character of the integrative process. One side of the process of political incorporation pertains to the *will* and *ability* of migrant-origin residents to self-actively engage in the political sphere of their countries of residence. The second side of the process is based on the society's ability and willingness to include migrants and their descendants in the political sphere (see e.g. Sartori, 1987; Bauböck, 1994).

Another important element of my conceptualisation regards my position on the notion of 'ethnic minority' for the case of the Moroccan communities. Although in this study I acknowledge the contribution that the literature on Black, Latino, and Asian minorities has made over the years in the field of political integration,

in this study I refrain from using the concepts of ethnicity and race as analytical concepts because I consider them potentially homogenising if not treated carefully and more consideration is needed using different data. Furthermore, considering the degree of ethnic heterogeneity that characterise the Moroccan communities in Europe—as shown in chapter 4—it is more appropriate to refer to these with the notion of 'migrant-origin' group rather than 'ethnic minority' group.

Another distinctive aspect of my conceptualisation refers to the role of the autochthonous group. Whilst it is common practice to include in the comparative analysis a control group of autochthonous populations (Mendez and Font, 2013), in this dissertation, as discussed in chapter 2, I intentionally refrain from using the modes of political engagement of the autochthnous group as a 'gold standard' to assess the degree of integration of the migrant-origin individuals. By developing this conceptualisation I try to address directly some of the criticism that been raised in relation to the use of relative and absolute notions of 'political integration'.

The conceptualisation of political integration I adopt in this study does not depend on the way autochthonous individuals engage in the political affairs of their country of residence. The process of inclusion of migrant-origin individuals in the political life of their country of residence is *dual*, and it is not *uni-directional*, meaning that there is no 'highway to integration', no 'end-state' where integration is achieved. Furthermore, it is reversible, meaning that migrant-origin individuals can at some point in their lives fail to engage because of their lack of abilities or as a result of external factors, or choose deliberately to disengage (see also Spencer and Charsley, 2016).

By using the modes of political engagement expressed by the autochthonous group as the 'gold standard' we would perpetuate a view of the process of inclusion whereby migrant-origin residents are labelled as "politically integrated" when they assimilate to certain models of engagement: those expressed by the members of the autochthonous group.

Where do we go from here? Future research areas

As mentioned above, future work can certainly focus more on testing the role that contexts of reception play in the overall process of integration of migrant-origin communities in the political sphere of their countries of residence. Future work could for example include a larger number of Moroccan-origin communities, by including small and large 'older' Moroccan-origin communities like the ones residing in Dutch and German cities, as well 'younger' communities, as those residing in Swiss, Swedish, and Austrian cities. By introducing further variation in the target population we could gain more information on the various Moroccan-origin

communities in Europe, and could further investigate more effectively the impact of important contextual factor like the presence of voting rights on their modes and degrees of political engagement. In the future, it would be very interesting to investigate the impact of extension of the franchise on migrant-origin political engagement by including other contexts where TCNs are granted the right to vote, and differ for example in relation to aspects like voter registration requirements, voting methods, and the way votes are then transposed into seats.

Another way to further extend the scope of this work consists in examining intra-country variation in the patterns of political engagement of Moroccan-origin migrants, for example by comparing the Moroccan-origin communities of Lyon and Paris, or the community of Turin with the community of Milan. In this study, this type of comparison was possible only between the Moroccan communities residing in Barcelona and Madrid. Further comparison of this nature will enable us to look more closely at the different *local* mechanisms of political integration that might exist within the same country of residence.

A second area for further development pertains to the operationalisation of the key concepts, political participation and strength of anti-discrimination policies. As described in chapter 3, the LOCALMULTIDEM individual-level survey provides very important data on the socio-economic profile of a larger number of migrant-origin groups, and their degree and mode of political engagement. Yet the questions about the various types of political are expressed, as in most surveys on political participation, in a general way which does not necessarily single-out online forms of political participation or e-participation like writing a political blog or joining virtual sit-ins. Some studies, for example, have shown that members of ethnic minorities and migrant-origin groups—notably the younger cohorts—in the United States and Europe are significantly active online through social media platforms, like Twitter. Interestingly, web-based forms of political participation are particularly important to these disadvantaged groups (see e.g., Spaiser 2011; O'Toole and Gale 2010; Clark 2014). By taking into account the recent technological advancements on political participation and their importance for voicing the preferences and concerns of migrant-origin groups, the city council of Amsterdam, for example, includes questions on e-participation in the survey (Vragenlijst Amsterdamse Burgermonitor) that circulates among the residents of the city of Amsterdam every year.

In the surveys used in this PhD study respondents would report their participation in online and offline forms of political acts, without necessarily distinguishing between them. Yet, future work on migrant-origin political engagement can certainly gain in clarity from the inclusion of specific questions on e-political participation.

The second point is represented by the measure of anti-discrimination policy employed in this dissertation. In this study, I used the MIPEX index to gain an idea of the strength of the anti-discrimination policies implemented. However the MIPEX measure refers to the country as a whole, hence does not take into account the differences that might exists within the same country. In this study, this point is solely relevant for the cities of Madrid and Barcelona. I pointed out in chapter 7 that after consulting the information reported by experts on anti-discrimination policies, I judged appropriate to make no distinction between the anti-discrimination policy implemented in Madrid and Barcelona. With more resources, in future it would certainly be interesting to adopt or build *ex novo* more refined measures of anti-discrimination policy which can take into account the differences that might exist within the countries under consideration.

The research I have conducted during these last five years contributes to the study of migrants' political integration, and constitutes more specifically an important step forward in the understanding of how Moroccan-origin people residing in different contexts engage in the political spheres of their new societies of residence. Future work can build upon the contributions I made here, and tackle the inevitable limitations of time and resources inherent to the PhD process. Future comparative research can take advantage of the multiple funding opportunities made available by the EU in this field to expand on the questions raised here. Such work will have the potential to liaise from the outset with policy makers and civil society, particularly the Moroccan-origin communities across Europe to improve the quality of life of Moroccan migrant people and their descendants.

Appendices

APPENDIX

A

CHAPTER 3: THE RESEARCH APPROACH

Table A.1.: Definition of Aggregation Centres in Three Phases

Pre Pilot (Before May 7)
(C1) Mosques and praying rooms
(C2) Italian language centres
(C3) Restaurants, cafes
(C4) Social services
(C5) Ethnic shops
(C6) Places of entertainment
(C7) Centres for management of certificates
(C8) Kindergartens and primary schools
(C9) Centres for documents related assistance
(C10) Outdoor meeting points

Pilot (Between May 7 and June 8)
(C1) Mosques and praying rooms
(C2) Training centres
(C3) Places of entertainment and restaurants
(C4) Assistance centres
(C5) Ethnic shops
(C6) Service centres
(C7) Centres for management of certificates
(C8) Kindergartens
(C9) Outdoor meeting points
(C10) Outdoor markets
(C11) University study rooms

Post Pilot (After June 8)
(C1) Mosques and praying rooms
(C2) Training centres
(C3) Places of entertainment and restaurants
(C4) Assistance centres
(C5) Ethnic shops
(C6) Centres for management of certificates
(C7) Kindergartens
(C8) Outdoor meeting points
(C9) Outdoor markets
(C10) University study rooms

Note: The table refers to fieldwork conducted in Turin, May 2014 - October 2014

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B

CHAPTER 5: MOROCCAN-ORIGIN COMMUNITIES IN EUROPE: COMPARING THEIR OUTLOOK AND PATTERNS OF ENGAGEMENT

Table B.1.: Household Monthly Income by Gender and Migrant Generation in the City of Brussels, Percentages

	First gen. (†)		1.5 gen.		Second gen.	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Less than 1,500 euros	71.7	75.3	71.4	60.0	65.4	59.1
From 1,500 euros	28.3	24.7	28.57	40.0	34.6	40.9
N	53	73	21	25	136	132

a. Source: Herman (2015).

b. (†) the first generation in this table includes only individuals who migrated at 15 years old or older.

c. * and ** indicate that the gender cross-group differences within each migrant generation are significant at 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.

Table B.2.: Household Monthly Income by Gender and Migrant Generation in the City of Lyon, Percentages

	First gen. (†)		1.5 gen.		Second gen.	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Less than 1,500 euros	71.4*	37.5*	80.0	75.0	64.7	50.0
From 1,500 euros	28.6*	62.5*	20.0	25.0	32.1	50.0
N	14	16	15	4	28	22

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014).

b. (†) the first generation in this table includes only individuals who migrated at 15 years old or older.

c. * and ** indicate that the gender cross-group differences within each migrant generation are significant at 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.

Table B.6.: Religious Affiliation by Gender and Migrant Generation in the Five Cities, Percentages

		First gen. (†)		1.5 gen.		Second gen.	
		Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Brussels							
	Muslim	94.3	92.9	95.2	84.0	92.7	89.9
	Jewish	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Catholic	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Protestant	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Atheist*	5.7	7.1	4.8	16.0	7.4	10.1
	Other	-	-	-	-	-	-
	N	53	70	21	25	136	129

		First gen. (†)		1.5 gen.		Second gen.	
		Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Lyon							
	Muslim	57.1	88.2	68.4	75.0	64.3	41.7
	Jewish	14.3	-	5.3	25.0	3.6	8.3
	Catholic	-	-	5.3	-	10.7	12.5
	Protestant	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Atheist*	21.4	11.8	21.1	-	21.4	37.5
	Other	7.1	-	-	-	-	-
	N	14	17	19	4	28	24

		First gen. (†)		1.5 gen.		Second gen.	
		Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Turin							
	Muslim	97.3	99.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Jewish	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Catholic	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Protestant	1.4	-	-	-	-	-
	Atheist*	-	1.0	-	-	-	-
	Other	1.4	-	-	-	-	-
	N	74	104	8	10	1	1

		First gen. (†)		1.5 gen.		Second gen.	
		Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Barcelona							
	Muslim	88.7	94.9	100.0	100.0	75.0	100.0
	Jewish	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Catholic	3.8	-	-	-	-	-
	Protestant	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Atheist*	7.6	5.1	-	-	-	-
	Other	-	-	-	-	-	-
	N	53	137	8	19	4	2

		First gen. (†)		1.5 gen.		Second gen.	
		Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Madrid							

Table B.6 continued from previous page

Muslim	97.2	99.4	100.0	100.0	100.0	-
Jewish	1.9	-	-	-	-	-
Catholic	0.9	-	-	-	-	-
Protestant	-	-	-	-	-	-
Atheist*	-	0.6	-	-	-	-
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	107	174	7	7	1	-

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

b. (†) the first generation in this table includes only individuals who migrated at 15 years old or older.

c. * Atheist or agnostic individual.

d. Brussels: the chi-square test between gender and religious attendance produced the following results for each migrant generation, χ^2=0.11 p=0.741 (first generation); χ^2=1.49 p=0.223 (1.5 generation); χ^2=0.62 p=0.431 (second generation). Lyon: the chi-square test between gender and religious attendance produced the following results for each migrant generation, χ^2=5.09 p=0.165 (first generation); χ^2=2.55 p=0.466 (1.5 generation); χ^2=2.93 p=0.403 (second generation). Turin: the chi-square test between gender and religious attendance produced the following results for each migrant generation, χ^2=3.54 p=0.316 (first generation). Barcelona: the chi-square test between gender and religious attendance produced the following results for each migrant generation, χ^2=5.72 p=0.057 (first generation). Madrid: the chi-square test between gender and religious attendance produced the following results for each migrant generation, χ^2=5.53 p=0.137 (first generation).

e. Brussels: the chi-square test between migration generation and religious attendance produced the following results for each gender group, χ^2=0.31 p=0.856 (female); χ^2=1.65 p=0.437 (male). Lyon: the chi-square test between migration generation and religious attendance produced the following results for each gender group, χ^2=6.93 p=0.544 (female); χ^2=13.23 p=0.040 (male). Turin: the chi-square test between migration generation and religious attendance produced the following results for each gender group, χ^2=0.25 p=0.993 (female); χ^2=0.11 p=0.948 (male). Barcelona: the chi-square test between migration generation and religious attendance produced the following results for each gender group, χ^2=2.82 p=0.588 (female); χ^2=1.12 p=0.570 (male). Madrid: the chi-square test between migration generation and religious attendance produced the following results for each gender group, χ^2=0.23 p=0.994 (female); χ^2=0.04 p=0.841 (male).

Table B.3.: Household Monthly Income by Gender and Migrant Generation in the City of Turin, Percentages

	First gen. (†)		1.5 gen.		Second gen.	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Less than 1,500 euros	75.8	87.1	75.0	70.0	-	-
From 1,500 euros	24.2	12.9	25.0	30.0	100.0	100.0
N	66	101	8	10	1	1

a. Source: Sajir (2017).

b. (†) the first generation in this table includes only individuals who migrated at 15 years old or older.

c. * and ** indicate that the gender cross-group differences within each migrant generation are significant at 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.

Table B.4.: Household Monthly Income by Gender and Migrant Generation in the City of Barcelona, Percentages

	First gen. (†)		1.5 gen.		Second gen.	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Less than 1,500 euros	67.9	72.5	100.0	55.6	50.0	-
From 1,500 euros	32.1	27.5	-	44.4	35.3	100.0
N	28	91	2	9	2	1

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014).

b. (†) the first generation in this table includes only individuals who migrated at 15 years old or older.

c. * and ** indicate that the gender cross-group differences within each migrant generation are significant at 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.

Table B.5.: Household Monthly Income by Gender and Migrant Generation in the City of Madrid, Percentages

	First gen. (†)		1.5 gen.		Second gen.	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Less than 1,500 euros	85.5	86.2	75.0	40.0	-	-
From 1,500 euros	15.7	13.8	25.0	60.0	-	-
N	70	123	4	5	-	-

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014).

b. (†) the first generation in this table includes only individuals who migrated at 15 years old or older.

c. * and ** indicate that the gender cross-group differences within each migrant generation are significant at 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.

Table B.7.: Perceived Discrimination by Gender and Migrant Generation in the City of Brussels, Percentages

	First generation (†)		1.5 generation		Second generation	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Not discriminated						
18-25	9.1	10.3	-	22.2	59.1	66.7
26-35	-	37.9	18.2	22.2	29.5	22.2
36-45	50.0	13.8	-	22.2	9.1	11.1
46-55	27.3	20.7	72.7	22.2	-	-
56-65	13.6	13.8	9.1	11.1	-	-
65+	-	3.4	-	-	2.3	-
N	22	29	11	9	44	27
Discriminated						
18-25	6.5	7.3	10.0	31.3	50.0	38.2
26-35	32.3	41.5	20.0	37.5	32.6	51.0
36-45	22.6	17.1	20.0	25.0	15.2	8.8
46-55	29.0	12.2	40.0	6.3	1.1	2.0
56-65	-	17.1	10.0	-	-	-
65+	9.7	4.9	-	-	1.1	-
N	31	41	10	16	92	102

a. Source: Herman (2015).

b. (†) the first generation in this table includes only individuals who migrated at 15 years old or older.

c. Notes: The overall model is statistically significant (LR χ^2 = 14.31, p = 0.0025). The effect of the migrant generation is statistically significant, whilst none of the other coefficients is statistically significant.

Table B.8.: Perceived Discrimination by Gender and Migrant Generation in the City of Lyon, Percentages

	First generation (†)		1.5 generation		Second generation	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Not discriminated						
18-25	37.5	-	35.7	-	61.9	50.0
26-35	25.0	-	7.1	-	19.0	35.7
36-45	12.5	37.5	42.9	33.3	9.5	14.3
46-55	25.0	25.0	7.1	33.3	4.8	-
56-65	-	37.5	7.1	-	-	-
65+	-	-	-	33.3	4.8	-
N	8	8	14	3	21	14
Discriminated						
18-25	-	25.0	40.0	-	57.1	77.8
26-35	25.0	12.5	20.0	100.0	28.6	22.2
36-45	25.0	-	20.0	-	14.3	-
46-55	25.0	50.0	20.0	-	-	-
56-65	25.0	12.5	-	-	-	-
65+	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	4	8	5	1	7	9

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014).

b. (†) the first generation in this table includes only individuals who migrated at 15 years old or older.

c. Notes: The overall model is not statistically significant (LR χ^2 = 4.98, p = 0.1733). None of the coefficients is statistically significant.

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Table B.9.: Perceived Discrimination by Gender and Migrant Generation in the City of Turin, Percentages

	First generation (†)		1.5 generation		Second generation	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Not discriminated						
18-25	12.8	6.9	50.0	37.5	100.0	-
26-35	42.6	44.8	50.0	62.5	-	-
36-45	36.2	31.0	-	-	-	-
46-55	2.1	12.1	-	-	-	-
56-65	4.3	1.7	-	-	-	-
65+	2.1	3.4	-	-	-	-
N	47	58	4	8	1	-
Discriminated						
18-25	12.0	8.7	75.0	100.0	-	100.0
26-35	28.0	32.6	25.0	-	-	-
36-45	48.0	34.8	-	-	-	-
46-55	8.0	21.7	-	-	-	-
56-65	4.0	2.2	-	-	-	-
65+	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	25	46	4	2	-	1

a. Source: Sajir (2017).

b. (†) the first generation in this table includes only individuals who migrated at 15 years old or older.

c. Notes: The overall model is not statistically significant (LR χ^2 = 1.16, p = 0.7628). The effect of gender is statistically significant, whilst none of the other coefficients is statistically significant.

Table B.10.: Perceived Discrimination by Gender and Migrant Generation in the City of Barcelona, Percentages

	First generation (†)		1.5 generation		Second generation	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Not discriminated						
18-25	-	7.2	50.0	37.5	100.0	-
26-35	26.7	47.0	25.0	25.0	-	100.0
36-45	40.0	32.1	25.0	-	-	-
46-55	20.0	7.5	-	9.1	-	-
56-65	6.7	-	-	-	-	-
65+	6.7	-	-	-	-	-
N	30	83	4	8	1	1
Discriminated						
18-25	4.5	17.0	50.0	72.7	33.3	100.0
26-35	22.7	43.4	-	18.2	66.7	-
36-45	50.0	32.1	25.0	-	-	-
46-55	22.7	7.5	25.0	9.1	-	-
56-65	-	-	-	-	-	-
65+	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	22	53	4	11	3	1

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014).

b. (†) the first generation in this table includes only individuals who migrated at 15 years old or older.

c. Notes: The overall model is statistically significant (LR χ^2 = 10.03, p = 0.0183). The effect of age is statistically significant, whilst none of the other coefficients is statistically significant.

Table B.11.: Perceived Discrimination by Gender and Migrant Generation in the City of Madrid, Percentages

	First generation (†)		1.5 generation		Second generation	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Not discriminated						
18-25	12.8	6.9	50.0	37.5	100.0	-
26-35	42.6	44.8	50.0	62.5	-	-
36-45	36.2	31.0	-	-	-	-
46-55	2.1	12.1	-	-	-	-
56-65	4.3	1.7	-	-	-	-
65+	2.1	3.4	-	-	-	-
N	47	58	4	8	1	-
Discriminated						
18-25	12.0	8.7	75.0	100.0	-	100.0
26-35	28.0	32.6	25.0	-	-	-
36-45	48.0	34.8	-	-	-	-
46-55	8.0	21.7	-	-	-	-
56-65	4.0	2.2	-	-	-	-
65+	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	25	46	4	2	-	1

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014).

b. (†) the first generation in this table includes only individuals who migrated at 15 years old or older.

c. Notes: The overall model is not statistically significant (LR χ^2 = 3.43, p = 0.3297). The effect of the migrant generation is statistically significant, whilst none of the other coefficients is statistically significant.

Table B.12.: Political Interest by Gender and Level of Education in the City of Brussels, Percentages

	Female	Male
Not interested		
Illiterate or primary not completed	18.9	12.5
Primary completed	14.4	15.9
Secondary completed	41.1	46.6
Post-secondary (non tertiary) completed	13.3	13.6
Tertiary completed	12.2	11.4
N	90	88
Interested		
Illiterate or primary not completed	12.2	6.9
Primary completed	13.8	13.1
Secondary completed	39.0	46.9
Post-secondary (non tertiary) completed	20.3	15.9
Tertiary completed	14.6	17.2
N	123	145

a. Source: Herman (2015).

b. Notes: The overall model is statistically significant (LR χ^2 = 6.72, p = 0.0347). The effect of the education level is statistically significant, whilst the effect of gender is not statistically significant.

Table B.13.: Political Interest by Gender and Level of Education in the
City of Lyon, Percentages

	Female	Male
Not interested		
Illiterate or primary not completed	7.1	11.1
Primary completed	7.1	-
Secondary completed	42.9	44.4
Post-secondary (non tertiary) completed	14.3	33.3
Tertiary completed	28.6	11.1
N	14	9
Interested		
Illiterate or primary not completed	2.0	9.8
Primary completed	6.1	4.9
Secondary completed	12.2	12.2
Post-secondary (non tertiary) completed	30.6	24.4
Tertiary completed	49.0	48.8
N	49	41

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014).

b. Notes: The overall model is not statistically significant (LR χ^2 = 4.63, p = 0.0986). The effect of the education level is statistically significant, whilst the effect of gender is not statistically significant.

Table B.14.: Political Interest by Gender and Level of Education in the City of Turin, Percentages

	Female	Male
Not interested		
Illiterate or primary not completed	12.50	4.9
Primary completed	8.3	9.8
Secondary completed	54.2	73.2
Post-secondary (non tertiary) completed	20.8	7.3
Tertiary completed	4.2	4.9
N	24	41
Interested		
Illiterate or primary not completed	5.2	3.0
Primary completed	5.2	3.0
Secondary completed	67.2	62.7
Post-secondary (non tertiary) completed	10.3	14.9
Tertiary completed	12.1	16.4
N	58	67

a. Source: Sajir (2017).

b. Notes: The overall model is statistically significant (LR χ^2 = 7.89, p = 0.0194). The effect of the education level is statistically significant, whilst the effect of gender is not statistically significant.

Table B.15.: Political Interest by Gender and Level of Education in the City of Barcelona, Percentages

	Female	Male
Not interested		
Illiterate or primary not completed	31.0	21.7
Primary completed	20.7	25.0
Secondary completed	34.5	33.3
Post-secondary (non tertiary) completed	13.8	6.7
Tertiary completed	-	13.3
N	29	60
Interested		
Illiterate or primary not completed	11.1	6.1
Primary completed	11.1	21.4
Secondary completed	47.2	40.8
Post-secondary (non tertiary) completed	8.3	10.2
Tertiary completed	22.2	21.4
N	36	98

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014).

b. Notes: The overall model is statistically significant (LR χ^2 = 15.94, p = 0.0003). The effect of the education level is statistically significant, whilst the effect of gender is not statistically significant.

Table B.16.: Political Interest by Gender and Level of Education in the City of Madrid, Percentages

	Female	Male
Not interested		
Illiterate or primary not completed	22.7	18.2
Primary completed	18.7	25.3
Secondary completed	50.7	52.5
Post-secondary (non tertiary) completed	1.3	-
Tertiary completed	6.7	4.0
N	75	99
Interested		
Illiterate or primary not completed	13.5	11.3
Primary completed	10.8	17.5
Secondary completed	59.5	56.3
Post-secondary (non tertiary) completed	-	3.5
Tertiary completed	16.2	11.3
N	37	80

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014).

b. Notes: The overall model is not statistically significant (LR χ^2 = 14.95, p = 0.0006). The effects of the education level and gender are statistically significant.

Table B.17.: Political Interest by Gender, Age Group, and Migrant Generation in the City of Brussels, Percentages

	First generation (†)		1.5 generation		Second generation	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Not interested						
18-25	4.3	13.8	11.1	45.5	61.1	56.3
26-35	13.0	44.8	11.1	27.3	27.8	37.5
36-45	34.8	13.8	22.2	9.1	9.3	4.2
46-55	30.4	10.3	55.6	18.2	-	2.1
56-65	8.7	10.3	-	-	-	-
65+	8.7	6.9	-	-	1.9	-
N	23	29	9	11	54	48
Interested						
18-25	6.9	4.5	-	14.3	47.6	36.9
26-35	24.1	36.4	18.2	35.7	34.1	48.8
36-45	34.5	18.2	-	35.7	15.9	11.9
46-55	27.6	18.2	63.6	7.1	1.2	2.4
56-65	3.4	20.5	18.2	7.1	-	-
65+	3.4	2.3	-	-	1.2	-
N	29	44	11	14	82	84

a. Source: Herman (2015).

b. (†) the first generation in this table includes only individuals who migrated at 15 years old or older.

c. Notes: The overall model is not statistically significant (LR χ^2 = 5.54, p = 0.1360). The effects of age is statistically significant, whilst none of the other coefficients is statistically significant.

Table B.18.: Political Interest by Gender, Age Group, and Migrant Generation in the City of Lyon, Percentages

	First generation (†)		1.5 generation		Second generation	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Not interested						
18-25	-	33.3	100.0	-	42.9	66.7
26-35	50.0	-	-	-	28.6	33.3
36-45	-	33.3	-	-	14.3	-
46-55	25.0	-	-	-	-	-
56-65	-	33.3	-	-	-	-
65+	25.0	-	-	-	14.3	-
N	4	3	2	-	7	6
Interested						
18-25	30.0	6.7	29.0	-	66.7	61.1
26-35	10.0	6.7	11.8	25.0	19.0	27.8
36-45	20.0	20.0	41.2	25.0	9.5	11.1
46-55	20.0	40.0	11.8	25.0	4.8	-
56-65	10.0	26.7	5.9	-	-	-
65+	10.0	-	-	25.0	-	-
N	10	15	17	4	21	18

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014).

b. (†) the first generation in this table includes only individuals who migrated at 15 years old or older.

c. Notes: The overall model is not statistically significant (LR χ^2 = 0.35, p = 0.9494). None of the coefficients is statistically significant.

Table B.19.: Political Interest by Gender, Age Group, and Migrant Generation in the City of Turin, Percentages

	First generation (†)		1.5 generation		Second generation	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Not interested						
18-25	9.5	5.3	50.0	33.3	100.0	-
26-35	42.9	39.5	50.0	66.7	-	-
36-45	42.9	28.9	-	-	-	-
46-55	-	15.8	-	-	-	-
56-65	4.8	5.3	-	-	-	-
65+	-	5.3	-	-	-	-
N	21	38	2	3	1	-
Interested						
18-25	13.7	6.8	29.4	57.1	-	100.0
26-35	35.3	37.3	11.8	42.9	-	-
36-45	39.2	-	41.2	-	-	-
46-55	5.9	16.9	11.8	-	-	-
56-65	3.9	-	5.9	-	-	-
65+	2.0	-	-	-	-	-
N	51	59	6	7	-	1

a. Source: Sajir (2017).

b. (†) the first generation in this table includes only individuals who migrated at 15 years old or older.

c. Notes: The overall model is not statistically significant (LR χ^2 = 2.35, p = 0.5033). None of the coefficients is statistically significant.

Table B.20.: Political Interest by Gender, Age Group, and Migrant Generation in the City of Barcelona, percentages

	First generation (†)		1.5 generation		Second generation	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Not interested						
18-25	-	11.3	33.3	71.4	66.7	-
26-35	18.2	47.2	-	14.3	33.3	-
36-45	36.4	26.4	33.3	-	-	-
46-55	36.4	9.4	33.3	14.3	-	-
56-65	4.5	1.9	-	-	-	-
65+	4.5	3.8	-	-	-	-
N	22	53	3	7	3	-
Interested						
18-25	3.3	11.9	60.0	50.0	-	50.0
26-35	33.3	44.0	20.0	25.0	100.0	50.0
36-45	46.7	35.7	20.0	8.3	-	-
46-55	10.0	7.1	-	-	-	-
56-65	3.3	1.2	-	8.3	-	-
65+	3.3	-	-	8.3	-	-
N	30	84	5	12	1	2

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014).

b. (†) the first generation in this table includes only individuals who migrated at 15 years old or older.

c. Notes: The overall model is not statistically significant (LR χ^2 = 2.27, p = 0.5176). None of the coefficients is statistically significant.

Table B.21.: Political Interest by Gender, Age Group, and Migrant Generation in the City of Madrid, Percentages

	First generation (†)		1.5 generation		Second generation	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Not interested						
18-25	11.8	14.6	83.3	100.0	-	-
26-35	41.2	56.3	50.0	-	-	-
36-45	36.8	21.9	-	-	-	-
46-55	5.9	5.2	-	-	-	-
56-65	4.4	2.1	-	-	-	-
65+	-	-	-	-	-	-
N	68	96	6	3	-	-
Interested						
18-25	14.3	13.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	-
26-35	31.4	48.1	-	-	-	-
36-45	42.9	28.6	-	-	-	-
46-55	11.4	6.5	-	-	-	-
56-65	-	2.6	-	-	-	-
65+	-	1.3	-	-	-	-
N	35	77	1	3	1	-

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014).

b. (†) the first generation in this table includes only individuals who migrated at 15 years old or older.

c. Notes: The overall model is not statistically significant (LR χ^2 = 5.06, p = 0.1676). None of the coefficients is statistically significant.

Table B.22.: Interest in National and Local Politics by Feelings of Belonging, Percentages

Brussels				
	None	Ethnic	National	Double
Not interested	48.6	60.0	29.1	32.7
Interested	51.5	40.0	70.9	67.3
N	138	50	103	162

Lyon				
	None	Ethnic	National	Double
Not interested	28.0	-	22.2	17.0
Interested	72.0	100.0	77.8	83.0
N	25	6	36	47

Turin				
	None	Ethnic	National	Double
Not interested	42.7	45.0	16.8	29.6
Interested	57.3	55.0	83.2	70.4
N	68	55	23	45

Barcelona				
	None	Ethnic	National	Double
Not interested	31.4	38.5	40.0	45.1
Interested	68.6	61.5	60.0	54.9
N	51	39	50	82

Madrid				
	None	Ethnic	National	Double
Not interested	68.1	68.5	51.2	56.5
Interested	31.9	31.5	48.8	43.5
N	47	54	43	147

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).
b. Notes: χ^2= 21.23, p< 0.001 (Brussels);
χ^2= 2.85, p= 0.415 (Lyon); χ^2= 6.18, p= 0.186 (Turin);
χ^2= 4.02, p= 0.403 (Barcelona);
χ^2= 6.54, p= 0.163 (Madrid).

Table B.23.: Interest in Local Politics by Feelings of Belonging, Percentages

Brussels	None	Ethnic	National	Double
Not interested	73.2	78.0	59.2	55.6
Interested	26.8	22.0	40.8	44.4
N	138	50	103	162

Lyon	None	Ethnic	National	Double
Not interested	56.0	16.7	47.2	48.9
Interested	44.0	83.3	52.8	51.1
N	25	6	36	47

Turin	None	Ethnic	National	Double
Not interested	54.0	50.9	12.2	33.2
Interested	46.0	49.1	87.8	66.8
N	66	53	21	44

Barcelona	None	Ethnic	National	Double
Not interested	47.1	46.2	50.0	52.4
Interested	52.9	53.9	50.0	47.6
N	51	39	50	82

Madrid	None	Ethnic	National	Double
Not interested	76.6	74.1	67.4	65.3
Interested	23.4	25.9	32.6	34.7
N	47	54	43	147

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).
b. Notes: χ^2= 15.38, p= 0.002 (Brussels);
χ^2= 3.02, p= 0.388 (Lyon); χ^2= 13.28, p= 0.010 (Turin);
χ^2= 1.60, p= 0.809 (Barcelona);
χ^2= 3.36, p= 0.500 (Madrid).

Table B.24.: Interest in National Politics by Feelings of
Belonging, Percentages

	Brussels			
	None	Ethnic	National	Double
Not interested	54.4	66.0	31.1	35.2
Interested	45.7	34.0	68.9	64.8
N	138	50	103	162

	Lyon			
	None	Ethnic	National	Double
Not interested	32.0	-	27.8	21.3
Interested	68.0	100.0	72.2	78.7
N	25	6	36	47

	Turin			
	None	Ethnic	National	Double
Not interested	52.6	60.6	24.3	36.2
Interested	47.4	39.4	75.7	63.8
N	68	55	23	43

	Barcelona			
	None	Ethnic	National	Double
Not interested	37.3	43.6	46.0	47.6
Interested	62.8	56.4	54.0	52.4
N	51	39	50	82

	Madrid			
	None	Ethnic	National	Double
Not interested	68.1	68.5	55.8	56.5
Interested	31.9	31.5	44.2	43.5
N	47	54	43	147

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).
b. Notes: $\chi^2 = 27.94$, $p < 0.001$ (Brussels);
$\chi^2 = 3.17$, $p = 0.365$ (Lyon); $\chi^2 = 9.80$, $p = 0.044$ (Turin);
$\chi^2 = 2.70$, $p = 0.609$ (Barcelona);
$\chi^2 = 5.50$, $p = 0.240$ (Madrid).

Table B.25.: Political Acts by Political Interest, Column Percentages / Row Percentages

Brussels	Not interested	Interested	N
Contacted a government official, media or solicitor	13.0/33.3	16.7/66.7	57
N	146	227	
Worked in a political party or action group	1.4/12.5*	6.3/87.5*	16
N	144	221	
Worn or displayed a badge, sticker or poster	6.9/40.0	6.7/60.0	25
N	146	223	
Signed a petition	20.0/34.9	24.2/65.1	83
N	145	223	
Taken part in a public demonstration	19.2/39.4	19.2/60.6	71
N	146	224	
Boycotted certain products	17.9/32.9	23.8/67.1	79
N	145	223	
Bought certain products for political reasons	2.1/15.8*	7.2/84.2*	19
N	145	222	
Donated money to a political organisation or group	4.9/21.9*	11.2/78.1*	32
N	144	223	

Taken part in a strike	11.6/63.0*	4.5/37.0*	27
N	146	222	
Not participated in any	57.5/42.0	51.1/58.0	200
N	84	116	

Lyon			
	Not interested	Interested	N
Contacted a government official, media or solicitor	4.4/6.25	16.5/93.8	16
N	23	91	
Worked in a political party or action group	-	6.6/100.0	6
N	23	91	
Worn or displayed a badge, sticker or poster	-*	16.7/100.0*	15
N	23	90	
Signed a petition	17.4/8.7	46.2/91.3	46
N	23	91	
Taken part in a public demonstration	17.4/13.3	28.6/86.7	30
N	23	91	
Boycotted certain products	13.0/14.3	20.0/85.7	21
N	23	90	

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Bought certain products for political reasons	-	11.0/100.0	10
N	23	91	
Donated money to a political organisation or group	-	7.7/100.0	7
N	23	91	
Taken part in a strike	8.7/6.9*	29.7/93.1*	29
N	23	91	
Not participated in any	56.5/31.0*	31.9/69.0*	42
N	13	29	

	Turin		
	Not interested	Interested	N
Contacted a government official, media or solicitor	3.8/31.1	5.0/68.9	9
N	71	120	
Worked in a political party or action group	-	2.5/100.0	3
N	71	121	
Worn or displayed a badge, sticker or poster	3.9/38.4	3.7/61.6	7
N	71	121	
Signed a petition	1.3/19.6	3.1/80.4	5
N	71	121	
Taken part in a public demonstration	8.3/28.6	20.6/71.4	29

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N	71	121	
Boycotted certain products	5.5/45.6	3.9/54.4	9
N	71	121	
Bought certain products for political reasons	-	1.7/100.0	2
N	71	121	
Donated money to a political organisation or group	4.4/39.7	4.0/60.3	8
N	71	121	
Taken part in a strike	2.6/18.6	6.8/81.4	10
N	71	121	
Not participated in any	80.2/40.5	69.5/59.5	140
N	57	84	

	Barcelona		
	Not interested	Interested	N
Contacted a government official, media or solicitor	5.7/20.8*	14.2/79.2*	24
N	88	134	
Worked in a political party or action group	1.1/50.0	0.8/50.0	2
N	88	134	
Worn or displayed a badge, sticker or poster	2.3/11.1**	12.0/88.9**	18
N	88	134	

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Signed a petition	5.7/19.2*	15.7/80.8*	26
N	88	134	
Taken part in a public demonstration	5.7/25.0	11.2/75.0	20
N	88	134	
Boycotted certain products	1.1/12.5	5.2/87.5	8
N	88	134	
Bought certain products for political reasons	2.3/18.2	6.7/81.8	11
N	88	134	
Donated money to a political organisation or group	5.7/33.3	7.5/66.7	15
N	88	134	
Taken part in a strike	-	3.7/100.0	5
N	88	134	
Not participated in any	76.1/46.5*	57.5/53.5*	144
N	67	77	

Madrid

	Not interested	Interested	N
Contacted a government official, media or solicitor	0.6/20.0	3.4/80.0	5
N	173	117	

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Worked in a political party or action group	-	-	-
N	-	-	
Worn or displayed a badge, sticker or poster	-	-	-
N	-	-	
Signed a petition	0.6/25.0	2.6/75.0	4
N	173	117	
Taken part in a public demonstration	1.2/28.6	4.3/71.4	7
N	173	117	
Boycotted certain products	-	0.9/100.0	1
N	173	117	
Bought certain products for political reasons	-	-	-
N	-	-	
Donated money to a political organisation or group	2.9/45.5	5.1/54.5	11
N	173	117	
Taken part in a strike	0.6/100.0	-	1
N	173	117	
Not participated in any	94.8/61.4*	88.0/38.6*	267
N	164	103	

a. Source: Morales et al. (2014); Herman (2015); Sajir (2017).

b. Notes: The figures separated by a slash indicates respectively the column and row

percentages. * and ** indicate that the gender cross-group differences within each migrant generation are significant at 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.

C

CHAPTER 6: CAN VOTING RIGHTS PROMOTE THE POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT OF MIGRANT-ORIGIN INDIVIDUALS?

Questions and variables

In this part of the appendix I report the exact question wording for the variables used in this chapter. This section contains the extended discussion of the decisions I made in constructing the variables. Actual question wordings are always in italics.

Gender

A binary variable taking value 1 for male and 0 for female.

Age

Item wording: *In which year were you born?*

This is a ratio variable that records the age of adult respondents. As pointed out in detail chapter 3, the surveys conducted in Turin and Brussels include only adult respondents, whilst those in carried out in Lyon, Barcelona, and Madrid included also a very small portion of minors. For the sake of comparability I consider only respondents who had achieved majority at the time of the survey.

On the basis of the suggestions of Leighley (1995), I also run regression analysis including the age variable in its quadratic form.

Education

Item wording: *What is the highest level of education you have achieved?*

For the surveys conducted in the cities of Lyon, Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid the original categories of answer are: (1) not completed primary education; (2) primary education or first stage of basic education; (3) lower level secondary education or second stage of basic education; (4) upper secondary education; (5) Post-secondary, non-tertiary education; (6) first and second stage of tertiary education.

For the survey conducted in the city of Brussels the secondary level education was collapsed into a single category: (1) not completed primary education; (2) primary education or first stage of basic education; (3) lower and upper level secondary; (4) Post-secondary, non-tertiary education; (5) tertiary education.

For the sake of comparability, I reduced the number of educational categories to 5 also for the respondents who were interviewed in Lyon, Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid, by collapsing the secondary level to one category only, as done in the survey carried out in Brussels.

From the original ordinal scale I then computed a variable ranging between 0 and 1. The variable was obtained by subtracting 1 from the original categories and dividing by 4.

In the tables 6.3 and 6.4, this variable is dichotomise in the following way: all individuals who obtained at least a post-secondary level education degree are coded as 1, otherwise 0.

Employment status

Item wording: *Which of these descriptions best describes your situation in the last seven days? Please, select only one.*

The response set was: (1) in paid work; (2) in education (not paid for by employer); (3) unemployed and actively looking for job; (4) unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for it; (5) permanently sick or disabled; (6) retired; (7) in community or military service; (8) doing housework, looking after children or other persons; (8) other.

A dummy variable labelled 'employed' was created that identified with a value of 1 those that had chosen category 1, and assigned a value of 0 to all other respondents.

Marital/partnership status

A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the individual is married or lives in partnership, and 0 for all other cases.

Has residence-country citizenship

This is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for respondents who have the citizenship of the country of residence and 0 for those who do not.

Proportion of years lived in the host country

This an interval scale variable indicating how many years the respondent has lived in the country. It was computed by taking into account the year when the interview took place and then dividing the number of years since arrival to the country of respondents by their age. This resulted into a scale ranging from 0 to 1. Individuals born in the country of residence were given a value of 1.

Associational involvement

This is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for respondents who are involved in voluntary associations and 0 for those who are not. It measures membership or participation in associations except in Lyon, where information is available only on membership, because the question asked on participation was not limited to

the last 12 months. I considered involvement in 18 types of association: (1) sports club or club for outdoor activities; (2) organization for cultural activities, tradition-preserving or any hobby activities (musical, dancing, animal breeding, etc); (3) political party; (4) trade union; (5) business, employers', professional or farmers' organization; (6) organization for humanitarian aid, charity or social welfare; (7) organization for environmental protection or animal rights; (8) human rights or peace organization; (9) religious or church organisation; (10) immigrants' organisation (that is, an organisation for the support or promotion of immigrants' interests, broadly defined); (11) [ethnic group] organization (an organization that primarily seeks the advancement of the ethnic/national-origin group); (12) anti- racism organization; (13) educational organization; (14) youth organization; (15) organization for the retired/elderly; (16) women's organisation; (17) residents', housing or neighbourhood organisation; (18) other organisation. The variable labelled 'involved' takes the value 1 if respondents declared to be members (currently or currently and in the past) of at least one type of organisation or to have participated in any activity arranged by at least one type of organisation in the last 12 months and 0 if not so.

Social trust

Item wording: *Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you cant be too careful in dealing with people?*

This is a 0-1 scale in which 0 meant you cant be too careful and 10 most people can be trusted. In the survey conducted in Turin in 2014 this question was not asked, for this reason it is used for all other cities except the Moroccan-origin community in Turin.

Internal efficacy

Item wording: *To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 1. People like me definitely have an influence on governmental politics; 2. Sometimes politics is so complicated that people like me do not understand any more what is going on.*

This is an additive based on the level of agreement given to these statements. This question was not asked in the survey conducted in Turin.

External efficacy

Item wording: *To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 1. Parties are only interested in our votes, not in our opinion; 2. Members of Parliament do not care about people like me.*

This is an additive based on the level of agreement given to these statements. In Lyon, only the response to the first statement was available. As in the case of social

trust and international efficacy, the survey conducted in Turin did not include this
question.

Political interest

Item wording: *People's interest sometimes varies across different areas of politics. How
interested are you personally in each of the following areas? [country-level] politics and
[city-level] politics.*

This is a binary variable taking the value 1 for very or fairly interested in the
politics of the country of residence at the national or local level, and 0 for not very
or not at all interested in the politics of the country of residence. The variable la-
belled 'inthostpol' was recoded from the original ones on political interest at local
level and country level, with response categories very interested, fairly interested,
not very interested and not at all interested. In the questionnaire used in Brussels,
the response categories were in reversed order and an additional category was in-
cluded (i.e. Ni intéressé ni pas intéressé). In the recoding, I changed the order of the
categories as done in the other questionnaires and treated the additional category
'Ni intéressé ni pas intéressé' as another nuance of the category 'not very interested.

Non-electoral participation

Item wording: *There are different ways of trying to improve things in society or to help
prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you for such reasons
done any of the following?*

In all surveys conducted, with the exception of the questionnaire submitted in
Brussels, respondents were given the possibility to express their participation or
lack of participation in 13 different types of political action: (1) contacted a politi-
cian; (2) contacted a government or local government official; (3) worked in a po-
litical party; (4) worked in a political action group; (5) worn or displayed a badge,
sticker or poster; (6) signed a petition; (7) taken part in a public demonstration;
(8) boycotted certain products; (9) deliberately bought certain products for political
reasons; (10) donated money to a political organisation or group; (11) taken part in
a strike; (12) contacted the media; (13) contacted a solicitor or a judicial body for
non-personal reasons. In the survey conducted in Brussels, respondents were not
asked information on the following types of political participation: (a) contacted a
government or local government official; (b) worked in a political action group.

This is a binary variable based on these different forms of political action. It
takes the value of 1 if the individual has engaged in at least one of these forms
of political participation, and 0 if the respondent has not engaged in any form of
political participation.

D

CHAPTER 7: HOW ANTI-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES SHAPE THE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF MOROCCAN-ORIGIN RESIDENTS

Questions and variables

In this part of the appendix I report the exact question wording for the variables used in this chapter. This section contains the extended discussion of the decisions I made in constructing the variables. Actual question wordings are always in italics.

Gender

A binary variable taking value 1 for male and 0 for female.

Age

Item wording: *In which year were you born?*

This is a ratio variable that records the age of adult respondents. As pointed out in detail chapter 3, the surveys conducted in Turin and Brussels include only adult respondents, whilst those in carried out in Lyon, Barcelona, and Madrid included also a very small portion of minors. For the sake of comparability I consider only respondents who had achieved majority at the time of the survey.

On the basis of the suggestions of Leighley (1995), I also run regression analysis including the age variable in its quadratic form.

Education

Item wording: *What is the highest level of education you have achieved?*

For the surveys conducted in the cities of Lyon, Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid the original categories of answer are: (1) not completed primary education; (2) primary education or first stage of basic education; (3) lower level secondary education or second stage of basic education; (4) upper secondary education; (5) Post-secondary, non-tertiary education; (6) first and second stage of tertiary education.

For the survey conducted in the city of Brussels the secondary level education was collapsed into a single category: (1) not completed primary education; (2) primary education or first stage of basic education; (3) lower and upper level secondary; (4) Post-secondary, non-tertiary education; (5) tertiary education.

For the sake of comparability, I reduced the number of educational categories to 5 also for the respondents who were interviewed in Lyon, Turin, Barcelona, and Madrid, by collapsing the secondary level to one category only, as done in the survey carried out in Brussels.

From the original ordinal scale I then computed a variable ranging between 0 and 1. The variable was obtained by subtracting 1 from the original categories and dividing by 4.

Employment status

Item wording: *Which of these descriptions best describes your situation in the last seven days? Please, select only one.*

The response set was: (1) in paid work; (2) in education (not paid for by employer); (3) unemployed and actively looking for job; (4) unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for it; (5) permanently sick or disabled; (6) retired; (7) in community or military service; (8) doing housework, looking after children or other persons; (8) other.

A dummy variable labelled 'employed' was created that identified with a value of 1 those that had chosen category 1, and assigned a value of 0 to all other respondents.

Marital/partnership status

A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the individual is married or lives in partnership, and 0 for all other cases.

Has residence-country citizenship

This is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for respondents who have the citizenship of the country of residence and 0 for those who do not.

Proportion of years lived in the host country

This an interval scale variable indicating how many years the respondent has lived in the country. It was computed by taking into account the year when the interview took place and then dividing the number of years since arrival to the country of respondents by their age. This resulted into a scale ranging from 0 to 1. Individuals born in the country of residence were given a value of 1.

Fluency in language of country of residence

This is a binary variable taking the value 1 for respondents who speak the language of the country of residence and 0 for those who do not. The variable labelled 'language1' was computed on the basis of three questions: the languages the respondents considered as their native languages (up to three languages); the residence country language proficiency declared by the respondents: I do not speak residence country language, I speak a little the language of the residence country, I speak reasonably the language of the residence country, I speak fluently the language of the residence country, I speak the language of the residence country like my native language, the language of the residence country is my first language;

and the control of the host language proficiency declared by the respondent as reported by the interviewer. If the respondents declared that the residence country language is their native language I coded it as being their first language. For the survey conducted in Brussels I considered also Dutch speaking respondents. These variables were then dichotomized by collapsing the first two and the last two categories. The cases for which the respondents declared to speak well were checked with the interviewers report about language proficiency. Cases of declared fluency that do not match the interviewers report were excluded. As a result of this procedure, all Moroccan-origin individuals in the sample extracted in the city of Brussels spoke well the language(s) of the country of residence. For this reason, this variable is not used for the regression analysis on the Moroccan-origin community residing in Brussels.

Associational involvement

This is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for respondents who are involved in voluntary associations and 0 for those who are not. It measures membership or participation in associations except in Lyon, where information is available only on membership, because the question asked on participation was not limited to the last 12 months. I considered involvement in 18 types of association: (1) sports club or club for outdoor activities; (2) organization for cultural activities, tradition-preserving or any hobby activities (musical, dancing, animal breeding, etc); (3) political party; (4) trade union; (5) business, employers', professional or farmers' organization; (6) organization for humanitarian aid, charity or social welfare; (7) organization for environmental protection or animal rights; (8) human rights or peace organization; (9) religious or church organisation; (10) immigrants' organisation (that is, an organisation for the support or promotion of immigrants' interests, broadly defined); (11) [ethnic group] organization (an organization that primarily seeks the advancement of the ethnic/national-origin group); (12) anti- racism organization; (13) educational organization; (14) youth organization; (15) organization for the retired/elderly; (16) women's organisation; (17) residents', housing or neighbourhood organisation; (18) other organisation. The variable labelled 'involved' takes the value 1 if respondents declared to be members (currently or currently and in the past) of at least one type of organisation or to have participated in any activity arranged by at least one type of organisation in the last 12 months and 0 if not so.

Political interest

Item wording: *People's interest sometimes varies across different areas of politics. How interested are you personally in each of the following areas? [country-level] politics and*

[city-level] politics.

This is a binary variable taking the value 1 for very or fairly interested in the politics of the country of residence at the national and local level, and and 0 for not very or not at all interested in the politics of the country of residence. The variable labelled 'inthostpol' was recoded from the original ones on political interest at local level and country level, with response categories very interested, fairly interested, not very interested and not at all interested. In the questionnaire used in Brussels, the response categories were in reversed order and an additional category was included (i.e. Ni intéressé ni pas intéressé). In the recoding, I changed the order of the categories as done in the other questionnaires and treated the additional category 'Ni intéressé ni pas intéressé' as another nuance of the category 'not very interested.

Item wording: *How often would you say that you talk to family, friends or colleagues about...[city politics; residence-country politics; origin-country politics]*

I created also a composite measure of political interest based on the recommendations of Corbetta (2003, 134); the author suggests to include also behavioural indicators of interest in politics, like reading political news in papers or the Internet, or watching and listening to the news on TV and radio, or talking about politics, rather than relying exclusively on the answers given by respondents to the question of whether they are interested in politics,

This is binary variable taking the value 1 for individuals with very or fairly interested in the politics of the country of residence at the national and local level or individuals who talks regularly or almost everyday about politics, and and 0 for individuals who are not very or not at all interested in the politics of the country of residence, or individuals who talks never or rarely about politics. The variable labelled 'intalkhostpol' was recoded from the variable 'inthostpol', mentioned above, and the original ones measuring the frequency respondents talks to family, friends or colleagues about city politics and country politics, with response categories almost everyday, regularly, rarely and never. In the questionnaire used in Brussels, the response categories were in reversed order and the category 'regularly' was split into two different categories (i.e. Au moins une fois par semaine; Au moins une fois par mois). In the recoding, I changed the order of the categories as done in the other questionnaires and treated both categories as two different nuances of the category 'regularly.

Feelings of belonging

Item wording: *Now I would like to ask you how attached you feel to different places and groups of people. [CATI: In a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means no attachment at all and 10 means very strong attachment] How attached are you to [C. residence-country people] and*

[I. ethnic group].

On the basis of this scale I created two dummy variables: 'NatioIdent' and 'EthnoIdent'. The first variable takes values 1 for individuals who scored at least 7 in the 0-10 scale on the attachment to the residence-country people, and 0 otherwise. The second variable takes values 1 for individuals who scored at least 7 in the 0-10 scale on the attachment to the ethnic group, and 0 otherwise.

I then used these two variables to create the 4 different dummy variables: (1) NoidentGrp; (2) DoubleidentGrp; (3) EthnoIdentGrp; (4) NatioIdentGrp.

'NoidentGrp' refers to individuals who developed weak or no attachment for none of the two groups (i.e. national and ethnic). NoidentGrp equals 1, if respondents scored 0 simultaneously on 'NatioIdent' and 'EthnoIdent', meaning that they expressed a low level of attachment on the 0 to 10 scale to both questions.

'DoubleidentGrp' refers to individuals who developed strong attachment for both groups. If respondents scored 1 simultaneously on 'NatioIdent' and 'EthnoIdent' they are attributed a score of 1 on DoubleidentGrp, and 0 on all other variables (i.e. NoidentGrp, NatioIdentGrp, and EthnoIdentGrp).

'EthnoIdentGrp' refers to individuals who developed strong attachment for the Moroccan group only. If respondents scored 0 on 'NatioIdent' and 1 on 'EthnoIdent' they would be given a score of 1 on EthnoIdentGrp, 0 on all other variables (i.e. NoidentGrp, NatioIdentGrp, and DoubleidentGrp).

'NatioIdentGrp' refers to individuals who developed strong attachment for autochthonous group only. If respondents scored 1 on 'NatioIdent' and 0 'EthnoIdent' they would obtain a score of 1 on NatioIdentGrp, and 0 on all other variables (i.e. NoidentGrp, EthnoIdentGrp, and DoubleidentGrp).

Perceived discrimination

Item wording: *And have you personally felt discriminated because of your origin in the past 12 months?*

In the surveys conducted in Lyon and Turin this was the only question (Q15) asked on individual experiences of perceived discrimination. The grounds of discrimination covered by this questions relates to the overall 'ethnic origin' of the respondent. Hence the origin might include traits like skin colour, race, nationality, and religion.

Yet, in the surveys conducted in Madrid, Barcelona, and Brussels, this general question on discrimination was preceded by the following filter question:

"Do you consider yourself discriminated for any of the following reasons?"

A. Colour and race

B. Nationality and origin

C. Religion

D. Language

F. Age

G. Gender

H. Sexual orientation

I. Disability

J. Accent or region

Only those who ever felt discriminated for their nationality and origin (option B) were then asked whether they personally perceived discriminated on these grounds also in the last 12 months. Conversely, all other respondents who felt discriminated on other grounds, were not asked whether this experience of discrimination occurred also in the last 12 months.

In the surveys conducted in Turin and Lyon, there is a single question that is asked to all respondents—because it is not preceded by any filter question—and by using the word 'origin' the respondents were not asked to single out any specific trait of their migrant-origin origin (e.g. colour, race, nationality, religion) on the basis of which they felt personally discriminated. Lastly, the question could simultaneously capture whether the overall experience of discrimination occurred in the last 12 months.

In brief, although the same question (Q15) was asked across the different surveys, it played different roles, because in some cities (Turin and Lyon) it could capture experiences of discrimination on the basis of the overall ethnic origin of the respondents, whilst in the other cities (Brussels, Barcelona, and Madrid), this question could not capture the experience of discrimination respondents perceived on the basis of other relevant grounds of discrimination, such as religion, color or race. Hence, the overall experience of perceived discrimination felt by Moroccan-origin individuals residing in Brussels, Barcelona, and Madrid is underestimated.

Although the filter question relates to the experience of discrimination perceived throughout the life cycle whilst Q15 refers to the last 12 months only, in order to re-include in the computation of people who felt discriminated against because of their origin also those who perceived discrimination on the basis of their religion, gender, colour or race, and language, I used the information provided by the filter question included before Q15 in the surveys conducted in Brussels, Barcelona, and Madrid.

As a result of these considerations I created dummy variable labelled 'Discriminatedummy' taking the value 1 for respondents who felt discriminated against for their origin and 0 for those who did not.

For the sake of comparability, I also created a dummy variable—labelled 'discri'—-according to the same instructions used by the LOCALMULTIDEM research team, by relying exclusively on the information provided by Q15.

Political action repertoire: an index of overall participation

Item wording: *There are different ways of trying to improve things in society or to help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you for such reasons done any of the following?*

In all surveys conducted, with the exception of the questionnaire submitted in Brussels, respondents were given the possibility to express their participation or lack of participation in 13 different types of political action: (1) contacted a politician; (2) contacted a government or local government official; (3) worked in a political party; (4) worked in a political action group; (5) worn or displayed a badge, sticker or poster; (6) signed a petition; (7) taken part in a public demonstration; (8) boycotted certain products; (9) deliberately bought certain products for political reasons; (10) donated money to a political organisation or group; (11) taken part in a strike; (12) contacted the media; (13) contacted a solicitor or a judicial body for non-personal reasons.

In the survey conducted in Brussels in fact, respondents were not asked information on the following types of political participation: (a) contacted a government or local government official; (b) worked in a political action group. For the sake of comparability I excluded both variables from the final analysis, and created an outcome variable labelled 'polactrep'. I also created a secondary variable labelled 'polactrepi', which include also these two forms of political participation, but in this case the analysis with this outcome variable does not include the respondents in Brussels.

Similar types of political action like contacting have been considered as a unique form of political participation. For this reason I collapsed the following items: (1) contacted a politician; (12) contacted the media; (13) contacted a solicitor or a judicial body for non-personal reasons.

Yet in the case of the acts of boycotting certain products and buying products for political reasons, I have preferred to keep these political acts distinct. The acts of buying or refusing to buy a particular good or service fall both under the umbrella term of political consumerism. But are these really simply the other side of the coin or these is more to it? Boycotts are a protest based form of action that

rely heavily on a group with whom individuals share the same behaviour; for this reason this form of political participation has more similarities with marches and rallies. Conversely, buying a product for political reasons, a practice labelled also with the jargon term "buycott", is the reflection of individualistic ways of life (e.g. eating from certain sources, wearing specific clothes, travelling to certain countries but not to others) that we later project on the public sphere, by making sure to inform members of close or extended social circles. In support of this argument, Lisa Neilson (2010), provide other reasons in her study why it is more informative to keep these two political forms of action distinct, and explain how *boycotters* and *buycotters* differ in important ways in relation to the level of trust they have towards political institutions.

As a result of these decisions, the components of the additive scale are as follows: (1) Contacted a politician, media, solicitor or a judicial body for non-personal reasons; (2) Worked in a political party; (3) Worn or displayed a badge, sticker or poster; (4) Signed a petition; (5) Taken part in a public demonstration; (6) Boycotted certain products; (7) Bought certain products for political reasons; (8) Donated money to a political organisation or group; (9) Taken part in a strike. One point was given to each act. The outcome variable 'polactrep' runs from 0 to 9.

Dimensions of anti-discrimination policy

The overall score of anti-discrimination policy for each country is obtained by averaging the 4 dimension scores. Each dimension examines a specific aspect of the anti-discrimination policy and it relates to a specific question. Tables D.1, D.2, D.3, and D.4 presents the score for each dimension from 2007 to 2014, for all four countries under consideration.

1 Definitions and concepts:

   Are all residents protected from racial, ethnic, religious, and nationality discrimination?

2 Fields of application:

   Is racial, ethnic, religious, and nationality discrimination outlawed in all areas of life?

3 Enforcement mechanisms:

   Are victims of discrimination encouraged to bring forward a case?

4 Equality policies:

   Can all residents benefit from strong government commitments to equality and independent equality policies?

Table D.1.: Dimensions of Anti-Discrimination Policy - Belgium

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Definitions and concepts	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75
Fields of application	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Enforcement mechanisms	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75
Equality policies	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61

Source: MIPEX.

Table D.2.: Dimensions of Anti-Discrimination Policy - France

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Definitions and concepts	67	67	67	67	67	67	67	67
Fields of application	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Enforcement mechanisms	88	81	81	81	81	81	81	81
Equality policies	56	56	56	56	56	56	61	61

Source: MIPEX.

Table D.3.: Dimensions of Anti-Discrimination Policy - Italy

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Definitions and concepts	58	58	58	58	58	58	58	58
Fields of application	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Enforcement mechanisms	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75
Equality policies	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11

Source: MIPEX.

Table D.4.: Dimensions of Anti-Discrimination Policy - Spain

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Definitions and concepts	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
Fields of application	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
Enforcement mechanisms	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69
Equality policies	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28

Source: MIPEX.

Count Models

I employed the *countfit* function in Stata, written by Long and Freese (2014, 544-559), to compare the fit of four different count models: Poisson regression model (PRM), negative binomial regression model (NBRM), zero-inflated Poisson regression model (ZIP), and zero-inflated binomial regression model (ZINB) (see UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group).

The figures D.1 to D.5 highlight the residuals for each count model; residuals are the difference between the observed values and the predicted values, obtained using *countfit* function. Smaller residuals are indicative of good-fitting models, so the models with lines closest to zero were preferred.

As shown in figures, the distribution of the count variable 'political action repertoire', as the data were collected in the cities of Brussels, Turin, and Barcelona, is best modelled through a negative binomial regression model (NBRM). Instead, a zero-inflated binomial regression model (ZINB) is more appropriate for the data collected in the city of Lyon. Finally, a Poisson model (PRM) is the best choice for the data collected in Madrid.

I chose the most appropriate count model for each sample not only through the information provided by the residual plots, but also by considering a number of specific diagnostic tests and fit statistics (e.g. BIC, AIC, and Vuong test).

Figure D.1.: Residuals of Poisson regression model (PRM), negative binomial regression model (NBRM), zero-inflated Poisson regression model (ZIP), and zero-inflated binomial regression model (ZINB) - Moroccan-origin community residing in Brussels


Figure D.2.: Residuals of Poisson regression model (PRM), negative binomial regression model (NBRM), zero-inflated Poisson regression model (ZIP), and zero-inflated binomial regression model (ZINB) - Moroccan-origin community residing in Lyon

Figure D.3.: Residuals of Poisson regression model (PRM), negative binomial regression model (NBRM), zero-inflated Poisson regression model (ZIP), and zero-inflated binomial regression model (ZINB) - Moroccan-origin community residing in Turin

Figure D.4.: Residuals of Poisson regression model (PRM), negative binomial regression model (NBRM), and zero-inflated Poisson regression model (ZIP) - Moroccan-origin community residing in Barcelona

Figure D.5.: Residuals of Poisson regression model (PRM) and zero-inflated Poisson regression model (ZIP) - Moroccan-origin community residing in Madrid

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