

NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND THE
NON-ALIGNED: A STUDY IN ANTI-COLONIALISM
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ZIMBABWE

by

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This is
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To the memory of my father, Amos,
who sacrificed so much to give me
the education which he believed would
equip me for life.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ALC	African Liberation Committee
ANC	African National Council (Rhodesia)
ANC	African National Congress (South Africa)
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
FLING	Frente de Luta pela Independencia Nacional da Guire
FLN	Front de Liberation Nationale (Algeria)
FLNA	Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola
FRELMO	Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique
FROLIZI	Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe
IDAF	International Defence and Aid Fund
JMC	Joint Military Command
JPC	Joint Political Council
MNR	Mozambique National Resistance
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola
NCNC	National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (later renamed National Council for Nigerian Citizens)
NDP	National Democratic Party (Rhodesia)
NLF	National Liberation Front (Vietnam)
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress (South Africa)
PAIGC	Partido Africans da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde
PDFLP	Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PRG	Provisional Revolutionary Government (Vietnam)
RDA	Rassemblement Democratique Africain

SWAPO	South West Africa Peoples Organization
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UGCC	United Gold Coast Convention
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNIP	United National Independence Party (Zambia)
UNITA	United Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola
WCC	World Council of Churches
WHO	World Health Organization
ZANU	Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African Peoples Union
ZIPA	Zimbabwe Peoples Army
ZLC	Zimbabwe Liberation Committee.

INTRODUCTION

Two significant developments which occurred on the international scene in the early post-war period were the emergence of the phenomena of national liberation movements and non-alignment. Both occurring outside the traditional centres of world politics, they presented an awkward picture in the established order of international relations. As a result they were subjected to various ideological assessments. What is true of them, however, is that they both have their roots in anti-colonialism.

Up to 1939, the vast expanse of European empires covering almost the whole of Africa, much of Asia, and parts of Latin America seemed likely to last for many more decades. Except in India and a few other colonies where nationalist sentiment had developed to a level which caused concern to the colonial authorities, there really existed no apparently serious challenge to the colonial system. But World War II was soon to change the situation. The war-time experience of the colonial soldiers gave a fillip to the nascent nationalism in most of these colonies, giving rise to a vigorous demand for independence. Under favourable international conditions given in the war-weariness of the colonial powers, the establishment of the United Nations Organization, and the growing opposition to colonialism in the metropolis, the campaign for independence in the colonies soon gathered enough momentum to force the colonial authorities into retreat.

In many of the colonies, the retreat was peaceful and orderly, guided by constitutionalism. This has led some authors to regard decolonization as an *ex-gratia* and a benevolent exercise to demonstrate what is portrayed as the depth of understanding on the part of the colonizer to the colonized. The tendency therefore

is to present colonialism as a "civilizing mission" which could not be accused of exploitation. It is thus understandable for Portugal to say that:

We take pride in the increasing toil and work that for nearly five centuries of common history we have achieved overseas: it has been the work of maintaining order, organizing community life, promoting economic development, providing education at all levels, investing capital, and raising living standards. However, one thing is certain: at least the progress and development which we brought and are still bringing into our overseas provinces was not and is not done by methods which are repugnant to the conscience of mankind nor by violations of human rights.¹

What the Portuguese statement implies is that colonialism gave no benefit but only sacrifice to the colonizer, and therefore might not be worth promoting except for humanitarian purpose. James Mayall seems to share this viewpoint when he asserts that for Britain "the establishment of an African empire was primarily determined by the need to secure the trade route to India, rather than of any overriding governmental conviction concerning the value of African colonies themselves."² Hence his expected conclusion that the decolonization of India made irrelevant the African colonies, and so their inevitable abandonment by Britain.

Such an argument creates a rather simplistic view of decolonization and denies the realities of the changes in international relations which ruled colonialism as anachronistic. It is an argument that seeks to cover up the retreat of colonialism in the face of the rising anti-colonial movements in the colonies.

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1. UN General Assembly Official Records, 15th Session, 926th Plenary Meeting, 28 November, 1960.
 2. James Mayall, Africa : The Cold War and After (London: Erek Books Ltd., 1971), p.68.

True, Britain can pride herself as being more 'civilized' in the general manner she effected decolonization; a development which has earned her the kind remark of King Mahendra of Nepal: "We do recognize that some colonial powers have acted with more grace and with greater statesmanship and imagination in reacting to the challenge of the time than others. A colonial power like the United Kingdom, having grasped the fact that the days of colonialism are numbered, has acted on the whole in such a manner so as to get the approbation of many countries. Having taken the lead in enslaving large masses of people, she has also taken a lead in freeing them".³ All the same, King Mahendra's praise does not detract from the fact that anti-colonialism connotes a struggle.

In the colonial situations where resistance to change made peaceful decolonization practically impossible, there emerged 'national liberation movements' for whom the use of force appeared inevitable in securing independence. Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe - all fought wars of national liberation, while Namibia is still fighting to be free. Whether by peaceful means or through an armed struggle, the result of decolonization struggle was the birth of dozens of new states in the post-war era. These new nations had a novel view of international relations. Their emergence, incidentally, coincided with the era of the Cold War, featuring an ideological and military rivalry between East and West which apparently took account of no other interest than the need to increase hegemonic power via alliances.

The likely consequences of this cold war rivalry was not lost on many of the new states. Their considered judgement was that taking sides in the rivalry

3. Official Report of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade, September 1-6, 1961 (Published by Publicisticko-Izdavacki Zavod, Yugoslavia, 1961) p. 139

could compromise their newly won freedom, since in any hegemonic alliance, the independence of the weak is ignored in the preservation of the alliance. Conscious of the dangers posed by strategic alliances to national independence and world peace; and determined to protect this independence, most of the new states opted for peaceful coexistence on the basis of equality of all states and people, which presupposes the elimination of colonial and all other forms of domination. This rejection of the old order in pursuit of their new vision is what finds expression in the policy of non-alignment, the promotion of which has brought them together in what is now the Non-Aligned Movement. For the purpose of this study, the non-aligned movement is interpreted to include those Third World regional organizations like the Arab League and the OAU because of their overlapping membership with the former. Thus for all practical purposes, the liberation activities of both the Arab League and the OAU are linked inextricably with those of the non-aligned movement.

The conclusion from the foregoing discussion is that both national liberation movements and the non-aligned movement owe their emergence to one common factor: decolonization. National liberation movements are the agents of decolonization; and without decolonization the new states would not have been around to formulate and adopt the policy of non-alignment. As a result, the non-aligned states are beholden to the liberation movements, and feel obliged to assist the liberation movements in their struggle for national independence. Evidence of this obligation is the adoption of the principle of anti-colonialism by the non-aligned movement. But how committed is the non-aligned movement to its professed support for anti-colonialism? And what is the nature and quality of this support, both at the corporate and individual state levels?

Because anti-colonialism apparently constitutes the common ideology of the non-aligned movement, it is often assumed that the national liberation struggle means the same to all member-states. The assumption is perhaps derived from the series of the movement's official declarations which continuously condemn colonialism and emphasize rather aggressively the determination to eliminate the system. But such bellicose rhetoric in relation to many states is not so marked as a sign of practical support as for political posturing. With national liberation becoming an event of international interest, many of the non-aligned countries simply employ anti-colonialism as a convenient foreign policy issue to make themselves heard on the world stage. For these countries, support for national liberation hardly goes beyond the declaratory level. For some states, however, support for the anti-colonial struggle is an act of faith, and the essence of their existence in what they perceive to be a world threatened by imperialism.

The aim of this study is to analyse this marked difference in attitude towards anti-colonialism between these two groups of countries, and to determine the level of the non-aligned movement's liberation support with particular reference to the Zimbabwean (Rhodesia)⁴ struggle. Chapter One analyses the two key concepts - national liberation and non-alignment - and examines the compatibility between the ideas of the movements of national liberation and the non-aligned movement with a view to establishing the basis of their working relationship. The study then falls into two parts. Part I includes background chapters on the non-aligned movement's support for national liberation generally and starts with a consideration in Chapter 2 of the determinants of this support.

4. 'Zimbabwe' is the African nationalist name for Rhodesia, and which the country assumed officially at independence. In this work, the two names are used interchangeably.

Chapter 3 focuses on the development of support within the non-aligned movement, while Chapter 4 is concerned with support at the United Nations, showing the process of the legitimization of national liberation. Chapter 5 looks at the strategic and material assistance to the liberation movements generally.

Part II which is a case study, considers the diplomatic, strategic and material support for the Zimbabwe struggle in the context of the determinants of support.

CHAPTER 1. 'NATIONAL LIBERATION' AND 'NON-ALIGNMENT' IN THEORY

The terms, national liberation and non-alignment are ~~so~~ widely used in contemporary international relations. Yet because of different ideological and moral attitudes, their conceptualization tend to suffer from a large measure of bias. It might therefore seem an ambitious attempt to construct an 'objective' meaning of them. Nevertheless, it is important for the purposes of this study to establish an operational definition of these terms for a better understanding of the two phenomena of national liberation movement^s and the non-aligned movement which are derived from them and which constitute the main subjects of the study.

(1) The Meaning of National Liberation

The difficulty in giving an unambiguous meaning^{to} of national liberation is highlighted by the fashionable application of the term to all sorts of protest movements which nurse one grievance or another against any established authority. Any time a group of individuals satisfies itself at having built up enough scores to need settling with the government of the day, the most 'legitimate' means of action is to form a 'national liberation movement' to press forward its case. Thus it is the normal order of protest for a handful of former Katangese rebels to style themselves as liberation forces whenever they decide to take up arms against President Mobutu. This also explains the assumption of the term by such religious fundamentalist organisations as the Moslem Brotherhood in their opposition to various Arab regimes. Even terrorist and secessionist movements claim to be engaged in 'national liberation' against their legitimate governments. Such use of the term certainly creates a perplexing conceptual problem.

An insight into what national liberation means may be obtained from Frederick Douglass' comment which was scornful of any compromise over freedom, and extorting change by means of force if need be:

Those who profess to favour freedom and yet deprecate agitation are men who want crops without ploughing up the ground. They want rain without thunder and lightening. They want the ocean without the awful roar of its waters. The struggle may be a moral one; or it may be a physical one; or it may be both moral and physical. But it must be a struggle. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and never will. Find out just what people will submit to, and you have found out the exact amount of injustice and wrong which will be imposed upon them. And this will either continue until they are resisted with either words or blows, or with both. The limits of tyrants are prescribed by the endurance of those whom they oppress.¹

The comment is significant in that it tells us the essence of liberation, which is the time-honoured struggle of man for freedom from tyrannical rule. With such history behind it, a way out of the conceptual predicament seems to be to define the term on the basis of weight of usage. But as we shall soon discover, this approach also has limitations.

(i) National Liberation in Historical Perspective

Historically, the concept of national liberation derives from the principle of self-determination which finds fulfilment in the nation-state.² In their philosophical treatises, Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Schleiermacher presented and advocated self-determination as a morally and religiously ordained right of man in his exercise of natural freedom.³ To be sure, the urge to be free has always been the most irresistible force in human history; and this factor has determined the type of relationship that exists between individuals, groups and nations.

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1. Quoted in New Internationalist, No. 47, January 1977, p. 17.
 2. Alfred Cobban, The Nation-State and National Self-Determination (London; Fontana Library, 1969) p.39.
defines self-determination as "the principle that each nation has a right to constitute an independent state and determine its own government"
 3. See Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, (London, Hutchinson and Co. Ltd. Library, 1960) for a discussion of the works of Kant and Schleiermacher on the subject of self-determination.

Any situation of subjugation creates a consciousness to be free which at the group level inevitably finds expression in that potent phenomenon known as nationalism, defined as "an assertion of a people's right to determine its political destiny autonomously".⁴ Another definition gives it as "a state of mind in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due to the nation-state".⁵ By insisting that the nation should be free from any external control, nationalism naturally demands that the nation must have its own government.

The focus of the demand for freedom could be either an indigenous tyrannical rule or an externally imposed system. The French Revolution of 1789 was in the sense of the former an uprising against royal absolutism that personified the state in the ruler, with Louis XIV claiming: "The state, I am the state". What the French Revolution did was to liberate the nation from monarchical usurpation and transfer sovereignty to the people under the new slogan: "The state belongs to the people". In its decrees establishing the new order, the revolution promised to undertake to defend any people fighting for freedom. "France", it declared, "renounces all wars of conquest and will never employ her forces against the freedom of people".⁶ The implication of this is the acceptance of liberation struggle as a just cause.

Paradoxically, this 'liberating' nationalism of the French revolution soon developed into a conquering one in the Napoleonic wars, and in turn provoked widespread national resistance against it all over Europe. In Prussia, the fights

4. D.A. Wilson, 'Nation-Building and Revolutionary War' in Karl Deutch and W.J. Foltz, (ed), Nation-Building, (New York, Artherton Press, 1963), p. 85.

5. Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History, (New York, Nostrand, 1955), p.9.

6. Quoted in Elie Kedourie, op cit, p.17.

against Napoleon were called "wars of liberation". The Spanish struggle in this anti-Napoleonic resistance has attracted considerable interest for its unorthodox campaign of guerrilla warfare which now forms the main feature in liberation strategy, although Richard Gibson argues that "national liberation is not immediately synonymous with guerrilla warfare or any other revolutionary war".^{6a}

Italian nationalism of the Machiavelli era was similarly of a liberating mission to free the nation "from the odious and humiliating yoke of foreigners"⁷ who were described as barbarians. Italy in this period was a collection of fiercely independent principalities which, in their known weakness, enticed invaders. Machiavelli's concern was how to weld them into a united Italian nation with a common citizenship in order to revive the country's glorious past.

More recently, the main target of nationalism has been colonialism in the European periphery, that is, the Afro-Asian world. Since World War II, the anti-colonial campaign in Africa and Asia has produced scores of new states from centuries-old European empires. Whether in Europe, Asia or Africa, the target of liberation has remained the same: foreign domination and tyranny; and the goal no less different: freedom. In every case, the collectivity of all the resistance efforts under one broad organisation is what is termed a national liberation movement.

What might be said about the anti-Napoleonic movements and most of the Afro-Asian organisations, however, is that both the expansionist power and the opposing movements appeared to share, to a large extent, a similar socio-economic outlook, thus making liberation only a matter of 'political independence'.

6a. Richard Gibson, African Liberation Movements : Contemporary Struggles against white minority rule, (London : Oxford University Press, 1972), p.11.

7. Hans Kohn, op cit, p.94.

This type of movement, which Konstantin Symmons-Symonolewicz prefers to call "restorative movements"⁸ belongs to reformist nationalism whose main goal is to oust the foreign, occupying entity from the country.

But there is commonly believed to be much more to liberation than just throwing out a foreign power under colonialism. The above idea of national liberation at best answers the question: liberation from whom? But when the question is extended to include the broader issue of 'liberation for what?' then it is clearly necessary to distinguish between the movements with a limited objective of political independence, and those which insist on a revolutionary change of society.⁹ The former which are preferably called 'nationalist political movements' show ideological moderation, frequently - although not invariably - adopting a constitutional strategy that relies at worst on civil disobedience. The UNIP of Zambia, the NCNC in Nigeria and the RDA in the French West African territories are examples in this category. If ever a 'nationalist political

8. Konstantin Symmons-Symonolewicz, Modern Nationalism, (New York, Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America, Inc, 1968) p.51.

9. See Hassan Mohammadi-Nejad, 'Revolutionary Organisations and Revolutionary Regimes', in Middle East Forum, Vol. XLVI, No. 4, 1970. Here the author makes a distinction between an ordinary nationalist movement and a revolutionary liberation movement on the basis of their objective, ideological content, and strategy. See also Elleck K. Mashingaidze, 'The role of Liberation Movements in the struggle for Southern Africa: 1955-77', in The Decolonisation of Africa: Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa, (Paris: The UNESCO Press, 1981). The author distinguishes between what he called nationalist organisations and liberation movements on the basis of the colonial challenge which determines the true meaning and defines the strategy of liberation. To clarify the point, he contends that African nationalism of the nationalist organisations brought about the process of decolonisation from 1945 to the mid sixties; while liberation movements seek to bring about something more than decolonisation. The objective of the liberation struggle, he said, is total liberation. Many other authors, however, leave out the distinction in their general characterisation of decolonisation as an anti-colonial revolution.

movement' employs violence, such violence is very often known to lack any revolutionary content. The Mau Mau war waged against British rule in Kenya could be cited in this respect.

On the other hand, the second type which some analysts would prefer to call the true 'national liberation movement', seeks the complete overthrow of the colonial system to reconstruct society along radical lines. Violence in this context is given a revolutionary meaning. The point to note however, is that whichever name is preferred is a matter of ideological definition of the colonial situation.

Applying this distinction in looking at the anti-colonial movements of the Third World, no room is left for any doubts that most of them started and ended simply as nationalist political movements. The reason is only too obvious: the Colonial Powers in the territories concerned, even before they were seriously challenged, reached for a compromise with the movements. This forestalled the emergence of revolutionary movements of the second category, and paved the way for a smooth transfer of political power which Gary Wasserman terms "consensual decolonisation".¹⁰ In fact any serious talk even of a nationalist political movement in some of these colonies amounts to an exaggeration since what had taken place was the sponsorship by colonialism of certain individuals to speak 'on behalf' of the masses whose liberation consciousness was never awakened to the conditions under the colonial system. Gabon's former president, Leon M'ba could not have been more forthcoming in support of this assertion in his praise of

10. Gary Wasserman, 'The Politics of Consensual Decolonisation', African Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1975, p.1. Wasserman defines the term as "the process of transferring colonial political authority in which there is a large measure of agreement among the participants that the outcome of the process is to be independence".

Gabonese-French ties. Independence, he said, had not altered the fundamental structural relations between colony and metropolis, adding that "between Gabon and France nothing has changed"¹¹.

(ii) The Basis of a Revolutionary Meaning

In the colonies where compromise was denied, with the result that colonialism remained determined to run its course, the situation came to be clearly defined along the lines of radical change. 'French' Algeria, 'Portuguese' Africa, Ian Smith's Rhodesia, Vietnam, and still Namibia and South Africa where the anti-colonial struggle is at once an anti-racial revolution, offer good examples. A history of the independence struggle in these countries shows that it started first as non-revolutionary, adopting constitutional methods to win political concessions towards eventual independence. But such peaceful methods were rebuffed and the nationalist parties harrassed into going underground, having been branded as subversive organisations. At this stage a necessary reassessment of strategy which viewed colonialism as fostering revolutionary pressures made the choice of revolutionary course imperative; a turn of events that waved goodbye to reform measures for which nationalist political movements are known, and signalled a new era of armed struggle championed by national liberation movements. The statement of Mozambique's FRELIMO heralding its armed confrontation illustrates the change in strategy to emphasise the critical phase in that territory's campaign against Portuguese rule:

Our armed struggle has begun. It begins as FRELIMO (Congress of the Mozambique Liberation Front) had planned, organised and determined. At the exact moment after FRELIMO had prepared the minimum military

11. Patrick Wilmot, Apartheid and African Liberation, (Ile-Ife, University of Ife Press, Nigeria, 1980) p.120.

and political conditions within Mozambique, the people under FRELIMO's leadership took up arms and attacked.

Up till then, our struggle was on the plan of negotiation, that is attempted negotiation. It was only after exhausting all possibilities of a peaceful solution that we decided to take up arms. We are now sure that this is the only means by which to convince the Portuguese people in Mozambique to get out, to give back what belongs to us, to restore to us our land.... We shall never turn back. Nothing can stop our revolution. The Mozambican revolution is an immense movement.¹²

An insight into the distinction between a national liberation movement and an ordinary nationalist political movement is provided in the literature of two liberators - Adegoke Adelabu¹³ and Amilcar Cabral;¹⁴ the former in his distinction of three elements in the anti-colonial struggle, and the latter in a theoretical analysis of productive forces.

Adegoke Adelabu divides the anti-colonial elements into three broad classes:

- (i) The 'materialists' whom he describes as "a motley crew of self-seeking careerists" who collaborate with the 'enemy' and emerge to serve as agents of the colonial authorities in the event of independence.

12. Quoted in Carl Leiden and Karl M. Schmitt, The Politics of Violence : Revolution in the Modern World, (New Jersey, Prentice-Hall Inc; Englewood Cliffs, 1968) p.109.

13. Adegoke Adelabu, 'Africa in Ebullition' in J. Ayo Langley, Ideologies of Liberation in Black Africa, 1856-1970 (London, Rex Collings 1979).

14. Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea : An African People's Struggle, (London, Stage 1, 1969).

- (ii) The intellectuals with their Western education and therefore values are no doubt genuine nationalists but lack the courage to face the 'enemy' when it comes to physical confrontation. Their road to independence lies in the constitutional path, having assured the colonizer that all would not be lost in the end.
- (iii) The "spiritualistic" elements or the revolutionary class who are the heroes, saints and angels.... They abjure leisure, they embrace poverty, they quit castles, they adjourn jailhouses, they scorn the transient, they reverse the everlasting. They are selfless. They are galant humble, loving, divine and immortal.

In his assessment of colonialism as an aggressive system, Adelabu derided the first two elements and hailed the third with reference to India's independence movement:

Indian freedom will still be a debatable question today if Gandhi had been only a patrician, Nehru just a scholar, Boshe solely an oratory and Petel merely a thinker. India became free because Gandhi had the will to become a hero, Petel the guts to become a fighter, and Boshe the courage to become a martyr. Mere intellectualism is incapable of opposing the evil designs of embattled and entrenched imperialism, determined to maintain its stranglehold on its victim. It is a futile weapon, a feeble antidote, an ineffective remedy, an inefficient counter-offensive, an effete rejuvenating force, an ineffectual tool of a Liberation Movement.¹⁵

By illustrating with the non-violent Indian struggle to show his preference for a militant stand against colonialism, Adelabu suggests a lack of clarity in the definition of a revolution. Nevertheless he had the consciousness of a revolutionary

15. Adegoke Adelabu, op cit, p.586.

situation as it exists under colonial circumstances to have wished a revolutionary solution to the colonial problem.

His experience in the Nigerian independence movement was obviously disappointing, and explains his feelings in the above categorisation which in effect was a pointed criticism of the country's struggle. As a member of the Zikist National Vanguard, (the radical wing of the country's main nationalist movement, the NCNC), he viewed the fight as a militant struggle but only to discover that the leaders of the movement favoured a compromise approach.¹⁶

Theirs was the 'civilised' way of fighting: throwing verbal missiles in accordance with the self-protective and pain-avoidance aphorism of "he who fights to run away lives to fight another day". Whatever may be the shortcomings in Adegoke Adelabu's blurred conceptualisation of national liberation, he was clear enough in his implied distinction, on revolutionary merit, of a 'nationalist political movement' from a 'national liberation movement'.

For his part, Amilcar Cabral designated national liberation movement as a revolutionary entity in its demand for a new development of productive forces. He therefore rejects any attempt at limiting its objective to the political goal of ending colonial rule as being too narrow in scope, and a "vague and subjective way of expressing a complex reality". Rather, he points out:

.... we prefer to be objective since for us the basis of national liberation, whatever the formulas adopted on the level of international law, is the inalienable right of every people to have its own history usurped by imperialism, that is to say to free the process of development of the national productive forces.... For this reason, in our opinion, any national liberation movement which does not take into consideration this basis and this objective may certainly struggle against imperialism but will surely not be struggling for national liberation.¹⁷

16. See G.O. Olusanya, 'The Zikist Movement - A study in Political Radicalism, 1946-50', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.4, No.3, 1966, pp.323-33 for the conflicting strategies within the country's anti-colonial movement.

17. Amilcar Cabral, *op cit*, p.83.

Understandably, Amilcar Cabral is contemptuous of those countries whose goal was political independence, especially through the peaceful means which, he suggests, shows a lack of awareness of the true nature of imperialism. He regards such form of independence as "compromises with imperialism" which create contradictions in those states by leaving intact neo-colonial structures that make a dangerous nonsense of their so-called freedom. To him national liberation can only be achieved through armed struggle as "this is the great lesson which contemporary history of liberation struggle teaches all those who are truly committed to the effort of liberating their people".¹⁸

In the same way, Cabral disagrees with the notion of part-by-part liberation by his conception of colonialism and neo-colonialism as forms of imperialism. "For our part", he said, "we are aware that the nature of our struggle is not limited simply to the elimination of the colonial yoke. Whether we wish it or not we are fighting against imperialism which is the basis of colonialism".¹⁹ The implication of this is the designation of imperialism as the real enemy of national liberation movements. Therefore there cannot be a different strategy against colonialism and another for imperialism. A liberation struggle is thus a war against all three. Hence national liberation movements understand the anti-colonial struggle in a wider context of anti-imperialism, and so regard liberation as multi-faceted to be fought on all fronts.

The purpose of this conceptual analysis is to distinguish an ordinary nationalist movement from a 'national liberation movement' on the basis of their

18. Ibid, p.87.

19. Ibid, p. 44.

analysis of the colonial situation and strategic approach; this establishes the national liberation movement as a revolutionary phenomenon. It is however worth stressing that under certain circumstances a 'nationalist political movement' could develop into a revolutionary force in a transformation consisting of leadership and ideological changes. Taking the Zimbabwe case as an example in the passage from reform-oriented political agitation to armed struggle, it immediately becomes obvious that the change is indicative of the contradictions in the anti-colonial strategy at the level of the peaceful approach. This goes to expose, in the opinion of the revolutionary, the lack of understanding of the actual nature of colonial violence, and reinforces his argument of the inevitable resolution of the colonial problem by means of violence.

What needs further explanation in this metamorphosis is the prospect of such a change being dictated by the factors of time and resistance to change: time at the disposal of change, and resistance by the opposing colonial power. These two conditions always conspire against a peaceful settlement to prolong the anti-colonial agitation and so harden attitudes on both sides to the extent that a solution is looked upon only in a win-lose framework. The longer the struggle, the more intensive it becomes to the advantage of the revolutionary forces. For the time-span could be such as to have unleashed all the horrors of a war on the people, thereby rendering the colonial system so totally discredited that no nostalgia is left at the end of the day. At this stage the insistence is on a complete overthrow of the old order on whose ruins a new social structure will be built.

President Kenneth Kaunda's warning to Portuguese Prime Minister Dr. Salazar against the dangers of a purely nationalist agitation transforming itself into a revolutionary movement through Lisbon's intransigence to change sums up the point: "You people are frightened of Marxism and Leninism. If you grant

independence to Mozambique and Angola, you will be granting independence to national leaders. If you won't, you will be granting independence to the very ideologies you fear".²⁰ And of course events have proved him right.

(2) Non-Alignment:

The concept of non-alignment has aroused ~~so~~ much argument. Not only is its origin a subject of different opinion, but its essence has also been a matter of debate, presenting different meaning to various interests. To some, non-alignment is an opportunistic and self-centred policy. To others, it is not even a policy but a mere declaration of intent, while to some others it is a non-power concept. Yet to many others, non-alignment stands for a balancer or a third bloc between the East and West.²¹ These viewpoints, while suggestive of the curiosity, especially in the early years, to understand the policy, reflect the ideologically-biased approach to it. For instance when John Foster Dulles, the United States Secretary of State, denounced it as an immoral and short-sighted conception and a fallacy that a

20. Quoted in Newsweek magazine, 8 November 1982. In an interview in the same edition, President Kaunda felt proud to congratulate himself for his foresight "I am right", he said. "Today we have Marxist - Leninist governments in Angola and Mozambique". p.21.

21. See J.W. Burton, ed., Non-Alignment, (London, Andre Deutsch Ltd. 1966) for some of these interpretations; and also his work, International Relations: A General Theory, (London, Cambridge University Press, 1968). Burton's description of non-alignment as a non-power concept is in his challenge to the orthodox power approach in International Relations. K.J. Holsti in his book, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis; second edition (London, Prentice-Hall International, 1974) pp.107-111, assesses non-alignment purely in military strategic framework: the "unwillingness to commit military capabilities to others' purposes is the hallmark of non-alignment as a foreign policy strategy", he says. Robert L. Rothstein, 'Alliance and Small Powers (New York: Colombia University Press, 1968) p.254 argues that non-alignment is not a policy. For other basic work on non-alignment, see G.H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, (London : Faber and Faber, 1966); and Hans Kochler, ed., The Principles of Non-Alignment : The Non-Aligned Countries in the Eighties - Results and Perspectives (London, Third World Centre, 1982).

nation can buy safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate of others,²² it was an understandable reproach in the context of the United States' strategic interest. He did so on the basis of America's philosophy which emphasised the 'universality' of Western democratic values and ideals that must be defended by all believers in democracy against communist expansion.

When Nikita Khrushchev referred regions adhering to the policy as "zone of peace",²³ he doubtless must have thought that it would help communism in the competition with the West for world supremacy. It was perhaps his hopeful guess that the "zone" created by the new states could be induced to form a barrier, and probably an alliance against capitalism. Thus, for purely ideological and strategic reasons, non-alignment became a desirable as well as a detestable policy in the super power game of spheres-of-influence politics.

It might be reasonable to suggest that much of the detestation for non-alignment apparently stems from the practice of the adherents of the policy to seek to obtain aid from both East and West. Leaders like Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt were often accused of a so-called strategy of playing one power against the other for purely selfish interests. Here reference is made to his tight-rope diplomacy which produced the Czechoslovakian arms deal in 1955.²⁴ The truth of the matter is that the West tried to pressure Nasser into joining a defence alliance (The Middle East Defence Organisation that became the Baghdad Pact) against the Soviet Union by making arms supply and economic aid conditional on

22. J.F. Dulles, 'The Cost of Peace', Department of State Bulletin, XXXIV, 18 June, 1956, pp.999-1000.

23. L.W. Martin, ed, Neutralism and Non-Alignment : The New States in World Affairs, (New York; Praeger, 1962) p.XIX.

24. See Charles Wakebridge, The Middle East Arms Race, Roger Stacey Ltd. (no date), pp.5-6. See also Muhammed Khalil, The Arab States and The Arab League : A Documentary Record, Vol. II (Beirut : Khayats, 1962) p.904 for Nasser's reply to his critics on the arms deal.

this. Nasser resisted the pressure, asserting that "I intend to judge issues on their merits, and to make any decisions only on a basis of what is good for Egypt. Having this kind of freedom is as important an objective to us as economic prosperity".²⁵

The comment by one American on Nasser's position is instructive, as it reveals the Western view, at least at the time, of non-alignment and the whole idea of foreign aid:

There is no such thing as complete independence for any country in this world, least of all a country that is as dependent as Egypt on outside aid. If we give him the economic aid he wants, he's damn well going to have to give some consideration for our interests.²⁶

It was only after his humiliating frustration with the West that he turned to the Eastern bloc; and this move was made more urgent by the Israeli raid on the Gaza Strip in August 1955, killing over forty Egyptians; an incident which forced him "to go to any length to obtain arms".²⁷

Such vilification of the policy was worrying enough for Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia to accuse the critics of unfairness:

We the non-aligned nations have acquired a very bad reputation, thanks to the constant "attention" of the press in committed states. It is said that we have decided to form a bloc which would establish its influence by shamelessly exploiting the rivalry between the two

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- 25. Miles Copeland, The Games of Nations, (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1969) p.148.
 - 26. Ibid, p.149. Copeland gives a fairly detailed account of the US - Egypt aid negotiations in Cairo against the backdrop of the Middle East Defence Organisation.
 - 27. Charles Wakebridge, op cit, p.5. See also Mohammed Heikal, Nasser: The Cairo Documents, (London, New English Library, 1972) pp. 47-60.

nuclear blocs. It is said we are impelled by boundless ambition to play the role of arbiters for which our partiality ill-equips us..... The fact that we can exist independently of the blocs arouses an indignation that is hard to explain.²⁸

The Prince may be right. However, a little circumspection would have revealed to him that the acquisition of a "bad reputation" was regrettably enough contributed to rather unwittingly by some of the adherents of the policy in their confusing identification of it with neutralism. Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia, in his use of the words 'neutrality', 'neutral', 'uncommitted' only succeeded partially in framing an adequate definition. As he put it, "We all are in the ultimate sense neutral in the cold war which rages unabated in the world today", and went on to explain that "by the word 'neutral' we do not of course mean that abstention from political activity which has been so far the hallmark of Switzerland.... Nor do we mean that without taking sides, we contend ourselves with urging the powers to negotiate in good faith to the solution of the issues in dispute between them."²⁹ According to the Emperor, to be neutral is to be impartial to judge actions and policies, and he insists that this is "the essence of non-alignment".

Similarly, characterising non-alignment as neutrality was King Mohammed Daoud Khan of Afghanistan who proudly claimed at the Belgrade Summit that his country had traditionally followed a policy of neutrality and had not deviated from it "even during the World Wars".³⁰ But this

28. Official report of The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade, September 1-6, 1961. (Published by Publicisticko-Izdavacki Zavod, Yugoslavia, 1961) p.193. The report is hereafter referred to as Belgrade Conference Report.

29. Belgrade Conference Report, p.86.

30. Ibid, p.80.

confusing use of synonymous terms to express non-alignment is not limited to the adherents of the policy. Many scholars also apply these terms to non-alignment.³¹

The different national, regional and international interests of the non-aligned states also produce a difference of view of the policy. Thus it has been approached from an Indian, a Yugoslav, an African, and Cuban standpoint. For example, to Prime Minister Pandit Nehru, who in later years was more concerned with the threat to World peace arising from bloc rivalry, non-alignment practically had an anti-bloc meaning:

The word non-alignment may be differently interpreted but basically it was used, and coined almost with the meaning non-aligned with the great power blocs of the world.... It means nations which object to this lining up for war purposes - military blocks, military alliances, and the like.³²

While Nehru proceeded from here to play down the anti-colonial content of the policy, many African nationalists and the radical leaders define it in terms of the liberation struggle. To Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, the fight against colonialism "represents the essence" of non-alignment. For Madagascar's President Didier

31. For example Peter Lyon, Neutralism, (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1963) while defining neutralism as "dissociation from the Cold War" (p 16), uses the term interchangeably with non-alignment, even calling the 1961 Belgrade Non-Aligned Conference a "neutralist summit" (p.177). The same interchangeable use is employed throughout in Laurence W. Martin, ed, Neutralism and Non-Alignment, (New York, Praeger, 1962). Although K.J. Holsti, op cit, (p.106) tried to distinguish between "neutrality", "neutralism" and "non-alignment", he ended in confusion by saying that a state is often neutralised when the great powers agree to guarantee its non-aligned position through a multilateral treaty, with reference to Switzerland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria and Laos.

32. Belgrade Conference Report, p.108.

Ratsiraka, "non-alignment does not mean uncommitment. We are committed to the anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist, anti-neocolonialist, anti-racist and anti-zionist struggle".³³ And further stressing this anti-colonial meaning, Prime Minister Michael Manley remarked: "Our movement is born because men and women were tired of domination and because they were ready for liberation. We were tired of the yoke and longed for freedom."³⁴

The African interpretation is understandably related to the fact that at the time, the continent still represented the major battleground against colonialism. Yet still to others, the policy in contemporary affairs is regarded as a development strategy, looked upon for the introduction of a new international economic order, which move it initiated and is fighting for through such forums as UNCTAD, Group of 77, and the United Nations as well.

These various approaches to the policy of non-alignment suffer some limitations as each falls short of expressing fully the essence of the policy in relation to the overall aspirations of the Third World. No doubt an important aspect of the policy is opposition to power blocs, (which is what it is by nomenclature); nevertheless that opposition is as much a desire to protect national independence against the threats of sphere-of-influence politics as maintaining world peace. Such a perspective on independence cannot fail to take into account the continuing anti-colonial struggle that eventually reinforces the national independence of the independent states. This being so, non-alignment, to quote

33. Granma Weekly Review, Havana, 16 September, 1979, p.6.

34. Speech at Havana Non-Aligned Summit Conference, 1979, and reprinted in Third World Quarterly, Vol. II, No. 2, April 1980, p. 338.

Edvard Kardelj, is "more than a policy of opposition to bloc divisions, even less did it imply a pragmatic search for equidistance between the blocs".³⁵ One point, however, emerges from these different viewpoints, which is that the policy of non-alignment, as remarked by Leo Mates, is in a sense still "undergoing definition, re-examination and criticism while resisting arbitrary assessment".³⁶

With all the ambiguities surrounding the policy, it might be expedient to attempt a meaning by first considering what it is not on the basis of the very issues to which it addresses itself; these are issues of freedom, peace, equality, social justice, independence and mutual co-operation.

(i) Non-alignment not Neutrality:

In the pursuit of these objectives, non-alignment cannot be said to be a neutral policy which in ordinary meaning obliges a nation to be uncommitted, indeed unconcerned, in international affairs. A neutral policy is one of inaction, not necessarily for lack of capability but for sheer commitment to passivity. It is a policy that refuses to pass opinion on any given situation. A neutral stand in the complexities of world affairs indicates a policy of fear of making mistakes, stretched to the excessive bounds of caution to give rise to a self-imposed non-participation. A rebuttal of the neutral label for non-alignment came from India's Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi in her observation that "only the dead are neutral".³⁷ Neither is non-alignment neutrality.

35. Edvard Kardelj, Yugoslavia in International Relations and in the Non-Aligned Movement, (Belgrade, Socialist Thought and Practice, 1979) p.142.

36. Leo Mates, Non-Alignment : Theory and Current Practice, (Belgrade, Institute of International Politics and Economics, 1972), p.81.

37. B.B.C. T.V. Panorama Programme, 1981.

Sometimes neutrality is an externally imposed and therefore an enforceable policy requiring non-participation in war through treaty obligations. It usually arises from big power strategic interests which legally incapacitate a country to its seeming advantage. A good example here is Austria, which was neutralized by the 1955 Austrian Peace Treaty. Although Desmond Crowley^{37a} is of the opinion that the country is not of outstanding strategic importance, her geographical position, straddling the East/West divide in Europe suitably qualified her as a target of bloc rivalry. Any bloc incorporating her would have increased its military and political influence in Europe.

The neutrality of Switzerland³⁸ on the other hand was of different origin which today is highly respected for the country's historic role of providing humanitarian services to states at war. It was in recognition of such services rendered through the International Red Cross and the nation's missions abroad in their use as diplomatic channels that make the Swiss type less strategically relevant but of great benefit to warring states. There are also countries like Sweden³⁹ and Ireland whose positions have been dictated by an over-riding national interest in staying out of armed conflicts; in this case neutrality is self-imposed. Neutrality is thus a war-avoidance policy which, according to John Burton, enables a country to remain at peace while others are at war;⁴⁰ and is further

37a. Desmond Crowley, *The Background to Current Affairs* (London : Macmillan 1967), p.188.

38. The extent of the practice of Swiss neutrality is illustrated by the country's deliberate decision not to join the United Nations.

39. The literature on Sweden's neutralist policy include Nils Andreu, Power-Balance and Non-Alignment : A Perspective on Swedish Foreign Policy, (Stockholm, Almquist & Wiksell, 1967) which gives a good analysis on the country's foreign policy whose official aim is "non-alignment in peace in order to make neutrality possible in war".

40. J.W. Burton, ed., Non-Alignment, op. cit. p.21.

articulated by the Irish in the words of James Connolly: "we serve neither King nor Kaiser"⁴¹ in reference to Dublin's stand of non-participation in any form in the war between Britain and Germany. In most of these instances, because it is a policy of treaty obligation, neutrality is respected and usually guaranteed by the international community, or at least by the external contracting parties.

Another synonym for non-alignment is 'neutralism', which, by definition, is simply a condition of being neutral. But it serves as a substitute for non-alignment when qualified with the word "positive", so that we hear of "positive neutralism" as opposed to "negative neutralism" propounded by President Kwame Nkrumah:

I would like to state what I believe to be the basic principles of non-alignment and neutralist policy. Ghana stands for positive neutralism. Negative neutralism consists in believing that armed conflict between Great Powers can only bring misery and destruction to those who participate in it. I consider this view to be entirely unrealistic.⁴²

Indonesia's President Ahmed Sukarno tried to straighten up the conceptual muddle in an emphatic rejection of what the policy is not. "Non-alignment", he said "is not neutrality. It is not a policy of seeking for neutral position in case of war; non-aligned policy is not a policy of neutrality without its own colours; being non-aligned does not mean becoming a buffer state between the two giant blocs".⁴³ Indeed the manner in which the words neutral, neutrality,

41. Christopher Thomas, 'Ireland : The Passion about Neutrality', in The Times of London, 10 March, 1981, p.14.

42. Belgrade Conference Report, p.99.

43. Ibid, p.27.

neutralism and isolationism have been bandied about in their reference to non-alignment create the erroneous impression that they have the same root, share a common history, and therefore the same meaning with the latter.

(ii) Not a bloc:

Because of the prevalence of the view which sees it as a response to the bloc rivalry of the cold war, non-alignment is deemed as constituting a third bloc, either acting as a wedge between East and West or as a counterweight to them. This at best is a view conditioned by cold war prejudices which believed that it was impossible not to belong to any of the blocs. Where you do not join either, then you form a bloc of your own, so the argument seems to run. Incidentally the indefinable and arbitrary division of the international system into "First", "Second" and "Third" worlds - the first referring to the Western bloc, the second to the East, and the third to the newly independent and underdeveloped states - grouped the adherents of non-alignment into the last category to reinforce this viewpoint.

Although its three-yearly summit conferences have, so to say, converted it into a movement with occasional suggestions of "institutionalisation", non-alignment remains far from being a bloc. Not only does it lack the structural characteristics of a power bloc, for example a hierarchical structure; it has, as a matter of policy, avoided being turned into one. And this is attested to in statements by the movement's leaders, and also in its official documents. Emperor Haile Selassie, in cautioning against any tendency towards bloc-formation, pointed out how "we the uncommitted nations cannot qualify as a power bloc".⁴⁴ President Sukarno was more explicit in dispelling the bloc notion:

44. Ibid p.87.

"We come together here not as members of a bloc.... We abhor the very idea of blocs. We have come together because we maintain the view that the creation of blocs, especially when based on power politics ... can only lead to war."⁴⁵

The point was further driven home in Section III, paragraph (3) of the Belgrade Declaration of 1961, wherein it was stated that "the non-aligned countries represented at this conference do not wish to form a new bloc and cannot be a bloc.." In fact it was Nehru's fear of possible 'bloc' creation that accounts for his implicit warning at Bandung against such an outcome. The same fear and suspicion underlines the rejection of the proposal at the 1961 summit Conference for the setting up of a permanent secretariat to serve the movement as implied in the speech of Prime Minister Mrs. Bandaranaike:

Many of the Heads of State and Heads of Government who addressed this conference in this plenary session have emphasised the point that our group of nations do not propose to become a third bloc or a third force. None of us can really disagree with that view, for that would be inconsistent with the very idea of non-alignment. But it is important to remember that in our anxiety to avoid becoming a third force, we must not allow our spirit of unity and purpose which has been so evident at this Conference to disintegrate and fall apart. We should endeavour to maximise the influence of non-aligned thinking in world affairs. We cannot, in my view, rely on the haphazard form of consultation which we have employed in the past. We are meeting in challenging circumstances and in a critical hour in the world's history. We must adapt our procedures to meet that challenge.⁴⁶

The above statement might be interpreted as insinuating what it claims to reject - bloc formation. In actual fact it was simply a plea for the non-aligned movement to evolve a kind of structure for the purpose of implementing decisions. Supporters of later development at institutionalisation in the setting up of Co-ordinating

45. Ibid p.25.

46. Ibid p.176.

Bureaux and Working Groups now credit Mrs. Bandaranaike with foresightedness and objectivity.

Neither is non-alignment a 'balancer' between the two rival blocs. A balancer in a balance-of-power system maintains the system by adding its weight to any one side as dictated by events to ensure an equilibrium. The balancer in this sense is inextricably part of the 'mechanism', possessing an intrinsic value by being 'heavy' enough to be credible in the eyes of all the parties if he is to command their respect. This was the 19th century position of Britain in the European states-system. By their very low level of military, economic and political capability, vis-a-vis the big powers, the non-aligned countries are patently ill-equipped to play this role even if they may wish to. And of course such a role negates a fundamental principle of the policy of non-alignment in its opposition to power politics.

(iii) Non-alignment: What it is

The rejection of these synonymous terms brings us to considering what non-alignment is. Non-alignment in its socio-historical context is a policy that strives for international peace on the principle of respect for the sovereignty and equality of all nations. It is a policy which has its roots in decolonisation, determined to protect and promote national independence by a rejection of an adversary bloc system, and which supports freedom through the elimination of all forms of domination. These principles are reflected in the criteria for membership of what eventually became the non-aligned movement:

- (i) an independent policy based on the co-existence of states with different political and social systems and non-alignment or a trend in favour of such a policy;

- (ii) consistent support to movements for national independence;
- (iii) non-membership of a multilateral military alliance concluded in the context of Great Power Conflicts;
- (iv) in case of bilateral military agreement with a Great Power, or membership of a regional defence pact, the agreement or pact should not be one deliberately concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts; and
- (v) in case of lease of military bases to a foreign power, the concession should not have been made in the context of Great Power conflicts.⁴⁷

It is partly from the above conditions that Leo Mates defines non-alignment as "a policy of non-participation in bloc groupings - military alliances and political blocs".⁴⁸ Margaret Legum described it, with emphasis on independence, as "the assertion of the right to freedom of decision in international affairs, and the right to make choices on the basis of each issue's merit regardless of the interest of the cold war alliances".⁴⁹

Fully aware of the historical circumstances that gave birth to it, non-alignment rejects any neutral position and insists on playing an independent role in the urgent task of ensuring world peace and security. As stated in an official declaration, the policy "symbolises mankind's search for peace and security among nations", affirming that "newly independent countries have an important role to play in easing tension and safeguarding peace".⁵⁰

47. Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned Movement, (London, Frances Pinter Ltd. 1978) p.18.

48. Leo Mates, *op cit*, p.

49. Margaret Legum, 'Africa and Non-Alignment' in J.W. Burton (ed), Non-Alignment, *op cit*, pp. 56-57.

50. Colombo Non-Aligned Conference Official Political Declaration, in Odette Jankowitsch and Karl P. Sauvant, The Third World Without Superpowers : The Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries, Vol. II (New York : Dobbs Ferry, Oceana Publications, 1978), p. 749.

The message of the policy is thus one of challenge that the days are gone when world problems had to be resolved only in the imperial chambers of London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, Washington, and Moscow. Today Havana, Lagos, New Delhi, Cairo, Belgrade, and Lusaka, among other capitals, are as concerned and interested to shoulder the burden of peace. The policy's total support for the United Nations Organisation, which it regards as a vital instrument for world peace, clearly manifests its commitment to active participation in affairs - be they economic, political or social - under the UN's auspices.

Because of the premium on independence, non-alignment is naturally an anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, and anti-racist policy. In fact the anti-colonial dimension has grown stronger in recent years and tends to overshadow the anti-bloc content in its peace enterprise, since it believes that a situation of domination is naturally an inviting factor, even a condition, for conflict. When the policy talks of peace, it does not limit it to the East-West antagonism but stresses that peace is predicated upon the elimination of foreign domination. It therefore considers it a duty to uphold the cause of self-determination and independence for all colonial peoples.

Explicit in the struggle against domination are the principles of equality, social justice and freedom. It is held that a system such as colonialism established on a master-servant relationship negates equality, justice and freedom. And an international order based on the exploitation of man by man, or state by state is one of subjugation. The freedom the policy seeks is not just nominal but full and unrestricted by any sort of external control. That these principles are central to non-alignment around which individual member-states' differences disappear is

clearly stated by President Sukarno:

We come from all parts of the globe Our people are different in many ways, our cultures differ, our forms of state differ, and so our political systems. But in an essential way we do not differ, and that is in our determination to implement a new order which is based upon independence, abiding peace, and social justice. We do not differ in our determination to have the freedom to be free.⁵¹

An active policy, though, non-alignment does not sacrifice feelings for results unlike power politics for which the reverse is the case in furtherance of the saying that 'might is right'. It abhors power relationships on the grounds that the politics of pressure is inimical to peaceful co-existence. For not only is power politics confrontational in essence, it also characteristically analyses issues from a position ^{of} strength and thus leaves little room for flexibility; the results being that negotiation within this ambit is very often a frustrating exercise. Power politics in the view of non-alignment is a prescription for war and insecurity. It is seen to undermine peace by deliberately pursuing a policy of force as opposed to moral persuasion. Consequently, non-alignment's approach to problem-solving is basically an appeal to moral conscience in order to influence world opinion. It thus puts itself up as a moral force, as Kwame Nkrumah approvingly described it when he said: "we are constituting ourselves into a moral force, a distinct moral force in the cause of peace";⁵² and one which Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie I acknowledged in his remark that the

51. Belgrade Conference Report, p.26.

52. Ibid p.99.

strength of the policy resides in the "cumulative moral influence" which could be brought to bear on the problems of the world. This moral pressure, he believed, could be achieved through a favourable international opinion in the face of which "we venture to suggest that even the greatest nations, powerful as they are, will hesitate to breach".⁵³ The reliance upon moral conscience is more anchored in Mrs. Bandaranaike's optimistic observation:

If I may attempt to assess the contribution that the non-aligned countries can make at this time, I would say that our endeavour should be to influence world opinion to such an extent that Government, however powerful, cannot regard warfare as an alternative to negotiation.⁵⁴

To summarise, it could be said that the formulation and adoption of non-alignment manifests a realistic assessment of the chaotic international environment - a reality which called for caution as in the policy's appeal for peace and international co-operation on the basis of mutual respect and equality; and dynamism to insist on the elimination of all forms of colonialism, imperialism and racism which threaten world peace. It is a survival policy in a turbulent world of power politics, offering pragmatic hope for change in an embattled international system.

(3) Tension and Harmony

As noted in the introduction, national liberation movements and non-alignment are drawn to each other in pursuit of one common objective - independence. The history of national liberation movements is that of anti-colonialism; and this history in its contribution to the emergence of the newly independent states forms a major part of the story of non-alignment. Consequently

53. Ibid p.89.

54. Ibid p.181.

national liberation movements and non-alignment manifest a cognate existence which feature a mutually beneficial relationship. The Algerian delegation at the 1961 Belgrade non-aligned conference put the relationship quite succinctly:

We cannot imagine that a country can avail itself fully of the advantages of non-aligned policy without fully pledging itself to the peoples struggling for independence. Nor do we think that a country can fight for liberation from colonial domination without placing its liberation movement within the independent and dynamic framework of non-alignment.⁵⁵

The solidarity between the two could thus be likened to a chain. Any section remaining under foreign domination represents a weak link. Strengthening the chain requires the total elimination of such domination which calls for support for national liberation movements. As assured by the 1973 Algiers Conference in emphasising the link, "so long as colonialism in any of its forms continues to exist, the non-aligned countries and the liberation movements must remain united in the common struggle".⁵⁶ Quite positively, both explain their collective historical condition in terms of colonialism and share a common determination to end it. James Mayall more precisely expressed this link in the remark that anti-colonialism, independence and non-alignment form a sequence.⁵⁷

Despite this common interest and the obvious harmony between national liberation movements and non-alignment, there seems to be a theoretical

55. Ibid p.234.

56. Algiers Conference Official Declaration in Jankowitsch and Sauvart, op. cit. Vol. I, p.212.

57. James Mayall, Africa : The Cold War and After, (London, Elek Books Ltd., 1971), p.103.

inconsistency in their relationship. By the foregoing definitions the former believes in 'struggle' and power, while the latter does not. This apparently creates a doctrinal incompatibility and tends to question their harmonious relationship. What is the nature of the doctrinal tension, and why is it that inspite of it, both phenomena maintain a mutual relationship? The answers lie in an analysis of the attitude of the two phenomena to conflict in order to establish a common ground of agreement between them on the need for change.

(i) Conflict Strategy of National Liberation Movements

National liberation movements of the revolutionary class tend to view conflict as objective in their assessment of colonialism as being inherently violent. Following this, they contend that the resolution of the anti-colonial conflict lies inevitably in an armed struggle. It is within this framework of 'objective conflict' that the PLO leader, Yassir Arafat prescribed a settlement of the Palestinian problem: "It should be clear to all", he said, "that there will be no peace, no stability, and no settlement in this region except through a Palestinian peace, and the peace of the revolutionaries of the Palestine Revolution".⁵⁸ Because national liberation movements view the colonial conflict as objective, they tend to ignore the variables of perception, values and motivation in conflict resolution.⁵⁹ This invariably characterises their attitude to negotiation and bargaining. Traditionally, the place of negotiation is to attempt to bring about a peaceful resolution of a conflict. But with revolutionary liberation war it might not be an over-statement to assert that liberation movements approach negotiation rather differently. Firmly committed to revolutionary change,

58. Yassir Arafat, '1980, Year of Change in This Region', Palestine, (PLO Information Bulletin, Vol. 6, No. 1, January 1980), p.4.

59. J.W. Burton, Conflict and Communication : The Use of Controlled Communication in International Relations (London : Macmillan, 1969) for a treatment of these variables in conflict resolution.

negotiation, if they should submit to it, is conducted as just a component of the armed struggle in the belief that a liberation war is one of opposing contradictory forces that rules out any compromise. Under such condition, there hardly exists a common basis for agreement, thus defeating the essence of negotiation which is the making of concessions through a bargaining process. Brigadier-General Griffith was therefore right in contending that "revolutions rarely compromise; compromises are made only to further the strategic design".⁶⁰ It is thus clear, and this is his conclusion, that negotiations are entered into as a device to gain time in the overall prosecution of the war.

An example of the use of negotiation as a strategic device was the attitude of ZANU (PF) towards the Lancaster House Conference to end the war in Rhodesia. In a question as to the meaning of the negotiations in the movement's revolution, bearing in mind Mao Tse Tung's dictum that nothing can be achieved at the Conference Table which has not been won already on the battlement field, Robert Mugabe, the co-leader of the Patriotic Front, replied: "We see the Lancaster House Conference as complementary to our struggle. We have used the Conference to consolidate our political position achieved as a result of the armed struggle."⁶¹ Although the Conference brought the war to an end, what the answer suggests is that chances for serious negotiation in liberation war are related to results in the military front. No meaningful negotiation has ever taken place in a liberation war at any stage below stalemate. Even though a settlement might be sought at an earlier stage, the realities of such wars have

60. Mao Tse Tung, Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, (London, Cassell, 1961) p.19.

61. I am grateful to Martyn Gregory for making available to me his interview with Mugabe on 18 November, 1979 which contained this quote.

always imposed a time-scale on a 'negotiated' settlement which in the opinion of the liberation movement, is only arrived at after weakening the military resolve of the enemy.

(ii) Attitude of Non-Alignment to Change:

In contrast, non-alignment, by the professed policy of negotiated settlement of disputes as often enunciated in the official declarations of the Non-Aligned Movement, stands at variance with national liberation movements in the approach to conflict resolution. It regards conflict as essentially a bargaining situation which operates within the parameters of common as well as competing interest.⁶² Hence the nudging of the liberation movements to the conference table at every conceivable opportunity, which pressure has very often constituted an irritating element in the relationship of the two. It is against this background that one can understand the spirit of the Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa adopted both by the OAU and the non-aligned movement as a strategy for resolving the Southern African racial and colonial problem. Taking a rundown of the situation in the region, the Manifesto, while recognising the necessity of the armed struggle, nevertheless declared its preference for a negotiated settlement:

We have always preferred and we still prefer to achieve it (meaning liberation) without physical violence. We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence, we advocate an end to the violence of human dignity which is now being perpetrated by the oppressors of Africa. If peaceful progress to negotiation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movement to use peaceful methods of struggle, even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change.⁶³

62. See Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960) for an excellent treatment of the theory of bargaining.

63. The Manifesto was drawn up by a meeting of East and Central African states held in Lusaka in April 1969. The participating countries were Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo(B), Ethiopia, Kenya, Ruanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia. See Africa Contemporary Record, 1969/70, pp.C41-44 for the full text of the Manifesto.

(iii) Non-Violent Strategy versus the Use of Force:

The pertinent question at this point is: if non-alignment's strategy of change is peaceful approach, why does it support national liberation movements' use of violence? On the face of it, the support for liberation violence contradicts non-aligned's policy of peaceful settlement of dispute and exposes it to accusations of hypocrisy which clearly undermines President Tito's self-confident statement that "it is to demonstrate to the protagonists of force that the majority of the world (referring to the non-aligned nations) decisively rejects the use of force as a means for settling the various important problems".⁶⁴ But the accusation seems to acquire credibility, considering the frequent recourse to force by member-states in their relations. Reference in this connection will be made to the Ethiopia-Somalia war, Tanzania's armed intervention in Uganda to oust President Idi Amin, the Libya-Egypt clash of 1977, and currently the Iraq-Iran war - all of which tend to challenge the conceptualization of non-alignment as an anti-power concept.

These actions portray a discrepancy between policy and practice and lead to the tempting conclusion that at the individual state level, non-aligned countries reserve to themselves the right of use of force in accordance with the dictates of national interest; while at the corporate level, the belief seems to be that it is immoral and ethically wrong for member-states to employ violence against each other, in the same way that it is unacceptable for a big power to do just that against a non-aligned state. Despite the unenviable record of such use of violence, non-alignment has persistently rebuffed the accusation of paying lip service to peaceful settlement of disputes. It will be necessary at this point to

64. Belgrade Conference Report, p. 20.

look at non-violence as a conflict strategy, and relate this to the use of force in an attempt to reconcile the apparent doctrinal incompatibility between national liberation and non-alignment.

(iv) The Nature of Non-Violent Strategy

Non-violence as a strategy approved by non-alignment is basically a Gandhian philosophy with moral and religious undertones. It is a strategy whose effectiveness is determined less by the adopter than by the opposing party; that is to say, it relies primarily on good intentions and reciprocal treatment.

By its tactics of sit-ins, boycotts, hunger strikes, and peaceful demonstrations, all that non-violence does is to appeal to reason, to throw a challenge to the moral conscience of the 'enemy', believing that man possesses certain attributes which can disincline him from brutality. It presupposes him exercising a moral choice between right and wrong on the basis of universalised norms. Values such as freedom, equality, justice, identity and prosperity are accepted as fundamental to human dignity, and never the exclusive enjoyment of a special group. Their attainment therefore becomes an international aspiration. Thus Gandhi, and after him Nehru, Nkrumah and many other Third World leaders came to be convinced that a non-violent protest against the denial of these rights was bound to evoke world indignation capable of heaping such moral pressure for change on their denier. But a non-violent strategy is more likely to succeed in situations of common values in which the stakes in any dispute are never too high. It should be remembered, though, that non-violent protest usually contains the threat of violence. It is therefore logical that non-aligned leaders generally reject pacifism as an alternative strategy to non-violence. No doubt both strategies abhor the use of force. But whereas pacifism totally eschews violence,

the proponent of non-violence employs violence prudentially. Nehru was quite explicit in his distinction between the two when he declared not being a pacifist but accepted non-violence as a strategy in which the use of force cannot be ruled out. As he explained: "I am not a pacifist. Unhappily, the world of today finds that it cannot be without force. We have to protect ourselves as to prepare ourselves for every contingency. We have to meet aggression and evils of other kind. To surrender to evil is always bad."⁶⁵

The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing analysis is that non-violence strategy will remain peaceful as long as the opposing party observes the rules of peaceful solution. But where this proves untenable, force becomes the inevitable alternative to non-violence. Even Gandhi, the arch-priest of non-violence, justified such use of violence when he remarked that "a Satyagrahi resists when there is a threat of force behind obstruction".⁶⁶ Thus, the support of the non-aligned for liberation violence could be defended as an answer to the challenge to peace by colonial violence. The resistance of certain colonial powers to respond to the demands of non-violent change led Sudan's president, Abraham Abboud to remark:

When in the aftermath of the last World War the surge of freedom dawned, we thought that the colonisers might have come to their senses, and that they were genuine in the change of attitude towards the subject peoples and were willing to co-operate with them on a new basis; and that colonialism in its sordid concept no longer existed as an international phenomenon. But we were soon dismayed when they succumbed to a relapse, and it was evident that their inner souls have not been purified of the vile rudiments of colonialism... That colonialism should continue to exist after the United Nation's resolution of December 1960 gives us every reason to suspect that the colonising powers are indifferent to either logic or justice.⁶⁷

65. A. Appadorai, Documents on Political Thought of Modern India, (Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1976), p.737.

66. Robert E. Klitgaard, 'Gandhi's Non-Violence as a Tactic', Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 8, 1971, p.149.

67. Belgrade Conference Report, p.56.

Invariably, the onus of change is thrust on non-alignment which, faced with succumbing to or standing up in defence of its principles, accepted the former as advised by Gandhi: "Where the choice is set between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence.... This is because he who runs away commits mental violence; has not the courage of facing death by killing. I would a thousand times prefer violence than the emasculation of a whole race. I prefer to use arms in defence of honour rather than remain the vile witness of dishonour."⁶⁸

Similarly, President Nyerere, a leading non-aligned figure acclaimed for his patience, acknowledged the necessary use of violence under certain conditions, without of course foregoing the peaceful option. In a foreign policy statement at a conference of Tanzania's ruling party, he sounded as the reluctant supporter of violence by pointing out that: "Our preference and that of every true African patriot has always been for peaceful methods of struggle. We abhor the sufferings and the terror, the sheer waste which is involved in violent upheavals, and believe that peaceful progress is worth some sacrifice in terms of time. But when the door of peaceful progress is slammed shut and bolted, then the struggle must take other forms; we cannot surrender."⁶⁹ Several years later, he reiterated this stand in the assurance that "to free ourselves we will fight if necessary; we will negotiate if possible".⁷⁰

68. Quoted in Kenneth W. Grundy, Guerrilla Struggle in Africa, An Analysis and Preview (New York, Grossman Publishers, 1971), p.33.

69. Julius Nyerere, Tanzania Policy on Foreign Affairs: Address by the President, Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, at the Tanganyika African National Union National Conference, 16 October, 1967 (Ministry of Information and Tourism, Information Services Division, Dar-es-Salaam), p.9.

70. Julius Nyerere, 'Third World Negotiating Strategy', Third World Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2, April 1980, p. 20.

Throughout the history of Third World opposition to foreign domination, the conditional use of force as the last resort has been emphasised to register the determination to be free. At the 1945 Manchester Conference on decolonisation, delegates expressed a preference for peaceful anti-colonial strategy, and urged the colonial powers to reciprocate this gesture by granting independence to the people. The demands contained in the Conference's resolution were basically political in the call for a constitutional approach to decolonisation, failure of which would necessitate a violent method, as made clear in the warning: "If the Western world is still determined to rule mankind by force, then Africans, as a last resort, may have to appeal to force in the effort to achieve freedom, even if force destroys them and the world".⁷¹

Since then, all Pan-African, Afro-Asian, and Non-aligned meetings have given recognition to the use of force as an alternative to peaceful approach in the struggle against colonialism. To this end was the acceptance by the 1961 Cairo All-Africa Peoples Conference of "the necessity in some respects to resort to force in order to eliminate colonialism";⁷² followed by the declaration of the second summit conference of the non-aligned movement that "colonised peoples may legitimately resort to arms to secure the full exercise of their right to self-determination and independence if the colonial powers resist in opposing their natural aspirations".⁷³ As it turned out, some colonial powers resisted, and the

71. J. Ayo Langley, Ideologies of Liberation in Black Africa: 1856-1970, (London, Rex Collings, 1979) in the Appendix, p.758.

72. Colin Legun, Pan-Africanism : A Short Political Guide (London : Pall Mall Press, 1962), p.247.

73. Odette Jankowitsch and Karl P. Sauvart, The Third World without Superpowers : The Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries, Vol. 1 (New York, Oceana Publications, 1978) p.47.

1976 Colombo Conference in condemning South Africa's and Rhodesia's continued intransigence inspite of the Lusaka Manifesto's offer of an olive branch, came out openly to sanction the armed struggle:

The Conference, noting that the racist minority regimes have rejected the offer for peaceful change contained in the Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa, reaffirmed its support for an intensification of the armed struggle against the forces of colonialism.⁷⁴

What all this amounts to is that non-alignment does not delude itself by a belief in any utopia in which power is rendered redundant. Although the policy believes that it is not the natural history of man to prefer aggression to peaceful coexistence, which by extension means that nations should not necessarily adopt a violent approach to peace, it has realistically accepted the grim fact of some states still according premium to the use of force in the pursuit of their objectives. It therefore follows that there must inevitably be an accommodation with violence in the transitional period of the restructuring of a new international order which it advocates.

(v) Doctrinal Reconciliation in the Moral use of Force:

Like non-alignment, national liberation movements justify their use of force on the grounds of colonial intransigence to peaceful decolonisation. In the attitude of both phenomena to change, force is regarded as the weapon of the powerless. The necessity to employ it is fuelled by the belief in the moral sufficiency of their cause to defeat any strategic advantage in favour of the enemy. In other words, they both base their employment of violence on moral premise

74. Ibid, Vol. II, p.761.

which is sanctioned by the United Nations regarded as the custodian of the world's moral conscience. Force, in this sense, acquires a moral strength as indicated in what seems to be a litany of liberation that was an appeal to the colonialists: "If you would so degrade your souls, and do violence to your moral nature, enlightened public opinion in your country and in the world at large will dissent and stay your hands. Appreciate this moral weakness of your position."⁷⁵

Indeed, so it was with the United States in its intervention in Vietnam; the French in Algeria; and with Portugal in her African colonies. Originally understood and accepted as a war of ensuring American security interests through the containment of communism and making the world safe for democracy, the Vietnam war later lost its appeal to the American public in the light of the horrors of the conflict. This led to a wave of protests. Opposition to it was further bolstered by the publication of the Pentagon Papers which revealed hitherto guarded secrets on the prosecution of the war.⁷⁶ The Nixon Administration interpreted all this as a national demand for the country's withdrawal from the conflict, and so felt shored up to initiate a peace process which culminated in the 1973 Paris Accords. There was no doubt that at this stage domestic developments and international outcry had so eroded United States' resolve and credibility, inflicting a moral defeat on her which was capped eventually by a military disaster.

In France, the colonial war in Algeria became the crucible test for the Fourth Republic, bringing the Government very close to a military coup that was only averted by the invitation to General Charles de Gaulle to assume power.

75. Adegoke Adelabu, op cit, p.588.

76. The Pentagon Papers as Published by the New York Times, (London Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971)

De Gaulle's approach to the conflict was in the main conciliatory. Algeria, all along regarded as a province of France, was now "Algerian Algeria". This opened the way to a negotiated settlement that was basically an acceptance of defeat. Portugal's frustration with her colonial wars in Africa gave rise to the overthrow of the Caetano Government in the Flower Revolution of 1974. General Spínola who took over power, immediately offered the olive branch to the liberation movements. But their military successes at the time had the temptation of underplaying the peace move, thus making a dignified surrender by Lisbon the only alternative solution.

Directly bearing on the moral principle in the justification for support of liberation violence is the invocation of just war doctrine underlined by the cause of the conflict, and rooted in the concept of national justice. However subjective the doctrine may be, it finds acceptance in the notion of natural law which sustains the Kantian philosophy of freedom and self-determination. Consequently a war against tyrannical rule is held to be just if the objective is to secure freedom. That is what liberation wars are about: a struggle against colonial domination which denies the right of self-determination. Non-alignment can make a strong case of the 'just war' doctrine from the point of moral compulsion. Over the centuries the idea of just war has been looked upon as mankind's purifying ordeal to restore the dignity of the individual and national respect. By their circumstances, just wars are regarded as inevitable and therefore worthy of support. Machiavelli acknowledged this in his appeal for the liberation of Italy: "Every war that is necessary is just; and it is humanity to take up arms for the defence of a people to whom no other recourse is left."⁷⁷

77. Hans Kohn op cit, p.94. See also Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars : A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, (London : Allen Lane, 1977) pp.176-206 in which the author has developed the just war concept in relation to guerrilla warfare.

Legally, non-alignment and national liberation movements, in claiming justification for the use of liberation violence on the basis of the just war doctrine, appeal to the tenet of self-defence enshrined in the United Nation's Charter to deal with aggression.⁷⁸ Both the non-aligned movement and the OAU attach great importance to this provision of the Charter, and from their interpretation of colonialism as an aggressive phenomenon, they conduct a campaign for the legitimisation and support for the armed struggle in the dependent territories. This places in proper context President Sekou Toure's demand on the OAU to lay "down a deadline for the end of foreign domination in Africa, after which date our armed forces should intervene in the legitimate defence of the African continent against aggressors";⁷⁹ and the Algerian delegation's submission in the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly that:

The Charter itself contemplated the lawful use of force in certain circumstances. One of these circumstances was individual or collective action in the exercise of the right of self-defence. The Addis Ababa Conference had simply exercised that right by providing for collective action to assist national liberation."⁸⁰

In conclusion we may say that judging by the general anti-colonial attitude of non-alignment, it will be unrealistic to expect that the policy would budge from any method, no matter how crude, to eliminate colonialism. Its acceptance of liberation violence is an expression of intense feeling to fulfil the anti-colonial principle. Margaret Legum seems to appreciate this fact in her reference to African attitude towards colonialism as "a cold war no less intense than the

78. On the plea for self-defence, see John Dugard, 'The OAU and Colonialism: An Inquiry into the Plea of Self-defence as justification for the use of force in the eradication of Colonialism', International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 16, January 1967.

79. Ibid, p.165.

80. Ibid.

East-West struggle, and in that war, any weapon will be used".⁸¹ For the national liberation movements, the case of force in the light of their experience is based on the premise that the colonial situation was created by force and therefore could only be reversed forcefully. This is to overcome the contradiction of seeking a peaceful solution to a violent problem. In other words, the acceptance of the armed struggle is a question of imperatively solving violence with violence which gives credence to Amilcar Cabral's position:

We see that there is not, and cannot be national liberation without the use of liberating violence ... to answer the criminal violence of the agents of imperialism. Nobody can doubt that whatever its local characteristics, imperialist domination implies a state of permanent violence.⁸²

(4) Demands of National Liberation Movements on the Non-aligned Movement:

Encouraged, in part, by the extent of their theoretical harmony, and aware of their common interest in opposing foreign domination, national liberation movements have made practical demands on the non-aligned movement in the fight against colonialism.

A national liberation struggle is an unequal contest in which, at least initially, the odds are stacked in favour of the colonial power. The use of the security arm of government to maintain 'law and order'; and the exploitation of diplomatic and commercial networks are early advantages a colonial government could bring to bear on a counter-liberation war. The only interim answer a national liberation movement has to this challenge is dependence on the loyalty of the disaffected population. This loyalty is what is tapped for the recruitment of

81. Margaret Legum, *op cit*, p.59.

82. Amilcar Cabral, *op cit*, p.87.

guerrilla forces, and discharge of other duties in such warfare. From such citizen-backed support arises the notion of a "peoples war" with its corollary of 'self-reliance' in a liberation struggle.

But self-reliance is not without its limitations. To succeed, a liberation war must count on external diplomatic and material support, and above all, especially in the early and middle phases, on a strategic rear. Invariably, national liberation movements adopt a three-dimensional policy in their relationship with the people they represent, their immediate regional affiliates and the wider international community, which, for the purpose of this study, is represented by the non-aligned movement. Quite naturally, and in a spirit of Third World solidarity, it is to these external sources that liberation movements have in the first instance turned for diplomatic, material and strategic support.

Although the liberation movements were able to establish direct relationship with the non-aligned movement through winning full membership status in the former in latter years, it was usually the case for the regional bodies to further the interests of their various liberation movements in the wider non-aligned forum. In this connection, the Arab League does for the PLO what the OAU does for the African liberation movements. It is from this level that the case of the liberation movements, backed by non-aligned support, is taken to the United Nations. In other words, the non-aligned movement, together with the regional organisations, serve as a communication channel, and offer the liberation movements a wider platform from which to put forward their grievances.

The significance of diplomatic support is primarily in international recognition which confers a respectable status on the movements and qualify them as legitimate actors in the international system. This distinguishes them from

mere terrorist organisations that carry the stigma of criminality. And being recognised as pursuing legitimate objective, national liberation forces are deemed protected as belligerents under the 1949 Geneva Convention which entitles them to treatment as prisoners-of-war if captured in combat. Recognition is thus an essential factor for effective operation as FROLIZI of Zimbabwe would admit: "We tell you from our experience during the last three months that it is difficult to operate without OAU recognition".⁸³

The drive for recognition usually starts at the regional level, from where it moves up to the broader non-aligned movement. Thus the African liberation movements would first turn to the OAU, while the PLO in the Middle East had to look to the Arab League in the first instance. In each case, de facto recognition for the most part is secured easily while it takes a vigorous campaign to be granted de jure recognition.

After recognition at these levels comes the application for diplomatic support for membership of international organisations, mostly UN agencies, as did the PRG of Vietnam when it sought to join WHO; and the approach by the PLO in seeking non-aligned backing when it was to take the Palestinian case to the UN in 1974. In both instances, the request was directed to the Chairman-in-office of the Non-aligned Movement, President Boumedienne of Algeria who then communicated it to member-states. Following the application by the PRG, the Algerian Foreign Minister, M. Abdelaziz Bouteflika had to send out a message to all non-aligned governments, asking them to support the application.⁸⁴ WHO's

83. Christopher Nyangoni and Gideon Nyandoro, Zimbabwe Independence Movements : Selected Documents, (London, Rex Collings, 1979) p. 227.

84. See Jankowitsch & Sauvart. Vol. II, pp.1095 and 1141 for the PLO and the PRG request respectively.

membership was particularly important for Vietnam, being a war ravaged country that badly needed all medical assistance to cope with sicknesses and diseases incidental to the war. The PLO's request, having received prior support from the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Arab League, was personally transmitted by President Boumedienne to the non-aligned governments in the following appeal:

I am convinced that your country will spare no effort at the UN to support this initiative which is inspired by the decisions of the Fourth Summit Conference of non-aligned countries, and of which I cannot stress enough the importance and weight it carries in the promotion of a solution to the Middle East crisis according to justice and lasting peace.⁸⁵

One other specific application by the PRG for diplomatic support came at the time of the Paris negotiations. In 1972, the PRG made a request to the Kuala Lumpur Preparatory Committee meeting through the Yugoslav delegation for a moral condemnation of the escalation of the war by the United States; and support for the resumption of the Paris talks.⁸⁶ The objective, obviously, was to pile up strong moral pressure on Washington, and to infuse a sense of guilt in her in a calculation to weaken her bargaining position at the negotiations, while bolstering that of North Vietnam.

Demands for material assistance often take an urgent and desperate form. Lacking formal governmental advantage in purchasing arms legally, and with severely limited financial resources, these beside the obvious disadvantages of being "movements in exile" at some stage - all of which renders Mao Tse Tung's emphasis on self-reliance in guerrilla warfare somewhat less than an ideal - the movements have had to rely to a large extent on outside assistance in the

85. Ibid Vol. II, p.1095.

86. Ibid p.668.

prosecution of the war. And one of the closest quarters to turn to is the non-aligned movement. One thus appreciates the appeal of the PLO to the Algiers Summit Conference for material assistance:

The persecuted peoples of the world who are represented by these national movements conceive of non-alignment as a revolutionary and patriotic movement which rises up against all forms of colonialism and exploitation. These peoples obviously understand this movement's assistance and support for all liberation movements... They also feel that non-alignment actually means commitment to all causes calling for progress and liberation if that commitment and assistance does not retreat in the face of any kind of imperialist pressure and if it is not confined to words alone but rather is based on concrete facts and truly revolutionary attitudes... That is why we shall appeal for your support for the liberation movements.⁸⁷

The complaint had always been that not enough is done in terms of material support. But the fact that the liberation movements continue to appeal for such assistance is indicative of the importance they attach to non-aligned material aid. This, of course, they admit with appreciation. SWAPO's leader, Sam Nujoma remarked at the Havana Summit that the future of Namibia depended first on its people and secondly on the material aid given by the non-aligned states.⁸⁸

Militarily, the provision of strategic bases and sanctuary fall outside the scope of self-reliance under certain operational constraints as experienced in Southern Africa and Indochina. The use of neighbouring countries as base for purposes of infiltration, attacks and retreat in the early and intermediate stages of the struggle cannot be over-emphasised. Herein lies the extra-territoriality of

87. Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, No. 565, October 1973, p. 13.

88. Gramma Weekly Review, Havana, 16 September 1979, p.10.

national liberation movements which lends internationalist dimension to liberation nationalism.

In Africa the countries contiguous to the colonial territories constitute the rear, serving as strategic depth, training ground and providing administrative headquarters for the movements. Tanzania was in this respect important to the Mozambican struggle; Zambia to Zimbabwe; and Congo and Zaire to the Angolan movements. After their independence, Mozambique and Angola had to render the same services to the Zimbabwean and South African movements, and SWAPO respectively. For the POLISARIO in Western Sahara Algeria fulfils all these functions. From such geographically determined responsibilities arises the concept of 'Frontline States'. It is not always, however, that such assistance is a function of geography. Ghana, Egypt, Cuba, Ethiopia and Yugoslavia have been known to have provided some of these facilities without necessarily being contiguous states.

This situation of external support inevitably increases the dependence of the movements which the host countries are not known to be reluctant to exploit in extracting acceptable behaviour from the movements basically for self-protection against enemy reprisals, but also, as Kenneth Grundy⁸⁹ explains, to check the possible destabilising influence of large armed groups in the country. After all, the security implications for the host country in this kind of support are obvious: it exposes it to retaliatory measures by the target state. The South African Prime Minister, John Vorster was clear on this in his warning in 1972:

89. Kenneth W. Grundy 'Host Countries and the Southern African Liberation Struggle', Africa Quarterly, Vol. 10, April-June 1970.

"If you, Zambia, want to try violence, as you have advised other states in Africa, we will hit you so hard that you will never forget it."⁹⁰

The concern of the chapters that follow is to examine to what extent the non-aligned movement has responded to the demands of the liberation movements. Considering its anti-colonial principle, one would naturally expect the non-aligned movement to be unfailing in its support for liberation. Indeed this it has always endeavoured to do. Nonetheless, the quality and degree of support - corporate and bilateral - has varied. The factors which are responsible for this variation form the subject of the next chapter.

90. Ibid, p.21.

PART I

NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT FOR 'NATIONAL LIBERATION'

CHAPTER 2. DETERMINANTS OF SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION

We have seen in Chapter 1 that issues of colonialism constitute major theme in the non-aligned movement. The central position given national liberation has prompted the assertion that "the phenomenon of non-alignment is most directly connected with the victory of the anti-colonial revolution".¹ Indeed as a policy that stresses independence, non-alignment's credibility and survival depend largely on the outcome of the liberation struggle. For by the success of this struggle, the policy acquires a wider international base through increased membership which enhances its influence.

Nevertheless, despite the acceptance of the principle of anti-colonialism as its cornerstone, support for national liberation in the movement has scarcely had the same appeal to all states. To some member states, assistance to liberation is an ordained responsibility. For quite a few, it is desirous politically for the building of an acceptable 'Third World' image. With these countries, support for anti-colonialism still remains at the level of empty posturing, which at best has public relations value. To others still, support is meaningful only in the context of regional actualities. A dispassionate consideration of these attitudes logically prompts the remark that the frequently put out general line of support in official declarations is capable of concealing the differences in opinion among countries on the subject of liberation. The numerous and ever increasing reservations entered by states on imperialism at summit conferences underlie this remark. However, when it is considered that support for liberation wars requires political will, which unfortunately many of the non-aligned states lack,

1. Stanimir Lazarevic, 'Non-Alignment and Liberation Movements', Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, Vol. 24, 5-20 July, 1973, p.26.

it certainly will be too much to expect an equal commitment to the liberation struggle. In explaining the measure of support a state, indeed the non-aligned movement, gives to national liberation, certain factors need to be taken into account. These are the international climate at any particular period, national and regional demands, a country's revolutionary experience, and leadership characteristics.

It might be pertinent to point out that the following analysis does not purport to cover all the factors that determine support for liberation.² Nor does it seek to portray the four variables as existing in isolation. Rather, what it intends to do is to provide a clue to an understanding of non-aligned's corporate and individual state support for liberation movements; in other words to set the non-aligned movement's assistance to national liberation in an analytical context. What this amounts to is, in fact, an attempt to answer two basic questions: first, why do the non-aligned states have an unequal commitment to the struggle for national liberation; second, why is that the intensity of anti-colonialism in the movement fluctuates periodically? As would be seen, the answers to these questions lie outside the scope of any one single factor. This stresses the inter-relatedness of all the four determinants, and illustrates how they reinforce one another.

1. International Climate

A characteristic feature of international politics is change which imposes agonizing constraints of choice on states in the conduct of their affairs. As governments change, and as national fortunes grow or decline, so do issues assume different priorities in a country's decision making process. It is thus

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2. See for instance Vincent Khapoya's 'Determinants of African Support for African Liberation Movements : A Comparative Analysis'. African Studies Association, November 1974, in which he listed twenty one independent variables ranging from territorial size of a state to population density and size of the armed forces.

normal to expect that "option politics" should form the better part of state-craft.

Generally, the politics of non-alignment centre around three basic principles: anti-bloc rivalry; anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism; and a new international economic order. Though not mutually exclusive in the light of the inter-relatedness of global issues, they have nevertheless displayed unequal intensity at various times and attracted an unequal degree of attention from the non-aligned movement at different periods. Prior to the 1961 Belgrade Conference and immediately after, cold war issues tended to dominate discussions. Incidentally, the period also coincided with the era of "progressive" decolonisation to lead certain non-aligned states into believing that colonialism was more or less dead.

With such flashpoints as Berlin, Korea, Congo and Cuba, besides an escalating arms race - all essentially products of bloc rivalry - anti-colonialism, though by no means ignored, was controversially subordinated to cold war considerations. Then, the preoccupation of the non-aligned movement was the need to maintain international peace through the prevention of a nuclear war. President Tito's opening address at the Belgrade Summit captured the mood of the period; and in giving urgency to this need established the purpose of the Conference:

Today ... we must, unfortunately, note that the situation is much worse as the cold war has assumed proportions liable to lead to the greatest tragedy at any moment. Precisely because of this it is necessary for the representatives of non-aligned countries to examine on the highest level the dangerous international situation, and to take in this connection, co-ordinated action ...

in order to find a way out of the present situation and to prevent the outbreak of a new military conflict.³

A sinister coincidence that rendered this disturbing situation even more alarming was the announcement by the Soviet Union at the time of the Conference of its intention to continue with nuclear tests. Prime Minister Nehru was particularly infuriated by the announcement that he for a moment, 'threw' away non-alignment to stress the danger of such actions: 'Non-alignment or no non-alignment, this is no longer the problem. We are now facing the question of war and peace... It's peace or war.'⁴ He therefore had to urge the Conference to "look at things in the proper perspective", insisting that "first things come first, and nothing is more important or has priority than this world situation of war and peace."⁵ Against this background of the threat of a possible Third World War was the presumed Conference feeling that the new states had not fought for independence only to lose it in a cataclysmic nuclear conflict. Indeed so serious was the threat of war portrayed that the protests by President Sukarno and the Algerian delegation against any attempt to play down the anti-colonial struggle in favour of international understanding was at best given less than urgent attention.

In the end, Belgrade came to be an 'anti-war' conference, almost at the expense of anti-colonialism. Apart from issuing a special statement expressing deep concern at the prospects of "world annihilation", the meeting also had to make written appeals to both Moscow and Washington, urging them to "negotiate"

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3. Official Report of the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned countries, Belgrade, September 1-6, 1961 (Published by Publicisticko-Izdavacki Zavod, Yugoslavia, 1961), pp.17-18, hereafter referred to as Belgrade Conference Report.
 4. Mohammed Heikal, Nasser : The Cairo Documents (London, New English Library, 1972), p.239.
 5. Belgrade Conference Report, p.108.

in order to avert the impending "terrible disaster". And from this perspective, the official communique went on to de-emphasise the colonial question by observing that colonial empires were disappearing.⁶

By 1964, super-power antagonism had begun showing signs of abatement, as evidenced, for example, by the signing of the Treaty of Moscow. This marked the beginning of the era of detente that was to define super-power relations for over a decade. Meanwhile, the first wave of decolonisation had ended, and the next stage begun, increasingly characterised by armed struggle to emphasise the acuteness of the colonial problem as already demonstrated in the Algerian war. Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau had all launched their offensives; while the war in Vietnam was well on the way to full escalation.

These widespread wars drew renewed attention to the anti-colonial question. Consequently, the Cairo summit of 1964 witnessed a shift away from cold war considerations to anti-colonialism, with results in the latter paralleling those of Belgrade on international peace. Contrasting the importance attached to these two issues at Cairo and Belgrade reveals that whereas the 1961 summit agenda regarded anti-colonialism and imperialism as aspects of international peace and security, 1964 reversed the order to make international peace conditional on the elimination of these phenomena. Significant of note also is the matching in importance by Cairo of Belgrade's statement on war and peace, with a special resolution on the liberation struggle.⁷

6. Ibid, p.254.

7. See Official Declaration of the Cairo Conference (in Odette Jankowitsch and Karl P. Sauvant, The Third World without Superpowers : The Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries, Vol. 1 (New York : Dobbs Ferry, Oceana Publications, 1978), pp.46-50.

But while the anti-colonial theme still remained near the top of the non-aligned agenda in the years ahead, the Algiers Conference of 1973 brought to the fore one other issue of interest that had been on the table for some time. This was the case for a new international economic order. The economic prosperity of the 1960s witnessed in the industrialised countries had all but eluded the new states, thereby further widening the gap between the rich and the poor nations. Blaming this on faulty global economic structures created by the historical injustice of colonial exploitation, Algiers set itself to finding ways of redressing the situation through the establishment of new patterns of economic relations. Accordingly, the Conference for the most part, and as if in deference to the United Nations' declaration of the 1970s as the decade of development, concentrated on what the Algerian Foreign Minister, M. Abdul-Aziz Bouteflika, termed "the struggle for economic independence."⁸ The significance of Algiers in giving prominence to the economic principle was acknowledged by the Colombo Conference of 1976: "The Fourth Summit conference in Algiers marked the turning point both with regard to the mutual co-operation among non-aligned and other developing countries in as much as its decisions and recommendations served the basis for the intensive international negotiations aimed at the establishment of the New International Economic Order."⁹

For its part, Colombo affirmed that "it is economic issues ... that will now be the major concern of international politics".¹⁰ Indeed, so has it been for the non-aligned movement as expressed in its lead in the formation of such bodies

8. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1973, p.26117.

9. Odette Jankowitsch and Karl P. Sauvart, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p.801.

10. *Ibid*, p.800.

as the Group of 77 and active interest in the North-South dialogue; in these activities the movement's bureaux~~x~~ at the United Nations (set up for the purposes of negotiation and advice on economic affairs) have played an important role. And all the more remarkable in this connection was the near devotion of the Lima and Georgetown Conferences to economic development and co-operation. From this point on, issues of economic development have increasingly come to compete with anti-colonialism for attention.

2. National and Regional Demands:

A separate but closely related factor to the international situation is the extent of national and regional demands manifested in 'interests' and exerted in coups and inter-state conflicts; most of these are territorial and ideological in nature. The discontinuity in policy caused by coups and wars has often produced some loss of support for liberation. There was, for example, the impact of the Nigerian civil war on the course of OAU politics in the area of anti-colonialism. The concern the war evoked was predictable and understandable. It heightened the fear of similar secessionist moves in other countries whose colonial boundaries were in no way immune to ethnic agitation for the redrawing of the political map. Moreover the internationalisation of the conflict in the recognition of "Biafra" by the four African states of Gabon, Ivory Coast, Zambia and Tanzania also had complications for the Organisation, whose diplomacy at the end of the war was substantially directed at reconciling these countries with Nigeria. Similarly attention diverting were the Sudanese civil war, the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict, and the crisis in Chad. All of these frayed the OAU's diplomatic nerves and strained its financial resources in mediation efforts and refugee problems, and caused some distraction, however minimal, from the liberation drive.

In Asia, the Indian sub-continent and the South East region have remained hot beds of deep ideological animosity and religious intolerance. The volatile situation so created often erupts in large scale wars as, for instance, between India and Pakistan on the one hand, and India and China on the other. The dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia over territorial claims during the Sukarno era also left a bitter mark in their relations for quite some time.

The involvement of India, a founding member of the non-aligned movement, in the turbulence of the region deserves particular consideration. Her regional, as well as international posture is primarily dictated by security needs in the light of relations with her neighbours. The religious war of 1947 that carved out Pakistan from the country still finds lingering traces in the border wars over Kashmir, Simla and Tashkent constitute important sign posts in this conflict, and the end of the road is still clearly not in sight. This has initiated and fuelled a frenzied arms race whose seriousness is best grasped when it is seen against the background of the obscene poverty that afflicts the broad majority of their peoples. The Chinese threat appears even graver for New Delhi in view of the imbalance of forces in China's favour. This was decidedly proved by the 1962 war in which Peking is reported to have occupied 14,000 square miles of Indian territory.¹¹

Torn between the peril of unending antagonism, and given the attitudes bequeathed to it by Gandhi, India's policy of non-alignment became a protective device in dealing with these problems. The main focus of her diplomacy in the

11. The Chinese on their part claimed that India was occupying 50,000 square miles of their territory. See The Times (London) 18 May, 1982, p.9.

movement for some time had accordingly been the striving to exclude Pakistan from membership, and to limit China's influence within it. By so isolating them, she no doubt had hoped to persuade them to reach an accommodation with her. This explains Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri's performance at the 1964 Cairo Conference in relation to these two countries. Frantically, he struggled to exclude them from the Conference by alleging that they had both sought to undermine it through the attempt to convene a second "Bandung" meeting instead of a non-aligned summit.¹² How convincing the allegation was, considering her known interest at the time in such a Conference,¹³ is a matter of political judgement. In any case, the two states were not in Cairo. And their exclusion from the movement for a long time attests to India's influence in the club.¹⁴

When eventually the meeting opened, the Chinese factor assumed a sharper dimension in the Prime Minister's show of concern over Peking's nuclear programme. In order to calm his country's fears, but also to buy time to develop her own nuclear capability, Shastri suggested the sending of a delegation to China (as did Belgrade to Washington and Moscow) to dissuade Peking from developing nuclear weapons. This very concern was known to have loomed large in a pre-conference meeting between the Prime Minister and President Nasser, following which a communique, ostensibly aimed at China, was issued, calling for the resolution of border disputes by negotiations, and general and complete disarmament under effective control.¹⁵ Outside the non-aligned movement,

12. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1964, p.20433.

13. Ibid.

14. Whereas China was never a member, Pakistan joined the movement in 1979.

15. Keesings Contemporary Archives. 1964, p. 20431

India's search for security accounts for the friendship with the Soviet Union which was consummated in the 1971 treaty.

These pressures have tended to make India's foreign policy more pragmatic; a pragmatism justified in M.S. Mehta's contention that "a viable foreign policy has to conform to enlightened self-interest".¹⁶ Under such circumstances, the defence of the national interest claims priority and renders any other policy, including active support for anti-colonialism, a secondary matter.

A more emotional aspect of the differences in South East Asia is ideological division. The ascendancy of ideologically committed Vietnam at the end of its war of liberation is viewed by the ASEAN states as a threat to their security defined in terms of the status quo. Because of their suspicion of communism as a destabilising influence, they were at best 'neutral' supporters of Vietnam in the Indo-China conflict.¹⁷ ASEAN suspicion was heightened by Hanoi's intervention in Cambodia (renamed Kampuchea) which, they felt, justified their pre-occupation with communism. Today they have forced a protective alliance against revolutionary change, that is to say, Vietnamese 'hegemonism'.

16. M.S. Mehta, 'India's Foreign Policy' in A. Appadorai (ed), India : 1947-1967 : Studies in Social and Political Developments (London, Asia Publishing House, 1968) p.212.

17. See V. Nguyen Giap, 'To Arm the Revolutionary Masses, To Build the People's Army' in Ben Turok (ed), Revolutionary Thought in the 20th Century, (London, Zed Press, 1980) p.302 where the author made allusion to the collaboration of some of these states in reference to the United States endeavour to organise "a kind of regional alliance among puppet forces, using Indochinese against Indochinese, Asians against Asians". Vietnam's Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach also alluded to it in his warning of ASEAN states of Hanoi's action for what they had done in Indochina. The Times (London) 20th July, 1982, p.8.

Consequently, the question of effecting a Vietnamese pull out from Cambodia now constitutes a major foreign policy objective energetically pursued in the United Nations, the non-aligned movement, and in all ASEAN forums. The logical conclusion from such a policy standpoint is that a sense of insecurity and profound distrust have combined to create resistance to radicalism. And this has negative implications for the support of liberation movements.

One other example of regional imperatives diluting the commitment to the liberation struggle is the Gulf War between Iran and Iraq. The war is particularly significant for the Gulf states for the military and political pressures it exerts on them. The attendant exacerbation of superpower rivalry in the region, together with the threat of radical change, provide an explanation for some of the conservative measures and policies embarked upon by the states in the region. It is in this context that one assesses the formation of the Gulf Co-operative Council, suspected of putting self-interest above all other Arab concerns, including Palestine. In a bid to dispel the suspicion, the Council's Secretary-General, Abdullah Bishara charged that "It is unfair to accuse our region of putting its self-interest first. If we look at the Arab world now, we see that regional interests are prevalent. Our priority, no doubt, is the security and unity of the Gulf."¹⁸

Ironically, Abdullah Bishara's answer did more to give substance to the accusation. The 'self-interest' is manifested in the open concern at starving off the threat of Khomeini's brand of revolutionary Islamic fundamentalism. And it is the fear of this threat that has prudently pushed them firmly on to the side of

18. Interview with Abdullah Bishara in The Middle East magazine, September, 1981, p.35.

Baghdad, while they also search for a negotiated settlement on the basis of Islamic solidarity. By mid 1982 their contribution to Iraq's war effort was estimated at \$30 billion. A further illustration of the degree of their exasperation was the willingness to meet some of the harsh peace conditions set by Tehran which included the payment of war reparations. Out of an Iranian demand of \$150 billion, the Gulf states were known to have offered \$50 billion.¹⁹ Putting the fear and concern in the perspective of the overall Middle East situation is the Gulf press: "The Arab 'frontline' states regard Israel as enemy Number One. But for the Gulf States the more immediate enemy is Khomeni - inspired aggression and subversion."²⁰

A more direct consequence of the war is the reduction of Iraqi support for the Palestinians. Her admission of the severity and cost of the war all but meant that as long as the conflict lasted, the country would have neither the time nor the resources left to invest in other issues. At one stage she had to appeal for the "Arabisation" of the war, to which King Hussein responded by forming a volunteer force - the Yarmouk Brigade - to assist her. To this, one would remark that Jordan could afford to send troops to Iraq but proved to be a lame duck in defending the PLO against attack by Israel in the June 1982 invasion of Lebanon.

On the basis of the above evidence, it must be concluded that there is a clash between regional and national interests, and the anti-colonialist principles of the non-aligned movement. Even where such interests may not be at cross-purpose, they nevertheless make an uncomfortable mix in the support for national liberation movements. India's External Affairs Minister, P.V. Narasinha's defence of the priority accorded to national demand is worth noting:

19. Time magazine, 26 July, 1982, pp.8-9.

20. The Guardian (London), 9 February, 1982, p.15.

It is an obvious truism - but is often lost sight of - that national interest as perceived by its people is paramount to each sovereign state. While the philosophy of non-alignment is the search for the noble ideal. this objective can be sought only through the enlightened self-interest of each state and its people. It cannot be realised by denying national interest, or pretending that it does not exist because such a policy cannot endure.²¹

So strong is the temptation to bow to the pressure of national interest that Gamel Abdel Nasser, a staunch supporter of liberation, gave in to it at one time over Palestine. In spite of his country's stated "limitless and unconditional" support for the Palestinian cause, Nasser succumbed to the demands of Egypt's interest in his preparedness to accept UN Resolution 242 of November 1967 solely to recover the Sinai from Israeli occupation, and least for its relevance to the Palestinian cause. At the time, it was of secondary consideration to him that the resolution lacked actual substance to solve the Palestinian issue. Reference to the problem as a refugee question implied that a solution could be found in the context of the Israeli state. Such an approach contradicts the claim of Palestinian inalienable right to self-determination. It was later in a speech to the Palestinian National Council in Cairo in 1969 that he confessed to this conflict of attitude in favour of national interest. He admitted that "this resolution may be enough to remove the traces of the aggression which took place in June 1967; but it is not enough as far as the Palestinian destiny is concerned."²²

Under national demand is to be considered the impact of the duration of independence on a country's application of support to national liberation.

21. Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, Vol. XXXI, 5 June 1980, p.5.

22. Walid Khadduri, ed. International Documents on Palestine, 1969. (Beirut, The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1972) p.583. (Hereafter referred to as International Documents on Palestine).

There is enough evidence to suggest that countries tend to exhibit greater interest in liberation support in the early years of independence. Then, the circumstances of their birth still colour their political and social horizons and place national policy on the side of anti-colonialism. But sooner or later, the intoxication with independence diminishes, revealing quite startling findings in the enormous task of nation-building. A new era has now begun in which revolutionary enthusiasm is mellowed by harsh realities.

This was the discovery by Guinea in the 1980s. For all her well known radicalism at independence, which she demonstrated in Pan-African and non-aligned politics, Guinea has lately shown surprising moderation in her international relations. Her stand on the Western Sahara issue, which amounts to a non-recognition of Polisario's claims, illustrates too clearly how far she has deviated from the radical path. The temptation might be to treat the change as a case of the country's leadership now being a spent revolutionary force that is no longer a critical factor in the anti-colonial struggle. The realistic explanation, however, lies in the deteriorating state of the nation's economy. After twenty six years of independence, the country has come to accept that it needs foreign investment for the exploitation of its rich mineral resources, and to develop the agricultural and industrial base. The crucial factor in all this is the industrialised West. By necessity, therefore, Sekou Touré seems to have concluded that Guinea must compromise her revolutionary principles in the interest of economic progress. Hence the new policy of opening to the West which took him to Washington and Paris within a period of three months in 1983 in search of economic aid.²³ The West for its part has shown keen interest in this new policy, primarily for the political advantages that might accrue to it in the event of President Sekou Toure

23. West Africa magazine, 12 July 1982, and 20 September, 1982.

becoming the OAU Chairman in 1984.²⁴

What the above implies is that domestic problems, hitherto unappreciated, now clamour for urgent attention at the expense of certain foreign policy undertakings. When this happens, whatever there was in the euphoria of nationhood turns out to be a matter of sweet rhetoric and bitter reality; a reality that in the words of Franz Fanon,²⁵ transforms the apotheosis of independence into the curse of independence.

Not every country, however, is fortunate enough to have a respite from these problems. In most instances, they show up more readily, and are rendered more serious by the nature of liberation politics. Naturally, anti-colonial politics is characterised by promise-making intended to spur the people to action. Besides, it is also to discredit the opposing power and subsequently placing it on the defensive, thus underlining the fact that the past is doomed. But it eventually transpires that the fulfilment of these promises, such as land reform, equal opportunity and social advancement constitute the challenges which the new government can only afford to neglect, even for a while, at the risk of stability. For the people, the realisation now of the material advantages denied them under the colonial regime can no longer be postponed.

Taking the Zimbabwean struggle as an example, land was a major factor in the war. The slogan 'land to the people' was a battle-cry with a resounding appeal. Even the Lancaster House Conference recognised the importance of the issue, which at one stage almost deadlocked the talks.²⁶ The war ended and one

24. See West Africa magazine, 13 September, 1982, p.2378.

25. Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex England, Penguin Books Ltd., 1965), p.76.

26. See Martyns Gregory, 'Rhodesia: From Lusaka to Lancaster House', The World Today, (London, Chatham House, January 1980), p.16.

of the immediate tasks that faced the Mugabe administration was land reform. But there was the dilemma of effecting land redistribution while at the same time ensuring efficiency in agriculture. Not to be ignored, of course, was where to raise the funds to pay compensation for land so expropriated. These constraints notwithstanding, Mugabe knows he has to proceed, even if slowly, not only to maintain credibility, but more importantly to satisfy the expectant population.

It is in the light of this need to 'deliver' the liberation goods, as well as economic and geographic realities that one must judge Zimbabwe's relations with South Africa. The country's independence raised hopes of the opening of a more effective front in the war against South Africa. But such strategic hopes proved short-lived when Mugabe, influenced by these impelling economic considerations, declared soon after independence that he would not allow Zimbabwe to be used as a base for guerrilla attacks on South Africa. However tactically intended the declaration was (being designed to avoid the destabilising anger of Pretoria), the point remains that Zimbabwean independence had already shown 'reluctance' to come openly to the aid of South Africa's liberation movement.

It is in this context also do we see Prime Minister Mugabe's admission that his country could not take part in trade sanctions against South Africa. While he welcomed international economic pressure on Pretoria, he accepted the reality of Zimbabwe's geographic position which dictated its economic ties with South Africa through which 90% of its trade passes. His plea therefore over sanctions was quite clear:

Any such pressures (economic) would be acceptable to Zimbabwe. But we have said Zimbabwe itself is not in a position to participate in any sanctions... We cannot stop using rail routes with South Africa.

This is the reality. We send our goods to South Africa and South Africa sends some of its goods to us. That is the type of sanctions we cannot participate in.²⁷

Furthermore, many of the newly emergent nations remain victims of divisive forces which are manifestations of the social contradictions in their historical development; these even limit liberation consciousness. For want of maintaining a united front against the enemy during the anti-colonial struggle, these divisions, serious as they might be, were patched up to achieve victory.²⁸ But once the war is won (in most instances with victory in sight) this facade of unity slowly disintegrates under the pressures of role competition to unleash a wave of confrontational politics reminiscent of political witch-hunting and given substance by charges of counter-revolutionary activities.

In Angola, the uncomfortable co-operation among the FLNA, MPLA and UNITA against Portugal at one stage in the revolutionary struggle became an open inter-movement conflict at the prospects of independence. The emergence of the MPLA as the winner in the conflict remains disputed by UNITA which has continued with its armed rebellion against Luanda. This, for all its contradiction of creating a situation of 'liberation-within-liberation', has failed to affect Angola's assistance to SWAPO. Nevertheless, the rebellion, supported and exploited by South Africa, has had the obvious effect of undermining the MPLA government's

27. The Guardian (London), 23 June, 1981, p.7.

28. President Nkrumah put the point quite succinctly in his speech at the opening of the OAU Accra Summit of October, 1965: "While in the fight against colonialism we can expect a large measure of political cohesion and unity of purpose, what happens thereafter is a different matter. The responsibility for safe-guarding political freedom, once it has been won, and the responsibility for fostering national development, are not seen in the same light by those who only yesterday were colleagues and comrades-in-arms". Source: Kwame Nkrumah, Rhodesia File, (London, Panaf, 1975), p.69.

strategic support for the Namibian movement.

In Mozambique, the disruptive operations of the Pretoria-backed Mozambique National Liberation Movement also impair the Government's support for liberation movements. The constant acts of sabotage and harassment of the country's population are enough to distract the government's attention from the anti-colonial struggle.

Faced with such problems, and very often lacking the capability to deal with them, it could be surmised that the dictates of national commitment will prove too strong to ignore in favour of external policies. For the radical states, this dilution of revolutionary zeal as it affects support for liberation movements is not readily admitted, not least recognised on the pretext of the theory of "permanent revolution". But the truth is that the facts seem to compromise this position without necessarily destroying their revolutionary credentials.

3. Revolutionary Experience:

Support for national liberation in the non-aligned movement is one area where member-states' differences in the road to national self-determination is evident. As varied as their social, economic, and political structures is their experience in the anti-colonial struggle. While some states took the constitutional path to independence as favoured by a combination of circumstances, others achieved it in an armed struggle. There is enough evidence to suggest that countries born out of armed revolutionary struggle adopt a more radical approach in international affairs, whereas the constitutionally established states tend toward moderation. This accounts for attitudes that mark a state as 'radical' or 'moderate'; a distinction which serves as a useful aid in defining a country's national role within a broader foreign policy framework.

The following characteristics tend to define the radical/moderate grouping:

Radical

- (a) Shows a high degree of ideological commitment.
- (b) Features a charismatic leadership.
- (c) Develops a higher perception of external threat.
- (d) Seeks a more active role in regional and international affairs on the basis of a clearly defined national role.
- (e) Maintains a cohesive domestic base.
- (f) Indulges in 'issue' politics to create national consensus and solidarity.
- (g) Insists on revolutionary change, 'having the benefit of such experience.'
- (h) Exhibits an ability to initiate an action and sustain it.

Moderate

- (a) Manifests a low degree of ideological persuasion.
- (b) Leadership is usually humble.
- (c) Shows low perception of external threat.
- (d) Has inward looking tendencies.
- (e) Strives to secure unity through compromise which tends to weaken cohesion.
- (f) Engages in 'non-issue' politics around which there is hardly any national consensus.
- (g) Opts for a negotiated and therefore mixed-interest solution.
- (h) Portrays limited ability to initiate and sustain an action.

Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Cuba and Algeria, which manifest these radical attributes, share a common tradition of revolutionary struggle. Vietnam's resurgence derives from its revolutionary experience; in addition to giving it a strong ideological fidelity, this has moulded the aspiration for regional leadership which is seen as a threat by other neighbouring states. Similarly, the attempt by Yugoslavia in the early post-war years to spearhead the creation of a Balkan Federation to include Bulgaria, Albania, Macedonia (incorporating parts of Greece) was considered as a drive for regional leadership. Her assistance to the Greek Communists in the 1948 civil war, while apparently a case of discharging a revolutionary duty, no doubt hinged on the "federal" scheme which failed to materialise.²⁹ But the collapse of the scheme did not deter Yugoslavia from embarking on a more ambitious international role that was subsumed in the wider non-aligned movement.

How the radical states relate these qualities to the anti-colonial struggle is illustrated in their steadfastness in support for liberation movements; this is discharged with a self-confidence that can only spring from revolutionary experience, as for example, in Algeria's adoption of the Angolan revolution.³⁰ Algeria also became a 'frontline' state in the Palestine cause, convinced as she was that "the Revolutionary Algerian Government is capable of offering a formula for work at the level of the Arab world".³¹ In the case of Cuba, the strength of

29. See John C. Campbell, Tito's Separate Road : America and Yugoslavia in World Politics, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1967), pp.112-3.

30. John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, 1962-1976, (The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1978), p.62.

31. Broadcast by President Houari Boumedienne over Radio Algiers Home Service, 31 October, 1970 and translated in BBC Monitoring Service.

her revolutionary qualities in support for liberation was registered in her impact on the sixth non-aligned Conference held in Havana. So pervasive was the country's revolutionary environment on the conference that even known moderates had to assume radicalism in order to belong.

An example which epitomises the radical/moderate distinction was provided by the West African countries of Ghana and Nigeria in the early 1960s. Ghana's anti-colonial politics under Dr. Kwame Nkrumah acquires a better perspective within this radical/moderate distinction. Although not a revolutionary of the Fidel Castro cast, President Nkrumah nevertheless practised militant politics which radically altered the course of Ghana's independence struggle.³² His appearance on the country's scene forced the pace of anti-colonialism in such a way that the earlier step-by-step constitutional method of Dr. Danquah's UGCC became discredited as too compromising and even tending towards betrayal.

Whereas his predecessors failed to mobilise mass support for the struggle, Nkrumah succeeded largely on account of dynamism, charisma and 'issue politics,' all of which had a more convincing appeal. His opposition to colonialism was built around the concept of "African Personality" which was later subscribed to by all African nationalists; this sought fulfilment in the total liberation of the continent from foreign rule. Support for liberation thus became an indispensable ingredient in the country's policy.

Perhaps an equally important reason for Nkrumah's success was his adamant resistance to any divisive tendencies in Ghanaian politics formulated in

32. For Nkrumah's strategy of "positive action", see his book, Ghana : The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, (London, Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd., 1957) Chapter 10.

the guise of federalism. Though this was achieved at a considerable cost to individual freedom, it minimised tribal antagonism and created a more cohesive home base. Thus freed from the inhibitions of disunity, Ghana was able to pursue a more dynamic African, and indeed international policy, whose impact far exceeded the demographic assets and resources of the nation.

In contrast was Nigeria of the first republic, whose moderate policy reflected disturbing domestic factors. A nation of great tribal diversity with corresponding political cultures which ranged from conservatism to republicanism, she was always preoccupied with the problem of maintaining national unity. Every issue, however unimportant, was sharply polarised along ethnic and religious lines, and prevented the emergence of national consensus. So deeply ingrained was the tribal factor that even the anti-colonial agitation failed to serve as a uniting force. Hence the acceptance of self-government by the three regions at different periods.³³ Under such circumstances, Nigeria's politics came to be heavily characterised by compromises to make a federal structure the most "realistic" arrangement.

Afraid of forcing issues in order not to upset the rather fragile unity based on an imbalanced support of firstly three, then four regions, caution, which often degenerated into indecision, was accepted as the hallmark of government in Nigeria. In effect the colonial legacy was hardly tampered with; and nothing manifests this more than the slogan of "unity in diversity", and the pride in a "humble" leadership to extol the virtue of compromise politics which did little to solve the country's problems. Invariably the contradictions in the

33. The Eastern and Western Regions became self-governing in 1957; the Northern Region in 1959.

system remained and increased in intensity to eventually sort themselves out in the thirty month civil war.

Not surprisingly, Nigeria carried this same caution to the continental level where conditions were similar in terms of diversity.³⁴ It could therefore be said that her African policy, and mostly the functional approach to continental unity, was largely dictated by those domestic factors which present the fear that pushing unity too fast at the continental level could undermine the home base. Consequently, despite the attributes of national greatness - human, agricultural, and mineral resources - Nigeria was unable to play her ascribed role as the leader of Africa. As a result she earned the derogatory title of "a giant with clay feet". Understandably then, while Ghana could pledge her independence to the total liberation of Africa, Nigeria could only do a little more than a show of symbolic solidarity with the freedom movements. In like manner, while Accra was hosting Pan-African Conferences, Lagos felt satisfied in searching for answers to the colonial and racist challenges outside the accepted framework of Pan-Africanism.³⁵

A further comparative analysis of the two groups with regard to action/reaction capability, defined as the ability of a state to initiate and sustain a policy objective, shows that the moderates generally possess a limited degree of tenacity

34. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe's veiled warning on the subject of African unity at the January, 1962 Lagos Conference of the Monsovia states, bears out this. He said in his opening address: "The unity this Conference seeks is not one which is based on regimented conformity. Total unity in Africa is impossible as it is in all other continents of the world. But we can develop unity in diversity and channel diversity into unity as the successful experiment of Nigeria has shown". Source: Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1962, p. 18708.

35. This refers to the January, 1966 Lagos Commonwealth Conference summoned especially to consider the Rhodesian situation.

of purpose in the area of liberation politics, no less in other fields. Their apparent lack of capacity for action in this respect, underlined by other moderate characteristics, render them ill-equipped for the high politics of liberation; this entails perseverance and great sacrifice. Colonel Gadaffi's remark on the setback of the 1982 Tripoli OAU summit underscores the point: "Doves do not triumph but hawks always do", he said, adding that he was on the "stronger side of Africa" which would, if necessary, impose its will on the others.³⁶ The point to be emphasised, therefore, is that instead of acting, they are generally acted upon, offering minimal, cautious reaction. In more concrete terms, it means that they exert much less diplomatic clout compared with the radicals.

The above helps to explain the failure of Saudi Arabia to push through the Fahd eight-point plan on the Middle East. The failure is attributed to inadequate consultation with other Arab states, notably the radicals in the 'Rejectionist Front'. But a more convincing reason was the lack of a principled determination to succeed as implied in Crown Prince Fahd's apologetic statement to the 1981 Fez Summit: "Look brothers, if our plan is going to create divisions, I am fully prepared to withdraw it."³⁷ Obviously the rejection of the plan by the 1981 Gulf States Conference at Riyadh, and its subsequent collapse at the November, 1981 Fez summit, was indicative of the inertia characterising Saudi diplomacy.

It is for the same reason that Jordan, by geographic position a 'frontline state' in the Middle East conflict, has maintained a low profile in the confrontation, scarcely daring to initiate either a military or diplomatic solution.

36. West Africa magazine, 16 August 1982, p.2089.

37. The Middle East magazine, January 1982, p.13.

Naturally she is drawn closer to Saudi Arabia with whom she shares a similar socio-political system. But whereas Saudi economic power has occasionally inspired her to venture solutions, Amman seems opinionless, as Crown Prince Hassan would admit:

We are used to other countries stating their views on the question of Palestine. We are also accustomed since 1974 to Arab countries making such reference to Jordan whenever Jordan enunciates a political position. That is why we are probably more conscious and more careful of the need for consensus at this time... Consequently we feel that individual statements should be linked to the Arab consensus to be effective.³⁸

Yet another illustration in support of the above contention is provided by the Ivory Coast. This state's limited reaction capability accounts for the quick drowning of her "dialogue with South Africa" proposal in 1970 in the face of radical opposition. And just like Prince Fahd with his peace plan, President Houphouet Boigny showed preparedness to drop the idea, which he did by indicating that "if we are faced with a majority of refusals, we shall do nothing about it".³⁹ In most cases of such failure, the reaction of the states concerned is to shy away from the diplomatic scene to the delight of the radicals. Kenya's unsuccessful attempt at mediation in 1975 to reconcile the Angolan liberation movements made her recoil into her shell, only to emerge again in 1981 when she hosted the OAU summit. As for the Ivory Coast, her attitude towards Pan-Africanism since the 'dialogue' fiasco could at best be described as passive, at worst negative.

38. Interview with Prince Hassan of Jordan in The Middle East magazine, December, 1981, p.17. The "such reference" in the quote refers to alleged accusation by some Arab countries that Jordan was always tempted to unilateral decisions on Palestine.

39. Africa Contemporary Record, 1970, p. 630.

The radical/moderate distinction is also characterised by different interpretations of the phenomena of colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism. These differences range from the vague and imperceptive analysis of the moderates to the highly doctrinaire conception of the radicals.

<u>Radicals</u>	<u>Moderates</u>
<u>Colonialism:</u>	
(a) An oppressive socio-political order that spells doom to the colonised. Must be overthrown by all means.	(a) Obnoxious system no doubt, but offers some insight into future socio-political development.
(b) Chooses revolutionary path to eliminate it because it is based on force.	(b) Adopts constitutional approach to end it.
<u>Imperialism:</u>	
(a) An intensely aggressive phenomenon that seeks domination of people and states. A driving force of colonialism and associated with world capitalism, therefore a Western creation. Opposed to progressive forces, defender of the status quo for purely selfish interests. It limits independence and offers enough explanation for the problems of the developing countries. Requires an international action by all progressives to defeat it.	(a) Subject to an ideological interpretation. Not particularly a phenomenon of capitalism and therefore cannot be restricted to the West. It does not provide any meaningful explanation to the problems of the Third World. It can limit independence.
	(b) More of a political phenomenon. Makes a distinction between economic and political aspects.

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|---|---|
| <p>(b) Associated with economic exploitation. Manipulates the economic, cultural, social and political structures of a country to its advantage.</p> <p>Based on violence, therefore should be challenged forcefully.</p> | <p>(b) Cont'd.</p> <p>Could be countered by a "strategy of co-operation".</p> |
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Neo-colonialism:

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| <p>(a) Disguised colonialism. More dangerous than classic colonialism because of its subtle tactics which are not easy to detect. The 'capitalist' West is always the neo-colonialist.</p> | <p>(a) More or less a fiction; Beneficial economic relations is not neo-colonialism. Former colonial master is now a friend to help in national development.</p> |
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The unequal degree of recognition of these phenomena as independence-robbing agents affects the level of commitment of countries to the liberation struggle. Apart from the colonial question, whose tangible manifestation in direct foreign rule is unquestionable, there hardly exists a consensus among non-aligned states as to how equally dangerous the others are to self-determination and national independence. Perhaps because of an aversion to rigid ideological posturing, the moderate camp prefers to view imperialism and neo-colonialism in abstract terms; and if they matter at all, as necessary evils in Third World relations with the developed nations. A pragmatic approach to them (so they believe) thus becomes the better part of valour in countering their negative influence. In fact in extreme right wing circles, the perception and analysis of

imperialism and neo-colonialism even assume a more accommodating character. The tendency here is to dismiss any campaign against these phenomena as nothing but a policy invention intended to boost the egotistic aspirations of leaders who, they allege, find scapegoatism in them in the face of mounting domestic problems.⁴⁰

Placed in the proper perspective of many non-aligned states' international relations, this compromising position on imperialism and neo-colonialism could be assessed as stemming from the very compelling variables of size, economy, geography, and military imperatives. The pressures and handicaps arising from these constraints limit the field of manoeuvre of small states in matters of foreign policy, as their options are very severely circumscribed by low capability. George Reid argues that the size of a state is a critical factor which determines a country's pattern of relationship between its domestic system and external environment. According to him, "domestic capability limitations predispose microstates to be highly dependent on the external environment". Such dependence, he said, restricts the scope of their foreign policy actions.⁴¹ It is hardly inconceivable what will be the behaviour of a state whose national budget is financed by another, and the defence of whose territorial integrity is the task of a foreign power. The inadequacies exert even more serious pressures where the states' geographic position is extremely vulnerable to the strategic interests of a more powerful neighbour with highly entrenched commitments. This is the predicament facing

40. Robert G. Good, 'The Congo Crisis : A Study of Post Colonial Politics' in L.W. Martin, (ed), Neutralism and Non-Alignment (New York, Praeger, 1962). The author's treatment of the various African perspectives on the Congo crisis makes an interesting reading on this point. See also Leopold Senghor, On African Socialism, (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1964) p.81. In the opinion of Senghor, the talk about colonialism reveals an inferiority complex. He therefore warns: "Let us stop denouncing colonialism and Europe, and attributing all our ills to them".

41. George Reid, The Impact of Very Small Size on the International Behaviour of Microstates (London; Sage Publications, 1974) p.34.

the countries, particularly the land-locked ones, in Southern Africa in their attempt to balance commitment to liberation, and dependence on South Africa against the background of national interest. Such countries, though independent, remain dangerously penetrable entities. Herein lies the substance in Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's description of them as "client states, independent in name"; and the import of Professor Ali Mazrui's thesis of "colonialism by consent";⁴² the colonies were forced to accept dependent status at independence.

Many of the ex-French colonies in Africa belong to this category. Heavily indebted to France for their economic development and security needs, the Franco-phone states of West and Central Africa (with the exception of Guinea) have always behaved as reluctant supporters of Pan-African aspirations, including the question of liberation. Their attitude to the Algerian war of independence was conspicuously neo-colonial and served French interests. So also was their hurried associate membership of the European Common Market at a time when Ghana and Guinea were vigorously opposed to such association on the grounds that it was a neo-colonial arrangement. A more overt expression of being camp-followers in the protection of French interests was their refusal at the Havana non-aligned summit conference to accept the colonial status of the territories of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guyana. Upper Volta's position reflected the common stand. According to her delegate, "on the subject of Martinique, Guadeloupe and French Guyana, my country believes that these French departments have not yet manifested any desire to become independent."⁴³

It is still in the familiar pattern of neo-colonial servitude for these countries to blink the insinuations of some African states against the continued

42. Ali A. Mazrui, Africa's International Relations, (London, Heinemann, 1977), p. 46.

43. Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned in Havana, (London, Francis Pinter, 1981), p. 246.

presence of French troops on their soil. This neo-colonial relationship is important in the determination of support for national liberation since it tends to portray a correlation between close affinity with a former colonial master, and the degree of support for anti-colonialism. The closer a state is drawn to the ex-metropolitan country, the less interest it shows in liberation. This poses a critical test for these states' adherence to non-alignment in view of the fact that the adoption of non-alignment expresses the desire to pursue an independent foreign policy which has support for national liberation as one fulfilling condition.

In strong contrast, the radicals regard imperialism and neo-colonialism as concrete phenomena existing in military, economic and political life, and exhibiting aggressive and exploitative tendencies. Accordingly, any abstract definition of them is strenuously challenged as being imperceptive and reactionary. Iraq's Dr. Hashim Jawad, in analysing them on the basis of his country's radicalism defined imperialism as "the struggle of certain powers and vested interests for world domination, and the control of its human and material resources".⁴⁴ According to him, the instrument of this domination is the formation of military blocs and the establishment of bases and bridgeheads. In certain instances, however, a more subtle method of diplomatic and financial pressure is applied towards the same end. This method he termed neo-colonialism.

Dr. Jawad's analysis squared up with Cuba's view as expounded at the 1961 Belgrade Non-aligned summit. This is not just a coincidence, considering that both countries shared similar radical outlook with anti-imperialism as the cornerstone of their foreign policy. For Cuba, the essence of Belgrade was not

44. Blegrade Conference Report, p.150.

so much an indulgence in platitudinous remarks about "colonialism, imperialism, and neo-colonialism", however morale-boosting such remarks might be. The real substance should be tackling them in the full recognition of their manifestations.

It was in denouncing any abstract connotation of them that Dr. Oswaldo Dorticos Torrado insisted:

They are not problems which can be dealt with by mere general declaration of principles with which many can agree but which few are disposed to comply. Each of these problems has a specific name and a concrete expression. Cuba asks the countries taking part in this meeting to consider concrete problems.⁴⁵

Cuba's and Iraq's radically-inspired attitude contrasts rather sharply with countries such as Burma and Nepal whose vague and passing references to these "problems" were at best a rueful and apologetic recognition.⁴⁶ What common ground there was in this contrasting attitude seemed to be only on colonialism. Even so Burma was reluctant to go along in an all out condemnation of it as borne out in her scriptural injunction to "obey the golden rule", which to many, smacked of a plea for neo-colonialism:

In combating colonialism and racial discrimination, she advised, ... we should be careful to avoid creating new problems and tensions. We should strive relentlessly to rid the world of these twin evils, but we should exercise care to ensure that this does not degenerate into a campaign of "getting our own back" against those who practised them. We must eschew all vindictiveness and obey the golden rule, "forgive and forget", when our goals have been attained. The good relations which exist today between so many newly liberated

45. Ibid, p.120.

46. Ibid. Instructively enough, the term "imperialism" was not employed throughout the speech of Burma. The only near mention of it was in her mild rebuke for France's "imperious attitude" towards the United Nations in her defiance of the Organisation's call for a negotiated settlement of the Algerian war. In the case of Nepal, it cropped up only once in association with colonialism.

countries and their former colonial powers prove that such a policy is not only possible but pays handsome dividends.⁴⁷

The conclusion in applying all of the above qualities to liberation politics bears out the general remark that countries with revolutionary experience show a high degree of radicalism that is consistent with support for national liberation movements. Imbued with such attributes as charismatic leadership, and a cohesive base which assures stability at home, a radical state, per force, seeks to play a far-reaching role beyond its national affairs which puts it up as a regional leader. In its revolutionary fidelity, it often opts for a 'win-lose' solution that finds adherents in radical movements. In terms of role conception then, such a country qualifies as the bastion of revolutionary forces, a staunch anti-imperialist, a protector of independence, and therefore a supporter of liberation struggle. So was Nasser's Egypt, as established in a letter cautioning King Hussein of Jordan against any attempt to liquidate the Palestinian Revolution:

The United Arab Republic believes in the importance of the Palestinian resistance, in its legality and in its effectiveness in the constant struggle against the enemy; and for this reason the United Arab Republic has always been of the opinion that the Palestinian resistance must be protected from all its enemies, and from some of those who, for their own purposes, pretend to be its friends.⁴⁸

The inescapable consequence of this kind of radicalism is the hostility it attracts from anti-revolutionary forces. Feeling threatened by a revolutionary upsurge, such forces are pushed into taking a defensive posture that is easily read as offensive by the revolutionary. This in turn creates an insecure

47. Belgrade Conference Report, p.70.

48. International Documents on Palestine, op. cit. (1970 volume), p.932.

environment for the latter, with the result that it now more than ever before convinces itself of the correctness of its foreign policy, as has been the case with Libya.⁴⁹ On this premise, radicalism grows more radical with a corresponding commitment to the task of promoting liberation struggles. The consequence is the emphasis on the strategic aspects of foreign policy on the rationalisation that support for liberation movements is a necessary condition for national survival. Thus the hypothesis that the revolutionary fervour of a country has a self-fulfilling function which goes into increased assistance for liberation activities. And from all this is the theoretical formulation of a country's measure of support for national liberation movements being related to its revolutionary experience.

4. Leadership:

The leadership factor, as already observed, is interwoven with the above determinant, but is worth a separate treatment because certain of its features give it a distinctive role. The argument remains as to the extent of the impact of a leader in foreign policy formulation. It forms part of the debate between the contending schools in International Relations - the 'realist' versus the 'Scientific' schools; or, more exactly, the practitioners versus the theorists - which requires the intervention of Alexis de Tocqueville, whose judgement is that:

49. Col. Gadaffi's Libya is viewed by moderate Arab and African states with intense suspicion as an agent of revolutionary instability. The country's assistance to all brands of liberation movements, together with a massive military build-up considered exceeding her defence needs, has created fear in many Arab governments. In their conservative policy, they see Gadaffi's revolutionary impetus as a threat to their positions. And in this, he makes no pretense. What can better justify their fears than his remarks that unless Saudi Arabia was "freed" there would be no liberation for the Arab World. Or when he would openly admit in a glowing sense of pride and mission as being the conscience of the Arab revolution: "I am the leader of a revolution that expresses the feelings of the whole Arab nation and the whole Islamic world. We in Libya are responsible for the whole Arab world" (Source: Newsweek, 20.7.81, p.22.

I have come across men of letters who have written history without taking part in public affairs, and politicians who have concerned themselves with producing events without thinking about them. I have observed that the first are always inclined to find general causes whereas the second, living in the midst of disconnected daily facts, are prone to imagine that everything is attributable to particular incidents, and that the wires they pull are the same as those that move the world. It is to be presumed that both are equally deceived.⁵⁰

In accepting Tocqueville's verdict, however, one does so with some reservations on the point of his hesitation to accord a precise recognition to the history-making capacity of the leader. In radical politics, the role of the leader in decision-making is of expanded significance and is basically a function of charisma and awareness. His ability to control the decision-making process makes the question of 'who rules' a practical consideration in its relevance to public policy. This is more so in the new states where social and political institutions are still in their formative stages, and where the leader assumes increased responsibility as being the modifier, thinker, and mobiliser. His task becomes even more daunting as a result of the incidence of widespread illiteracy and a despicable level of poverty which limit social and political awareness. From such a crusading role arises the concept of the 'Great Leader' with its pervasiveness that borders on hero-worshipping associated with a dictatorial order. In the assessment of Singapore's Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, such leaders command loyalty much greater than their high office may attract. According to him, "President Nkrumah is more Osagyefo or, the great leader than he is the President of Ghana. So too President Sukarno is more the Bung than the life President."⁵¹

50. Quoted in Theodore Coulombis and James Wolfe, Introduction to International Relations, (Prentice-Hall, Inc. New Jersey 1978), p.91.

51. Gehau Wijeyewardene (ed), Leadership and Authority, (University of Malaya Press, Singapore, 1968), p.3.

By the 'Great Leader' concept, the impressions, attitudes, and preferences of the individual, indeed his political posturing, are given an approximation of the inclinations and choices of the people and the nation. Invariably his ideas and policies acquire social value of general acceptance within the political environment he has so created. He is thus able to build a consensus on any issue to which he is personally committed. In this way a leader casts a movement in his own mould, directs the passions of the people into channels in conformity with his interpretation of events, and eventually symbolises the spirit of the nation.⁵²

It is in the true image of the 'Great Leader', in addition to acting in accordance with their revolutionary merit, that certain non-aligned leaders are reputed to be more principled and ardent supporters of national liberation movements than others. Through personal qualities which attract mass support, they bring their radical perspectives to bear on their countries' policies which generally seek to promote revolutionary change everywhere as a condition for safety at home and solidarity abroad. It is not enough for leaders like Nasser, Gadaffi, Sukarno, Ben Bella, Nkrumah and Ho Chi Minh to dream of Arab, African and Asian liberation. Nor was liberation to them a mere show of emotional solidarity with freedom movements. After all, one may rightly argue that the basis of their popularity, the legitimacy of their rule, and their claims to regional and international roles hinge on the very important single factor of the anti-colonial struggle. The performance of these leaders at the different non-aligned and various regional organisations' Conferences provide convincing proof of their dedication to liberation. This has very often brought them into conflict with the more moderate leaders who are seen as obstacles to the anti-imperialist drive. The anger of Sukarno at the attempts to promote peaceful coexistence over anti-imperialism, the vigorous anti-colonialism of Vietnam's Prime Minister,

52. See R. Hrair Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasser, (London : University of London Press, 1970) p.40 for Nasser's impact on Egyptian thinking.

Phan Van Dong, at Havana, which he described as a "sacred duty", and President Nkrumah's impatience with the functioning of the OAU Liberation Committee, constitute the hallmark of leadership role in the liberation struggle.

The question at this point is: with such over-powering influence in the shaping of their countries' decision-making, what happens when these leaders are off the scene, either by death or coup d'etat? There is no gainsaying the fact that the removal of some radical figures from the ranks of the non-aligned movement has had the adverse effect of lowering, even if temporarily, the anti-colonial pitch to a less militant and more accommodating level. It was not altogether a strange development, therefore, that the 'lull' in non-aligned affairs, marked by the break-off of regular three yearly summit meetings between 1964 and 1970, should coincide with the departure of such leaders as Presidents Ben Bella, Sukarno and Nkrumah. Besides, the period also coincided with the most intractable stage in the decolonisation process, presented by the new challenge of Ian Smith's UDI in Rhodesia, and the increasing intransigence of Portugal. Yet it was during this time that the non-aligned movement began to show a general softening of its anti-imperialist line and a flagging resolve to keep up the armed struggle. This was demonstrated in the 'Lusaka Manifesto', which formed the plank of anti-colonialism at the 1970 Summit Conference. All this indicated how much the movement had been deprived of the driving force these leaders gave to the anti-colonial campaign.

Except in one situation,⁵³ the attitude of the new regimes in the countries concerned has been one of declining interest in liberation affairs. The tendency

53. In Algeria, Ben Bella was replaced by an equally radical leader in President Boumedienne. See William B. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership in Algeria : 1954-1968, (Cambridge : The M.I.T. Press, 1961).

for them was to be inward looking, ostensibly to 'clear the debris' left behind by the ousted government. This often meant a reordering of priorities in which domestic issues prevailed over external commitments, and anti-colonialism was thereby rendered a less urgent policy, both in rhetoric and substance.

In Ghana, the overthrow of Dr. Nkrumah introduced a dramatic shift to moderate policy that even his external commitment to African liberation was employed as justification for the coup.⁵⁴ Not only was he accused of sacrificing the country's interest on the altar of Pan-Africanism; the new military government also claimed that his 'excesses' in foreign policy had alienated Ghana from her neighbours.^{54a} As a fence-mending measure, the country had to adopt a very moderate policy, more so in liberation politics. Hence the "discovery" of subversive cells in Accra run by Chinese instructors, to account for the hasty severance of diplomatic relations with Peking; and the subsequent identification of the country with the 'pro-dialogue' group in the OAU's liberation strategy on Southern Africa.

Nasser's departure from the Egyptian scene similarly initiated a new perspective on liberation that undermined Egypt's leading position in the Arab and non-aligned world. Nasser considered support for national liberation a sacred duty as demanded by the country's geographic position as the 'gate-keeper' of the

54. A.A. Afrifa, The Ghana Coup, 24th February, 1966. (London, 1966,), p.104. The author, a Lt. General, was a leader of the coup; and according to him, one of the major reasons for the overthrow was the fear within the Ghanaian Armed Forces that soldiers were to be sent to Rhodesia to fight what he termed an "unnecessary war". In his opinion, the four million blacks in Rhodesia should be left to fight their war of independence. His endorsement of the stand of Malawi and Kenya on UDI is important for its relevance to Ghana's later liberation policy which supported dialogue with South Africa in the early seventies.

54a. See Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa (Ministry of Information, State Publishing Corp.; Accra, 1966).

African and Asian continents. This made Cairo a symbol of strength to liberation forces. In awareness of this, the country's ruling Arab Socialist Union Central Committee in a policy statement on his death assured the nation that the "field which he capably occupied as a "history maker" would be effectively taken over. But his successor, it turned out, decided otherwise on the pledge "that Egypt should remain strong and the backbone of the Arab revolution; and to retain its leading position in the world liberation movement."⁵⁵ Considering in effect the Committee's wishes to "perpetuate his principles" which included total liberation of all Arab lands by money or blood, the signing of a separate peace treaty - the Camp David Accord with Israel clearly amounted to a betrayal of these principles for which the leader worked and died.

On the whole, the weakening in support for liberation caused by the erosion of radical leadership characterised the non-aligned movement in the second half of the 1960s. It was not until 1972⁵⁶ and thereafter, with the arrival of a new breed of revolutionary leaders like Col. Gadaffi of Libya, Michael Manley of Jamaica, Ethiopia's Col. Mengistu, and the presidents of the newly liberated Portuguese colonies, among others, that anti-colonialism became once again a dominant theme in the movement.

55. Africa Contemporary Record, 1970, C8.

56. Ran Kochan, 'Changing emphasis in the Non-Aligned Movement', The World Today, November, 1972, p.502. Kochan assessed the impact of new leaders on the movement; and using the Georgetown Ministerial Conference as an indicator, observed that "the general tenor of the gathering suggested a new profile for the non-aligned countries - more demanding, more radical, and more militant.

Conclusion:

As already pointed out at the beginning of the chapter, the temptation might be to treat these four major factors as separate variables. But such a treatment could well be misleading as it fails to take into account their inter-relatedness. For example, when we talk of the revolutionary experience of a country, what we should bear in mind is that the success of any revolution has much to do with leadership qualities. The kind of leadership influences the outcome of a revolution which eventually defines a country's ideological position, and consigns it either to the radical or moderate camp. It is thus both theoretically and practically impossible to isolate the determinant of revolutionary experience from that of leadership characteristics. Nor can we separate, in strict terms, the factors of regional and national demands, and duration of independence, since a nation's experience in the course of independent existence contributes significantly to defining its national interest.

The inter-relatedness of these variables also point to how they reinforce one another. Although it is stated that the lull in non-aligned campaign for national liberation movements in the late '60s and early '70s was as a result of the erosion of radical leadership, we cannot wholly attribute this lull to one particular factor, however far-reaching that may be. For as could be seen, the period which witnessed the removal of some of the radical leaders also marked a new wave of inter-state conflicts and civil wars in many non-aligned countries, thus emphasising the impact of regional and national interests in helping to bring about the lull.

Not only that; the general international climate which set different priorities for the Belgrade and the Cairo Conferences continued to influence the

trend and nature of support. What we are trying to say here is that all the four factors influence each other, and often combine to produce one result. One therefore discerns a general argument emerge from their inter-relatedness; which is that the non-aligned movement's support, or lack of it, for national liberation is basically determined by a combination of variables discussed above.

CHAPTER 3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUPPORT WITHIN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

In discussing the development of liberation support within the non-aligned movement, it is necessary to go back to the years preceeding the formal establishment of the movement in 1961. This is because the period leading up to the first non-aligned summit Conference in Belgrade forms a significant part of the history of the movement. Beginning with India in 1947, almost all the newly independent states, in opting for a non-aligned foreign policy, advocated the necessity of the anti-colonial struggle and actually identified with it. That identification greatly encouraged the rise and spread of national liberation movements in the colonial territories. Thus, a survey of the development of the anti-colonial support should start by examining the emergence of the liberation movements in the non-aligned movement.

But to talk of the emergence of national liberation movements in non-alignment appears to be a contradiction in terms, considering that liberation movements are the agents of independence. The issue however, is simplified by the fact that although national liberation movements had contributed to the emergence of non-alignment, what actually established the policy are sovereign states. And the liberation movements not being sovereign could not immediately qualify as direct subjects of non-alignment. No doubt the movements subscribe to the policy of non-alignment; but the fact remains that non-alignment as a foreign policy belongs to independent states. In which case the profession of the policy by the liberation movements is but an aspiration awaiting the arrival of independence to actualise it. Be this as it may, the bond between the sovereign states and the liberation movements, rooted in a long evolving pattern of interaction preceeding the official founding of the non-aligned movement, provides the liberation

organisations with a formidable claim to participation in the non-aligned movement.

The Rise of Movements of National Liberation in the Non-Aligned Movement

The origins of liberation movements in the non-aligned movement are traceable to such gatherings as the 1947 and 1949 New Delhi meetings summoned at the instance of India to discuss national independence generally. The January 1949 Asian States Conference sought to mobilize support for the Indonesian independence struggle, and for which it drew up certain collective measures against the Netherlands in the wake of fighting between the Dutch colonial army and the Indonesian liberation forces.¹ Thereafter the issue of national liberation became an integral part of Afro-Asian co-operation manifested in bodies like the non-governmental Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organisation, and in the inter-governmental move represented by the 1955 Bandung Conference.

The premise of the co-operation centred mainly around the anti-colonial struggle which was partly conceived in terms of protecting national independence thought to be secure only in the context of the anti-colonial victory. In the 1950s, almost all of Africa was still under colonial rule, while in Asia the liberation struggle, encouraged and hastened by India's victory in 1947, was far from over. Apart from viewing the continued existence of colonialism on these continents as an affront to their dignity, the new states saw the dependent territories as a threat to their independence in the fear that the colonies could be used as staging posts for aggression. This accounted for the assertion of Ghana that the country's independence was meaningless unless the whole of Africa was free. Several years

1. See G.H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), pp.56-62 and 83-100 for a discussion of the two meetings.

later, the non-aligned movement entered a similar note:

The non-aligned countries are aware of the importance of the state which the Third World represents for the forces of hegemony, all the more so because the many difficulties they encounter in their desire to consolidate their sovereignty and ensure their development are strengthening their conviction that safeguarding of their independence is inseparable from the attainment of the aspirations of all oppressed peoples to freedom and independence.²

As a result, nothing at the time was considered more urgent than the colonial question; all other demands - economic and social - could be said to hinge on it. Not even international peace threatened by the East-West ideological and military rivalry was seen as deserving a more serious attention. On this, one recalls Prime Minister Nehru's panacea for international peace; that the world "cannot long maintain peace if half of it is enslaved and despised... Political subjugation, racial inequality, economic inequality and misery - these are the evils we have to remove if we would ensure peace".³ To that will be added his rejection of the United State's assessment of the international situation in the 1950s as basically a moral struggle of democracy against communism: "Probably" he said, "in the United States the crisis of the time is supposed to be communism versus anti-communism. It may be so to some extent. But the crisis of the time in Asia is colonialism versus anti-colonialism. Let us be clear about it".⁴

All this serves to explain the fierce pro-liberation outlook of the Afro-

Asian Peoples Solidarity Organisation whose call on President Gamel Abdel Nasser

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2. Algiers Conference Declaration in Odette Jankowitsch and Karl Sauvant The Third World, Without Superpowers : The Collected Document of the Non-Aligned Countries, Vol. 1 (New York : Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, 1978), p. 221.
 3. A. Appadorai, Documents on Political Thought of Modern India, (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1976) p. 729.
 4. Quoted in Leo Mates, Non-Alignment : Theory and Current Practice, (New York: Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, 1972) p. 84.

to summon a meeting of all anti-imperialist forces led to the December 1957 Cairo Conference.⁵ The Conference was especially notable for the radical speeches which in the end resulted in an anti-colonial resolution expressing "full support for the rights of peoples to self-determination, sovereignty, and complete independence".⁶ Particularly significant was the fact that for the first time in the history of the independence struggle, the movements for liberation in these two continents had gathered in their own right to discuss and plan common action.

The impact the Conference had, especially on African liberation, was registered in a similar meeting - the All-Africa People's Conference of December 1958 in Accra. Like the Cairo meeting, Accra was also a non-governmental gathering of anti-colonial forces, bringing together political parties, trade unions, and nationalist movements. The Conference took two important decisions which signalled the coming of a new phase in the anti-colonial struggle. These were the establishment of a permanent secretariat in the Ghanaian capital to co-ordinate liberation activities, and the setting up of a Freedom Fund to be contributed to mainly by African states in order to "accelerate the liberation of Africa from imperialism and colonialism".⁷

Earlier in the same year, in April, a Conference of Independent African States had taken place in the same capital to consider ways of helping those colonies still under colonial rule. The host president, Kwame Nkrumah, gave urgency to this need in a keynote address by making clear that it was the sole

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5. See Robert Mortimer, Third World Coalition in International Politics (New York : Praeger Publications, 1980), p.10.
 6. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1957, p. 16000.
 7. Louis B. Sohn, (ed), Basic Documents of African Regional Organisations, Vol. 1 (New York, Dobbs Ferry, Oceana Publications Ltd. 1971), p.33.

responsibility of Africa "to hasten the total liberation of Africa, the last stronghold of colonialism".⁸ The Conference marked the first concerted approach by African States to the issue of colonialism, and eventually paved the way to similar meetings such as the Monrovia and Casablanca summits of 1959 and 1961 respectively.⁹

Both the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organisation's meeting and the two Accra Conferences are important for the impetus they gave the anti-colonial momentum, with delegates, in the case of the All-Africa Peoples Conference, agreeing to prosecute the liberation struggle with all means possible, including the use of violence, in response to Nkrumah's call for "positive action". Patrice Lumumba of the Congo was one nationalist leader who immediately translated this resolve into action. On returning home from the meeting, he delivered his now famous speech which inflamed the anti-colonial passions of the people, and precipitated that country's independence. In faithfulness to the demands of the Conference, he vowed: "From this day forward, during the entire course of our campaign, we shall therefore do our utmost not to disappoint those patriots who have demonstrated their trust in us by supporting us and seconding our efforts".¹⁰ This trust and support largely encouraged the radicalisation of the anti-colonial campaign and accounted for the emergence of many of the national liberation movements in the late 1950s and early sixties, a period that might be taken as marking the dawn of an era of the phenomenon of national liberation.

8. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1958, p. 16226.

9. In attendance at Monrovia were Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic (Egypt). The Casablanca meeting was attended by Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, Libya, United Arab Republic, Mali and the Algerian Provisional Government.

10. Jean Van Lierde (ed), Lumumba Speaks : The Speeches and Writings of Patrice Lumumba, 1958-1961, (Boston : Little Brown and Company, 1963) p. 59.

More important was the step taken by the Conference of Independent African States to admit, albeit as observers, the UPC of Cameroon and the Algerian Liberation Movement - the FLN; the latter seized the opportunity to request African states for material and financial assistance. The significance of admission for the FLN lies in its implied recognition for the movement as the representative of the Algerian people. For up till then France, the colonial power, had strenuously challenged any treatment of the FLN as representing the Algerian people. With regard to other nationalist movements, the Conference opened the door for them for a more direct interaction with independent states. In the words of one nationalist leader, these meetings brought the freedom movements "in contact with experienced political figures from all the African countries and from all over the world".¹¹

The Bandung Conference

The 1955 Bandung Conference marked a higher phase in the bi-continental co-operation. The summit, regarded by some scholars as the forerunner of the non-aligned movement, was mainly to consider "problems of common interest and concern to the countries of Asia and Africa", and to discuss "ways and means by which their peoples could achieve fuller economic, cultural and political co-operation".¹² But it realised that "the existence of colonialism in many parts of Asia and Africa ... not only prevents cultural co-operation but also suppresses the national cultures of the people".¹³ Inevitably, therefore, anti-colonialism formed a major item on the Bandung agenda, and in the end became the spirit of the Conference.

11. Ibid, p. 58.

12. Odette Jankowitsch and Karl Sauvart, The Third World without Superpowers: The Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries, Vol. I, (New York: Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, 1978) p. lvii.

13. Ibid, p. lx.

The host president, Ahmed Sukarno, in his opening speech emphasised the anti-colonial content by observing that the participating countries were united, despite their superficial divisions, by a common detestation of colonialism. And some seven years before Nehru certified colonialism as more or less dead, Sukarno challenged any such view in his conception of colonialism as something more than direct foreign rule:

Do not think of colonialism only in the classic form which we of Indonesia and brothers in different parts of Asia and Africa knew. Colonialism has also its modern dress in the form of economic control, of intellectual control, and actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation. It is a skilful and determined enemy, and it appears in many guises. Wherever, whenever and however it appears, colonialism is an evil thing and one which must be eradicated from the earth.¹⁴

In what might be described as the intense atmosphere of anti-colonialism created by President Sukarno's address, even moderate Pakistan made "the right of self-determination of all people, and resistance to colonial exploitation in any form" as one of its seven conditions for world peace.¹⁵ But this pronounced anti-colonial feeling soon ran foul of an ideologically influenced interpretation of the phenomenon of colonialism, thereby initiating a heated controversy about its form. The generally accepted notion which identified colonialism only with the West was challenged by the pro-Western countries in their characterisation of the Soviet Union's relationship with Eastern Europe as colonial as well. In a way, therefore, the issue of colonialism became the subject which at once created both pronounced agreement and disagreement at the Conference.

14. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1955/56, p. 14181.

15. Keesings Contemporary Archives, Ibid.

Despite the contending interpretations of colonialism, the Conference ended on a strong anti-colonial note in the condemnation of any form of foreign domination as an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation, and constituting a denial of fundamental human rights contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. Racialism was equally condemned, on which basis the Conference "extended its warm sympathy and support for the courageous stand taken by the victims of racial discrimination, especially by the peoples of African, Indian and Pakistan origin in South Africa".¹⁶ The position reflected the anti-apartheid crusade, championed by India at the time in the United Nations.

Bandung, in registering such open support for the liberation struggle, delighted the freedom movements. But it could also be said to have left them rather disappointed for the minor role it offered them. The ANC of South Africa together with other movements attended as unofficial observers and were denied the right to address the conference on the excuse that they were too many to be heard individually.¹⁷ This was at best an excuse that probably made sense at that time when liberation movements were merely patronised by the independent states which were always quick to draw the distinction in their relationship on the basis of sovereign inequality. Nevertheless, Bandung, together with the other conferences referred to, was later to prove invaluable to the movements in their quest for non-aligned recognition.

The achievement of Bandung in bringing together countries so diverse in culture and political system to pursue common objectives raised hopes for an

16. Jankowitsch and Sauvart, op cit. p. lxii.

17. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1955/56, p. 14181.

institutionalisation of this type of Afro-Asian co-operation. But these were unfulfilled hopes for which India was in part responsible;¹⁸ and the reason lay in her antagonistic relations with Pakistan and China.¹⁹ It must have been the fear of India that an Afro-Asian organisation in which Pakistan and China could play an increasingly important role would certainly be detrimental to her interest. It was therefore natural for her to show a reduced interest in any re-enactment of 'Bandung'.

While the continuation of 'Bandung' was becoming a subject of controversy, President Josip Tito of Yugoslavia was working to establish a more broadly based forum in the nature of the non-aligned movement.^{19a} He had discovered in Bandung the potential of non-alignment. His groundwork for this project initially resulted in the summit meeting of Nasser, Nehru and himself in July 1956 at Brioni. The meeting is generally held remarkable for the future development of Third World international relations. It is seen as a significant and decisive step in the opinion-sounding process aimed at synthesizing various national interests into one single perspective that eventually came to be represented in non-alignment. The summiteers might have had their various national interests to look after. But these were underpinned by one common factor - independence - and by implication, the anti-colonial struggle. The summit gave due recognition to the desire for

18. Peter Lyons, Neutralism, (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1963), p. 179 has given as reason for non-continuation of 'Bandung' the unpopularity of China with Tito, Nasser and Nehru.

19. For India/Pakistan relations, see G.W. Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India, (London : Pall Mall Press, 1968).

19a. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970) pp. 63-64. See also G.H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, (London : Faber and Faber, 1966) for the 'collapse' of future Bandung and the emergence of non-aligned movement.

national independence in its communique - better known as the Brioni Document - which condemned colonialism with particular reference to Algeria and Palestine.²⁰

Soon, a selective process was to be initiated, making support for national liberation as one major criterion for membership of this evolving Third World alliance. The June 1961 Cairo Preparatory Conference for that year's Belgrade non-aligned summit did exactly that in setting out the conditions for invitation to attend.* The reasoning behind the invitation criteria, as is widely suggested, was to restrict membership of the non-aligned movement to those radical states which had adopted anti-imperialism as the cornerstone of their foreign policy. This decision seemed to bear the impressions of Nasser and Nkrumah, both of whom were members of the Casablanca bloc which was opposed to the Brazzaville group²¹ for the latter's support for France over the Algerian struggle. Certainly the two leaders would have liked to exclude the Brazzaville states from the emerging Third World alliance on grounds of their lukewarm attitude towards national liberation. In the end, they were not invited to the Cairo summit.

The sequel to the criterion of liberation support was the making of anti-colonialism a top item on the recommended agenda for the Belgrade summit. And the emphasis on the subject was conveyed in the communique of the preparatory meeting which implicitly called on the main conference to register positive results

20. Communique of the Brioni Conference reprinted in Leo Mates, op. cit. pp. 379-381.

21. The Brazzaville Group was composed of the following countries: Niger, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey (now Benin), Cameroon, Central African Republic, Malagasy, Mauritania, Chad, Congo(B), Gabon and Senegal. See Hella Pick, 'The Brazaville Twelve and How They Came to Be', Africa Report, May 1961, for the political orientation of the group.

* See pp 30-31 Chapter 1 for these criteria.

in "the realisation of the aspirations of millions of people for independence".²²

When eventually the summit conference took place, it left no doubts about the commitment of the non-aligned movement to anti-colonialism by the attendance, albeit as observers and guests, of a large number of national liberation movements.²³

At this stage, the primacy of the independence struggle seemed assured in the overall policy of the new states. Just fresh from colonial rule, the perspective of most of them on the world was still dominated by the experience of the liberation struggle as they searched for a realistic approach to international relations. It was this struggle which had introduced them to the world community, and whatever experience they had acquired in international diplomacy was limited at the time to the politics of colonial independence. Besides, there was a moral dimension which, in viewing colonialism as inhuman, obliged its past victims to render whatever assistance that was needed to eradicate the system. It is from such historical and moral necessity that the affinity between the national liberation

22. Communique of the Preparatory Meeting of Representatives of Non-Aligned Countries, Cairo, 5-12 June 1961, in The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, 1-6 September, 1961 (Blegrade: Published by Publicisticko - Izda - Vacki Zavod, Yugoslavia), p. 15.

23. The following national liberation movements attended as observers: The Angolan National Liberation Movement; United National Independence Party of Northern Rhodesia (latter Zambia); National Democratic Party of Southern Rhodesia; the Uganda National Congress; the Ruanda-Urundi National Union; the Uganda People's Congress; the African Independence Party of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC); the Democratic National Union of Mozambique; Kenya African National Union (KANU); the United Front of South Africa; the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa; the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC); the South African Indian National Congress; the South-West African People's Organisation; the Union of the People of Angola; the Union of the People of Cameroon (UPC); and South-West African People's Organisation (SWAPO).

movements and the non-aligned has grown. There is therefore no over-stating the fact of these countries' attachment to the liberation campaign which provides the explanation for action in most other areas of national endeavour.

However, certain crucial points tend to emerge in assessing the importance of the conferences discussed above in their relationship with the national liberation movements. If the Conference of Independent African States should be regarded as a follow-up of Bandung, albeit on a uni-continental scale, for their similarity in many respects, the second Accra meeting of liberation movements could well be considered as successor to the Cairo Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference for the simple reason of their composition, outlook and results. But more important in this contrasting similarity is the acceptance by the three summit conferences of Bandung, Accra and Belgrade of the principle of inequality between the sovereign states and the liberation movements in the way the latter were treated. Whereas the two non-governmental meetings accepted the movements as full participants as was rightly expected, the three summit conferences held back on full participation in demonstration of sovereign prerogative, a point that was to have unsettling consequences in their future relationship as we shall soon see.

Nevertheless a process of acceptance of the movements in the emergent broader non-aligned movement had begun, the trend resulting mainly from two factors. The first concerned the recognition granted them by such organisations as the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organisation and other regional bodies whose influence on the non-aligned augured well for such acceptance. Then of course the very logical reason that since the national liberation movements are the entities directly engaged in the liberation struggle, it is only fair to insist that

for non-alignment's anti-colonial principle to be credible, the liberation movements should necessarily be involved in its anti-colonial affairs. After all, it might be said that the adoption of the national liberation movements provides the only true test to the anti-colonial foundations of non-alignment. What gives added weight to these two factors is presumably the professed policy of non-alignment by the liberation movements. Though lacking reality since non-alignment is a policy of independent states, the adherence to the policy has the positive value of building a Third World image for the movements.

Recognition of the National Liberation Movements

Despite such well-founded arguments in favour of full acceptance of the liberation movements by the non-aligned; and inspite of the adoption of anti-colonialism as a common ideology by the new states, there still existed the thorny question of a definite status for the liberation movements in non-aligned membership. At the root of the matter lay the issue of recognition which had evoked the argument as to whether or not national liberation movements should be invited to non-aligned conferences. If the answer was yes, in what capacity? Were they to attend as guests, observers or full participants? These were crucial questions to the movements to whom recognition was vital for their very existence and meaningful operations. But though the liberation movements realised the importance of recognition, they were not so naive as to think that it would be handed to them on a platter of gold, given their limitation of non-sovereign attribute. Hence the vigorous campaign for it. In fact some of the movements, in seeking a way out of the non-sovereign limitation, but also as an expression of their military successes, had had to form governments-in-exile to facilitate the winning of de jure recognition. This was the tactics of the Algerian, Angolan and the Vietnamese movements.

The Cairo non-aligned preparatory meeting of June 1961 set itself to answer the question of representation, but in doing so provoked a heated debate that illustrated the divisive influence of liberation politics in the non-aligned movement.²⁴ Ghana at this meeting proposed the invitation of the Algerian Provisional Government. The move probably was aimed at further promoting the Algerian cause through diplomatic backing as already entered at various Pan-African meetings, including the most recent one in Casablanca in which the Provisional Government participated as a full member. But the proposal was hotly contested, with Sri Lanka seeking "clarification" on the subject. India, Burma, Ethiopia and Sudan were also known to have made reservations.²⁵ A comprehensive resolution put forward by the Foreign Minister of Indonesia failed to resolve the differences in opinion. Consequently, a sub-committee composed of representatives of Afghanistan, Cuba, Cambodia, Guinea, India, Iraq, Mali, Egypt, Morocco and Yugoslavia was set up to consider the issue. The sub-committee's decision, hardly a consensus,²⁶ but at best a "preponderant view", recommended that the Provisional Government be invited to the Preparatory Meeting and the summit conference in Belgrade. This gave Algeria full membership of the non-aligned movement.

No firm decision was taken with regard to the liberation movements, nevertheless they attended the summit conference unofficially as observers.

24. See Jankowitsch and Sauvart, *op. cit.* pp. 33-39 for the proceedings of the meeting.

25. Peter Lyons, *op. cit.* p. 182.

26. The lack of consensus was recorded in the sub-committee's report in these words: "Some delegates while reiterating their full support for the movement for Algerian independence, explained the attitude of their Governments on the question of the recognition of the Provisional Government of Algeria, and abstained from the proposal".

It was at the Colombo Preparatory Meeting of March 1964 where the question of their representation was officially raised, following the application by twenty-one liberation organisations for authority to make representations to the Council of Ministers of the Preparatory Meeting. Then, the meeting agreed that the movements be "associated" with the non-aligned conferences, but failed to spell out the form of association. This again necessitated the setting up of another sub-committee comprising Algeria, Ghana, India and Morocco to go into the matter. Its accepted recommendations were as follows:

- (i) All nationalist movements from colonial territories which have not yet attained independence are welcome to present their views to the Conference, and the host country will be requested to give them all facilities to do so.

With regard to Provisional Governments, it provided that

- (ii) Should any new provisional government be formed in Africa between now and the holding of the Conference, and be recognised by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Standing Committee should extend invitation to that provisional government as a full member.
- (iii) Should any new provisional government be formed in the continents other than the African continent between now and the holding of the Conference, the Standing Committee should consider the matter and after consulting and obtaining the approval of all member-states, extend an invitation as observer or full member.²⁷

27. See Jankowitsch and Sauvart, *op. cit.* p. 67.

It was on the strength of the second recommendation that the Angolan Provisional Government attended the Cairo summit as a full participant.

The conditions for admission and the whole procedure of recognition, characterised by such controversy, bear out the following observations:

(a) there seems to have been a good measure of inconsistency and actual discrimination in dealing with the movements, on which ground one questions the rationale for the different status accorded the African Provisional Governments and their Asian counterparts, as so undisguisidly made in the ambiguous and indeterminate requirement for the latter. The obvious explanation might be that at the time there was no regional organisation like the OAU in Asia to pass the responsibility of recognition to. But then there was the Arab League, not to be described as an African organisation, which could do for the PLO what the OAU was expected to do for any African movement. (b) Though the conditions in a way regularised the position of the liberation movements, this did not remove the contention that the non-aligned body was yet to come to terms with the emergence of the national liberation movements in its activities.

The first of these observations soon became a major point of disagreement.

Not only was the apparent unequal treatment a source of acrimony; but from later developments it seemed as though the Colombo decision had been reneged upon.

These were the issues which confronted the Dar-es-Salaam Preparatory Meeting of April 1970.²⁸ One would have thought that the Colombo agreement on admission stood inviolate, in which case any request by the Provisional Government of Vietnam for participation was just a matter of formality. On the contrary, the

28. See *ibid*, pp. 167-168 for the debate and decisions on the subject of the representation of the PRG and the liberation movements.

issue reopened, showing sharp division that threatened the unity of the non-aligned movement.

At the time of the Dar-es-Salaam meeting, about thirty states, half of which were non-aligned, had already recognised the Provisional Government. Those in favour of its admission as full participant used this fact to advance their position. And referring to the precedent in the admission of Algeria and Angola to further support their case, they pointed to the military successes of the NLF which had brought large areas of South Vietnam under the Provisional Government's effective control. Above all, they tried to touch on the sensibility of the non-aligned movement by contending that member-states ought to do better than the United States which had already granted the Government a de facto recognition by agreeing to enter into direct negotiations with it.

The opponents of admission on the other hand countered these arguments by the refusal to draw any parallel between the African examples and the PRG on the grounds that:

- (i) The non-aligned movement was a body of independent states.
- (ii) The question of South Vietnam was partly that of the problem of divided nations like Korea and Germany.
- (iii) The PRG did not represent South Vietnam.

A compromise proposal suggested observer status for the Provisional Government at the preparatory meeting, while recommendation was made to the Summit Conference to consider granting it full membership. The proposal failed to soften the entrenched positions. Following this, the Chairman of the meeting had to intervene in a ruling which allowed the PRG observer status at

Dar-es-Salaam, but referred the issue of membership to the Heads of State Conference. This, as he put it, was "in order to preserve the cohesion of the non-aligned countries". The national liberation movements on their part also applied for participation in the meeting. The application evoked disagreement which was finally settled, allowing African liberation movements recognised by the OAU, and Asian organisations so recognised, to be heard at non-aligned meetings and conferences. In the end, the PRG attended the Lusaka Summit as an observer and the African liberation movements as guests.

Once again, in August 1972 at the Georgetown Preparatory meeting for the Algiers Summit, the PRG applied for full membership but was only admitted as an observer. Even this was strongly opposed by the Central African Republic, Indonesia, Laos, Lesotho, Malaysia, Rwanda, Zaire and Singapore.^{29a} And once again the application was referred to the Summit Conference which on this occasion granted it full participation.

With regard to the recognition of the PLO, the non-aligned movement seized the initiative from the Arab League. In March 1974, the Algiers meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau recognised the organisation as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, thus doing better than the Arab League in this respect.²⁹ For the ten years of the PLO's existence, the Arab League had dithered in recognising the organisation as such, apparently in order not to annoy King Hussein of Jordan whose rule over 1,160,000 Palestinians formed the basis of his claim of being their representative. Designating the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people was viewed by the King as amounting to interference in the internal affairs of Jordan. It was presumably for this reason

29. Jankowitsch and Sauvart, (Vol. III) Ibid p. 1387.

29a. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1972, p.25465.

that the country refused to accept the forces of the Palestine Liberation Army on its soil in 1964. In October, 1974, the Arab League also granted the same recognition to the Organisation.³⁰ This double recognition, together with the Organisation's respectable appearance at the United Nations in November 1974, won it full participation at the 1975 Foreign Ministers Conference at Lima. Although SWAPO was recognised by the 1973 Algiers Conference as the "legitimate representative and spokesman of the Namibian people in conformity with the decisions and resolutions of the Organisation of African Unity" it was not until 1978 that the Extraordinary Meeting of Foreign Ministers held in New York decided to admit the Organisation as a full member of the non-aligned movement. The Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe, representing ZANU and ZAPU achieved the same status in 1979 after its recognition by the OAU summit of 1977 in Libreville, Gabon.

The observation of partiality in attitude towards some of the movements, and the whole question of paternalistic treatment of the national liberation movements demand further explanation, without which it would be difficult to understand the underlying factors which influence recognition. The first of these factors is the ideological conflict within the non-aligned movement. Nowhere is this more pronounced than in the case of the PRG. Although opposition to the admission of the PRG was ostensibly based on the reality of the division of Vietnam, it more importantly had to do with ideology. It might be pertinent to point out here the non-mention of the Vietnam struggle in the 1961 Belgrade Communiqué under colonialism. The possible impression this created at the

30. The Search for Peace in the Middle East : Documents and Statements, 1967-79 (Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), p.273. It is important to note that to satisfy King Hussein's objections, the League's recognition only covered "Palestinian people in any Palestinian territory that is liberated".

time seemed to be that the non-aligned movement was yet to agree on the definite status of the NLF, and therefore the PRG, for want of clarification on the real focus of the NLF.

Unlike the liberation movements in Africa whose focus was clearly anti-colonialism and which made their ideological orientation less of an issue, what to make of the NLF remained a nagging question in non-aligned liberation politics. Whereas the radical countries accepted it for what it claimed to be - an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movement - the moderates saw the NLF as nothing but a front for North Vietnam's communist take-over of the South in a war of national unification. In their recognition of South Vietnam as an independent state with due regard to the 1954 Geneva agreement on Indochina, the moderates viewed the war in South Vietnam as a domestic concern. Consequently any non-aligned support for the NLF was deemed as interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Malaysia seemed to speak for the moderates at the 1973 Algiers summit conference when in an implicit reference to Vietnam she criticised any such interference. It might be well to quote her to obtain a clearer perspective of these countries on the Vietnam war:

Together with the other non-aligned countries, Malaysia is irreversably opposed to colonialism, imperialism and racism. We stand firmly behind the liberation movements in their struggle for freedom and human dignity. This profound principle of the non-aligned movement must not be exploited for giving support to interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Our movement cannot assume a position in favour of one or the other side in internal rivalries or conflicts within the fold of one state. This would be tantamount to meddling in their internal affairs. The people of every country have the right to make their own decisions about their future without any interference from the outside; and the non-aligned countries must endeavour to facilitate reconciliation, to make it easier to find peaceful solutions, and to prevent further bloodshed between differing sides.³¹

31. Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, No. 565, October 1973, p. 12.

Indeed the eventual unification of the country support the contention that the Vietnam war was basically the problem of divided nations. But this, as the radicals might argue, formed only part of the larger issue of imperialism, and did not invalidate the fact that the war was a continuation of the unfinished Indochina anti-colonial struggle, first against the French and then the United States. Unfortunately not many countries were capable of perceiving it in this light for the very obvious reasons of ideological and national interests.

Concerning the national liberation movements, the reluctance to grant them full recognition is attributable to an excessive evaluation of independence which would not allow nations, especially the moderate status quo states, to water down sovereignty in order to accommodate the liberation movements. In their strong attachment to the principle of sovereignty, member-countries regarded any concession to the movements as equal partners as being incompatible with the traditionally acclaimed position of the state as the major actor in the international system. Consequently, even the granting of observer status to the movements was viewed as a considerable compromise. In the opinion of the national liberation movements, however, the discrimination on grounds of sovereignty was inconsiderate; since it ignored the reality of the international situation in which absolute sovereignty is least tenable. In frowning at the non-sovereign limitation to their status, the movements contended that the fact that others were independent and they not yet free was only fortuitous, as implied in their request for membership in the OAU:

No African country or nation is really free until all Africa is free. Accordingly, we urge most strongly that in all African countries no forms of discrimination or differentiation of status should even be entertained among us African peoples. We are all African Freedom fighters. The fact that we are not yet free is not due to any lack of

revolutionary spirit in our movements. It is due to the oppressive tactics of the imperialists as well as some historical and political realities in our territories. We urge sincerely that in this summit conference we be accorded a status commensurate to our position as brothers and comrades of other African freedom fighters who have already won their independence. We request that the opportunity be given to us to participate in and address the summit conference as associate members.³²

Seven years after, the request was still to be considered. The silence incited a less subdued appeal which made it known to the OAU that "the petitionary status presently held by the liberation movements no longer respects the needs of the struggle, nor the historic dignity of our peoples."³³

An attempt to reconcile the sovereign prerogative with the non-sovereign attributes of the liberation movements to accord the latter some measure of recognition was made by the African Group at the United Nations with respect to the FLN. The Group decided to admit the FLN to its meetings but, with the proviso that the movement could only speak on matters pertaining to Algeria. It was a concession Immanuel Wallerstein described as amounting to "a small breach of juridicial correctness".³⁴

But such measure (which later became the normal pattern of relationship between the liberation movements and the non-aligned movement) did not go far enough to satisfy the liberation movements which continued to press for equality in status. At one stage when the pressures appeared ignored, the African liberation movements were known to take the dramatic step of setting up

32. Quoted in Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa : The Politics of Unity, (London : Pall Mall Press, 1968), p. 154.

33. Africa Contemporary Records, 1971, p. C 130.

34. Immanuel Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 28.

their own organisation, apparently as challenge to the refusal of the OAU to accord them full recognition. The organisation, to be known as the Union of Non-Independent African States, had as its objective, among others, "to plan strategy on problems confronting the African liberation movement ... and to uphold the independence of the Liberation Movement".³⁵ But the project was abandoned on the advice of the Tanzanian Government.

A final observation about the criteria for recognition in relation to the liberation movements is the implication of making regional recognition a condition for non-aligned acceptance. This might have been intended to insulate the non-aligned movement from the divisive influence of recognition politics which afflict, for example, the OAU. Disunity among the liberation movements in most territories did not only involve the OAU's resources and effort to create unity; it also gave rise to intra OAU rivalry arising from member-states preference for one movement or the other. Being an organisation that functions on decision-making by consensus, the non-aligned movement could ill-afford to open itself to such divisive influence. Also the decision to leave it at that must have been dictated by the fact that the regional bodies are the first point of contact with the liberation movements in the latter's two-tier external relationship.

But if the condition proved advantageous to the non-aligned organisation, it certainly had very obvious drawbacks for the liberation movements. By making non-aligned recognition dependent on regional acceptance, all that the non-aligned movement had done was virtually to place the liberation organisations in a begging position vis-a-vis the non-aligned movement and the regional organisations.

35. Ibid, p. 162.

The inescapable impact of this on the liberation movements was ensured both in the influence and control of the regional organisations over their respective national liberation movements; a fact that was not lost on all the parties, and one which the regional bodies were only too eager to exploit for purposes of sanction or reward in their dealings with the movements.

Trend of Support in Non-Aligned Conferences

The issue of recognition, important as it is, is only part of the general trend in development of support for national liberation within the non-aligned movement. Having discussed it we now consider the other aspects of broader diplomatic, material and moral support within the movement. And the most appropriate place to look for this trend is the Conferences of Heads of State which constitute 'the supreme organ' of the non-aligned movement and where major decisions of the movement are made.

(a) Belgrade Summit: 1st-6th September, 1961*

The Belgrade Conference took place under a threatening cold war climate, which itself was one explanation for the emergence of non-alignment. Among the growing international concerns during this period was the Congo crisis which had assumed cold war proportions with the danger of superpower confrontation. But the most serious cold war issue was the Berlin crisis with its lasting reminder in the Berlin Wall. The impact of this situation on the Conference was felt in the pulls on non-aligned principles of anti-bloc rivalry (meaning peace) and anti-

* The account of the Conference is drawn mainly from the Official Publication of The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, September 1-6, 1961, (Belgrade : Publicisticko - Izdavacki Zavod, 1961) hereafter referred to as Belgrade Conference Report.

colonialism, thus presenting the non-aligned movement from the outset with the argument of priority in policy. President Tito was quick to emphasise the peace factor in his opening speech to set the tone of the Conference. His positive assertion that "the purpose of this meeting is to make the Great Powers realise that the fate of the World cannot rest in their hands alone";³⁶ in contrast with what looked like a chance remark that "there is no doubt we shall examine such problems as the question of colonialism",³⁷ illustrates the relevance of non-alignment to Yugoslavia. It showed that for Tito, the policy is derived more from the imperatives of the cold war and its threat to independence than from anti-colonialism.

Such a Yugoslav perspective is hardly surprising. Yugoslavia then, and now, might be said to be living in the context of her immediate post-war history, still to overcome the fears of the consequences of the spheres-of-influence politics that could compromise her independence. In this respect Yugoslavia could recall the 1944 Moscow Summit at which Stalin and Churchill agreed to divide the Balkans into zones of interest.³⁸ The extent to which such memories reinforce her fears and suspicion of bloc politics is summed up by the well known Egyptian journalist, Mohammed Heikal, who characterised the country's non-alignment as "not only Yugoslavia's way to peace but also the very basis of its independence and security".³⁹

36. Belgrade Conference Report, p. 20.

37. Ibid, p. 21.

38. See Albert Resis, "The Churchill-Stalin 'Percentages' Agreement on the Balkans, Moscow, October 1944". American Historical Review, 83, April 1978, pp.368-387.

39. Mohammed Heikal, Nasser : The Cairo Documents, (London : New English Library, 1972) p. 230.

President Tito was not alone in his peace crusade. Prime Minister Pandit Nehru of India also showed equal, if not greater, concern over the ominous prospects of war arising from superpower antagonism. Like Tito, Nehru's stand was in keeping with his conception of non-alignment as a policy which rejects the existence of power blocs lined up for war purposes. World peace, he said, depended "essentially" on the United States and the Soviet Union, thus implying that a healthy relationship between them provided the best insurance against war. Accordingly, his prescribed role for the non-aligned movement was to help to narrow the dangerous gap between the two blocs, hence his feverish appeal for superpower understanding through a negotiated settlement of disputes.

With such eagerness for peace which consigned "everything else however vital to us" to "second place", Nehru gave anti-colonialism a rather uncaring treatment when he argued that classic colonialism was dead, but nevertheless observing: "of course we stand for anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-racialism and all that".⁴⁰ When it is recalled that five years ago Nehru portrayed anti-colonialism as the most serious challenge facing the world, one can appreciate how far events have altered the focus of India's foreign policy.

Perhaps the remark about Nehru in so ordering New Delhi's priorities was presumably the discovery of a new role for the country. India having given the lead in Third World anti-colonial struggle had now considered it the time to lead the fight for international peace. The desire of Nehru to fulfil this new role was after all consistent with the wish to see India become a great power of moral influence. The desire is very much a product of the Gandhian philosophy of the

40. Belgrade Conference Report, p. 108.

superiority of moral might over naked force. Indeed at one stage, the wish developed into an ambition that smacked of immodesty, while it also portrayed a measure of self-assurance as reflected in statements like "India is growing into a real giant again ... India can play a big part, and perhaps an effective part in helping to avoid war".⁴¹ Surely, it is to India's credit which Nehru would proudly point out, that she acted in this capacity in the offer of mediation in such conflicts as the 1956 Suez crisis and Cuban Missile issue of 1962.

The total commitment of these two influential leaders to the cause of international peace at the seeming expense of anti-colonialism evoked genuine concern in certain quarters as to the place of national liberation in the scheme of the Conference, and by implication of the non-aligned movement. There must have been the fear that any conspicuous subordination of anti-colonialism to other interests, however vital, could jeopardise the emerging international anti-colonial consensus symbolised in the 1960 United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples. And for non-alignment, that would have meant a lack of credibility in its protestation against foreign domination. Belgrade might therefore be regarded as crucial in setting policy priorities which would determine the future direction of the non-aligned movement. It was to get this right, and prompted by the fact that liberation issues were about being relegated to the background, that Algeria's delegate, Ben Youssef Ben Khedda cautioned: "The cold war must not make us forget the localised wars that are going on in some countries... World peace will remain an empty phrase until the colonial system and its effects have been extirpated".⁴²

41. A. Appadorai, (ed), India : 1947-1967 : Studies in Social and Political Development, (London : Asia Publishing House, 1968) p. 219.

42. Belgrade Conference Report, p. 237.

The Algerian position may be seen as self-seeking in view of that country's independence struggle for which it asked the Conference to "consider practical means of helping the colonised peoples, including the Algerian people to free themselves".⁴³ But then a more spirited challenge against promoting superpower understanding above anti-colonialism came from President Ahmed Sukarno of Indonesia, and Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah, both of whom contended that it was colonialism, and not East-West rivalry, which was the root of world tension. In the opinion of the Indonesian leader, the fear of bloc conflict was being exaggerated and over-dramatised without regard to the historical fact that different social systems could co-exist but there could be no co-existence between independence on one side and imperialism and colonialism on the other. For all that it mattered to him, in an obvious reference to national liberation, the key factor in contemporary international relations was the conflict between the new emergent forces and the old, and it was not fortuitous that non-aligned countries allied themselves with the new forces. President Sukarno's uncompromising stand in favour of national liberation was analytically a feature of Indonesia's revolutionary assessment of the international system in which confrontation rather than co-operation constituted the basic element of relationship in the struggle against imperialism.⁴⁴

Similarly, Iraq and Cuba saw the essence of the Conference as being the liberation struggle. Iraq in a doctrinaire analysis which rebuffed any notion of peaceful co-existence between the blocs as a condition for peace, held war as directly related to colonialism and imperialism.⁴⁵ Cuba insisted on concrete

43. Ibid.

44. See Donald Weatherbee, Ideology in Indonesia : Sukarno's Indonesian Revolution, Yale University, Monograph Series, No. 8, 1966.

45. Belgrade Conference Report, p. 146.

action against colonialism by charging that "This meeting will sacrifice its effectiveness to the extent that we speak a language of diplomatic disguise and elusive reticence. Cuba therefore asks that ... we plunge our arms to the elbow in the truth like a butcher in a slaughtered beast".⁴⁶ For most other countries, notably Ethiopia and Cambodia, however, the Conference was seen as an occasion for exercise in policy definition, while they adopted a simplistic approach to anti-colonialism.

What finally emerged from these competing priorities was a Conference declaration which attempted to synthesise the various viewpoints on the issues of world peace and anti-colonialism. In accepting President Sukarno's thesis of the conflict between the old and the new forces, the declaration indicated how this confrontation could lead to lasting peace through the elimination of the "domination of colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism in all their manifestations".⁴⁷ But while it recognised the existence of these systems as the main cause of conflict, the declaration nevertheless tended to minimise the significance of anti-colonialism by its conspicuous shift to the issues of the cold war. The assertion that "war has never threatened mankind with graver consequences than today" resulted in the playing down of the liberation theme as was clear in the statement that "Imperialism is weakening. Colonial empires and other forms of foreign oppression of peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America are gradually disappearing from the state of history".⁴⁸

46. Ibid, p. 120.

47. Ibid, p. 254.

48. Ibid.

Invariably, the conference adopted peaceful co-existence, held to be the only alternative to a possible nuclear catastrophe, as the main objective within which the anti-colonial struggle was to be conducted. For as the declaration put it, the principles of peaceful co-existence also included the right of peoples to self-determination and independence. It was "in this connection", the declaration stressed, "that the policy of co-existence amounts to an active effort towards the elimination of historical injustices and the liquidation of national oppression, guaranteeing at the same time to every people their independent development".⁴⁹

Despite such inclination to peace, the Conference would still not want to appear delinquent on national liberation, at least to assure the liberation movements of its support. This it tried to do by first proclaiming the non-aligned's support "to all peoples fighting for their independence and equality"; and then affirming continued assistance on the basis of the United Nations declaration on decolonisation of 1960. Specifically, the Conference expressed the determination to extend to the Algerian people "all the possible support and aid" in their struggle; "resolutely" condemned South Africa's apartheid policy and demanded its "immediate abandonment"; called on Portugal to end its colonial war against the Angolan people; and declared support "for the full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine in conformity with the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations".⁵⁰ The point to be made about the support of the Conference for liberation is that the disproportionate emphasis on international peace meant in effect the debasement, rather unwittingly, of anti-colonialism,

49. Ibid, p. 255.

50. Ibid, pp. 257-258.

leaving the subject about where it was at Bandung. All that the declaration had done was to limit itself to a general approach in the affirmation of the anti-colonial principle of non-alignment. The importance of the Conference, therefore, laid not so much in the support for national liberation as in giving a signal to the Colonial Powers and the world that the uncommitted nations were determined to undertake a united action against colonial domination. On a more critical note, it would be said that Belgrade took a rather optimistic view of the passing away of colonialism, having apparently been lulled into such a view by the progress so far in political decolonisation. But the opposition this stand attracted is significant for its indication of member-states' different perception and interpretation of colonialism and imperialism, a point that has bedevilled the non-aligned's liberation politics.

(b) Cairo Summit: 5th-10th October, 1964

The Cairo non-aligned Conference was held at a more auspicious period in superpower relations. The threats posed by the Congo and Berlin crises to international peace had receded, if not over; and the more ominous Cuban Missile crisis of October 1962 which brought the world to the brink of a nuclear conflict had been safely disposed of. But the most concrete evidence of improvement in East-West relations was the signing of the 1963 Moscow Partial Test-ban Treaty.⁵¹ Conference delegates hailed the treaty as a healthy development in the lessening of the cold war tensions, and President Tito described it as a positive international action in the direction of peace. The euphoria over the treaty was a patent reminder of the concern shown at Belgrade

51. This was one of the earliest arms limitation agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. The treaty sought to impose specific limitations on the testing of nuclear weapons.

of the need for world peace.

But while superpower relations was on the mend, the decolonisation process had taken a more critical turn. All the indications were that the period of peaceful decolonisation was over, and a new phase begun, featuring armed liberation. This naturally made anti-colonialism the most pressing issue at Cairo. It was therefore not surprising that some countries, notably the radicals, should view Gamal Abdel Nasser's stress on economic matters as being out of step with the realities of the day. The warning of Nasser about economic disparity between nations being an equally serious source of danger to international stability; and his proposal for developing countries to raise the prices of their products to match those of manufactured goods,⁵² were considered as less relevant to the immediate practical question of the national liberation struggle. At least so it appeared to President Sukarno who resisted any attempt to channel debate away from anti-colonialism into the economic sphere in a warning that "It would not work to turn our attention to economic development and social welfare unless we have torn up by their roots all the links that make us subservient in any way to the old order of domination".⁵³

President Sukarno's vigorous pro-liberation stand, framed in a call for common front against imperialism, was a continuation of an earlier position at Belgrade. In a measure of increased militancy, he rejected the growing view that the forces of colonialism were already weakened so as not to cause any serious consternation in non-aligned policy. Instead, he argued:

52. Henry M. Christman, ed. Neither East Nor West : The Basic Documents of Non-Alignment, (New York : Sheed and Ward, 1973), p.77.

53. Ibid, p.103.

The old forces are still powerful. Their influence still extends throughout the world. And while they still have power to act ... let us be under no illusion that a 'moral obligation' and 'humanitarian feelings' will ever force them to retreat from their favourable position... The struggle against imperialism in this present period is as imperative for us as is the struggle for liberation that led to our national independence.⁵⁴

Conceivably, this viewpoint is in accordance with the revolutionary interpretation of Sukarno of the colonial situation. As pointed out by Donald Weatherbee, and very much in line with Indonesia's ideology of internationalism, which cast the country in the forefront of the anti-imperialist struggle, the task of the anti-colonial revolution in Sukarno's definition is to destroy the old order and create a new one of political, economic and social justice.⁵⁵ And because Sukarno characterised revolution as a "long chain going from one confrontation to another confrontation",^{55a} his prescription for the elimination of the "unfavourable position" created by power differential between the old and new forces was to achieve a force parity. In conformity with this strategic calculation was President Sukarno's conception of peaceful co-existence as a "balance and equilibrium" of forces. Hence his conclusion that it was only when the developing nations and the "imperialist states" could face each other in equal strength that co-existence would become a reality.⁵⁶

Once again, the prospects were that the division over priority as occurred at Belgrade in 1961 might be repeated in Cairo. It is on this basis does one assess the enthusiastic support of Tito for Nasser on economic development and

54. Ibid, p.105.

55. Donald Weatherbee, op. cit., p. 19.

55a. Ibid, p. 20.

56. Henry M. Christman, op. cit, p.104.

world peace; and Nkrumah's identification with the stand of Sukarno in advocating an "armed revolution" to liberate the remaining colonial territories in Africa. And as was in 1961, Algeria, now independent, remained faithful to the cause of anti-colonialism and urged positive action of political and material support for the national liberation movements.

In between these two main strands of opinion stood a number of countries for whom the conference was, so to say, a court of complaint to solicit support for various national causes. The preoccupation of Cambodia lay primarily with United States' "imperialist" designs in Indochina as it affected her neutrality.⁵⁷ For President Makarios of Cyprus the major issue was the situation in his country blamed on foreign powers, and for which he appealed to the non-aligned movement for backing on the issue at the United Nations.⁵⁸ India saw the occasion as one more opportunity to launch a diplomatic campaign against her adversaries - Pakistan whom she sought to exclude from the Conference; and China whose nuclear weapons programme was the target of attack. At the broader regional level, Indonesia's territorial dispute with Malaysia, and the alleged discrimination against foreigners in Sri Lanka and Burma represented rather serious concern to India.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, India could be credited for her proposal, accepted by the Conference's sub-committee on the international situation and colonialism, that non-aligned states pledged themselves to eradicate colonialism and neo-colonialism.⁶⁰

57. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1964, p.20433.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

In the clash over priority this time, the pro-liberation group could count on the changed international climate marked by the improvement in super-power relations on the one hand, and the upsurge in the armed liberation struggle on the other; both developments had made anti-colonialism the focus of attention. The cold war logic in non-alignment, while still relevant, was nevertheless given a less urgent treatment. But equally contributing to the promotion of anti-colonialism over world peace was the numerical impact of the African group at the Conference. Since the Belgrade summit, thanks to the progress in political decolonisation in the early 1960s, African membership of the non-aligned movement had increased from eleven to twenty-eight,⁶¹ This had greatly swollen the ranks of the movement. At the same time, the continent continued to pose the greatest challenge to the anti-colonial principle of non-alignment with some countries still to be free. With their newly found unity in the establishment of the OAU in 1963, African states were able to put that principle to the test at Cairo and at subsequent conferences; a development the 1976 Colombo summit spelt out thus:

The identification of the African continent as a whole with non-alignment was a development of major significance in the history of non-alignment. Africa gave numerical strength to the movements and contributed to making it a powerful force in the United Nations. Africa gave a firm anti-colonial and anti-racist content to the movements.⁶²

What the remark illustrates is the correlation between decolonisation and the influence of non-alignment which was exploited to further the anti-colonial

61. This figure includes the Provisional Government of Angola.

62. Political Declaration of the Fifth Summit (Colombo) Conference of Non-Aligned Governments (hereafter referred to as Colombo Conference Declaration) in Jankotwistch and Sauvart, Vol. II, op. cit. p.752.

principle of the non-aligned movement.

Given all this, Cairo took a firmer stand on colonialism and registered a more significant contribution in support for national liberation. For the first time, the liberation movements were given the opportunity to be heard at a non-aligned summit. Amilcar Cabral of the PAIGC who spoke on behalf of the movements was plainly appreciative of the anti-colonial bias of the Conference:

Faithfully translating the unanimous feelings of active solidarity of your peoples with our liberation struggle, you have given a striking proof of your position as combatants for liberty. You our fellow combatants, at present occupy the place of honour which history has reserved for you, and which allows you to contribute by all necessary means to the pressing elimination of colonial domination in our countries.⁶³

The Cairo Conference, by making an elaborate appraisal of the colonial situation on a country by country basis, adopted specific recommendations to deal with various colonial and racist powers. On the situation in Africa, decisions regarding which were no doubt influenced by the 1964 Cairo OAU resolutions, the Conference called for the breaking of diplomatic, consular and economic relations with Portugal over its colonial policy in Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique; and appealed to the "Powers" to withdraw all military aid and any other forms of assistance to her.⁶⁴

63. Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea : An African People's Struggle, (Selected Texts), (London : Stage 1, 1969), p. 43.

64. Cairo Summit Conference Declaration (hereafter referred to as Cairo Conference Declaration) Section I on Concerted Action for the Liberation of the Countries still dependent : Elimination of Colonialism, Neo-Colonialism and Imperialism in Jankowitsch and Sauvart, Vol. 1, pp. 46-49.

The resolution on Rhodesia indicated a foreboding of the seizure of independence by the white minority in the territory, which happened a year later. It was to prevent such a situation that the Conference urged Britain, as the colonial authority, to convene "immediately a constitutional conference to which all political groups . . . would be invited for the purpose of preparing a new constitution based on the 'one man, one vote' principle". But in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence, countries were urged not to recognise such independence.

South Africa received the most strident criticism for her apartheid policy condemned as the "most odious manifestation" of racial discrimination. In a stand similar to the OAU position, the Conference pressed for sanctions against Pretoria, calling on all states:

- (i) to boycott all South African goods and to refrain from exporting goods, especially arms, ammunition, oil and minerals to her;
- (ii) those states which have not yet done so to break off diplomatic, consular and other relations with her; and
- (iii) requested the Governments represented at the Conference to deny airport and overflying facilities to aircrafts, and port facilities to ships proceeding to and from South Africa, and to discontinue all road and railway traffic with that country.

It was partly to effect these measures that the Conference appealed to countries to give support to the special bureau set up by the OAU for the application of sanctions against the country.

Again, over Namibia, South Africa came under severe stricture. The Conference, in reaffirming the "inalienable right of the people of South West Africa to self-determination and independence", condemned Pretoria for its "persistent refusal to co-operate with the United Nations in the implementation of the pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly". Similarly Israel was condemned over Palestine for the "imperialistic policy pursued in the Middle East"; this was followed by an endorsement, in conformity with the United Nations Charter, of "the full restoration of all rights of the Arab people of Palestine to their homeland, and their inalienable right to self-determination"; and full support to them "in their struggle for liberation from colonialism and racism". The support for the Palestinian cause is particularly significant for its implicit acceptance of the Palestinian question as a colonial and racist situation, and therefore to be incorporated in the United Nations Decolonisation Declaration of 1960. However, it was not until the Algiers summit in 1973 that this new definition was stated explicitly and sanctioned as we shall see later.

As important as all these were in themselves, the most striking achievement of the Conference for the liberation movements was the much sought for recognition it gave them in the unequivocal declaration that:

The participating countries recognise the nationalist movements of the peoples which are struggling to free themselves from colonial domination as being the authentic representatives of the colonial peoples.⁶⁵

Although such blanket recognition could hardly clarify the status to be granted the movements, it nevertheless served to further legitimise their

65. Ibid

position vis-a-vis the colonial and racist authorities. As a follow up to the recognition, the Conference committed the non-aligned movement to "undertake to work unremittingly to eradicate all vestiges of colonialism", and to "combine all efforts to render all necessary aid and support, whether moral, political or material" to the national liberation movements and the OAU Liberation Committee.⁶⁶ Yet of greater significance was the pledge for military assistance which amounted to an official sanction of the armed struggle as implied in the statement: "The process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible. Colonised peoples may legitimately resort to arms to secure the full exercise of their right to self-determination and independence".⁶⁷

The Cairo summit, by adopting such militancy on liberation, appears to have reversed the tendency towards emphasis on world peace initiated at Belgrade in 1961, and by intent and circumstances reduced superpower relations to a secondary position. While the Conference doubtlessly appreciated the need for easing bloc rivalry as indicated in its expression of satisfaction at the progress already made in this direction, the categorical rejection of international security being dependent essentially on East-West mood debased most of what Belgrade stood for. Furthermore in playing down the dangers of superpower antagonism, the Conference tended to argue that the search for peace should not be conducted in a manner to appear oblivious of the correlation between colonial wars and global upheaval. In other words, it was totally unrealistic, as it was impossible, to separate national and sub-regional conflicts from international security.

66. Ibid

67. Ibid

Consequently, world peace was made contingent on decolonisation in the understanding that "imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism constitute a basic source of international tension and conflict because they endanger world peace and security".⁶⁸ It was on this basis that the Conference implicitly queried the notion of peaceful co-existence being a variable of bloc relations. As it argued, the policy of peaceful co-existence "is an indivisible whole" which could not be applied partially to satisfy big power interests. Thus, peaceful co-existence was given an anti-colonial interpretation which emphasised the struggle against imperialism as the common striving for peace. All this directly challenged the traditional Euro-centric concept of the international system which regarded colonies as objects of international politics, thereby treating colonial issues as peripheral and never constituting any danger to world peace.⁶⁹

Acting from a pronounced perspective on national liberation, the Conference succeeded in making plain that non-alignment's international relations hinge on anti-colonialism. Paradoxically however, the Conference also revealed the dangers to liberation portended in the conflict to reconcile national interest with support for anti-colonialism. A case in point was the reservation of Malawi on the paragraphs in the official declaration relating to Portugal.⁷⁰ Being economically dependent on the colony of Mozambique and South Africa by force of geography, Malawi considered it inimical to her economic and political well-being to apply the advocated sanctions against Portugal and South Africa.

68. Ibid

69. Joseph Frankel, International Politics, (Middlesex, England; Penguin Books, 1969), p. 21

70. Jankowitsch and Sauvart, Vol. 1, op. cit. p. 61.

President Kamuzu Banda was honest enough to admit this dependency problem at the July 1964 Cairo OAU Conference when he openly stated that Malawi would not "commit economic suicide to be a loyal OAU member".⁷¹ As he put it, cutting economic and diplomatic relations with Portugal "would mean economic strangulation" for the country. Whereas Malawi had the courage to stand up in the protection of her national interest over sanctions, some states, to mention Ivory Coast and Kenya, silently defied the call for denial of airport and overflying facilities to South African aircrafts, while Saudi oil continued to flow to South Africa. There was however one immediate outcome of the Conference. Following the declaration on Portugal and South Africa, Cambodia announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Lisbon and Pretoria.⁷²

(c) Lusaka Summit: 8th-10th September, 1970

The years between the Cairo meeting and the Lusaka Conference marked a trying period for the non-aligned movement. To start with, there existed a kind of 'break in convention' in the holding of the Conference. Instead of the already initiated three-yearly meetings, Lusaka came six years after the last summit. This time lag raised speculations about a loss of momentum in the non-aligned movement. The speculation, incidentally, tended to acquire substance in the departure from the non-aligned scene of some avowedly pro-liberation leaders. During the interval, Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria, President Nkrumah of Ghana, and Indonesia's leader, Ahmed Sukarno, known for their fiery anti-colonialism, were all overthrown in coups d'etat.

71. Africa Digest, 12, 1964/65, p. 64.

72. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1963/64, p. 20434.

In addition, there was the morass into which the national liberation struggle had sunk. In Africa the armed struggle which started in the early sixties seemed to have made only slow progress except in Guinea Bissau, and even appeared to have been contained following some serious set-backs; most of these were as a result of developments within the movements. The FRELIMO in Mozambique was dealt a severe blow by the assassination of its leader, Eduardo Moudlane, in 1969. Then there was the 1965 unilateral declaration of independence in Rhodesia which subsequently drew the minority regime of that territory more firmly into the Lisbon - Pretoria - Salisbury axis to further strengthen the grand counter-liberation alliance in the Southern African region. Yet the liberation movements in Rhodesia remained more divided than ever. Meanwhile the war in Vietnam raged unabated, while in the Middle East, the Arab defeat in the 1967 war had further complicated the Palestinian situation. The 1969 Belgrade Consultative meeting regretfully but sincerely acknowledged this decline in liberation activities, especially in Africa, by observing "with indignation that the process of liquidation of colonialism was stagnating".⁷³

It was against this gloomy background, and in the shadow of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, that President Tito strove to convene a third summit conference late in that year. His African tour in 1968 to sell the idea failed to win enough support from member-states, most of whom feared at the time that the Czech invasion, with all its ideological implications, might cause a split at such a Conference, thereby causing irreparable damage to the non-aligned movement. On the contrary, President Tito regarded the fate of Czechoslovakia as a confirmation of the dangers of superpower sphere-of-influence politics to

73. Jankowitsch and Sauvart, op. cit. p. 159.

which non-alignment is opposed, and which made a 1968 summit, considered "the best weapon against a return to the cold war",⁷⁴ all the more necessary.

President Tito failed in the effort to convene a summit Conference. But he was compensated with the Belgrade Consultative meeting of July 1969 at which Yugoslavia attempted, as she possibly would have done in an actual summit gathering, to focus attention on war and peace with particular reference to the Czechoslovakian situation. This was precisely the direction of the speech of the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Mr. Mitja Ribichich which pointed to the "growing danger of pressure of all kinds on the independence of countries outside and inside the blocs, and armed aggression limited in scope".⁷⁵ Mitja Ribichich may be right but to some other countries, particularly Algeria, the most outstanding problem remained colonialism. Thus the meeting assumed the character of a clash between Yugoslavia's quest for security through eliminating the threat of spheres-of-influence politics on the one hand, and anti-colonialism on the other.

The difference once again raised the issue of priority in the non-aligned movement so that when the subject of support for liberation movements came up, it generated a lengthy debate which almost affected the request by the PLO for admission to the meeting. Although the organisation was admitted as an observer, Algeria's delegate, Tayeb Boulharouf, attacked the decision as insufficient recognition of the PLO, and indeed national liberation movements generally. In his opinion, all liberation movements should, as a right, be invited to non-

74. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1969/70, p. 23663.

75. Consultative Meeting of Special Government Representatives of Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade, July 8-12, 1969 (Medunaradna Politika, Beograd, 1970), p.25.

aligned meetings, since non-alignment was "not merely a moral and political force" but "an active policy which should assist all movements fighting against imperialism".⁷⁶ This argument later reinforced the request of the PLO delegation for non-aligned assistance to the Palestinian struggle.

Despite his obvious disappointment by the failure to hold a 1968 Conference, President Tito's interest in a third summit remained strong; for which he embarked on yet another tour of Africa in February 1970 to canvass support for it. This took him to Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Egypt and Libya. An overall assessment of his talks with the host countries revealed the adroitness of President Tito in playing on the anti-colonial instincts of the leaders. In Zambia, for example, which later hosted the 1970 summit, he whipped up the liberation sentiment by emphasising that the next conference should not limit itself to passing resolutions, but to insist on concrete actions, especially on the question of "the definitive decolonisation of Africa".⁷⁷ And truly he followed this up at the Lusaka Conference by strongly advocating increased material aid to the liberation movements in Southern Africa. "We who have come together here must agree not only to extend moral and political support but also the most effective possible material assistance to those who are fighting with arms in hand against colonial oppression and racial discrimination", he insisted.⁷⁸

Earlier, the host President, Kenneth Kaunda, had dictated the anti-colonial tone in an attack on the West for its economic and military relations

76. Keesings Contemporary Archives, op. cit.

77. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1969/1970, p. 24212.

78. Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, Vol. XXI, No. 491, 20 September, 1970, p. 13.

with South Africa, which had "strengthened the hand of apartheid and enabled it to extend the boundaries of its influence".⁷⁹ Kenneth Kaunda was particularly concerned that the extension of South Africa's influence to the independent states north of the Zambezi was bound to undermine these countries' support for the national liberation movements.

The anti-colonial spirit of the Conference was kept alive as speakers advocated increased support to the liberation movements. Understandably, Lusaka offered the most appropriate setting for such display of liberation solidarity. Being the base of some of the liberation movements, and with the war drums beating all around in Mozambique, Rhodesia, Angola and Namibia, it was inconceivable for the Conference to have behaved otherwise. But an adequate response to the colonial situation required more than mere calls for assistance. Augustinho Neto of the MPLA, speaking on behalf of the African liberation movements, put the point quite bluntly when he challenged the Conference to the fact that war is "not compatible with slow and eloquent speeches, but one requiring action and resources".⁸⁰ His demand, therefore, was for money and military equipment to the liberation movements for a more effective prosecution of the struggle. It would seem that Neto's challenge was taken up by Prime Minister Forbes Burnham of Guyana who pledged on behalf of his country an annual contribution to the OAU Liberation Committee Fund, and actually made the first payment of \$10,000 in course of the Conference.⁸¹

79. Ibid p. 19.

80. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1969/70, p. 242213.

81. Ibid.

Generally the declaration of the Conference reflected the importance attached to anti-colonialism in the scheme of non-alignment. So that when the Conference pleaded for a rededication to, and not a redefinition of the central aims and objectives of non-alignment,⁸² what it seemed to imply was no doubt the need to adhere to the liberation principle. Invariably the tendency at Lusaka, as at Cairo, was to de-emphasise issues of bloc-rivalry, but stress the threat posed by colonialism and racism to world peace. Concerned by this threat, the Conference, in the General Resolution on Decolonisation, with regard to Southern Africa called on member states to:

- (i) make substantial contribution to the Special Fund of the OAU Liberation Committee; and
- (ii) increase support and material aid to the liberation movements through the OAU.⁸³

Measures to be taken against Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia were those already called for at Cairo. However, the declaration added something new to the anti-colonial campaign. President Kaunda in his capacity as the new Chairman of the non-aligned movement, was empowered to undertake appropriate actions and initiatives with countries supporting the colonial and racist regimes to stop such assistance.⁸⁴ West Germany, Britain, the United States, France, Italy, Switzerland and Japan were specifically condemned for the sale of arms to South Africa in violation of United Nations resolutions and for which Britain was urged to reconsider its intention to resume arms sales to that country.

82. Lusaka Declaration on Peace, Independence, Development, Co-operation and Democratisation of International Relations (hereafter referred to as Lusaka Declaration) in Review of International Affairs, op. cit. p. 25.

83. Lusaka Declaration, General Resolution on Decolonisation, Ibid, p. 30.

84. Ibid.

Although the Conference displayed a consensus on the resolution, African reaction before now to the British proposal to sell arms to South Africa was interesting as it showed a division along open conservative support and radical opposition to the proposal.⁸⁵ At one extreme, Malawi, together with Mauritius supported the sale for ideological and national security reasons. Dr. Hastings Banda, the Malawian President, invoked the communist scare, pointing to alleged Soviet presence in Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Aden, with Mozambique and South Africa as next possible targets. In dismissing the argument that the sale would strengthen South Africa's apartheid system and thus impede the anti-racist struggle, Dr. Banda made it known that he would rather support the sale than see "the body of water between Gibraltar in the West and Bombay in the East become a private swimming pool of a hostile nation".⁸⁶ Mauritius favoured the sale because, as stated by the Foreign Minister, M Duval, "we cannot ask Britain to look after our defence and then take away the means to do so ... we cannot accuse Britain of strengthening apartheid ... Her only aim is to ensure the defence of the sea route around the Cape".⁸⁷

On the other extreme were Sudan, Tanzania, Somalia, Algeria and Uganda who vehemently opposed the proposal, with threats of economic and diplomatic (quitting the Commonwealth in the case of member-states) reprisals against Britain. Occupying a middle ground were Ethiopia, Ghana, Gambia, Sierra Leone and Madagascar who would only express regret at the decision.

85. See *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1970, C20-28, for the reactions of African States to the proposal.

86. Ibid p. C 22.

87. Ibid p. C 22-33

Events in Rhodesia had turned for the worse since the Cairo summit with the unilateral declaration of independence in 1965. The Conference, in acknowledging this new development, accused Britain for failing to take effective measures, including the use of force, to bring down Ian Smith's rebellion. But it did nothing concrete on its part to take the suggested action of the use of force except to warn that the future of the territory could not be negotiated with an illegal regime. The issue of Palestine, now held to be a colonial and racist situation following the interpretation by the Cairo Conference, was considered within the context of United Nations Security Council resolution 242 of November, 1967.⁸⁸ The Conference deplored the intransigence of Israel in refusing to implement the resolution, and backed this up with a recommendation to the United Nations to take adequate measures against her for the continued disregard of the resolution. It was still in the context of the United Nations resolution that the Conference called for the "full restoration of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine in their usurped homeland"; and gave approval for the efforts of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General, Dr. Gunnar Jarring, in the implementation of Resolution 242.

Although apparently based on Security Council resolution 242, the resolution of the Conference on Palestine in a way went further than the United

88. The main provisions of the resolution were: (a) the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war; (b) the need for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include: (i) withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (ii) termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force; (c) for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem.

Nations position on the problem. The Conference's reaffirmation of support for the struggle of the Palestinian people "for national liberation against colonialism and racism" implies a solution well outside the refugee framework in which resolution 242 had located the problem. Perhaps this was intended to satisfy the radical Arab states which had already rejected Security Council Resolution 242 and therefore the Jarring Mission as well. But it did not. Syria and Iraq still felt that the Conference resolution did not go far enough in addressing the Palestinian problem, as it failed, in the opinion of the Iraqi delegation, to insist on establishing "a democratic secular and non-racial state in Palestine where all citizens may live regardless of their race, creed or religion".⁸⁹

Such a definition of the Palestinian problem, which implies the dismantling of the state of Israel makes it difficult, if not impossible for most Arab countries to accept any compromise solution. In their assessment the Security Council Resolution only concerned itself with marginal issues, leaving aside the real problem of Palestinian sovereignty. The position of the PLO sums up this radical Arab perspective:

We refuse to allow the history of the Palestinian problem to be fragmented by the concentration at the outset on the elimination of the consequences of the 1948 aggression. For Israeli aggression is one and continuous, and the occupation must be terminated as a whole.⁹⁰

But while Syria and Iraq rejected the Conference resolution on Palestine, Nepal made reservations on the ground that the stand of the Conference contradicted

89. Jankowitsch and Sauvart, *op. cit.* p. 113.

90. Walid Khadduri (ed.), International Documents on Palestine, 1970 (Beruit : The Institute for Palestinian Studies, 1972), pp. 753-754.

Security Council Resolution 242,⁹¹ presumably for the reference to "usurped homeland" and the pledge to recover this land in a liberation struggle.

As far as it concerned African liberation, the most significant outcome of the Conference was the adoption of the Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa drawn up by the April 1969 meeting of East and Central African Heads of State held in the Zambian capital, as a basic liberation document. Aimed at wooing South Africa in particular, and other racist and colonial regimes in Southern Africa, it explained the African position on the liberation struggle in the region as one of "commitment to the principle of human equality, and not hatred against any racial group:

We are not hostile to the Administrations of these States because they are manned and controlled by white people. We are hostile to them because they are systems of minority control which exist as a result of, and in pursuance of, doctrines of human inequality. What we are working for is the right of self-determination for the people of those territories. We are working for a rule in those countries which is based on the will of all the people, and an acceptance of the equality of every citizen.⁹²

To further allay the fears of these regimes about racial revenge, the Manifesto, in conformity with non-alignment's belief in negotiated settlement of disputes, assured them of Africa's preference for peaceful solution to an armed struggle: "We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill. We do not advocate violence, we advocate an end to the violence against

91. Jankowitsch and Sauvart, op. cit. p.112.

92. Africa Contemporary Record, 1969/70, op. cit. C42.

human dignity". The Manifesto's forthright advocacy of negotiated settlement underlined by the promise, albeit conditional, that "we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change" seemed out of tune with the call by the Conference for greater financial and material support to the liberation movements through increased contribution to the OAU Liberation Fund. Whatever were its intended outcome, the liberation movements saw the Manifesto as ill-advised, and if implemented could leave them in the lurch. Hence their insistence that the armed struggle remained the only credible strategy in the liberation campaign.⁹³ Three years later, the Algiers Summit upheld this position.

(d) Algiers Conference: 5th-9th September, 1973

Most of the problems which characterised the period leading up to the Lusaka summit persisted into the Algiers meeting. At the time of the Conference, the general prospects for the non-aligned world looked rather depressed. Not only were individual states facing the imponderables of the turbulence of the international situation; the non-aligned movement as a whole was apparently in a frustrating shape over the realisation of most of its objectives, not least the liberation drive. Indeed the period between 1970 and now was one of crowded events of daunting trial for the movement. Many of these were what could naturally be associated with experiment in nation-building, and so might be regarded as inevitable in the early years of the 1960s. The tendency was

93. The Manifesto particularly alarmed the Zimbabwean movement which asked that "the OAU once again states clearly and unequivocally that only armed struggle is the only solution to the Zimbabwe problem; and that the OAU supports unreservedly freedom fighters waging the armed struggle in Zimbabwe".

therefore to minimise their seriousness in the immediate post-independence era. But at the end of what could be described as the decade of massive decolonisation, these problems were still very much alive, and had in fact increased in severity to cause exasperation.

Besides mounting economic pressures, political stability remained more or less an ideal for most of the non-aligned countries in the face of rampant coups and civil wars. All this rendered the promise of independence little more than a fading hope. As a result, states came under increasing domestic pressures to the seeming detriment of external commitments including support for national liberation. As if this state of affairs was not bad enough for the liberation movements, there was also the attempt by the non-aligned to alter the liberation strategy from the 'faithfully' accepted armed struggle to negotiation. Both the Lusaka Manifesto adopted at the last summit, and the divisive policy of dialogue with South Africa were interpreted by the liberation movements as being part of the new strategy.

In the Middle East, the Palestinian question had assumed a more dangerous dimension with deepening crisis in Arab-Israeli relations on the one hand, and intra-Arab rivalry on the other. During the period, the war of attrition between Egypt and Israel had escalated so much that a fourth Middle East war was safely thought to be imminent. Nevertheless, this growing tension did not restrain King Hussein of Jordan from dealing a crushing blow to the PLO. In an operation that embarrassed his Arab brothers but delighted the 'common enemy' - Israel, the King in September 1970, launched a massive military offensive against the PLO in Jordan to end what he feared was the development of a 'state within a state' by the growing activities of the organisation.

But a more serious blow to the Palestinian cause, and indeed the non-aligned movement was to follow soon in the death of Gamel Abdel Nasser in September 1970. Without any doubt, Nasser's death deprived the movement of much of the respect and influence that flowed from his international standing, given his position as a founding father of the movement. For the Palestinian struggle, and liberation generally, the death of the Egyptian leader, while creating a void in Arab leadership also meant a significant loss of support for national liberation to which he dedicated his life. Tunisia's President Habib Bourguiba seemed to sum up this depressing situation in his remark that the non-aligned countries were "confused and uncertain about the way to take".⁹⁴ It is against this background of instability generating a feeling of general despair that the Algiers summit is assessed as a soul-searching Conference in which economic questions almost submerged political issues.

From the outset, the host country appeared determined to give the Conference an economic meaning. In a pre-summit briefing, the country's Foreign Minister, M. Abdelaziz Bouteflika stated the purpose of the meeting as "the struggle for economic independence to be fought through (i) the maximum mobilization of internal resources; (ii) the strengthening of co-operation and trade exchanges between developing and non-aligned states; (iii) the democratisation of relations between the rich and poor nations by the implementation of the progress of the Group of 77."⁹⁵ When the Conference finally opened, President Houari Boumedienne took this objective further by graphically, if simplistically, defining the problems of international relations in

94. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1977, p. 26119.

95. Ibid, p. 26117.

terms of a conflict between "the haves and the have nots", the peoples of the North and the peoples of the South; in short between the poor nations and the rich states. He was thus led irresistably from this confrontational perspective to prescribe a development strategy of 'conflict in co-operation' with the industrialised world in order to extract economic concessions.⁹⁶

Surely, this Algerian inclination, capable of exciting fears that anti-colonialism might be upstaged by economics, must have baffled the revolutionary core of the non-aligned movement which had possibly anticipated liberation fire-works at Algiers, reckoning on the revolutionary record of Algeria. That there must have been such anticipation was implied in the speech of Aristides Pereira, the leader of the PAIGC. In thanking the Conference for the opportunity given the national liberation movements to be heard, Aristides Pereira seemed to believe that Algeria's "revolutionary role" particularly contributed to this, helped by her history of "the years of the national liberation war, and the millions of dead".⁹⁷ Not even the political message of China's Premier Chou En Lai, assuring the Conference of "even greater victories in non-aligned struggle against imperialism and colonialism"; nor the letter from the Archbishop of Algiers, Cardinal Leon-Etienne Duval, exhorting an end to all forms of racial discrimination and the notion of "dominant and dominated people", did much to temper Algeria's advocacy of the economic theme.⁹⁸

Certain reasons might account for the Algerian stress on economic issues. First there was the country's frustrating experience in trying to secure

96. Ibid p. 26118.

97. Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, No. 565, October 1973, p. 9.

98. Keesings Contemporary Archives, op. cit. p. 26117.

World Bank assistance. Algeria's application for loan in 1962 to repair the war damaged economy was rejected on grounds of her nationalisation policy. This she interpreted as a classic example of economic blackmail to impose a particular development model on an independent state. Indeed so it appeared by the arms-twisting tactics of the Bank in the hardly disguised insistence that the Government diluted, if not abandoned, its socialist programme. For ten years, the Bank employed dilatoriness in considering the application; a tactic that reinforced the country's ideological conviction of economic imperialism and neo-colonialism on the part of the West which happened to be the major financier, (hence the controllers) of the Bank.⁹⁹ But Algeria could count herself fortunate, unlike many Third World countries, to be able to withstand the pressure on account of her oil wealth which buoyed up the economy. The lesson which she would like all developing countries to learn from her experience was loud and clear: political independence cannot be divorced from economic self-determination in the fullest exercise of national freedom.

The second reason, and one which exercised an immediate influence on the Conference, focuses on the impending use of the oil weapon by the Arabs in the wake of the 1973 Middle East war. It could not have been a chance event that just at the time of the Conference, a meeting of the ten Foreign Ministers of OAPEC's member-countries was also being held in Algiers. It was strongly suspected that the meeting discussed the oil weapon. One is therefore hard pressed to suggest that Algeria's stress on economic issues was partly a ploy to prepare the minds of the non-aligned countries to accept this new weapon as a

99. See Teresa Hayter 'Bank's red button-hole' The Guardian (London) 15 January, 1982, p.7 for a concise account of Algeria's relationship with the World Bank.

necessary component in the military campaign for liberation. This is the likely interpretation to be given to the country's Foreign Minister's persuasive remark:

Knowing as we do the strategic importance of our hydrocarbons, we have never thought of exploiting them in an abusive form. In the present energy crisis, we are capable of distinguishing between the accidental and the essential.¹⁰⁰

Such thinking fitted well with President Boumedienne's concept of giving economic substance to political independence;¹⁰¹ and in this he found a powerful ally in President Tito who advocated the flexing of the non-aligned's economic muscle in seeking a solution to the problem of colonialism and imperialism. In the assessment of the Yugoslav leader, the Middle East conflict was allied to "petroleum politics". So that when he called on the non-aligned states, and particularly the Arab countries to agree on the best possible use of their vast energy and financial resources in the elimination of colonialism,¹⁰² he was understandably according legitimacy to the oil weapon.

The Arabs must have been greatly encouraged by this vigorous stand of Tito, and there was no doubt that they needed it. Prior to the Conference, President Sadat, it appeared, had cultivated Tito in a general diplomatic campaign to win non-aligned support for the next action of the Arabs against Israel. In January 1973, the Egyptian leader held talks in Brioni with the Yugoslav President on the situation in the Middle East. The meeting took place against the background of an earlier one, still in January, in Tripoli between Sadat and Ghadafi which dwelt

100. Keesings Contemporary Archives, op. cit.

101. See Robert Mortimer, 'Algeria and Politics of International Economic Reform', OBIS Vol. 21, No. 3, Fall, 1977, p. 671 for an analysis of Algeria's interest in a new international economic order.

102. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1973, p. 26118.

on the "confrontation of the Israeli aggression and the nature of the coming battle ... in the context of Arab action, in co-operation with the group of non-aligned countries ..."¹⁰³ In consequence, Sadat invoked the concept of collective security at the Algiers Conference in his war with Israel. As he put it:

In view of the fact that any aggression against a non-aligned country must be considered a violation of the security of all other countries, we must fight together against such aggression, for aggression against one of our countries is aimed at all non-aligned states.¹⁰⁴

The interplay of economic and political elements in liberation strategy was, of course, not a sudden realisation. The awareness had always been that neglect of economic issues renders political analysis rather sterile since the economic aspects of international relations have now become greatly pronounced in determining political objectives. What Algiers has done was to heighten this awareness as reflected in the various speeches. Indira Gandhi of India asserted that political freedom was incomplete if not accompanied by economic freedom.¹⁰⁴ And President Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone, in equating such freedom with the equality of all states, called for "the creation of a new economic order based on equality".¹⁰⁵

Although the emphasis on the economic factor was placed in the context of national independence, it nonetheless required a distinct anti-colonial voice to ensure an equally important place for the liberation struggle. Nigeria gave that voice in her call for the creation of a non-aligned decolonisation fund.¹⁰⁶ A rather

103. Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 January 1973, p. 2716.

104. Review of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 10.

104. Ibid, p. 7.

105. Ibid, p. 25.

106. Ibid, p. 18.

dramatic, though seemingly theatrical, show of support for anti-colonialism was the disclosure by President Idi Amin of his planned military operations for the total liberation of Africa, for which he requested neighbouring African countries to give refuelling rights to his troops on their way to the battlefield.¹⁰⁷ But if to Idi Amin the meaning of support for anti-colonialism is rhetorical pretext, to the Jamaican Prime Minister, Michael Manley, and Sheikh Zaid el Nahyane of the United Arab Emirates it meant concrete action as expressed in their donation of \$160,000 and \$500,000 respectively to the national liberation movements.¹⁰⁸

So far the detectable tendency in the Algiers summit has been the attempt to lay the foundation for a coherent economic policy for the non-aligned movement formulated in the demand for a new international economic order. The importance the Conference attached to this policy was reflected in the warning against the threat of war posed by economic disparity between nations:

In a world where side by side with a minority of rich countries there exists a majority of poor countries, it would be dangerous to accentuate this division by restricting peace to the prosperous areas of the world while the rest of mankind remained condemned to insecurity and the law of the strongest.¹⁰⁹

The warning, from all indications, had introduced a new element in the non-aligned movement's concept of peaceful co-existence. No longer was peaceful co-existence determined on the basis of superpower relations, or as a factor of the anti-colonial struggle, but it was now a matter of economic determination. The likely conclusion from this was the regard of economic issues prevailing over

107. Ibid, p. 38.

108. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1973, p. 26120

109. Algiers Conference Declaration, in Jankowitsch and Sauvart, op.cit, p. 193.

the demands of anti-colonialism. But the Conference, in its final declaration, moderated that impression by blending the two interests together within a general framework of national independence. As it observed:

The national liberation movement is confronting the increasingly intensified action of political, economic and military machinery which tends to freeze the existing situation and to introduce new forms of oppression and exploitation aimed at halting the emancipation of the Third World. Colonialism is still rampant in various forms, all rooted in political subjection and economic exploitation. It is a fact that the coalition of systems of domination is being continually strengthened with the encouragement of the monopolies and foreign economic and financial interests which are expanding their activities in the colonised territories and whose enterprises are financed by capital supplied by most of the Western countries.¹¹⁰

Nevertheless the overall position of the Conference on colonialism showed a hardening of attitude on the liberation struggle as indicated in what was obviously a rejection of the Lusaka Manifesto. Having observed with frustration the negative response of the colonial powers in Southern Africa to the appeal contained in the Manifesto, the Conference declared a firm support for the continuation of the armed struggle as being "the only way of ending colonial and racial domination in this region".¹¹¹ Its full identification with the liberation struggle was rationalised on the ground that "the confrontation of the peoples with colonialism, neo-colonialism, zionism and imperialism remains a fundamental reality of our era, continually emphasising the common destiny and the indivisible nature of the struggle of the peoples of the Third World".¹¹² For this reason, it accepted assistance to the national liberation movements as

110. Ibid, p. 208.

111. Ibid, p. 198.

112. Ibid, p. 207.

imperative and a necessary condition for Third World solidarity in the fight to protect independence.

Consequently, the Conference undertook to increase military, material, political and moral support to the movements. It was to effect the undertaking that the Algiers summit initiated the creation of "a support and solidarity fund to increase the effectiveness of the struggles of the national liberation movements". Until now, corporate support had been mostly moral and political; material assistance being left to the discretion of individual states. It was however not until 1977 after a reminder by the 1976 Colombo Conference that the fund, known as the Non-Aligned Support and Solidarity Fund for the Liberation of Southern Africa, was established in New York.

Diplomatically, the Conference proved a more remarkable success, not just for its decision "to do everything to isolate the colonialist, racist and apartheid regimes"; but more importantly, for the specific appeal to countries to assist the national liberation movements to open offices in their capitals, and to grant means to facilitate travel by representatives of the liberation movements.¹¹³ As part of the diplomatic offensive, the Conference also decided to wage a moral campaign conducted through publicity drive "to inform world public opinion, especially in the Western countries" on the evils of colonialism and racism. The aim was to awaken international conscience against colonialism and racism, and to bring pressure to bear on the Western countries in their support for Portugal, South Africa, Rhodesia and Israel. To back up the campaign, Algiers held out the threat of economic reprisal for such support in an attempt to try to force the

113. Ibid, p. 212.

West to make a choice between friendship with the non-aligned nations, and the racist and colonialist states.¹¹⁴

Some of the Conference's anti-colonial measures happened to be demands already made by the liberation organisations. And their realisation so far, especially by the PLO, clearly manifested the impact of non-aligned's diplomatic support. Since 1973, the PLO had scored impressive diplomatic gains both in the non-aligned world and in what might be described as hostile camps. The opening of Western Europe to it, which brought the organisation in direct contact with Governments and important sections of the European community, represent a major breakthrough in the face of decades of dominant pro-Israeli opinion. Today, despite its characterization by its enemies as a terrorist organization, the PLO is recognized by over one hundred countries¹¹⁵ and has offices in several states, including many European capitals, with two countries - Greece and Austria - having moved further to upgrade this to diplomatic status.

An interesting contribution of the Algiers Conference was the extended definition of colonialism to include apartheid regarded as "not just a system of racial discrimination; it is above all a form of colonialism based on fascist oppression of the people by a minority of alien settlers who exploit the people and deprive them of their fundamental rights".¹¹⁶ Based on this definition, and drawing an analogy between South Africa's policy and the Israeli attitude towards the Palestinians, the summit took the far-reaching step, indicated at Cairo in 1964, of formally equating Zionism with racism:

114. Ibid, p. 213.

115. Edward Said, The Question of Palestine, London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, p.25.

116. Algiers Conference Declaration, in Jankowitsch and Sauvart, op. cit, p. 209.

In this connection, the case of Palestine, where Zionist settler-colonialism has taken the form of systematic uprooting of the Palestinian people from their homeland and represents a very serious threat to their survival as a nation, is exactly the same as the situation in Southern Africa where racist and segregationist minorities are using the same method of colonial domination and exploitation.¹¹⁷

The Lima Foreign Ministers meeting of August 1975 further amplified this definition; from there it went up to the United Nations in November that year to be accorded universal acceptance. The significance of this lies in the transformation of Palestinian struggle, hitherto assessed internationally as a refugee problem, into an anti-colonial struggle, thus granting legitimacy to the PLO.

On the whole, the importance of Algiers could be summed up thus: by linking economic independence to the liberation struggle, the Conference was as much a summit for the fight for independence as it was for the consolidation of this independence. It was for this reason that the merits of international peace and peaceful co-existence came to be constructed around economic development and anti-colonialism as reflected in the declaration:

As long as colonial wars, apartheid, imperialist aggression, alien domination, foreign occupation, power politics, economic exploitation and plunder prevail, peace will be limited in principle and scope ... Peace is indivisible; it cannot be reduced to a mere shifting of confrontation from one area to another, nor should it condone the continued existence of tension in some areas while endeavouring to eliminate it elsewhere.¹¹⁸

(e) The Colombo Meeting: 16th-19th August, 1976

The anti-colonial mood at the time of Colombo suggested a growing

117. Ibid.

118. Ibid, p. 193.

confidence within the non-aligned movement about the eventual and not-too-distant defeat of colonialism in its remaining strongholds. The feeling doubtlessly stemmed from the conquest of independence by Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola since the 1973 Algiers Conference. The tendency at Colombo was therefore to view colonialism as a spent force only struggling to hold on to lost grounds against the tide of history. In consequence, instead of the usual all-out condemnation in bellicose rhetoric typical of past conferences, speeches increasingly concentrated on the gains made in decolonisation, but stressing, however, that final victory was yet to be achieved.

With such confidence in the eventual disappearance of colonialism, other issues more to do with the consolidation of independence and the expansion of inter-state co-operation in various fields acquired prominence in the overall scheme of the conference. Subjects as diverse as culture, transport and agriculture which had only received passing attention in the past, became substantial in competition with anti-colonialism. One particular project - the creation of a non-aligned news agency - came up for serious consideration, having been discussed earlier at the Special Ministerial Council meeting held in New Delhi in July 1976. The movement, suspicious of the Western mass media as a tool of foreign domination, was unanimous on the need for such an agency as an aspect of the anti-imperialist struggle to break down what it regarded as cultural, psychological and intellectual enslavement.

It is least surprising from this highly optimistic standpoint of predicted doom of the colonial order to hear President Tito proclaim that "the disintegration of the colonial system" was almost completed. His primary concern, as it had always been, was the danger of superpower rivalry and its associated arms race.

It was in this context that he analysed the Middle East crisis and arrived at the conclusion that Israel continued to be intransigent because of the support of a particular superpower.¹¹⁹

As already noted, President Tito's undying preoccupation with peace based on superpower rapprochement derives from Yugoslavia's national and regional interests defined in terms of such issues as a nuclear-free Mediterranean zone, and the implementation of the Helsinki accord on security and co-operation in Europe. These two subjects constituted the major part of his address, with a corresponding call for a special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament. The reason for this position was obvious: Yugoslavia, having succeeded in 1948 in detaching itself from the Soviet bloc, has had to pursue a foreign policy that would safeguard its independence.¹²⁰ Tito believed that besides non-alignment, the Helsinki agreement, which seeks to promote detente on the basis of respect for territorial integrity and non-interference in the affairs of another state, guaranteed his country's independence. This perspective on independence came out clearly in a Yugoslav news agency commentary in reference to Soviet presence in Afghanistan, which says "socialism based on national independence, not on external power".¹²¹

Such pronounced disposition towards national concern with its possible implications for anti-colonialism left considerable doubts as to the extent President Tito had mellowed as a 'liberator'. His revolutionary resistance against

119. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1976, p. 27978

120. See John Campbell, Tito's Separate Road : Yugoslavia and America in World Politics, (New York : Harper and Row Publishers, 1967), Chapter 2 for Yugoslavia's break with the Soviet Union.

121. BBC Foreign Service News, 27 December, 1981.

Nazi occupation and the defiance against Stalinist control provide a shining example for all freedom fighters. Yet Tito could now caution against revolutionary tactics in favour of peaceful means of combating 'imperialism',¹²² apparently acting from the perspective of changed international circumstances. The obvious conclusion to be drawn is that for President Tito, anti-colonialism is but an adjunct to world peace conditioned upon bloc understanding and general disarmament.

As if taking a cue from the Yugoslav leader, but in fact preceeding his speech, Mrs. Siramavo Bandaranaike, the host Prime Minister, also set out to de-emphasise the anti-colonial principle, influenced by the victories of Mozambique and Angola over Portuguese colonialism. In her view, the victories indicated that "imperialism in its cruder forms" no longer constituted the main problem of non-alignment. What now confronted the Third World was economic imperialism which had brought the non-aligned movement to "the stage at which it ought to concentrate more than ever before on lending economic substance to its political victories".¹²³ Mrs. Bandaranaike's overall political demands made the need to declare the Indian Ocean a zone of peace (which implied the dismantling of the United States base at Diego Garcia) a top priority, while anti-colonialism received the ritualistic support of verbal expression. So relegated was the latter in her speech that not even the call for the withdrawal of Israel from "territories conquered by oppression" helped substantially to redress the imbalance.

122. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1976, p.27978. This was his advice to General Omar Torrijos of Panama who had wanted to take military action against the US in the Panama Canal zone, op. cit.

123. Ibid

The fact which cannot escape observation at Colombo was the approach to the issue of liberation determined by the standpoint of various national and regional interests. In essence, the anti-colonial theme was devalued to the level where it became primarily a 'regional' concern. Thus, it fell on the Arab group to press forward the Palestinian cause; the African bloc to promote the cause of the struggle in Southern Africa; and Cuba to champion the case of Puerto Rica. Invariably, the speech of President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia was mainly devoted to the situation in Southern Africa. His tough stand which easily qualified him unofficially as the spokesman for Africa reflected the acute sacrifice Zambia was making as a frontline state in the continent's liberation wars. Apart from the financial loss to the country in implementing sanctions against Rhodesia over the past three years, there was also the sacrifice in human lives resulting from the ever increasing military reprisals against her by the Smith regime for providing sanctuary to the freedom fighters. But while Kaunda pleaded with the non-aligned states for assistance, he brooked no illusions that the only practical solution to the problem lay in an early victory of the nationalist forces; a victory, he said, that must be achieved on the battlefield. Therefore the plea for more assistance to the liberation movements:

There is no turning back. In the fight for justice, freedom, and independence for the people of Southern Africa, the countries of the non-aligned movement should individually or collectively increase their contribution to the armed struggle.¹²⁴

For President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, the Conference provided yet another forum to keep up the euphoria of the Arab's partial success in the October 1973 war, which success he partly attributed to the "political and moral support of the non-aligned group".¹²⁵

124. Ibid, p. 27979.

125. Ibid, p. 27978.

But one man, it appeared, did not share the optimism that colonialism was on the way out. He was Libya's Colonel Muammar Ghadafi whose show of support for liberation took a polemical form. His accusation of "imperialist agents" said to have infiltrated the non-aligned movement set the Conference on a rough edge. According to him, "it is not everyone who is attending this non-aligned group who is actually non-aligned. There are some among us who could be called a 'Trojan Horse'." Ghadafi's vitriolic attack might be attributed to a feeling of disenchantment with the movement for a considered lack of concrete action to combat imperialism, especially the Israeli "aggression" against the Palestinian people. Consequently, he excused himself of any immodesty to defend Libya's record of the undisclosed financial and material assistance to the Palestinian cause; and defended such aid against accusations of Libya promoting terrorism: "If their (the Palestinian) struggle is terrorism, then we accept the accusation and it is an honour to us. It is the Zionists who are terrorists".¹²⁶

The optimism displayed at the beginning of the Conference about the eventual defeat of colonialism was translated into an official position. With the

126. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1976, pp. 27978-9.
Col. Ghadafi has his own definition of terrorism which covers the production of nuclear weapons. "As long as the big powers continue to manufacture atomic weapons, it means they are continuing to terrorise the world", he said. And he includes in his definition the maintenance of military bases on foreign lands as well as the deployment of naval fleets around the world. As for his defence against accusation of supporting terrorism, he points out: "There is a big difference between supporting liberation movements, the just cause of the people fighting for freedom, and supporting terrorism. We have emphasised many times that we are opposed to terrorism. But there is no justification in putting the PLO on the list of terrorist organisations".
Source: Time magazine, 8 June, 1981, p. 16.

recent independence of the former Portuguese colonies in mind, the Conference believed that colonialism as traditionally understood was coming to an end.¹²⁷

The struggles in Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Palestine now represented the final assault against the system. Consequently the Conference called on member-states to give increased practical assistance to the liberation movements as "any delay in effective action is bound to encourage the minority and racist regimes to precipitate wider conflicts and resort to massive violence".¹²⁸

Apart from this, the contribution of the Colombo Conference to anti-colonialism hardly went beyond 'urges' and 'condemnations'. Much of the substance in the official declaration was the endorsement of United Nations and OAU resolutions, and the reaffirmation of previous non-aligned conference decisions. Invariably, the declaration, in further calling for the isolation of Ian Smith's illegal regime, could only urge on member-countries to enforce existing mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia; while it also endorsed the OAU stand of non-recognition of the so-called independent 'bantustan' states created by Pretoria.

Support for Palestinian took the form of approval for the United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,¹²⁹ besides the usual condemnation of Israel, following which states were urged to support the Committee's report at the thirty first session of the United Nations General Assembly. In addition the PLO was given a further diplomatic boost by the Conference position that the organisation should be involved in any

127. Colombo Conference Declaration, in Jankowitsch and Sauvant, op.cit. Vol. II, p.757.

128. Ibid, p. 765.

129. The Committee was set up by General Assembly Resolution 3376 (XXX) of 10 November 1975. For the first report of the Committee, issued in 1976, see General Assembly Official Records, 31st session, Supplement No. 35, Document A/31/35.

Middle East settlement since the Palestinian question formed "the root cause of the conflict in the region".

But as it turned out, the support for the PLO was less than total, especially where it touched on the vital interest of Israel. For instance, the Conference in equating Zionism with racism, framed earlier at Algiers, gave rise to numerous reservations which in a way demonstrated the partial acceptance of the Palestinian cause as anti-colonial and anti-racist struggle. Burma, Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, Morocco and Panama, all entered reservations on the issue, some of them having voted against the equation at the United Nations in General Assembly Resolution 3379. Morocco, Ivory Coast and Chad also made reservations on the call upon "member states to separately and collectively impose such sanctions as oil embargo against France and Israel", with Chad describing the move as "extreme" and "unilateral".¹³⁰

(f) Havana Conference: 3rd-9th September, 1979.

The Havana Conference is memorable for the uncertainties that characterised it. The hostilities from quarters identified as "imperialist" towards the holding of the summit in Cuba predicted doom for a sixth non-aligned gathering. Indeed at one stage, the intrigues of "international imperialism" to ensure a boycott of the Conference were so undisguisably threatening that it prompted speculation of a possible change of venue if the movement was to survive. A proof of this conspiracy, apparently to undermine Dr. Fidel Castro's revolutionary position in the non-aligned movement, came from Grenada's Maurice Bishop in his account at the Conference of Washington's pressures on

130. See Jankowitsch and Sauvart, Vol. II, op. cit, pp. 922-948 for reservations.

him not to attend.¹³¹ Oliver Tambo of the African National Congress was therefore not indulging in platitude when he remarked: "As liberation movements, we have been aware of all the manoeuvres, of attempts, of schemes to prevent this great summit taking place - only because the host country was Cuba".¹³² That the meeting was still held in Havana was no doubt a victory for the anti-imperialist core of the non-aligned, for Cuba, and above all a personal triumph for Fidel Castro.

The general conference atmosphere was conditioned by Cuba's revolutionary environment to such a degree that it turned out to be a competitive 'show' of revolutionary credentials. In fact so overpowering was the environmental factor that countries which should qualify as moderates had to assume radicalism in order to belong. To cite but one example was the militant stand of Panama's President A. Royo. In reminding the Conference of his country's fight to establish full sovereignty over the canal zone, President Royo surprised many by his touch remark in an obvious allusion to the United States: "If there is any continent that really knows what exploitation, intervention, colonialism and neo-colonialism means, it is the Latin American continent".¹³³

What it all meant was that anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, less by calculation than by influencing power, captured the spirit of the Conference. Greatly contributing to this was the arrival of several newly emergent revolutionary regimes. Nicaragua, Grenada, Iran, Ethiopia, Benin, Ghana, Madagascar and Seychelles had all changed political course in the wake of either

131. Granma Weekly Review (Havana) No. 37, 16 September, 1979, p.9.

132. Addresses Delivered at the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Havana, 3-9 September 1979. (Editorial De Ciencias Sociales, La Havana, 1980), p.36. Hereafter referred to as Havana Conference Addresses.

133. Granma Weekly Review, op. cit. p.2.

a coup-initiated or popular revolutionary struggle. Besides, there was the impact of Fidel Castro's opening address, described by Prime Minister Jayewardene of Sri Lanka as an "inspired speech", which helped to influence the course of debate. The speech, while whipping up revolutionary sentiment, also instilled a sense of guilt in those countries which often showed faltering support for liberation in their moderate policy that make an "art of opportunism".¹³⁴

When the Cuban leader spoke of "the true measure of a revolutionary people" as one of "the unblemished conduct of a country that cannot be bribed, bought or intimidated", the aim supposedly was to indict, and even shame those states considered to be soft and compromising on colonialism. And in openly pointing out Cuba's "supreme sacrifice" in support of liberation movements as an expression of "solidarity with deeds, not fine words", the idea, perhaps, was to throw a challenge to the liberation consciousness of the non-aligned movement, and to ruffle the sensibility of member-states into action against colonialism. As far as Cuba was concerned, the essence of non-alignment is the struggle against domination around which members should be united:

We (Cubans) are firmly anti-imperialist, anti-colonial, anti-neo-colonial, anti-racist, anti-zionist and anti-facist because these principles are part of our thinking; they constitute the essence and origin of the movement of Non-Aligned countries, and have formed its life and history ever since its founding... Was any country that now belong to our movement really independent more than thirty five years ago? Is there any member that hasn't known colonialism, neo-colonialism, fascism, racial discrimination or imperialist oppression?¹³⁵

The immediate response to Fidel Castro's address was an irresistible

134. See Granma Weekly Review (Havana) No. 36, 9 September, 1979, pp. 2-3 for the opening speech of Fidel Castro.

135. Ibid, p. 2.

show of praise and admiration for the Cuban leader. President Didier Ratsiraka of Madagascar, moved by the speech, recalled with a promise: "Dear Comrade Fidel, you once said that the duty of all revolutionaries is to make the revolution. We are ready to make the revolution. The struggle continues".¹³⁶ Equally moved to admiration was Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda who responded thus: Comrade President Castro, you have provided for us a food for thought. You have given us a picture of what is taking place in our troubled world today.... Speaking as one of many African leaders, let me assure you, Comrade Castro, that the greatest majority of Africa admire, love and appreciate your revolutionary zeal in tackling the problems of mankind."¹³⁷

From this impelling anti-colonial perspective, it became impossible even for President Tito to subordinate national liberation to world peace. Not that Tito was now totally converted to the staunch 'pro-liberation camp' which regard anti-colonialism as a condition for international peace and peaceful co-existence; nevertheless his modified shift to the above viewpoint added significance to the assessment of Havana as the high tide of anti-colonialism in non-aligned conferences. In an appraisal of the international situation, President Tito warned against the danger of war with the continued "obstinate presence" of colonialism and racism in Southern Africa, and promised that "the peoples of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, and their legitimate representatives - the Patriotic Front, SWAPO and the African National Congress - as well as the Frontline States, can be sure of our full support for their just struggle and determination to win their right to freedom and independence".¹³⁸

136. Havana Conference Addresses, op. cit, p.445.

137. Ibid, pp.19-20.

138. Granma Weekly Review, op. cit. p.3.

As for the new revolutionary leaders who were attending a non-aligned Conference for the first time, there was the eagerness in them to establish their radicalism as demonstrated in fiery anti-imperialist denunciations. Ethiopia's Col. Haile Mariam Mengistu spent a good part of his address on what he considered to be an imperialist-inspired Somali invasion of his country. Although the overthrown monarchy was a known sympathiser, even an interested supporter of anti-colonialism despite its conservatism, the new regime carried this support to revolutionary proportions. This explains Col. Mengistu's virulent condemnation of the Rhodesian internal settlement seen as another example of the constant manoeuvres of imperialism and neo-colonialism. In like manner was the scathing attack on South Africa for her repeated show of contempt for international opinion and United Nations resolutions on apartheid. Finally Col. Mengistu pledged Ethiopia's readiness to strengthen militant solidarity with all forces struggling against colonialism.¹³⁹ In the case of Ghana, one tended to observe a nostalgia in the desire to relive that country's past as an anti-colonial frontliner. Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings recalled the statement of the country's former President, Kwame Nkrumah, that Ghana's independence remained incomplete unless the whole of Africa was freed; hence his pledged support for national liberation movements.¹⁴⁰

The trend of debate suggests one thing: whereas past conferences were mostly known to reinstate and reaffirm the principles of non-alignment as enunciated in 1961, Havana sought a redefinition of the policy to set priorities in favour of anti-colonialism, a change which sets the argument of 'natural allies'

139. Ibid

140. Ibid, p. 6.

thesis in a proper context. The radicals led by Cuba fought strenuously to promote the reordering of priorities, for which President Sekou Toure of Guinea characterised non-alignment as hardly an indifferent policy in the face of colonialism and freedom: As he put it, "We've made our choice between colonisation and national independence; between apartheid and racial equality; between racism and non-discrimination; between the economic plundering of nations and the free and full enjoyment of the people's productive efforts".¹⁴¹

The Prime Minister of Vietnam, Pham Van Dong, was even more direct in raking up the hardly resolved issue of contending priorities of the policy. He totally disagreed with any suggestion that non-alignment should keep to its 'initial' objective of anti-bloc stand, as this he said was aimed at diverting the movement from its anti-imperialist goal. His argument in defence of his position was that:

Today, more than ever before, we must ratify our independent and sovereign character, and at the same time we must struggle for the people's inalienable objectives: to combat imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, apartheid, zionism and hegemonism in order to achieve and preserve peace, national independence, and social progress. This is our sacred cause, the supreme interests and the most cherished aspiration of thousands of millions of men and women in this world. It is also the inexorable trend of our times.¹⁴²

Pham Van Dong's anti-imperialist line might read well with his fellow radicals in their adherence to revolutionary change as being historically inevitable. However, what his statement implicitly acknowledged in the bid to promote anti-colonialism above any other objective is the fact of the 'unity of principles' in which all the objectives protect and reinforce one another. Anti-colonialism, international

141. Ibid, p. 8.

142. Ibid, p. 5.

peace, and the anti-bloc principle are all to be pursued within the common goal of national independence. Nevertheless the Prime Minister could be adjudged right in his choice of priority, since one cannot protect what one has not got. Independence has to be won before it could be protected. And liberation movements being the harbingers of independence should naturally claim the pride of place in non-alignment. Hence his insistence on making anti-colonialism the focal point of non-alignment.

Havana and Camp David Accord

The vigorous anti-colonial posture of the Conference was played out over the issue of the Camp David accord for which Egypt was severely censured. The acrimonious debate on the subject dangerously set the radicals against the moderates and conservatives in a demonstration of the attitudinal difference among member-states which had so often strained the cohesion of the movement. Taking the lead in the attack against the accord from a most affected standpoint were Syria and the PLO. The bewilderment of President Assad with Sadat's action was summed up in his question: "where does one find what the Egyptian regime has in all this?" The answer as provided by him was simply that Camp David amounted to a betrayal of the Arab cause, and a contradiction of accepted international position on the Palestinian question.¹⁴³

For the PLO, Camp David had a more damaging significance for its implication of denying the organisation a legitimate standing by the failure to recognise it as a party to the Middle East crisis as urged by Colombo. Nothing could be more derisory to the organisation's status than the fact that the fate of

143. Ibid, p. 3.

the people it represents should be decided to its utter exclusion. Israel may be right to exclude the PLO in the negotiations since that is the usual treatment of insurgent movements by status quo authorities in order to portray the former as illegal and illegitimate. This was a pitfall Egypt apparently ignored in the pursuit of her national interest. Secondly, the PLO suspected its exclusion as an Israeli strategy to undermine the organisation's authority and pave the way for the creation of an alternative, pliable Palestinian leadership. Indeed later Israeli policy in the occupied West Bank to sponsor a moderate Palestinian leadership to compete with, even oppose the PLO, confirm the suspicion. Commenting two years later on the strategy, the Washington Post observed: "Israel has blocked authentic currents of Palestinian nationalism, and offered an autonomy so watery-thin as to discourage sampling by all but a docile few".¹⁴⁴

Militarily, the PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, assessed the agreement as a United States' policy, but now given 'Arab' approval, to boost Israel's offensive capability in her aggression against the Arab countries. If not, he asked, "how can the signatories claim that these are peace agreements when they include a clause legalising the purchase of arms by Israel worth a total of \$13,000,000?"¹⁴⁵ The demand of Yasser Arafat on the Conference was accordingly to condemn the treaty, sanction Egypt for violating non-aligned and United Nations decisions, and insist on the restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people.

144. Reprinted in the International Herald Tribune, 26 April, 1982, p.4.

145. Granma Weekly Review, op. cit, p.4.

Similar opposition came from, among others, Ethiopia, Vietnam and Libya. Cuba for example, characterised the agreement as "an armed, dirty, unjust, bloody peace that will never be a true peace". On the other hand, Zaire openly supported Egypt, while Nepal accepted the treaty as a necessary step towards an eventual resolution of the Middle East conflict. Amid this controversy, of radical hostility to, and conservative support of the accord, Egypt's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Boutros Ghali defended his country's move as a "revolutionary act, despite what some people may claim".¹⁴⁶ The main argument of his defence hinged on the United Nations Security Council resolution 242 of November 1967, which provisions he claimed, "were faithfully applied" in the signing of the treaty. And invoking the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference, Mr. Boutros Ghali charged the critics of violating these principles of national independence by their attacks which he read as an attempt to define a foreign policy for Egypt. But such defence was certainly not convincing enough to persuade his suspicious, even reluctant audience, that Camp David augured well for the Palestinians; a point which explains the unenthusiastic response to the assurance that Egypt was still dedicated to the Palestinian cause.

Considering the steps, in some ways quite deliberately taken, by Sadat to reach agreement with Israel, there is every reason to suspect that peace on such basis could only be achieved at the expense of the PLO. In the first place, there was the Egyptian Government's encouraged campaign to excuse Egypt from Pan-Arab commitment to Palestine. The campaign fed on the fact that the country had borne the brunt of all the wars with severe consequences on Egyptian domestic

146. Ibid, p. 12.

life. The best way to sell this idea to the Egyptian people was to discredit the Palestinians as the main cause of Egypt's problems, and that of course meant denigrating the PLO.¹⁴⁷

The final test of Camp David came during the meeting of the Political Commission set up to draft the conference official declaration. Here the Arab bloc piled up pressure for the suspension of Egypt from the non-aligned movement. But a group of African states, including Senegal, Gabon, Nigeria and Zaire countered the demand on the grounds that censoring Egypt would create a precedent.¹⁴⁸ After a tedious debate during which over thirty countries contributed, the Commission decided that those sections of the General Declaration concerning the treaty and Egypt be passed on to the plenary session. In the end the Conference "energetically" condemned the accord, "Bearing in mind that the Camp David Agreements and the Egypt-Israeli Treaty of 26th March, 1979 constitute a partial agreement and a separate treaty that mean total abandonment of the cause of the Arab countries, and an act of complicity with the continued occupation of the Arab territories and violate the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine."¹⁴⁹

On the question of suspension, the Conference skirted a decision by entrusting the Co-ordinating Bureau, acting as an ad hoc committee, with the task of examining "the damage caused to the Arab people by the conduct of the

147. Walid W. Kazziha, Palestine in the Arab Dilemma, (London: Groom Helm, 1979) pp. 87-107 gives an account of Sadat's peace initiatives and the eventual outcome.

148. Granma Weekly Review, op. cit. p. 13.

149. Havana Conference Political and Economic Resolutions reprinted in Peter Willetts The Non-Aligned in Havana, (London : Frances Pinter Ltd. 1981), pp. 189-190.

Egyptian Government in signing the Camp David Agreements".¹⁵⁰ These decisions represented a compromise in the controversy as it offered a little less than what each party had wanted. While the radicals, notably Syria and the PLO, may not be totally satisfied with mere condemnation, however stringent that was, Egypt and her friends were no doubt delighted that the demand for suspension was not upheld.

The Issue of Western Sahara

Western Sahara was one other subject for which another member-state, Morocco, was rebuked almost to the extent of being isolated. Morocco's annexation in 1975 of this former Spanish colony had already been challenged by both the OAU and the United Nations as a negation of decolonisation. The non-aligned movement until now had adopted a cautious attitude on the issue, believing, perhaps, that the problem was better left with the OAU. Probably for this reason, the 1976 Colombo Conference limited itself to mere expression of a desire for a peaceful solution, thereby tending to play down the existence of a liberation war waged by the POLISARIO in the territory against Morocco.

This partly explains the non-recognition of the POLISARIO by the OAU and the non-aligned movement for a long time. One thus detects a certain ambivalence in the non-aligned's attitude towards the question of colonialism which seems to be that only the West could be guilty of colonial and imperialist adventures. If it was convenient at first for the non-aligned movement to so pretend in order not to embarrass itself as being an accomplice of colonialism through the policy of a member-state, Havana decided to shed that pretence.

150. Ibid, p. 190.

Delegates, mostly the radicals, accused Morocco of denying the people of the territory the right to self-determination. This naturally lent support to the POLISARIO. But it was a support with measured feelings. The attacks on Morocco markedly fell short of the invective which, by interpretation, were reserved for the 'white' colonialists. That was why even Cuba, known to be speaking from a privileged position capable of eliciting a less compromising stand, could exercise surprising restraint on the issue.¹⁵¹

This circumspect approach to the issue of Western Sahara only resulted in an official expression of "deep concern at the serious situation prevailing in Western Sahara";¹⁵² with a recall of the earlier decisions on the question by the non-aligned, the United Nations, and the OAU. On the whole, the strategy of the conference in dealing with Western Sahara was to rely on the OAU's Special Committee set up to work out a solution.¹⁵³ Unlike Egypt over Camp David, Morocco in the end got away with a mild condemnation that only "deplored" the extension of her armed occupation of the southern part of the territory previously administered by Mauritania.

But as tempered as the condemnation was, it still did not obtain a general approval. The reservations by Cameroon, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Tunisia¹⁵⁴ which implicitly meant an acquiescence to the policies of Rabat, tended to

151. Cuba was a member of the United Nations Commission which investigated the wishes of the Saharan people on independence.

152. Peter Willetts, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

153. OAU Document AHG/Dec. 114 (XVI) Members of the Committee were Nigeria, Guinea, Mali, Sudan, Tanzania and Liberia. It was established "to work out the modalities and to supervise the organisation of a referendum with the co-operation of the UN on the basis of one person one vote".

154. See Peter Willetts, *op. cit.*, pp. 239-247 for the reservations.

identify them with Morocco's defence that decolonisation had already been achieved in the territory in conformity with international law. This, however, was an untenable argument not only in the light of the recognized processes of decolonization but also in the face of the OAU's recommendation for a referendum in the territory to determine the wishes of the inhabitants.

In the end, the POLISARIO FRONT emerged a winner, having achieved a de facto recognition ensured in the Conference declaration which welcomed the agreement between Mauritania and the Front. Thus, the Havana meeting, as observed by Peter Willetts,¹⁵⁵ represented a significant progress on the issue in relation to the Colombo Conference's stand which merely expressed hope for a "just and durable solution".

Besides these two sensitive subjects, the Conference demonstrated firmness on the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and Namibia.¹⁵⁶ A boost to the struggle in these two territories was given in the acceptance as full members of the non-aligned movement of SWAPO and the Patriotic Front. However, much of the support for their cause took the form of reaffirmation of earlier non-aligned position and adoption of OAU and United Nations resolutions. On this basis the Conference rejected the internal settlement in Rhodesia, and urged for assistance to the Patriotic Front in a degree that surpassed earlier calls. Such assistance was to include:

- (i) the supply of equipment, financial aid and training to advance the national liberation armed struggle;

155. Ibid, p. 98.

156. Ibid, pp. 89-93 for the Conference Declaration on Zimbabwe and Namibia.

- (ii) support of other Patriotic Front training programmes;
- (iii) support for reconstruction programmes in Zimbabwean territory under direct control of the Patriotic Front; and
- (iv) support for Zimbabwean refugees driven from their homes to neighbouring countries.

Similar support for Namibia, manifested in the establishment of a Special Fund for Namibia that would "effectively serve the liberation of that country", reflected the new status of SWAPO as a full member of the non-aligned movement.

The South African situation was pragmatically assessed as remaining intractable, offering "extremely different conditions of the most brutal repression" against which the impact of the ANC was yet to be seriously felt. Although the Conference stressed the need to provide financial and military assistance to the country's liberation movement, the emphasis weighed on diplomatic pressure backed by economic measures. Accordingly, it demanded a "strict implementation" of all United Nations resolutions on South Africa which included economic sanction, and arms and oil embargo. In line with this, the Conference denounced all collaboration with South Africa, and the political, diplomatic and moral support that the "imperialist powers" provide for.

An observation about the Conference which is a contradiction of some sort is that as successful as it was as an anti-colonial summit, it also showed a growing disenchantment of the moderate and conservative group towards national liberation struggle. The numerous reservations by this group of countries even on issues that seemed self-evident to rule out any dissent, apparently weakened

a common anti-colonial stand, also put to question the movement's principle of decision-making by consensus; a point underscored by the Conference appeal which said that "The practice of allowing reservations on decisions adopted at meetings and conferences of Non-Aligned countries is continued. However, reservations should be avoided as far as possible because they tend to weaken the consensus".¹⁵⁷

The Middle East problem attracted the greatest reservations, followed by declarations concerning the Latin American territories of Puerto Rico, Guadeloupe, Martinique and French Guyana where the absence of "national liberation movements" was employed to deny them of colonial status. The most contradictory reservation happened to be Gabon's on Zimbabwe which amounted to a de facto recognition of the internal constitutional settlement that installed the Muzorewa Government. The reservation apparently rejected the Patriotic Front as "the sole legitimate, authentic representative of the people of Zimbabwe", arguing that such formulation, "contrary to the democratic reality" provided by the internal settlement, "will never favour dialogue among all the interested parties".¹⁵⁸ Yet it was at Libreville, the Gabonese capital, in 1977 that the OAU summit gave sole recognition to the Patriotic Front.

Summary and Conclusion

Two major points tend to emerge from this survey of development of liberation support within the non-aligned movement. The first point is that in spite of the affinity between the national liberation movements and the non-aligned arising from the common ideology of anti-colonialism, recognition of the

157. Ibid, pp. 210-211.

158. Ibid, p. 242.

liberation movements became such an issue to be fought for. The jealous attachment to sovereignty, besides the ideological differences of member-states, presented serious obstacle for quite some time to the full acceptance of the liberation movements into the fold of the non-aligned nations. The obviously misleading impression created by this apparent reluctance to accord full recognition to the movements is that the non-aligned movement did not seem to appreciate fully the significance of recognition to the liberation movements. Not only was recognition important to create an acceptable international image for the movement, it was more importantly a vital requirement in ensuring a better material condition of the movements. Without such recognition, the liberation movements could be treated as no better than terrorist organisations subject to national laws. But recognition gives them international respectability, and opens the door for material support to their struggle. Yet recognition involved the non-aligned movement in a lot of divisive argument to the utter dismay of the liberation movement.

The second point to be made is the changes in anti-colonial fortune at the various summit conferences. While national liberation was a regular theme at all the conferences, emphasis on anti-colonialism tended to vary under the influence of certain factors discussed in Chapter 2. Invariably the Belgrade Conference was more concerned with international peace conceived in terms of superpower understanding. This was in response to the heightened fear of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union caused by the deterioration in the relationship of both countries. The attempt by some countries to promote anti-colonialism over world peace was largely unsuccessful. In the end Belgrade became an anti-war conference but nevertheless recognising the need to prosecute the anti-colonial struggle.

At Cairo the emphasis was reversed in favour of anti-colonialism.

Three reasons were responsible for this: the improvement in superpower relations, the increase in liberation activities in form of the armed struggle, and the large attendance of African states fresh from the colonial struggle. The Lusaka Conference also made anti-colonialism the main theme, apparently influenced by its nearness to the 'liberation' zone. Besides there was the special interest of the host country. The ever increasing burden of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa on Zambia ensured that President Kenneth Kaunda pressed for an early solution to the problem. This meant giving increased material support to the liberation movements.

At the Algiers Conference in 1973, the issue of a new international economic order competed keenly with anti-colonialism for attention. The result of this competition was the introduction of the economic dimension into the national liberation struggle. But the more significant outcome of the Conference were the formal equation of Zionism with racism, and the call for the establishment of the Non-Aligned Support and Solidarity Fund for national liberation.

The Colombo summit meeting showed complacency on colonialism, encouraged in this by the independence of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola between 1973 and 1976. But the Havana Conference once again re-established the supremacy of national liberation in the scheme of non-alignment. Cuba's revolutionary influence and the arrival of many more radical leaders contributed to making the Conference basically an anti-colonial gathering, with the Camp David Treaty between Egypt and Israel as a major issue.

In conclusion, it has to be said that these two major points did not in any great measure seriously affect the non-aligned movements' commitment to national liberation. Recognition of the liberation movements, though delayed in some cases, was finally granted. And the fluctuations in emphasis only highlights the contending priorities in the non-aligned movement, and illustrates the dynamic nature of international politics.

CHAPTER 4. DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AT THE UNITED NATIONS:
LEGITIMISATION OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

The collecting point of the non-aligned's anti-colonial campaign is the United Nations. Here they and the liberation movements - the accusers - come face to face with the accused - the colonial powers - in the arena of international public opinion that in effect turns the Organisation into a propaganda battlefield. Generally the decolonisation strategy of the non-aligned is simply to exert pressure on the colonial authorities through economic sanction, diplomatic isolation, and moral censure. The strategy was dictated by the awareness that they lacked the capability to force the United Nations into taking military action against the colonial powers along the pattern of the Organisation's involvement in Korea, no matter how hard they tried to present the colonial situation as a threat to world peace.

Anti-colonialism has always formed part of the history of the United Nations. From the very inception of the Organisation, the colonial question constituted one major problem which called for urgent attention in the post-war years. The Charter of the Organisation reflected this need in an expressed desire to apply the principle of self-determination to all nations.¹ Yet the decolonisation process had very often proved a painful experience because of the resistance of the colonial powers to change. At one stage their opposition to internationalisation of the colonies through United Nation's control almost stood in the way of establishing the Organisation. It was to forestall such control and keep the territories under domestic jurisdiction that Winston Churchill was

1. UN Charter, Chapter XI, Articles 73 and 74 on declaration regarding non-self-governing territories.

understood to have preferred the creation of a number of regional organisations in place of one universal body.² France particularly derided the very idea of international control, suggesting that the United Nations was, as an impotent body, incapable of shouldering colonial responsibilities - a duty she claimed to be discharging in the best traditions of a civilising mission. As put by R. Pleven, the Commissioner for the Colonies of the French Government:

At this moment when France is certainly more aware than ever of the importance of her Empire and of the duties that are awaiting her there, a new doctrine is being put forward whereby colonial responsibilities should be assumed no longer by those countries who for centuries carried them out ... but by some international organisation which one has to assume, is credited with the cardinal virtue of justice ... and of competence and diligence. Neither the interests nor the wishes of the colonial populations would be served by a reform which would transfer to a caretaker organisation, acting under a collective name, the continuation of the colonising work which is liberating the primitive societies from the great calamities which are ravaging them and which are called disease, ignorance, superstition, tyranny ...³

Besides the British and French objections, there was the interest of the United States whose opposition to colonial independence at the time was dictated primarily by strategic considerations as evidenced by a letter of 8th July 1941 from President Roosevelt to the Portuguese leader, Antonio Salazar:

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2. E.J. Hughes, 'Winston Churchill and the Formation of the United Nations Organisation', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 9, No. 4, October 1974, pp. 177-194.
 3. Quoted in Henri Grimal, Decolonisation : The British, French, Dutch and Belgian Empires, 1919-1963, (London; Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965) p. 124.

In the opinion of the Government of the United States, the continued exercise of unimpaired and sovereign jurisdiction by the Government of Portugal over all the overseas territories offers complete assurance of security to the Western Hemisphere in so far as regions mentioned are concerned ... It is consequently the consistent desire of the United States that there be no infringement of Portuguese sovereign control over those territories.⁴

Although the United States later showed flexibility in its attitude towards decolonisation, these were powerful positions which required an equally strong opposition to ensure that the principle of anti-colonialism was enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. China, the Soviet Union, Egypt and some Latin American countries insisted that the Organisation committed itself to ending colonialism. In the end a compromise was reached, symbolized in the Trusteeship System which Henri Grimal remarked, "managed to present a synthesis of colonialism and anti-colonialism".⁵

The effect of this compromise in the early years was illustrated in the cautious approach of the United Nations to decolonisation which was designed not to push the colonial powers too fast, while it also sought to placate the anti-colonial forces. It must be remembered, of course, that the Organisation was primarily a Western creation intended to protect Western and great power interests, among which was colonialism.

It was in this environment of implicit support for Western colonial values that the newly independent states arrived at the United Nations in the 1960s with their avowedly anti-colonial politics. The immediate task facing them was how to erode this support. They accepted the task, fully determined to raise the

4. Referred to by Salazar in his 'Declaration on Overseas Policy', (Lisbon : National Secretariat of Information) 1963.

5. Henri Grimal, op cit. p. 159.

anti-colonial campaign to a radical level which demanded elimination rather than reform of the colonial system.

But the determination suffered from lack of political clout and numerical superiority which for some time limited the impact of the new states in the Organisation. This was demonstrated in the earlier failure of the Afro-Asian bloc to make any diplomatic headway over the Algerian situation. All proposals on the conflict were defeated either by France's use of the veto in the Security Council, or because of inability to secure the required votes in the General Assembly. A turning point was reached in 1955 when the General Assembly set aside France's opposition to, and the General Committee's recommendation (UN Document A/2980) against the inclusion of Algeria on the agenda of the tenth session of the Assembly.⁶ Although the General Assembly, at the request of India and supported by other Afro-Asian states, later decided in resolution 909(X) not to consider the Algerian issue at that session, the very decision to include it on its agenda marked the start of the boycott by France of the Assembly over Algeria. Until now, despite the demand of the Afro-Asian group to censure her, the world body had upheld France's claim that Algeria was an integral part of France. Encouraging as this development was, its impact to create a majority position in favour of the Afro-Asian countries' demands was nowhere an immediate prospect.⁷

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6. UN Document, A/2924 and Add. 1 which was a letter to the Secretary-General by Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Thailand, requested the inclusion of Algeria on the agenda of the 10th General Assembly.
 7. UN Document A/C.1/L.232, recommended by First Committee as Doc. A/4075. The sponsors were: Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, U.A.R. and Yemen.

Three years later, a resolution calling for United Nations recognition of the right of the Algerian people to self-determination, and demanding the immediate settlement of the conflict, failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority. The right was however recognised in December 1960 in another resolution adopted by sixty-three to eight with twenty-seven abstentions.⁸ Nevertheless a proposal in the draft resolution for a United Nations "arranged, controlled and supervised" referendum to enable the people to determine their future was defeated in a vote of forty in favour, forty against, with sixteen abstentions.⁹

Apart from the handicaps of numbers and power base, the defection of Senegal from the ranks of the non-aligned bloc in her reservations about a more active role for the United Nations in the war contributed greatly to the defeat of the proposal for a referendum. Her ambiguously defined position, while ostensibly supporting the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence, preferred a solution based on President De Gaulle's November 1960 plan.¹⁰ De Gaulle's plan sought to apply self-determination selectively - not self-determination to the Algerian nation but to various opinions in the country. It was his subtle threat under the scheme that if the country were to choose independence from the three options of autonomy within a French Community, integration with France, or independence, Paris would take the necessary measures to protect those Algerians, including the French residents, who wished to remain French. Senegal's suggested role for the UN was to act as a mediator

8. General Assembly (G.A.) Resolution 1573(XV) of 19th December, 1960.

9. UN Document A/C.1/L.265 and Add. 1-3.

10. See Year Book of the United Nations (YUN) 1960, p.133.

to create the atmosphere for the resumption of negotiation between both parties. On this, she claimed to speak on behalf of "certain other African States", all ex-French colonies, who joined her in sponsoring a counter-proposal to the official non-aligned draft.¹¹ It was lost.

The position of the Francophone countries was hardly surprising, given their close ties with France arising from the circumstances of their independence. Having themselves accepted in 1958 De Gaulle's offer of autonomous status within the French Community in place of independence, they were perhaps minded to recommend same to Algeria on the basis of their definition of the situation. To them, as indicated in Ivory Coast's contribution in a United Nations debate,¹² the Algerian conflict was not a colonial war as such, but an issue that could be solved by mutual understanding between the two parties.

South Africa in the same way was able to deflect for quite some time the wrath of the non-aligned countries over its racial policy. The framework within which apartheid was discussed confined United Nations action to mere protests and appeals. Though it deplored that country's refusal to heed such appeals, the world body proved impotent to initiate any practical measures to deal with the situation. All it could do at best was to leave the matter with individual states to take "such separate and collective action as is open to them, in conformity

11. The other countries were Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey (now Benin), Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Niger and Upper Volta. Their amendment was A/L.334 to the official non-aligned proposal, A/4660 recommended by the First Committee.

12. YUN, 1961, p.98.

with the Charter".¹³ Consequently, not even the attempt by the non-aligned states represented in a 1961 draft resolution¹⁴ of the Special Political Committee to impose economic and diplomatic sanctions against the Pretoria regime and the possible expulsion of the country from the United Nations could pass, having failed to secure the required two-thirds majority on these demands.

The defeat of the draft resolution, as seen by the non-aligned, had to do with Western calculations of the economic and strategic relevance of South Africa to the Atlantic Community.¹⁵ Indeed, the South African representative, Mr. Eric Louw, openly exploited this point earlier in the General Assembly debate by reminding the West of his country's services in shipping, following the closure of the Suez Canal in 1956; a service, he warned, that would be lost in future if the sanctions proposed in the draft were accepted.¹⁶ Ghana's Foreign Minister, H.R. Amao, in his criticism of the United Nations lack of firmness in dealing with South Africa, summed up the anger and frustration of the non-aligned countries: "We cannot believe that this apartheid system can be uprooted by persuasion, understanding, and moderation. Such methods have been used before

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13. G.A. Resolution 1663(XVI) of 28th November 1961, Para. 6(9) of the resolution merely "calls once again upon the Government of South Africa to change its policies and conduct so as to conform to its obligations imposed by the Charter".
 14. UN Document A/SPC/L.71. The draft resolution sponsored by thirty-one states was withdrawn because of the non-adoption of the three recommended specific measures in a separate vote on the paragraphs. But another draft, Document A/SPC/L.72/Rev. 1 and Add.1 amending the former and introduced by Afghanistan, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Malaysia, India, Venezuela, Denmark, Norway and Togo was passed.
 15. See J.E. Spence, The Strategic Significance of Southern Africa (London: Royal United Service Institution, 1970), for an incisive analysis of the importance of South Africa to Western military strategy.
 16. United Nations Review, (8) December 1961, p. 22.

to no avail since the present leaders of South Africa are no respectors of such considerations".¹⁷

In spite of these failures, there was every reason to believe that by 1961, colonialism had come to be seen as an anachronism. Any action taken to dismantle it could therefore claim justification as did the defence of India against accusation of aggression to end Portuguese rule over Goa:

This is not a question of aggression. If anybody says it is, he is going against the tide of history; he is going against the entire thesis of the United Nations; he is going against the tide of world history and public opinion because colonialism can no longer be tolerated. There is no question that it is illegal and immoral. It was illegal in the beginning, it is illegal and immoral today; and that has got to be recognised.¹⁸

The arrival of dozens of non-aligned states at the United Nations in the early 1960s reinforced the Indian contention. With a new found numerical superiority, these states were able in due course to exert significant diplomatic pressure to achieve most of their anti-colonial objectives, a development that was to transform the world body profoundly, and which led to Francis Wilcox's prediction that the future of the Organisation belonged to the new emergent states. "They can make it or break it", he said, while observing that the colonial question remained "the factor that shapes the attitudes and conditions the behaviour of the non-aligned countries in the United Nations."¹⁹

17. Ibid.

18. Quoted in Martin Wight 'International Legitimacy', International Affairs, Vol. IV, No. 1, May 1972, p.1.

19. Francis Wilcox 'The Non-Aligned States and the United Nations' in Laurence W. Martin, (ed.), Neutralism and Non-Alignment, (New York, Praeger, 1962), p.122.

Certainly, if the progress in decolonisation is anything to measure the changes which have taken place in the history of the United Nations, Francis Wilcox has been proved right in his assessment. Between 1960 and 1970, not less than thirty-three countries achieved independence in Africa alone and gained membership of the United Nations. Whatever the interests of the major powers in the establishment of the United Nations, the newly independent non-aligned countries had their own conception of the Organisation which casts it in the role of anti-colonialism. To them, as already noted in Chapter 3, the maintenance of world peace is interwoven with, even dependent upon, the democratisation of international relations based on national independence and equality of all states. The Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories enshrined in Article 73 of the Charter came close to this viewpoint by making progress towards self-government an aspect of world peace and security. The non-aligned's view of the Organisation is thus one of a legitimisation authority of the liberation struggle to remove all forms of colonial domination in the promotion of peace and security. Consequently, they have always striven to give specific meaning to the general anti-colonial expressions of the Charter in an effort to create a world movement of decolonisation.

Although future trend in the United Nations in the area of anti-colonialism predictably favoured them, the non-aligned states entertained no illusions about the obstacles presented by the Charter for a fuller realisation of their aspirations. The right of veto in the Security Council - the repository of power politics - which often over-rides majority decisions of the General Assembly has the effect of neutralising their gains in the Assembly. It remains their belief that for the Organisation to be effective in its mission of peace and development, it is necessary to adapt the Charter to the dynamic changes and evolution of international

conditions which demand independence, social justice and mutual respect of all states. The desire to so reform the Organisation is borne out in the castigating remark that:

Disregard for United Nations decision, and the tendency of the Great Powers to monopolise the Organisation's activities, to paralyse or orient it in the direction of their own private interests are in contradiction with the universal nature of the Organisation, and damaging its standing and prestige.²⁰

On this, the new nations had the sympathetic support of the Organisations' former Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, whose wish to see them play an important role in the United Nations system is implied in his statement: "It is not the Soviet Union, or indeed any other big power, who need the United Nations for their protection. It is all the others. In this sense the Organisation is first of all their Organisation, and I deeply believe in the wisdom with which they will be able to use it and guide it."²¹

The 1960 Decolonisation Declaration

The readiness of the non-aligned to challenge Great Power dominance of the United Nations contributed to the rise of many anti-colonial revolutionary movements in the 1960s. The first major shot in the liberation campaign was fired in the December 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.²² Practically, the declaration marked a turning point in the Organisation's decolonisation politics by dramatically altering the cautious approach that showed considerable sensitivity to great power feeling.

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- 20. Algiers Conference Official Declaration in Odette Jankowitsch and Karl Sauvart, *The Third World Without Superpowers : The Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries* (New York : Dobbs Ferry Oceana Publication, 1978, Vol. 1, p.203.
 - 21. UN Document APV, 883rd Plenary Meeting, 13 October, 1960, para. 11.
 - 22. G.A. Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December, 1960.

For the first time, the Organisation openly took up the challenge of colonialism by solemnly proclaiming "the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations". This was subsequently to provide the basis for the liberation struggle.

The debate on the declaration was nearly marred by cold war bias.

Because the declaration was originally proposed by the Soviet Union,²³ the West rather typically introduced ideological interpretation into it, thereby attempting to whittle down its importance. There was no doubt that the Soviet Union saw an opportunity in the anti-colonial drive to woo the non-aligned and nail the West to the accusation of imperialistic domination of the world. The language of the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, in the proposal²⁴ had all the undertones of the cold war rivalry to make the West feel concerned as the reaction of the British representative showed. In an effort to counter the Soviet Union's "ideological"

23. UN Doc. A/L.312 later amended and replaced by A/L.312/Rev. 1.

24. Part of Khrushchev's speech reads: "For how many centuries did the colonialists squeeze the sweat and blood out of your peoples, mercilessly exploiting them, suppressing the very lives of your countries? Now that they can no longer carry on in your countries their policy of plunder, violence, and murder, they profess to be your benefactors. They say that by their participation in the colonial system they only created conditions for preparing your countries for independence and self-government. But this is only a lie of robbers who know that they are robbers. They want to erase their crimes from the memory of the people whom they had been stifling for ages. Therefore they flatter you, arrange receptions and make mealy-mouthed speeches ... Remember that the fate of your brothers on the African continent only depends on you. The colonialists want to use you as their cat-paws... They want to use your hands to continue tightening the noose around the neck of the colonial people... If the UNO does not accept these proposals aimed at abolishing the colonial regime, there will be nothing left for the peoples of the colonial countries but to take up arms. If they are denied the right to independent existence, they will win this right in struggle. I have already said, and repeat: The Soviet people take the side of those who are fighting for liberation from colonial oppression" - Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1961-62, p. 17931.

interest, he charged that the aim of the draft resolution seemed to be to generate hatred, violence, and chaos. Yet a more aggravating attack was the British representative's remark concerning what he termed the Soviet Union's rule over the world's "three newest colonies" of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia.²⁵ It was plainly an attempt to turn the decolonisation proposal on the head of the proposer.

The subjection of decolonisation to such cold war rhetoric, though not anything new, was capable of undermining the substance of the anti-colonial process. It could also create division in the non-aligned group as argument was bound to arise whether it was worth getting entangled in East-West quarrel even on a subject that concerned them most. To put it simply, the question was: should anti-colonialism influence the non-aligned movement's choice of friends without basically compromising the principle of non-alignment to maintain equal relationship with both blocs? It was a difficult question, but one which should hardly arise since it would be utterly mischievous to conceive of decolonisation as a cold war issue. As argued by Cuba's representative, Garcia Inchanstegri,

We do not share the misgivings of some that the question of colonialism may become a cold war issue, because that is one of the very excuses the colonialists will offer for delaying the independence of the territories under their rule... The cold war has nothing to do with a struggle that is between the people and those who enslave them, and if the colonial powers at any time find that cold war problems arise, let them quickly give up their colonial power and not put these problems forward as arguments.²⁶

25. YUN, 1960, p.45.

26. UN General Assembly Official Record, 16th Session, 1048th Plenary, Vol. XVI (2), 7th November 1961, p. 757. (The Records are hereafter referred to as G.A. Official Records).

The Cuban advice, though specifically aimed at the West, also contained a message for some members of the non-aligned group who showed discomfort over the Soviet Union's strong pro-liberation stand in the debate, and were anxious to distance themselves from that position so as not to appear taking sides in the cold war. But these non-aligned countries also had another compelling reason to be cautious in going along with the Soviet Union. Although they welcomed the proposal, the Soviet move kept them uncomfortable as it apparently seized the anti-colonial initiative from them. Their embarrassment at this could scarcely be covered by the remark of the Tunisian representative that although decolonisation was a universal problem, it was nevertheless the sacred duty of the newly independent states to champion it.²⁷ To reassure themselves of being in the forefront of the anti-colonial struggle, a new draft resolution, which in many respects was similar to the Soviet Union's, was put forward by Cambodia and supported by forty-two, mostly non-aligned, states.²⁸

The resolution, passed by an overwhelming majority of 89-0-9 with nine abstentions, categorically upheld the right of all people to self-determination. In so doing, it rejected any qualification to colonial freedom, asserting that "inadequacy of political, economic, social and educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence." Besides, the resolution's call for "immediate steps" to be taken "in trust and non-self-governing

27. YUN, 1960, p.47.

28. UN Document A/L.323 and Add. 1-6. The 43 sponsors of the draft were: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville, now Zaire), Cyprus, Dahomey, (renamed Benin), Malaysia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic (Egypt) and Upper Volta.

territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories without any conditions or reservations", all but meant the discarding of the Trusteeship system which talks of preparing the colonies for independence.

So much enthusiasm was shown in the passing of the resolution, and hopes were raised about the "immediate" disposal of the colonial system. The speech of India's representative, C.S. Jha on the occasion reflected the general feeling:

I believe that future historians will regard it as one of the noblest declarations coming out of the United Nations... It is a resolution which will inspire everyone, inspire the people who are under colonial domination and give them hope and faith, not only in themselves but in the United Nations. We have no doubt that it will enormously expedite the processes which are working towards the liberation of independent peoples.²⁹

Yet no sooner had debate on the implementation of the declaration begun than the Afro-Asian bloc found itself divided over the time element. At this stage, it became clear to the group how certain practical problems in effecting the declaration were either unforeseen or possibly taken for granted. Factors such as size, geographic location, and economic realities of some territories had to be considered. Sri Lanka insisted on all of these conditions, and questioned the wisdom of setting a time limit for ending colonialism. In a perceptibly telling rebuke of any attempt to press the colonies into independence, Mr. Malalasekera, the country's representative, warned against the dangers of haste in decolonisation, as independence under certain circumstances could prove to be an undue burden to some of the colonies.³⁰ Nigeria, Malaysia, Burma and Madagascar expressed

29. United Nations Review, Vol. 8, January 1961, p. 6.

30. G.A. Official Records, op cit, p. 583.

similar doubts while they also stressed the need for immediate action by the Colonial Powers to prepare the peoples for self-rule.

Ironically, the stand of these five countries suggests a more direct involvement of the colonial authorities in the territories at the expense of a United Nations role in the decolonisation process, thus apparently negating the provisions of the declaration. In fact, Nigeria plainly advocated such a course. Foreign Minister Jaja Nwachukwu's statement, urging that decolonisation should take into consideration the interests of the Colonial Powers, showed lack of faith in the United Nations to put into effect the decolonisation declaration.³¹ Perhaps the contradiction might be explained as being pragmatic in balancing what was thought feasible against what was desirable, bearing in mind the Congo experience, which was blamed on ill-preparedness for statehood. But such misgivings about a precipitate decolonisation were not shared by the radical states. The answer of Mali, Guinea, Ghana and India to the argument showed an assertion of anti-colonial self-confidence: that 'independence now' represented no extra challenge to the people in administering their affairs.³² And against the Congo example might be cited the case of Guinea which in 1958 voted 'no' to De Gaulle's neo-

31. Ibid, p. 608. Citing the impotence of the United Nations in the face of the intransigence of South Africa to comply with the Organisations resolutions on Namibia, Jaja Nwachukwu said: "Of course we are realistic enough to appreciate that one cannot sit down in the General Assembly and arrive at conclusions as to when a particular territory will be free and independent, taking into account the historical factors... The political leaders of the areas concerned must be consulted - after all - it is they who govern the areas, and not ourselves. The Powers that control the areas must also be taken into consideration because they will have a stake in the whole matter".

32. YUN, 1961, p.48.

colonial decolonisation proposal, and stood up to face the challenge of the rejection.

The provision that inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should not serve as a pretext for delaying independence was variously interpreted in the context of the Colonial Powers' responsibility towards the territories. What the radicals insisted on was for the United Nations to undertake the task of bringing the colonies to independence and, in so doing, force the administering authorities to a definite time-table of decolonisation. All that was required in such arrangement was to settle the modalities of the immediate transfer of power to the colonial people. This argument highlighted the moderate/radical dichotomy in the non-aligned movement. Whereas the former group of moderate persuasion preferred a gradual approach to decolonisation to allow for a transitional period, the latter insisted on a radical solution of immediate transfer of power.

The gap between the two viewpoints was bridged on the basis of India's advice that it was not in the interest of the colonial peoples to set dates by calender; liberation should be dictated by the pace of events.³³ In the end they took a more relaxed view on the question of the time-table but still stressed the element of "immediacy" in the decolonisation declaration.

Significance of the Declaration

The significance of the 1960 declaration is to be found in the unrestricted meaning applied to the principle of self-determination. Hitherto, self-

33. G.A. Official Records, op cit, p. 712.

determination, by the choice and interpretation of the colonisers, was limited to self-government short of total independence.³⁴ Apparently the interpretation was intended to subvert the United Nations' emerging anti-colonial position through the formulation of a new concept of decolonisation translated into such spurious and manipulative institutions as the British Commonwealth, the French Union and the Dutch Commonwealth based on the "doctrine of synthesis". But more significant was the declaration's intention to undermine the very basis of colonialism - the use of force - by the call for cessation of "all armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples". The call was particularly meaningful in the context of the declaration's acknowledgement of "the increasingly powerful trends towards freedom", in the colonial territories; which implies a recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of the national liberation movements, and so enhancing their position vis-a-vis the colonial authorities. On the whole the fundamental significance of the declaration is the use of 'right' to legitimise national liberation on a universal basis that meant in effect passing a death sentence on the colonial system.

The new momentum the declaration gave to national liberation was soon seen in the setting up of the Special Committee on Colonialism to examine the application of the declaration and "make suggestions and recommendations on the progress and extent of the implementation of the Declaration".³⁵ The Committee's

34. For interpretations of self-determination, see Benjamin Rivlin, 'Decolonisation and Dependent Peoples', International Conciliation, No. 501, January 1955; Yassin El-Ayouty, The United Nations and Decolonisation : The Role of Afro-Asia; (The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 53-63; and Henri Grimal, op cit. p.157.

35. G.A. Resolution 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961,

extensive functions, increased by the take-over of bodies as the Special Committee on South West Africa, and the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, clearly marks out the resolution as one of the most prominent anti-colonial statements. And its overall impact on the colonial question is encapsulated in Peter Willetts' observation that as it were "a major amendment had been made to the Charter creating a new organ to fulfil and expand the role that originally had been envisaged for the Trusteeship Council".³⁶

So it was indeed; for there was no doubt that the setting up of the Committee meant a reduction in the anti-colonial significance of the Trusteeship Council whose method of operation could be said to belong to the era of peaceful decolonisation. The new anti-colonial phase featuring intractable cases such as Portuguese intransigence, Rhodesia's rebellion, and South Africa's obduracy, certainly called for a more determined approach which the Special Committee was expected to provide. The composition of the Committee in the main reflected this determination, with nine of its original seventeen members (later increased to twenty-four) belonging to the non-aligned movement. Furthermore, to enhance its effectiveness, a number of separate bodies, each charged with a particular colonial situation, was created, but all working under the overall supervision of the Committee. They included the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese rule apart from that on Angola; one on apartheid, and another on Rhodesia, while a separate council was also established for Namibia.

The activities of these bodies underlined the growing impatience of the United Nations with colonialism. The non-aligned countries, with the advantage

36. Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned Movement : The Origins of a Third World Alliance, (London: Frances Pinter Ltd., 1978) p. 152.

of adequate representation on the Committees, played a very active role in the formulation of an anti-colonial consensus; and they were most successful in the effort to involve the liberation movements in the affairs of the Committees as part of the general process of legitimisation of liberation. Soon it became the regular practice for liberation leaders to be invited to meetings of the Special Committee to present their grievances. In 1961, Joshua Nkomo appeared before the Committee as a petitioner to put across the case of the African people of Southern Rhodesia for genuine independence. This was followed in October, 1962 by another Rhodesian representation comprising Josiah Chinamano, Enoch Dumbutshena and Nathan Shamuyarira.³⁷ Similarly the PAIGC represented by its leader, Amilcar Cabral, was given the opportunity to appear before the Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration.

The practice, it has to be said, was by no means a new trend. Already it had been in motion even in the Trusteeship Council before which nationalist movements were invited to state their case against the colonial powers. However, under the new development, the degree of involvement became more pronounced. It was given a more authoritative sanction in various General Assembly and Security Council resolutions in their recognition of the liberation movements as the authentic representatives of the peoples. Hence the directive under the Programme of Action for the Full Implementation of the Declaration on Decolonisation that:

representatives of liberation movements shall be invited, whenever necessary by the United Nations and other international organisations within the United Nations system to participate in an appropriate capacity in the proceedings of those organs relating to their countries.³⁸

37. Nathan Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia, (New York: Transatlantic Arts, 1965) pp. 194-5.

38. G.A. Resolution 2621 (XXV) of October 1970.

The acceptance of the representative status of the national liberation movements has obvious implications for both the relationship of the movements with the colonial regimes, and United Nations membership. In the first place, the recognition of the movements as the authentic representatives of the peoples 'automatically' illegitimises the colonial and racist regimes, since the peoples' right to be ruled by a government of their choice cannot be duplicated between two authorities. Secondly, and this relates to the first, since the United Nations is an organisation of sovereign states, the granting of legitimate and representative status to the liberation movements seems to place a question mark on the membership of such countries as Israel and South Africa whose governments are in role competition with the movements for the same seat of power. Both these implications were put to test in the various attempts to expel the two countries from the United Nations.

In 1974, the non-aligned nations, at the instance of the OAU, initiated a move in the Credentials Committee to reject the credentials of South Africa at the 29th session of the General Assembly, giving as their reason South Africa's continued defiance of United Nations resolutions on apartheid and Namibia, besides the threat of international conflict posed by the growing liberation struggle in the region. Algeria, Cuba, Yugoslavia, Uganda, Syria and Somalia were foremost in the campaign. And following a favourable report of the credentials committee on the subject, the non-aligned presented a 52-nation draft resolution to the General Assembly requesting the Security Council to "examine the relations between the United Nations and South Africa" with a view to expelling the latter from the organisation.³⁹

39. UN Document A/9779, amended as Document A/L.731/Rev.1.

Not surprisingly, the move had to contend with Western opposition which argued for the continued membership of South Africa as a means to influence her in the direction of abandoning apartheid. What was not altogether expected, however, was the dissension of Saudi Arabia which questioned the very premise of the draft for consigning South Africa's racial policy as human rights violation. It was the fear of Riyadh that such a broad view of apartheid could open a 'Pandora's box' of more expulsions, since she believed there were several member-states that could hardly pass the human rights tests. Hence the country's amendment of the draft which would merely urge South Africa, pending any Security Council decision, to rectify the anomaly whereby the Government was "representative of the white minority without its having ascertained the will of the black majority".⁴⁰

What might be inferred from the Saudi amendment is probably Riyadh's assessment of the South African situation as a constitutional problem of internal jurisdiction, at most requiring some external prodding; and not a case of colonialism which, in the circumstances, warranted international intervention on the scale of support for a revolutionary change. But faced with stiff opposition from the non-aligned group, she had to suspend the amendment. And when eventually the General Assembly voted on the draft, it was passed by an overwhelming majority of 98 in favour, 28 against and 14 abstentions including Botswana and Malawi, with Lesotho later indicating its intention to have abstained.⁴¹ Thus the General Assembly disallowed South Africa's participation in the work of the 29th Session. This stage of the diplomatic campaign against

40. UN Document A/L.732.

41. G.A. Resolution 3206 (XXIX) of 30 September 1974.

South Africa indicates the level attained in the General Assembly in raising the anti-apartheid debate from appeals to sanction. And this was brought about through the non-aligned's characterisation of apartheid as a policy of national oppression that is a manifestation of colonialism and which poses a threat to international peace.

The situation was different with regard to Israel which maintained diplomatic relations with a number of non-aligned countries. Although the 1973 Algiers Conference had equated Zionism with racism, many states would still not place Israel in the same category with South Africa. This position of Israel has affected their perspective on Palestine and prevented the emergence of a common attitude towards the PLO, despite the observer status granted the Organisation at the 1969 Belgrade Consultative meeting, and the marked support for it at the Algiers summit. Palestine meant different things to different countries as was evident in the General Assembly debate on the granting of observer status to the PLO, and the right of the Palestinians to regain their homeland. Some of the states politely distanced themselves from the majority position by abstaining in the vote on the subsequent resolutions.⁴² Nepal abstained for the reason that the resolution was "one sided" as it failed to take into account the legitimate interests of Israel.

But Barbados⁴³ which also abstained, showed glaring hostility to the

42. Two resolutions were passed, all of 22nd November 1974. The first, Res. 3236(XXIX) affirmed the right of the Palestinians to national independence in Palestine. Laos, Malawi, Nepal, Panama, Singapore and Swaziland abstained. In the second resolution, 3237(XXIX) which gave observer status to the PLO at the UN, the following countries abstained: Jamaica, Laos, Malawi, Panama and Swaziland.

43. Barbados at the time had only observer status at Non-Aligned Conferences.

resolution. The country's representative, Mr. Waldron-Ramsey, queried the premise of the draft resolution by challenging the very idea of a Palestinian state. In his view, to talk of the Palestinians regaining the right to their homeland implied the destruction of Israel. And since there was no Palestine, the reference in the draft to "the Palestinian people in Palestine" was simply redundant, hence his rhetorical question: "Where is Palestine..... If Palestine does not exist, what do the co-sponsors really mean by the Palestinian people in Palestine?"⁴⁴ It was the lack of a common attitude towards Israel with its implications for Palestine and the PLO that the 1975 Lima Foreign Ministers meeting rejected the Arab states call for the expulsion of Israel from the United Nations,⁴⁵ and also partly accounted for the defeat of a similar move spearheaded by Libya and Iran at the UN in October 1982.

Support for the armed struggle

For much of the 1960s, the success of the non-aligned was mostly in the political advancement of the liberation movements. The 1960 decolonisation declaration, in upholding the cause of the movements, had explicitly conferred on them political standing. In large measure, the declaration could be said to be the ultimate in the gradual process of internationalisation of the colonies, and by implication the promotion of the liberation movements to international status.

It might rightly be assumed that this political success also carried military legitimacy as well. On the contrary, the question of the military standing

44. UN General Assembly, 29th Session (22 November, 1974), Provisional Verbatim Record, p.36. Cited as Document A/L.742.

45. Peter Willetts, op cit, p.36.

of the movements continued to arouse controversy against the backdrop of legal determination of belligerent status. In traditional thinking, only states are accorded belligerent status in war, since world order, it was accepted, is organised on the basis of the states-system. This tends to exclude developments within the nation-state from the preview of international relations, hence the view that anti-colonial struggles are the internal affairs of the states concerned.

Consequently, liberation wars came to be characterised as rebellions to be dealt with locally. But to argue thus is to ignore the link between domestic and foreign affairs.⁴⁶ The acceptance of this linkage formed the basis of the non-aligned's campaign for military legitimacy of the liberation movements.

In 1967, a group of non-aligned countries, mostly African, initiated a move to achieve legal recognition of the liberation movements as combatants under the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Maintaining that there was warfare of international significance in Southern Africa in their bid to dismiss the notion of the anti-colonial struggle being a rebellion, these countries pointed out in a letter of the Special Committee on Apartheid:

The national liberation organisations of South Africa, Rhodesia, South West Africa, Angola, Mozambique, all have forces in the field. These are not terrorist groups as racist propaganda portends, but properly trained and disciplined military forces. Their enemies are conducting full-scale operations against them... Under these circumstances, it is intolerable that these forces of the national liberation organisations should, when captured, be treated as common criminals... By every reasonable criterion, these forces qualify for recognition as belligerents and for rights accorded to members of military forces by the Geneva Conventions. If captured they should be treated as prisoners-of-war.⁴⁷

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46. James Rosenau (ed), Linkage Politics, (New York: The Free Press, 1969) is an excellent study on the link between domestic and foreign policies.
47. UN Document A/AC.115/L.210 and published in UN Law Report, Vol. 2, No. 5, January 1, 1968.

The non-aligned countries took the plea to the 1968 Tehran Conference on Human Rights in ~~Armed Conflicts~~. It was to defeat the argument as to whether or not the 1949 Geneva Convention covered insurgent forces that they sought to broaden the Convention's definition of war to cover all armed conflicts, including anti-colonial wars. They won. A resolution which emerged noted the inhuman treatment of those who struggle against the racist minority of colonial regimes, and considered that "such persons should be protected against inhuman or brutal treatment, and also that such persons if detained should be treated as prisoners-of-war or political prisoners under international law."⁴⁸

The resolution, naturally, failed to make any impression on the colonial regimes and their Western allies whose 'terrorist' definition⁴⁹ of national liberation movements ridicules the whole idea of liberation struggle insofar as it is considered to assault the territorial integrity and sovereign rights of the nation-state. Nevertheless the legitimisation campaign continued, eventually resulting in the United Nations' acceptance of the unavoidability of the armed struggle in the conception of liberation violence as an act of self-defence against colonialism. The General Assembly resolution 2787 (XXVI) of December 1971 which affirmed "the legality of the peoples' struggle for self-determination and liberation from colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation by all available means consistent with the Charter of the United Nations" manifests one

48. G.A. Resolution 2444 (XXIII) of 12 May, 1968.

49. A C.I.A. -sponsored definition of 'terrorism' as "the threat or use of violence for political symbolic effect that is aimed at achieving a psychological impact on a target group wider than its immediate victims", which was broadened to include operations with "military, paramilitary or insurrectionary goals, was deemed to cover wars of national liberation. International Herald Tribune, 22 April, 1981, p. 3.

such open support for the armed struggle.

Certainly, the reference to the Charter in the resolution offered the anti-legitimisation lobby some argument to buttress its opposition, as it was wont to ask how consistent armed struggle is with the Charter's commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes. Already, this much had been made clear by the West during the 1970 General Assembly debate on the Programme of Action on decolonisation which started the decade of the United Nation's total identification with the armed struggle. The United States and Britain, in opposing the resultant resolution's (2621) support for liberation, voted for an alternative resolution that called for a non-violent settlement. It was however lost.

The non-aligned, in their opposition to continuing Western attempts to discredit the armed struggle, have often had to view even anti-terrorist draft resolutions with enough suspicion for fear of the obvious dangers in such resolutions for liberation movements. A case in point was the 1972 General Assembly debate on combating international terrorism.⁵⁰ Coming after the Munich killings of Israeli athletes in 1972 by Palestinian commandos, the move predictably aroused non-aligned, and in particular Arab states' disquiet that the idea was intended to suppress the liberation movements, and more specifically the PLO. Whatever be their objections to the idea, the non-aligned countries realised that they ought to apply caution in order not to be seen as condoning terrorism.

The argument of the non-aligned as put forward by Lebanon and Algeria was one of considering the circumstances of terrorism. It was not enough to condemn terrorism; what was more important was to tackle the underlying

50. YUN, Vol. 26, 1972, pp.639-648.

causes of the crime since its effects could not be separated from the causes. Algeria even went further to suggest that a study of the origins of terrorism be undertaken so as to determine the illegality or legality of a particular terrorist action. Their intention no doubt was to define terrorism as a political offence, with the main objective of placing the national liberation movements outside the scope of the criminal implications of the subsequent resolution. In this they succeeded. The Sixth (Legal) Committee which considered the matter accepted an amended draft resolution⁵¹ upholding the legitimacy of the liberation movements and the legality of the armed struggle; and this was passed as General Assembly resolution 3034(XXVII) of 18 December, 1972.

But once again, this overall position of the non-aligned movement in support of liberation was breached by the deviation of some member-states under the impact of consideration for national interest. Lesotho, a landlocked country largely dependent on South Africa for economic survival, voted with that country and Portugal, while Malawi (whose geographic position makes her a 'pragmatic' partner in the sub-regional Salisbury-Pretoria-Portuguese alliance), Zaire and the Ivory Coast abstained.

Subsequently, the substance of the above resolution formed the core of resolution 3103(XXVIII) of December 1973 on the basic principles of the legal status of liberation forces which more explicitly affirmed colonialism as violent to justify the use of liberation violence. "Colonial peoples", it assured, "have the inherent right to struggle by all necessary means at their disposal against Colonial Powers and alien domination in exercise of their right to self-

51. UN Document A/C.6/L.880/Rev. 1 which was adopted by the Six (Legal) Committee as Document A/8969.

determination recognised in the Charter of the United Nations". But by far the most important aspect of the resolution, and which the non-aligned states had all along fought for, is the particular concern shown at the maltreatment of captured freedom fighters. This underlies the very significant proclamation for the protection of such forces under the Geneva Conventions. By the provisions of the resolution:

- (i) armed conflicts involving the struggle of the peoples against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes are to be regarded as international armed conflicts in the sense of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the legal status envisaged to apply to the combatants in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and other international instruments is to apply to the persons engaged in armed struggle against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes;
- (ii) the combatants struggling against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes captured as prisoners are to be accorded the status of prisoners-of-war, and their treatment should be in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners-of-war of 12th August, 1949.

The import of the resolution consists of making wars of national liberation not governed by national laws but by international law.

All this represented significant advancement in the legitimisation process, and so when a treaty against international hostage-taking was proposed in 1977,⁵²

52. See UN Document A/32/39. Report of Ad Hoc Committee on Drafting of an International Convention against Taking of Hostages.

the non-aligned states, reading it as a strategem to demilitarise liberation, insisted on drawing a distinction between terrorism and national liberation. If a German text of the treaty were accepted, that would have hampered, even made illegal, the operations of anti-colonial forces whose guerrilla tactics inescapably involve terrorist acts.⁵³ The demand of Tanzania was therefore to exclude from the treaty "acts carried out by liberation movements recognised by the United Nations or regional organisations when such acts are done in the process of national liberation against colonial rule and racist and foreign regimes."⁵⁴

The direct benefit in the legitimisation process lay in the international recognition of the movements from which is derived moral and material support for liberation. The focus of the moral support is the campaign to awaken and strengthen world opinion against colonialism and racial discrimination. This is conducted within the framework of the 1970 Programme of Action which enjoins all states to "undertake measures aimed at enhancing public awareness of the need for active assistance ... for activities by national and international non-governmental organisations in support of the peoples under colonial domination".⁵⁵

The main strategy of the campaign centres on public information programmes such as conferences, seminars and media works to publicise the activities of the liberation movements. That in turn requires exposing the designs of the

53. According to the German text, countries would be required "to prosecute or extradite anybody they catch who has seized another person in order to compel a third person, a corporation, a state, or an international organisation to do something". International Herald Tribune, 15 August, 1977, p. 5.

54. Ibid. p. 5.

55. G.A. Resolution 2621(XXV) of October 1970.

colonialists and their backers against the movements which explains the call to wage "a vigorous and sustained campaign against practices of foreign economic, financial and other interests in those territories which benefit these regimes and their supporters."⁵⁶

The Oslo (1973), Lagos (1977) and Maputo (1977) Conferences jointly sponsored by the United Nations and the OAU, among several others, form part of the moral campaign of public enlightenment; but they were equally important for the diplomatic support and the material assistance which accrued from them. The first of these meetings was particularly significant for according a definite political status to the liberation movements. As pointed out by George Shepherd, it marked the first official international conference where delegates of the movement were given comparable status to that enjoyed by sovereign states.⁵⁷ The confidence and the encouragement the representative status gave the movements was illustrated in the demand of the Namibian movement for all aid from Governments and non-Governmental organisations to be channeled through SWAPO.⁵⁸

Just like the 1960 Decolonisation Declaration, which it was meant to implement, the resolution setting up the Programme of Action stands out as another major contribution in the United Nations' anti-colonial initiative. Its comprehensiveness, covering every facet of decolonisation, incorporates all the organs of the United Nations into the Programmes' activities, requiring them,

56. Ibid.

57. George W. Shepherd, Jr., Anti-Apartheid : Transnational Conflict and Western Policy in the Liberation of South Africa, (Westport, Connecticut : Greenwood Press, 1977), p.186.

58. See Olav Stokke and Carl Widstrand (ed), Southern Africa : The UN-OAU Conference, Oslo, 9-14 April 1973, Vol. II (Uppsala : Scandinavian Institute of African Affairs, 1973) for the demands of the liberation movements.

especially the specialised agencies, to take positive steps "to assist in the provision of practical assistance to the colonised peoples ... and their liberation movements". For the purpose of this "practical assistance", and seizing the opportunity offered by the Oslo Conference, the United Nations Secretariat has clearly categorised liberation aid as humanitarian,⁵⁹ even though nothing prevents the diversion of such aid into military use.

The overall impact of these measures in support of liberation could be assessed in the growth and spread of national and international non-governmental organisations in the last decade alone to champion the anti-colonial and anti-racial campaign.⁶⁰ Most notably among them is the anti-apartheid movement widely established in several countries and providing leadership to, and co-ordinating the activities of, interested bodies such as trade unions and student organisations. There is also the influential World Council of Churches which has been particularly active in the anti-apartheid struggle. Not only do these organisations publicise the evils of racism, they are also effective in applying political, economic, and moral pressure on national governments, and acting as watchdogs against violations of United Nations sanctions; all this besides their fund raising activities.

59. Ibid, p. 121.

60. See George Shepherd, *op cit*, for a detailed study of the growth of these bodies, and their support to the liberation struggle.

CHAPTER 5. STRATEGIC AND MATERIAL SUPPORT

The diplomatic backing for the national liberation movements was comparatively easy to enlist, registering a near unanimous show of solidarity. As far as that went, it was a battle fought on safe grounds as it imposed no serious sacrifice on a state. In practice, it was simply characteristic of Third World, indeed UN diplomacy of jaw-jaw which substitutes rhetoric for action. That explains why even Israel could condemn UDI, express opposition to racist minority rule, and castigate imperialism despite her close relations with the countries often accused of these acts and practices. But when it comes to practical support which entails the patent risk of reprisals from the enemy, the response is less than total. Yet this is the most crucial support that provides the acid test of the non-aligned movement's profession of anti-colonialism, and serves more clearly to divide the states into radicals and moderates.

Practical assistance takes two forms: strategic support, which is the provision of sanctuary and other rear base facilities; and material aid in the form of arms and financial contribution, and other types of humanitarian assistance.

Strategic Support

The strategic support for the liberation struggle is well known, and is perhaps more important to the movements than any other form of external assistance. For a successful guerrilla war, a rear base support provided by contiguous states is vital for the purposes of training, infiltration, transit of materials, and administration. It is from this geographically dictated responsibility that the concept of Frontline States has emerged. This type of assistance involves great risks as it provokes severe reprisals against a country.

Under the pretext of hot pursuit, the target states of the liberation movements have sought to apply military pressure on the neighbouring countries in order to force them to abandon support for the guerrillas. The dangers of such a strategy to the liberation struggle are only too real. A broken rear base support inevitably reduces the effectiveness of the national liberation movements, and could in extreme situations deliver the guerrilla forces to the enemy. The April 1977 New Delhi Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Co-ordination ~~Committee~~^B was particularly concerned about such pressures on the Frontline States in Southern Africa, as indicated by its call on the international community to give all necessary assistance to these states to enable them to continue their rear base support.¹

The abortive Portuguese invasion of Guinea in 1970 formed part of this counter-liberation strategy. Its objective was to cut off Conakry's rear base support for the PAIGC. But where Portugal failed, South Africa seemed to have succeeded through the application of both military and economic pressure on the neighbouring countries. Exploiting the military imbalance in the region, and the economic dependency of the Frontline States on her, which in the case of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland is worsened by their land-locked position, South Africa has apparently succeeded in intimidating these countries into denying the ANC the use of their territories as rear base.

1. Communique of the New Delhi Ministerial Meeting published in Odette Jankowitsch and Karl Sauvart, The Third World Without Superpowers : The Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries, Vol. IV, (New York : Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, 1978), p.2082.

It was in order to wean Lesotho from the OAU's anti-apartheid stand that South Africa 'adopted' the country at independence.² The policy worked, favoured by the geographic and economic realities of Lesotho. With over half the adult male population working at any one time in South Africa, and over 70% of rural house-hold income coming as remittances from this labour force, with the same percentage of state revenue derived from the South African Customs Union,³ it would be fool-hardy for Lesotho to constitute itself into any kind of menace to South Africa.

Moreover, South Africa knew that Chief Lebua Jonathan relied on the support of Pretoria in dealing with opposition to his rule which developed into an armed rebellion, following the rigging of the elections of 1970. The advantage of this to South Africa, as pointed out by one writer, is "to show that it can use Lesotho's Liberation Army (of Ntsu Mokhehle) to reciprocate in kind if Chief Jonathan does not take tougher action to prevent the African National Congress from using Lesotho as a refuge".⁴

The dependence of the Frontline States on South African grain further illustrates the 'hostage' condition of these states. In 1980, export of maize to them, including Kenya, amounted to 700,000 tons.⁵ Pretoria has always been quick to put this dependence to political and military use in its fight to defeat international ostracisation. Quite blatantly, Prime Minister Botha warned that

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2. J.E. Spence, Lesotho : The Politics of Dependence, (London : Oxford University Press, 1968) pp. 73-88 deals with South Africa's relations with Lesotho.
 3. Africa magazine, No. 125, January 1982, p. 30.
 4. Michael Hornsby, 'Why clashes strain links with Pretoria', The Times (London), 27 October, 1981, p. 7.
 5. Ibid, 11 March, 1981, p. 9.

the Frontline States risked having grain supplies cut off if they continued to support sanctions against her.⁶ Though the threat did not deter them from voting in favour of the General Assembly's March 1981 sanctions resolution,⁷ its impact in the context of the regional economic realities was brought home in Zimbabwe's confessed inability to implement sanctions against South Africa.⁸

Mozambique however chose to ignore the threats in the exercise of her revolutionary duty to the ANC, and the consequences for her were grave. Series of raids by South Africa deep into Mozambique in the guise of destroying ANC bases; and her support for the anti-FRELIMO movement - the MNR;⁹ these combined with economic arms-twisting, almost brought about the collapse of Mozambique's economy. The total cost to Mozambique of this destabilisation strategy has been put at \$4 billion made up as follows:

- (i) The number of Mozambiquans working in South African mines has fallen by almost two-thirds, with the loss of \$568 million in remittances; 70,000 workers were rendered unemployed;
- (ii) The cancellation of the former agreement whereby South Africa paid one-half of miners' wages in gold at official prices. The total loss of Mozambique was estimated at over \$2.6 billion.
- (iii) Direct aggression by South Africa and by the South African-sponsored

6. Ibid

7. The Times (London), 11 March, 1981, p.9.

8. The Guardian, London, 23 June, 1981, p. 7.

9. See The Times, (London), 14 February, 1981, p. 5, for South Africa's assistance to the MNR as told by one Hose Martins Gilberto, a deserter from the movement.

rebel movement caused \$333 million damage. In 1982/83, the rebels destroyed 900 rural shops, affecting 4.5 million people; almost 500 primary schools and 86 secondary schools;

(iv) In 1982, alone, the anti-government guerrilla's destroyed 130 communal villages with the result that more than 100,000 peasants lost their property.¹⁰

Pressures on Angola were even greater for the country's support for SWAPO. After her humiliating set back in the 1975 invasion of the country, South Africa stepped up her military intervention in Angola as part of a general strategy to weaken Angola's support for SWAPO. Her primary objective was to occupy southern Angola to prevent cross border raids by SWAPO guerrillas into Namibia. Additional pressure was applied through support for the anti-government UNITA movement whose rebellion against the Luanda authorities since independence presents an even more serious threat to the government.

Faced with such destabilisation, the choice for South Africa's neighbours was either to remain faithful in their rear base support for the ANC and SWAPO or acquiesce in the pressure and abandon the movements. Swaziland too an early decision in favour of non-support when in February 1982 she formally signed non-aggression pact with South Africa which virtually outlawed the ANC in the country.¹¹ And in spite of the revolutionary credentials of Angola and Mozambique, the national interest of these two countries seemed to have dictated the acceptance of the second option, leading inevitably to the 1984 good neighbourly agreements

10. New Africa magazine, No. 198, March, 1984, p. 17.

11. The Guardian (London), 2 April, 1984, p. 5. The pact was kept secret until early 1984.

with South Africa which provide for the withdrawal of rear base support for guerrilla movements against each other.

The national liberation movements have pledged not to recognise the agreements, and they expressed this by attacks on targets in Namibia and South Africa immediately the agreements were announced. But such show of 'strength', intended to demonstrate that the people of the territories are their own liberators, cannot minimise the adverse impact of the re-approachment on their struggle. As admitted by Oliver Tambo, the president of the ANC, these new developments, especially the Nkomati accord,* would certainly prolong white minority rule in South Africa.¹² At last South Africa had achieved the objective of her 'outward policy' through the application of military and economic pressure.

Strategic support for the PLO is provided mainly by Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt before the Camp David agreement. But the fear of Israeli reprisals, and the possible destabilisation effect of the presence of a large body of armed guerrilla units within their borders have affected the support of some of these states. The intense military pressure of Israel which had turned Southern Lebanon into an active battlefield by 1981, forced the country's Foreign Minister, Faud Butros to request the Arab League in March of that year "to lay down a comprehensive strategy which would clearly define each country's responsibility in the struggle against Israel".¹³ The request, it seemed, was a mute warning by Lebanon that unless the Arab League took measures to relieve the country of the pressure, Lebanon might reconsider her role as a Frontline State. That in effect would mean putting an end to the rear base operations of

* This is the name by which the agreement with Mozambique is known.

12. Ibid, 6 April, 1984, p.7.

13. The Times (London), 25 March, 1981, p.6.

the PLO in the country. Whether Lebanon could effectively keep the PLO out of the country is arguable, given her known military and political weakness, and the claimed right of the PLO to the use of neighbouring countries as sanctuary. It was this claim against the determination of the host countries to exercise their sovereign, territorial right which led to the PLO's conflict with Lebanon and Jordan in 1969 and 1970 respectively.

Apart from the problems with host countries, two other difficulties face the PLO's liberation strategy. The desert feature of the region hampers effective guerrilla warfare. The absence of adequate vegetation leaves the guerrillas without proper protective cover in their hit and run tactics. In consequence guerrilla activities are bound to remain at the low level of sporadic and isolated attacks. Under such circumstances, the adoption of urban guerrilla tactics appears to be the logical alternative. Even so the proposition remains highly dangerous. Not only is the absence of big population centres a militating factor against such tactics; the tight Israeli military presence which reins in the Arab population makes it all the more a suicidal strategy.

The second difficulty, of fundamental influence on the struggle, concerns the Arab determination of the Palestinian issue as an Arab-Israeli conflict which imposed a wrong strategy on the struggle. Instead of the widely acclaimed national liberation strategy of guerrilla warfare, the PLO was forced into fighting a conventional war in a general Arab campaign. The Arab League Conference of September 1964 at Alexandria ensured just that. The subject of an Arab Joint Defence Force to 'liberate' Palestine dominated the discussion. As part of this joint strategy, the Conference adopted an Iraqi proposal requiring each Arab country to keep part of its forces under emergency for battle with Israel. And for

the upkeep of such an emergency force, Kuwait, Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Libya and Yemen were to contribute among them £E5 over a period of five years. Little regard was given to any independent role for the newly formed PLO. Rather the Conference approved the formation of a Palestine Liberation Army - (PLA) - to be part of the joint Arab force. The PLA was immediately allocated £E6,500,000 of which Kuwait undertook to provide £E2,000,000, and Iraq and Saudi Arabia £E1,000,000 each.¹⁴ We thus found Palestinian soldiers taking up the same frontline positions with Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, Iraqi and Algerian soldiers at the various Middle East war fronts.

The unrealism about this strategy is the irony whereby the liberation war is fought today, not in 'Palestine' but on the 'liberators' territories as a result of Israeli military gains. Unfortunately, after four wars in the region, most Arab states are yet to acknowledge the unfeasibility of the strategy. For the PFLP however, the 1967 war was convincing enough that Palestinians could never recover their land by means of conventional war. Guerrilla warfare seems to be the most effective strategy.¹⁵ If the Arab strategy is to take a united stand in a classifical war as counterpoise to Israeli military superiority, that certainly has had the damaging effect of robbing the PLO of much of the sympathy that goes to the underdog in similar struggles. Conversely, the strategy has won Israel the propaganda war, portraying her as the 'David' threatened by the Arab 'Goliath'.

Material Support

If the strategic support to the liberation struggle is well known, material

14. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1964, p.

15. *Ibid*, p. 20335.

assistance is less well known because of the difficulty of penetrating it. The security need to protect the sources and extent of material assistance has almost thrown a wall of secrecy around this type of aid. There have been occasions, however, when some states have publicly announced their contributions in the euphoria of the moment. As we have already seen in Chapter 3, both Forbes Burham of Guyana and Sheikh Zaid el Nabyone of the United Arab Emirates publicly donated to the liberation struggle in Africa at the Lusaka and Algiers non-aligned conferences respectively. Similarly Jamaica, having earlier reported a contribution of £12,500¹⁶ to the OAU Liberation Fund at the 1972 Georgetown Conference, also announced a further donation of \$160,000 at Algiers in 1973.¹⁷ So also was Egypt which in a report to the 1973 Oslo Conference disclosed her annual payment of £100,000 to the OAU Liberation Fund;¹⁸ and Togo which paid £6,316 to the Fund in 1971/72.¹⁹

Kenya in the same way sprang a surprise on the OAU Foreign Ministers Conference of June, 1981 in Nairobi by initiating a Namibia Liberation Fund with a donation of £500,000. Immediately Libya responded by accepting to match this amount in cash and arms.²⁰ In view of the country's moderate politics which is not known for an active liberation support; and considering that the country would soon assume the chairmanship of the OAU that year, the Kenyan move could at

16. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1971/72, p. 25465.

17. *Ibid*, 1973, p. 26120.

18. Olav Stokke and Carl Widstrand, Southern Africa : The UN-OAU Conference, Oslo, 9-14 April, 1973, Vol. 1, (Uppsala : Scandinavian Institute of African Affairs, 1973), p. 200.

19. *Ibid*, p. 321.

20. Sunday Times (London), 21 June, 1981, p.8.

best be seen as aimed at persuading African states that the Organisation's commitment to anti-colonialism would not suffer under her leadership.

These disclosures, however, form only an insignificant proportion of the material assistance to the liberation movements. Under this condition of secrecy, the pronouncements of states and statements of liberation leaders showing appreciation of support, seem to offer some insight into the sources of certain type of material assistance. But there is the pitfall in any over-reliance on such statements for analytical purposes; for not only do they reveal little, but there is the suspicion that most of them merely serve the propaganda ends of the liberation. One therefore needs to be circumspect in according them any objectivity.

Generally, material assistance to the liberation movements falls into two categories: multilateral and bilateral aid. The former is provided through various international organisations, both inter-governmental and non-governmental. And the best known agencies employed in channelling this assistance include the various liberation support funds and specialised agencies of the United Nations; the African Liberation Fund, and the Assistance Fund for the Struggle Against Colonialism and Apartheid of the OAU; and the numerous transnational non-governmental bodies. The establishment of these funds, and the involvement of the United Nations agencies in the liberation struggle are the result of the non-aligned movement's campaign to mobilise international support for the liberation movements. They are therefore considered in this work as forming part of the material assistance of the non-aligned movement whose multilateral fund is the

Support and Solidarity Fund for the Liberation of Southern Africa. Why there was no similar fund for movements in other continents will be seen later. Bilateral assistance on the other hand is given on a country-to-movement basis and constitutes the bulk of the material assistance.

The nature of the material assistance reveals the limitations and strength of both categories of aid and serves to indicate which particular type is more important to the national liberation movements. This is the point that runs through our analysis of the various sources of aid.

The Support and Solidarity Fund for the Liberation of Southern Africa

Until the establishment of the Fund in 1976, the material support of the non-aligned movement for national liberation remained at the bi-lateral level. The Cairo Summit Conference of 1964, however, seemed to recognise the need for collective action. In endorsing the armed struggle, the Conference called on member-states to "combine all their efforts to render all necessary aid", including material support to the movements of national liberation.²¹ But it was at Algiers in 1973 that the decision was taken to set up a non-aligned support and solidarity fund "to increase the effectiveness of the struggles of national liberation movements".²² Nevertheless it still required the Colombo Summit to remind the movement of its full responsibility to the liberation movements before the Fund, known as the Support and Solidarity Fund for the Liberation of Southern Africa, was established.

The task of establishing the Fund was assigned to the Bureau of Non -

21. Cairo Conference Declaration, Section 1, in Jankowitsch and Sauvart, Vol. I, op. cit., p.47.

22. Algiers Conference Declaration, Ibid, p.212.

Aligned countries which in turn set up a Working Group that formally created it in New York in November, 1976. The Fund is administered by a Council of five members chosen from the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned states and has as its purpose:

- (i) assistance to liberation movements;
- (ii) the channelling of humanitarian and other assistance to peoples under racist regimes;
- (iii) the undertaking of publicity for the cause of liberation in Southern Africa;
- (iv) the provision of educational facilities in Non-Aligned countries for students under racist regimes; and
- (v) other forms of assistance, including medical supplies, agricultural equipments, food, etc.²³

Specifically, contributions to the Fund were limited to member-countries, and observers and guests of the 1976 Colombo Conference. And since the Fund is in support of the Southern African struggle, there exists naturally a link between it and the OAU. It is for a smooth working relationship that the Executive Secretary of the OAU in the organisation's New York office was appointed the secretary of the Fund's administering council; while non-cash contributions were to be sent to the OAU Liberation Committee in Dar-es-Salaam. With the creation of the Fund, the non-aligned movement could claim credibility in the profession of material support, even though in contrast to the unanimous approval

23. Jankowitsch and Sauvart, Vol. IV, op. cit. p.2406.

to establish it, response to the Fund appears to be slow. By the end of the first half of 1977, pledged contributions stood at only \$621,000 from the following:²⁴

Cuba	\$10,000
Iraq	50,000
Indonesia	1,500
Madagascar	41,000
Mali	5,000
Nigeria	50,000
Libya	20,000
North Korea	10,000
Bangladesh	3,000
Senegal	40,000
Democratic Yemen	1,000
India	30,000
Philippines	1,000
Qatar	10,000
Somalia	500
Sri Lanka	2,500
Tanzania	32,000
PLO	5,000
Kuwait	10,000
Vietnam	175,000
Uganda	2,000
United Arab Emirates	15,000
Yugoslavia	100,000
Zambia	6,000
Total:	<u>621,000</u>

Since then, not much is heard about the Fund, except the call by the 1979 Havana

Non-Aligned Conference for measures "to strengthen and activate"^{24a} the

24. Ibid, p.2408.

24a. Official Declarations of the Havana Conference in Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned in Havana : Documents of the Sixth Summit Conference and an Analysis of their Significance for Global Political System. (London : Frances Puiters Publishers, 1981) p.88.

fund which suggests a declining interest of member-states in the fund.

Bilateral Aid

Considering the needs of the liberation movements in comparison with the military resources of the enemy, this pledged non-aligned corporate assistance amounted to no more than a symbolic gesture. No doubt aid of whatever quantity would be greatly appreciated by the liberation movements in their grim struggle for independence; nevertheless they believed that the non-aligned collective material assistance, like most other multilateral aid, was nowhere adequate in meeting their requirements. Consequently the movements have had to develop independent contacts with countries for bilateral assistance which has come to be the mainstay of the liberation struggle.

For one thing, liberation movements prefer bilateral aid because it is more reliable, and could be tailored to the needs of the struggle as it is usually given on the basis of specific demands. Nevertheless this type of aid is not without its problems. One of these is political. Bilateral aid, especially from the rival blocs, is never known to be entirely free of political and ideological undertones. Even without any overt or covert pressure, it induces a moral feeling whereby the receiver tends to be beholden to the giver. Invariably the independence and the scope of manoeuvre of the movements exercised under multilateral aid arrangement in which donors are superficially anonymous, is remarkably reduced in bilateralism. But such disadvantage pales into insignificance when balanced against the advantages, and not least, given the life-and-death circumstances in which the aid is sought. Obviously the prospects of defeat are too grim to render any disadvantages which do not interfere with victory as acceptable penalty.

Generally, the radical states have shown greater readiness and capacity to offer bilateral aid, especially in arms and military-related requirements in their zeal to demonstrate revolutionary solidarity. Impatient with the politics of collective assistance, the radicals find direct aid as a way out of the frustrating bureaucratic red-tapism that tend to characterise multilateral aid agencies. Nkrumah's explanation for the refusal to contribute to the Fund of the African Liberation Committee put this point quite plainly: "The frequent and persistent reports from freedom fighters about the short comings of the aid ... offered to them make it impossible for the government of Ghana to turn over its contribution to the Committee".²⁵ And if the 'Rejectionist Front'* in Arab politics should criticise the Arab League, it is because of what these states regard as the sluggishness of the League in the area of material support to the PLO.

Amilcar Cabral of the PAIGC acknowledged the role of the radical states in bilateral support when he identified Guinea, Algeria, Egypt, Tanzania and Congo(B) as the main supporters of his country's struggle. But he reserved special praise for Cuba whose "untiring efforts - sacrifices that we deeply appreciate" - constituted effective aid and encouragement to the struggle of the PAIGC.²⁶

25. Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 7, July 1964, p.122C. See Zdenek Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity : Africa and the OAU, (London : Julian Friedmann Publishers Ltd., 1977) pp.53-55 for Nkrumah's criticisms of the Liberation Committee; and Olajide Aluko, 'The OAU Liberation Committee After a Decade : An Appraisal' in Quarterly Journal of Administration, (University of Ife, Nigeria) Vol. 8, October 1973, pp.59-68 for an assessment of the Committee's general performance.

* The 'Rejectionist Front' comprises Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, South Yemen and the PLO in their opposition to the Camp David Accord.

26. Amilcar Cabral in an interview with Tricontinental Magazine (Havana), No. 8, September, 1968.

The support of Cuba for the PAIGC follows a familiar pattern of the country's assistance to wars of liberation in Africa. In Guinea-Bissau, as in Algeria, apart from providing arms, Cuban troops were actually engaged in the fighting. Evidence of this was the capture of Commander Pedro Rodriguez Peralta by the Portuguese.^{26a} Such assistance like that of most other radical states to national liberation movements, could only be understood within the context of the country's revolutionary tradition. Following her revolution which she conceives as part of the world anti-imperialist struggle within which her future is believed to be secure, Cuba has consistently pursued a policy of promoting revolution abroad as an internationalist duty. It is a policy she is proud of, and there are no signs as yet of a weakening resolve in her to pursue it as was made abundantly clear by Fidel Castro:

In all our revolutionary process, we have always followed a policy of solidarity with the African revolutionary movements. One of the first things the revolution did was to send arms to the Algerian combatants who were fighting for their independence... We have given our support to the revolutionary movement in Africa since the very moment of the victory of the revolution. And we will continue supporting them. This assistance has taken different forms. Some-
times we have sent weapons, or on other occasions we have sent men.²⁷

This Cuban assistance may be highly valued by the liberation movements for certain reasons. It is true that the movements obtain the bulk of their military hardware from the Eastern bloc countries, especially the Soviet Union and China. But they are apprehensive of the dangers of over-reliance on a particular bloc which could compromise their 'non-aligned' position. Besides, there exists the fear that aid from the USSR and China could draw them unwittingly

26a. The Times (London), 12 March, 1968, p.6. Fidel Castro himself confirmed Commander Peralta's presence in Guinea-Bissau in Michael Taber (ed.), Fidel Castro Speeches, (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1981), p.78.

27. Ibid.

into the Sino-Soviet quarrel. Paul Whitaker in highlighting the problems associated with bilateral assistance from certain quarters has told of Chinese demand on Mozambique's FRELIMO to sign anti-Soviet and anti-Western propaganda materials in return for aid.²⁸ None of these fears have so far been expressed with regard to assistance from Cuba. Being a small Third World country with past colonial experience, Cuba is hardly considered a danger to the freedom of the liberation movements. The tendency therefore is to regard her support as disinterested, purely fraternal and free of any substance of power politics.

A second reason for the importance of the Cuban assistance is perhaps its relevance for post-war programme. In many liberation circles, there is an unconcealed admiration for the 'success story' of Cuba's development. For a country her size, with limited natural resources, the progress of Cuba since the revolution is viewed by most of the national liberation movements as a model for their post-independence development. Thus the support of Cuba in the period of the struggle is appreciated as forming the basis for future co-operation.

The prominent role of Algeria in liberation support also springs from the same revolutionary source. Of particular mention is the country's assistance to the Angolan movements. The commitment of Algeria to the colony's struggle, intended to demonstrate her revolutionary experience, underlined President Ben Bella's tough liberation-support stand at the May 1963 Addis Ababa Conference of African Heads of State. Apart from supply of arms to the Angolan movements,

28. Paul M. Whitaker, 'Arms and the Nationalists : Where and on what terms do they obtain their support and how important is external aid to their revolution?', African Report, Vol. 15, No. 5, 1970.

Algeria also showed preparedness to commit men to the war in defence of her "own sacred liberation".²⁹ Taking a position different from the general OAU policy of assistance to only unified fronts, Algeria extended aid to both the MPLA and the FLNA. And it was at the request of Holden Roberto for assistance that President Ben Bella sent a ship load of arms to the FLNA in January 1963.³⁰ But intense inter-movement rivalry later marred this non-discriminatory policy. As the MPLA drew closer to the country, the FLNA grew cool about Algier's aid, rejecting even the offer of Algerian volunteers to fight in the war.³¹ It was on the strength of the enthusiasm of the country's support, and her belief in the vitality of that support to bring about an early victory, than Ben Bella optimistically proclaimed that in late 1963 African leaders "shall witness the victory parade of the battalions of Angola" in Algiers.³² This of course did not materialize, and it took twelve years more before Angola won her independence.

The material support of most moderate states is mainly financial and other forms of less controversial aid, and these are usually channelled through the various multilateral agencies. Where they offer bilateral aid, it very often goes, but not exclusively, to the moderate movements as part of a policy of undermining a rival more revolutionary movement. Ideological considerations come to the

29. John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, 1962-1976, Vol. II (Cambridge; The MIT Press, 1978) p.63. President Ben Bella warned in November 1962 that if the United Nations did not end the Angolan war in 1963, Algeria "shall send volunteers and technicians, and finance this war". Then his disclosure at the 1963 African Heads of State Conference in Addis Ababa of the refusal of Congo (K) (now Zaire) to receive on its soil some 10,000 Algerians to join forces with the liberation movements; Africa Digest, 12, 1964/65.

30. John Marcum, op. cit. p.63.

31. Ibid, pp.62-66 give a good account of the FLNA-MPLA rivalry, and how this affected Algeria's support to them.

32. Arslam Humbaraci, Algeria : The Revolution that Failed, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966) p.160.

fore in determining the dispensation of their aid. Thus Congo (Kinshasa, now Zaire) assisted the FLNA but did everything to undermine the MPLA. Similarly Nigeria in 1963 donated £25,000³³ to the FLNA while she worked through the OAU Goodwill Mission on Angola to deny the rival MPLA of OAU recognition.³⁴ The Nigerian attitude changed dramatically under the rule of General Murtala Muhammed when the country championed the cause of the MPLA with a handsome donation of \$13,500,000 to help it fight off South Africa's invasion of Angola in 1976.³⁵

To supplement contribution to the Liberation Fund, many countries have launched liberation support funds at both governmental and non-governmental levels. The campaigns for these funds are usually actively promoted by the numerous national anti-apartheid movements and their growing importance in recent years is measured by the increasing response to the campaigns. In March 1973, the Foreign Minister of Ghana launched a public fund-raising campaign with a target of 50,000 cedis (\$43,500) for assistance to the African Liberation Movements.³⁶ A similar drive in Nigeria in 1977 raised ₦7,000,000.³⁷

33. Washington Post, 25 May, 1963, and cited in John Marcum op.cit. p. 73.

34. The Goodwill Mission composed of Congo (K), Guinea, Nigeria, Algeria and Uganda was sent by the African Liberation Committee to Kinshasa in July 1963 with a view to settling the quarrel between the MPLA and the FLNA. The recommendations of the Mission under the chairmanship of Nigeria's Foreign Minister, Jaja Nwackukwu, said among other things, that (a) all aid to the Angolan struggle should be channelled through the Government of Congo (K), (b) the FLNA should be the only fighting front for the liberation of Angola, (c) the organisation of other fronts should be discouraged, and the fighting forces of the MPLA should join the FLNA. For the manoeuvres of Nigeria which led to these decisions, see John Marcum, op. cit. pp. 93-99.

35. See Olajide Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy, (George Allen and Unwin, 1981) part six, for an analysis of this period of the country's foreign policy).

36. Olav Stokke and Carl Widstrand, op. cit. p. 307.

37. In 1977, the Federal Military Government launched a Southern Africa Relief Fund. Besides contributing towards the military effort, the Fund was to provide educational assistance and medical facilities in the Frontline States for wounded guerrillas. Source: Africa Current, 1975-1978, No. 9, p.29.

Support for the Non-African Movements

Compared with their African counterparts, the non-African movements have received less corporate patronage. Apparently because of their incontestable anti-colonial and anti-racist thrust, material assistance to the movements in Africa have won a general approval. But united response in support of the other movements whose struggles were controversially defined for a long period in the non-aligned movement's anti-colonial politics featured little more than verbal solidarity. The only collective assistance given the Vietnam struggle was for post-war reconstruction. In January 1977, following the recommendation of the August 1975 Lima Foreign Ministers Conference, the non-aligned movement established the Solidarity Fund for the Reconstruction of Laos and Vietnam with the objective of rehabilitating the economies of these two war ravaged countries. Though not strictly a liberation support fund, it nonetheless demonstrated the non-aligned movements' support for the PRG of Vietnam, and the appreciation of the role of Laos as a strategic rear to the Vietnam struggle. The life of the Fund was restricted to the completion of specific projects proposed by the two countries with 1979 as the time limit. By June 1977, only seventeen countries had pledged contributions totalling \$318,080 and made up as follows:³⁸

Algeria	\$100,000
Bangladesh	2,000
Benin	4,000
Cuba	10,000
Cyprus	480
India	10,000
Indonesia	5,000
Libya	150,000

38. Jankowitsch and Sauvart, Vol. IV; op. cit. p.2411.

Malaysia	1,500
Mali	2,000
Panama	1,000
Philippines	1,000
Romania	20,800
Singapore	1,000
Sri Lanka	2,500
Tanzania	6,000
Togo	800
Total:	<u>\$318,080</u>

Although it was about the first colonial issue to involve the UN directly, the issue of Palestine failed, for sometime, to attract non-aligned anti-colonial unanimity unlike the African cases. Whatever support it received in the early years of the non-aligned movement (and this was mostly moral), derived basically from the influence of Nasser. Yet many countries still remained aloof, taking a position that was largely dictated by their ties with Israel. For these countries, the more the issue was promoted, the more divisive it became in non-aligned anti-colonial consensus.

A clear indication of this division first appeared at the 1963 Conference of African Heads of State held in Addis Ababa where the moderate countries opposed any involvement of Africa in the Middle East crisis. The opposition left no doubts that Afro-Arab solidarity as it concerned Palestine was not without limits. It was a painful realisation for Nasser, and the impact it had on him was visible in the excessive caution he took to introduce the Palestinian issue at the 1964 Cairo OAU Summit. Tactfully, he linked Israel with South Africa on the basis of their policy towards the indigenous population and denounced them as imperialist bases. Nevertheless, fearing that this could still irk the friends of

Israel, Nasser tried to assure them that he was not asking for a resolution on Israel but merely a "deep thought that you may reach the truth".³⁹ So at Cairo in 1964, the need to play the good host and maintain African unity forced Nasser to be circumspect in asking for African support for the Palestinian cause.

With such difference in attitude towards the Palestinian problem, non-aligned material support for the PLO has become first and foremost an Arab responsibility, although documents said to have been captured in the wake of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon tell of the assistance of some other non-aligned states, notably Cuba, Yugoslavia, India, Pakistan and Vietnam, in providing military training to PLO cadres.⁴⁰ But even at the Pan-Arab level, one tends to detect an impairment of support caused by the radical/moderate cleavage in Arab politics, in addition to the religious factor as it affects each country's foreign policy orientation.

Prior to 1970, the split in the Arab world with implications for the Palestinian cause, was centred around Nasser's revolutionary Pan-Arabism and Saudi-Arabia's conservative Pan-Islamism. Nasser employed Pan-Arabism as a vehicle against imperialism in his policy of introducing radical change in the region to challenge Israel more effectively. The policy accorded with his conception of the role of Egypt as a supporter and custodian of liberation movements and as a regional leader.

On the other hand was the Pan-Islamism of Saudi Arabia which offered a direct challenge to the perceived threat of Pan-Arabic revolutionary pressures of

39. Keesings Contemporary Archives , 1963/64; p.20253.

40. Raphael Israeli (ed), PLO in Lebanon : Selected Documents (London : Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983).

Nasser. The challenge is subsumed in the country's foreign policy. Dr. Bakor Al-Amri has distinguished four components of the policy:⁴¹

- (i) regional leadership;
- (ii) international peace keeping;
- (iii) control of Communism; and
- (iv) development of expansion of Islam.

Saudi Arabia's instrument in pursuing these objectives has been the country's economic power based on vast oil wealth; a petro-dollar diplomacy which employs sanction and reward to peddle influence. But her drive for regional leadership floundered in the days of Nasser. It was to offset this loss that she decided to strengthen the Islamic base of her policy, favoured in this by being the custodian of the Moslem world's holy places in Mecca and Medina. In consequence Islamic solidarity became the corner stone of the country's foreign policy with Arab unity as a desirable objective. The late King Faisal defined the policy in these words:

We stretch our hands, we open our breasts to our Arab brethren, in the fullest sense of the terms. We are fully prepared to co-operate with them to the limits of co-operation. We are prepared to reach the goal set before us which is complete Arab unity, but we cannot forget in any situation that this country has a holy Muslim faith, and this distinguishes her from other Arab countries, namely her geographical location and the presence of holy places. We support Islam above all things; and we look upon Islam as our solid foundation.⁴²

The tendency in Saudi Arabia is therefore to employ the anti-communist and Pan-Islamic elements of her foreign policy to try to solve the Palestinian question.

41. Bakor O. Al-Amri, 'Towards -Understanding Saudi Foreign Policy' in Saudi Arabia and Its Place in the World, (Riyadh : Ministry of Information Publication, 1979) p. 96.

42. Abdullah Omer Nassief, 'The Emergence of Islamic Solidarity : The Role of Saudi Arabia', Ibid, p. 104.

Although Nasser would like to seize every Third World grouping to project his anti-imperialist policy, of which the Palestinian problem was an integral part, he appeared reluctant to promote Islamic solidarity above the wider non-aligned movement. A strong Pan-Islamic community, he feared, could undermine his position in a larger Third World grouping whose common anti-colonial ideology was more relevant to his leadership role than religious exclusivism in the solution of the Palestinian problem. Other radical Arab States apparently followed the position of Nasser as was clear in Iraq's boycott of the 1970 Riyadh Islamic Conference summoned by Saudi Arabia to consider the Palestinian problem. Rejecting the suggestion of the usefulness of such a conference, Iraq pointed out: "As regards the Islamic Conference, we did not believe it would be of any avail to the Arab nation or the cause of Palestine."⁴³

The implication for the Palestinian struggle of the intra-Arab rivalry is the lack of common Arab strategy against Israel in their support for the PLO. This affects, and is in turn underlined by, the interpretations of the Palestinian cause by various countries. Depending on a particular country's national interest and role conception, the issue is analysed either as an ideological conflict for the introduction of progressive change in the Arab world through the elimination of Israeli 'colonialism' and Arab conservatism, or as a religious battle in which the recovery of Islam's other holy places in Jerusalem is the central issue. These different perspectives have inevitably led to the transformation of the Palestinian struggle into an Arab-Israeli conflict.

Consequently, material support for the PLO came to be equated with assistance to the Arab Frontline States; and it takes the form of replacing the losses

43. International Documents on Palestine, (1970 Volume) p. 776.

in the wars. For example, following the disastrous Six day War in 1967, the Arab League voted about £180 million for such losses.⁴⁴ It was still towards this end that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya agreed at the September 1967 Arab Summit to pay annually £50,000,000, £55,000,000 and £30,000,000 respectively "until the effects of the aggression are eliminated".⁴⁵ Again the fifth Arab summit conference in Rabat in 1970 allocated £35 million for arms contract to be carried out by Egypt⁴⁶ but gave nothing tangible to the PLO. Rather the conference recommended that the PLO should make bilateral contacts with Arab States in the hope of securing funds. This took Arafat to the Maghreb states, Egypt, Iraq, and Kuwait immediately after the summit. In fact that treatment of the PLO by the conference provoked Arafat into challenging the Arab position on Palestine. "The Palestinian revolution", he pointed out "started without the benefit of any conference or recommendations and would continue its historical advance without the benefits of conferences and recommendations".⁴⁷ The remark moved Nasser to renounce the money "in favour of the Palestinian people to support their endurance and in favour of the Palestinian revolution".⁴⁸ But Arafat, in recognition of Egypt's sacrifices for the Palestinian cause, refused the offer.

Indeed, Egypt under Nasser, constituted the backbone of the Palestinian struggle. Apart from bearing the burden of much of the Palestinian refugee

44. Ibid, p. 810.

45. T.G. Fraser, The Middle East; 1914-1979 : Documents of Modern History, (London : Edward Arnold (Publishers) Ltd. 1980), p. 116.

46. International Documents on Palestine, op. cit. p. 750

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

problem, one important aspect of which was the provision of educational facilities to Palestinians, Egypt was more importantly a major arms supplier to the PLO. Not only did Nasser provide it with weapons against Israel; he also armed the organisation to protect itself against its 'Arab' enemies. For instance, in the organisation's conflict with Jordan in September 1970, much of its weapons came from Egypt. Nasser himself revealed this while trying to persuade Arafat to accept the cease-fire worked out by Arab heads of state and Government:

In the last few days, I have made all the arms and ammunition you wanted available to you. I have also sent you planes and the men of the three Palestinian battalions in the Palestinian Liberation Army that were on the Egyptian Front, to strengthen your position - All this was to gain time in which we could prevent the resistance being dealt a mortal blow. In the last few days I have sweated blood to protect you.⁴⁹

The burden of the Middle East conflict on Egypt is better appreciated by the impact of the 1967 war on the economy of the country. The war which left the economy in shambles, displaced 350,000 people in the Canal Zone, thus creating a serious refugee problem for the Government. Besides, the closure of the Suez Canal and the loss of the Sinai oil fields deprived the Government of £E100 million and £E20 million annually as money from these respective sources. Added to that was the burden of re-equipping the armed forces so badly battered in the 1967 war. All these imposed such heavy strain on the economy that the country in 1969 could hardly find the foreign exchange of £E60 million to purchase much needed wheat. It was only through the assistance of the 1969 Arab Conference in Khartoum, and a £E20 million Soviet aid that Egypt was able to overcome the immediate food problem.⁵⁰

49. Ibid, p. 955.

50. International Documents on Palestine, (1969 Volume), pp.645-6. These facts were disclosed by Nasser in a speech at the Inauguration of the Second Session of the General National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union in Cairo on 27th March, 1969.

One leader whose material assistance to the PLO stems from a radical analysis of the Middle East crisis is Colonel Ghadafi of Libya, much given to revolutionary show offs.⁵¹ He queries the interpretation of the conflict in the region as primarily an Israeli aggression against Arab countries, aware of the dangers of such a perspective in subordinating the core issue of Palestinian national independence to a much later problem of violation of Arab territories by Israel. For this reason, Ghadafi insisted that whatever aid he gave to the front-line states should go into promoting the Palestinian struggle. Thus when King Hussein took on the PLO in 1970, Libya suspended her £10 million⁵² per year financial aid to Jordan on the accusation that the money was used for a purpose other than fighting the Palestinian cause. Kuwait also suspended her £15 million aid to the country.⁵³

A measure of Colonel Ghadafi's zeal in support for the Palestinian cause is his impatience with moderate Arab states whom he blames for the disunity in the Arab front, and which he believes affects the scale of material assistance to the PLO. The Libyan leader's support for the Palestinian struggle cannot be doubted. His rise to power had a significant impact on Middle East politics, not least on the Palestinian issue. One of his early actions was the establishment of a Jihad Fund to build "strong Libyan Armed forces to support the armed struggle

51. See Mirella Bianco, Gadafi : Voice from the Desert, (London : Longman Group Ltd. 1975) pp. 141-150 for the Libyan leaders' analysis of the Palestinian problem. Bianco disagrees with the point of view which portrays Gadafi as resolutely wedded to the destruction of Israel in order to establish Palestinian rights. In her opinion, such view is a misrepresentation of Gadafi's position which is better understood in the context of his desire for Arab unity.

52. Edgar O'Ballance, Arab Guerrilla Power : 1967-1972 (London : Faber & Faber, 1974), p.147 (Footnote 1).

53. Ibid, p.148.

for the liberation of usurped Arab territories from Zionist control";⁵⁴ and he followed this up with an announcement of an aid package of £L4 million to the PLO.⁵⁵ He has since then been a consistent supporter of the struggle in arms and cash. Worried about the lack of co-ordinated Arab material support to the PLO except replenishing the loss of the Frontline states, Colonel Ghadafi in 1970 undertook a mission to rally Arab solidarity. Because he viewed the Palestinian issue as a revolutionary struggle requiring the full mobilisation of Arab resources which cannot be substituted by rhetoric, Colonel Ghadafi shows open contempt for those states which, in his opinion, do more of talking than acting. In a plea for concerted Arab material support, he said:

Today when we talk of liberation of Palestine we must not vaguely employ slogans advocating destruction, liberation or peace. We must fully realise that the battle of Palestine - of which the territories occupied in 1967 are a part - requires a vast mobilisation of the resources of the Arab nation. Since 1948 the Arabs have been employing slogans calling for the destruction of Israel, for liberation, for the return of the Palestinian people. But today, after many years, we have not destroyed Israel, we have not liberated Palestine, we have not returned the refugees to their home.⁵⁶

Ghadafi's revolutionary view of the Palestinian struggle led him to conclude that there could be no negotiated settlement of the Palestinian question; for as he put it, the conflict had "reached such a degree as to make it impossible to achieve a peaceful solution satisfactory to all sides".⁵⁷ This then leaves a revolutionary solution as the only alternative.

54. Libyan Government Official Gazzette, No. 1, 10 January, 1970.

55. Al-Anwar (Beirut), 20 January, 1970.

56. Al-Ahram, 23 June, 1970.

57. B.B.C. Monitoring Service, 4 August, 1970.

In contrast to Ghadafi's fiery revolutionary approach, the conservative states caution moderation and even a change of strategy away from destruction to constructive engagement. Although the conservatives also make the attainment of Palestinian self-determination a policy objective, there have been times when some of them have expressed doubts about the feasibility of the armed struggle as a solution to the problem. Apart from the countries like Saudi Arabia and Jordan which are always drawn to a negotiated settlement in recent years, this seems to be the long standing policy of Tunisia as evidenced in President Habib Bourguiba's veiled criticism of the Palestinian National Covenant, and the stand of the radical Arab countries. In 1965, the Tunisian leader had the courage to advise that:

It is an easy thing to use the language of emotion. What is more difficult is to be sincere and faithful in what one says or does. If we discover that our forces cannot drive the enemy into the sea, we must not ignore this fact but must take full account of it. We should then pursue the struggle by other strategic means so that we can approach our objective step by step.⁵⁸

Predictably, the PLO viewed the advice as an indication of a wavering Arab support for its cause, and called on the Arab states to reaffirm their commitment to the Palestinian resistance. And of course the PLO obtained the reaffirmation at the April 1965 Cairo Committee Meeting of representatives of the Arab states. A communique issued at the end of the meeting routinely reaffirmed that "Arab Governments, expressing the will of their peoples, are intent upon the firm support of the United Arab Command, the PLO and the Palestine Liberation Army".⁵⁹

58. Arab Political Documents, 1965 (Beirut : American University) p. 77.

59. Ibid, p. 151.

Such militant rhetorical stand did not, however, debase Bourguiba's advice. If the Tunisian president was thought mistaken, it certainly was because he spoke out at too early a stage when the full impact of the military superiority of Israel was yet to be felt by the Arabs. Fifteen years later, the wisdom in the advice was accepted in the 1979 Camp David Accord between Egypt and Israel.

But even before 1979, despite the assurance of support for the armed struggle, the temptations of an alternative strategy were visible in Nasser's acceptance of UN Security Council resolution 242 of November 1967 as a basis for negotiation.⁶⁰ The response of Egypt to the Jarring Mission and the Rogers Plan of 1969 formed part of the search for a peaceful settlement. These two peace initiatives dominated the fifth Arab Summit Conference held in Rabat in 1970 to the annoyance of the radical states. The PLO, in alliance with Syria, Algeria and Libya opposed any compromise solution at the expense of the armed struggle. Algeria's opposition was even more vehement, going as far as withdrawing Algerian troops from the Canal front. Describing the Rogers Plan as injurious to the Palestinian struggle, President Boumedienne in an obvious reference to Nasser, pointed out that "no Arab head of state, no Arab official has the right to deal with the Palestinian cause in such a way that the Palestinian people have to pay the price of the 1967 defeat - that price being the Palestinian people".⁶¹ To Yassir Arafat, the strategy of the Conference was to pressure the organisation into accepting a negotiated settlement which he described as "surrender solution" purposely released to sabotage the summit. Alleging that he was in possession

60. Mahmoud Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East, (London; Quartet Books, 1981) gives a detailed account of Egypt's peace moves leading to the signing of the Camp David Accord. The author served as Foreign Minister under Nasser and Sadat.

61. Al-Sha'b, (Algiers) 25 August, 1970.

of documents of "every peace project, of every solution that has been submitted to the Arab countries", Arafat made clear his opposition to any pressures on the PLO, saying that:

We have refused all invitations to compromise. For had we wanted any other way than that of liberation, we should have accepted the proposals that have been made to the Palestinian people in the dozens for the establishment of a Palestinian state and entity side by side with the Zionist state and entity.⁶²

Placing the pressures for peace in perspective, the PLO leader symbolized 1969 as the year of Arab conspiracy, and 1970 the year of international ploy against the Palestinian cause.

The surprising thing about Arab states' disagreement over a peace strategy was Ghadafi's acceptance of the Rogers Plan which contradicted his stated revolutionary position. However, it would be misleading to interpret this as a softening of his radical line. Instead, the apparent contradiction should be seen more appropriately as arising from Ghadafi's excessive devotion to the leadership of Nasser whose revolution serves as an inspiration to that of Libya.⁶³ The attachment of the Libyan leader to a radical solution was clear in his promise of continued aid to the PLO as long as the organization kept to the revolutionary course.^{63a} And it appears that the warning in the promise was effected after Arafat refused to "commit revolutionary suicide" as urged by the Libyan leader in the wake of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon to flush out the PLO. Since then Libyan material assistance to the PLO seemed to have shifted away from Fatah, the Arafat wing of the organization, to its rival factions which are judged to be

62. International Documents on Palestine, 1970, p.749.

63. Mirella Bianco, op. cit, p.139, in her interview with Ghadafi elicited this as one reason, beside the other explanation of a recognition of Egypt's national interest.

63a. International Documents in Palestine, 1970, p.885.

more revolutionary.

The quest for a negotiated settlement did not, however, preclude a general Arab material support to the PLO. Money from the oil rich states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria and Iraq continued to pour into the coffers of the organisation, making it the richest liberation movement.⁶⁴ So rich is the PLO that it could afford to contribute to the Non-Aligned Solidarity and Support Fund, and to the relief project to assist Dominica, following the hurricane disaster in that Caribbean island in 1979.^{64a} Edward Said, a renowned Palestinian scholar even considers such material well-being - "the sheer presence and availability of almost unlimited capital", as he put it - as capable of 'corrupting' the will of the PLO to fight.

Behind Said's remark is presumably the notion that national liberation implies sacrifice and rigour. Material comfort, it is feared, could undermine these qualities and weaken the resolve to fight. Whether this has been the case with the PLO is difficult to judge. What we can say, however, is that, given the peculiar nature of the Palestinian problem, the organisation cannot be said to be unnecessarily rich, not least profligate. The organisation's huge welfare programmes in the form of medical care, educational, cultural and recreational facilities to millions of Palestinian refugees demand resources that are well above the limits of a liberation movement.

Arab support to the PLO is, however, not without some self interest.

64. Edward Said, The Question of Palestine, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 214.

64a. Granma Weekly Review, No. 37, 16 September, 1979, p. 8. The PLO donated \$10,000 to the relief fund.

Its other objective seems to be the use of the PLO as an aspect of the intra-Arab rivalry, although this is often denied. Given the moderate/radical divide in Arab politics, the insinuation is that aid to the PLO is intended, in part, to achieve two objectives: it is either to moderate the revolutionary propensity of the organisation or to promote revolutionary change in the region. With regard to the first objective, it might be observed that most countries still retain feudal structures which resist radical change. Change if it should take place, has to be regulated in order not to upset the status quo. This presents a dilemma to the conservatives in their assistance to the PLO which is seen as an agent of revolutionary change. They realise that withholding material support has the danger of pushing the organisation further into the radical camp, while extending assistance could help to strengthen its revolutionary base. To guard against the former outcome, the conservatives concentrate their assistance on the organisation's more moderate wing, Fatah, led by Arafat, and which constitutes 70% of the PLO membership.⁶⁵ In effect this type of support, as Everette Mendelsohn argues, amounts to sanctioning conservative and largely non-revolutionary nationalism for the PLO. The answer of the radicals to this conservative ploy is to adopt the radical factions of the PLO and use them as leverage on the organisation to attempt to keep it on the revolutionary course. Such is the insidious battle between these two Arab groupings to win the soul of the PLO.

In consequence, the PLO is caught between the opposing currents of Arab politics with all the pressures this entails. But the PLO has, as a matter of

65. Everette Mendelsohn, A Compassionate Peace, (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1982), p. 42.

policy, sought to avoid being used as a pawn in intra-Arab quarrels even at the expense of denying itself assistance from some Arab sources. The organisation, to ensure its independence, has always tried to resist army control, including financial pressure, while striving to maintain equal relations with all the states. As explained by Yassir Arafat, "Fatah received offers from many Arab countries which tried to tempt it with money and arms when it was still in urgent need of everything, but it rejected all these offers. The Arab countries are today grouped into six axes. Why should we attach ourselves to one of these axes, when to do so would offend the others."⁶⁶

The more radical wing of the PLO even takes a more cynical view of any attempt to compromise the independence of the organisation. For the PDFLP, the struggle to maintain this independence means "liberating the PLO from official Arab pressures represented by material aid" through self-reliance based on the resources of the Palestinian people.⁶⁷ Nothing demonstrates the policy of self-reliance more than the organisation's budget for 1980. Out of an expenditure of about £800 million, £600,000,000 came from internal sources made up partly of contributions of five per cent of the earnings of all Palestinians abroad.⁶⁸ But self-reliance in liberation struggles has its limitations which the PLO could hardly ignore. Therefore, however hard the organisation might try to resist external control, it has on occasions deferred to pressures to adopt a more flexible posture. We thus find Yassir Arafat agreeing to accept United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 in return for United States recognition of the PLO,

66. International Documents on Palestine, 1970, p. 750.

67. George Habash, leader of the PDFLP, in a memorandum to the Seventh Session of the Palestine National Assembly, Beirut in June 1970. International Documents on Palestine, *ibid*, p. 817.

68. B.B.C. T.V. Panorama Programme, 29 June, 1981.

showing willingness to discuss with King Hussein on the question of Palestinian representation at any peace negotiations, and more surprising, making moves to improve relations with Egypt despite the existence of the Camp David Accord. Unfortunately these gestures have very often proved to be unsatisfactory to some of the Arab factions and the different camps within the PLO, leading ironically to more pressures on the organisation.

United Nations' Material Assistance

A far reaching non-aligned material support to national liberation comes indirectly in the assistance of the United Nations. As discussed in Chapter 4 the non-aligned movements' anti-colonial diplomatic drive at the Organisation led to the acceptance of the legitimacy of the armed struggle, and the logical decision to give material assistance to the liberation movements. The success of the non-aligned movement to mobilise UN assistance has been immeasurable. By 1970 the campaign for UN material support had developed into a world-wide programme, even enlisting various degrees of support from traditionally anti-liberation quarters.

In its early period, UN assistance to national liberation was more of a humanitarian kind in the form of aid to refugees from the colonial and racist territories. The first in the series of such assistance was through a special educational and training programme for Namibia established by the General Assembly in 1961. This was followed in 1962 by the setting up of the Special Training Programme for Territories under Portuguese Administration to cater for refugees from Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. Such low-level support, although disapproved by Portugal and South Africa, carried no serious political opposition from the Western powers whose alliance with the former, and

relations with the latter stood in the way of legitimisation of liberation for some time.

By the mid-1960s, the national liberation movements had themselves become recipients of UN aid as a result of the acceptance of the legitimacy of the armed struggle. Consequently, in 1965 alone, the General Assembly passed five resolutions calling for material assistance to the movements.⁶⁹ The practical step in this direction was taken by the Assembly in the establishment of the UN Trust Fund for South Africa in 1965; the Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa in 1967, and the Fund for Namibia in 1971. But despite the endorsement of the armed struggle, and making the movements direct recipients of aid, the world body continued to insist on the humanitarian nature of its assistance ostensibly in order to involve even those countries that object to the armed struggle. And for that kind of assistance, the following guidelines were spelt out:

- (a) Inside the territories controlled by colonial and minority regimes:
 - (i) Legal assistance to persons persecuted under repressive and discriminatory legislation;
 - (ii) Despatch of observers to trial under such legislation;
 - (iii) Assistance, including assistance for education and training, to families of political prisoners, restrictees, banned persons, ex-prisoners and students expelled from schools for political activities;
 - (iv) Grants for emigration of persecuted persons in exceptional cases;

69. UN G.A. Resolutions 2022 (XX), 5 November 1965; 2054 (XX) 15 December, 1965; 2074 (XX), 17 December, 1965; 2105 (XX) 20 December, 1965 and 2107 (XX), 21 December, 1965.

- (v) Scholarships and other educational assistance to victims of racial discrimination;
- (vi) Grants to educational institutions which cater to such persons, including correspondence colleges;
- (vii) Appropriate assistance to groups opposed to colonialism and racial discrimination, especially for specific welfare projects; and
- (viii) Research grants for individuals or institutions.

(b) Inside "liberated areas"

- (i) Supplies of educational materials, medical equipment, medical supplies, foodstuffs, seeds, agricultural implements, etc.
- (ii) Supplies of telecommunication equipment, radios, trucks, etc. and
- (iii) Technical assistance inside the Territory.

(c) Outside the territories:

- (i) Assistance to refugees: (a) assistance for resettlement, self-support, maintenance, etc. (b) legal protection; and (c) assistance in securing employment.
- (ii) Scholarships and facilities for education and training at various levels for the indigenous inhabitants;
- (iii) Subventions to institutions providing places for students from territories;
- (iv) Assistance to institutions associated with the liberation movements for educational, health and other activities;
- (v) Provision of hospitals, schools, print shops and other facilities to the liberation movements;
- (vi) Printing and supply of text books;

- (vii) Technical assistance to the liberation movements, including supply of doctors and teachers; and
- (viii) Other assistance to the liberation movements, such as: (a) grants for travel to Conferences; (b) printing and distribution of publications; (c) provision of facilities and grants for offices of liberation movements; and (d) treatment of the wounded.⁷⁰

If the emphasis on humanitarian assistance was intended to mollify the opponents of armed liberation, there is no guarantee whatsoever that the aid would not be used for military purposes. What is more, the difficulty in maintaining the humanitarian nature of support lies in the unfeasibility of drawing a distinction between this type of aid and military assistance. After all, some of the above provisions could serve a dual function to make the insistence on humanitarian aid rather unrealistic.

It was in the concept of humanitarianism that the Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa was set up, as the name implies, to "educate and train" people from the region.⁷¹ By October, 1972, total contributions to the Programme had reached \$2,629,477.⁷² Subsequent years saw a remarkable increase in contribution, and in 1980 alone, about \$4,000,000 was realised.⁷³ Under the Programme a total of 744 awards were made in 1971/72 - 78 in Namibia, 268 to South Africa, 148 to Rhodesia and 250 to the Portuguese

70. Olav Stokke and Carl Widstrand, op. cit, pp. 267-269.

71. G.A. Resolution 2349 (XXII) of December, 1967.

72. Olav Stokke and Carl Widstrand, op. cit, p. 276

73. UN Document A/35/525, 10 October, 1980, p. 3.

colonies.⁷⁴ The number increased to 1428 in 1979/80 and distributed as follows:⁷⁵

Angola	22
Cape Verde	9
Guinea -Bissau	27
Mozambique	2
Namibia	215
Sao Tome and Principe	7
South Africa	290
Zimbabwe	556

The Trust Fund for South Africa whose services, despite the name, extends to Namibians and Rhodesians, provides, in addition to educational needs:

- (i) Legal assistance to persons prosecuted under the repressive and discriminatory legislation of the Republic of South Africa;
- (ii) Relief to such persons and their families; and
- (iii) Relief for refugees from South Africa.⁷⁶

A special feature of the Fund is its operation through third parties. But its overall direction lies with a Committee of Trustees which decides on the uses of the Fund and makes grants to voluntary organisations and countries hosting refugees for assistance to the affected individuals and families. By March 1973, the Fund had received \$1,804,513, out of which thirty grants totalling \$1,656,400 were made.⁷⁷

74. Olav Stokke and Carl Widstrand, *op. cit.* p. 277.

75. UN Document, A/36/147, 6 October, 1981, p. 5.

76. The Fund was established in pursuance of para. 2 of G.A. Resolution 2054 (XX) of 15 December, 1965.

77. Olav Stokke and Carl Widstrand, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

The newest of these funds - the Fund for Namibia - has as its main project the Institute for Namibia in Lusaka established to train Namibians in preparation for independence. To supplement the efforts of the Institute whose modest intake was about 300 students in 1980, the Fund also finds placement for Namibians abroad, and by mid 1977, 94 students were receiving training in various fields in several countries at a cost of \$279,095.⁷⁸ As part of its educational programme, the Fund runs a farm school in Zambia, and a clinic and a school in Botswana for Namibians.

The irony in the contributions to these Funds is the fact that whereas payment by Western countries has increased over the years, the contributions by the non-aligned have been declining. More ironic is that the regular contributors among the non-aligned states happen to be the moderates (as shown in Table 1) whose commitment to the national liberation struggle has not always proved to be as strong as that of the radicals. The explanation for this ironical situation seem to lie in the different approach of the moderates and radicals to the question of material assistance. The moderates, as earlier observed, apparently find it more convenient to render multilateral financial, humanitarian support which is less controversial and less challenging than the 'hard' material aid in the form of arms. By multilateral support, they hope to maintain their moderate image in those international circles that oppose the armed struggle. On the other hand, the radicals, in their insistence on the armed revolutionary struggle, tend to accord priority to real military aid on bilateral basis.

78. Report of the UN Council for Namibia, Vol. I; General Assembly Official Records, 32nd Session, Supplement No. 24 (A/32/24) pp. 32-33.

[illegible]

[illegible]

	UN Trust Fund for South Africa				UN Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa				UN Fund for Namibia
	(a) 1966- 1974	(b) 1981	(c) 1982	(d) 1983	(e) 1968- 1972	(f) 1981	(g) 1982	(h) 1983	(i) 1972
(81) Sudan	1500								
(82) Surinam		1000				1000			
(83) SWAPO ⁺									
(84) Swaziland									
(85) Syria		1000	1000						
(86) Tanzania					6582				
(87) Trinidad and Tobago	1250	1250			625	1250			
(88) Togo									
(89) Tunisia	1200								
(90) Uganda					1400				
(91) United Arab Emirate									
(92) Upper Volta									
(93) Vietnam									
(94) Yugoslavia	8000	4000			15000	1000			
(95) Zaire	5000								
(96) Zambia	1960	24696							

+ These are liberation movements with membership status.

* Burma has since withdrawn her membership.

** Chile was not at Havana.

Sources: (a) George W. Shepherd, Anti-Apartheid : Transnational Conflict and Western Policy in the Liberation of South Africa, (Westport, Connecticut : Greenwood Press, 1977) pp. 129-130.

(b) UN Documents A/36/619 of 30 October 1981; General Assembly Thirty-sixth Session; Report of the Secretary-General.

(c) UN Document A/37/484 of 4 October 1982: General Assembly Thirty-seventh Session; Report of the Secretary-General.

- (d) UN Document A/38/455 of 13 October, 1983; General Assembly Thirty-eighth Session; Report of the Secretary-General.
- (e) Olav Stokke and Carl Widstrand, Southern Africa; The UN-OAU Conference Oslo 9-14 April, 1973, Vol. II (Uppsala : Scandinavian Institute of African Affairs, 1973), pp. 281-282.
- (f) UN Document A/36/147 of 6 October 1981; General Assembly Thirty-sixth Session; Report of the Secretary-General.
- (g) UN Document A/37/436 of 22 September, 1982; General Assembly Thirty-seventh Session; Report of the Secretary-General.
- (h) UN Document A/38/469 of 19 October, 1983; General Assembly Thirty-eighth Session; Report of the Secretary-General.
- (i) Stokke and Widstrand, *op. cit.*

Another category of active assistance within the UN system comes from specialised agencies. Like the other UN aid, their assistance is intended to be humanitarian, and is mostly for the provision of medical supplies, food, educational equipment and other social services. The FAO, UNESCO, UNDP, WHO and UNHCR are the leading activists, and they maintain regular consultation with the liberation movements to draw up schemes for assistance. Working separately or in co-ordination with each other, the aid of the agencies normally involves the support and participation of the host countries to the liberation movements for maximum success. Thus in 1972, the UNDP went into partnership with Tanzania, Guinea and Zambia in a regional educational project to assist refugees in Bagamoyo in Tanzania, Conakry and Nkumbi in Zambia. UNDP cost in the scheme amounted to \$353,600, while the three countries were to contribute \$2,116,000. And following consultation with the OAU, Tanzania and FRELIMO, the FAO drew up an agricultural scheme in 1973 within a UNDP-funded UNESCO project at a cost of \$351,000 as assistance to FRELIMO.

The project was located at Bagamoyo and Tunduru in Tanzania.⁷⁹

The activities of the UNHCR are more directly related to the refugee problem. The Commission's primary concern for a long time had been the Palestinian refugee situation. But with the beginning of the armed struggle in the Portuguese colonies, its attention was drawn to the African scene, and as the problem increased, so was the Commission's involvement. Thus by the end of 1971, the Commission had spent \$6,800,000 to care for 550,000 refugees who were victims of racist and colonial rule.⁸⁰

The most serious refugee situation the Commission faced in Africa was that of Angola. Out of an estimated refugee population of about half a million in 1972, over 400,000 were in Zaire, with Zambia and Botswana accounting for 12,000 and 4,300 respectively. Consequently the largest share of UNHCR aid went to Zaire which received \$300,000 in 1973 alone. Refugees from Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau also received similar assistance through their host countries, mainly Tanzania and Guinea-Conakry. In the case of South African and Namibian refugees, the assistance of the Commission is supplemented by grants from the Trust Fund for South Africa and the UN budget. Between July 1971 and June 1972, the Trust Fund allocated \$70,000 to the Commission to assist South African refugees in a number of African countries.⁸¹ And in 1971, a total of \$15,000 was received from the annual UN budget for assistance to Namibians.⁸²

79. Olav Stokke and Carl Widstrand, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

80. *Ibid.*, p. 290.

81. *Ibid.*, p. 293. The countries were Egypt, Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Lesotho, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia.

82. *Ibid.*

The Scandinavian Countries

In the general consideration of the response to non-aligned and UN appeals for liberation support, the Scandinavian countries qualify for special mention. As the biggest contributors to the various UN liberation funds, and the single largest source of aid to the liberation movements outside the non-aligned countries and the socialist bloc, these countries have demonstrated such support which could come only from the strength of shared perspective. The contribution of Sweden might seem expected in view of the country's close association with the non-aligned movement. Since 1973, Sweden has been invited to the summit conferences of the non-aligned as a guest, apparently in recognition of the country's neutralist policy depicted as 'non-alignment in peace, neutrality at war'.

The second reason for the liberation support of Sweden probably has to do with the country's political history in the nineteenth century. The political development of Sweden in the later part of the century manifested radical attitudes characteristic of all revolutionary movements, and very similar to what obtained in most of colonial Africa. The Social Democratic Party which symbolised these attitudes was not, as Olof Palme, the former Prime Minister admitted, alien to revolutionary violence in its struggle for social change. A resolution of the Party at its 1891 congress unambiguously proclaimed the alternative need for liberating violence to achieve political goals in these words:

The Social Democratic Labour Party, being a revolutionary party striving for a radical transformation of the existing bourgeois society, must take into consideration the possibility of using organised violence as the final means of liberating the suffering proletariat.⁸³

83. Quoted in a speech by Olof Palme at the United Nations Conference in Maputo, 20 May, 1977 and reprinted in Nordic Statements on Apartheid (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1977) p. 47.

This alternative strategy was however, not employed in the end because of a combination of circumstances which promoted peaceful change. Nevertheless its very premise could certainly be an influencing factor in Sweden's support for national liberation in Southern Africa.

What could not be easily explained is the commitment of Denmark and Norway whose formal membership of the Western alliance system has not proved to be much of a hindrance to supporting liberation. Perhaps their assistance springs from moral consideration which is translated into a determination to ensure freedom and equality to all people. When Henning Hjorth-Nielsen, Denmark's UN representative in 1976, referred to events in Southern Africa as causing a "profound shock and indignation among all those who firmly believe, as do the Danish people and Danish Government, in the protection of human rights in all parts of the world",⁸⁴ he no doubt was giving vent to the feelings of the whole of Scandinavia in their opposition to apartheid. The record of these countries in implementing the arms embargo against South Africa reflects the determination to give meaning to their belief in national freedom and human dignity.

Although the Scandinavian countries, like the United Nations stress the non-military nature of their assistance, this hardly conceals their acceptance of the armed struggle as inevitable in the absence of non-violent change. This puts them at odds with most other Western countries who would not support liberation violence under any circumstance. A veiled criticism of the Western attitude towards the national liberation struggle came from Olof Palme at the United Nations anti-apartheid conference held in Maputo on 20 May, 1977:

84. Statement in the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly on 29 October, 1976, and printed in Nordic Statements on Apartheid, *ibid*, p. 15.

The resistance of the racist regimes raises the question of whether changes can be brought about only by violence, by armed struggle, or whether there is still peaceful way of eradicating the affront to human dignity known as colonialism, racism and apartheid. We all obviously prefer peaceful solutions to violent ones. But those of us who are privileged and who had the good fortune of peaceful change should never moralize about it, never try to appear virtuous in relation to those who have been forced to take up arms to liberate themselves.⁸⁵

From this standpoint, and believing that the desire for freedom is the most important objective of the national liberation movements, Olof Palme took the strong line of support for the movements by urging that "we should support the African peoples' struggle for liberation on their terms".⁸⁶ We can therefore understand the close affinity between movements of national liberation and the Scandinavian countries.

The national liberation aid programme of Sweden started in 1964 in the form of educational assistance to refugees, and legal and humanitarian support to victims of apartheid. Four years later in 1968, the liberation movements themselves became the subjects of aid. Between 1969 and 1973, assistance to the movements rose from 6.8 million to 21 million Swedish crown; and in the 1972/73 fiscal year alone, more than 15 million crown were allocated as follows:⁸⁷

PAIGC	10 million crown
FRELIMO	2 million crown
MPLA	2 million crown
ZANU	70,000 crown
ZAPU	50,000 crown

85. Speech by Olof Palme, op. cit, p. 46.

86. Ibid, p. 49.

87. Olav Stokke and Carl Widstrand, op. cit, p. 318.

SWAPO	100,000 crown
ANC	\$30,000

In 1973/74, SIDA aid budget for the movements was 30 million crown.⁸⁸ Sweden has even gone further in her aid policy by designating liberated areas as recipients of continuous development programmes on the same level with independent developing countries. The significance of this is the full recognition of the liberation movements as the authentic representatives of the people; a policy which impairs the claim of the colonial regimes to sovereign territorial rights over the colonies. In 1983/84 Sweden's assistance to national liberation movements stood at 160 million crown.⁸⁹

The assistance of Norway is also on a similar scale, amounting to \$2,083,332 between 1972 and 1973 as contribution to the various UN Funds and direct aid to the liberation movements. In 1972, the PAIGC received \$151,515; FRELIMO's Mozambique Institute in Tanzania was given \$106,061, and the MPLA School for refugees in Zambia was allocated \$50,000, while in 1973, the overall aid to the liberation movements amounted to \$757,576.⁹⁰ In 1976, total Norwegian aid to the liberation struggle stood at about \$2,500,000⁹¹ while that of Denmark for the same period was \$2,000,000, rising to \$4.8 million in 1982.⁹²

Support of Non-Governmental Organisations

A far more significant measure of success in the non-aligned campaign

88. Ibid.

89. Fact Sheets on Sweden, (published by the Swedish Institute, November, 1983).

90. Olav Stokke and Carl Widstrand, op. cit, p. 313.

91. Nordic Statements on Apartheid, op. cit, p. 13.

92. Source: Danish Embassy (London) 11 May, 1984.

for liberation support is the assistance from non-governmental organisations. The fund raising activities of these bodies now form a regular feature of most non-aligned countries' overall support for national liberation movements. Student bodies, churches and trade union organisations have all been actively involved in several countries in contributing financial and material assistance to the liberation movements. Once again, the Scandinavian countries come in for special mention for the role of their national non-governmental organisations. Among these is the Norwegian Council for Southern Africa which in 1972 made cash donation of \$2,424 to SWAPO; \$152 to the PAIGC; \$200 to the MPLA; and \$371 to FRELIMO. A rather interesting contribution was that of the Association of Norwegian Secondary School Students. Through voluntary work campaigns, the association in the period 1971-72 raised a total of \$189,394 allocated to the liberation movements as follows:⁹³

PAIGC (School material, 1971)	\$45,455
(Printing Press, 1972)	\$75,758
MPLA (Medicines, 1971)	\$37,878
FRELIMO (School Construction, 1972)	\$26,515
(Mozambique Institute, 1972)	\$ 3,788

A well known organisation whose liberation support might be taken for granted because of its highly visible anti-imperialist politics was the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organisation. As early as the late 1950s, the organisation had established a Solidarity Fund, with an office in Conakry, to aid the African liberation movements.⁹⁴ There is also the International Defence and Aid Fund

93. Olav Stokke and Carl Widstrand, op. cit. p. 314.

94. George Shepherd, Non-Aligned Black Africa, (Massachusetts; D.C. Heath and Company, 1970) p. 96.

best known for its legal assistance to those prosecuted under the unjust laws of the colonial and racist regimes. Formally created in 1964 but with a history going back to 1956, the IDAF achieved world fame for its role in the Rivonia trial of 1963-64 involving Mandela and ten others.⁹⁵ Although Mandela and seven others⁹⁶ were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment, the support given them by the IDAF created a new awareness of the need to assist those who constantly face the perils of the apartheid laws. Besides legal representation, the IDAF also renders financial assistance to liberation movements for humanitarian purposes from its diversified sources of fund. By 1972, it had received over £1,750,000 made up of about £700,000 from national governments and £700,000 from private sources such as churches, trade unions and individuals.⁹⁷

By far the most prominent of the non-governmental transnational organisations is the World Council of Churches. After years of soul-searching as to what should be the attitude of the Church to the racial and colonial problem in Southern Africa, which had defied peaceful solution, the question was eventually resolved in favour of support for the armed struggle. As a result, the Council set up the Special Fund to Combat Racism in 1970 to render assistance to "organisations of oppressed racial groups or organisations supporting victims of racial injustice".⁹⁸ For the purpose of this support, the

95. Following a police raid on a farm at Rivonia, near Johannesburg, the eleven were charged of sabotage offences and accused of embarking on a campaign to overthrow the Government of South Africa by revolution.

96. The seven were Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba, Elia Motsoaledi, Andrew Mlangeni, Ahmed Kathrada and Denis Goldberg.

97. Olav Stokke and Carl Widstrand, *op. cit.* p. 333.

98. *Ibid*, p. 336.

Executive Committee of the Council laid down the following conditions, that:

- (1) The purpose of the organisations must not be inconsistent with the general purposes of the WCC, and that grants be used for humanitarian
- (2) The proceeds of the Fund be used to support organisations that combat racism, rather than welfare organisations that alleviate the effects of racism which would normally be eligible for support of other units of the WCC;
- (3) The focus of the grant should be on raising the level of awareness and on strengthening the organisational capability of racially oppressed people; in addition support should be given to organisations that align themselves with the victims of racial injustice;
- (4) The grants should be made without control of the manner in which they are spent; and
- (5) Grants should be made with due regard to where they can have the maximum effects; token grants should not be made unless there is a possibility of their eliciting a substantial response from other organisations.⁹⁹

There can be no doubt that by these conditions, the WCC intended its aid to go beyond mere humanitarian assistance, and this is more so with the making of direct financial grants to the liberation movements. It is important in this connection to note the distinction in support to organisations that combat

99. Ibid p. 337.

racism and those which engage in welfare activities to alleviate the effects of racism. Furthermore, the fourth condition which gives the organisations the right to decide on how the money is to be spent means that the aid could as well go into military use. And this of course cannot be said to be inconsistent with the general purposes of the Council on racial discrimination as spelt out at the Mindolo Consultation in 1964: "For many Christians involved in the struggle for a just solution, the question of possible violence as the remaining alternative has become an urgent and ever-pressing one".¹⁰⁰ It was in pursuit of this principled choice that the Council made a grant of about \$600,000 between 1970 and 1972 to liberation support,¹⁰¹ bringing the total aid to \$2,055,000 in 1980 with disbursement to the national liberation movements as follows:¹⁰²

UNITA - 1970, 1971, 1973, 1974	\$ 37,500
MPLA - 1970, 1971, 1973, 1974	78,000
FLNA (GRAE) - 1970, 1971, 1973, 1974	60,500
PAIGC - 1970, 1971, 1973, 1974	170,000
FRELIMO - 1970, 1971, 1973, 1974	120,000
SWAPO - 1970, 1971, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980	698,500
ANC (South Africa) - 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980	295,000
Lutuli Memorial Foundation of the ANC	32,500
PAC - 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978	162,500
ANC (Zimbabwe) - 1975, 1976	111,834
ZANU - 1970, 1971, 1974, 1976	58,333
ZAPU - 1970, 1971, 1974, 1976	58,333
Patriotic Front - 1977, 1979	120,000

100. 'Christians and Race Relations in Southern Africa', Consultation Report, World Council of Churches, pp.12-13.

101. Olav Stokke and Carl Widstrand, op. cit. p.337.

102. Baldwin Sjollema, 'Isolating Apartheid', Geneva, 1982, Appendix F, The Special Fund to Combat Racism 1970-1980, p.131 (World Council of Churches publication).

Summary and Conclusion

The intervention of outside help has been decisive in any guerrilla war. Since liberation struggles by nature rely to a large extent on external support, the provision of strategic and material assistance has become crucial in determining the outcome of such struggles. Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, Vietnam and Zimbabwe - all owe their victories in part to the rear base support provided by neighbouring states; and the cost of this support are expectedly high. There is always the danger that countries offering sanctuaries to guerrilla forces might be drawn into the conflict, since the practice of the target states of the liberation movements is to respond to such support by conducting reprisal attacks against them.

Where the target states possess an overwhelming military capability in relation to the contiguous countries, the task of maintaining an effective rear base support has often been rendered extremely difficult. In this connection is the strength of Israel and South Africa which has almost ensured the collapse of the strategic support for the movements fighting them. Israel's apparent success through the Camp David Accord in extricating Egypt from its frontline responsibility to the PLO; her intense military pressure on Lebanon which culminated in the invasion of that country in 1982; and her constant threat of reprisal against Jordan have significantly weakened the rear base of the PLO. A more serious danger to the success of the liberation struggle has been South Africa's destabilisation strategy against her neighbours. Through a combination of military and economic measures, South Africa has brought severe pressures on these countries to break their rear base support for SWAPO and the ANC. Starting with Swaziland in 1982, South Africa had by 1984 forced two other states - Mozambique and Angola - into signing non-aggression pacts, thus eliminating even if temporarily, these

countries' strategic support for the ANC and SWAPO.

Although the non-aligned movement was clearly concerned about danger of the South African strategy to liberation support, all it could do was to appeal for international assistance to these states to enable them to withstand the pressures. But mere appeal was not enough. With no practical assistance, the beleaguered frontline states were left to their own devices to survive the pressures. And the way out seemed to be coming to terms with South Africa, which meant abandoning the movements.

The material support, less risky but equally important, takes two forms; multilateral and bilateral. A great proportion of the former is for humanitarian needs, and it is provided mainly by the United Nations and its agencies, and other intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations. Particular mention is made of the Scandinavian countries in the provision of humanitarian aid. Sweden, Norway and Denmark, in addition to being the major contributors to the various United Nations trust funds, also render aid directly to the liberation movements. The numerous anti-apartheid movements and the liberation support groups provide the bulk of the non-governmental assistance, the most notable among them being the World Council of Churches.

The corporate performance of the non-aligned movement in the multi-lateral support might at best be described as a token gesture. The movements' lone fund - the Support and Solidarity Fund for the Liberation of Southern Africa - was only established in response to what it saw as a challenge to its professed anti-colonial support by the existence of similar United Nations and OAU funds.¹⁰³

103. Jankowitsch and Sauvart, Vol. IV, op. cit. p.2405.

The setting up of a fund for the African movements to the exclusion, for example, of the PLO indicates the division within the non-aligned movement as to the actual definition of the Palestinian problem. The apparent lack of consensus on Palestine had shifted the burden of support on to the Arab states.

Apart from the observation of 'discrimination' against other movements in the non-aligned's corporate assistance, there is yet another criticism of this support. From all indications, it appears that the enthusiasm in the Fund did not go beyond the initial pledged contributions in the first year of its creation. Since then not much seems to have happened. It is however in the area of bilateral support that the non-aligned states' contribution has had the greatest impact. Considered more important than multilateral aid, bilateral assistance, mostly in arms and military-related material, is more specifically geared towards meeting the needs of the liberation struggle; and it is usually, but not exclusively, provided by the radical states. Nevertheless, bilateral aid from certain sources is also known to carry certain limitations.

In the main, external support has greatly encouraged the national liberation movements, reassuring them of the international approval of the justness of their struggle. Whatever may be the limitations, there is no doubt that the material and strategic assistance by the non-aligned movements have produced salutary results in the liberation struggle.

PART II

SUPPORT FOR 'NATIONAL LIBERATION' IN RHODESIA

CHAPTER 6. DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT

No colonial situation in the non-aligned movement's decolonization history has offered a more gruelling diplomatic challenge than the Rhodesian crisis. The peculiar nature of the problem - a racist settler-colonial situation - set Rhodesia apart from most other colonial cases. The very history of the colonization of the territory from which developed the peculiar constitutional arrangements that were germane to the crisis,¹ made Rhodesia a special case in the non-aligned movement's anti-colonial experience. For the first time, the non-aligned movement was confronted with a situation of a colonial authority refusing to admit its obligation to its colony. Then came the unilateral declaration of independence, UDI, which added a new dimension to the already complex situation. To the non-aligned countries, Britain's protestations about Rhodesia being her charge was intended to shirk London's responsibility to the colony. While their main strategy was to exert pressure on Britain to shoulder her obligation and effect a genuine decolonization of the territory, the non-aligned also strove to isolate the the Ian Smith minority regime after the illegal declaration of independence in November 1965.

These two tactics of pressure and isolation practically determined the

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1. There is an impressive list of literature on the colonization and constitutional development of Rhodesia. These include Hugh Marshall Hole, The Making of Rhodesia, (London : Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1967); Philip Mason, The Birth of a Dilemma : Conquest and Settlement of Rhodesia, (London : Oxford University Press, 1958); Terrence O. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia : A Study in African Resistance, (London : Heinemann, 1967); Robert Blake, A History of Rhodesia, (London : Eyre Methuen, 1977); L.H. Gann, A History of Southern Rhodesia : Early days to 1934, (New York, Humanities Press, 1969); Claire Palley, The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia, (Oxford : The Clarendon Press, 1966); and Benedict V. Mtshali, Rhodesia : Background to Conflict, (New York : Hawthorn Books, 1967).

content of the non-aligned's diplomatic support for the colony's liberation movement. Intrinsic in the call on Britain to shoulder her responsibility was the need to involve the liberation movements in any process of constitutional decolonization. And the strategy of isolating the Smith regime was partly designed to present the liberation movement as the legitimate representative of the people. The corollary seemed to be that legitimization of the liberation movement meant illegitimization of the Smith regime.

The non-aligned states conducted their diplomatic campaign in all international forums with interest in anti-colonialism. The Commonwealth, with a natural interest in Rhodesia and in which the influence of countries like Nigeria, India, Tanzania and Zambia contributed greatly to an eventual settlement as we shall soon see, was one such forum. Yet by far the most important forum of the campaign, apart from the conferences of the non-aligned movement itself, was the United Nations Organization, whose open diplomacy makes much of the non-aligned diplomatic support a familiar reading. But first we look briefly at the support within the Conferences of the movement.

Rhodesia at Non-Aligned Conferences

Conference support for the Rhodesian struggle has already been touched upon in Chapter 3. The inescapable observation about the adoption of Rhodesia in the non-aligned anti-colonial agenda is the omission of the territory in the declaration of the 1961 Belgrade Conference. Although the colony's National Democratic Party (NDP) was among several nationalist parties and movements that turned up at the Conference, no mention was made of the colony in the summits' final document. The probable explanation for this might be that Rhodesia then was not considered a pressing case compared with the situation in Algeria and the Portuguese territories. Apparently, in 1961, there existed the

hope of a peaceful decolonization of the territory, given the record of Britain in this respect. Even the nationalists seemed to entertain such a hope as illustrated in their participation in the 1961 constitutional conference, and the initial acceptance of the subsequent constitution.² But both the non-aligned movement and the nationalists were mistaken in their hope for a constitutional decolonization as events were to prove later. Rhodesia in many respects differed from other colonial situations. The entrenchment of white minority rule through the acquisition of self-governing status in 1923 introduced serious complications into the decolonization process of the colony.

At the time of the Cairo non-aligned conference in 1964, events in the territory had soured any hope of peaceful decolonization. UDI was very clearly on the colony's political horizon against a background of increased repression of any African political opposition. Consequently, for the first time in a non-aligned conference, Rhodesia received a separate consideration in the Cairo Declaration. With a premonition of UDI, the declaration called on "all states not to recognise the independence of Southern Rhodesia if proclaimed under the rule of the racist minority", but "instead to give favourable consideration to according recognition to an African nationalist government in exile, should such a government be set up."³ Without doubt, the Algerian example must have influenced the suggestion for a government in exile. In the end the suggestion fell through.

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2. Joshua Nkomo, the leader of the NDP and later of ZAPU, initially accepted the 1961 constitution which was overwhelmingly rejected by the main body of African nationalists for its racist provisions. See Enoch Dumbutshena, 'Why the Nationalist Rejected the 1961 Constitution', in Frederick B. Rea, ed., Southern Rhodesia, the Price of Freedom, (Bulawayo : Midsho Press, 1964).
 3. Official Declaration of the Cairo Conference in Odette Jankowitsch and Karl Sauvart, The Third World Without Superpowers : Collected Documents of the Non -Aligned Countries, Vol. I (New York : Dobbs Ferry, Oceana Publications, 1978), p.47.

The Cairo Conference declaration is important in a number of ways.

It marked the beginning of the campaign to legitimize the colony's liberation movements and pitch them in direct confrontation with the settler regime for international recognition. It also marked the evolution of a definite pattern of support for the territory's liberation struggle. Henceforth Rhodesia became a regular item in all non-aligned major conference declarations. From the 1970 Lusaka summit to the Georgetown Ministerial Meeting of 1972, through Algiers and Colombo to the Havana Conference of 1979, support was given in the form of calls on Britain to act towards granting independence on the basis of universal adult suffrage, demands for diplomatic isolation of the Smith regime and economic boycott of the colony, and appeals for moral and political support for the liberation movement.

Diplomatic Support at the United Nations

The various non-aligned conference resolutions, while addressed to member-states, were more importantly appeals to the wider international community. By the very nature of these resolutions, all of which were reintroduced in one form or another at the UN, their effective implementation certainly required the co-operation of the whole world. A resolution calling for economic sanctions was obviously one directed more specifically at the colony's major trading partners in the West and less at the non-aligned states, most of whom had little or no trade links with Rhodesia. In 1966, for example, the direction of the territory's trade went mainly to the United States, Britain, Japan, Belgium, West Germany, Holland and France besides South Africa, the Portuguese colony of Mozambique and Zambia. Thus the failure or success of sanctions depended to a large degree on the actions of the West and South Africa. And since economic relations are not wholly independent of political life, total

diplomatic isolation of the minority regime would be almost impossible unless the colony's trading partners were persuaded to co-operate.

All this made the UN the major forum for the non-aligned movement's campaign for diplomatic assistance to the anti-colonial struggle of the colony. In their belief in the UN as the keeper of the world's moral conscience, the non-aligned nations hoped to cultivate and deploy the moral influence of the Organization on the side of the liberation movements so as to persuade Britain to yield to the demands on her. Consequently, our discussion of the diplomatic support is focussed mainly on the activities at the UN.

The introduction of Rhodesia into the UN decolonization process had a rather unusual origin. To begin with the colony was not even included in the 1946 UN list of non-self-governing territories.⁴ Then Southern Rhodesia was self-governing, a status attained in 1923 and which she continued to enjoy in a different form in the Central African Federation. This omission shielded the colony from the attention of the UN Trusteeship Council. It was not until 1961 with the prospects of independence for Northern Rhodesia and Nyassaland (now Zambia and Malawi respectively), and with the growing demand by the white Rhodesian population for independence, that UN attention moved on to the colony.

The first consideration of Rhodesia at the UN came with the observation by eleven non-aligned states⁵ on the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee that Britain had not been reporting on the territory as required under Article 73 of the UN

4. UN General Assembly Resolution 66(1) of 14 December, 1946, which listed the non-self-governing territories.

5. These were Burma, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Mali, Morocco, the United Arab Republic (Egypt), Yugoslavia and the Philippines.

Charter. Britain refused to transmit information on the colony on the excuse that Southern Rhodesia's self-governing status excluded the territory from the provision of the said article. Using this argument, Britain resisted for a long time all non-aligned pressures on her with regard to her colonial responsibilities to the territory. But the argument was untenable and tended to fly in the face of precedents. As Ghana's Foreign Minister was quick to point out, his country's self-governing status between 1954-7 did not preclude Britain from reporting on the colony.⁶ What is more, the argument could hardly stand up to the test of the UN's determinants for an independent status of any territory: these are (1) emergence as a sovereign independent state, (2) free association with an independent state, and (3) integration with an independent state.⁷ Surely the mere fact that Rhodesia's constitutional development remained the ultimate responsibility of an external authority - in this case Britain - defeated any claim to sovereignty. Not even Charles Marshall's reference to the territory's status as "self-governing rather than colonial" contradicts this fact.⁸

The British argument contained two basic implications which stood in the path of decolonization. Firstly, it all but ignored the political aspirations of the African population of the territory who through their representative movement - ZAPU - had already appealed to the UN to declare "Southern Rhodesia as a

6. United Nations Review, Vol. 9, March 1962, p.16.

7. UN General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV), Principle VI.

8. Charles Burton Marshall, Crisis Over Rhodesia : A Skeptical View (Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967) p.19. Marshall shows reluctance to define Southern Rhodesia as a colony, arguing that from 1923, Britain's relations with the territory were handled not through the Colonial Office but through the Dominions Office as applied to Canada, Australia and New Zealand at one stage in their constitutional development. The ties, he argued, were "quasidiplomatic in character rather than directive or executive - a distinction of basic significance".

dependent and non-self-governing territory".⁹ Secondly, accepting the argument would have meant the elimination of the colony from the scrutiny of the UN, hence from the purview of the 1960 decolonization declaration.

It was clear from the above that the immediate hurdle which faced the non-aligned movement over Rhodesia was the assertion of the colony as non-self-governing against the implicit British position of non-interference in the affairs of the territory. So, right from the outset, Britain and the non-aligned found themselves locked in a battle over the fundamental question of what constituted a colony. While the non-aligned countries were firm in the contention that a self-governing territory without the prerequisites of sovereignty as Rhodesia was, remained a colony, Britain sought cover under the 1946 definition of trust and non-self-governing territories. (It is worth noting that the term 'colony' was not employed in that definition). In this confrontation, the non-aligned scored their first victory in the defeat of a British proposal to exclude Southern Rhodesia from the General Assembly debate in 1962.

Following the recommendation of the Fourth Committee¹⁰ based on the draft resolution of the eleven-states,¹¹ the General Assembly in February 1962 asked the Special Committee on Colonialism to enquire into the status of Rhodesia,¹² for which the Committee set up a six member sub-committee headed by India.

9. ZAPU's leader, Joshua Nkomo's memorandum to the UN, February 1962 in Christopher Nyangoni and Gideon Nyandoro, Zimbabwe Independence Movements : Select Document, (London : Rex Collings, 1979) p.55.

10. UN Document A/4997/Add. 2.

11. UN Document A/C.4/L.729.

12. UN General Assembly Resolution 1745 (XVI).

Britain, however, would not co-operate with the Committee. The first visit of the sub-committee to London in April, 1962 was scarcely welcome. Two other visits in 1963 and 1964 fared no better. All the same, the sub-committee, basing its report on petitions, especially from the nationalists, held Rhodesia to be a dependent territory. Among other things, the report stressed the "explosive nature" of the situation in the colony to underline its overall recommendation for the making of fresh efforts by Britain towards formulating a new constitutional plan that would guide the territory to majority rule.¹³ Armed with this report, the Special Committee in a draft resolution by Ethiopia, Mali and Tunisia recommended to the General Assembly to place Rhodesia as a colony.¹⁴

When the General Assembly resumed its sixteenth session to discuss the Special Committee's recommendation, it did so in a climate of mutual antagonism between Britain and the non-aligned states. Once again Britain objected to the inclusion of the colony on the Assembly's agenda,¹⁵ but once again she was defeated. This left the Assembly to proceed to consider a thirty-eight Afro-Asian nations draft resolution which sought to declare Rhodesia a non-self-governing territory, and to request Britain to convene immediately an all-party conference to draw-up a new constitution for the colony in conformity with majority rule. The resolution was passed in a vote of 73 in favour, one against, and 27 abstentions.¹⁶ Britain predictably rejected it, describing it as "ultra vires, unacceptable, and impracticable". As further pressure on her, the General Assembly alone in 1963 passed no less than three resolutions, urging Britain to

13. UN Document A/5124, Annex 1, 21 May, 1962.

14. Ibid Annex III.

15. United Nations Year Book, (YUN), 1962, p.420-1.

16. UN Document A/L.386/Rev. 1 and Add. 1-4, June 1962; and passed as G.A. Resolution 1747 (xvi), 28 June, 1962.

discharge her colonial obligation to the territory.¹⁷

The ultimate in Britain's resistance to these pressures came in September 1963, and it demonstrated the set of barriers confronting the non-aligned states in their pursuit of the issue of Rhodesia in the Security Council. At the Council's first consideration of Rhodesia, following a request by Ghana, Guinea, Egypt and Morocco,¹⁸ the Ghanaian delegation showed particular concern over the likely handing over command of the Southern Rhodesia's armed forces to the settler government in the event of the break-up of the Central African Federation. It was feared that control of the armed forces, and especially the air force, described as the most powerful in Africa, would equip the Rhodesian Authorities with the means to suppress permanently any nationalist agitation for decolonization. As a result, Ghana called on the Security Council to intervene in the situation.¹⁹

But Britain thought otherwise. Not only did she judge the situation in the colony to be under control, but she particularly objected to any idea of UN intervention in Rhodesia. Sir Patrick Dean, the British representative, put the point in no uncertain terms:

I have demonstrated to this Council that the situation in Southern Rhodesia does not fall within this Council's responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and that, however the situation may be described, it has in no sense deteriorated over the past six months. I have pointed out that the contrary obtains and that Southern Rhodesia is enjoying progress and tranquility.

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- 17. These included Resolutions 1883 (XVIII) of 14 October, 1963; and 1889 (XVIII) of 6 November, 1963.
 - 18. UN Document S/5382, 2 August, 1963.
 - 19. See Kwame Nkrumah, Rhodesia File, (London : Panaf Books Ltd. 1976), pp. 37-55 for the speech of the Ghanaian delegate at the Security Council meeting.

The Ghanaian contention that it is necessary to invoke the authority of the Security Council is therefore wrong in fact and in terms of the Charter.²⁰

Based on this argument, Britain vetoed the resolution that would "invite the United Kingdom Government not to transfer to its colony of Southern Rhodesia as at present governed any powers or attributes of sovereignty".²¹

This use of the veto reinforced the view of the non-aligned of the unsuitability of the UN in its present power structure for solving acute world problems involving great power interest. As they were wont to argue, the British action justified their demand for changes in the Organization's structure to give less recognition to power politics. The frustration with the veto underlie the Algiers non-aligned conference plea that "The Security Council, the organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, should not be prevented from exercising all the responsibilities conferred on it by the Charter."²²

If the veto was intended to emphasise that Britain still remained master of her affairs, and to prove to the non-aligned countries the limit to which they could go in their demands on her, its main effect was to force them to rely more and more on the Special Committee and the General Assembly where their numerical superiority assured them of a fairer say and hearing. So in 1964 the non-aligned states turned to the Committee to condemn Britain for her refusal to implement the General Assembly resolutions on Rhodesia.²³

20. Security Council Official Records, 1066th Meeting, September 1963, para. 61.

21. UN Document, S/5425, 11 September, 1963.

22. Algiers Conference Declaration, in Jankowitsch and Sauvart, op.cit, p.203.

23. UN Document, A/AC.109/61, 23 March, 1964.

Towards a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI)

In the meantime, the situation in the territory moved inexorably towards a seizure of independence. The defeat of the reform-minded Prime Minister, Sir Edgar Whitehead, in the 1962 election meant a setback in attempts at constitutional reforms. While Sir Edgar could not be described as a great champion of the nationalist cause, his proposed reforms showed a good measure of sympathy for the African majority and could pass as a sincere attempt, however limited, to improve their lot. His address to the Trusteeship Committee on 30 October 1963 recognized the economic, social and political aspirations of the African population, and indicated a willingness on the part of his government to try to satisfy some of these aspirations.²⁴ He spoke of the need to make more land available to the Africans. On the political front, while Sir Edgar would not concede to immediate majority rule, (he set fifteen years for that) he was bold enough to acknowledge that there was no future for continued white supremacy in the territory. He therefore thought it necessary to start preparing the Africans for their inevitable future responsibilities in government.

Edgar Whitehead's successor, Winston Field, was soon replaced in April 1964 by Ian Smith who pursued a hard-line policy on independence. The new government's forceful demand for independence, together with a heightened display of racial arrogance (Smith was widely reported to have ruled out African majority rule in his life-time in order to preserve what he called European civilization) left little doubts that whether or not Britain liked it, Rhodesia would claim independence for herself under the 1961 constitution. The Prime Minister's

24. UN General Assembly, Official Records, 17th Session, Fourth Committee, 1366th Meeting.

speech in 1965 gave more than a hint that a unilateral declaration of independence could not be ruled out. With stunning frankness, he disclosed that:

The Government of Rhodesia had weighed all the consequences of a Unilateral Declaration of Independence very carefully, and although they wish to avoid a unilateral declaration, if they possibly can, they have been forced to conclude that its results, whatever they may be, must be accepted if the question is - as it will be - literally one of life and death for Rhodesia..... Independence is therefore a precondition for survival of Rhodesia as a worthwhile country; and judged by this criterion, a Unilateral Declaration of Independence, whatever its consequences, may be preferable in the last resort to the gradual extinction of civilized life in this country....²⁵

Ian Smith could count on the support of the majority of white Rhodesians who shared his racial views and were equally committed to immediate independence. As justification for continued white rule, they always cited what they saw as the chaos of independence in other African countries, especially Zaire, for which Brigadier A. Skeen said:

We in Rhodesia had realized from what we had seen happening to the north of us, and were determined to control the rate of African political advancement to power till time and education had made it a safe possibility. Moreover we wish to have the power to retard it, should that advancement outstrip the capability of the African to govern wisely and fairly.²⁶

There is a conspicuous inconsistency in Skeen's prescription for African rule.

On the one hand Brigadier Skeen accepted African political advancement as a necessary condition for majority rule. On the other hand, he was prepared to

25. Quoted in A.J.A. Peck, Rhodesia Condemns (Salisbury : Three Sisters Books, 1967), p.25.

26. Brigadier A. Skeen, Prelude to Independence : Skeen's 115 days, (Johannesbourg : Nasionale Boekhandel, 1966) p.51.

limit that advancement. On the whole his argument against African rule manifests a racist philosophy which fostered the fear of the white minority losing their privileges under a majority government. An interplay of racial arrogance and paranoia had set the stage for what was to come - UDI.

An indication of the wide support Ian Smith enjoyed among his white constituency was provided by the result of the referendum on independence which gave him an 89% majority, and the overwhelming victory of his Rhodesia Front Party in the 1965 election. Seeing himself in such a strong position, Ian Smith felt confident enough to take on Britain on her conditions for independence popularly referred to as 'No Independence Before Majority African Rule (NIBMAR)'. These stated as follows:²⁷ (i) The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule would have to be maintained and guaranteed. (ii) There would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the constitution. (iii) There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population. (iv) There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination; and (v) The British Government would have to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

Ian Smith would have none of these principles and literally dismissed them with five of his own:²⁸ (i) Rhodesia is unable to accept the principle of

27. Southern Rhodesia : Documents to the negotiations between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian Governments, November 1963 - November 1965 (Cmnd 2807) (London : Her Majesty's Stationary Office, November, 1965). The Labour Government of Harold Wilson later added a sixth : no oppression of the majority by the minority and vice-versa.

28. Ibid.

unimpeded progress towards majority rule enshrined in the 1961 constitution.

- (ii) Rhodesia rejects the idea of any constitutional safeguard that would prevent Europeans in Rhodesia from changing the constitution to prevent the "premature" emergence of an African government.
- (iii) Rhodesia sees the extension of adult suffrage on the 'B' Roll as the only measure of African advancement.
- (iv) Rhodesia intends to take no specific steps towards racial discrimination or amending the Land Apportionment Act; and (v) Rhodesia will tolerate no procedure of consulting African opinion in Rhodesia which might lead to the rejection of the negotiated agreements between the two governments.

The non-aligned states seized upon the growing racial invective of Smith, and his disagreement with the British Government to stress the deteriorating situation in the colony and the threat it posed to international peace. Indeed in the geopolitical configuration of Southern Africa, a conflict in Rhodesia could hardly be confined to the territory's borders since the interests of the parties to such a conflict were bound up in a variety of ways with those of the neighbouring states. While the black African countries would be drawn naturally to the side of the nationalists, South Africa and Portugal for reason of colour, but also for very obvious economic and military considerations might be tempted to assist the minority regime. Not only was Rhodesia vital to these two countries in terms of sub-regional economic co-operation, she was a great strategic asset to them in their counter-revolutionary campaigns against liberation forces.

South Africa in particular saw any threat to the status quo in Rhodesia or any other neighbouring state as a threat to her security, and had accordingly adopted a military strategy of striking deep into these states. The strategy remains in force even today and was made perfectly clear by a South African

military commander. As he put it: "About the will of the government to use the forces at its disposal, there should be no doubt. The government has made it clear that it will not accept chaos in the neighbouring states".²⁹

On the part of the liberation movements, one now discerned a growing desperation to enlist international action in dealing with the situation. Each day that passed increased their frustration for the lack of any progress towards a solution. In fact the enactment of severe anti-sabotage laws carrying the death sentence, the banning of nationalist political activities, and the widespread imprisonment and detention of members of the nationalist movement, left them with no hope for an internal solution of the problem. Two petitioners - Garfield Todd, former Prime Minister of the territory but now drawn to the side of the nationalists, and George Nyandoro, the Secretary General of ZAPU - who appeared before the April 1964 session of the Special Committee were particularly stern in their demand on the Security Council to ensure the full implementation of all UN resolutions on the colony.³⁰ Henceforth, with the ominous prospect of UDI, the question of Southern Rhodesia took on a new importance.

The flurry of diplomatic activities inside and outside the UN at this time were obvious signs of the unease within the non-aligned movement about the likelihood of UDI. The 1964 Cairo Summit Conference, in calling on states not to recognize such independence, showed a premonition of what was to come. The Accra Heads of State meeting of the OAU in October, 1965 also anticipated UDI for which the conference drew up a contingency plan. If Britain failed to take the

29. Brigadier D.J. Mortimer, 'Conventional Deterrence with Specific Reference to the Republic of South Africa', ISSUP Strategic Review, University of Pretoria, May 1980, p.5.

30. YUN, 1964, p.443.

necessary action to restore legality in the event of UDI, member-states would be required to adopt the following measures:³¹ (i) to consider all political, economic, diplomatic and financial relations with Britain; (ii) to use all possible means, including the use of force to oppose UDI; and (iii) to give immediate and every necessary assistance to the people of the territory with a view to establishing majority rule. The liberation movements also had the same suspicion about UDI. ZANU, for example, had enough cause to warn the June 1965 Commonwealth Conference in London of a likely seizure of independence by the Smith regime. It therefore urged African Commonwealth states to bring pressure on Britain to intervene militarily in Rhodesia to ensure majority rule.³²

Even the British Government did not discount the possibility of UDI. To deter Smith from taking the illegal course, Harold Wilson, in October 1965, repeated an earlier British Government warning that UDI would have no constitutional effect. The only way in which Rhodesia could become a sovereign independent state was by an act of the British Parliament. A declaration of independence would be an open act of defiance and rebellion, and it would be treasonable to take step to give effect to it.³³ That was a tough line which no colony could treat with levity. Acts of rebellion and treason are normally met with stern measures as had been the practice in all colonial situations. The question here was whether Prime Minister Wilson meant what his warning implied - the use of force in the event of UDI.

31. AHG/Res. 25. Rev. II

32. ZANU: Supplementary Memorandum submitted to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, London, 17 June, 1965 in Christopher Nyangoni and Gideon Nyandoro, *op. cit.* p.107.

33. House of Commons Debate, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 718, Col. 629.

The Announcement of UDI and the reaction to it

Amidst these growing indications that UDI was no longer a possibility but a certainty, the non-aligned states made two further attempts to prevent it. On 12 October 1965 the General Assembly at their instance passed resolution 2012 (xx) condemning any move towards UDI, followed by another resolution on 5 November which called on Britain to prevent such an act.³⁴ But all these efforts were of no avail as Ian Smith remained defiant in his drive for independence. In what was virtually an ultimatum to Prime Minister Wilson, as late as October 1965, he told the British Government to accept an independence for Rhodesia on the basis of the 1961 constitution. This apparent ultimatum, Arthur Bottomley, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, remarked "looked like the prelude to a Unilateral declaration of Independence".³⁵ Yet nothing in the policy of Britain in terms of concrete measures could as yet demonstrate a resolve or preparedness to take control of the situation in the colony, not even in the event of UDI. This irresolute British approach to developments in Rhodesia, which might be said to have encouraged Ian Smith to be defiant, was revealed in the assurance of Wilson that Britain would not use force to prevent an illegal seizure of independence.³⁶ Less than two weeks after the assurance, Ian Smith declared the independence of Rhodesia on 11 November, 1965, thus putting non-aligned policy on Rhodesia to the test.

Reaction to UDI was swift. In the wider non-aligned world, the response was marked by an intense passion for action. In New Delhi, India's Foreign Minister, Sardar Singh's statement to Parliament which formed the basis of a

34. UN General Assembly Resolution 2022 (XX), 5 November, 1965.

35. House of Commons Debate, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 720, Col. 527, 12 November, 1965.

36. House of Commons Debate, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 718, Cols. 633-4.

letter to the president of the Security Council,³⁷ recalled General Assembly resolution 2012 (xx), and stressed Britain's responsibility to the colony. India, Singh disclosed, had in May 1965 withdrawn her diplomatic mission in Salisbury. Now she moved further to sever all economic relations with Rhodesia and promised to recognize any Rhodesian nationalist provisional government-in-exile in fulfilment of the 1964 Cairo Conference suggestions. Yugoslavia pledged "full support to the just struggle of the people of Zimbabwe for national liberation".³⁸ Cuba on her part adopted the most militant stand, declaring a "readiness to furnish the subjugated, exploited and wronged people of Southern Rhodesia with the necessary assistance in whatever form, to enable it to carry on its struggle against imperialism and its agents".³⁹

On the African continent, the reaction was mainly one of indignation and outrage characterised by calls for war on Rhodesia. Radicals and moderates alike united in a display of solidarity with the African population of the territory. The depth of feeling the event evoked could be measured in Ivory Coast's representative, Arsene Usher's address to the Security Council on 13th November 1965 in which he asked if Africans have not the right to free their brothers taken as hostages by white rebels.⁴⁰ Nigeria's Nuhu Bamali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, presented UDI as a challenge to the whole world. "Rhodesia", he said, "had acted; it now remains for the world to react".⁴¹ And President

37. UN Document S/6959, 19 November, 1965.

38. UN Document S/6942, 17 November, 1965.

39. UN Document S/6961, 20 November, 1965; also issued as Doc. A/6112.

40. Cited in Robert C. Good, U.D.I. : The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion, (London : Faber & Faber, 1973), pp. 74-75.

41. The Times (London), 12 November, 1965.

Sekou Toure's message of 12th November 1965 depicted the widespread anger and the demand for common action:

The new situation created in Rhodesia must not be a matter of indifference to any African state that is conscious both of its historic responsibilities in the permanent and vigorous defence of the cause of the freedom and sovereignty of our people.... It is imperative that all the forces within the continent be combined in order to take up without delay, the challenge hurled at Africa.... Our states which consider themselves in a state of war against the illegal act committed in Rhodesia must denounce those who are responsible.... We must consider all practical measures that will make collective military intervention in Rhodesia possible.⁴²

That possibility was what Ghana's President, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, strove to put into effect. In the immediate aftermath of the event, the Ghanaian leader contacted the leaders of Congo (B), Sudan, Zaire, Guinea, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia on the need for military confrontation in the belief that only positive African action could solve the Rhodesian problem. A letter to them outlining his plan said:

I am convinced that we must do something now to demonstrate that we are planning realistically to deal with the situation created by the racist rebellion in Southern Rhodesia. I suggest in order to make our efforts more effective and realistic, that a Treaty of Mutual Defence and Security be signed between as many African states as possible.⁴³

Three months after, Nkrumah was deposed in a military coup which effectively stilled the militant voice of Ghana on the Rhodesian situation.

The British response to UDI was equally swift. Afraid of hostile external intervention in Rhodesia, Britain took the

42. UN Document S/6923, 12 November, 1965.

43. Kwame Nkrumah, Rhodesia File op. cit. p.97. .

dramatic step of bringing the issue before the Security Council, a move that was contrary to her earlier denial of the right of the UN to intervene in the colony's affairs. In his letter to the President of the Security Council requesting a meeting to discuss the crisis, the British representative said: "It is the wish of the United Kingdom Government to inform the Security Council of the situation which has been created by this illegal action by the Salisbury authorities, and of the steps which the United Kingdom Government is taking to meet this situation."⁴⁴

The motive of Britain for this rather surprising move remains unclear. On the face of it, the letter requesting the Security Council meeting signified a change in her earlier position, but in substance it gave away very little of her intentions. If, as stated, the purpose was merely to inform the Council of the steps which the Government was taking to meet the challenge of UDI, does it imply an intent to prevent the Security Council from taking any appropriate action of its own. Or was the move just a ploy to shift responsibility on to the UN in order for Britain to escape the pressures on her? There may not be straight forward answers to these questions although Mr. Michael Stewart, the Foreign Secretary, appearing before the Council gave two reasons for the move:

- (1) Britain considered the new development to be a matter of world concern;
- (2) Britain would like to enlist international support for the action she had already taken to deal with the situation if such measures were to be effective.⁴⁵

The Security Council met within twenty-four hours of the British request. Several non-aligned countries participated in the Council's debate. Britain was

44. UN Document S/6896, 11 November, 1965.

45. UN Security Council Official Records, 1256th meeting, 11 November, 1965, p.5.

no doubt embarrassed by the chorus of non-aligned states' condemnation of her for what had happened in Rhodesia.⁴⁶ It would be observed, however, that not all the countries were impetuous in their condemnation. Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Malaysia and Senegal spoke in measured language, and looked eagerly to Britain to reverse UDI.⁴⁷ Jordan saw a wider implication of UDI in the Southern African regional context, and proposed that the Council should invite Portugal and South Africa to the meeting. This was agreed but the two countries declined the invitation on grounds that UDI was an internal affair of Rhodesia.⁴⁸

On the other hand, Ghana, Guinea and Algeria were strident in their attack on Britain. As far as they were concerned, relying on Britain for a solution to the problem was simply wishful thinking. Individual and collective non-aligned action seemed to be the most practical approach to UDI. On this account the Algerian representative, Mr. Bouathoura, firmly stated that "Algeria is henceforth determined to assume all its responsibilities. Faithful to the principle for which it has fought for so long, it will provide the Zimbabwe people with all the necessary assistance in the crucial ordeal through which they are passing."⁴⁹

46. Britain's discomfort of the Security Council's pressure which she apparently would like to dismiss as ineffective, is indicated in Prime Minister Wilson's advice to the Council in 1968 over Rhodesia: "Perhaps the Security Council will be well advised to proceed on the basis of what is practicable and what is effective perhaps a little less forcible talk, and a little more practical action on the part of all concerned might get the right answer". Source: House of Commons Debate, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 720, Col. 1621.

47. UN Security Council Official Records, op. cit.

48. South Africa declined the invitation in a letter, S/6935 of 15 November, 1965. Although she recognized the wider ramifications of UDI, she considered the issue as "one of exclusively domestic concern in which the United Nations was not competent to intervene".

49. UN Security Council Official Records, op. cit., p.14.

Ghana on her part saw an opportunity in the debate to try to humiliate Britain. Feeling his suggestion to the Security Council in September 1963, to have been vindicated by events, the Ghanaian delegate recalled Britain's objection to it. As determined by Ghana, the new move by Britain illustrated a certain measure of incongruity in British policy, for which Mr. Quaison Sackey remarked quite mockingly that "today the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom has come here to invoke the Security Council when the horses have bolted from the stable".⁵⁰

Two resolutions emerged eventually from the Security Council's debate. The first, proposed by Jordan and coming a day after the General Assembly's condemnation of UDI,⁵¹ urged states "not to recognize this illegal racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia, and to refrain from rendering any assistance to this illegal regime".⁵² The second resolution improved on the first by being more elaborate. The resolution's demand that states should desist from providing the illegal regime "with arms, equipment and military material, and to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products"⁵³ marked the beginning of sanctions against the colony.

Despite the non-aligned states' united stand against Britain at the UN, the gap between rhetoric and practice in their diplomatic campaign

50. Ibid p.10.

51. UN General Assembly Resolution 2024(XX) of 11 November 1965. The resolution invited Britain "to implement immediately the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and Security Council in order to put an end to the rebellion by the unlawful authorities in Southern Rhodesia."

52. Security Council Resolution 216 (1965), 12 November, 1965.

53. Security Council Resolution 217 (1965), 20 November, 1965.

remained. While the non-aligned movement persistently called on Britain to act on Rhodesia, some member-states displayed a bewildering inertia when it came to taking measures to force Britain to comply with the pressures on her. This inconsistency was more conspicuous at the regional level of the OAU, and it demonstrates the influence on state behaviour of some of the determinants of liberation support discussed in Chapter 2. Revolutionary experience, national interest defined in the context of regional realities, and leadership characteristics - all combined to determine the response of states to UDI and relations with Britain.

One country, Malawi, in particular, had right from the outset of the crisis taken a stand in opposition to the general non-aligned policy.⁵⁴ Its leader, Dr. Kamuzu Banda was known to sneer at calls for war against Smith by extolling the military superiority of Rhodesia against all of Africa. His reaction to UDI, five days after the announcement was a warning to Africa against any military adventure because the Rhodesian army, he said, could conquer Central and East Africa within a week.⁵⁵ True, Rhodesia's military strength backed by South Africa's made any military option by Africa too risky to contemplate. Thus Banda in his warning might be seen as a pragmatist, and not just an idealist. But was his position actually a case of pragmatism?

For sure the Malawian leader did not just oppose military action for the risks involved; the opposition on the other hand sprang from his apathetic, even

54. See Carolyn McMaster, Malawi : Foreign Policy and Development (London : Julian Friedmann Publishers Ltd., 1974) pp.113-119 for Malawi's policy towards Rhodesia.

55. The Times (London) 12 November, 1965, p.8.

hostile attitude towards the liberation struggle. For reasons of internal political pressures, economic need, geography, and personality, Banda instead of looking north to his African brothers faced South and allied Malawi with the colonial and racist regimes of Southern Africa. Hemmed in in most parts by the Portuguese colony of Mozambique, the country became a willing partner of Portugal against FRELIMO, the Mozambican liberation movement, and acted as the apologist of Lisbon's colonial policy. Banda no doubt greatly shocked his fellow Africans when he remarked that "The Portuguese in Mozambique have changed their policy towards their own Africans. You do not hear any more harsh treatment... Even their methods of administration are becoming more liberal.... We Africans, north of Zambia, have no right to speak for all the Africans now under colonial rule. What do we know what the Africans of Mozambique themselves want?"⁵⁶ Towards South Africa, Banda adopted a policy of active co-operation and won for Malawi the dubious distinction of being the first and only independent African state to establish diplomatic relations and perhaps military collaboration with South Africa. The economic pay off of the policy, apart from trading benefits, is illustrated in the R8,000,000 loan from Pretoria to help build the country's new capital of Lilongwe.⁵⁷

However, although President Banda showed disdain for liberation, events were later to prove that his derisory comment on Africa's impotence to take on the Smith regime was not altogether baseless. For when it came to translating words into action, African states exhibited a lack of resolve that could hardly be

56. Quoted in Martin Plaut, et. al. The Struggle for Southern Africa. A publication of War and Want and Liberation, London, 1981, p.38.

57. Ibid, p.37.

covered by rhetoric. Even the less risky action of severing diplomatic relations with Britain, sanctioned by the December 1965 emergency meeting of the OAU Ministerial Conference⁵⁸ as a follow-up to the October 1965 Accra summit decision in response to UDI, failed to achieve enough compliance. Kenya said diplomatic action against Britain would not be effective, Zambia expressed similar doubts and feared the consequences to her of such action, Ethiopia, no more enthusiastic to sever relations with Britain, found a pretext in the apparent split within the OAU on the issue to propose an emergency summit to consider the matter once again and work out a more acceptable common strategy.⁵⁹ In the end, out of thirty-nine member-states, only nine - Tanzania, Ghana, Mauritania, Mali, Congo (B), Guinea, Egypt, Algeria and Sudan - complied.

This abysmal failure to effect the OAU recommended decision was hardly surprising. The economic dependence of most African countries on their former colonial masters do affect their political judgement and inhibit them from taking actions not particularly favoured by the aid givers. Just to cite but three examples of such dependence: in 1964 Malawi's expected budgetary deficit of £4.26 million was covered by Britain through a grant-in-aid,⁶⁰ and of the total aid of Shs 837 million offered to Uganda in 1969, Shs 225 million came from Britain.⁶¹ On her part, Zambia agreed to go along with Britain's policy on Rhodesia, and had agreed to implement sanctions, encouraged by British offer of aid as compensation for any hardship. Between November 1965 and September

58. ECM/Res. (IU).

59. Commonwealth Survey, Vol. 12, No. 1, 7 January 1966, p.29.

60. Carolyn McMaster, op. cit. p.44.

61. Y. Tandon, 'An analysis of the foreign policy of African states: a case study of Uganda' in K. Ingham, ed., Foreign Relations of African States, (London : Butterworths, 1974), p.198.

1966, Britain had given Zambia £9,000,000 in aid with a further promise of £14,000,000.⁶² In this particular instance, one would have thought that the Francophone states which had minimal ties with Britain were better placed to implement the OAU decision. But they too could not, perhaps for reasons of neo-colonial inertia. Considering all this, it was a mark of courage on the part of Tanzania to forgoe a £7.5 million British loan.⁶³

What was quite surprising, however, was the action of Nigeria to convene the January, 1966 Lagos Special Commonwealth Conference on Rhodesia in spite of the well known OAU position. On 9th December, 1965, barely a week to the OAU deadline for action against Britain, the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafewa Balewa announced that severance of diplomatic relations with Britain would not only go against Nigeria's interest but would also not solve the Rhodesian problem.⁶⁴ On this note he left for London to arrange for the Lagos Commonwealth Conference. This deviation, it might be contended, plainly established the direction of Nigeria's foreign policy under the first post-independence government of Prime Minister Abubakar Tafewa Balewa. Though Africa was proclaimed as the centrepiece of the policy, in practice the country's economic interests dictated otherwise in her reconciliation of foreign policy to national economic objectives. The impact of that policy was the neo-colonial option it forced on the country to make her move closer to the former colonial power who, with its creation - the Commonwealth - remained the dominant

62. A.J.A. Peck, *op. cit.*, p.128.

63. See Nathan Shamuyarira, National Liberation Through Self-Reliance in Rhodesia: 1956-1972. (PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, 1976)p.438.

64. Commonwealth Survey. Vol. 12, No. 1, 7 January, 1966, p.29.

trading partner long after independence. It was therefore normal for Nigeria to invest more in Commonwealth diplomacy than in the OAU in the search for a solution to the Rhodesian crisis. In doing so, she further exposed the OAU to internal dissention as it concerned a common continental approach to the crisis. Apart from playing into the hands of the British Government which used the Conference to hold back African states in effecting the OAU decision, thereby undermining the OAU strategy, the Nigerian move also gave Britain the pretext to insist on a non-violent solution. If only Nigeria had acted with a little discretion, who knows, the December 1965 OAU decision would have made a more significant impact.

With such obvious disarray within the OAU, Britain must have felt relieved of the anxiety of being pushed into a corner to act against her considered interest. Michael Stewart, the Foreign Secretary, could thus politely deride and play down the impact of the diplomatic action against Britain when he said:

I think that it will now be realized that if this action of breaking off relations were to have any effect at all, it could only be the effect of giving aid and comfort to the rebellion in Rhodesia.⁶⁵

It was to stress the point of Britain's independent action over the situation in Rhodesia that the Foreign Secretary added that British measures to deal with the crisis could not be taken as a result of pressure of this kind. But although the OAU action might not have had its intended effect, it was no doubt a blow to British prestige in Africa. And if the impact of the action was not felt, it was because Britain circumvented it by establishing special interest sections, still using British diplomats, in friendly embassies in some of these countries.⁶⁶

65. Ibid.

66. See Eileen Denza, Diplomatic Law, (New York : Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, 1976), p.280.

In the main, the inability of the OAU to act decisively could be attributed to the fact that the majority of states, weak and gullible, reposed so much trust in Britain's ability and supposed willingness to deal with the crisis. Here again, Banda's position is worth noting. According to him, "the only way we can follow Britain's course, the only way we can follow Britain's action, is to support her morally. Because, let us be frank and honest with ourselves, we have no physical, economic, or other means to do anything else ... I would like to be honest with myself, with you my people, and with the world outside".⁶⁷ But it soon transpired how misplaced such trust was as demonstrated in the reluctance of Britain for over a decade to end the rebellion. One is therefore tempted to remark that resting action as African states have done on the good faith of a reluctant power in solving the Rhodesian crisis suggests a half-hearted stand of the OAU in its approach to the situation; It proves Nkrumah right in his contention that Rhodesia was primarily an African problem.

The Sanctions Weapon

The years following UDI were particularly crucial to the future of the territory. The non-aligned countries rejected the act. In their desperation to reverse it but lacking the effective means, they had come to rely more and more on a UN-sponsored solution aimed primarily at persuading Britain to accept her responsibility for the colony. For the national liberation movements, UDI amounted to a confirmation of their belief that force was the only language the minority regime understood. In the wider context of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, the rebellion meant a further entrenchment of white interest represented in Portuguese colonialism and South Africa's racist

67. Carolyn McMaster op. cit., p.113.

rule, thereby making the task of liberation more difficult. All this demanded a muscular approach to the Rhodesian crisis, and the non-aligned strategy at the UN was to combine economic sanction with diplomatic isolation of the illegal regime in Salisbury to force it to accept a genuine decolonization.

The idea of taking economic measures against the Smith regime was first mooted well before UDI by the Special Committee. In its request to the UN Secretary-General the Committee called for a study of the implications of the activities of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia and their mode of operation in order to assess their economic and political influence.⁶⁸ The British Government had on its own also warned Ian Smith of the imposition of sanctions if he went ahead with UDI.⁶⁹ Thus when UDI was announced, and Britain took the matter to the Security Council, the imposition of sanctions formed part of her request to the Council in dealing with the rebellion. The non-aligned countries, without setting great store on the efficacy of sanctions, nevertheless supported it. So did the liberation movements which had all along advocated sanctions.

The Security Council, in imposing sanctions, adopted a gradual procedure, starting with a call for voluntary action, as in Resolution 217 (1965), and ending with a demand for comprehensive mandatory sanctions. In spite of the provisions of the above resolution, certain remarks of Harold Wilson in the early stages of sanctions tended to create the impression that the British Prime Minister was unsure of the form and extent sanctions should take. In a Commons debate on whether sanctions should be coercive or punitive, the Prime Minister, while ruling out any punitive

68. UN Document A/AC.109/112, para. 9.

69. Commonwealth Survey, Vol. 10, No. 23, 10 November 1964, p.1088.

intentions, gave the impression that he agreed to sanctions without a definite strategy for implementing them. This is the possible interpretation to be given to his answer to a question about the specific steps that would have to be taken in regard to oil supplies. "We have no proposals to make on this subject", he said.⁷⁰ Yet oil was very easily the single most important item on the sanctions list that could, as one author pointed out, bring "Smith near to breaking point".⁷¹

However the action of Britain in April 1966 showed that the Government had overcome this uncertainty about sanctions and was prepared to enforce them. When the oil embargo was threatened by supplies through Mozambique. Britain asked for an emergency meeting of the Security Council to discuss the matter. At her instance, the Council passed a resolution calling on Portugal to implement the ban on oil, requesting all states to ensure the non-use of their ship for carrying oil destined for Rhodesia, and calling "upon the Government of the United Kingdom to prevent by the use of force if necessary"⁷² oil deliveries to Rhodesia through the Mozambican ports. The non-aligned states tried to seize the opportunity to amend the resolution to allow for comprehensive sanctions but were defeated by British opposition.⁷³ Nonetheless the resolution had given Britain the authority to employ force to effect the oil embargo, and she did this by preventing oil tankers from reaching the port of Beira.

In May 1966, the non-aligned states attempted once again to make sanctions mandatory, and once again they failed because, as Cefkin put it, the

70. House of Commons Debate, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 720, 11 November, 1965, col. 360.

71. Donald Smith, Rhodesia : The Problem, (London : Robert Maxwell, 1969) p.51.

72. Security Council Resolution 221 (1966), 9 April, 1966.

73. UN Document S/7243.

measures "went beyond what London would accept".⁷⁴ But in December 1966, the Security Council, at the initiative of Britain, imposed mandatory sanctions which covered a range of selected commodities including iron ore, chrome, asbestos, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper and meat. This British move, it is believed, was influenced by Ian Smith's rejection of the HMS Tiger proposals of early December 1966.⁷⁵ But it was also seen as a follow up of Wilson's promise to the September 1966 Commonwealth Conference of taking new and stronger measures to end UDI.⁷⁶

Mandatory sanctions soon proved deficient as well. The apparent inadequacy of all the resolutions in terms of coverage, and the fact that over two years of sanctions had failed to bring down Smith's regime, led to mandatory comprehensive sanctions in May 1968. The latest resolution banned all trade with Rhodesia with the exclusion of the importation of medical supplies, educational equipments and food on humanitarian grounds.⁷⁷ Unlike the previous occasions when the Council seemed only satisfied with the passing of the resolutions, this time it took the radical step of attempting to 'police' the resolutions. It set up a Sanctions Implementation Committee to monitor compliance and make progress report to the Secretary-General. This was the first time in the history of the UN that mandatory comprehensive sanctions were imposed. It had been a far way back in 1936 since an international organization (then the League of Nations) took such a measure to deal with an international crisis. It was an unparalleled move and

74. J. Leo Cefkin, 'The Rhodesian Question at the United Nations' International Organization, 22, Summer, 1968, p.660.

75. See Guy Arnold and Alan Baldwin, 'Rhodesia : Token Sanctions or Total Economic Warfare' The Africa Bureau, September, 1972.

76. J. Leo Cefkin, op. cit. pp.660-661.

77. Security Council Resolution 253 (1968), 29 May, 1968.

one that, to borrow the words of Berhanykun Andemicael, constituted a test case of the capacity of the United Nations to take effective action in a crisis between the non-aligned states and the colonial or settler regimes in Africa.⁷⁸

The Impact of Sanctions:

But how effective were sanctions? Opinion may differ on the efficacy of sanctions in dealing with an international problem involving big power interest. The case of Italy over her invasion of Ethiopia in 1936 could readily be cited as a classic example of the impotence of sanctions to punish a determined offender. Nevertheless it has to be admitted that it is difficult to gauge the actual impact of sanctions.⁷⁹ Depending on what sanctions were intended to achieve, any assessment of their effectiveness could range from negative to positive result. If sanctions alone were to defeat the Smith regime then obviously they failed; an assessment the non-aligned countries accepted at a much earlier stage in the conflict. But if sanctions were intended to supplement other measures like the military campaign, the answer to the above question might well be a qualified one.

To the liberation movements, sanctions in themselves alone were never considered strong enough to beat Smith; they were at best useful for their diplomatic and psychological boost to the armed struggle. This, at least, was

78. Berhanykun Andemicael, The OAU and the UN : Relations between the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations, (New York : Africana Publishing Company, 1976) p.115.

79. For an excellent study of the impact of sanctions, see Johan Galtung, 'On The Effects of International Economic Sanctions with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia' World Politics, Vol. XIX, April 1967, pp.378-416. Here the author advances a general theory of sanctions and analyses of the conditions under which sanctions could be effective.

how ZANU viewed them as implied in its statement to the 1973 Oslo UN-OAU

Conference on Southern Africa:

On the diplomatic front, we cannot press too strongly the necessity to make existing sanctions work, and even to extend them. This is the international community's way of demonstrating its disapproval of the Smith regime, and indirectly of supporting the armed struggle.⁸⁰

Surely, whatever the objective of sanctions, there was no doubt that they were less than effective. The anticipated damage to the Rhodesian economy did not materialize. Although exports dropped from £R164 million to £R104 million in the first year of UDI, sliding to £R101 million in 1967, and with a further drop to £R97.4 million in 1968,⁸¹ these did not augur an immediate nor remote possibility of the collapse of the economy. In fact it had been claimed that not only did Rhodesia hold out against sanctions but she even prospered under them. Exaggerated as the claim may be, it is true to say that sanctions created a besieged mentality in white Rhodesians, and strengthened their determination not to succumb to international economic pressure. As a result they became more self-reliant in defence of UDI.⁸²

Guy Arnold and Alan Baldwin put the failings of sanctions to three main causes:⁸³ (i) the long period of time that elapsed between UDI and the imposition of full-scale mandatory sanctions in May 1968 which enabled the regime to make

80. Olav Stokke and Carl Widstrand, ed., Southern Africa : The UN-OAU Conference, Oslo 9-14 April, 1973 (Uppsala : Scandinavia Institute of African Affairs, 1973), Vol. II. p. 150.

81. Report of the UN Secretary-General, S/8786 and Add. 1-11, of 6 June, 1969.

82. See David Smith, op. cit. p.48.

83. Guy Arnold and Alan Baldwin, op. cit, p.271.

adjustments and arrangements for their evasions; (2) the total refusal of South Africa and Portugal to apply sanctions both by trading 'as normal' with Rhodesia and also by acting as go-betweens to market her goods and import on her behalf; (3) the lack of a general political will on the part of most members of the UN to make sanctions work, effectively. Taking the first and second causes of the failure, of sanctions, it would be observed that the worst period of sanctions for the Rhodesian economy was the first five years. Thereafter, the economy picked up, and by 1971 the territory's trade figures were back to the pre-UDI level and rising steadily in the years up to 1977. Much of this was contributed to by the Portuguese, and more especially the South African factors. (See Tables 2 and 3). Until its independence in 1975, the Portuguese colony of Mozambique provided the major outlet for Rhodesia's exports. Before the Portuguese revolution in 1974, 80% of the export trade of Rhodesia passed through the ports of Maputo and Beira.

Table 2 : Rhodesian Exports and Import through Mozambique (in tons)

	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
<u>Maputo</u>			
Imports	792,614	739,398	438,144
Exports	1,329,468	1,020,474	766,000
<u>Beira</u>			
Imports	170,271	211,702	165,319
Exports	547,998	731,156	770,161
Total Imports through Mozambique	962,885	951,100	603,463
Total Exports through Mozambique	1,877,466	1,751,630	1,536,161

Source: The Observer (London), 14 March, 1976, quoting Mozambique Railways and Harbour Authorities.

To a large extent, the economic survival of Rhodesia in the most critical years of sanctions, between 1966 and 1970, depend on her trade with South Africa.

In open defiance of the UN resolutions, Dr. Diederichs, South Africa's Minister of Economic Affairs, maintained that South Africa would continue to trade normally with Rhodesia.⁸⁴ In consequence whatever fall in Rhodesia's foreign trade as a result of the sanctions was made up quite significantly by imports from South Africa. Following the imposition of sanctions in 1965, Rhodesia's import from South Africa rose dramatically from \$78 million in 1965 to \$110 million in 1966, showing an increase of almost 100%, and representing 46.6% of the colony's imports (see Table 3). The rise was maintained through 1967 and 1968, reaching its peak in 1969 with an increase of about 108% which represented 55.8% of the colony's total import for that year. But as Rhodesia became more successful in breaking sanctions, she grew less dependent on South African imports until the closure of her border with Mozambique in 1976 forced her back to South Africa again.

Table 3 : South Africa's Trade with Rhodesia (in \$m)

	Total Rhodesian Imports	Imports from South Africa	% of total
1965	334	78	23.4
1966	236	110	46.6
1967	262	135	51.5
1968	290	150	51.7
1969	278	155	55.8
1970	329	160	48.6
1971	395	170	43.0
1972	404	165	40.8
1973	480	180	37.5

Source: Seventh Report of the UN Security Council Committee established in Pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968) Annex VII.

84. The Times (London) 30 December, 1966, p.8.

It was in recognition of this crucial position of Portugal and South Africa in the economic life of Rhodesia that the non-aligned countries insisted on bringing these two countries under sanctions. As the 1969 report of the Secretary-General, based on that of the Security Council's Sanctions Committee showed, sanctions were largely ineffective because of the non compliance of South Africa and Portugal.⁸⁵ Following this, Algeria, Nepal, Pakistan, Senegal and Zambia co-sponsored a draft resolution at the Security Council meeting of June 1969, calling for the extension of sanctions to cover South Africa and the Portuguese colony of Mozambique.⁸⁶ The resolution was rejected by a vote of eight in favour, none against with seven abstentions including Britain.

But South Africa and Portugal were not the only sanction breakers. West Germany, Japan, the United States, Netherlands, Belgium and Italy among other Western countries continued to import Rhodesia's tobacco and minerals. (See Table 4). An even greater issue of sanction busting which doubtlessly was of great embarrassment to the non-aligned movement concerned the activities of some non-aligned states. Apart from Botswana, Zambia and Malawi whose geographic positions made continued economic relations with Rhodesia inevitable, Zaire, Gabon and the Ivory Coast were known to carry on trade with Rhodesia as usual.⁸⁷ The role of Gabon in this respect deserves particular mention. Gabon during this period played host to Affretair, an airline set up by one Jack Malloch, a Rhodesian, whose sanctions-busting operations helped greatly to sustain the

85. UN Document S/8786 and Add. a-aa, 6 June, 1969.

86. UN Document S/9270, Rev. 1.

87. The ZANU leader, Robert Mugabe, specifically accused these three countries of sanctions-breaking. Daily Times (Lagos) 19 March, 1977.

Table 4 : Direction of Major Rhodesian Exports

		Japan	Netherlands	Belgium/ Lux.	South Africa	W. Germany
Tobacco (tons)	1971		8,257	3,639	16,000	1,895
	1972		11,755	4,243	11,400	2,907
	1973				10,500	
Asbestos (000 tons)	1971	34.2			11.8	21.8
	1972	37.0			16.0	16.9
	1973				21.0	
Chrome (000 tons)	1971	364.2			21.0	1,153
	1972	192.2			124.0	65.4
	1973				100.0	80.4
Nickel and Nickel Alloys	1971	119.7	1,677			4,074
	1972		1,476			
	1973		1,245			

Source: Seventh Report of the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968) Annex VII.

Rhodesian economy. When this was discovered, the country's airline, Air Gabon, took over the operations, helping Rhodesian beef find markets abroad.⁸⁸

Yet another crucial area of sanction breaking of great concern to the non-aligned movement was the role of some oil producing countries, mostly the Gulf states. The continued flow of Saudi, Iraqi, Qatari and Abu Dhabi oil to South Africa, part of which was passed on to Rhodesia had been a long standing issue in Afro-Arab relations. Long before sanctions were imposed against Rhodesia,

88. Africa Now magazine, December, 1983, p.13, citing Pierre Pean, Affaires Africaines (Paris: Librairie Artheme, 1983).

African states had sought to cut off oil supplies to South Africa. In 1964, the Cairo Conference of the OAU adopted a resolution which appealed to "all oil producing countries to cease, as a matter of urgency, their supply of oil and petroleum products to South Africa".⁸⁹ This was in line with a 1963 UN General Assembly resolution which urged all states to "refrain from supplying in any manner or form any petroleum or petroleum products to South Africa".⁹⁰

With sanctions against Rhodesia, the need to enforce the oil boycott of South Africa became a more pressing issue in Afro Arab relations. A concerted Afro-Arab action was necessary if the oil embargo was to be effective, not only against South Africa but Rhodesia as well. According to one source, the respective percentage of the South African market supplied by individual oil producing countries by 1973 was as follows: Iran 32; Saudi Arabia 22.9; Iraq 15.6; Qatar 8.8; Abu Dhabi 7.7.⁹¹ After some 'horse-trading' which placed the Palestinian problem in the same context as the South African struggle, the November 1973 Algiers Arab summit conference produced a resolution on Arab oil boycott against South Africa and Rhodesia.⁹² But as the Arab boycott took effect, Iran (not yet a member of the non-aligned movement) stepped in to make up the loss, supplying about 90% of South Africa's oil import, with part of the balance coming from Indonesia.⁹³ In view of such non-compliance and

89. Resolution reprinted in Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism : A Short Political Guide (London : Pall Mall, 1962, p.307.

90. UN General Assembly Resolution 1899 (XVIII), 13 November, 1963.

91. Economist Intelligent Unit (E.I.U.), Special Report, No. 32, July, 1976, p.18.

92. See Colin Legum, 'Africa, Arabs and Oil', Africa Contemporary Record, 1974-5, pp.A102-A113 for an analysis of the place of oil in Afro-Arab relations.

93. Economist Intelligent Unit, op. cit.

sanctions-busting strategies, there hardly existed any chance of the economic weapon ever succeeding on the intended scale. Ian Smith was therefore right in his remark in 1965 that to "force Rhodesia to capitulate to the demands of the African extremists by introducing economic sanctions ... would require concerted action by all the trading nations of the world. History has shown that this will not prove successful".⁹⁴

The Use of Force

By the end of the 1960s, it had become obvious to the non-aligned states that sanctions had failed to bring down Ian Smith's rebellion. This hard fact which they had appreciated all along but thought could be softened by UN action was here to stay. Even where states claimed to comply with sanctions, some were known to adopt the dubious sanction-busting strategy of increasing trade with Pretoria and Lisbon for resupply to Rhodesia. In these circumstances, the non-aligned states became more convinced of the need for the use of force to end the rebellion in the colony. Their demand therefore was for the Security Council to apply the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter which calls for the use of force in situations of threat to world peace, as the Rhodesian crisis had been presented. Specifically the non-aligned countries urged Britain to intervene militarily in Rhodesia, and indicated their willingness to assist where possible. Zambia in particular offered the use of her territory to help overcome any logistical problems in the event of such an intervention.⁹⁵ And Prime Minister Forbes Burnham of Guyana, at the September 1966 Commonwealth Conference even suggested the deployment of British troops soon to be released from duty

94. Commonwealth Survey, Vol. 11, No. 10, 11 May 1965, p.487.

95. Robert C. Good, op. cit., p.59.

in his country for this purpose.⁹⁶

There is controversy over the question of whether or not the Rhodesian crisis indeed constituted a threat to international peace. Those who looked at it as basically a domestic problem within the competence of Britain, as France, Portugal and South Africa did, argued against any internationalization of the crisis. Others who assessed it within the context of Southern African regional realities, and on the basis of the emergent consensus which holds colonialism as an international concern saw every need for the use of force. To be noted here, as had been observed earlier, is that Britain by taking the issue to the Security Council in November 1965 had internationalized the situation. And what is more, by agreeing to mandatory comprehensive sanctions which, under Chapter VII of the Charter, could only be imposed in situations of threat to or breach of the peace, Britain seemed to have acknowledged the argument that the crisis demanded the use of force.

The 1964 statement of Prime Minister Wilson which regarded UDI as an illegal act, a rebellion and treason, and which he reiterated in November 1965,⁹⁷ suggested a possible use of force to end the rebellion. But when it came to the crunch, Britain took a position which baffled the non-aligned. In rejecting any call for the application of force, she gave the impression that if indeed the situation threatened the peace, the Smith regime should be able to maintain order as implied in Wilson's policy statement:

96. Roy Preiswerk, ed., Documents of International Relations in the Caribbean, (Institute of Caribbean Studies, Universidad de Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras, 1970), p.55.

97. House of Commons Debate, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 720, 11 November 1965, col. 353.

I think that the solution of this problem is not one to be dealt with by military intervention, unless of course our troops are asked for to preserve law and order, and to avert a tragic action, subversion, murder and so on. But we do not contemplate as I have made very clear, any national action, and may I say international action for the purpose of coercing even the illegal Government of Rhodesia into a constitutional posture.⁹⁸

An analysis of the statement only serves to indicate Britain's prevarication and double-standard in her approach to the Rhodesian crisis. Surely the ambiguity of the policy raises certain pertinent questions. What is the definition of "law and order" in the context of a colonial rebellion? If UDI already described as treason did not amount to a tragic action or subversion, what else could? Moreover, who was to ask for the troops; was it the UN or the Smith regime? If it was the UN, then, that negated any rejection of international action. But were it the Smith regime, the all too obvious meaning of the policy was the abandonment by Britain of her constitutional authority over the colony in violation of the provisions of the Southern Rhodesia Act of 16 November 1965 which re-affirmed Rhodesia as a colony of the Crown.⁹⁹ If UDI in this context was not considered as subversive, and therefore not constituting a breakdown of 'law and order', then we are left to assume that it was only a challenge to it, possibly by the liberation movements, which could result in "murder and so on" that must need to be contained. Such an interpretation of the policy inevitably led to charges against Britain of indulging in kith and kin politics, in the protection of the white settlers, more so when it is known that never in British imperial history had a colonial rebellion been tolerated.

98. Ibid, cols 360-361.

99. See House of Commons Debates, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 720, Cols. 689-851.

For all the combative posture of the non-aligned movement in the demand for military intervention in Rhodesia, Britain remained firm against the application of force. Frustrating as this was to them, the non-aligned states knew that they lacked the influence and the power to commit the UN to employing force against the Smith regime. The position of Britain in the Security Council ensured just that. Although Britain now acknowledged the situation as a threat to world peace, and had passed on the issue as a Security Council problem, Britain nevertheless prevented the Council from reaching such a decision. At the most she would only agree to a continuation of the already discredited and ineffective sanctions weapons.

This attitude formed the key point in Britain's counter-resolution to a non-aligned draft calling on her to take all necessary measures including the use of force to end the rebellion.¹⁰⁰ While she wished the Security Council to "reaffirm its determination that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security", she nevertheless restrained it from taking the logical action of use of force to meet such a threat (sanctions having failed) by urging the Council to remain faithful to Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter.^{100a} On this occasion, she achieved her objective not by the crude use of the veto but through persuasion. A compromise resolution¹⁰¹ which emerged at the Security Council's resumed meeting on 29th May, 1968 showed the quality of British diplomacy in its ability to mellow the original non-aligned draft. Clauses demanding the use of force were toned down, while call for assistance to the national liberation movements was amended to read "assistance to the people of

100. UN Document S/8545 and Corr. 1 submitted by Algeria, Ethiopia, Senegal, India and Pakistan.

100a. UN Document S/8554.

101. Security Council Resolution 253 (1968), 29 May, 1968.

Southern Rhodesia" to reflect the Western distaste for the concept of national liberation.

This of course was only one of many instances when Britain had been successful in introducing vagueness into concrete demands of the non-aligned states at the Security Council in order to avoid being pinned down to specific actions. Whereas the non-aligned with their numerical strength could push through most of their resolutions in the General Assembly, they were usually forced to make compromise in the Security Council if Britain was not to use the veto.

1970 - 74

The 1960s drew to a close without any prospects of a solution to the Rhodesian problem. What was probably an expected upsurge in liberation activities within the territory appeared to have petered out, or at best become sporadic after the initial guerrilla actions in 1966. With Britain shying away from her responsibilities, and the UN apparently impotent to enforce a settlement, all the signs were that the rebellion was going to last longer than at first thought. It was now evident that Harold Wilson's prescription in 1966 of a sanctions-solution within weeks¹⁰² was simply unrealistic, if not deceptive. In fact it might be said of Harold Wilson that he knew from all his talks with Smith how adamant the Rhodesian leader was in his rebellion. Yet the British Prime Minister continued to convey the impression of a possible Rhodesian surrender. His remarks, for example, following the adjournment of the July 1968 informal talks between British and Rhodesian officials showed the amount of hope Wilson

102. Commonwealth Survey, Vol. 12, No. 2, 21 January, 1966, p.86.

still reposed in reaching an understanding with Smith for a peaceful settlement.

"It is expected", he told Parliament, "that the talks will be resumed at a fairly early date. The House will agree that it is important that they should then make more rapid progress".¹⁰³ To this, Smith replied rather sarcastically, pretending to share such hope while still sticking to his position:

This has been my line of thinking. As I said recently, it is important for us to grapple with the problem, and the sooner we stop talking about talking and get on with the talking the better..... We have set our course and we have no intention whatsoever of deviating. We will never surrender to threats. We will never surrender to sanctions; in fact we are not the sort of people who will surrender to anything.¹⁰⁴

Distressing as the British inconsistency was to the non-aligned countries, events during this period within the non-aligned movement and on the world scene seemed to affect the movement's push for a settlement of the Rhodesian crisis. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 which revived the fear of big power sphere-of-influence politics; the death or removal in coups of some of the movement's leading figures; and the wide spread unhealthy political and economic situations in many non-aligned countries, without doubt, impinged on the general anti-colonial thrust of the non-aligned movement as already observed in Chapter 3. But of more direct bearing on the non-aligned diplomatic campaign in the Rhodesian crisis at the UN was the 1967 Middle East War. The explosive nature of this crisis in terms of super-power conflict almost relegated Rhodesia to the diplomatic backseat of the non-aligned in 1967/68. While, for example, in 1965 the Rhodesian issue remained a regular feature on the Security Council

103. Relations between the Rhodesian Government and the United Kingdom Government, November 1965 - December 1966 (Salisbury : Prime Minister's Department, Government Printer, 1966), p.14.

104. Ibid.

agenda, especially after UDI (of the eighty sessions between 15 March 1965 and 17 December 1965, thirteen sessions following UDI were devoted exclusively to Rhodesia). 1968 showed a very different record. In that year the Middle East crisis dominated the Security Council agenda. Out of the Council's sixty three sessions, the Middle East featured forty two times exclusively; Rhodesia with six entries came third after Namibia's eight.¹⁰⁵

Meanwhile, Ian Smith had taken one more step to consolidate his position, confirmed in the result of the 1969 referendum, which held out the prospects of Rhodesia severing all remaining ties with Britain. This led to the resignation of the territory's nominal Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, in whose opinion the deteriorating situation no longer offered any chance of a negotiated settlement in the foreseeable future.¹⁰⁶ Under these unfavourable circumstances, it was not unusual to find settlement hopes degenerating into disillusionment. As a result the non-aligned movement was forced to explore other apparently less popular solution; not a solution at any cost of course, but one that tempered the earlier combative mood in the immediate aftermath of UDI to a more accommodating stance. It marked the dawn of a new pragmatism which perhaps was the *raison d'être* of the Lusaka Manifesto adopted at the 1970 non-aligned conference and the UN.* So with dimmed hope for a negotiated settlement, the non-aligned movement entered the next decade.

The first problem that confronted the non-aligned states in 1970 was the

105. This was worked out from Security Council Official Records, 1190th - 1270th sessions from 15 March 1965 - 17 December 1965; and 1399th - 1462th sessions covering 25 January to December 1968.

106. See Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart's statement to Parliament, House of Commons Debates, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol.785, Col.1219.

* The Lusaka Manifesto was adopted as UN G.A. Resolution 2505 (XXIV) of November, 1969.

decision of Britain to resume the sale of arms to South Africa. Recognizing the economic importance of South Africa to Rhodesia under sanctions situation, Britain seemed to have accepted the 'reality' of Pretoria now the key to a solution of the Rhodesian crisis. She would therefore wish to encourage South Africa to prevail upon Ian Smith for a negotiated settlement. Indeed, since Rhodesia could no longer count on the support of Britain in facing the hostile international attitude, Ian Smith came to be virtually dependent on South Africa for his regime's economic and military survival. The leverage Britain appeared to have lost over Smith was now to be exercised by Pretoria. But South Africa, as it might reasonably be expected, would want to reap some reward from Britain in playing such a role though it was also in her interest to work to achieve a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia. And the price she charged was for Britain to lift the arms embargo against her. The October 1968 talks between South Africa's Foreign Minister, Dr. Hilgard Muller, and George Thomson, Britain's Minister without Portfolio were known to centre on this issue.¹⁰⁷ Almost two years later in July 1970, Britain announced her proposal to sell arms to South Africa.¹⁰⁸

Officially, Britain tried to explain the sale in terms of the Simonstown Agreement which consummates the long standing British interest of military collaboration with South Africa within an anti-Soviet framework. Sir Alec Douglas Home, the then British Foreign Secretary was clear on this: "It is our intention to give effect to the purposes of that agreement, and we believe that as a consequence we shall be ready to consider within that context application for

107. Africa Confidential, No. 21, October 1968, p.2.

108. House of Commons Debates, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 804, Col.49.

export to South Africa of certain limited categories of arms, so long as they are for the maintenance of defence directly related to the security of the sea route".¹⁰⁹

The non-aligned states, at least the majority, (see Chapter 3 for the difference in opinion) disagreed with Sir Alec. As they saw it, (a view which they translated into a Security Council and Special Committee position)¹¹⁰, the sale would go to strengthen the triple alliance of South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal, and so increase the alliance's repressive capacity against the national liberation movements.

How the 'replacement' of Britain by South Africa in Rhodesia's affairs detracted from the international standing of Britain as a colonial authority is a different matter. But it confirmed one thing which the non-aligned movement had always emphasized, that any meaningful approach to the Rhodesian problem must necessarily be conducted within the wider Southern African context. In the end, Britain shelved the proposal but not before she realized what it could have meant for her to risk ignoring in particular the broad African opinion on the issue of Rhodesia. The strong opposition to the sale with threats by African Commonwealth states of pulling out of the association indicated the possible harm to British diplomatic interest in the continent for her dilatory stand on Rhodesia. The plea of Julius Nyerere to her not "to take sides against free Africa in its conflict with racialism and colonialism"¹¹¹ presented a choice to Britain in the arms decision. And cautiously enough she chose not to side with either party putting off the proposal.

109. Ibid.

110. Security Council Resolution 282 (1970) of 23 July 1970 while not naming Britain, called upon all states to strengthen the arms embargo against South Africa by implementing it fully and unconditionally and without reservations whatsoever.

111. Africa Contemporary Record, 1970/71, p.C29.

At this juncture Britain took one more initiative to raise hopes of a possible settlement. Her continued dialogue with the Smith regime formed the subject of the 25 November 1971 meeting of the Security Council. Summoned at Britain's request and attended by a number of non-aligned countries, the British representative, Sir Colin Crowe informed the Council of the agreement reached the previous day between Sir Alec Douglas Home, the Foreign Secretary, and Ian Smith on proposals for a settlement.¹¹² These were based on the five principles encapsulated in NIBMAR referred to earlier in this chapter.

According to the proposals, Africans would proceed to attain parity of seats in the legislature by means of additional seats created on the basis of progressive increases in the number of Africans registered on a new African roll to be known as the African higher roll. What this meant was that the existing provisions of the 1969 constitution governing the increase of African representation would be repealed. The proposal combined a system of direct and indirect election to bring African representation to fifty at par with the European seats. Thereafter a referendum for the Africans alone would be held to ascertain whether the indirectly elected seats should remain or be replaced with directly elected representatives.

The whole proposal which quite simply meant parity as a step to majority rule, would establish a tedious process that was open to manipulation to justify the misgivings of the non-aligned of its workability. Even the explanation that the proposals would only be implemented if they were acceptable to all sections of Rhodesia failed to satisfy the non-aligned. For the

112. UN Security Council Official Records, 1602th Meeting, 25 November, 1971.

'acceptability test', a Royal Commission headed by Lord Pearce was set up to consult Rhodesian opinion. Saudi Arabia described the scheme as "Periclean democracy, a democracy for the Athenians" alone, concluding that it would hardly change the status quo in the colony.¹¹³ Somalia wanted to know how ZAPU and ZANU, already banned, were going to participate in the arrangements.¹¹⁴ Sierra Leone for one doubted the impartiality of the Commission with Lord Pearce as Chairman whom she recalled offered the only dissenting opinion in favour of Smith among Law Lords in a previous case to determine the legality or otherwise of the detention powers of the Salisbury regime.¹¹⁵

Predictably the non-aligned states dismissed the proposals as superficial and futile, beneficial only to Ian Smith as a time-saving device to further entrench his rule. For one thing, any talk now of improving the lot of the African population (which implies that they were ill-equipped for independence) could only reinforce the argument of Smith that the African majority was incapable of shouldering state responsibilities. Moreover the absence of a time table for the achievement of the parity all but meant postponing majority rule for much longer. Above all the non-aligned group in accordance with its 1970 Lusaka Summit Declarations regarded the talks that led to the proposals as illegal since they were conducted with an illegal regime. The only basis of legitimacy of such negotiation would have been the involvement of the colony's national liberation movements. By excluding the liberation movements in the negotiations, Britain behaved as though the opinion of the Africans counted for very little in any settlement plan.

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid.

115. Ibid, 1609th meeting, 8 December 1971, p.10.

In the face of these objections, Somalia introduced a draft resolution, sponsored by Syria, Sierra Leone and Burundi which called on the Security Council to reject the proposals "as they did not guarantee the inalienable rights of the majority of the people of Southern Rhodesia"¹¹⁶ to the free exercise of self-determination. The resolution was defeated by a vote of nine to one (Britain) with five abstentions. Nonetheless the prevalent view of the non-aligned, expressed through the Special Committee was for Britain to discontinue all negotiations with Smith, and instead deal directly with the liberation movements.¹¹⁷

The attitude of the non-aligned reinforced those of the national liberation movements to create a climate of opinion in the colony that made compromise with the Smith regime look like a sell out. For similar reasons advanced by the non-aligned, the African population also rejected the proposals. In the event, although the whites gave their approval, the Commission reported that "in our opinion the people of Rhodesia as a whole do not regard the proposals as acceptable as a basis for independence."¹¹⁸

The diplomatic impasse, coupled with the apparent failure of sanctions in reaching a settlement forcefully brought home to the non-aligned and the liberation movements the political necessity of war. From 1970, emphasis began to shift to an intensification of the armed struggle which had the welcome effect of increasing the pressure on the need for a negotiated settlement. Instead of the earlier approach which placed Britain in the centre of events, non-aligned

116. UN Document S/10489.

117. YUN, Vol. 25, 1971, p.91.

118. Report of the Commission on Rhodesian Opinion under the Chairmanship of the Right Hon., the Lord Pearce (Cmnd 4964), May, 1972.

diplomatic effort became increasingly concerned with generating support for the armed struggle. The idea that military pressure on the Smith regime would aid diplomacy took on significance with the drive to involve the movements more actively in the affairs of the United Nations as part of the overall strategy of the legitimization of national liberation. Henceforth, diplomacy acquired a militancy with virtually every UN resolution calling for increased material assistance to the liberation movements.

Consequently, in 1972, following a recommendation of the Chairman of the Special Committee to the Chairman of the Fourth Committee, the latter decided to invite representatives of the Zimbabwe liberation movements to participate as observers in the examination of the Rhodesian case.¹¹⁹ This was followed by the Special Committee's invitation in 1973.¹²⁰ Ultimately, the General Assembly at its 1973 session, in reaffirming the decisions of the Special Committee on the issue, explicitly accepted the territory's liberation movements recognised by the OAU as "the authentic representatives" of the people.¹²¹ This position was marked increasingly by the appearance of representatives of the liberation movements before the Special Committee to state their case. In its March-April 1974 meeting, the Committee heard statements by Noel Mukons of ZANU and T. George Silundika of ZAPU about the situation in the colony. In June 1975, Sithole and Luke Munyawarara representing the ANC gave evidence before the Committee.¹²² The immediate benefit of all this to the movements was increased international recognition manifested in the 1973 General Assembly

119. UN Document A/C.4/SR.1975.

120. UN Document A/9023 (Part 1)

121. UN General Assembly Resolution 3115 (XXVIII)

122. YUN, Vol. 30, 1976, p.148.

request to all governments, specialised agencies, and other organizations within the United Nations system "to ensure the representation of the colonial territories in Africa by the national liberation movements concerned, in the appropriate capacity, when dealing with matters pertaining to these territories".¹²³

The UN directive gave a further boost to the diplomatic stature of the movements, having assured them of a place at all UN-related conferences and seminars so important to the movements as forums to put across their case and solicit for support. The 1973 Oslo Conference on Southern Africa, jointly organized by the UN and the OAU, was particularly significant in this respect. Both ZANU and ZAPU used the occasion to match the enemy's propaganda which had sought to create an unfavourable international image for them. ZAPU, in defending the liberation struggle against accusation of terrorism, proclaimed the armed struggle as the "supreme instrument of appeal" and justified it thus: "Since there can be no such thing as peaceful oppression, there can be no such thing as peaceful elimination of oppression. Colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa are, in every essence, the most violent forms of oppression. They have logically bred resistance from their victims - hence the armed revolutionary struggle in Southern Africa."¹²⁴ What followed as usual was appeal to the international community for wide ranging support. In the area of diplomatic backing, the movements requested, among other things, representative status at all international forums; isolation of the illegal regime of Ian Smith; mobilization of international support through publicity work in support of their struggle; and a closer and more direct contact between them and international organisations.

123. UN General Assembly Resolution 3163 (XXVIII).

124. Olav Stokke and Carl Widstrand op. cit. p. 140.

The realization of closer and more direct contact could only be facilitated through one crucial aspect of practical support: the opportunity for the liberation movements to establish offices abroad for more effective propagation of their cause and to liaise more closely with their sources of external aid as called for by the 1973 Algiers non-aligned Conference. With limited financial resources of their own, these offices were largely maintained through the generosity of the host countries. The provision of office accommodation, basic administrative facilities, and no less important, the protection of the personnel were burdens usually incurred by the supporting states.

Not many countries were willing to shoulder such responsibilities either for ideological, economic or security reasons. The liberation movements on their part were careful in deciding on countries in which to open offices, the decision being influenced by the same factors above but for different considerations. The choice of a country was often determined by the relative importance of the state in the international system, its ideological correctness in terms of commitment to national liberation, and the security it could provide the staff of the mission. Besides the Frontline States, both ZAPU and ZANU separately, and later in the Patriotic Front, established offices at various periods in Ghana, Egypt, Cuba, Ethiopia, Libya, Nigeria, Syria, Yugoslavia, and North Korea charged with the task of procuring material assistance in addition to conducting other diplomatic functions.¹²⁵

1975 - 79

The second half of the 1970s witnessed dramatic developments in

125. Interview with an official of Zimbabwe High Commission, London, July, 1984.

Rhodesia. The escalating armed struggle, and Smith's drive for an internal settlement gave fresh impetus to diplomacy in and outside the United Nations. The period also coincided with the emergence of the Frontline States as a potent force in any settlement proposal of the crisis. By virtue of their geographic position in relation to Rhodesia, and considering the pressures of other issues on the non-aligned movement, the rise of these states as the fulcrum of the non-aligned liberation strategy with regard to Rhodesia could be seen as an inevitable and indeed a welcome development. The 1976 Port Louis OAU Summit decision requiring the agreement of the Frontline States for member-states military assistance to the liberation movements,¹²⁶ and the call by the non-aligned movement for international assistance to the Frontline States were in recognition of the crucial role of these countries in both the diplomatic and strategic support for the struggle. But so wide and independent did the role become that it tended to marginalize the direct contribution of the non-aligned movement in the search for a settlement during this period.

At the level of the OAU, the dominance of the Frontline States gave rise to insinuations of usurpation by these states of the Organization's responsibility to the Zimbabwe liberation struggle. OAU spokesmen in denying any usurpation of the Organization's responsibilities have always striven to emphasize the special function of the Frontline States. As explained by Peter Onu, the Assistant Secretary-General of the Organization, to Witness Mangwende,¹²⁷ the Frontline State presidents only meet as a sub-committee when they discuss issues

126. OAU Document AHG/Res. 80 (XVIII) July, 1976.

127. Witness Mangwende, The Organization of African Unity and the Zimbabwe Crisis : A Case Study in OAU attempts at Collective Liberation, 1963-1977 : Unpublished PhD. thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1980, p.276.

Pertaining to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. In other words, they act as mere agents of the OAU. Accordingly, all their decisions and actions are deemed to represent the OAU and hence non-aligned policy. But there were times when the Frontline State presidents, either acting individually or collectively had apparently gone too far in initiation moves which proved embarrassing to the OAU and the non-aligned movement. One such move was detente with South Africa supposedly based on the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969.

Following contacts between President Kaunda of Zambia and Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa in 1974, the Frontline States embarked on a policy of detente with Pretoria with the objective of enlisting South Africa's support to force Ian Smith into a settlement. Both Zambia and South Africa saw certain benefits to them in detente. With her economy reeling under the impact of sanctions implementation, Zambia naturally wished an early end of the war. The closure of the Rhodesia/Zambia¹²⁸ in January 1973 was known to have cost her \$124 million in the first quarter of that year alone. For South Africa, the emergence of a radical government in Mozambique under FRELIMO, and the fear of a military defeat in Rhodesia which would instal yet another radical government on her doorstep, were considered highly detrimental to her security needs. It was therefore in her interest to work for a non-military solution in Rhodesia with the hope of putting a moderate regime in power.

We may not need to go into the details of the policy of detente¹²⁹ except

128. See the Report by the UN Security Council Special Mission established under SC Resolution 326 (1973) to assess the impact of the closure on Zambia. Ref. UN Document S/10896 of 5 March, 1973.

129. For the literature on detente, see among others Douglas Anglis, 'Zambia and Southern Africa detente', International Journal (Toronto), No. 3, 1975; Colin Legum, Vorster's Gamble for Africa : How the Search for Peace Failed, (London: Rex Collings, 1976).

to observe that the main features of the policy as spelt out by David Martin and Phyllis Johnson were (1) for South Africa to make it clear to Ian Smith that a political settlement of the crisis was most desirable and urgently needed; (2) that South Africa stopped interfering in Rhodesia's internal affairs by withdrawing her security personnel and equipment from Rhodesia, and (3) that South Africa should declare that a negotiated settlement was in the best interest of Rhodesia.¹³⁰ In return Zambia, and presumably, the other Frontline States undertook to "use their influence to ensure that ZANU and ZAPU desist from armed struggle and engage in the mechanics for finding a political solution in Rhodesia".¹³¹

Part of this political solution to which the liberation movements would be drawn presented itself in the Geneva Conference of October, 1976. The Conference grew out of the Henry Kissinger peace initiative started in his African tour in April, 1976 and from which developed the Kissinger Plan whose basic proposal was the achievement of majority rule within two years.

Kissinger's tour encountered obstacles from the outset. Apart from Kenya and Zambia, other African countries in his itinerary showed little interest in the mission. In Tanzania, he only received a polite hearing after protocol questions which almost marred the visit.¹³² Nigeria, Ghana and Mozambique were more outspoken and made known their intention not to receive him.¹³³ To President Samora Machel of Mozambique, the purpose of the mission was anything but an honourable settlement. He saw it as an attempt to stamp out the armed

131. Ibid

132. David Martin and Phyllis Johnson. The Struggle for Zimbabwe, London, Faber & Faber, 1981, p.230.

133. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1976, p.27777.

struggle in favour of the status quo, for as he put it in the context of the stage in the Zimbabwe struggle: "This is the secondary school. When it becomes a revolutionary struggle that is the University. Dr. Kissinger is coming to close the University before they can get there."¹³⁴

Perhaps the general lack of enthusiasm, which marked the Kissinger mission, had to do with the United States' African policy spelt out in National Securities Studies Directive Memorandum 39 of 1969.¹³⁵ The document, authored by Kissinger's National Security Council Staff suggested a more flexible U.S. attitude toward the Smith regime which meant, among other options, a U.S. review of sanctions against Rhodesia. In consequence, the Nixon Administration in 1971 endorsed the Byrd Amendment that exempted Rhodesian chrome from the sanctions list. It was too early in April 1976 for African states to forget what they considered as a blatant anti-black Africa stand by a man who was now a supposed pro-African lobbyist. They suspected that as far as United States interest went, a negotiated settlement of the crisis was only vital in order to prevent a radical takeover of Rhodesia as had happened in Angola. In viewing Angola as a major disaster for United States strategy in Africa, American policy on the Rhodesian situation was to place Washington in a position to influence a settlement in line with Washington's interest in the region.¹³⁶

Such strategic calculation did not seem to go down well with African

134. David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, op. cit. p.236.

135. See Mohammed El-Khawas and Barry Cohen, ed. The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa, (New York : Lawrence Hill and Co., 1976).

136. See Robert M. Price, 'US Policy Towards Southern Africa' in Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, ed., International Politics in Southern Africa, (Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1982), pp.47-50.

states, and it added to their lukewarm attitude towards the Kissinger mission. Generally, they resented any attempt to introduce superpower rivalry into the conflict, and on this Kissinger's statements were least helpful. As he himself portrayed it, the mission had all the undertones of this rivalry. His pre-departure speech in which he warned "against foreign intervention, direct or surrogate, that would block all hope for progress" towards a settlement;¹³⁷ together with his rebuke of Soviet and Cuban involvement in Angola¹³⁸ amply indicated the ideological purpose of the mission. In these circumstances, it was doubtful if Kissinger's assurance that "the United States is wholly committed to help bring about a rapid, just and African solution to the issue of Rhodesia"¹³⁹ did cut ice with African countries. The mission, however, produced one significant outcome. Acting under pressure from South Africa which had already bought the Kissinger Plan, Ian Smith announced on 24 September, 1976 that his government had accepted majority rule within two years. This was a very tempting offer to negotiate, so that despite their reservations, the Frontline States persuaded the Patriotic Front to attend the Geneva Conference of October 1976. The Conference adjourned in December, having failed to resolve the disagreement between the parties on the details of an interim arrangement of transfer of power prior to independence. And with that came the exit of Dr. Kissinger from the Rhodesian scene.¹⁴⁰

Generally the attitude of the non-aligned movement to detente was anything but supportive. The rejection by the 1973 Algiers Conference and again by the Colombo Summit of the Lusaka Manifesto¹⁴¹ on which detente was apparently

137. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1976, p.27777.

138. Ibid.

139. David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, op. cit., p.234.

140. The election of Jimmy Carter in the 1976 US elections also put paid to Henry Kissinger's diplomatic role in Southern Africa.

141. Jankowitsch and Sauvart, Vol. III, op. cit., p.

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based, indicated a disapproval of rapprochement with South Africa. Just like Ivory Coast's ill-fated "dialogue" with South Africa, detente was viewed by some non-aligned states as a capitulation to apartheid and a betrayal of the armed struggle. Guinea, Libya and Algeria, among others denounced it as Pretoria's strategy of destabilization of Africa.¹⁴² President Kaunda however disagreed, arguing that far from abandoning the armed struggle, detente represented one other tactic in the strategy to achieve majority rule. As he put it, "our policy has been to achieve this objective by peaceful means if possible, and by armed struggle if necessary. We stand for both. This double strategy remains our firm policy."¹⁴³ Being the main architect of the Lusaka Manifesto, it was understandable that Kaunda should remain committed to the document and the detente it sought to establish.

President Kaunda's defence of detente broadly represented the position of other Frontline States which, whatever their reservations about the Lusaka Manifesto in the light of South Africa's attitude, would undoubtedly prefer its implementation as a matter of collective action. As a result when Zambia unilaterally approached Ian Smith for a settlement of the Rhodesian problem, the move evoked considerable difference within the Councils of the Frontline States. In August 1978, Kenneth Kaunda, with the help of British officials, arranged a meeting in Lusaka between Joshua Nkomo and Ian Smith; this at a time when Smith had already concluded an internal settlement with some African nationalists following the collapse of the Anglo/American plan of 1977.¹⁴⁴ The meeting came to grief over

142. Southern Africa Record, Vol. 2, June 1975, p.27.

143. Ibid.

144. The Anglo/American Plan, arising from the new Owen/Young initiative, replaced the deal Kissinger Plan. A detailed discussion of the initiative as provided in David Martin and Phyllis Johnson op. cit., Chapter 13.

Joshua Nkomo's condition of a revocation of the internal settlement scheme in favour of the Anglo/American plan.¹⁴⁵

The premature disclosure of the Nkomo/Smith talks while embarrassing to the Frontline States, was particularly bad for Kaunda who risked accusations of promoting a particular interest in the national liberation movement which could split the Patriotic Front*, a fear voiced openly by President Nyerere. At their September 1978 meeting in the Zambia capital, the Frontline States implicitly rebuked Kaunda for his unilateral action by the agreement that all contacts between the Patriotic Front and Smith should cease. The Zambian President agreed, but pointed out that the Frontline States could not decide for the liberation movements in the matter of negotiating with the Salisbury regime.¹⁴⁶

This difference between the Frontline States was interpreted variously by the two alliance parties of the Patriotic Front. ZANU led by Robert Mugabe and not particularly known to be enthusiastic about a negotiated settlement could be said to have derived some satisfaction from the decision to stop all further contacts with Smith. Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU on the other hand showed disguised hostility to that decision. In an obvious regard of the rebuke of Kaunda as an attack on him, Nkomo directed his anger primarily at President Nyerere whose pro-ZANU sympathy was read by Nkomo as anti-ZAPU. So embittered was Nkomo over the decision that he went as far as questioning the qualification of Nyerere^A as a Frontline State President to the Rhodesian conflict, Tanzania not being

145. Keesings Contemporary Archives. 1979, p.29438.

* The Patriotic Front was formed by the coming together of ZAPU and ZANU in a Union in 1976. Its formation is more fully discussed in Chapter 7.

146. Keesings Contemporary Archives. op. cit.

contiguous with Rhodesia. He then made it clear that any future peace talks would depend on the condition that President Nyerere was not to be the final authority on what happened in Zimbabwe.¹⁴⁷

While the Frontline States ruled against contact between the Patriotic Front and Ian Smith, the minority regime pressed ahead with its internal settlement scheme. In November 1977, Smith announced his readiness to make concessions towards majority rule on the basis of an internal settlement. Smith took advantage of the split in the nationalist camp and opened negotiations with Abel Muzerowa, Ndabaningi Sithole and Jeremiah Chirau. Surely there could not have been a more willing trio than these nationalists to go along with the internal settlement plan. The three leaders, having lost favour with both the mainstream nationalist guerrilla movement and most non-aligned states, following the formation of the Patriotic Front, were obviously engaged in a last minute battle to find themselves a place in the territory's political future. The outcome of the negotiations was the signing of the Internal Settlement Agreement on 3 March, 1978 and the drawing up of a new constitution. The agreement fixed 31 December, 1978 as independence day.^{147a} ?

A year later in April 1979, elections held under the new constitution installed Bishop Abel Muzerowa as the Prime Minister of the territory now renamed Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

The aim of the Internal Settlement as determined the parties to it was to win international recognition for Rhodesia and end sanctions. But for Smith the settlement was also intended to preserve a measure of white privilege under a

147. Ibid

147a. Survey of Current Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3, March 1978, p.94.

moderate black rule. It was to achieve the first objective that the regime strove hard to 'sell' the elections as "free and fair" by the invitation to foreign observers. This objective was never realized. Throughout the period of the Internal Settlement negotiations up to the April 1979 elections and beyond, the non-aligned movement mounted an international campaign aimed at denying any form of legitimacy or credibility to the scheme and its result. Already in March 1978, the non-aligned countries had secured a Security Council resolution 423 (1978) which declared as "illegal and unacceptable any internal settlement concluded under the auspices of the illegal regime and calls upon all states not to accord any recognition to such a settlement". And when it was learnt that the United States Senate Sub-Committee on Africa was contemplating sending a team to the colony to monitor the elections, the non-aligned, at the instance of the African group strongly opposed the move and urged the US Government to take appropriate measures to stop sanctioning the Internal Settlement.¹⁴⁸ In the end, only Britain and South Africa sent observers. As argued by the non-aligned on the basis of the various UN resolutions, Britain alone could organize constitutionally recognized elections in the colony. Accepting the measures of Ian Smith meant legalizing UDI. When eventually the elections took place, the Security Council at their initiative passed a resolution which declared the elections as "null and void".¹⁴⁹

In an obvious display of solidarity with the colony's national liberation movement, the Special Committee of the UN General Assembly, at the initiative of

148. The non-aligned protest was contained in a letter to the UN Secretary-General. See UN Document S/13084 (A/34/88 of 14 February, 1979).

149. Security Council Resolution 448 (1979), 30 April, 1979.

the non-aligned, invited Tirivafi Kangai and John Nkomo of the Patriotic Front as observers to the Committee's meeting in Belgrade in April 1979 where Rhodesia was discussed. The meeting bolstered the position of the Patriotic Front in the insistence that the liberation movement must be involved in any negotiated settlement of the crisis. At the same time, the meeting signalled a warning on all future negotiations that the time was past when the armed struggle was subordinated to a peaceful settlement. Tanzania, Syria and India were particularly vociferous in their condemnation of the so-called internal settlement which was seen as Ian Smith's manoeuvres to subvert the liberation struggle.¹⁵⁰

But a new challenge to the call for non-recognition of the Muzorewa regime had emerged in Britain with the change in political fortunes. The May 1979 general elections in Britain had installed a Conservative government which scarcely concealed its approval of the latest development in Rhodesia. Short of open recognition, the Thatcher administration conferred some measure of legitimacy on the Muzorewa government by accepting the elections as free and fair,¹⁵¹ and defended this position on the grounds that:¹⁵²

150. YUN, Vol. 33, 1979, pp.1105-7.

151. The British observer team's report had no difficulty in pronouncing the elections as fair "in the sense that the electoral machinery was fairly conducted and above reproach". It was however a more complex matter in determining whether they were free. The team pointed out that it was difficult for any elections to be free in conditions of war as prevalent at the time in the territory. Despite this, and in spite of the fact that the Patriotic Front boycotted the elections, the team arrived at a decision of 'free elections' since, it said, the voters freely chose the parties they wanted to vote for. See Report to the Prime Minister on the Elections Held in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia in April, 1979. (Royal Institute of International Affairs Document, London, 1979).

152. This was the main substance in Lord Carrington's address to the House of Lord Debates, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 400, Cols. 240-242.

- (i) they fulfilled the principle of 'one man, one vote';
- (ii) there was a substantial turn out at the polls;
- (iii) they introduced substantial black majority in the new Parliament; and
- (iv) they resulted in the appointment of an African Prime Minister.

In consequence, the Prime Minister told Parliament that "The Government welcome the major change that has taken place in Rhodesia as a result of the recent elections and the emergence of an African majority Government... We must and will recognise the realities of the present situation in Rhodesia."¹⁵³

Although she promised that the government would "take into account of the wider international implications" of the situation, the fact remained that the reality as defined by her in the statement conflicted with that of the non-aligned and the UN as indicated in the most recent Security Council resolution, and in the outcome of the Belgrade Special Committee meeting discussed above.

The suspicion that the British Government might recognise the Muzorewa regime grew stronger as every statement of the Government pointed in that direction. For example, the Prime Minister's speech in Canberra in July 1979 which gave notice of an unlikely renewal of sanctions ("we doubt very much whether a renewal will go through the British Parliament", she said)¹⁵⁴ was interpreted as leaving the door open for eventual recognition. Then there was the confusion about the statement of Lord Carrington, the Foreign Secretary, in New

153. House of Commons Debate, Official Report, Fifth Series. Vol. 967, Cols. 86-87.

154. 'The Zimbabwe/Rhodesia Story, May 28 - July 19' (A chronological report on key developments in the immediate post-election period of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia) in African Index, Washington, D.C.; July 1-15, 1979, p.48.

Delhi on 3 July, 1979. First report had it that according to the Foreign Secretary, Britain would recognize Zimbabwe-Rhodesia after the forthcoming Commonwealth Conference of August 1979. This however was later denied by the Foreign Office which explained that what he actually said was that Britain "would seek to bring the country back to legality with the widest possible international recognition".¹⁵⁵

Nevertheless non-aligned fear of a possible British recognition remained, as was underlined in the recommendation of the OAU Council of Ministers. At their Monrovia meeting in July, 1979, the Ministers took the view that any attempt at recognizing the Salisbury regime would be regarded as a hostile act. It therefore called on member-states to impose "cultural, political commercial and economic sanctions" against any state which recognized the Government of Muzorewa or lifted sanctions against Rhodesia.¹⁵⁶ The stand of Tanzania at the Monrovia meeting that such a move would be tantamount to declaring war on black Africa,¹⁵⁷ while expressive of the general non-aligned feeling, also puts in perspective the warning of James Callaghan, the British Opposition leader, to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher: "If you are not very careful, you will find yourself isolated, Britain isolated, and the interest of the United Kingdom put at great risk as a result of what you call your pithy comments".¹⁵⁸

The fear of a likely British recognition apart, the non-aligned movement was also concerned about a possible internal difference within its ranks over policy towards the Muzorewa regime. The initiatives of individual states, well

155. Ibid.

156. OAU Document CM/Res. 719 (XXXIII)

157. African Index, op. cit., p.48.

158. Ibid.

intentioned as they might be, were capable of raising concern that some countries could fall under the influence of Britain to move closer to the Muzorewa government. Already Kenya in June 1979 appeared to have been taken in by British diplomacy toward this end. Following a meeting in London between President Daniel Arap Moi and Prime Minister Thatcher, the Kenyan leader offered to host an all party conference, including the Muzorewa government, which had been denounced and denied any form of recognition.¹⁵⁹

Zambia also came under suspicion of seeking an accommodation with the Muzorewa regime. Her entanglement in a British-mediated initiative between Bishop Muzorewa and President Kaunda to discuss Zambia's economic plight created by transportation problems; closely followed by reports that the country "would be prepared to support fresh settlement efforts over Rhodesia provided ... Muzorewa declares himself as merely an interim prime minister preparing for full majority rule under a constitution drawn up at all-party talks",¹⁶⁰ suggests an implied de facto recognition of the position that accepts the relevance of a Muzorewa government. It seemed that both Zambia and Kenya had found a common ground with Britain in an acknowledgement of the "reality" of the new situation in the territory, and the need to use this 'reality' as the basis of a new settlement.

Presidents Kenneth Kaunda and Daniel Arap Moi could have been acting from different premises and under different influences. But if Kenya's consideration was less obvious, except for the general reason of her strong ties with Britain, Zambia had a more tangible cause for seeking an understanding with the illegal regimes of both Ian Smith and Bishop Abel Muzorewa. The country's worsening

159. Ibid, p.47.

160. Ibid

economic situation as a result of the liberation war, with its possible consequences of creating political discontent, were already proving too high a price for a rather moderate state to pay.¹⁶¹ Something had to be done to ameliorate the situation. A significant move in this direction was taken when the country reopened the rail link with Rhodesia in October, 1978. At a time of mounting economic difficulties, exacerbated by the disruption of her alternative transportation lines through Angola, besides the strain on the Tanzam railway, the use of the Rhodesian route to South Africa offered the most attractive alternative for the export of her copper, which was the mainstay of the economy. Not even pressure from Presidents Julius Nyerere and Samora Machel, with offers of quicker service on the Tanzam line, and emergency airlift of vital import like fertilizer;¹⁶² nor the threats by ZANU to sabotage the line¹⁶³ could dissuade Zambia.

Britain must no doubt have found some encouragement in the position of these two African states, following which she embarked on a diplomatic drive whose aim was to use the latest development in the territory as a basis of negotiation. She was however less successful in the effort. A visit to Tanzania, Botswana, Malawi, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique and Nigeria by the British Prime

161. See Richard Hall, The High Price of Principles : Kaunda and the White South, (London : Hodder and Stoughton, 1969) and R.B. Sutcliffe, 'Zambia and the strains of UDI' The World Today, Vol. XXIII, December 1967, pp.506-511 for an account of the impact of the conflict on the Zambian economy.

162. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1979, p.

163. The ZANU leader, Robert Mugabe, saw the Zambian decision as implicitly asking the liberation movements "to maintain a kind of ceasefire along the railway lines, which would obviously give the enemy some breathing space" Zimbabwe News, Vol. 10, No, 5, September-October, 1978, p.6.

Minister's special envoy, Lord Harlech in June 1979 revealed the strength of opposition of some of those countries to any compromise settlement with the Muzorewa government, contrary to his expressed optimism that there existed some "common ground" between the Frontline States and Muzorewa in recognition of the latest development in the territory. The Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, in his report of the visit acknowledged the opposition¹⁶⁴ by accepting that different views were held as to whether there had been a real transfer of power from the minority to the majority. His statement that "we cannot, nor would we wish to ignore these views" and the promise "to make firm proposals of our own to bring Rhodesia to legal independence on a basis which we believe should be acceptable to the international community"¹⁶⁵ were interpreted as a 'U' -turn in the Government's position.

Prior to this time however, when British policy, to say the least, was proving distressing to the non-aligned states, they were heartened by the United States administration's decision not to lift economic sanctions on Rhodesia. Intended as a gesture in President Carter's continuing effort to improve relations with Africa, and ostensibly as a show of concern for the fate of the people of Rhodesia, the decision was basically a product of Washington's policy to maintain and protect Western interests in the region. As explained by the President:

The position that I have outlined best serves not only American interests but the interests of our allies in a region of the world of increasing importance to us. It should preserve our diplomatic and ties of trade with friendly African governments and also limit - and this is very important - the opportunity of outside powers to take advantage of the situation in Southern Africa at the expense of the United States.¹⁶⁶

164. African Index, op. cit., p.48.

165. House of Lords Debates, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol.401, Cols. 760 and 763.

166. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 79, No.2029, August 1979, p.25.

Notwithstanding African states' detestation to treat the continent as a strategic pawn in the superpower game of spheres-of-influence, the decision received wide acclaim in Africa and the larger non-aligned world. The co-leader of the Patriotic Front, Robert Mugabe, welcomed it as a "stand to support the complete dismantling of the Muzorewa government", while Nigeria hailed it as "statesmanlike, farseeing, and consistent with Carter's moral stance".¹⁶⁷

The extent to which the Carter administration's decision was influenced by non-aligned, and in particular African, pressure is difficult to assess. To accept the US Government's reason of "deep principle"¹⁶⁸ as paramount in reaching the decision dismisses any suggestion of external influence as a factor. Yet it could be argued that Nigeria's economic muscle flexing had some bearing on the administration's stand. In 1978, the US imported 44% of Nigeria's oil export, making Nigeria the second largest supplier.¹⁶⁹ This was at a time when America's doubts about uninterrupted import from Libya in view of Col. Ghaddafi's policies were a source of concern. Nigeria's importance as a major oil exporter could therefore not be underestimated. The prominence given to trade between the two countries, particularly in oil, during the visit of President Carter to Nigeria in 1978 underlined the fact. Nigeria, aware of this importance, indicated to the Carter administration that any decision the U.S. took on Rhodesia might have an effect upon the country's decision to sell oil to America. The implied warning might not be a major determinant, but it could have been an influencing factor on the Carter Administration's policy towards Rhodesia.

167. African Index, op. cit. p.47.

168. Department of State Bulletin, op. cit.

169. Central Bank of Nigeria : Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for the year ended 31 December, 1980, p.94.

It is significant that the U.S. decision not to lift sanctions on Rhodesia tended to place Washington at odds with London's intention to recognize the Muzorewa Government. But because the U.S. would not wish to do anything that could undermine British constitutional authority over the territory; and since Britain valued America's active participation in the search for a solution to the crisis, (in which case it was expedient for her to defer to the U.S. position), consultation continued between them. Such American influence, in addition to pressures from Commonwealth African countries, as we shall soon see, held back the Thatcher Government from recognising the Muzorewa regime.

The Commonwealth Conference, August 1979

The August 1979 Lusaka Commonwealth Conference marked the climax in the diplomatic battle over Rhodesia. For the non-aligned Commonwealth states, the Conference was seen as the last stand in the campaign to persuade Britain to move in the direction of majority rule. Given the stated intentions of the British Government to use the outcome of the Conference as a pretext for recognising the Muzorewa regime, the non-aligned, particularly the African countries, were left in no doubt as to the consequences of a failure to reach an acceptable formula for a settlement. However, recent British Government pronouncements seemed to indicate a shift in policy in favour of genuine majority rule. Evidence of this shift was the Government's decision to take into account the emergent African opinion in formulating any new proposals for a settlement following Lord Harlech's June 1979 tour to the Frontline states, including Nigeria for consultation. Besides, the British pressure on the Muzorewa regime for certain concessions, including the removal of Smith from the Cabinet, reduction of the power of the whites to block constitutional amendments, and, very

significantly, changes in the composition of the all-white Commissions governing entry into and promotion in the civil service, armed forces, the police and the judiciary, were seen as hopeful signs of change in British attitude.¹⁷⁰

Nevertheless some scepticism still existed in non-aligned thinking as to what constituted in British opinion an honourable settlement. The importance the Government continued to attach to the Internal Settlement suggested that any settlement had to be based on it. Margaret Thatcher, the Prime Minister, held strongly to that line right into the Commonwealth Conference as was evident in her August 1979 statement in reference to the April 1979 elections: "I simply do not believe that there is anything now dividing the people of Rhodesia which is worth the use of the bomb and the gun to kill and maim men, women and children by the thousands or which can justify the misery of the hundreds of thousands in refugee camps. In the changes that have now taken place, we surely have the basis from which to try to develop a solution..."¹⁷¹ Although the rider that such a solution should command general international acceptance was soothing, it was not reassuring enough to make the African Commonwealth states feel complacent. Reliance on supposed good intentions of the British Government had not achieved much in the past. Invariably, these countries kept up the pressure on Britain, with the UN and the Havana Non-Aligned Summit Conference insisting that no solution which skirted the fundamental issue of majority would be acceptable.

170. The New York Times, 15 July, 1979, and referred to in African Index, op. cit., p.48.

171. Survey of Current Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 8, August 1979, p.222.

But the most striking pressure came from Nigeria in the flexing of her economic muscle. A few days before the Conference, the country nationalised BP, a British Government owned company which had a large stake in Nigeria's oil industry. Many analysts consider the action to have been mainly responsible for the change in Britain's policy at the Conference. Alex Callinicos in particular is firm in this view, and cites the case of a delegation of British firms with interests in Nigeria (they included BP, Dunlop and Barclays Bank International) to the Foreign Office in a bid to dissuade the Government from recognizing the Muzorewa Government.¹⁷² Lord Carrington, the British Foreign Secretary, however, disputes the claim. He contends that the nationalisation had no real impact on the Government's policy since a decision on Rhodesia had already been made before the nationalisation.¹⁷³

These pressures aside, Britain knew that a breakthrough in terms of a settlement at the Conference required the co-operation of the Frontline States if the Patriotic Front were to be persuaded to accept any settlement proposals. On their part, the Frontline States were anxious to co-operate with Britain to bring about a settlement so as to end the military and economic pressures on them as a result of the conflict. Luckily for both Britain and the Frontline States, the Patriotic Front also seemed to invest some hopes in the Conference for an acceptable solution. If Robert Mugabe was cautious in expressing such hopes, Joshua Nkomo sounded quite optimistic: "We have great deference to the

172. Alex Callinicos, Southern Rhodesia after Zimbabwe, (London : Pluto Press, 1981), pp.47-48.

173. I am grateful to Martyn Gregory for this information given him by the Foreign Secretary in an interview.

Commonwealth and the role it plays internationally for the benefits of our struggle".¹⁷⁴ And on this account he unilaterally declared a ceasefire on the Zambia-Rhodesia border in order to give the Conference a chance to succeed.

It was against this background of a general desire for a settlement that the Lusaka Conference took place. The result of the Conference, embodied in what came to be known as the Lusaka Accord,¹⁷⁵ showed a spirit of give and take on all sides in a typical Commonwealth tradition. On balance, however, the Conference gave a clear gain to the non-aligned Commonwealth states which apparently realised most of their objectives pursued over the years. Very clearly in their favour was the Conference affirmation of a commitment to genuine black majority rule, and the acceptance that it was the constitutional responsibility of Britain to grant legal independence to the territory on the basis of majority rule.

Britain also had something to congratulate herself for. The avoidance of an open condemnation of the Muzorewa regime in place of a mild reproach that the internal settlement constitution was defective in certain important respects (a view held by Margaret Thatcher); and the recognition that "the search for a lasting settlement must involve all parties to the conflict" satisfied the British position of using the changes in the 1979 elections as a basis for negotiation. That in effect implied according some measure of recognition to the Muzorewa government. Deriving from all this were the following decisions:

(i) acceptance of the urgent need to achieve a settlement and bring peace to

174. The Guardian (London), 7 July, 1979.

175. See Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Lusaka, 1-7 August 1979 : Final Communique (London : Commonwealth Secretariat 1979), pp.5-6.

Zimbabwe and its neighbours; (ii) the acceptance that independence on the basis of majority rule required the adoption of a democratic constitution including adequate safeguard for minorities; (iii) an acknowledgement that the government formed under such an independence constitution must be chosen through free and fair elections properly supervised under British Government authority, and with Commonwealth supervision. The advancement of these objectives obliged Britain to convene a constitutional conference to be attended by all parties to the conflict. The conference welcomed such a meeting, and made it "a major objective to bring about a cessation of hostilities and an end to sanctions as part of the process of implementation of a lasting settlement". This marked the start of the journey to the crucial Lancaster House negotiations.

The first step in the process of implementing the decisions was how to sell the accord to the parties involved in the conflict. To Muzorewa and Ian Smith, the outcome of the conference represented a setback in their hope of gaining international recognition which would have ended sanctions, and which the British Government had earlier indicated to do. All that was not forthcoming, and with the war still raging, the Muzorewa Government stood clearly undermined by the failure to fulfil its election promise of achieving recognition, ending sanctions and winning the peace. The attitude of the Patriotic Front was no less disapproving. Whatever hopes it had entertained proved disappointing in its assessment of the Lusaka Accord as being "unduly favourable to the Salisbury regime and Britain".¹⁷⁶ In the opinion of the Front, the whole agreement was simply a British strategy to attempt to consolidate imperialism in Rhodesia by granting legitimacy to the

176. Robert Mugabe in an interview with Martyn Gregory, 18 November, 1979.

Muzorewa regime and bolstering its international position.

Although the Patriotic Front had persistently maintained that the decolonisation of Rhodesia was primarily a British responsibility, it was at this stage reluctant to substitute wholly British authority for a more visible international role in the form of UN involvement. Having secured recognition from the Non-Aligned Movement and to a degree from the United Nations, the Patriotic Front felt that giving such prominence to Britain in any settlement, as the Lusaka Conference had proposed, could only rob it of the international support it had received thus far. This formed part of the Front's criticism of the Lusaka Accord as contained in a joint Mugabe/Nkomo statement of 18 August, 1979 in Dar-es-Salaam.¹⁷⁷ The statement advanced the following points in arguing against British supervision of the elections:

- (i) By the fact of the advance of the armed struggle, resulting, as it claimed, in the establishment of firm control over a vast region of the territory, the Patriotic Front had become the only dominant force against the regime, thus diminishing the role of Britain as a decolonizing power to the extent to which it had become merely nominal.
- (ii) The British Government, having publicly endorsed the April 1979 elections as "free and fair", and having pronounced themselves in favour of lifting sanctions had shown itself to be biased in favour of the illegal regime, and so had forfeited the right to supervise the process of change.
- (iii) Any proposed scheme for solving the conflict must be consistent with the course which the international community represented by the UN had

177. 'The Basic Political Position of the Patriotic Front', Zimbabwe News, Vol. II, No. 2, July-August 1979, p.35.

prescribed and advocated over the years. Here the statement referred to a 1977 Security Council resolution at the request of Britain empowering the UN to supervise elections in the colony under the Anglo/American plan; and a March 1978 Security Council resolution rejecting the Internal Settlement and called for a solution based on UN resolutions.

The criticism of the Patriotic Front implied the existence of disagreement between it and the Frontline States which were the main architects of the Lusaka accord. The disagreement surfaced at the 1979 Havana Non-Aligned Conference where in a meeting with the Patriotic Front, the Frontline State presidents demanded an end to the war.¹⁷⁸ Although the Havana Conference declared its unqualified support for the position of the Patriotic Front in any settlement scheme, the Frontline State presidents brought considerable pressure on the Patriotic Front to attend the proposed Lancaster House Conference, despite the objections of the latter. So insistent were the Frontline States on a settlement that the Patriotic Front felt it had been let down by the Frontline States over their joint position in response to the Anglo/American plan. The disappointment of the Front was mirrored in the comments of its co-leaders. Joshua Nkomo, in describing the attitude of the Frontline States admitted that "the pressure on us to reach a settlement was intense".¹⁷⁹ Robert Mugabe, unhappy that the views of the Patriotic Front was virtually ignored sadly remarked:

Thus we were in a position in which the Frontline States, an important element in the international forces that support us, had shifted their stance away from the joint principles we shared

178. The Economist, 22 September, 1979.

179. Nkomo : The Story of My Life, (London, Methuen, 1984) p.193.

and worked together at the time of the Anglo/American plan.... We saw the agreement as a British manoeuvre, not a Commonwealth initiative, and we still hold to that view. We felt that the Frontline States had sold us short in the sense that the status accorded us by the OAU and the UN was effectively negated by Lusaka and its provision for the Lancaster House Conference.¹⁸⁰

But like Smith and Muzerowa, the Patriotic Front had no choice under such pressure but to go to Lancaster House.

The Lancaster House Conference

Throughout the period of the Lancaster House Conference, the Patriotic Front remained under great pressure by the Frontline States to negotiate seriously. Having committed themselves to the Lusaka Accord, the Frontline presidents felt honour bound to support the agreement, notwithstanding the objections of the Patriotic Front. And although the Front was critical of the Lusaka agreement for what it considered as the conspicuous British hand in it, this time it submitted to an even more prominent British role. Such a role conformed with both UN and non-aligned calls on Britain to shoulder her colonial responsibility and convene an all party constitutional conference to work out a genuine independence of the colony.

On many occasions, the Lancaster House Conference was threatened by issues, both trivial and substantive. As a result of a good deal of posturing, the Conference got off to a controversial start over sitting plan. The Patriotic Front, in order to avoid giving any sort of legitimacy to the Muzorewa delegation, refused to sit opposite it. The argument of the Front was that the negotiations were mainly between Britain and itself, and therefore, it should face the British team

180. Interview with Robert Mugabe, op. cit.

in the sitting arrangement. Britain turned down this demand as a gesture of respect to the Muzorewa Government. And the Patriotic Front only backed down after "some sharp telephone words" from the Mozambican observers who warned it that such an inconsequential issue should not be allowed to disrupt the Conference.¹⁸¹

The most serious contentious issues, however, concerned land policy, and the position of the guerrilla forces in a transitional period of any settlement agreement. The land problem, symbolized in the 1930 Land Apportionment Act constituted one major issue in the conflict. In the view of the Patriotic Front - a view arising from the promises of liberation politics, the credibility of any African majority government, indeed its survival, depended almost entirely on the land question. With over 50% of the land allocated to the white minority which constituted about a mere five percent of the population, the need for a radical land reform could not be ignored. But how to effect such a reform without inflicting any financial loss to the white land owners presented an issue. The Patriotic Front was uncompromising over the land question and appeared unimpressed by arguments of financial constraint. The intervention of the United States, with a promise to help finance a multilateral fund that would compensate expropriated white farmers, saved the Conference from floundering on this issue.¹⁸²

The subject of the position of the liberation forces during a transition period to independence was settled by Britain's recognition of the guerrillas on an equal basis to the Rhodesian army, and the agreement to place both forces under

181. The Economist, 15 September, 1979.

182. Martyn Gregory, 'Rhodesia : From Lusaka to Lancaster House', The World Today, Vol. 36, No. 1, January 1980, p.16.

the control of the British Governor during the transition. But the agreement was almost marred by disagreement over the number of assembly points the liberation forces were to report to. The Patriotic Front's concern for the safety of its forces, prompted by a suspicion against the intentions of the Salisbury security establishment, presented a threat to most of the issues already agreed upon. It was the firm intervention of President Samora Machel of Mozambique that got the Patriotic Front into line.¹⁸³ But a more serious obstacle to a final agreement was the reservation of twenty seats for the whites in the independence constitution which the Patriotic Front saw as racist. Once again under pressure, the Front abandoned its opposition to it.

With all the major disagreement cleared, the argument now was about the mechanism of effecting a hitch-free transfer of power to an elected majority government, which raised the question of who should conduct the elections. The Patriotic Front, while recognising British colonial authority, nevertheless preferred a UN supervised election as envisaged and agreed upon in the abandoned Anglo/American plan. Britain considered it her duty to conduct and supervise any such election, and in this she had the firm support of President Nyerere and other Frontline State presidents, who, however, suggested a compromise whereby a Commonwealth team would monitor the elections.¹⁸⁴ The Patriotic Front, feeling isolated, was forced to concede to British supervision. The issue represented one of the most important disagreements between the Patriotic Front and the

183. See Martyn Gregory, 'The Zimbabwe Election : The political and military implications', Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, October 1980, p.23. According to this author, Samora Machel was said to have urged the Patriotic Front to sign the Lancaster Agreement stating quite clearly that "we cannot go on beyond 1980".

184. Martyn Gregory, 'Rhodesia : From Lusaka to Lancaster House', op. cit. p.17.

Frontline States, for which Robert Mugabe accused the former of abandoning "the principle of UN supervised elections and transition which was enshrined in our joint approach to the Anglo-American plan." This, he pointed out, "was a hypocritical position which made it impossible for us to argue for a UN force when important Commonwealth leaders and Frontline State presidents were opposed to the idea. Thus both Nyerere and Kaunda became prisoners within walls they helped construct in Lusaka".¹⁸⁵

And yet one more area of disagreement remained between Britain and the Patriotic Front; the issue of the duration of the transition period. Whereas the Front demanded a minimum of six months which would give it sufficient time to prepare for the elections, Britain offered a maximum of two months. It required the personal intervention of President Kaunda whose proposal of a two month period starting from the completion of a cease-fire settled the question.¹⁸⁶

Generally, the negotiating strategy of the Patriotic Front at Lancaster was to exploit its battlefield successes to squeeze enough concessions from the Ian Smith/Muzerowa camp; a strategy which Robert Mugabe put bluntly in these words: "We have used the Conference to consolidate our political position achieved as a result of our armed struggle".¹⁸⁷ Indeed, the military situation at the time had created new political possibilities which together with external pressure made the Patriotic Front to develop a more serious negotiating attitude. The confidence the Front exhibited in making concessions derived from the belief that in that phase of the war, the achievements on the ground stood firmly

185. Interview with Robert Mugabe.

186. Kaunda visited London from 8-11 November 1979 during which period he held separate talks with each side in the negotiations. This helped resolve many of the sticking points in reaching an agreement. See Survey of Current Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 12, December 1979, p.368.

187. Interview with Robert Mugabe .

irreversible, to enhance a political settlement, if need be to a military victory.

In other words, Lancaster House could be seen as the political front of the shooting war, intended, as the ZANU leader said, to show the world the commitment of the Patriotic Front to democracy, and to the ballot box as being complementary to the armed struggle.¹⁸⁸ In the end the commitment to democracy prevailed and the guns were silenced. In April 1980, independence came to Rhodesia under its new name of Zimbabwe, thus bringing one more chapter of colonial rule in Africa to a close.

Crucial to this outcome was of course the role of the non-aligned, and in particular the Frontline States. Through a co-ordinated political and diplomatic campaign in support of the liberation struggle, the non-aligned countries brought considerable moral pressure to bear on Britain, the colonial power, to exert her authority over Rhodesia in reaching a settlement of the crisis. And her acceptance to do that was reciprocated by the non-aligned pressure on the liberation movement to compromise. Mr. Simbi Mubako, the head of the ZANU legal team to the Lancaster House negotiations, commenting on such pressure, especially by the Frontline States, said: "I must admit we were forced to accept it (the Lancaster House Agreement)".¹⁸⁹

188. Ibid.

189. Diana Mitchell in an interview with Mr. Mubako, and quoted in African Nationalist Leaders in Zimbabwe; Who's Who.1980 by Diana Mitchell (Salisbury; Diana Mitchell, April 1980), p.19.

CHAPTER 7. MATERIAL AND STRATEGIC SUPPORT

In his address to the January 1979 Maputo extraordinary meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, Robert Mugabe, the co-leader of the Patriotic Front said: "Among our allies and friends is the Non-Aligned Movement. This Movement's commitment to the liquidation of colonialism and imperialism is a matter of public record. We have appreciated your political, moral, diplomatic and material support in the past. Today we call upon you to increase your help to match the intensification of the war by our combatants."¹ The demand of Mugabe goes to underline the importance of external material assistance in any guerrilla war. Coincidental it may be, yet it is worth observing the order in which Mugabe arranged the forms of non-aligned support. This conformed with the practice whereby material assistance comes in the wake of diplomatic support. Having declared the struggle as legitimate, and proceeding from there to accord recognition to the national liberation movements as the representative of the people of the colony, it became obligatory on the non-aligned movement to give the necessary material assistance to the liberation movements. This accounted for the calls on member-states to render all possible aid to the colony's liberation struggle.

The Development of Material Support

Before the actual launching of the armed struggle in 1966, no specific call for material support was made by the non-aligned movement in aid of the Zimbabwe struggle. In fact the official declaration of the 1961 Belgrade Conference did not even refer to Rhodesia among the colonial territories mentioned. The interpretation of this omission seems to be that at that time the

1. Robert Mugabe, Our War of Liberation (Gweru : Mambo Press, 1983) p.200.

Zimbabwe situation was yet to receive the non-aligned movement's diplomatic backing. The 1964 Cairo Conference gave the diplomatic support but left out any mention of material assistance probably because the liberation movements were still to prove themselves militarily. It was only after the launching of the armed struggle in the wake of UDI that calls for material assistance came to be made with increasing frequency in response to the intensification of the war. The 1970 Lusaka summit acknowledged the existence of a war of liberation in the territory by asking for material support to the liberation movements. In a separate resolution on Zimbabwe, the official declaration of the Conference, after recalling recent OAU resolution, CM/Res. 235 (xv) and various United Nations' Security Council resolutions on the colony, came out forthrightly in expressing "solidarity with the people of Zimbabwe", and urged member-states to provide increased moral and material assistance to the liberation movements "in order to render their struggle more effective".² From then on, the need for material support became a component of all resolutions on Zimbabwe.

To what extent these calls were effected is what constitutes the burden of the first part of this chapter. We have already seen in Chapter 5 that one concrete action at the corporate level was the establishment of the Support and Solidarity Fund for the Liberation of Southern Africa. Though not specifically for the Zimbabwe struggle, the Fund's geographic delineation qualified that colony's movements as beneficiaries. In addition to cash donation, the Fund also welcomed non-financial contributions, but these were to be sent to the African Liberation Committee (ALC) of the OAU in Dar-es-Salaam.

2. Lusaka Declaration in Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, Vol. XXI, No. 491, 20 September 1970, p.32.

There is scarcely any information as to how the cash contributions are disbursed to the liberation movements. But since other material contributions are handled by the ALC, thus making the Committee an agent of the non-aligned movement, and considering that the non-aligned movement and the OAU have overlapping membership, it is reasonable to treat the work of the ALC as forming an integral part of the non-aligned movement's corporate assistance to the Zimbabwe struggle; a point already clarified in the introduction to this study.

The African Liberation Committee as Instrument of Decolonization

The ALC occupies a special place in the scheme of the OAU. As the instrument of decolonization, the Committee gives practical meaning to the anti-colonial principle of the OAU. An indication of the Committee's importance is its essence as the rallying point of African states. Whatever disagreement marked the establishment of the OAU in May 1963 disappeared almost immediately at the suggestion of the creation of the Committee.³ In a sense, therefore, the

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3. It is important to note that the actual suggestion for the establishment of a separate body to serve liberation needs was made by the liberation movements themselves. Kenya's Oginga Odinga, representing the movements, proposed the setting up of an "African Liberation Bureau" whose functions should be (a) to co-ordinate the struggle for African liberation in all non-independent territories; (b) to receive, distribute and transport funds and other forms of aid, including military equipment and personnel, on behalf of the liberation movements; (c) to administer the refugee relief programme for Africans from war-torn and otherwise victimized African territories; (d) to ensure the security and protection of leaders and personnel of African national liberation movements operating outside their respective countries due to hard conditions at home; (e) to organize the training of personnel for administrative, military and diplomatic service; (f) to co-ordinate information, propaganda and research for total African liberation; and (g) to confer with the leaders of African national liberation movements. Source: Zdenek Cervenka, 'Major policy shifts in the Organization of African Unity, 1963-1973' in K. Ingham (ed.) Foreign Relations of African States, (London, Butterworths & Co. Ltd., 1974).

ALC symbolized the spirit of African Unity, as Doudou Thiam, Senegal's former Minister of Foreign Affairs would agree: "decolonization is undoubtedly the subject which commends the greatest measure of unity between the various African countries".⁴ One only needs to look at the African political scene prior to 1963 to appreciate the wisdom of Doudou Thiam.

Before 1963, African politics featured a contest between two groups - the Monrovia and the Casablanca camps. It is generally contended that the major difference between the groups centred on the issue of continental unity. Whereas the Monrovia states, consisting of the moderates, favoured a functionalist and regionalist approach to unity, the other group representing the radicals stood for an immediate political union. This difference in approach to continental unity basically determined the trend of debate at the 1963 Conference of Independent African States. At one stage when the debate became increasingly acrimonious, it was the liberation factor injected by President Ben Bella of Algeria which saved the meeting from running into more threatening controversy. His now famous call for the need "to die a little or even completely so that the peoples still under colonial domination may be free and African unity may not be a vain word"⁵ immediately set the Conference on the liberation course and became the prime mover in the creation of the ALC.

Ben Bella's speech generated a sense of unity among the delegates and in their competition to outdo each other in professing support for liberation, the conference heard several countries including Uganda, Sudan and Congo (B) offering

4. Doudou Thiam, The Foreign Policy of African States, (London : Phoenix House, 1965) p.85.

5. Proceedings of the Summit Conference of Independent African States, Addis Ababa, OAU Secretariat, 1963, Vol. 1, p.27.

their territories as training ground for freedom fighters. The Tanzanian leader, Julius Nyerere, crowned it all in his promise that "The time for allowing our brethren to struggle unaided has gone; from now on our brethren in non-independent Africa should be helped by independent Africa".⁶ Such a massive display of anti-colonial fervour puts in better perspective the position of the radicals that continental unity presupposes a totally liberated Africa, and underlines the saying that unity is a subject for free people, and not for the enslaved.

The establishment of the ALC marked a watershed in Africa's anti-colonial campaign. It signalled the end of the first phase of constitutional decolonization, and the beginning of the second era featuring armed struggle in response to the intransigence of certain colonial authorities. The overall policy of the Committee reflected the new situation: "Where the colonial powers showed no sign or willingness to recognize the right of the people to self-determination and independence, the Committee would use all means at its disposal to help in the achievement of independence".⁷ It was this shift to armed strategy which defined the functions of the ALC. These in broad terms are: to co-ordinate liberation activities; to promote the unity of the liberation movements; and to co-ordinate aid to the liberation movements. In its role of aiding the movements, the Committee serves as the channel of assistance to the liberation organizations, and has consequently developed a working relationship with the UN Decolonization Committee and the Non-Aligned Movement, whose liberation fund it helps to administer.

Despite the euphoria surrounding the creation of the Committee, and in

6. Ibid, p.34.

7. Africa Diary, 27 July - 2 August, 1963, p.1936

spite of the importance attached to it with regard to the situation in Southern Africa, the ALC has been the most criticized and perhaps the most controversial organ of the OAU. Very much criticized are its structure, membership, and financing. With an administrative set-up that ties its hand to the OAU bureaucratic machine, a membership that exposes it to competing ideological and national interests and interference, and above all a financial backing that does little more than wet the fighting appetite of the liberation movements, it was not surprising to find many states becoming disenchanted with the work of the Committee. The clash between President Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere in 1964 over the choice of Dar-es-Salaam as the Committee's headquarters, the controversy about membership which at the OAU Accra Summit in 1965 saw Nyerere threaten to withdraw from the OAU if Malawi, accused of being anti-liberation, was appointed and the perennial arguments about the size of its budget, revealed some of the problems which beset the Committee from the outset. Soon the initial enthusiasm which greeted its birth in the expectation of an early overthrow of the colonial regimes in Southern Africa could no longer be sustained in the face of the barrage of criticisms against it. Even the liberation movements it was created to serve were no less charitable. The criticism portrayed the Committee as ineffective and so generated a feeling of disillusionment among many of the member states with its operations. It is against this background that one can appreciate the extreme suggestion of Tunisia's President, Habib Bourguiba, in November 1966, to scrap the Committee.⁸

Liberation Unity as Condition for Aid, and the Divisions within the Zimbabwe Nationalist Movement

Many of the criticisms against the Committee appear to be unduly harsh in that they fail to take account of the fact that a great deal of the Committee's

8. Africa Research Bulletin, November, 1966, p.652.

problems were external to it, and one of these was the issue of disunity in the nationalist camp in most territories. Not even the threatening condition of making ALC aid dependent on the formation of a united liberation front could coerce the movements into line. With reference to Zimbabwe, it has been suggested with some justification that the relative ineffectiveness of the colony's liberation movements in the 1960s and up to the early seventies stemmed mainly from the fragmentation in the nationalist camp, a view strongly shared by Kenneth Grundy.⁹ Surely the history of the movements makes the suggestion incontrovertible.

From the birth of ZAPU in 1961 to the formation of the Patriotic Front in 1976, the story of the Zimbabwean national liberation movement had been one of splits and coalitions characterized by intense competition for recognition and external resources. It was the split in ZAPU which gave birth to ZANU in August, 1964. In October 1971, some breakaway elements from ZAPU and ZANU, led by Nathan Shamuyarira, Shelton Siwela and James Chikerema formed a new movement, FROLIZI, after they had failed in their efforts to unite ZAPU and ZANU.

The founders of FROLIZI had no doubt assumed that there existed among the masses a measure of widespread disenchantment with the feuding between the two older movements, in which case the formation of FROLIZI was expected to provoke a mass exodus from ZAPU and ZANU to the new movement in order to rejuvenate the armed struggle. This line of reasoning was reflected in Shamuyarira's explanation of why FROLIZI was formed: to secure liberation unity and bring to an end the "shameful chapter in the history of our struggle in which ZAPU and ZANU were more often at each others throat than they cared to fight the real

9. Kenneth Grundy, Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa; The Limits of Independence, (Berkely, The University of California Press, 1973), p.181.

enemy".¹⁰ Thus FROLIZI put up itself as the standard bearer of the colony's struggle around which the people were to be united. FROLIZI failed in its unity objective and became one other distinct liberation movement so that where before there existed 'two-movement' disunity, we now had three organizations to be united. In that same year of 1971 another movement, the African National Council (ANC) under the leadership of Bishop Abel Muzorewa, came into existence with the declared objective of seeking a "non-violent" and "just" settlement of the crisis.¹¹ No doubt all the liberation movements spoke the language of anti-colonialism; yet their mutual jealousy ran so deep that the two main rivals - ZAPU and ZANU - would even refuse joint training of their forces, and also reject joint participation in such minor public relations-inspired activities like cultural events.¹²

So much has been written, some patently partisan, on the causes of the division within the nationalist movement that a detailed analysis of these here is unnecessary.¹³ Suffice it to say that the main causes of disunity were ideological,

10. 'Shamuyarira : Explanation of why FROLIZI was formed' in Christopher Nyangoni and Gideon Nyandoro, (ed.), Zimbabwe Independence Movements; Select Documents, (London, Rex Collings, 1979), p.172.
11. 'African National Council : Aims and Objects, Salisbury, 10 March 1972' in Nyangoni and Nyandoro, *Ibid*, pp.231-234.
12. Mugabe in an interview with Liberation Support Movement and published in New African, May, 1979, p.35. Mugabe tells of Nkomo's refusal of offer by Ethiopia's Mangistu for joint training of Zimbabwe fighters, and his objection to a joint ZANU/ZAPU cultural troupe to Cuba.
13. For literature on the divisions within the nationalist movement, see Simbi Mubako, 'The Quest for Unity in the Zimbabwe Liberation Movement', ISSUE, Vol. V, No.1, Spring 1975, pp.7-17; John Day, 'The Divisions of the Rhodesian African Nationalist Movement', The World Today, Vol.33, No.11, October 1977; David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe; The Chimurenga War (London, Faber and Faber Ltd. 1981); and Kees Maxey, The Fight for Zimbabwe : The Armed Conflict in Southern Rhodesia since UDI, (London, Rex Collings, 1975). See also Witness Mangwende, The Organization of African Unity and the Zimbabwe Crisis: A Case Study in OAU attempts at Collective Liberation; 1963-1977, An unpublished PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1980; Nkomo, The Story of My Life (London, Methuen Ltd. 1984), Chapter 11; and Patrick O'Meara, Aspects of African Political Opposition and Political Conflict in Rhodesia. A PhD dissertation, Department of Political Science, Indiana University, 1970.

personal, tribal and strategic differences. Some authors have given considerable, even primary, importance to the tribal factor, on the basic assumption that the tribe is the framework for understanding African affairs. I.M. Lewis happens to belong to this group of analysts. After making one or two exceptions of countries free from tribal disruptions in national life, Lewis came clean in his attachment to the ethnic factor when he said: "If we want to find true examples of nations, we have to fall back on the traditional tribal components of these pluralistic new states", and went on to add that tribal loyalties still remain in most of the new African states highly significant.¹⁴ Patrick O'Meara is hesitant to go along fully with this viewpoint, and maintains in relation to the Zimbabwean situation that "the ethnic factor is secondary to the power play" within the nationalist movement.¹⁵ Other analysts tend to emphasize the ideological, leadership, or strategic factors. For example, Simbi Mubako bases his analysis of the divisions on the differences in liberation strategy, ideology and personality, but only considers tribalism as a factor in ZAPU's intra-party conflict, which he presents as constituting the obstacle to ZAPU/ZANU unity.¹⁶

But ZANU could not be said to be immune to tribal cleavage. It is true that the movement from 1970 adopted a more pronounced and clearly defined ideological position which in certain respects set it apart from ZAPU. Its political programme of August 1972, declaring the transformation of the movement from "a nationalist political party to a revolutionary movement", accepted applying

14. I.M. Lewis, 'The Tribal Factor in Contemporary Africa', Africa Contemporary Record, 1969/70, pp.A12-A16.

15. Patrick O'Meara, op. cit. p.138.

16. Simbi Mubako, op. cit.

"Scientific Socialism and Marxism-Leninism to the objective and subjective conditions in Zimbabwe".¹⁷ Such a revolutionary pose did not of course eliminate the ethnic conflict within the movement. Like ZAPU, ZANU was also riven by ethnic rivalry as emerged in the report of the Special International Commission on the death of Herbert Chitepo in 1975. Much of the evidence before the Commission pointed to Chitepo's death being a result of the power tussle within the Manyikas (to which Chitepo belonged) and the Karangas within the movement.¹⁸ By simply ignoring the same ethnic rivalry within ZANU, Mubako portrays himself as a ZANU sympathiser (which, of course, he was), and so might be grouped with those ZANU cadres who clung tenaciously to the ideological and strategic factors of disunity in their presentation of the organization as a revolutionary movement.¹⁹

On the other hand, John Day plays down the ideological factor and stresses the ambitions of the leaders for political aggrandisement as a major cause of the division.²⁰ Since he minimizes the ideological difference, John Day is naturally

17. 'Zimbabwe African National Union: Mwenje No. 2. ZANU's Political Programme, Lusaka, Zambia, 1 August 1972 in Nyangoni and Nyandoro, op. cit. pp.251-252.

18. Report of the Special International Commission on the Assassination of Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo, Lusaka, March 1975.

19. This is the picture that emerged throughout the interview of Eddison Zuobgo, ZANU's Publicity Secretary with Fletcher Forum, Vol. 3, Part 1, January 1979. On the differences between ZAPU and ZANU, he said, "The differences are mainly ideological. Secondly there are organizational differences. ZAPU does not stress ideology. It simply has straightforward military training just like the Western soldier who is simply taught to shoot. There is no political stress. For our fellows, the position is that before you can handle a gun, you must undergo strict political training".

20. John Day, 'The Divisions of the Rhodesian African Nationalist Movement,' The World Today, Vol. 33, No. 11, October 1977, p.392.

reluctant to attach any importance to the divergence in strategic approach. And he supports this position by arguing that all the political leaders agreed to a negotiated settlement of the crisis but only reverted to guerrilla activities from time to time whenever peace talks failed.²¹ This of course might be typical of the tactics of Nkomo, Muzorewa and Sithole but not exactly so of Mugabe who consistently maintained the need for the primacy of the armed struggle.

The divisions within the Zimbabwe nationalist movement presented the ALC with the problem of how to ensure the maximum utilization of whatever aid was allocated to the colony's struggle. Officially, the ALC insisted on the formation of a united front as one condition for aid. But it knew that left to the liberation movements alone, the divisions would continue and thus limit the potentiality of its aid. This brings us to considering the Committee's quest for the unity of the movements.

The Quest of the ALC for Zimbabwe Liberation Unity

The disunity in the nationalist camp involved a great deal of ALC effort to create a common front for the colony's liberation movement. These efforts were very often unsuccessful and in certain instances led paradoxically to an exacerbation of the problem. Apart from the reluctance of the liberation movements to accept what they considered to be a dictated unity, the interference of individual states in the affairs of the movements made unity bids a rather frustrating undertaking. Far from being neutral, some independent African states, for reasons of ideological preference, strategic consideration and

21. Ibid, p.388.

personal friendship with particular nationalist leaders, were known to choose sides in the quarrels of the movements. At the level of the Frontline States, Zambia looked more favourably on Nkomo's ZAPU, whereas Tanzania, and after some initial hesitation, Mozambique, preferred ZANU. In a way the operational zones of the movements also reflected the choices of these countries. While ZAPU conducted its attacks from across the Zambian border, ZANU had as its main front the north-eastern region bordering Mozambique.

Sometimes outside interference assumed the form of pressure on a movement to integrate with another under a particular leadership, as was recommended by Nigeria to ZANU to merge with ZAPU under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo. Mugabe refused, saying that "We do not respond to that kind of interference in our decision-making".²² Such involvement in the affairs of the movements often created problems for the countries concerned as they wrestled with the dilemma of whether to subordinate their national interests to the wider policy of the ALC on liberation unity. Joshua Nkomo's protestation against external meddling, while ostensibly aimed at Julius Nyerere whom he accused of creating ZANU, represented the general feeling of the movements. "It would be hypocritical of me", he said, "if I did not state frankly that some of our independent brothers in their cruel kindness, have, through their preferences of individuals, contributed persistently to the division by encouraging these individuals either to split or opt out of solemn unity agreements".²³ Nkomo may have been right, but surely the greater part of the blame

22. New African. May, 1979, p.36.

23. 'African National Council: Statement to the 13th OAU Summit on the Zimbabwe struggle by Joshua Nkomo, 2 July, 1976 in Nyangoni and Nyandoro, op. cit, p.439.

for disunity rested with the nationalist leaders. Outsiders were only too pleased to exploit the division to their selfish ends.

It might be well to recall how the question of unity among liberation movements had been a nagging problem in OAU anti-colonial politics. Over Angola, the antagonism between the MPLA, FLNA and UNITA created such differences within the OAU that the role of the ALC in aiding that colony's struggle was almost discredited. The lining up of countries behind the various movements rendered the attempts to establish a united front in Angola more tasking. Eventually the OAU found itself debating whether unity was indeed a vital condition for the successful prosecution of the war.

The positions of Tanzania and Algeria broadly represented the opposing views on the question of liberation unity. President Julius Nyerere, with reference to Zimbabwe, argued for unity as a necessary condition for the advancement of the anti-colonial struggle. It was a disgrace, he said, that ZANU and ZAPU should compete in the face of a common danger posed by white minority rule.²⁴ Algeria, however, took a different view. At the 1964 OAU summit in Cairo, President Ben Bella made the point that unity could not be imposed from outside. With the benefit of his own country's experience, he said:

24. The Nationalist (Dar-es-Salaam) 12 October 1965, and cited in E. Dube, 'Relations between Liberation Movements and the OAU', in Nathan Shamuyarira, ed, Essays on the Liberation of Southern Africa, (Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House, 1975) p.43. In later years, Nyerere seemed to have adopted a less rigid position on liberation unity as implied in the following statement: "The struggle for human liberation, in all its aspects, is thus a difficult, complex and continuing one. There will be genuine difference of opinion about priorities, and about measures among people who are working for the same ends". Julius Nyerere, 'Process of Liberation', Address given at the Convocation of University of Ibadan, Nigeria, 17 November 1976.

I would like to draw your attention to the emotional concept of unity. I know by experience that unity is one phase of the struggle for liberation that is not easily reached, whatever the efforts..... Perhaps you have formed a picture of the Algerian liberation and believe that we were united as one man. This is completely false.²⁵

Thus, Algeria, as indicated earlier in Chapter 5, maintained a policy of extending aid to all movements, contrary to the ALC's general principle. Curiously enough the ALC itself lacked the firmness to stick to the general principle of assisting only one united front in each colonial territory.

The ALC's quest to unite the Zimbabwean movements started with the Tanzania/Malawi mission appointed by the 1964 Cairo Summit Conference "to offer their good offices to the nationalist parties in Southern Rhodesia so as to bring about a united front of all liberation movements for the rapid attainment of their common objective of independence."²⁶ The mission failed. Another attempt represented by the Committee of six²⁷ set up in June 1965 by the Lagos meeting of the Special Session of the Council of Ministers also foundered. A sub-committee appointed in August 1965 and composed of Egypt, Algeria and Nigeria fared no better.²⁸ Thereafter the ALC on its own, and also working through the good offices of the Frontline States, attempted over a dozen unity bids.

25. E. Dube, *ibid.*

26. Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 8, 1964, p.134C.

27. The Committee comprised Zambia, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Malawi and Tanzania.

28. E. Dube, *op. cit.*, p.49.

From the start, the unity efforts of the ALC were hardly well received by the liberation movements. Although the Committee could confidently act from a position of strength through the use of recognition either as reward or sanction, it was nevertheless aware of the need to enlist the co-operation of all the factions to achieve a viable unity. It realized that it faced an awkward situation whereby the movements showed open hostility to dictated unity on the one hand, and on the other hand solicited for intervention to create that unity. Notwithstanding such a contradiction, the Committee knew that the overriding desire of the movements in their relationship with it remained the retention and assertion of their independence. The desire was borne out in ZANU's subtle warning to the OAU against pushing unity too fast. Its admonition that "while we welcome the advice from our friends on the question of unity, it is our submission that the final decision should be left to the people of Zimbabwe who are specially engaged in the fighting"²⁹ buttresses the Algerian contention that unity at all cost could be a dangerous proposition. To the ZANU stand might be added FROLIZI's view of the ALC's role on unity: "The task of the Committee today, as we see it, is not to set up more conciliation Commissions but to lend support to and consolidate the unity already achieved".³⁰

These suggestions were not lost on the Committee. As a result it compromised its stated policy and gave separate recognition to ZANU and ZAPU in the 1960s, and quite inexplicable extended aid

29. 'Zimbabwe African National Union : Memorandum submitted to the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa meeting in Mogadishu, Somalia, 15-20 October 1973, in Nyangoni and Nyandoro, op cit. pp. 273-274.

30. 'FROLIZI : Memorandum to the Liberation Committee of the Organisation of African Unity. January, 1972, in Nyangoni and Nyandoro, ibid, p.227.

to FROLIZI which was not formally recognized all through its existence. By these measures, it appeared that the ALC had come to accept the reality of disunity. That, however, was not the case. The Committee continued to press for unity, and the defiance of the movements soon incurred the displeasure of the OAU, with the threat of withdrawal of material assistance. This precisely was the recommendation of the Committee of Six of the Council of Ministers at its 1965 Accra meeting: that the ALC should suspend all forms of assistance to both ZANU and ZAPU as long as they resisted the call for unity.³¹

The failure to reach a negotiated settlement of the colony's crisis in the 1960s focussed increased attention on the promotion of the armed struggle in the 1970s, which in turn increased the pressure for liberation unity. But the realities of the sixties and part of the seventies seemed to suggest that these unity drives were premature since each movement tended to believe that it could prevail over the rest in the long run to emerge as the only fighting force. Invariably what was reported to be the formation of a common front in 1970 was immediately dismissed as "false and groundless" by a ZANU spokesman.³²

The first prospects for unity came in January 1972 at the Benghazi meeting of the ALC where ZANU and ZAPU were pressed into signing a declaration of intention "to achieve the unity of the people of Zimbabwe for their liberation through the armed struggle".³³ Following this, both movements submitted a

31. Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 10, 1965, p.378C.

32. 'Zimbabwe African National Union : Press Statement issued by the Supreme Council (DARE), Lusaka, 19 April 1971' in Nyangoni and Nyandoro (ed.) op. cit., p.170.

33. See Reports of the 19th and 20th Ordinary Session of the OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, CM/430/Rev. 1.

'Draft Programme of Joint Action' on policy and military matters to the OAU at the end of a meeting in Mbeya, Tanzania in March 1972.³⁴ Although political union proved elusive, the movements showed outward understanding in strategic co-operation by the creation of a Joint Military Command (JMC). But shortly after, they returned to their usual game of split and hostilities, only paying lip service to unity in the propaganda campaign to attract OAU assistance.

Predictably, the differences between them grew wider, their relationship became characterised by accusations and counter-accusations of obstructing unity, while they displayed bitter contempt for one another. It was now left for each movement to promote its claim of being the true representative of the people. Consequently ZANU boasted in October 1973 to have united all the fighting men under its umbrella:

All of them without exception who came into contact with ZANLA forces - whether they were ZAPU or ANC or any other organisation - gave themselves to fight under the banner of ZANU which is spear-heading the fight through its military wing. This unity carved in action and cemented in blood, forms the basis and permanent solution towards complete unity of the people of Zimbabwe.³⁵

But ZANU knew that the claim was far-fetched so long as ZAPU continued to treat it as a splinter group. In fact in the opinion of some ZAPU leaders, ZANU as a movement did not even exist.³⁶

34. Simbi Mubako, op. cit. p.11.

35. 'Zimbabwe African National Union : Memorandum submitted to the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa meeting in Mogadishu, Somalia, 15-20 October, 1973' in Nyangoni and Nyandoro (ed) op. cit. p.273.

36. See interview on 22 September, 1976 by Mozambique Information Agency with Dzinashe Machingura, a ZAPU member and Political Commissair in ZIPA. Reprinted in Issue, 7; 1977, p.15.

On its part, FROLIZI, the new comer, raised the stakes higher in the propaganda war on unity. Desperately in need of recognition, it unleashed a virulent attack on ZANU and ZAPU, accusing them of persistent opposition to national unity. As if to demonstrate its belief in unity but more certainly in order to secure OAU recognition, FROLIZI entered into a curious alliance with the ANC in 1971 notwithstanding the ANC's lack of enthusiasm for the armed struggle. From here it urged the OAU to "dump the effete relics (referring to ZANU and ZAPU) of the past phases of the Zimbabwe liberation struggle, and give full support to the new and progressive forces",³⁷ declaring afterwards that "unity had been given concrete and practical meaning in the form of FROLIZI and the ANC". But like ZANU, FROLIZI could not be sure of the substance of its unity claim, not least whether it would stand, as revealed in the movement's appeal to the ALC working of January, 1972:

The militants and members of FROLIZI are prepared to, at this meeting of the OAU Liberation Committee, to unite immediately with any party, group or individuals that are prepared to unite in a national united front with one structure of command.... If this unity that Zimbabwe so much needs, and that so many have worked for so assiduously cannot be arrived at, or forced on all of us at this meeting, then we and the fighters we represent shall count on our own efforts to consolidate the united front we have already concretised.³⁸

Once again, in 1973, the ALC initiated another move to bring the movements together. An ad hoc Committee composed of the Foreign Ministers of Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia was asked to reconcile the two main movements. This time ZANU and ZAPU made an attempt at political union

37. A FROLIZI memorandum to the OAU Liberation Committee, January 1972, in Nyangoni and Nyandoro, op. cit., p.226.

38. Ibid, p.227.

which resulted in the establishment of a Joint Political Council (JPC). A statement by the movements after signing the new unity document in Lusaka in March 1973 illustrates the conspicuous role of the ALC and the Frontline states in the affairs of the movements, and at the same time the reluctance of the movements to be dictated to by the Committee. The document, the statement indicated, "will come into force two months hence during which period the two parties with the help of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Tanzania and Zambia, assisted by the Executive Secretariat of the OAU Liberation Committee, will work out methods of implementation. The Chairman of the OAU Liberation Committee and the Foreign Ministers of Tanzania and Zambia, assisted by the Executive Secretariat of the Liberation Committee shall supervise the implementation of this document."³⁹

But both the JPC and the JMC as earlier served only one purpose: to create the impression of unity in order to satisfy ALC wishes and escape sanctions. This explains why the movements continued the verbal assault on each other, much of that being personal vilification. What looked in later years like an ideological and strategic quarrel became one of personality difference. For example, a ZANU policy statement of August 1972 indicted the position of Nkomo in ZAPU which it said led to the split of 1963. It accused Nkomo of a personality cult, and went on to clarify ZANU's overall leadership stand "to unite all Zimbabwe people behind a clearly defined objective, and not an individual. Policy takes precedence over personality".⁴⁰ Plainly, all the leaders made themselves

39. Witness Mangwende, *op. cit.*

40. Zimbabwe African National Union : Mwenje No. 2. ZANU's Political Programme, Lusaka, Zambia, 1 August, 1972 in Nyangoni and Nyandoro, *op. cit.* pp.250-251.

obstructive as even to unity but none would wish to be portrayed as the obstacle to unity.

One thing the movements had apparently failed to appreciate in their quarrels at this moment was the likely impact of the developments in Portugal on their resistance to unity efforts and the struggle in general. The April 1974 revolution in that country had almost immediately transformed the political and military situation in the Southern African region. The Spínola regime's offer of the olive branch to the liberation movements of Mozambique and Angola paved the way for Portugal's hasty withdrawal from these territories, leaving Rhodesia exposed to guerrilla attacks from a wider front and so threatening more than ever before the collapse of Ian Smith's regime.

The obvious implication of these developments for South Africa's security was the prospect of bringing the liberation struggle closer to her borders. And her concern at this was revealed in one of Prime Minister Vorster's letters to President Kenneth Kaunda in which he expressed fears about a war in Southern Africa whose consequences were "too ghastly to contemplate".⁴¹ In fact the prospects of such a war had been haunting South Africa for years. Her so-called 'outward policy' of the early seventies, ostensibly holding out an interest in a negotiated settlement of the Rhodesian conflict, was basically designed to meet such prospects.⁴² Some of the Frontline States, especially Zambia and Botswana,

41. See Nathan Shamuyarira, 'The Lusaka Manifesto Strategy of OAU States and its consequences for the Freedom Struggle in Southern Africa' Utafiti Journal of the Faculty of Arts and Social Science, University of Dar-es-Salaam, Vol. 2, No. 11, 1977, p.251.

42. For a discussion of South Africa's 'Outward Policy', see J.E. Spence, 'South Africa's New Look Foreign Policy', The World Today, Vol. 24, No. 6, 1968. Kenneth Grundy in his book, Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa, (Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1973) Chapter 7, traces the first use of the term 'outward' to 1961 in describing the country's African policy.

interpreted the policy as a convergence of interest in the desire to bring the war in Rhodesia to an end. They were thus drawn into detente with Pretoria, a move that started in 1969 (claiming authority in the Lusaka Manifesto), and became full blown in 1975. All this goes to support Colin Legum's assessment of the impact of the Portuguese Revolution on the liberation struggle in Southern Africa as:

a situation that both sides - Black Africa committed to its 'unfinished African revolution, and the two allies, South Africa and Rhodesia, committed to maintaining the systems of white political domination - sought to exploit to their own advantage and, at the same time, to reduce the threat of a greater violent confrontation between them".⁴³

With the Frontline states committed to detente, the choice before the liberation movements was either to submit to an arranged peace settlement, or to intensify the armed struggle. Nathan Shamuyarira's remark in criticizing the Lusaka Manifesto's strategy of detente showed the apparent helplessness of the liberation movements in the face of these developments. As he put it, "the Frontline states in particular and the OAU as a whole had taken most of the initiative from the Zimbabwe leadership into their own hands".⁴⁴ True, the Frontline states might have side-tracked the movements in reaching certain negotiating decisions, but that in no way meant the abandonment of the armed struggle. In their strategy of detente, the Frontline states seemed to see no contradiction in combining negotiation and the armed struggle. To them,

43. Colin Legum, 'Southern Africa : The Secret Diplomacy of Detente' Africa Contemporary Record, 1974/75, p.A3. See Nathan Shamuyarira, op. cit. for a discussion of the policy of detente; and Dear Mr. Vorster ... Exchanges between President Kaunda and Mr. Vorster, (Published by the Zambian Information Services, Lusaka, 22 April 1971) for some background information on the subject.

44. Nathan Shamuyarira, op. cit. p.256.

negotiation and the armed struggle were simply two sides of the same coin. They worked for both but were convinced that the success of either depended largely on the creation of a common liberation front.

The ALC, whose main function was to promote the armed struggle, seemed at this stage to have entrusted the task of reconciling the movements to the Frontline states. In December, 1974, the Frontline states, employing tactics bordering on coercion, brought the leaders of the liberation movements to Lusaka to negotiate a union. The result was a delicately fashioned unity under the umbrella of the ANC and the chairmanship of Bishop Muzerowa, expressed in the Zimbabwe Declaration of Unity of 7 December, 1974. For a while it looked as though the inter-movement rivalry had come to an end; at least so it appeared in the unity declaration signed on 7 December 1974; and in a joint statement a few days later in which all the movements recognized "the paramount need for unity in the Zimbabwean liberation struggle" and "agreed to unite under one organization with immediate effect".⁴⁵ But the fragility of the unity could hardly be concealed in the conspicuous retention of the various movements' identity as figured in the agreement "to consolidate the leadership of the ANC by the inclusion into it of the presidents of ZANU, ZAPU and FROLIZI under the chairmanship of the ANC".⁴⁶ The ALC, aware of this inherent fragility, and determined to ensure that the agreement stuck, moved fast to withdraw recognition from ZANU and ZAPU in January 1975 at its Dar-es-Salaam meeting, making it clear that from then on, funds and any other assistance were to go to the ANC alone. And as a follow-up

45. Salisbury Declaration, 11 December, 1974 in Nyangoni and Nyandoro, op. cit. p.296.

46. Zimbabwe Declaration of Unity, Lusaka, 7 December 1974, ibid, p.295.

to the Committee's decision, Tanzania banned the two movements from operating on her territory.⁴⁷

Like others before it, this latest unity agreement turned out to be short-lived, undermined by the differences in liberation strategy and the ambitions of the leaders. The compromise position of Bishop Muzorewa (Nkomo even claims to have put him there), the inclination of Joshua Nkomo to arrive at a negotiated settlement with Ian Smith,⁴⁸ these in contrast to the pronounced demand of ZANU for absolute dedication to the armed struggle sustained by a growing ideological commitment, worked against unity. So, for all we can say, unity under the ANC existed only on paper. From the outset, both ZAPU and ZANU showed open disregard for the leadership of the ANC and what it stood for, in terms of the armed struggle. Openly the Nkomo faction challenged Bishop Muzorewa's leadership which it saw as creating a misconception of unity by holding out the Bishop as the "uniting factor". A ZAPU statement attempting to correct such impression contended that what was presented before the OAU for recognition was the ANC as an organization, not an individual. The Bishop, it argued, was never meant to be the condition for unity.⁴⁹

47. David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, op. cit. p.206.

48. Nkomo's inclination towards a negotiated settlement is scarcely disguised in his autobiography, The Story of My Life, op cit. And his flirtation with settlement proposals which depict him as inconsistent in his liberation strategy was given the sarcastic remark that "Nkomo could have breakfast at the Kremlin, Lunch in the Lonrho boardroom and dinner at the White House in the same day". Quoted in David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, op. cit. p.287.

49. 'Michael Mawema : Memorandum on realistic approach to the Zimbabwe Political Revolutionary Struggle' in Nyangoni and Nyandoro, op. cit. p.345.

Joshua Nkomo's rejection of Bishop Muzorewa's leadership had a personal interest about it. Nkomo showed contempt for Muzorewa's leadership because of the weak military position of the Bishop in the ANC.⁵⁰ Nkomo must therefore have seen himself as a more suitable leader of the ANC which explains his preoccupation with getting elected as the leader. Towards this end, he remained in Zimbabwe and called a meeting of the ANC's National Executive Committee to work out plans for a Congress for the purpose of the election. The immediate response of Muzorewa to this move was to expel Nkomo from the ANC. But despite the expulsion, Nkomo convened the Congress in September 1975 and was elected leader of the ANC.⁵¹

It has been alleged that Nkomo wanted the ANC leadership in order to negotiate with Smith. Reference in this connection is made to the overtures of Smith to him in 1975 that if he could become the leader of the ANC, he, Smith, would negotiate for a settlement.⁵² Events following the Congress were to confirm this allegation although Nkomo has denied it strenuously. Immediately Nkomo was elected leader, Smith renewed his approaches to him for negotiations. And Nkomo regarding his election as giving a "genuine voice" once again to Zimbabwean nationalism, started talks with Smith in October which led to a declaration of intent to negotiate a settlement. On 11 December, 1975, the negotiations opened in Salisbury.⁵³

50. For example his derisive remarks about the Bishop: "The bishop had no army at all, but while he was acting as interim president of the African National Council that we had agreed to set up at Lusaka. I allowed him the title of commander-in-chief of ZIPRA". Nkomo: The Story of My Life op. cit. p.156.

51. See Andre Astrow, Zimbabwe : A Revolution that Lost Its Way? (London, Zed Press, 1983) p.91.

52. Ibid.

53. Nkomo : The Story of My Life, op. cit, p.156.

The criticism of ZANU of the ANC was directed mainly at the Zimbabwe Liberation Committee (ZLC) established in July 1975 as the external wing of the ANC. The composition and operation of the Committee were viewed by ZANU as intended to dampen the movement's revolutionary drive, if not to seek its demise. According to a ZANU memorandum:

The ZLC structure was set up in such a way as to whittle away all authority and power of ZANU, and invest in the hands of counter-revolutionaries who had been known as public critics of Chimurenga. The ZLC imposed upon the ZANU freedom fighters a military hierarchy composed of reactionaries and international opportunists.... There is sufficient evidence that the ZLC was a conspiracy organization against ZANU.⁵⁴

Looking at the membership of the Committee, the complaint of ZANU might be dismissed as unreasonable. With four representatives allocated initially to each of the movements forming the ANC, ZANU could not be said to be under-represented on the Committee. Thus the basis of its complaint lay somewhere; it had to do with the power struggle within the movement, aimed at replacing Sithole's leadership which had become unpopular among the rank and file for its alleged manifestation of anti-revolutionary attitude.⁵⁵ It was therefore inconceivable for ZANU to accept the Sithole's chairmanship of the ZLC, and worse still his appointments to key positions on the bodies of the Committee. One particular appointment which no doubt greatly infuriated ZANU was the replacement of Josiah Tangogara with Mukono as Chief of Defence, despite the latter's implication in the Chitepo affair.⁵⁶ In the eyes of ZANU, the ZLC was nothing but an instrument of betrayal of the Zimbabwe struggle.

54. 'Michael Mawema : Memorandum on realistic approach to the Zimbabwe Political Revolutionary Settlement' in Nyangoni and Nyandoro, op. cit. p.336.

55. Sithole's denunciation of the armed struggle at his trial in 1968 for plotting to murder Ian Smith particularly jeopardized his leadership position in ZANU, see Robert Mugabe, Our War of Liberation, op. cit. pp.vii-xi.

56. David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, op. cit. p.218.

Whether or not ZANU was right in its assessment of the ZLC is open to argument. What is clear, however, is that the struggle within the ANC for control of the guerrillas, which Andre Astrow⁵⁷ points out had been the central purpose in forming the ZLC, did little to promote the military effectiveness of the liberation movement. Added to this was the prevalent external situation at the time. As earlier observed, 1975 marked the high-tide of detente in the region for the purposes of securing South Africa's co-operation to bring about a negotiated settlement of the conflict. The ceasefire arrangement of early that year; the August 1975 Victoria Falls Conference; and the exchange of notes and visits between Lusaka and Pretoria, formed part of the detente strategy which was intended to facilitate the search for a peaceful solution. In the process the armed struggle was almost stifled by the virtual restriction of the fighting forces to their camps in Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique.⁵⁸

To break loose from such imposed detente, but also as a protest against the divisive politics of the traditional political leadership of the struggle,⁵⁹ the armies of ZANU and ZAPU with the active support of the Frontline states took the rare action of forming a joint fighting force called the Zimbabwe Peoples Army (ZIPA) in late 1975. From all indications, it seemed as if the quarrelling leaders had lost favour with the guerrillas who had now seized control of the war to save the struggle from the dangers of inter-movement antagonism. ZIPA did not confine its protest to the military sphere; it carried it to the diplomatic front as well. This was expressed later in a rejection of the 1977 Anglo-American plan,

57. Andre Astrow, *op. cit.* p.90.

58. David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, *op. cit.*

59. See Mozambique Information Agency interview with Dzinashe Manchingura, *op. cit.*, p.15.

and earlier substantiated in the decision to send a separate delegation to the 1976 Geneva Conference. Rex Nhongo, a leading ZIPA official gave the reason for going to Geneva in these words:

We are going to Geneva to guarantee the independence of the people against the political and personal ambitions of the opportunists and defenders of monopoly capitalism ... and to prevent the racists, their imperialist allies and the apologists of monopoly capitalism to create a neo-colonialist Zimbabwe.⁶⁰

Simply put, Rex Nhongo's statement shows that the formation of ZIPA amounted to a vote of no confidence on the political leadership of the liberation struggle.

ZIPA, unfortunately, could not hold on to this line for much longer. The manoeuvring of the political leaders, most notably Joshua Nkomo, to capture the organization's leadership, laid it open to sectarian rivalry resulting in clashes between ZANU and ZAPU guerrillas; and with that came its demise.⁶¹

Although such was the sad end of ZIPA, its creation had established one important fact which augured well for the much sought for unity. The open involvement of the Frontline states to the exclusion of the political leaders in the formation of the organization represented a clear signal to these leaders that their grand patrons, the Frontline presidents, were no longer prepared to tolerate the factionalism that had bedevilled the liberation movement for so long. The message to the leaders was unambiguous: either they came together in a common front or stand the risk of being rendered irrelevant in the political and military equation of the struggle through the cultivation of an alternative leadership.

60. Quoted in Andre Astrow, *op. cit.* p.105.

61. See David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, *op. cit.* pp. 215-263 for an account of the rise and fall of ZIPA.

There was no doubt that the Frontline presidents were determined to call the bluff of the quarrelling leaders as was evident in Nyerere's disclosure that ZIPA, which he called a "Third Force" would have the final say on any question of a settlement of the conflict.⁶² The pressure this brought on the leaders subsequently paved the way for the formation of the Patriotic Front, embracing ZANU and ZAPU, in October 1976. The creation of ZIPA was, in this respect, a positive contribution to the eventual emergence of a united front.

The formation of the Patriotic Front raised expectations of an early resolution of the conflict either on the battlefield or around the negotiating table. The hope was that such a front would increase the military pressure on the minority regime, register greater impact on diplomacy, and speed up negotiations for a settlement where necessary. Its co-leader, Joshua Nkomo, was apparently responding to such hope when he announced on the occasion of the July 1978 OAU Summit Conference in Khartoum that nine months thence, African leaders would be invited to 'Harare' to mark Zimbabwe's independence celebration.⁶³

The next important step for the Patriotic Front was to win recognition. The Frontline states which were mainly instrumental to its formation stood united in securing it OAU recognition, and the first action in this direction was taken by the ALC. At its January, 1977 meeting in Lusaka, the twenty-two state Committee recognized the Front as the only organization fighting for Zimbabwe's freedom after endorsing "the decision of the Frontline states to give full political, material and diplomatic support" to the Patriotic Front.⁶⁴ But this

62. Nyerere in an interview with The Observer (London) 7 March, 1976.

63. In a speech at a Solidarity rally at Omdurman, Khartoum, at which the author was present. July 20, 1978.

64. The Guardian (London) 5 February, 1977.

was not arrived at without a challenge from some states. The recognition of the Front as "the sole nationalist movement" in Zimbabwe, as proposed by Nigeria evoked objection particularly from Zaire, Liberia and Uganda who wanted a place for the Muzorewa and Sithole factions as well in the territory's struggle.⁶⁵

Their objection failed, but that did not end the issue. It re-opened at the 1977 OAU Council of Ministers meeting in Libreville where the Frontline states again recommended only the Patriotic Front for recognition. The OAU accepted the recommendation which in turn won the Front non-aligned recognition in 1979.

Once the Patriotic Front was recognised, every obstacle was placed on the path of other factions to operate externally.⁶⁶

The OAU recognition of the Patriotic Front as the sole representative of the people was partly intended to avoid the mistake as happened in Angola where the recognition of the three movements (MPLA, FLNA, UNITA) encouraged their separate existence which at independence contributed to the civil war in that country. Given the circumstances of its emergence, there was no reason to doubt that the Patriotic Front would stand. Instead of the four-cornered unity on which the ANC stood, the coming together of two movements, not in a union but in a front, significantly narrowed the field of conflict. It augured well for the Front that FROLIZI had already disbanded. Also, the sweeping aside of Abel Muzorewa from the leadership of the armed struggle and his confinement to non-violent

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid. This in fact was the complaint of the Muzorewa team to the ALC at its January 1977 meeting in Lusaka. According to them, despite the internal support for their liberation faction inside Rhodesia, they were prevented by the Frontline states from forming a "liberation" army. And that where their 'recruits' crossed into Zambia and Mozambique to organise, they were often arrested and imprisoned.

internal politics, created strategic objective that helped the intensification of the armed struggle. Above all, there was the interest of the Frontline states - economic and strategic - which dictated that liberation unity was maintained to bring the conflict to a speedy end.

Yet, in spite of these favourable circumstances, the formation of the Patriotic Front could not be said to have overcome completely the problem of disunity. The mutual jealousy between ZANU and ZAPU continued but with less intensity, taking the form of the argument about what should constitute a more meaningful unity. Should unity begin with political merger or the integration of the armed forces? ZANU preferred a military union preceeding a political merger for the reason that there were no complete political parties outside Zimbabwe to enter into an amalgamation, but there existed complete armies outside the territory to take the decision of complete unity.⁶⁷ ZAPU on the other hand wanted political union to give effect to a military merger. As argued by its leader, Joshua Nkomo: "Unless you have political unity and authority, it is not possible to instil into the armies the fact that they are one. After all the army is an instrument of a political organization. Disagreement on this point has delayed complete unification."⁶⁸ Plausible as the two viewpoints are, to argue about political merger and military union as though one precludes the other only serves to demonstrate the lack of trust in their relationship. After all, both conditions serve each other to achieve the common objective of victory over the enemy. Despite such disagreement, the Patriotic Front in the end justified the hopes its

67. Mugabe in an interview with Liberation Support Movement (LSM) and published in New African, May 1979, p.35.

68. Nkomo in an interview with Liberation Support Movement, *ibid*, p.36.

formation raised, and survived to see the end of the war and claimed victory for Zimbabwe.

Financial Resources of the ALC

Having examined the Liberation Committee's function of creating unity among the movements, which was supposed to be the condition of aid, we now turn to the other important function, the rendering of material assistance for which a liberation fund, the Special Fund, was established. The question however is: how equipped was the ALC to discharge this crucial function? An answer requires a study of the Committee's financial standing which means the politics of its funding.

As earlier observed, the Liberation Committee was created amidst outpourings of professed support for the cause of national liberation. The extent of anti-colonial feeling at the establishment of the Committee apparently reflected a new sense of purpose in the continent and accounted for the characterisation of the 1963 Conference as Africa's finest hour. To the casual observer, the spectacle in Africa Hall at the time suggested that the armies of independent Africa were already mobilised to go into action to liberate those territories still under colonial and racist rule. But then, as it soon turned out, it was one thing to offer verbal support and quite another to effect such support. Almost immediately, the debate on the financial contribution to the Special Fund split the Conference into members who wanted on-the-spot action, and those suggesting further consultation.⁶⁹

69. See Michael Wolfers, Politics in the Organization of African Unity, (London, Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1979), Chapter 5, for a detailed account of the debate from which much of the information here is derived.

The radicals pressed for immediate action to give practical meaning to the creation of the Committee by insisting on discussion on aid, financial and material, to the Committee. On the other hand the moderates adopted a non-committal attitude to detailed consideration of aid, and pointed to the security risk of any open discussion on liberation support. Ben Bella's pledge of one hundred million francs on behalf of Algeria encouraged Guinea, Uganda and Ghana to demand immediate contribution of funds. Ghana even went further and proposed the payment of £30,000 per state. But the objection by Nigeria to an open debate of the subject which Prime Minister Tafewa Balewa felt should be restricted to Heads of State and Foreign Ministers, put off the proposal to the apparent relief of his fellow moderates. In the end the Conference decided to make contribution voluntary. Two months later in July, Algeria, Tanzania and Guinea acted decisively with a collective contribution of £120,000.⁷⁰ In that first year, the sum of £600,000 was paid out to the national liberation movements from the ALC's pledged assistance of £727,000 and a recommended annual OAU contribution of £1,500,000.⁷¹

The wranglings over contribution continued at the 1964 Cairo Conference despite President Nasser's appeal for firm and practical support to the liberation effort. Eventually the meeting agreed upon a formula based on UN membership contributions which gave an ALC budget estimate of between £700,000 and £800,000.⁷² But by the time of the 1965 Accra Summit, the Committee was already in debt to the tune of £2,000,000. Many states had failed to pay their contributions. Yet

70. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1963, p.19737.

71. Ibid.

72. Michael Wolfers, op. cit., p.176.

the Council of Ministers at its September, 1967 meeting voted \$2,000,000 for the Liberation Committee. This also fell in arrears.⁷³ A clear expression of a waning interest in liberation support was given in 1968 when the Algiers summit conference of the OAU defeated a request for a ten percent increase of the Liberation Fund.⁷⁴

By any assessment, this collective approach to financing anti-colonialism could not be less satisfactory in meeting the needs of the liberation movements against the vast military expenditure of the colonial and racist regimes. For example, ALC receipt during the fiscal year 1968/69 amounted to just \$749,000⁷⁵ compared with Rhodesia's military expenditure of £14,700,000 for the army, airforce and police.⁷⁶ In that year as many as twenty-three countries failed to pay their contribution to the ALC.⁷⁷ Obviously the approach shows the weakness of the OAU and highlights the importance of bilateral aid and other sources of external assistance to the movements. So, in 1970, seven years after its establishment, President Nkrumah's 1964 attack on the ineffectiveness of the OAU and by extension of the ALC, in tackling the issue of liberation still remained valid. As he pointed out,

By raising a threat of Addis Ababa, and not being able to take effective action against apartheid and colonialism, we have worsened the plight of our kinsmen in Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa. We have frightened the imperialists sufficiently to strengthen their defences and the repression in Southern Africa, but we have not frightened them enough to abandon apartheid supremacy to its ill-fated doom.⁷⁸

73. The Times (London) 12 September, 1967; and see Michael Wolfers, op. cit. pp.178-179 for the payment of members up to 1968/69.

74. Africa Today, Vol. 15, No. 5, October/November, 1968, pp.1-2.

75. Ibid.

76. Alan Rake 'Black Guerrillas in Rhodesia', Africa Report, December 1968, p.24

77. Michael Wolfers, op. cit., p.179.

78. Africa Digest, 12, 1964/65, p.64.

In the 1970's, the intensification of the armed struggle in the Portuguese colonies and Rhodesia demanded a corresponding increase in assistance from the ALC. Disappointingly, the Committee could do very little because of its poor financial standing. The January 1973 Accra meeting of the Committee, concerned about the deteriorating financial situation, attempted to revive interest in liberation support by formulating a new strategy of liberation. In what came to be known as the 'Accra Declaration of African Liberation', the 21st session of the ALC disclosed the drafting of a comprehensive analytical document on the military and political situation in the unliberated territories to be submitted to the Council of Ministers.⁷⁹ The objective of the scheme was to equip the liberation movements more adequately. Ghana seized the occasion to inform the meeting of having made a contribution of material assistance worth \$380,000, besides honouring her obligation to the Liberation Committee.⁸⁰ That year the announced budget of the ALC stood at £1,400,000, out of which £500,000 came from OAU member-states' contribution.⁸¹ As a fund raising drive, the meeting mandated its Chairman, Ghana's Foreign Minister, Major Kwame Baah, to visit those African States in arrears and to make a personal appeal for payment of outstanding dues.

A further indication of the seriousness of the financial situation was the proposal that material assistance should be sought from non-OAU sources like the socialist countries, and friendly European states notably the Scandinavian countries.⁸² The fund raising effort proved worthwhile, judging from the handsome aid of £2,000,000 to the movements between June and October 1974,

79. Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 January, 1973, p.2715.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

in addition to a previous allocation of £860,000.⁸³ This however was far from solving the problem of indebtedness. By the first quarter of 1975, only five states - Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Sudan and Tanzania - had fully paid their contribution. Arrears now amounted to \$13,200,000 with Egypt and Nigeria being the biggest debtors, owing \$1.6 million and \$1.3 million respectively.⁸⁴

That Egypt should default by such magnitude might seem surprising, given that country's record as a frontliner in the anti-colonial struggle. But to look at it that way is to overlook certain facts. Egypt's leading role as a liberation supporter was basically a feature of the Nasser era. Under him the country was the beacon of anti-imperialists. Then, Cairo stood as the 'Mecca' to all liberation movements. All this had to change under his successor, President Sadat, whose definition of liberation support was centred around a narrow conception of Egypt's national interest. To promote the new policy required the de-Nasserisation of Egyptian politics - both domestic and external; a process that culminated in the 1979 Camp David Treaty with Israel.⁸⁵ However much the Camp David accord might be made to appear inevitable in the light of Egypt's domestic problems arising mainly from the wars with Israel, the fact remains that President Sadat was a much less enthusiastic supporter of national liberation movements than his predecessor. In fact in the opinion of one liberation fighter, Sadat was unsympathetic to African liberation movements.⁸⁶

83. Zdenek Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity : Africa and the OAU (London, Julian Friedmann Ltd., 1977) p.201 (See footnote 14).

84. See Tony Avirgan, 'Payment delays to the OAU', The Guardian (London) 14 May, 1975.

85. Sadat carried out the de-Nasserisation of Egypt in the economic sphere under the policy of 'Infitah' (The Opening) by which he tried to transform Egypt's war battered economy into an economic miracle. See David Hirst and Irene Beeson, Sadat (London, Faber & Faber, 1981) pp.202-206.

86. Nkomo: The Story of My Life, op. cit. p.87.

In the case of Nigeria, the civil war provides a convenient explanation for the non-payment. The war and the subsequent national reconstruction constituted the most important tasks for the country for some years to come, pushing anti-colonialism to the back seat in the nation's order of priorities. An illustration of the impact of the war on the country's external commitments, is provided by the fact that throughout the thirty month period of the conflict, Nigeria stayed away from meetings of the ALC, ostensibly in protest against the recognition of break-away 'Biafra' by Tanzania and Zambia who were also members of the Committee.⁸⁷ But five years after the war was long enough for Nigeria to have paid up, more so with the advantage of her new prosperity in oil production. That she did not showed how little the country's foreign policy had changed under the Gowon regime. The caution which characterized the policy under the Balewa administration was continued though in less conspicuous form.⁸⁸

Assistance to the Zimbabwe Struggle:

(i) Multilateral aid:

The foregoing analysis shows the financial constraints under which the ALC was expected to discharge its function of aiding the national liberation movements. Large scale default by member-states in the payment of

87. Zdenek Cervenka, op. cit., p.52.

88. Olajide Aluko in his contribution, 'Nigeria and Southern Africa' in Gwendolen Carter and Patrick O'Meara (ed) International Politics in Southern Africa, (Bloomington, Indiana, University Press, 1982) seems to have taken a 'nationalistic' standpoint in presenting Nigeria as a consistent supporter in practical terms of national liberation. Detailing Nigeria's anti-colonial role, starting with her lead to force South Africa out of the Commonwealth, to her support for the Zimbabwe struggle, Aluko gives the impression that the country had been regular in contributing to the OAU Liberation Fund. This position slightly contradicts his earlier contention in 'Nigeria's Role in Inter-African Relations : With Special Reference to the Organization of African Unity', African Affairs, 72, No. 287, pp.148-50, that as a result of her oil fortune, the country was now able to pay her contribution to the OAU and assist the national liberation movements.

contributions to the Liberation Fund meant a limitation on the effectiveness of the Committee. Desperately in need of support, the Committee was even forced to look across the continent's borders for assistance to the movements. Given all this, one could hardly expect the Zimbabwean struggle to have benefitted greatly from this particular source of assistance. This inadequacy of multilateral aid emphasized the importance of bilateral assistance.

Because of security reasons, material assistance to liberation movements is kept a highly guarded secret. As a result not much is known about the ALC's aid to the Zimbabwe struggle; and it is more difficult to ascertain the actual bilateral assistance to the liberation movements. Information on the subject is rather patchy and tends to be too general thus making any detailed account a rather frustrating assignment. At best one works on selectively released facts; at worst on speculative information often attributed to "sources close" to the bureaucracy. What is however known is that every liberation movement submits its annual budget and plans to the ALC which deliberates on the submissions and disburses funds and material on the basis of the Committee's assessment of the needs of each liberation movement, and within the constraints of the resources of the ALC.⁸⁹

This method of aiding the liberation movements is open to a number of criticisms. One of these is the possibility that where a movement lacks the favour of most members of the ALC, its case for assistance is less likely to receive adequate consideration. On the other hand a less vigorous movement could count on greater assistance if it is backed by a powerful voice in support of its claim. All that such a movement needs to obtain ALC aid is to cultivate a good relationship with its Frontline state which as a rule is a member of the ALC. Such bias in the

89. Source: Zimbabwe High Commission, London, June 1984.

dispensation of aid, though clearly detectable, very often takes refuge under the Committee's subjective conditions for aid which imply: (i) the ability of a movement to wage the armed struggle, and a demonstration of this in the field; (ii) ideological correctness; and (iii) OAU recognition.⁹⁰ Thus, although FLING in the Guinea-Bissau struggle did not distinguish itself in the war in comparison with the PAIGC, it received ALC assistance for many years because of the support of Senegal. In Angola, Zaire's dislike for the MPLA because of its ideological orientation deprived the movement initially of OAU recognition and ALC assistance, regardless of the MPLA's effectiveness in the field.⁹¹ In the case of Zimbabwe, it was difficult for the ALC to show any bias in the treatment of ZAPU and ZANU since both movements were more or less equally matched and enjoyed about the same amount of support in the ALC. Even though ZAPU in the beginning apparently had wider support, this was offset by Tanzania's strong backing for ZANU. The anomaly, however, was the aid to FROLIZI which without recognition and a significant military presence in the field received ALC assistance until it disbanded itself.

The second criticism, which Leonard Kapungu makes,⁹² relates to the composition of the ALC. This is thought to be unsuitable for any effective discharge of the function of funding the liberation movements. A membership of seventeen in 1973 was considered to be too large a body to deliberate on military budgets and plans. Indeed it will not be an unfair comment to make that the composition of the Committee was apparently intended more to balance the various

90. Kenneth Grundy, op. cit. p.194.

91. See John Marcum, op. cit.

92. Leonard Kapungu, 'The OAU Support for the Liberation of Southern Africa', in Yassin El-Auouty (ed.), The OAU after 10 Years : Comparative Perspectives, (New York : Praeger, 1975).

liberation opinions in the OAU than to achieve efficiency and effectiveness in co-ordinating liberation activities. This balance was reflected in the Committee's membership from the outset. And as carefully pointed out by Immanuel Wallerstein,⁹³ of the nine original members, three (Algeria, Guinea and Egypt) belonged to the former Casablanca group; four (Zaire, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Senegal) to the disbanded Monrovia camp; and two (Tanzania and Uganda) to PAFMECSA. Today's composition of twenty-two states still ensures this balance, while it is also ostensibly designed to satisfy the membership criteria of geographic representation, proximity to the colonial territories, and experience in armed struggle for independence, and in co-operation with liberation movements prior to the founding of the OAU.

Stages of Assistance to the Zimbabwe Struggle

As is the case with support for other colonial struggles, non-aligned assistance to the Zimbabwe movements showed a tardy beginning and remained so for the first half of the 1960s. Prior to UDI, the subject of material support received only a passing attention as the armed struggle was yet to start in earnest. Much of this period was taken up by the search for a constitutional solution in the hope that Britain would shoulder her colonial responsibility and effect a genuine decolonization. As noted in Chapter 6, this seemed a well-placed hope in view of Britain's record of decolonization. The period also coincided with the launching of the armed struggle in the various Portuguese territories: Guinea-Bissau and Angola in 1961, and Mozambique in 1964, making them the more immediate concern of the non-aligned movement and the OAU in the allocation of resources to the liberation movements. But the advent of UDI

93. Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa; The Politics of Unity: An Analysis of a Contemporary Social Movement (London : Pall Mall Press, 1968) p.158.

changed all this, and reinforced the stand of the more radical elements within the nationalist camp and the non-aligned movement that only force could bring about majority rule in Zimbabwe. To this group of nationalists, UDI was a blessing in disguise. In the view of a former guerrilla, Chenhamo Chimutengivende, the positive effect of UDI was to attract increased external material support for the liberation movements.⁹⁴ The first proof of this came in the 1967/68 ALC financial allocation to the African liberation movements. What might be regarded as the UDI factor gave the Zimbabwe movements \$300,000 compared with \$216,000 to Guinea-Bissau, \$264,000 to Mozambique and \$180,000 to Angola, while the South African movements and SWAPO received \$120,000 and \$72,000 respectively.⁹⁵ In 1968/69 although Zimbabwe dropped from first position to a third place, the allocation nonetheless reflected the intense feeling in the OAU against UDI. That year, the disbursement was as follows:⁹⁶

Mozambique	\$348,000
Guinea -Bissau	\$331,200
Zimbabwe	\$240,000
Angola	\$120,000
South Africa	\$ 86,400
Namibia	\$ 48,000
Others	\$ 36,000

The early seventies were not particularly good for the Zimbabwe liberation struggle. The period 1970-2 featured a relative decline in guerrilla

94. Chenhamo Chimutengivende, 'The Rhodesian Crisis and the Liberation Movement', Race Today, Vol. 1, No. 3, July 1969, p.69.

95. Sunday Telegraph (London) 4 May, 1969, p.6.

96. Ibid.

activities for a number of reasons, one of which was the continuing divisions in the political leadership of the nationalist movement which in turn affected military operations. The period also witnessed the outbreak of detente giving rise to an exploration of a negotiated settlement of the conflict with the co-operation of South Africa. These two factors as they affected the level of fighting, together with the advanced stage of the struggle in the Portuguese colonies which called for more ALC assistance, impinged on the Committee's aid to the Zimbabwe struggle. Late in 1972, ZANU renewed its offensive but that did not significantly alter the level of ALC aid in the period under consideration. For example, the Committee's proposed allocation to the liberation movements in 1973 gave the PAIGC, 25 per cent; FRELIMO, 25 per cent; FLNA, 20 per cent; SWAPO, 10 per cent; ANC and PAC, 5 per cent; while the rest including ZAPU and ZANU were to receive 5 per cent.⁹⁷

The ALC maintained the above pattern of allocation in 1974. At its Dar-es-Salaam meeting in November 1974, the Committee budgeted £2,000,000 in addition to the previous allocation of £864,000 for the period of June to October 1974 as aid to the movements. Out of this, the MPLA and FLNA were each allocated £115,000; FRELIMO, £800,000; £1,000,000 to the PAIGC to supplement its first independence budget; and the remainder to all the others including the Zimbabwean movements.⁹⁸ The allocation for these two years were in conformity with the decision of the 1973 Accra meeting of the Liberation Committee to give the movements in the Portuguese territories the largest share of the ALC aid.⁹⁹ It was not until after the independence of the Portuguese colonies

97. Zdenek Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity, op.cit. p.201 (footnote 14).

98. Ibid.

99. Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 January, 1973, pp.2714-2715.

that Zimbabwe once again became a focal point in the ALC's dispensation of aid. Thus in 1975, the ANC, now representing all the movements, received a total sum of \$1,550,000 made up of \$50,000 in material and administrative assistance and \$1,500,000 to run the training centres in Zambia and Tanzania.¹⁰⁰

Bilateral Aid

Worthwhile and significant as the ALC's multilateral assistance was, it covered only a small fraction of the needs of the movements. According to one estimate, the ALC's budget of about \$1.7 million in 1970 represented about a tenth of the total value of assistance to the liberation movements.¹⁰¹ A comparison of the 1975 allocation with the Rhodesian regimes' military budget of \$102 million for 1975/76,¹⁰² reveals the inadequacy of the ALC assistance, although it would be unrealistic to expect a liberation movement to mobilize equal amount of material resources with the opposing power in order to win the struggle. In consequence the movements, while still relying on multilateral assistance, were compelled to make arrangements for bilateral aid which, as we have said earlier, provided the mainstay of support. Two ZANU officials - Simpson Mtambanengwe, Political Secretary, and Mukudzei Mudzi, Administrative Secretary - poignantly summed up the point for the relative importance of bilateral aid over multilateral assistance:

We get help from the liberation Committee for example, but this help is only useful within a clear political programme. If you go to the liberation Committee and get so much allocation to you in the budget, what actually comes in is so much less than what you have anticipated. So in the end if you get one twenty-fifth of what

100. Tony Avirgan, op. cit.

101. Kenneth Grundy, Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa, op. cit. p.195.

102. Africa Contemporary Record, 1975/76, p.B656.

you were promised in the budget, you are lucky. And this is because so many countries are not contributing their assessment to the Liberation Committee. This is why we think it is important to emphasize the need for bilateral assistance. We think it is very important because some of these individual countries understand the situation, some of them have had the experience and known what hardships are.¹⁰³

Apart from the volume, there are other attractions which makes bilateral aid more appealing. It is considered to be more reliable, and more suitable to the specific requirements of the struggle, and it is preferred as an answer to the bureaucratic management of multilateral aid. Nevertheless the suspicion of its use to exact an unacceptable price from the receiver remains. The MPLA's Augustinho Neto's demand on the Oslo Conference of 1973 included this homily on bilateral assistance: Aid should be given to us directly. It is our people's executive right to determine which states we should approach. Our view is that direct aid is speedier, more effective, and more readily adaptable to the needs of the moment. Such aid should be unconditional and not subject to any guarantee reflecting neo-colonialist situations."¹⁰⁴

In the area of bilateral assistance, the long standing leadership of Joshua Nkomo gave ZAPU an initial advantage over ZANU in securing this type of aid. ZAPU as the older movement had an early start in developing relations with countries, notably Zambia, Cuba, Egypt and Algeria which constituted important sources of bilateral aid outside the Eastern bloc.¹⁰⁵ Nkomo had approached Cuba for help as early as 1960,¹⁰⁶ and was no doubt encouraged in

103. In an interview with Afriscopes magazine, March, 1973, p.23.

104. Olav Stokke and Carl Widstrand, (ed.), Southern Africa : The UN-OAU Conference, Oslo, 9-14 April, 1973, Vol. 1 (Uppsala; Scandinavian Institute of African Affairs, 1973), p.96.

105. ZAPU's source of material support is given in Nkomo : The Story of My Life, op. cit.

106. Ibid, p.80.

his contact with Egypt, Algeria and Ghana in the early sixties by the June 1961 decision of the Casablanca states to set up a military command for African liberation under Egyptian leadership.¹⁰⁷ ZAPU received the first consignment of arms from Egypt in 1962; these included twenty-four semi-automatic assault rifles with magazines and ammunitions and a bag of grenades.¹⁰⁸ Though small in quantity, the supply was psychologically and symbolically important in creating confidence in the contemplated strategy of armed resistance. Egypt's assistance was boosted over the years during the rule of President Nasser.

The ZAPU leader seemed particularly impressed by the assistance of Col. Ghadafi of Libya which he described as "the promptest and most generous help we ever received". The swiftness with which his request for the training of 2,000 guerrillas was met, and the extent the Libyan leader went to transport these men from Zambia to Libya were more than what Nkomo had expected. But Libya's assistance went beyond the training of guerrillas. Ghadafi also provided arms and money.¹⁰⁹ In 1974 the country donated £250,000 to ZAPU, ZANU and SWAPO at the Dar-es-Salaam meeting of the Special Committee of the ALC.¹¹⁰

Zambia's aid to ZAPU derived partly from the personal friendship between Joshua Nkomo and President Kaunda forged in the days of the Central African Federation, and also from the responsibilities imposed by the country's position as a frontline state. As host to ZAPU, Zambia was obliged to render

107. Ibid, pp.101-102.

108. Ibid, p.102.

109. Ibid, p.185.

110. See Zdenek Cervenka, op. cit.

such assistance as transport and administrative facilities to the movement, and was particularly helpful in supplying food to the refugee camps, in spite of the country's poor food situation. Besides these commitments inside the country, there was also the added burden to her of airlifting Zimbabwe refugees and ZAPU guerrilla recruits out of Botswana into Zambia; an operation that was estimated to cost the country "several million dollars".¹¹¹

What has been described as ZAPU's initial advantage over ZANU in securing bilateral assistance did not in any serious way affect ZANU's access to sources of aid as it seems to imply. Although there were occasions when initial contacts with some of these sources proved less successful, with time the obstacles were cleared and ZANU came to draw her support more or less from the same sources as ZAPU.¹¹² Yugoslavia was a major source of arms for ZANU.¹¹³ Other sources were indicated by Robert Mugabe's 1977/78 tour which took him to Algeria, Vietnam, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, North Korea and Ethiopia. In each of these places, he received firm assurances of material assistance. In Syria, encouraged by President Assad's promise ("Well, lets do business", he told Mugabe) a ZANU official was posted there to supervise the procurement of arms.¹¹⁴

111. Nkomo : The Story of My Life, op. cit. p.163.

112. I am grateful to Thomas Bvuma, Information Attache, Zimbabwe High Commission, London (who was a guerrilla fighter in the war) for much of the information about ZANU's sources of material support.

113. Interview with Thomas Bvuma, Ibid, 27 June, 1974.

114. 'Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe : A Talk with Eddison Zvobgo' Forum Interview, Fletcher Forum, op. cit. p.117.

The choice of these countries in Mugabe's tour was not fortuitous. It was dictated by and belies the popular view that revolutionary governments are best equipped to extend material assistance by virtue of their emphasis on the strategic aspect of foreign policy which makes support for national liberation as part of the condition for national safety. In order to counter what they perceive to be a hostile environment, revolutionary states engage in massive arms build-up, mostly aided by the Soviet Union. Some of these weapons are generously passed on to the national liberation movements as revealed in Col. Mengistu's remark to Mugabe on the subject of Soviet assistance to ZANU: 'Damn the Russians. I'll give you the guns. I know they won't give you guns, but all I have to do is pick up the phone and say I want more and they will give.'¹¹⁵ Consequently, a correlation could thus be established between the volume of military aid a country receives and the amount of material assistance it renders to national liberation movements.

The favourable disposition of Tanzania towards ZANU, and how this allowed the latter to benefit from the former's ties with China, explains the special relationship that existed between Tanzania and ZANU throughout the period of the liberation struggle. Like ZAPU in Zambia, Tanzania as host to ZANU was greatly useful in providing administrative support, transport facilities, and helping to sustain the refugees in the camps. Such assistance to ZANU and the Zimbabwe struggle in general forms part of the record of Tanzania's support for the liberation of Africa. Despite being one of the poorest countries in the continent, Tanzania is among the very few states that are up to date in their payments to the ALC fund. And besides her normal contribution to the Fund, the country's

115. Ibid.

assistance to the Southern African liberation struggle is said to amount to about \$3,000,000 annually.¹¹⁶ Much of this was on the Mozambican campaign but a good proportion also went to Zimbabwe. It is such commitment to anti-colonialism which gave Julius Nyerere the influence he exercises as a Frontline state president in Tanzania's relations with the liberation movements.

In the latter years of the war, Nigeria became a major factor in the Zimbabwe struggle following the leadership change in the 1975 coup against General Gowon. The new Murtala/Obasanjo regime infused radicalism into the country's foreign policy so that Nigeria's African policy, whose primary objective is the total liberation of the continent, was given practical meaning in actual support for the anti-colonial/racist struggle. The firm support the country gave to the MPLA during the Angolan civil war also went for the Zimbabwe struggle. Nigeria was favoured in all this by her new wealth from oil which in 1975 fetched her ₦ 4,563,100 and rising to ₦ 5,401,600 in 1978.¹¹⁷ Economic prosperity together with a radical leadership created political confidence which enabled Nigeria to play a more active role in international affairs. The address of General Obasanjo to the Libreville Summit of the OAU in 1977 showed the determination of Nigeria to assume her ascribed role in leading the support for the anti-colonial struggle. In what looked like a rebuke to African countries for engaging in inter-state conflicts at the expense of assistance to the liberation wars in Southern Africa, the Nigerian leader told them:

Over and above whatever assistance the OAU as an organization extends to the struggle in South Africa, it is incumbent upon us

116. Interview with President Julius Nyerere, Africa Now magazine, December, 1983, p. 121.

117. Source: Central Bank of Nigeria: Nigeria's Imports and Exports : Economic and Financial Review, December 1978, p.14; and Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for the year ended 31 December 1980 (Lagos, 1981) p.94.

all to augment these efforts through bilateral financial and military support. There is an incredible stockpile of arms and ammunition in Africa. The cause of liberation will be dramatically advanced if only a fraction of this stockpile is made available to our freedom fighters rather than using them in fratricidal wars against one another.¹¹⁸

Such a bold stand on liberation marked a significant departure from the country's cautious, even conservative anti-colonial attitude of the first civilian regime whose visible pro-Western posture dampened the professed anti-colonial policy. But Obasanjo's radical call for bilateral aid seems to contradict the new regime's stated policy of giving aid through multilateral agencies (in this case the ALC), which method is usually favoured by the moderates. As explained by Joseph Garba, the Foreign Affairs Commissioner:

We channel our aid to the liberation movements through the OAU Liberation Committee. We don't deal with them directly on a bilateral basis. We channel this aid through the OAU's auspices and we hope it reaches them. This is what we have been doing. We will continue to do it and there is nothing wrong about it.¹¹⁹

The impression this apparent contradiction creates in Nigeria's overall liberation politics is that the radicalism of the new leadership was still tempered by the moderation of the past. Be that as it may, the country's assertiveness in African affairs was no longer in any doubts; a fact that was widely recognized by other African states and which conferred on her the status of a frontline state regardless of the geographic disqualification. Invariably, Lagos like Accra and Cairo in the past became the 'Mecca' of African national

118. Address by His Excellency, Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo at the 14th Summit Conference of the OAU Heads of State and Government, in Libreville, Gabon on 3 July, 1977. Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos.

119. Interview on NBC/TV, Lagos, 24 October, 1975.

liberation leaders.

Between 1976 and 1978, the leaders of the Zimbabwe movements were familiar visitors to Dodan Barracks¹²⁰ to solicit for Nigeria's assistance in their struggle; and the response was expectedly encouraging. At the March 1976 meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers in Addis Ababa, the country made a donation of \$250,000 through Mozambique to the liberation struggle.¹²¹ At a time, it was even reported that Nigeria had offered to commit troops to the war. The offer was said to have been rejected by the Frontline states.¹²² But Robert Mugabe's visit to Lagos about this time during which he urged the country to join the Zimbabwean independence struggle, saying "we want every assistance from Nigeria",¹²³ indicated the need and the willingness of the liberation movements to accept such help. In any event, Nigeria did not send troops to fight in Zimbabwe but gave the necessary financial and material support to the struggle.

Strategic Support

Throughout the period of the Zimbabwe struggle, African states displayed a remarkable evasion of the question of mounting a continental military action against the minority regime. Nothing demonstrated the impotence of the OAU more than its inability to meet force with force to call Ian Smith's bluff. Logistical problems and the consequences of a continental action might be given as reasonable excuse for the inaction. Surely, the lining up of a united African army against the

120. Dodan Barracks is the seat of the Nigerian Military Government.

121. Zdenek Cervenka, op. cit. p.133.

122. Daily Telegraph (London) 31 January, 1977.

123. Daily Express (London) 17 February, 1977.

Smith regime was fraught with the dangers of widening the conflict by introducing an East-West dimension to it and thus turn Africa into an arena of superpower confrontation. But the most compelling reason for this impotence could be found in the lack of will and the absolute commitment to act.

This general lack of will and the fear to take such a course went into weakening the resolve of certain states to embark on unilateral action. Kenya, which together with Niger, Ivory Coast and Zaire, often adopted a condemnatory attitude towards militant OAU resolutions on Rhodesia - variously describing them as "unwise", ineffective "ultimatums", and "unrealistic" - always discouraged unilateralism.¹²⁴ President Banda for one openly ridiculed any suggestions of military action, based on his belief that all of African armies were no match for Rhodesia.¹²⁵ It is against these factors of fear, and the lack of commitment that one assesses the fate of the OAU Defence Committee.

The Defence Committee was established in 1965,¹²⁶ followed by the setting up of a Committee to draw up plans for an OAU force.¹²⁷ In the wake of UDI, the Committee met in Dar-es-Salaam in November 1965 and agreed on armed struggle as the only solution to the Rhodesian crisis. A month later, the OAU Council of Ministers, meeting in Addis Ababa, accepted the Committee's recommendation on the use of force to

124. Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 2, p.423 as cited by A. Gupta, 'The Rhodesian Crisis and the Organization of African Unity', International Studies, (New Delhi), Vol. 9, No. 1, July 1967, p. 60.

125. The Times (London) 12 November, 1965.

126. AHG/Res.39. 22 October, 1965.

127. Known as the Committee of five on Rhodesia, the members included Zambia, Tanzania, Egypt, Kenya and Nigeria.

bring down Smith's rebellion. But Zambia whose territory could serve as the staging post for such operation, was not in the least impressed by calls for military intervention on a continental scale. Not only did the Zambian Minister show scepticism about the feasibility of any continental military operation, he apparently frightened many other states from further contemplating the military option by pointing to the implications of that course of action:

On the military side, it is grave, it will demand a lot from us all. When I say it will demand a lot from us all, it is because it is involving everybody. It will involve the whole of Africa, it will involve the two, three, four or five years development plans you have made in your countries. You will require some of your troops being sent, it will require a lot of transportation.¹²⁸

The appeal to national economic interest, together with the calculated risk proved too strong to ignore in favour of such an adventure; and with this came the immobilization of the Defence Committee. In the end, much of the burden of strategic assistance to the liberation movements was transferred to the front-line states.

The Role of the Frontline States

According to the OAU guidelines, countries bordering unliberated territories were to offer rear base support in the provision of training camps, transit facilities and administrative headquarters for the movements.¹²⁹ For the Zimbabwe struggle, this responsibility fell on Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania which, though not contiguous, was an important Frontline State.

128. OAU Document ECM/P.V. 1, pp.29-30.

129. The Ministerial Council Meeting of August 1970 called on "African states neighbouring dependent territories to accord to Liberation Movements the facilities necessary for the movement of their men and materials to and from the dependent territories". OAU Document CM/Res. 266(XV).

Botswana geographically should perform similar role but was reluctant to allow her territory to be used as guerrilla base because of obvious military and economic constraints. Even if she might wish to shoulder the burden of hosting the liberation movements, the country could ill afford to ignore these two constraints. Her economic dependence on South Africa and Rhodesia arising from her landlocked position virtually made Botswana a hostage state of the two countries, thus limiting her role in the anti-colonial struggle.¹³⁰ President Seretse Khama graphically presented the dilemma of the country with regard to support for the liberation struggle in his speech to the Development Committee of the European Parliament in June, 1977:

My country depends on those minority-ruled regimes whose policies we deplore. The railway line that passes through my country is owned by Rhodesia. The beef that we sell to the Community is transported to the sea through South Africa. Our whole economic life and transportation system are bound up with those of Rhodesia and South Africa. This is the extent to which we find ourselves at the mercy of the regimes against which we support the liberation struggle.¹³¹

The military constraint was no less serious. Botswana, without a standing army, realized how vulnerable she was to possible reprisal attacks by Rhodesia for any strategic assistance to the liberation forces. Self-interest therefore dictated that she denied sanctuary to the guerrillas to avoid incurring the displeasure of the Salisbury regime. This had been the official liberation support policy of Botswana, not only in her relations with Rhodesia but with South Africa as well, and the policy was recently reiterated.

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130. See E. Philip Morgan, 'Botswana : Democratic Politics and Development' in Gwendolen Carter and Patrick O'Meara (ed.) Southern Africa in Crisis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977) pp.200-225 for the political, economic and strategic vulnerability of Botswana arising from her landlocked position.
131. Quoted in The Frontline States : The Burden of the Liberation Struggle Commonwealth Secretariat Publication, London, 1979, p.39.

by the country's High Commissioner in Britain, Mr. Sam Mpuchane, in a talk to the Royal Commonwealth Society in London.¹³² Her only strategic contribution to the Zimbabwe struggle was the use of the country as transit for refugees, some of whom were potential guerrilla recruits enroute for Zambia. A big camp in Francistown near the border was opened for this purpose. But even this low-keyed service was considered serious enough to provoke the Rhodesian forces into carrying out a massive ground attack against Botswana in February 1977.¹³³

Tanzania

The position of Tanzania as a Frontline state to Zimbabwe, in the strictest sense of the concept, presents an anomaly which is only understood on the basis of certain considerations. One of these is the country's role as host to the ALC. Given the need for close relationship between the ALC and the national liberation movements, it became necessary for the movements to establish physical presence in the country. It was for this reason, and also for the firm anti-colonial policy of Tanzania that many liberation movements set up their headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam at some period in their struggle.

The second consideration relates to the advantage the country offered as a littoral state through which arms from abroad were passed on to the movements. The opening of the Tanzam railway line in 1975 particularly facilitated the transit of arms and equipment from Dar-es-Salaam to bases in Zambia for the movements. But what is perhaps the most important consideration in Tanzania's qualification as a frontline state to Zimbabwe is the fact that before the

132. The Guardian (London), 27 July, 1984, p.7.

133. The Financial Times (London), 25 February, 1977.

independence of Zambia in 1964, the country remained the most effective base for the colony's liberation movements, providing training facilities for guerrillas, administrative back-up for the movements, and home for the refugees. And she continued to render these services, though to a lesser degree, even after Zambia's independence. In effect, instead of the geographic factor weakening her position as a frontline state, Tanzania remained a strategic asset to the Zimbabwe struggle.

What in fact might be considered as a geographic disadvantage in Tanzania's position as a frontline state turned out to be an advantage for the movements. Being further away from Rhodesia, the guerrilla and refugee camps in Tanzania enjoyed the comparative safety provided by distance against attacks by the enemy, to which camps in Zambia and Mozambique were exposed. The total number of guerrilla camps in the country could not be ascertained for security reasons, but it was known that existing bases included Itumbi, opened in 1965, Nachingurea, Mgagao, Kongwa and Mbeya. From Kongwa in the north-east, an assault route connecting a number of staging camps, led through Dodoma and Mbeya into Zambia, and up to the border with Rhodesia before the guerrilla fanned out to infiltration points around Lake Kariba into Rhodesia.¹³⁴ With the opportunity for the active use of Mozambican territory even before the independence of that country, the Tanzanian trail became less and less viable.

Zambia

Of the Frontline states, the role of Zambia was considered most crucial to the success of the armed struggle. Until 1972 when ZANU operated

134. The Times (London), 11 March, 1968, p.8.

from FRELIMO-controlled area in Mozambique, Zambia provided the only effective territorial link with Rhodesia and served as headquarters of the liberation movements. At the same time, however, her support had also been most controversial, occasionally showing a wavering commitment to the armed struggle, and viewed by ZANU as inciting disunity in the nationalist camp. But if she ever wavered, it was understandably because of the high cost of support which President Kaunda addressed in no uncertain language in his March, 1975 statement on the death of Herbert Chitepo of ZANU:

In this great African endeavour to liberate the rest of Africa, there is no struggle which has been as expensive for Zambia as that currently waged in Zimbabwe. We have spent millions of Kwacha.* We have lost more lives and property to assist the Zimbabweans in their liberation struggle than we have lost in the armed struggle to free Mozambique and Angola. The sacrifice we have made in terms of development is greater in respect of Zimbabwe than the amount of sacrifice in the struggle for independence in Mozambique and Angola. Zimbabweans themselves know that whatever successes have been achieved in the armed struggle have depended on what sacrifice Zambians have been able to make.... It is a fact that no country, no people in the world, apart from Zimbabweans themselves, have suffered more for the freedom of Zimbabwe than Zambians. We have paid and we will continue to pay a just price for the freedom of our brothers and sisters.¹³⁵

The non-aligned evidently recognised this sacrifice, and concerned that it might weaken the country's resolve to continue the support, sought ways to help her withstand the burden. Calls for international assistance, especially after the border closure of 1973, to alleviate some of the sufferings incurred as a result of implementing UN resolutions showed the extent of international understanding of her situation. The OAU even went further. In 1966, it decided

* The Zambian currency.

135. 'President Kaunda's Message to the Nation' in Report of the Special International Commission on the Assassination of Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo, Lusaka, March, 1976, Appendix I, p.56.

to extend technical and economic assistance to the country to enable her to cope with the effects of sanctions implementation, and for this purpose, the organization set up a Zambia Solidarity Committee comprising Tanzania, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya and Egypt.¹³⁶

For its rear base support to the guerrilla forces, Zambia was subjected to incessant attacks by the Rhodesian regime. Several lives were lost in these aggressive acts, and property worth millions of dollars destroyed. Between September 1977 and March 1978 alone, about sixty cases of aggression were carried out by the Rhodesian armed forces; some of these resulted in clashes with the Zambian army. During this period, estimated civilian casualties amounted to about thirty-five killed and a similar number wounded. On January 26 1978, three villages in the Southern Province were destroyed by Rhodesian ground forces backed by helicopters, while heavier attacks took place on March 6, 1977 in the Luangwa district.¹³⁷

Zambia had always protested against such raids as being attacks on refugee camps in the hard attempt to deny the existence of guerrilla camps on her soil. Granted, most of the attacks were on refugee camps, yet it cannot be denied that some of these camps also served a military purpose: as centres for guerrilla training and arms depots. Victory Camp near Lusaka, for example, provided welfare services such as school and hospital to the refugees as well as military functions. This and others - Freedom Camp, Mboroma Camp, Mkushi Camp - had very frequently been the target of Ian Smith's air force and

136. OAU Document CM/Res. 75 (VI).

137. The Frontline States : The Burden of the Liberation Struggle,
op. cit. pp.36-37.

raid parties. On June 29, 1979, Rhodesian jets attacked one of ZIPRA's camps on the outskirts of Lusaka, followed five days later by another commando raid on yet "one of ZIPRA's main arms storage facilities" west of Lusaka.¹³³

If there was the attempt by the Zambian authorities to hide the operational use of Zambia by the guerrillas, the liberation movement themselves were open about their military presence in the country, and the active use of the territory for cross-border attacks and infiltration purposes. ZAPU's announcement on 6 July, 1979 of a unilateral ceasefire with respect to "activities at the Zambia-Rhodesia border" during the period of the August 1979 Lusaka Commonwealth Conference¹³⁹ confirmed the active use of Zambia as a base. It was this use which prompted Smith to close the Zambia/Rhodesia border in January 1973. Ian Smith intended the border to remain closed until Lusaka gave satisfactory assurances that it would no longer allow freedom fighters to operate from its territory. It was to persuade Zambia to accept his demand that he exempted the exportation of Zambian copper through Rhodesia. President Kaunda refused the gesture and described the border closure as a "blackmail a provocative act and an economic war", adding that "what Smith wants is for us to fight the war of Liberation on his behalf which only a mad man would expect Zambia to do".¹⁴⁰

The closure of the border evoked non-aligned support for Zambia, even though much of this was verbal. Messages of solidarity hardly

138. 'The Zimbabwe Rhodesia Story, May 28 - July 19'; a chronicle of events in African Index, Washington D.C. 1-15 July, 1979, pp.47-48.

139. Ibid, p.48.

140. Africa Research Bulletin, 1-31 January, 1973, p.2730.

accompanied by actual aid soon inundated President Kaunda's office. Apart from their common diplomatic stand at the UN in appeal for assistance to the country, practical support came from only a few states. Libya and Nigeria were among the few countries that offered material assistance. Three weeks after the incident, Major Mohammed Nejm, a member of the Libyan Revolutionary Council, arrived in Lusaka with an offer of "material aid",¹⁴¹ while Nigeria made a donation of \$750,000 as compensation for the resultant economic loss in the border confrontation.¹⁴² An intriguing offer of assistance came from Zaire which announced the readiness of 20,000 troops to come to Zambia's support if she was attacked.¹⁴³ Of course Zambia was attacked several times but the troops were never sent.

Naturally one would expect true appreciation by the liberation movements for Zambia's sacrifice in support of their cause. Paradoxically, the support of Zambia became controversial, viewed by a section of the nationalist movement as contributing to the inter-movement antagonism. ZANU, suspecting Zambia as being a partial host, strongly believed that Zambia's policy was basically intended to protect and further the interest of ZAPU at the expense of ZANU. Invariably in the ZANU-ZAPU conflict, Robert Mugabe openly accused President Kaunda of seeking to destroy ZANU. To substantiate the charge of discrimination against it, Mugabe pointed to the detention and shooting of ZANU fighters in Lusaka, and accused Kaunda of being "the principal factor in slowing

141. Ibid, p.2731.

142. Ibid.

143. Ibid, p.2732.

down our revolution. He has arrested our men, locked them up, and within his prisons and restriction areas there have been cases of poisoning, and there's also been murders".¹⁴⁴ What ZANU would not admit was that in most instances, some of these measures by Zambia were plainly in response to certain actions of ZANU which tend to abuse the hospitality of their host. Actions like frequent shoot-outs in the camps, and the abduction of Zambian nationals for guerrilla training, albeit by mistake, touched upon the country's security and so invited immediate and firm reaction.¹⁴⁵

A particular incident which seriously soured ZANU's relations with Zambia was the death of Herbert Chitepo, a prominent ZANU figure, in March 1975, in Lusaka. Known for his hardline position on the armed struggle, a section of ZANU's leadership saw his death as a Zambian conspiracy with Ian Smith to neutralize the armed struggle and pave the way for a negotiated settlement. The refusal by the Zambian Government to allow ZANU to make a funeral speech seemed to have convinced the movement of the implication of Zambia in Chitepo's assassination.¹⁴⁶ This lacked any proof anyway. Not only did the Special Commission which investigated the death find Zambia free of such charges but Josiah Tongogara, a ZANU military commander also ruled out any external involvement in the assassination. According to him, "definitely we must rule out the question of Smith killing Chitepo. I must rule out the question of any other external influence. This is out. Chitepo was not

144. David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, *op. cit.*, p.210.

145. See Kees Maxey, *The Fight for Zimbabwe*, *op. cit.*, p.7; and David, Slovo and Wilkinson, *Southern Africa : The New Politics of Revolution*, (Middlesex, England, Penguin Books, 1976) p.247, how this aspect of ZANU guerrilla recruitment affected Zambia - ZANU relations.

146. Report of the Special International Commission on the Assassination of Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo, *op. cit.*, p.43.

killed by ZANU as a Party. That I want to be honest. We never sat down to decide step by step, but Mutaure died at the hands of ZANU as a Party".¹⁴⁷ Obviously what Tongogara seemed to imply was that the blame for Chitepo's death lay squarely with ZANU. Chitepo was a victim of the power struggle within ZANU.

Whether ZANU was satisfied with the report of the Special Commission is difficult to say. But if it ever had any doubts about the usefulness of the investigation except as a distraction to the armed struggle, President Kaunda's remark was aimed at not only dispelling such doubts, but also to portray his accusers as being insensitive to the death of one of their leaders. "To suggest", he said, "that we are frustrating the struggle by investigating the assassination of Mr. Chitepo is not only to show no regard for this prominent leader, but also to add very grave insult to the irreparable injuries sustained by Zambians in their unequivocal support for majority rule in Zimbabwe".¹⁴⁸

These complaints and accusations of ZANU against Zambia demonstrate the problems associated with host-country relationship with liberation movements in the quest of the former to exercise its sovereign right over the latter. For reasons of both internal and external security, countries hosting liberation movements usually insist on maintaining a measure of control over the activities of the movements, even if this amounts to restraining their military effectiveness. How such control came to be weighted more against ZANU in Zambia is inferred

147. Report of the Special International Commission on the Assassination of Herbert Wiltshire Chitepo, op. cit. p.43.

148. Ibid, p. 56.

from the Zambian Governments' warning to Angolan nationalist movements in November, 1965 on conditions for use of Zambian territory for military operations. "The opportunity", the warning said, "is also taken of reminding officials of alien nationalist parties that the Government of the Republic of Zambia will not agree to the territory of Zambia being used as a military base for operations by followers of such parties who have received military training elsewhere."¹⁴⁹ If the aim of the order was to ensure national security by keeping out imported destabilising ideology, and to maintain a close check on the guerrillas, there was little doubt that the policy least favoured ZANU whose forces were mainly trained in an earlier period in China, Tanzania, Ghana and Algeria. But so also were ZAPU fighters, yet ZAPU had a cordial relationship with Zambia. Following continued deterioration in relations with the Zambian authorities, but also for strategic reasons of the difficulty posed by the north-west region for effective guerrilla penetration, ZANU moved its operational base from Zambia in 1975 and moved into Mozambique.¹⁵⁰

Altogether Zambia paid a high price both in strategic and economic terms for her support of the Zimbabwe struggle. The implementation of UN sanctions alone cost her about \$1 billion between 1965 and 1977. Of this amount \$744 million was incurred after the closure of the border with Rhodesia in 1973.¹⁵¹ But as a UN report pointed out, these monetary costs did not themselves

149. A letter, Ref. S/OP/119/06 of 4 November, 1965 from the Office of the President, to the Chief Representative, The Union of Populations of Angola. Reprinted in John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, op. cit. (Appendix 1), p.308.

150. Interview with an official, Zimbabwe High Commission, London, June 1984.

151. The Frontline States: The Burden of the Liberation Struggle. op. cit. p.35. For a more detailed assessment, see the Report of Sir Robert Jackson, (formerly Co-ordinator of UN Assistance to Zambia) to ECOSOC, covering the period 1973-1977.

fully measure the adverse impact on the country's economy as a result of compliance with sanctions. President Kaunda gave £800,000,000 as the cost in physical damage resulting from Rhodesian military acts.¹⁵² Further cost to the economy could be assessed in the diversion of resources into defence expenditure in order to defend herself against Rhodesian attacks.¹⁵³ Despite all this, Zambia continued her support until victory was achieved.

Mozambique

Zambia's support was said to be an important factor in determining the success or failure of the Zimbabwe struggle because of the country's long standing use as rear base. To the extent that this is so, is it also true to say that the support of Mozambique decided the final outcome of the war. At independence, Mozambique promised to give all the necessary assistance to the Zimbabwe liberation movements in the enthusiasm to share her liberation experience with the Zimbabwe nationalists. In May 1975, the Mozambican Foreign Minister, Joachim Chissano, sent out an encouraging call to the Zimbabwe movements, urging them to take advantage of Mozambique's independence in achieving theirs. "We are only waiting for our brothers in Rhodesia to tell us what they need from Mozambique for the liberation of their own country. We are prepared", he told the nationalists.¹⁵⁴

It is easy to regard the offer of Joachim Chissano simply as a gesture usually associated with the euphoria of independence. But then, even before independence, Mozambique had already proved through the strategic co-operation

152. National Concord (Lagos) 15 September, 1981, p.8.

153. The attacks by the Rhodesian forces forced Zambia to sign a military assistance pact with the Soviet Union in 1979. Late that year Kaunda announced the purchase of weapons worth \$100 million from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. (See Robert M. Price, 'US Policy toward Southern Africa' in Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, ed. International Politics in Southern Africa, op. cit. p.238 (footnote 17).

154. The Morning Star (London) 9 May, 1975.

between FRELIMO and ZANU that notwithstanding domestic problems, she could discharge her revolutionary internationalist duty to the Zimbabwe struggle. An agreement with FRELIMO in the last phase of the Mozambican struggle allowed ZANU the use of the Tete region, already liberated by FRELIMO, to conduct operations in the north east sector of Zimbabwe.¹⁵⁵

By the time Mozambique became independent, ZANU had established a firm base in the country to be able to operate effectively along the whole length of the Mozambique/Rhodesia border. Chimoco, Nyadzonia, Chibabawa, Mavudzi, Gondola and Doroi were major training camps as well as refugee centres.

According to one estimate, by early 1977 about 2,500 guerrillas were operating in Zimbabwe from bases in Mozambique.¹⁵⁶ In addition to this military co-operation, Mozambique also bore the brunt of the Zimbabwean refugee problem, providing house for about 59,500 refugees at the peak of the war - all of whom were the responsibilities of the Mozambican Government.¹⁵⁷

The measure of the assistance of Mozambique to this category of Zimbabweans, and also the guerrillas in the camps was summed up by a guerrilla:

"Whenever we were desperate about food supplies, the Mozambican authorities came to our rescue".¹⁵⁸

155. For details of the strategic co-operation between ZANU and FRELIMO, see M. Meredith, The Past is Another Country. Rhodesia : UDI to Zimbabwe, (London, Pan Books, 1980); David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, op. cit. and Kees Maxey, The Fight for Zimbabwe, op. cit. pp. 114-119.

156. New York Times, 27 April, 1977.

157. People's Power, No. 11, January-March, 1978, p.50. A publication of the Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau (MAGIC) Information Centre, London.

158. Interview with Thomas Bvuma, op. cit.

As with Zambia, Mozambique's strategic support invited heavy reprisals from the Rhodesian armed forces. Between March 1977 and April the following year, Rhodesia carried out over 143 attacks against Mozambique, resulting in the death of 875 refugees at Nyadzonia, and the total destruction of four communities - Massangerra, Magai, Navonda and Chico.¹⁵⁹ ZANU headquarters in the country was also destroyed in one of these attacks.¹⁶⁰ As ferocious as the attacks were, Mozambique showed the capacity to absorb them in the spirit of revolutionary solidarity for which she said proudly: "When some voices within the international community, and even on our own continent, began to falter, the Central Committee of the FRELIMO Party intensified support for the people of Zimbabwe".¹⁶¹

But the worst of the attacks came in the last quarter of 1977. One of these in November, involving ground and air operation, resulted in 85 dead, 534 wounded, eight missing at Chimoio and 246 killed at Tembwe which was said to be a Zimbabwean transit camp in Tete Province. The overall casualty figures included 1,338 Mozambique nationals, 1,538 wounded and 751 missing or abducted.¹⁶² A far reaching support was the 500 FPLM (Mozambique Army) volunteers who joined forces with the Zimbabwean fighters "against the common enemy". Among them, 24 lost their lives, six were wounded and two taken prisoner.¹⁶³

159. People's Power, No. 10, October - December, 1977, p.30.

160. Interview with Thomas Bvuma, op. cit.

161. Out of Underdevelopment to Socialism : Report of the Central Committee (IV Congress of FRELIMO). A FRELIMO Party Publication June, 1983, p.145.

162. Ibid, p.146.

163. Ibid.

Certainly, the objective of Smith was to weaken Mozambique's support by raising the cost of liberation assistance to an intolerable level through military pressure. But if anything, the strategy proved counter-productive, galvanising Mozambique's resolve sustained and buttressed by her experience in the liberation war against Portugal. Antonio Thai, the Governor of Tete Province, summed up the country's attitude to such military pressure after the Tembwe massacre:

They (the Smith regime) are hoping we will withdraw our support for the Zimbabwean people's struggle. We do not hide the fact that we support the Zimbabwean fighters and will continue to make every effort so that their country will one day be a liberated zone. In this way we will also become more independent... We, the People's Republic of Mozambique, will continue our internationalist mission - we receive the refugees who flee from Southern Rhodesia, we have transit camps for the Zimbabwean fighters; they can send their biggest bomb to destroy us, but our support for the armed struggle will not cease.¹⁶⁴

The economic cost of support, though comparatively lighter than that suffered by Zambia, was nonetheless a heavy sacrifice to make for a country just emerging from the ravages of its own liberation war. Less than a year after independence, Mozambique decided in March 1976 to close its border with Rhodesia in the application of sanctions. The decision, while depriving Rhodesia of the use of the railway lines through Mozambique and the ports of Beira and Maputo, was no less painful for Mozambique either. A UN mission to the country reported in April 1976 that the direct loss in foreign exchange earnings as a result of applying sanctions on traffic and tourism against

164. People's Power, op. cit. pp. 34-35.

Rhodesia stood at between \$68 and \$91 million a year.¹⁶⁵ On the whole the cost in sanctions application amounted to more than \$500 million;¹⁶⁶ the figure excludes the cost in diverting resources from the economic front to defence need necessitated by the aggression against her.

The Support of other Non-Aligned Countries

Besides the Frontline states, strategic support in the form of provision of training facilities was provided by other non-aligned countries, principally Ghana, Egypt, Cuba, Algeria, Congo (B), Angola and Ethiopia. Ghana, under Nkrumah, in anticipation of UDI, and convinced that only African initiative would solve the Rhodesian crisis, established camps for the training of Rhodesian freedom fighters as early as 1963. Robert Mugabe, once an exile in Ghana, and married to a Ghanaian, was able to obtain the support of President Nkrumah for the training of fifty guerrillas in 1964 in camps at Half Assini, Kumasi and Obenamasi¹⁶⁷ with Chinese instructors. The existence of these camps was employed to 'substantiate' the rumour that Nkrumah was planning a military action against Rhodesia involving Ghanaian troops; an accusation given as one reason for his overthrow in February 1966. Thereafter the camps were closed and the Chinese sent packing.

Egypt during Nasser's rule provided training facilities; and in Algeria where some of the earliest cadres received training, the Themcew camp was the

165. The Frontline States : The Burden of the Liberation Struggle, op. cit. p.60. For a detailed assessment of the cost of the liberation support to Mozambique, see the Report of the Mission appointed by the Secretary-General of the UN in compliance with Security Council resolution 411 (1977), and in pursuance of ECOSOC resolution 2094 (LXIII), A/32/268, S/12413, 20 October, 1977.

166. See Anthony R. Wilkinson, Insurgency in Rhodesia, 1957-1973 : An Account and Assessment (London, International Institute of Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper, No. 100, p.25.

167. The Times (London) 11 March, 1968, p.8.

main training centre. The Dolisie camp in Congo (B) established in the early sixties for the MPLA recruits grew to be one of the largest guerrilla training centres in Africa to which Zimbabwean guerrilla recruits were sent as well.¹⁶⁸ In Ethiopia, it was only after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1974, and under Mengistu, that training facilities were provided for Zimbabwe freedom fighters.¹⁶⁹

Cuban and Angolan assistance in the training of fighters mostly benefited ZAPU almost to the exclusion of ZANU. The major training base in Angola was Mossamedes in the south and run by Cuban and Soviet instructors.¹⁷⁰ Robert Mugabe's tour in 1978 to Luanda and Havana was, among other things, to solicit for similar training facilities for ZANU fighters.¹⁷¹ Although he obtained the promise of the two countries to extend the same assistance to his movement, their long standing relations with ZAPU which Nkomo often exploited to ZANU's disadvantage held back action for much of the period of the war.

Cuba's adjustment to an even-handed support came later towards the end of 1979 when it became clear that ZANU had gained the upper hand in the struggle. In a move apparently aimed at appeasing a likely ZANU-led government for past error of judgement, she offered, not military support, but assistance in technical training to ZANU cadres.¹⁷² There was no doubt as to

168. Ibid.

169. Interview with Thomas Bvuma.

170. The Daily Telegraph (London), 26 September, 1977.

171. Foreign Report, (London), 1 November, 1978, p.8. Published by Economic Intelligence Unit.

172. Interview with an official of Zimbabwe High Commission, London, June, 1984.

the embarrassment Cuba must have suffered in her choice of movement for support in the Zimbabwe struggle.

Despite such discomfiture which could whittle down any importance that might be attached to her support, Cuba's involvement in the Zimbabwe struggle was generally held to be more far-reaching. At some stage, it was thought to include the commitment of Cuban troops in the war. Although such commitment was never verified, the Rhodesian and South African Press, in early 1977, made a field day of this suspected involvement.¹⁷³ Most of the reports, in mainly speculative and feeding on the experience of Angola in 1976, talked of a build-up of Cuban arms and troops in Mozambique ostensibly in preparation to join the war in Rhodesia.¹⁷⁴ One particular report quoting United States intelligence sources disclosed the arrival of 200 Cuban soldiers in Tanzania in January 1977 for the purpose of training guerrillas and actual engagement in the field.¹⁷⁵ About the same time, South African sources were claiming the presence of between 200 and 500 Cuban troops in five guerrilla camps in the Gaza and Monica-Sofale provinces of Mozambique.¹⁷⁶ These reports were bolstered by the speculation that Mozambique, like Angola, might seek Cuban assistance to ward off Rhodesian attacks, one of which involved a train from Mapai to Chicualacuala in Southern Gaza in February 1977, killing two people and injuring four.¹⁷⁷

173. See the Daily Telegraph (London), 3 February, 1977, and The Times (London) 11 February, 1977 for these reports.

174. The Times, *ibid.*

175. The Daily Telegraph, *op. cit.*

176. *Ibid.*

177. The Times, *op. cit.*

Summary and Conclusion

These reports, whether or not they are correct, serve to stress the fact of the reliance of national liberation movements on external support in their struggle. For the Zimbabwe movements, material support came from both multilateral and bilateral sources, with the African Liberation Committee being the main source of the former. As the co-ordinating organ of aid to the movements, the Committee received contributions both from within Africa and from outside the Continent. In 1964, a Special Fund into which such payments are made, was established by the OAU. It is to this fund, and also through its Support and Solidarity Fund for the Liberation of Southern Africa administered by the ALC that the non-aligned movement enjoined member-states to contribute as part of its multilateral support for the Zimbabwe struggle.

Despite the importance of the ALC in its role as the co-ordinator of liberation aid, the relationship between the Committee and the liberation movements was for the most part strained. Besides the general complaint of ineffectiveness against the Committee, the ALC's use of liberation unity as a condition for aid constituted a major source of friction in its relationship with the movements. Because it insisted on the creation of a united front, the Committee devoted a great deal of effort to trying to reconcile the 'warring' movements, working on its own at times, and at other times employing the good offices of the Frontline states. These efforts were very often frustrated mainly by the non-co-operative attitude of the liberation movements who viewed such outside involvement as unnecessary interference in their affairs. But the realization that there was a penalty to be paid for continued intransigence forced them now and then into going along with the efforts of the Committee. After many

failures of unity bids, the two main rivals, ZANU and ZAPU, eventually got together in a union in the Patriotic Front.

The importance the non-aligned movements and the OAU attached to the ALC as the agent of decolonization could easily lead to an exaggeration of the significance of the material assistance from this source. No doubt the ALC aid meant much to the movements, yet in practice the Committee's assistance amounted only to a small proportion of the overall material requirements of the movements. This was not surprising because of the poor financial standing of the Committee. Consequently bilateral aid, preferred for its efficiency and reliability, became much sought after and it was provided mainly but not exclusively by the radical states.

The utility of material assistance was enhanced by the provision of strategic support. This made the contiguous countries the linch-pin of the liberation struggle in their offer of sanctuary to the guerrillas and the provision of other rear-base facilities like administrative headquarters, transit routes, training camps, and homes for the refugees. It was a responsibility that entailed great sacrifice in terms of economic and military pressures from the target state. There were however other non-aligned states which also rendered some of these facilities. Cuba, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Ghana, North Korea and Congo (B) provided training bases for guerrilla training. Like all guerrilla wars, the Zimbabwe liberation struggle was fought on unequal terms, the odds always against the liberation movements. That victory was theirs in the end could be attributed partly to the quality of the non-aligned material support.

CONCLUSION

An attempt has been made in this study to explore the non-aligned movement's diplomatic, strategic and material support for national liberation in the knowledge that anti-colonialism constitutes the common ideology of the non-aligned movement. This explains the relationship between the national liberation movements and the non-aligned. Drawn together by the need to promote national independence, it might be tempting to regard their relationship for granted. In reality, the relationship is, not unusually, one of both tension and harmony. One particular area of this tension, besides their apparent difference in attitude to conflict, was in the demand of the liberation movements for full membership of the non-aligned movement in an assertion of their independent status. The independent states, although they favoured a close relationship with the movements, had generally demurred at such membership apparently on the principle of sovereign prerogative. But through perseverance, many of the movements were able in due course to gain membership.

We have also tried to show that despite the priority accorded the anti-colonial principle in non-aligned policy, support for anti-colonialism had scarcely had the same appeal to all member-states. At the declaratory level, the impression seems to be that there is a flawless commitment by all states to the liberation struggle. But declarations are one thing, and practical support quite another. Beneath the frequently put out official anti-colonial proclamations are strains which emerge when it comes to fulfilling the stated support. While some countries accept support for national liberation as an ordained responsibility, for many others anti-colonialism is simply of sentimental relevance as a Third World creed. To this later group, verbal support is an acceptable substitute for practical assistance.

Four factors have been identified as generally influencing support for anti-colonialism both at the corporate and individual state levels. These are the international climate at any particular period, regional and national demands on states, the revolutionary experience, and the leadership characteristics of a country. In periods of intense superpower rivalry as featured in the early sixties, the quest for world peace had often jostled for position with anti-colonialism on the non-aligned agenda. Similarly under conditions of growing economic problems, the tendency had been to concentrate more on economic issues almost at the expense of national liberation. In this respect is the demand for a new international economic order that featured prominently at the 1973 Algiers non-aligned conference, and for which at the initiative of the non-aligned movement the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly was held in 1974.

The impact of regional and national interests on support for liberation works both ways. Whereas national and regional interests under certain circumstances militate against anti-colonial support, more so with regard to the policies of the moderate states, others employ national interest to promote anti-colonialism. Where the conflict arises, as it very often does, in the protection of national interest and discharging the anti-colonial duty, the inclination of many states has been to opt for the former. Such self-seeking policy is usually portrayed as pragmatic and finds refuge in the explanation of commonsense prevailing over what might be regarded as the idealism of liberation support at any cost. It is in this context that the anti-colonial policies of most of the land-locked countries of Southern Africa is understood. The economic dependence of Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland on South Africa arising from their geographical position has forced on them a policy of co-operation with Pretoria to the obvious

abandonment (more especially by Lesotho and Swaziland) of anti-colonialism. Malawi has even gone further in this regard to adopt open hostility to the very idea of national liberation. Its leader, Dr. Hastings Banda has not ceased to cause a stir in non-aligned circles by his vituperations against the anti-colonial struggle in the region. In what they now accept as their hostage condition as a result of environmental factor, these countries suffer little inhibition in distancing themselves from the non-alignment's anti-colonial stance even at the diplomatic level where the risk of support are not as high. Invariably we find Swaziland and Lesotho abstaining as a matter of routine in votes on resolutions relating to South Africa at the UN, while Malawi is known to have even voted against them as she sees fit.

There is, however, an exception to the rule of the apparent overwhelming impact of geographical condition determining a negative application of support for national liberation. To a very large degree, Zambia, landlocked as well, was heavily dependent economically on Rhodesia and South Africa, and exposed to the same pressures of co-operation with the white ruled states. Yet she stood firm on an anti-colonial policy and assisted the liberation movements of Rhodesia on a scale that surpassed the wildest of expectation from a moderate state which she is deemed to be. Instead of feeling helpless in her position and using that to deepen her relations with the minority regimes in the South, she embarked on a conscious policy of disengagement from the dependence on those countries. Not that Zambia totally ignored these constraints on her in her liberation support policy. She was able to pursue the policy she adopted because she refused to define her problem only in terms of the rigid choice of either co-operation or non-co-operation with the white minority governments as Malawi did. Rather Zambia

took the middle course that allowed her some measure of manoeuvrability in balancing what was feasible with the ideal. So, despite her exposure to the economic and military blackmail by the Rhodesian Government, Zambia unlike the other landlocked countries gave strategic, material and diplomatic support to the Zimbabwean liberation movements, while she at the same time managed to maintain some link with both Salisbury and Pretoria.

In practice, the temptation to give priority to domestic issues in relation to external commitment is what few countries can resist, and they are generally the states with radical leadership and revolutionary experience. Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, Egypt under Nasser, Yugoslavia, Algeria, Ghadaffi's Libya and Tanzania belong to this group. For them, support for the national liberation struggle has profound foreign policy implications which override any other considerations of national survival. Because of their revolutionary politics, radical states conceive their national interest in the context of 'revolutionary internationalism' which means a commitment to the national liberation struggle wherever it is waged. Libya articulates her support for national liberation as an internationalist obligation which requires her to "conduct active contact with other countries, participate in the active support of liberation support in other countries, and play a role in the achievement of world peace and prosperity".¹ This policy, as further stated, springs from the belief that the search for Libya's freedom is fulfilled only in the citizen's understanding of the meaning of the support of his country's revolution for liberation movements everywhere.² In other words, Libya's national interest

1. The Revolution of 1st September, The Fourth Anniversary, (Ministry of Information and Culture Publication, Benghazi, 1973) p.178.

2. Ibid, p.177.

is served better by an absolute dedication to her perceived external commitment of promoting anti-colonialism.

It is in this same radical perspective of subordinating national interest to the internationalist duty of advancing the anti-colonial struggle that Ghana, under Nkrumah, pledged her sovereignty to the total liberation of the African continent from colonialism. Algeria has even gone further and incorporated religion into her internationalist obligation of promoting the liberation struggle. In reconciling the Islamic content of society to her revolutionary ideals, Algeria has placed Islam in the service of national liberation in accordance with what she regards as the realities of the contemporary world. Her conception of the Faith is linked to no other interest than the struggle for independence. According to her policy on national guidance:

Neither feudalism nor capitalism can claim to it, or use it for their own ends. Islam has brought to the world a greatly heightened conception of human dignity which condemns any form of racialism, chauvinism or exploitation of man by man.... Its fundamental egalitarianism can find suitable expression in any age. It is therefore proper for the Muslim peoples, whose destiny is today that of the Third World, to renew their awareness of the positive acquirements of their cultural and spiritual heritage, and to reassimilate it in the light of the values and new developments of present-day life.... The Muslim peoples will increasingly realize that it is only by intensifying their struggle against imperialism that they will fulfil most completely the imperatives of their faith and accord action with principle.³

Although it is pertinent to stress the inter-relatedness of all the four determinants of support, in which case to remove one and bestow upon it singular importance is to sacrifice complexity for simplicity, the evidence seems to

3. National Charter, (Ministry of Culture and Information Publication, Algiers, 1981), p.19.

suggest that revolutionary experience and leadership quality have had the greatest influence on a country's anti-colonial support. These two attributes basically define the radical/moderate dichotomy in the non-aligned movement. We could therefore postulate that countries with revolutionary experience are more likely to be ardent supporters of national liberation.

Having established non-aligned support for the anti-colonial struggle, the question arises as to how effective the assistance had been. It is difficult to gauge precisely the impact of the support on the outcome of the liberation struggle. Nevertheless the importance of this assistance could be inferred from the constant demands of the liberation movements on the non-aligned movement, and the movements' appreciation of the response by the non-aligned.

By its very nature, guerrilla warfare which is the main strategy of the liberation struggle, relies heavily on external support. This is the fact which emerged quite distinctly even in the study of Nathan Shamuyarira on self-reliance in guerrilla struggle.⁴ Rear base support and material assistance are what no liberation movement can satisfactorily provide for itself, at least in the early and intermediate stages of the struggle. Only contiguous states can fulfil the need for strategic rear while material assistance comes from friendly states. For the Zimbabwean struggle, Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania to some extent, provided the rear, giving sanctuary to the liberation movements. And although the bulk of the material assistance, mostly arms, came from the Eastern bloc countries, non-aligned contribution, - both bilateral and multilateral - proved quite valuable. The Support and Solidarity Fund for the Liberation of Southern Africa,

4. Nathan Shamuyarira, National Liberation Through Self-Reliance in Rhodesia: 1956-1972. A PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 1976.

and the OAU's African Liberation Committee's Fund were the main channels of multilateral aid, while the liberation movements negotiated for bilateral aid which they seem to find more suitable to their requirements.

Since anti-colonialism is basically a political struggle, the need for diplomatic support for the liberation movements cannot be overemphasized. The vigorous non-aligned campaign, especially at the UN, which brought about the legitimization of national liberation and created an international consensus on decolonization, is a measure of the success in diplomatic support. This success is, however, evaluated differently by certain circles in their assessment of the non-aligned at the UN as a mere talking group, lacking the power to influence the Organization substantially in goal attainment. Such criticism may not be altogether baseless, and it raises the problem of impact of the small states in an international system that gives premium to power politics. What must not be ignored here is the fact that some of the movement's crucial anti-colonial decisions (taking sanctions as example) are largely external to it at the operational level, though we are aware that even on decisions internal to it, implementation has not always been total. Even so, the 'talking' certainly has not been without effect as is evident in the huge investment in propaganda by some of the colonial and racist regimes to try to counteract it. If South Africa is regarded as an international pariah, it is as a result of the anti-racist campaign spear-headed by the non-aligned group. And it is not for nothing that the country is today engaged in a counter diplomatic and propaganda offensive in order to break loose from her international ostracism.

In the case of the decolonization of Rhodesia, the shift in the policy of Britain from an initial refusal to accept her colonial responsibility, to a reluctant

acknowledgement of this responsibility, and finally to a full assumption of her duty to the colony came about mainly through pressures from the non-aligned states in the UN and the Commonwealth. Throughout the crises, the non-aligned were able to deny the Ian Smith regime and its successor, the Muzerowa government, their much desired international recognition. Not even the Conservative Government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher could carry out its threat of recognizing the Muzerowa regime in the face of the moral, diplomatic and economic pressures. In the end, Britain yielded to the demands on her to convene an all-party constitutional conference and work out a settlement of the crisis on the basis of genuine majority rule. In this she was assisted immensely by the Frontline States which used their influence with the Patriotic Front to secure a negotiated settlement.

In conclusion, the impact of non-aligned support for national liberation should be assessed in terms of the rapid dismantling of the colonial system in the last thirty years. Indeed the struggle against colonialism has come a long way since 1945 to have become one of the major significant events of the century. Taking Africa as an example, in 1945 there were only three independent states, besides South Africa, in the continent. In 1980 the number had risen to 51. Although this remarkable progress cannot be attributed to only one single cause, it is no doubt true to say that the greatest catalyst to the process of decolonization in this period was the role of the non-aligned countries in their support for the anti-colonial struggle.

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