A ONE WORLD ONE VOICE?: LIBYAN AFFAIRS COVERAGE BY ONE EUROPEAN AND THREE AFRICAN NEWSPAPERS; 1970-1986.

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by

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by

A. Abdullahi.

ABSTRACT.

This thesis basically proffers a critical reexamination of the debate on the New International Information Order. It mainly accosts two problematic issues viz; the faulty conceptual framework adopted by a majority of the Third World member countries of the Non-Aligned Movement Under the auspicies of UNESCO to address the problems of international communication, and secondly, the inability of researchers - as a result of the limitations imposed by the North vs South polarization of the debate and the Third World leader's pedestrian conceptualization of the problems at hand - to focus on the operations of the Third World media in order to arrive at much more comprehensive generalizations.

The starting point of this thesis is that it is not enough to concentrate on only one side of the coin. To fully understand the interconnections of neocolonialism and its symptomatic manifestations in the field of information and communication, we have to go beyond the polemical stance the debate and current research assumed. That is, it is not enough to accuse or heap all the blames on imperialism and neocolonialism. It is obvious most of the accusations levelled against the media of the advanced capitalist countries in their portrayal of the Third World countries are valid. But, to get to the roots of the problems i.e., the underlying causes of these problems at large, there is also a fundamental need to put the Third World media themselves under the same analytical microscope.

It is with this in mind that we set out to analyse how the African media cover and project African affairs, taking Libya as a case study. The rational behind this endeavour is that since the African states have been accusing the media of the capitalist countries of ill treatment by negatively portraying them, the African media would somewhat cover and portray other African states in a more positive manner, particularly in the period of the debate and in its aftermath. Our results suggests the opposite. That is, there is no fundamental difference in how Libya was covered and projected to the outside world by both the African media in our sample (The Nigerian Daily Times, The Tanzanian Daily News and The Nairobi Standard) and The Times of London in the period 1970-1986.

This we believe suggests that both the Third World media and the media of the advanced capitalist nations share some characteristics that makes them to operate along similar lines. They are to a certain extent, two sides of the same coin, which might suggest that, what we are confronted with in the field of international communication is a paradox of "a one world with a one voice" when it comes to the coverage of some contentious issues that threaten what is normally projected as the norm in society. Although these findings are tentative, we hope they will open avenues for further research in our efforts to fully understand the complexities not only of the information sector, but the whole institutional structures that underlie and give bearing to international relations, politics and economics.

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DEDICATION.

This thesis is dedicated to those it is concerned with; **the struggling peoples of the world.** A LUTA CONTINUA!!!

INTRODUCTION.

The demand for, and subsequent debate on the New International Information Order under the auspices of the Non-Aligned Movement and UNESCO, has been a major preoccupation of communication scholars and researchers from all works of life and different segments of the international community for the past one and a half decades. The basis of the debate was the Third World leaders' dissatisfaction with the then existing structures of dependency characterising their economies particularly in the fields of international economics and communication. To further consolidate and strengthen their earlier dissatisfaction with the existing imbalanced international economic arrangements that put them at a disadvantageous position, and initiated their earlier call for a New International Economic Order, a fresh call for a New International Information order was made.

This partains to the area of international communications and concerns all its antecedent cultaral, economic, political, and legal aspects. Issues relating to the dominance of the Western European countries in the means of collection and dissemination of information, control of communication infrastructure, dominance in the use of outer space for communication purposes, preferential allocation of broadcast frequencies, implications of direct satellite broadcasting, and most importantly the almost near total control the Western Countries exercise in the flow of

international information and news. Particularly, as it affects the direction and content of information flow from the advanced capitalist countries of Western Europe and North America to the Third World countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The Third World leaders pointed out the dominance exercised on international communication and information gathering and dissemination by the big international news agencies of Western Europe and North America. This situation they argued, reinforces the dependency structures that characterize the unequal symmetry of the contemporary international system. In the same vain, it was pointed out that the images of the Third World countries projected by the information produced, packaged and disseminated by the media of the advanced capitalist countries, is mostly negative and hence not only inimical to their developmental efforts, but also threatens their cultural autonomy.

These accusations formed the basis upon which subsequent discussions and debates ruminate in an attempt to bring forth evidence either in support of the Third World's position or, in contesting the validity of their claims. Two major positions emerged in this respect with the proponents of the new order arguing that the existing dependency relations that bind the Third World countries to the industrialized nations are to blame to the extent that, a proper understanding of the problem has to start from that basic premise. On the other hand, the opponents dismissed this premise that attempts to link problems of imbalance and negativity of international news to structural relations of dependency. Their basic argument is that there is no conspiracy on the part of the media of the advanced capitalist countries to deliberately project the Third World countries in bad light. What

is conspicuous they pointed out, is the apparent uniformity of journalistic practices all over the world. In the Debates surrounding the above two contending positions on the need to develop a New International Information Order, according to Hamelink,[1]

> both the proponents and opponents tend to reduce the concept of information to one category - news. The discussion is thus diverted into a relatively superficial analysis of problems (for example, whether journalists in Third World countries are adequately trained or whether existing international news agencies have the right percentage of Third World news). As more compromises are made, the focus has tended to drift away from profound changes in the international information order to emphasis on reform of the present system.

The recommendations forwarded by the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems - **The MacBride Commission** - basically contained all the above positions in what critics referred to as "a spirit of compromise".

The position adhered to here is that, in as much as the claims of the proponents of the New International Information Order were substantial, and to a large degree based on a valid postulate, the operational framework guiding the debate left a lot to be desired. This is partly because, the conceptual framework employed to inform the debate was fallacious. This conceptual framework assumes the possibility of solving the problems associated with international communication and information flow without recourse to a fundamental restructuring of the system that gave rise to these problems in the first instance. Associated with the above casuistry is the inability of research to focus on the

operations of the Third World media themselves with a view to explicating their operational framework and performance. Particularly, on how they cover and project Third World affairs, and how this relates to or diverge from how the same issues are treated by the media of the advanced capitalist countries. This kind of research we believe, is fundamental to the attainment of a more comprehensive picture on the operations of the international media with a view to advancing adequate solutions.

This is the task addressed in this thesis. That is to attempt a contribution in this field by looking at how the African media cover African affairs (Libya as a case study) and how this compares with a European newspaper coverage of the same issues. Secondly, the thesis also focuses on seeing whether or not the pattern of this coverage changed, particularly among the African media as a result of the debate on the New International Information order demanded by the leaders of these countries.

The first four chapters of the thesis basically attempted to put into context the theoretical positions as to the basis of capitalism as a system and the way and manner it grew out of its homeground and incorporated almost all the regions of the present Third World, and the consequences this expansion has for international communication and information flow which invariably followed along the lines of this capitalist expansion.

This theoretical excursion attempted in chapter one, to introduce the New International Information Order debate. In doing so, the adequacy of the conceptual framework adopted by the proponents of the debate in view of their location and immersion as a privileged class in the system they are questioning is contested. The second chapter further augmented the points raised in chapter one by attempting to locate and link the development and spread of information and communication infrastructure to the Third World countries to the process of international capitalist expansion.

The consequences of this historical fact are discussed in chapter three, in which it was argued that theoretical postulates in the 1950's and 1960's which tried to link the modernization drives of the newly independent states to availability and utilization of adequate communication and information dissemination infrastructure can not be divorced from some inherent interests of the international capitalist system in general. To drive this point home, chapter four presented the various arguments in the literature that tried to locate the functions of the media as a whole in the advanced capitalist countries in the region of ideological reproduction for the purpose of reaffirming a particular view of society and the social relations governing society. These arguments were extended to the international arena in which the non-application of these same theoretical tools in the analysis of the nature and function of international communication was pointed out. Chapter five basically presented the "nuts and bolts" of the methodology used in which brief resumes of both our media and nation samples were

presented.

Chapter six and seven consists mainly of the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the data and the presentation of the major findings. The last chapter is a conclusion in which the similarity of the operational framework of both the African newspapers and the Western European newspaper in the sample was pointed out in their coverage of Libya in the period under study. This is followed by a few number of suggestions for future research in the hope that the little contribution this thesis makes in the field will be taken-up and explored further.

CHAPTER ONE.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
INFORMATION ORDER DEBATE.

One of the most important contribution of Marxism to the understanding of present day society is its materialist conception of history.[1] This conception, which starts from the basic principle that production is the basis of every social order, asserts that in every society which has appeared in human history, the distribution of products, and with it the division of society into classes, is determined by what is produced, how it is produced and how the product is exchanged.

The development of human societies, therefore, right from the primitive, medieval, slave and feudal, to present day capitalist society, is governed by the relationships between means and forces of production and therefore, the relations of production. This relationship, according to historical materialism, is always contradictory in that the forces of production are always developing faster than the relations of production. For example, the bourgeois revolution that brought about the emergence of the capitalist system is based on the inability of the feudal system to deal with the contradictions that emerged from increased production as a result of an increase in the development of forces and means of production, while relations of production remained unchanged. That is a situation of increase in

surplus as a result of concentration of means of production while old forms of appropriation are still maintained. The bourgeoisie emerged to overthrow the feudal system which brought about anarchy in social production. They socialized production, but at the same time, individualized exchange and with it appropriation. This situation, in which individual capitalists solely appropriate the social product is according to Marx[2] a fundamental contradiction, from which arise all the contradictions in which present day society moves and which modern history bring to light.

Generally speaking, historical materialism allows us to understand and perceive the present day capitalist society as one riddled with socioeconomic contradictions based upon the dialectical relationship between ownership of the means of production and labour. Simply put, the relationship between capital and labour. This relationship, according to Marxist analysis, is contradictory and antagonistic. Fundamentally, it is an antagonism between the exploiters i.e., the capitalists and the exploited; the working classes. The exploiters, in this context as a class seek all the available means to them to consolidate their position and increase their property by extracting more surplus from the production process. This brings about the antagonistic relationship between labour and capital which, according to Marxist analysis, is the fundamental basis for the transformation of the capitalist society into a higher form, i.e. a socialist society through a revolution initiated and executed by the working class. This revolution, however, has not concretely materialised in modern history, at least not in terms of how

it was perceived by Marx himself. One contributory factor for this situation is, as pointed out above; that, the capitalist class try by all means to seek and utilize every available means at their disposal to see to it that they consolidate their position and defend their property.

One such means of maintaining the hegemony of the bourgeois class is the state apparatus. The state, according to Marx, appears only because of the existence of irreconcilable class antagonisms; and that the state does not exist in order to reconcile these contradictory class antagonisms and differences. (Lenin;1949.)[3] But, on the other hand, the state, should be seen as "an organ of class rule; an organ for the oppression of one class by another; it is the creation of "order", which legalizes and perpetuates this oppression by moderating the conflict between classes.[4] This viewpoint, is much more succinctly expounded by Engels in his work; **The Origin Of The Family, Private Property And The State**, (1894.)[5] in which he states that;

> the state is, therefore, by no means a power forced on society from without; just as little is it "the reason" as Hegel maintains. Rather, it is a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that is, it has split into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel. But, in order that these antagonisms, these classes with economic interests might not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, it become necessary to have a power, seemingly above society, that would alleviate the conflict and keep it within the bounds of "order; "and this power, arisen out of society but placing itself above it, and alienating itself more and more from it, is the state.

Accordingly, along with the state, arises a number of institutions, in this case, both legal and political i.e. social institutions, and with them prevailing systems of ideas corresponding to the economic structure of the society. These social institutions, and the system of ideas prevailing, will be such as to serve the maintenance of the prevailing mode of production, in this context, the capitalist mode of production. The modern capitalist society, according to this line of thinking can not survive without the existence of such institutions like the army, police, universities, legislature, and the media etc.; and their corresponding ideologies. (Cornforth;1982.)[6]

It is within this context; of the need for the capitalist system to resolve its inherent class contradictions and antagonisms in order to ensure its survival and growth that its late nineteenth century expansion which brought about the incorporation of the continents of Africa, Asia and Latin America into its folds through imperialism and direct colonialism can be fully understood and located. Also, and most importantly, all subsequent developments as a result of, or accruing from this process of the internationalization of capitalism and hence, capitalist relations must be seen, located, and analysed from this perspective of the inherent contradictions embedded in the system and the ability or otherwise of the system to contain them for its survival, particularly, in its international monopoly stage.

Late nineteenth century capitalism in Europe was riddled with problems resulting from the anarchical nature of social production in a capitalist system. The industrial revolution in Europe unleashed rapid developments in industrial production which

allowed for mass production of goods and services thereby generating more surplus. These developments which revolutionized production and hence advanced the means and forces of production however, did not affect or change the relations of production prevailing. Mechanization of agriculture has rendered masses of agrarian peasants landless, and hence forced them to be proletarianized and seek employment in urban industrial estates. This situation, created surplus labour which consequently implied that labour power and value has to fall and hence a dramatic reduction in the real incomes of the labourers. The resultant effect of these developments is that while the production of goods and services is dramatically accelerating, thus creating masses of surplus of goods and services in the market, the consumption capability of the population is drastically reduced due to a fall in the real incomes of workers as a result of surplus labour and the inherent drive of the capitalist to maximize profit by selling more and paying less for labour. The resultant effects of these developments are market gluts, unemployment and underemployment, poverty etc., which forced the capitalist system to look for alternative markets, new sources of cheap raw materials where labour is cheaper, thereby allowing for capital growth. This situation was succinctly, albeit, arrogantly expressed by Cecil Rhodes, one of the architects of British imperialism, after attending a rally in the East-End working class quarters of London, where he witnessed the anger of the working class; "that, to avoid a bloody civil war, Britain has no alternative but to become an imperialist." (Lenin;1982.)[7]

Generally speaking, the expansion of the capitalist system, which grew out of Europe to incorporate other regions of the

world, is to be seen as an attempt at partially resolving the crisis faced by the system at home. Associated with this expansion, is the planting of an alien socioeconomic system on societies which were at that time either operating on a different mode of production or at a one or another level of social transformation. The most important aspect to us here is that the transnationalization of the capitalist system also involves the exportation of all its institutional structure and arrangements both legal and political, and its underlining ideological setups to the colonized societies, and hence the reproduction of the same capitalist relations of production and class antagonisms. Although it has to be pointed out that the above mentioned process is generally gradual, it nevertheless is the ultimate for the survival of the system.

Just as capitalism was threatened by crisis at home due to contradictions inherent in it and has to move out or expand in order to partially solve these crises, capitalism in its international dimension was also faced with similar crisis resulting from the consequences of the capitalist first and second world wars. Particularly after the second world war, the metropolitan centers of capitalism were weakened economically, politically, and militarily to adequately deal with the imminent crisis erupting in the peripheries in the form of nationalist agitations for independence. Some of these nationalist agitations and movements of the post world-war two period, were not aimed at dismantling the basic structures of international capitalism, but rather, were centered on self rule and self government. In essence, most of the movements were basically political, racial, and nationalistic in outlook. Most of the leaders of these

movements generally do not question the fundamental problems of the capitalist system in its totality, but were merely opposed to alien rule and domination, and hence just want to replace the white man. (cf.Fanon;1963.)[8] The institutional framework of the capitalist system imposed on these societies is partially to blame for the outlook of the post world-war two nationalist leaders of the Third world. They have been socialized through education, political indoctrination, and acculturation to believe that there is no alternative but to continue in the same framework they find themselves in.

Faced with these new possible crises which, if unchecked, might lead to or cause disruptions in the world capitalist system, the colonial powers; the agents of capitalism, have to find a way of dealing with the crisis. Instead of allowing the nationalist movements to degenerate from their subtle and more or less impotent struggle for political independence into a more concerted, and articulated struggle for overall socioeconomic and political independence, most of the colonial powers decided to calmly grant nominal political independence to these nations. They were given their own flags, and national anthems; written for them by the departing colonialist; and the mantle to run their own affairs through constitutions written for them and protected by the same capitalist interests of Europe. In the words of Kwame Nkrumah, most of what happened was basically the granting of independence to these nations on a "silver platter." (Nkrumah;1963.)[9]

Nominal independence to some of the former colonies therefore, was a crisis management strategy which partially

arrested some of the possible distruptions that might have engulfed and affected the world capitalist system. This process of 'decolonization' therefore, acts as a buffer for the continuation of the relationships that are vital to the survival of the international capitalist system. In this case, epitomized by the mutation of colonialism into neocolonialism; a much more subtle but, decisive process of capitalist growth and expansion. In short, neocolonialism is a process that emerged as a result of the crisis management capability of the capitalist system just as is the case with its precedetator colonialism which came about as a result of the necessity to contain the crisis in the system at its homeground; Europe.

Central to these processes of eliminating or suffocating the contradictions of the system is the process of the formation of the middle class elites; the petit bourgeoisie; a process instrumental to and fundamental to the survival of the system. This is because, these middle class petit bourgeois elements act as a stabilizing factor in the process of capitalist dynamics. They share the same world outlook of the bourgeois class, and vehemently aspire to join the bourgeois class. This situation also constitute, dialectically, a source of crisis in the system. This is because, despite their aspirations, the petit bourgeoisie always find it difficult to transcend their class positions and advance to the bourgeois class because of the nature of the system. More importantly, the system is well equipped to deal with and cushion these intra class antagonisms, particularly, since the petit bourgeoisie are alienated from both the class above them and that below them. It is precisely within this context, that the call for the New International Information Order by the dependent

petit bourgeois elites of the dependent underdeveloped states of Africa, Asia, and Latin America who also, in all respects, are the political leaders of these nation states and at the same time the representatives; "the middlemen" of international monopoly capitalism will be looked at.

Attempting a characterization of the dependent bourgeoisie of the underdeveloped countries, Ledda; [1967][10] outlines five main groups of these "compradore" bourgeoisie who function as "middlemen" for the large foreign trading firms. These include;

> Indigenous entrepreneurs, a bureaucratic bourgeoisie emerging from the nationalist elites, and including both new political leadership's and former state functionaries; local planters, and feudal landlords. In some cases, he points out; these groups merge and become, in fact, a single capitalist class. But such a class cannot be regarded as a "national bourgeoisie" in the sense of a national force capable of producing a high level of development of a country's productive forces on the basis of its own choices. The African bourgeoisie, is tied, body and soul to foreign capital, and its interests cannot exist or be defended independently.(emphasis added)

This situation is more compounded by the emergence of, or more appropriately, the existence of an objective contradiction between the process of surplus extraction and appropriation from the peripheral nation states by international monopoly capital, and the desire of the compradore bourgeoisie of these nation states to establish an independent base for the internal appropriation of their resources and also for the reproduction of capitalist relations of production. (Mafeji;1977.)[11]

1:1   THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT AND THE NEW

INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION ORDER.

The call for a New International Information Order and the New International Economic Order which preceeded it, by the leaders of the underdeveloped states under the umbrella of the Non-Aligned Movement, can be linked to the above objective contradictions existing and which characterized the relationship between international capitalist interests and the interests of the local elites pertaining to the process of surplus appropriation.

Most of the nationalist movements of the 1950's and 1960's shared a unitary (mis)conception of the problems of their nation states and the best way of resolving these problems. They tended to believe that by obtaining political independence, they can be able to map-out their destiny economically, politically, and socially. Even the revolutionary among them like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, tended to believe and exhort that the struggle should aim at "seeking the political kingdom first" and everything else will follow. (Nkrumah; 1963.)[12] This compartmentalized conceptualization of the process of decolonization, in which politics, or political power, is seen by most nationalist leaders to be the major framework from within which problems of neocolonialism and underdevelopment can be resolved and possible solutions arrived at, characterized how dependency issues are looked at from independence to date. The formation of the Non-Aligned Movement in the early 1950's is directly connected with this current of thinking.

It is pertinent at this juncture, to point out that there is a very strong demarcation in the ideological stance and praxis of what can generally be referred to as the post-world war nationalist movements which pervaded in most colonies and the less frequent social revolutionary regimes that emerged in Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique etc, and related protracted internal uprisings against white settlers in Algeria, Kenya and present-day South Africa. In as much as the majority of the nationalist movements can be said to be some form of ambivalent nationalist uprisings whose main preoccupation is the attainment of an obscure political independence with a view to establishing and consolidating state capitalist formations; the social revolutionary movements paid more attention to the dismantling of the exploitative capitalist relations of production and with it the entire system in all its manifestations. The above political ambivalence therefore is much more a feature of states emanating from the perspectives of the nationalist movements rather than that of the social revolutionary regimes, and to a certain extent constitute the major positions of the early members of the Non-Aligned Movement.

It is not surprising therefore that the Non-Aligned Movement was conceived as an alternative to the military alliances of the post-world-war superpowers within the context of cold-war politics and political alignment. The newly emergent states felt that by "ganging-up" together they could form a strong political force to be reckoned with, and thereby, influence international affairs and politics. The movement had its roots in the conference of developing countries of Africa and Asia held in Bandung, Indonesia, on April 18, 1955, which, six years later, led to the

formal establishment of the group of Non-Aligned Nations during its conference of Heads of States in Belgrade, in 1961, where they met to discuss;

> ways and means by which their peoples could achieve fuller economic, cultural, and political cooperation in order to secure their own independence. Particularly, at a time during which the cold war polarised the world into two antagonistic blocs. (Jankowitsch and Sauvant;1978.)[13]

The main preoccupation and criteria of membership was and still is, with "Non-Alignment",[14] with either of the super powers. This criteria however, does not mean to signal a passive role in world politics by the Non-Aligned Nations. Rather, the states involved "aimed at formulating their own independent positions that reflect their interests and conditions as militarily weak and economically underdeveloped countries. (Jankowitsch et.al;1978.)[15] Their main objectives include, self determination, non-adherence to multilateral military pacts, disarmament, and non-interference in the internal affairs of states.

Although there was a concern with the economic problems of their countries since the Bandung conference, which was also reiterated at Cairo in 1962, the main focus of attention of the movement in the late 1950's and early 1960's, was on decolonization, non-interference, and disarmament. According to Jankowitsch and Sauvant, this "reflected directly the preoccupation of the members of the movement to consolidate and ensure their political independence."[16] In reality, it is after some of the factors threatening the political positions of some of the leaders of these states have receeded to the background by the

end of the 1960's, through the emergence of more nominally independent states, that economic issues emerged to the forefront. Fundamentally, the failure of the United Nations Development Decade, of the 1950's and 1960's, which was accompanied by drastic decline in financial aid to these nation states; was much more instrumental for the emergence of the call for a New International Economic Order.

It was not until 1973, almost a decade and a half after the formation of the movement and exactly a decade after the formation of the Group of 77 in 1963 which first introduced that the issue of a New International Economic Order was concretely analysed at the fourth conference of the Heads of State of the Non-Aligned Nations held in Algeria. The Algiers conference can be seen to be the beginning of the North-South dialogue in which the ruling class of the Third World are demanding for a New International Economic Order. This call, at the initiative of Algeria, led to the Sixth Special Assembly of the United Nations to come out with two important resolutions; viz; on the need for the establishment of a NIEO, and the programme for action required as a springboard towards the New International Economic Order. (Adebayo;1983.)[17] This was followed by the 1976 Nairobi United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD IV) which further elaborated on the issue. Central to the debate were issues of aid, trade, technology transfer, monetary reform, debt problems, the role of transnational corporations, and above all, the Integrated Programme For Commodities, (IPC) which seeks to deal with the problem of primary commodity price fluctuations.[18]

Just as the NIEO was treated as secondary during the 1950s
and 1960s, when the attention of the ruling class of the Third
World was focused on consolidating their political positions; so
was the issue of the New International Information Order (NIIO)
which was submerged during the NIEO debates.

The NIIO debate can be said to be intrinsically present in
the discussions of the Non-Aligned Movement since the early days
of their formation. The rudiments of the debate can be said to
emanate from such philosophies that underlined the early
Pan-African, Pan-Asian, and Negritude movements. Concretely,
however, the NIIO debate started as a counter-current to the
concept of the "Free Flow Of Information"; a concept introduced
into international discourse by the United States's post war
policy. [cf.Schiller;1984][19] This concept found its expression and
universal support in its incorporation in article 19 of the United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which
states that; "the right to freedom of opinion and expression
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media
and regardless of any frontiers."[20] This was further reinforced by
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966,
which, stipulates that the right to freedom of expression;[21]

> comprises of the freedom to seek out, to
> receive and to communicate information
> and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
> frontiers, whether oral, printed, or
> artistic form, or by any other means of
> individual's choice.

By the late 1960's and early 1970's, tangible evidence was
brought forward to argue that the so-called "free flow" of

information concept was nothing more than a "one way flow". And hence, the need to reformulate the principle upon which it was based to guarantee "a free and balanced flow" of information. (UNESCO;1980.)[22] However, it was not until 1973, at the fourth conference of the Non-Aligned Nations which took place in Algiers that, a comprehensive normative declaration was made which tried to locate the problem of international communication within the realm of the dependent structures of these nation states. Article 14 of this declaration states that;[23]

> it is an established fact that the
> activities of imperialism are not
> confined solely to the political and
> economic fields but also cover the
> cultural and social fields, thus imposing
> an alien ideological domination over the
> peoples of the developing world.

This formed the beginning of the debate on the New International Information Order which dominated the 1970's particularly, under the auspices of a commission formed by Unesco under the chairmanship of Sean MacBride which was entrusted with the responsibility of looking at the overall problems of communication in the world. Without retracing the steps taken by this debate over the years, the major themes on which the debate was based can easily be summarised. These include the observation that few Western European and North American based news agencies exercise a monopoly over the means of information gathering and dissemination. Secondly, that the technologically powerful countries exploit their advantages through these transnational news agencies, to exercise a form of cultural and ideological domination which jeopardizes the national identity of other nations. Thirdly, that the image of the developing countries presented by the media of the powerful, technologically advanced

nations is frequently distorted, and falsified. more importantly, it is argued that, it is this same image, which is harmful to their balance, that is presented to the developing countries themselves. Later in the discussion, issues of content and the quality of the information transmitted together with the awareness of the lag in news production and dissemination in the developing countries was brought to bear on the debate. (Unesco;1980.)[24]

According to the MacBride report, this is in essence, how the call for the "new order" as distinct from the "old order" in the field of information and communication came into being, because;[25]

> the feeling that such a new order is
> today a necessity, stems from the
> conviction that information and
> communication are an essential factor of
> international relations in all fields and
> particularly, in the establishment of a
> new system founded on the principle of
> equality of right and the independence
> and unfetted developments of countries
> and peoples

What then is this "old order" that has to be dismantled, and what is the "new order" that is envisaged by the leaders of the Third World? Most importantly, how do they propose to go about achieving this new order"?

At the economic level, based on the NIEO debate and discussions, the old order is characterized as one in which there is a constant deterioration in the economic conditions of the underdeveloped countries, with an ever widening gap between them and the industrialized countries. This is compounded by the failure of the first and second United Nations Development Decades to achieve any substantial results. Similarly, it was pointed out

that the old order is one in which there is an increasing instance of infringement on the sovereignty of states. Secondly, there is the neocolonialist exploitation of these countries by transnational corporations in particular, and the existence of inadequate internal structures in these countries exharbated by restrictions imposed by certain industrialized nations in regards to the implementation of the international development strategy.[26] All these, it is argued, perpetually worsened the situation of the underdeveloped countries within the context of the "old order".

At the level of culture and information, the underdeveloped countries posited that the old order, is one in which the "present global information flows are marked by serious inadequacy and imbalance".[27] The means of communication and information, it is said, are concentrated in few countries. This situation results in the great majority of countries reduced to passive recipients of information which is disseminated from a few centers. The argument goes further to point out that, the situation perpetuates the colonial era of dependence and domination, and hence tends to retards the achievements of political and economic growth of the Third World. This also, tends to erode their unity and their efforts to safeguard their political and economic independence and stability.[28]

The new order proposed, in both fields of information and economics, is one which will eliminate in the economic sphere, neocolonialist exploitation and hence close the widening-gap between the Third World countries and the industrialized nations. Also, this new economic order, should be founded on equity and capable of redressing the flagrant inequalities of the present

system.

According to Mustapha Masmoudi, [1978][29] Secretary of State for Information of Tunisia, and a leading advocate and proponent of these debates;

> The New International Economic Order can be achieved through joint action by (both) the developing and industrialized countries in all fields of economic and social life. The aim was in particular, to set-up machinery to ensure price stability of raw materials and the granting of official development aid of a nature to improve the standards of living in the Third World populations which, tomorrow, might constitute new markets for the industrialized countries.

Concomitantly, at the level of information, the perceived new order is, according to Masmoudi,[30] one that is both "logical and natural" and seen as an imperative need, even an obligation;

> This new order is designed to institute a relationship of equality in place of the present one between those who dominate and those dominated. It will be illustrated by a free and balanced flow of information organized in respect for the principles of the United Nations charter concerning the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.

The realization of this order Masmoudi contends, involves the consolidation and development of established structures, particularly among the Non-Aligned Nations, while at the same time, helping, in cooperation with the developed nations and international organizations concerned, to establish communication media, to train qualified personnel and to acquire suitable materials and equipment in the spirit of self reliance.[31]

It is evident from the foregoing that, the whole debate is located within a particular conceptualization of the problems of international dependency in which, the overall system of international capitalism is not questioned, but rather some aspects of it. The ruling class of the Third World in general, are not so much interested in dislocating their countries from the grasps of capitalism, but rather, prefer to use their so-called newly acquired political power, especially, under the auspices of the Non-Aligned Movement, to solicit for more leverage in their activities as "middlemen" of the international capitalist system. As Hamelink pointed out, "the discussion was extracted from the context of international dependency relations and the need for a fundamental reordering of these relationships. (Hamelink;1980.)[32]

The whole debate was underlined by a positivistic and functionalist conception of society in which the international system is seen as an "abstract" world characterized by "interdependence" and the need for all sectors concerned to work together towards achieving an ideal stable international society; an "order" that will benefit all mankind. This conceptualization according to Nordenstreng; [1980.][33]

> helps to maintain a reasoning where the world has been artificially compartmentalized according to international political cross- currents which again easily serves an ideological distortion of the true nature of reality.

Central to this compartmentalization of historical reality and social processes, is the dislocation of the problems of imperialism in general, which characterized the economic, sociocultural, and political situations in the Third World and the

relocation of these problems within the realm of international politics and bipolar political alignments, i.e.; the North-South political arrangements.

This situation results in positing the problem as the solution. This atomic and reductionist perspective asserts that if the Third World is lagging behind in economic growth, or lacks efficient communication structures, the North, blessed with these facilities, should be called upon to help the Third World. This is why we find such concepts as "fair", "equitable" and "balanced flow" of information, saturating the whole debate. This "integrationist" model advocated by the ruling class of the Third World according to Hamelink, [1980.][34] leads to the assumption that;

> "imbalances" in international information exchange are the real problems that can be solved by having dependent countries participate more fully in the exchange through an improved transfer of capital, technology and know-how. "Balance" is then likely to be measured against the scope and technical quality of contributions from the metropolis.

This is why the developed countries tacitly accepted the call for the New International Information Order because, it reduces the problems of international information flow to quasi issues of transfer of professional know-how, and technology, which clearly fits into their own interests. This acceptance, is aptly described by Nordenstreng (1980.)[35] as "a strategic design geared towards achieving a stage of mutual accomodation in a spirit of compromise". It is in all respects, a welcomed legitimation of capitalist market expansion.

It is this integrationist model that we take as our point of departure. The main position here is that, the "world" is much more of a "company town", or a "corporate village" than a "global village". (Idris-soven;et.al;1978); (Hamelink;1983); and (McLuhan;1968)[36] Also, to fully understand the role of communication and information in perpetuating exploitative relations of production in dependent capitalist societies, there is first and foremost, the need to reconceptualize the problem by fully locating it within the context of the dynamics of international monopoly capitalism. That is to say, the problems associated with the dependent societies have to be seen within the context of capitalist relations of production in which they are located historically. Instead of dichotomizing and simplifying the situation as that of North-South political polemics, the issues should be seen as located and emanating from a unitary system of international monopoly capital. To this extent then, even the role of information, and communication in general has to be explained within the context of the dynamics of this system.

The next chapter will attempt an historical analysis of the process of the incorporation of the Third World into the world capitalist system and the role information played in the process, and thereof.

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13. Jankowitsch, O. and K.P.Sauvant; (eds.) The Third World Without Superpowers:The Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries; vol.1,2,3 &4 Oceana Publ. N.Y. 1978; pxxi.

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15. Jankowitsch,et.al; op.cit; pxxxii

16. Ibid; piviii.

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            1968; for a discussion of the characterisation of
            the world according to these perspectives.

CHAPTER TWO.

INFORMATION AND IMPERIALISM:

AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.

The underdeveloped countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America are today plagued by socioeconomic malaise and chaos that no amount of description could adequately paint an overall picture of the realities existing. However, it is possible to point out some of the symptoms that characterize the root causes of the problem. These countries are the poorest in the world with the majority of their populace living well below the poverty datum line, resulting in hunger, disease, inadequate or non existing medical care, and facilities, and inadequate or disarticulated social services. Associated with these are problems of blatant socioeconomic inequality, and political instability. What then is the root cause or causes of these contradictions?.

Current thinking and academic discourse by both liberal, Marxist, and neo-marxist and petit-bourgeois intellectuals alike, tend to agree in general that the root causes of the problems stifling the underdeveloped countries can be explained by way of their historical incorporation into the world capitalist system. The way and manner this phenomenon; generally referred to as imperialism with its later variants in the form of colonialism and neocolonialism; is explained and accounted for, and how this phenomena accounts for the present day socioeconomic and political nature of these societies, greatly differ from one point of view

to another. The intention in this chapter is to attempt an historical analysis of the process of the incorporation of the underdeveloped countries into the world capitalist system and the role or location of communication in the process.

So much has been written about, and on imperialism that what follows here is merely an attempt to synthesize those arguments applicable to this thesis. On the other hand, very little has been systematically done to relate communication activities in the late nineteenth century with the European capitalist expansion of the same period. The little done tended to either account for, in an ahistorical manner, the development of communication facilities of the period and see them just as "follow-ups"; or consequences of the industrial drives of the period. There was little attempt to concretely link and locate these means of communication as central to the dynamics of the world capitalist system of the period. An attempt will be made to redress this anomaly.

Imperialism, like any other phenomena that finds itself under the "microscope" of the social scientist, was subjected to as many interpretations and analyses as the number of "accepted leading theorists" of the time. However, to those who experienced what imperialism really was, they have no doubt in their minds and body as to what it means, or what it is; their is no controversy. As one Latin American pointed out; (Galeno;1971.)[1]

> Imperialism first makes its subjects ill, and then it constructs the hospitals in which the patient lies imprisoned and without any possibility of being cured... it is a vicious circle of strangulation; amortizations, interests, dividends, and other services also increase. (sic) In order to make these payments, new injections of capital that generate

greater obligations are needed, and so on successively.

The most influential discussions on imperialism can, for the sake of analytical convenience, be categorized under three main headings, viz; the socio-psychological, liberal reformist, and Marxist. These categories are just for heuristic purposes and hence, in no way exhaustive of the various strands of arguments and positions that enriched the discourse on late nineteenth century capitalist expansion.

The most influential positions under the above categories are those of Joseph A. Schumpeter (1919),[2] J. A. Hobson (1902),[3] Marx (1859,1867,1885),[4] Lenin (1917),[5] and Luxemburg (1913),[6] respectively. We will start with Schumpeters polemics because, despite being the weakest of all the early interpretations of, and analyses offered on late nineteenth century capitalist expansion, the potential political implications his theory of imperialism contains, necessitate that it should not be glossed over.

Schumpeter's position is that late nineteenth century capitalist expansion should be seen as a part of "imperialisms" in general. This according to him is because, imperialism was and still is, an "atavism"; the result of culturally rooted and inherited political and social attitudes which hung on from a previous stage when they had a justifiable existence. (Schumpeter; 1961.)[7] The main purpose of his essay titled; **Imperialism And Social Classes (1951)**[8] was to repudiate any claims that attempted to link imperialism to any form of economic motives, or for that matter, any politico-economic explanations as to the causes, nature, and consequences of the internationalization of capital

which incorporated almost three quarters of the globe under its aegis.

In place of economic interpretations, Schumpeter offered the classical bourgeois socio-psychological approach to explaining socioeconomic and political issues by way of the psychological composition of individuals or groups of individuals. According to this line of argument, the socioeconomic nature of a society is not to blame, but the individuals who make up that society; its "human nature", simple. This can be easily gleamed from his definition of imperialism which he stated is; "the objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion." (in Wright [ed] 1961)[9] Positing his arguments against explanations of imperialism as caused by the dynamics, and the inherent characteristics of the capitalist mode of production, Schumpeter,[10] pointed out that;

> If only it is kept in mind that customary
> modes of political thought and feelings
> in a given age can never be mere
> "reflexes" of, or counterparts to, the
> production situation of that age. Because
> of the persistence of such habits, they
> will always, to a considerable degree, be
> dominated by the production context of
> past ages. Hence, imperialism as an
> atavism.

His argument here is that in all human societies, certain psychological instincts of individuals, tend to dominate and if consolidated into coherent forms, like in warrior societies, these traits, have the tendency to persist and keep on reappearing even if that society has progressed and developed into a different social order altogether. He gave the example of ancient Egypt as a society built on and organized around socio-psychological warrior

traits and instincts, and which, even after changing into a new social organization, had to be confronted with these past "atavistic" warlike instincts. To the extent that it had to continue to find outlets for these tensions for the sake of its political stability; hence, "objectless" expansionist tendencies.

Schumpeter insists that there is ample historical evidence to show the unquestionable fact that "objectless" tendencies towards forcible expansion, without definite, utilitarian limits; that is non-rational and irrational, purely instinctual inclinations towards war and conquest; play a very large role in the history of mankind.[11] Explanations of imperialism therefore, should be found in the vital needs and situations that molded people and classes into warriors. That is, if they wanted to avoid extinction, these peoples have to fall back on psychological dispositions and social structures acquired in the dim past. This led him to conclude that;[12]

> Imperialism is thus atavistic in character. It falls into that large group of surviving features from earlier ages that play such an important part in every concrete social situation. In other words it is an element that stems from living conditions, not of the present, but of the past; or put in terms of economic interpretation of history, from past rather than present relations of production. It is an atavism in the social structure, in individual psychological habits of emotional reaction.

His main reason for arriving at the above conclusions as to the nature of and form of imperialism, is that a purely capitalist society is a rational society which will not offer fertile grounds for imperialist tendencies, since according to his arguments

above, imperialism is irrational, and purposeless. Secondly, he argued that capitalism in its modern form, has the capacity to absorb any excess energy that might be motivated by individual psychological traits through competition, in that, any excess energy will be poured into industry. And lastly, he argued that, capitalism by its very nature, needs stability to function and grow to the extent that expansion of the capitalist system as is epitomized by the late nineteenth century developments, should not be regarded as mere purposeless wars of expansion.[13]

In general, Schumpeter's discourse on imperialism is utterly subjective in that, what he offers is a truncated account of what imperialism is, and what causes it. More appropriately, an analysis which focuses on the internal compulsions of societies to expand with no account of what the object or goal of this expansion is. All what is offered is a definition of a process in which, according to Murray Green; (1961)[14]

> one is immediately struck by how much is excluded by the definition. All instances in history or prehistory of expansion for the purpose of obtaining fertile lands, grazing areas, hunting grounds, precious minerals, plunder, tribute, and taxes, slaves, colonizing areas, or for commercial advantages are automatically excluded. Also excluded, and most important for the purpose of all modern times, is expansion for the purpose of acquiring industrial raw materials, markets, capital investment areas, and cheap labour power.

One can also argue along these lines that, even the classic case of Egypt that Schumpeter heavily relied upon, was not and could not be solely explained by reference to warrior instincts alone. Egypt of the period referred to was a fully organized

civilization which, because of the development of writing, gave rise to a fully organized bureaucratic structure which, has to rely on forced taxes and tribute to maintain its government machinery. Also, since taxes were dependent on overall productivity of the society, the state has to encourage and defend its emergent merchants by sending armies to open-up trading routes for its citizens by way of annexations and political annihilation, especially during the Trans-Saharan trade which, besides military force, also utilized religion as a basis for subjugating most nations along the trading routes.

By dislocating the nineteenth century capitalist expansion from any form of socioeconomic and political discourse and locating the causes of imperialism on some individual psychological forces from the distant past that keep reappearing to haunt modern capitalist societies, and which, because of their persistence, or "atavistic" nature have to be mediated through politics for the well being of the society at large, Schumpeter, has in all respects, given his tacit acceptance and approval of the capitalist order. This is because, the ultimate political implications of his theory of imperialism is one which is favourable to the status quo and for which it provides a theoretical defence, and a vindication. That is its only value, and the reason why it should not be taken lightly. Besides that, it has very little to offer us as far as the understanding of the phenomenon of imperialism and its consequences is concerned.

Quite distinct to Schumpeter's subjective social psychological interpretation of imperialism, the next positions to be discussed, all offer one or another form of economic

interpretation of imperialism. Both positions were concerned with providing economic evaluations of the immediate needs which drove capitalism into political action. Their general contention was that most European states of the late nineteenth century, were driven to expand and acquire overseas territories to be sure of having the vital raw materials needed to feed their rapidly growing industrial complexes. Secondly, these states badly needed new markets for the products of their industries which produce much more goods and services than could profitably be sold at home. Thirdly, there is the need to find undeveloped areas for investments in order to absorb the great amounts of capital which had accumulated in the form of profits from industrial and financial concerns.

Despite the apparent unity in their general discourse as to the nature of, and the underlining causes of imperialism, the liberal positions represented here by Hobson, fundamentally diverge from the general Marxist positions of Lenin, and Luxemburg, both drawing on Marx, as to just how these economic forces requiring overseas expansion under capitalism "force" or "induce" the governments of these nations to seek it, and how these forces are related to the social structure as a whole. (Wright;1961.)[15] It should be noted however, that the above observation by Wright is much of an over-generalization in that Lenin himself admitted to relying on Hobson for the evidence he produced of the relations between British imperial policies and capitalist exports in his **Imperialism; The Highest Stage of Capitalism**, (1917) (see his selected works, 1970 p671 for this acknowledgment). But then it can also be argued that Lenin scarcely owe anything to Hobson from a theoretical point of view

considering the fact that he explicitly repudiated Hobson's theoretical perspective.

In his book; Imperialism: A Study,(1902) J.A.Hobson argued that "imperialism" together with such developments as the aggressive militarism, the growing monopolies, and the new protective tariffs in the European nations at the time, were to a great extent, the result of financial weaknesses in the capitalist system. "Financial leaders desired to expand overseas because of their wish to invest more profitably their surplus capital." (Hobson, in Wright;1961.)[16]

As a liberal theorist, Hobson did not see or accept the contention that imperialism was an inevitable product of capitalism; a necessary response to the internal contradictions generated by the capitalist mode of production. Rather, he argued that the "new imperialism was a response to certain maladjustments within the contemporary capitalist system which, given "proper will", could be corrected". (Cohen;1974.)[17] To a large extent, his theory of imperialism is based on the nineteenth century doctorine of the declining tendency of the rate of profit on capital. The assumption is that the rate of profit in capitalist societies tend to fall over the long term. The reasons for this tendency; generally referred to as the underconsumption hypothesis, is that highly developed capitalist economies simply tended to produce more than they could consume.

The root cause of this tendency therefore, was the inadequate purchasing power of workers. Labour was not paid enough by its capitalist employers to buy all the goods and services produced at

any given time. And, since any individual's capacity to consume is limited, much of that income would be savaged. But, on the other hand, capitalists could be expected to seek to maintain the level of output of their industrial complexes owing to the force of competition in the market place. Ultimately, there would be a tendency to oversaving and overproduction, and consequently, a decline in the rate of profit over time.

Despite Hobson's perception that this tendency may be one of the obvious reasons for the expansion of capitalism overseas through imperialism, in order to find new market outlets for this underconsumed products, he did not accept that politically it was the only solution or the most profitable to the system. He argued that instead of imperialism, the system could have been better off raising the level of income of the workers. Simply, Hobson advocated for a redistribution of income.

This liberal bourgeois reformism of Hobson led him to posit that the "new imperialism had been bad business for the nation at large, but only benefiting certain classes and certain traders within the nation".[18] His position is that certain classes of individuals, i.e. the capitalist, use the state to intervene on their behalf through the use of public resources and funds on armaments, costly wars, and public works in form of railways, canals, and communication facilities in colonized societies so as to further the interests of these classes. He supports his position by presenting data to show that the bulk of "benefits" Britain enjoyed from the imperialist debacle was more on returns on investments rather than on simple commodity trade. This tend to dispute the arguments brought forward in support of simple trade

as being the cause of imperialism. The "taproot" of imperialism, he contends, is as a result of "improvements of methods of production, concentration of ownership and control, accentuated by the direct influence exercised by great financial houses in "high politics", supported by their control over the body of public opinion through the press."[19]

Generally, the strength of Hobson's theory of imperialism, is in its multidimensional approach in which, besides locating the root causes of the process within the realm of the economic contradictions of the capitalist system at large, it also incorporates the political, social, and ideological issues that, taken together, could throw more light on the process of imperialism in general. His main problems however, are based on his liberal, and pacifist conceptual framework which presumed that the contradictions of the system could be corrected given proper will. He ended up painting a pessimistic picture of imperialism in which the very financial powers of the interests connected with imperialism, are seen to corrupt public life, thwart democratic institutions, dominate and control sources of information and even penetrate and contaminate academic institutions. As Kemp (1967.)[20] aptly pointed out;

> Hobson accepts the validity of private profit and other property incomes and this leads to a contradiction which can only be resolved by moral appeal for a reform of capitalism. And this appeal is all the more weaker because it is made within the framework of capitalism.

As against Hobson's position above, Marxist analysis generally, see imperialism as a necessary and inevitable outcome of the inherent contradictions characterizing the advanced

capitalist system. Imperialism is a necessary precondition for the survival of the capitalist system as a whole. As Magdoff (1969.)[21] asserts; "Imperialism is not a matter of choice for a capitalist society; it is the way of life of such a society."

The problematic for Marxist analysts therefore, was not so much on answering the why, but also the how questions. As Marx puts it, "a theory of imperialism and any other theory for that matter, must be a means not merely for understanding the world but also of changing it". (in Kemp;1967.)[22] Although Marx himself did very little on the question of imperialism apart from some few newspaper articles on India and Northern Ireland, his analysis of the dynamics of the capitalist system form the starting point for most subsequent attempts by Lenin, Luxemburg, and others to answer both the why and how questions on imperialism.

Marx started his analysis of the capitalist societies from the then prevalent views of the then classical economists like Ricardo and Adam Smith which, he made his point of departure. Starting with the doctorine of the declining rate of profit, Marx explained that the problem was with the "rising organic composition of capital."[23] This he contends, refers to the increasing share of physical plant and equipment (constant capital) and the decreasing share of payments to labour (variable capital) in the total cost of production (total capital).[24] Simply put, capitalists were driven by technological advancements as well as the competitive nature of the market place to reinvest profits continually in new physical capital i.e. machinery. Accumulated capital however, could not create economic value. Only labour could create value and therefore profit. Accordingly, as total

capital increasingly took the form of constant capital, and less the form of variable capital, which was the source of all profit, profit necessarily had to fall. Profit in this context is defined as the difference between what workers were paid and the value of what they produced i.e., "surplus value".

It is on this basis, of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall over time in capitalist societies, coupled with the tendency of workers to be exploited through the expropriation of their surplus labour value by the owners of the means of production, that Marx based his assertion of the inherent contradictory nature of the capitalist societies; a contradiction which must be resolved if the system is to survive. Both Lenin and Luxemburg took over from this point to show that imperialism was the most logical means of resolving this contradiction. It was not just a simple reparable distortion of capitalism. It is pertinent to point out at this juncture, that both Lenin and Luxemburg argued from the same theoretical position. Their difference, if at all there is any, must be seen as merely polemical, from the point of view of the relationship of theory to praxis.

Rosa Luxemburg tried to explain the emergence of imperialism from the point of view of the commercial needs of capitalism, i.e. imperialism as caused by insufficient effective demand. In her book; The Accumulation Of Capital; (1951)[25] she tried to argue that the main problem of capitalism was lack of effective demand because, workers could not be expected to gain more in wages and the capitalist, the owners of the means of production, could not be expected to slow down their investments. The resultant effect is overproduction. The solution to this contradiction is for

capitalism to seek new markets elsewhere, particularly, in non-capitalist economies.[26] This is because;

> capital needs the means of production and labour power of the whole globe for untrammeled accumulation; it cannot manage without the natural resources and labour power of all territories...thus, the immediate and vital conditions for capital and its accumulation is the existence of non-capitalist buyers of the surplus value, which is decisive to this extent for the problem of capitalist accumulation. (And) whatever the theoretical aspects, the accumulation of capital as an historical process depends in every aspect upon non-capitalist social strata and forms of social organization.

One major problem faced by capitalism in this process of world wide accumulation is that, the non-capitalist economies could not submit voluntarily, to the extent that, trade between the capitalist and non-capitalist economies would not take place at all unless the capitalist economies took control of the non-capitalist economies and forced them to trade on advantageous terms to them. This problem according to Luxemburg, is resolved by colonial annexation of the non-capitalist economies to guarantee the survival of capitalism. "Overseas empires had to be created in order to guarantee outlets for domestic overproduction, here possibly lies the reason for the new imperialism".[27]

The growth of capitalism therefore, is not a peaceful organic process, but one in which force is the only solution open to capital. The accumulation of capital, seen here as an historical process, employs force as a permanent weapon, not only at its genesis, but further down to the present day.[28] Militarism and colonial expansion are handmaidens of the pressure for

accumulation inherent in capitalism. This is where Luxemburg ran
into trouble with other Marxists in that, by locating the causes
of imperialism solely on the need for markets to create effective
demand by all means, she tended to characterize imperialism as
having "economic origins, but essentially more of a process of
political expansion, violence, and war, with hardly a place for an
imperialism based on investments by extraterritorial capitalist
enterprises in less developed countries, whether or not they were
politically independent." (Lenin;1982.)[29]

This is precisely where Luxemburg differs from Lenin who
started with the position that the principal reason for capitalist
expansion lay not in the commercial needs of capitalism, but in
its financial needs; that is, the requirement for profitable
outlets for surplus capital. Imperialism to Lenin; (1939.)[30]

> emerged as the development and direct
> continuation of the fundamental
> characteristics of capitalism in general.
> But, capitalism only became capitalist
> imperialism at a definite and very high
> stage of its development; when certain of
> its fundamental characteristics begun to
> change into their opposites; when the
> features of the epoch of transition from
> capitalism to a higher social and
> economic system had taken shape and
> revealed themselves in all spheres.
> Economically, the main thing in this
> process is the displacement of capitalist
> free competition by capitalist
> monopoly...; if it were necessary to give
> the briefest possible definition of
> imperialism, we should have to say that
> imperialism is the monopoly stage of
> capitalism.

Lenin's thesis on this matter can simply be summarized as
follows; that imperialism is a product of the mutation of free
competitive capitalism into monopoly capitalism through the

process of the concentration of capital into few hands, which gave rise to the formation of cartels, and financial syndicates. Central to this process is the transformation of capital itself from its commercial and industrial nature to become financial i.e., capital controlled and managed by banks and financial institutions. This is the basis of his argument that imperialism is mainly for the satisfaction of the financial needs of capitalism. Lenin offered us a five point definition or characterization of imperialism, as follows;[31]

[a] The concentration of production and capital developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life.

[b] The merging of bank capital with industrial capital and the creation on this basis, of "finance capital", of a financial oligarchy.

[c] The export of capital, as distinct from the export of commodities becomes of particular great importance.

[d] International monopoly combines of capitalists are formed which divide up the world.

[e] The territorial division of the world by the greatest capitalist powers is completed.

According to Lenin, it is this international competition between the great monopoly undertakings that made it a supreme objective to curve out colonial possessions as exclusive preserves; sources of raw material, and investment fields and markets. And that, territories were being acquired not only for their actual, but also for their potential use; to keep out competitors, or out of fear of being "left behind" in the

insensate struggle for the last available morsels of unapportioned territory, or for a re-partition of those which have already been parcelled out.[32] The strength of Lenin's theory of imperialism is that, it did not limit itself to economic explanations alone, but saw colonial conquests as acts of politics and ideology with economic roots. Marx also argued from the same perspective when he states that; (in Yves de la Haye; [ed] 1980.)[33]

> This struggle, with its economic root was intensified by the "non-economic superstructure" which grows up on the basis of finance capital, its politics and its ideology accentuate the striving for colonial conquests.

It is from this perspective that an attempt to discuss how the means of communication developed in relation to the development of capitalism will be made and how these communication facilities, in this context, relate to, or accentuate; both as economic structures and as information ideological structures; the drive for colonial conquests in the wake of nineteenth century capitalist expansion. The starting premise here is that, the mode of production at any given instance determines, to a certain extent, the mode of communication prevailing. Communication in this context, refers to both the material conditions of transportation and communication, and the means or instruments for the transmission and diffusion of information.

In simple communal societies, the material conditions of transportation and communication i.e., roads, ports, railways, etc., as we know of them now, were either nonexistent or very rudimentary and localized. This also applies to the instruments of information transmission. Similarly, in this simple societies,

these infrastructures were communally made, used, and controlled by the community at large. However, with the development of societies from this simplistic modes of production, to more advanced and complex modes, changes also occur in the mode and means of communications, to reflect the prevalent mode of production.

The feudal mode of production for example, tended to be more advanced in communication infrastructures and means of information dissemination to serve not only its much more complex social structure, but also to disseminate information vital for social harmony, which is a prerequisite for the survival of such a differentiated society. The development of communication and transportation infrastructure and the emergence of news-sheets as means of information dissemination, are directly correlated to the interests of the feudal lords and their lieutenants; the clergy. The licensing laws, and "taxes on knowledge" in Europe, particularly in England, attest to these developments.

On the other hand, in a capitalist mode of production, in which production rests on exchange, the physical conditions of exchange i.e., the means of communication and transport, become very important for the costs of production and ultimately, the development of the capitalist system itself. As Marx pointed out;[34]

> Capital by its very nature drives beyond every spatial barrier to the extent that every creation of the physical conditions of exchange, of the means of communication and transport, the annihilation of space by time becomes an extraordinary necessity for it.

In the developmental process of the capitalist system, the systems of communication, which were no more than a peripheral and unorganized activity in the feudal society, became an essential element. This is because, the capitalist mode of production;[35]

> dissolved the social relations of the ancient community, exchange value therefore, little by little comes to dominate social relations, causing them to lose their personal character, and a system of general social metabolism, of universal relations of all round needs and universal capabilities is formed for the first time.

Here, it can be seen that the means of communication has two important historical roles to play in a capitalist society, and all two are related. One is that it facilitates the circulation of commodities through exchange; the backbone of the capitalist mode of production. Secondly, it provides interconnections between those who are active in commerce through the mails, telegraphs, telephones, newspapers, and television, by providing such specific information on stock market quotations, raw material prices, statistics on available goods and services, and credit rates, etc. On another level, the means of communication and information dissemination in a capitalist mode of production, are also instrumental in acting as lubricants for the smooth running of the system. This is because, the level of individualism brought about by urbanization and industrialization puts the means of communication in a central position as informers, opinion makers and socializers. Along the lines this dictates that the mass media act as both informers and socializers in a way that is consonant to the survival of the system in general.

In this context therefore, when we look at the development and nature of the means of communication and the infrastructure of communication in general, that accompanied the late nineteenth century capitalist expansion, there emerges a strong link between the functions and centrality of communication, and prevalent relations of production. As Anthony Smith (1980.)[36] pointed out;

> It is impossible, when looking at the evolution of (the International News Agencies) to fail to perceive in them the shadow of the structure of the capitalist system itself. For capitalism was a financial and productive system; its development necessitated bringing one unexploited part of the globe into a single market in which social classes, companies, transportation methods and stock markets become inextricably combined into a single, complicated and variegated, ever growing and interdependent system.

This process of communication systems following the shadow of capitalism in its world wide excursion can be discerned even in its infancy. That is at the stage of mercantile capitalism. As far back as the seventeenth century, the emergence of newspapers in North America tended to follow the colonial flag, to the extent that, the printers were still under the same licensing laws and had to seek authority to print from the royal governors appointed by the Crown. Most importantly, these presses had to import most of their requirements like ink, paper, and equipment, from England.

The first of such newspapers to be established in the American colonies was in Boston, the significance of which is that Boston was the entry point to the America's and to a certain extent, the commercial and trading nerve center of the continent.

This is why the paper, titled **Publick Occurrences Both Forreign And Domestick,** concentrated mostly on the gathering and dissemination of commercial and financial information on international maritime trading activities. (Desmond;1978.)[37]

With the advent of the industrial revolution in Europe, a new revolution in communication technology was also ushered in. These new communication technologies that accompanied the industrial revolution, have a dialectical relationship up to a point, with the success of the capitalist imperialist expansion of that period. Improved navigational facilities, steamships, improved facilities for information transmission, the oceanic cables, and telegraphs etc., all have a bearing in the success of capitalism to expand from its home base in Europe, to as far as India, the Far-East and Australia. One important fact is that these communication facilities are always the first to be established in any subjugated nation so as to link it with the centers of capitalism. The first newspaper in Asia for example, **The Calcutta General Advertiser,** was established by the British East India Company in 1780. The same was the case in Africa, where the first newspaper was established in Cairo by French colonial interests in 1789.[38] (Desmond;1978;p35)

The development of oceanic cables was also along these colonial commercial lines in that the first cable laid was the North Atlantic cable linking England with the America's, in 1866. And, by 1869 the Mediterranean cable was also completed to link Malta with Alexandria in Egypt. In 1869, another cable was laid to join the Aden from the Suez Canal with Port Sudan on the Red Sea, which was later joined with another cable laid beneath the

Arabian Sea to completely join Aden, Bombay, and Malta by 1870. The rest of Africa was fully incorporated with the laying in 1887, of a cable to join Aden with the east coast of Africa, extending to Zanzibar and then to Durban and Cape Town in South Africa.[39]

It is quite clear that these communication facilities were tied, linked and inseparable from the colonial lines of expansion which paved the way for capitalist imperialist ventures. Most crucial is that, most of the points of communication i.e., points of cable links, are also ports with commercial and political significance. These same commercial nerve centers, or clearing houses, also became information clearing centers, mostly for commercial, financial and political communications.

It is obvious that these communication facilities were very instrumental to the success of the plundering of Africa, Asia and Latin America, in the sense that, commercial and financial trading depended on adequate flow of information about commodity prices, demand and supply situations, and investments possibilities. This same information also determined what to be produced or plundered from these colonized territories and what prices these commodities should attract. On another level, the importance of these means of communication was underlined by the need for State intervention to mediate between competing capitalist interests. In the face of such fierce competition among different capitalist interests for exclusive first use of commercial, and financial information, the State comes in to take them over so that they become the State's object of interests. In this manner, the State provides security and the necessary conditions for obtaining supplies and the free circulation of commodities and information. For example, when the

anarchic competition between different private telegraph networks led to chaos in 1868, the British government decided to take over the entire industry and put it in the charge of the Post Master General. (de la Haye;1980.)[40] In essence, the State intervenes to remove the telegraph from intra-capitalist rivalries and places it at the service of the entire capitalist class in general.

The growth and development of the International News Agencies, could also, up to a certain point, be regarded as a result of the development of the telegraphic equipment on a world wide scale. Most of the early news agencies started operating fully as international concerns about a decade after the development of the telegraph. (Desmond;1978.)[41] These agencies, from their humble beginnings as quasi national agencies, developed, by the middle of the nineteenth century into fully international agencies operating mainly in the collection and dissemination of financial and commodity market information. Reuters, Havas, UP, and Wolff, all started as financial and commercial news carriers before incorporating general and political news later in their history.[42]

Most significant for the discussion here is that these agencies literally followed the footsteps of capitalist imperial expansion. Reuters for example, had its first office in Asia in India, and its main clients were the British East India Company, merchants, and bankers. The same goes for Havas which was bought and developed into an international agency by Baron d'Erlanger, a Paris banker with international financial interests in 1879.[43]

These developments were formalized in 1870, when the International News Agencies formed a "cartel" to draw reserved territories for the three most powerful world agencies, along lines drawn up in the famous 1884 Berlin conference. Reuters got the lion share based on the fact that Britain was the most powerful of the capitalist nations, coupled with the fact that it also, has control over almost all the cable lines in the world.

These so-called "ring combinations", entail that Reuters share included Britain and Holland, and their combined dependencies, i.e. most of Africa and Asia. Havas, the French agency was allocated France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the Levant, while Wolff, the German agency, was given Germany and the German colonies. The Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and Belgium were jointly covered by Reuters and Havas. Most of the American colonies and Canada, were initially covered by Reuters which later relented these areas to AP with which it later formed an agreement for exchange of information traded.[44] As Tunstall (1977)[45] pointed out;

> From 1870 to 1914, Reuters, based in London at the hub of the worlds cable systems, dominated with the French assistance the flow of news. Reuters specialized in financial news. Havas and Reuters both supplied financial news to businessmen before they began supplying news to newspapers. Both British and French agencies operated in the world from an imperial base.

Besides dealing in financial information, both agencies' second most important function was the collection and dissemination of political news most relevant to their home governments. Both Palmer (1978)[46] and Boyd-Barrett (1978)[47] have

shown that Reuters for example, is inextricably linked to the British government, especially during the war period and crisis periods in general. They also pointed out how these relationships, though "nurtured" in war and crisis situations, tended to continue into the postwar years.[48] There seems to be a fusion of interests between the State and the agency, even if it is based on an allusion to the agency's responsibility for the "national interest". A responsibility which, according to Boyd-Barrett, "Reuters was willing to affirm if only in order to obtain material concessions in communication rates and the goodwill that follow a coincidence of values".[49]

In the foregoing discussion, an attempt has been made to present the various arguments as to the origin of capitalist imperialism, or the late nineteenth century capitalist expansion into the continents of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The foregoing discussion therefore only dealt with 19th century capitalist expansion or imperialism and lays no claim to earlier forms of feudal and aristocratic ventures and crusades which can also be classified as forms of imperialist activities. This distinction we feel is necessary because it has generated serious debates as to the nature, root causes, and aims of imperialism. The discussion by Schumpeter attest to this line of thinking in which imperialism is discussed under a general rubric without much distinction to the extent that factors, other than economic ones are given more weight as the prime causes of the phenomena. Other specific challenges to the Lenin's and hobson's positions on the nature and causes of Imperialism, maintained that the 'scramble' for Africa in the 1880's was triggered off not by developments in Europe but movements which had their origin in Africa itself. P.

J. Gallagher and R. Robinson[50] in their article, "The Imperialism of Free Trade" (1953) and also in their subsequent book Africa and the Victorians (1961) for example, argued that, Britain's African Empire was not obtained for economic or domestic political reasons. The main aim was to safeguard Britain's position in the world by maintaining the route to India. Safety of this route they pointed out was threatened in the early 1880's by nationalist crises in Egypt.

Another form of criticism of Hobson's and Lenin's theories came from D. K. Fieldhouse[51] who was instrumental in resurrecting the political approach in which the division of the world after 1870 was seen as dependent on diplomatic rivalries within Europe. Similarly, M. Barratt and Harry Magdoff[52] attempted to account for the 'new Imperialism' after 1870 not so much in terms of export of capital as Hobson has done, but more as a function of increasing international competition leading to an intensive search for protected markets and access to vital raw materials. All these arguements we feel have certain elements of truth in themselves because as Hobson himself pointed out, the major part of British investments never went to the newly acquired colonies but to the republics and dominions of South America. He also admitted that other factors than commercial gains also occupy the mind of the imperialist. "Power, pride, prestige are prevailing sentiments in an imperialist policy". (1938)[53] But then these factors can only be as such and no more - sentiments.

Our position here is that all these factors of psychology, politics and of course economics do play a part in determining the incorporation of a vast majority of the world into the orbits of

international capital. But, to seriously account for the root causes of capitalist imperialism, it is imperative to first and foremost see the dynamics of social activity and all historical developments as entrenched in the production and reproduction of the means of existence. It is on this material base, itself continually changing as men and women establish greater powers of control over their enviroment, that the superstructures of culture, institutions, law and the political system arises. Within this context therefore, explanations of such aspects of imperialism as colonial expansion and power struggles between states has to be sought in material conditions rather than ideology and politics. While not denying the influence of forces which are mainly superstructural, we also strongly reject the view that the course of history can be adequately explained in terms of power drives of individuals, desire for glory and the influence of outstanding personalities. Imperialism therefore is seen here as an expression of the working out of the immanent laws of the capitalist mode of production.

To a certain extent therefore, the internationalization of capital was mainly for the purpose of securing additional markets for the products of the industrial complexes of Europe. Secondly, to find both existing and potential outlets for finance capital which needed new fertile grounds for investments, so that returns on profit will be maximized. Thirdly, there is the need for cheap labour in the pre-capitalist countries of the world. Most important however, is for the purpose of securing sources of raw materials to satisfy the growing needs of the industries of Europe.

This chapter has also attempted to link this internationalization of capitalism and capitalist relations of production to the role played by communication infrastructure and means of information dissemination. That is, to see them not only as economic activities in themselves, but also as providers of information that is vital to the smooth running of the overall system. Thus, acting as lubricants to the process of imperialism.

It is within this context that the process of capitalist penetration of Africa, Asia, and Latin America should be understood. This process can easily be confused with its effects i.e., economic domination. It is true that African economies were and are dominated, but the domination is the effect of the manner in which they have been integrated into the western capitalist system. Similarly, the dependent nature of the African, Asian, and Latin American economies is just the effect of their integration into the world capitalist system; and not the essence of the process of integration.

The Third World economies were integrated into the world capitalist system through colonial trade and investments and the subsequent monetization process which spearheaded the inevitable spread of capitalist relations of production into these countries. The monetization of the economies of these countries, led to the emergence of wage labour, either through forced labour policies, or through the practice of land appropriation which ultimately, led to the emergence of wage labourers, squatters, landless peasants, and lumpen proletariat.

Similarly, the form of trade that was introduced between these countries and the metropolitan centers of capitalism, turned these countries into primary commodity producers, which made them to specialize into the production of one or another single product, which, in most cases, is the product most needed by the industrial complexes of Europe. This form of primary commodity trade created consumerist orientations because of the dependence of these countries on the capitalist nations of Europe for almost all other products and services they need. This also stimulated the growth of money markets and financial institutions which led to a form of development which is disarticulated, thereby making the economies of these countries to be heavily dependent on the metropolitan centers of capitalism.

Along the lines, there is the need for the establishment of the infrastructures necessary for the tapping of the needed primary products and investment proceeds. Hence, the construction of railway lines and roads, and of course, cable networks, telegraphic facilities, radio stations, newspapers, and schools, to link, and assimilate, the sources of raw materials and investment sites to points of exit, and onwards to Europe. It is within this context that the present neocolonial and dependent nature of the Third World economies should be located and perceived for a better perspective, with a view to an adequate analysis.

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CHAPTER THREE.

DECOLONIZATION, DEPENDENCE AND MODERNIZATION:

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA.

In this chapter, an attempt is made to build upon our discussion of the incorporation of the Third World into the world capitalist system and extend the discourse to the present dependent post-colonial state of the economies of these states. The first half of the twentieth century saw the major part of the countries of the Third World waking-up to two paradoxically related and yet contradictory developments. The first was the attainments of political independence from their erstwhile colonial masters of Western Europe. Numerous factors are adduced to account for this process of decolonization, but, the most important is perhaps the emergence of, and consolidation of nationalist movements throughout the colonial empires. These agitations, coupled with the weakening of the colonial centers by the first and second world wars inevitably rendered the business of direct colonial control not only impractical, but also costly both economically and politically.

As soon as, or even before the fanfare, the trumpeting, the drumming and the echo of the national anthems had died down, these countries were jolted by the realization that the so-called independence fought for and won is severely limited and restricted by the historical realities that governed their development within the context of their incorporation into the world capitalist

system. This development is characterized by an asymmetry of power relations in which these countries are at the receiving end of a consolidated system of a transnational power structure.

This asymmetric relationship is generally referred to as one of dependency in which the newly emergent countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America found themselves dependent economically, politically, and socially to and on the advanced capitalist countries of Europe and North America. Most crucial is the fact that this dependency relationship is aggravating the process of underdeveloping these nations, a process started by colonialism. Direct colonialism, which cemented and gave political legality to the expansion of capitalism world-wide, also acted as an agent and root cause of the underdevelopment of the Third World countries through various mechanisms.

One such mechanism was the expropriation and export of available and potential capital away from the domestic economies of the colonized countries to the colonial centers of Europe through investments and currency reserve holdings. Secondly, the developed nations determined supply and demand on world markets for both manufactured goods and raw materials, a situation which leads to a third factor, i.e. the forcing of the colonized nations to specialize in the production of a few primary type commodities for export and thus strangulating them from developing their own home grown manufacturing. In most cases, even existing budding cottage industries were practically physically destroyed or forced into extinction due to lack of needed raw material. The end result is the molding of these economies into mono-commodity export producers basically geared towards satisfying the needs of the

factories of the metropolitan colonial centers. Associated with the above is the inevitable reliance of these countries on an import substitution strategy which ultimately stifles their domestic entrepreneurial activity and domestic industrial development.

Faced with these two contradictory, albeit interwoven issues of political independence and socioeconomic underdevelopment and dependence, characterized by abject poverty, low level literacy, disease and hunger, the leaders and petit bourgeois elites of these countries needed little persuasion to accept the diagnosis of, and prescriptions offered for the malaise of their societies by Western scholarship and policies of the Western countries of Europe and North America. Characteristic of this was the first and second United Nations Development Decades.

It is pertinent at this juncture to point out, at least for heuristic purposes, that, if the initial colonization of Africa, Asia and Latin America was much more in response to the internal dynamics of capitalism, the developments in the first half of the twentieth century aimed at firmly strengthening the neocolonial dependency relationships between the underdeveloped countries and the centers of capitalism, were much more as a result of conscious policy decisions. Particularly, the kind of foreign policy pursued by the United States of America.

Underlining this policy is an academic enterprise which, despite its claims to scientific rigor was very much influenced by conscious policy decisions with particular specific political and economic goals in mind. Here, we are referring to the

modernization theories of the 1950's which originated primarily in the United States since the second world war and which has its roots firmly entrenched in the Western intellectual tradition that Gouldner referred to as "academic social science"[1] epitomized by the tradition of the American Sociological and Anthropological schools. Of significance to this tradition has been the Western political and social thought on the nature of social change, especially evolutionary theory and structural functionalism.[2] As Tipps (1973)[3] pointed out;

> If modernization theory is an outgrowth of modern liberal scholarship, its immediate origins are to be found in the attitudes of America's political elites and intellectuals to post world war-two setting, especially the impact of the cold-war and the emergence of new Third World states as international actors after the disintegration of the European Empires.

This Modernization School, whose main aim was the analysis of underdevelopment in what is generally referred to as the "developing societies" and prescribing solutions which are mainly consonant with the interests of the societies from which this "school" emerged, owes its intellectual pedigree to the works of Weber and the ideological teachings of Talcott Parsons.

Parsons adapted Weber's analysis of the nature of social change in industrialized societies in which, for analytical purposes, a 'duality' between **Traditionalism** and **Modernism** was adapted as a means of explicating the nature of social relations in each, and how these relations determine and explain social change, or the move from the traditional to the modern.

This dualism was adapted by Parsons in his attempts to achieve what he called a "unified science of society"[4] and postulated his famous "pattern variables" which are exclusive categories characterizing the two polar segments of tradition and modernity.

In this context, the "Parsonian pattern variables"; as distinct from the Weberian dichotomy which centers on the industrialized societies; are aimed at explaining what a backward or an industrialized society is. In this case, the "pattern variables" refer to the backward states of Africa, Asia, and Latin America on the one hand, and the developed nations of Europe and North America on the other.

Succinctly put, Parsons advanced the thesis that the states of Africa, Asia and Latin America, are backward because of the prevalence of archaic traditional values, in which roles occupied by individuals are diffused, and rewards accorded them usually based on ascription, rather than on individual achievement. Similarly, the general norms and values governing these societies, are said to be particularistic and not universal in outlook and application. The polar opposites of these variables characterize a developed society i.e. in which norms and values are universal in character, and roles clearly specified and rewarded based on individual achievement. This position was adapted and operationalized, by most Modernization theorists through various researches and academic discourse. According to Higgot (1978)[5],

> The central concerns of Modernization theory was Dualism and the nature of the Dichotomy, and Diffusion. Many scholars have posited simple dualities to explain social change. The Dichotomy is of course

that of tradition and modernity, in which
tradition was seen by Modernization
theorists in the Weberian sense as
pre-state, pre-industrial and
pre-rational.

Modernization theorists, continued Higgott, believed in the
optimistic period of the 1950's that for underdevelopment to be
eradicated, it was merely necessary to solve the dichotomy. That
is, to bridge the gap between tradition and modernity.

Walt Rostow, for example, provided an elaborate theory of the
process of modernization. In his book; **The Stages Of Economic
Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto**, (1971), Rostow posited a
unilineal theory of socioeconomic change in which five stages were
provided which all societies must pass through in their efforts to
modernize. These range from the [a] traditional [b] transitional
[c] the take off stage [d] the drive to maturity and lastly, [e]
the stage of high mass consumption.

Implicit in this formulation, is the assumption that the
underdeveloped societies are at a stage of development i.e. the
traditional, that the now developed societies were at one stage in
their history. Central to most theories of economic development,
including Rostow's and others like Hoselitz (1960)[8] is the
assumption that such factors as capital, entrepreneurial drives,
technology, and universal behavioral patterns and values
constitute the crucial and essential elements of the process of
socioeconomic change or modernization. Explanations of why such
factors are absent in some societies and abundant in others, and
how these elements can be generated in societies lacking them
forms the central concern of most socio-psychological researchers

like E.Hagen and D.McClelland (1962;1961).[9]

Both Hagen and McClelland saw the problem generating structures that mitigate against social change as rooted in some individualistic socio-psychological aspects of the people of the underdeveloped societies. These include the existence of hierarchical and authoritative social structure, and rigid, authoritarian family set-up and relationships and the prevalence of ascribed autocratic social statuses. This situation, the argument goes, stifles and limits innovative drives in children and hence their inability to develop the crucial psychological Need for Achievement (N-ach.), which according to McClelland, is the most crucial element for social change. The prescription offered is that, these barriers should be eliminated so that the appropriate socio-pschological traits conducive to the emergence of the need for Achievement, autonomy, social order, and hence, modernization, could be achieved.

Generally speaking, the implicit and explicit implication of the works of the modernization theorists was that for development to take place, it was necessary for the countries of the Third World to simply imitate the historical processes of the advanced capitalist countries of the West. It was their position that the Third World countries could develop at a rapid pace because they would benefit from a diffusion process which would see the ingredients of Western societies diffused rapidly into them. Belief in the modernization capabilities of diffusion, be it the diffusion of cultural values, as advocated by Daniel Lerner, (1958)[10] the diffusion of capital and technology, as advocated by Walter Rostow; or the diffusion of Western political values as was

advocated in the literature of the Committee on Comparative Politics, and some of its leading exponents a'la Lucian Pye and Ithel De Sola Pool, was a central theme in the literature of modernization theory since the second world-war. The key to this diffusion process is the assumed role the modern mass media can play in the process of creating an awareness or outrightly 'diffusing' the required ideas, values, and universal norms for rapid socioeconomic change.

This belief in the power of the media, as is contained in the dominant paradigm on the role of the media in national development, has its roots in the empirical research tradition in mass communication dating back to the inter-war years. The preoccupation of this research tradition in the 1930's was with specifying the precise conditions under which the media are likely to produce changes in the information levels, attitudes and behaviour of mass media audiences.

One of the major outcomes of this "effects studies" was the so much talked about power of the media in propaganda during the world wars and the assumed "omnipotent" power of the media to establish and sustain public opinion and taste, especially in consumer advertisements in the United States around the 1940's. This perspective, which viewed mass media audiences as passive and isolated, was later modified to take cognizance of the structured nature of the audience, the influence of interpersonal channels of communication, and the modifying effects which group membership and dynamics exert on the relationship between the media and its audience. It is against the background of this research tradition that most of the influential formulations on the role of the media

in development processes emerged. Notable among the exponents of this tradition are Daniel Lerner, Everett M. Rogers, and Wilbur Schramm.

Most of their works had its foundation in rural sociology and the American tradition of research into persuasive communication, of which works of such researchers as C.I.Lumsdaine and Sheffield, (1949)[11] among others, on propaganda techniques during the second world war stand as classic examples. Also influential to this diffusion theorists were studies of voting behaviour by Lazarsfeld and Berelson (1944).[12] The most important influence on these researchers however, was perhaps the realization by the early effects studies that the media alone are not adequate to produce direct changes in attitudes. Hence, the arrival of the famous "Two Step Flow" concept which tended to accommodate the importance of opinion leaders in affecting changes in audience attitudes and information levels.[13]

Rogers studies (1969),[14] were basically centered on the application of these and other related ideas to the spread of, or the diffusion of agricultural innovations among farmers in the United States and Columbia, from which he proposed a general model for the change processes involved. This was the background of what later came to be known as the Diffusion Approach to the role of the media in national development. The main contention of the approach, with its different variants, sometimes referred to as the "gap approach", or the "missing components approach", was that certain factors are taken to be the major indices of development. As mentioned earlier, such factors as technology, education, universal norms and values, adequate media infrastructure etc. are

taken to indicate development if present in a society, while if absent, the society should be classified as underdeveloped. What is needed therefore, and this is the major preoccupation of the diffusion studies, was to find ways and means of diffusing these missing components into the underdeveloped countries so as to provide the necessary climatic conditions for an adequate socioeconomic change. In this context, by way of adequately harnessing the potentialities of the modern mass media.

The media, according to Rogers, can only be used to create an awareness of the desired innovation, while its actual adaptation and utilization rests crucially upon the influentials among the targeted groups, i.e. opinion leaders of recognized social status. The basic strategy therefore, was to first sell the idea to the identified group leaders and recognized opinion makers, mostly people in authority and of high social status, who will then give some sort of "testimonial" to the idea to guarantee its acceptance.

Much in common with Rogers' diffusion of innovation studies was Daniel Lerner's research on the role of communication in social change processes. His major research was in the Middle East from which he wrote the most often cited book in the field titled: The Passing Of Traditional Society; Modernization In The Middle East. [1958][15] The main thesis was that modernization failed to occur in the underdeveloped regions of the world because of lack of "EMPATHY", Which was defined as the inability of the peasants of this regions to imaginatively identify with new roles and better ways of life, thus, "liberating their ingenuity and initiative"[16] His main argument was that;[17]

> In traditional society now passing from the world, **INERTIA** was the modal principle of personality for most people. It is not that traditional people did nothing; on the contrary, many worked as hard and long as their oxen. It is rather that they did nothing **NEW**. What sustained traditional society, indeed was the routinization of life patterns in a self-sealing system, that required no ingenuity and rewarded no initiative from its population. Rooted in their place and pride, traditional mankind lived by its constraints unaware of them as constraints because no communication alerted them to alternatives. [emphasis in the original]

The alternative, modernization through effective communication, according to Lerner, requires "the development of a skill that would remedy the lost sense of what they were, ... their inertial identity, ... by supplying a sense of what they might become: This was EMPATHY"[18] [emphasis added] To this extent, Lerner pointed out that, since "the West can not supply enough skilled empathizers to develop the rest of the world simultaneously over the next few decades; ... if the external inoculation of modern ways is to "take", each developing area must raise an indigenous skill-force that will invade every sector and region of the transitional society."[19] Obviously, Lerner saw the mass media of communication as the panacea; the "needle", that should contain and dispense the required inoculation of external stimuli necessary to develop the empathy needed for modernization.

The main indices of development in Lerner's thesis include such components as level of urbanization, literacy levels, media exposure and political[voter] participation. The interrelationship between these indices underlie the importance of the media, and which bestows upon it the qualification that made it the prime

choice for bringing about modernization in the Third World. As he
pointed out, it is only after a country reaches about 10%
urbanization is there any significant increase in literacy;
thereafter urbanization and literacy increase together until they
reach about 25%; and that once societies are about 25% urbanized,
the closest relationship of media growth is with the increase in
literacy.[20] To underline the above point, he succinctly stated
that;

> everywhere, for example, increasing
> urbanization has tended to increase media
> exposure; increasing media exposure has
> "gone with" wider economic participation
> [per capita income]$_{21}$ and political
> participation [voting].

Although Lerner acknowledged that the above indices tended to
depict a Western model of development or modernization, he asserts
that it is of global relevance because the model is a historical
fact, and thus, his declared interest in clarifying the process of
this social change in which "high empathizers should be developed
and encouraged to become 'cash customers', radio listeners and
voters".[22] To support his model of modernization, he pointed out
the correlation between economic productivity and media provision
in different countries. The richest countries are said to have the
most newspapers, radio receivers and television sets, while the
poorest nations have the least.

Although his major notable statements came well towards the
end of the United Nations Development Decades, Schramm's ideas and
polemics on media role in national development amount to no more
than putting "an old wine in a new bottle." In fact, it was an
attempt to rescue the modernization theories from an apparent

failure through rhetorical reformulation of old theories and ideas. In his UNESCO sponsored book, **Mass Media And National Development** [1964], he reiterated earlier conceptions of the causes of underdevelopment by asserting that "the backward nations are limited in what they can do by the societies around them, by their poverty, and lack of education, to the extent that economic growth and the social change that must accompany this economic growth, have not yet passed a certain point."[23] For these countries to develop therefore;[24]

> Social change of great magnitude is required. Information must flow, not only to them, but also from them, so that their needs can be known and so that they may participate in the acts and decisions of nation building.

Schramm emphasised that what is crucial in this process of information flow is vertical communication, and this is where mass communication and the modern mass media are inserted into the modernization calculus.[25] This according to him is because;

> Free and adequate flow of information is thus not a goal; it is a means of bringing about desired social change. Without adequate and effective communication, economic and social development will inevitably be retarded, and may be counter productive. With adequate and effective communication, the pathway to change can be easier and shorter.

He went on to reiterate Lerner's position on the relationship between modernization indices and media availability by asserting that; "when a country has reached a relatively advanced stage of mass media growth we can be quite sure that its per capita income, its proportion of people in cities, its percentage of literates, its industrial products, its proportion of children in school, are

also high.[26]

Faced with these apparently "value free" scientific statements and "prophesies" and outright political pressure shrouded in harmless benevolent handouts from Western European and American interests under the auspices of "neutral International Agencies" a'la the United Nations, little wonder that most Third World countries wholeheartedly accepted the so-called Development Decade. This is partly encouraged by the problems of underdevelopment these countries face and which threatened not only their survival as politico-economic entities, but also, crucially in this case, the survival of the political and economic elite of these countries as actors domestically and internationally.

Most of these Third World leaders and political elites accepted the rhetoric that, for development or modernization to occur in their societies, heavy investments have to be made in the development of mass communication systems particularly, at that time, in the field of radio transmission and receiving facilities. The emphasis was on investments not withstanding the content of the message. The very presence of the mass media was seen to be adequate to set in motion those socioeconomic processes that would ultimately modernize their societies. Between 1963 and 1973 for example, the number of radio receivers increased by 30% in Africa, 450% in Asia and 250% in Latin America.[27] The same can be said of the flow of media and cultural artifacts, books, magazines, newspapers, etc. and in later years, of the flow of television receivers and video recorders. Also, there is a corresponding increase in the number of transmission facilities in these

countries to cater for the growing number of audiences initiated by the influx of receivers and the recently cultivated appetite for imported foreign programmes.

However, despite these investments and the subsequent rise in communication infrastructure and the corresponding rise in imported programmes and cultural artifacts, by the end of the United Nations Development Decades, which emphasised industrialization through technology transfer, this "injection of communication infrastructure into the system did not result in 'modernization' or 'development'. Communication, it was stated, was in an inverse ratio when correlated to development".[28]

The only success of the United Nations Development decade was that the Third World countries were successfully re-penetrated by Western, particularly in this case, by American transnational companies especially, in the field of communication. Accompanying this process is the problem of subjecting these countries to media artifacts that have far-reaching consequences to their "independence" and "cultural autonomy". Why then did the Third World countries failed to develop or modernize despite all these sophisticated scientific analyses and prescription. One important factor, and the least to be substantiated empirically, is the politico-philosophical basis of the modernization theories of the 1950's and 1960's. This political philosophy was basically policy oriented aimed at the achievement of specific political and economic goals. This necessarily involved the modernization theories to adapt a conceptual framework that is more amenable to the realization of these goals; the success of which is evident in the neocolonial nature and position of the Third World countries

of today.

It has been argued vehemently by Schiller (1977)[29] for example, that the force with which the United States argued for, and defended, the "Free Flow Of Information" principle, and its initiation and support for the first U.N. Development Decade was inextricably interwoven. They form and represent the general direction of American post world war two foreign policy. According to him, they aimed at consolidating the ascendancy of America's global hegemony. The argument is that the United States needed to penetrate the newly emergent states and establish a firm foothold for its fast growing businesses particularly, in the face of a growing tide of the spread of socialism. The drive to establish American hegemony, particularly in the field of communication, started well before the end of the second World war. That is, with the bitter struggle the Associated Press [AP] waged against Western European, especially, British domination and hegemonic control of communication facilities in the form of international news cartels, i.e. Reuters, oceanic cables etc. and the advantages these confer on British industry in general.

The relationship between communication and commercial interests was underlined by Schiller,[30] quoting James Lawrence Fly, the chairman of the Federal Communication Commission during the second world war as saying that;

> Among the artificial restraints to the free development of commerce throughout the world, none is more irksome and less justifiable than the control of communication facilities by one country with preferential services and rates to its own nationals.

This communication cum industrial interest couplet was incorporated into the cold war rhetoric and thereby, turn it into an effective weapon. This according to Schiller, was achieved by "rallying public opinion to the support of a commercial goal expressed as an ethical imperative. Simultaneously, it provided a highly effective ideological club against the Soviet Union and its newly created neighboring zone of anti-capitalist influence" [31] John Foster Dulles, one of the chief architects and executors of America's cold war policy, summed up the point when he said; "If I were to be granted one point of foreign policy and no other, I would make it the free flow of information". [32]

These ideological undercurrents of American post war foreign policy did, to a large extent affect or had serious bearing on the direction of socio-scientific research in the United States and in Western Europe of that time. Research, as at that time was more policy and status-quo oriented. A form of "social engineering", serving the interests of its major sponsors; industry and government. This situation can partly be explained by a particular paradox that makes social scientists and social science in general, to reflect the conditions under which they, or it operates. While society is the subject of study, it does at the same time, to a greater or lesser extent, determine, in a curious way, the direction inquiries usually take. As O'Brien (1972)[33] pointed out;

> The ideological implications for the work of social scientist do not need elaboration; ..... [There is a] substantial body of literature which documents the role of political science and social science in general has played in American government activity throughout the Third World.

This curious government, industry, and academic partnership is further compounded by a more serious epistemological problem that underlines this brand of socio-scientific research tradition. Here, we are referring to the empirico-positivistic framework which makes social science a sort of "crisis management enterprise". The main preoccupation of this science is to respond to "social anomalies" or "cracks" within the social system with a view to "cementing" these visible "cracks" without recourse to the actual underlining causes of these "cracks". The emergence of various specializations within the social sciences is an apt indicator to this "crisis management" orientation of this brand of science.

One major problem that emerged from this empirical research tradition, particularly in its application to the problems of modernization, is its stark ahistoricity. That is to say, problems for research are dislocated from the social structures within which they emerged and dealt with in isolation. This serious limitation of the modernization theories, one can argue, is perennial in the sense that it is only by neglecting or extricating the problem of underdevelopment from its historical context i.e. imperialism and colonialism, can these theories come up with the conclusions they wanted. It also allows them to make such generalizations and prescriptions most favourable to their starting position.

From the preceding discussions of the modernization theories particularly, those concerned with the role of the media in the development of the Third World countries, it can be clearly discerned that none of the theories even attributed to, or

referred to the colonization of these countries as a major factor in determining the state of affairs they are now in. As a matter of fact, some of the positions even tended to argue that colonialism had a positive impact on, or initiated a development process in these regions. This initiative, the argument goes, was resisted by the prevalence of archaic fatalistic traditional values and attitudes. Hence, it is these static value systems and attitudes which have to be dealt with, for adequate development to take place. This is the main reason why almost all the theories were able to point to some individualistic socio-psychological attributes such as backward traditional values and norms, lack of empathy or entrepreneurial drive, or absence of the need for achievement, capital and technology etc., as the main causes of underdevelopment. These attributes, according to the theories, have to be diffused from outside by means of the modern mass media for adequate socioeconomic development to commence.

This ahistorical dualism which adapted an extreme polarity of traditionalism and modernism for analytical purposes, and allows Talcott Parsons, for example, to come up with his "pattern variables", has been severely criticized by most Neo-Marxists, generally referred to as the dependency school. Their argument is that, the problem of underdevelopment can only be explained and understood within the context of the historical dynamics that accounted for the development of the now industrialized capitalist countries of Europe and North America. Their general position is that, the now developed nations only became so because they underdeveloped the present backward countries through colonial incorporation and neocolonialism.

A.G.Frank (19690[34] one of the leading exponents of the dependency school, introduced the "development of underdevelopment thesis" which allows him and his contemporaries to argue that; "While it [Latin America] may have been undeveloped before Western penetration, it only became underdeveloped after [its] incorporation into the international capitalist system."[35] In this context, development and underdevelopment were seen as two sides of the same coin. They are linked, in a dialectical relationship which allowed the advanced capitalist countries to develop by underdeveloping their erstwhile colonies. This dialectical relationship gave rise to a form of satellite - metropolis situation in which, the satellites are perpetually dependent and underdeveloped because of the expropriation and sucking out of their surplus by the metropolis.

The above position contradicts earlier modernization theories which, with utter disregard for history, adapted "the national society" as their unit of analysis. Although such cultural and institutional features as may be found in any "national society" may help in understanding the problems of these societies, they simply are not the key independent variables accounting for the relative backwardness of these areas. The point been made here is that, the relative presence of traditional and modern features may or may not, help to differentiate societies, but it does not in itself explain the origins of modernity in some contexts and lack of modernity in others. As such, the tradition - modernity polarity is seen here to be of little value as a working concept, because, there exists a fundamental flow in the empirical validity and reliability of both the working concepts and generalizations of the modernization theories. Frank,[37] for instance, had argued

that the "Parsonian Pattern Variables" and their various manifestations which are said to account for backwardness, are not exclusive categories that can be applied only to Third World countries, but on the contrary, are also found in the advanced countries in one form or another.

Associated with the above atomic conceptualization of the problem of underdevelopment, is the implicit ethnocentric bias and teleological assumption of the theories. That is, that the most desirable and natural course of development for the Third World countries was, and still is, the type of political, economic, and social structures found in the Western countries of Europe and North America. In this sense, "Western middle class life styles are deemed to be the most appropriate for emergent peoples".[38] In this context then, what the media is required to do is to portray the necessary incentives required for modernization. According to Elliott and Golding;[39]

> This led media researchers to concentrate on the use of the media to promote 'appropriate' values for modernity, normally the industrial work ethic and the universalistic slogans of free enterprise in partial disguise.

Ithel de-Sola Pool[40] for example, asserted that "the media should show what opportunities exist for using new commodities such as electricity, refrigeration, or automotive transportation." Elliott and Golding, commenting on such statements, pointed out that the need to beat the communist at their own life-style promotion in the Third World was paramount, and that it is questionable whether the media portray 'what opportunities exist' or whether they portray what opportunities ought to exist".[41]

[emphasis added.] This statement, we posit, summarizes the general position and hence, the practical implications of both the policy, theory and action of the developments in the field of modernization efforts of the 1950's and 1960's and the role of the media in the process.

Policy wise there was a concerted effort to see to a further consolidation of the dependency relationship brought about by the expansion of capitalism and the incorporation of the Third World countries into the international capitalist system by way of such programmes like the United Nations Development Decades and other similar aid programmes. These practical policy oriented initiatives were supported by a body of theory and research which implicitly attempted to justify a particular socioeconomic and political framework as the most desirable and hence inevitable course to be pursued by the Third World countries if they want to modernize.

In terms of action, or what to do and how to go about it, in the process of modernization, the media are given a central role to play. That is, as the conveyor of the needed ingredients that would allow for modernization, i.e. Empathy, Need For Achievement, [N-ach] Literacy, Capital etc. In this context, the starting point is the establishment of adequate communication infrastructure so as to guarantee the effective utilization of what the media ought to offer. Translated, it means the <u>provision of what ought to exist</u>; i.e. capitalist relations of production and the transnational power structure that emerged from the internationalization of these relations so as to guarantee and provide the climate for both its continuation and survival. This

is achieved by using the media to provide a particular view of society and the social relations governing it that tended to automatically exclude any possible alternatives.

This is the role the media had been playing historically in the capitalist countries of Europe and North America and in the Third World countries where these same media models have been imported to during colonialism and further consolidated in the neocolonial era of this century. The various discussions on the role of the media in the reproduction of capitalist relations of production and its position as a provider of consensus and consciousness manipulator in this process will form the basis of the next chapter.

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CHAPTER FOUR.

NEWS AND IDEOLOGY IN ADVANCED CAPITALIST SOCIETIES:

THE STATE OF THE ART IN RESEARCH.

In an attempt to repudiate the foregoing claims ascribed to the media in national development in the Third World regions an attempt is made here to present the current theoretical positions that informed us as to the historical role the media has and still is playing in the advanced capitalist countries and in the international context. Historically, four major traditions of media theory can be identified which underlie most research into the nature, role and context of the mass media in advanced capitalist societies. Particularly, the nature and role of its most visible product, news. These are the Mass Society thesis, the perspectives of the Frankfurt School, the liberal/pluralist perspective, and the Marxist positions. In addition to the four major rubrics under which most media research emanates, there is of recent the emergence of the socio-cultural approach generally referred to as Cultural Studies and Discourse Analysis.

The Mass Society thesis, which has a pedigree reaching back into the mid-nineteenth century, viewed the development of the mass media pessimistically as constituting a threat to elite cultural values and the viability of political institutions of democracy. However, the diversity of the theorists who are usually regarded as having contributed to the development of the Mass Society theory is forbidding in both their background and

theoretical position. To name a few, cultural theorists such as T.S.Eliot, Friedrich Nietzsche, Ortega Y Gasset; Political analysts such as J.S.Mill, and Alexis de Tocqueville; crowd psychologists such as Hanna Arendt and the Italian sociologists Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto etc. are all somewhat grouped together as Mass Society theorists.

What they have in common however, is the sharing of concepts and an adherence to the writings of Emile Durkheim and Ferdinand Tonnies concerning the implications of the withering away of traditional forms of social relationships necessary for social cohesion. One recurring theme in the work of the founding fathers of sociology was the concern with the threat of moral disorder which was said to be posed by the disintegration of traditional social ties binding the individual to the community. In this context, urbanization brought about by industrialization was seen to reconstitute society into a collection of atomized and individualized masses of people who are vulnerable and prone to manipulation by the newly emergent mass media. This view was reinforced by the perception of the media as all-powerful and omnipotent, a perception born out of an assumed power of radio as a propaganda instrument during the first and second world wars.

Ultimately, research in the 1930's concentrated on discovering the effects of the media on these atomized and individualized collectivities of people detached from family, kinship, and social setups, and who are now governed by some sort of "social contract", in Durkhemian terms, as against the "organic community." Later developments saw the emergence of a strand of media effects research which questioned the mass society theorists

conception of society as composed of anomic individuals. Also, the assumed vulnerability of these individuals to manipulation by the media was reexamined. Most importantly, earlier assumptions of the all-powerful and omnipotent nature of the media was also subjected to close scrutiny. The media it was argued, can only reinforce certain held beliefs.

The emergence of what is generally referred to as the "uses and gratification" research was an attempt to reverse the above earlier positions adhered to by the mass society theorists. Summarizing this position, Klapper [1960][1] pointed out that "mass communications ordinarily do not serve as a necessary and sufficient cause for audience effects". A later variant of this type of social inquiry asserts that people tended to expose themselves to the media selectively, based on prior dispositions and "needs". People, it was argued, manipulated the media to satisfy some of their "basic needs", rather than being manipulated by the media. The central question for research therefore was, what do people do with the media?, and not the earlier question of what do the media do to people?.

To a certain extent, the emergence of the liberal/pluralist tradition of research was also in response to the general conceptualization of the mass society theory as regards the nature of society and the location of individuals and institutions within it. The basic premise of the liberal/pluralists was that society is a structured social system composed of different institutions and competing interests all working towards the survival of the overall system; i.e., the democratic process. The society was seen not as a simple agglomeration of atomized individuals, but as a

pluralist hotch-potch of different regional, ethnic, religious, and political groups. This conception of society has serious consequences for the working of the democratic process, in that, if at all democracy is to survive, there is a need for these different primary social groups and their interests to exist and function in such a way that one particular group or interest will not assume a position of preponderance in relation to other groups or interests. At the same time, the above theoretical realignment had serious implications for the way the media were viewed earlier. As Tony Bennett [1982] [2] remarked;

> Once regarded as the villains of mass society, they came to be viewed as the unsung heroes of liberalism-pluralism triumphant ... the media, it was contended, were far from monolithic. The clash and diversity of the viewpoints contained within them contributed to the free and open circulation of ideas, thereby, enabling them to play the role of a "fourth estate" through which governing elites could be pressurized and reminded of their dependency on majority opinion.

Most of the audience research conducted by American sociologists around the 1940's and 1950's on public opinion formation and socialization, derive from this liberal/pluralist theoretical posture. Ironically, despite the apparent conservatism of the Mass Society theory, it also influenced earlier Marxist positions on the media in society. The Frankfurt School for example, analysed the media by submitting to what Bennett called the "field of force" exerted by the mass society outlook. Their critique of the "culture industry", was basically a critique of the media's impact in stifling the formation of a socialist political consciousness amongst the working classes. Their main concern however, was with the apparent political stability of the

postwar Western world despite all indications of the existence of socioeconomic and political contradictions to the contrary. They saw cultural processes and the way they are "managed", as accounting for ideological transformations through which this stability had been produced. According to Bennett [1982][3], both Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse tended to persistently argue that;

> If the prospect of radical social change no longer seemed imminent, this was substantially because the consciousness of a need for such change had been eliminated, yielding an ideological climate in which the prospect of a horizon beyond the limits constituted by the present had been virtually lobotomized.

In One Dimensional Man, [1968][4] Marcuse puts forward one of the "school's" positions on the media by asserting that;

> The productive apparatus and the goods and services which it produces "sell" or impose the social system as a whole. The means of mass transportation and communication, the commodities of lodging and clothing, the irresistible output of the entertainment and information industry, carry with them prescribed attitudes and habits, certain intellectual and emotional reactions which bind the consumers more or less pleasantly to the producers and, through the latter, to the whole. The products indoctrinate and manipulate; they promote a false consciousness which is immune against its falsehood ... Thus, emerges a pattern of <u>one dimensional thought and behaviour in which ideas, aspirations, and objectives</u> that, by their content, transcend the established universe of discourse and action are either repelled or reduced to the terms of this universe. [emphasis added.]

Marcuse contended that the media's treatment of political issues is limited to the question of determining which techniques

are best for the management of the system as it is and of containing its contradictions. Possible alternative political ends are automatically excluded from the terms of reference established by such debates. It was this tendency that Marcuse referred to as the media's role in effecting a "closing of the universe of discourse". Despite been criticized for being idealists or engaging in some form of historical romanticism i.e., Adorno's obsession about the "lost aura" of contemporary art and music, the centrality the critical school accorded to the study of ideology played an important role in undermining the erstwhile economism of mainstream Marxism. Similarly, their concept of "containment"; the ideological process by which contradictions of capitalism are "contained", or held in check, also did have a strong influence in the way and manner later day Marxist positions approached the analysis of the relationship between class, ideology and the media. These more recent developments in Marxist theory however, have widened the theoretical parameters within which questions of the ideological role of the media can be approached and investigated. Particularly, the centrality accorded the role of ideologies in reproducing dominant class ideas and power structures in contemporary capitalist societies. The most often quoted starting point of the Marxist positions for the analysis of ideology and its role in reproducing class ideas and representing class interests, is the passage by Marx and Engels in The German Ideology [1965][5] which states that;

> The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas; i.e. the class which is the ruling material force is, at the same time, its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the

ideas of those who lack the means of
mental production are subject to it. The
ruling ideas are nothing more than the
ideal expression of the dominant material
relationships grasped as ideas: hence of
the relationships which make one class
the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of
its dominance.

The above assertion suggests crucial interconnections between
economic power, ideological domination and class power. This is
based on a dialectical materialist conception of society in which
there is said to exist a "determinate relationship" between the
"base" [economy] and the "superstructures" [institutional
arrangements] in any given type of society in history. This "base
- superstructure metaphor" tended to posit that the type and
nature of economic arrangements in society tended to determine the
way and manner the various institutions of that society operate
and function. In advanced capitalist societies, for example, the
various institutions of the family, education, religion, police,
army, the courts, and the mass media, are said to function in a
determinate fashion, to reproduce the dominant capitalist
relations of production. Hence, their assumed ideological
insertion and function within the economy. The media in
particular, were singled out as evidence of how this ideological
reproduction is achieved.

In most of his polemical writings, mostly described as the
"instrumentalist approach", Marx presented the press as an
instrument of the capitalist class or segments of it. Arguing,
that the press was a central element of the superstructures; the
"uberbau", which the ruling classes erected as their literary,
political, and ideological mechanism for maintaining power.
[Altschull, 1984][6] In his mature economic writings however, Marx

tended to adopt a "structural approach" which directs attention away from the intentions and actions of press proprietors and capitalists and concentrates instead on the ways in which the underlying dynamics of the capitalist economic system structure both the operational strategies and output of newspapers.[7]

These two approaches have continued to dominate Marxist critical analyses and discourse on the media particularly in the sphere of ideological reproduction. Recently, there is also a revival of Marxist Political Economy as it applies to the press. In as much as these strands of critical research differ, they only do so as different approaches to the same problem, i.e. the problem of ideology in advanced capitalist societies. Other than that, they all tended to accept the centrality of ideological processes in determining what we see, hear, think and do. Their main concern therefore, was to explicate how the ideological process work and its mechanisms, and how "the ideological" is to be conceived in relation to other practices within the social formation.

In doing so, attention was paid to the questions of ownership and control of the media, or, more specifically, how and to which extent, the ruling class took over the control of the operations of the media. Secondly, attention was also paid to the nature of the media's products, and to what extent these "signifying systems" relayed by the media work or function to achieve the "ideological effect" attributed to them. Thirdly, there were attempts to address questions pertaining to the interrelationships between and among the economic, political, and ideological levels of the advanced capitalist societies. We shall briefly discuss the

more normative or theoretical positions of both the Instrumentalists, the Structuralists, and the Political Economists on the above issues before delving into some of the empirical works done in an attempt to answer some of the questions on the role of news in advanced capitalist societies.

Instrumentalism according to Murdock [1980][8], "contests the same conceptual ground as Pluralism [because] both focus on the interests, intentions and actions of the key individuals and groups involved in newspaper production". Pluralist approaches start from the premise that ownership is relatively unimportant and a declining source of effective control over the activities of large modern corporations. At the specific level, they emphasize the use and power of the managerial strata and the relative autonomy of the creative personnel within communication corporations. At a more general level of analyses, they stress the relative autonomy of media elites like editors and investigative reporters and their competitive relationships to other institutional elites. More sophisticated variants of this approach operate from a laissez-faire model of the "industrial society" in which the centrality of consumer sovereignty is stressed. Focus of analyses in this context is on the ways in which the range and nature of the goods supplied by the media is shaped by the demands and interests of consumers or audiences as expressed through their choice between competing media fares and products in the free market.

Countering the above positions, Instrumental approaches start by asserting that ownership of the means of production remains the most important source of power in advanced capitalist societies.

They stress the continuing centrality of ownership as a source of control over the policies and activities of large communication corporations. At the specific level, they focus on the control exercised by individual capitalists to advance their own particular interests. And, at a more general level, they examine the ways in which the communications industries as a whole operate to bolster the general interests of the capitalist class, or of dominant factions within it.

Instrumentalist analyses at the specific level, in which actions of individual proprietors or press barons are imputed as ultimate determinants of newspaper content and output led to its being criticized and labelled as a crude "conspiracy theory". This simplistic variant of Instrumentalism focuses on a one-to-one relation between individual capitalists and particular newspapers or press groups. Research done in this context, inevitably concentrates on the influence exercised by newspaper owners and the pressures exerted by advertisers to ensure that their products and activities are portrayed in favourable light. This position has been criticized for its total disregard for the apparent operational autonomy of editorial staff and their resistance to proprietorial and outside pressures, especially in the era of declining individual family ownership of the press due to the concentration and centralization of corporate activities. This "Managerial Revolution" thesis points to the emergence of a powerful managerial stratum within these corporations as a countervailing force to the power of individual press barons.

The more sophisticated versions of Instrumentalism attempted to deal with the above criticism by focusing at a more general

level, on the ways in which the press as a whole represents and reflects the general interests of the capitalist class. One approach of detailing this class cohesion, is to show the social connections and commonalities linking the press with other groups in society. The assumption here is; according to Miliband [1977],[9]

> {that} a common social background and origin, education, connections, kinship, and friendship, a similar way of life, result in a cluster of common ideological and political positions and attitudes, common values and perspectives.

Research conducted by Murdock on these asymmetries during the period of 1976-1977 pointed to a number of commonalities and connections between the leading press owning groups and other key segments of British capital, in terms of educational background, position and club membership. These links between the media and other sectors of the advanced capitalist societies were further augmented by emergent patterns of interlocking directorships. The analysis of the structure of these interlocking directorships according to Murdock [1980][10];

> Produces a kind of "sociometrics of capital" which reveals the patterns of interconnection between newspaper organizations and other leading industrial concerns, and indicates the key nodes on this network. Also, they indicate possible bases for collective interests and common consciousness and they point to potential channels through which these interests might be pursued.

This is the point at which Instrumentalism rests its case. For, apart from the above inference that interlocking directorships and its other correlates could function as power bases within corporate businesses, they fell short of actually showing that they do. Instrumentalism succeeded in pointing to

instances of direct manipulation, but failed to offer a sustained plausible account of the processes of power and influence. To quote Murdock again;[11]

> Instrumentalism fails to explore the ways in which the repertoire of effective choices open to both owners and editorial personnel is framed and limited by the underlying economic dynamics of newspaper production.

It is the emphasis on "structural determinations", that forms the main concern of the structural approaches, or "Structuralism", and to a certain extent, differentiate it from the Instrumentalist approach. In essence, structural approaches locate the primary connections between class, power, and ideology in the mode of production or political economy and the limits it imposes on the choices and actions of press proprietors and personnel, whatever their social origins, social connections or personal commitments. Two strands of structural analysis can be identified. The first, normally associated with the works of Louis Althusser and Nicos Poulantzas which tended to concentrate on the "political" in the political economy, thus focusing on the role of the state, and the second which emphasizes the "economic" aspects in the couplet and concentrates on the structures and dynamics of the private sector.

To a certain extent, both Althusser and Poulantzas followed the footsteps of Antonio Gramsci in their analysis of the emergence, formation and consolidation of "hegemony" in civil society. The contention is that, the rule of force, in which repression is the only means of civic control, can only be effectively applicable to a certain point, beyond which other subtler means of societal control have to come into effect. The

concept of hegemony is employed here to account for the process of political legitimation employed by the dominant groups in society to establish themselves without recourse to outright repression. The state, according to this line of argument, is central in the process of legitimation.

Accordingly, Althusser divided the institutions of the capitalist state into two major types; the "repressive" and the "ideological". The institutions of the army, police, courts and prisons, constitute the "Repressive State Apparatuses" [RSA's] which are seen to underwrite the rule of capital through coercion. Counterpoised against these are the "Ideological State Apparatuses" [ISA's] whose main function is the engineering of consent of the dominated classes through ideological dissemination. These ideological agencies according to Althusser, include the family, the educational system, political parties and trade unions, cultural institutions, and the press and other branches of the communications industries. Both Althusser and Poulantzas were able to make and maintain the above dichotomy for the purpose of their analysis by adopting a wider definition of the "State" to include such institutions as the press which otherwise would belong to the private sector. Their argument is that these institutions are functional in the maintenance of class domination by their capacity to reproduce the conditions and relations of production in advanced capitalist societies.

This posture has been criticized as being tautological and for abolishing the crucial empirical distinction between different forms of capital-class relations.[12] Without this distinction, i.e. between state power and class power, the critics argue, it is

almost impossible to address the complex and contradictory relations between the dominant segments of capital and the key groups commanding the state apparatuses.[13] The "political economy" approach attempts to rectify this conceptual anomaly by focusing on the ways in which economic dynamics shape the operations and output of the press and other mass media. Their basic argument is that;

> It is the structure and dynamics of the capitalist economy which principally determines the organization and performance of the press. Proprietors and other capitalist do not need to intervene in newspaper production since the logic of the prevailing market structure ensures that by and large the output endorses rather than opposes their general interests.[14]

One major contention between structuralism and the political economy approach is on which comes first in the operations of media industries; ideology or commercial imperatives. This issue has generated a long running internal dialogue which time and space can not allow us to go into here. However, as can be discerned from the above summaries of the conceptual frameworks of the contemporary Marxist positions, there emerge a common belief in the ideological location and function of the mass media in capitalist societies. It is the way and manner in which this ideological discourse is reproduced and disseminated that is contentious.

Both cultural studies and discourse analysis to a certain extent attempt to fill in for the above impasse by providing a methodological parameter within which ideology can be 'read' or uncovered in mediated messages and discourse. As Hall (1986)[15]

pointed out, cultural studies as a distinctive problematic emerges in the 1950's with the emergence of Hoggart's book, <u>Uses of Literature</u> and William's <u>Culture and Society</u>. The Uses of literature according to Hall, set out to 'read' working class culture for the values and meanings embodied in its patterns and arrangements, as if they were certain kinds of 'texts.' Culture in this context therefore, is seen not simply as a practice or simply the descriptive sum of the mores and folkways of societies, but as threaded through all social practices and is the sum of their interrelationship. What is studied in cultural studies therefore, is culture conceptualized as those patterns of organization, those characteristic forms of human energy which can be discovered as revealing themselves in unexpected identities and correspondences as well as in discontinuities of an unexpected kind. The analysis of culture is then "the attempt to discover the nature of the organization which is the complex of these relationships."[16] Cultural studies to a certain extent do share certain positions with the structuralists discussed above with more or less one distinctive difference. That is the possibility of mapping out the culturalists paradigm without requiring a conceptual reference to the term ideology, while at the same time the structuralists do not tend to favour the term culture in contrast to ideology. Structuralism to a certain extent owe a lot to the early Semiotics such as Levi-strauss and Saussure who provided the possibility of a "human sciences of culture". Summarizing what can be considered as the dominant paradigm in cultural studies, Hall pointed out that;[17]

> It stands opposed to the residual and
> merely reflective role assigned to 'the
> cultural'. In its different ways, it
> conceptualizes culture as interwoven with
> all social practices; and those

> practices, in turn, as a common form of
> human activity: Sensuous human praxis,
> the activity through which men and women
> make history.

It is from the above perspective that the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham once headed by Hall above operates by breaking away from the classical quantitative stimilus-response approaches. Their approach defined the media as a major cultural and ideological force, standing in a dominant position with respect to the way in which social relations and political problems were defined and the production and transformation of popular ideologies in the audiences addressed.

This concern for the reproduction of ideologies in and through the media is also the main focus of discourse analysis as is represented in the works of French thinkers such as Barthes, Lacan, Foucault, Althusser, Laclau etc., and currently Van Dijk. Discourse analysis stresses that ideological positions, interests and power can be 'signalled' through such apparently 'context free' language characteristics as sentential syntax. (Van Dijk, 1985)[18] It stresses the crucial interrelations between text and context. In the study of international communication, discourse analysis attempts to show economic and cultural dominance in communication is actualized in the details of media texts and their uses. (Hamelink, 1985)[19] Explicit comparison of media products across nations and cultures specify which thematic, stylistic, rhetorical, schematic or other features of media discourse are imposed or not by the dominant communication monopolies. (Van Dijk, 1985)[20]

This contention, of news as ideology, has been recently raised in a large number of studies focusing on both news as a social system of production, and on news as a particular type of message or text. [c.f. Halloran et.al, 1970;[21] Hartmann, 1975; 1976;[22] Altheide, 1976;[23] Fisherman, 1978; 1980;[24] Gans, 1979;[25] Golding and Elliott, 1979;[26] Schlesinger, 1978;[27] Tracy, 1977;[28] Tuchman, 1972; 1973; 1978;[29] Chibnall, 1977;[30] Gitlin, 1980;[31] Glasgow Media Group, 1976; 1980; 1985;[32] Hall et.al, 1978;[33] Molotch and Lester, 1975].[34] All of these studies tended to share a common concern with ideology, and the desire to unearth the underlying practices and assumptions on which the process of news making is "constituted and reconstituted in an otherwise unproblematic and taken-for-granted fashion." [Knight, 1982][35] Most of these studies attempted to show how the routinizing of news work and news practices tended to create accounts that systematically rely on and reinforce certain types and forms of social knowledge to the exclusion of others. [Tuchman, 1978][36] And hence, begin to point to the ways in which these "underlying practices and assumptions register the broader relations of domination that inform social life, and our intellectual appropriation of it". [Knight,1982][37]

Gans,[1979][38] provided a list of four theoretical categories that tried to explain how certain stories are selected as news. First, there are the Journalist-centered theories which explain news as a product of professional judgements. This position posits journalism as an autonomous profession, serving the public interest based on stated and unstated rules of objectivity, balance and impartiality, and to a certain extent divorced from outside political, economic or ideological pressures.

The second set of theories stress the **inertia, the sheer habit of news organizations.** Emphasis here is on the organizational structure of the news operations themselves, and commercial imperatives.[39] Associated with these theories are the more recent phenomenological approaches to news as a social construct, which emphasizes the various informal rules which journalists adopt to enables them to select, process and package vast amounts of information in a form audiences will accept as news.[40]

The third theoretical strand according to Gans, is **event centered.** Its basic argument is that, news "mirrors" or "reflects" the actual nature of the world: it is a mirror of reality. The contention is that news necessarily responds to events.

Fourthly, there are theories which attempted to locate the causes of news selection in **institutions or social conditions outside the news organization;** i.e. in technological factors, economics, the audience, national culture, the most powerful news sources, and/or the ideologies of the dominant power groups in society. These theoretical categories are not necessarily exclusive of each other, each has something to offer, but nonetheless, none on its own can provide an adequate account of news processes and the nature of news. As Gans himself pointed out;[41]

> News should be viewed as information
> which is transmitted from sources to
> audiences, with journalists - who are
> both employees of bureaucratic commercial
> organizations and members of a profession
> - summarizing, refining, and altering
> what becomes available to them from
> sources in order to make the information
> suitable for their audiences. Because

> news has consequences, however, journalists are susceptible to pressures from groups and individuals [including sources and audiences] with power to hurt them, their organizations, and their firms ... Sources, journalists, and audiences coexist in a system, although it is closer to being a tug of war than a functionally interrelated organism. These "tugs of war" are in the end "resolved by power", and news is therefore, among other things, in the words of Philip Schlesinger, "the exercise of power over the interpretation of reality"[42]

Within this context therefore, the best approach to the understanding of the nature of news, is one in which the above factors are taken together as both determinants of news production in themselves, and most importantly, as determined or responding to commercial imperatives within the context of advanced capitalist relations of production. As Murdock pointed out,[43] "the manufacture of news is framed by a distinctive set of journalistic criteria of news worthiness, and by routine practices of gathering and processing through which these values are operationalized. [But], these news values and practices, it is argued, evolved historically in response to the press's changing market situation and still carry the imprint of this legacy."

For example, the desire of the press to free itself from direct government control and establish itself as a commercial service catering for the needs and interests of the public, necessitate that it must establish itself as a profession, autonomous, and with clear cut professional ethics and codes of conduct. As an occupation therefore, journalism, in its attempt to provide professional services to its clients, ideally strives to be neutral, detached, disinterested, [Knight;1982][44] in a nutshell, 'objective'. To achieve this objectivity which Tuchman,

[1972][45] termed a "strategic ritual," journalists attempt to separate "facts" from "opinions". Reporting the news is separated from interpreting it, which entails that in news reports, both sides of the case have to be presented. Interpretation of events on the other hand, is left to the mercy of the opinionated editorials.

This problematic according to Knight, [1982][46] is resolved by reliance on news sources as the primary definers of news, and in this way, journalism operationalizes objectivity, and deflects external criticisms of bias. Most studies of news production have shown that the tendency is to rely heavily on established bureaucratic spokespersons, professional experts and political elites as news sources. Here then, is how stratification mediates the relationship between news and ideology because, reliance on officials and elites reinforces the form and substance of news along class lines. Molotoch and Lester's, [1975][47] work on the representativeness of citizens groups on environmental issues; the work of Tuchman, [1978][48] on early women movements in the United States; Hartmann's, [1976][49] study of news coverage of industrial relations, and Elliott's [1980][50] study on the reporting of Northern Ireland all clearly showed that social movements are not accorded the same legitimacy as credible news sources as other more formalized organizations. Ordinary people, according to Molotoch and Lester, [1974][51] "must assemble in the wrong place at the wrong time to do the wrong thing": otherwise, they remain invisible to reporters and editors. "News then presents a politically legitimated reality, and the news frame thrusts that mode of interpreting the world on news consumers." [Tuchman;1978][52] Fisherman's [1977][53] study of a small town

newspaper, reiterated the above position by demonstrating that news is a product of negotiated interactions among news workers and news sources. He went on to point out that:

> All hard-news reporting reproduces the primacy of such legitimated bureaucratic institutions; facts produced by centralized bureaucratic sources are assumed to be essentially correct and disinterested; facts promoted by others are 'soft', 'nonobjective', and interested.

Within this framework, crime is always defined by the police, and not by either the victim or the perpetrator; and the impact of inflation is defined by government statisticians, not the taxpayer. [Tuchman;1978][54] The Glasgow media group, [1976][55] also pointed out that, news coverage of industrial relations tended to generate accounts of uncontrollable forces, in which social actors are cast as either villains or heroes; those who disrupt the consumer society and those who battle to retain social order. As Hartmann [1976][56] concurred, mainstream news tends to depict trade unions only in the context of strikes, while attention to many "positive" activities they are involved in remains slight. Trade unions are described as troublesome, destructive and militant, to the extent that "industrial relations news tends to be structured within an over-aching frame of reference in which workers and trade unions are accorded less legitimacy than employers."[57]

This tendency of news to be predominantly about the actions and opinions of elites is further compounded by the fact that not all the elites are equally attended to. As Murdock [1980][58] pointed out, "news tends to concentrate on political elites and give comparatively little coverage to industrial elites ... [T]his

skew of attention has the pertinent effect of divorcing power from property ownership and identifying political and state office as the prime sources of power".[59]

Similarly, accelerated commercialization forced the press to attempt to maximize its audience in order to increase revenue and attract more advertisers. This situation according to Murdock [1980][60] "intensified competition further thereby, reinforcing the press's stress on recency and speed." This ultimately resulted in the identification of news firmly with current events. News therefore, became a commodity with a very short life cycle. By definition therefore, news is about novelty and recency; events as they are happening in the here and now.

This "empiricism of news" [Knight; 1982][61] led news accounts to play down the question of historical connectedness and development. Even in cases where news stories are accompanied with some attention to "background" information, in order to "fill in" the current story and assist reader understanding; what this amounts to is no more than an "appropriation of the past without history: The past is called up to bear witness, but only in the sense that it is a repository of other discrete 'events' and occurrences. [Knight; 1982.][62]

> News empiricism collapses the past into the present, evacuating real history of its historical specificity, and homogenizing its substance into more-of-the-same strikes or crimes or scandals or crises ... The past becomes a less immediate version of the present.[63]

These ahistorical "ritualized"[64] news accounts also have the added tendency of de-socializing and naturalizing the social

world. The use of photographs, direct quotations from sources etc., encourage the audience to perceive and read news as a direct product of the actual and factual, and not as "an abstracted account of what took place." [Knight;1982][65] This has the ideological i.e. uncritical effect of making the audience to assume that the violence and disruptions they see and read time and time again means any form of strike or demonstration is violent or disruptive.

Associated with the above naturalized and de-socialized character of news is its tendency to personalize news events. In this context, strikers are seen to cause strikes and not the management, crime is always attributed to individuals with psychological problems and not the society at large. This personalization of news according to Knight, [1982][66] "reflects the wider ideology of individualism that sustains it and is sustained by it: The only permanent reality of the world is the reality of the individual subjects". Elliott's [1980][67] study of the British media coverage of the struggle in Northern Ireland clearly documents this personalization and naturalization of social action. Here again, there are sound commercial reasons for the tendency of news to naturalize and personalize events, in that;[68]

> Focusing on individual action fits easily with daily production schedules and offers points of intelligibility, interest and identification for readers. Nevertheless, together with the 'event orientation' it offers a particular view of social structure and process. It tends to transform structures of inequalities into individual differences. 'No more classes, only a cloud of individuals'; no more history, only a mosaic of events; this is the only message. ... Hence, industrial relations become news in the

> form of disputes and strikes, social and
> political conflict in the form of
> demonstrations and public disturbances.

Of relevance to us here is the assertion by Murdock [1980][69] that, "emphasis on 'negative' events, on fractures in the social fabric surreptitiously normalizes the status quo, [to the extent that] everyday life under capitalism becomes the taken-for-granted base from which to describe and assess interruptions and challenges." A crude observation of this phenomenon by leaders of the Third World in respect to the nature of international news gave impetus to most research done on the subject.

4:1

NEWS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CAPITALIST SYSTEM: THE CONTEXT OF RESEARCH.

Political considerations and interests are said to always have a bearing on what kind of research is done, how it is conducted, and to a large extent therefore, the outcome or results arrived at. [cf. Halloran,1982][70] This is more so in the study of international communication which, to a large extent is inherently tied to international politics and relations. As Mowlana [1973][71] pointed out, most research carried out in the United States in the 1950's and 1960's was affected by historical events in that, most studies on specific cultural and geographical areas have corresponded roughly to the United States involvement in those areas.

The second phase of upsurge in research on international communication in the 1970's and 1980's is also in response to political questions raised by the leaders of the Non-Aligned Nations regarding the nature, direction and content of international media artifacts and news as it affects their countries. Prominent in this current research is the preponderance of attention to the flow and content of international news. Two lines of inquiry which characterize the present state of research can be discerned. First, there are studies dealing with the actual flow of and content of news, and second, those studies concerned with the factors determining the flow of news.

The first set of studies concentrated on examining the flow and content of news from one country to another or, at a comparative basis, examines the direction and amount of flow within a region or at the international level. Under this rubric, three major hypotheses were employed. First, the "centre-periphery" perspective adopted by Johan Galtung in the analysis of his **Structural Theory Of Imperialism** [1971][72] and second, the conception that international news tended to flow from the North to the South; from the developed nations to the underdeveloped countries. Thirdly, there is the hypothesis which adopted a triangular flow pattern by subdividing the North into East and West and connecting each to the South.

Galtung's "centre-periphery" hypothesis pointed to the inequalities of nations and the existence of "feudal networks in international communication" dominated by the nations in the 'centre'. His major conclusions were that, there is a preponderance of 'centre' news events reported in the world press

systems, and that this 'centre' news occupies a larger proportion of the foreign news content in the media of the 'periphery' nations than the 'periphery' news occupies in the 'centre' nations. Also there is said to be relatively little or no flow of news among the 'periphery' nations, especially across colonially based bloc borders. Lastly, there is a much larger discrepancy in the news exchange ratios of 'centre' and 'periphery' nations than in the exchange ratios of 'centre' nations.[73]

This "centre-periphery" notion was reconceptualized in the parlance of the New International Information Order debate, to refer to international news flow as one in which news flows in a vertical direction from the developed nations of the North to the developing countries of the South. Most research findings indicate that though there exists some form of horizontal flow of news within both the North and South, the flow within the South is significantly less. Also, while a good deal of news flow from the South to the North, the volume is substantially insignificant compared to the flow in the opposite direction. Reyes Matta's [1975][74] study of Latin American newspapers revealed that foreign news flow from the North dominated foreign news in Latin America. On the other hand, Gehan Rachty's [1978][75] research on news flow in nine Arab countries indicated the predominance of a South-South flow within the region.

In general, research findings indicate that Third World coverage focuses on negative or 'bad' news; catastrophes, violence and corruption, rather than on 'developmental' news. Associated with this is that international news generally is 'Westerncentric', shallow and simplistic, concentrating on

political leanings of governments and actions and statements of
political elites. This makes international news to be 'event
oriented; concentrating on fragmented events without recourse to
the factors causing these events.

One of the most recent studies in this area is the joint
UNESCO/IAMCR project on foreign images in the international media,
[Sreberny-Mohammadi;1984,1985][76] which showed the dominance of
international news by certain exceptional events which attract
global attention. This finding points to a similarity of news
processing structures across countries and regions. A similar
conclusion was earlier reached by Elliott and Golding [1979][77] in
their comparative study of news production processes in Ireland,
Nigeria and Sweden. They pointed out that, "a very large
proportion of news stories [in both countries, but more so in
Nigeria] concerns the prepackaged statements, press conferences,
and public meetings of publicity seeking bodies".[78] Several
studies [cf. Aronowitz and Haik,1980; Dahlgren and Chakpapani,
1982; Morales,1982; Hatchten and Bell,1985][79] which dealt with
Western media coverage of the Third world, tend to concur to the
negative nature of international news coverage of these regions of
the world.

The most interesting finding of these studies is the tendency
of international news to associate certain topics of coverage or
'images' with certain regions or countries. For example, Hester
[1978][80] showed that United States television tends to associate
some regions with particular types of news subjects. Thus, 83% of
Middle East news falls under only three main headings - foreign
relations, military and defence, and crime and justice. Similarly,

East European news was either under foreign relations, crime –
justice – terror, or prominent people. The only balanced treatment
according to McQuail,[1987][81] seemed to be received by Western
Europe, and that even if a peripheral country enters the news and
received large coverage, it is usually for some exceptional reason
of disaster or political upheavals, and it is newsworthy only in
relation to this event. Pratt, [1980][82] for instance, concluded
that his analysis of the portrayal of Africa in six United States
news and opinion magazines showed the impression of Africa as
unstable, conflict-ridden, dependent on the great powers and thus
lacking autonomy. In general, developing countries appear as sites
of war, disturbance or natural disaster much more often than do
developed countries.[83]

As to why international news assumed the characteristics
mentioned above, research concentrates on the activities and
operations of the world news gathering systems – the International
news agencies. Because of the almost total reliance of the world
media [both Western, Eastern and developing] on the "big four"
international news agencies, [Reuters, AP, UPI, and AFP.] the
above pattern of news flow is attributed to the processes of
selection and transmission employed routinely by these agencies. A
comprehensive study of the international news agencies by Harris
[1976][84] pointed out that even African wire service news tends to
concentrate on the political elite, dealing mainly with issues of
relevance to wider problems of international relations, rather
than African problems as such. This is because, for stories to
qualify for inclusion in the menu of this West African news
agency, they must have a potential for inclusion in the Western
media. Events of purely African interest or those difficult to

assimilate to Western news values are generally not included. A similar conclusion was reached by Elliott and Golding in their earlier mentioned study of news production processes in Ireland, Nigeria and Sweden.[85] They pointed out that television news;

> almost always concentrates on the visible and accessible, on political institutions and elite actors, on the areas of the world where there is conflict ... the structure of content is strongly shaped by the newsroom information gathering routines, news values and on the material which is made available through the news film agencies.

Seminal in this form of news analysis is the theory offered by Galtung and Ruge. [1965][86] The theory specified the factors governing the relative degree of attention given to foreign news events by the media of the developed nations. Most of the factors offered relate to the more mundane aspects of news reporting. Viz; the intrinsic value of events, their suitability for recording within the routine daily schedule of news gathering, cultural and physical proximity to the reporting nation, and their established newsworthiness etc. Of most interest is their "culture bound" factors that impinge on selection processes; i.e., those relating to dominant news values, which underlie established Western media practice and involve emphasis on elite nations, elite persons, negativity, and personalization. A further modification of the theory was offered by Rosengren [1973][87] in which 'extra-media' factors like population and trade are employed as possible determinants of news and its flow between nations.

In summary therefore, most studies of international news have tried to establish the points raised by the leaders of the

Non-Aligned Nations that their countries are at the receiving-end of international news flow both in terms of direction, quantity, and quality. Similarly, research done has, to a certain extent, established that the Third World countries are negatively depicted in the international media, in which they are tagged with images of instability, disaster, crises and dependence.

However, there still remains a lot of 'grey areas' not only in terms of methodology and consistency, but more fundamentally, in the context of the research itself. Almost all the studies done adopt a particular perspective which view the world as made-up of two or three distinct entities; North and South or West, East and South. In this context therefore, the problems of international communication or specifically, international flow of news is reduced to this North versus South polemics. Research inevitably concentrated on proving or disproving the South's accusations against the North. This polemical endeavour completely dislocates the historical realities that underpin the relationship between these nations and which have an important bearing on social processes either between or within them. For example, the possible similarities in structure and operations of the media in both the developed and underdeveloped regions of the world. A typical example is the inability of researchers to apply to the study of international news, theories and conceptualizations successfully applied to the study of the nature and function of the mass media in the advanced capitalist countries. This is a serious limitation considering that the so called Third World is a part and parcel of the international capitalist system by its historical incorporation through direct colonialism and neocolonialism as discussed in the preceding chapters.

Similarly, and this forms the problem and basis of our study, there was little or no research done in a systematic manner, on how the Third World media itself cover the Third World, and how this compares with Western media coverage of the regions. The intention here is to attempt to shade more light, however faint, on this 'grey area', by looking at how the African media cover African affairs, [in this case, Libya from 1970 to 1986] and how this compares with the Western media coverage of the same issue during the same period.

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functions as an instrument of foreign policy; economic, in which it functions as a conduit for the support of economic interests through the marketing of consumerist values and distribution of financial information; cultural, in which international communication functions as a conduit for the transmission of 'metropolitan' cultural systems and values to the 'satellite' countries; and lastly, the ideological, in which it acts as a channel for the distribution of messages that convey sets of thought patterns through which the existing international order is legitimized. International News flow has a major role to play in the execution of the above functions because it forms one of the most potent, effective and fastest means or conduit for the transmission of messages and information particularly through straight news items or stories in newspapers or over the radio or telephone, telex and facimile (Fax) sevices, and editorializing. This potential in conjunction with the easy accessibility of news to researchers makes it a very attractive avenue for research in the process of international communication. This however is not an excuse for the apparent neglect of the other important and crucial components of the process of international communication if at all the aim is to comprehensively unearth all the crucial interconnections and functions of the process. Since our main concern here is with international news flow, it is pertinent to also point out in addition to the above pausity of research directions and preoccupations in the field, that it is also evident that an imbalance exists in research, particularly with regard to its implication for critical, comparative evaluation of communication systems in different parts of the world. Nowhere has this problem manifested itself more than in the debates and subsequent directions research took on the issue of the New

International Information Order. As already pointed out, both research and policy questions were dealt with within a polemical framework in which sides have to be taken, justified and defended. This we believe, is a major problem to be addressed and rectified if research is to assume, even if partially, its role of providing informed opinions so as to eradicate prejudice, and contribute in the production of knowledge for the betterment of human endeavour. It is our belief that in as much as "fence sitting" is bad, so also is a dogmatic and idiosyncratic adherence to a particular viewpoint or opinion at whatever costs.

The purpose of this study is to attempt to provide some parameters within which the above problems can be redressed by contributing the little we can to an area of study we believe is neglected by current research on the New International Information Order. With few exceptions, most research done in the area is on the direction of flow and nature of content of international news flow from the developed nations to the underdeveloped countries. A proper detailed study of how the Third World covers itself; especially after all the rhetoric of the New International Information Order debate; the publication of the MacBride report which recommended fundamental changes in news values and perceptions and effective policies for the attainment of a just and equitable new order by the Third World countries; is almost nonexistent. Our aim therefore, is to see to what extent the African media, in this case the press, have changed in their overall approach to news gathering, news making, and dissemination. Particularly, as it affects the African continent within the context of the recommendations of the MacBride report almost half a decade after its publication, and to what extent

these practices compare or differ from those of the Western press.

Our study starts with a simple supposition which states that; after all these years of debates, research and policy recommendations, and the establishment of various national and regional news agencies and communication infrastructure initiated by the Third World countries themselves; the African press will fundamentally differ or deviate from earlier practices in regards to the collection and dissemination of information about and on the African continent. Similarly, that these "new" practices will also fundamentally differ from those adapted by the Western press in their coverage of African affairs.

This assumption may be contested on the grounds that it is over-generalizing taking into cognisance a possibility that it is not all the Third countries that fully supported the call for the International Information Order and that even among those who did, it is the government representatives who were the spokepersons in the various fora and not the journalists and media practioners directly concerned. This is a valid contention, particularly in some parts of the Third World, i.e. Latin America, where the media is principally private and commercially oriented. But, at the same time, in Africa which forms our area of focus and attention, such a possibility of change might be expected for a number of reasons. One of such is that in a large number of African countries, a large number of the media are owned and controlled or partially owned and controlled by the state. Even in instances where private media ventures exist, they are owned by individuals who in one way or the other share some similar interests with the state, a situation that might even account for the continued existence of

such media in the first place, if we regard the apparent distrust the African states usally exibits towards oppositional tendencies and opinions. In such situations therefore, even though the practicing media professionals were not directly involved in discussing the new information order, being employees of the state and directly under the supervission of its political functionaries, i.e., the Ministers of Information, they can be expected to execute policies the state adapts. It is not intended here however, that the African media must accomplish whatever the state wants them to do, it is only an assumption based on the above intricate relationships between the media, the Government or state and journalists. Even in relation to the privately owned media, this posibilty is a very strong supposition taking into cognisance the interrelationships between the commercial, political and intellectual elites and the State in most States in Africa.

A logical opposite supposition or null hypothesis is that; despite all these developments, the African press will not show any marked difference in the way and manner they cover and portray African affairs because of structural constraints of dependence and neocolonialism, which makes even their press systems and journalistic practices to operate within the same old established Western models. This supporsition is predicated on the possibility that media practitioners may rely more and more on long acquired and established journalistic practices and professional codes of conduct and ethics to not only resist a reversal of these firmly held beliefs of what makes news and what news is all about, but also reject the whole idea of the new order on grounds already banded about by the opponents of the old order. That is, as an

obstacle to freedom of speech and circulation of ideas and freedom of the press in general.

5:2 STUDY DESIGN

To subject the above suppositions to test, we decided to conduct a longitudinal and comparative study of three African and one European press coverage of Libyan affairs from January 1970 to January 1986.

SAMPLING PROCEDURE.
5:2:1 STUDY SAMPLE

The country we chose to be the focus of our study is Libya. This is based on a number of criteria. One of which is the apparent visibility of Libya in the international political scene which, concomitantly also made the country very visible in the international media. This visibility enables us to have a better framework for comparative analysis in that the country tends to satisfy most of the factors necessary for media attention from both the developed and underdeveloped nation's press. [Galtung and Ruge; 1965][1] Secondly, even within the African context, Libya under Col. Muammar Gaddafi has generated so much controversy in its relations with its neighbors and other African states to the extent that, it becomes a worthwhile research venture to try to understand how these developments are interpreted and projected by the African media.

The third and perhaps most important factor influencing our choice of Libya is related to the issues underlining the debate on

the New International Information Order. That is the issues of socioeconomic, political, and cultural dependence the Third World countries are living with. Despite their detestation of the existing international arrangements in the fields of economics, politics, culture, etc, most of the Third World countries find it extremely difficult to extricate themselves from the situations they are thrown into by these international dependency relations. Examples of even partially 'dependent' Third World nations are very difficult to come by. What we have are a few countries which tried to maintain a semblence of independence economically, politically, and socially and in the end have to be reincorporated. Cuba might stand out as the only one left of the early attempts and now possibly Libya, even though the reasons, and philosophical motives of such attempts differ fundamentally. Countries like Chile during Allende, Peru, Guinea Bissau during the time of Amilcar Cabral, Tanzania, and many other Latin American, Asian and Caribbean countries have attempted and failed. These historical examples might have conditioned the minds of most Third World leaders that the best approach is to find partial solutions through the intricate webs of international organizations by means of meaningful dialogue instead of political action.

What Libya has done is to take the old strategy of political action in dealing with its socioecomic and political dependence on the Western European countries and North America particularly, after the overthrow of King Idris whose political authority was guaranteed by Britain, the United States, France and to a certain extent, Italy. (a full review of this and other issues is undertaken in our discussion on Libya's polity and economy.) In

short, Libya might be the only country in Africa which has politically partially severed (or was severed) relationships with the superpowers and is still holding on however precarious the situation is. To a certain extent Libya has even attempted to be the decision maker in respect of its economic relationships with the superpowers i.e., in deciding the price of its crude oil etc.

Underlying all the above attempts by these Third World nations for self reliance and autonomy is the fierce and sometimes total propaganda that is unleashed by the powerful Western European and North American countries to suffocate such declarations of independence. Historically, we find that whenever such things occur the media is there in full force. Vietnam provided the impetus and countries like Cuba, Chile, Peru, the Congo in the times Lumumba, Iran and now Libya followed. None of these instances however can be said to be treated equally the same by the media, even though some of the underlying reportorial currents and themes might be the same. It is therefore an interesting research venture to see how the socioeconomic and political developments in Libya from the ascendency of Colonel Gaddafi to power in 1970 were covered and treated by the international and African media. This venture assumed more importance in the context of the emergence of the call for the New International Information Order. It provides us with the opportunity to find out how the African media will perform in such situations. That is, will they follow in the footsteps of the Western European and North American media and employ the prevalent framework of interpreting the nature and context of the political developments in Libya, or be influenced by the call for the new order, and evolve a totally different perspective in their

treatment of Libya, particularly since Libya is an African country.

The choice of Libya here might seem to be a convenient strategy even if it is based on the above rationalizations which can easily be interpreted as politically motivated. This might be the case. However, it can also be argued that most research directions and choices are one way or another influenced by one form of interest or another. It is also worth noting that currently Libya might easily stand out as one country in Africa (with the exception of South Africa and the Middle East) that has engaged the attention of the media for well over a decade. Of course there are the periodic eruptions here and there i.e., the famine in Ethiopia etc, which have emerged and commanded the attention of the media. But they always tend to assume typical characteristics which inevitably made their coverage by the media to also reflect those characteristics. For example it is possible for the coverage of the Ethiopian famine to assume a sympathetic angle evoking images of suffering and death. These images are bound to be adhered to by most of the media because no media will like to diverge from such angles of human feelings and sympathy. The Libyan case however is somewhat devoid of such humanistic elements because of its "neutral" political inclinations. This then will allow us to see the diversity of angles the various media in our sample will adopt in their treatment of Libyan affairs. This to a large extent influenced our choice of Libya.

√ 5:2:2 THE MEDIA

The media sampled for analysis are three African newspapers, viz; The Nigerian Daily Times, The Daily News of Tanzania and The Standard of Kenya, and one Western European newspaper, The Times of London. The three African newspapers were chosen based on their ownership, circulation, age, and to a certain extent, influence in terms of readership and public opinion formation capability.

The second factor influencing our selection is based on the declared or assumed socioeconomic and political nature of their home countries which we believe has a bearing on their operational framework. For example, Nigeria claims to be a mixed economy in which both the private and public sectors of the economy operate equally. This stance is reflected even in the ownership structure of the Daily Times in which both the government and the private sector participate almost equally. The Tanzanian Daily News on the other hand, operates in a country that declares itself to be a Socialist State in which private enterprise is severely limited. To this extent, the ownership of the Daily News is solely in the hands of the government. Lastly, The Standard of Kenya operates in a country described as the citadel of capitalism or free enterprise in Africa, which is also reflected in the ownership of the standard which is not even Kenyan, but foreign. The Times of London is sampled because of its international reputation, and influence both at home and abroad. Most importantly, as a good example of the operations of the capitalist press particularly in the international arena.

The limitation of our sample to the above newspapers however, was influenced more by other extraneous factors we have little power to circumvent in the given circumstances. First, the sample is only limited to the Anglophone countries of Africa in neglect of the other major linguistic regions of the continent. This inevitably is predicated on the fact that financial and time factors inhibit the consideration of the other linguistic regions because of the amount of money needed for the translation of vast amounts of news items covering almost fifteen years from either Arabic, French or Portuguese, all languages totally foreign to the researcher. Secondly, it would have been worthwhile to select countries that might have been more vocal in the debate on the New International Order. But again we were limited by the fact that we could not lay our hands on any existing literature that categorically listed the particular African countries that either supported or opporsed the issue with the exception of Tunisia in particular, whose Information Minister stood out as an exceptionally vocal supporter for the issue. Overall we have to work with the premise that all the African countries were in support of the issue in the absence of a bonafide public acknowledgement to the contrary.

The above limitations notwithstanding, we believe the sample is adequate to tackle the issue at hand given the fact that most of the African countries in one way or the other share similar political and economic structures which we believe are crucial in shaping and determining the operations of their media systems. This it is believed is circumscribed by our choice of countries representing and operating the three different socioeconomic and political practices i.e., capitalist, socialist and mixed economy,

which also is reflected in the ownership of the three media
sampled. That is private (The Nairobi Standard), public (The Daily
News), and mixed (The Nigerian Daily Times).

The choice of The Nairobi Standard once again may be seen to
be problematic in that it is not actually an African newspaper
because of its foreign ownership. This again is as a result of
operational difficulties. The initial intention was to select the
Daily Nation which has more circulation figures and is more
importantly a more Kenyan Newspaper than The Standard even though
it is also owned by the Agha Khan group, owned by an Asian. This
however, was not possible because we have to rely on the British
Newspaper Library for all the newspapers to be analysed because of
the limited finance we have which preclude the travelling to the
various countries concerned to collect the necessary samples
required. This and the fact that getting back issues from African
newspaper establishments is a problem because they do not usually
keep them (as experienced when an attemt was made to get back
copies of The Nigerian Daily Times) because of storage facilities,
made us to select The Standard. The Daily Nation collection at The
British Newspaper Library at Colindale, only exist up to 29th of
June 1963, while the only other Kenyan published newspaper
existing for the whole duration of our sampled period was the The
Standard, and hence its selection.

It is however worthwhile to poin out that despite the above
handcaps, The Standard can as well serve the purpose without in
any way affecting any generalizations or conclussions to be
reached. This is because, even though it is foreign owned, as most
financial, industrial, commercial and even agricultural concerns

in Kenya, it is nevertheless to a large extent under a certain amount of control of the State and its local political machinery to an extent that its operations and outlook may be be expected to a certain degree be consonant or tally with the interest of the State and its local bureacratic elite and machinery. In conclussion therefore, the above limitations apart, it is expected the above sample will effectively serve the purpose this research set out to do.

5:2:3 PERIOD OF STUDY.

The study period is from January 1970, about four months after the Libyan revolution which brought Col. Muammar Gaddafi to power, to January 1986. The period is subdivided into three phases viz; 1970 - 1975; 1976 - 1980; and 1981 - 1986. The first phase of our time sample, 1970 - 1975, represents the early period of the Libyan revolution and the pre-New International Information Order Debate or when the debate was at its infancy. The second phase, 1976 - 1980, represents both the period of consolidation for the Libyan revolution and the time in which the New International Information Order debate was at its peak, culminating in the publication of the MacBride report in 1980. The third phase, 1981 - 1986, represents the post debate era in which any changes in the operations of the African media in line with the recommendations of the debate in general might be expected. It also represents the time when Libya as a nation was attracting so much attention to itself in the international community.

The main purpose for this phasing is to enable us to see if the coverage of Libyan affairs by our African press sample

significantly changes both qualitatively and quantitatively over the three periods and how this relates with or differs from the European press coverage of Libya in the same time period. The above phasing does not in any way imply an assumption of some form of media potentialities to respond to poltical currents such as the call for the new order in information dissemination, but more of an interest to see to the possibility of such a potential and also provide us with an avenue for comparisons in respect to the operations of the media in the respective periods.

Because of the size of the study period which spans over 16 years, we decided to first draw an analytical sample of four months in each year of the period 1970 to 1985. This amounts to 64 months in all. In this context, a systematic sampling procedure was employed to select the required four months of our yearly sample. Starting with 1970, the first month of the year was selected i.e. January and then every third month of the year. This gave us January, April, July and October as the sample for 1970. In 1971 however, which is the second year of our study period, we start by selecting the second month of the year i.e., February, followed by every third month as is permissible to allow us have a sample of four months. This procedure is applied throughout the study period. For example, in year three, which is 1972, we start by selecting the third month i.e., March, and in 1973, the fourth year of the study period, we select April, the fourth month first. In 1974, however, the process is started all over again in that the first month to be selected is the first month; in 1975, the second and 1976, the third, etc., up to 1985. Similarly, in some of the years in which the sampling procedure starts well into the year, for example, 1973, in which April was the sampling base, we

extrapolate back to the beginning of the year after reaching the end in order to have our four months sample. In 1973 for example, April was selected first, then followed by July, October and then extrapolating back into the year we find that the third month after October is January, which is selected to complete our sample for that year. The sample we ended-up with was;

1970: January, April, July, October.

1971: February, May, August, November

1972: March, June, September, December.

1973: April, July, October, January.

1974: May, August, November, February.

1975: June, September, December, March.

1976: July, October, January, April.

1977: August, November, February, May.

1978: September, December, March, June.

1979: October, January, April, July.

1980: November, February, May, August.

1981: December, March, June, September.

1982: January, April, July, October.

1983: February, May, August, November.

1984: March, June, September, December.

1985: April, July, October, January.

In summary, the sample consists of 64 calendar months in which the months of January, April, July, and October all have a frequency of six, while February, March, May, June, August, September, November and December all have a frequency of five. The Overall mean is 5.3, with a standard deviation of one.

The above sample however, is still too large to be fully analysed given the time period and resources available to us. To this extent, we decided to take a further sub-sample of one week in each month for example January $1^{st} - 7^{th}$ or July $8^{th} - 14^{th}$ etc. In this sense, our sample week is not a normal continuous week of Monday to Sunday, but rather a seven day calendar week, i.e. 1st to 7th or 15th to 21st etc. of a month. Here also, we adopted a systematic sampling procedure that entails that in the first year of our study period, we will only analyse the first "weeks" i.e. first seven days of our sampled months. In the second year we take only the second week and the third and fourth weeks of the third and fourth years respectively. From year five, i.e. 1974, the whole process is repeated again up until 1985. It is worth noting that the "weeks" forming our sample do contain Sundays which for the sake of comparability, we decided to eliminate because of the different formats Sunday newspapers tend to adapt. This makes our sample mainly to consist of six newspaper days. Our final sample therefore is;

YEAR	DAYS	MONTHS
1970:	1 - 7	January, April, July, October.
1971:	8 - 14	February, May, August, November.
1972:	15 - 21	March, June, September, December.
1973:	22 - 28	April, July, October, January.
1974:	1 - 7	May, August, November, February.

1975:	8 - 14	June, September, December, March.
1976:	15 - 21	July, October, January, April.
1977:	22 - 28	August, November, February, May.
1978:	1 - 7	September, December, March, June.
1979:	8 - 14	October, January, April, July.
1980:	15 - 21	November, February, May, August.
1981:	22 - 28	December, March, June, September.
1982:	1 - 7	January, April, July, October.
1983:	8 - 14	February, May, August, November.
1984:	15 - 21	March, June, September, December.
1985:	22 - 28	April, July, October, January.

This sampling procedure we must admit, looks cumbersome. But, we believe in the long run, it will give us a better picture of the pattern of Libyan affairs coverage than a simple random sample that may saddle us with a sample concentrated in a few number of years or months which will undoubtedly skew the results of the study to a particular event or period. In an effort to achieve some form of reliability which might be affected by the apparent spread of the above sample, we decided to take a further random sub-sample of one month in the last year of our study period i.e., 1986. The month selected was January 1986, which will be analysed in full. This we hope will allow us to see if there are any discernible patterns between the main sample in our longitudinal sample and the January 1986 sub-sample and which might have a bearing on the validity of any generalizations we might come-up with.

5:2:4 METHOD OF ANALYSIS

The basic unit of analysis is the news item. Specifically defined for analytical purposes as all news items about and or on Libya located in the general and or specialized pages of the newspapers with the exclusion of adverts, and private or public announcements. The main criteria for inclusion is that the news item should specifically have a heading or headline indicating that it is about or on Libya. In this sense, a news item about another country or issue which contains just a passing reference to Libya will not be considered. The reason for this is associated with the problem of locating these items since it is almost impossible to read through the whole newspapers, a necessary task if these items are not to be missed.

These units of analysis, i.e., straight news items, editorials, features, datelines, readers letters, photographs and cartoons, are to be analysed quantitatively and qualitatively by way of content analysis. A pre-coded coding schedule was constructed by adopting The IAMCR/UNESCO coding schedule used in the Foreign Images project. The main categories to be analysed and measured are the nature of content, volume, length in column centimeters, source, main actors, and the general topics of the news coverage of Libya. Similarly, a list of general positive and negative motifs was constructed and applied to see to what extent they appear or are implied in the news texts in an effort to map out the kind of image of Libya portrayed by these media. See the coding schedule in appendix A for the full analytical categories to be looked at. This will be supplemented with a contextual analysis of the politico-economic and social factors that form the

background upon which these news items are predicated and which, in the longrun determines its content, both manifest and latent.

5:3 MEDIA SAMPLE: A BRIEF RESUME.

5:3:1 THE NIGERIAN DAILY TIMES.

The Nigerian Daily Times was founded by a group of European traders and some African conservatives as a counter current to the nationalist African press of the time. Its first issue appeared on the first of June, 1926. Twenty one years later, The Daily Times was taken over by Cecil King, the publisher of The Daily Mirror of London. According to Frank Barton, [1979][2], King's African adventure began in 1947 when at the suggestion of a British colonial officer he purchased for a modest 46,000 pounds, The Lagos Daily Times and its two magazines, West Africa and West Africa Review. His recipe for The Daily Times was not different from the one that had propelled The Daily Mirror to its dominance on British newsstands.

The Daily Times became a public liability company in 1967 with Nigerians owning about a quarter of its ordinary stock. In 1972, the Nigerian Government promulgated the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree with a deadline for the 31st of March by which all companies should be fully Nigerianized in terms of ownership. In 1974 therefore, the last British presence in the Nigerian press was removed when the London Mirror Group sold all its shares in The Daily Times and The Sunday Times of Lagos just a few weeks before the Decree came into effect. Not long after that,

Government-press relations started to take a new turn due to the inherent sensitivity of the military rulers to press criticism. This led to the Government take-over of The Daily Times and Sunday Times in 1975, by acquiring a 60% controlling share in the company.

The Daily Times has a circulation of about 350,000, the highest circulation figure among the Nigerian dailies. Its Sunday edition, The Sunday Times has the highest circulation figures, among both dailies and non-dailies, of around 420,000. Its format is tabloid with local news dominating the front and back pages while international news is mostly in the inside pages.

In general, The Daily Times is considered to be the most influential newspaper in Nigeria in that it has had a great impact on the course of mass communication in the country. Its influence on the character of the Nigerian public is also said to be significant, although of recent, its credibility is been questioned because of its lack of a clear position on political issues and as to what extent a Government owned paper with politicians as its policy makers could truly be editorially independent. On the other hand, it is argued that in a developing country like Nigeria, it is essential that the Government owns a newspaper in order to ensure effective and wide publicity of its developmental activities. These advocates of Government ownership maintain that only the existence of Government-owned media can guarantee that the national interests are represented and protected in a media dominated by giant international media conglomerates.

5:3:2 THE DAILY NEWS OF TANZANIA.

The Tanzanian press according to Wilcox [1982][3] is dominated through ownership and editorial control by either the Government or the ruling party; The CCM [Chama Cha Mapinduzi: Revolutionary Party] in this nation that has become the leading model on the continent for African Socialism. Tanzania's newspapers are concentrated in the capital, Dar-es-Salaam, and are elitist in terms of readership and distribution. However, their content is mostly in the popular, mass-appeal type.

The Daily News is the largest circulating English language daily in Tanzania, and the third largest circulating daily in the country. It is an eight column broadsheet with eight pages Monday to Thursday and 12 pages on Friday. It has its roots in The Tanganyika Standard which was formed in 1930 when the Colonial Government in Tanganyika requested The Standard of Kenya to establish a newspaper in Dar-es-Salaam. Nine years after the then Tanganyika gained independence, The Standard was nationalized in 1970 by Nyerere in line with his Arusha Declaration of 1967, which states that Tanzania will follow the path of Socialism as a means of national development. Subsequently The Standard started operating as a Government newspaper, with the editors appointed by the office of the president. Prior to the nationalization of The Standard, the Government was relying on an unsuccessful party paper, The Nationalist, established by TANU in 1964. Two years after The Standard was nationalized, it was merged with The Nationalist in 1972, to form The Daily News.

The Daily News has a circulation of about 28,000, and its Sunday edition, The Sunday News, a circulation of 28,288. Like the weekly edition, The Sunday News is also an eight column broadsheet averaging about 12 pages. Both The Daily News and The Sunday News circulate mainly in Dar-es-Salaam, and their primary readership is the diplomatic community, expatriates, tourists, and government civil servants. Both papers carry more international news than the remaining vernacular newspapers; Uhuru and Mzalendo.

5:3:3 THE STANDARD: KENYA.

The Kenyan press is an anomaly among the press systems of African states in that private and commercial interests still control and operate the mass and popular press. The country's daily newspapers are not only privately owned but are the last remaining dailies in Black Africa owned and controlled by foreign interests. Kenya's press remains very British in its appearance as a result of Kenya been a British colony-protectorate for more than 80 years before its independence in 1963. This long period of colonialism instilled British journalistic traditions in a number of ways. In particular, the press was geared to the European settlers, and British expatriates directed the operations of the major dailies in Kenya up to the middle of the 1970's.

The beginnings of what was to become for a long time the most powerful press group in East Africa was the founding of the weekly African Standard in Mombasa in 1902 by an Asian, A. M. Jeevanjee. In 1910, The African Standard was sold to two Englishmen who renamed the paper to The East African Standard and moved it to Nairobi, the Kenyan capital. On the 24th of May, 1910, the East

African Standard became daily. In 1967, the Standard once again changed hands when it was bought by Lonrho; formerly, London-Rhodesia; a multi-National property company that has mining interests, breweries, and transport companies in many African countries.

The Standard is the third highest circulating newspaper after the Daily Nation [100,000], and the Taifa Leo [50,000], with a circulation of 33,000. It uses a six-column tabloid format with an average of 28 pages.

5:3:4 THE TIMES OF LONDON.

The Times is considered to be one of the most influential among the quality press of Great Britain and also among the world's elite newspapers. Almost two centuries old, The Times has always been considered as "the establishment paper, a paper to read to keep up with the affairs of Empire."[4] Established as The Daily Universal Register, in 1785 by Mr. John Walter, and renamed to its present title in 1788, The Times was probably most appreciated for its financial and commercial news. But, "the section of the paper which was destined to mark it out from its contemporaries, and make it almost a necessity for any man in public position to read was the foreign news."[5] According to John Welke, The Times strives to provide its readers with complete coverage of national, international and business news, which in an average issue of 28-32 broadsheet pages, take up respectively 14%, 10%, and almost 20% of the paper's total content.

The Times changed ownership in 1908 when it was taken over by Northcliffe, the owner of the then Sunday Observer and The Daily Mail. Again in 1922, The Times was bought by Major J.J. Astor, who continued to run it until the Thomson Organization in 1967, took over the management of The Times Newspapers Ltd., an organization formed as a result of the merger of The Times and The Sunday Times in September 1966. The Times last change of ownership was in 1981, when it was taken over by Rupert Murdoch.

5:3:5: NATION SAMPLE:

LIBYA, ITS ECONOMY AND SOCIETY; A BRIEF OUTLINE.

According to John Wright, [1969][6] Libya is a country upon which history has been imposed. "It is a country many times invaded and occupied." This Wright pointed out is much evident even in the configuration of languages spoken and used in Libya. This ranges from the Italian language imposed by the Italians from 1911-1951, to the English ordained by the British occupation forces in 1942-3, the French prescribed by the French when they occupied the Fezzan region after the second world war, and the American version of the Queen's language introduced by American oilmen and experts who started to arrive in the 1950's.[7]

The above pedestrian anthropological account of the general characteristics of Libya by Wright subsumes a more pedantic meaning in relation to the contemporary political economy of Libya. It highlights the relative importance of Libya to the Western Europeans, Americans and even the Russians from the times of the second world war to date. And, this interest has much more

to do with economic and military factors than the simple imposition of language, even though language in itself is an important component of these military and economic interests.

The Italians effectively imposed a form of 'demographic colonialism' on Libya with the conquest of the two main regions of present day Libya; Cyrenaica and Tripolitania in 1934. As far back as the late 17th century, even before the formal advent of the "scramble" for Africa in the later part of that century, Italy saw and recognizes the importance of Libya as a vital strategic landmark in the Mediterranean. In his book, Libya, [1969], cited above, John Wright pointed to this strategic value of Libya in the Mediterranean by quoting the then influential newspaper, The Opinion Of Turin which in as far back as 1863 said;[8]

> If Egypt, and with it the Suez Canal,
> falls to the British, if Tunis falls to
> the French, and if Austria expands from
> Dalmatia into Albania, etc., we will soon
> find ourselves without a breathing space
> in the dead centre of the mediterranean.

Mussolini in particular poignantly sums-up the political position of the time when he said; "for others the mediterranean is just a route, for us it is life itself."[9] It is the strategic geographical position of Libya in the mediterranean trade route that made it a prime target for Italian annexation and colonization. One of the Italian interests was the posibility of "opening overland trade routes between the mediterranean and the Red Sea."[10] In 1911, Italy invaded the parts of the Libyan provinces and ousted the Turks who were controlling that part of North Africa at the time. Nevertheless, it took the Italians almost 20 years of bitter fighting with the established monarchies

of the three seperate regions of Libya before they finally achieved what might be considered a "complete occupation and pacification" of the territory in 1932.[11] A logical correlate to the above economic impetus for the colonization of Libya was the military imperative of war weary Western Europe of the time. Trade and military excursions go hand in hand, with the later facilitating the former as evidenced in the way and manner North Africa was turned into one of the biggest and perhaps, the most important war theaters of the second world war. Last but not the least, like any colonial venture in history, Italy's schemes for Libya in the era of Mussoloni's fascism, were also predicated on the need to export segments of its population considered unworthy; the underprivileged, poor and the undesirables - the so-called "demographic colonialism". Ironically, it is this last initiative that had the most impact on Libyan economy than any of the above factors in Italian colonization of the country.

Italian peasants and the poor were shipped in their thousands to the colony at the expence of the government and given vast amounts of land with enough capital to start large scale farming with the use of Libyan labour. In order to find enough arable land which was definately scarce in a desert territory like Libya, the existing Islamic land tenure laws which confer ownership of a piece of land on the last user or whoever has cultivated the piece before, were repealed and replaced by a decree justifying the confiscation of such land on the grounds of "public use". According to Wright [1969][12];

> Land was sold, mortgaged, or rented in
> large concessions by the state and
> between 1922 and 1925 about 75000 acres
> near Tripoli were appropriated and sold
> off cheaply as large estates or

one-family holdings. Mussolini wanted
Italy's landless peasants and unemployed
to settle in Libya with their families
and establish their own farms....
These 'legionaries of labour', and
'soldiers of the soil' moved into Libya –
Italy's 'fourth Shore' and were soon
supplying Rome with food, grains and
vegetable oil. Fascist Libya was not an
African Colony, but a colony of Europeans
in Africa.

This sedentary position of Italy in Libya was distrupted by

the outbreak of the second world war in which Italy found itself

fighting on the side of Hitlers Germany thus making it an enemy of

most European countries. Libya's location in one of the most

important theaters of the war, i.e., North Africa precipitated its

occupation once again by the Allied forces of Britain and France.

By 1943, both Britain and France have effectively ousted the

Italians and established their own military administrations in

Libya. The British had the control of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania

while the French exercise dominion over the Fezzan provinces.

Italy on the other hand only retained what might be termed an

absentee claim to Libya's Sovereignty. According to Wright, both

the Italians, British and the French were interested in Libya

because of its strategic location militarily and in terms of trade

and navigation. He pointed out that Tobruk, a port in Libya, which

was frequently visited by the Royal Navy at that time;[13]

"could rather belatedly have become a
link in the chain of British bases on the
sea route from Gibraltar to Singapore,
while the nearby airfield at El Adem was
a staging post on the route to East
Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the Far
East. it was thought that cyrenaica could
become an alternative, if less effective,
Middle East base when the Suez Canal zone
was evacuated on expiry of the
Anglo-Egyptian treaty. ... (Similarly),
Fezzan, securely garrisoned by French
troops, was a convenient 'buffer
territory' protecting an exposed flank of

the French African empire.

To this scenario was added another dimension with the appearance of the United States on the Libyan territory before the end of the second world war. Thus, increasing the number of the occupation powers to three. The United States had acquired an old airfield used by the Italians and according to Wright, spent about $100 million to develop the field which was named Wheelus in honour of a young U.S.A.F. officer killed in Iran. This oldest American military base in Africa, was 'by the 1950's playing its part in Cold War strategy, as one of a series of U.S. bases in Western Europe, North Africa, and South and East Asia encircling the communist bloc.'[14]

It is within this context that the question of Libyan independence came up, discussed, and was implemented under the auspicies of the United Nations in the late 1940's. One major consequence of the above presence of various colonialists on Libyan territory was that unlike other colonial countries, the movement for national independence in Libya was directed not at any single ruling power, but against the proposals thrown up by these colonial powers in the international arena i.e., the United Nations as to the modalities of independence and the future of independent Libya. As Wright pointed out, "up to 1949 when the Libyan case was given a relatively disinterested hearing in the United Nations, it was the prospect, rather than the fact, of division and rule by foreigners that the Libyans and their sympathisers had to resist as best as they could".[15] In 1949 the United Nations adopted a resolution that Libya, comprising the three provinces of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan, shall be

constituted an independent and sovereign state, and appointed one of its assistant secretary-Generals, Adrian Pelt, as the U.N. commissioner in Libya.[16] On the 24th of December, 1951, Libya was given its formal independence with a hereditary monarch King Sayyid Idris the traditional ruler of Cyrenaica as the norminal head.

As with most former colonies in Africa, independence in Libya only meant the granting of a certain measure of political leverage to do what it wants within certain accepted limits. In the early days of most African nation's independence, and to a certain level even decades after the attainment of such independence, the actual policy maker is the erstwhile colonial power. In the case of Libya the situation is more compounded by the fact that there was more than one colonial power with a vested interest in the way and manner things are run in the country. To circumvent the possibility of other interests thwarting their own designs for an independent Libya, both Britain and with its support, the United States, entered into agreements that almost secured them a confortable niche in the future affairs of Libya.

In the first two years of its nominal independence Libya under the stewardship of the monarchy of King Idris signed a twenty-year "Treaty of Alliance" with Britain which even the conservative Arab governments of the period condemned as a blow to Libya's sovereignty and independence. This treaty was for 'peace and friendship' between the two countries and mutual aid in the event of war or armed conflict.[17] This involves the granting of facilities to Britain within Libyan territory for military purposes while Britain in turn promised annual grants of financial

aid for the duration of the agreement. As Wright pointed out, this gave Britain an alternative Middle East base to those in the Suez Canal zone. As early as 1954, barely a year after the treaty was signed by King Idris, the British evacuated their Suez Canal bases and moved to Libya where they started to build a complete division, the Tenth Armoured, at Idris airport near Tripoli and at El Adem near Tobruk on the strategic air corridors to East Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the Far East.[18]

In the same fashion, the United States which has retained its use of the Wheelus Air Force Base, went into further agreements with Libya which were to make the base and with it Libya to later play a strategic role in the defence arrangements of the 'Free World'. The agreement was formally signed in September 1954, purportedly to 'strengthen the firm friendship and understanding now existing between them'.[19] In return for a lease on the base and other areas up to the end of 1970, plus concessions on troops, aircrft carriers, and surface transport movements, the United States promised to pay $42 million in cash over the period 1954-1971 and to supply $3 million worth of grain for immediate drought relief.[20] According to Wright, the then U.S. ambassador to Libya described this arrangement as 'the keystone of the bridge between the two countries and the best example of Libyan orientation towards the West'.[21] This Libyan tactic of 'living on its geography', or more appropritely, the mortgaging of its sovereignty, was extended to the French and Italians. The French were given certain military air and surface transit rights in return for a contribution of 500 million francs to Libya's development spending in 1955-56. On the same level, the Italians were allowed to retain the large scale farms they appropriated

from Libya after they had promised to pay about £2,750,000 in economic aid in the name of 'friendship and collaboration'.[22]

These arrangements were never in vain for the foresighted colonialists because not long after, oil was struck in Libya in 1959, and significantly changed the relationship. The British and Americans in particular reaped almost overnight where they have never sowed in that the Libyan monarchy allocated most of the oil prospecting concessions to American and British oil companies. More important is the availability of oil in a country virtually in their control as an alternative to other Middle Eastern sources whose regularity of supply is becoming dependent on political factors.

A case in point is the closure of the Suez Canal in the 1956-57 period which threatened to cut off the necessary oil supply of the European nations. Libya's strategic placement made its oil accessible even with the closure of the canal. A round trip from one of the Gulf of Sirte ports to the South European pipeline terminal near Marsseilles for example, is 2,000 neutical miles; a comparable trip from the Eastern Mediterranean terminals is 3,200 miles, and from Kuwait through the Canal, 9,200 miles.[23] The stakes of both Britain, France, Italy, the United States and Germany, the major buyers of and exploiters of Libyan oil in keeping the source of this raw material open and accessible are best imagined. Libya has again become a 'rentier nation'. Before oil, it was a 'rentier' of its geography, dependent on rent on its mortgaged land and geography. With oil, it became more dependent on rent collected from oil prospecting and production. According to Bearman, [1986][24] the two most important forms of income, base

rentals and, particularly, oil revenues, come within the classification of rents. "Distinct from the costs of fixed capital, both are sums paid to the Libyan state for natural conditions which cannot be generalised".

It is within this socioeconomic and political situation that the Free Officers Coup led by Gaddafi took place and overthrew the monarchical feudal government of King Idris, in september 1969. The first indication of the political perspective and direction of the new rulers was contained in the first speech Gaddafi gave over Benghazi radio on the 1st of September 1969. The announcement declared that;[25]

> People of Libya! In response to your will, fulfilling your most heartfelt wishes, answering your most incessant demands for change and regeneration, and your longing to strive towards these ends: listening to your incitement to rebel, your armed forces have undertaken the overthrow of the corrupt regime, the stench of which has sickened and horrified us all. At a single blow your gallant army has toppled these idols and destroyed their images. ... From this day forward Libya is a free self-governing republic. ... She will advance on the road to freedom, the path of unity and social justice, guaranteeing equality to all her citizens and throwing wide in front of them the gate to honest employment, where injustice and exploitation are banished, where no one will count himself master and servant, and where all will be free.

Embedded in the above statement is the admission or allegation that hitherto, Libya was not a free nation and neither are its citizens, who according to the above statement are enslaved and exploited by the erstwhile feudal regime of the Sanussi and its foreign mentors and collaborators. It is not

surprising therefore that the first act of the new government was to abolish the parameters and institutions that facilitated these exploitative relationships. Although almost 20 years of formal independence seperated Libya from the era of foreign political control, the first stage of the Libyan revolution, following the deposition of the monarchy, was characterised by post-colonial reformist and consolidation strategies.

The first four themes in the programs of the Free Officer Leadership adequately denote this reformist orientation. Firstly, the promotion of Arabism, and the commitment to pursue the conflict with Israel; secondly, a determination to revoke the 1954 Italo-Libyan Treaty and the appropriation of the property of the Italian settlers; thirdly, the dissolution of the military relationship with Britain and the United States and the removal of their bases from Libyan soil; and lastly, the desire to bring under domestic control the principal source of the country's productive wealth, the oil industry.

All the above programs are inherently anti-colonial reform strategies aimed at the attainment of legitimacy by the new nationalist government through various modernization and sometimes overtly nationalistic rhetorics. The first act is normally - and it is the case in Libya - to replace the colonial personnel or in this case the representatives of the monarchy with those sympathetic to the new breed and their cause. This is followed by the nationalization of foreign investments, assets and interests, thus paving the way for local participation in these sectors. This allowed the Free Officer Leaders to confiscate Italian assets and investments and put them in the hands of the local population.

Next to be attacked by the new government was another form of repression exercised upon the Libyan's by both the colonialists and their resident representative, the monarchy. That is the question of language and religion. Arabic was made the official language and with it, a revolutionized version of Islam which rejects anything connected with Western capitalist values and ethics.

From these apparently simple nationalistic reforms, the revolutionary government of Gaddafi embarked on a more structurally based programs that threatened the interests of international monopoly capital. First is the expulsion of the British and American military bases in March and June 1970 respectively. These bases were of strategic importance to the Western, NATO alliance because of the growing influence of the Soviet Union in the region particularly, in Nasser's Egypt and the associated Western and American military-industrial and politico-economic interests in the African continent and the Middle East. In one single stroke, the revolutionary authorities in Libya has partly succeeded in breaking the British and American stranglehold on their country.

The second and most decisive action against the Western nations in general and international capital in particular is the Gaddafi's government taming of the international oil companies. According to Jonathan Bearman, [1986][26] "the world outside Libya felt the impact of the political transformation chiefly through the changes instituted in oil policy." The Libyans started to tackle the giant oil companies by asking for an increase in posted prices for their crude oil which the oil companies vigorously

resisted. The closure of the Suez Canal, and the coincidental blowing-up of Western oil pipelines in the Gulf by the Palestinian Liberation Organization augured well for the Libyans in their struggle against the giant oil industries.[27]

As a result, the Libyans went further than asking for an increase in posted prices and demanded that the oil companies reinvest some of their profits back into the Libyan economy in such ventures as agriculture, industry and other social services. The refusal of the oil companies to participate in this ventures led the Libyans to unvail some of the most effective strategies that brought the multinationals almost to their knees. The first of such strategies was the demand by Libya that they all cut back on production in the face of rising world market demand for oil and the shortages imposed by the incapacitation of the Gulf oil pipelines by the PLO and Syria.

The net result was that the independent oil companies operating in Libya like Occidental were forced to comply which paved the way for Libya to turn to the major producers like Esso, Mobil and BP. Within a very short period, Libya has succeeded not only in acquiring increased prices for its oil, but in tackling one of the most powerful multinational concerns in the international capitalist system. By September 1st 1973, Libya has succeeded in nationalizing almost 51 per cent of all the major and independent oil producers which was followed with the outright takeover of Occidental and Hunt Oil of Texas in the next two years.[28]

This is a precedent never set in Africa and only parallel to the events in Cuba in the aftermath of the 1959 revolution. It is this show of determination for national independence, not only politically, but economically and socially that made Libya a prime target of the international capitalist system. It is obvious to the Western countries of Europe and North America that a success of the Libyan initiative will spur other Third world countries with similar designs to try again even if they failed in earlier attempts. The Libyan threat to the activities of international monopoly capitalism in the peripheral nations was further compounded by another Cuban parallel. That is the internationalization of Libya's support to the Palestinian Liberation struggle against Israeli domination in the Middle East.

Libya's first act was to attain some form of Arab unity in line with the ideas of Gamel Abdel Nasser by proposing various merger schemes with almost all the Arab states in the region. Almost all of these mergers failed partly because of minor internal differences partaining to the questions of the need for each nation to preserve its identity and sovereignty but fundamentally because the Western European nations and the United States will not stand by idle in the face of such plans which obviously will jeopardize their interests in the region. As a result of such failures, Libya resorted to encouraging the possible removal of the conservative Arab regimes that compromise the interests of the Arab world particularly in regards to the crisis in the Middle East.

The internationalization of the above endeavors to include the support of any other liberation or nationalist movement

anywhere in the world, was one other way of Libya's attempt to deal the Western nations, particularly those who are active supporters of Israel, a serious political blow. In actual fact, these acts in themselves are not considered serious enough by the Western nations in that, besides increasing the revenue they will earn from the sale of military armaments and hardware as a result of such confrontations worldwide, it gives them another avenue to whip-up the old cold war rhetoric of Soviet influence which is crucial in the maintenance of the international capitalist system in general. Here then, we believe is one of the major reasons for the level of attention given to Libya in the international community. An attention that tried to link it with Soviet Communist expansion, even though Libya's adherence to Islam and Gaddafi's denounciation of both capitalism and communism as impractical and incompatible with his Third Universal Theory preclude such connections.

One other factor, a corollary to the above, is the relative success of Libya's internal modernization programs in the areas of social services and industry in general. Industrial policy in pre-revolutionary Libya emphasised private enterprise and not state investment. Post-revolutionary Libya under the Revolutionary Command Council [RCC], headed by Gaddafi emphasised the policy of state capitalism as is typical with most newly independent states. The state intervened in the economy by investing in plant and machinery and organizing production. This shift in priorities from entrepreneurial capitalism to a form of "collective capitalism", according to Bearman [1986][29] can be observed from the growing allocations to the industrial developments after 1969:

from an average of 3% in the period
between 1961-1969 expenditure on industry
jumped to 10.3% in 1970 and 10.7% in
1971, in consecutive annual development
plans, and rose again in the RCC's first
integrated development plan, the 1972-75
Intermediate Development Plan. In
addition, the sectoral inceases took
place in the context of a much higher
total outlay on development.

The story is the same for almost all the sectors of the
economy, (see table 2). This adherence to state capitalism or
"collective capitalism" as a viable pathway to Libya's development
was somewhat questioned when the cultural revolution was
introduced in 1973 which dictated that all the sectors of the
economy be manned by the "people's committees" in which decision
making is vested with the people to the extent that capitalist
ideals ware greatly undermined. By march 1977, The General
People's Congress (GPC) endorsed the plan that Libya be renamed
into the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, with power
vested in the people through people's congresses and popular
committees, a development which further complicated Libya's desire
for 'collective capitalism'. One problem associated with this is
that the sheer size of the committees and the proliferation of
ideas they contain will act as an impediment to the efficient
running of these sectors on purely capitalist lines. This may well
have been good for the country because, the Libya of today has
succeeded where most African countries with similar or better
resources have failed.

The Lloyds Bank Group Economic Report of 1982 showed that in
terms of housing provision, "the goal, set in 1969, to give
everyone a roof over their heads has largely been met." The same

TABLE 1: ALLOCTIONS OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS: 1969-75 (LD)

	Annual Plans			1972-75 Development Plan.			
	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Agriculture	16.4	50.0	50.4	61.1	92.8	70.5	100.1
Integrated Development						100.4	131.0
Industry And Mineral Res.	7.9	20.5	32.0	48.0	56.1	90.2	138.7
Oil And Gas	–	–	21.6	22.9	23.2	64.7	83.8
Public Works	24.9	18.4	21.5	62.3	71.7	81.4	114.3
Transport & Communicat.	22.6	27.1	39.8	39.2	35.5	67.1	72.4
Education	14.6	11.4	27.2	32.7	36.8	60.2	110.2
Health	7.4	5.9	17.0	14.0	9.3	16.5	25.2
Labour Force	–	–	–	–	–	7.4	9.1
Social Security	2.0	1.3	4.9	–	–	8.5	6.9
Housing	22.2	32.8	40.0	68.6	61.8	100	130.0
Economy	0.3	0.1	5.6	(	)(	) 3.5	3.4
Information	8.4	2.9	5.3	(4.9)	(9.7)	8.5	8.1
Municipalities	13.0	25.5	29.2	(	)(	)55.0	95.9
Planning	0.7	0.4	1.6			2.1	8.5
Reserve	1.5	2.4	2.0			3.9	5.3
Nutrition	–	–	–				3.9
Marine Transport	–	1.0	–			63.4	
Interior	1.5	1.0	2.7				
Total	145	200	300	353.7	396.9	740	1110

Figures are in million Libyan Dinars.

Source: Jonathan Bearman; Qadhafi's Libya; Zed Books; London; 1986; p125.

report also pointed out that the Libyan government runs a free health service which in 1978 barely a decade after the revolution could boast of 48 beds per 1,000 of the population in 89 hospitals, and one doctor for every 900 persons, which the report pointed out compares favourably with the UK's one doctor per 2,000 people.[30] These achievements in conjunction with the fact that Libya's gross national product (GNP) per head was in 1983 about $8,450, the highest level amoung African countries, ranked Libya one of the most developed, at least at the level of social services provision, among all the African states.

More interesting is the fact that Libya's achievements in economic independence and self-sufficiency are not confined only to the domestic economy. Even though the Italians were the first to be expelled from Libya after the 1969 revolution, Italy at the moment is Libya's major trading partner. More importantly, unlike other African states with similar natural resources, i.e. oil, who today have to resort to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the Western nations for aid packages, Libya has substantial investments all over Europe which it usually fall back onto when world oil prices slump. In 1976 Libya bought 13.6% of stock in Italy's largest motor car manufacturing company, Fiat. Through the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Bank, which Libya established in Paris, to deal with such transactions, it bought in 1985, the Italian oil company Tamoil. With this Tamoil investment, Libya now owns 850 gas pumps, a refinery, an oil distribution network for the state-owned electric company and a pipeline between Genova and Piacenza. Similarly, Libya has numerous investments in tourist agencies and hotels, television stations in Southern Italy, as well as printing presses and publishing houses.[31]

It is not a coincidence therefore that the Western European countries and the United States hated the developments in Libya. A dislike that necessitated the United States to militarily attack Libya. Libya's crime is its declaration of the right to self-determination in the face of the onslought of Western imperialistic maneuvers and the activities of international monopoly capital. The fact that Libya could somewhat successfully, even in rudimentary terms, resist all the pressures mounted against it and achieve the level of success it had in improving the level of standard of its economy and hence its citizens is a pointer to the vulnerability of the international capitalist system. The response of the defenders of the system a'la Western Europe and the United States to this `defection' by Libya also points to very intricate interrelationships between the so-called `international free market economy' and the `democratic' governments of its home base.

Present day Libya: The Socialist Arab Jamahiriya, according to The Europa Yearbook of 1986;[32] extends along the Mediterranean coast of North Africa. Its neighbors are Tunisia and Algeria to the West, Niger and Chad to the South, Egypt to the East, and Sudan to the Southeast. The country's land mass area is about 1,7775,500 square kilometers, with a population estimates of 3.64 million as at 1984. It has a population density of about 2.0 persons per square kilometer. With a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of almost $8,480 as at 1983, Libya statistically can be said to be one of the richest countries in Africa. The structure of government is one in which power is vested in the people through People's Congresses, Popular Committees, Trade Unions, Vocational Syndicates, and the 1,112-member General People's

Congress (GPC), with its General Secretariat. The Head Of State is the Revolutionary Leader, elected by the GPC. Executive power is exercised by the General People's Committee, which comprises 20 secretaries, each responsible for a Department. The country is divided into three provinces and 10 Governorates.

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CHAPTER 6:

LIBYA IN A SELECTED AFRICAN AND EUROPEAN PRESS; 1970-1986:

A LONGITUDINAL COMPARISON.

6:1 LIBYA IN THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA; 1970-1986: A SCENARIO.

A simple reconstruction of Libya's visibility in the international media from 1970 to 1986, will provide us with a scenario in which the country is gleamed in leaps and bounds from the screens and pages of the international media. This does not in any way suggest that there is no sustained coverage of the country. On the contrary, it is almost always in the news. But, it is the differential in intensity or pitch between this "normal coverage" and "the once in a while bursts" of attention that makes the scenario to assume this "leaps and bounds" characteristic.

In a simple pilot study prior to our main project, we attempted to see the level of Libya's visibility in The Times of London from 1970 to 1986 by measuring the amount of space occupied by the Times Index listings on Libya. We discovered that the amount of space measured in column centimeters and translated here to represents Libya's visibility in The Times, fluctuates from 15-35 column centimeters in the period between 1970 to 1978. From 1978 however, there was a dramatic increase in the coverage of Libya which rose from 17.5 column centimeters in 1978, to almost 110 column centimeters in 1981. This was accompanied by a reverse dramatic drop in coverage to less than 30 column centimeters in

1983. In 1984, coverage once again rose to almost 140 column centimeters and then dropped to about 70 column centimeters in 1985. From then on, Libya once again shot into the limelight in that the 1986 Times Index listings of its coverage amount to about 390 column centimeters, almost 33.2% of The Times total coverage for the whole period.

Looked at in three phases, i.e. 1970-75, 1976-80, and 1981-86, as in our study design, these pilot results indicate that 61.7% of The Times coverage of Libya was in the 1981-86 period with the periods 1976-80 and 1970-75, accounting for only 16.6% and 21.7% respectively. [see table 2 below.]

TABLE 2: AMOUNT OF SPACE COVERED BY THE TIMES INDEX LISTINGS ON LIBYA AS A MEASURE OF LIBYA'S VISIBILITY IN THE TIMES FROM 1970 TO 1986.

YEAR	AMOUNT OF SPACE IN COLUMN CENTIMETERS	%
1970-1975	277	21.7
1976-1980	212.5	16.6
1981-1986	787	61.7
TOTALS	1276.5	100

These pilot results incidentally correspond with the pattern of Libya's visibility in our study sample despite obvious factors that may determine coverage to differ from one medium to another. One major determining factor in the pattern of Libya's coverage

which cut across all the press in our sample and which also tends
to correspond to our pilot findings above was international
relations and politics.

Based on the periodic phasing above, the period between 1970
and 1975 represents the time when Libya, in the aftermath of the
September 1969 revolution, was consolidating its policies
internally and externally. International response at this stage
was one of "wait and see." Media coverage of Libya in this period
was dominated by news of internal economic and political reforms.
In the international arena, the main issues were centered on
Libya's arms deals with the French and British, and questions of
Libya-Arab relations.

In the later part of the period, some of the more contentious
issues that caught the attention of the international community
and its media were the oil price war started by Libya against the
multinational oil companies which culminated in the
nationalization of some of them. Equally prominent in the
international media at this time was the closure of the American
and British military bases in Libya. These last two factors i.e.
the nationalization of the international oil companies, and the
expulsion of foreign military forces, formed the main focus of the
international media on Libya in the period between 1970 and 1975.

In the period between 1976 and 1980, the above earlier
nascent international and domestic policy issues commanded more
attention in the international media. In this period, relations
between Libya and the Arab world, especially Egypt and Sudan; its
activities in neighboring Chad; its relations with the United

States; and most importantly, its relations with Nationalist and Revolutionary Movements world wide became central. Also crucial, was the internationalization of some of Libya's domestic socioeconomic policies in terms of the transformation of its Embassies abroad into "Peoples Bureaus" and the call for all political exiles living abroad to return home or face "liquidation".

The international community and its media started to interpret and publicize these issues as an attempt by Libya to export terrorism abroad. Terrorism, the campaign against dissidents abroad, and Libya's relations with the United States dominated both the African, American, and Western European media in that period.

These issues were consolidated in the 1981 to 1986 period in which Libyan coverage by the international media concentrated on the break in diplomatic relations between Libya and the United States over claims of terrorism and a dubious assassination plot against president Reagan allegedly hatched by Libya. Also prominent in the international news media was the Libyan London Embassy siege in which a policewoman was killed. The epic, as far as the international news media were concerned, is perhaps the bombing of Libyan military installations by the United States over a dispute on the United States military maneuvers over the Gulf of Sirte in the Mediterranean in 1986.

The above issues were the main focus of the international media regarding its coverage of Libya in the period under study, and to a certain extent corresponds with our press sample coverage

of Libya during the same period. There are however, some regional and continentally based factors that do determine the level of attention and extent of coverage given to any issue by the different press in our sample. These will be discussed in the later part of this chapter.

6:2 LIBYAN AFFAIRS COVERAGE BY THE NIGERIAN DAILY TIMES; THE TANZANIAN DAILY NEWS; THE STANDARD OF KENYA AND THE TIMES OF LONDON: 1970-85.

A total of 1792 newspaper issues were analysed for news on or about Libya from 1970 to 1985. This represents a total of 488 issues for each newspaper i.e., 28 issues a year over a period of 16 years. From this sample, 294 news items were found to be on or about Libya, in which The Times of London accounted for 95 cases which was the highest, representing almost 32.3% of the total sample while The Standard of Kenya with 58 cases or 19.7% of the total, had the least.

In terms of space however, The Daily Times of Nigeria had the highest with 1879 column centimeters which amounts to about 28.1% of the total space devoted to Libya by the entire sample. The Daily News had the least with 1293 column centimeters representing about 19.4% of the total. Table 3 below summarizes the number of newspaper issues analysed and the number of news items and the corresponding amount of space the four newspapers in our sample devoted to Libya in the period under study.

TABLE 3: MEDIUM BY TOTAL NUMBER OF ISSUES, CASES AND SPACE.

MEDIUM	TOTAL NUMBER OF ISSUES	CASES	%	SPACE IN COL.CM.	%
TIMES OF LONDON	448	95	32.3	1765	26.4
NIGERIAN DAILY TIMES	448	76	25.9	1879	28.1
DAILY NEWS, TANZANIA	448	65	22.1	1293	19.4
THE STANDARD, KENYA	448	58	19.7	1740	26.1
TOTAL	1792	294	100	6677	100

As can be seen, The Daily Times devotes more space but accounts for only 25.9% of the total news items, while The Standard even though accounting for the third largest amount of space, has the least number of news items. An explanation for this is that The Daily Times tends to have more editorials and feature articles than The Times of London. Similarly, The Standard also features much more editorials and feature articles than The Daily News which normally carries its foreign news in short one column formats. [see table 9.]

This tendency for both The Daily Times and The Standard to provide more feature articles and editorials might not be unrelated with, in the case of The Daily Times, Libya's involvement in Nigeria's neighboring State, Chad. A similar explanation can be advanced in the case of The Standard in the form of Libya's involvement in the Uganda - Tanzania war in the 1970's, because of Uganda's proximity to Kenya. Another reason why

The Standard carries more feature articles might also relate to the proximity of The Standard to the hub of the international press and wire services in Africa. Nairobi, the Kenyan capital houses almost all the international media correspondents and wire services in black Africa. This might allow The Standard to have access to feature article materials and also the services of foreign correspondents who might write for the inadequately staffed Standard and earn some local currency on the side.

In general, Libya received more attention from our media sample in the year 1981 with a total of 39 news items totalling 1422 column centimeters or 13.3% of the total number of cases and 21.3% of total amount of space for the study period. The least coverage received by Libya from our press sample was in 1975 with only 4 news items totalling just 84 column centimeters i.e., 1.4% and 1.3% of the total number of cases and space respectively. Table 4, below gives the yearly distribution of cases and amount of space.

The figures in table 4 do not in themselves tell us much about the general pattern of the coverage of Libya by our press sample. They do however indicate the relative spread or distribution of the coverage in the period under study, and also indicate that the range in the frequency of the coverage is relatively high i.e., from only 4 cases in 1975 to 39 cases in 1981 giving a range of 35. The data also indicate that between 1974 and 1979, Libya's visibility was relatively low compared to that of 1970 to 1973, and 1980 to 1985. This gives an indication of a periodic attention been given to Libya in line with one of the accusations levelled against the Western media by the Third

TABLE 4: <u>YEARLY DISTRIBUTION OF CASES AND AMOUNT OF SPACE.</u>

YEAR	NUMBER OF CASES	%	SPACE IN COL.CM.	%
1970	23	7.8	485	7.3
1971	14	4.8	230	3.4
1972	25	8.5	499	7.5
1973	24	8.2	585	8.7
1974	11	3.7	92	1.4
1975	4	1.4	84	1.3
1976	16	5.4	268	4.0
1977	10	3.4	179	2.7
1978	11	3.7	205	3.0
1979	7	2.4	234	3.5
1980	20	6.8	439	6.6
1981	39	13.3	1422	21.3
1982	15	5.1	394	5.9
1983	28	9.5	828	12.4
1984	35	11.9	586	8.8
1985	12	4.1	147	2.2
TOTALS	294	100	6677	100

World countries in the debates on the New International Information Order.

Since the major bulk of our media sample is African, the above indication tends to raise a lot of questions because it clearly points out that the African media itself also operates within the same framework that their countries are fighting to do

away with. The picture becomes more glaring if we look at the pattern of coverage in terms of the amount of space allotted to Libya in the study period. This ranges from an abysmal 84 column centimeters in 1975 to a proportionally very high 1422 column centimeters in 1981. If we break down the above data into the three periods of the study, we find that almost 50% and 44% of the total number of news items and total amount of space these items occupy respectively, falls within the 1981 to 1985 period. This is followed by the 1970 to 1975 period in which more than 30% of Libyan coverage falls. Libya received least attention both in terms of amount of news items and space from the press in 1976 to 1980. [see table 5]

TABLE 5: **PERIODIC DISTRIBUTION OF CASES AND SPACE FOR ENTIRE POPULATION: 1970 - 1985**

PERIOD	COL.CM	%	N	%
1970 - 1975	1975	30	101	34
1976 - 1980	1325	20	64	22
1981 - 1985	3377	50	129	44
TOTALS	6677	100	294	100

A clearer picture of the pattern of coverage is obtained by cross tabulating the figures in table 6 with our respective media. As tables 6 and 7 shows, The Times of London's highest coverage of Libya was in the 1981 to 1985 period. In terms of the number of

news items this amounts to almost 63.2% of The Times total coverage of Libya for the entire study period. In relation to the total number of news items devoted to Libya by the entire media sample in the 1981 to 1985 period however, it represents about 46%, and 20.4% of the total sampled media coverage for the entire period under study. The corresponding figures for amount of space devoted to Libya are a little bit lower, i.e., 60%, 31%, and 15.8% respectively for The Times coverage of Libya for the entire period, The Times coverage in relation to the other media for the 1981 to 1985 period, and The Times coverage of the period in relation to the total sample media coverage of Libya for the entire period.

The Nigerian Daily Times also followed the same pattern above in that its coverage of Libya for the whole period under study was higher in the 1981 to 1985 period, representing almost 47% of its total coverage in terms of the number of news items on or about Libya. In terms of the amount of space these news items occupy however, The Daily Times has the largest in relation to its total coverage for the entire period and in relation to the whole media sample for the 1981 to 1985 period and for the entire period as a whole. That is 59.5%, 33% and 16.7% respectively.

The Standard's coverage of Libya during the whole period was also higher in terms of total space in the 1981 to 1985 period as is the case with The Daily Times and The Times. This was about 54% of its total coverage. In terms of number of news items however, The Standard has its highest coverage in the 1976 to 1980 period, which is about 40% of the total number of news items it devoted to Libya in the period under study. This anomaly is associated with

the tendency of The Standard to have more feature articles and editorials than the rest of the newspapers in our sample as explained above. This also reveals that this tendency is not a common occurrence, but rather associated to certain events or periods in time.

The Daily News is the only newspaper that diverge from the above pattern of Libyan coverage that is a feature of both The Times, The Daily Times, and The Standard in which at least in terms of amount of space, all three covered Libya the most in the 1981 to 1985 period with only The Standard giving more coverage in terms of total number of news items, in the 1976 to 1980 period. Both in terms of space and number of news items, The Daily News covered Libya the most in the 1970 to 1975 period. This represents in terms of number of news items, about 53.8% of its total coverage for the entire period, and in terms of space, about 51% of its total coverage for the entire period.

In summary, taking the total coverage given to Libya by the four newspapers over the entire period, we find that in the 1970 to 1975 period, Libya was covered the most by The Daily News with 33.2% of the total space and 34.7% of the total number of news items. In the 1976 to 1980 period it is The Standard That gave the highest amount of coverage to Libya, which was about 40% and 36% of the total amount of space and number of news items respectively. In the 1981 to 1985 period however, both The Times of London and The Daily Times tend to share the credit of covering Libya the most. In terms of total number of news items, The Times has the highest in relation to the other newspapers, with almost 40.5% of the total. But, in terms of total amount of space given

to Libya in this period, it is The Daily Times that has the most, almost 33% of the total for the whole media during the entire period under study. Tables 6 and 7 below summarizes some of these points made.

TABLE 6:   PERIODIC DISTRIBUTION OF NEWS ITEMS BY MEDIUM.

COUNT
ROW PCT
COL.PCT
TOT.PCT   PERIOD

MEDIUM	1970–1975	1976–1980	1981–1985	ROW TOTALS
THE TIMES OF LONDON	27 28.4 26.7 9.2	8 8.4 13 2.7	60 63.2 46.5 20.4	95 32.3
THE NIGERIAN DAILY TIMES	25 33 24.7 9	15 20 23 5	36 47 27.9 12	76 26
THE TANZANIAN DAILY NEWS	35 53.8 34.7 12	18 27.7 28 6	12 18.5 9.3 4	65 22
THE STANDARD OF KENYA	14 24 13.9 4.8	23 40 36 7.8	21 36 16.3 7.1	58 19.7
COLUMN TOTALS	101 35	64 21.5	129 43.5	294 100.0

When pitched against existing research findings on international news, the pattern of Libyan coverage represented by the figures in tables 6 and 7 reveal some interesting points. The

TABLE 7:   PERIODIC DISTRIBUTION OF NEWSPAPER SPACE BY MEDIUM.

COUNT ROW PCT COL.PCT TOT.PCT	PERIOD			
MEDIUM	1970–1975	1976–1980	1981–1985	ROW TOTALS
THE TIMES OF LONDON	529 30 26.8 7.9	181 10 13.7 2.7	1055 60 31 15.8	1765 26.4
THE NIGERIAN DAILY TIMES	532 28.3 26.9 8	230 12.2 17.7 3.4	1117 59.5 33 16.7	1879 28.1
THE TANZANIAN DAILY NEWS	656 51 33.2 9.8	379 29 28.6 5.7	258 20 8 3.9	1293 19.4
THE STANDARD OF KENYA	258 15 13.1 3.9	535 31 40 8	947 54 28 14.2	1740 26.1
COLUMN TOTALS	1975 29.6	1325 19.8	3377 50.6	6677 100.0

generality of research findings, despite obvious methodological differences, have tended to come up with a number of similar generalizations as regards the general pattern and direction of international news. Studies by Schramm and Atwood, [1981][1] Gerbner and Marvanyi, [1977][2] Al Hester, [1974][3] Golding and Elliott, [1979][4] McQuail, [1986][5] Sreberny-Mohammedi et.al, [1985][6] and the seminal work of Galtung, [1972][7] to cite a few, have all pointed out that for almost all the world media systems, geographical proximity is a dominant orientation for determining newsworthiness. This it is argued, "may be a reflection of a true

sense of regional identity, the product of shared historical fortunes, cultural similarities and economic interrelationships."[8]

Second to geographical proximity and metropolitan orientations in determining newsworthiness according to these findings is, news values of sensation, drama and world significance, that allows parts of the Third World to wax and wane in news attention depending on the particular period of time and the specific events breaking.[9] In this context, "own region" is said to be the main source and focus of international news to the extent that in the IAMCR project reported by Sreberny-Mohammedi et.al, the African press was found to focus mostly on the African region with around 50% of its international news items dealing with African affairs.

This presupposes that the three African newspapers in our sample should cover African affairs [in this case Libya] more than The Times of London whose "catchment area" is definitely not Africa but Western Europe. Our data indicate the opposite in that overall, The Times, at least in terms of total number of news items, covered Libya more than the three African newspapers. The Times' coverage of Libya from 1970 to 1985 was almost 32.3% of the total number of news items devoted to Libya by all sampled media. Following closely behind is The Nigerian Daily Times with 26%, The Daily News with 22%, and The Standard with 19.7%. [see table 7] In terms of total space however, The Daily Times dominates with about 28.1% of the total, followed by The Times with 26.4%. Even here it is noticeable that the difference between The Times and The Daily Times is not very significant.

In terms of physical geographical proximity, Kenya and Nigeria are closer to Libya than Tanzania in that both have only one other country in between them and Libya, while Tanzania is about two other countries away. In this regards, it should have been expected that The Standard and The Daily Times should pay more attention to Libya than The Daily News or The Times of London. But, as the data indicate, The Daily Times ranks second while The Standard has the least in terms of total number of news items on Libya.

On the other hand, if total amount of space is taken as the criteria for measuring coverage, The Daily Times tends to rank first while The Standard accounts for the third largest amount of space on Libya. The problematic here is which of the two criteria would be a more acceptable representative measure for attention; frequency of coverage in the form of total number of news items, or total amount of space these items occupy.? Total amount of space as a measure of media attention has the advantage of indicating possible in-depth analytical coverage. But, it might also give a skewed semblance of more coverage while in reality only one or two long articles predominate to the extent that it will be less adequate a measure when contrasted with a large number of small articles over time.

Whatever the case, the general pattern indicated by the data above is one in which contrary to the assertion that geographical proximity is a major determinant of media attention, the African media in our sample did not fare substantially better than The Times of London in covering Libya. One possible factor determining this large amount of attention accorded to Libya by The Times of

London might be related to British economic and military interests in Libya. In line with arguments put forward by Galtung [1972], economic ties between dependent or neocolonial societies and their metropolitan centers in Europe, tend to account for the high level of metropolitan media attention being focussed on these peripheral societies. In the case of The Times coverage of Libya, these politico-economic factors certainly do play a substantial role.

With respect to socioeconomic and political proximity, Libya as a former North African Italian Colony, shares very little direct political allegiance with any of the African countries in our sample. They do not share a similar colonial history with the exception of a limited period during the second world war, when Britain occupy and assumed the role of a trustee of two Libyan provinces of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania after the dismantling of Italian colonial rule. As a protectorate, Libya undoubtedly experienced very little of the direct colonial political and economic controls and influences Britain exerted on Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania, although it certainly did influence the type of political structures to emerge with "independent" Libya in 1951.

The only socioeconomic and political proximity Libya has with Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania is somewhat indirect. That is in terms of political and physical geography as an African nation which makes it a member of the Organization Of African Unity; OAU, although it also belongs to the Organization Of Arab States, a constant source of friction between the Black and Arab states of the continent. Fundamentally, independent Libya's activities and political relations with its neighbors is the major determinant of

its political relationship and hence proximity with both Kenya and Nigeria.

In the case of Kenya, it is the often cold and hot relationship between Libya and Sudan that affects or determines most of its relationship with Libya. In the case of Nigeria, it is the Libya-Chad crisis that is determinant. As far as Tanzania is concerned, the issue is a little bit more problematic. First there is the question of religion and culture in that Tanzania has a large proportion of Arabs and followers of the Islamic religion especially in the Zanzibar region. But, more relevant to our discussion is the ideological identification of Tanzania with Libya especially in the early stages of the 1969 "Free Officers Revolution" when the outside world was busy relating the revolution with socialist ideals and the ideas of Gamar Abdul Nasser of Egypt. The above issues, with a sprinkling of economic factors, especially oil pricing, and the Libyan connection with The Organization Of Petroleum Exporting Countries; OPEC, tended to be the major determinants of the coverage of Libya by The Daily News, The Daily Times, and The Standard.

The Daily News' highest coverage of Libya was in the early stages of the revolution in which Libya's identification with Nasser's political ideals and the Socialist World underlie most of its news items. There was an atmosphere of a "brotherhood" in political ideals which somehow disappeared in the later years possibly due to Libya's wavering political stance from one extreme ideological position to another; flickering in between Socialism and Islamic fundamentalism and subsequently to a more obscure Third Universal Theory expounded by Col. Gadhafi himself.

The Daily Times on the other hand, concentrated most of its coverage on the Libyan involvement on the Chad conflict. This was augmented by a more general but related issue of national sovereignty with reference to alleged Libya's expansionist policies in Africa. Also crucial in The Daily Times' coverage of Libya, was the question of oil particularly as it relates to OPEC prices and their adherence to, or undermining by Libya which, together with Nigeria and Algeria are the only major producers of the low sulphur high grade petroleum which The United States in particular depends upon. The Daily Times' highest coverage of Libya was in the 1981 to 1985 period in which, the Chad conflict assumed an international dimension as a result of the involvement of both France and The United States thus, threatening to bring a full-scale international war on the doorsteps of Nigeria.

The Standard's coverage of Libya, especially in the 1976 to 1980 period in which it was at its peak, was concentrated on the relations between Libya and Sudan. Particularly, on the alliance between Egypt, Sudan and The United States, and how this affects the politico-military situation in the region. Also important was the involvement of Libya in the Uganda-Tanzania war. In the 1981 to 1985 period in which The Standard paid more attention to Libya in terms of amount of space, the major determinant factors were the Chad and Libya conflict; and the subsequent Libyan relations with Britain and The United States over the shooting incident in the Libyan London Embassy in which a policewoman was killed and the military confrontation over the Gulf of Sirte respectively. Also crucial was Libya's alleged support for international terrorism.

As far as The Times of London is concerned, the major factors determining its coverage of Libya were undoubtedly related more to economic and political issues in line with British interests in The Mediterranean, North Africa, and The Middle East. Libya's strategic location in terms of trade routes, its abundant oil supplies, and its importance as a net importer, particularly from Western Europe was also a strong influence. In between, the above issues do generate a periodic coverage of the more mundane issues of terrorism and the Libyan London Embassy shooting incident.

In summary, our data indicate that politico-economic factors tended to prevail as determinants of press coverage of Libya more than mere geographical proximity. However, this does not in any way invalidate the general conclusions reached by earlier studies. This is because our data did not allow us to measure, for example, how Libyan coverage by these media correlates with coverage of other African states, or the rest of the world. It is also pertinent to note that, the general trend of geographical proximity determining media attention as observed by these studies, may be as a result of the large number of countries constituting what might be referred to as "own region".

In this context, Africa as a continent comprises of 51 "independent" countries and South Africa which, grouped together as one region will obviously account for a large amount of media attention. Looked at individually however, the pattern might reveal one or two countries, depending on time, place and events, dominating and accounting for most of the attention while the major part of the continent remains invisible. It is probable that Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, or Libya, being politically,

economically or even "controversially" powerful can account for most of the regional and international media attention while smaller and less powerful states like Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, Swaziland or Niger remain invisible.

It is also within reasonable bounds to assert that the above data indicates that one of the most important determinants of the media coverage of Libya has been news values of sensation, drama, and world significance. An observation also made by the IAMCR study reported by Sreberny-Mohammedi et.al. This is evident in the manner both the newspapers, particularly The Times of London, The Daily Times and The Standard tended to pay more attention to Libya in terms of coverage at periodic times of crisis. These periodic crisis issues include among others, the Chad conflict, Libya's political crisis with Sudan and Egypt, its military involvement in the Uganda-Tanzania conflict, its military confrontation with the United States, and its London Embassy shooting incident. Besides supporting the observations of Al Hester,[1974][10] Pratt,[1980][11] and Sreberny-Mohammedi, [1985][12] that international news, especially on the Third World, tends to emphasize violence, crisis and social disintegration, our data also shows that the African Media operates or conform to this pattern even in its coverage of African affairs, i.e. Libya in this case.

As regards our initial supposition that the African media will cover Libya more during the New International Information Order Debate and in the aftermath of the MacBride Report, the data shows that the African press, as is the case with the Times, gave more coverage to Libya before and after than during the debate. In terms of number of news items, 35% of the total fell in the

pre-debate period of 1970-1975, while the debate period of 1976-1980 only accounted for 21.5% of the total. The post-debate period of 1981-1985 accounted for the highest number of news items, which was almost 43.5% of the total. In terms of space, Libya received more attention in the post-debate period with almost 50.6% of the total space falling within the 1981-1985 period. This is followed by the pre-debate and debate periods with 29.6% and 19.8% of total space respectively.

At a glance, one may be tempted to conclude that since the quantitative figures above indicate that Libya received more coverage in the post MacBride era, there is a sort of correlation between this increase and the debate on the New International Information Order. Our data however, does not allow us to reach such a conclusion. At the same time, we cannot but accept that the data shows a significant increase of attention on Libya in the post debate period compared to the pre-debate and debate periods, even though a causal relationship cannot be established due to limitations imposed by our study design.

On the other hand, a closer examination of the data reveals that Libyan coverage in the post debate period is concentrated in one or two years i.e. 1981 and 1984. These years also accounted for the highest total number of news items devoted to Libya by the entire media over the whole study period, i.e. 13.3% and 11.9% respectively [see table 5]. More than that, this attention also spans just over a few number of months and was dominated by only two major issues; the break in diplomatic relations between Libya and the United States in 1981 and with Britain in 1984. The events leading to these two incidents and in their aftermath between

August and September 1981, and in-between April and May 1984 dominated our press coverage. This incidentally also applies to The Daily News which covered Libya the least in this period. Once again we are confronted with the possibility that the superpower involvement with Libya might be a strong determinant for this concentration of coverage in this particular period. It is a strong argument posited by Galtung [1972] that this kind of situations always precipitate high level media attention. The more powerful the actors in any event, the higher the possibility of reporting the event by the media.

On the basis of this, we can argue that the increase in coverage in the post-debate period of 1981-1985, may as well be a response to particular crisis situations which almost all the media in our sample considered to be newsworthy, than as a result of the call for a New International Information Order.

6:3: PLACEMENT, PRESENTATION FORMAT AND TYPE OF NEWS STORIES.

Each news item was coded according to its placement in the newspaper, that is, whether it is the main lead or headline, on the front, inside, or back page. The news items were also coded according to their journalistic format of presentation as to whether they are given as straight news stories, editorials, feature articles, readers letters, cartoons, pictures only, or as datelines. Similarly, the items were coded on the basis of story type, that is, whether they can be classified as; "the paper's home news in Libya", "Libyan news in the paper's home country", "Libyan news in Libya", or "Libyan news abroad". The purpose here is to see whether Libyan news was given any prominence in presentation and placement or not, and the type of news stories that constitute our media coverage of Libya.

In general, 78.6% of the news items were in the inside pages, while just about 16.7% were found to be on the front pages other than the main leads or headlines. The main leads accounted for 3.4%, followed by items on the back page with 1.3% of the total. [see table 8] In all the newspapers, international news is mostly contained in regular spaces or pages. In the Times of London, this normally occupies about four to six regular pages of an average issue. In The Daily Times, Daily News, and The Standard, international news items usually occupy a single regular page of an average issue.

TABLE 8: PLACEMENT OF NEWS ITEMS.

POSITION OF NEWS ITEMS	N	%
MAIN LEAD	10	3.4
OTHER FRONT PAGE	49	16.7
INSIDE PAGE	231	78.6
BACK PAGE	4	1.3
TOTALS	294	100.0

As a rule, news items only find themselves on the front page if they possess some journalistic qualities of sensation, great local or international concern and relevance, or both. In this context, it is worth noting that the total amount of news items on Libya that found their way to the front pages of our sample media in form of lead stories and other front page items, is a significant 20.1% of the total.

Considering that an average issue of The Times contains between 28-32 pages, The Daily Times 18-20 pages, The Daily News 8-12 pages, and The Standard 28 pages, the appearance of 20.1% of the total news items on Libya on the front page is definitely an indication of a sort of prominence given to Libyan news by our media. This might be due to a number of factors related to established journalistic criteria of news selection such as sensationalism, local or community significance and international importance.

A similar pattern is presented by the type of news items in that over 60% of the news in all the newspapers under study were straight news stories. Overall, 81.2% of the total number of news items for all the newspapers were straight news stories, with datelines and feature articles constituting 9% and 4.4% respectively. The fourth largest category was editorials with 3.4%, followed by pictures only with 1.4% and readers letters with 0.6% of the total. [see table 9.]

TABLE 9: **TYPE OF NEWS ITEMS ON LIBYA IN THE MEDIA.**

COUNT
ROW PCT
COL.PCT   NEWS TYPE
TOT.PCT

MEDIUM	NEWS STORY	EDITORIAL	FEATURE	READERS LETTERS	DATE-LINE	PICTURE	ROW TOTAL
THE TIMES	88 93 36.8 30	1 1 10 0.3	3 3 23.1 1	1 1 50 0.3	— — — —	2 2 50 0.7	95 32.3
DAILY TIMES	48 63 20.1 16.3	3 4 30 1	5 7 38.5 1.7	— — — —	20 26 77 6.9	— — — —	76 25.9
DAILY NEWS	58 89.2 24.3 19.7	— — — —	1 1.5 7.7 0.3	— — — —	4 6.2 15 1.4	2 3.1 50 0.7	65 22.1
STANDARD	45 77.6 18.8 15.3	6 10.3 60 2.1	4 7 30.8 1.4	1 1.7 50 0.3	2 3.4 8 0.7	— — — —	58 19.7
COLUMN TOTALS	239 81.2	10 3.4	13 4.4	2 0.6	26 9	4 1.4	294 100

The figures in table 8 clearly show that about 90% of the editorials in our sample were carried by The Daily Times and The Standard i.e., 30% and 60% respectively. The same newspapers also account for the highest number of feature articles. That is, 38.5% and 30.8% respectively which, taken together amount to well over 60% of the total. Editorials and feature articles are very much within the domain of public opinion formation compared to straight news items which are usually presented with a view to conform to some sort of journalistic criteria of objectivity. It is because of this that these forms of news, i.e., editorials and features, are always credited to certain individuals; editors or columnists and hence, considered opinionated. In a nutshell, they do not reflect the policy or political leanings of the newspaper as a whole. This convenient dichotomy between news and opinion adapted by the media to absolve itself from accusations of impartiality and bias is, to a large extent, polemical. It is at best an exercise in ritual, and to a large extent an important segment of the legitimizing process engaged in by the press.

As the figures in table 9 indicate, The Daily Times and The Standard tend to engage in this opinion forming exercise more than The Times and The Daily News. The problematic is, in which direction is this opinion guided to, i.e., is it negatively or positively inclined. A cursory inspection of the headlines of these editorials and feature articles indicate that most are capable of evoking negative opinions about Libya. In figure 1 below are some of the headlines of the editorials and features carried by The Daily Times and The Standard from 1970 to 1985.

FIGURE 1.

[A]   DAILY TIMES EDITORIALS AND FEATURE ARTICLES ON LIBYA.

TITLE.	NEWS TYPE	DATE
1. OIL PRICE BATTLE MAY LEAD TO SHOWDOWN.	EDITORIAL	26/4/1973
2. OAU SUMMIT: GADDAFI'S TWO-FACED APPROACH.	-DO-	7/4/1982
3. ALL AFRICA FOR TRIPOLI.	-DO-	5/7/1982
4. GADDAFI'S DESIGNS IN AFRICA.	FEATURE	8/5/1971
5. LIBYAN ACTION IS DISTURBING.	-DO-	28/11/1980
6. OAU SHOULD DEAL WITH LIBYA.	-DO-	24/6/1981
7. REAGAN'S VALUE TO AFRICA.	-DO-	25/9/1981
8. WHO GAINS FROM CONFLICT IN CHAD?	-DO-	21/6/1984

[B]   THE STANDARD'S EDITORIALS AND FEATURE ARTICLES ON LIBYA.

TITLE	NEWS TYPE	DATE
9. ARABS HAVE THE WEST OVER AN OIL BARREL.	EDITORIAL	25/10/1973
10. ANXIETY OVER HUMAN RIGHTS.	-DO-	26/2/1977
11. SHOCK WAVES FROM GADDAFI.	-DO-	18/11/1980
12. GADDAFI'S RED ARMY.	-DO-	27/3/1981
13. LEADERS OF GREAT WORTH.	-DO-	25/6/1981
14. GADDAFI'S SUBVERSION.	-DO-	26/6/1981
15. THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC COUP: HOW FRANCE STYMIED LIBYA.	FEATURE	15/10/1979
16. USA WAKES UP TO ISLAM.	-DO-	20/2/1980
17. THE FIGHTING GIRLS OF CHAD.	-DO-	24/3/1981
18. THE CRISIS OVER CHAD: LIBYA'S ROLE IN WEST AFRICA.	-DO-	23/6/1981 & 24/6/1981

Two major themes run through the above editorials and feature articles of both The Daily Times and The Standard. While The Daily Times took a Pan-Africanist stance by concentrating mostly on Libya's relations with African states, particularly Chad; The Standard on the other hand, tends to parrot some of the recurrent themes employed by the Western nations and their media to depict Libya.

The Daily Times adapts a more cautionary position in its disagreement with Libya and its activities in Africa. At the same time, it believes or calls for a diplomatic solution i.e., under the aegis of the Organization Of African Unity. This is evident in its reference to the problems as those of Libya as a nation which the OAU has the capacity to resolve, as against seeing the issues involved as actions of a single individual, Gaddafi.

On the other hand, The Standard's point of reference is mostly on Gaddafi as an individual, and his relations with the Western world. Particularly, as an Islamic oil producing Arab. Such motifs as Arabs and oil, Islam, Subversion, the red army, human rights, etc., as contained in The Standard's editorials and feature articles, fits smugly into the genre of myths weaved and paraded by the Western media in reference to situations considered dissenting to established frameworks of international dependence.

The picture painted is one in which Libya is depicted as a nation ruled by a single despot. One of those crazy oil producing Arabs who delight in starving the Western world and its citizens of crucial energy, probably at the behest of the Communist Soviet Union; an Islamic fundamentalist and staunch supporter of

Ayatollah Khomeni of Iran, who suppresses the rights of citizens and even encourage the same in other countries by supporting subversive activities and Communists. Out of the six editorials and four feature articles carried by The Standard, all but two fell within the above framework. The exception, if at all it is, are the two articles on Chad. One concentrated on painting a picture of Chad as a nation swamped by the Libyan military to the extent that, even young girls are forced to take-up arms to defend their motherland. Most of the article consists of an emotional expose of the suffering and commitment of a 19 year old Chadian rebel fighter. No reference was made to the fact that Libyan forces are in Chad on the invitation of the government in power in Chad at the time, or to the fact that both France and The United States were arming and even fighting alongside the rebels. The second article, which was run for two days, was written by Colin Legum, a versatile writer on African affairs. It was an attempt to provide an analysis of the situation in Chad and its ramifications for the West African region within the context of the Libyan connection. Even here, the prevailing Westcentric portrait of Libya is pervasive.

In summary, both The Daily Times' and The Standard's editorials and feature articles were predicated on an assumption that what is existing or happening in Libya in the form of domestic socioeconomic reconstruction, and international political and economic realignments is a deviation from established norms and rules of the game.

6:4 STORY TYPE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

This study is about Libyan affairs coverage by the media in our sample to the extent that, the focus of analysis is generally on news items on or about Libya. This means that some of these news items will definitely have some domestic bearing or relevance while others may be carried by these media purely on their international importance in terms of international politics and relations between states. To differentiate these possible angles and in the process try to see the general focus and character of Libyan coverage by the media, we decided to adopt a classification based on story type. That is, whether a news item consists of the "newspaper's home country news in Libya"; "Libyan news in the newspaper's home country"; "Libyan news in Libya", or "Libyan news abroad". These categories simply refer to whether a news item is on or about events or happenings in Libya that involve, concern, or affect the home country of the reporting media; or news of events in the media's home country that involve or concern Libya; or news about events on Libya taking place in Libya; or Purely news on or about Libyan affairs taking place somewhere else other than Libya or the newspaper's home country.

Since this classification inevitably shows that some items of news about Libya may be purely based on international relations between Libya and other nations or institutions, a further classification is done in order to explicate this focus or pattern of news reporting as regards which types of international relations engaged in by Libya are given more prominence by these media. The purpose here is to see whether there are any systematically recurrent patterns in the way the news media report

these relations.

Across all the media in our sample, the bulk of the news items fell within the "Libyan news abroad" category. This comprises about 58.5% of the total number of items carried by all the newspapers. [see table 10] This ranges from 48% of total news items in The Daily news to 72% for The Daily Times. The next most frequent category is "Libyan news in Libya", which consists of between 25-49 percent of total items in all the newspapers. In general, well over 90% of total number of news items in the newspapers were on "Libyan news abroad" and "Libyan news in Libya".

TABLE 10: DISTRIBUTION OF STORY TYPE BY MEDIA.

MEDIA

STORY TYPE	THE TIMES N=95	DAILY TIMES N=76	DAILY NEWS N=65	STANDARD N=58	TOTALS N=295
PAPERS HOME NEWS IN LIBYA	7	0	1.5	0	2.7
LIBYAN NEWS IN PAPER'S HOME COUNTRY	15	0	1.5	5	6.1
LIBYAN NEWS IN LIBYA	25	28	49	33	32.7
LIBYAN NEWS ABROAD	53	72	48	62	58.5
TOTAL %	32.3	25.9	22.1	19.7	100.0

This shows that our media coverage of Libya has little to do with any relations, happenings, or events involving the domestic affairs of the countries of these newspapers. The only exception is The Times of London which has about 15% of its news items

dealing with events in connection with Libyan affairs in Britain and about 7% dealing with British affairs in Libya. The African newspapers in our sample seemed to cover Libyan affairs abroad more than events connected to their own countries. The Daily Times and The Standard actually have the highest number of news items dealing with Libyan affairs abroad than either The Times or The Daily News. This consists of 72% for The Daily Times and 62% for The Standard. Among the African newspapers however, The Standard has the highest number of news items on Libyan affairs in its country, Kenya, which was 5% of the total, while The Daily News devoted 1.5% of its total news items each to Tanzanian news in Libya and Libyan news in Tanzania. The Daily Times has none for these two categories.

One interesting finding here is that the African newspapers actually did cover Libyan affairs in Libya more than The Times. This ranges from 28% for The Daily Times to 33% and 49% for The Standard and The Daily News respectively. To what extent these news items really concern or deal with Libyan domestic issues is problematic, because it is possible for issues or events happening in Libya, but which also have implications or connections to other nations or external factors that do not directly affect the countries of these media to fall within this category.

In general, the data shows that The Daily News in particular gave more coverage to Libyan affairs located in Libya than any form of news. This is almost 49%, which is even higher than the "Libyan news abroad" category most favoured by the other newspapers. Across all the media, issues of international terrorism, Libyan relations with the United States and Western

Europe, the Middle East, Chad, and other African states, may well be the main reason for the preponderance of Libyan news abroad.

In regards to the other two categories, the stories on the Libyan Embassy shooting in London and subsequent attempts to deal with Libyan dissidents in Britain and the jailing of some Britons in Libya over spying charges, forms the backdrop of most Libyan news in Britain and British news in Libya in The Times of London. In the case of The Standard, claims of Libyan support for and training of Kenyans as terrorists in order to destabilize Kenya, particularly during the 1982 coup attempt against the Kenyan Government, might account for the 5% total news in The Standard dealing with Libyan news in Kenya.

As far as The Daily News is concerned, there have been visiting exchanges between Tanzanian and Libyan government functionaries in the early days of the Libyan revolution which might account for the 1.5% total news items each for Tanzanian news in Libya and Libyan news in Tanzania respectively. More influential however, has been the initial identification Tanzania accorded Libya on ideological grounds, which accounted for most of the news items dealing with Libyan domestic affairs, or more appropriately, Libyan news located in Libya. As a matter of fact, The Daily News is the only newspaper in our sample that uses JANA, the Libyan News Agency, as a source of news more frequently than the other newspapers. This definitely explains why it tends to have more Libyan domestic news. [see table 15]

One important component of this study is to see to what extent the general characteristics of news on or about Libya in

our media compare over the entire study period which we divided
into three phases i.e., the pre-debate period of 1970-1975; the
debate period of 1976-1980; and the post debate period of
1981-1985. The data shows that the coverage of Libyan domestic
issues, or stories about Libya with a domestic location was
concentrated in the pre-debate period of 1970-1975. This
incidentally also corresponds with the early days of the Libyan
revolution. This ranges from 58% of The Times' total for the
category "Libyan news in Libya", to 62% of The Daily Times' total
and 72% of The Daily News' total. The only deviation is by The
Standard whose coverage of Libyan domestic stories was mostly in
the 1976-1980 period. On the other hand, stories about Libyan
affairs located abroad were more frequent in the 1981-1985 period
for both The Times and The Daily Times, which was 74% and 60%
respectively. The daily news covered this category of news more in
the 1970-1975 period, while The Standard's coverage of the same
type of stories was more frequent in the 1976-1980 period. [see
table 11.]

One obvious pattern presented by these figures is that
stories concerning local or domestic issues on Libya were mostly
covered by our media in the early days of the Libyan revolution, a
period in which the debate on The New International Information
Order was at its infancy, while the post-debate period is
characterized by a concentration of news about international
relations, or Libyan relations with the outside world. As a matter
of fact, all our African newspapers contained less Libyan domestic
stories in the post debate-period when compared to other types of
stories. On the other hand, The Standard provides a different
picture all together in that, it is the only newspaper that

TABLE 11: PERIODIC DISTRIBUTION OF STORY TYPES

STORY TYPE.

MEDIUM	PAPER'S HOME NEWS IN LIBYA	LIBYAN NEWS IN PAPER'S HOME COUNTRY	LIBYAN NEWS IN LIBYA	LIBYAN NEWS ABROAD	TOTALS
THE TIMES	N=7	N=14	N=24	N=50	N=95
1970-1975	29%	7%	58%	20%	
1976-1980	14	7	13	6	
1981-1985	57	86	29	74	
DAILY TIMES	N=0	N=0	N=21	N=55	N=76
1970-1975	0%	0%	62%	22%	
1976-1980	0	0	24	18	
1981-1985	0	0	14	60	
DAILY NEWS	N=1	N=1	N=32	N=31	N=65
1970-1975	0%	0%	72%	39%	
1976-1980	100	100	19	32	
1981-1985	0	0	9	29	
STANDARD	N=0	N=3	N=19	N=36	N=58
1970-1975	0%	0%	26%	25%	
1976-1980	0	0	53	36	
1981-1985	0	100	21	39	
TOTAL	N=8	N=18	N=96	N=172	N=294

contained more domestically based stories on Libya in the debate period of 1976-1980. For both The Daily Times and The Daily News, these type of news stories were the second most frequent in the entire period that is after the pre-debate period. The implication here is that contrary to our assumption that Libyan domestic issues might attract more media attention in the aftermath of the debate, it is international relations that tends to be pervasive in both the African newspapers and The Times.

6:4:1   LIBYA'S RELATIONS WITH THE WORLD:

A MEDIA GEOGRAPHY.

The predominance of international politics and relations in international news has been a recurrent conclussion of most studies dealing with how the media of the world report other nations. The findings of this study do not, to any degree, constitute an exception to that rule. This is because, our discussions above indicate that the most frequent type of story in almost all the newspapers in our sample, with the exception of The Daily News, is Libyan news abroad. A category defined here to mean news on or about Libyan relations with other countries other than the reporting media's home country.

In general, 83% of the total news items carried by all the media in our sample relate to international relations and politics. This means that it is inevitable for some news items with domestic flavor or locally based either in Libya or the reporting media's home country, to overlap into this category, because of the possibility of either reporters or editors adapting an international angle in their reportage of these events. An example is the Libyan-American confrontation over the Gulf Of Sirte, which strictly is more of a Libyan domestic issue, but which also is an event of international relevance and hence its overlapping into the category concerning international relations and politics or relations between states. For all the newspapers, well over 70% of their total news items dealt with relations between states. More appropriately, relations between Libya and other countries. This ranges from 74% for The Standard and 83% for

The Daily News, to 80% for The Times and 92% for The Daily Times.

In an attempt to capture the pattern of Libya's external relationships focused upon most by the newspapers, a list of possible categories were pre-coded which we hoped will provide us with a kind of geography of international relations between Libya and other countries. The categories and their corresponding frequencies of mention are presented in table 12.

For the African newspapers in our sample, the most frequently reported category is that of Libya's relations with its neighbors. This is followed by relations between Libya and the rest of Africa; Libya's relations with the Middle East; Libya's relations with Western Europe, and Libya-United States relations. The pattern for The Times diverge slightly from that of the African media above in that it gave equal coverage to relations between Libya and its immediate neighbors, and relations between Libya and Western Europe, followed by that of Libya and the Middle East; Libya and Africa and Libya and the United States. Relations between Libya and the USSR only featured in The Times, while Libya and Latin America only featured in The Daily Times. The Caribbean was invisible, while Libya-Asia relations only appeared in The Daily Times and The Daily News.

The above geography of Libya's external relations presented by these media tends to conform to the observation made by the IAMCR study that, own region predominates as a major factor in reporting international events, particularly as regards international politics. This however does not invalidate our earlier argument that in the context of this study, crisis

situations tend to prevail over geopolitical factors as determinants of media attention. This is clearly reinforced by the fact that relations between Libya and its neighbors constitute the main focus of the media even more than relations between Libya and the rest of Africa. As already pointed out, relations between Libya and Sudan, Chad, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, etc. have been in constant turmoil. Similarly, the fact that the other most frequently focused upon issues have been Libya's relations with Western Europe, the Middle East, and the United States, respectively, strengthens the point. This is because, all these relationships are characterized by one form of crisis or another.

As the figures in tables 13 and 14 show, with the exception of The Daily News, the highest concentration of international relations news in all the media was in the 1981-1985 period. This is the period in which the relations between Libya and the United States and Western Europe, particularly Britain, and the conflict in Chad assumed an unprecedented proportion. More so, it is the time when international terrorism is been banded as the sole preserve of Libya by the governments of the Western World especially, through the media.

TABLE 12: RELATIONS BETWEEN LIBYA AND
OTHER NATIONS IN THE MEDIA.

MEDIA

TYPE OF RELATIONS	THE TIMES N=76	DAILY TIMES N=70	DAILY NEWS N=54	STANDARD N=43	TOTAL N=243
LIBYA AND ITS NEIGHBORS	30%	31%	48%	42%	89
LIBYA AND AFRICA	9	30	24	30	54
LIBYA AND MIDDLE EAST	16	16	9	7	31
LIBYA AND WESTERN EUROPE	30	6	7	12	36
LIBYA AND U.S.S.R.	4	0	0	0	3
LIBYA AND ASIA	0	3	4	0	4
LIBYA AND THE CARIBBEAN	0	0	0	0	0
LIBYA AND THE U.S.A.	7	12	4	9	19
LIBYA AND INTER. BODIES	3	1	2	0	4
LIBYA AND LATIN AMERICA	0	1	0	0	1
LIBYA AND OTHER	1	0	2	0	2

TABLE 13: DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ITEMS: 1970-1985.

PERIOD

MEDIA	1970-1975 N	%	1976-1980 N	%	1981-1985 N	%	TOTALS N	%
THE TIMES	17	23	3	6.1	55	45.8	76	30.9
THE DAILY TIMES	21	28.4	14	28.6	35	29.2	70	28.8
THE DAILY NEWS	27	36.5	16	32.7	11	9.2	54	22.2
THE STANDARD	9	12.2	16	32.7	19	15.8	43	18.1
TOTALS	74	30.5	49	20.2	120	49.9	243	100

TABLE 14: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE MEDIA: 1970-1985.

RELATIONS

MEDIA	LIBYA AND ITS NEIGHBORS	LIBYA AND AFRICA	LIBYA AND M/EAST	LIBYA AND W/EUROPE	LIBYA AND U.S.S.R.	LIBYA AND ASIA	LIBYA AND U.S.A.	LIBYA & INTERN. BODIES	LIBYA AND L/AMERICA	LIBYA AND OTHER	TOTALS
THE TIMES	N=23	N=7	N=12	N=23	N=3	N=0	N=5	N=2	N=0	N=1	N=76
1970-1975	9%	29%	75%	13%	0%	0%	0%	50%	0%	0%	
1976-1980	4	29	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1981-1985	87	42	12	87	100	0	100	50	0	100	
DAILY TIMES	N=22	N=21	N=11	N=4	N=0	N=2	N=8	N=1	N=1	N=0	N=70
1970-1975	23%	33%	64%	0%	0%	0%	25%	0%	0%	0%	
1976-1980	18	14	27	0	0	50	25	100	0	0	
1981-1985	59	53	9	100	0	50	50	0	100	0	
DAILY NEWS	N=26	N=13	N=5	N=5	N=0	N=2	N=2	N=1	N=0	N=1	N=54
1970-1975	50%	46%	100%	50%	0%	50%	0%	0%	0%	0%	
1976-1980	23	39	0	50	0	50	50	100	0	0	
1981-1985	27	15	0	0	0	0	50	0	0	100	
STANDARD	N=18	N=13	N=3	N=5	N=3	N=4	N=4	N=0	N=0	N=0	N=43
1970-1975	17%	0%	33.3%	80%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	
1976-1980	50	31	33.3	20	0	0	25	0	0	0	
1981-1985	33	69	33.3	0	0	0	75	0	0	0	
	N=69	N=54	N=31	N=36	N=3	N=4	N=19	N=4	N=1	N=2	N=243

6:5

THE PROBLEMATIC OF NEWS SOURCE:

ITS VISIBILITY AND INVISIBILITY.

Central and perhaps, the most contentious, in the debate on international news reporting, has been the role of the international news agencies as the most dominant purveyors and definers of most of the news made available to the media systems of the world and their audiences. This led to the emergence of a plethora of alternative national, regional and intergovernmental news services whose sole aim was to rectify this global dominance by a few Transnational news agencies in international news gathering and dissemination.

To what extent the situation has changed, to what degree, and in which direction, is still an uncharted terrain in international news flow research. One can easily surmise that, little has been substantially added on the earlier observations made by Phil Harris [1976]^{13} and Oliver Boyd-Barrett [1980]^{14} as regards the dominance of the four big Western news agencies; Reuters, AP, UPI, and AFP. One of the most important recent observations was put forward by the IAMCR report by Sreberny-Mohammedi and her colleagues. [1985]^{15} They pointed out that most Third World media systems have adapted a practice of not reporting or acknowledging their news source, particularly, in situations when national news agencies act as secondary gatekeepers between the originating source of news items and the reporting media.

This practice of the nondisclosure of news source is clearly indicated by the figures in table 15 in which the bulk of the news items reported by the African media in our sample, fell within the "Other European", "Other African", "Own Correspondent", "Other", and "Unidentified", categories. This is augmented by the invisibility of all the African national news agencies, with the exception of the Libyan Arab News Agency, JANA, as news sources. The Pan-African News Agency, PANA, and the Tanzanian News Agency; SHIHATA, are completely invisible, while the Nigerian News Agency, NAN, was only mentioned once and the Kenyan News Agency, KNA, only thrice.

Overall, the only most frequently quoted African agency is the Libyan Arab News Agency in both the newspapers, while the most quoted among the Western agencies is Reuters followed by AFP and AP. The Standard stand out among the African newspapers as the one relying most on the Western news agencies. This probably is due to the fact that Nairobi, the home base of The Standard serves as the base for almost all the international news services in black Africa. Most interesting is the similarity of The Standard's news source with that of The Times, i.e., Reuters, UPI/AP, and own correspondents. Among the big international news agencies, the Soviet News Agency, TASS, is completely invisible, even in The Daily News whose country particularly houses mostly Eastern European News Agencies. The proportion of news items accredited to own correspondent in the African newspapers is significantly very high. This definitely is paradoxical considering the fact that most of these newspapers do not have enough resources to even cover their countries adequately not to talk of having the resources to have enough correspondents in almost all the capitals

of the African continent.

Even though a clear cut case for the dominance of the international news services can not be established, particularly among the African newspapers, their relative visibility and the predominance of unidentified news sources among these media does, to a certain extent, indicate the possibility of such dominance. The Standard for example, always accredit its news source, which explains the relative absence of unidentified cases, and hence clearly shows its reliance on the big four Western news agencies.

Tables 16 and 17 show the distribution of news sources for the entire period under study according to our periodic phasing and how these sources crosstabulate according to the respective media. Most apparent in table 16, is that there is not much significant difference in the reliance of the media on the big four news agencies over the periods. This ranges from 39%, 28%, 33% and 28%, 39%, 33% of all news items accredited to Reuters and AFP falling in the 1970-1975, 1976-1980 and 1981-1985 periods respectively, to 40%, 20%, and 40% of all items accredited to UPI. The only significant difference is in respect to AP, which has only 19% of items accredited to it falling between 1970 and 1975, and 1976 to 1980, respectively, while almost 62% of items accredited to it fell in the 1981 to 1985 period.

On the other hand reliance on the Libyan Arab News Agency, JANA, significantly declined over the period. This ranges from 45% in 1970-1975 to 26% in 1976-1980 and 29% in the 1981-1985 period. Similarly, the frequency of other sources and unidentified sources

TABLE 15:   SOURCE OF NEWS ITEMS.

MEDIUM

SOURCE	THE TIMES		DAILY TIMES		DAILY NEWS		STANDARD		TOTALS	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
REUTERS	16	15	–	–	2	2.8	18	28	36	11.4
UPI	–	–	1	1.3	–	–	4	6	5	1.6
AP	13	12	–	–	–	–	3	5	16	5.1
AFP	3	5	1	1.3	1	1.4	11	17	18	5.7
TASS	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
NAN	–	–	1	1.3	–	–	–	–	1	0.3
KNA	–	–	3	4	–	–	–	–	3	1.0
SHIHATA	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
JANA	6	6	11	15	23	33	2	3	42	13.4
PANA	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
OTHER EUROPEAN	1	1	4	5	4	5.7	2	3	11	3.5
OTHER AFRICAN	2	2	4	5	16	23	3	5	25	8.0
OWN-CORRESPONDENT	56	53	9	12	6	8.7	15	23	86	27.4
OTHER	3	3	16	21	3	4.4	1	2	23	7.3
UNIDENTIFIED	3	3	26	34	14	20	5	8	48	15.3
TOTALS*	105	33	76	25	69	22	64	20	314	100

* Note that totals exceed sample size Of 294 items due to multiple coding

also declined. One other notable significance is the relative increase in the reliance on own correspondent and other African news sources over the period. [see table 17].

TABLE 16: **SOURCE OF NEWS ITEMS; 1970–1985.**

PERIOD

SOURCE	1970–1975 N	1970–1975 %	1976–1980 N	1976–1980 %	1981–1985 N	1981–1985 %	TOTALS N	TOTALS %
REUTERS	14	39	10	28	12	33	36	11
UPI	2	40	1	20	2	40	5	2
AP	3	19	3	19	10	62	16	5
AFP	5	28	7	39	6	33	18	6
TASS	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
NAN	–	–	–	–	1	100	1	0.3
KNA	–	–	–	–	3	100	3	1
SHIHATA	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
JANA	19	45	11	26	12	29	42	13.4
PANA	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
OTHER EUROPEAN	4	36	4	36	3	28	11	4
OTHER AFRICAN	5	20	8	32	12	48	25	8
OWN CORRESPONDENT	15	17	15	17	56	66	86	27.3
OTHER	11	48	6	26	6	26	23	7
UNIDENTIFIED	27	56	6	13	15	31	48	15
TOTALS	105	33	71	23	138	44	314	100

TABLE 17:   PERIODIC DISTRIBUTION OF NEWS SOURCE BY MEDIUM

SOURCE

MEDIA	Reuters	UPI	AP	AFP	TASS	NAN	RNA	SHIHATA	JANA	PANA	Other European	Other African	Own Correspondent	Other	Unidentified
THE TIMES	N=16	N=0	N=13	N=5	N=0	N=0	N=0	N=0	N=6	N=0	N=1	N=2	N=56	N=3	N=3
1970–1975	37.5%	0%	23%	40%	0%	0%	0%	0%	17%	0%	100%	0%	21%	100%	33%
1976–1980	12.5	0	8	20	0	0	0	0	17	0	0	0	9	0	0
1981–1985	50	0	69	40	0	0	0	0	66	0	0	100	70	0	67
DAILY TIMES	N=0	N=1	N=0	N=1	N=0	N=1	N=3	N=0	N=11	N=0	N=4	N=4	N=9	N=16	N=26
1970–1975	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	55%	0%	0%	25%	22%	37.5%	39%
1976–1980	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	18	0	25	0	11	37.5	15
1981–1985	0	0	0	100	0	100	100	0	27	0	75	75	67	25	46
DAILY NEWS	N=2	N=0	N=3	N=1	N=0	N=0	N=0	N=0	N=23	N=0	N=4	N=16	N=6	N=3	N=14
1970–1975	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	52.2%	0	50%	25%	17%	67	93
1976–1980	50	0	67	0	0	0	0	0	30.4	0	50	37.5	66	0	7
1981–1985	50	0	33	0	0	0	0	0	17.4	0	0	37.5	17	33	0
STANDARD	N=18	N=4	N=3	N=11	N=0	N=0	N=0	N=0	N=2	N=0	N=2	N=3	N=15	N=1	N=5
1970–1975	0%	50%	0%	18%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	50%	0%	0%	0%	60%
1976–1980	50	0	67	55	0	0	0	0	50	0	50	67	33	0	20
1981–1985	50	50	33	27	0	0	0	0	50	0	0	33	67	100	20
TOTAL SOURCE	N=36	N=5	N=16	N=18	N=0	N=1	N=3	N=0	N=42	N=0	N=11	N=25	N=86	N=23	N=48
1970–1975	44%														
1976–1980	39														
1981–1985	17														

Looking at how the individual newspapers rely on the various news agencies over the years, we can not observe any discernible pattern or changes running across all the media as a whole. [see table 18] The only exception is that in regards to the use of JANA as a news source, both The Times and The Standard tended to utilise it more in the 1976-1980 and 1981-1985 periods while The Daily Times and The Daily News rely on it more in the 1970-1975 period. The other specifically mentioned African sources, i.e. The News Agency Of Nigeria, NAN and The Kenya News Agency, KNA, were all utilised solely by The Daily Times in the 1981-1985 period. Even here it has to be pointed out that the percentages are based on very low frequencies i.e., once for the NAN and thrice for the KNA.

In regards to other sources with very high frequencies however, the categories "other African Agency" and "own correspondent", are certainly cited as a source of news more frequently in the years between 1976-1980 and 1981-1985 by all the newspapers. Unidentified sources on the other hand, tended to increase over the years in both The Times and The Daily Times, while decreasing in The Daily News and The Standard. As we mentioned earlier, there is hardly any coherent pattern to be discerned that might allow us to reach some form of generalizations as regards the characteristics of news sources of our media sample.

What is obvious however, is the fact that African agencies do not feature as prominent sources of news to the African newspapers with the exception of the Libyan agency, JANA. On the other hand, almost all the African newspapers admit to an occasional use of the international news agencies and other European sources. Similarly, The Times' use of African news sources favourably compares with that of the African newspapers, with the exception of The Daily News, which even among the African newspapers, shows the highest use of African news agencies as sources of its news materials.

6:6   THE WHAT?, THE WHO?, AND MOTIFS OF LIBYAN NEWS.

News is generally about events and happenings in the here and now of everyday life. In this context, newsmaking in general follows a routinized framework, a ritual, involving in most cases, certain actors, certain issues, and a set of established motifs about the nature of society and the actions of individuals or collectivities within society. Within this framework, research has shown that the actions of some particular set of individuals, based on their class positions in society tend to constitute a very high proportion of the product called news. In the international scene, established research has pointed out that politics and political actors, whether as individuals or nations, constitute the bulk of international news. To what extent then does coverage of Libya by our media sample correspond or diverge from the above assertion?.

6:7: RECURRENT TOPICS IN LIBYAN NEWS.

A list of 35 main topics and subsidiary topics were coded for analysis in an attempt to capture the major issues that dominate Libyan affairs coverage. This constitute a total of 14 main topics and up to two subsidiary topics. For the sake of clarity, only the main topics will be discussed here because they also contain the subsidiary topics. However, in certain cases were a main topic may be inadequate in the sense that it blurs the essence or significance of a subsidiary topic which is more crucial, the subsidiary issues at hand will be brought to light. A typical example here, is the subsidiary issue of international terrorism which in most cases is reported under international politics, but which in this case assumed a very prominent position to the extent that we cannot afford to bury it under the general rubric of politics. In this context, we decided to make it a main topic of its own standing for analytical purposes.

Of the 14 main topics coded, 12 main issues were found to be the main focus of the news items, while the remaining two; natural disaster and nuclear energy were totally absent. Out of the 12 main topics, political issues predominate with international politics accounting for almost 40% of the total number of news items and domestic politics accounting for almost 9%. Taken together, this represents almost 50% of the total number of news items on Libya carried by the respective newspapers in our sample over the entire study period. Next to politics is military matters with a substantial 27% share of the total number of items. This is followed by international terrorism with 9.5% and economic matters

both national and international, with 8% of the total. These four hard core news categories or issues form the substance of our media coverage of Libya. The only other visible issues are crime with 2.4% and academic/student matters with 1.3% of the total number of news items. [see table 18].

TABLE 18: DISTRIBUTION OF NEWS ITEMS BY TOPICS

TOPIC	N	%
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS	117	39.7
DOMESTIC POLITICS	25	8.5
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM	28	9.5
ECONOMIC MATTERS	23	8.0
MILITARY	80	27.2
SOCIAL PROVISIONS	1	0.3
CRIME	7	2.4
CULTURE, RELIGION AND HISTORY	3	1.0
SPORTS	2	0.7
HUMAN INTEREST	2	0.7
ACADEMIC/STUDENT MATTERS	4	1.3
INTERNATIONAL AID	2	0.7
TOTALS	294	100.0

This preoccupation of news with politics has been an established premise in communication research and discourse. As indicated in our earlier discussion of news and ideology in chapter four, the event orientation of the media in the advanced capitalist societies and by extension, in the international context, makes the media to concentrate on a limited number of 'newsworthy' sources in order to meet daily deadlines. The most obvious of these sources are the economic and political elite. This tendency has serious implications for the position of the media as a molder of public opinion within these societies in regards to the 'picture of the world' presented.

One of such implications particularly within the advanced capitalist societies, is the attempt by the media to separate the 'State' from political processes. This is enhanced by the existence of competing political parties which the media present to its audience as the bedrock of socioeconomic and political processes, with the state somewhat suspended above these processes, acting as an overseer, or arbiter.

This separation of the State and politics allows the media to present a simplified version of events in society within the context of actions of the political elite. Simply, this version of social reality evacuates problems of society from the socioeconomic system in operation and puts them squarely on the laps of individual political actors. The type of political democracy under which the press operates is always called upon to bear witness and offer plausible testimony to this version of reality. In the international context, the story is the same depending on the type of political systems referred to. Political

actions of two Western "democratic" systems for example will be presented within this established framework. On the other hand, if a political system perceived as non-democratic is involved, the interpretation of events presented to the audience is one in which a legitimate democratic system is involved with an authoritarian, non-egalitarian or dictatorial system. The other party is presented as illegitimate, an aberration of reality. In this context, the State and political processes are merged and in most cases, personified in the actions of one individual. Hence, Libya becomes Gaddafi's Libya, Cuba; Castro's Cuba, and China; Mao's China, etc. The State and political processes merge with individual political actors and become synonymous. This has serious implications for foreign affairs coverage by the media because, as Golding and Elliott [1973][16] pointed out in one of their dated seminal paper;

> although in quantitative terms most media concentrate on political news when dealing with foreign affairs, there is a sense in which their handling of it is apolitical; their is more to political conflict and political process than the leaders and form of government.

Similarly, it is our position that we have to go beyond the mere assertion that international affairs coverage concentrates mostly on politics and actions of politicians. Foreign policy we believe is a crisis management activity. It is an attempt to manage and control actual or potential crisis situations. To paraphrase Mao Tse Tung, it is a war by other means. It is an extension of war by other means, just as war is an extension of politics by other means. This then means that the politics that permeates and forms the daily diet of international news is

actually a crisis or conflict management activity. Translated simply, it is an attempt to maintain a particular system of operation at the international level from deviating from the established norm. Political news or news of politics is therefore, crisis news.

An argument may be made against the above assertion by pointing out that most political reporting is made-up of policy pronouncements within nation states and even in the international arena. This is partly true. But, even then, policies are mostly responses to socioeconomic and political crisis. Any single policy is an attempt to provide a more palatable means of either maintaining the existing structures in society or introducing frameworks capable of bringing about changes in such a way as to arrest the emergence of possible crisis situations that might accrue in lieu of such changes. In the context of international news, reporting clearly concentrates on the goings and comings of political actors, mostly on errands to mend political fences, consolidate existing relations, or on policy pronouncements of these actors regarding positions taken in disputes in terms of break in diplomatic relations, diplomatic reconciliations, trade embargoes or any such sanctions, or possible military agreements or engagements. The list is endless, but it does point out that almost all these activities that constitute political reporting border on crisis lines.

The figures in table 19 and 20 clearly show that the most frequent topics i.e. international politics, international terrorism and military matters all tend to feature more in the 1981-1985 period. This is the period when the political crisis

between Libya and Western Europe and the United States over charges of Libyan involvement with terrorist activities and the civil war in Chad was at its peak. Correspondingly, economic matters and domestic politics also featured mostly in the 1970-1975 period in which Libya was busy reorganizing its internal political structures, a process which is always crisis laden with coup and counter coup attempts. Similarly, the economic issues recurrent in this period were centered on the nationalization of the transnational oil industries operating in Libya by the Gaddafi government.

Three of the newspapers in our sample; The Times, The Daily Times and The Standard, conform to the above pattern. The only exception once again is The Daily News which featured more international politics in the 1970-1975 period, and more international terrorism and military matters in the 1976-1980 period. It does however cover more economic and domestic political issues in the same pattern the other three newspapers did. One explanation is that as regards giving more coverage to international politics in the 1970-1975 period when the Libyan revolution was at its infancy, The Daily News was, as discussed earlier, following with keen comradely interest the political actions of the new Libyan government, particularly as it relates to international power alignments. In respect of military matters, the involvement of Libya in the Tanzania-Uganda war which fell within the 1976-1980 period is the main factor. [see table 19]. It is worth noting that The Times did actually cover Libyan domestic politics and economic issues more than all the African newspapers. In the same vain it is interesting to note that with the exception of The Daily News, none of the African newspapers covered as much

TABLE 19: PERIODIC DISTRIBUTION OF TOPICS; 1970–1985.

PERIOD

TOPICS	1970–1975		1976–1980		1981–1985		TOTALS	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS	41	35	20	17	56	48	117	39.7
DOMESTIC POLITICS	16	64	7	28	2	8	25	8.5
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM	6	21	7	25	15	54	28	9.5
ECONOMIC MATTERS	15	65	3	13	5	22	23	8.0
MILITARY MATTERS	18	23	20	25	42	52	80	27.0
SOCIAL SERVICES	0	0	1	100	0	0	1	0.3
CRIME	1	14	3	43	3	43	7	2.4
CULTURE, RELIGION AND HISTORY	0	0	3	100	0	0	3	1.0
SPORTS	0	0	0	0	2	100	2	0.7
HUMAN INTEREST	2	100	0	0	0	0	2	0.7
ACADEMIC/STUDENT MATTERS	1	25	1	25	2	50	4	2.1
INTERNATIONAL AID	2	100	0	0	0	0	2	0.7
TOTALS	102	35	65	22	127	43	294	100

as one single issue related to social services in Libya despite the fact that the provision of these services particularly in housing, education and health, is one of the landmarks of the Libyan revolution. The absence of such issues as relating to agriculture is also glaring.

TABLE 20:   PERIODIC DISTRIBUTION OF TOPICS BY MEDIA

TOPICS

MEDIA	INTERNATIONAL POLITICS	DOMESTIC POLITICS	INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM	ECONOMIC MATTERS	MILITARY MATTERS	SOCIAL SERVICE	CRIME	CULTURE RELIGION AND HISTORY	SPORTS	HUMAN INTEREST	ACADEMIC MATTERS	INTERNATIONAL AID
THE TIMES	N=30	N=10	N=9	N=10	N=30	N=0	N=6	N=0	N=0	N=0	N=0	N=0
1970-1975	23%	50%	0%	50%	23%	0%	17%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
1976-1980	0	20	44	10	7	0	33	0	0	0	0	0
1981-1985	77	30	56	40	70	0	50	0	100	0	0	0
DAILY TIMES	N=36	N=6	N=7	N=4	N=17	N=0	N=1	N=2	N=1	N=0	N=1	N=1
1970-1975	31%	50%	14%	100%	18%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
1976-1980	22	17	14	0	12	0	100	100	0	0	100	0
1981-1985	47	33	72	0	70	0	0	0	100	0	0	0
DAILY NEWS	N=29	N=6	N=2	N=6	N=13	N=1	N=0	N=1	N=1	N=2	N=3	N=1
1970-1975	48%	66%	0%	67%	23%	100%	0%	100%	100%	100%	0%	100%
1976-1980	24	17	100	33	54	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1981-1985	28	17	0	0	23	0	0	0	0	0	100	0
STANDARD	N=22	N=3	N=10	N=3	N=20	N=0	N=0	N=0	N=0	N=0	N=0	N=0
1970-1975	18%	67%	10%	33.3%	25%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
1976-1980	23	0	40	33.3	45	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1981-1985	59	33	50	33.3	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTALS TOPICS	N=117	N=25	N=28	N=23	N=80	N=1	N=7	N=3	N=2	N=2	N=4	N=2

6:8: THE ACTORS IN LIBYAN NEWS.

Since politics dominates media coverage of Libyan affairs, it is natural that politicians in their individual capacity or nations as political actors predominate as the main actors in these news items. As table 21 shows nations as political actors constitute the main reference point of our media coverage of Libya with a frequency of almost 46%. This is followed by top leaders with 29%, terrorists with 7%, military with 4% and industry with 4%.

TABLE 21: DISTRIBUTION OF NEWS ITEMS BY ACTORS.

ACTORS	N	%
TOP LEADER	85	28.9
RULING PARTY	5	1.7
LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION	2	0.7
DIPLOMATS	6	2.0
TERRORISTS	19	6.5
MEDIA	3	1.0
MILITARY	12	4.1
NATIONS	134	45.6
INTERNATIONAL BODIES	4	1.4
ELITE PERSONS	3	1.0
ORDINARY PEOPLE	7	2.4
INDUSTRY	11	3.7
RELIGIOUS BODIES	3	1.0
TOTALS	294	100.0

The preponderance of nations as actors can be tied down to the high frequency of international politics as a topical category. Also, this can be related to our earlier argument that in the coverage of Libya, the media in general tended to portray the nation as a non-democratic entity headed by an individual despot, Gaddafi. In this respect, the nation becomes personified in the individual and the individual, Gaddafi becomes reified as an object, the nation. Hence, both become synonymous. This, and the relative low frequency of domestic politics as a category explains the preponderance of nations as actors. This is clearly visible in table 22 in which in the early days of the revolution, i.e. the 1970-1975 period, the main actors in the media coverage of Libya were the top leader, in this case Gaddafi, and industry. As the years go by however, Gaddafi as an individual political actor disappeared from the scene to be replaced by the nation, Libya but personified as "Gaddafi's Libya". In the same vain, the industry as an actor also gave way to the military and terrorists. The main actors in the 1970-1975 period were the top leader, nations, industry. In the 1976-1980 period, the main actors were nations, the top leader, the military and terrorists. In the 1981-1985 period however, it was nations, the top leader and terrorists, in that order. [see table 22]

A crosstabulation of the above figures with the respective media presents a similar picture. That is, across almost all the newspapers with the exception of The Standard, top leader as an actor appears most in the 1970-1975 period. In the case of The Standard it is in the 1976-1980 period. Terrorists and nations as media actors appeared most in the news stories of all the newspapers in the 1981-1985 period, while Industry appeared mostly

TABLE 22:   PERIODIC DISTRIBUTION OF ACTORS

ACTORS	1970–1975		1976–1980		1981–1985		TOTALS	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
TOP LEADER	46	54	19	22	20	24	85	28.9
RULING PARTY	5	100	–	–	–	–	5	1.7
LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION	–	–	–	–	2	100	2	0.7
DIPLOMATS	–	–	3	50	3	50	6	2.0
TERRORISTS	4	21	7	37	8	42	19	6.5
MEDIA	1	33	–	–	2	67	3	1.0
MILITARY	2	17	8	67	2	17	12	4.1
NATIONS	31	23	20	15	83	62	134	45.6
INTERNATIONAL BODIES	–	–	3	75	1	25	4	1.4
ELITE PERSONS	–	–	1	33	2	67	3	1.0
ORDINARY PEOPLE	4	57	1	14	2	29	7	2.4
INDUSTRY	8	73	2	18	1	9	11	3.7
RELIGIOUS BODIES	–	–	–	–	3	100	3	1.0
TOTALS	101	34	64	22	129	44	294	100

in the 1970–1975 period. Overall, both The Times, The Daily Times and The Standard rely more on nations as the main actors in their news stories throughout the study period. This ranges from 51% of The Times total number of items in which nations are presented as actors to 62% of The Daily Times' and 38% of The Standard's. The Daily News on the other hand tends to present top Leaders as actors more often than any other type. These figures are presented in table 23.

TABLE 23: PERIODIC DISTRIBUTION OF ACTORS BY MEDIA

ACTORS

MEDIA		TOP LEADER	RULING PARTY	LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION	DIPLOMATS	TERRORISTS	MEDIA	MILITARY	NATIONS	INTERNATIONAL BODIES	ELITE	ORDINARY	INDUSTRY	RELIGIOUS
		N=65	N=5	N=2	N=6	N=19	N=3	N=12	N=134	N=4	N=3	N=7	N=11	N=3
THE TIMES		N=19	N=1	N=1	N=2	N=6	N=0	N=3	N=48	N=1	N=3	N=3	N=5	N=3
	1970–1975	53%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	33.3%	17%	0%	0%	67%	80%	0%
	1976–1980	10	0	0	0	33	0	33.3	2	0	33	33	20	0
	1981–1985	37	0	100	100	67	0	33.3	81	100	67	20	0	100
DAILY TIMES		N=21	N=0	N=0	N=0	N=4	N=1	N=1	N=47	N=1	N=0	N=0	N=1	N=0
	1970–1975	57%	0%	0%	0%	25%	0%	0%	23%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%
	1976–1980	10	0	0	0	0	0	100	23	100	0	0	0	0
	1981–1985	33	0	0	0	75	100	0	54	0	0	0	0	0
DAILY NEWS		N=31	N=2	N=1	N=1	N=2	N=1	N=4	N=17	N=1	N=0	N=3	N=3	N=0
	1970–1975	68%	100%	0%	0%	0%	100%	25%	24%	0%	0%	100%	100%	0%
	1976–1980	26	0	0	100	100	0	75	18	100	0	0	0	0
	1981–1985	6	0	100	0	0	0	0	58	0	0	0	0	0
STANDARD		N=14	N=2	N=1	N=3	N=7	N=1	N=4	N=22	N=1	N=0	N=1	N=2	N=0
	1970–1975	21%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	36%	0%	0%	0%	50%	0%
	1976–1980	50	0	0	67	43	0	75	23	100	0	0	50	0
	1981–1985	29	0	100	33	57	100	25	41	0	0	100	0	0

6:9: GENERAL MOTIFS; POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE.

The main exercise here is to map out the most recurrent issues on, and references to Libya imbedded in the news items. These are divided into two categories i.e., those motifs that are positively inclined towards Libya and those that can be classified as negatively inclined. Some of the motifs are coded for presence only and only if they are specifically mentioned while others are coded even if they are only inferred. For example, reference to Gaddafi as a "mad dog", as "unpredictable", a "Communist" or "Socialist" has to be specifically mentioned before it can be coded as present in the news item. This goes for a host of other motifs. On the other hand, such motifs and references as political and economic "dependence" or "independence", "interference in the affairs of other nations", "political instability", "support for international terrorism", "Pan-Africanism" or "Pan-Arabism", "political independence", etc. can be coded even if they are just inferred in the news text.

Overall, 100 positive and 440 negative references to Libya were found to be present in the total news items analysed. This is at an average rate of one positive reference in every three news items and almost one and one half negative reference in each news item analysed. For heuristic and analytical purposes, these references are categorised into eight major positive motifs and 20 negative motifs. [see tables 24;25].

TABLE 24:   POSITIVE MOTIFS.

MOTIFS: LIBYA AS/OR HAVING;	N	%
POLITICALLY INDEPENDENT	3	3
ECONOMICALLY SELF-SUFFICIENT	13	13
PAN-ARABIST/FOR ARAB UNITY	46	46
MEDIATOR IN THE MIDDLE-EAST CRISIS	2	2
AGAINST NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE	1	1
HELPING INDEPEN./LIBERATION MOVEMENTS	16	16
PAN-AFRICAN/FOR AFRICAN UNITY	13	13
DISCOURAGING INTERFERENCE IN THE NATIONAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER NATIONS	2	2
HAVING A COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP	4	4
TOTALS	100	100

As can be observed, Libya's affinity to the unification of all Arabs and Arab states is the most frequently referred to motif or issue among all the media. This is followed by references to Libya's support for Independence and Liberation Movements, its stand for a united Africa, its economic viability, and to a certain extent, reference to its collective leadership. It is apt at this juncture to point out that the context, tone and semantics of the news items regarding these issues, plays a very fundamental role in deciding whether these motifs are positive or negative. For example, a reference to Libya's help to "Independence" or "Liberation" movements can be classified as positive while if the same reference employs such terms as "Guerrillas" or

TABLE 25: NEGATIVE MOTIFS.

NO.	MOTIFS: LIBYA AS/OR HAVING;	N	%**
1.	ECONOMICALLY BACKWARD	1	0.3
2.	ENCOURAGING ARAB DISUNITY	4	1.4
3.	PRO-PLO/STRONGLY AGAINST ISRAEL/PARTISAN	34	11.6
4.	ENCOURAGING EAST-WEST DIVISION	4	1.4
5.	ENCOURAGING NORTH-SOUTH DIVISION	32	10.9
6.	A SUPPORTER OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM	56	19.0
7.	PURSUING EXPANSIONIST POLICIES IN AFRICA	65	22.1
8.	INTERFERING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER NATIONS	84	28.6
9.	HAVING AUTHORITARIAN/ECCENTRIC LEADERSHIP	11	3.7
10.	PREDOMINANCE OF RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM	13	4.4
11.	A VIOLATOR OF HUMAN RIGHTS	4	1.4
12.	A SUPPRESSOR OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH/OPINION	3	1.0
13.	PLAGUED WITH POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND VIOLENCE	9	3.1
14.	NON-EGALITARIAN	8	2.7
15.	COMMUNIST/SOCIALIST	29	9.9
16.	A TERRORIST/GUERRILLA FACTORY AND SANCTUARY	33	11.2
17.	GADDAFI AS A "MAD DOG"	3	1.0
18.	GADDAFI AS ERRATIC/UNPREDICTABLE	12	4.1
19.	GADDAFI AS "THE WORLD'S MOST DANGEROUS MAN"	2	0.7
20.	HAVING A GOVERNMENT DESCRIBED AS A REGIME/JUNTA	33	11.2
	TOTALS	440	149.7

** % BASED ON TOTAL NUMBER OF NEWS ITEMS OF 294.

"revolutionary" or "terrorists" movements, depending on the context, will be classified as negative.

With regards to recurrent negative references, accusations of Libya's meddling in the internal affairs of other nations heads the list. This is followed closely by a related accusation that Libya is pursuing some form of expansionist policies in Africa, particularly with reference to its involvement in the Chad civil war. The third most recurrent negative issue emphasised by the media in reference to Libya is its alleged involvement with international terrorism. This is closely followed by references to Libya as a strong supporter of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. In this context, Libya is depicted as a partisan and interested party in the Middle-East crisis to the extent that it does not encourage any dialogue or compromise towards the Jews and the Jewish State of Israel.

Other recurrent themes are references to Libya as a terrorist training ground and most importantly, one of their best havens or sanctuary. This is a theme developed from attempts by airline hijackers to seek for asylum in Libya after hijack attempts. Also there is the reference to Libya as a military Junta or Regime, a term usually employed by the Western countries and hence the media when referring to countries they consider undemocratic or dictatorial. Similarly, there is the old clinger, i.e., the reference to Libya as a communist or Socialist country. A summary of these negative motifs and their respective frequencies are presented in table 26 above.

Almost all the most frequent positive motifs employed by the media in their reference to Libya were used in the 1970-1975. This is in the early days of the Libyan revolution in which it is possible to concur that the media was still peddling on soft ground in its treatment of Libyan affairs. On the other hand, almost all the most frequent negative motifs happened to be used in reference to Libya in the 1981-1985 period. As tables 27 and 28 indicate, in the early days of the revolution, the picture of Libya painted by the media, is one of a moderate politically independent, and economically self sufficient African State concerned mostly with African and Arab unity. A State with a collective leadership whose goals and aims extend beyond their local boundary to make it one of their duties to see to the general emancipation of oppressed peoples all over the world.

This picture could not last long as can be seen from our figures because, even at this early stage, and spilling into the 1976-1980 period, there are references to Libya which tend to portray it as encouraging more disunity among the Arabs because of its adherence to some form of religious fundamentalism which in one form or another encourages political cum religious violence, in this case aggravated by a military regime with an eccentric leadership which takes extreme irrational positions on these matters. In the 1981-1985 period, Libya started to be presented as one of those "banana republics" in which every form of atrocity is committed. It is always accused of interfering in the affairs of other nations, training terrorists to go out and hijack airplanes and ships full of children and pregnant women, and suppressing even the most basic of its citizens fundamental rights of speech and opinion and worship. All these the media concur, is engineered

and directed by a single "Mad Dog", an eccentric and unpredictable despot who even president Ronald Reagan described as the "worlds most dangerous man". That is the communist and religious bigot, Col. Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. The respective figures of the frequencies of these positive and negative motifs across the period of our study are presented in tables 26 and 27.

TABLE 26: PERIODIC DISTRIBUTION OF POSITIVE MOTIFS.

	1970–1975		1976–1980		1981–1985		TOTALS	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
POLITICALLY INDEPENDENT	3	100	–	–	–	–	3	3
ECONOMICALLY SELF SUFFICIENT	8	62	1	8	4	30	13	13
PAN–ARAB/FOR ARAB UNITY	37	81	8	17	1	2	46	46
MEDIATOR IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS	2	100	–	–	1	–	2	2
AGAINST NORTH–SOUTH DIVIDE	–	–	–	–	1	100	1	1
HELPING INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS WORLDWIDE	13	81	2	13	1	6	16	16
PAN–AFRICANIST	7	54	5	39	1	7	13	13
DISCOURAGING INTERFERENCE IN THE AFFAIRS OF OTHER NATIONS	–	–	1	50	1	50	2	2
HAVING COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP	4	100	–	–	–	–	4	4
TOTALS	74	74	17	17	9	9	100	100

TABLE 27: PERIODIC DISTRIBUTION OF NEGATIVE MOTIFS.

MOTIF NO.***	PERIOD							
	1970–1975		1976–1980		1981–1985		TOTALS	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
NMOTIF 1	–	–	–	–	1	100	1	0.2
NMOTIF 2	–	–	1	25	3	75	4	0.9
NMOTIF 3	21	62	7	21	6	17	34	7.7
NMOTIF 4	–	–	1	25	3	75	4	0.9
NMOTIF 5	13	41	5	15	14	44	32	7.2
NMOTIF 6	6	11	8	14	42	75	56	12.7
NMOTIF 7	4	6	12	19	49	75	65	15.0
NMOTIF 8	7	8	18	22	59	70	84	19.0
NMOTIF 9	4	36	3	28	4	36	11	2.5
NMOTIF 10	1	8	8	61	4	31	13	2.9
NMOTIF 11	–	–	1	25	3	75	4	0.9
NMOTIF 12	1	33.3	1	33.3	1	33.3	3	0.7
NMOTIF 13	–	–	7	78	2	22	9	2.0
NMOTIF 14	1	13	–	–	7	87	8	1.7
NMOTIF 15	5	17	8	28	16	55	29	7.0
NMOTIF 16	4	12	5	15	24	73	33	7.5
NMOTIF 17	–	–	1	33	2	67	3	0.7
NMOTIF 18	4	33	2	17	6	50	12	2.6
NMOTIF 19	–	–	–	–	2	100	2	0.4
NMOTIF 20	19	58	3	9	11	33	33	7.5
TOTALS	90	20	91	21	259	59	440	100

*** BECAUSE OF SPACE, THE NEGATIVE MOTIFS IN THESE TABLE ARE JUST NUMBERED 1-20 CORRESPONDING WITH THE LIST OF THE MOTIFS IN TABLE 26 ABOVE.

Crosstabulating the above figures in tables 26 and 27 with the respective media in our sample shows that the three African newspapers are the only ones that ever attributed any form of political independence to Libya. Even here it can be seen from the figures in table 28 that this attribution was, in all the three African newspapers, in the 1970-1975 period. The situation is the same for the presentation of Libya as an economically viable nation. In this context, all the newspapers did portray Libya as an economically viable nation mainly in the early years of the Libyan revolution. The Times, The Daily Times and The Standard all concurred to this in the 1970-1975 period, while The Daily News provided a sustained propagation of this theme throughout the study period.

Similarly, the portrayal of Libya as a supporter of both African and Arab unity featured most in all the newspapers in the 1970-1975 period as with the associated theme of helping Independence movements which also mostly featured in the 1970-1975 period in both The Times, The Daily Times and The Daily News, while The Standard attributed to this mostly in the 1976-1980 period. Ironically, it is only the Times that ever indicated that Libya is against any form of political rift between the developed countries of the North and the underdeveloped countries of the South. The Times also stands alone in asserting that Libya discourages interference in the national affairs of other nations. Also it is The Times in conjunction with the daily News that portrayed Libya as having any form of collective leadership in the 1970-1975 period and as a mediator in the middle east crises in the 1976-1980 period.

TABLE 28: **PERIODIC DISTRIBUTION OF POSITIVE MOTIFS BY MEDIA**

MOTIFS

MEDIA	POLITICALLY INDEPENDENT	ECONOMICALLY SELF SUFFICIENT	PAN-ARABIC	MEDIATOR IN THE MIDDLE CRISIS	AGAINST NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE	HELPING INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS	PAN-AFRICAN	DISCOURAGING INTERFERENCE IN OTHER NATIONS	HAVING COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP
	N=3	N=13	N=46	N=2	N=1	N=16	N=13	N=2	N=2
THE TIMES	N=0	N=5	N=14	N=1	N=1	N=2	N=2	N=2	N=2
1970-1975	0%	40%	86%	0%	0%	50%	100%	0%	100%
1976-1980	0	0	7	100	0	0	0	50	0
1981-1985	0	60	7	0	100	50	0	50	0
DAILY TIMES	N=1	N=4	N=11	N=0	N=0	N=6	N=5	N=0	N=0
1970-1975	100%	100%	73%	0	0	50%	40%	0%	0%
1976-1980	0	0	27	0	0	17	40	0	0
1981-1985	0	0	0	0	0	33	20	0	0
DAILY NEWS	N=1	N=3	N=12	N=1	N=0	N=7	N=6	N=0	N=2
1970-1975	100%	33.3%	92%	0%	0%	57%	50%	0%	100%
1976-1980	0	33.3	8	100	0	14	50	0	0
1981-1985	0	33.3	0	0	0	29	0	0	0
THE STANDARD	N=1	N=1	N=9	N=0	N=0	N=1	N=0	N=0	N=0
1970-1975	100%	100%	67%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
1976-1980	0	0	33	0	0	100	0	0	0
1981-1985	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

With respect to the negative motifs, all the newspapers depicted Libya as a partisan party in the middle East crises in the 1970-1975 period. The Times of London and The Nigerian Daily Times have the highest references, eleven and ten respectively followed by The Standard with seven references while The Daily News had the least with six references. The depiction of Libya as a supporter of international terrorism, as pursuing expansionist policies in Africa, as interfering in the internal affairs of other nations and as a terrorist or guerrilla factory and sanctuary all featured most in three of the newspapers viz; The Times, The Daily Times and The Standard. The only exception is The Daily News which recorded very low frequencies in the 1981-1985 period. These related motifs are somewhat products of the international image of Libya created and solidified in relation to the political crises Libya and Western Europe and the United States are engaged in at that time. One interesting fact is that The Standard tends to consistently associate Libya with the above imagery even more than The Times which has more at stake. The Standard's portrayal of Libya as a Communist or Socialist country for example, is almost 62% of the total references across all the media. The Daily News in most cases, provides less of the above imagery. [see table 29].

TABLE 29: PERIODIC DISTRIBUTION OF NEGATIVE MOTIFS BY MEDIA

MOTIFS NUMBER *

MEDIA	NM1 N=1	NM2 N=4	NM3 N=34	NM4 N=4	NM5 N=32	NM6 N=56	NM7 N=65	NM8 N=84	NM9 N=11	NM10 N=13	NM11 N=4	NM12 N=3	NM13 N=9	NM14 N=8	NM15 N=29	NM16 N=33	NM17 N=3	NM18 N=12	NM19 N=2	NM20 N=33
THE TIMES	N=0	N=1	N=11	N=1	N=6	N=18	N=20	N=24	N=2	N=13	N=2	N=1	N=2	N=6	N=5	N=7	N=1	N=4	N=1	N=6
1970-1975	0%	0%	73%	0%	50%	6%	0%	4%	50%	33.3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	20%	0%	0%	100%	0%	83%
1976-1980	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	8	0	33.3	0	100	100	0	20	0	0	0	0	0
1981-1985	0	100	27	100	50	88	100	88	50	33.3	100	0	0	100	60	100	100	0	100	17
DAILY TIMES	N=0	N=0	N=10	N=0	N=11	N=14	N=17	N=22	N=3	N=2	N=0	N=0	N=3	N=0	N=2	N=9	N=0	N=2	N=0	N=8
1970-1975			50%		27%	14%	12%	9%	33%	0%			0%		0%	11%		0%		25%
1976-1980			30		18	7	24	14	0	50			67		50	11		0		25
1981-1985			20		55	79	64	77	67	50			33		50	78		100		50
DAILY NEWS	N=0	N=3	N=6	N=0	N=8	N=4	N=7	N=10	N=3	N=2	N=0	N=0	N=1	N=0	N=4	N=5	N=1	N=0	N=0	N=11
1970-1975		0%	83%		63%	50%	14%	20%	67%	0%			0%		25%	60%	0%			91%
1976-1980		33	17		25	25	43	40	33	100			100		50	20	100			0
1981-1985		67	0		12	25	43	40	0	0			0		25	20	0			9
STANDARD	N=1	N=0	N=7	N=3	N=7	N=20	N=21	N=28	N=3	N=6	N=2	N=2	N=3	N=2	N=18	N=12	N=1	N=6	N=1	N=8
1970-1975	0%		43%	0%	29%	5%	5%	7%	0%	0%	0%	50%	0%	50%	17%	0%	0%	0%	0%	25%
1976-1980	0		43	33	14	25	24	32	67	67	50	0	67	0	22	25	0	33	0	13
1981-1985	100		14	67	57	70	71	61	33	33	50	50	33	50	61	75	100	67	100	62

* Because of space restrictions, these motifs numbers correspond to the numbered motifs in table 25.

6:9:1: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS.

The above data on our sampled media coverage of Libya from 1970-1985, shows that most of our initial suppositions were not significantly supported. In terms of amount and volume of coverage, the African media did not fare better than The Times of London's. In terms of number of news items, The Times actually accounted for almost 32% of the total number of news items devoted to Libya by all the newspapers, followed among the African media by The Daily Times Of Nigeria with 26%, The Daily News Of Tanzania with 22%, and The Standard Of Kenya with 20% of the total. In terms of space however, The Nigerian Daily Times is at the top of the list with 28.1%, followed by The London Times with 26.4%, The Standard with 26.1% and The Daily News with 19.4% of the total. As argued earlier, this differential is attributed to the tendency of both The Daily Times and The Standard to feature more editorials and feature articles than both The Times and The Daily News. To this extent, we can safely conclude that contrary to our initial hypothesis that the African newspapers will cover Libyan affairs more than the European Times of London, the opposite is the case. The Times did actually cover Libya in the 1970-1985 period more in terms of total number of news items. Even with regards to volume of coverage, The Times is only surpassed by The Nigerian Daily Times, in this case, with only a marginal and insignificant 1.7% difference.

Similarly, with regard to our assertion that the media, particularly the African newspapers in our sample, will cover Libya more during and after the New International Information

order Debate which somehow culminated with the publication of The

MacBride report, we found that the empirical data tend to support

the supposition in that, almost all the media with the exception

of The Tanzanian Daily news, covered Libya the most in the

1981-1985 period. The Daily News on the other hand, covered Libya

the most in the pre-debate period of 1970-1975. This however does

not indicate a causal relationship between the debate and the

recommendations of the MacBride report and this apparent increase

in coverage. This is because this increase is bellied by two

important factors. One is the low level coverage Libya received in

the actual debate period of 1976-1980, which is much lower than

even the pre-debate period of 1970-1975 across all the newspapers.

The second important factor is the coincidence of high level

coverage with periods of crisis. In this case Libya received its

highest coverage from both The Times, The Daily Times, in terms of

both volume and space, and from The Standard, in terms of space,

in the 1981-1985 period. This period we have argued earlier is

characterized by some prominent periodic political crisis and

eruptions between Libya and the Western world, particularly,

Britain and the United States Of America. Similarly, the

relatively high level coverage accorded Libya by The Kenya

Standard in the 1976-1980 period, coincided with the time when

Libya became involved in the Tanzania-Uganda border war in which

Kenya has far reaching politico-economic interests because it

shares borders with Uganda, the battle ground. It is because of

these factors, and the limitation imposed by our methodology,

which hinders us from drawing possible causal relationships, that

the only conclussion plausible is one that accepts the empirical

evidence of increase in coverage in the post debate period, but at

the same time qualifying it with the fact that the coverage is

concentrated in a few number of months corresponding with certain major crisis situations involving Libya. This to a certain extent indicate that coverage of Libya is as much a product of political and economic factors as well as news values of sensation, drama, and crisis.

One other interesting finding of this study is the predominance of politics both local to Libya and international over any other issue. According to our data, politics, economics, military issues and terrorism constitute the main framework within which Libya is reported to the world. Associated with this is the finding that The Times did actually cover more Libyan domestic political and economic issues than the African newspapers.

Thirdly, our data shows the glaring invisibility of African news sources even among the African newspapers to the extent that even The Times' use of African news sources compares favourably with the African newspapers' use of the same source. With the exception of the Libyan News Agency, JANA, no any other African news source is given any substantial weight as a source. A typical example is the total absence of the Pan-African News Agency, PANA, as a source of news. One possible explanation for this anomaly might be the practice of not disclosing national and regional news sources among the African media as can be seen in the relatively large percentage of reliance on own-correspondent and the prevalence of 'other' and 'unidentified' sources. This claim to reliance on own-correspondents by the African newspapers is a somewhat contestable possibility. Particularly, when we consider the limited resources these media had to do with which even limits the coverage of their national affairs to more easily accessible

urban settings to the detriment of events and issues happening in the rural hinterlands.

On the other hand, there is a substantial reliance on the international news agencies by the African newspapers which in actual fact increased slightly in the debate and post-debate period, while even the reliance on JANA, the only African source quoted tended to decline over the years. i.e. from 45% in 1970-1975 to 26% in 1976-1980, and 29% in the post-debate 1981-1985 period. One exception is that among the African media, The Daily News in particular stand out as relying more on African news sources.

Lastly, as regards one of the most contentious issues raised by the New International Information Order Debate, that is the accusation leveled against the Western media of covering the Third world only in terms of crisis and political upheavals, our African newspapers in the sample could not escape the blame either in the way and manner they reported Libya. This is pinpointed by the prevalence of large number of negative references or motifs employed by these media in their depiction and reporting of Libyan affairs. In actual fact, The Standard employs these negative motifs even more than The Times Of London, while the The Daily Times and The Daily News compares relatively well with The Times in their general selection of negative references and themes. These themes and references will be more adequately analysed in our next chapter dealing specifically with an in-depth analysis of the various news items on Libya in January 1986, a few weeks before the first American bombing of Libya.

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CHAPTER SEVEN.

MEDIATED IMAGERY OF "LIBYAN TERRORISM":

THE ROME AND VIENNA AIRPORTS ATTACKS.

In the preceeding chapter, we presented a host number of recurrent issues and their related references most frequently used by the media in their reporting of Libyan affairs. One of such motifs was the depiction of Libya as the citadel, training ground and haven of international terrorism. This we pointed out was even more pervasive in the 1981-1985 period of our study. Our intention in this chapter is to go a little further than the mere listings of frequencies above and attempt a qualitative analysis of these themes and references as they are presented in the various news items carried by the respective newspapers of our sample.

To do this, we decided to take a random sample of one month in the year 1986. The rationale for this is to allow us to have a form of material which will be related and compared based on the assumption that almost all the newspapers might cover some of the events equally, particularly if the events happen to be of great news value. As it turned out, the month we came-up with was January, 1986, a few months before the 1986 bombing of Libya by the United States over allegations of Libyan support for international terrorism. Our main purpose here is to compare the news items that are comparable across all the media. That is news items reported by almost all the newspapers in an attempt to explicate the news angles adapted, the general perspectives within which the events are reported and the various themes and

references or motifs that tend to pervade in the reporting of Libyan affairs by these media. Interesting enough, the main event(s) that dominated our media coverage of Libya in this period was Libya's linkage with international terrorism and terrorists. In this context, it was the attacks carried out by members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization on Israeli targets at Rome and Vienna airports in the December of 1986, that constitute the main substance of almost all the news items on Libya carried by all the newspapers in our sample. The rational was that the attacks were carried out by an "extreme" faction of the PLO, headed by an "extreme fanatic"; Abu Nidal, who is widely believed to be financed and supported by Libya.

In the past decade, "terrorism" has been one of the major preoccupations of political discourse, media attention and even social-scientific enterprise. In the case of the media, activities of "terrorists" and those who oppose them or those that they oppose, has become the stable diet of documentaries, news reports, feature articles and even fictional novels. The media's presentation of these political struggles is almost always apolitical, in that it is always depicted as a countenance of "terror and counter terror". In this polemical fashion, the political actions and positions of the "terrorists" and that of the state are presented as good Versus Evil, Light versus Darkness, Democracy versus Totalitarianism, Civilization versus Anarchy, and Rationality versus Irrationality. Most importantly, even public knowledge and opinion about terrorism and its position in society is mostly based on "these images, definitions and explanations provided by the media" [Schlesinger, et.al,[1983].[1] Nowhere, with the probable exception of Northern Ireland, at least

in the past one decade, is the above operationalized fully to its logical conclusion than in the presentation of, and coverage of Libya by the international media. It is within this context that we will approach our media coverage of Libya in the January of 1986, with a view to explicating the most pervasive typifications and representations contained in the news items and articles on and about Libya.

In the January of 1986, almost 87% of the news items on Libya carried by The Times were related to the late December 1985 Rome and Vienna airports attacks carried out by the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Similarly, 96%, 88%, and 96% of The Daily Times', The Daily News' and The Standard's respectively also relate to these attacks and the subsequent developments that followed. As the actual attacks at both Rome and Vienna airports actually took place in December 1985, the stories in our sampled month of January 1986 were basically on the follow-ups of the events. Most of the news items were on the United States reactions to the attacks with a sprinkling of accusations, refutals, and the reactions of the international community, particularly Western Europe to the incidents.

The first story to appear in both The Times, The Daily Times and The Standard was a speech by the Israeli prime minister Shimon Peres to the Israeli parliament calling for international intelligence cooperation and sanctions against Libya and the PLO as a result of the attacks in Rome and Vienna airports. The news item was carried by the Times and The Standard in their January 2nd issues while the Daily Times carried it two days later. Although the story is the same in all the newspapers, it appeared

under different banners, and contain, to a certain extent different excerpts of the speech by Peres. While The Times picked portions of the speech emphasizing the links between the Abu Nidal PLO faction and Libya, The Standard mostly carried segments of the speech accusing Gaddafi of aiding terrorists, and running a "murder state." The Daily Times on the other hand was emphasizing the possible reprisals on Libya from Israel and the United States that might follow. Both The Times and The Daily Times carried Gaddafi's reaction to this developments. While The Daily Times carried Gaddafi's denial of Libya's involvement in the Rome and Vienna incidents, The Times only carried his threat of declaring a war in the Mediterranean and the Middle East if attacked by Israel and the United States. Below are excerpts of the same article from the three newspapers.

THE TIMES	THE STANDARD	THE DAILY TIMES
Angry Peres Lashes PLO Libya Links	**Israeli Premier Hits At Gaddafi**	**Govt. Won't let Raids go Unpunished – PM**
A clear demand for international sanctions against all countries, and especially against Libya, was made yesterday by Mr. Shimon Peres, the Israeli prime minister.	*Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres today accused Libya leader Muammar Gadafi of running a "murder state" which aids terrorists, and appealed to world leaders to take punitive action.*	*Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres, in his latest verbal blast against Libya, has pledged that his country will not let attacks against its El Al Airline in Italy and Austria go unpunished.*
In a hard hitting statement to the Knesset he called for international collaboration backed by deepened intelligence ties between all responsible countries "to put an end to this ugly and dangerous hybrid".	*Addressing parliament on last Friday's Palestinian guerilla attacks at Rome and Vianna airports, Peres said: "Libya under Gaddafi's leadership is not a state in which crime exists, but a state that deals in crime".*	*'If the countries abetting murder are not struck at, the war against terrorism will never be won', Peres told parliament on Wednesday in a speech on last Fridays Palestinian guerrilla attacks at Rome and Vienna airports.*

"This organization does not exist in outer space", he said. "It has bases in defined places on this planet. It has bases of operation in Syria and in Libya.

"From Libya come persons bearing pistols with silencers, and to it return persons who have commited cold-blooded murder. Libya finances terrorism, holds receptions for terrorists and issues declarations lauding their supposedly heroic operations.

The Libyan leader, Colonel Gadaffi, said yesterday that any attack on Libya would cause it to "declare war in the Mediterranean sea and in all the Middle East". [AP reports].

In a press conference shown on French television, he accused president Reagan and the Israelis of "leading the world to war".

Peres said Libya was the headquarters of Abu Nidal, the radical Palestinian guerilla suspected of masterminding the attacks which killed 18 people and wounded more than 100 at the check-in counters of the Israeli airline, El Al.

"From Libya come people with silencer-equipped pistols, and to Libya return people who have committed cold-blooded murder", Peres said.

Peres called Libya a "state that deal in crime and said it harbored the radical Palestinian guerrilla group led by Abu Nidal

Israel has accused him of having organised the attacks in which 18 people died and over 100 were injured.

Libya leader Muammar Gaddafi on Wednesday denied that Libya was responsible for Palestinian guerrilla actions and said an attack on his country would lead to war in the Middle East and the Mediterranean and perhaps the whole world.

At a Tripoli press conference, Gaddafi said Israel had used terrorism against the Palestinians and "the Israelis were the number one terrorists

One pertinent question to ask in relation to the above news item is, why its selection by almost 75% of the newspapers in our sample. Conventional explanations point out that the selection of a news item for publication or broadcasting depends upon certain criteria of newsworthiness, accessibility, audience relevance, credibility of source, and other values of sensation, drama or exceptionality. It is evident that the above news item was carried by the major international news agencies to allow it to be accessible to all the three newspapers at almost the same time. The Standard acknowledged that it received the item from Reuters

while The Times quoted its Middle East correspondent. The Daily Times on the other hand, did not credit its source and carried the story about two days behind The Times and The Standard. Even then the similarity in the wording and content of the story point to the possibility of The Daily Times' source corresponding with the other two newspapers.

Given that the story was carried by the major international news agencies and hence giving it a form of status as a major news item or a "hot" story, what other factors compelled the editors of these three almost "divergent" newspapers, with "different" policies, interests and audiences to select it for publication almost in concert? The crisis in the Middle East is definitely nothing new or out of the ordinary. Similarly, such verbal attacks between the major conflicting groups in the crisis are commonplace, and the incident upon which the speech by Peres was based, i.e. the Rome and Vienna airport attacks happened some weeks ago to the extent that it is almost "stale news". On another level, both Kenya and Nigeria, the home countries of The Standard and The Daily Times respectively, do not even have diplomatic relations with Israel to warrant them carrying such a policy statement aimed against an independent sister African nation, Libya. Particularly as Libya is in the forefront of dismantling these same policies that led to the above break in diplomatic relations.

One possible explanation is that at that time, there is an air of expectancy of a major event breaking out soon between the United States and Libya over the Rome and Vienna attacks. To this extent, the speech by Shimon Peres was seen as containing some

form of indications as to how the events will unfold and to a large extent offer some justifications or legitimacy to any form of military action against Libya. Of the three newspapers that carried the news item, it was only The Daily Times that gave prominence to this portion or aspect of the Peres speech. The Times and The Standard concentrated mostly on the rhetorics of Libyan involvement in the airports attacks, the basis of the looming military reprisals against it by Israel and the United States. Even though Gaddafi denied been involved, both The Times and The Standard ignored to carry the denial despite the fact that the Times for example, carried excerpts from the same interview in which the denial was made. Instead The Times only referred to parts of the interview in which Gaddafi said that if he is attacked by Israel and the United States, he will declare a war in the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

It is interesting to note that The Times adapted a different angle in its coverage of the news item compared to The Standard and The Daily Times. The Times concentrated on Shimon Peres' castigation of the PLO, his number one enemy only bringing in Libya as a collaborator not to be ignored. In this regards, The Times carefully, avoided printing some of the references Peres made to Libya even within the context of the journalistic practice of using direct quotation marks to reproduce otherwise unprintable statements. On the other hand, both The Daily Times and The Standard, covered the story from an angle that subsumes the speech by Peres to be totally directed at Gaddafi and not the PLO. The PLO in this context is giving a secondary role, with Libya assuming the center stage. We thus find The Standard saying; "Peres today accused Libya leader Muammar Gaddafi of running a

'murder state' which aids terrorists"; "Libya under Gaddafi's leadership is not a state in which crime exists, but a state that deals in crime. Similarly, The Daily Times carried this excerpt. Viz; "if the countries abetting murder are not struck at, the war against terrorism will never be won", and "Peres called Libya a state that deal in crime". Both The Times and The Standard however carried a segment of the speech in which Peres made an emotional statement as to the brutal role Libya is playing in the Middle East crisis. Thus, from The Times, "from Libya come persons bearing pistols with silencers, and to it return persons who have committed cold-blooded murder. Libya finances terrorism, holds receptions for terrorists and issues declarations lauding their supposedly heroic operations". And from The Standard, "from Libya come people with silencer-equipped pistols, and to Libya return people who have committed cold-blooded murder". This particular portion of the speech was not carried by The Daily Times, instead, it went on to discuss possible reprisals against Libya by The United States and Israel as reported in the Israeli media.

Contained in the above news item as it is reported by all the three newspapers is a classical case of the media reliance on official sources to reproduce a version of reality consonant with dominant views or ideology in society. In this context, both the PLO and its supporters, particularly Libya, are presented as illegitimate, and engaged in criminal activities of subversion, and terrorism against established democratic systems. The history and purpose of their struggle is conveniently evacuated from this everyday version of reality. Their actions are completely de-politicised, to the extent that all what they are engaged in is the "murdering of innocent people in cold-blood". They are no more

revolutionary fighters or liberation organizations even if the name of their organization says so, they are "cold-blooded murderers". The message is that Freedom fighters do not carry silencer-equipped pistols, they carry machine guns. Its only murderers who carry pistols with silencers.

The thrust of the news story is that Israeli killings of the Palestinians is legal, its done by a state with a legitimate preserve of the use of force to defend itself and its citizens against any external or internal threats. Even if these actions are criticized, it is to point out that they are excessive, without any serious questioning or condemnation of the basis upon which these actions are based. On the other hand, the PLO is presented as an illegal terror organization whose sole aim is to destabilize this established order. In this context, those who support Israel i.e., the United States, are obviously supporting the maintenance of global law and order against this "international terror network" while those who support the PLO, in this case Libya, are definitely maintaining these terrorists to the extent that even the legitimacy of their states is questionable, they are "murder states".

The appearance of such a news item in the newspapers of countries who publicly denounce the State of Israel and even severed diplomatic relations with it indicate a sort of endorsement of the viewpoints contained therein. This might be so even though, the news item and portions of it reproduced by the African media are dully credited and presented as the personal views of the Israeli Prime Minister. This is because, it is possible to report the story from a different angle in which such

an endorsement will not be apparent. The Times for example was able to avoid most of the extreme statements levelled against Libya contained in the speech, which The Standard in particular reproduced almost with glee. Similarly, there is an apparent lack of balance even within the context of the doctrine of "objective journalism" in that Gaddafi's denials of involvement ware ignored by both The Times and The Standard. Likewise his counter statement that both Israel and the United States are also engaged in terroristic activities against the Palestinian people. Even The Daily Times which carried segments of these denials and counter accusations only used it as a 15 one column centimeter "filler" to the main story.

Even though The Daily News did not carry the Shimon Peres speech, it did carry a news item related to the Rome and Vienna airports incidents on the same day the other three newspapers carried the speech. The news item which appeared under the banner, GUNMAN CLAIMS LIBYAN BACKING, is an account of the confessions of one of the gunmen captured after the Rome and Vienna attacks. The news item claims that the gunman confessed to belonging to the Abu Nidal faction of the PLO, and that all 300 of them are trained with Libyan backing to carry out suicide attacks on European airports. The source of these confessions according to The Daily News is the Italian police and courts. The captured gunman according to this sources was alleged to have said; "we are 300, all dedicated to suicide missions", and that "he said he was among 35 people chosen for intensive daily training with Kalashnikov weapons and hand grenades." The story ended with a "filler" of Libya's denial of involvement in the Rome and Vienna attacks.

As is the case with the presentation of the above news item on the Peres speech, we find similar themes and references employed by The Daily News in its reporting of the above story. Police sources and the courts [magistrates] are quoted to give the story credibility as is the case with any crime story. In this case, the police and the courts ascertained that the gunman has confessed to the involvement of Libya in the attacks. More than that, they are trained purposely for "suicide missions" on European targets using "hand grenades" and "Kalashnikovs". The connection between Libya, international terrorism and the Soviet Union is completed. The specific mention of the Kalashnikov as the main weapon these terrorists use transcends more than it implies. It is projected as the symbol of Soviet influence in the world. According to this mythology, anywhere you find a revolutionary or a guerrilla fighter, he is backed by the Soviet Union and therefore must be using a Kalashnikov. The gun has become synonymous with subversion and is always described by the experts and the media as the Guerrilla's best friend. Similarly, in all the above news stories, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, PLO as a political organization, and with it, the entire underlining framework of the Middle East crisis and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict disappears from view. What we are presented with, is the activities of a few 300 or so senseless demagogues plundering and ravaging around Europe killing innocent people at the behest of Libya and the Soviet Union. Yassif Arafat is evacuated from the center stage and replaced by Abu Nidal and Gaddafi because, any reference to him will amount to an admission of the political status and basis of these actions.

The rest of the news items contained in the four newspapers for the rest of the month of January 1986, were basically follow-ups of the developments related to the airports attacks and the responses of the parties concerned, particularly, between the United States, Israel, Western Europe and Libya. Most of these developments were reported by all the newspapers to the extent that there is a tight correspondence not only in terms of the stories covered but also in the issues addressed, the angles and perspectives from which the stories are reported, the general themes and references employed, and to a large extent, even the possibility of a ·uniformity of sources because of these similarities. In order not to belabor the point, below is a tabulation of some of the headlines of the various news items that were reported by all the four newspapers. This is in order to show how the same stories were covered by the respective newspapers almost simultaneously, and in most cases on the same date or a few days apart.

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FIGURE 2: TABULATION OF NEWS HEADLINES ACROSS THE NEWSPAPERS IN JANUARY 1986.

The Times	The Standard	The Daily Times	The Daily News
Pentagon Lists Libyan Targets For Terror Attack Repraisals. 3/1/1986.	Libya Threatened by US Attacks. 4/1/1986.		US Draws Plans Against Libya. 3/1/1986. US Calls For Libya's Isolation. 4/1/1986.
Carrier Force Sails As US Increases Pressure On Libya. 4/1/1986.		US Jet Carrier Leaves Italy 6/1/1986.	
Tripoli Shrugs Off US Retaliation. 7/1/1986.	US Playing With Fire: Says Gaddafi. 7/1/1986.	US Warned Again. 8/1/1986.	Gaddafi defies US. 7/1/1986.
Tripoli Wins Islamic Support. 8/1/1986.	Arabs Meet On US-Libya Crisis. 11/1/1986.	Middle East Crisis: OIC Ministers meet. 7/1/1986.	Arab League Backs Libya. 6/1/1986. Libya Gets Strong Support. 9/1/1986.
Reagan Ends All Trade With Gadaffi 'The Pariah'. 8/1/1986.	Reagan Imposes New Sanctions On Libya. 9/1/1986.		
Washington Freezes Libya's US Assets. 9/1/1986.	Libyan Assets In The US 'Frozen'. 10/1/1986.		Reagan Freezes Libya's Assets. 10/1/1986.
Gadaffi Threatens To Freeze US Assets. 10/1/1986.	Emergency Meeting On Anti-Libya Sanctions. 10/1/1986.		Take care, Gaddafi Tells Reagan. 12/1/1986.

FIGURE 2: Continued.

The Times	The Standard	The Daily Times	The Daily News
Gadaffi Takes To His Tent For Some Cosy Showmanship: Invites Reagan To His Bedouin Tent. 13/1/1986.	Now Gadaffi Invites Reagan. 13/1/1986.	Gaddafi Invites Reagan 13/1/1986.	
Order To Get Out Splits Americans. 13/1/1986.		Foreigners Free To Leave Libya. 14/1/1986.	Americans Free To Leave - Gaddafi. 14/1/1986.
Peoples Power Gadaffi Can Rely On. 15/1/1986.	Libya Training Insurgents: Third World War Warning. 15/1/1986. "We'll Arm The Terrorists." 17/1/1986.	Gaddafi Offers To Train Arab Soilders. 17/1/1986.	
	Syria Backed Rome Attack. (Israel) 25/1/1986.	Guerrilla Attack: Libya Cleared. (by Israel) 25/1/1986.	
US Navy To Fly Jets Off Coast Of Libya. 24/1/1986. US Sticks To Threat Of Military Strike At Gadaffi. 30/1/1986.	US Warships 'Closing In On Libya'. 29/1/1986.	US Ships Carry Out Exercises. 28/1/1986. Threat Against Libya Condemned. 29/1/1986.	US, Libya Escalate War Of Nerves. 27/1/1986. US Navy Continues Manoeuvres Off Libya. 28/1/1986. US Navy Moving Closer To Libya. 29/1/1986.
Why Abu Nidal Took The Flight To Tripoli. (by Robert Fisk) 28/1/1986. Timetable Of Terror (by Paul Wilkinson) 28/1/1986.	Gaddafi Wonders Why They Consider Him A Terrorist. [article by Kate Dourian] 20/1/1986.		Gaddafi: Why Brand Me Terrorist? [article by Kate Dourian] 26/1/1986.

It is apparent from the above tabulation that despite the semantic differences in the headlines, the corresponding news items covered by the four newspapers are basically the same. They deal with the same topics, issues, and adapt to a certain degree, the same reportorial perspective and news angles. This means that the above news items possess some qualities that made them to be selected and reported by these four somewhat divergent media operating within different political systems and organizational frameworks of journalistic practices and policies. On the other hand, it may well be that the selection of these news items is not so much dependent on their 'news attributes', but on a more fundamental historical reality that made these societies in which these media operate, and their journalistic practices, professional outlooks, and organizational structures, not to be so much different after all. This historical reality is tangential to the fact that both Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania were erstwhile colonies of Britain, and to a large degree are still neocolonial dependences, with the level of dependence differing from one country to another. Within this context, the basic institutions of these African states were basically imported from Britain and transplanted in whole into them. As discussed in chapter five, both The Daily Times, The Daily Nation and The Standard were started by British interests and modelled upon British journalistic practices and perspectives.

These papers have obviously come a long way from those early days and have to a certain extent changed ownership from individual press barons to government, [with the exception of The Standard], but still not much has changed substantially. As

Golding and Elliott showed in their comparative study of the media
in Ireland, Nigeria and Sweden, there is very little difference in
the way and manner journalism is practiced in these countries. The
organizational structures and journalistic practices upon which
the production of news is dependent is to a certain extent the
same. This is much more the case with Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania and
Britain because of the past colonial and continuing neocolonial
ties that dictate that journalists from these African countries
have to depend on "Fleet Street" and other journalism schools and
colleges in Britain for their training and professional
indoctrination.

The regularity with which all the newspapers cover the same
news items as indicated above, is certainly a pointer to this
similarity in journalistic practices and professional judgements
in the procedures of news selection. On the average, the same news
story is carried by at least three of the newspapers either on the
same day, or one or two days later, and in some instances even
using the same headlines. In most cases however, the headlines and
the stories are just juggled up a little bit as a measure of
editorial imperative, but basically retaining the same wordings of
the main substance and convey the same meaning. The above coverage
of the Shimon Peres speech is a typical example. To further
augment the point, here are some excerpts from two news items that
were published by all the four newspapers. The first news item was
on Libya's response to the imminent military attack against it by
the United States and the other on the actual deployment of troops
by the United States in to the Mediterranean that led to the April
1986 confrontation between the two countries.

THE STANDARD: 7/1/1986;p2
US PLAYING WITH FIRE. SAYS
GADDAFI.

THE DAILY NEWS: 7/1/1986;P2.
Gaddafi Defies US.

Reuter: TRIPOLI, Monday.
Colonel Muammar Gaddafi says
he has declared a military
alert in Libya and has told
the United States it is
playing a dangerous game in
the Mediterranean.
Speaking to Western repor-
ters while touring a farm
yesterday the Libyan leader
said 40 US navy vessels were
now massed along the Libyan
shore. "I took this to mean
a declaration of war and I
announced a state of alert
in the air force and navy
and yesterday we were ready
for battle without any fuss
or publicity," he said.
Gaddafi warned the United
States that it was "playing
a dangerous game in the
Mediterranean... yesterday
we were on the verge of
unlimited war. There could
have been a third world
war." Gaddafi said he would
take his fight to the
streets of America if he
were attacked. He said that
although Libya did not
possess B-52 bombers or
aircraft carriers to reach
the United States, it had
Guerillas."
"If America thinks it can
hit any place then we can
strike anywhere with suicide
groups. That is what I meant
when I said that we would
the fight to America's
streets," he said.

Tripoli; Monday.
Colonel Muammar Gaddafi says
he has declared a military
alert in Libya and has told
the United States it is
playing a dangerous game in
the Mediterranean.
Responding to reprisal
threats from Washington and
Israel over last month's gue-
rilla attacks on Rome and
Vienna airport, Gaddafi threa-
tened to send suicide squads
into America if Libya was
attacked.
Speaking to Western reporters
while touring a farm yesterday
the Libyan leader said 40 US
navy vessels were now massed
along the Libyan shore.
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ration of war and I announced
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fight to America's streets,"
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THE NIGERIAN DAILY TIMES: 8/1/1986;p8.
US Warned Again.

The Libyan leader, Col. Gaddafi has given another warning that Libya will retaliate violently if attacked by the United States.

Speaking to reporters near Tripoli, Col. Gaddafi said that unlike the United States, Libya did not have aircraft carriers or bombers, instead she would send suicide squads on to American streets.

Col. Gaddafi referred to reports of American military moves in the Mediterranean. These, he said have brought the United States and Libya to the brink of war.

THE TIMES: 7/1/1986;p6.
Tripoli Shrugs Off Threat Of US Retaliation.

Tripoli (Reuter) - It was business as usual in Tripoli yesterday, with no obvious sign that Libyans were taking seriously reports of possible US retaliation against their country over last month's airport attacks in Rome and Vienna.

The Libyan leader, Colonel Gadaffi, was relaxed and jovial as he spoke to reporters on Sunday in a barley field outside Tripoli and said he had placed his armed forces on full alert to confront a possible US attack

But there were no visible signs of troop movements around military barracks or other installations in the Tripoli area yesterday and diplomats said they had noticed only a slight increase of movement at Tripoli harbour since the crisis began.

"The threat of US retaliation is not being taken seriously" one Western diplomat said. "There is no sign of troops on the streets, no panic and no major changes in day-to-day life."

THE STANDARD: 29/1/1986;p2
US Warships "Closing In On Libya.
Washington; Tuesday (Reuter)
Us Navy warships are ploughing closer to the disputed Gulf of Sirte in heavy Mediterranean seas, but have not crossed the "line of death" drawn by Libya's Col. Muammar Gaddafi across the mouth of the waters, US officials say.

The officials, who asked not to be identified, declined to say whether ships or planes from the sixth fleet would directly challenge Libya's territorial claim over the Gulf.

But US television reported that the United States intends to move at least one of its warships into the Gulf.

Citing unidentified defence department officials, the television network said the ship would probably be the USS Yorktown, a heavily armed cruiser capable of fighting attacking aircraft, missiles and surface ships simultaneously.

THE DAILY NEWS: 29/1/1986;p2
US Navy Moving Closer To Libya. Washington; Tuesday.
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THE TIMES: 24/1/1986:p6
US Navy To Fly Jets Off Coast of Libya.
Washington (AP) - The United States, in what appears to be a thinly veiled warning to Libya, has notified civilian traffic officials that fighter planes from US Navy aircraft carriers will be conducting flight operations off the Libyan coast during the next week.

Libyan claims the Gulf of Sidra (sic) as its own territorial waters, a contention dismissed by the US, which recognizes a territorial limit of only 12 miles. Washington sources declined to say whether Navy planes or ships might actually move into the Gulf.

THE DAILY TIMES: 28/1/1986;P9
US Ships Carry Out Exercises.

U.S. warships carried out exercises without incident on Sunday in the Gulf of Sirte, which Libya regards as part of its territorial waters, the ABC Television network reported last Sunday night.

ABC reporters who overflew the area filmed several warships of the sixth fleet on manoeuvres south of parallel 32.5 which marks the northern limit of the gulf.

A spokesman for the defence department said the exercises were going on in international waters. The United States regards the Gulf of Sirte as international waters.

It is clear from the above headlines and excerpts of the news items reported by all our media that there is a uniformity of approach and choice of stories across all the newspapers in their coverage of Libya in the period under study. In some instances, this similarity of coverage even transcends a simple coincidence of editorial judgements and reportorial angle, as is exemplified by the news items carried by The Standard and The Daily News. Although these newspapers had a common origin in that they were both part of the East African Standard Group owned by Lonrho, while The Standard still belongs to this conglomerate, The Daily News has since been nationalized by the Tanzanian government. To this extent, at least in terms of political rhetorics, we should expect The Daily News by the mere fact that it is owned by a government which declared itself to be pursuing socialist ideals, to differ in both its news sources and perspectives from The Standard, a newspaper owned and operated within the principles and ideals of profit maximization. This however proved not to be the case. In the two news items cited above, both The Standard and The Daily News carried the same news items word for word and from the same source Reuter, even though The Daily News does not disclose its source. The same can also be said of The Daily Times' coverage of these same news stories in that even though it does not acknowledge its sources, the similarity of the articles, down to the use of the same words and phrases, clearly indicate that its source is not different from the others.

This we believe is a very important point to consider in that it brings to light and answers some of the intricate questions our quantitative data and analysis could not cope with due to methodological constraints. One of the issues relate to similarity

or difference of coverage given to Libya by the media which in this case clearly indicate that in terms of news selection, that is what the newspapers decide to select and report about Libya, is basically the same in terms of both content, semantics, and references employed to depict Libya to their audiences. Similarly, the problem of news source that bedevilled our quantitative analysis is almost resolved by the above news items. Even though we can not categorically say that all the African newspapers utilise the same source in their coverage of Libya, the similarity of the content in terms of wordings of the news stories carried by all of them, indicate that they all originate from the international news agencies. The fact that The Standard accredit Reuters as its source and that the same story is carried by The Daily News word for word definitely indicate that The Daily News also got the story from Reuters. But this does not necessarily be the case because it is possible for different news agencies to use the same format and wording especially if the story is coming from the same source and involve verbatim reporting of statements of politicians for example. It is not our intention here to discuss the falsity or factuality of the viewpoints and statements contained in the above news items, but to attempt an analysis of the type of imagery these news items and reports contain. However, myths and imageries are traditionally based on certain typifications of reality in which, facts are falsified or mutated to present a picture consonant with a certain kind of world view supportive of certain vested interests in society.

7:1

REPORTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND THE CRIMINALIZATION
OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE: AN EPILOGUE ON LIBYA 1970-1986.

In an attempt to explicate the kind of myths and imageries
these four newspapers present to their audiences, and the possible
interests these world views are supportive of, we decided to
analyse a number of feature articles published by our media in the
period under study. The criteria for selecting these articles is
that they should have dealt with one of the most pervasive issues
in the reporting of Libya i.e., terrorism, around which most of
Libyan coverage in the period under study revolves. By their
nature, feature articles tend to engage in public opinion
formation or manipulation more than straight news items. The same
rule applies whether the article is written by one of the editors,
correspondent or reporter of the news organization, or by an
outside independent contributor. These characteristics inevitably
makes feature articles a valuable source of the prevalent world
views expounded or adhered to by the newspaper publishing it. Of
course newspapers or newspaper editors do not have to agree or
subscribe to views and ideas contained in an article before they
could publish it. But, at the same time, if the article is written
by a staff member of the organization, he is bound to take into
consideration not only the political stance of his organization,
but also that of his editor and colleagues if he wants to see that
article published. Similarly, this unwritten rules also tend to
apply or influence even outside independent contributors in the
sense that these articles are written with a particular outlet in

mind thus, in a way determining its format and import apriori.

With the above in mind, we decided to analyze five articles;
two from the Daily Times of Nigeria, as far back as 1981 and 1982,
two from The Times of London, published in 1986, and one published
simultaneously by both The Daily News and The Standard in 1986.
They were purposely chosen because they all dealt with one issue.
That is Libya's involvement with international terrorism and how
this relates to transnational power structures and processes. In a
way they set the parameters of our discussions because they
provide a succinct summary of the picture of Libya presented to
the world. For heuristic purposes these articles are reproduced in
full.

The Daily Times articles were written by two of its senior
staff, Gabriel Mbaka and Obika Kienyi, while those of The Times
were written by one of its Middle East correspondents Robert Fisk,
and Professor Paul Wilkinson of the University Of Aberdeen. Fisk
is considered an authority on terrorism by virtue of his
experience as a correspondent in the Middle East, one of the
bedrocks of modern terrorism. Professor Wilkinson, on the other
hand, is a self acclaimed "expert on terrorism", who the media in
Britain always called upon to provide the needed "expert's"
interpretation of, and testimonial for events related to
terrorism. The article published by both The Daily News and The
Standard were written by one of their regular contributors, Kate
Dourian. While the articles in The Daily Times and The Times
endorse the view and idea that Libya under Gaddafi is a state that
deals in terrorism by providing what Schlesinger et.al. [1983][2],
refers to as the "official perspective", the article in both The

Daily News and The Standard contain an element of a refutal to the above position by providing the "oppositional perspective", that of the accused, Gaddafi. Below are the full texts of the articles.

OAU SHOULD DEAL WITH LIBYA.[3]

BY GABRIEL MBAKA.

The organization of African Unity Heads of State summit begins today in Nairobi Kenya.

over the years, the summits had become more of a social get-togethers where African leaders meet to acquaint themselves with new colleagues, most of whom came to power by coups, and congratulate old friends for having survived another year in office.

Whatever decisions were made, seemed to have been reached in the full knowledge that neither the members, nor any others concerned, would abide by them. Some of the issues likely to come up in this year's summit are the Western Sahara conflict, the Namibian question the Somali-Ethiopian conflict, the Nigeria-Cameroun problem, the situation in Chad and Libya's belligerence towards neighboring nations.

A number of these have come up in previous summits. The fact that they will be re-tabled at this one is an indication of the importance of the summits so far and the willingness of members and others concerned to abide by its resolutions.

It is highly unlikely that the 1981 summit can, in three days, resolve all the above-mentioned problems. But it would have carved out a special place for itself in African history, if as a result of its deliberations, even one of these conflicts or questions

is resolved. Of all the issues mentioned, the one which the OAU can most successful use its influence to resolve, is the situation in Chad, and Libya's relationship with neighboring nations. This it can do, not by passing another ineffective resolution, but by condemning Libya's activities in no uncertain terms and immediately initiating action towards the composition of an African peacekeeping force that will replace the Libyans in the territory.

Colonel Moammer Gaddafi would not show up in Nairobi, as he usually does not attend meetings where he would not have his way. If he does not show up, the summit in addition to an open conference condemnation of his activities should send a high powered delegation of four to six heads of state to inform him of the proceedings of the meeting.

Gaddafi, as he went(sic) to do, will probably not abide by mere condemnatory resolutions, so the summit should take care of that possibility by providing for his ostracism and also making arrangements to help all those nations which are currently being intimidated, harrassed (sic) or subverted by Libya.

Since he came to power 11 years ago the Libyan leader, Colonel Gaddafi, has been trying to concretize his dream of making his desert nation

Africa's powerful nation.

He first started by trying to merge Libya with a number of neighboring states. When this failed he began a mission of subversion against his neighbors, occasionally intervening directly in their internal conflicts or invading them for his own personal reasons.

Since December, his troops have been in effective occupation of the Central African nation of Chad. All efforts to get them to leave have so far been rebuffed by the mercurial colonel whose (sic) alternatively claims that he was invited by the legitimate government or that he will only leave when a peacekeeping force arrives.

Indications however are that he sees Chad as the first step in what he envisions as a Pan-Islamic Federation of African States, headed by him and that he is busy planning the annexation of other territories.

What is known so far of his plans include the open threats he has made against various nations, the direct intervention in Tunisia, Uganda and Niger, his arming of dissidents in Sudan and Egypt, the undiplomatic activities of his emissaries in Ghana, and Mali and his recruitment of nationals of other African nations for military training in Libya. Gaddafi claims that his country has the right to mobilize any foreign nationals on its territory. In a speech marking the founding of the Libyan Jamhariyar at Sebha on March 2, he said; "workers are pouring in by thousands, mostly from African countries, to take refuge in Libya. We tell these workers that when they enter Libyan borders without a request and permission we have the right to deal with them as we wish. We are free to act towards them by any means we please. It is our right to

mobilize them; it is our right to put them in camps. This act is public and legal and is exercised under sovereignty (sic)

Libya however does not only conscript the foreign nationals in its territory, but goes out of its way to entice people out of their own countries for induction into either its Islamic legion or the regular Libyan Army. After their training, these mercenaries are made to engage in terrorist operations or conventional warfare against any state including their own, which does not support Libya.

It is also a safe haven and training ground for dissidents from virtually all African nations. In the neighboring nations of Niger, Mauritania, Upper Volta, and Algeria, Gaddafi's agents are actively recruiting for an organization which Libya finances and supports called the Liberation Front Of Southern Sahara.

The extent of Libyan interest and involvement in training individuals from any particular country varies with the status of the country's relations with Libya and the unpredictable colonel's moods.

The Al Khuns training camp, for example, was opened by Libyan authorities following the collapse of the Libyan - Tunisian unity agreement of 1976. Gaddafi was furious at president Bourguiba for reneging on the agreement and immediately conscripted several hundred Tunisians working in Libya. These Tunisians were used in the commando raid of the Tunisian border town of Qafsah in January 1980.

Libya is still conscripting and training more Tunisians in both guerrilla and conventional warfare which suggests that it might still attempt to undermine Tunisia again.

In response to Sudanese criticism of Libyan policies, Gaddafi periodically conscripts

Sudanese citizens for training at Kufrah camp in southeastern Libya.

While waiting for deployment into terrorist activities or conventional warfare against their own nations, members of Gaddafi's foreign legion are occasionally used elsewhere.

In 1978, a small contingent of Tunisians, trained by Libya served with Libya expeditionary forces in Uganda. Reports indicate that some of the "Libyan" troops presently occupying Chad are members of the "foreign" or "Islamic Legion".

OAU SUMMIT: GADDAFI'S 2 - FACED APPROACH.[4]

By

OBIKA KIENYI

"LIBYA is the defender of Africa. Libya fights against imperialism and racism in defence of Africa. Peace in Africa is our concern". Those are the words of Libyan leader, Colonel Muammer Gaddafi, as he welcomed African soccer players and fans to an early match tournament in Tripoli.

Earlier this year, Gaddafi went on a fence mending visit to Tunisia and met with President Habib Bourguiba. Before that, Gaddafi withdrew Libyan occupation troops from Chad, to be replaced by a peacekeeping force from the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Gaddafi has also reestablished recently with the conservative Arab kingdoms of Morocco and Saudi Arabia.

All these words and deeds are designed to project an image of Libyan peaceability, (sic) conciliation and interest in African solidarity. Gaddafi is sprucing up his image in preparation for the August 1982 summit conference of the Organization Of African Unity.

That summit is still slated to be held in Tripoli. As host for the conference, Gaddafi would assume the OAU chairmanship for the next one year. Eager to snatch that honour and the political power and international prestige that go with it, the Libyan leader

is determined to be on his best behaviour, to launch no new aggression or provoke on new controversy that would jeopardise his accession to the OAU chairmanship.

It remains to be seen how many African chiefs of state will be won over by Gaddafi's newly donned image. Some continue to express concern over the venue of the summit. Sudan's President Jaafar Nimeiry, for one, is unlikely to attend any OAU meeting held in Tripoli. Gaddafi has vowed to overthrow Nimeiry and has supported two coup attempts in the Sudan in 1975 and most recently in 1981. Nimeiry is not eager to follow in the footsteps of the Lebanese Shi'ite religious leader, Imam Musa Sadr. That Moslem clergyman, who apparently turned down Libyan overtures for a political alliance, was foolish enough to accept Gaddafi's invitation to attend revolution day festivities in Tripoli in 1978. Musa Sadr has not been seen or heard from since.

The Gaddafi who just vowed to fight "against Imperialism" is the same man who has been trying to shape and lead a Pan-Islamic empire of his own, Stretching from the Atlantic to the Middle East. Gaddafi has pursued a series of state

merger schemes; with Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan, Syria and Chad. One by one, each of these planned mergers fell apart as Gaddafi's would-be partners realized that "merger" was a euphemism for a Libyan takeover.

Unable to establish his empire · through merger agreements, Gaddafi has repeatedly resorted to subversion, with plans to instal his own loyalists in power in other countries. Gaddafi is currently backing the rebels in the Somali Salvation Front, in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, and an assortment of Moslem dissidents in Niger, Uganda, Mali, Gambia and Senegal.

Gaddafi has also been linked to the recent coup in Ghana. And even though the failed coup attempt in Egypt last October seems to have been carried out solely by Egyptians, the Libyan leader had no qualms about celebrating the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.

Gaddafi may have oozed diplomacy and cordiality during his visit to Tunisia early this year, but few Tunisian politicians have forgotten the Libyan's effort to overthrow President Bourguiba two years ago. Gaddafi backed an armed invasion of the Tunisian border town of Gafsa at that time.

The concern for peace, which the Libyan leader professed before the audience of African soccer players and fans, will surprise most of Gaddafi's watchers. If peace is his goal, why has he set up 20 terrorist and guerilla training camps in his country? Graduates of these camps, the Japanese Red Army and various radical Palestinian groups have killed scores of innocent civilians throughout the globe. Graduates of Libyan training camps were among the

terrorists who set off bombs in airports in Rome and Athens in 1973. Gaddafi certainly was not furthering the cause of peace when he rewarded with a gift of two million dollars the infamous international terrorist, Carlos the "Jackal", for directing the bloody kidnapping of OPEC oil ministers in 1975.

One might also question why a man of peace would want to buy $8 billion worth of sophisticated military equipment from the USSR. The Libyan Air Force now has 20 Soviet MIG-21 fighters, 100 MIG-23's and 35 MIG-25's and 5 MIG-25RS, the most advanced of all Soviet military aircraft now in operation, plus 17 TU-22 bombers.

Colonel Gaddafi's Army has 2,400 Soviet tanks, including fairly sophisticated T-72 models, not commonly sold to Third World buyers. The small Libyan Navy even has three Soviet-made submarines. All of this massive, sophisticated firepower far exceeds what Libya's 2.9 million population would ever need for purely defensive purposes.

Now would a true man of peace send hit squads to assassinate Libyan dissidents living in exile in Europe or to stalk the leaders of foreign countries, as the US maintains.

With his record of terrorism, subversion, neocolonialism and treachery, Gaddafi seems a most inappropriate candidate for the leadership of a prestigious international organization like the OAU. Regardless of the Libyan leader's current effort to put his best foot forward, Gaddafi's interest in the OAU seems to have little to do with peace or African solidarity. His record suggests he is motivated solely by a lust for power, the power he can derive from the OAU chairmanship.

From the attack on the Munich Olympics to the siege of
St. James's Square, Libya is the chief sponsor of world
terrorism:

WHY ABU NIDAL TOOK THE FLIGHT TO TRIPOLI.[5]

When Abu Nidal first went to see Colonel Gadaffi, he was
asking for money rather than training in terrorism. Robert
Fisk looks at the development of the relationship between
the Libyan leader and the man who planned last December's
airport bombings.

Colonel Gadaffi's involvement with Abu Nidal and his Palestinian assassination squads began in a formal, almost bureaucratic way in late February 1984, when several dozen officials from Syria and Iran arrived at Tripoli International Airport for what must have been the most unusual conference of its kind ever held. The Syrian and Iranian delegations - the former soberly suited and wearing ties, the latter bearded and tieless - met within a few hours with their Libyan opposite numbers. All were senior members (of) their countries' intelligence services, the Mukhaberrat or in Farsee the Sazman Amriat.

In theory, their talks were to focus on internal security, co-operation in thwarting the Byzantine plots and conspiracies to which all three nations make constant reference in their constant condemnation of America and Israel. But they discussed other ways in which the security services could help each other by easy transit through each other's territories. For example, the provision of false identities and false passports for agents who need to conceal their identities, and the provision of weapons. At the same time, the world took little notice of their meeting although the participants gathered again to reaffirm their tripartite agreement in November of last year, just a month before the murders at Rome and Vienna airports.

Their system of mutual co-operation was extremely sophisticated. It meant, for example, that goods - weapons, documents, even people - could be transshipped regularly on special diplomatic flights between the three countries. The CIA suspect that William Buckley, the American embassy official kidnapped in Beirut in March 1984, was subsequently bundled off to Iran from Damascus airport. An Iran Air diplomatic flight - its contents carried only at the discretion of the Iranian ambassador in damascus - operates between the two cities once a fortnight and there was indeed a rumor in Teheran that Buckley had been flown out of Syria on the jet.

The CIA has put it about that Buckley was murdered - possibly killed under torture - in Iran. For their part, Iranian sources say that Buckley was indeed brought to Teheran by his kidnappers but that the authorities there were so angry that they promptly sent him back to Syria again, and hence to Lebanon.

The air traffic between the two countries also enabled Palestinians in Lebanon and Syria to have free access to Iran and Libya without fear of discovery en route. This specially applied to those Palestinians most fiercely opposed to Yassif Arafat, the PLO chairman, who had long ago incurred the personal hostility of President Assad.

By late 1983, Abu Nidal - the nomi de guerre of Sabri

El-Banna – had been permitted to open offices in Damascus principally to frighten Arafat but also as a potential weapon against King Hussain of Jordan: and it was only a matter of time before this most feared of all the Middle East's extremist leaders was invited to take the flight to Tripoli.

The Syrians had already permitted Abu Nidal to maintain camps at two locations in the Bekaa valley in Lebanon: near Majdalyoun, south west of Baalbek, and at Qab Elias, only a few hundred yards from the main Beirut-Damascus highway. Abu Nidal's men also set up offices in a derelict villa high up in the mountains above Beirut, in the town of Bhamdoun, which is under the control of Walid Jumblatt's Druze militia.

It was therefore, not for training for his men that Abu Nidal first visited Libya, but for money – something the Syrians were never able to supply in sufficient quantity and of which the Libyans always seemed to have too much. Exactly when Gadaffi first met Sabri El-Banna is still unclear, although there can be no doubt that the Palestinian's utterly ruthless and uncompromising policy over Israel – namely its total destruction through "armed struggle" – appealed to Gadaffi's simplistic view of the world.

It is nevertheless certain that Abu Nidal effectively moved his loyalties from Damascus to Tripoli in midsummer of last year when Syria – under a series of conditions, some of which still remain secret – agreed to help Washington to resolve the hijacking of the TWA jet and rescue its passengers from Beirut. Syrian sources say that the Americans effectively gave President Assad a guarantee of Israeli nonaggression in return for his help and for a promise

that Abu Nidal would no longer be able to count on Syrian assistance.

There is however, some ambivalence in Gadaffi's attitude to Abu Nidal: happy – indeed eager – to identify himself with the cause he represented, but less enthusiastic to become personally involved in his plans. Arab sources say that Gadaffi was only told in the vaguest way about the forthcoming attacks at Rome and Vienna and was asked to provide only passports by way of assistance.

he did so without demur, and the documentation was easy. For the passports handed to Abu Nidal's men – which were subsequently found on the gunmen at Rome airport – were not those of Tunisian guest workers to Libya whose identity papers had been confiscated by the Libyan authorities. They were the passports of Tunisians who had been working illegally in Libya and whose passports had been taken as a punishment by the police. What made the passports so valuable to the Libyan Mukhaberrat was the very fact that their owners had entered the country illegally: the documents thus contained no Libyan entry visas and therefore bore no marks linking them to Colonel Gadaffi's regime.

The gunmen sent to Rome were given their new "identities" and handed their false passports in Damascus: they were then flown from Syria apparently to Yugoslavia, en route to Italy. None of this, of course, in any way absolves Gadaffi of responsibility for what happened. But it does raise questions about who else was involved. If the Palestinians came from Lebanon and the passports from Libya, then who was arranging their transport through Syria? The Americans have made no mention of Damascus in their angry

condemnation of the slaughter in Rome and Vienna save for a few discreetly voiced suspicions. Since its help over the TWA hijack and its refusal to become involved with the Palestinian hijackers of the Achille Lauro cruise liner, the Syrians have acquired an almost respectable reputation in America. Yet neither the TWA hijack nor the commandeering of the ship was the work of Abu Nidal. The Americans need the Syrians just now - and prefer to concentrate their wrath upon Libya.

The fact is that the secret police triumvirate which now exist in the Middle East may be becoming a law unto itself, directing and redirecting extremists who are of momentary or long-term advantage to their respective leaders. Abu Nidal can now exist inside this framework with semi autonomy, encouraged or paid - and only occasionally reined in - depending on the amount of pressure which Libya, Syria, and Iran choose to place upon their mutual enemies in the Middle East.

For those who believe that the Americans can only be defeated in the region by being provoked into a helpless military adventure, men like Abu Nidal are valuable. The chances are that in Tripoli, as well as in Damascus and Teheran, their values will grow rather than diminish in the coming months.

Timetable Of Terror.[6]

Paul Wilkinson.

Muammar Gadaffi seized power in September 1969, when he led the coup that overthrew King Idris. The new Libyan leader was initially seen by the Americans as a potentially useful influence when he disavowed communism. But the arrogant young dictator soon became a thorn in the flesh of the West and a constant source of trouble in the Middle East. He ended an Anglo-Libyan treaty of friendship in 1972 and nationalize British oil interests in Libya.

Most Arab countries view him at best as an unstable upstart, at worst a wild expansionist threatening the security of his neighbors, especially the smaller and weaker ones.

Gadaffi's ideological differences with Soviet communism have not proved any bar to close relations with Moscow, which found it convenient to have a fanatically anti-American ally with friendly bases in the Mediterranean. Libya has been allowed to buy millions of pounds worth of military equipment since the early 1970's, including Soviet submarines, MiG fighter aircraft and hundres of T72 tanks. Libya also has treaties of friendship and co-operation with other communist countries.

If there were a Nobel Prize for terrorism, Gadaffi would surely be the obvious candidate. He has provided Libya's oil wealth, weapons, diplomatic facilities, terrorist training camps and sanctuary for client terrorist groups of every type, including Black September, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Moro Group in the Philippines, the IRA, Italian fascists, the Red Brigades, and even the Black Muslims in the United States.

A libyan exile, the former minister of planning

Omar-el-Meheisi, has alleged that Gadaffi provided a £1 million purse for the attack on OPEC"s headquaters in Vienna in 1975.

Sept 1972: Terrorist who carried out the Munich Olympic massacre use Libyan diplomatic
• bags to take their weapons to Germany and are given heroes' funerals in Libya after being shot by German police.

Oct 1972: Terrorists hijack Lufthansa jet and demand the release of the rest of the Munich death squad. Hijackers and released terrorists are given hospitality by Gadaffi in the Tripoli Hilton.

March 1973: Saudi Arabian embassy in Khartoum is occupied by Black September terrorists. US ambassador and two other diplomats are killed. Libya instigated the attack and Libyan diplomatic bag is used to carry the weapons. The terrorists are returned to Libya.

July 1973: Japanese airliner is hijacked by five terrorists and forced to land in Libya. The plane is blown up and the terrorists released by the authorities.

Aug 1973: Terrorists attack passengers in Athens airport, killing five and wounding 55. They claim to have been trained in Libya and nine months later are released and put on a train for Libya.

Dec 1973: Terrorists belonging to National Youth Organization for Liberation, a Libyan-controlled group, attack a Pan Am aircraft at rome airport, killing 31.

Feb 1974: Greek ship is siezed by terrorists demanding release of two colleagues responsible for massacre at Athens in August 1973. Terrorists are released and allowed to go to Libya.

Dec 1975: Carlos group attacks OPEC conference in Vienna capturing 11 oil ministers. Libya actively involved in planning of the raid. After hostages are freed the terrorists (went) to Libya. Carlos reported to have been paid £1 million by Gadaffi as a reward.

April 1976: Gadaffi admits ordering an attack on the QE2 while it was en route to Israel in 1973. President Sadat countermanded Gadaffi's instructions and ordered an Egyptian submarine to ignore Gadaffi.

July 1976: US intelligence claims Gadaffi has ordered his fighters to shoot down a plane carrying American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

August 1976: Terrorists open fire on passengers about to board an El-Al plane at Istanbul airport, killing four and wounding 21. Captured terrorists say they received their passports, arms and air tickets in Libya. Terrorists hijack Egyptian plane but are arrested in Egyptian counter strike. Egypt claims hijackers were financed by Libya.

Jan 1980: Gadaffi severs relations with the PLO, denouncing Yassir Arafat's diplomatic strategy as capitulationist.

April 1980: Gadaffi threatens Libyans who refuse to return to Libya that they will "inevitably be liquidated". During 1980, 10 Libyan exiles are assassinated in Rome, London, Bonn, Athens, Milan and Manchester.

May 1981: US Government severs links with Libya and expels all Libyan diplomats.

Oct 1981: Libyan suspected of involvement in assassination of President Sadat. Libyan plot to assassinate US ambassador in Rome is discovered.

1982-1983: Continuing campaign by Gadaffi to murder Libyan exiles abroad.

March 1984: WPC Fletcher is murdered by a gunman firing from a window of the Libyan People's Bureau in St James's Square, in London. Britain severs diplomatic relations

with Libya.
 Dec 1985: Libya is suspected
of involvement in hijacking of
Egypt airline jet to Malta and
terrorists attacks on airport
terminals at Rome and Vienna in
which 19 people are killed.

GADDAFI: Why Brand me Terrorist?

By Kate Dourian writing from Tripoli.[7]

He admires George Washington
and Abraham Lincoln. He is an
accomplished horseman. His
favourite books include Uncle
Tom's Cabin and Roots.
Beethoven is a cherished
composer.

The leader of many million
Libyans, he threatened to send
suicide squads to the United
States. And he cannot
understand why some people call
him a terrorist.

Colonel Muammar Gaddafi has
been an enigma since seizing
power in Libya in 1969 at the
age of 27.

Dressed in a smart Safari
suit covered by long brown
cloak and lounging in a chair,
Gaddafi told five women
reporters of his likes,
thoughts, ideas and beliefs.

He said his dream was to make
people free and happy in a
utopian society of his own
making.

"I had a general idea how to
make the masses free, how to
make man happy. After that,
things started to get clearer",
said Gaddafi, a son of the
desert who was born in the
Mediterranean city of Sirte in
1942.

Tall, thickset, with a
backward tilt of the head that
him seem supercilious at times,
Gaddafi speaks in halting
English. He reveals an almost
childlike quality that is a far
cry from his image abroad as a
man to be feared.

He has not travelled much and
is surprised to hear that US
President Ronald Reagan, who
recently slapped punitive
economic sanctions on Libya, is
a popular man.

"They do? They love him",
Gaddafi asked when told that
Reagan was loved by most
Americans. "But he did cause
many crises in the world."
Gaddafi declared.

While he appears to have an
almost personal antipathy
toward Reagan, whom he has
called "an ageing third-rate
actor", Gaddafi said he admired
former Presidents George
Washington and Abraham Lincoln.

Other past world leaders he
admires are Egypt's late Gamal
Abdel-Nasser, India's Mahatma
Gandhi, Sun Yat-Sen of China
and Italy's Garibaldi and
Mazini.

Gaddafi laughed heartily at
stories about the peculiarities
of life in the United States.

He learned English at school
in Tripoli and later had a
brief course at Wilton park in
Beaconsfield, near London, in
1966. But he says he hated
England because he felt he did
not belong.

It must have been-then that
he read The Outsider by British
author Colin Wilson, which he
says is his favourite book.
Others he likes are Uncle Tom's
Cabin by Harrit Becham Stowe
and Roots by Alex Haley.

Besides reading, his
favourite pastimes are horse
riding - he is known to be an
accomplished equestin (sic) -
and playing football. He likes
classical music, Beethoven in
particular..

Throughout the interview,
Gaddafi sought to portray
himself as a man able to smile

and laugh and he proved a hospitable host. He was apparently pained when he was unable to provide cigarettes for one of his interviewers.

Gaddafi's ideas about the role of women in society are liberal and he says he is campaigning to make it illegal for Libyan men to marry more than one woman.

Now married to a former nurse, who rarely appears in public, he has seven children, six of them boys and one girl.

Gaddafi created a sensation when, on rare travels abroad, he appeared surrounded by gun-toting women bodyguards.

He is reported to have survived several attempts on his life in Libya and is heavily protected at home at all times. His headquarters at the Bab al-Aziziya barracks in Tripoli is a maze guarded by green barricades painted with slogans from his "Green Book" of ideological and political dogma.

But inside, Gaddafi appears relaxed – we were asked to leave our handbags outside the small office. He seems to take great pains over his appearance. His safari suit was crisply ironed, his black boots well polished.

Heightened tension with the United States and the threat of what he sees as an American attack on his country has given Gaddafi cause for joy as Arab leaders rally to his support.

He told newsmen recently that the American threat had made Libya "the leader of the resistance against imperialism," likening it to Egypt during the Suez crisis of 1956.

Nasser has inspired him since childhood, and he has sought to emulate and possibly replace him as a Pan-Arab leader.

"He is our teacher," the Libyan leader declared last week.

As stated earlier, the above articles are reproduced because they contain within themselves almost all the images and references attributed to Libya by the media. Most importantly, as can be seen from the above four articles, the similarity of the content is striking, despite the fact that they were written years apart and by different authors. Across all the articles, the picture that emerges is of a Libya ruled by a fanatical, unpredictable, and Islamic fundamentalist, whose only vocation is to use the vast oil wealth of his country to train and sponsor subversive elements with a view to destabilizing other "legitimate governments" or engage in terrorist activities killing innocent children, women and citizens of other countries. Gaddafi is presented as a ruler whose legitimacy is fundamentally questioned. Hence, the use of the word "leader" as against "President", "Head

of State" or "Prime Minister" as is the case when referring to other heads of governments in the articles.

This signifies that Libya is undemocratic, and, does not have a legitimate government in which to talk of "the governed" and "the governing", but a totalitarian state of "the led" and "the leader". It is an established mythology that communist countries do not have governments; they have leaders. Likewise revolutionary movements and parties, even if they exist within what may be regarded and accepted as a democratic system. This denial of "legal rationality" is an important component of the delegitimization process waged against establishments, groups, organizations, political parties and nations considered a threat to the survival of international capitalism. In a nutshell, you cannot expect rational thoughts and actions from a group of people or a nation lacking any rational organizational structure and in most cases "led" by one or two irrational despots or madmen.

The similarity with which the above articles reiterate these motifs might even lead one to wonder whether they originate from the same source if not for the fact they are all feature articles and not straight news items. This however does not preclude such a possibility in that most of these opinions may be based on earlier news reports on Libya which highlight these attributes. One can also argue that the source and impetus behind such publications may not be far fetched from international power play. The American Government through its various counter insurgency and propaganda agencies like the USIS, is known to plant information or even sponsor publications that will bolster its foreign policy objectives. As pointed out in a review of American foreign policy

under the Reagan administration published by Third World Reports
[undated];[8]

> The CIA's hand in media coverage of
> Libyan affairs was disclosed in an
> article by the informed Washington
> journalist Claudia Wright, in a 1979
> article published in the **New Statesman**
> and the **International Herald Tribune**, in
> which she wrote: 'In April, for example,
> the CIA was putting out stories that the
> Libyan leader has tried to buy a nuclear
> bomb from Peking in 1971, and had then
> suggested to the PLO that it help
> manufacture one in 1975. ... Claudia
> Wright added that these CIA planted
> stories were then followed with others in
> the Egyptian press, which she described
> as 'particularly active in circulating
> rumours of "thousands" of Libyan
> casualties in Uganda, internal
> disturbances in Libya and attempted coups
> against Qadhafi.' She pointed out that 'a
> January report in **Al Ahram** of a coup
> attempt found its way into **BBC** foreign
> service broadcasts and then into the
> press in February.

This is even more plausible in the case of Libya because at
the time the two articles appeared in the Nigerian Daily Times,
the United States was very concerned about the possibility of
Gaddafi assuming the chairmanship of the Organization Of African
Unity, OAU because of the obvious influence such a position
commands in regards to African foreign policy etc. As a matter of
fact the United States openly campaigned against holding the 1982
summit in Tripoli by sending high powered delegations to almost
all the influential capitals of Africa. The articles by Mbaka and
Kienyi did not mince words in their disqualification of Gaddafi as
a suitable candidate for the post of the OAU chairmanship. In the
long run, the campaign succeeded because for the first time in the
history of the organization, the venue was rejected because of the
refusal of the majority of states to attend. This led to the

choice of a "neutral" permanent base for the organization as opposed to the usual practice of rotational venues and leadership.

Even though the campaign to isolate Libya started a long time ago, that is since it expelled all NATO bases from its territory and nationalize all foreign oil companies, the US-Libya relations assumed an added dimension in the late 1979 to early 1980 period with the break in diplomatic relations between the two countries. From that time on, a vicious international campaign against this declaration of independence by Libya was embarked upon by the United States, to see to the isolation of Libya not only by the Western European Countries, but also by the conservative majority of African states. In 1980 alone, following in the wake of the United States, diplomatic relations between Libya and the Central African Republic, Gabon, Ghana, Gambia, Mauritania, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Tunisia were severed. This was followed by another surge in the severance of diplomatic relations between Libya and Malta, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan, Liberia, and Somalia in 1981. Immediately after these developments, the United States in conjunction with its allies in the area i.e. Egypt and Sudan, embarked on a provocative military exercise in the Mediterranean which led to the confrontation between the two countries over the Gulf Of Sirte towards the end of 1981. Underlining these developments is the politico-military relationships the United States has built with most of the above countries either directly or indirectly through their former colonial masters i.e., Britain, and France. The Third World report cited above showed that;[9]

> The US has embarked on a five year plan to construct or expand a string of military bases in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean in support of American naval, ground and air forces in the area

> which is expected to cost over $2 billion
> according to administration officials
> familiar with the plan. ... Under the
> Sadat regime, Egypt is set to provide the
> focal point for the United States
> military plans, backed by other bases in
> Somalia, Oman, and according to the
> latest evidence, the Sudan also. Kenya,
> another pro-western satellite, will also
> provide base facilities in the Indian
> Ocean. ... To the west of the region,
> America continues to pour military aid
> into Morocco to support King Hassan's
> annexation of Western Sahara.

Considering that even the other two articles by Robert Fisk and Paul Wilkinson also appeared in the Times at a time when the campaign against Libya by the United States was reaching its peak, culminating in the bombing of Libya by the United States in April 1986, their propaganda import and timing can not be lightly dismissed. The identification and labeling of Libya through its leader, Gaddafi with "subversive" activities within Africa and abroad; the employment of the "red scare" or "Soviet communism" and its associated military pacts; the labelling of Libya as striving for a form of "Pan-Islamic empire"; the depiction of Libya as a "terrorist factory and sanctuary", evoking such mythical groups as the Red Brigades, the IRA, and even the fictional terrorist Character Carlos as close associates of Gaddafi, is definitely a very strong propaganda tool in the process of not only delegitimizing and criminalizing Libya's policies and actions, but also in legitimizing any action taken against it in the international arena. In this case, the purpose was to legitimize the actions of the United States, in its capacity as the self appointed policeman of the world to do whatever it wants with Libya without much international outcry.

This "official perspective" which aims at delegitimising the "enemies" of the established order is, according Schlesinger, et.al, [1983][10];

> elaborated by certain kinds of intellectual - notably counter-insurgency theorists, academics and journalists - who are consciously engaged in waging the propaganda 'war against terrorism'. They provide what may be perceived as independent support in the struggle to win public opinion. ... the official perspective removes terrorism from the political arena by stressing its essential criminality. (But) meanwhile it places it firmly on the political agenda by presenting it as part of the Soviet Union's continuing attempt to destabilize Western democracies.

This is clearly the viewpoint expounded by both Kienyi of the Daily Times and Paul Wilkinson in their articles above. Both authors tried to connect Libyan alleged terrorist activities with the Soviet Union by pinpointing Libya's heavy spending on Soviet military hardware. At the center of the articles by Fisk and Wilkinson for example, is a large 24 column centimeters cartoon of Gaddafi in uniform, armed with a pistol and relaxing, with a smile, legs crossed and hands folded at the back of the head to form a cushion under a solitary date palm tree in the middle of the desert whose branches are four large sickles and hammers - the Soviet national flag. In the background is a single solitary dome shaped building representing a mosque with only one door and two windows. By the building are two normal date palm trees. This thematic representation of a thriving communist influence in the middle of the desert, cohabiting, side by side with the Islamic fundamentalism of a "trigger happy", oil rich and unpredictable Arab at the helm of affairs sums up the imagery presented by these articles. The point is further driven home in the following

excerpts.

> One might also question why a man of
> peace would want to buy $8 billion worth
> of sophisticated military equipment from
> the USSR. The Libyan Air Force now has 20
> Soviet MiG-21 fighters, 100 MiG-23's and
> 35 MiG-25's and 5 MiG-25RS, the most
> advanced of all Soviet military aircraft
> now in operation, plus 17 TU-22 bombers.
> Col. Gaddafi's Army has 2,400 Soviet
> tanks, including fairly sophisticated
> T-72 models, not commonly sold to Third
> World buyers. The small Libyan Navy even
> has three Soviet-made submarines. All of
> this massive, sophisticated firepower far
> exceeds what Libya's 2.9 million
> population would ever need for purely
> defensive purposes. [Kienyi;1982][11]

> Gadaffi's ideological differences with
> Soviet Communism have not proved any bar
> to close relations with Moscow, which
> found it convenient to have a fanatically
> anti-American ally with friendly bases in
> the Mediterranean. Libya has been allowed
> to buy millions of pounds worth of
> military equipment since the early
> 1970's, including Soviet submarines, MiG
> fighter aircraft and hundreds of T72
> tanks. Libya also has treaties of
> friendship and co-operation with other
> communist countries. [Wilkinson, 1986][12]

A more subtle but nevertheless effective connection of Libya

with Soviet communism is the evocation of the mythical figure of

"Carlos the Jackal". Both articles categorically stated that

Gaddafi employed and paid Carlos $2 million dollars to direct the

1975 kidnapping of OPEC oil ministers. "Carlos the Jackal" is a

part and parcel of the anti-communism campaign waged by the

Western capitalist countries and their media. "He" has been the

subject matter of numerous fiction novels and feature films and

has been accused of almost any unsolved crime in the world,

including an attempt on General de Gaulle's life which has been

made into a feature film titled "The Day Of The Jackal" based on a novel with the same title by Fredrick Forsyth. His connection with Moscow according to this myth is that he has been trained in the fine art of terrorism, guerrilla warfare and subversion at the Patrice Lumumba University in Leningrad, the alleged world's number one center for the inculcation of such traits. This man as the story goes is so canny, hence the name "the Jackal", that he has never been photographed and can never be recognized even by his mother, because of his gift for disguise. Yet, in the 1970's he is resurfacing in Libya to claim his reward for kidnapping the OPEC ministers on behalf of Gaddafi.

One interesting point highlighted in the above articles is the tendency of the African authors to state these allegations against Libya and Gaddafi as given facts even though no evidence is advanced to back them, while the Times writers adapt a more cautionary stance by either quoting specific or unidentified sources. On the issue of alleged Libya's intervention in the affairs of other nations and the promotion of international terrorism, Gabriel Mbaka of The Daily Times assert that;[13]

> Libya however does not only conscript the foreign nationals in its territory, but goes out of its way to entice people out of their own countries for induction into either its Islamic legion or the regular Libyan Army. After their training, these mercenaries are made to engage in terrorist operations or conventional warfare against any state including their own, which does not support Libya. ... While awaiting for deployment into terrorist activities or conventional warfare against their own nations, members of Gaddafi's foreign legion are occasionally used elsewhere. In 1978, a small contingent of Tunisians, trained by Libya served with Libya expeditionary forces in Uganda.

In the same vain, Obika Kienyi also of The Daily Times stated that;[14]

> If peace is his (Gaddafi) goal, why has he set up 20 terrorist and guerilla training camps in his country? Graduates of these camps, the Japanese Red Army, and various radical Palestinian groups have killed scores of innocent civilians throughout the globe. Graduates of Libyan training camps were among the terrorists who set off bombs in airports in Rome and Athens in 1973. Gaddafi certainly was not furthering the cause of peace when he rewarded with a gift of two million dollars the infamous international terrorist, Carlos the "Jackal", for directing the bloody Kidnapping of OPEC ministers in 1975.

On the other hand, both Robert Fisk and Paul Wilkinson base their accusations on some of references to sources however obscure and dubious they may be. In trying to connect Gaddafi with Abu Nidal and the Rome and Vienna attacks, Fisk referred to "Arab sources" and actually, somewhat exonerated Gaddafi of masterminding these attacks as claimed by both Mbaka and Kienyi. Fisk in actual fact pointed accusing fingers to Syria who the Americans refused to blame because of an accord reached between the two countries in the aftermath of the 1985 TWA hijacking. According to Fisk;[15]

> There is however, some ambivalence in Gadaffi's attitude to Abu Nidal: happy – indeed eager – to identify himself with the cause he represented, but less enthusiastic to become personally involved in his plans. Arab sources say that Gadaffi was only told in the vaguest way about the forthcoming attacks at Rome and Vienna and was asked to provide only passports by way of assistance. ... The gunmen sent to Rome were given their new "identities" and handed their false passports in Damascus: they were flown from Syria apparently to Yugoslavia, en

> route to Italy. ...The Americans need the
> Syrians just now — and prefer to
> concentrate their wrath upon Libya.

Paul Wilkinson on the other hand is a mixture of the above two positions. On the one hand, he makes sweeping statements connecting Gaddafi with any foreseeable crime and on the other attempt a form of scholarship by providing some form of evidence to support specific allegations. Thus we find him reiterating statements advanced by Kienyi above that Gaddafi uses his vast resources in support of international terrorism and the training of dissidents with a view to destabilize their own countries. Viz;[16]

> If there were a Nobel prize for
> terrorism, Gadaffi would surely be the
> obvious candidate. He has provided
> Libya's oil wealth, weapons, diplomatic
> facilities, terrorist training camps and
> sanctuary for client terrorist groups of
> every type, including Black September,
> the Popular Front For The Liberation Of
> Palestine, the Moro Group in the
> Philippines, the IRA, Italian Fascists,
> the Red Brigades, and even the Black
> Muslims in the United States.

When it comes to citing specific cases as a support to the above accusations however, Wilkinson in most instances relies on unsubstantiated sources. In the case of the 1975 kidnapping of the OPEC oil ministers in Vienna, in which "Carlos" was said to be contracted by Gaddafi and paid one million pounds, Wilkinson quoted as a source, a self exiled former Libyan minister of planning who definitely has a vested interest in anything that might discredit his opponents. Similarly, in his "timetable of terror" above, Wilkinson uses such phrases as "terrorists claim",

"terrorists say", "Libya is suspected of", "Libyan suspected", "US intelligence Claims" or allude to the release of arrested terrorists to Libyan authorities as enough evidence of Libyan involvement. Most of the emphasized sentences in the article by Wilkinson above highlight this tendency.

The article by Kate Dourian published by both The Daily News and The Standard was deliberately left to the last because it attempted to adapt a different framework from the above four in its portrayal of Libya. While the above four operated within a framework described by Schlesinger et.al., [1983][17] as the official perspective in which Gaddafi is tightly linked with terrorism with an attempt to make his support for revolutionary movements look illegal and criminal, probably with an impetus from the Soviet Union in its grand worldwide communist design to destabilize the free democratic world; the article by Dourian attempted to provide what may be referred to as the oppositional perspective. That is, as the title of the article – **Gaddafi: Why brand me a terrorist?** – suggests, it is supposed to be a refutal of the allegations levelled against him by his opponents.

What we are presented with however, is a reinforcement of the above imagery. The basic issue of whether Gaddafi is a terrorist or not which the article was supposed to tackle was not addressed. In fact the whole premise was not even questioned. The article started by accepting the position that Gaddafi's actions are terroristic and tried to meander within this imagery and bring to light some of the more exotic and esoteric characteristics and behavioral patterns of the man Gaddafi. He knows about Abraham Lincoln and George Washington whom he even admires. He is an

accomplished horseman, and has even read Uncle Tom's Cabin and Roots. What more, he has even been to England, even though he did not like it, and most of all likes classical music and cherish Beethoven. He has a family with seven children and support the idea of women liberation even though his own wife is hardly seen in public.

In a nutshell, he seems as human as your next door neighbor. But as far as this article is concerned, do not be deceived by these subtleties because this man who speaks in **halting** English is **supercilious,** (meaning disdainful or feeling superior towards others) – a 'wolf in sheep clothes'. This is because he has very 'dangerous ideas' about "how to make man happy and free in an utopian society of his own". In order to enforce these ideas he lives in an "impregnable fortress (just as Hitler did) guarded by tanks and green barricades painted with slogans from his 'green book' of ideological and political dogma." The imagery contained in this article does to a certain extent, open certain parameters of discourse that were completely excluded from the official perspective adapted by the earlier discussed articles. For example, it brings to light familial and social aspects of Gaddafi that the official perspective will like to see buried forever because that will question some of the fundamental mythologies upon which the whole framework is based. Communist for example, are not known to have families as far as this popular mythology is concerned. Neither do they cherish Beethoven or like Abraham Lincoln and Washington. In the same vain we cannot expect terrorists whose only vocation is the killing and maiming of innocent children and women to have children of their own. At the same time, you should be surprised to hear a terrorist been an

accomplished horseman, a footballer and one who wears crisply tailored Safari suits and well polished boots. More than that, this man can "smile and laugh and proved to be a hospitable host." This imagery obviously punched some few holes in the recurrent imagery of a terrorist or communist offered by the official perspective. But as pointed out, these issues are raised within the dominant discursive framework because of the inability of the article to raise the most fundamental question of whether Libyan actions in supporting revolutionary and independence movements amount to terrorism or not. Conversely, as what makes these actions criminal and illegal and what makes similar actions by the United States in South and Central America, Africa and Asia legal, desirable and democratic.

In summary therefore, we can conclude that there is no fundamental difference in the way and manner Libyan affairs are covered by all the newspapers in our sample. Both in quantitative and qualitative terms, these newspapers tend to project Libya in the same light despite their apparent differences as distinct organizations operating under different sets of conditions and managerial climate. This we believe has serious consequences to the way and manner the whole debate on the New International Information Order was conducted and for future research initiatives in this direction.

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CHAPTER 8:

CONCLUSION: A ONE WORLD, ONE VOICE?

One serious fallacy in the social sciences is the belief that socioeconomic crisis or social malaise can be solved within existing structures or international frameworks. This type of social engineering assumes that existing social structures are inevitable and immutable, to the extent that the vocation of the social scientist is mainly to find ways and means of solving current social problems within the parameters allowed and dictated by the system in operation. This fallacy underlies some of the currents and positions in the debate on the New International Information Order. Within this framework, the debate precipitated two major normative positions which polemically run counter to each other in both discourse and practical solutions offered. These differences however, are predicated on the methodological and conceptual framework both positions adapt respectively, in their analysis of international flow of information and cultural artifacts, and the processes that generate these artifacts and information flows.

The first position is the one adapted by the leaders of the nonaligned member nations in their various meetings and particularly under the auspices of UNESCO. This position also attracted some sympathies from a minority of researchers with critical perspectives. These academic researchers sympathetic to the Third World's position and call for a new order in information

and communication flow and content, generally argued from a position which sees the problems associated with international information and communication as imbedded and located in the general dynamics of international monopoly capital. Their basic argument is that, the economic logic and essence of the transnational information and communication industries dictates the overall framework within which they operate, how they operate and the consequences of their operations on the recipient dependent Third World economies. The Works of Beltran (1978), Guback (1974, 1977), Hamelink (1977, 1983a, 1983b, 1983c), Mattelart (1979), Nordenstreng (1974, 1979), Salinas (1978, 1979), Schiller (1973, 1976, 1979, 1981), Sauvant (1976, 1979), Van Dinh (1979) Varis (1973, 1976),[1] etc., represents this line of discourse and research. Their main contributions to the debate on the New International Information order is on showing how these relationships binding international monopoly capital with its foremost agents, the transnational corporations operate in praxis and how these relates to and affect dependency relations in which the Third World countries find themselves, and the overall implications these have on their culture. This position posits that the Third World countries are basically dependent on the Western industrialized nations economically, politically and socially to the extent that even in the field of information and communication;

1.   International news is defined by the West; a situation which distorts or excludes authentic non-Western values of the Third World.

2.   That, this cultural filter excludes the major parts of the world which are of little immediate economic, political and social interest to the West.

3.   What little information about the Third World that finds itself in the international news system emphasize negative aspects of these countries.

4.   These practices of distortion and negativity characterising the treatments of the Third World by the Western media is often transferred to the Third World media itself because of the latter's dependence on the Western news agencies as major purveyors of the dominant processes of news gathering and dissemination.

5.   Lastly, that development news is always excluded from this recurrent diet of the international news agencies.

Mustapha Masmoudi's [1978][2] statement summarises the most salient points contained in this position. Viz;

> Information is distorted by reference to moral, cultural or political values peculiar to certain states, in defiance of the values and concerns of other nations. The criteria governing selection are consciously or unconsciously based on the political and economic interests of the transnational system and of the countries in which this system is established. Moreover, [they often] present these communities – when indeed they show interest in them – in most unfavorable light, stressing crises, strikes, street demonstrations, putsches, etc., or even holding them to ridicule... The present–day information system enshrines a form of political, economic and cultural colonialism which is reflected in the often tendentious

> interpretation of news concerning the developing countries. This consists in highlighting events whose significance, in certain cases, is limited or even nonexistent; in collecting isolated facts and presenting them as a "whole"; in setting out facts in such a way that the conclusion to be drawn from them is necessarily favorable to the interests of the transnational system; in amplifying small-scale events so as to arouse justified fears; in keeping silent on situations unfavorable to the interests of the countries of origin of these media.

The above position has been supported by a number of researches in the field to the extent that a call was made to redress the anomaly through a more balanced, equitable flow of information by the special commission appointed by UNESCO to look into the global problems of communication, The MacBride Commission. This recommendation however, was not equally shared by a number of critical communication researchers who see it as another political rhetoric aimed at the achievement of some form of cosmetic changes without recourse to a fundamental reversal of the problem at hand i.e., the international structures erected by imperialism and which constitute the main problem. That is, the issue of dependence. The solutions offered however, range from an advocation for a gradual dissociation from the international capitalist system by the Third World countries through compressively articulated and formulated communication and information policies, to an outright call and agitation for a revolutionary solution through class struggle (cf. Hamelink 1983a, Mattelart 1979)[3]

On the other end of the continuum is the position of those who vehemently opposed the idea of a new international information

order as is demanded by the Third World countries. The composition of this camp is a hotchpotch of academics, representatives of the Western media establishments, American and Western European government representatives and public figures, organizations like Freedom House, and even sponsored publications. Their basic contention is that the New International Information Order will tantamount to curtailing the freedom of the press. In most Third World countries they argued, the political systems in operation are non-democratic and in most cases, dictatorial. In such political climates the argument goes, the press is inevitably controlled and owned by the government. In such a context the opponents fear, the new order will only act as a licence for the muzzling of a free flow of ideas and information. The New International Information Order therefore is interpreted to mean a setback on the freedom of the press and its role as a "watchdog" on political excesses in society. This functionalist stance advocates for an interdependent international framework in which those who have are called upon to help those who don't have. They refuse to accept that the problems faced by the Third World countries are historical products of this unequal interdependence or more appropriately, dialectical dependence. As a result, they advocated, as an alternative solution to the new order, the establishment of international structures that will facilitate the Third World countries to acquire the necessary manpower and resources, capital and technogical infrastructure that will allow them to participate meaningfully in the process of information collection and dissemination. This viewpoint is represented in the publications and activities of such institutions, academics and individuals as Freedom House, The American Society of Newspaper Editors(ASNE), the International Press Institute (IPI), and its

former president, Max Snijders, editors of independent Western European and American news media, Leonard Sussman Director of the U.S institute, Freedom House, Rosemary Righter of The Sunday Times, and the orchestrated research findings published by Stevenson and Shaw in 1979.

Stevenson and his group in supporting the above position, tried to show that almost all the accusations labelled against the Western media could as well apply to the media of the Third World themselves. This position is summarized in their book titled **Foreign News And The New World Information Order** [Stevenson and Shaw 1979], which was a reaction to the report of the IAMCR team on the images of the world presented by the world press. The papers presented in the book argued that some of the points raised on international news flow and its character are valid, but that;[4]

> the problems of world news flow are less problems of Western dominance than problems of journalism. The criticisms of the West can be applied to foreign coverage of every national system in the [IAMCR] study, representing societies as diverse as the United States and the Soviet Union, and covering the spectrum of Third World countries from Algeria to Zambia... A remarkable similarity in the quantitative aspects of foreign news that emerges implies an almost universal definition of news: foreign news is politics, mostly in the immediate geographical region or in countries where national interest is represented, and newsmakers are high government officials. ... All media systems define news narrowly, all reporters quote a narrow range of newsmakers, all editors put a heavy emphasis on what happened today in the world's hot spots ... what is needed, is not the mobilization of news media to support government objectives but improved professionalism and independence so that media can do better what they can do best.

The basic premise of our thesis is that all the above positions are to a certain degree limited in what they offer as the understanding of the problems and processes of international information flow and thus, in the solutions they offer based on these explanations of the problem at hand. This premise is based on our belief that while the first position is limited by methodological constraints, the second position is seriously constrained by a faulty conceptual framework. This inevitably made both positions incapable of answering in a holistic manner, some of the intricate questions that this line of enquiry demands. In short, methodological constraints and narrow conceptualizations limits the effectiveness of both their generalizations and theoretical adequacies respectively. This in the end also affects the policy and empirical application of their discourse.

The first position, starts from an adequate theoretical and conceptual framework which sees (although there are fundamental differences in how this is expressed) and firmly locates the problems of international communication and information flow within the context of past and present dynamics of international monopoly capital, and the structures erected by these capitalist dynamics to ensure not only for its smooth running, but also for its growth and survival. The dependent nature of the Third World brought about by their historical incorporation into the international capitalist system through direct colonialism and neocolonialism, is convoked to explain away most of the current problems facing them.

The major problem with the above position's analysis of international communication and the problems of dependence

associated with it, has got much to do with limitations imposed by problems of methodology. That is, the inability of these researchers in general to move out of their research domiciles and study in a comprehensive manner the operations of the media in other countries, particularly in this instance, the Third world media. What we are left with therefore, is a skewed research enterprise that concentrates on the structure, operation and ideological location of the Western Media without a reciprocal analysis of its other half, the media in the Third world. Even in the field of international communication, attention is in most cases on the activities of transnational communication industries from where findings and theories are extrapolated to predict possible consequencies they might have for the dependent countries. This tendency can not in any way be construed as a form of research or academic ethnocentrism but rather more tied down to issues of funding and interest and other structural constraints. Nevertheless, it affects our proper understanding of the complex problems of international communication because we have to rely in most cases on these skewed and truncated accounts.

On the other hand, the position adopted by the opponents of the New International Information order, posits that the problems of international communication and information flow, even if there are any problems at all, are not in any way related to issues of dependence or neocolonialism. The issues at stake have to do with the free flow of information and freedom of the press which they see as lacking in most non-democratic countries of the Third World and which they fear, the "new order" will compound. They believe the world as it is, is already interdependent and working smoothly, the only problems being that some parts of the world

system are disadvantaged because of some internal constraints which the developed nations could do well do help redress from their vast accumulated experience. This conceptualization we believe is faulty.

Even though the above position seems pedestrian and utterly naive in both its polemics and conceptualization of the problem, it nevertheless brought to light a tacit possibility ignored – possibly through oversight, political reasons or sheer methodological expedience, (because of the context within which the whole debate has been conducted) by the proponents of the New International Information Order. That is, the possibility of the Third World media itself to operate in the same manner as do the Western press precisely because of the fact that they are transplants of the Western press and the fact that neocolonial interrelationships demand that almost all the institutions of the Third World societies operate within parameters set by the international capitalist system. While disagreeing with their theoretical position, we nevertheless think they made a point in the right direction by pointing out this possibility.

In general, therefore, our thesis takes as its point of departure the limitations of the above two positions and posit that the problems of international communication and information flow in general cannot be explicated outside the structures of neocolonial dependence that govern the operations within and between the developed and underdeveloped countries of the world. To the extent that even the operations of the institutions in these societies, i.e., the media, will at least be similar because of corresponding organizational structures, work practices and

consonant professional outlooks and socialization, that conjoin the media in the Western capitalist societies with their offsprings in the Third World.

To underscore our position above, we attempted in chapter one of this thesis, to firmly locate the call for a New International Information Order within these neocolonial institutional arrangements and socioeconomic and political realignments which gave both the impetus to the debate and the way and manner the whole issue was conceptualized and operationalized. Our basic argument is that, the whole debate is located within a particular conceptualization of the issues of international dependency in which the overall system of international capitalism and its accompanying operations is not questioned, but only some aspects of it. One main reason for this we pointed out, is related to the character and ideological position of the leaders of the Third World countries who incidentally initiated the debate. These privileged elites cherish their position as "middle men" of international capitalism and have been socialized to accept and defend the system in return for the benefits and prebends that accrue to them as a privileged class. The debate they initiated therefore, can be said to be an intra-class discord whose sole purpose was to guarantee them a better deal in the expropriation of the booties extracted by the system, and the guarantee of some sort of political leverage or independence in the determination of how these surpluses are extracted from their countries, and how they are shared out. In a nutshell, the whole discussion was extracted from the context of international dependency relations and the need for a fundamental reordering of these relationships.

In the next three chapters, we embarked on a theoretical excursion in order to analyse the process of the incorporation of the Third World into the world capitalist system and the role played by information and communication infrastructure in the process. This is followed by an analysis of the role accorded information, particularly in the process of social change as it affects the newly emergent states of Africa, Asia and Latin America in the post colonial era. The next chapter attempted to augment the arguments presented in the preceeding chapter by providing the various arguments in the literature on the nature of news, particularly in the advanced capitalist societies and in the international context.

Our position is that in order to understand the workings, nature and composition of international communication; particularly the flow of information or news and mediated cultural artifacts from the advanced capitalist countries of Europe and North America into the underdeveloped countries of the Third World; and how this relates to, or affects these countries; it is necessary to understand why in the first place they were colonized and what roles, if any, communication and information played in lubricating this process of the internationalization of capital and capitalist relations of production. Capitalism it was pointed out, has to expand in order to consolidate and grow as a mode of production. That is, it has to find new markets, actual and potential investment grounds, and new sources of raw material to supplement existing ones in the home ground to release more land and labour for the bourgeoning industries. Vital to this process of the internationalization of capitalism was adequate information flow on such matters as available markets, investment

opportunities, prices of raw materials and finished goods, and most importantly, on socioeconomic and political climates which are a prerequisite for commercial ventures.

The development and spread of communication and information infrastructures – which incidentally followed colonial lines – therefore, should be understood within this context of servicing the daily information needs of capital on a world scale. In this regards, the whole idea banded about in the 1950's and 1960's that, adequate flow of information was fundamentally vital to the development efforts of the newly emergent states, should be seen as an attempt to saturate these countries with this infrastructure which in itself, has become an industrial concern abiding to the dictates of profit maximization as well as performing its traditional role of lubricating the wheels of international monopoly capitalism. That is, as providers of a particular view of society and the social relations governing it that tended to automatically exclude other possible alternatives. This ideological location and function of the mass media in the advanced capitalist societies is subsumed in the way and manner they operate as commercial concerns responding to the needs of the market place, as well as the dictates of their owners and controllers. This commercial imperative, in conjunction with other factors relating to work practices and aspects of professionalism, and how all these relate to the power structure in society, tended to squarely locate the functions of the mass media within the region of ideological reproduction in the advanced capitalist societies.

As was pointed out in chapter four, this level of analysis, as it is applied to the media in the advanced capitalist societies, is less evident in the analysis of the operations of the media at the international level, or more crucially on how the media operate in the Third World countries. The tendency was to perceive the media in the Third World as operating under different sets of conditions and rules of the game because of the nature of their ownership, and differences in socioeconomic structures. Because most of these media systems are publicly owned and controled, it is assumed that their ideological function and location will fundamentally differ from that of the private media in the advanced capitalist societies. At the micro analytical level, this might be a valid observation which might be fruitful in unearthing the basic operational framework and function of these media in respect to the political alignments of the societies within which they operate. But, at a more macro level of analysis geared towards the unearthing of the complex and intricate conditions under which these media operate, and how this relates to their overall position in society, we have to go beyond the national society perceived in isolation. That is, we have to locate the operations of these media institutions within the type of socioeconomic system that binds nations and states together at the international level, and to a certain extent, even determines the politics, economics and social relations pervading within and between these national entities.

Within this context then, it is not enough, as did most of the research done in the field of international information flow, to dichotomize between the Industrialized West and the Underdeveloped South and start to throw accusations against the

Western media as being insensitive to Third World needs by reporting them negatively, or not reporting them at all. It is crucial to also have a thorough analysis of how the media in the Third World treat contentious as well as less contentious issues relating to the political, economic and social aspects of the their societies particularly, on how these relate to the international capitalist system which binds most of these regions to the metropolitan centers of the capitalist West. That is the task we set ourselves here. That is to look at how the African press reported and imaged Libyan affairs and how this compares, or differs, from how the same issues are dealt with by a Western European newspaper.

A One World One Voice?.

The major findings of both our quantitative and qualitative analysis of the African and European press coverage and portrayal of Libya from 1970 to 1986 show that; quantitatively, The Times of London did cover Libya more than any of the African newspapers in our sample. This finding tends to belie earlier research conclusions that geographical proximity is a major determinant of media coverage. However, as we argued earlier, socioeconomic and political factors play a large part in determining the large amount of attention given to Libya by The Times of London and to a certain degree, the African press in our sample. This in conjunction with particular crisis situations between Libya and Western Europe and the United States plus Libya's political involvement with neighboring countries and other nations and

states in Africa and the Middle East, constitute the main diet and hence major determinants of all the press' coverage in the entire period of our study.

In terms of the pattern of this coverage however, we found that both The Times and the African press covered Libya more in the period preceeding the New International Information Order debate and in its aftermath than during the actual debate itself. The post debate period actually account for the bulk of these newspapers' coverage of Libya. But as we pointed out, our methodology did not allow us to provide statistical correlations between this periodic attention and the impact of the debate itself. However, what our data allowed us to uncover is the fact that even this high level coverage of Libyan affairs in the post debate period of 1981-1985 was concentrated in only one or two months of two particular years, i.e., 1981 and 1984. This corresponds to the break in diplomatic relations between Libya and the United States in 1981, and between Libya and Britain in 1984. This we believe underlines the cruciality of these crisis periods in accounting for the large amount of coverage given to Libya by the press in the post-debate period, than the impact of the debate in itself. The only exception to the above rule is The Daily News of Tanzania which covered Libya more in the early period of the Libyan revolution, i.e., 1970-1975, which is also the pre-debate period than in the post debate period.

Another interesting finding of this study is the predominance of politics both local to Libya and international over any other issue. According to our data, politics, economics, military issues and terrorism constitute the main framework within

which Libya is reported to the world by all the newspapers in our sample. Associated with this is the finding that The Times of London did actually cover more Libyan domestic political issues and economic matters, than any of the African newspapers. Similarly, with the exception of the Daily News, non of the African newspapers as much as covered one single issue on social services, health or agriculture in Libya despite the fact that the provision of these services is one of the strong points of the Libyan government after the revolution. In actual fact, all the media, particularly the African media's coverage of Libyan domestic political and economic matters was less in the post debate period when compared to the pre-debate and debate periods.

Thirdly, our data shows the glaring invisibility of African news sources even among the African newspapers to the extent that even The Times' use of African news sources compares favourably well with the African newspapers' use of the same source. With the exception of the Libyan News Agency, JANA, no any other African news source is given any substantial weight as a source. A typical example is the total absence of the Pan-African News Agency, PANA, as a source of news.

On the other hand, there is a substantial reliance on the international news agencies by the African newspapers which in actual fact increased in the post-debate period, while even the reliance on JANA, the only African source quoted declined drastically over the years. The practice of nondisclosure of news sources pointed out by Sreberny-Mohaammadi et.al (1985)[5], in their studies of foreing news in 29 countries is also evident in this context and to a certain degree tends to mask the level of

dependence of the African media on the big international news agencies and the African agencies which our quantitative data could not reveal. But, as our qualitative analysis clearly shows, the same stories were reported verbatim from the same international agencies by all the newspapers with some crediting their sources while others don't. This practice however, was not evident with the African news sources as we could not find a single story in our one month's sample in 1986, which was credited to any of the African or Third World news agency. One exception is that, among the African media, The Daily News in particular stand out as relying more on African news sources.

Lastly, as regards one of the most contentious issues raised by the New International Information Order Debate, that is the accusation leveled against the Western media of covering the Third World only in terms of crisis and political upheavals, our African newspapers in the sample could not escape the blame either, in the way and manner they reported Libya. This is pinpointed by the prevalence of large number of negative references or motifs employed by these media in their depiction and reporting of Libyan affairs. In actual fact, The Standard employs these negative motifs even more than The Times of London, while the The Daily Times and The Daily News, compares relatively well with The Times in their general selection of negative references and themes. In general, there is one positive reference to Libya in every three news items, while almost every single news item contains about one and one half negative references. The most popular positive motifs are references to Libya as a Pan-African, Pan-Arab and economically self-sufficient. The most recurrent negative references include Libya's interference in the internal affairs of

other nations, as pursuing expansionist policies in Africa, and as a supporter of, and haven for international terrorism. Most of the positive motifs were employed by almost all the media in the pre-debate period while the majority of the negative motifs appeared most in the post debate period.

Our qualitative analysis reveals very interesting findings as regards the images of Libya projected by these newspapers and to a certain extent fills in the gaps left by our quantitative data. Most glaring of this, is the tendency of these newspapers operating supposedly under different political and economic environments, with different editorial and managerial policies, to select and report almost verbatim, the same news items on Libya. In actual fact, some of the news items were carried by all the newspapers apparently from the same source and published either on the same day or a few days in between. This to a large extent indicate not only a similarity in editorial judgements in regards to news values or what makes news or not, it also indicate a strong reliance on the same international news sources. An important element of this reliance on these international news agencies, in an era when alternative regional agencies are in operation however skeletal the operation might be, is the continuing perseverance of particular viewpoints and images of the world. In this case, we find almost all the newspapers, despite their differences, running the same agency stories word for word, to the extent that the themes and references employed by the international news agencies are the same that are reproduced by the African press.

To a large extent therefore, the picture of Libya painted by the African press, is basically based on the viewpoints of the Western capitalist countries of Europe and North America upon which the international news agencies mostly rely for background information, political interpretations of events, official viewpoints and testimonial, for most of their stories. In this context therefore, it is not surprising to find both The Times of London, The Daily Times, The Daily News, and The Standard, presenting Libya as a communist inspired nation whose only vocation is to destabilize other nations by sponsoring terrorists to go out and kill and maim innocent women and children. This image of Libya and Gaddafi is much more expounded in the feature articles some of the newspapers carry, which in most cases are written by the newspaper's staff. The similarity of themes and references found across all these articles also underlines the similarity in orientations, journalistic practices, and world views of most of the journalists in these newspapers. The picture we are presented with in this instance, is more of a **one world with a one voice.** As far as the coverage of, and imagery of Libya presented to the world by the media in our sample is concerned, we cannot discern any fundamental difference. They all seemed to sing the same song with only slight differences in tenor and pitch.

As hitherto pointed out, this situation can only be explained by reference to the inveterate dependent relations that bind not only the political and economic structures of the African states to the interests of their erstwhile colonial masters and hence, the operations of the international capitalist system, but also to a large degree determine the operations and outlook of the institutional infrastructure they transplanted and nurtured into

fruition in these countries. The similarity in organizational structures, work practices, professional training, socialization and education, and an imbibed middle class elite attitude all add-up to account for these similarities in the Western European and African press coverage of Libyan affairs in this study.

The above factors notwithstanding, we believe there are other extraneous factors that have a bearing on why Libya for example is projected with a more or less unanimous voice by all the newspapers. This also is unconnected to issues of dependence upon which the present structures of international monopoly capital hinges. By challenging the operations of the transnational oil companies, and the military, political and economic interests of their parent countries, Libya invariably was challenging the operational structures of international capital to the extent that if allowed to succeed, it will be opening soft grounds for other states to tread on. In simple terms, Libya could not be allowed to succeed in its challenge against the established order because that will bring to light the vulnerability of the system as a whole. This led to the initiation of the campaign to isolate it internationally, and even within and among the African states and Arab nations through various means, one of which is the manipulation of public opinion through the mass media. A research done by Sami Tayie [1989][6], on the role of the Egyptian mass media in the formation of young Egyptians' images of foreign people and countries, clearly shows the level of success of this campaign to isolate Libya. His results showed that Libya came only second to Israel as the least favoured country by young Egyptians. The reasons advanced by the young Egyptians for not wanting to live in Libya were that; Libya has a dictatorial political system and is

ruled by a dictator. These images, Tayie concluded, could only be obtained from the media particularly after the break in diplomatic relations between Libya and Egypt following the Egypt-Israeli camp David accord.

In the same vain, one can argue that most leaders and elites of the African countries, are first class beneficiaries of the present international arrangements that perpetuate the dependence of their states on the international capitalist system. In a sense therefore, these privileged few will not be happy to see Libya succeed in its protracted war with the established order because, that will be an "eye opener" for their citizens to demand the same - a form of "bush fire effect" that characterise most coups in Africa - thus, jeopardizing their well entrenched advantageous positions. This "middlemen" status conferred on the elites and lumpen bourgeoisie of the African states by the historical processes of colonialism and neocolonialism at the international level, also manifest itself at the level of the nation state. That is, these middlemen and lumpen bourgeoisie also try as much as they could to reproduce these client-patronage relationships for the purpose of solidifying their social, political and economic base and legitimacy; a necessary venture for their survival as an unproductive class.

To this end, drawing on the Nigerian society, it can be argued that the political and economic elites have perfected the art of cultivating other segments of the social fabric through some form of a "Pavlonian" reward-punishment schema. Nigerian journalists are conditioned to believe that they are powerful in society, partly as a result of their constant proximity to

corridors of power in the course of their daily duties, and partly as a result of the constant changes in government mostly through military coups. This assumed power of the media however is underlined. That is, the press is said to be free to criticise government policies in as much as it doesn't touch on national unity, interest and security. This in essence makes the press to identify with the interests of the ruling political and economic elite who in any way, are the definers of what borders on national unity, interests, and security. Within this context, those journalists who are clever enough to read in-between the lines and work out the exact definitions of these concepts as they are held by the current elite in power, get rewarded with political positions in the government, and in major government owned and controlled media establishments. On the other hand, those who do not tow the establishment line find themselves either professionally stagnant or without a job. The end result is that as far as the Nigerian media are concerned, the only bad government is a government out of power. That is, the media hardily offer any serious criticism of any government in power. (cf. Elliott and Golding 1979, Ayu 1984, Oso 1986).[7] They wait until it is replaced before they start to catalogue all the socioeconomic and political crimes it had committed.

The above attitude is also reflected in the way and manner some of the Nigerian media, particularly those owned and controlled by the state and powerful polical and economic elite, approach and interpret foreign issues. They follow the interpretations and vested interests of the government irrespective of whether the government's position is profound or not. A typical example is the Libyan case, in which the Nigerian

political and economic elite have a vested interest to see to its
isolation internationally. Nigeria stand to gain economically if
the major oil importers accept the American imposed embargo on oil
purchases from Libya. That means more reliance on the Nigerian
crude in an era of stagnating oil prices and to a certain extent
more economic benefits to the Nigerian comprador bourgeoisie in
terms of commissions and prebends.

We are not in any sense implying that what is going on in
Libya is a well articulated challenge to international capital
with a view to installing an alternative socioeconomic framework.
Libya is basically pursuing a capitalist path to development but
with a different tint. That is, its self declared interest to
determine its destiny and pursue its political and economic
interests nationally and internationally, without undue
interference from the big superpowers. It thus become an enemy
from within, an "errant boy" to be punished and brought back into
the fold least others try to follow suit.

In the context of these political and economic discords, the
newspapers in our sample more or less did supplement other
initiatives and institutions to accomplish this arduous task. The
media in this case were performing one of their historical
ideological roles. That is, to delegitimize Libya's declaration of
independence from the dictates of international monopoly capital
and transnational power structures, by projecting such an act as
irrational and destabilizing to the established world order and
accepted frameworks of behaviour. Both The Times, The Daily Times,
The Standard, and to a certain extent The Daily News as far as our
findings are concerned, performed this task equally well and with

a unitary voice.

This thesis set out to attempt a contribution in the field by exploring an area it is felt is neglected in the discussions on the New International Information Order and which we believe limited the comprehensiveness of the framework of the debate. That is looking or focusing by researchers on the operations of the African media in a comparative framework as to how they report African issues particularly within the context of the issues raised by the proponents of the debate. If this has been done it is believed, the debate should have had a much more holistic perspective as to the nature of the problem. As indicated in this research, neocolonial dependent relations and structures to a certain extent influenced the functioning of the African mass media to the extent that even in reporting African issues, in this case Libya, they do not fundamentally differ in both content, amount, source and reportorial frameworks from a typical Western European newspaper. In general, there is a very strong indication that the same old Western European and North American news agencies still constitute a major source of news on and about Africa for the African newspapers in our sample despite the existence of the Pan African News Agency, the Nonaligned Agencies News Pool and the various national Agencies of these newspapers. Secondly, there is an almost total absence of news on domestic Libyan socioeconomic developments notwithstanding the call for more developmental oriented journalistic practices. Thirdly, even though one of the most contentious issues raised by the Nonaligned countries was their dissatisfaction with the tendency of the Western European and American media to concentrate on negative and crises situations in their coverage of the Third World nations,

our sampled African newspapers' coverage of Libya falls within that category. This we believe, particularly in the context of over a decade of conferences and debates on the need to restructure media performance and operations in both the developed and developing world, is a serious implication to be taken into account if the socioeconomic, political and cultural independence of the Third World nations is to be given the priority it deserves.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

To quote J. D. Halloran, the kind of questions a researcher asks invariably determine the kind of answers he gets. This study is no exception in that the above findings and generalizations can only be read within the context and parameters of this study. There is a serious need for further research in the field, preferably along the lines we embarked upon here, to look at the operations of the African media particularly, their coverage of African affairs within the context of the issues raised by these states in the New International Information Order Debate. One obvious limitation of our study, is that it is limited to the press, which necessitate further efforts in the area of broadcasting and news agencies. Similarly further efforts are crucial in studies that will focus on media systems having different colonial backgrounds with ours here i.e., on Francophone and Lusophone media systems. At the same time, there is a need to look at how the media for example covers the so-called "stable democracies" in Africa — the countries that we barely hear about until their leaders fall out with their masters — and the smaller

nations and states in the continent that are still effectively appendages of their colonial masters.

This notwithstanding, we feel this thesis has accomplish what it set out to do. That is, to throw more light, however faint, on the issues at hand with a view to initiating further research and discussion in the field. Our findings we hope, will open avenues for further research in our efforts to fully understand the complexities not only of the information and communication sector, but the whole institutional structures that underlie and give bearing to international relations, politics and economics.

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APPENDIX.

CODING SCHEDULE.

CARD ONE.

1. ITEM SERIAL NUMBER:

1
2
3
4

2. MEDIUM:

    1. Times Of London.
    2. Nigerian Daily Times.
    3. The Daily News, Tanzania.   5
    4. The Standard, Kenya.

3. SAMPLE DATE.

                                         6
                                         7
       Day.   8
       Month.   9
       Year.   10
                                        11

4. POSITION OF ITEM.

    1. Main Lead.
    2. Other Front Page.
    3. Inside Pages.   12
    4. Back page.

5. TYPE OF NEWS ITEM.

    1. News Story.
    2. Editorial.
    3. Feature Articles.
    4. Readers Letter.   13
    5. Picture Only.
    6. Cartoon Only.
    7. Dateline.

6. SOURCE OF NEWS ITEM.
   (check 1=yes;0=no)

Reuters.	14
UPI.	15
AP.	16
AFP.	17
TASS.	18
News Agency Of Nigeria; NAN.	19
Kenya News Agency; KNA.	20
Tanzania News Agency; SHIHATA.	21
Libya News Agency; JANA.	22
Pan-African News Agency; PANA.	23
Other European/American agency.	24
Other African agency or source.	25
Own Correspondent/Reporter.	26
Other.	27
Unidentified.	28

7. LENGTH OF NEWS ITEM.   29
   (in Column Centimeters)   30
                              31
                              32

√ 8. IS THERE A PICTURE?

   1. Yes
   2. No.   33

b. IF YES, LENGTH IN   34
   COLUMN CENTIMETERS.   35
                              36

c. PICTURE CAPTION.
   (write in.)   _____

d. PICTURE DESCRIPTION.
   (write in.)   _____

9. IS THERE A CARTOON.

                         1. Yes.   37 ☐
                         2. No.

                                               38
b. IF YES, LENGTH IN   39
    COLUMN CENTIMETERS.   40

c. CARTOON CAPTION.
    (write In.)   _____

d. CARTOON DESCRIPTION.
    (write In.)   _____

10. STORY HEADLINE.
    (write In.)   _____

11. STORY TYPE.

                         1. Paper's Home News In Libya.
                         2. Libyan News In Paper's Home.
                         3. Libyan News In Libya.
                         4. Libyan news Abroad. (other 41 ☐
                           than Libyan news in paper's
                           home.)

12. LOCATION OF MAIN EVENT.
    (write in.)   _____

13. IS THE STORY ABOUT RELATIONS BETWEEN LIBYA AND OTHER
    COUNTRIES? I.E. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS?.

                         1. Yes.
                         2. No.   42 ☐

b. IF YES, IS IT ABOUT RELATIONS BETWEEN;
    √(code 1=yes,0=no)

<div style="text-align:center">

Libya And Its Immediate Neighbors.	43
Libya And The Rest Of Africa.	44
Libya And The Middle East/	45
Arab World.	46
Libya And Western Europe.	47
Libya And Eastern Europe/USSR.	48
Libya And Asia/Far East.	49
Libya And The Caribbean.	50
Libya And The USA.	51
Libya And International Bodies,	52
i.e. The OAU, UN,etc.	53
Libya And Latin America.	54
Libya And Others. (specify)	

</div>

---

14. COUNTRIES INVOLVED. (write in.) _____

15. MAIN TOPICS. (code 1=yes for one main topic and up to two
    subsidiary topics and 0=no for all others.)

DIPLOMATIC/POLITICAL ACTIVITY BETWEEN LIBYA AND THE REST
OF THE WORLD.

– Diplomatic Cooperation/Renewal.	
– Break In Diplomatic Ties/	55
Hostilities.	56
– International Terrorism And The	57
Threat To World Peace/Security.	58
– Other Diplomatic Activity.	

DOMESTIC POLITICS WITHIN LIBYA.

– Internal Conflict/Crisis And National Security.	60
– Political Mobilization; Policy pronouncements, Campaigns, etc.	61
– Constitutional/Legislative Changes; Cabinet Reshuffles, Reforms, New Laws, etc.	62

LIBYAN DOMESTIC ECONOMIC MATTERS.

- Internal Economic Situation And
  Policies.   62
- General Economic Performance;
  Output, Growth, Standard Of   63
  Living, Inflation, Labour
  Relations, etc.   64
- Industry And Agricultural;
  Projects, Factories, Dams, Roads,   65
  Ports, Crops And Harvests, etc.
- The Oil Industry; Output, Prices,
  Nationalizations, Embargoes, etc.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC MATTERS.

- Agreements On Trade And Tariffs;   66
  Economic Cooperation, Loans, etc.
- Imports, Exports, Trade Balances.   67
- Embargoes, Blockades, Negotia-
  tions, etc.   68

MILITARY AND DEFENCE.

- Armed Conflict Or Threat Of...
- Arms Deals, Weapons, Purchases,   69
  Bases, Exercises, Training,
  Terrorist Activities And   70
  Reprisals, Military Aid, etc.
- Peace moves, Negotiations,   71
  Settlements, etc.

SOCIAL SERVICES IN LIBYA.

- General Social Problems of
  Health, Housing, Illiteracy,   72
  Poverty, etc.
- Provision Of Housing, Education,   73
  Health, etc.
- Other Social Issues And Welfare   74
  Services.

CRIME

- Non-Political Crime.   75
- Political Crime.   76
- Military Crime.   77
- Other   78

CULTURE, RELIGION AND HISTORY.

79 ☐

SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT; NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL.

- Regional, International And
  Local Competitions, Boycotts.   1
- Youth Festivals And Forums.   2

HUMAN INTEREST STORIES.

3 ☐

STUDENT AND ACADEMIC MATTERS.

- Intellectual Freedom.   4
- Suppression of Intellectual   5
  Freedom.   6
- Academic Reorientation.   7
- Student Activities.

NUCLEAR ENERGY AND OTHER FORMS OF ENERGY.

8 ☐

NATURAL DISASTERS; DROUGHT, FLOODS, ETC.

9 ☐

INTERNATIONAL AID; E.G. FOR FAMINE, ECONOMIC PURPOSES,
MILITARY AID, ETC.   10 ☐

16. MAIN ACTOR.

      01 Top Leader.
      02 Aristocracy/Royalty/nominal Head
      03 Legislature/Ruling Council.
      04 Ruling Party/Government.
      05 Legitimate Opposition.
      06 Non-Legitimate Opposition.
      07 Diplomats.
      08 Terrorists/Guerrillas/Spies.
      09 Media.
      10 Military.   11
      11 Nations.
      12 International Bodies or   12
          Organizations.
      13 Elite Persons.
      14 Ordinary people.
      15 Business/Industry.
      16 Judiciary/The Police/Prisons.
      17 Religious Bodies.
      18 Other Actors. (specify).

17. POSITIVE MOTIFS: LIBYA AS;
    (code 1=present and 0=absent)

      - Politically Independent.   13
      - Economically Self-Sufficient. 14
      - A Pan-Arabist/For Arab Unity. 15
      - A Mediator In The Middle East 16
        Crisis.   17
      - Encouraging East-West Detente. 18
      - Against North-South Divide.   19
      - A Helper Of Independence/   20
        Liberation Movements.   21
      - A Pan-Africanist/For African 22
        Unity.   23
      - Discouraging Interference In The 24
        National Affairs Of Other Nations.25
      - Having A Collective Leadership. 26
      - A Respecter of Human Rights. 27
      - A Respecter Of Religious Freedom.
      - A Respecter Of The Freedom Speech
        And Opinion.
      - Politically Stable.
      - An Egalitarian Society.

18. NEGATIVE MOTIFS: LIBYA AS;
     (code 1=present, 0=absent.)

- Politically Dependent.	
- Economically Backward.	28
- Aggravating Arab Disunity.	
- Pro-PLO, Strongly Partisan In	29
The Middle East Crisis.	
- Encouraging East-West Division.	30
- An Enemy Of Western Europe And	
The United States.	31
- An Ardent Supporter of Interna-	
tional Terrorism.	32
- Pursuing Expansionist Policies	
In Africa.	33
- Interfering In The Internal	
Affairs of Other Nations.	34
- Having Authoritarian And	
Eccentric Leadership.	35
- Having A Predominance Of	
Religious Fundamentalism.	36
- A Violator of Human Rights.	
- A Suppressor Of Freedom Of	37
Speech And Opinion.	
- Plagued By Political	38
Instability And Violence.	39
- A Non-Egalitarian Society.	40
- A Communist/Socialist Society.	41
- A Terrorist/Guerrilla	42
"Factory" And Sanctuary.	43
	44

HAVING A LEADERSHIP DESCRIBED AS;

- A "Mad Dog."	45
- "The Libyan Strong Man."	46
- "Erratic"/"Extremist"/	47
"Unpridictable".	48
- "The World's Most Dangerous	
Man"	

HAVING A GOVERNMENT DESCRIBED AS;

- A Military Junta.	49
- "Revolutionary" Regime.	50

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