

**Audiences' Perceptions of News Media Services in Three  
Arab Countries**

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**by**

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **Audiences' Perceptions of News Media Services in Three Arab Countries**

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Since their launch, Arabic news satellite TV channels have been recognized as a milestone in the history of Arab media, and their operation has affected – or infected - the Arab audience like no other medium has ever done. This study investigates Arab audiences' perceptions of news media services. Moreover, it is a study of news consumption profiles and how these are related to new and old news service provision as well as to viewers' motivations for watching news, and their perceptions of different news services in terms of their credibility. It also attempts to understand the evolution of mass media services in the Arab world in the last decade and the interaction between the news media and their audiences.

The study takes place in the Arab Gulf States region (GCC countries), "The Gulf Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf". Research data were obtained using a self-completion survey from three countries Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar, where 1,752 participants of Arab descent answered the questionnaire.

The findings indicate that news consumers' demographic profiles did not differ greatly between the three countries. In gender, the major participants of the study were reported to be more male than female. The majority of the audiences were young, under thirty years old, better educated, had bachelor degrees, were employed, and earned up to 25,000 (USD) per year. Politically they did not display extreme or polarised political orientations. Moreover, the study found that Arabic news TV services have emerged as the leading news resource and source of information for participants in the three Arab Gulf States. Furthermore, Al-Jazeera and BBC (Arabic) TV were rated as highly credible sources.

Finally, the results of the study suggest that Arab audiences seek information from media they deem to be reliable and credible to gratify their need for news information.

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## **Chapter 1 Introduction**

### **1.1 Background of the Study**

The world has experienced significant expansion in the media, and internal and external communications and information technology. The communications revolution has become the most important development which has enabled information, in terms of sound, pictures and script, to be smoothly and freely transmitted across continents. Such transmissions can ignore borders and distances by bringing the information source, with its particular agenda, directly to the recipient through the use of the modern technology.

With the increasing proliferation of new technologies, such as satellite communication, has affected all the media sectors, giving them an international dimension. Media organisations have increasingly geared themselves towards globalization, which currently marks all human activities. Thus, with the development of telecommunications networks and the use of digital satellite as well as interactive communication systems, there has been an unprecedented increase in the flow and dissemination of information.

The second half of the twentieth century has witnessed the birth of what is called in media literature the "media community"; this community is the offspring of three revolutions that have taken place during the century, which have also lead to the creation of a new society marked by the ease with which people can acquire information (Deane et al., 2003). These revolutions are, the information revolution, embodied by a tremendous explosion in knowledge; the communications revolution, embodied by modern communication technology which started with wire and wireless communications, and progressed to television and eventually satellite and optical fibre technology; and the electronic computer revolution, which has immersed itself in

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various aspects of human life, mixed with means of communication, and merged with them (Deane et al., 2003).

Communication and information breakthroughs have contributed and continue to contribute to the transformation of the world media landscape, which began in the last decade of the twentieth century. The Arab media scene was no exception to this radical change. Media in the Arab world have made a variety of participants to the overwhelming impact of this revolution, and have been able to develop their capabilities to benefit from these windows of opportunities, creating the so-called "new wave media" of the Arab satellite channels, newspapers, electronic journals and news sites on the Internet.

It is clear that the media landscape today is different from that which was long-standing in the Arab world, which was embodied by local television stations, radio and newspapers controlled and directed by the state. These media were owned and run by the state to promote government policy, and maintain stability, enhance national identity and extend central state control over their country (Rugh, 2004). Momentum in media activity, particularly television, has increased in the Arab World during recent years, and its components have broadened in an unprecedented way. Arab satellite channels have emerged and expanded the margin of freedom and pluralism, and their influence has extended far beyond national borders. They have presented rhetoric that has displaced the official rhetoric of media, broken the global monopoly of Western media in news transmission, and contributed to putting Arab media on the global media map.

This important transition has reduced the need of Arab audiences for international radio services such as the BBC World Service, Monte Carlo Radio, and the Voice of America. The transition of audience attention to new Arab satellite channels occurred concurrently with important events that beset the Arab region in the 1990s,

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including the Gulf War (the Liberation of Kuwait) in 1991, which played a major role in the fast evolution of the new media created the cornerstone of today's unprecedented media environment.

New media developments in the Arab world, such as satellite TV channels, the major source of news and information today, have caused a real jolt because they operate across national borders and cannot be so readily controlled by governments. In this way, media in the Arab world are no longer so tied to official establishments and their resentful slogans and rhetoric. State media in the Arab world today look dull, poor and empty compared to the more vibrant, responsive and sophisticated new satellite media.

The emergence of Arabic satellite channels in the early 1990s, such as MBC and ART, were a step toward breaking government monopolies of the media in the Arab world, particularly in Arab Gulf countries. These channels have created real competition between local national channels and pan-Arab satellite TV broadcasters. However, since the mid-1990s Arab audiences have encountered an important and influential transition in the history of modern media in the Arab world with the launch of Arabic news channels, starting with the emergence of the Al-Jazeera news network. Al-Jazeera TV broke the status quo previously prevailing in the Arab satellite channels, which was marked by total reliance on entertainment programmes, soap operas and other variety programmes, by providing the Arab viewer with a real and powerful news channel that relies on news bulletins, programmes and documentaries broadcast 24 hours a day. Recently, with these important media breakthroughs, new private channels have emerged, so that numerous Arabic satellite channels are watched both inside and outside the Arab world.

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This new diversity in the media map has created a diverse audience that uses the remote control as a hunter uses his gun; this has made satisfying the viewer one of the most difficult tasks undertaken by Arabic media services, as they vie for this large audience with its exciting media mobility (Ayish, 2004, 2006; Rugh, 2004; Sakr, 2007; Zayani & Sahraoui, 2007).

However, in spite of this remarkable evolution, the reality of the media situation in the Arab world is that they are still struggling for more freedom and independence. Hence it is not possible to isolate media in the Arab world from the broad environment in which they function, from which they derive their input, and to which they deliver their outcomes. This approximation, nevertheless, does not mean that the relationship between media and society is a static one that moves in one linear direction; rather, it is a dialectical relationship of mutual influence. Media is affected by what happens in the community and at the same time it affects the dynamic of Arab societies, especially as these societies are also undergoing shifts in their socio-political reality.

Arabic news media TV channels have emerged as stimulating mechanisms for the process of social change in the Arab World as opposed to the traditional media, which have contributed to the preservation of conservative social cultures that no longer reflect the social reality of the Arab states (Lynch, 2006). Moreover, media rhetoric in Arabic traditional media from mostly local and national channels have started to lag behind the obvious real developments in the Arab community in regard to women and youth. Instead of contributing to developing civil society, traditional media have taken a hostile attitude towards it.

While media alone, satellite media in particular, cannot cause a radical change, they can contribute to creating the appropriate environment for the development of civil society and push for social change, through expanding the participation of social groups

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in the public debate of current topics, creating a "public space" for society and its institutions to express its views and interests. Arabic news satellite TV services has provided a window for more than 300 million people in the Middle East and North Africa to shape their view about the world on a daily basis. It has also fostered remarkable change in the way Arab societies, which tend to favour traditional and group-oriented values, engage in open discussions about politics and society (Miladi, 2006; Zayani & Sahraoui, 2007; Jamal & Melkote, 2008; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008; Allied Media Corporation, 2007). Even though it has begun to move toward progress, the press and media in the Arab world are still facing the challenge of credibility, accuracy and the reconciliation between the terms of the profession literally and the media mission in all its responsibilities in order to win the Arab audience (Rugh, 2004). Despite the fact that the field of communication in the Arab World is still straggling to open up, this study believes that the next phase promises a wide media, a free flow of information and solid and varied media, giving the Arab world options and alternatives.

### **1.2 Research Problem**

The change that news media TV services have witnessed in the Arab world over the last decade is remarkable. However, the phenomenon of Arabic news satellite TV channels and their success in the Arab world, particularly in the GCC countries, raises serious questions about their role, influence, quality, objectivity, credibility, and their status in relation to the governments, audiences and the future landscape of media in the Arab world.

This study investigates the profiles of news audiences across three Arab Gulf countries, namely Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar. The study examines the emergence and evolution of news media in these Arab Gulf states and the audiences' motivation in watching Arabic news TV services. The study also attempts to explore Arab viewers'

attitudes toward Arabic news TV channels. Measures that focus on perceived credibility of news providers were used to gauge attitudes towards news suppliers in these three Gulf Arab states.

### **1.3 Justification for the Study**

This study is intended to be one of the few studies that deal with audiences' attitudes toward the most important Arabic news services in Arab Gulf countries through the application of uses and gratifications, and media credibility. The study is important within the communication field because of the emerging influence that new media developments in the Arab world, such as satellite communication, have on the way Arab audiences consume media. It is important to understand media consumers' habits and their motivations for consuming news services. Moreover, given the rapid rise of Arabic news satellite channels, it is important to create original research that helps to explain the audiences' motivations in using these new media in the Arab world.

This study is also important because it explores the role of the new media, such as satellite channels, as a major means of communication and information today in the Arab world. It deals with the changes that have occurred in the media landscape in the Arab world not just in a technical dimension, but also as a key factor in changing media production and consumption patterns in the Arab world. Therefore, this study seeks to understand the influence of Arabic news TV channels on developing countries in the Arab world such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and its audiences' attitudes toward a particular medium.

Before the advent of the new media such as satellite communication, audiences in the Arab world could only view the few television channels that were provided and controlled by their governments. Thus, the study deals with the perceptual relationship between new media developments and their massive audiences in the Arab world in

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light of the wide popularity the media enjoys by managing to present the new media rhetoric in a new shape unknown before by the Arab official media. This has led to the widening of the audiences, as this service is offered free of charge in addition to the low cost of obtaining communications apparatus.

This study is imperative because it explores the transformation that occurred in the structure of media outlets in the Arab world. Even though the Arab World still lags behind in terms of economics and political and cultural freedoms compared to western countries, a number of Arab media have been able to catch up and compete with leading international and media outlets like CNN and the BBC. Satellite channels such as Al-Jazeera have become like popular parliaments discussing major topics by transmitting live public opinion. Al-Jazeera has taken a resistant stance against the current Arab system and a lack of intellectual freedom in the Arab world which has aroused disputes and accusations that Al-Jazeera is inciting and spreading hatred. Indeed, some of the channel's news presenters were sued in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and some of its offices were closed down (Rugh, 2004; Miles, 2005; Zayani & Sahraoui, 2007).

The study is significant because it examines how audiences in the Arab Gulf states perceive and use the Arabic TV services of international satellite broadcasters such as the BBC from London, Al-Hurra Arabic-language American satellite TV, and France24 Arabic-language satellite TV. The study also examines the Arab public's perception of the credibility of the Arabic versions of foreign media.

Mass media have revolutionized the way individuals communicate with each other and receive information. Therefore, this study is essential in terms of deepening the understanding of governments, leaders, specialists, researchers, and scholars in the Arab world of the public opinion changes that are occurring in this region regarding the phenomenon of news satellite channels and their broad impact.

Finally, this study is important because it gives priority to studying the reaction of the masses as a systematic and tangible expression of the reality of media missions. This importance is deepened when evaluating specialized media news media in particular. Furthermore, this study might be useful because it adopts new Arabic measures and scales for examining gratifications and credibility. These measures and scales can be applied to similar research in the Arab world. The study also examines the application of uses and gratifications and media credibility in a non-Western culture with a different press system, and documents its effectiveness.

### **1.4 The Objectives of the Study**

The study explores the emergence and evolution of news TV services in Arab Gulf states, and audiences' motivations for watching Arabic news TV channels. The study also *examines the credibility and objectivity of Arabic news satellite channels*. The chief objectives for which the study was undertaken were as follows:

- A. To measure the extent of media use in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as a part of the Arab world.
- B. To understand the major characteristics of Arab viewers in Arab Gulf States.
- C. To examine the viewing habits of the Arab audience and its preference for Arabic news satellite TV channels.
- D. To discover the motivation of Arab viewers for watching Arabic news satellite channels.
- E. To explore the basic dimensions of Arabic news satellite TV channels' credibility.
- F. To reveal the public's attitudes towards Arabic news satellite TV channels' credibility.

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- G. To explore the opinions of Arab viewers regarding news, programmers, and other general media issues.
- H. To explore the relationship between demographic characteristic factors such as age, education, income, gender, and the credibility of Arabic news satellite channels.
- I. To discover variables predicted and reported frequencies of viewing the Arabic TV channels as trustworthy news sources.

### **1.5 Statement of Research Questions**

This study investigates the Arab audiences' perceptions of news media services across three Arabic Gulf countries. The study examines the demographic characteristics of Arab audiences in these nations. The study also explores the audiences' motivations and levels of interest regarding Arabic news media services. Moreover, the study investigates viewers' attitudes toward Arab news TV channels. This research tries to answer a series of research questions that have been addressed in the survey of this study. The first set of research questions deals with news consumption habits. These include:

RQ1: Which news sources are most used by Arab audiences in GCC countries?

RQ2: Which are the most favoured Arabic news satellite TV channels as viewed by audiences in these countries?

RQ3: Which are the most favoured news topics as viewed by Arab audience in GCC countries.

RQ4: Are there any relationships between news consumption and participants' demographic characteristics?

The second set of the research questions is concerned with motivations for news media.

These include:

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RQ5: What are the Arab GCC audiences' motivations for watching TV news services?

RQ6: Are there any relationships between news motivation and different news services?

RQ7: Are there any relationships between news motives and demographic characteristics?

RQ8: Are there any significant demographic differences in news motivation?

RQ9: What are the key predicted variables for viewing TV news services?

The final set of research questions is concerned with Arab audiences' perceptions of news credibility. These include:

RQ10: What are Arab viewers' perceptions of Arabic news TV channels' credibility?

RQ11: Are certain Arabic news channels more credible than others and how differently do audiences perceive them?

RQ12: Are there any significant relationships between perceived credibility and following news services in all three Arab countries?

RQ13: Are there any significant differences between perceived credibility and viewing Arabic news TV channels?

RQ14: Are there any significant differences between demographic variables, and perceived credibility of Arabic news channels?

RQ15: Are there any specific variables which predict reported frequencies of viewing Arabic TV channels as credible news sources?

### **1.6 Design of the study**

This research consists of nine chapters. Chapter one comprises the introduction to the study, background to the study, research problem, significance of the research, aims and objectives of the study, and research questions. A description of the design of the research has been included at the end of this chapter.

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The second chapter introduces the media scene in the Arab world, which includes a brief geography, human development status, and political, economic, and freedom of press overviews. Moreover, mass media, television and broadcasting in Arab world are presented. The emergence of Arabic news TV channels is also discussed.

The third chapter demonstrates the shifting media landscape in the Arab Gulf States as part and parcel of the larger process of media development and expansion in the Arab world. Radio broadcasting, television production, national news agencies, and Arab satellite services are all discussed.

Chapter four presents the uses and gratifications model and media credibility as theoretical frameworks of this research. The chapter focuses on the historical development, criticisms, typologies, and measurements in terms of both theory and practice by previous studies in Western and Arab media outlets research.

Chapter five describes the methodological procedures of data collection of this research. It mainly discusses the research method, online survey, questionnaire design, pilot study sample and analysis techniques.

Chapter six of this study discusses the main findings of the survey data as they relate to investigating the news consumption landscape of news audiences in the Arab Gulf states region. It includes identified main news sources for news and information, general patterns of media use, news interests, news consumption habits and perceptions of news provided by local and national media and Arabic news satellite TV channels.

Chapter seven examines the motivations data of news audiences in the Arab Gulf states region. It reports personal motivations for using news media in general, and Arabic news satellite TV channels, in particular. The chapter investigates the

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relationships between specific news motivation, different news services, and demographic characteristics.

Chapter eight examines the perceptions of audiences regarding the credibility and objectivity of the news that is broadcast from Arabic news services in general and Arabic TV news channels in particular. The data reported in this chapter also allows examination of the relationships between credibility perceptions applied to news providers by Arab audiences, the demographic characteristics of audience members and reported consumption of news from different suppliers.

Chapter nine concludes the thesis by providing a summary and general discussion of the study findings. The chapter discusses the study aims, findings, research limitations, conclusions, recommendations and suggestions for future studies.

## **Chapter 2 The Arab World Media Scene**

### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter concisely describes the geographical, economic and political situation of the Arab world region, which is the focus of this project. The chapter discusses the role of mass media in the Arab world and where the newer news providers that are the focal point of the research are situated within that news provision context. It also investigates the shifting media outlets in the Arab world, the components of the Arab media, Arab broadcasting networks, pan-Arab satellite television, and mainstream Arabic news TV channels, such as Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, BBC (Arabic), France 24, and Al-Hurra.

### **2.2 People and Countries of the Arab World**

The Arab world stretches from the Arabian Gulf through North Africa to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. The Arabic language, which is the official language in all Arab countries, is considered the sixth most spoken language in the world. Arabic is in the Semitic group of languages, most closely related to Hebrew and Aramaic, and also related to the South Semitic languages (Lagasse, 2008).

The Arabic world comprises 22 countries, and Arabic peoples constitute the overwhelming majority of the populations in Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, and the nations of North Africa. There are 367.4 million Arab people, which accounts for five per cent of the world population (UNPD, 2011). Current growth rates will result in there being between 410 million and 459 million Arabs in 2020. Even though Arab countries have the lowest level of dire poverty in the world (income of less than one dollar per day), together with high levels of inequality, one out of every five Arabs lives on less than two dollars per day. Poverty of capability is more pronounced as a result of the high rates of illiteracy and inadequate access to quality

education and learning (UNPD, 2002, 2009). Average per capita incomes range from under \$300 a year in Yemen to an estimated \$18,000 a year in the United Arab Emirates (World Bank, 2006, 2010).

### **2.3 Human development Status in the Arab World**

Human development reports, issued by the United Nations, since they started in 1994, have tackled a number of issues such as public expenditure on human development, public participation in decision-making and the relationship between human development and national growth, gender, poverty, economic growth in a globalized economy, human rights and technology for the sake of human development. Human development reports have had a great impact on development planning and application and many forums have been held on national levels that have prompted policy-makers to plan new strategies for their policies and divide areas according to certain criteria to define those that should be targeted in their development plans (UNDP, 2005, 2009, 2001). Data has indicated inequalities and disparities within countries and helped governments to direct the necessary resources required for policy formulation. Claimants of development, such as non-governmental organizations and civil society institutions, have used these reports and documents to support their demands. Important university studies have been conducted to broaden the scope of human development in terms of analytical frameworks, statistical indicators, and work and policy recommendations relying on the human development reports. As a result of publishing human development reports, more than 260 national reports on human development in more than 120 countries have been produced, and countries have relied on them to become part of the data bank referred to in development issues. Within the framework of these reports, in 1992 Arab countries began to issue human development reports, which have had a deep impact on development and political forums, as they have

tackled boldly and frankly a host of new and important ideas about the real challenges that impede development and progress in the Arab world plans (UNDP, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2011). The important challenges tackled by the UN Human Development Reports in the Arab World are discussed below.

### **2.3.1 Democracy and Political Participation**

UN Human Development Reports (2002, 2005, 2009, 2011) have mentioned that other regions in the world are progressing more towards democracy and political participation than most Arab countries, given that democratic governance is taking place in Latin America and Asia but has not reached most parts of the Arab world. Further, the reports state that this lack of freedom undermines human development and is considered to be one of the most painful manifestations of political development. The reports also indicated that the political obstacles to obtaining information seem to be more serious than the socio-economic constraints given that the political power in the Arab countries strengthens the cognitive trends that goes in harmony with its trends and objectives, and fights opposing intellectual trends. And due to the absence of political competition and the peaceful transfer of power, scientific institutions are subjected to political strategies and fighting over power, and consequently promotion takes place on the standards of loyalty to the regime rather than competence and knowledge. Restricting research and scientific innovation has resulting in chaining minds and extinguishing the flame of knowledge. Security authorities bypass constitutional establishments and laws to confiscate publications and prevent some of them from being circulated (UNDP, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2011).

UN Human Rights Reports (2009, 2010, 2011) have pointed out that various governments' practices in the Arab World represent threats to human security. The UN has arrived at this conclusion after assessing the level of people's acceptance of their

governments, states' commitment to international pacts of human rights, how a state manages the right to use force and coercion, and how monitoring and control among institutions limits the abuse of power. The reports argue that diversity of identity and culture is not the direct cause of conflicts; rather, the real face of conflict lies in how to find access to political power or wealth, and the lack of representation and political participation, the freedom of the press, and the suppression of cultural and linguistic diversity.

### **2.3.2 Structure of Production and Economy**

UN Human Development Reports (2009, 2011) have indicated that economic performance in the Arab countries is unstable because of their dependence on volatile oil prices. This was reflected in the growth rates during the drop in oil prices in the 1980s, which forced Gulf states, like Saudi Arabia, to borrow from abroad, and the dropping of economic growth in some Arab countries into negative figures. The reports argue that the Arab countries are less industrialized than four decades ago due to their heavy investment in infrastructure, real estate projects and services sector while neglecting industry and agriculture; this has caused them to be dependent on imports from abroad. This structural imbalance in the Arab economies has led to the aggravation of poverty and unemployment. Non-oil Arab countries depend on oil revenues indirectly through remittances from workers abroad and hosting investment projects of the oil countries (UNDP, 2009, 2011).

UN Human Development Reports (2009, 2011) have also dealt with the situation of unemployment in the Arab world based on statistics from the Arab Labor Organization. These estimate that unemployment stands at 14.4 per cent of the workforce in the Arab world, and have indicated that unemployment among Arab youth was the highest among other regions of the world, at 40 per cent. The UN has also

stated that the Arab World needs to create 51 million new jobs by 2020. The reports attribute the high rates of unemployment to various reasons, the most important of which are: the shrinking role of the public sector, and the weakness of the role of the private sector, and declining levels of education. In addition, demographic pressure is escalating as the population of the Arab World is expected to reach 395 million in 2015 as compared with 317 million people in 2007, especially in light of the current recession of farm land, water scarcity and desertification. As for the conditions of poverty in the Arab World, the reports have relied on data available from seven Arab countries that constitute 63 per cent of the Arab world's population, and it was found that there are approximately 34.6 million Arabs suffering from extreme poverty; when this figure is compared to the high level of income per capita, it is clear that there is a case of inequality in wealth distribution (UNDP, 2009, 2011).

### **2.4 Mass Media and the Arab World**

The controversial dialectical relationship between media freedom and democracy lies in the fact that democracy is based on political communication and freedom of expression and thought; of course, these conditions cannot occur unless there is a media system that monitors, criticises, detects, investigates and presents the main and sensitive issues to the community and opens them for discussion and debate. The stakeholders in the social, political, economic and cultural life need mass media and platforms to express their views, ideas and concepts. Any decline in the freedom of the press means a decline in democracy, and the history of press freedom in the world proves the principle of mutual influence between democracy and journalism. Political regimes of dictatorship or authoritarianism cannot in any way enjoy a free and strong press, and the same applies to those systems that do not believe in multi-party politics and freedom of

opinion and expression; the press in such systems always acts only to serve the interest of its supervisors and financiers (Alterman, 2000; Rugh, 2004; Mellor et al., 2011).

Even though the media scene in the Arab world has changed dramatically in the past 15 years, with particular emphasis on the growth of satellite television channels and the Internet, there is still a disjunction between this phenomenon and the reality of Arab politics and societies. The majority of the Arab countries remain impeded by old political divisions, static economic models, and poor media structures and performance (Amin, 2001). Mass media press and publications in the Arab world have regularly been controlled by Arab governments. Arab countries have customarily controlled media and geared its various apparatus, while some have even considered information and media ministries to be sovereign ministries (Rugh, 2004).

A review of Arab media studies (Ayalon, 1995, 2001; Al-Mousa, 1996; Rugh, 2004; Mellor et al., 2011) and Arab history of media and mass communication since its inception in the mid-eighteenth century shows that Arab media has evolved through four phases: control, the rise, containment, and inundation.

### **A. Control**

The entrance of the printing press into the Ottoman Empire, including Arab countries, was delayed until the eighteenth century due to an Islamic advisory opinion stating that the printing press was "filth made by Satan." The ruling elite were threatened by the press and considered it to be a dangerous competitor that could jeopardise their monopoly of control over science and knowledge. The first Arabic newspaper was published in 1800 during the French rule of Egypt. Moreover, *The Missionary* was the first newspaper published in Algeria (in 1847), which only occurred after occupation by the French in the 1830s; further newspapers were published in the capitals of the states controlled by the Ottomans or colonizing countries. These newspapers were the

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mouthpieces of the governments and they were preoccupied with the publication of government view points and instructions, while inhibiting any critical view point. The Printing Law issued in 1857 and modified in 1865 by the Ottomans or colonial powers or dissident powers (like Muhammad Ali in Egypt) was hegemonic and restrictive to freedom, aiming to control Arab thought, subjugate it to the authority's vision, and direct it to submit to its ideas (Ayalon, 1995, 2001; Rugh, 2004).

### **B. The Rise**

Arab journalists challenged the Ottoman authority and called for the liberation of Arab countries, particularly after the issuance of 1909 law that gave a margin of freedom of expression. Prior to that, the Egyptian and Lebanese press played an important role in the second half of the nineteenth century, especially writers like Adib Ishaq, Abdul Rahman Al-Kawakibi, who called for liberation from corrupt occupying forces and advocated secularism; although these calls were more pronounced by Christian journalists than their Arab journalist brothers (Ayalon, 1995).

### **C. Containment**

After the First and Second World Wars Arab countries gradually gained their independence. Yet, this independence was not void from the subjugation of colonial powers, as is evident in the suspension of pro-nationalism and unity newspapers and the arrest and punishment of their journalists. This was accompanied by the entry of radio and then television into the media landscape. It was natural in this situation that the authority which was controlled by the mandatory country would work to contain calls for freedom of expression and suppress adverse opinions. Although authorities privatized the press in some countries, they regulated its work by means of press and publications laws. In other countries, the press was nationalized and subjected to the directions of the authority. Ministries of information emerged and the minister of

information was entitled to appoint the editors-in-chief. In fact, electronic communication means, including radio and TV, remained subjected to the authorities that considered them as a means to speak on their behalf and promote their policies until the onset of the present century. The authorities did not stop at that point; rather, they recruited and set up news agencies, feeding them a stream of official news. These methods proved effective in Arab communities because of high illiteracy rates. During this stage, Egyptian media dominated the media of the Arab world until 1967. In other words, in this stage, media were completely contained and all their capabilities were dedicated to serving regimes, promote their policies, and preventing criticism. The only exception to this came from a few cases in Lebanon, Kuwait, and Morocco, where multiple media outlets emerged and were allowed to provide a diversity of views (Rugh, 1979; Al-Mousa, 1996).

### **D. Inundation**

This stage witnessed the emergence of satellite TV stations and the Internet through the mid-1980s to the end of the twentieth century. This led to the emergence of private media alongside official, government-owned media. At this stage, censorship and direct guidance became less effective because of the advent of many satellite TV stations transmitted across national borders, some of which criticized other regimes while turning a blind eye to flaws in the system of the country where the channel had its operational base. One researcher has described new media developments in the Arab world by pointing out that it was a new kind of revolution in the Arab world that in turn led to the establishment of modern regional means of communication superior to the direct control of the region's governments and political systems (Alterman, 2000). This stage also gave the Gulf media outlets the upper hand over the Egyptian media, whose

propaganda role had weakened after the 1967 war (Al-Mousa, 1996; Alterman 2000; Rugh, 2004).

Despite the number of Arabic satellite TV stations having increased over the last several decades, UNESCO reports show that 85 per cent of the information circulating in the media of developing countries, including the Arab media, is exported to them by western agencies; this situation does not help the Arab media to articulate views that are consistent with its declared policies. Despite attempts by the ruling establishments to voice views they deem appropriate through media, these views ignore the perspectives of citizens, who are in many cases themselves sceptical about the credibility of these views and seek truth from other sources of information. Therefore, the problem of the Arab media is that they are used as a substitute for democracy in Arab countries. Ruling regimes often use this margin of freedom of expression as an alternative to democracy, as they do not allow transfer of power but instead create pseudo-democracies in terms of the freedom of expression through media (Amin, 2001; Rugh, 2004).

Media, and particularly local TV, local radio, local newspapers, and news agencies mostly until recently, have served Arab states and governments' specific political objectives and the interests of the elite (Nötzolda & Piesb, 2010). Mellor (2005, p 30) pointed out that the role of local Arab news agencies their main function were to "assist the government in disseminating its information and controlling the incoming news from foreign sources." There is a tendency to control media centrally, not only to curtail freedom of expression but also to tighten the government grip of what formulates trends of public opinion (Zayani, 2005; Zayani & Sahraoui, 2007; Sakr, 2007; Mellor et al., 2011). This reveals a paradox in the Arab countries between the freedom and curbing of expression. Whereas Arab constitutions uphold the freedom of expression, this constitutional right is restrained by legal and procedural constraints like

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publications and penalty laws (Rugh, 2004). Censorship by governments, access to information, and lack of technology were the main reasons that drove a number of newspapers and other press publication to publish outside the Arab region (Mellor, 2005).

There are many legal constraints on media freedom and independence in the Arab world. It is noteworthy in this context that a Reporters Sans Frontiers report concluded that the Middle East and North Africa are the least free countries in terms of media. Freedom House, an independent nongovernmental organization, is widely recognized as the definitive source of information on the state of freedom around the globe, and has provided analytical reports and numerical ratings for world countries and territories since 1980. A Freedom House report (*Freedom in the Middle East and North Africa*) showed that the Arab countries lag behind other regions in areas such as adherence to democratic standards, independent media, the rights of women, and the rule of law. It also showed that the people of the Arab Middle East experienced a modest but potentially significant increase in political rights and civil liberties with the separating of new media, activism by citizen groups and reforms by governments (Freedom House, 2003, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011).

The Freedom of the Press index is an annual survey of media independence in 195 countries and territories. Countries are given a total score from 0 (best) to 100 (worst) on the basis of a set of 23 questions divided into three subcategories. Assigning numerical points allows for comparative analysis among the countries surveyed and facilitates an examination of trends over time. The degree to which each country permits the free flow of news and information determines the classification of its media as Free, Partly Free, or Not Free. Countries scoring 0 to 30 are regarded as having free

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media; 31 to 60, Partly Free media; and 61 to 100, Not Free media (Freedom House, 2008, 2009, 2011).

The Freedom House reports (2006, 2008, 2010, 2011) pointed out that Lebanon experienced the most significant improvement; its status improved from Not Free to Partly Free due to major improvements in both political rights and civil liberties. Furthermore, encouraging signs in the region over the last few years have been elections exhibiting increased competition in Iraq, Egypt, and Tunisia; the introduction of women's suffrage in Kuwait; and improvements of press in Arab gulf countries, particularly in Saudi Arabia's media environment. However, the Freedom House survey showed that of the 17 Arab states in the Middle East-North Africa region, 15 fit the description of being not free, and – by Freedom House standards – only three (Kuwait, Lebanon and Egypt) are considered to be partly free. The report noted that the Arab world still suffers from the lowest levels of media freedom worldwide (Freedom House, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2011).

### **2.5 Digital Technology and the Arab Media System**

With the emergence of digital technology and the appearance of a new type of Arab media climate represented in satellite TV channels, dialogue and even debate have become available to virtually everyone in the Arab diaspora, despite the fact that the Arab regimes have struggled to maintain control of their local media. The trans-national media have opened up alternative political discussions and these new media (satellite TV channels and electronic media) are no longer under the absolute control of the authorities, as they had been many years earlier. This practically means that state authority in terms of censorship and banning print media has become relative, as it has lost its overall unified ability to censor, ban or confiscate print and broadcast media (Alterman 2000; Amin, 2001).

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The advent of satellite networks in the region's space, which spread through coverage of the Gulf War in 1990, shifted the focus of controversy on the media in the region (Mellor, 2007; Nötzolda & Piesb, 2010). Whereas there was one source of information at the time when Arab governments fully controlled media, today Arab and international satellite TV stations, the Internet, and international newspapers compete with official media, which has resulted in a decline in state control over the flow of information. The new media, such as satellite TV stations and the Internet, have been able to escape direct government intervention, elicit the views of writers and journalists from all over the world, and broadcast a summary of news in the regular channels of modern satellite stations, as well as the Internet; this has help the younger generations to follow news as reported by the world press. These developments have also enabled the Arab press to gain access to wider audiences. As a result, local television stations have rapidly lost their political market and viewers. For instance, one of the most famous confessions of the Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh is that he watched Al-Jazeera television more than official Yemeni television (Bahry, 2001; Rugh, 2004; Miles, 2005). Arab journalists at satellite channels have even become celebrities in their own right and new "heroes" after their brave reporting from Iraq, Palestinian territories, Afghanistan, and the heart of violence, particularly inside Arab and Muslims countries (Mellor, 2008).

One of the most appealing features of this new media system across the Arab world and beyond is the idea that a public sphere is emerging (Alterman 1998; Eickelman & Anderson 1999; Lynch, 2006; Miladi, 2006). The impact of new media and other "liberalized" media in the Arab world has been discussed in relation to the rise of the "Arab public sphere," which has brought disparate local debates together in a manner of promoting central pan-Arab issues, and has emerged as a location of vibrant

and open political debates (Lynch, 2006; Miladi, 2006). The overall result is that the region's broadcasting landscape is far different today than it was 30 years ago. The emergence of a global telecommunications revolution, particularly in satellite television, has brought and continues to bring dramatic changes to the Arab world, perhaps more so than to any other region on Earth (Miles, 2005; Lynch, 2006).

### **2.6 Television Broadcasting in Arab Countries**

The role of television has grown rapidly compared to other means of mass communication due to its unique composition of sound and image. Thus it is not surprising that television has overtaken other mass communication means to become the foremost important source of information. Television has acquired a wide spectrum of the audience so much that communications experts have described the TV audience as a 'staggering audience' in terms of its percentage of the population and a social phenomenon unprecedented in history (Rugh, 2004). Television generates a cultural environment made up of images and representations with which people grow up (Morgan et al., 1999).

Television broadcasting in the Arab world began in the late 1950s in Iraq and Lebanon (Boyd, 1999; Rugh, 2004). Egypt and Syria followed in 1960, Kuwait and Algeria in 1961, Sudan and Morocco in 1962, Yemen in 1964, Saudi Arabia in 1965, Tunisia in 1966, Jordan in 1968, Libya in 1968, Dubai in 1968, Abu Dhabi in 1969, Qatar in 1970, Bahrain in 1972, Oman in 1974 and North Yemen in 1975 (Labib et al., 1983; Boyd, 1999; Rugh, 2004). However, almost all television channels in the Arab countries developed under the direct ownership and control of Arab governments (Rugh, 2004).

Ayish (2001) has argued that television systems in the Arab world during the 1970s were constrained by three major problems. First, insufficient local programme

production, which led to external programme importation, mainly from the United States and Western Europe. Second, close government scrutiny and control, leading to prohibitive working environments. Third, shortages in human and financial resources which led to dull and low-quality local programming output. Nevertheless, by the end of the 1980s the television monopoly in the Arab world was experiencing a major erosion with the emergence of more autonomous television organizations and the rise of commercial television services alongside government broadcasting (Ayish, 2001). In the 1990s the shackles of censorship and government control of broadcasting in the Arab world were broken by this rise of Arab satellite stations and new media (Ghareeb, 2000).

The impact of the second Gulf War of 1991 also opened a new chapter in the history of media and press freedom in the Arab world (Abduljaleel, 1994; Van-Hwei Lo, 1994; Mellor, 2007). The onset of satellite channels after the crisis of the second Gulf war and the distinguished coverage by the American CNN station of the war, the liberation of Kuwait and ousting of Iraqi forces from Kuwait by the Alliance Forces resulted in the spread of public and private satellite stations with various broadcasting material ranging from news to entertainment (Flournoy & Stewart, 1997; Pan et al., 1994; Schleifer, 1999; Amin, 2001; Bahry, 2001). The use of satellites in telecommunications has given rise to new kinds of media outlets that are generally beyond Arab governments' direct control (Alterman, 1998; Nötzolda & Piesb, 2010).

### **2.7 Satellite Broadcasting and Arab Media**

The first attempts of the Arab world to introduce satellite TV broadcasting go back to 1976 when the Arab countries joined together to establish the Arab Satellite Communication Organization (ARABSAT). Guaaybess (2002) pointed out that ARABSAT was the Arab countries' reply to the new information and communication

challenging situations, which condemned the unequal circulation of information and communication flows, and the unbalanced distribution of the means of communication. Arab countries also had to provide the world with their own image of themselves (Guaaybess, 2002). However, since the beginning of the 1990s, the ARABSAT broadcasting configuration has been totally changed because the idea of cooperation, and the claim for a fairer sharing of the means of information and communication, were replaced by a reality governed by economic rationality (Guaaybess, 2002).

Many channels and satellite stations emerged in the Arab regions that have tried to attract the largest mass basis in the framework of benefiting from the developments of digital broadcasting technology via satellite. Several satellite channels, governmental and private, have emerged relying on ARABSAT and other global satellite systems (Rugh, 2004; Lynch, 2006). In the light of these developments, including the proliferation of satellites and the use of digital technology in place of analogue technology, the world has witnessed many changes in the areas of information and its content, and the notion of specialized channels has emerged due to the changing of many prevailing media concepts that arose in the era of live transmission satellites. These developments also led to an increase in the number of investors, financiers and channels in addition to the emergence of a trend towards special taste or specialization in movies, drama, music, sports, children, fashion, advertising, women, religion, education, health, culture, and news. And with the development of space technology, viewers in the Arab world have owned an open space to receive several official and private satellite channels (Ayish, 2001, Sakr, 2007). The explosion in the number of satellite channels has led such channels to compete among themselves by offering open debates and live news reports, which has had an impact on the development of other Arab media outlets such as local, national, and pan-Arab press (Mellor, 2007).

## **2.8 The Pan-Arab TV Services**

The second Arab satellite TV provider was Arab Radio and Television (ART), which started transmitting from Italy in 1994. It initially provided four channels: a movie channel, a sports channel, a variety channel, and a children's programming channel. Since then ART has become a global platform of more than 20 channels, seven of which are its own and most of which are encrypted. ART also carries a variety of other non-ART channels, such as MBC, LBC, M-Net, TNT, Cartoon Network, RAI International, and the Moroccan and Tunisian national channels (Sakr, 2007; Arab Radio and Television, 2010).

The third satellite TV provider, Orbit, was launched in 1994 by the Saudi investment group al-Mawared and was transmitted from Rome. Orbit, produced by the BBC Arabic News channel, sought to provide highly objective news stories, interviews and talk shows, informed professional reports and experts from across the world (Sakr, 2007). However, Orbit broke its lease after a year with BBC Arabic News because of a quarrel over editorial control between the owners of Orbit and the BBC. Orbit subscribers now have access to over 40 television and radio services provided by its own television and radio network and by Star Select, an exclusive package of services provided to Orbit by Star TV. Orbit provides many networks, including the Disney Channel, Orbit-ESPN Sports, America Plus, Super Movies, Orbit News (a composite of programming provided by NBC, ABC and CBS), the Hollywood Channel, CNN International and the Fun Channel (Orbit, 2010, Schleifer, 1999).

Another popular Arab satellite channel is LBC Television, the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation, which started transmitting from Lebanon in 1996. LBC rapidly became known for producing a variety of talk shows. These shows tackled many subjects considered taboo issues in the Arab world, such as premarital sex, incest, and homosexuality (Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation, 2010).

The Abu Dhabi Satellite Channel (ADSC) is another popular Arab satellite channel, which started transmitting from Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates in 1995. It claims to have state-of-the-art technologies, a professional staff, and has mostly entertainment-orientated programming. ADSC operates as part of the Emirates Media Corporation, which is a government organization controlled by the UAE Ministry of Information, a newly established media body serving as an umbrella for one national newspaper, three television stations, four radio stations, and numerous publications. ADSC underwent major developmental and technical modernization between 2008 and 2010 (Ministry of Information and Culture, 2010).

Another popular Arab satellite channel is the Arab News Network (ANN), which is based in London. It started transmitting in 1997. The ANN was owned by the brother of deceased Syrian president Hafez El Assad, Rifâat El Assad, and his son Soumar. The channel produces news programmes, talk shows, open debates, and in-depth analysis of news bulletins, political, economic, social, documentary, and entertainment programmes for 18 broadcasting hours daily, and six hours of repeated programming (ANN, 2010).

Satellite technology has had vast effects on the Arab world. According to Zureikat (1999), the role of Arab ministries of information has been threatened since the increase of satellite television. Satellite television stations constitute a watchdog on governments in the Arab world. Thus following the rise of satellite channel, Arab officials started handling issues that might influence Arab public opinion with caution (Alterman, 1998; Zureikat, 1999). According to Alterman (1998), the marketplace of ideas led by satellite television stations has caused Arabs to think for themselves rather than let authorities think for them. Moreover, Marghalani et al., (1998) found that a mix of technological, political, economic, cultural, and religious forces has given rise to a

number of strong motivations to adopt Satellite technology and watch satellite TV channels.

## **2.9 The Specialized TV Channels**

Specialized media, such as news media, are defined as media basically concerned with a specific field like politics, culture, economy, science or sports. They focus attention on tackling events, phenomena and developments in a particular field in their general socio-economic context. This kind of media is transacted by specialized media corporations where employees are qualified in media and specialized in that particular specialty of the media corporation (Sakr, 2007). Specialized media have emerged at a certain stage of ordinary audience development in number and quality. However, before the emergence of Arab media institutions, both official and private, foreign channels dominated the Arab media space (Sakr, 2007).

News is an important pillar of the media and a tool that enables the public to be informed about local and global events (Golan et al., 2010; Valeriani, 2010). News satellite channels combine all the components of the press in its printed, audio and visual forms and they are characterized by instantaneousness, comprehensiveness, credibility and a wide spread to an increasing audience. A satellite news channel is instantaneous in covering news, just like radio. It is unique in addressing the sense of sight, a sense that human beings depend on to obtain most of the information stored in their memory throughout their life (Bignell, 2004; Darwish, 2009; Golan et al., 2010).

In the early stages of Arab satellite channels, the viewer was not satisfied with what was seen on some satellite TV channels as some of them were copies of the terrestrial channels (Rugh, 2004). Other Arabic satellite TV channels carried the same mistakes of the past, in that they neglected the viewer and dealt with him in a condescending manner in addition to continuing the broadcast of news about public

officials, presidents, ministers, and protocol issues of presidents and ministers. This repeating of several Arabic satellite TV channels rhetoric ignored what was happening around them in a changing and very open world. Then came satellite news TV channels such as Al-Jazeera to challenge and change the Arab media scene for ever (Rugh, 2004; Sakr, 2007).

In this context, it is opportune to present a historical overview of Arabic news channels received in the Arab World as a prelude to this chapter before we review the role of news media and Arabic news satellite TV channels in the Arab Gulf States region.

### **2.10 Arabic News TV Channels**

For several decades, viewers in the Arab world used to watch news which consisted of reporting the activities of Arab leaders (emirs, presidents, and kings). Bulletins would then proceed to show other news activities of the crown prince and vice-president, followed by more news about the interior minister, foreign minister, and after that viewers saw different news related to the Arab world and the crises in the region (most of the news dealt with the 60 years of the Israeli-Palestine conflict), finally, the bulletin would broadcast general news related to some major events in the world. These kinds of news bulletins have haunted the viewers in the Arab world almost every day and night for the past several decades (Ayish, 2002; Lynch, 2006; Darwish, 2009).

This approach of news broadcasting in the Arab World changed after the introduction of Arabic news satellite televisions, which began with the partnership initiative between the BBC and Orbit Communications Corporation, that launched BBC Arabic Television in 1996. However, this only lasted for several months before closing. Immediately after this, Al-Jazeera was established in 1996 and opened the door for a new generation of news channels to enter the Arab world (Zayani, 2005; Albaghdady,

2007; Darwish, 2009). Arab news media have become as windows onto other words practices and life style beside acting as a mirror that reflects a new hybrid image of the self (Mellor, 2007; Valeriani, 2010).

Arab news satellite stations are divided into either publicly owned operations run by governments or businesses, or non-governmental bodies or privately operations based in the Arab world or in non-Arab countries. The most popular Arabic news channels are Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, BBC (Arabic), France 24, and Al-Hurra (Ayish, 2001; El-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2002; Rugh, 2004; Zayani, 2005; Albaghdady, 2007; Darwish, 2009; Valeriani, 2010).

### **2.10.1 Al-Jazeera News TV Channel**

Al-Jazeera is considered today as is the largest and most controversial Arabic News Channel in the Arab world. If one attempts to read the phenomenon of Al-Jazeera with some deliberation and objectivity, it must be based on the principle that for every phenomenon there are a sphere and conditions from which it emerges; in this case, the Gulf area and Qatar being one of them, which witnessed recently the tremors of the Second Gulf War that led to shifts in their social and political structure. Al-Jazeera has played a prominent role in the dynamic and unprecedented mobility in the region. Rarely does any viewer miss its news, analyses and programmes. Most studies about the channel have pointed out that Al-Jazeera represents a radical and bold turning point in the Arab region as it allows Arab citizens to reflect their own views freely, and participate in any political or intellectual dialogue broadcast by the channel (Miles, 2005).

According to several polls that have been conducted by numerous studies, the most popular Arabic satellite channel for Arab viewers is Al-Jazeera (Darwish, 2009), which is known as “the Arabic CNN”. In November 1996 Al-Jazeera, which means “the island” in Arabic, was introduced in Qatar as the first Arab news satellite channel. The

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network now has an estimated 45 million viewers. The channel was financed with 500 million riyals from the Qatari government (\$137 million); besides funding from the Qatari government, it has relied on advertising and viewer revenue (El-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2002). In early 1997, it increased its broadcasts to nine hours and then to 12 hours a day after being six hours in 1996; broadcasts were then increased to 18 hours a day until they became around the clock starting from 1 February 1999 (Auter et al., 2004, 2005; Miles, 2005).

Since its early beginnings, Al-Jazeera has sought to transcend regional frontiers and has turned into an international media phenomenon, especially after its distinguished performance in covering major events regionally and globally; this is particularly exemplified by coverage of the Al-Aqsa Uprising in the Palestinian territories and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan which sought to provide viewers with a different vision, daring, and reasonable coverage. The wide field spread of Al-Jazeera's offices and crew has led to scoops on several occasions and unveiled the real face of war through transmitting scenes of destruction and highlighting images of casualties among civilians, often shunned by media cameras associated with super powers (Zayani, 2005; Arafa el al., 2005; Eliades, 2006).

Al-Jazeera has sought to position itself as a channel specializing in news articles, programmes and seminars of a political nature and property in contrast to other Arabic satellite channels. It has been argued that Al-Jazeera has adopted a clear strategy and adhered to its manifesto by breaking the taboos of thought that prevailed in the Arab media over the decades (Zayani, 2005). Hence, it has been credited with restoring Arab viewers' confidence and contact with them after a long reliance on international news agencies, western satellite TV stations that tackle issues from a pure western perspective, and Arab-government media outlets (Lynch, 2005; Arafa el al., 2005; Miles, 2006;

Darwish, 2009).

However, the Al-Jazeera phenomenon has become controversial in the Arab media. Views differ over its effect on the Arab media; it has generated both a welcome wave of opinion and also conservative opinion filled with apprehension and suspicion of the programmes it carries, accusing them of driving wedges between groups of nations rather than enlightening them, converging their differences or serving Arab causes. Al-Jazeera channel has been subject to criticism from numerous press, radio stations, television channels, as well as Internet sites and the majority of Arab, Middle Eastern, and Western governments for its presentation style, story choices, financial resources, subsidies, and independence from Qatar's government (El-Nawawy & Iskander, 2002; Lynch, 2005; Zayani, 2005).

### **2.10.2 Al-Arabiya News TV Channel**

The Centre for Middle East Television (Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC)) was the first Arab satellite television station to be broadcast via satellite from Europe, specifically London. Beginning in September 1991, it aims to serve Arab viewers holding resident status abroad. The channel is a commercial company owned by private Saudi financiers. Its capital amounts to 60 million US dollars and its annual budget amounts to 300 million US dollars. It transferred its headquarters to Dubai after King Fahd of Saudi Arabia stopped the annual financial support for the station in late 2005. After buying United Press International news agency in June 1992 for 3.95 million US dollars, the station expanded its news service and maintained the international nature of the news agency, as well as its reputation in casting information and news. It also increased its share in the news agency from 20 per cent to 30 per cent after the latter raised its capital (Sakr, 1999; Kraidy, 2002; Cochrane, 2007).

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The station claims to encourage all forms of cooperation and joint production with several TV corporations around the world. The MBC bureau in Washington prepares report on the most important events in the world to be broadcast within CNN programmes (Cochrane, 2007).

Al-Arabiya satellite station debuted its transmission in February 2003, but the idea of establishing a specialized news channel within MBC goes back much earlier than this, being expedited by the September 11 attacks. It broadcasts through NILESAT, ARABSAT and BOLTSAT and it aims to provide an Arab alternative to news services marked by the Arab point of view, especially after the successive events of Iraq's invasion and the Palestinian uprising allegedly having made the Arab viewer in a constant state of anxiety and wanting to hear more about these topics, as well as focusing on other news of interest to Arab viewers (Zayani and Ayish, 2006). Al-Arabiya specializes in news content and presents a series of public affairs programmes which tackle Arab issues, in addition to documentaries and cultural and debate shows. The channel first adopted the logo of "All the news" but later in 2005 it changed this to "The nearest to truth." Al-Arabiya is an independent station and has a separate budget from MBC; it is owned by the Saudi "Ara Group" and the Kuwaiti-Lebanese Businessmen Group (Sakr, 2007; Al-Arabiya Channel, 2010).

Al-Arabiya has a board of directors and its internal bill stipulates that it specializes in news, political programmes and documentaries, for which it has allocated studios equipped with state-of-the-art technology, and provided a cadre of carefully-selected broadcasters and technicians with wide expertise in the news field from various Arab countries like Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, Oman and Palestine. The station has also launched its own website which specializes in political and economic affairs, especially by following up news on Arab financial markets. The website is

concerned with all investment activities in real estate, oil and finance. It has also launched a texting service through mobile phones following the footsteps of Al-Jazeera mobile (Al-Arabiya Channel, 2010).

### **2.10.3 Al-Alam News Channel**

Al-Alam news channel broadcasts in Arabic around the clock. The channel was launched at the beginning of April 2003 and it transmits through terrestrial and satellite means. It can also be viewed through its website and can be received in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and the American Pacific region. It claims that it aims to present Islamic views, break the Western monopoly of news channels, and fill the vacuum in the existing news transmission in the world (Al-Alam, 2010).

Al-Alam is managed and financed by the Radio and TV Corporation in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Its stance toward the American and British invasion of Iraq was marked with fierce opposition. The channel has a large team of correspondents and distributors around the world. Its programmes include around-the-clock news bulletins, interactive shows, seminars and documentaries. The fact that Iran has a huge satellite system has helped to boost the Al-Alam channel. It transmits through several satellites to the region, and Asia and Europe. The European satellite helps provide the channel constantly with varied news programmes, recorded programmes and documentaries from other Iranian satellite channels which are dubbed into Arabic before broadcast (Al-Alam, 2010).

### **2.10.4 Al-Hurra News Channel**

This is an Arabic-speaking American channel which is financed by the US congress. It debuted its programmes in February 2004. Al-Hurra (Arabic for “The Free One”) primarily provides news and information programming. According to the US Bureau of Radio and TV, which manages Al-Hurrah, it is meant to be a non-commercial channel

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financed by US citizens through the American congress. It operates under the supervision of a trustees council which, is an independent federal autonomous authority concerned with safeguarding professional autonomy and media integrity within its institutions. Al-Hurra, as reported by its officials, aims to counteract the influence of the Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya news channels and improve the image of the USA in the Arab World. It is worth mentioning that the USA has also established two media outlets to address Arab youth: "Sawa" Radio and "Hawa" magazine. The channel focuses on news and events in the Middle East and the world and is broadcast via satellites (Rugh, 2004; AlHurra, 2010). It has focused on co-existence between Arab and Israel, and it debuted its programmes with interviews with young people from both sides, in addition to an interview with an interview with then-president George W. Bush, and former American secretary of state Madeleine Albright.

Al-Hurra is considered to be the latest American initiative to improve the US image in the Arab World. Yet, observers argue that the channel faces a tough task among Arab viewers as anti-America sentiments are large and anger rages against US bias toward Israel and the American policy towards Iraq. This channel, which targets the Arab World using its native language, is but a step in the "Public Diplomacy" enterprise proposed by the US congress International Affairs Committee, which allocated a sum of 245 million US dollars to launch radio and TV transmissions and a cultural exchange programme directed to the Middle East. The most important achievement is that it is a TV satellite channel that transmits various programmes, including educational programmes, in English in addition to press programmes around the clock (Rugh, 2004; El-Nawawy, 2006).

### **2.10.5 France 24**

In November 2005, the TV station France International News France 24, was launched, although it actually began broadcasting in December 2006. It aims to compete with the American media, as represented by CNN, and British media, as represented by the BBC, and broadcasts to Europe, Africa and the Middle East. Then-French president Jacques Chirac stated the station aims to broadcast the vision and values of France all over the world so that France could be in the frontline of the global image picture. It was allocated 15 million Euros to launch the experimental transmission of the station. It broadcasts in French around the clock but allocates certain hours to Arabic and English. The channel also aims to attract viewers from decision makers in the global intellectual elites, most of whom are English-speaking. France 24 relies on the state-owned TV F-1 and the French General Radio and TV Corporation for funding, which is estimated at 86 million Euros. Former French president Jacques Chirac proposed the idea of establishing France 24 and government officials say that the huge cost of the project will be compensated for by gaining an international influence at a time when France is trying to become an alternative voice to the United States in international affairs (France 24, 2010).

### **2.10.6 BBC Arabic Station**

BBC Arabic network was launched in March 2008 as a TV news channel broadcasting 12 hours a day, before moving to broadcast around the clock. It is available free of charge and can be received via satellites and cable. It launched its programme service with an introductory film about the channel. Launching the channel was part of a comprehensive change implemented by the network, including designing a new website and developing its radio programmes. These changes made the channel enter a new phase of its history that started in January 1938 as a radio station then expanded to become information network in March 2008 that broadcasts through a multimedia

system that includes radio, TV, websites and mobile phones. The BBC had previously entered the Arabic TV transmission market in partnership with the Saudi Arabia-based Orbit Corporation but this closed down in 1996 after a dispute over editorial control (BBC Arabic, 2010).

### **2.11 Summary**

The common argument concerning Arab media is that it is still mostly state-owned, and that all the Arab viewer sees is either imported from abroad or produced by government departments, which makes him or her only a spectator in decision-making. This might be true to a certain extent, but it does not reflect the whole truth because modern news media are making great progress that is leading to two results: the transformation of media from an authoritarian to liberal basis, and a technical transformation represented in mass communication. These two results will reflect positively on the mode of thinking in Arab society, and will lead to future political and social changes.

Arab news TV services have succeeded in changing the old-style news reporting that represented little more than propaganda opportunities for Arab leaders. News audiences now seek information about what Arab leaders are actually doing and why (Jamal & Melkote, 2008; Pintak, 2011). Unlike other media outlets in the region, that are still controlled by Arab governments, Arabic news channels do not aim to disseminate a specific ideology because of the information open space, to spread the culture of a new politics by adopting the spirit of diversity and coexistence among ideologies, despite their contradiction and conflict (Zayani, 2005, Zayani & Sahraoui, 2007; Darwish, 2009). The goal of these media outlets is then to liberate Arab audiences from the fear factor and silence policy in the first place and establish a culture of pluralism and diversity in the second place (Zayani, 2005, Zayani & Sahraoui, 2007; Pintak, 2011). As most studies have suggested, these news channels such as Al-Jazeera,

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Al-Arabia, BBC Arabic, Al-Hurra, and France24 Arabic TV news, continue to exert their influence on the national broadcasting and TV stations of the Arab countries. These older stations have now started to introduce talk shows and other modern forms of news presentation in their programmes. More importantly, major Western countries, and also Asian countries such as Russia, Japan and China, have embarked on huge investments in the media field to attract Arab viewers. The outcome of all this competition is a heightening of the ceiling of freedom and more intensity in competition between these channels (Sakr, 1999, 2001, 2007; Zayani, 2005, Zayani & Sahraoui, 2007; Pintak, 2011).

The world is living in the era of open source information and new media technologies. These new media technologies have affected the audiences in the Arab world. Despite the Arab regimes' attempts to retain authority and restrain media via restrictive laws, the Arabic news TV channels and new media continue to foster popular demands for reform and accountability. The latest significant event in the Arab world, popularly known as the “Arab Spring”, beginning in 2011, is proof that Arabic news TV channels have been major key players in broadcasting the uprisings and demands of the young protestors in Arab countries, particularly in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria. As the Arab Spring has started changing the relations between people and their governments in the Arab world, it is expected to transform Arab media outlets in numerous ways.

The following chapter discusses mainstream media systems and news markets in the Arab Gulf States region, as this area represents a sample of the Arab world and was where the survey of the project was conducted.

## **Chapter 3 Media Landscape in the Arab Gulf States**

### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents an overview of the mass media systems and news markets in the six GCC (the Gulf Cooperation Council, also known as the Cooperation for the Arab States of the Gulf or CCASG) countries – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, where the research was carried out and the survey of the study conducted. This chapter examines the mainstream media histories of the GCC countries (press, radio, television broadcasting services and national news agencies), culminating in the emergence of the new digital media transmitted via satellite broadcasting. It also discusses the challenges that these developments have posed for the governments of these states.

### **3.2 Arab Gulf Countries Background**

The terms "Arab states of the Persian Gulf," "Persian Gulf states," "Gulf Persian states" or "Persian Gulf Arab states", are usually reserved for the six Arab monarchical states that have been economically joined since 1981 in the Gulf Cooperation Council. All the Arab States of the Gulf countries share a regional culture that is sometimes referred to as the "Khaleeji (Gulf) Culture". They all speak the Gulf dialect of Arabic and share similar styles of cuisine, dress, and music (Hourani, 1991).

The Arab area of the Persian Gulf is mostly shallow and has many islands, of which Bahrain is the largest. The Arab states are bordered by Oman and the United Arab Emirates to the south, to the west by Qatar and Saudi Arabia, to the north by Kuwait and Iraq, and along the entire east coast by Iran. The Persian Gulf was one of the most important transportation routes in antiquity but declined with the fall of Mesopotamia. In succeeding centuries control of the region was contested by many groups such as Arabs, Persians, Turks, and Western Europeans. In 1853, Britain and the

### Chapter 3 Media Landscape in the Arab Gulf States

Arab sheikhdoms that occupied the Persian Gulf signed the Perpetual Maritime Truce, formalizing the temporary truces of 1820 and 1835. These sheikhdoms thus became known as the Trucial States. In 1907 an international agreement among the major powers placed the gulf in the British sphere of influence. However, in the late 1960s, following British military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf area, the United States of America and the USSR sought to fill the vacuum. In 1971 the first U.S. military installation in the gulf was established in Bahrain then in Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar (Lagasse, 2008).

The majority of the Arab states of the Gulf have greatly relied on oil and gas reserves. This has turned them into the wealthiest nations in the Arab world with higher per capita incomes compared to those of their Arab neighbours in the Middle East and North Africa. However, because of labour shortages they host huge numbers of temporary non-citizen economic migrants from South Asia, Southeast Asia and Africa. In the past there were also significant numbers of immigrants from other Arab countries such as Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, and Yemen (Lagasse, 2008).

All six of these states are monarchies with limited political representation. However, Kuwait and Bahrain have legislatures with popularly elected members. Oman has an advisory council that is popularly elected and in the UAE - which is in fact a federation of seven monarchical emirates - the Federal National Council also functions only as an advisory body and has a portion of its members elected from a small electoral college nominated by the seven rulers. In Qatar, an elected national parliament is written into the new constitution which was released in 2003, but no elections have yet been held. However, women in Qatar were granted the right to vote and be elected in Qatar's first democratic "municipal elections" in 1999, even before women in Kuwait

were granted the right to vote and stand for election in 2006 (Auter & Al-Jaber, 2003; Lagasse, 2008).

It was the nature of the those Arab countries and the similarity of their geographical and economic circumstances and social interdependence and the nature of contemporary challenges they face that prompted the countries to form an organization which is called Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). On May 25, 1981 the first summit conference of the GCC was held in Abu Dhabi, UAE and a summit conference is still held annually (Lagasse, 2008; BBC, 2012).

### **3.3 Media Developments in the GCC States**

Traditionally mass media in the GCC countries have been government-owned and operated. They have privileged concerns about the image of the state, most often equated with that of its ruler, an unelected monarch. Recent developments in communications technologies, most visibly manifest with the emergence of satellite TV channels have changed the media landscape of these countries and impacted the media consumption patterns of their indigenous populations (Boyd, 1999; Auter & Al-Jaber, 2003). Accompanying satellite transmissions have been the steady penetrations of broadband Internet and advanced mobile telephones that are also capable to interact with the Internet. Among the outcomes for media consumers have been significant expansion of choice of content to which they can gain access, greater control over access, and exposure to content over which state governments have diminishing direct control (Ghareeb, 2000; Guaaybess, 2002).

The new communications media have proven to be popular and the new content they convey has created a more competitive media marketplace within the region, not least in respect of the provision and consumption of news. Such changes have forced governments, regulators and policy-makers, and media operators themselves to re-think

their policies and practices. Competition from the new media, loss of control over information flow, criticism of inefficient national television systems, erosion of audience loyalty, and the clamouring by entrepreneurs for a role in emerging pan-national commercial media operations have led to the establishment of a new media environment in all GCC countries (Adhoum, 1996).

All this represents a significant shift from how the media used to look in the Middle East. Rugh (2004) described Arab media even in the last quarter of the twentieth century as being under tight government control. Effectively, the media served as an extension of government and were carefully monitored to ensure they never strayed from the ruling party line in any news stories they published and never criticized their government. In this regard, there were minimal differences between the Arab States. By the early twenty-first century, however, the same author observed changes starting to emerge in the way the media were conceived by Arab governments, often accompanied by new expectations of the media on the part of Arab citizens (Rugh, 2004). Governments still retained overwhelming control over the media, largely exercised through ownership of media infrastructures, but in some cases were allowing limited freedom of expression within news reporting. The emergence and popularity of satellite television was identified as a key instrument of change in this context.

As more new media operations emerged that were privately owned, there was a growing expectation on the part of media owners and their audiences that there should be greater plurality in news provision, both in terms of content and production style (Ghareeb, 2000). Developments such as these that began in the GCC countries also began to spread to other Arab nations. This trend was facilitated by the migration of media operations from other parts of the Arab world to Dubai, which has adopted a more open attitude to the media.

### Chapter 3 Media Landscape in the Arab Gulf States

The dominant satellite TV channels came to be associated with the GCC countries as a result of Saudi investments in operations such as MBC, Orbit, ART, Showtime, and Dubai Media City. These channels form part of a framework called the Arab Satellite Communications Organization (ARABSAT) owned by the governments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar. Although expanded media infrastructures have permitted the flow of much more media content to Arab audiences, a clear vision of how this will serve Arab peoples or help to create a distinctive Arab identity that can be promoted across the Arab world and beyond has yet to materialize (Guaaybess, 2002; Rugh, 2004). Furthermore, despite the emergence of a buoyant private sector, commercially funded media operations in the Arab world are dominated by those based in the Gulf. Governments may no longer enjoy controlling ownership of these companies, but they can still impose local censorship laws that place restrictions on what news providers can publish or broadcast (Boyd, 1999).

Journalists and other media personnel working in the Gulf area do not enjoy freedom of association or the protection of professional trades unions. Although some informal professional communities have been established, these do not enjoy the status of their counterparts in the West. There is lack of balance between nations and regimes that prevents the opening of channels of dialogue or the serious discussion of issues to serve common interests (Rugh, 2004).

Journalism in the Gulf itself has undergone three important phases, the first of which started with the publication of the *Journal of Kuwait* in 1928. This publication moved from Kuwait to Bahrain just one year after its inception. Bahrain was the site of another newspaper launched in 1939, *Al-Bahrain*. This publication had an influential role in supporting the UK against Nazi Germany.

### Chapter 3 Media Landscape in the Arab Gulf States

The second phase occurred between 1949 and 1956 and was characterized by the emergence of a number of newspapers, magazines and periodicals across the Gulf, and especially in Bahrain. Perhaps the most important publication at this time was the *Voice of Bahrain*, a news magazine which specialized in tackling issues of the day and recruited well-educated writers to produce high quality reporting that could enrich the cultural and social awareness of local populations. The publication's activities were curtailed by censorship and other government-imposed restrictions that undermined its prominence. It was not until the 1970s that the Gulf press began to assert greater influence as more writers moved to Kuwait where they enjoyed relatively greater freedom of expression than elsewhere in the Arab world.

The third phase in the development of printed news media in the Gulf states saw print journalism being challenged by broadcast journalism that had been invigorated in the 1990s with the emergence of satellite transmission platforms. The role played by journalism also became redefined with the coverage provided by Western media, and especially CNN, of the first Gulf war in Iraq. This conflict witnessed more direct eyewitness coverage than before; with journalists becoming embedded with the military and enabled to report live from the frontline.

Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and UAE recognized the significant role that could be played by a private press which was independent of the direct intervention of the state. Meanwhile, though unwilling to embrace privatized media to that extent, Saudi Arabia sought to create public-private media partnerships that could source and transmit news beyond its national borders. These initiatives resulted in the spread of the international Arab press and the emergence of celebrity newsmen whose views can influence public opinion locally and abroad.

### **3.3.1 The Press and News Publications**

The Gulf press was born at the beginning of the twentieth century in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain. The press spread to Oman, Qatar and the UAE in the early 1960s and 1970s. The first Saudi newspaper, *Al-Hijaz*, was launched in 1908, followed by newspapers in Kuwait in 1928, Bahrain in 1939, UAE in 1966, Oman in 1970 and finally Qatar in 1972 (GCC Publications, 2004).

The number of published newspapers dramatically increased at the end of the twentieth century, facilitated by technological developments in publishing and printing. Daily newspapers, magazines and other publications emerged across all the Gulf countries. By 2002, for instance, there were 176 news publications in Saudi Arabia, 80 in Kuwait, 72 in the United Arab Emirates, 27 in Oman, and 22 each in Bahrain and Qatar (GCC Publications, 2004). Some newspapers are published in languages other than Arabic, the most important of which is English.

Freedom House (2009) indicated that Kuwait ranked first among the Gulf region in terms of the degree of freedom accorded to its indigenous press, and second among all Arab countries. It was categorized, however, only as a “partially free country.” The other Gulf countries were classified as “non-free countries” and all ranked outside the top 100 countries on this scale. The Reporters Without Borders annual report for 2009, which summarizes the nature of the media in different countries, indicated that there were signs of evolution in freedom of the press in the Arabian Gulf region, but noted that the GCC states still have a long way to go. The next section of this chapter examines individual Gulf nations and the nature of news media and journalism in each case.

#### **3.3.1.1 Kuwaiti Press**

The first pamphlet published in Kuwait was a monthly magazine known as the *Journal of Kuwait*, owned by Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al-Rashid and first published in 1928.

### Chapter 3 Media Landscape in the Arab Gulf States

Following the *Journal of Kuwait* came the *Kuwait Journal* in 1954 and *Al-Arabi* in 1958. The first press law to regulate the relationship between the press and the state was not issued, however, until 1956. Kuwaiti press history can be marked by two eras: pre-independence press and post-independence press. The pre-independence period marked the beginning of specialized press during which a newspaper was no longer a collection of jokes, stories and features. Instead, it became a chronicle of daily events together with critical analysis and interpretation.

The post-independence press refers to the period after 1961 which witnessed the issuance of press law to boost press activity in Kuwait. *Al-Arabi* magazine in December 1958 represented the first indication of what could be possible. The daily journal *Public Opinion* was first issued on April 16, 1961, however, it is considered to mark the beginning of Kuwaiti journalism in its modern sense. Since that time, the number of daily newspapers and weekly magazines in Kuwait has increased significantly.

The Press and Publications Law No. 8 of 1979 entrusted to the Directory of Publications and Distribution (DPD) a number of competences related to supervising the activities of the press and their distribution in Kuwait. This law charged the DPD with regulating the press, but at the same time provided the necessary facilities to underpin the production of newspapers, to create some stories via press releases, and facilitate the flow of employees into the news media (GCC Publications, 2004).

The oil boom of the 1970s was accompanied by a publication boom. Since the beginning of the flourishing publications services market, the Kuwaiti government had published newspapers and magazines, however they were suspended because they could not compete with privately owned newspapers and publications. Newspapers and magazines in Kuwait are now published in several languages including, English, French, Urdu, and there are more than fifteen daily newspapers published in Arabic.

## Chapter 3 Media Landscape in the Arab Gulf States

The most popular Arabic daily newspapers in Kuwait are *Al-Seyassah* (Policy), which was established in 1965, *Al-Qabas* (Starbrand), launched in 1972, *Al-Watan* (The Homeland), which began publication in 1974, and *Al-Anbas* (The News) which was first published in 1976. After the news amendments made to the Press and Publications Law in 2007, other newspapers have been published, including: *Alam Alyoum*, *Al Jareeda*, *Al Wasat* and *Annahar*.

### 3.3.1.2 Qatari Press

Print and publication media started in Qatar with the governmental publication of an official gazette that contained the laws and Emiri's decrees in 1961. Qatar established its Department of Information in 1969, which issued *Doha* magazine the same year. Moreover, the Ministry of Education then issued the *Education* magazine in 1970. In the same year, *Al Urooba press and Gulf News*, a bimonthly English language magazine, was launched as the first private press publication in Qatar (Auter & Al-Jaber, 2003).

There are three main Qatari daily newspapers, namely: *Al-Raya*, *Al-Sharq*, and *Al-Watan*. Prior to these newspapers, there was a publication titled *Al-Arab*, which started in 1971 and ceased publication in 1996 only to be resumed again in 2008 (GCC Publications, 2004). The oldest of the other three publications is *Al-Sharq*, whose first issue came out in September 1978, followed by *Al-Raya* (launched 10 May 1979) and then *Al-Watan* (3 September 1995). In addition to Arabic newspapers, the *Gulf Times* newspaper is published in English by Al-Raya press. It was published for the first time on 10 December, 1978 and was followed by the *Peninsula* newspaper in 2001 issued by Al-Sharq Press, while the Al-Watan Press issued the *Qatar Tribune* in September 2006. Furthermore, magazines are published in Qatar covering many subjects: politics, business, society, finance, health, art and entertainment.

The Qatari government provided financial support for local newspapers and press since the establishment of the Ministry of Information in 1979. However, this was stopped in 1995. Censorship was lifted from the local press in October 1995 by virtue of Law No. 5 of 1998, which abolished the Ministry of Information and Culture, distributed its competencies and transformed some of its directories to independent bodies. At this time also the National Council for Culture, Arts and Heritage was established. This left the press and publication media essentially free from government interference and many national and international newspapers and magazines started to appear in the Qatari market, such as the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, *Time* magazine, the *Financial Times* and *Alquds Alarabi* (Auter & Al-Jaber, 2003).

### **3.3.1.3 Emirates Press**

The press started in the UAE later than in the other Gulf countries. Some UAE emirates initiated early newspapers that were, however, only short lived. In 1927, for example, Ibrahim Mohamed Al-Madfa'a issued a bi-weekly newspaper called *Oman*, in collaboration with some poets and writers from the region. *Oman* was handwritten with five printed copies that were traded among the literate people of the country. The newspaper contained excerpts from the news published in other Arab newspapers especially Egyptian and Iraqi ones, which tended to arrive in Sharja several weeks after their release, in addition to a host of local news, information about the prices of commodities and Bedouin tales. *Oman* newspaper ceased publication only one year after its launch. Subsequently, a group of young writers based in Dubai and Sharjah issued a daily bulletin written by hand which they called *The Sound of Sparrows*. In addition, there were a number of leaflets and posters that were posted in markets containing advertisements in English on the arrival timetables of ships coming from India and Iran.

In January 1965, the Dubai Municipality Media Directory issued a bulletin under the title of *Dubai News*, to be followed by the Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah which issued a similar magazine in 1968. The two publications continued to be published for a long time until after the establishment of the state of the United Arab Emirates. The Sharja emirate followed in the footsteps of Dubai and Ras El-Khaima and from 1970 published *Al-Shurooq*, a monthly magazine produced by two brothers, Treim Omran and Abdullah Omran. This publication, however, was short lived. The Omran brothers then launched a second magazine *Al-Khaleej* on October 19, 1970 which was edited in Sharjah, printed in Kuwait, and shipped by air to Sharjah. This newspaper subsequently ceased publication.

On October 20, 1969, the *Al-Ittihad* weekly newspaper was published by the Department of Information and Tourism in Abu Dhabi, and became a daily newspaper on April 20, 1972; this was followed by *Al-Wahda* on August 16, 1973 which was owned and edited by Mr Rashid Oweidha. More newspapers followed. *Al-Fajr* came out on March 17 March 17, 1975. It was owned and edited by Mr Obeid Al Mazrui. Then, *Al-Khaleej* was revived on April 15, 1980 in Sharjah, to be followed by the *Al-Bayan* daily that was issued by the Dubai Information Department from 10 May, 1980 (GCC Publications, 2004).

### **3.3.1.4 Bahraini Press**

Bahrain is a leading country in the Gulf in terms of promulgating legislation regulating the press, printing and publication. The first Act to regulate the press goes back to 1930, which was known as the "Press Regulation Law". In 1979, a comprehensive law was issued that contained detailed principles governing the press, printing, publishing and circulation (GCC Publications, 2004). The beginning of the breakthrough in the Bahraini press occurred when the *Bahrain* newspaper was issued by Abdullah Al-za'id

between 1939 and 1944 to tackle political, cultural, literary and domestic social news and to support the Allied forces at war against Germany.

Newspapers of the 1950s in Bahrain played a prominent role, especially *Al-Qafila*, *Al-Watan*, *Al-Mizan* and even *Al-Shu'la* which published only one edition, in fighting colonialism and spreading national awareness and supporting the revolution of July 23, 1952 in Egypt, and criticizing the political situation of the British protectorates in the Gulf region. Such was their impact on public opinion that the British ordered them all to cease publication in 1956. Subsequently, the following two decades witnessed the publication of relatively low profile newspapers and political journals that touched only tangentially on local issues and focused mainly on reporting pan-Arab and foreign news.

The 1970s and 1980s are considered to be the period of maturity of the literary and cultural movement in Bahrain and saw the emergence of varied newspapers such as the *Akhbar Al-Khaleej* daily in 1976, the English language *Gulf Daily* in 1978, and the *Al-Ayyam* daily in 1989. The 1980s witnessed dynamic cultural change embodied by the publication of cultural periodicals such as *Akhbar Al-Tarbiya* in 1981, *Al-Watheeqa* in 1982, and *Al-Muhami* edited and published by Bahraini lawyers in 1982. A literary magazine, *Kalemat*, was issued in 1983 by writers and dealt with cultural issues. More magazines were issued side by side with *Kalemat*, namely, *Afaqun Amniyya*, *Panorama Al-khaleej*, and *Bahrain Charity*.

### **3.3.1.5 Omani Press**

Press history in Oman is relatively short because, until 1970, no newspapers were published except for the news release of the Omani oil Company entitled *News of our Company* in 1967 that covered corporate news only. On July 25, 1970, and only two days after the ascension of Sultan Qaboos to the throne, a newspaper entitled *Oman*

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*News* was printed on stencil paper in Arabic and English and contained news of the Sultanate in addition to Sultani decrees and government resolutions (GCC Publications, 2004).

*Al-Watan* was the first and most important Omani daily newspaper. The first issue came out on 28 Jan 1971. It was published by the Omani Press for Publication and Dissemination Corporation. *Al-Watan* was published in more than one Arab capital. In the early 1970s, it was published in Beirut then transferred to Kuwait in 1974 due to the Lebanese Civil War. Then it migrated to Oman after the establishment of the International Press Corporation and was eventually published by *Al-Watan's* own press from 1988.

The *Oman* daily is considered to be the first state-run newspaper published in the Sultanate of Oman, with publication starting on November 18, 1972 on the occasion of the Second National Day celebrations. It was committed to come out every Saturday on temporary basis until 11 Nov 11, 1975 when it started to be published twice a week, (Saturdays and Tuesdays) so as to stay more up to date with the important events in the country. On 29 May 1972, however, Sultan Qaboos Bin Saeed introduced Law No 49 of 1980 establishing the Oman Press which separated the newspaper from the General Directorate of Information and Tourism.

*The Times of Oman* was the first English-language newspaper in the Sultanate, debuting on 23 February, 1975 as a weekly paper published every Thursday. It included a variety of articles covering local affairs and offering a special service for the expatriate community. Starting from 1 January 1991, it became a daily newspaper issued by Dar Muscat for Press, Publishing and Distribution.

### 3.3.1.6 Saudi Press

The first press activity in the Arabian Peninsula started with the introduction of printing machines to the area in 1908, when several newspapers were published during the late Ottoman era. Most of these newspapers disappeared soon after for many reasons including the volatility of the political situation in Hijaz and financial problems (GCC Publications, 2004).

During the Ottoman era, newspapers were published in Mecca, Jedda and Medina between 1908 and 1912. These were titled *Hijaz*, *Hijaz Reform* (The Sun of Truth), *Safa'a Al-Hijaz* and *Al-Madina Al-Munawwara*. The entry of King Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman to Mecca marks the real beginning of Saudi media in general and the Saudi press in particular, as is evident in the initiative of publishing the *Umm Al Qura* daily in Makkah in 1924. This publication emerged around the same time as a number of miscellaneous periodicals.

The Printing Presses and Publications Law was introduced four years after the publication of *Ummu Al-Qura* and was in force for ten years. It was then succeeded by another law that reached assent in 1940 and included 36 articles that marked the beginning of the idea of building Saudi media structures and institutions. At this time, Saudi radio was in its infancy under the management and supervision of the Ministry of Finance, while the press was under the supervision and management of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A number of further Saudi newspapers were published, some of which are still published while others have gone out of business such as *Hera'a*, *Al-Dhahran*, *Al-Fajer Al-Jadeed*, *Qaseem* and *Commercial Week*. Some newspapers of that time are still leading newspapers today such as *Al-Madina* which was first issued in 1937, first in Medina and then in Jeddah; *Al-Bilad* daily which was first issued in 1964 in Mecca; *Okaz* which debuted its publication in 1960 in Jeddah; *Aljazirah* which was first issued in 1965 in Riyadh; *Al-Riyadh* newspaper, which came out first in 1965 in Riyadh;

*Asharq al-Awsat* which was first published in 1978 in London; followed by *Al-Riyadh*, *Jeddah* and *Al-Watan* which were published in 2000 in Abha.

### **3.3.2 Radio Broadcasting Services**

Radio services have become more entrenched in the Arab world since the late 1950s and 1960s. This development was followed by the spread of television broadcasting in the Gulf region during the 1970s and 1980s. Radio stations broadcast news around the clock, but mainstream newscasts are usually transmitted between 12 noon and 12 midnight (Boyd, 1999).

Gulf radio stations broadcast detailed bulletins specializing in politics, economics, sports, culture, and science, in addition to independent programmes comprising "Light on Local and Arab Press" and reports of radio correspondents in the Arab world and reports of news agencies. Radio broadcasts in the Gulf region can also be heard via the Internet (GCC Publications, 2004).

Saudi Arabia was the first country in the Gulf region to establish a wireless network in 1932, while broadcasting to the public began in 1949 in Jeddah. At that time, it was called Radio Mecca and heard only in Hijaz. On August 23, 1979, broadcasting was unified under the name of "Saudi Arabia from Riyadh" and started live broadcasting for more than 20 hours a day. By 1980 the broadcasting system in Saudi Arabia had become a match for the radio systems in most developed countries of the world in terms of signal strength and clarity of reception.

Public broadcasting in Bahrain and Kuwait began in 1941 during World War II and continued broadcasting until 1945. In July 1955, the Public Bahrain Broadcasting Station was opened to broadcast for four hours only per day, though gradually increasing its broadcast hours across the 1960s. At the beginning of 1990, Bahrain Radio became a 24-hour radio broadcaster through two short waves.

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Kuwait official radio began broadcasting on 12 May 1951 with its recurrent slogan "This is Kuwait". The year 1961 represented an important turning point in the history of Radio Kuwait, as it marks Kuwait's independence, and radio played a significant role before the spread of TV by providing news, programmes, and speeches of the rulers of Kuwait demanding independence and not to be part of Iraq or a colony of Britain. Consequently, People Radio was the sole source of independence news and the subsequent statement and the congratulatory telegrams sent to Kuwait. During the Iraqi invasion in 1990, Radio Kuwait continued broadcasting from Saudi Arabia. However, after liberation and by the end of 1991, all channels had started operating again from Kuwait.

In Qatar, the first radio broadcast came in the early 1960s, this was Mosque Radio which covered part of the area of the capital, Doha. On 25 June 1968, Qatar Radio was established and Big Mosque Radio continued to broadcast for a few more months after the establishment of the official Qatar Radio until the acquisition of live transmission facilities by Qatar Radio. The Qatar Broadcasting Service (QBS) began airing radio programming in Arabic languages. English, Urdu, and French programming were added to the lineup in 1971, 1980, and 1985 respectively. There is no private radio in Qatar—it is all state-run. However, international radio stations such as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Voice of America, and Radio Sawa, which is publicly funded by the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the U.S. Congress, are available (Auter & Al-Jaber, 2003).

In the United Arab Emirates, Abu Dhabi Radio was set up on 25 February, 1969 and subsequently changed its name on 2 December, 1971 to the "Voice of the United Arab Emirates from Abu Dhabi". Prior to that, Dubai Radio was set up bearing the name of "Voice of the Coast" and began broadcasting from Sharja in 1966. It later

changed its name to "Dubai Radio". In addition, "Ras El-Khaima Radio" started its broadcasts in September 1972, while Umm Al Quwain Radio began its official broadcasts in March 1978 (Boyd, 1999).

Radio in Oman is entirely government funded, advertising is prohibited, and it is overseen by the Ministry of Information. Oman Radio began broadcasting on July 30, 1970 for a period of five hours a day to cover the capital Muscat. On 25 November, 1975 the station moved to a new site in Salalah. The BBC utilizes Masirah Island off the coast of Oman for a medium-wave relay station to boost the signal for its Arabic, Farsi, Hindi, Pashtu, English and Urdu programming. The eventual plan is to move the relay station from the island to the Omani mainland (Boyd, 1999).

### **3.3.3 Television Broadcasting Services**

Television transmission in Saudi Arabia started in 1965 to cover the major cities of the Kingdom through TV transmitters. In December 1967 a TV station was set up in Medina followed by Qassim station in July 1968, and by Dammam station in November 1969 to cover all the cities of the eastern region and most of the Arabian Gulf. Subsequently, these were joined by the Abha station in 1977 to cover the surrounding areas. Saudi TV broadcasts through four satellite channels. The first and second channels broadcast in English with news bulletins in French. In addition there is a news channel and a sports channel. The first channel and sports channel broadcast their programmes via land transmission in addition to their satellite transmission (Boyd, 1999; GCC Publications, 2004).

TV broadcasting in Kuwait started 1957 and transmitted only animation and feature films to the northern and eastern regions of the country. In 1964 it expanded to cover all the areas of Kuwait. Kuwait's TV consists of four terrestrial channels and a

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satellite TV channel together offering political, religious, scientific, cultural and recreational programmes.

Qatar Television broadcasting started in 1970 and transmissions were initially confined to afternoons from 3pm to 7pm in black and white programming. Transmission was extended to nine hours per day by 1974 at the time of the introduction of colour TV. It continued to develop until 1982 when Channel 2 in English was launched to broadcast cultural programmes, sporting events and other important events. In 1998, satellite transmissions were introduced to Qatar to broadcast for more than 18 hours a day. All television channels were government-owned except Al-Jazeera satellite News channel, which was introduced in 1996. Al-Jazeera TV is considered a private entity even though the Qatari government originally financed it.

In the United Arab Emirates there were mainly four popular television stations, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah and Ajman, which began transmission from Abu Dhabi in black and white on 6 October, 1969. Colour TV transmissions began on 4 January, 1974 using the PAL system via a main transmission station in Abu Dhabi and relay stations in other cities. Dubai TV began broadcasting in 1976. Sharjah TV was inaugurated in February 1989 and Ajman TV station in February 1996. However, in Bahrain television started broadcasting for five hours a day in 1973. The first satellite transmissions began in October 1996. Bahrain Radio and Television became an independent public body in January 1996. Finally, Oman began television transmissions in 1974 covering the capital only. In 1975 it was extended to cover the capital and other parts of the country.

It is worth noting that media laws and regulations in the Gulf States do not allow private ownership of radio and television stations except in Dubai, which overcame such restrictions and established Dubai Media City. This area is a free zone where media services including satellite TV stations and production and other services are

licensed, overriding the local laws and regulations that would restrict their operations in other parts of the Arab world.

### **3.3.4 National News Agencies**

All the Gulf Arab states own national news agencies aimed at collecting and disseminating news about them as well as other countries in the world, and they often rely on the news and information from international and national news agencies.

The role of Arab news agencies is to provide an interface between Arab states and the rest of the world. They are an extension of their respective governments and generate stories that have the purpose of highlighting their accomplishments in different domains, as well as fostering their relations with authorities and media figures abroad and arranging their visits to them. A news agency undertakes the exchange and transfer services and cooperation with national, pan-Arab and international parties, in addition to reporting local and international events and distributing and marketing these reports. It also conducts research projects and produces specialized newsletters and other visual and printed news. In addition, a news agency provides governmental bodies with news through its reporters locally and abroad and monitors all news related to the country in pan-Arab and international media and news networks and the Internet. Furthermore, an agency follows up professional and technological advances in media. The first news agency in the Gulf area was established in Saudi Arabia in 1971, followed by others in Qatar in 1975, Kuwait and UAE in 1976 and finally in Bahrain in 2006 (GCC Publications, 2004).

### **3.3.5 Satellite TV Channels in the Arabian Gulf**

Audio-visual media in the Gulf Arab countries have evolved greatly since the end of the twentieth century. This development has been evident in the growing number of satellite TV channels and the improved quality of programmes aired by these channels. Another

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important factor has been the emergence of the private sector as a partner to national governments in respect of the operation and ownership of TV stations which have, for a long time, been the preserve of the official public sector in Gulf Arab states. The provision of adequate funding to operate high quality satellite TV services is a challenge for private enterprises in the Arab states just as it is in other parts of the world. The involvement of governments can therefore help to underwrite these costs. Although, such support would normally be exchanged for editorial control, Arab Gulf region governments have increasingly come to recognize the benefits of a more hands-off approach to dealing with TV news operations (Ayish, 2001; Rugh, 2004).

The international coalition that liberated Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1991 constituted a turning point for public media in the Gulf region and taught Arab governments some valuable lessons. First, it made the people in charge of media realize the vital role that cross-border TV stations, like CNN, can play in wars in the sense that they control the flow of information, thereby controlling public opinion at the national and international levels regarding the conflict in the area. The ‘CNN effect’ was noted in countries around the world. Even in its home country, the United States, the channel broke new ground in the nature of its war coverage. Its 24-hour news cycle meant that it had an enormous amount of airtime to fill compared with the other major TV networks. It deployed many more reporters to the Middle East at the time of the 1991 Gulf conflict and took a lead in breaking latest events coverage. Despite the increased news coverage of the major networks at this time, CNN was found to have presented more event-oriented coverage of the war than other TV channels (Wicks & Walker, 1993).

Second, officials in the Gulf region realized that they can utilize media to shape public opinion regarding national issues. This realization coincided with the emergence of new digital technologies that enhanced the development of new media operations

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within the private sector. Such operations opened up a different type of media service for Arab audiences from those to which they had become accustomed under purely authoritarian media regimes. Nation states in the Middle East also recognized that more open media systems could be used to advance their economic objectives through the creation of profitable new businesses and platforms; these could be utilized to reach out to the non-Arab world with messages designed to enhance Arab identity and to cultivate a more positive brand image (Zayani, 2005; Lynch, 2006).

After the first allied war against Iraq, the Gulf countries competed in the launching of satellite TV channels to reach the masses of Arabs everywhere starting with the Kuwaiti satellite channel in 1991, and followed by Abu Dhabi TV (1992), Dubai Satellite Channel (1992), Al Bahrain, Saudi Arabia channels I and II (1995), and Al-Jazeera news TV channels. In November 1996 Al-Jazeera was introduced in Qatar as the first Arab news satellite channel (El-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2002).

The Gulf countries were the first in the Arab world to involve the private sector in the TV industry through launching several media enterprises with local funding. The first of these new TV channels to see the light of day was MBC from London in 1991, broadcasting from outside the Arab World. MBC introduced varied entertainment programmes new to the Arab viewer after half a century of official media whose main concern was glorifying their rulers and promoting his policies, which created a sense of boredom and futility among Arab viewers (Boyd, 1999).

In 1994, "Orbit Radio and Television" launched its satellite channels from Italy to put the Arab viewer face-to-face with Western entertainment programmes and news, which were unseen before in the Arab media environment. This network also introduced Arab viewers to subscription TV services for the first time. By the end of the 1990s, viewers in the Gulf region had access to dozens of TV entertainment channels that

offered music, drama and comedy broadcasting from the region or from abroad (Rugh, 2004).

One of the most important outcomes of this developmental phase was the changing of the concept of television in the Gulf region from being a tool for political propaganda into a source of entertainment, cultural enrichment and education for the masses (Miles, 2005). Television has become an important fixture in modern Arab households enabling people to keep pace with economic, social and cultural developments experienced by the region (Sakr, 2001). Developments involving satellite TV have not just brought many new forms of entertainment to Arab audiences, they have also promoted the launch of many new news channels. Researchers and analysts agree that the Arabian Gulf region is unique among Arab countries for its satellite news channels that present news and analyses with a high level of professionalism and objectivity (Guaaybess, 2008). Most prominent among these channels are Al-Jazeera, Abu Dhabi and Al-Arabiya, which are the best representatives of this emerging generation of TV channels marked out by boldness in tackling controversial issues with a high level of professionalism (Ayish, 2001).

If debate in the wake of the Gulf War in 1991 pivoted around what came to be known as the "CNN effect", the wake of the events of 11th September, 2001 brought the "Al-Jazeera effect" (Seib, 2008). Such was its perceived significance that the USA administration resorted to counteracting this effect by establishing the "Al-Hurra" satellite TV channel to compete in the same media marketplace in the Arab world against Al-Jazeera from Qatar and Al-Arabiya from Dubai, United Arab Emirates (Miles, 2005; Seib, 2008).

Satellite news TV channels that broadcast from the Arabian Gulf region, such as Al-Jazeera, have managed to find a foothold on the international media map. Al-

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Jazeera's reporting has outraged many Arab Gulf States, Arab countries, and foreign countries, who have accused it of transcending the boundaries and professional standards in dealing with issues and events (Arafa et al., 2005; Miles, 2005). Nevertheless, one cannot but acknowledge that the channel has stirred the stagnant water of media in the Gulf region and the wider Arab World and it is now playing a leading role in raising the level of professionalism in media.

The proliferation of satellite TV news channels reflects the depth and nature of the political transformations in the region after the events of 11th September, 2001 and subsequent occupation of Iraq. The Arab region in general and the Gulf region in particular found themselves in the heart of the international conflicts led by the United States, labelled as a war on terrorism. At the same time, these states have found themselves under pressure to embrace political, economic and social reforms. Initially these pressures were external to the Arab world, but the uprisings of the Arab spring in 2011 bore witness to internal pressures for change (Miles, 2005; Andersen, 2011; Al-Mahdi, 2011).

There is no doubt that these changes, whether they are sourced from abroad or from within, require the ruling political elites in the region to search for local solutions rather than submit to external prescriptions for change imposed by force from outside their borders. The growing role of satellite TV news channels can be conceived as one of the internal tools for change to contain the tensions resulting from external pressures. These channels may be able to create an environment of interaction and dialogue that can provide local alternatives to political, economic and social problems without any need for external pressure. Satellite TV news services can play an important role in promoting a state of equilibrium in the community that enables the region's nations to handle the input of international politics and the local environment without the need to

make huge sacrifices to ensure their survival and prosperity (El-Nawawy & Iskandar; 2003; Seib, 2008).

### **3.4 Summary**

The press, publications, and media broadcasting industries and services in the Arab world, particularly in the Arab States of the Gulf countries (GCC) are on the verge of unprecedented transitions, challenges and transformations. The GCC have witnessed transformational changes ranging from political 'openness' to economic booms. They have also encountered political challenges on different levels of security and politics, which seem to struggle with opposition to current government strategies and decisions. The turbulence of the Arab Spring movements and protests is a vivid example of the kind of obstacles facing Arab Gulf states (Khalil, 2006; Andersen, 2011; Al-Mahdi, 2011).

The development of new communication technologies and access to satellite TV news channels since the beginning of the 1990s have spread a new terminology to the Arab masses by covering issues such as: alternative media, new media, public participation in decision-making, administrative corruption, voting patterns in elections, human rights and civil society, pressure groups, government transparency and accountability, free market economics, money-laundering, rights of women and children, domestic violence, rights of defendants, and banning torture in prisons. These subjects were not generally covered in traditional, government-controlled press, publications or local TV news services (El-Nawawy & Iskandar, 2003; Zayani, 2005).

Satellite TV news channels have, for instance, hosted Israeli officials and analysts, a practice initiated by Al-Jazeera in a dramatic development that made Israel look nearer and its democracy a model dreamed of by some Arabs. Opposition politicians have found platforms on satellite TV news channels, private and public alike

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(Miles, 2005; Zayani, 2005). Prior to the spread of satellite TV stations and new media, Arab ruling regimes used to have the final say regarding social change and they would introduce any change gradually without consulting the masses. The spread of satellite TV stations has enabled government opposition figures to have their messages heard as well in a way that used to be classified as an infringement on national sovereignty and the government's control of information (Lynch, 2006). Yet, some of these TV stations, especially the ones with widespread audience reach, are owned by businessmen close to the ruling regimes. This fact inevitably raises doubts about the editorial independence from governments.

The impact of new media and satellite TV news channels, including those aligned with the Arab governments, has had unexpected negative consequences that have acted as a catalyst to demands for political and societal changes. Such has been the pace of the demand for change that some incumbent political administrations have been perceived as slow to respond to the public's wishes (Rugh, 2004).

In this way the new Arab media has virtually revolutionized the Arab world, and has begun working to break down the authoritarian communication system based on one point of view representing the "sacred point of view of the regime," which has prompted governments to defer the upcoming danger by issuing laws to regulate satellite transmission. The most significant of these is "a document of principles regulating space transmission of radio and television in the Arab countries" proposed by the Arab information ministers meeting in Cairo upon an initiative of Egypt in 2008. The issuance of this document aroused a lot of controversy since it came from the ministries of information targeting the most popular media outlet, television, and touched the most sensitive issue for citizens which are public freedoms, particularly, freedom of thought and query (Ghareeb, 2000; Alterman, 2000; Rugh, 2004).

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A key issue for Gulf administrations arising from the growing appeal of new media and satellite TV channels is concern about the potential impact, culturally and socially, of foreign TV channels. Exposure of Arab publics to non-Arab ways of life via satellite TV transmissions could cause people to question their satisfaction with local political, economic and social circumstances and to seek a break with specific cultural traditions.

The next chapter examines mainly theoretical aspects of this research. The chapter discusses in detail two theoretical models, the uses and gratification model and media credibility model as a theoretical framework for the study.

## **Chapter 4 Theoretical Frameworks**

### **4.1 Introduction**

The aim of this study is to explore news audience attitudes, interests, motivations, and habits towards news media in general, and Arabic news satellite TV channels in particular, by application of an appropriate theoretical framework. This chapter concentrates on the uses and gratification model and media credibility research as a theoretical framework, including a review of the research literature, history, criticism and arguments presented as they have progressed over the past years. The chapter also reviews the concepts and measurements of motivations and perceived credibility of news media to examine the quality of the news services of Arabic news satellite channels.

Tan (1985) pointed out that scientific studies of mass media communication are by no means complete unless they are guided by theories that explain, predict and discover systematic relationships between media and audiences. The introduction of new media such as satellite technology, the Internet, digital technology, and mobile communication technologies, has concurrently presented an opportunity for researchers to study audience motivations and how motives influence usage patterns. Given the changes in technology, the concept of the users as an active and an important element, increases the choices and the level of inherent interactivity between the users and the media.

Communication researchers believe that audience members are more likely to read or watch a medium that they think is more credible than one that they think is not (Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Kelman & Hovland, 1953; Bochner & Insko, 1966). Thus the application of uses and gratification and media credibility concepts for different media has helped to explain the differences between those media and the relative preference of

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one medium over another. It has helped also in exploring factors that may underpin media choices and selections on the part of members of the audience. Previous studies have utilized the uses and gratifications model and media source credibility research when studying traditional media, but as Kaye (1998) explained, limited attention has been afforded to the application of this model to new technologies. This research is enhancing that scientific track by investigating and evaluating new media, such as satellite channels.

The uses and gratification model and media credibility depict the audience as the primary element in understanding the mass media process (Al-Shaqsi, 2000). This study is concerned to discuss the theoretical background as applied to determining how news receivers' attitudes are affected by news messages that appear in sources that are considered to be either high in credibility or low in credibility, and since different individuals react differently to the content of a media message, it can be predicted that the rating of media credibility will also be different. In conclusion, this chapter depends on a theoretical framework to shed light on the mechanism of differential news perception by issue-involved audiences.

### **4.2 The Uses and Gratifications Model**

The uses and gratifications model is one of the best developed theoretical perspectives for studying audience motivation, in which media users play an active role in choosing and using the mass media (Cantril, 1942; Blumler & Katz, 1974; Infante et al., 1997; Lowery & De Fleur, 1995). It first became popular in the 1960s and 1970s and is still today widely applied to new media and new communication technologies (Rubin, 1984; Ruggiero, 2000). For decades the uses and gratifications model has been viewed as the backbone of communications theory (Wenner, 1982), and has been applied by researchers to study mediated communication situations via single or multiple sets of

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psychological needs, psychological motives, communication channels, communication content and psychological gratifications within a particular or cross-cultural context. As a conceptual and analytical framework, it has been applied to wide ranging situations involving mediated communication (Lin, 1996; Littlejohn, 2001).

Marghalani (1997) pointed out that, despite the fact that uses and gratifications research has been around for over fifty years, it still holds promise for studying the new communication technologies including direct satellite broadcasting. The uses and gratifications research deals with the human and social aspects of the new media, which are the ultimate concerns of the social sciences not just features of the innovation itself (Marghalani, 1997). Moreover, Ruggiero (2000) called for a renewed interest in uses and gratifications research of new media based on the foundational element that individuals are active agents. Ruggiero states that “uses and gratifications has always provided a cutting edge theoretical approach in the initial stages of each new mass communications medium: newspapers, radio, television, and now the Internet” (Ruggiero, 2000, p. 3).

Today the uses and gratifications model has been utilized to explore the impact of the new communication technologies on the audience, and models of uses and gratifications have been refined, revised and extended accordingly (Ruggiero, 2000; Stanley and Dennis, 2006). Furthermore, the uses and gratifications model has been widely used in studies on the use of satellite TV channels and other new media such as the Internet and mobile communication technologies (Turban et al., 2000). The model holds that the audience is not passive or reactive, but rather is composed of active participants in the consumption of media (Rubin, 2002). There are three objectives in developing the uses and gratifications model: first, to explain how individuals use mass communication to gratify their needs; “What do people do with the media?” Second, to

discover underlying motives for individuals' media use. And third, to identify the positive and the negative consequences of individual media use (Turban et al., 2000, Rubin, 2002).

### **4.2.1 Dimensional Structure of Uses and Gratifications**

The uses and gratifications model can be seen as more concerned with what people do with media; how media are used to satisfy cognitive and affective needs (Rubin, 2002). Uses and gratifications can therefore be considered as what people do with media, rather than what media do to people (Wimmer & Dominick, 1994; Severin & Tankard, 1997). It is concerned with "what people do and can be brought to do with mass communication [which] may largely determine what mass communication does and can be brought to do to people" (Klapper, 1963, p.523). Katz et al., (1974) pointed out that the uses and gratifications model is concerned with "the social and psychological origins of needs, which generate expectation of the mass media or other sources, which lead to different patterns of media exposure resulting in need gratifications and other consequences" (Katz et al., 1974b, p. 20).

The uses and gratifications model was developed in the 1940s when several researchers became interested to investigate why audiences engaged in various forms of mass media, and how they use mass media to meet individual needs (Wimmer & Dominick, 1994).

Further thinking, advanced by Lazarsfeld and Stanton (1944), attempted to explain the reasons why people use mass media and what different types of gratification they receive from it. They found that audiences play an active role in selecting different media to meet their needs (Lazarsfeld & Stanton, 1942, 1944, 1949). Moreover, Lazarsfeld et al. (1945) studied the effects of the mass media on political behaviour by examining survey data to determine the relationship between the media and public

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opinion. Their study pointed out that mass media effects on people's political behaviour were limited and indirect compared with personal influence of other people or groups (Lazarsfeld et al. 1945; Lowery & DeFleur, 1995).

By the end of 1940s, studies such as Herzog's (1940) pointed out four gratifications associated with radio quiz programmes: competitive, education, self-rating and sporting. Moreover, Herzog (1944) interviewed soap opera audiences and identified three types of gratification associated with listening to radio soap operas: emotional release, wishful thinking, and obtaining advice. Furthermore, a study by Berelson (1949) discovered five reasons why many people read newspapers: as respite or recreation (to unwind from stress or as a tension reliever), public affairs (to develop public opinions), for information (to know what is going on in the society) as entertainment (for pleasure or to find out about pleasurable activities) and for socialization (to feel joined to others beyond the family block in the broader society) (Severin & Tankard, 1997).

During the 1950s and 1960s more research studies were carried out to apply the uses and gratifications. Researchers indicated numerous social and psychological variables that were presumed to be the precursors of different consumption patterns of gratifications (Ruggiero, 2000). They also heavily criticized uses and gratifications because such research which focused on the fact relied heavily on self-reports; self-reports, however, are based on personal memory which can be problematic (Nagel et al., 2004). It also was too uncritical of the possible dysfunctions both for self and society of certain kinds of audience satisfaction (Katz, 1959; Katz, 1987; Ruggiero, 2000).

The challenges to uses and gratifications research emerged in the 1970s and early 1980s. Several researchers attempted to examine audience motivation and

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develop additional typologies of the uses people made of media (Ebersole, 2000; Ruggiero, 2000). Katz et al. (1973, 1974) provided a framework for understanding the correlation between mass media and audiences, which was widely adopted by academics:

- (1) The audience is conceived as active, i.e. an important part of mass media use is assumed to be goal orientated: patterns... of media use are shaped by more or less definite expectations of what certain kinds of content have to offer the audience member.
- (2) In the mass communication process there is much initiative in linking need gratification and media choice that lies with the audience member... individual and public opinion has power vis-à-vis the seemingly all-powerful media
- (3) The media compete with other sources of need satisfaction. The needs served by mass communication constitute but a segment of the wider range of human needs, and the degree to which they can be adequately met through mass media consumption certainly varies.
- (4) Methodologically speaking, many of the goals of mass media use can be derived from data supplied by individual audience members themselves – i.e. people are sufficiently self-aware to be able to report their interests and motives in particular cases or at least to recognize them when confronted with them in an intelligible and familiar verbal formulation.
- (5) Value judgments about the cultural significance of mass communication should be suspended while audience orientations are explored on their own terms. (p. 15-17).

Moreover, a previous study by Katz et al., (1973) indicated that mass media is a means by which individuals connect or disconnect themselves from others via instrumental, affective, or integrative relations. Moreover, those authors developed 35

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needs based on the social and psychological functions of the mass media and put them into five categories:

- (1) Cognitive needs (acquiring information, knowledge, and understanding)
- (2) Affective needs (emotional, pleasurable, or aesthetic experience)
- (3) Personal integrative needs (strengthening credibility, confidence, stability, and status)
- (4) Social interactive needs (straightening contacts with family, friends, etc.)
- (5) Tension release needs (escape and diversion)

McQuail, Blumler, and Brown (1972) addressed four primary factors for which one may use the media:

- (1) Diversion (escape from routine problems; emotional release)
- (2) Personal relationships (social utility of information in conversations; substitute of the media for companionship)
- (3) Personal identity or individual psychology (value reinforcement or reassurance; self-understanding; reality exploration; etc.)
- (4) Surveillance (information about things which might affect one or will help one to do or accomplish something).

Greenberg (1974) in his study about watching television argued that certain media provide more gratification than other media. Greenberg (1974) examined the uses and gratifications of watching television among British children. The study found seven television viewing motivations: passing time, forgetting, learning, for arousal, relaxation, companionship, and habit. The result also found relationships between television viewing motivations and behaviour. This study suggested that certain media provided more gratification than other media, and that audience motivations were most accessible for particular gratification.

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Further, McQuail (1987) offered four typologies for media use. (1) information, (2) personal identity, (3) integration and social interaction and (4) entertainment).

### (1) Information

- Finding out about relevant events and conditions in immediate surroundings, society and the world
- Seeking advice on practical matters or opinion and decision choices
- Satisfying curiosity and general interest
- Learning, self-education
- Gaining a sense of security through knowledge

### (2) Personal Identity

- Finding reinforcement for personal values
- Finding models of behaviour
- Identifying with valued others (in the media)
- Gaining insight into oneself

### (3) Integration and Social Interaction

- Gaining insight into the circumstances of others; social empathy
- Identifying with others and gaining a sense of belonging
- Finding a basis for conversation and social interaction
- Having a substitute for real-life companionship
- Helping to carry out social roles
- Enabling one to connect with family, friends and society

### (4) Entertainment

- Escaping, or being diverted from problems
- Relaxing
- Getting intrinsic or aesthetic enjoyment

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- Filling time
- Emotional release
- Erotic/sexual arousal (McQuail 1987, p 73)

However, from 1980 to 1990, media researchers turned to investigating mass communication from the perspective of the receiver and also focused on active audiences. Rubin (1984) introduced two primary types of television viewers: instrumental and ritualized. The instrumental viewers watch television mainly for information, while the ritualized viewer uses the television medium primarily as a diversion. Instrumental users were therefore more selective and goal-oriented than the ritualized users (Infante et al., 1997). Rubin (1984) distinguished also between instrumental and ritualized contents, and suggested five major television categories, including news, knowledge/information, television drama, popular entertainment, and sports; he further added under each category a number of specific programmes.

Atkin (1985) also drew a distinction between the two concepts of media “uses” and media “gratifications” with uses being more of a cognitive construct that addressed "anticipated post exposure application of the mediated experience" and gratifications being a "transitory" affective experience "providing momentary satisfaction at an intrinsic level" (p. 63).

Rubin (1994) addressed five assumptions for a contemporary view of the uses and gratifications research: first, “communication behavior, including media selection and use, is goal-directed, purposive, and motivated.” Second, “people take the initiative in selecting and using communication vehicles to satisfy felt needs or desires.” Third, “a host of social and psychological factors mediate people’s communication behaviour.” Fourth, “media compete with other forms of communication (i.e., functional alternatives) for selection, attention, and use to gratify our needs or wants.” And finally,

“people are typically more influential than the media in the relationship, but not always” (p. 420).

In their attempt to explain audience motivations for media use, Chesebro and Bertelsen (1996) pointed out that media were used for a number of reasons: (1) "escapism—to avoid ongoing reality systems; (2) reality exploration—to secure basic information and to understand the world in which they exist; (3) character reference—to find suitable models for their own lives; and (4) incidental learning—a kind of miscellaneous category in which it is recognized that each individual may use or be gratified by media for very different, personal, and unique reasons" (p. 35).

Stone et al. (1999) listed ten dimensions that audiences' motives for using media can fall into: (1) entertainment, to look for fun, enjoyment, and pleasure; (2) surveillance, to view the media as a source for news; (3) information, to gain knowledge; (4) diversion, to “redirect one's attention to the media reality”; (5) escape, to ignore a problem situation; (6) social interaction, to have something to talk about with others; (7) parasocial interaction, to “talk back” to the characters media presents; (8) identity, to recognize self with other people; (9) pass time, to “kill” time; and (10) companionship, to “reduce the feeling of loneliness” (Stone et al., 1999).

#### **4.2.2 Uses and Gratifications Research from a New Perspective**

Various researches have applied the uses and gratifications model to traditional media; newspaper, radio, and television were at the heart of these earlier investigations (Kaye, 2005). More recent studies, however, have shifted their attention to new media. From early times scholars such as Palmgreen (1984) suggested to adapt uses and gratifications research to the new communication technologies. He stated that "researchers should not be wedded to gratification typologies that the very changes under study may have rendered incomplete, if not obsolete" (p. 49). Other scholars predicted that “Previously

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identified uses may shift to new media from old ones, providing fresh insights into the relationship between media use and gratifications” (Williams et al., 1985).

During the past ten years new media studies have explored uses and gratification in relation to new communication technologies such as the Internet (Charney & Greenberg, 2001; Ferguson & Perse, 2000; Kang & Atkin, 1999; Kaye, 1998; Lin, 2002). While other studies have looked at motivations for using e-mail, chat rooms, bulletin boards and blogs (Fuentes, 2000; James et al., 1995; Kaye & Johnson, 2004; Papacharissi & Rubin, 2000). The expansion of new media has increased the opportunities for applying uses and gratification to different mass communication studies, because this medium requires a higher level of interactivity from its users in comparison with other traditional media (Ruggiero, 2000).

Ruggiero (2000) identified three key reasons for interactive computer mediated mass communication as a treasure trove of possibilities for applying uses and gratification:

- A. Concept of interactivity, which connects with the core tenet of uses and gratifications that consumers are active users.
- B. Demassification, which is the “ability of the media user to select from a wide menu; unlike traditional mass media, new media like the Internet provide selectivity characteristics that allow individuals to tailor messages to their needs.” (Ruggiero, 2000, p 15)
- C. Asynchronicity, which is the idea that mediated messages may be staggered in time. Reactions can happen at the convenience of the users in both the sending and receiving areas. This convenience makes computer mediated communication an option to meet the needs of many users.

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A study by the Online Publishers Association (2004) showed that Internet users considered the Internet (41 per cent), along with television (41 per cent), their most important sources of news, followed by newspapers (24 per cent) and magazines (6 per cent). Asked which medium helps them keep up with topics they were interested in, however, (73 per cent) of those indicated the Internet, followed by television (41 per cent), magazines (38 per cent), and newspapers (35 per cent). Similarly, Kaye and Johnson (2004) found that there is a growing influence of Internet gratifications on traditional media use. Internet gratifications, such as guidance, entertainment/social utility, convenience, and information-seeking, were correlated with time spent with television, newspapers, and news magazines. After controlling for other factors, however, only the convenience reason for using the web significantly predicted time of television viewing, suggesting that Internet users go online to get news because it is convenient and so are less likely to watch television news.

A study by Ko et al., (2005) also examined relationships between social motivations and interaction on the Internet and attitude toward website, trade mark, and purchasing intention. The researchers identified hypotheses related to interaction with Internet advertisements using a sample of 385 American students and Korean students who participated in the research project by providing survey participants which were analysed for statistically significant and insignificant relationships. The result indicated that users who had higher information motivations for using the Internet were more likely to continue to stay on a website (Ko et al., 2005).

Further, Lin (1999) investigated the relationship between Internet usage motivations and the likelihood of on-line service adoption. The study showed that surveillance motivation had the strongest effects for visiting both information and infotainment websites. However, shopping sites were most strongly affected by

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entertainment and surveillance motivations. Another study of Luo (2002) also explored the effects of informativeness, entertainment, and irritation on various types of on-line consumer behaviour, such as attitude toward the site, Internet usage, and satisfaction. The study found that the informativeness of a website is positively associated with the attitude toward the website.

Several studies found that using different components of the Internet and other Internet applications may gratify different needs. Fuentes (2000) indicated that chat rooms can be a satisfaction for the *social contact needs* of the participants to share mutual interests. The study conducted by Kaye (2005) focused on blogs using the uses and gratifications model. Kaye (2005) evaluated 28 reasons for accessing weblogs and found six primary motivations for using blogs: information seeking/media check, convenience, personal fulfilment, political surveillance, social surveillance, and expression of affiliation. Researchers also conducted several studies to examine Internet uses of chat rooms, where multiple users of a chat room can chat by sending each other both public and private text messages. Rollman et al. (2000) studied the effects of a number of variables on reciprocal conversation in Internet chat rooms. The results indicated that the perceived gender of the participants in Yahoo chat rooms and whether or not the typed messages were general or specific had no effect on reciprocal communication. The results also showed that the length of written statements and the amount of time spent in a chat room increased reciprocal communication. Nevertheless, the amount of reciprocal communication in a chat room was directly related to the aversive quality of the statements made by the participants (Rollman et al. 2000).

Recently, studies attempted to examine popular online social networking sites which have dramatically expanded in recent years such as Facebook and Myspace. A study by Stern and Taylor (2007) applied the uses and gratifications model using a

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survey administered to college students to identify why they used Facebook. The results indicated the following reasons: meeting new friends, sending messages to friends, entertainment, viewing photos, advertising parties and social events, and to get information about classes. Another study by Ray (2007) applied the uses and gratifications model to Facebook using qualitative methods. This study administered in-depth interviews with 25 Facebook users, and while the results were qualitative in nature, it identified similar categories to the study of Stern and Taylor (2007) such as social utility, surveillance (information-gathering), entertainment, and diversion (Ray, 2007). The study of Raacke and Bonds (2008) was conducted to examine: why people use online friend-networking sites, such as Myspace and Facebook, what the characteristics are of the typical user, and what uses and gratifications are met by using these sites. The results indicated that most users were using these friend-networking sites for a significant portion of their day for reasons such as making new friends and locating old friends and using the sites for academic purposes. Moreover, both men and women of traditional college age were equally engaged in online communication with this result holding true for nearly all ethnic groups (Raacke & Bonds, 2008).

In addition, the viewing of news video on YouTube has been examined by different studies. A study by Gary and Haridakis (2008) applied a uses and gratifications framework and considered how personality characteristics (that is, locus of control and sensation seeking), social background factors (that is, social activity and interpersonal interaction) and motives for using YouTube influence how and why the much-sought-after college-age cohort views and shares news videos. The results showed that different motives predicted watching and sharing different types of news-related content. The study suggested that viewers may be driven by one set of motives

for watching news clips on YouTube, and a different set of motives for sharing them with others (Gary and Haridakis, 2008).

Last but not least, a study by Kaye and Johnson (2002) also applied a uses and gratifications model to investigate how Internet users seek out political information. The study determined four primary motivations among users seeking political information online: guidance (learning more about issues and candidates to guide their voting decisions), information seeking/surveillance (searching out specific political information to stay up-to-date on current events and issues), entertainment (relaxation and amusement), and social utility (reinforcing opinions and engaging in discussion with others).

Based on the above discussion, it is clear that studies have applied the uses and gratifications model to examine the motivations of watching different news media outlets. Moreover, the model has been used extensively to investigate audience motivations for watching certain channels or programmes (for example, news programmes). It has also been used to endeavour to understand the reasons behind watching television (Rubin, 1981). This study used an online survey to examine the motivations of Arab audiences consuming new media TV services through applying uses and gratifications typology. Therefore, the reviewing of previous studies has also helped to guide this research in terms of the design of the online survey.

### **Criticisms of Uses and Gratifications Research**

Criticism has surrounded uses and gratifications since the introduction of the model. Katz (1987) pointed out four areas that scholars needed to keep in mind when studying uses and gratifications theory: (1) the theory mainly focuses on self-reports data (2) this theory does not study the audiences' "social origin of the needs" in details, (3) the theory was not significant in terms of the "possible dysfunction both for self and society

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of certain kinds of audience satisfaction,” and (4) uses and gratifications research was “too captivated by the inventive diversity of audiences used to pay attention to the constraints of the text” Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955; Katz ,1987; Ruggiero, 2000, p. 525-545).

Littlejohn (2001) divided his criticism of uses and gratification research into three major strands: (a) lack of coherence and theory in the tradition; (b) social and political objections; and (c) the instrumental (versus ritualistic) philosophical bias of uses and gratifications. In addition, a study conducted by Swanson (1977) pointed out four major conceptual problems with the theory: a vague conceptual framework; a lack of precision in major concepts; a confused explanatory apparatus; and a failure to consider audiences' perceptions of media content.

In his argument, Rubin (2002) pointed out that the uses and gratification suffered from a “lack of clarity of central constructs and how researchers attached different meanings to concepts such as motives, uses, gratifications, and functional alternatives” (p. 531). Rubin (1993) also presented previous criticism of the uses and gratifications when he noticed that the audience is not always as active as was once originally thought, “a valid view of audience behavior lies between the extremes of being passive and expected to be influenced by the communicated messages and being active and expected to make decisions about what media content to accept and reject” Rubin (1983) also indicated that researchers were beginning to generate a valid response to the criticism that uses and gratifications lacks a theoretical basis. At that point, uses and gratifications researchers systematically tried to (1) conduct modified replications or extensions of previous studies, (2) refine their methodology, (3) comparatively analyse the findings of separate investigations, and (4) treat mass media use as an integrated communication and social phenomenon (Rubin, 1983).

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Further, the researcher Ang (1990) criticized the uses and gratifications model in three aspects:

1. It is highly individualistic, with only the individual psychological gratification derived from individual media use. The social context of the media use tends to be ignored.
2. There is relatively little attention paid to media content, researchers attending to why people use the media, but less to what meanings they actually get out of their media use.
3. The model starts from the view that the media are always functional to people and may thus implicitly offer a justification for the way the media are currently organized.

However, Palmgreen (1984) defended the uses and gratifications model. According to him, uses and gratifications research is in a late phase, one of "theory development," which "is concentrated on attempts to provide explanations of the ways in which audience motives, expectations, and media behaviors are interconnected". In addition, Palmgreen (1984) identified six main strands of research evident in uses and gratifications studies, and proposed a theoretical model that integrates all of them. These six research strands are: "(1) gratifications and media consumption; (2) social and psychological orientations of gratifications; (3) gratifications and media effects; (4) gratifications sought and obtained; (5) expectancy-value approaches to uses and gratifications; and (6) audience activity" (p. 21).

Many researchers believe that uses and gratifications model receives such distinction because it focuses solely on the audiences instead of the media content itself (Littlejohn, 2001). Furthermore, Keeler (2004) stressed the value of the uses and gratifications model as a "framework" for scholars who study media audiences.

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Scholars are able to uncover the reason people use particular media in their daily life by analysing their uses and gratifications (Keeler, 2004). In this context, research has revealed that media news consumers utilise different media platforms for different purposes and they have different motives for selecting news from different news sources (Kayany & Yelsma, 2000; Ofcom, 2007; Rubin, 1981, 1983, 1984).

Rubin (2002) indicated that the extent to which audience motives are satisfied more by a certain medium than another is not only determined by the media attributes but also by the individual's social and psychological circumstances. . Ko et al. (2005) pointed out that even though uses and gratification model has been relatively effective in understanding motivations and needs for using the Internet, there are still several reasons to worry about the relationship between Internet users' motivations for using the medium and interactive aspects when browsing some web pages.

Applying uses and gratification model to measure motivations for using online media, Flanagin and Metzger (2001) found that motivations for using online media differ from person to person. While some users browse some web pages because of multiple motivations, other users browse different sites with a single motivation to satisfy their information needs. Charney and Greenberg (2002) also indicated that after examining the audience motivations of using the Internet as news media, the Internet seems to allow little passivity on the part of its audiences, and that the findings are not consistent.

Despite such criticisms that are shown in this study, many researchers believe that uses and gratifications model should nonetheless be considered a fruitful approach in mass communication research and should still be useful for evaluating new media sources (Ruggiero, 2000).

### **4.3 Media Credibility**

This section reviews the role of media credibility research in the mass communication field. It discusses the early history and criticism of media credibility studies. It also discusses numerous pieces of research that have applied media credibility measurement scales, which have been used by previous studies since the early study of Gaziano and McGrath (1986).

Media credibility is an issue which has received significant attention in media research over the last five decades. Communication researchers defined credibility as the attitude toward a speaker held by a listener. The concept of credibility within mass communication was originally studied as a part of audiences' attitudes toward mass media sources of information (Hovland and Weiss, 1952). Earlier credibility studies within mass communication frequently focused on how media audiences perceive the credibility of different media channels (Newhagen & Nass, 1989; Sargent, 1965). Most studies in media credibility research have argued that a high credibility source is more effective in causing attitude change than a low credibility source (Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Kelman & Hovland, 1953; Bochner & Insko, 1966). In this context, this study examines how a credible source is linked to consuming different news media. Highly credible sources produce a more positive attitude in audiences than sources that are considered less credible (Hovland and Weiss, 1951).

The credibility of media is important to audience members, who tend to seek information and news from media they perceive to be believable. Gaziano (1988) pointed out several reasons that credibility is an important issue to study "because public inability to believe the news media severely hampers the nation's ability to inform the public, to monitor leaders, and to govern (p. 267).

Credibility has a long history of being studied in numerous areas, such as rhetoric, education, religion, politics, international finance, business advertisements, and

interpersonal communication. Furthermore, credibility has been a key topic of mass communication research since the first issues of *Journalism Quarterly* (Flint, 1924).

### **4.3.1 Dimensional Structure of Media Credibility**

Credibility in general refers to the objective and subjective components of the believability of a source or message. However, source credibility refers to the amount of credibility(believability) attributed to a source of information (either a medium or an individual) by the receivers. Some researchers pointed out that credibility is not an objective property of the source of information, but is in a receiver's perception (Gunther, 1992). Fogg et al. (2001) defined credibility as "a perceived quality; it doesn't reside in an object, a person, or a piece of information" (p.80). While Hovland and Weiss (1951) indicated that credibility refers to the trustworthiness and expertise of a source. Sparks and Sparks (2002) explained that expertise has to do with the extent to which people perceive that the source of a message is a real expert on the topic that he or she is speaking about, while trustworthiness has to do with the extent to which people find the source of the message to be reliable or truthful.

Fogg et al. (2002) pointed out that credible information is believable information. People perceive credibility by evaluating multiple dimensions simultaneously. In general, these dimensions can be categorized into two key components: trustworthiness and expertise. The trustworthiness component refers to the goodness or morality of the sources and can be described with terms such as well-intentioned, truthful, or unbiased. The expertise component refers to perceived knowledge of the source and can be described with terms such as knowledgeable, reputable, or competent. People combine assessments of both trustworthiness and expertise to arrive at a final credibility perception (p. 9).

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Early studies of media source credibility date back to near the beginning of the 1950s. Hovland and Weiss (1952) defined credibility as a communicator's expertise and trustworthiness. Expertise refers to a communicator's qualifications related to issues, while trustworthiness refers to the perception of a speaker's motivation to tell the truth about issues (Hovland et al., 1959). Hovland and Weiss (1952) found that a message tends to be more persuasive if its source is credible. In their study two groups of subjects were presented with the same message in which a highly credible source was used with the first group and low-credible source was used with the other. The results showed that the groups of participants who heard the message from the high-credible source were more persuaded than other groups who heard from the low-credible source.

Different studies during the 1950s and 1960s showed that credibility promotes effective attitude in regard to implausible messages. Johnson and Scileppi (1969) conducted a study to explore if male high school students who received either a plausible or implausible message from a high or low credibility source under high-ego (that is, where participants were informed that their opinion was important) or low-ego involvement conditions (that is, where participants were informed that their opinion was not important). The results showed that there was in fact less attitude change under high ego-involvement conditions, in addition to less attitude change in regard to low credibility sources and less attitude change in regard to implausible messages. The study suggested that the high credibility sources elicit more attitude change than do low credibility sources.

Gunther (1987) argued that a highly involved person is likely to maintain his/her existing opinion, meaning that the degree of involvement will be a greater factor in evaluating media credibility rather than the strength of personal opinion in an issue such as abortion. Westley and Severin (1964) stated that people will react differently to the

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content of news across media outlets, such as radio, television, or newspaper and it can be predicted that their rating of credibility of the media will be different. In addition, the demographic variables, such as age, gender, education, social status, and ethnicity can also be varied when they rate news media credibility (Westley & Severin, 1964).

However, early studies criticized media credibility. Delia (1976) criticized studies and work that turned credibility into simple factors of “expertness, trustworthiness, and dynamism,” saying they “do little more than summarize the state of a problem” and do not “advance the theoretical understanding of the credibility concept” or explain alternative dimensions (p. 363). This criticism remains valid nearly three decades and dozens of credibility studies later. Cronkite and Liska (1976) found that “most of these studies have not engaged the possibility that a listener’s perceptual structure may change over time, so that it may differ depending upon whether it is measured before, during, or after the speech” (p. 92). Audiences may have different sets of credibility perceptions for different news media outlet (Rimmer & Weaver, 1987).

During the 1970s to the end of 1980s the credibility studies focused on measuring attitude toward different news media outlets. Therefore the credibility of newspapers, radio, magazines and television has also been measured and compared. The study of Newhagen and Nass, (1989) pointed out that receivers have different standards for judging the credibility of newspapers and television news, as well as the messages they deliver. Newspaper believability is determined based on its institutional qualities. Television news believability is based on what viewers think about the on-camera individuals who present the news. The authors argued that newspapers will always be at a disadvantage relative to television in surveys of public attitudes because the “separation in time and space between readers and the people who produce newspapers will lead newspapers to be perceived as an organizational unit rather than as a set of

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individuals” (p. 278). However, Abdulrahim (1999) found that credibility predicted and measured readership since most audiences in Kuwait do perceive newspapers as credible sources of information.

To measure the credibility of Asian news broadcasts, Rampal and Adams (1990) investigated the Asian news broadcasts of the Voice of America (VOA) and the BBC. The results indicated that the news services of the VOA and the BBC are credible; the study found that the two stations rank as equal in the quality of their news broadcasts. There was no significant difference between the two broadcasting services on the credibility variables. Even though both the VOA and the BBC tended to give relatively more treatment to issues of interest to their respective countries, the difference was not statistically significant.

In addition, McGrath (1985) conducted a study to measure audience perceptions of news television and daily newspapers. The results indicated that about half of Americans believed television was the most credible news medium, with only 25 per cent believing newspapers were more credible (others chose magazines or radio). Americans preferred television for local news (50 per cent, compared to 36 per cent for newspapers), for state news (57 per cent, compared to 33 per cent for newspapers), and for national and international news (72 per cent, compared to 18 per cent for newspapers). Newspapers and television scored similarly for “credibility” and “trustworthiness,” but television news presenters and reporters both beat their newspaper counterparts on “honesty and ethical grounds.”

By the early 1990s, television was frequently chosen as the most credible medium (Finberg & Stone, 2002). A study by Trevisani (1992) argued that respondents rated messages attributed to a TV channel as more interesting, knowledgeable, pleasant, and persuasive than the same message attributed to a national newspaper. Abel and

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Wirth (1977) found that respondents regarded television to be more believable and trustworthy than newspapers in the presentation of local news. Ryan (1973) showed that newspapers were more believable for news on public affairs and science, while television was seen as more believable for news on student protests. Gunter (1987) explained that news programmes, even the style of presentation carried by television, have been changed so that much attention has been paid to the screen medium from the beginning. He pointed out that for most consumers TV channels are identified as the most popular news source in their lives. However, Rimmer and Weaver (1987) asked if frequency of media use is correlated with TV or newspaper credibility. Their study found no relationship between how often a person reads a paper or watches television and how that person rates each medium's credibility. But people who prefer newspapers over TV for news are more likely to believe newspapers to be more believable than TV.

The relationship between audience characteristics and perceptions of news media credibility has been examined. Ibelema and Powell (2001) showed that television received higher trust ratings than newspapers, but the differences were primarily attributed to higher ratings for cable TV news. Mingxin (2006) studied mass media credibility perception and its internal mechanism in China's rural residents through a survey administered to a randomly selected sample. The authors found that mass media credibility perception was relatively low and there were significant differences in credibility perception across media channels, with newspapers and radio broadcasting being the most credible, followed by TV and magazine. The authors discovered that demographic and media use factors have a great effect on media credibility, while media reliance and interpersonal communication variables make little contribution.

Moreover, Stavchansky (2007) investigated the perceived credibility of television news in relationship to the acquisition of knowledge of digital video

compositing techniques. Findings showed that after participants acquired knowledge of digital video post-production techniques, their perception of television news credibility was less than participants who did not acquire knowledge of digital video post-production techniques. Also, the amount of education a subject possessed played a significant role in how he or she perceived the credibility of television news. Frequency of television news consumption, familiarity with digital imaging software tools, and academic background were also examined in relationship to perceived credibility of television news.

Studies of Arab media also indicated that television has been seen as the most trusted and consumed medium ahead of radio, newspaper and magazine. This perspective comes from Arab audiences who have rated television, especially news programmes as more watched than other media (Auter et al., 2004, 2005; Zayani, 2005; Arafa et al., 2005; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008; Jamal & Melkote, 2008). This study is also an attempt at examining the credibility of different news media that broadcast in the Arab world, in order to discover audiences' attitude toward Arabic news TV services media.

### **4.3.2 Measurement of Media Credibility**

The conceptualization and measurement of media credibility has been a continuing concern of credibility research for over 50 years (West, 1994). Nevertheless, many researchers consider the Gaziano and McGrath (1986) credibility scale to be the most popular measurement of media credibility (Kioussis, 2001). Westley and Severin's (1964) study indicated that people see credibility according to their own criteria, such as understanding of the news source, established perception, bias, or first-sight impressions. They also judged news credibility by whether the messages were being

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presented completely and if the background or supplementary information was sufficient.

In early development of media credibility measurement, Infante (1980) applied three dimensions to measure source credibility: trustworthiness, expertise, and dynamism. For trustworthiness, he used honest-dishonest, trustworthy-untrustworthy, and sincere-insincere. For expertise, he applied skilled-unskilled, qualified-unqualified, and informed-uninformed. For dynamism, he chose bold-timid, active-passive, and aggressive-meek.

Further, Gaziano (1987) evaluated the operational definitions of media credibility from four surveys that he conducted in 1985. They included believability, accuracy and completeness, trustworthiness and reliability, being unbiased, newsgathering techniques, overall evaluations of how media do their jobs, confidence in media institutions as compared with other societal institutions, independence of media, the power/influence of media in society, the relationship of news media to government, the media's honesty and ethical standards, and the professionalism of media workers. However, prior to this Gaziano and McGrath (1986) developed the most popular tools to identify news credibility. The scale included these 12 items: fair, unbiased, told the whole story, accurate, respected people's privacy, watched out after people's interests, concerned about the community's well-being, separated fact and opinion, could be trusted, concerned about public interest, factual, and had well-trained reporters. Other academics share the same viewpoints as Gaziano and McGrath (Newhagen & Nass, 1989). West (1994) described the Gaziano-McGrath scales as "the only set of scales for the measurement of media credibility to have undergone validation" (p. 160).

After Gaziano and McGrath's scale, which has been considered the most popular measurement of media credibility (Greenberg, 1966; Johnson & Kaye, 1998;

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Wanta & Hu, 1994), Meyer (1988) argued the scale lacks face validity and theoretical grounding and instead presented a five-item news credibility scale. The scales measure fair or unfair, biased or unbiased, accurate or inaccurate, can be trusted or cannot be trusted, and tells the whole story or does not tell the whole story. Meyer pointed out that the new scale on a five-point Likert scale had face validity and reliability as the concept of believability was reflected in each of the five items (Rubin et al., 1994; West, 1994).

In his study, Ohanian (1991) synthesized the previous studies of media source credibility and proposed three dimensions: expertise, trustworthiness, and attractiveness. Attractiveness refers to the attraction of spokesperson. Trustworthiness refers to the level of objective and honest characteristics of a spokesperson. Expertise refers to the level of professional knowledge of a spokesperson. Moreover, Wanta and Hu (1994) applied believability and affiliation indices to evaluate media credibility. First, the believability index was developed around media manipulation of public opinion, getting facts straight, dealing fairly with all sides of an issue, and separation of fact from opinion. Second, the affiliation index was concerned with community well-being, watching out for reader interests, and concern for public welfare. The results of the study suggested that different media might have different optimum time lags. For instance, television, could obtain more immediate impact, whereas newspapers could be more effective in the long term.

In addition, Schweiger (2000, p. 39) suggested six different levels of reference objects for credibility attributions. The first level refers to the presenter/author, who is considered the first person associated with the messages. The second level refers to the “news report of the action or statements of certain people, the actor, or authors of the message”. The third level refers to the editorial unit such as news items on radio and television, or articles in the print media or on the Internet. The fourth level refers to

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single media products, such as television channels and radio stations. The fifth level refers to the single media product, which is similar in content and institutional background, and can be a subsystem of a media type. The sixth level rates the general credibility of entire media outlets types. Schweiger (2000) also noted that audiences trust the news media outlets they use most.

Even though the measurement of media credibility has been widely used by numerous studies, the assessment of Gaziano and McGrath called for an updated operationalization of credibility in order for future academic research in the field to become standardized and cumulative. Meyer (1988) noted that Gaziano and McGrath's work was an issue with these indices in that they not only lack face validity, but also ignore prior theories that could inform their interpretation. Gaziano (1987) justifies his model by allowing participants to define 'credibility' by themselves rather than imposing an academic definition on them. Moreover, some studies found that composition of credibility dimensions have been inconsistent across studies (Kiouisis, 2001; Meyer, 1988).

In addition, several studies that have used media credibility research to measure audiences perception have not administered open-ended questionnaires, and little effort has been made to draw out different credibility elements from different media (Sundar, 1999). However, perceptions of media credibility may be made more accurate if participants are asked to rate the relative credibility of media of their choice (Choi et al., 2006). In relation to these studies this research examines the audience perceptions of media credibility by asking participants to rate the relative credibility of news media of their choice.

#### **4.4 Theoretical Applications**

The study reported in this thesis measured Arab viewers' attitudes toward Arabic media news and satellite TV channels quality and credibility in the Arab Gulf states region through the lens of the uses and gratification and media credibility. This uses and gratification model states that: “(a) the social and psychological origins of (b) needs, which generate (c) expectations of (d) the mass media or other sources (or engagement in other activities), ... lead to (e) differential patterns of media exposure... resulting in (t) need gratifications and (g) other consequences, perhaps mostly unintended ones” (Katz et al., 1974, p. 510).

Moreover, various studies have shown that credibility plays an important role in media use because people tend to rely on the medium that they find provides them with more accurate information and knowledge (Schweiger, 2000; Choi et al., 2006; Flanagin & Metzger, 2007; Lin, 2008). If the public does not believe or trust the media or press, they are less likely to pay attention to it (Gaziano, 1988). Johnson and Kaye (1998) suggest that lack of trust in information obtained from the new media could keep it from becoming an even more important and influential news source. Thus, credibility can be both an explanation of media use and a measure of whether consumption of a medium delivered the experiences expected from it. As such it can indicate the characteristics of the audience and of the media (Ganahl, 1994). Ganahl (1994) also explained that audiences who seek credible information will pursue the medium that is trustworthy because it will provide correct information, up-to-date news, all sides of the story, limited opinion, and in-depth and detailed information. He conceived credibility to be a gratification or a satisfied need because it describes the degree of satisfaction achieved through audiences (Abdulrahim, 1999).

Credibility has been examined from three different angles (Kiousis, 2001). The first is source credibility (Singletary, 1976; White & Andsager, 1991), which targeted four dimensions of credibility: knowledge, trustworthiness, attractiveness, and dynamism. The second is news credibility, a more commonly studied topic relating to the credibility of the industry or a particular medium (Gaziano & McGrath, 1986; Kiousis, 2001; Wanta & Hu, 1994). Finally, message credibility examines the believability of the message content (Sundar & Nass, 2001). The study's centre of attention is news credibility, in particular, Arabic news TV channels' credibility.

In view of the fact that this study is concerned with the broader question of how Arabic news TV services have gained so much popularity among Arab audiences, uses and gratifications as well as media credibility concepts lend themselves to the needs of this study in respect of explaining key drivers of audience behaviour. The uses and gratifications model is appropriate and can be applied to explore the credibility of Arabic news satellite channels. As the uses and gratifications model attempts to understand the reasons why people choose and use certain media forms and the gratifications they receive, this researcher believes that its principles can be applied to this study.

### **4.5 Summary**

Over the last several decades, and the last ten years in particular, the media in most developing countries, such as the Arab world and particularly GCC countries, have undergone a revolution in their structure, dynamism, interactivity, reach and accessibility. Large portions of the population in these countries today can be said to be highly interested in information, and most often they obtain that information via the news which helps them construct their beliefs and understanding of the world (Deane et

## Chapter 4 Theoretical Frameworks

al., 2002). Given the significance of information and news, it is critical to recognize the value of this research topic and why it is worthy of consideration in the context of the fortification of the uses and gratification and media credibility.

In recent years few studies have been conducted on new media in the Arab world, and little attention has been paid to perceived gratifications, the credibility of the newscaster and the message of new media, particularly in regards to Arabic news satellite channels in the Arab Gulf states. In this respect this research attempts to fill this gap by increasing the examination of news consumers' interest, uses, motivations, and media trust to examine and evaluate the attitude toward the quality and credibility of Arabic media services and Arabic news satellite channels.

The chapter examined two theoretical frameworks that can be utilised to shed light on the factors underpinning differential news perceptions by news media audiences. The uses and gratification research was reviewed in this context (Palmgreen, Wenner & Rosengren, 1985; Rubin, Perse & Barbato, 1988; Charney & Greenberg, 2001; Dimmick, Kline & Stafford, 2000; Eighmey & McCord, 1998; Ferguson & Perse, 2000; Flanagin & Metzger, 2001; Lin, 1999; Papacharissi & Rubin, 2000) and media credibility research (Gaziano, 1988; Gunther, 1992; Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Mosier, 1981; Singletary, 1976; Stamm & Dube, 1994; Choi et al., 2006; Flanagin and Metzger, 2007; Lin, 2008).

The next chapter deals with the methodology element of the study. It explains the procedure of data collection from news consumers of Arabic media services and Arabic news satellite TV channels, who inhabit the Arab Gulf States region.

## **Chapter 5 Methodologies and Design**

### **5.1 Introduction**

The research was concerned with measuring the news media consumption habits of television viewers across the six GCC countries; this was done in order to relate these viewing habits to viewers' motives for watching and their perceptions of the quality of news provision by different news sources. The main focus was placed on the use of news on satellite TV channels with services that traversed national boundaries. Analysis centred how use of these channels fit within wider news consumption habits and which factors relating to viewers needs and interests, personal characteristics, and attitudes towards news services were significant as mediators of these types of viewing behaviour.

This chapter explains how this study collected data using an online survey method. The study was conducted in the Arab Gulf states region (GCC countries). These countries comprise Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, where participants of Arab descent answered an online survey questionnaire. The survey questionnaire was posted online so as to be easily reachable by the participants, who were able to gain access to the Internet from different locations such as home, work, and in public places. Links to the online survey website were posted in local and national Arabic newspaper websites.

This study also included paper-based questionnaires which were used for a pilot field study before redeployment online. The types of questions used in the survey questionnaire are the five-point Likert-type scale, five-point semantic differential questions, open-ended, and multiple choice questions. The 28-item questionnaires dealt with demographic questions, motivation, media uses and gratification, and attitude toward media quality and credibility.

## **5.2 Survey Method**

Survey research was the method employed in this study. This method was deemed to be the most appropriate to reach the goals outlined in this research. It has been argued that asking people is the best way to learn about their attitudes toward different topics (DeFleur & DeFleur, 2010). The survey methodology is also one of the most commonly used methodologies in mass communications field. Moreover, the survey is a commonly used research method in the areas of marketing, business, education, psychology, political and information science, sociology, and social work.

Surveys have also been widely used in uses and gratifications research (Greenber, 1974; Rubin, 1981; Palmgreen, 1984; Charney & Greenberg, 2001; Ferguson & Perse, 2000; Kang & Atkin, 1999; Kaye, 1998; Lin, 2002), and in media credibility studies (Westley and Severin, 1964; Gaziano and McGrath, 1986; Meyer, 1988; Schweiger, 2000; Kim and Johnson, 2009). Questionnaires were deployed to seek information from participants about their media use, motives, and perceptions of the credibility of news sources. This methodology is based on the assumption that audiences can provide information about why they attend to a particular medium. With this approach it is important that audiences provide accurate information about their personal motivations for approaching specific media content.

### **5.2.1 Online Questionnaires**

This study relied on online survey methodology to collect data to explore participants perceptions of news media services. The national samples were not randomly constructed and, therefore, are not demographically representative of the indigenous populations of the Arab Gulf countries in which this research took place. Given that the data were collected online, the survey was restricted to people who had Internet access. However, many researchers have a high level of confidence in using online surveys to collect data from specific subsets of the online population because online surveys

## Chapter 5 Methodologies & Design

provide access to individuals or groups who would be hard to reach through other channels, such as face-to-face or telephone interviews (Garton, Haythornthwaite & Wellman, 1999; Wellman, 1997) participants .

In the past decade, surveys which are conducted online have quickly gained popularity after the emergence of the Internet and the increasing population of Internet users and organizations' websites (Ferguson & Perse, 2000; Charney & Greenberg, 2001; Lin, 2002). Studies show that the Internet has increasingly become a major source of news for the public (Gunter, 2003). Survey research is a very useful method for gathering data to describe a vast population to discover "the relative incidence, distribution, and interrelations of sociological and psychological variables" (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000, p. 599).

With the exponential growth of the Internet and dramatically occurring transformations in the way people access and receive news and information, it is important to note that news audiences are no longer passive consumers of news, but are increasingly becoming an integral part of the journalistic process in the rapidly evolving online environment (Gillmor, 2004; Stovall, 2004). Therefore, online surveys have become one of the most important tools to explore audiences' attitude toward media news and services compared to other research methods, which require more time, energy, money, and research knowledge (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000). Online survey products and services allow researchers to quickly and easily design and implement surveys and collect huge participants from all over the world; such methods, however, can also vary considerably in terms of available features, consumer costs, and limitations (Dillman 2007).

### **5.2.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Online Questionnaires**

Online survey research carries a number of advantages, the first of which is the ability to use the Internet to reach a large audience who it would otherwise be difficult, if not impossible, to reach through other traditional methods (Garton et al., 1999; Wellman, 1997). Moreover, online surveys allow researchers to reach large populations in a short amount of time, even though the participants may be separated by great geographic distances (Taylor, 2000). Furthermore, online surveys can be low cost data collection exercises in comparison with many other methods of survey administration. Online surveys cost less to researchers than making phone calls or sending postal mail surveys (Llieva et al., 2002).

The study of Bertot and McClure (1996) indicated that online survey methods are more convenience than printed questionnaire surveys. In their study participants were given the option of completing an electronic survey rather than the printed version. The results showed that slightly more than half (52.3 per cent) of the participants described the online version as “very easy to complete”. Furthermore, slightly under one third (32.6%) of the participants mentioned that the electronic version was “very time-efficient.” Certainly, online surveys are no more time consuming than traditional print-based surveys, as 6 out of the 23 participants who completed both the print and electronic versions found that there was little difference in time or effort between the two surveys. The researchers suggest that giving participants a copy of their replies to an electronic survey might also motivate them to participate (Bertot & McClure, 1996). Another study by Thompson et al. (2003) showed that an overwhelming majority (more than 80 per cent of participants) expressed satisfaction with the online format.

Despite the many advantages of online surveys, some researchers are doubtful about adopting them because of a number of methodological concerns including sampling, response rate, generalizability and representativeness of samples, response

duplication, survey design, and the effects of survey media on the research results (Couper, 2000). One of the major disadvantages of online surveys is that they cannot be conducted with certain populations who do not have ready access to the Internet. It is not possible to draw probability samples based on e-mail addresses or website visitations. In addition, the researcher has less control over the participants and it is hard to make distinctions between participants who are using one computer or if there is only one respondent completing a survey from a variety of computers. Some researchers suggested that privacy is also a primary concern with online surveys (Cho & LaRose, 1999). Others have indicated that anonymity perceptions are unrelated to survey participants' computer literacy levels (Roztocki & Lahri, 2003).

Zhang (2000) pointed out that the most challenging aspect of using online surveys is that there do not exist many research guidelines. Therefore, further research is needed to expand our understanding of this new approach and to explore the full potential the Internet can offer to survey researchers. Despite those disadvantages, online surveys have increasingly been a popular tool for collecting data from a specific subset of a population who have access to news from the Internet (Dillman 2007).

### **5.3 Survey Procedure and Questionnaire Design**

With the development of advanced Internet technologies, there are several forms of surveys for targeting media users on the Internet. For instance, surveys can be sent to participants and returned through e-mail messages, or they can be designed and delivered through online survey web sites which allowing participants to fill out the survey online (Dillman 2007).

The survey instrument used in this study consisted of a 28-item questionnaire (See Appendix 1). The questionnaire measured demographics, media news gratification, and media credibility using Likert Rating Scales as the primary form of measurement. Some

## Chapter 5 Methodologies & Design

questions were replicated from previous studies (Palmgreen et al., 1980; Levy & Windahl, 1984; Gaziano & McGrath, 1986; Meyer, 1988; Ganahl, 1994; Taylor, 2007). Other questions were modified to fit Arabic news satellite TV channels. The survey consisted of an introduction that explained the purpose of the study and asked participants for their consent to participation. Participants were allowed to discontinue their participation in the study at any time by choosing the cancel option that appeared in each section at the bottom of the screen. The study informed the participants that all information they provided would be held in strict confidence, would remain completely anonymous, and that the survey was not carrying a cookie or any tracking software that would capture their Internet addresses for future use. The convenience sample consisted of viewers from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, which contains six traditional Arab Gulf states (the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait).

The questionnaire was divided into six sections: demographic profile, news consumption, news interests, motivations of news, and quality of news. The study defined the social environment by means of eight variously measured demographic items. The demographic variables measured here were age, education level, income level, employment status, gender, country of origin, marital status, and political Orientation. The participants were asked to choose one of multiple answers that reflected their situation.

The news consumption section was designed to explore which kind of sources audiences utilise to obtain news information and how frequently do they use each of the news sources, which included eight news sources: (1) 'Local & National TV', (2) 'Arabic News TV', (3) 'Non-Arabic News TV', (4) 'Internet', (5) 'Radio', (6) 'Newspapers', (7) 'Magazines', and (8) 'Mobile'. Seven point Likert-type scales

(‘daily’ to ‘don’t use’) have been used to measure the eight news sources (Al-Shaqsi, 2000).

The second part of the news consumption section investigated how frequently news was consumed from different TV channels. The list consisted of (1) Local & National TV, which included the items Saudi Arabia TV, Kuwait TV, Bahrain TV, Qatar TV, UAE TV, and Oman TV; (2) Arabic News TV which included the items Al-Jazeera TV, Al-Arabiya TV, BBC (Arabic) TV, Al-Hurra TV, and France 24 (Arabic) TV; and (3) Non-Arabic News TV which included the items CNN News, BBC International, and Euronews TV. Five point Likert-type scales (‘daily’ to ‘never’) have been used to measure news consumption in different TV channels (Marghalani et al., 1998).

The news interests section endeavoured to collect data about which were the most interesting news topics to audiences who watch Arabic News TV. The news topics which were measured on five point Likert-type scales (‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’), included: (1) Human interest stories, (2) Politics in Arab world, (3) World-wide politics and current events, (4) City, business and financial issues, (5) Current events in your country, (6) Entertainment, (7) Crime news, (8) Consumer affairs, (9) Sports news, (10) Travel news, (11) Weather news, (12) Human Rights issues, (13) Minority issues, (14) Youth issues, (15) Iranian Nuclear Weapon, (16) the Israel/Palestine Conflict, (17) Terrorism issues, (18) Sunnis and Shias, (19) Arab-Arab conflict, (20) The Iraq conflict, (21) The Afghan Conflict, (22) The Darfur Conflict, (23) Financial crisis, (24) European issues, (25) American issues, (26) Latin American Issues, (27) Asian issues, and (28) African issues (Abdel Rahman, 1998).

For the motivations and media use section this study utilized a measurement scale based on the literature review of the typologies of past uses and gratifications

## Chapter 5 Methodologies & Design

studies (Kim & Rubin, 1997; Rubin, 1979, 1981, 1983; Rubin et al., 1994) to measure the motivations of viewing Arabic News TV services, including Al-Jazeera TV, Al-Arabiya TV, BBC (Arabic) TV, France 24 (Arabic) TV and Al-Hurra TV. For measuring media uses motivations, the study adopted three gratification scale categories used by Jamal & Melkote (2008), which consisted of (1) Opinion Leadership which included the items 'It is a credible source of news,' 'It provides me with information about what is going on,' 'It helps me make up my mind about the important issues of the day,' 'I use its discussions of issues as ammunition in discourse with others,' and 'It helps me judge what kind of job the Arab government officials are doing'; (2) Free Marketplace of Information which included the items 'It provides me with uncensored information,' 'The channel is free to discuss any political issue,' 'It shows the real work of Arab political rulers and governments, including their misconduct,' 'It covers news and issues those Arab political leaders and governments try to hide,' and 'It gives different political points of views the chance to exist'; and (3) Surveillance which included the items 'It keeps me informed about the current issues and events,' 'It discusses issues and presents news in exciting and thrilling ways,' and 'It presents news events with thorough and in-depth analysis'.

The study also added the Parasocial Interaction items in the gratification scale measurement as used by Rubin, Perse and Powell (1985) and Henningham (1982), which included 'I enjoy watching their news anchors,' 'I enjoy watching their news reporters,' 'I watch its news to compare my own ideas to what the commentators say,' and 'It provides good visual coverage of news events' (See Table 1).

Audiences who participated in this section were asked to indicate the degree to which their feelings about Arabic news TV channels, for which they could choose one option from: strongly agree (SA), Agree (A), Neutral (N), Disagree (D) or Strongly

Disagree (SD). Participants were coded so that a “5” indicated a high level, while a “1” reflected a low level (Rubin et al., 1981, 1983).

**Table 5.1 Media Uses and Gratification Statements**

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**Index Statements**

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**Opinion Leadership**

- It is a credible source of news.
- It provides me with information about what is going on.
- It helps me make up my mind about the important issues of the day.
- I use its discussions of issues as ammunition in discourse with others.
- It helps me judge what kind of job the Arab government officials are doing.

**Free Marketplace of Information**

- It provides me with uncensored information.
- The channel is free to discuss any political issue.
- It shows the real work of Arab political rulers and governments, including their misconduct.
- It covers news and issues that Arab political leaders and governments try to hide.
- It gives different political points of views the chance to exist.

**Surveillance**

- It keeps me informed about the current issues and events.
- It discusses issues and presents news in exciting and thrilling ways.
- It presents news events with thorough and in-depth analysis.

**Parasocial Interaction**

- I enjoy watching their news anchors.
  - It has the best news reporters.
  - I watch its news to compare my own ideas to what the commentators say.
  - It provides good visual coverage of news events.
- 

For the news quality section this research used a credibility measurement scale used by previous studies (Gaziano and McGrath, 1986; Meyer, 1988), to measure the quality and credibility of Arabic news TV channels, including Al-Jazeera TV, Al-Arabiya TV, BBC (Arabic) TV, France 24 (Arabic) TV and Al-Hurra TV.

The credibility measurement scale was included eleven items: ‘fair’, ‘unbiased,’ ‘tells the whole story,’ ‘accuracy,’ ‘respect for privacy,’ ‘concern for community,’ ‘respects people’s privacy,’ ‘separation of fact and opinion,’ ‘trust,’ ‘does care what the audience thinks’ and ‘level of training.’ The study added six more dimensions as used by previous studies (Meyer, 1988; Ganahl, 1994; Wanta and Hu, 1994; Ohanian, 1991),

that included ‘Does not sensationalize the news,’ ‘moral code,’ ‘produces news that makes the service profitable,’ ‘not afraid to gives it own opinions about news issues,’ ‘making the news exciting for people,’ ‘produces news that is relevant to me,’ and ‘is up-to-date with latest news developments’ (See Table 2).

The participants were asked to choose the best representation for their feelings about Arabic news TV channels, on each of the following series of statements, including Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Neutral (N), Disagree (D), or Strongly Disagree (SD). Participants were coded so that a “5” indicated a high level, while a “1” reflected a low level.

**Table 5.2 Media Credibility Statements**

---

**Index Statements**

---

Fair  
Unbiased  
Tells the whole story  
Accurate  
Concerned with the community’s well-being  
Respects people’s privacy  
Separates facts from opinions  
Can be trusted  
Reporters are well trained  
Does care what the audience thinks  
Does not sensationalize the news  
Has a clear moral code  
Produces news that makes the service profitable  
Not afraid to gives it own opinions about news issues  
Making the news exciting for people  
Produces news that is relevant to me  
Is up-to-date with the latest news developments

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#### **5.4 Pilot Study**

The questions were developed in English (See Appendix 1), and the final version was translated into an Arabic version by the researcher of the study, and was checked by professional Arabic and English languages teacher at the University of Qatar. After checking and reviewing the *Code of Practice on Ethical Standards for Research Involving Human Participants*, the survey items were approved by the University of

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Leicester. Two pilot tests were conducted to measure the reliability and validity of the instrument, and as a result of the pilot changes in wording were created for the final version in Arabic.

For the pilot field study, a draft paper questionnaire was administered to 38 Arabic-speaking University of Leicester students for feedback on the questions (as written in Arabic). A further pilot field study using the web-based survey ‘SurveyMonkey’ was conducted by sending emails of the survey website to 25 Arabic speakers who study and live in the UK, to test if there were any issues being addressed by participants who answer the online survey questions. The study made it clear that participation to answer the online survey was voluntary, the data provided were anonymous, and the completion of the survey took approximately 20 minutes.

### **5.5 Survey Fieldwork**

The survey fieldwork began immediately after the pilot study, on Thursday December 10, 2009, through relocation of the address of the Arabic online survey that was carried out by the web-based survey ‘SurveyMonkey’ ([www.surveymonkey.com/arabicnewssurvey](http://www.surveymonkey.com/arabicnewssurvey)). The study advertised the survey website address in local and national Arabic newspapers websites and social network organizations. The main newspaper website that the study depended on to collect data was ‘Elaph.com’, which is the leading round-the-clock Arabic news portal, with over 1.3 million Arabic users (Elaph, 2010). Posting the online survey website address on ‘Elaph’ helped the study to gather the majority of the participants from Saudi Arabia, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. Moreover, for targeting more participants the study had the agreement of the leading local newspaper in Qatar *Al-sharq* to post the survey link address in the right of the first page of its website. Furthermore, in Bahrain, *Al Wasat* newspaper and *Bahrain Forum Organizations*

agreed to post the survey link address in the right section of their first page as well. In Kuwait, 'National Network Organizations' also agreed to host the survey link address. Even though the researcher tried to reach media outlets, several newspapers and organizations in the Arab Gulf states, no agreements were made, particularly in Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates.

Since there are many online websites available to create online surveys and collect participants, most online survey services provide survey design assistance, generate samples, and analyse and interpret data. The current study used 'Survey Monkey's' (<http://www.surveymonkey.com/>), online survey services to design the questionnaire and collect the data from the participants in the GCC countries. The website allowed the participants to input their own data, which was automatically stored electronically; this helped to ease and streamline data analysis, and the data is available immediately at any time for further analyses. The website also allowed participants to comfortably answer sensitive and private questions and provide more text on open-ended questions. Moreover, participants were able to answer questions on their schedule, at their pace, and could even start a survey at one time, stop, and complete it later.

### **5.6 Statistical Data Analysis**

The study performed a number of statistical tests using SPSS to analyse the data collected from the online survey. A systematic evaluation of the statistical significance of different test methods was used to determine how much confidence can be had that a particular result is not the product of chance. Statistical significance means that there is a good chance that we are right in finding that a relationship exists between two variables (Brace et al., 2009).

The study used several tests to explore if there is a relationship between two categorical variables. A t-test was used to investigate the difference in means of a continuous variable between two groups. Moreover, the study carried out a Mann-Whitney test, which is one of the most well-known non-parametric significance tests that can be used to compare two unpaired groups.

For samples with two or more groups, one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used in the study to determine whether there are any significant differences between the means of three or more independent (unrelated) groups. Furthermore, the Kruskal Wallis test was used with ranked data to compare between the medians of two or more samples to determine if the samples have come from different populations. Finally, stepwise multiple regression was used to try to predict some outcomes or criterion variables (Brace et al., 2009).

### **5.7 Sample Composition**

The data were collected from the 2,146 participants of Arabic speaking viewers of Arabic news satellite TV channels in six of the GCC countries, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Since the focus of this study was on the Arab Gulf states region, participants from outside the geographical domain of the study were filtered out. As for participants from within the Arab Gulf countries, answers were filtered and participants who tried to answer the survey more than once were eliminated by enabling IP blocking (internet addresses). Furthermore, the participants from Kuwait, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates were excluded from the study because of low rates of response to the survey items. Consequently, the national base sizes for these countries were too small for a reliable analysis.

The results of two-step filtering and elimination process yielded a total sample of 1,752 participants who qualified as completed data from three GCC countries: Saudi

Arabia (with 631 participants), Bahrain (with 568 participants), and Qatar (with 553 participants). The 28-item questionnaires were all completed. The questionnaires were administered from December 10, 2009 until March 12, 2010. The item questionnaires dealt with demographic characteristics, media use, consumption habits, and perceptions of news provided by Arabic news media services and Arabic news satellite TV channels, attitude toward news media objectivity and credibility and, and news media motivation and gratification.

### **5.8 Demographic Characteristics Analysis**

The first demographic question in the sample asked about the gender of the news consumers in all Arab Gulf states (See table 1). The survey found that the great majority of the participants (78.6%) were males and the remaining proportion of more than one fifth (21.4%) were females. Additionally, by country, the findings showed that on average the greatest proportion of male news consumers was found in Bahrain (90.1%), compared with Qatar (83.5%) and Saudi Arabia (63.9%). Whereas the larger percentage of female news consumers was observed in Saudi (36.1%) than in Qatar (16.5%) and Bahrain (9.9%). The table (5.3) below is a breakdown of participants by age.

The second demographic question measured age categories by asking the participants to indicate the best categories that described their age level. The analysis of survey data showed that in all GCC countries, the majority of the participants (67.0%) were young, being under 30 years old, whereas the second highest proportion, of over one quarter (29.0%), were mature, being 35 to 50 years old, and the remaining small percentage (3.3%), were above 51 years old. However, country by country it was observed (See table 5.3) that the proportion of young news consumers (71.1%) in Saudi Arabia was higher than that in Bahrain (65.5%) and Qatar (63.8%). Whereas the proportion of mature news consumers was found to be almost equal and higher in Bahrain (32.6%) and Qatar (31.8%) than in Saudi Arabia (25.2%); finally the proportion

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of old age consumers was the highest in Qatar (4.3%) compared with in Saudi Arabia (3.7%) and Bahrain (1.9%). These results were consistent with the study of Abdel Rahman, (1998) which indicated that adult Arab viewers starting from 25 years old comprised the most participants of viewing satellite TV.

The third demographic question examined the level of education. The result indicated that in all GCC countries the good majority of news consumers had bachelor degrees (65.0%), whereas the second highest proportion of a little less than one fifth (18.1%) had masters/PhD degrees, and the remaining proportion (16.0%) had school-level education. However, according to country, the findings showed that on average the proportions of school-level educated and master/PhD degree holder news consumers were higher in Bahrain (19.5% and 19.5% respectively) than in Saudi Arabia (11.4% and 17.6% respectively) or Qatar (17.5% and 17.2% respectively), whereas the proportion of bachelor degree holders was larger in Saudi Arabia (71.0%) than in Qatar (65.3%) or Bahrain (60.9%).

The fourth demographic question looked at yearly income in all GCC countries. This showed that the majority of news consumers (79.0%) earned up to 25,000 US dollars per year, whereas the second highest proportion of more than one tenth (14.6%) earned 26-55,000 US dollars per annum, and the remaining proportion (6.3%) earned more than 56,000 US dollars annually. Moreover, in perspective of countries it was observed that on average the proportion of those news consumers who earned up to 25,000 US dollars was almost equal and higher in Saudi Arabia (80.3%) and Qatar (79.6%), compared with the news consumers in Bahrain (77.1%). Whereas the highest proportion of those who earned between 26,000 and 55,000 US dollars was found in Bahrain (18.1%), followed by Saudi Arabia (12.9%) and then Qatar (13.0%). As far as

the proportion of those who earned above 56,000 US dollars per annum, this was greatest in Qatar (7.4%) followed by Saudi Arabia (6.8%) and then Bahrain (4.8%).

The fifth demographic question observed audience employment status. The data indicated that the majority of news consumers in all GCC countries were employed (53.6%). In contrast the second highest proportion (40.9%) said they were unemployed; and the remaining proportion (5.5%) mentioned themselves as in part-time employment. Additionally, concerning the country breakdown, the findings show that on average the highest proportion of unemployed news consumers were found in Qatar (42.4%) followed by Saudi Arabia (40.9%) and then Bahrain (39.4%). Contrary to this, the highest percentage of employed news consumers was observed in Bahrain (57.5%) then in Saudi Arabia (51.7%) and Qatar (51.7%). Regarding those in part-time employment, the findings showed that the higher proportion lived in Saudi Arabia (7.5%) than in Bahrain (3.0%) or Qatar (5.8%).

The sixth demographic question asked about marital status. The considerable majority of the news consumers in all GCC countries were single (53.6%), compared with (45.0%) who said they were married, and the remaining small proportion who said they were divorced/widowed (1.4%). The findings further showed that on average the percentage of single news consumers was equal in Saudi Arabia (55.5%) and Qatar (55.0%), which were higher than Bahrain (50.2%). Whereas the proportion of married news consumers was higher in Bahrain (48.6%) than Saudi Arabia (42.6%) and Qatar (43.9%). As far as the percentage of divorced/widowed, this was observed as being highest in Saudi Arabia (1.9%), then Bahrain (1.2%) and then Qatar (1.1%).

Finally, concerning political orientation, the highest proportion of more than two fifths of news consumers called themselves politically neutral (47.0%) and the second highest proportion of more than one third (36.2%) said they were conservatives;

whereas the remaining percentage, which is higher than one tenth (16.8%), stated that they were liberal. Moreover, on average the percentage of liberal news consumers was equal in Bahrain (18.0%) and Qatar (17.9%), and higher than news consumers in Saudi (14.7%). Similarly the percentage of those news consumers who were neutral was almost equal in Bahrain (50.5%) and Qatar (49.5%), and lower in Saudi Arabia (41.7%). As far as conservative news consumers were concerned, on average their proportion was found highest in Saudi Arabia (43.6%), followed by Bahrain (31.5%) and then Qatar (32.5%).

**Table 5.3 Distribution of Participants by Origin of Country and Demographic Variables**

<b>Demographic Variables</b>	<b>Saudi</b> %	<b>Bahrain</b> %	<b>Qatar</b> %
<b>Age categories</b>			
Young (Up to 30 years old)	71.1%	65.5%	63.8%
Mature (31-50 years old)	25.2%	32.6%	31.8
Old (Above 51 years)	3.7%	1.9%	4.3 %
<b>Education level</b>			
School educated	11.4%	19.5%	17.5%
Bachelor	71.0%	60.9%	65.3%
Master/PhD	17.6%	19.5%	17.2%
<b>Yearly income</b>			
Up to \$ 25000	80.3%	77.1%	79.6%
Between \$ 26000 - \$ 55000	12.9%	18.1%	13.0%
Above \$ 56000	6.8%	4.8%	7.4%
<b>Employment Status</b>			
Un-employee	40.9%	39.4%	42.4%
Part-timer	7.5%	3.0%	5.8%
Employee	51.7%	57.5%	51.7%
<b>Marital status</b>			
Single	55.5%	50.2%	55.0%
Married	42.6%	48.6%	43.9%
Divorced/widowed	1.9%	1.2%	1.1%
<b>Political Orientation</b>			
Liberal	14.7%	18.0%	17.9%
Neutral	41.7%	50.5%	49.5%
Conservative	43.6%	31.5%	32.5%
<b>Gender</b>			
Male	63.9%	90.1%	83.5%
Female	36.1%	9.9%	16.5%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

### **5.9 Summary**

The study followed online survey method for the advantages mentioned above as being more convenient for the sample population drawn from three countries: Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain. The first part of the questionnaire was dedicated to the demographic characteristics of the sample to obtain information about them in terms of gender, age, education, income, marital status and political orientation. These characteristics are important later on in this study when the researcher finds out if there is any relationship between attitudes and the demographic variables and if attitude changes according to the change in the demographic characteristics.

The following chapter deals with the results of the survey regarding the questions of the study which are related to the news consumption patterns and the attitudes of Arab viewers in three countries of the Gulf region toward various media news services.

## **Chapter 6 News Consumption Patterns**

### **6.1 Introduction**

This chapter explores the news consumption landscape of news audiences in the three Arab Gulf states from which participants were sampled for this study. The outcomes of the data derive from a total sample of 1,752 participants that included 631 participants from Saudi Arabia, 568 participants from Bahrain, and 553 participants from Qatar. The participants were asked to identify their main news sources for news and information, their general patterns of media use, their news interests, their news consumption habits and their perceptions of news provided by local and national media and Arabic news satellite TV channels. The participants also provided demographic information about themselves. The chapter investigates the following research questions:

RQ1: Which news sources are most used by Arab audience in GCC countries?

RQ2: Which are the most favoured Arabic news satellite TV channels as viewed by these countries?

RQ3: Which are the most favoured news topics as viewed by the Arab audience in GCC countries.

RQ4: Are there any relationships between news consumption and the participants' demographic characteristics?

### **6.2 News Media Source and Arab audiences**

The Arab world has experienced significant growth in the availability of media sources especially in relation to the provision of news (Rugh, 2004; Zayani, 2005). The emergence of new communications and information technologies from the end of the twentieth century has transformed media landscapes around the world, but also carry with them especially poignant implications for the Arab world because of the challenges they present to governments. Media in the Arab world has had a variety of participants

to the overwhelming impact of this communications revolution. One particularly significant outcome has been the rapidly growing popularity of Arabic TV satellite news channels and news sites on the Internet (Rugh, 2004; Zayani & Sahraoui, 2007).

It is clear that the news media landscape today is different from that which prevailed in the Arab Gulf States region twenty years ago. Then, news provision was dominated by local television, local radio stations, and local newspapers controlled and directed by the state; these were a means to promote domestic policy and national identity, maintain stability, and extend central state control over the country (Rugh, 2004). Previous studies showed that news suppliers were closely controlled by governments, which restricted their news agendas and also their presentation styles. This has changed with pan-Arab satellite TV news services and Internet services over which governments have less control. Today audiences in the Arab world customarily enjoy visiting different news suppliers to get news and information. Moreover, they spend a great deal of time watching Arabic News satellite channels compared to other media (Alterman 1998; Boyd, 1999; Ayish, 2001; Guaaybess, 2002; Lynch, 2006; Sakr, 2007; Johnson & Fahmy, 2009, 2010).

Through communication technology, satellite media since the 1990s has been at the forefront of developing Arabic TV news services. After the success of the Al-Jazeera news channel in its Arabic form and then followed by English versions, came Al-Arabia channel, BBC Arabic news, Al-Hurra, France24 Arabic TV news and others, which have managed to realize that the balance and diversity of broadcasting and covering the news have been restored by the magnitude of events in the Arab World, which has been the maker and the source of news for almost two decades (Ayish, 2001; Miles, 2005; Lynch, 2006).

The Arab Satellite Communications Organization, (ARABSAT), indicated that there were more than 164 million viewers of Arab satellite TV service within the 21 Arab countries alone. Nevertheless, Allied Media Corporation (2007) stated that the number of Arab people watching Arab language satellite television in the Middle East, Europe, Africa and South America appears to be growing and is as high as 300 million viewers (Allied Media Corp, 2007). This study attempted to extend the investigation of news consumption by Arab audiences and to enhance the foundation for further research into the news consumption patterns in the Arab world.

### 6.3 Reported Frequency of Use of Different News Sources

This section explored the main news sources of audiences in the Arab Gulf states; a seven-point frequency scale was developed for participants to self-report their use of different news media, ranging from ‘daily’ use to ‘do not use’. The eight news sources examined here comprised: (1) ‘Local & National TV’, (2) Arabic News TV’, (3) ‘Non-Arabic News TV’, (4) ‘Internet’ , (5) Radio’, (6) ‘Newspapers’ , (7) ‘Magazine’, and (8) ‘Mobile’. The results are summarized in Table 6.1.

**Table 6.1**Composition of News Consumers in GCC Countries who Said Consuming Following Sources “Daily/Almost daily”

News Sources	Saudi (%)	Bahrain (%)	Qatar (%)
Arabic News TV	76.3%	64.3%	69.4%
Internet	72.0%	69.0%	74.2%
Newspapers	23.3%	26.7%	30.1%
Local & National TV	18.2%	16.3%	18.3%
Mobile	15.3%	20.2%	14.0%
Radio	12.1%	16.4%	13.1%
Non- Arabic News TV	5.4%	8.4%	7.8%
Magazines	1.7%	4.1%	3.7%

The participants were initially asked to report personal frequency estimates regarding their use of a number of different news sources. The results are summarized in Table 6.1. The most frequently used news medium was ‘Arabic News TV’, followed by ‘Internet’, ‘Newspapers’, ‘Local & National TV’, ‘Mobile’ , ‘Radio’, ‘Non-Arabic

News TV', and then 'Magazine'. As the table shows, this rank order in terms of claimed frequency of use was very similar across each of the three Gulf States from which participants were sampled. The findings showed that the main exception here was the relative popularity of mobile communications as a news reception platform.

The results of the study were consistent with previous studies that showed that television is considered the main source for news and information in the Arab world. A study by Boyd (1972) indicated that 91% of audiences in Saudi Arabia who had been surveyed owned at least one television set, 60% watched television daily, and 98% believed that television had an influence on their society. The study of Abdel Rahman (1998), also confirmed that satellite TV viewers relied on satellite TV as a major news source; Arabic satellite TV services were ranked first with international satellite TV services coming in second, newspapers followed with third place, and radio stations ranked last. The results of the study sustain the findings of the previous studies which indicated that new media, particularly Arab satellite news service, are considered the most favoured news sources for Arab audiences (Amin, 2001; Bahry, 2001; Guaaybess, 2002; Rugh, 2004; Sakr, 2007; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008, 2009, 2010).

### **6.4 Demographic Differences in News Consumption**

This part of the study examined the demographic profile of news consumers upon the most frequently used news sources. The demographic profile consisted of: Gender, Age, Marital Status, Education Level, Annual Income, Employment Status, Marital Status, and Political Orientation. The demographic comparisons were made over the total sample drawn from all three countries and then within each country separately.

The findings of this section attempted to shed light on the diversity of the demographic characteristics of the Arab news service audiences in the Arab world. In general, the findings from previous studies showed similar results. The study of Arab

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audiences in Egypt conducted by Abdel Rahman (1998), for instance, showed that males were more likely to watch satellite TV than were females. It was also observed here that young adults between 18-30 years old, represented 50% of the total sample and older adults, 30-60 years old, represented the remaining 50%. In other words, viewing was equally divided between younger and older people. The same study indicated that satellite TV was viewed more by high school graduates (69%) compared to viewers who held university degrees (15.5%), or elementary school graduates (4.5%) (Abdel Rahman, 1998).

Two Arab Advisors Media Surveys (2007 and 2008) involved face-to-face interviews with 550 participants from different households in Bahrain and Qatar, and showed that 95.5% of the participants over 15 years in Bahrain watched TV and 89.5% of population, mostly mature and older participants, listened to news on the radio. However, the Arab Advisors 2007 media survey, which involved face-to-face interviews with 530 participants from different households across Qatar, indicated that 94.41% of the population watched Arabic satellite TV channels, irrespective of their age category. It revealed that radio listening was also widely spread in Qatar, with 88.1% of the participants stating that they tune into the radio, with 49.3% saying they did so on a daily basis and 80.6% reporting being aware of or using 3G services and gaining access to the Internet (Arab Advisors Media Survey, 2011).

This research supported the investigation of the demographic profile of news consumers in the Arab world; specifically it sought to discover if there are any significant differences between news consumption and participants' demographic characteristics. The findings showed that there were significant demographic differences across news sources in terms of claimed frequency of use. TV news audiences were differentiated by gender, age and income. Similarly, radio audiences

were also differentiated by age and income. However, newspaper, mobile and magazine audiences were only differentiated by income. The findings on the demographic profile (Gender, Age, Marital Status, Education Level, Annual Income, Employment Status, Marital Status, and Political Orientation) are explained below.

### **6.4.1 Gender Differences**

To assess the significance of gender in relation to reported use of news sources, a Mann-Whitney U-test was run (Brace et al. 2009), which largely resulted in no statistically significant differences. One significant result emerged in Saudi Arabia where ‘Arabic news TV’ as a news source was reportedly used more by males (94.4%) than females (84.7%) with a significant Mann-Whitney U test ( $U(612) = 38610.00$ ; exact  $p < .000$ ).

In Bahrain also ‘Arabic news TV’ was reportedly used as a news source more by males (83.4%) than females (72.5%), ( $U(546) = 11275.50$ ;  $p < .05$ , 2- tailed). In Qatar ‘Arabic news TV’ and ‘Internet’ as news sources were both used more by males (85.7% and 88.1% respectively) than females (74.7% and 76.4% respectively) with significant Mann-Whitney U tests ( $U(527) = 17062.00$ ; exact  $p < .01$ , 2- tailed), and ( $U(534) = 17460.50$ ; exact  $p < .003$ , 2- tailed).

The findings were consistent with several studies in the Arab world that showed there were slight differences between males and females in regard to news consumption. Research has catalogued the rising number of Arab female followers of different news media services particularly those available via satellite TV and the Internet (Ayish, 2001; Miles, 2005; Lynch, 2006; Sakr, 2007).

Najai (1982) indicated that Arab males and females watched similar amounts of news television. The Arab Advisors Media Survey (2011) studied Internet use in Saudi Arabia and provides insights into media consumption habits The survey revealed that

over half (55.4%) of TV viewers in Saudi Arabia watch news programmes. However there were no statistically significant differences between males and females (Najai, 1982).

### 6.4.2 Age Differences

To know the impact of age, marital status, education, income, employment status and political orientation of the news consumers upon most frequently used news sources, a series of Kruskal-Wallis tests were run (Brace et al., 2009). The results indicated several statistically significant differences: firstly in the context of age in Saudi Arabia there were statistically significant differences between the young age group (18-30 years old), or mature age group (31-50 years old) or older age group (above 51 years). 'local & national TV' was reportedly used more frequently as a main source by the news consumers of the older age category (23.1%) than the news consumers of the young (14.1%) or mature age category (10.2%) ( $X^2(2, N = 475) = 9.21, p < .05$ ).

In Bahrain, 'radio' was reportedly used more frequently as a main source of news and information by news consumers in the mature age category (47.7%) than by young (36.9%) or older participants (30.0%), with Kruskal-Wallis H test =  $X^2(2, N = 487) = 7.16, p < .05$ , whereas 'Internet' was used as source of news and information more by the young (42.0%) than the mature group (31.1%) or older group (18.2%), ( $X^2(2, N = 498) = 6.30, p < .05$ ).

In Qatar the 'Internet' was used as a main source more by news consumers in the mature age categories (91.8%), than the news consumers in the young (83.7%), or older age categories (81.8%) ( $X^2(2, N = 534) = 6.28, p < .05$ ). However, 'radio' was used as a main source more by the news consumers of the older age category (64.7%) than the news consumers of young (35.3%), or mature age categories (32.6%), ( $X^2(2, N = 472) = 7.45, p < .05$ ). Furthermore, 'newspaper', 'local & national TV', 'non-Arabic

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News TV' 'mobile' and 'magazine' were used more as sources of news by consumers of the older age category (55.6%, 55.0%, 68.4%, 41.2%, and 56.3% respectively) than the news consumers of the mature (48.0%, 31.2%, 34.6%, 20.6% and 15.0% respectively), or young age category (37.8%, 25.2%, 32.0%, 15.6% and 12.0% respectively) Kruskal-Wallis H test =  $X^2(2, N = 501) = 5.95, p < .05$ , ( $X^2(2, N = 487) = 8.76, p < .05$ ), ( $X^2(2, N = 477) = 11.86, p < .001$ ), ( $X^2(2, N = 473) = 7.94, p < .05$ ) and ( $X^2(2, N = 464) = 24.01, p < .000$ ) respectively.

The findings showed that there were significant age differences across news sources in terms of claimed frequency of use. The viewing of different media was divided between the younger, mature, and older age groups. The study findings were consistent with the study of Abdel Rahman (1998), the Arab Advisors Media Survey (2007), and Jamal and Melkote (2008), which also showed the majority of viewing existed between the younger and mature age groups compared to the older consumers age group.

### 6.4.3 Marital Status Differences

In Saudi Arabia, the 'Internet' was reportedly used as a news source more by married news consumers (90.8%) than those who were single (83.6%) or divorced/widowed (81.8%) ( $X^2(2, N = 607) = 6.60, p < .05$ ), whereas 'Newspapers' ( $X^2(2, N = 556) = 6.24, p < .05$ ) and 'Magazine' ( $X^2(2, N = 540) = 6.59, p < .05$ ) were reportedly used more by divorced/widowed participants (20.0% and 18.2% respectively) than by married (13.3% and 3.2% respectively) or by single participants (8.9% and 2.9% respectively).

In Bahrain, 'Radio' was reportedly used more by married (33.2%) than by single (22.2%) or divorced/widowed participants (.0%) ( $X^2(2, N = 487) = 8.64, p < .05$ ). However, in Qatar the 'Internet' was reportedly used more by married news consumers

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(97.8%) than by single (94.6%) or divorced/widowed participants (83.3%) ( $X^2$  (2, N = 534) = 6.81,  $p < .05$ ), whereas in contrast 'Newspaper' ( $X^2$  (2, N = 501) = 9.79,  $p < .001$ ) and 'Magazine' ( $X^2$  (2, N = 464) = 6.68,  $p < .05$  respectively), were reportedly used more as a news source by divorced/widowed (60.0% and 25.0% respectively) than by married participants (49.3% and 7.8% respectively), or single participants (35.4% and 4.5% respectively).

These marital status findings were not consistent with the studies conducted in Western countries (Peterson et al., 2009; Taylor et al., 2003; Rotunda et al., 2003). While married news consumers in the Arab world such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar used new media, particularly the 'Internet', more than single and divorced/widowed participants, the "never-married" consumers were found to have a higher level of Internet usage in the United States (Taylor et al., 2003).

### 6.4.4 Education Differences

In regard to education it was observed that in Saudi Arabia the 'Internet' as a news source was reportedly used more by news consumers who held a masters/PhD degree (89.0%) or a bachelor's degree (87.5%) than by those who only had school education (76.9%), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 607) = 5.87,  $p < .05$ ). In contrast, 'Local & National TV' was reportedly used more by school educated news consumers (43.3%) than by masters/PhD degree holders (33.3%) or bachelor's degree holders (27.9%), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 554) = 10.26,  $p < .000$ ).

In Bahrain, masters/PhD degree holders (89.6%) and bachelor's degree holders (83.4%) reportedly used the 'Internet' more often as a new source than did participants only with school-level education (75.5%), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 545) = 8.06,  $p < .05$ ); whereas 'Mobile' was reportedly used more as a news source by school educated news

consumers (34.4%) than by masters/PhD degree holders (25.3%) or those with a bachelor's degree (21.2%), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 489) = 7.55,  $p < .05$ ).

In Qatar 'Non-Arabic News TV' was reportedly used more by those who had a masters/PhD degree (24.1%) than by those who had a bachelor's degree (15.7%) or school level only education (10.4%) ( $X^2$  (2, N = 477) = 9.20,  $p < .05$ ). In a similar vein 'Magazines' were also reportedly used more by masters/PhD degree holders (11.1%) and by those with school-level education only (9.6%) than by those holding a bachelor's degree (3.9%), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 464) = 9.14,  $p < .05$ ).

These findings were consistent with other studies that showed that highly educated people, such as bachelor's degree and masters/PhD degree holders use the 'Internet' and watch 'News TV services' more than those holding a school-level only education (Johnson & Fahmy, 2008; Jamal & Melkote, 2008). Furthermore, consuming Arabic satellite TV channels particularly for entertainment reasons was viewed more by high school graduates compared to viewers who held university degrees or higher education (Abdel Rahman, 1998).

### **6.4.5 Annual Income Differences**

In Saudi Arabia 'Non-Arabic News TV' was reportedly used more by news consumers with a high income level (21.6%) and middle level annual income (19.4%) than by those who had a low annual income (8.5%), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 555) = 12.81,  $p < .05$ ). In Bahrain 'Radio' as a news source was reportedly used regularly more by news consumers having a middle level (51.6%) and a high level (47.8%) annual income than by those who had a low level income (36.9%), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 487) = 12.11,  $p < .05$ ).

In Qatar 'Newspaper' as a news source was reportedly used more by news consumers having high level (65.7%) and middle level annual incomes (52.5%) than by those who had low level incomes (37.8%) ( $X^2$  (2, N = 501) = 11.88,  $p < .05$ ). Similarly,

'Radio' and 'Non-Arabic News TV' were reportedly used more by those having high level incomes (46.7%, 48.6%) than by those having middle level (30.5%, 41.3%) or low level incomes (18.5%, 31.7%), ( $X^2(2, N = 472) = 17.83, p < .000$ ) ( $X^2(2, N = 477) = 6.13, p < .05$ ). Further, it was observed that 'Mobile' and 'Magazine' were reportedly used more by news consumers having a high level income (42.4% and 17.2% respectively) than by news consumers having middle level (22.4% and 8.8% respectively) or low level incomes (15.2%, 4.8% respectively), ( $X^2(2, N = 473) = 16.54, p < .000$ ), and ( $X^2(2, N = 464) = 18.64, p < .000$ ) respectively.

These findings were not consistent with other studies in the Arab world, since the income of Arab Gulf states is usually higher than other Arab countries. Previous studies indicated that the majority of the Arab participants in news media surveys reported that they made between US\$15,000 and US\$35,000 per year, while another reported that they had an annual household income equivalent to less than US \$15,000 (Auter et al., 2005; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008).

### **6.4.6 Employment Status Differences**

In Saudi Arabia 'Arabic News TV', 'Internet', and 'Radio' were reportedly used more as news source by those news consumers who were in employment (92.5%, 89.6%, and 26.3% respectively) than those who were unemployed (90.8%, 84.4%, and 22.2% respectively) or by those in part-time employment (81.0%, 77.3%, and 15.4% respectively) ( $X^2(2, N = 611) = 6.51, p < .05$ ), ( $X^2(2, N = 606) = 6.64, p < .05$ ), and ( $X^2(2, N = 542) = 7.31, p < .05$ ) respectively. However, 'Local & National TV' was reportedly used more as a news source by those news consumers who were employed (36.2%) or by those who were in part-time employment (23.7%), ( $X^2(2, N = 553) = 7.17, p < .028$ ).

In Bahrain the 'Internet' and 'Newspapers' were reportedly used more by the full-time employed (96.1% and 47.3% respectively) than by those in part-time employment (87.5% and 46.7% respectively) or by those who were unemployed (76.8% and 33.0% respectively), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 540) = 10.37,  $p < .05$ ) and ( $X^2$  (2, N = 508) = 10.40,  $p < .05$ ). However, 'Radio' was reportedly used more by those in part-time employment (40.0%) than by those in full-time employment (31.1%) or those who were unemployed (17.9%) ( $X^2$  (2, N = 482) = 15.95,  $p < .000$ ).

In Qatar 'Newspapers' was used more by those in full-time employment (48.2%) than by the unemployed (35.2%) or by the part-time employed (25.2%), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 462) = 8.37,  $p < .05$ ) whereas 'Radio' was reportedly used more by the unemployed (23.5%) than by those in full-time employment (21.9%) or in part-time employment (6.5%), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 470) = 5.78,  $p < .05$ ).

In general, the findings showed that 'Arabic News TV', 'Internet', 'Newspapers', were reportedly used more as news sources by those news consumers who were employed compared to news consumers who reported being unemployed or in part-time employment. These findings are consistent with other studies (Auter et al., 2004, 2005).

### **6.4.7 Political Orientation Differences**

In Saudi Arabia 'Non-Arabic News TV' was reportedly used more as a news source by those news consumers who were ideologically liberal (45.4%) than by those who were neutral (33.0%) or conservative (28.7%), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 556) = 7.64,  $p < .05$ ). In Bahrain 'Local & National TV' was reportedly used more by liberals (29.5%) than by neutrals (27.9%) or conservatives (21.6%), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 491) = 5.73,  $p < .05$ ). Moreover, 'Non-Arabic TV' was reportedly used more by liberals (26.1%) than by those who were

conservatives (19.3%) or neutral (14.5%), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 498) = 11.00,  $p < .05$ ) respectively.

In Qatar 'Non-Arabic TV' and 'Magazines' were reportedly used more by liberals (22.9% and 13.0% respectively) than by neutrals (16.0% and 4.2% respectively) or by conservatives (13.4% and 5.3% respectively), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 477) = 11.28,  $p < .05$ ) and ( $X^2$  (2, N = 464) = 12.75,  $p < .05$ ).

The study findings had similar results with other studies that tried to explore the political orientation of Arab news audiences. A study by Auter et al. (2005) indicated that liberal Arab news audiences consumed news particularly from satellite TV channels slightly more than conservatives consumers. However, participants who identified themselves as neutrals consumed news more than liberal or conservative audiences. Moreover, another study conducted by Al-Shaqsi (2000) stated that consumers who were conservatives or had strong religious beliefs and came from conservative families are less likely to watch satellite TV channels.

### **6.5 Arabic News Media TV Services**

This section reports results that address which TV news services participants identified as their most preferred, and any differences associated with demographics and national market. The watching of news television by Arab audiences has increased in the Arab world during recent years (Allied Media Corp, 2007). Satellite TV news channels have emerged as major news sources of news information in the Arab world (Ayish, 2001), and they mark a significant departure from traditional news because their programming is transmitted across traditional geographical, political and governmental borders. As such, these new media services are no longer connected to official establishments and their slogans and rhetoric (Lynch, 2006; Sakr, 2007).

Given this growth in diversity of Arabic news media services, this study considered which services were rated most favourably. The names of 14 news services which operated across the Arab world were given to participants in all GCC countries. The news sources were clustered within each factor and then their relative popularity with different national audiences based on self-reported frequency of use is reported on. A principal components factor analysis was computed to detect structure in the relationships between variables and to examine whether these channels clustered into distinct groups according to the way they were regarded by news consumers in these countries (Brace et al., 2009).

**Table 6.2 Factors Analysis of News Consumers in GCC Countries for Most Preferred Arabic News Channels**

News TV channels	Factors			
	Mean	1	2	3
<b>Factor 1: Local &amp; State TV Channels</b>	<b>1.28</b>			
Kuwait TV	1.21	.825		
Bahrain TV	1.17	.800		
Oman TV	1.12	.749		
Qatar TV	1.31	.746		
UAE TV	1.62	.652		
Saudi Arabia TV	1.29	.628		
<b>Factor 2: International News TV</b>	<b>1.32</b>			
BBC (International)	1.41		.845	
CNN News	1.38		.825	
Euro News	1.23		.748	
France 24 (Arabic)	1.27		.655	
<b>Factor 3: Arabic News TV</b>	<b>2.03</b>			
Al-Arabiya TV	2.09			.725
BBC (Arabic)	1.96			.677
Al-Hurra	1.26			.539
Al-Jazeera TV	2.83			.521
Eigenvalues		4.41	2.15	1.25
Total Percentage of Variance	55.882	24.68	19.0	12.2

Principal component analysis Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization; KMO=0.85; Bartlett's Test of Sphericity,  $p < 0.000$ . N= 1752 Alpha valid 1484- Cronbach's alpha (.816). Higher mean scores equal greater importance. Scale ranges from 3 = Daily to 1 = Never.

The results of this analysis are summarised in table 6.2, above. The outcome of this analysis comprised three orthogonal factors having an Eigenvalue more than one and explaining 55.9% of the total variance. Further, if any variable loaded on more than

one factor, it was put together with the factor on which it attained the highest loading. The first factor to emerge was called 'Local & State TV', and explained 24.7% of the variance. It comprised six TV services: Kuwait TV, Bahrain TV, Oman TV, Qatar TV, UAE TV and Saudi Arabia TV, which are broadcast in the Arabic language and are owned by the respective governments of those countries. These channels provide news programmes and a variety of other genres including drama, music, religious programmes, education programmes, women's programmes, cultural and children's programmes.

The second factor was called 'International News TV' and explained a total of 19% of the variance and comprised four TV services, BBC (International), CNN News, Euro News and France 24 (Arabic). Two of these channels (BBC International and CNN News) broadcast news in English, whereas the other two channels (Euro News and France 24 Arabic) broadcast news and information in English and Arabic.

The third factor was called 'Arabic News TV' and explained 12.2% of the total variance. It comprised four TV services, Al-Arabiya TV, BBC (Arabic), Al-Hurra and Al-Jazeera TV. These channels are primarily news channels and are broadcast in the Arabic language to international audiences.

### **6.6 Frequency of Self-Reported Use of Different News TV Channels**

In regard to assessment of TV channel preferences among news consumers in all GCC countries, the study depended on self-reported use of different news TV channels. Results from previous studies indicated that 'Al-Jazeera TV', 'Al-Arabiya TV', 'CNN' and 'BBC' dominate the attention of Arab news consumers in different Arab countries regarding the watching news TV channels (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002; Ayish, 2004; Miles, 2005; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008, 2010). The results of this analysis are summarised in table 6.3, below.

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The findings of this study showed that the most viewed Arabic News TV channel on a daily basis was the 'Al-Jazeera TV' channel. 'Al-Arabiya TV' was the second most viewed channel by Arab news audiences. 'BBC (Arabic) news TV channel' was third, followed by 'France 24 (Arabic)'. Whereas the least frequently viewed Arabic news channel was 'Al-Hurra TV.' Concerning the 'International News TV' category, the most frequently viewed channel was 'BBC (International) TV', followed by 'CNN News TV' than 'Euro News TV'. Finally, the least watched services were 'Local & State TV' channels which are broadcast in the Arabic language and owned by governments of their countries. The most frequently viewed channels by the Arab participants were 'UAE TV', and 'Qatar TV', Followed by 'Saudi Arabia TV', 'Kuwait TV', 'Bahrain TV', and 'Oman TV'. The results of this analysis are summarised in table 6.3, below.

The findings showed that in all the GCC countries, among the channels broadcasting news and information in the English language, BBC (International) and CNN News were the most frequently viewed. Among the channels broadcasting news and information in the Arabic language, Al-Jazeera TV, Al-Arabiya TV and BBC (Arabic) were the most frequently viewed. The results of this study supported the findings of previous research regarding Arab publics' consumption of Arabic TV services, that have revealed that Arab audiences depend on Arabic news TV more than local & national and international TV channels as their main news resources. Arabic news TV, such Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, BBC (Arabic) and were highly viewed by viewers in most Arab counties (Ayish, 2001, 2004; El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002; El-Nawawy, 2003; Miles, 2005; Powers and El-Nawawy, 2009; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008, 2009, 2010).

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The research also indicated that Arabic news TV channels could be driving audiences' in the Arab world from their local and national channels particularly when it comes to broadcasts concerning Arab political issues and international news (Zayani, 2005). A number of earlier studies in the Arab world have shown that the Al-Jazeera news channel has emerged as the leading channel watched by Arab viewers in the Arab world or by Arab diasporas across the rest of the world (Auter et al., 2004, 2005; Miladi, 2006). Several studies conducted in different countries in the Arab world showed that Al-Jazeera was a leading Arabic news channel watched by Arab audiences. The results of a poll in Jordan showed that Al-Jazeera is the first choice for more than 62% of Jordanians. In Egypt, the poll showed a similar opinion, with 88% of the population of Cairo making Al-Jazeera their first choice for news. The Arab Advisors Group (2003, 2004) conducted a study to explore audiences in Saudi Arabia that use satellite TV channels. This study showed that Al-Jazeera topped the ranking in terms of brand recognition and audiences with close to 82% of households watching the station. Al-Jazeera was closely followed by Al Arabiya with 75% of households watching it. The Saudi Al Ekhbaria was viewed by 33% of households, while the United States-sponsored Al Hurra was watched by 16% of households. CNN followed with 12%, followed by Al Mustakila (11%), ANN (8%), NBN (8%), and BBC World (6%).

The findings here added to the results of research conducted by Western media outlets and organizations. For instance, the Washington Post (2004) carried out a survey of views on 120 TV channels in the Middle East and North Africa, and found that Al-Jazeera being the most channel with (51.7%), Al-Arabia television ranked second, which received only (8.4%), while Abu Dhabi TV got (7.6%), and CNN (6.4%). In October 2002, a study conducted by the Institute of Spotbeam, UK, covering all the Arab states and Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, Israel and Cyprus concluded that Al-Jazeera

attracted 35 million viewers daily. Four months later, in February 2003, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy estimated the number of viewers of Al-Jazeera at 50 million, 15 million of which were in Europe and America. Furthermore, according to opinion polls conducted in Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian territories, Al-Jazeera is indisputably the most popular Arab news channel. For example, a survey of opinion conducted by Alpha Informatics in February 2005 showed that 76% of Palestinians preferred to follow the news on Al-Jazeera (Zayani, 2005; Barkho, 2006).

However, some researchers (Fandy, 2007) doubt the credibility of these polls, noting that the Arab space lacks the independent statistical institutions that can provide reliable information about the share of each channel of the market. Thus, it becomes necessary to refer to the reliable opinion polls carried out by organizations about the popularity of Arabic news satellite TV channels and the degree of their spread. Therefore, one of main goals of the study was to enhance the scientific methods by conducting more reliable survey measurements to investigate the attitude of Arab news consumers toward Arabic news TV services.

**Table 6.3** Frequencies (% saying Daily-Most Daily) of Viewing Favourite Arabic News Satellite TV Channels

Arabic News TV channels	Saudi %	Bahrain %	Qatar %
1. Al-Jazeera TV	90.6%	84.7%	83.7%
2. Al-Arabiya TV	36.3%	39.3%	33.4%
3. BBC (Arabic)	25.2%	30.7%	33.9%
4. UAE TV	10.5%	18.1%	11.4%
5. BBC (International)	6.4%	9.2%	9.0%
6. Saudi Arabia TV	6.4%	5.4%	4.4%
7. CNN News	5.4%	7.5%	7.6%
8. Qatar TV	3.6%	5.9%	6.6%
9. Euro News	3.0%	6.4%	5.4%
10. France 24 (Arabic)	2.7%	5.5%	8.0%
11. Al-Hurra	1.5%	7.1%	5.6%
12. Kuwait TV	1.5%	6.5%	1.4%
13. Oman TV	0.9%	3.0%	1.2%
14. Bahrain TV	0.5%	6.2%	0.6%

### **6.7 Demographic Differences in Viewing News TV Channels**

This section of the study examined the demographic profiles of different TV news channels in the GCC countries. The research applied two statistical tests, the Mann-Whitney U test to compare gender differences and the Kruskal-Wallis Test to compare statistically significant differences between other demographic factors where there were three or more groups.

The earlier studies of Arab news audiences revealed a variety of outcomes regarding demographic profiles. The study of Auter et al. (2004, 2005) showed that males were more likely than females to follow the news on Al-Jazeera on a daily basis. Nearly half of participants were between 25 and 35 years old, while the group was nearly equally split between married and single. The overwhelming majority had a Muslim background and half of the participants considered themselves politically neutral and had a moderate philosophy of life.

The findings of this study are consistent with other studies that suggested that the majority of our sample in the Arab world prefer to view Arabic news TV services such as Al-Jazeera TV, Al-Arabiya TV, and BBC (Arabic) TV, were relatively young males and females, well-educated, financially stable and considered themselves neutral and as having a moderate perspective (Ayish, 2001; Miles, 2005; Zayani, 2005; Lynch, 2006, Sakr, 2007; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008, 2009, 2010).

In this part of the study the results reported the significant differences of news consumer demographic profiles viewing news in a range of TV channels in the GCC countries. The demographic profiles which included gender, age, marital status, education level, annual income, employment status, marital status, and political orientation are summarized below.

### 6.7.1 Gender Differences

First, in Saudi Arabia, under the category of ‘*Local & National TV channels*’, Kuwait TV, Bahrain TV, UAE TV and Saudi Arabia TV were viewed more by female news audiences (4.2%, 1.4%, 15.3% and 16.0% respectively) than by males (.0%, .0%, 7.7% and .8% respectively) with significant Mann-Whitney U tests (  $U(590) = 34932.0$ ; exact  $p < .000$ , 2-tailed), (  $U(589) = 36352.5$ ; exact  $p < .001$ , 2-tailed), (  $U(591) = 37004.0$ ; exact  $p < .05$ , 2-tailed and (  $U(597) = 26024.0$ ; exact  $p < .000$ , 2-tailed. Under the factor ‘*Arabic News TV*’, it was observed that Al-Arabiya TV was viewed more by females (50.0%) than by males (28.0%), (  $U(603) = 32045.0$ ; exact  $p < .000$ , 2-tailed). In contrast, Al-Jazeera TV was viewed more by males (94.7%) than by females (83.5%), (  $U(621) = 39490.5$ ; exact  $p < .000$ , 2-tailed). Al-Hurra TV was viewed regularly more by females (24.5%) than males (15.2%) (  $U(587) = 36112.5$ ; exact  $p < .05$ , 2-tailed).

In Bahrain under the factor ‘*Local & National TV channels*,’ Kuwait TV was viewed more by female news consumers (15.6%) than by males (5.6%), (  $U(535) = 10566.0$ ; exact  $p < .05$ , 2-tailed), resembling the findings from Saudi Arabia. Under the factor ‘*International News Channels*,’ Euro News TV was viewed more by males (6.6%) compared with females (4.0%), (  $U(534) = 10528.0$ ; exact  $p < .05$ , 2-tailed). Finally, under the third factor ‘*Arabic News TV*,’ it was observed that BBC (Arabic) was watched more by males (31.7%) than by females (21.2%), (  $U(542) = 36342.0$ ; exact  $p < .005$ , 2-tailed). Furthermore, Al-Jazeera TV was viewed more by males (86.1%) than by females (71.7%), (  $U(558) = 11487.5$ ; exact  $p < .05$ , 2-tailed).

In Qatar under the factor ‘*International News Channels*’ Euro News TV was watched more by male news consumers (6.6%) compared with females (.2%), (  $U(496) = 16042.5$ ; exact  $p < .05$ , 2-tailed), which resembles the findings in Bahrain. And under the factor ‘*Arabic News TV*,’ the findings showed that Al-Arabiya TV, BBC (Arabic),

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Al-Hurra TV and Al-Jazeera TV were all watched more by male news consumers (36.6%, 36.5%, 18.7% and 85.6% respectively) than females (18.2%, 21.2%, 12.8% and 74.2% respectively) with significant Mann-Whitney U tests ( $U(512) = 14480.5$ ; exact  $p < .000$ , 2-tailed), ( $U(510) = 13582.0$ ; exact  $p < .000$ , 2-tailed), ( $U(497) = 15849.5$ ; exact  $p < .041$ , 2-tailed) and ( $U(540) = 17839.0$ ; exact  $p < .05$ , 2-tailed) respectively; and that the result had similarities with the findings in Saudi Arabia where also Al-Arabiya TV, Al-Hurra TV and Al-Jazeera TV were watched more by male news consumers than by female news consumers.

The findings were consistent other studies which indicated that male news consumers watch more Arabic and international news TV services than females (Auter et al., 2005; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008).

### 6.7.2 Age Group Differences

In Saudi Arabia under the factor 'Local & National TV channels,' Kuwait TV, Bahrain TV, Saudi Arabia TV, Oman TV, and Qatar TV were all viewed more by older age news consumers (38.1%, 19.1%, 9.5%, 4.8%, and 4.8% respectively) than by younger participants (14.2%, 9.5%, 4.8%, 4.8%, and 4.8% respectively) or by mature age news consumers (8.7%, 4.9%, .0%, .0%, and 4.3% respectively), with Kruskal-Wallis H test ( $X^2(2, N = 590) = 13.14$ ,  $p < .001$ ), ( $X^2(2, N = 589) = 6.50$ ,  $p < .05$ ), ( $X^2(2, N = 582) = 7.39$ ,  $p < .05$ ), ( $X^2(2, N = 590) = 6.64$ ,  $p < .036$ ) and ( $X^2(2, N = 597) = 16.37$ ,  $p < .000$ ).

In Bahrain no statistically significant differences were observed. However, In Qatar the findings showed that under factor 'Local & National TV channels' Kuwait TV, Bahrain TV, Oman TV, Qatar TV and Saudi Arabia TV were seen more by older news consumers (11.8%, 5.6%, 6.3%, 16.7% and 22.2% respectively) than by younger ones (.9%, .3%, .9%, 5.7% and 3.0% respectively) or than by mature age news

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consumers (1.3%, .7%, 1.4%, 7.3% and 5.4% respectively), ( $X^2(2, N = 502) = 20.93, p < .000$ ), ( $X^2(2, N = 502) = 15.32, p < .000$ ), ( $X^2(2, N = 491) = 15.75, p < .000$ ), ( $X^2(2, N = 502) = 14.78, p < .001$ ) and ( $X^2(2, N = 503) = 13.73, p < .001$ ) respectively. Similarly under the factor 'International News Channels' older news consumers watched BBC (International) more often (18.8%) than did young news consumers (8.4%) or mature news consumers (9.5%), ( $X^2(2, N = 496) = 6.50, p < .039$ ).

The findings showed that local and national TV channels were mostly watched by older news consumers compared to younger and mature age news consumers. The results here were consistent with those of Johnson and Fahmy (2008), who indicated that younger and mature age viewers (25-35 years) viewed Arabic news TV services such as Al-Jazeera TV more than local and national TV channels.

### 6.7.3 Marital Status Differences

In respect of marital status in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain there were no statistically significant differences across the TV channels clustered under all three factors. In Qatar, however, under the factor 'Local & National TV channels,' Kuwait TV, Bahrain TV, Oman TV and Saudi Arabia TV were viewed regularly more by divorced/widowed news consumers (40%, 40%, 40% and 40% respectively) than by married participants (26.8%, 19.6%, 16.2% and 32.5% respectively) or by single news consumers (12.1, 10.4%, 7.4% and 17.0% respectively), ( $X^2(2, N = 502) = 18.47, p < .000$ ), ( $X^2(2, N = 502) = 11.07, p < .05$ ), ( $X^2(2, N = 491) = 12.90, p < .05$ ) and ( $X^2(2, N = 503) = 17.19, p < .000$ ) respectively; whereas Qatar TV was viewed more by divorced/widowed news consumers (40%) than by married participants (37.2%) or single participants (18.6%), ( $X^2(2, N = 502) = 21.68, p < .000$ ). Further under the factor 'Arabic News TV,' viewing BBC (Arabic) news regularly was found to be

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greater among married news consumers (42.3) than among singles (40.0) and divorced/widowed participants (28.1), ( $X^2(2, N = 510) = 17.09, p < .000$ ).

The findings showed that local and national TV channels, such as Kuwait TV, Bahrain TV, Oman TV, Qatar TV and Saudi Arabia TV were viewed more by divorced/widowed news consumers. However, Arabic news TV channels were watched more among single and married news consumers (Auter et al., 2005).

### 6.7.4 Education Group Differences

In Saudi Arabia under the factor 'Local & National TV channels,' Oman TV and Saudi Arabia TV were viewed more by school-only educated participants (3.1% and 7.5% respectively) than by those who held a bachelor's degree (.7% and 6.6% respectively) or masters/PhD degree (.0% and 4.7% respectively), ( $X^2(2, N = 582) = 6.87, p < .05$ ) and ( $X^2(2, N = 597) = 6.06, p < .000$ ) respectively. Under the factor 'International News TV,' BBC News, CNN News and Euro News were consumed more by masters/PhD degree holders (12.1%, 11.4% and 3.8% respectively) than by those with school-level only education (3.1%, 6.2% and .0% respectively) or bachelor's degree level education (5.5%, 3.8% and 3.4% respectively), ( $X^2(2, N = 589) = 11.60, p < .05$ ), ( $X^2(2, N = 592) = 8.86, p < .05$ ) and ( $X^2(2, N = 581) = 9.41, p < .05$ ) respectively. France 24 (Arabic) was watched more by those who held bachelor's degrees (20.1%) and masters/PhD degrees (14.0%) than by those who were only educated to school level (7.9), ( $X^2(2, N = 585) = 6.30, p < .05$ ). Finally, under the factor 'Arabic News TV,' Al-Jazeera TV was viewed more by bachelor degree holders (93.2%) and those with masters/PhD degrees (86.4%) than by school educated news consumers (81.7%) in Saudi Arabia ( $X^2(2, N = 621) = 12.62, p < .05$ ).

In Bahrain under the factor 'Local & National TV channels,' Bahrain TV was viewed more by those who were educated at school level (11.0%) than by those who

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held a bachelor's degree (5.8%) or a masters/PhD degree (2.9%), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 530) = 7.37,  $p < .05$ ). Under the factor 'International News TV,' BBC (International) and CNN were consumed more by those who held masters/PhD degrees (46.1% and 43.8% respectively) than by those who held bachelor's degrees (35.5% and 39.0% respectively) or who were educated only at school level (24.8% and 24.8% respectively), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 529) = 9.42,  $p < .05$ ) and ( $X^2$  (2, N = 534) = 6.22,  $p < .05$ ) respectively. Euro News was found to be consumed more by masters/PhD degree holders (32.7%) than by bachelor's degree holders (23.1%) and school-level educated participants (17.8% ) ( $X^2$  (2, N = 534) = 5.95,  $p < .05$ ).

In Qatar under the factor 'Local & National TV channels,' Kuwait TV was viewed more by masters/PhD degree holders (24.4%) and school-only educated participants (23.8%) than by bachelor degree holders (15.7%), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 502) = 5.70,  $p < .05$ ). Under the factor 'International News TV,' BBC (International) and CNN News were consumed more by Master/PhD degree holders (20.7% and 11.8% respectively) than by bachelor degree holders (8.5% and 9.6% respectively) and those who were educated only to school level (6.1% and 6.0% respectively), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 496 ) = 23.42,  $p < .000$ ) and ( $X^2$  (2, N = 499) = 11.79,  $p < .05$ ) respectively.

The findings confirmed results of the study conducted by Jamal and Melkote, (2008) whose research indicated that local and national TV channels such as Kuwait TV are viewed by people with a low education background. However, the majority of those who watched Arabic and international news TV, such as Al-Jazeera, were either bachelor degree holders or masters/PhD degree holders.

### **6.7.5 Annual Income Differences**

In Saudi Arabia under the factor 'Local & National TV channels' Saudi Arabia TV was watched more by those consumers who had low incomes (7.7%) than by those who had

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medium incomes (1.4%) or high level annual incomes (.1%), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 596) = 18.14,  $p < .000$ ). Under the second factor 'International News TV,' CNN News and Euro News were viewed more by the news consumers having high incomes (15.4% and 13.2% respectively) than by those having low (4.2% and 2.1% respectively) and medium level incomes (7.9% and 4.1% respectively), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 591) = 8.03,  $p < .05$ ) and ( $X^2$  (2, N = 580) = 5.78,  $p < .05$ ).

In Bahrain under the factor 'Arabic News TV,' BBC (Arabic) was viewed more by consumers having low level incomes (32.9%) than by those having medium (23.2%) and high level incomes (23.1%), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 544) = 6.86,  $p < .05$ ). However, in Qatar under the factor 'Local & National TV channels' Kuwait TV, Bahrain TV, Qatar TV, UAE TV and Saudi Arabia TV were viewed more by the news consumers of high income (6.1%, 3.0%, 18.8%, 21.9% and 12.1% respectively) than by those having low (1.2% .5%, 5.4%, 10.3% and 2.9% respectively) and medium level incomes (.1%, .2%, 8.1%, 12.9% and 9.8% respectively), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 502) = 24.38,  $p < .000$ ), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 502) = 10.38,  $p < .05$ ), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 502) = 30.20,  $p < .000$ ), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 500) = 7.19,  $p < .05$ ) and ( $X^2$  (2, N = 503) = 7.99,  $p < .05$ ) respectively.

In Qatar, under the factor 'International News TV,' BBC (International) was viewed more by those having medium incomes (45.7%) and high incomes (48.3%) than by those having low level incomes (29.7%), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 496) = 11.68,  $p < .05$ ). In contrast CNN News was watched more by those having high incomes (52.8%) than those having medium incomes (44.8%) or level low income (26.9%), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 499) = 16.78,  $p < .000$ ).

The findings of this study were not consistent with other Arabic media studies. Previous studies pointed out that the majority of the Arab participants in news media

surveys were associated with low income levels compared with those who live in the Arab Gulf Countries (Al-Shaqsi, 2000; Al-Asfar, 2002; Auter et al., 2005).

### **6.7.6 Employment Status Differences**

In Saudi Arabia under the factor 'Local & National TV channels,' Saudi Arabia TV was viewed more by those in part-time employment (51.2%) than by the unemployed (25.2%) or those in full-time employment (23.0%), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 596) = 16.82,  $p < .000$ ). Similarly, under the factor 'Arabic News TV' Al-Arabiya TV was viewed more by those in part-time employment (93.5%), than by those in full-time employment (73.8%) or those who were unemployed (70.0%), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 602) = 8.95,  $p < .05$ ). Furthermore, in Bahrain under the factor 'Arabic News TV' Al-Arabiya TV was viewed more by those in full-time employment (42.6%) than those who were unemployed (34.7%) or in part-time employment (33.3%), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 538) = 8.37,  $p < .05$ ).

In Qatar under the factor 'Local & National TV channels' Kuwait TV was viewed more by the full-time employed (24.1%) than by those who were unemployed (13.4%) or by those in part-time employment (6.6%), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 499) = 11.16,  $p < .05$ ); similarly Qatar TV was viewed more by those in full-time employment (34.5%) than by unemployed (18.6%) or part-time employed participants (16.7%), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 500) = 15.59,  $p < .000$ ). Finally and surprisingly, under the factor 'International News TV' France 24 (Arabic) was more likely to be watched by the unemployed (11.2%) than by those in part-time employment (6.7%) or in full-time employment (5.6%), ( $X^2$  (2, N = 496) = 5.95,  $p < .05$ ).

The findings of the study on occupation differences are consistent with other studies conducted with Arab audiences. The study of Auter et al. (2005) showed that those in full-time and part-time employment consumed more news from national TV channels, Arabic and international TV services compared to those who were

unemployed. The present study is significant because the majority of previous studies have not measured occupation differences in the demographic characteristics of audiences.

### **6.7.7 Political Orientation Differences**

The study asked the participants to identify their political perspective and how they consider themselves (liberals, neutral, and conservatives). The findings showed that in Saudi Arabia, under the factor 'Local & National TV channels', Saudi Arabia TV was watched more by conservatives (8.8%) and neutrals (5.6%) than by liberals (1.2%), ( $X^2(2, N = 597) = 18.44, p < .000$ ). However, under the factor 'International News TV' BBC (International), CNN News and Euro News were watched more by liberals (12.6%, 10.2% and 4.7% respectively) than by conservatives (5.9%, 4.7% and 2.0% respectively) or by neutrals (4.8%, 4.4% and 3.7% respectively), ( $X^2(2, N = 589) = 11.52, p < .05$ ), ( $X^2(2, N = 592) = 9.94, p < .05$ ) and ( $X^2(2, N = 581) = 10.85, p < .05$ ) respectively.

In Bahrain under the factor 'International News TV' also BBC (International), CNN News, Euro News and France 24 (Arabic) were watched more by liberals (18.5%, 18.5%, 15.1% and 13.8% respectively) than by conservatives (8.5%, 7.2%, 4.2% and 4.2% respectively) or by neutrals (6.6%, 4.0%, 4.7% and 3.3% respectively), ( $X^2(2, N = 529) = 15.92, p < .000$ ), ( $X^2(2, N = 534) = 15.41, p < .000$ ), ( $X^2(2, N = 534) = 15.74, p < .000$ ) and ( $X^2(2, N = 530) = 10.01, p < .05$ ) respectively. Under the factor 'Arabic News TV' it was observed that Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera TV were viewed more by liberals (54.7% and 93.0% respectively) than by neutrals (38.4% and 84.3% respectively) or by conservatives (32.2% and 80.8% respectively), ( $X^2(2, N = 542) = 12.86, p < .05$ ) and ( $X^2(2, N = 558) = 6.79, p < .05$ ).

In Qatar under the factor 'International News TV' BBC (International) and CNN News were viewed by liberals (20.0% and 16.7% respectively) than by neutrals (7.2% and 5.9% respectively) or by conservatives (6.2% and 5.6% respectively), ( $X^2(2, N = 496) = 21.61, p < .000$ ) and ( $X^2(2, N = 499) = 19.56, p < .000$ ). Euro News was watched by liberals (26.1%) and conservatives (17.9%) more than by neutrals (14.0%), ( $X^2(2, N = 496) = 6.53, p < .05$ ). Finally, under the factor 'Arabic News TV,' Al-Arabiya TV, and BBC (Arabic) TV were viewed more by liberals (51.2%, 54.7% respectively) than by neutrals (32.6%, 32.0% respectively) or by conservatives (25.5%, 26.1% respectively), ( $X^2(2, N = 512) = 16.79, p < .000$ ), ( $X^2(2, N = 510) = 13.18, p < .001$ ). However, Al-Hurra TV was viewed more by liberals (37.3%) than by neutrals (20.7%) or by conservatives (20.2%), ( $X^2(2, N = 497) = 11.88, p < .05$ ). Al-Jazeera TV was watched more by conservatives (90.8%) than by liberals (83.2%) or neutrals (79.3%) (Kruskal-Wallis H test =  $X^2(2, N = 540) = 10.22, p < .05$ ).

The findings of the study were not consistent with other studies that showed Arabic news channels such as Al-Jazeera TV as being viewed more by neutral news audiences than by liberals or conservatives (Auter et al., 2005; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008).

### **6.8 News Audiences Topics of Interest**

Gandy et al. (1987) pointed out that interest drives the public to search for information and news from the media so they can learn about and understand what is going on around them. Previous studies indicated that audiences with specific interests may possibly watch further television news coverage after learning from other sources that certain topics are in the news (Merialdo et al., 1999; Carpini and Williams, 2000). Audiences are more likely to pay attention to subjects that are relevant to their interest (Straughan, 1989; Pinkleton et al., 1998; Zillmann & Bryant, 2002).

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This research investigated Arab audience priorities in the relative importance of news topics, such as local issues, entertainment, human affairs, and national and international events. Previous studies showed that audiences in the Arab world were most likely interested in different kinds of topics. The study of Al-Asfar (2002) showed that the television programme viewing preferences of the sample Arab audience groups seem to be divided into three categories. The most frequently watched programme types are the news, music, comedy, scientific programmes, religious programmes, and cultural and educational programmes. Hamza (2008) conducted a study to measure the topics of most interest for Arab audiences in Egypt. The findings showed that economics, social affairs, politics, education, the environment, religion, and cultural issues were the top issues that concerned the majority of audiences.

The study measured the news preferences of news consumers in GCC countries. A 28-item scale was constructed that listed various news topics. These data were reduced using a principal components analysis with varimax rotation of factor analytic techniques. Factor analysis was used to reduce the number of variables and to detect structure in the relationships between variables (Brace et al., 2009). The factor solution identified seven orthogonal factors each having Eigenvalues of more than one (except for one item - sports news) and together explained 62.91% of the total variance. In addition, if any variable loaded on more than one factor, it was put together with the factor on which it had highest loading (See Table 6.4).

**Table 6.4** Factors Analysis of the News Topic Interests by News Consumers in GCC Countries

News Topics	Factors							
	Mean	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>Factor 1 International Affairs</b>	<b>3.43</b>							
Latin American Issues	3.28	.853						
Asian issues	3.47	.839						
American issues	3.48	.833						
African issues	3.48	.807						
European issues	3.48	.767						
<b>Factor 2 Human Affairs</b>	<b>4.24</b>							
Human Rights issues	4.34		.802					
Minority issues	3.88		.712					
Youth issues	4.25		.710					
Human interest stories	4.49		.597					
<b>Factor 3 War &amp; Crisis</b>	<b>3.92</b>							
The Iraq conflict	4.03			.837				
The Afghan Conflict	4.05			.818				
Darfur Conflict	3.68			.708				
<b>Factor 4 Arab Politics</b>	<b>4.59</b>							
Politics in Arab world	4.59				.811			
World-wide politics	4.47				.749			
Events in your country	4.60				.696			
Israel/Palestine Conflict	4.70				.526			
<b>Factor 5 Conflict Issues</b>	<b>3.54</b>							
Terrorism issues	3.80					.718		
Iranian nuclear weapons	3.69					.714		
Sunnis and Shias	3.03					.672		
Arab-Arab conflict	3.64					.549		
<b>Factor 6 Business &amp; Interest</b>	<b>3.74</b>							
City, business issues	3.94						.679	
Financial crisis	3.96						.631	
Weather news	3.91						.552	
Consumer affairs	3.87						.445	
Travel news	3.20						.425	
Sports news	3.61						.377	
<b>Factor 7 Crime &amp; Pleasure</b>	<b>3.23</b>							
Crime news	3.27							.746
Entertainment	3.20							.729
Eigenvalue		7.55	2.41	2.40	1.72	1.31	1.13	1.07
Total Variance	62.91	14.11	9.52	9.44	8.91	7.91	6.97	6.01

Principal component analysis Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization; KMO=0.88; Bartlett's Test of Sphericity,  $p < 0.001$ . N = 1752 Alpha valid 1506 – Cronbach's alpha (.888).

In terms of average level of interest the participants had, Arab politics was the most highly rated news topic, followed, by 'International News', 'Human Affairs', and 'War & Crisis'. The findings showed that there were similar results in terms of relative popularity of different types of news across each of the three countries. Under Arab politics, the items 'Israel/Palestine conflict', 'Current events in your country', 'Politics

in the Arab world', were most highly rated by audiences in all of the three countries. Interest in business and financial issues had the second highest interest after political issues, which was the main topic of interest as rated by viewers in all GCC countries. Finally, least interest was shown in entertainment and pleasure issues as rated by viewers in all three countries. These results are summarized in table 6.5, below.

**Table 6.5** Frequencies (%Interest) of Viewing News Topic

News Interest	Saudi %	Bahrain %	Qatar %
1. Israel/Palestine Conflict	94.9%	91.8%	95.9%
2. Current events in your country	93.9%	92.4%	92.8%
3. Politics in the Arab world	94.2%	90.1%	93.7%
4. Human interest stories	93.1%	91.7%	91.9%
5. World-wide politics	93.2%	89.7%	92.3%
6. Human rights issues	88.5%	87.1%	85.5%
7. Youth issues	83.6%	85.5%	86.3%
8. The Afghani conflict	77.8%	69.8%	78.5%
9. The Iraq conflict	78.1%	71.2%	78.0%
10. Financial crisis	60.8%	72.3%	70.2%
11. City, business and financial	72.2%	70.7%	70.2%
12. Weather news	73.6%	73.2%	73.0%
13. Minority issues	69.7%	67.6%	69.5%
14. Consumer affairs	68.1%	74.5%	64.9%
15. Terrorism issues	61.1%	67.2%	71.2%
16. Iranian nuclear weapons	59.3%	56.5%	62.0%
17. Darfur conflict	60.8%	58.4%	63.9%
18. Arab-Arab conflict	62.3%	60.2%	60.5%
19. Sports news	54.7%	55.9%	58.8%
20. American issues	51.8%	47.4%	55.0%
21. European issues	53.1%	49.1%	54.5%
22. African issues	41.6%	44.8%	61.8%
23. Asian issues	45.5%	51.5%	50.1%
24. Latin American Issues	36.0%	38.2%	43.1%
25. Crime news	45.4%	43.6%	36.2%
26. Entertainment	37.7%	37.4%	31.1%
27. Travel news	32.7%	34.6%	33.4%
28. Sunnis and Shias	38.2%	37.0%	45.5%

## 6.9 Demographic Differences in News Topic Interest

This section examines the significance of demographic differences in the stated news interests of the participants. The statistical significance of demographic differences in news interests was computed for each national sub-sample using one-way ANOVA and a paired sample t-tests. Four demographic variables emerged as significant

discriminators of news topics interests' factors: Gender, Age, Income, and ideologies. Other news topic interests of news TV channels were excluded from the measurement because of low rates of response to the survey questionnaires.

The results of the studies by Hamada, (1997), Salah, (1997), and Hamza (2008) showed that there were no significant demographic differences in age level and gender in Egypt from both male and female participants. However, there was a significant difference in education level (Hamza, 2008). Whereas in this study the findings showed that four demographic variables emerged as significant discriminators of news topics interest factors: gender, age, income, and ideology.

### **6.9.1 Gender Differences**

The findings indicated that in Bahrain, there were significant gender differences for reported interests in 'War & Crisis' ( $t$  test:  $t(540) = -2.29, p < .05, 2$ -tailed); surprisingly, it was found that female news consumers ( $M=4.11$ ) were more interested in news concerning war and crisis slightly more than males ( $M=3.77$ ). The most popular news topics that interested females, compared to males, were 'The Iraq conflict' ( $M=4.20$  and  $M=3.89$  respectively), 'The Afghan conflict' ( $M= 4.16$  and  $M=3.87$  respectively), and the 'Darfur conflict' ( $M=3.98$  and  $M=3.56$  respectively).

Turning to Saudi Arabia, significant gender differences occurred for 'Arab Politics' ( $t(607) = 3.973, p < .000, 2$ -tailed), and it was found that male audiences were more interested in topics related to 'Arab Politics' than females were. Males were more interested in the 'Israel/Palestine conflict', 'Politics in the Arab world', 'Current events in your country' and 'World-wide politics', ( $M= 4.87, 4.69, 4.67$  and  $4.55$  respectively), compared to females ( $M= 4.51, 4.52, 4.56$  and  $4.39$  respectively).

Finally, in Qatar, there were significant gender differences in respect of 'Conflict issues' ( $t(510) = 2.009, p < .05, 2$ -tailed), with male news consumers in Qatar

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(M= 3.67) being more interested in news about 'Conflict issues' than females (M= 3.45). The news topics most favoured by male audiences were 'Terrorism issues', 'Iranian nuclear weapons', 'Arab-Arab conflicts' and 'Sunnis and Shias' (M= 3.95, 3.85, 3.67, and 3.25 respectively), compared to female news consumers (M= 3.80, 3.53, 3.52, and 3.00 respectively).

### **6.9.2 Age Differences**

The results showed that in Bahrain, there were significant age differences for reported interest in 'Human affairs' (ANOVA:  $F(2,543) = 3.706, p < .05$ ). The finding indicated that topics that include 'Human interest stories', 'Human rights issues', 'Youth issues', and 'Minority issues' were viewed more by young age news consumers (M= 4.54, 4.40, 4.31 and 3.94 respectively) than mature (M= 4.57, 4.42, 4.23, and 3.94 respectively) or older age news consumers (M= 4.18, 3.91, 3.64, and 3.36 respectively).

In Qatar, age differences occurred for 'Conflict issues' (ANOVA:  $F(2,520) = 3.472, p < .05$ ). Young age news audiences (M= 3.94, 3.85, 3.71, and 3.23 respectively) were more interested in 'Terrorism issues', 'Iranian nuclear weapons', 'Arab-Arab conflicts', and 'Sunnis and Shias', than mature (M= 3.85, 3.64, 3.52 and 3.20 respectively) or older age news consumers (M= 4.22, 4.09, 3.64 and 2.95 respectively).

In Saudi Arabia, there were significant age differences in respect of 'Crime & pleasure', (ANOVA:  $F(2,603) = 3.306, p < .05$ ). The findings indicated that older age news consumers (M=, 3.38 and 3.33 respectively), were more interested in 'Entertainment' and 'Crime news', than young (M= 3.28, and 3.42 respectively), or mature age news consumers (M=, 3.09 and 3.23 respectively).

### **6.9.3 Annual Income Differences**

The findings indicated that in Bahrain, annual income differences existed for 'Human affairs' (ANOVA:  $F(2,543) = 4.231, p < .05$ ). The results showed that consumers who

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had low income (M= 4.57, 4.43, 4.31 and 3.95 respectively), were more interested in ‘Human interest stories’, ‘Human rights issues’, ‘Youth issues’, and ‘Minority issues’, than those who had medium (M= 4.46, 4.34, 4.21 and 3.93 respectively), or high level annual incomes (M= 4.42, 4.00, 3.88 and 3.54 respectively).

In Saudi Arabia there were significant age differences in respect of ‘Arab politics’ (ANOVA:  $F(2,607) = 3.160, p < .05$ ). Audiences who had medium incomes (M= 4.88, 4.80, 4.70 and 4.65 respectively) were more interested in ‘Israel/Palestine conflict’, ‘Politics in the Arab world’, ‘Current events in your country’, and ‘World-wide politics’, than those who had high (M= 4.88, 4.77, 4.53 and 4.47 respectively) or low level annual income (M= 4.70, 4.59, 4.63 and 4.46 respectively).

In Qatar, age differences occurred for ‘Business & Interest’, (ANOVA:  $F(2,496) = 3.032, p < .05$ ). Participants with high incomes (M= 4.21, 4.11, 4.03, 3.94, 3.66, and 3.47 respectively) were more interested in ‘City business issues’, ‘financial crises’, ‘Weather news’, ‘Consumer news’, ‘Sports news’ and ‘Travel news’, than those who had medium incomes (M= 3.97, 4.12, 4.05, 3.76, 3.69, and 3.39, respectively) or low-level annual incomes (M= 3.86, 3.90, 3.86, 3.81, 3.64 and 3.14 respectively).

### **6.9.4 Political Orientation Differences**

In Saudi Arabia, the findings showed that there were significant differences. However, in Bahrain there were differences in news interests associated with political orientation. Significant interest differences occurred for ‘Business & Interest’ (ANOVA:  $F(2,526) = 4.676, p < .05$ ). The results indicated neutral audiences (M= 4.04, M= 4.03, M= 3.99, M= 3.97, M= 3.75, and M= 3.29,) were more interested in ‘City business issues’, ‘Consumer news’, ‘financial crises’, ‘Weather news’, ‘Sports news’, and ‘Travel news’ than those who reported themselves to be liberals (M= 3.92, M= 3.74, M= 3.91, M=

4.05,  $M= 3.65$ , and  $M= 3.35$ ,) or conservatives ( $M= 3.88$ ,  $M= 3.94$ ,  $M= 3.98$ ,  $M= 3.80$ ,  $M= 3.43$ , and  $M= 3.18$ ).

Finally, in Qatar there were significant political orientation differences in respect of ‘Crime & Pleasure’ (ANOVA:  $F= (2,511) = 8.627$ ,  $p <.05$ ). The liberal news consumers ( $M= 3.39$  and  $3.36$  respectively) were more interested in ‘Entertainment’ and ‘Crime news’ compared with neutrals ( $M= 3.22$ , and  $3.11$  respectively) and conservative news audiences.

### **6.10 The Relationships between Reported News Interest and Reported Use of Arabic TV Services**

Further analyses were conducted using the Pearson correlation measurement to find out if there were any significant relationships between watching Arabic TV channels and levels of reported interest in specific news topics.

The results indicated that in Saudi Arabia there was a strong positive correlation between news consumers who were interested in business affairs and watching some local and national TV channels (Kuwait TV ( $r =.09$ ,  $p<0.05$ ), Bahrain TV ( $r=.10$ ,  $p<0.05$ ), UAE TV( $r =.14$ ,  $p<0.01$ ), and Saudi Arabia TV ( $r= .21$ ,  $p<0.00$ )); some international TV news channels (BBC-International ( $r =.10$ ,  $p<0.05$ ), and Al-Arabiya TV ( $r =.22$ ,  $p<0.00$ )); and newspapers ( $r= .14$ ,  $p<0.01$ ). In contrast, there was a negative correlation between interest in Arab political issues and claimed viewing of local and national TV channels.

News consumers who were interested in Arab political news watched more Al-Jazeera news ( $r =.17$ ,  $p<0.00$ ), and viewed less Kuwait TV ( $r =-.09$ ,  $p<0.05$ ), Qatar TV ( $r =-.16$ ,  $p<0.00$ ), or Saudi Arabia TV ( $r =-.20$ ,  $p<0.00$ ). The finding also indicated that there was a negative correlation between interest in human affairs news and reported watching of non-Arabic TV channels. News consumers who were interested in human affairs news watched less UAE TV ( $r =-.10$ ,  $p<0.05$ ), BBC (International) ( $r =-.11$ ,

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$p < 0.05$ ), CNN ( $r = -.15$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), Al-Arabiya ( $r = -.11$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ), and BBC Arabic ( $r = -.09$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ).

Saudi Arabia news consumers who were interested in conflict issues were more likely to report consuming news from the Internet ( $r = .10$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ), newspapers ( $r = .10$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ), magazines ( $r = .9$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ), and via mobile technologies ( $r = .8$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ). Finally news consumers in Saudi Arabia who were interested in international news reportedly watched less Saudi Arabian TV ( $r = -.14$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ).

In Bahrain, the data showed that there was a strongly positive correlation between interest in business affairs and reported viewing of local and national TV channels (Kuwait TV ( $r = .12$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), Bahrain TV ( $r = .21$ ,  $p < 0.00$ ), UAE ( $r = .10$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ), Saudi Arabia ( $r = .09$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ); non-Arabic TV (BBC-International ( $r = .13$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), CCN ( $r = .13$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), Euro-News ( $r = .19$ ,  $p < 0.00$ )); and newspapers ( $r = .16$ ,  $p < 0.00$ ). There was a positive correlation between interest in entertainment and crime news and reported viewing of local and national TV channels (Kuwait TV ( $r = .19$ ,  $p < 0.00$ ), Bahrain TV ( $r = .21$ ,  $p < 0.00$ ), Oman ( $r = .15$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), Qatar ( $r = .18$ ,  $p < 0.00$ ), and UAE ( $r = .14$ ,  $p < 0.01$ )); Arabic news TV (Al-Arabiya TV ( $r = .08$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ), Al-Hurra ( $r = .13$ ,  $p < 0.01$ )); newspapers ( $r = .11$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ), and magazines ( $r = .20$ ,  $p < 0.00$ ).

There was a negative correlation between level of interest in entertainment and crime news and reported watching of Al-Jazeera TV ( $r = -.11$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ). There was also a strong positive correlation between interest in conflict issues and claimed watching of Arabic news TV (Al-Arabiya TV ( $r = .32$ ,  $p < 0.00$ ), BBC (Arabic) ( $r = .09$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ), and Al-Hurra ( $r = .16$ ,  $p < 0.00$ ); the Internet ( $r = .12$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ); radio ( $r = .12$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ); newspapers ( $r = .20$ ,  $p < 0.00$ ), magazines ( $r = .10$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ); and mobile ( $r = .09$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ).

Participants who were interested in international affairs were more likely to say they watched local and national TV channels (Oman ( $r = .11$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ), and Qatar ( $r$

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=.11,  $p<0.05$ ); and Arabic news TV (France 24 - Arabic ( $r = .15$ ,  $p<0.01$ ), and Al-Hurra ( $r = .12$ ,  $p<0.01$ )); newspapers ( $r = .09$ ,  $p<0.05$ ); and magazines ( $r = .15$ ,  $p<0.01$ ). The data also showed that Bahrain news consumers interested in human affairs were also positively related to watch Al-Jazeera TV ( $r = .13$ ,  $p<0.01$ ), and BBC (International) ( $r = .09$ ,  $p<0.05$ ).

Finally, in Qatar, as well as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, interest in business affairs correlated with claimed viewing of local and national TV channels (Kuwait TV ( $r = .17$ ,  $p<0.01$ ), Bahrain TV ( $r = .15$ ,  $p<0.01$ ), Oman TV ( $r = .12$ ,  $p<0.05$ ), UAE TV ( $r = .17$ ,  $p<0.01$ ), and Saudi Arabia TV ( $r = .14$ ,  $p<0.01$ )); Arabic news TV (Al-Arabiya TV ( $r = .17$ ,  $p<0.01$ ), and BBC-Arabic ( $r = .11$ ,  $p<0.05$ ).

Moreover, interest in entertainment and crime was positively correlated with claimed viewing of local and national TV channels (Kuwait TV ( $r = .10$ ,  $p<0.05$ ), Bahrain TV ( $r = .10$ ,  $p<0.05$ ), Oman TV ( $r = .14$ ,  $p<0.01$ ), Qatar ( $r = .09$ ,  $p<0.05$ ), and UAE TV ( $r = .17$ ,  $p<0.00$ ), Al-Arabiya TV ( $r = .11$ ,  $p<0.05$ )), and radio ( $r = .12$ ,  $p<0.05$ ). Furthermore, interest in war and crisis news was positively correlated with claimed viewing of local and national TV channels (Bahrain TV ( $r = .10$ ,  $p<0.05$ ), Qatar TV ( $r = .12$ ,  $p<0.05$ ), and UAE TV ( $r = .10$ ,  $p<0.05$ )); Al-Jazeera TV ( $r = .09$ ,  $p<0.05$ ); radio ( $r = .10$ ,  $p<0.05$ ); and newspapers ( $r = .09$ ,  $p<0.05$ ). In the same way, interest in Arab politics news was positively correlated with claimed viewing of Arabic news TV: Al-Jazeera ( $r = .29$ ,  $p<0.00$ ), and BBC Arabic ( $r = .11$ ,  $p<0.05$ ). Finally, the findings indicated that interest in international affairs issues was positively correlated with claimed viewing of non-Arabic TV (BBC International ( $r = .11$ ,  $p<0.05$ ), and CNN ( $r = .11$ ,  $p<0.05$ )), beside Al-Jazeera TV ( $r = .10$ ,  $p<0.05$ ).

### **6.11 Summary and Discussion**

This chapter examined news consumption patterns among a sample of media users in Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The findings showed that the most frequently used news medium was ‘Arabic News TV’, followed by ‘Internet’, ‘Newspapers’, ‘Local & National TV’, ‘Mobile’, ‘Radio’, ‘Non-Arabic News TV’, and ‘Magazine’. The results of the study are consistent with previous studies which pointed out that media audiences consider television the main sources for news and information (Boyd, 1972; Abdel Rahman, 1998). Bait Al-Mal (1992) pointed out that time spent viewing of Saudi TV channels declined after the advent of satellite channels. Abdel Rahman (1998) showed that the amount of time spent watching satellite TV appeared to be longer than the amount of time spent viewing national TV among Arab audiences in Egypt. The results indicated that 86 per cent of Arab viewers in Egypt reported that they watch satellite TV on a daily basis. Moreover, Arab satellite news TV services are the most favoured news sources for Arab audiences (Amin, 2001; Bahry, 2001; Guaaybess, 2002; Rugh, 2004; Lynch, 2006; Sakr, 2007).

The results showed that that the majority of our participants in the Arab Gulf states region were quite young, mixed gender, well-educated, financially stable individuals and families, employed, and considered themselves politically moderate and neutral. The majority of Arab Gulf states audiences depend on pan-Arab satellite news channels for news and information. The findings indicated that the most viewed Arabic News TV channel on a daily basis was ‘Al-Jazeera TV’ channel followed by ‘Al-Arabiya TV’, ‘BBC (Arabic) news TV channel’ ‘France 24 (Arabic)’ and ‘Al-Hurra TV’. These findings are consistent with the results of previous studies (Auter et al., 2005; Arafa el al., 2005; Jamal & Melkote, 2008; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008). In the category of ‘International News TV’ the most frequently viewed channel was ‘BBC (International) TV’, followed by ‘CNN News TV’ than ‘Euro News TV’. Finally, the

least watched services were 'Local & State TV' channels which included: 'UAE TV', 'Qatar TV', 'Saudi Arabia TV', 'Kuwait TV', 'Bahrain TV', and 'Oman TV'.

The results of this study supported the findings of previous research regarding the Arab public's consumption of Arabic TV services, which showed that Arab audiences depend on Arabic news TV more than local and national or international TV channels as their main news resources. Arabic news TV such as Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, and BBC (Arabic) were reported to be extensively viewed by viewers in most Arab countries (Ayish, 2004, 2006; El-Nawawy, 2003; El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002; El-Nawawy and Powers, 2008; Miles, 2005). The research here has also suggested that Arabic news TV channels could be driving audiences' in the Arab world away from their local and national channels, particularly when it comes to broadcasts about Arab political issues and international news (Zayani, 2005; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008, 2010).

The findings also revealed that the majority of our participants in the Arab Gulf states were interested in watching topics news related to Arab political issues, followed, by 'International News', 'Human Affairs', and 'War & Crisis'. Moreover, under Arab politics, items of the 'Israel/Palestine conflict', 'Current events in your country', and 'Politics in the Arab world' were the most highly rated by audiences in all of the three countries. The interest in business and financial issues was the second highest after political issues, which was the topic of main interest as rated by viewers in all GCC countries. Finally, least interest was shown in entertainment and pleasure issues by viewers in all three countries. The study conducted by Ayish (2001) indicated that the coverage of Arab political issues, mainly the Israel/Palestine topic, was particularly delivered by satellite television services to audiences in the Arab world. The findings of this study are similar to previous studies, which indicated that local politics and current

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events, Arab political issues, and human affairs were considered the most interesting news topics by the Arab audience in Libya (Mokhter, 2012).

The next chapter investigates the motivation and gratification data of Arab news audiences in the Arab Gulf states.

## **Chapter 7 Motivations of News Media Exposure**

### **7.1 Introduction**

This chapter examines motivations of news audiences in the Arab Gulf states region. The study requested the participants to report on their personal motivations for using news media in general, and Arabic news satellite TV channels in particular. This chapter tries to discover the factors that predict viewing of Arabic news satellite TV channels. Furthermore, the chapter also tries to investigate if there are any relationships between specific news motivations, different news services, and demographic characteristics. The chapter investigates the following main questions:

RQ5: What are the Arab GCC audiences' motivations for watching TV news services?

RQ6: Are there any relationships between motivations for watching news and different news services?

RQ7: Are there any relationships between motivations for watching news and demographic characteristics?

RQ8: Are there any significant demographic differences in news motivation?

RQ9: What are the key predicted variables for viewing TV news services?

### **7.2 Motivations of News Media Utilization**

Motivation can be defined as an internal state of being, or an internal condition (sometimes described as a need, desire, or want), that serves as a driving force to display different kinds of behaviour toward certain types of activities, developing preferences, arriving at some expected satisfactory outcome (Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981; Backman et al., 1995).

Since the beginning of media research numerous studies have examined audience motivations. Scholars have studied motives in relation to the reported use of radio (Herzog, 1944; Lazarsfeld & Stanton, 1944; Browne, 1982; El-Nawawy, 2007),

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newspapers and magazines (Belson, 1961; Blumler, 1979; Meyer, 1988; Newhagen & Nass, 1989), telephone (O’Keefe & Sulanowski, 1995; Dimmick et al., 2000), VCR (Rubin & Bantz, 1987; Levy & Gunter, 1988; Lin, 1993); television (Boyd, 1972; Palmgreen et al., 1980; Rubin, 1981, 1983, 1984; Rugh, 2004; Sakr, 2007), and the Internet (Bertot et al., 1996; Ebersole, 2000; Taylor, 2000; Flanagin & Metzger, 2007). Moreover, stated content preferences within specific media have also been found to be related to different reasons for using the media (Wimmer & Dominick, 1994).

Researchers have moved from studying motives linked to use of media to motives linked to use of genres. The latter mostly involves the study of motivation behind news media usage, psychological needs, demographic characteristics, and other form of communication behaviour (Rubin, 1981). Palmgreen et al. (1980) recommended four motivations dimensions in relation to news viewing in television: interpersonal utility, surveillance, entertainment, and parasocial interaction. Their results indicated that each dimension correlated either moderately or strongly with the corresponding gratifications obtained; in addition, researchers found that the motivations audiences reportedly seek are not always the same as the gratifications they obtain. Henningham (1985) examined the motivations audiences have for viewing TV news in relation to their preferences for different types of news. The results revealed that people who watch TV news for information tend to prefer serious and high impact news, while those seeking entertainment prefer human interest news and stories about conflict or human tragedy (Henningham, 1985). Levy and Windahl (1984) conducted a survey of 390 Swedish television news consumers in an attempt to explain the concept of audience activity. The results of this small survey indicated that audience activity and motivations have a real effect on the communication process; not all audience members are active to

the same degree, and audience members seek out communication because they have learned to seek it.

### **7.3 Measures of Motivations and Arabic News Media Choice**

This section of the study examines the motivation of Arab Gulf audiences for consuming news from Arabic news TV services. Several studies have applied the uses and gratifications model to examine the motives behind media usage. Rosengren and Windahl (1972) found that audiences depend upon the media to fulfil certain needs, such as vicarious experience and escapism, involvement or interaction. The uses and gratifications model attempts to meet the following goals: to explain how people use media to gratify their needs, to understand motives for media behaviour and to identify functions or consequences that follow from needs, motives and behaviour (Rubin, 1972). Rubin (1981) applied the uses and gratifications model to television viewing to investigate the relation between viewing motivation and age, attitudes toward watching television, and programme preferences.

In the early 1970s uses and gratifications researchers began developing typologies of media use, and most of these typologies dealt with television. McQuail et al. (1972) applied a media-person interaction typology by linking social circumstances and viewer background with gratifications sought, which this research anticipated to develop. Their typology included the following uses: (a) diversion (escape, emotional release); (b) personal relationships (companionship, social utility); (c) personal identity (personal reference, reality exploration, value reinforcement); and (d) surveillance (acquiring news and information) (p. 162). This study utilized the measurement scale based on a literature review of typologies of past uses and gratifications studies, specifically Rubin et al. (1985) and Henningham (1982). Several typologies were also used in previous studies conducted with different media in the Arab world (Marghalani

et al., 1998; Al-Amoudi, 1990; Al-Attibi, 1986; Al-Heezan, 1993; Yousef, 1999; Al-Shaqsi, 2000). Moreover, the study adopted three gratification scale categories used by Jamal and Melkote (2008).

The study used a 17-item scale to measure media motivations. The scale was developed to assess the gratifications sought by news consumers in relation to following news in all GCC countries. Principal components analysis was applied to the data from this scale to identify a series of factor variables that represented motivational constructs associated with news consumption. These variables were then used in subsequent analyses that included news consumption measures. Factor analysis methods were used with items for measuring media motivations to reduce the number of variables and to detect structure in the relationships between variables (Brace et al., 2009). The principal components analysis with varimax rotation reduced the 17 items to four orthogonal factors that each had Eigenvalues of more than one and explained 61.25 per cent of the total variance. Furthermore, if any variable loaded on more than one factor, it was placed together with the factor on which it had highest loading. The findings showed that four gratifications factors for news media emerged in this research, which were: 'Free Marketplace of News', 'Parasocial Interaction & Surveillance', 'Discussions & Judgments', and 'Trustworthy Source'. The results of the analysis are summarised in table 7.1.

**Table 7.1 Factor Analysis of News Motivational by Consumers in GCC Countries**

News Motivations	Factors				
	Mean	1	2	3	4
<b>Factor 1: Free Marketplace of News</b>	<b>4.53</b>				
It shows the reality of Arab politics	4.55	.856			
It covers news about Arab leaders	4.59	.850			
Free to discuss any political issue	4.41	.760			
It gives views the chance to exist	4.52	.697			
Uncensored information	4.49	.597			
It keeps me up-to-date with news	4.69	.440			
<b>Factor 2: Parasocial Interaction &amp; Surveillance</b>	<b>4.18</b>				
I enjoy watching their news reporters	4.46		.727		
I enjoy its news anchors	3.55		.703		
It provides good visual coverage	4.61		.628		
I compare my own ideas with commentators	3.98		.616		
It's exciting and thrilling	4.02		.492		
It presents news events and in-depth analysis	4.50		.469		
<b>Factor 3: Discussions &amp; Judgments</b>	<b>4.28</b>				
I use its discussions of issues	4.20			.794	
Make up my mind about issues	4.31			.785	
It helps me judge Arab governments	4.35			.674	
<b>Factor 4: Trustworthy Source</b>	<b>4.85</b>				
It is a credible source	4.88				.841
It provides me with information	4.82				.825
Eigenvalue		6.21	1.68	1.32	1.18
Total Percentage of Variance		21.2	15.7	13.06	11.25

Principal component analysis Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization; KMO=0.89; Bartlett's Test of Sphericity,  $P < 0.001$ . N=1752 Alpha valid 1599- Cronbach's alpha (.879)

In terms of average level of participants' motivation, the results indicated that there were similar results in terms of relative popularity of different types of motivation for viewing news across each of the three countries. The motivation items 'It keeps me up-to-date with news', 'It is a credible source', 'It keeps me informed', and 'It provides good visual coverage of news events' were most highly rated by audiences. Furthermore, the items related to Arab political: 'It covers news Arab governments try to hide', 'It shows the reality of Arab politics', and 'It helps me judge Arab governments', were also highly rated by audiences in all of the three countries. Finally, parasocial interaction became the last source of motivation rated by audiences in the Arab Gulf States, with the items 'It has the best news reporters', 'I use its discussions of issues', 'I compare my own ideas to what the commentators say', 'I enjoy its news

anchors'. Table 7.2 shows the percentages of participants in each national sub-sample that endorsed each composite item of these factor variables.

The findings here were consistent with several previous studies into Arab media, which examined media-related motivations and measured gratifications among Arab audiences. Marghalani et al. (1998) applied a gratifications scale in their study to examine the adoption of Direct Broadcasting Satellite (DBS) in Saudi Arabia. Their findings showed motivations factors such as: free marketplace of information, political, economical, religious forces and cultural, had driven the majority of audiences in Saudi Arabia to adopt satellite channels.

Abdel Rahman (1998) conducted a study to detect viewers' gratifications associated with use of satellite television in Egypt. She showed that nearly nine out of ten (89%) of the total sample reported that they watch satellite television to understand what is going on in the world, over eight in ten (81%) said they watched satellite television to learn things happening in the world, and slightly smaller proportions claimed to watch news to obtain useful information for daily life (79%), to observe foreign cultures and traditions (79%), and to obtain information about foreign lifestyles (76%).

Yousef (1999) investigated audience motivations in Kuwait and found that audiences were motivated to use television for habit, companionship, relaxation, entertainment, information seeking, social interaction, escape, and passing time (Yousef, 1999).

Al-Shaqsi (2000) applied the uses and gratifications model to examine the uses of satellite channels. The finding of his study showed that audiences watch satellite television stations to satisfy their goal-directed needs. Other researchers found that viewers in the Arab world, particularly in Saudi Arabia used television for different

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motivations such as surveillance, diversion, relaxation, companionship, passing time, and social utility (Abouzinada, 1988; Al-Amoudi, 1990; Al-Attibi, 1986; Al-Heezan, 1993; Al-Oofy, 1990; Merdad, 1993).

The findings of this study are similar to previous studies which indicated that information seeking, discussing Arabic political issues, parasocial interaction, social interaction, and surveillance were strong motivations to watch Arabic TV channels (Marghalani et al. 1998; Yousef, 1999; Al-Attibi, 1986; Al-Oofy, 1990; Al-Heezan, 1993; Al-Shaqsi, 2000; Jamal & Melkote, 2008).

**Table 7.2 Endorsement of News Motivational Attributes in GCC Countries**

News Motivations	Saudi %	Bahrain %	Qatar %
1. It provides me with information	99.4%	98.0%	99.1%
2. It is a credible source	99.0%	97.3%	98.3%
3. It keeps me informed	98.2%	95.1%	97.2%
4. It provides good visual coverage	94.6%	94.3%	94.0%
5. It covers news Arab governments try to hide	90.4%	90.2%	90.2%
6. It shows the reality of Arab politics	90.6%	88.4%	88.9%
7. It gives views the chance to exist.	90.6%	89.1%	91.7%
8. It presents in-depth analysis of news events	91.7%	86.7%	92.8%
9. Uncensored information	86.3%	87.4%	90.3%
10. It has the best news reporters	89.1%	87.5%	87.7%
11. Free to discuss any political issue	85.5%	85.1%	84.4%
12. It helps me judge Arab governments	86.8%	83.8%	86.7%
13. Helps me make up my mind about the issues	82.9%	82.1%	83.6%
14. I use its discussions of issues	82.1%	75.3%	83.9%
15. It discusses issues in exciting and thrilling ways	73.2%	70.6%	68.3%
16. I compare my own ideas to those of the commentators	71.4%	68.5%	74.6%
17. I enjoy its news anchors	53.0%	47.1%	53.0%

### 7.4 The Relationships between Motivation and Different News Services

Further analysis was conducted to explore if there were relationships between measures of motivation and claimed use of different news media services. A series of pair-wise Pearson correlation analyses were run between the four motivations factor variables and claimed use of different news services which included: 'Local & National TV channels', 'Arabic News TV', 'Non-Arabic news TV', 'Radio', 'Newspapers', 'Internet', and 'Magazines'. These analyses were run separately for each national survey sample for Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar.

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In Saudi Arabia, there were just three significant correlation coefficients between factor one, 'Free Marketplace of News', and claimed less use of 'Local and National TV channels' ( $r = -.12, p < 0.01$ ); between factor two 'Parasocial Interaction & Surveillance' and claimed greater use of 'Arabic TV news' ( $r = .16, p < 0.01, 2$ ); and between factor three 'Discussion & Judgments' and claimed larger use of news on the 'Internet' ( $r = .13, p < 0.01$ ).

In Bahrain, there were just six significant correlation coefficients between factor one, 'Free Marketplace of News', and claimed larger use of 'Arabic News TV' ( $r = .14, p < 0.01$ ); between factor two 'Parasocial Interaction & Surveillance' and claimed greater use of 'Arabic TV news' ( $r = .24, p < 0.00$ ), less use of 'Local & National TV channels' ( $r = .11, p < 0.01$ ), and less use of 'Radio' ( $r = .09, p < 0.05$ ); and between factor three 'Discussion & Judgments' and claimed less use of news on the 'Magazines' ( $r = .11, p < 0.01$ ) and 'Newspapers' ( $r = .10, p < 0.01$ ).

In Qatar there were also six significant correlation coefficients that emerged between factor one, 'Free Marketplace of News', and claimed larger use of 'Arabic News TV' ( $r = .20, p < 0.01$ ), and less use of 'local and national TV channels' ( $r = -.15, p < 0.01$ ); between factor two 'Parasocial Interaction & Surveillance' and claimed larger use of 'Arabic News TV' ( $r = .10, p < 0.05$ ); between factor three 'Discussion & Judgments' and claimed larger use of news on the 'Arabic News TV' ( $r = .09, p < 0.05$ ); and between factor four, 'Trustworthy Source', and claimed large use of news on the 'Internet' ( $r = .12, p < 0.01$ ), and less use of news in 'Radio' ( $r = -.10, p < 0.05$ ).

### **7.5 Motivation Differences between News TV Channels**

The study conducted advanced analysis to draw comparisons between different TV news services in respect of the motives participants claimed to have for watching them. These comparisons were made with each of the national sub-samples from Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

The motivations from Al-Jazeera and from the BBC Arabic News TV service were compared using analyses of variance with Bonferonni tests. Comparisons involving other news channels, 'Al-Arabiya TV', 'France 24 (Arabic) TV' and 'Al-Hurra TV', were not made because national base sizes for these services were too small. Each motivation item was endorsed in terms of participants stating how much they agree or disagreed that it represented a characteristic of that news service. The results are summarized in table 7.3.

In Saudi Arabia the first motivation item was 'It provides me with information' and was highly associated with Al-Jazeera TV ( $M = 4.79$ ) compared to BBC Arabic TV ( $M = 3.56$ ). The second motivation item was 'It gives views the chance to exist' and was also more highly associated with Al-Jazeera TV ( $M = 4.60$ ) than BBC Arabic TV ( $M = 3.30$ ). The third motivation item was 'It provides good visual coverage of news events' and this was largely more associated with Al-Jazeera TV ( $M = 4.58$ ) compared to BBC Arabic TV ( $M = 3.35$ ). The fourth motivation item was 'It is a credible source' and this was also associated more with Al-Jazeera TV ( $M = 4.57$ ) than BBC Arabic TV ( $M = 3.35$ ).

In Bahrain the first motivation item was 'It shows the reality of Arab politics' and this was highly associated with Al-Jazeera TV ( $M = 4.65$ ) compared to BBC Arabic TV ( $M = 3.56$ ). The second motivation item was 'It provides me with information' and this was also associated more with Al-Jazeera TV ( $M = 4.58$ ) than BBC Arabic TV ( $M = 3.79$ ). The third motivation item was 'It is a credible source', which was associated

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more with Al-Jazeera TV (M = 4.53) compared to BBC Arabic TV (M = 3.61). The fourth motivation item was ‘It keeps me informed with current issues’ and this was also largely associated with Al-Jazeera TV (M = 4.53) rather than BBC Arabic TV (M = 3.81).

In Qatar the first motivation item was ‘It provides me with information’ and this was more highly associated with Al-Jazeera TV (M = 4.53) compared to BBC Arabic TV (M = 3.81). The second motivation item was ‘It keeps me informed with current issues’, which was also associated more with Al-Jazeera TV (M = 4.52) than BBC Arabic TV (M = 3.78). The third motivation item was ‘It provides good visual coverage of news events’ and this was largely associated with Al-Jazeera TV (M = 4.46) compared to BBC Arabic TV (M = 3.65). The fourth motivation item was ‘It is a credible source’, which was also largely associated with Al-Jazeera TV (M = 4.41) rather than to BBC Arabic TV (M = 3.62).

**Table 7.3 Motivation Items Associated with Arabic News TV Channels**

News TV Channels Motivation	Saudi			Bahrain			Qatar		
	AJE	BBC	F-value	AJE	BBC	F-value	AJE	BBC	F-value
It is a credible source	4.57	3.35	83.76***	4.53	3.61	72.88***	4.41	3.62	22.37***
It shows the reality of Arab politics	4.39	3.10	83.88***	4.65	3.56	36.37***	4.10	3.30	19.55***
Free to discuss any political issue	4.33	3.31	65.40***	4.19	3.56	24.31***	4.03	3.42	7.176**
It covers news about Arab leaders.	4.44	3.15	105.73***	4.20	3.51	43.44***	4.25	3.24	59.86***
It gives views the chance to exist.	4.60	3.30	84.35***	4.35	3.59	44.78***	4.23	3.46	28.87***
Uncensored information	4.34	3.25	74.28***	4.17	3.56	26.65***	4.14	3.41	29.20***
It keeps me informed with current issues	4.21	3.43	126.00***	4.53	3.81	65.90***	4.52	3.78	58.32***
I enjoy watching their news reporters.	4.54	3.14	115.93***	4.45	3.44	88.51***	4.36	3.38	66.80***
It provides good visual coverage	4.58	3.35	107.25***	4.50	3.63	87.08***	4.46	3.65	56.43***
I enjoy its news anchors.	4.08	3.04	69.11***	4.01	3.22	62.06***	3.77	3.26	10.06**
I compare my own ideas	4.18	3.25	67.76***	4.06	3.48	34.94***	4.07	3.44	42.63***
News events and in-depth analysis.	4.55	3.29	109.76***	4.46	3.54	80.54***	4.36	3.40	68.71***
It's exciting and thrilling.	4.55	3.22	57.33***	4.03	3.46	25.82***	3.90	3.38	17.54***
I use its discussions of issues	4.31	3.20	77.03***	4.20	3.39	62.01***	4.04	3.26	30.94***
Make up my mind about issues	4.34	3.18	108.4***	4.25	3.39	61.71***	4.12	3.33	22.58***
It helps me judge Arab governments	4.38	3.12	107.5***	4.24	3.36	77.58***	4.17	3.25	50.07***
It provides me with information	4.65	3.56	83.55***	4.58	3.79	43.31***	4.53	3.81	30.72***

Note: Means with common superscripts differ significantly at the .05 level. Scores ranged from 1 to 5.

\* =  $P < 0.05$ , \*\* =  $P < 0.01$  and \*\*\* =  $P < 0.001$ . ns = Not Significant

1= Al-Jazeera TV (Saudi- n=595, Bahrain- n=520, Qatar- n=513), 2= BBC (Saudi- n=161, Bahrain- n=174, Qatar- n=183)

The findings here were consistent with previous studies such as Johnson and Fahmy 2008 and Jamal and Melkote (2008), which showed that audiences watched Arabic news TV channels like Al-Jazeera because it provided them with information they needed and showed the kind of job Arab government agencies do, they were free to discuss any political issue, it gave different views the chance to exist and because it is a credible source of news.

### **7.6 Demographic Differences in News Motivations**

This section examines demographic differences in the motivations associated with specific news services in each of the three sampled GCC countries. A paired sample t-test and one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) were carried out to determine whether there were significant differences between motivations of Arabic News TV Channels and demographic variables.

Several studies attempted to explore motivations and demographic differences associated with specific Arabic media services. The study by Basher (1987) which investigated the television viewing behaviour of Qatar University students showed that there were significant differences between male and female students with respect to their cognitive and affective needs. The study also showed that there was a significant difference among age groups. However, the study showed there were no significant differences among students with different academic majors and academic achievements. Abduljaleel (1994) investigated the impact of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait upon the communication and media consumption habits. The findings pointed out that that crisis situations seem to level out former usage differences associated with gender, age, and education.

The research findings showed several significant demographic factors associated with motivations of Arabic news TV services, such as Al-Jazeera and the BBC Arabic

News TV Channel. The significant differences in demographic characteristics were associated with gender, age, annual income and political orientation.

### **7.6.1 Gender Group Differences**

The outcomes of the study samples revealed that there were a number of significant motivation differences associated with gender for Al-Jazeera and BBC Arabic News in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, whereas there were no significant gender differences found among the audiences in Qatar.

In Saudi Arabia, females ( $M=2.29$ ), were more motivated than males ( $M=1.96$ ) to watch Al-Jazeera because it was a 'Free Marketplace of News' (t test:  $t(416) = -3.287$ ,  $p < .01$ , 2-tailed). However, males ( $M=4.46$ ), were considerably more motivated than females ( $M=4.16$ ), to view Al-Jazeera news for 'Parasocial Interaction & Surveillance' (t test:  $t(570) = 4.556$ ,  $p < .00$ , 2-tailed). Males ( $M=4.47$ ), also were more motivated than females ( $M=4.11$ ), to watch Al-Jazeera news for 'Discussion & Judgments' (t test:  $t(584) = 4.538$ ,  $p < .00$ , 2-tailed). Moreover, males ( $M=4.74$ ), were more motivated than females ( $M=4.38$ ) to watch Al-Jazeera news because it was a 'Trustworthy source', (t test:  $t(597) = 5.252$ ,  $p < .00$ , 2-tailed). In contrast, the only significant gender differences obtained for the viewing of the BBC Arabic News TV Channel by Saudi Arabia consumers emerged with the gratifications factor 'Discussion & Judgments'. The outcomes showed that females ( $M=3.43$ ), were more motivated than males ( $M=3.02$ ), to watch BBC Arabic News for 'Discussion & Judgments' (t test:  $t(153) = 2.140$ ,  $p < .05$ , 2-tailed).

In Bahrain, significant gender differences only emerged with Al-Jazeera news TV. The finding revealed that females in Bahrain ( $M=2.67$ ), as well as Saudi Arabian females, were slightly more motivated than males ( $M=2.26$ ), to watch Al-Jazeera because it is a 'Free Marketplace of News' (t test:  $t(359) = -2.035$ ,  $p < .05$ , 2-tailed). On

the other hand, males ( $M=4.27$ ), were more motivated than females ( $M=4.06$ ), to watch Al-Jazeera news for 'Parasocial Interaction & Surveillance' (t test:  $t(435) = 1.861$ ,  $p < .05$ , 2-tailed).

### 7.6.2 Age Group Differences

In respect of age, the study carried out a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to investigate differences between the three GCC countries in terms of participants' motivations for following Arabic News TV Channels. The data revealed that the significant differences with gratification measures only emerged with viewers in Saudi Arabia watching Al-Jazeera, and with viewers in Qatar viewing the BBC Arabic News TV Channel; there were no significant differences found in Bahrain.

In Saudi Arabia, older news consumers ( $M=2.38$ ) were more motivated to watch Al-Jazeera because it was a 'Free Marketplace of News' than were younger age participants ( $M=2.17$ ) or mature age news consumers ( $M=1.82$ ), with a significant One-Way ANOVA test (ANOVA:  $F(2,417) = 5.635$ ,  $p < .05$ ).

In Qatar, the results showed that older news audiences ( $M=3.69$ ) were more motivated to watch BBC Arabic News TV Channel because it was a 'Free Marketplace of News' than younger age participants ( $M=3.58$ ) or mature age news consumers ( $M=3.20$ ), with a significant One-Way ANOVA test (ANOVA:  $F(2,166) = 2.997$ ,  $p < .05$ ). Furthermore, older age participants ( $M=4.00$ ) also were likely to be motivated to watch BBC Arabic News TV Channel because it was a 'Trustworthy source' than were younger ( $M=3.48$ ) or mature news consumers ( $M=3.47$ ), (ANOVA:  $F(2,180) = 3.071$ ,  $p < .05$ ).

### 7.6.3 Annual Income Differences

In relation to annual income differences and reported watching of Arabic News TV Channels, the results showed significant differences only for claimed watching of Al-

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Jazeera in Bahrain. News consumers in Bahrain who had low incomes ( $M=4.29$ ), were more slightly motivated to watch Al-Jazeera for ‘Parasocial Interaction & Surveillance’, than by those who had medium incomes ( $M=4.16$ ), or high level annual incomes ( $M=3.97$ ), (ANOVA:  $F= (2,496) = 3.383$ ,  $p <.05$ ). Moreover, consumers having low level incomes ( $M=4.60$ ), were more likely to say they were motivated to watch Al-Jazeera because it was a ‘Trustworthy source’, than by those having medium incomes ( $M=4.41$ ), or those who had high level annual incomes ( $M=4.38$ ), (ANOVA:  $F= (2,597) = 4.108$ ,  $p <.05$ ).

### 7.6.4 Political Orientation Differences

There were few significant differences in motivations to watch different TV news sources associated with political orientation. In Saudi Arabia, liberals ( $M= 4.53$ ,  $4.52$  and  $4.79$  respectively) were more likely motivated to watch Al-Jazeera for ‘Parasocial Interaction & Surveillance’, (ANOVA:  $F= (2,571) = 6.231$ ,  $p <.05$ ), ‘Discussion & Judgments’, (ANOVA:  $F= (2,590) = 6.034$ ,  $p <.05$ ), and because it was a ‘Trustworthy source’, (ANOVA:  $F= (2,598) = 7.243$ ,  $p <.05$ ), compared with those were reported conservatives ( $M=4.41$ ,  $4.42$ , and  $4.62$  respectively), or those who reported being neutral ( $M=4.24$ ,  $4.20$ , and  $4.54$  respectively).

The news consumers in Bahrain who identified themselves as liberals ( $M= 2.61$ , and  $4.67$  respectively), were more likely motivated to watch Al-Jazeera for ‘Free Marketplace of News’ (ANOVA:  $F= (2,360) = 3.385$ ,  $p <.05$ ), and because it was a ‘Trustworthy source’, (ANOVA:  $F= (2,517) = 3.339$ ,  $p <.05$ ), than those who considered themselves neutrals ( $M=2.24$ , and  $4.50$  respectively) or conservatives ( $M=2.21$ , and  $4.57$  respectively).

In contrast with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, the outcomes in the ideologies categories indicated that in Qatar, conservative news consumers ( $M=4.26$ ,  $4.35$ , and

4.67 respectively) were more slightly motivated to watch Al-Jazeera for ‘Parasocial Interaction & Surveillance’, (ANOVA:  $F= (2,484) = 3.250$ ,  $p <.05$ ), ‘Discussion & Judgments’, (ANOVA:  $F= (2,498) = 9.153$ ,  $p <.00$ ), and because it was a ‘Trustworthy source’ (ANOVA:  $F= (2,510) = 7.728$ ,  $p <.05$ ) than those who considered themselves neutrals ( $M=4.12$ ,  $4.04$ , and  $4.40$  respectively) or conservative consumers ( $M=3.98$ ,  $3.83$ , and  $4.28$  respectively).

These findings suggested that across the three Arab Gulf states region, males were generally more motivated than females to watch Al-Jazeera for ‘Parasocial Interaction & Surveillance’, ‘Discussion & Judgments’, and because it was a ‘Trustworthy source’, while females were more motivated than males to watch Al-Jazeera and BBC News TV because they were ‘Free Marketplaces of News’. Moreover, older and younger audiences were more motivated to watch Al-Jazeera and BBC News TV because they were ‘Free Marketplaces of News’. The news consumers who had low incomes and medium incomes were slightly more motivated to watch Al-Jazeera for ‘Parasocial Interaction & Surveillance’, and because it was a ‘Trustworthy source’. Finally, the news viewers who identified themselves as liberals were more motivated to watch Al-Jazeera for ‘Parasocial Interaction & Surveillance’, its ‘Discussion & Judgments’ and because it was a ‘Trustworthy source’.

The results of the study concurred with a number of earlier studies that examined the demographic profile of Arab audiences, which indicated that there were significant differences between gender, age, and political orientation, with respect of their motivations and gratifications. The findings were similar to Bachers (1987) and Abduljaleel (1994), who indicated significant differences between males and females and among different age groups. Moreover, the study supported the findings of Jamal and Melkote (2008), which showed that audiences, particularly males, those with a

higher education, and older individuals were more likely to watch Arabic news TV channels such as Al-Jazeera for opinion leadership and surveillance-related gratifications.

### **7.7 Motivation Predictors of Viewing News TV Channels**

Further multivariate analyses were computed to explore whether specific motivation variables predicted the reported frequency Arabic news TV channel viewing. In stepwise multiple regression analysis, four sets of variables were entered as predictor variables and regressed against claimed viewing of these two pan-Arab TV services. Separate regression analyses were computed for each national sample – Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

Stepwise multiple regressions were applied in this study to find the relationship between one predicted (dependent) variable and a selection of predictor variables (Brace et al., 2009). The stepwise multiple regressions analyses were conducted in several stages. First, one block of predictor variables comprised questions asked about the frequency with which participants used each of eight different news sources: local TV channels, Arabic news satellite TV channels (e.g., Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya), non-Arabic satellite TV news services (e.g., CNN and BBC, International), the Internet, radio, newspapers, magazines and mobile devices.

Second, the frequency with which participants said they watched the news on local TV channels (Saudi Arabia TV, Kuwait TV, Bahrain TV, Qatar TV, UAE TV, Oman TV), Arabic satellite TV news channels (Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, BBC (Arabic), Al-Hurra, and France 24), and non-Arabic TV channels (CNN, BBC word News, Euro News) represented another block of predictor variables.

Third, motivation variables were also entered as potential predictor factors. Here, free marketplace of information items were: ‘it provides me with uncensored

information', 'the channel is free to discuss any political issue', 'it shows the real work of Arab political rulers and governments, including their misconduct', and 'it gives different political points of view the chance to exist'.

Fourth, surveillance subsumed three items: 'it keeps me informed about current issues and events', 'it discusses issues and presents news in exciting and thrilling ways', and 'it presents news events with thorough and in-depth analysis'. Fifth, parasocial interaction comprised four items: 'I enjoy watching their news anchors', 'it has the best news reporters', 'I watch its news to compare my own ideas to what the commentators say', and 'it provides good visual coverage of news events'. Participants to each item were provided along a five-point scale: agree strongly (5), agree (4), no opinion (3), disagree (2), and disagree strongly (1). In the last stage, demographic variables were entered as potential predictor factors. Personal details questions asked participants to report on their age, gender, highest level of education, gross annual household income, and political orientation.

All six regression analyses yielded statistically significant predictor models for claimed viewing of Al-Jazeera and BBC (Arabic) for the samples from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar. The results of this analysis are summarised in table 7.4, below.

### **7.7.1 Motivation Predictors of Viewing Al-Jazeera**

Claimed viewing of Al-Jazeera was predicted in Saudi Arabia by claimed viewing of pan-Arab TV news channels in general (beta = .21,  $p < 0.001$ ), the importance of covering the Israel-Palestine conflict (beta = .17,  $p < 0.01$ ) and any conflicts between Arab nations (beta = .13,  $p < 0.01$ ), the importance of news source credibility (beta = .17,  $p < .01$ ), less frequent reading of magazines (beta = -.15,  $p < 0.01$ ), and claimed viewing of Al-Arabiya (beta = .11,  $p < 0.01$ ).

In Bahrain, claimed viewing of Al-Jazeera was predicted by greater general watching of pan-Arab TV news channels ( $\beta = .54, p < 0.001$ ), the importance of news services as providers of up-to-date information ( $\beta = .19, p < 0.001$ ), and the importance attached to news services providing coverage of politics in the Arab world ( $\beta = .11, p < 0.05$ ).

In Qatar, claimed watching of Al-Jazeera was predicted by greater general watching of pan-Arab TV news channels ( $\beta = .54, p < 0.001$ ), the importance of up-to-date information ( $\beta = .13, p < 0.05$ ), the importance of coverage of politics in the Arab world ( $\beta = .13, p < 0.05$ ), and the importance of credible news sources ( $\beta = .12, p < 0.05$ ).

### **7.7.2 Motivation Predictors of Viewing BBC (Arabic)**

Claimed viewing of BBC (Arabic) was predicted in Saudi Arabia by five variables: the importance attached to coverage of events in own country ( $\beta = .32, p < 0.01$ ), rejection of news as entertainment ( $\beta = -.25, p < 0.01$ ), claimed viewing of Al-Arabiya ( $\beta = .24, p < 0.01$ ), claimed viewing of France 24 (Arabic) ( $\beta = .24, p < 0.01$ ), and the importance attached to showing the real work of Arab governments ( $\beta = .21, p < 0.01$ ).

In Bahrain, claimed viewing of BBC (Arabic) was predicted by three variables: claimed viewing of France 24 (Arabic) ( $\beta = .29, p < 0.001$ ), the importance of news services that help viewers to judge Arab governments ( $\beta = .20, p < 0.05$ ), and the importance of receiving coverage of worldwide politics and current events ( $\beta = .20, p < 0.05$ ).

In Qatar, reported watching of BBC (Arabic) was predicted by three variables: the importance attached to good visual coverage of events ( $\beta = .27, p < 0.01$ ), greater viewing of non-Arab news TV channels ( $\beta = .26, p < 0.01$ ), and greater viewing of Al-Arabiya ( $\beta = .25, p < 0.05$ ).

**Table 7.4 Motivation Predictors of Viewing News TV Channels**

Model	Saudi		Bahrain		Qatar	
	AJE	BBC	AJE	BBC	AJE	BBC
Provides me with information			.19***		.13*	
Credible source of news	.17**				.12*	
Shows the real work of Arab Leaders		.21*				
Helps me judge Arab governments.				.20*		
Provides good visual coverage						.27**
Politics in Arab world			.11*		.13**	
Israel/Palestine Conflict	.17**					
Arab-Arab Conflict	.13**					
Current events in your country		.32**				
World-wide politics and current events				.20*		
Entertainment		-.25*				
Arabic News Satellite TV channels	.21***		.54***		.54***	
None-Arabic News Satellite TV channels						.26**
BBC Arabic News TV channels						
Al-Arabiya News TV channels	.11**	.24**				.25**
France 24 (Arabic) channels		.24**		.29***		
Magazines	-.15**					
Annual Household Income						
Variance explained (adjusted R2)	.24	.32	.45	.24	.56	.28
R2	.26	.35	.46	.26	.57	.30

Stepwise regression, beta scores \* $P < .05$ , \*\* $P < .01$ , \*\*\* $P < .001$ .

Note: Scores for news question were collapsed and reversed to 4= daily and 1= Never.

- The positive scores in the table indicated more consumption/use of these channels, while negative scores indicated less frequent use of these channels

The findings of the study were similar to the study conducted by Jamal and Melkote (2008) which predicted that participants who tended to spend a lot of time watching Arabic news TV channels such as Al-Jazeera were very interested in politics, news information services, and discussed more civil problems with other people.

## 7.8 Summary and Discussion

Given the growing number of Arabic news TV channels and audience use of news channels to keep up with news and information, the primary goal of this chapter was to examine the motivations of following the news and watching Arabic news TV services, and how certain motivations related with specific usage of news beside demographic variables. The findings of the study attempted to answer the research questions set out at the beginning of the chapter that investigated the motivations of Arab viewers for

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watching Arabic news satellite TV services, the relationships between news motives, demographic characteristics, and different news services, particularly Arabic TV news channels, and which factors predicted the motivations of watching the Arabic TV channels.

The findings showed that four factors for viewing news media emerged in this research, which were 'Free Marketplace of News', 'Parasocial Interaction & Surveillance', 'Discussions & Judgments', and 'Trustworthy Source'. Overall, certain motivations were found to be related with specific usage of Arabic news satellite TV channels: Al-Jazeera TV, and BBC Arabic News TV, beside the demographic variables of gender, age, annual income and ideology. Previous studies that have sought to explore media motivations among audiences in Arab world indicated similar results (Marghalani et al., 1998; Al-Amoudi, 1990; Al-Attibi, 1986; Al-Heezan, 1993; Yousef, 1999; Al-Shaqsi, 2000; Jamal & Melkote, 2008; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008, 2010).

The findings of the present study showed that while overall news motivation profiles did not differ greatly between these countries, motivations variables were associated with or predictive of news consumption patterns in different ways among participants from these countries. Arab news consumers value news services that provide open political discussion and challenge or at least ask searching questions about government policies and performance (Jamal & Melkote, 2008). They seek well-presented and thorough analysis of events and issues. They also widely value news that can provide information they can utilize to develop better informed opinions about their governments and important issues of the day. They also seek up-to-date and credible news (Auter et al., 2004, 2005; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008, 2010).

Participants from all three countries indicated that attaching importance to the free flow of political ideas, well-presented news, and access to information to help

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formulate well-rounded opinions about current issues leads them to turn to pan-Arab TV news services rather than local and national (government controlled) TV news (Al-Shaqsi, 2000, Elareshi and Gunter, 2010). Despite the widespread popularity of the Internet as a news source, this was used more often only by participants in Saudi Arabia who sought information to help them judge governments and to take decisions on important issues, or by participants in Qatar for whom news trustworthiness was important. The study conducted by Jamal and Melkote (2008), which investigated audiences in Kuwait (an Arab Gulf country), showed that Arab audiences who live in conservative societies can listen to secular explanations on issues and discuss various political issues after turning to pan-Arab TV news channels.

What is apparent from the regression analyses is that viewing of Al-Jazeera and BBC (Arabic) channels was associated in all three countries with a tendency to watch other non-local Arab and non-Arab TV news services (Johnson & Fahmy, 2008). News interests were also linked to watching these channels, but these were primary drivers of viewing Al-Jazeera only in Saudi Arabia among participants who sought good quality information about the Israel-Palestine conflict and Arab-Arab conflicts. It is interesting to note that seeking quality coverage of current events in their own country led Saudi participants to watch BBC (Arabic) more than Al-Jazeera. This result differed from other studies, and it shows the range of diversity among Arab audiences regarding their motivations for viewing different news channels (Johnson & Fahmy, 2008; Jamal & Melkote, 2008).

News motivations were associated with claimed viewing of Al-Jazeera and BBC (Arabic) in all three countries, but not in the same ways. In Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the importance of new source credibility predicted greater reported viewing of Al-Jazeera, while in Bahrain greater viewing of this channel was linked to the need for up-to-date

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information. Greater viewing of BBC (Arabic) was predicted by needing the news to show the real work of Arab governments among Saudi participants and for the news to help audiences to judge Arab governments in Bahrain. In Qatar, watching more of Al-Jazeera was predicted by the need for good visual coverage of events (Auter et al., 2004, 2005).

The next chapter involves a large-scale examination of Arabic news TV accuracy and the perceptions news audiences have of the credibility of Arabic news services.

## **Chapter 8 Perceptions of News Media Credibility**

### **8.1 Introduction**

One of the main purposes of this study was to examine the perceptions of Arab audiences regarding the quality of the news that is broadcast from Arabic news services. This chapter examines audience perceptions of the credibility and objectivity of the news by applying a measurement scale which drew on factors investigated by earlier studies (Gaziano & McGrath, 1986; Ganahl, 1994; Ohanian, 1991). The data reported in this chapter examined relationships between credibility perceptions applied to news providers by Arab audiences, the demographic characteristics of audience members and reported consumption of news from different suppliers. The chapter investigates the main following questions:

RQ10: What are Arab viewers' perceptions of Arabic news TV channel's credibility?

RQ11: Are certain Arabic news channels more credible than others and how do different audiences perceive them?

RQ12: Are there any significant relationships between perceived credibility and the following of news services in all three Arab countries?

RQ13: Are there any significant differences between perceived credibility and viewing Arabic news TV channels?

RQ14: Are there any significant differences between demographic variables, and perceived credibility of Arabic news channels?

RQ15: Are there any specific variables that predict reported frequencies of viewing the Arabic TV channels as credible news sources?

## **8.2 News Media Credibility**

Credibility has been widely researched in relation to sources of mediated news supply. Earlier studies indicated that credibility plays an important role in media use because audiences tend to rely on the medium that they find provides them with the most accurate information and knowledge (Schweiger, 2000; Choi et al., 2006; Flanagin & Metzger, 2007; Lin, 2008). Credibility has been defined as the attitude toward a speaker held by a listener; however, the concept of credibility within communication research has been mainly studied as an aspect of audiences' attitudes toward mass media sources of information (Hovland and Weiss, 1952; Sargent, 1965; Newhagen & Nass, 1989). Credibility in general refers to the objective and subjective components of the believability of a source or message. However, source credibility refers to the amount of credibility (believability) attributed to a source of information (either a medium or an individual) by the receivers. Some researchers have pointed out that credibility is not an objective property of the source of information, but is in the receiver's perception (Gunther, 1992).

Several studies found that a high credibility source is more effective in causing attitude change than a low credibility source (Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Kelman & Hovland, 1953; Bochner & Insko, 1966). Hovland and Weiss (1951) pointed out that credibility is associated with the trustworthiness and expertise of a source. Trustworthiness has to do with the extent to which people find sources of the message to be reliable or truthful (Sparks & Sparks, 2002). News objectivity, fairness and balance of news stories are important elements in studying the objectivity of news. Audiences who seek credible information will pursue the medium that is trustworthy because it will provide correct information, up-to-date news, all sides of the story, limited opinion, and in-depth and detailed information (Ganahl, 1994). Credibility is an important issue to study because the public's inability to believe the news media

severely hinders a nation's ability to inform the public; it is also important due to the credibility "monitor leaders and to govern" (Gaziano, 1988, p. 267). Furthermore, decreased credibility can also lead to diminished freedom of the press and undermine the economic stability of the media (Gaziano, 1988).

### **8.3 Measures of Arabic News Media Credibility**

Westley and Severins (1964) pointed out that people see credibility according to their own criteria, such as understanding of the news source, established perception, bias, or first-sight impressions. They also judge news credibility by whether messages are being presented completely and if the background or supplementary information is sufficient (Westley and Severins, 1964). The conceptualization and measurement of media credibility has been a continuing concern of credibility research for 50 years (West, 1994). However, the majority of media studies have applied the credibility measurement scale devised by Gaziano and McGrath (1986), which is therefore considered the most popular measurement of media credibility (Kioussis, 2001). This study also utilized the credibility measurement scale to examine the attitude toward Arabic news TV services among Arab Gulf States audiences.

Previous researchers have applied credibility measurement scales to define and examine the perception of the credibility of news in Arab media such as newspapers, radio and television. Al-Makaty et al. (1994) investigated how Saudi Arabians sought and placed credibility in information sources about the Gulf War and showed that all participants relied more heavily on broadcast media than on print media. The study also showed that several audiences felt that the most trustworthy sources of information about the Gulf conflict were broadcasting outlets, particularly those of Western origin such as, the British Broadcasting Corporation World Service, Voice of America, and Radio Monte Carlo Middle East.

A study by Al-Habib (1995) examined the perception of the Arab elite toward national and international radio services in terms of credibility, satisfaction, and censorship. This study also examined the use of national and international radio services in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, these included: Voice of America (VOA), the British Broadcasting Corporation World Service (BBC), and Radio Monte Carlo Middle East (RMC). The study pointed out that the Jordanian elite were more exposed to the national radio service and perceived as more credible than did the Saudi elite. However, the Saudi elite perceived BBC, VOA, and RMC respectively as more credible and satisfactory than the Jordanian elite

A study conducted by Albuloushi (2000) examined media advertising credibility in Kuwait. The results indicated that there was a strong relationship between credibility dimensions and advertising functions. Moreover, a study by Abdulla et al. (2002) which analysed the components of credibility of US news from newspapers, television, and online sites, revealed that participants evaluated newspaper and television news credibility more similarly than they did online news credibility. The study also found that participants judged all three news media most positively in terms of being current, up-to-date, and timely, and most negatively in terms of bias and completeness. The study also showed that Television news credibility was found to have two components that were based on fairness and currency.

### **8.4 The Credibility of Arabic News TV Services**

This study tries to explore attitudes concerning the credibility of Arabic news satellite TV channel's held by news consumers in the three GCC countries. The research used the credibility measurement scale which applied by previous studies (Gaziano and McGrath, 1986; Meyer, 1988). The study used 11 dimensions of news credibility to measure the credibility and objectivity of Arabic news TV channels including Al-

## Chapter 8 Perceptions of News Media Credibility

Jazeera TV, Al-Arabiya TV, BBC (Arabic) TV, France 24 (Arabic) TV and Al-Hurra TV. The credibility measurement scale items included: fair, unbiased, tells the whole story, accuracy, respect for privacy, concern for community, respects people's privacy, separation of fact and opinion, trust, does care what the audience thinks and level of training. The study added six more dimensions used by previous studies (Meyer, 1988; Ganahl, 1994; Wanta & Hu, 1994; Ohanian, 1991) which included does not sensationalize the news, moral code, produces news that makes the service profitable, not afraid to give its own opinions about news issues, making the news exciting for people, produces news that is relevant to me, and is up-to-date with latest news developments (See table 8.1).

**Table 8.1 Factor Analysis of Media Credibility by News Consumers in GCC Countries**

News Credibility	Factors				
	Mean	1	2	3	4
<b>Factor 1: Accuracy</b>	<b>3.81</b>				
Accurate	3.87	.684			
Up-to-date with the latest news	3.78	.649			
Separates facts from opinions	3.82	.615			
Can be trusted	3.85	.606			
Tell the whole story	3.83	.598			
Reporters are well trained	3.72	.567			
<b>Factor 2: Public-Oriented</b>	<b>3.52</b>				
Concerned with the community	3.61		.733		
Watches out for your interests	3.28		.711		
Respect people's privacy	3.62		.600		
Care about audience thinks	3.47		.597		
Does not sensationalize the news	3.41		.524		
Has a clear moral code	3.78		.515		
<b>Factor 3: Enthralling</b>	<b>3.21</b>				
Makes news exciting	2.86			.769	
Produces news that is relevant to me	3.43			.593	
News makes the service profitable	2.95			.555	
Not afraid to gives it own opinions about issues	3.62			.463	
<b>Factor 4: Objectivity</b>	<b>3.67</b>				
Unbiased	3.68				.806
Fair to all sides	3.66				.787
Eigenvalue		3.03	2.66	2.20	1.64
Total Percentage of Variance		16.88	14.82	12.27	9.12

Principal component analysis Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization; KMO=0.87; Bartlett's Test of Sphericity,  $p < 0.001$ . N= 1752 Alpha valid 1608- Cronbach's alpha (.834)

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A principal components analysis was applied to the data to identify a series of factor variables that represented credibility constructs associated with news consumption. Factor analysis methods have been used with items for measuring media credibility to reduce the number of variables and to detect structure in the relationships between variables (Brace et al., 2009). The principal components analysis with varimax rotation reduced the 18 items to four orthogonal factors that each had Eigenvalues of more than one and explained 53.10 per cent of the total variance. As can be seen in table 8.1, the four factors emerged from this analysis were: accuracy, which comprised six items; public-oriented, which comprised six items; enthralling, which comprised four items; and Objectivity, which comprised two items.

In terms of average level of participants' credibility, the findings showed that there were similar results among news consumers in the three GCC countries. The credibility items of accurate, can be trusted, tells the whole story, separates facts from opinions, is up-to-date with the latest news, and it has well trained reporters were most highly rated by audiences in the three GCC countries. Table 8.2 shows the percentages of participants in each national sub-sample that endorsed each of the composite items of these factor variables.

The findings supported the results of other studies conducted to measure news services across various countries, which showed that up-to-date news and information, accuracy, trustworthiness, believability, fairness, and expertise were the main credibility factors highly rated by audiences in Arab world (Auter et al., 2004, 2005; Jamal & Melkote, 2008; Johnson and Fahmy, 2008, 2009).

**Table 8.2 Endorsement of News Credibility Attributes in GCC Countries**

<b>News Credibility</b>	<b>Saudi %</b>	<b>Bahrain %</b>	<b>Qatar %</b>
Accurate	99.0%	99.5%	99.3%
Can be trusted	99.0%	98.4%	99.1%
Is up-to-date	99.5%	97.8%	99.4%
Tells the whole story	98.1%	97.8%	98.9%
Separates facts from opinions	98.9%	98.9%	99.4%
Has a clear moral code	98.7%	97.6%	97.4%
Reporters are well trained	97.7%	97.6%	98.0%
Fair	94.5%	94.0%	91.4%
Concerned with the community well-being	94.7%	92.8%	93.3%
Respects people's privacy	92.7%	93.1%	93.5%
Unbiased	91.6%	95.5%	93.1%
Does make the news exciting	90.8%	93.5%	93.6%
News that is relevant to me	89.4%	83.2%	88.9%
Care what the audience thinks	88.9%	87.7%	89.2%
Does not sensationalize	83.8%	86.7%	86.9%
News makes the service profitable	68.4%	64.7%	66.7%
Not afraid to give its own opinions about issues	65.5%	62.7%	61.2%

### **8.5 The Significant Relationships between Credibility and Claimed News Consumption**

Further analyses were conducted to investigate if there were any significant relationships between media credibility and claimed news consumption in order to answer the research question. Pearson correlation measurement was run between the four credibility factor variables and claimed use of different news services which included: 'Local & National TV channels', 'Arabic News TV', 'Non-Arabic news TV', 'Radio', 'Newspapers', 'Internet', and 'Magazines'. These analyses were run separately for each national survey sample for Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar.

Prior studies found that there were relationships between credibility and claimed news consumption. A study by the American Society of Newspaper Editors (1985) indicated that about 50 per cent of Americans who watched television regularly believed it was the most credible news medium, followed by newspapers and magazines or radio. Americans preferred television for local news, compared to newspapers for state news and for national and international news. Newspapers and television scored similarly for "trustworthiness," but television news anchors and reporters both beat their

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newspaper counterparts on “honesty and ethical grounds”. Results from the Pew Research Center (2008), which conducted the largest studies to evaluate credibility of the media in the United States, found out that credibility ratings for the major TV news outlets have remained relatively stable, with CNN rated the most believable TV news source. Approximately half of Americans said they can believe the news broadcast by CNN. Furthermore, the network news magazines were rated slightly better than the networks themselves. With radio, National Public Radio (NPR) got the highest rating for believability. Internet users gave the CNN and ABC News websites high believability ratings.

Mingxin (2006) reported that mass media credibility perception was relatively low and there were relations in credibility perception across media outlets, with newspapers and radio broadcasting being the most credible, followed by TV, and magazines being the most incredible. Armstrong and Collins (2009) reported that there were correlations between interest in news content and credibility for both local newspapers and college newspapers. Their study indicated that exposure to a newspaper was found to be strongly correlated to credibility for that newspaper. Abel and Wirth (1977) found that participants regarded television to be more believable and trustworthy in the presentation of local news. Ryan (1973) showed that newspapers were more believable for news on public affairs and science, while television was seen as more believable for news on student protests.

The findings here showed significant relations associated between credibility factors and claimed news consumption among audiences across all three countries. In Saudi Arabia, there were six significant correlation coefficients between factor one ‘Accuracy’ and claimed just the right amount use of ‘Arabic News TV’ ( $r = .09$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ); between factor two ‘Public-Oriented’ and claimed large use of ‘Magazines’ ( $r$

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=.13,  $p < 0.05$ ); between factor three 'Enthralling' and claimed greater use of 'Arabic News TV' ( $r = .12$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ); and claimed just the right amount use of 'Radio' ( $r = .09$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ); and claimed less use of 'Non-Arabic News TV' ( $r = -.11$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ); and finally between factor four 'Objectivity' and claimed just the right amount use of 'Internet' ( $r = .09$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ).

In Bahrain there were seven significant correlation coefficients between factor one 'Accuracy' and claimed just the right amount use of 'Arabic News TV' ( $r = .11$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ); between factor two 'Public-Oriented' and claimed less use of 'Arabic News TV' ( $r = -.10$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ); and 'Non-Arabic News TV' ( $r = -.14$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ); between factor three 'Enthralling' and claimed greater use of 'Arabic News TV' ( $r = -.14$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ); and claimed just the right amount use of 'Magazines' ( $r = .12$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ); and claimed less use of 'Internet' ( $r = .08$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ); and between factor four 'Objectivity' and claimed just the right amount use of 'Newspapers' ( $r = .10$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ).

In Qatar there were four significant correlation coefficients between factor one 'Accuracy' and claimed large use of 'Internet' ( $r = .12$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ); and claimed less use of 'Local & National TV' ( $r = -.10$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ); between factor three 'Enthralling' and claimed just the right amount use of 'Arabic News TV' ( $r = .11$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ); and between factor four 'Objectivity' and claimed large use of 'Newspapers' ( $r = .12$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ).

The findings of the study are consistent with other studies that pointed out that credibility is highly associated with 'Arabic News TV' compared to other media outlets. Several studies found that even though credibility ratings of all media have declined over time, television has frequently been named as the most credible medium (Finberg & Stone, 2002). Arabic news TV services were highly rated as credible sources of information (El-Nawawy, 2003; Auter et al., 2004; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008).

### **8.6 Credibility Differences between Arabic News TV channels**

The study conducted further analyses to make comparisons between different TV news services in respect of the credibility participants claimed to have for watching them. These comparisons were made with each of the national sub-samples from Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The Bonferroni tests were used to compare perceived credibility of Al-Jazeera and the BBC Arabic News TV service. Comparisons involving the other news channels (Al-Arabiya TV, France 24 (Arabic) TV and Al-Hurra TV) were not made because national base sizes for these services were too small. Each credibility item was endorsed in terms of the participants stating how much they agree or disagreed that it represented a characteristic of that news service. However, the credibility item 'watches out for your interests' was not used because it was not answered by the participants.

Rampal and Adams (1990) conducted a study to examine the credibility of Asian news broadcasts of the Voice of America and the British Broadcasting Corporation. The findings demonstrated that the news services of the VOA and the BBC were considered credible sources by participants. The study found that the two stations ranked as equal in terms of the perceived quality of their news broadcasts. There was no significant difference between the two broadcasting services on the credibility variables. Even though both the VOA and the BBC tended to give relatively more treatment to issues of interest to their respective countries, the difference was not statistically significant.

Previous studies that were conducted in the Arab world showed that Al-Jazeera news credibility was rated higher than the BBC, CNN and local Arab media (Johnson & Fahmy, 2009). Al-Jazeera news was seen as credible, fair, balanced and objective because it interviewed the public from all sides of an issue (Ayish, 2002; Auter et al., 2004; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008).

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The findings of this study showed that Al-Jazeera news was generally rated higher than BBC Arabic News TV Channel on virtually all items in all three countries. The main exceptions to this pattern were ratings concerning whether the two channels separate facts from opinion and do not sensationalise the news, where in Qatar only, there was no significant difference perceived between the two channels. The results of the analysis are summarized in table 8.3.

The findings showed that Al-Jazeera was rated to be the more credible source and a supplier of objective news services compared with BBC Arabic News TV Channel in the majority of the credibility measurements scale items. Credibility items such as ‘does not sensationalize the news’ and ‘unbiased’ were found to have no significant differences among news consumers in Qatar.

**Table 8.3 Credibility Associated with Arabic News TV Channels**

News TV Channels Gratifications	Saudi			Bahrain			Qatar		
	AJE	BBC	F-value	AJE	BBC	F-value	AJE	BBC	F-value
Is up-to-date	4.75	3.53	92.69***	4.60	3.67	63.21***	4.52	3.78	29.28***
Can be trusted	4.60	3.27	71.99***	4.48	3.28	63.89***	4.25	3.43	17.91***
Gives it own opinions	4.61	3.32	89.01***	4.46	3.60	32.94***	4.32	3.51	28.54***
Accurate	4.54	3.33	68.13***	4.38	3.44	48.18***	4.22	3.61	13.84***
News that is relevant to me	4.54	3.48	101.33***	4.35	3.46	75.17***	4.32	3.70	55.82***
Tell the whole story	4.48	3.17	96.70***	4.27	3.22	42.77***	4.08	3.37	18.34***
Separates facts from opinions	4.46	3.39	60.79***	4.37	3.44	37.32***	4.05	3.59	2.68 <sup>ns</sup>
Has well trained reporters	4.79	3.76	63.54***	4.70	4.10	27.20***	4.58	4.03	15.80***
Has a clear moral code	4.64	3.38	97.59***	4.55	3.56	53.30***	4.40	3.68	29.62***
Not Sensationalizes the news	3.73	3.20	16.48***	3.78	3.29	9.67**	3.44	3.51	.523 <sup>ns</sup>
Community Concerned	4.44	3.10	87.02***	4.32	3.12	78.83***	4.04	3.14	22.95***
Respects people’s privacy	4.50	3.62	21.87***	4.36	3.60	17.93***	4.17	3.73	14.83***
Makes the news exciting	4.40	3.40	62.86***	4.30	3.52	39.57***	4.25	3.58	22.37***
Makes the service profitable	4.07	3.15	25.18***	4.09	3.34	24.06***	3.93	3.51	7.57***
Care about audience thinks	4.53	3.56	37.53***	4.37	3.51	38.86***	4.23	3.74	5.78*
Unbiased	4.11	3.18	33.55***	4.01	3.00	31.29***	3.63	3.23	1.50 <sup>ns</sup>
Fair	4.36	3.20	57.71***	4.20	3.16	44.23***	3.91	3.26	8.22**

Note: Means with common superscripts differ significantly at the .05 level. Scores ranged from 1 to 5.

\* = P < 0.05, \*\* = P < 0.01 and \*\*\* = P < 0.001. (<sup>ns</sup>): Not significant

1= Al-Jazeera TV (Saudi- n=487, Bahrain- n=426, Qatar- n=361), 2= BBC (Saudi- n=160, Bahrain- n=181, Qatar- n=175)

The findings of the study are consistent with other studies that showed the clear majority of Arab audiences judged Al-Jazeera to be believable, accurate, trustworthy, and that its reporters were well trained (Auter et al., 2004; Johnson & Fahmy, 2009).

Auter et al. (2004) found that heavy viewing of Al-Jazeera indicated higher levels of credibility. Johnson and Fahmy (2008) indicated that Arab audiences rated the credibility of Al-Jazeera higher than BBC.

### **8.7 Demographic Differences in News Credibility**

This part of the study examined the demographic variables of the perceived credibility of Arabic news TV channels. News consumers in all three GCC countries who indicated that they watched news 'daily' or 'quite often' were asked to evaluate the credibility and objectivity of Arabic news TV channels. The study relied on a paired sample t-test, and one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to measure statistically significant differences between demographic groups and attitude toward Arabic TV news channels' perceived credibility.

Westly and Severin (1964) stated that different people will react differently to the content of a news medium, and it can be predicted that their rating of media credibility will be different. In addition, the personal characteristics of the message receiver, such as age, education, social status, ethnicity and knowledge of the media can also contribute to an evaluation of media credibility (Westly & Severin, 1964). Gunther (1987) argued that a highly involved person is likely to maintain his/her existing opinion, meaning that the degree of involvement will be a greater factor in evaluating media credibility rather than the strength of personal opinion in an issue. Stavchansky (2007) investigated the perceived credibility of television news. The findings showed that the amount of education a subject possessed played a significant role in how he or she perceived the credibility of television news. Johnson and Fahmy (2008, 2009) indicated that demographics had little influence, apart from that young audiences of the English-language Al-Jazeera website judged the satellite network credible.

The findings of this research indicated that several demographic variables were significantly associated with the perceived credibility of Arabic news TV services such as Al-Jazeera and the BBC Arabic News TV Channel. The key demographic characteristics in this context were gender, age, annual income, and political orientation.

### **8.7.1 Gender Group Differences**

A paired sample t-test was carried out to determine whether there was a significant difference between the perceived credibility of Arabic News TV Channels and gender in three countries. The results indicated that there were quite a few significant gender differences for Al-Jazeera and the BBC Arabic News TV Channel in terms of Saudi Arabian news viewers. No significant gender differences occurred among participants from Bahrain or Qatar.

In general the findings showed that male news consumers in Saudi Arabia ( $M=4.73$ ) rated Al-Jazeera news TV more highly than did females ( $M=4.38$ ) for news media 'Accuracy' (t test:  $t(572) = 5.543$ ,  $p < .00$ , 2-tailed). Furthermore, males in Saudi Arabia ( $M=4.50$ ;  $M=4.45$ ; and  $M=3.79$  respectively) rated Al-Jazeera news TV more highly than did females ( $M=4.23$ ;  $M=3.86$ ; and  $M=3.35$  respectively) for 'Enthralling' news media (t test:  $t(583) = 4.252$ ,  $p < .00$ , 2-tailed), media 'Objectivity', (t test:  $t(594) = 5.947$ ,  $p < .00$ , 2-tailed), and for 'Public-Oriented' (t test:  $t(580) = 6.907$ ,  $p < .00$ , 2-tailed).

In contrast, for the perceived credibility of the BBC Arabic Channel, the findings revealed that female news consumers in Saudi Arabia ( $M=3.78$ ) rated BBC Arabic News more highly than did males ( $M=3.35$ ), (t test:  $t(123) = -2.129$ ,  $p < .05$ , 2-tailed). Moreover, females ( $M=3.80$  and  $3.70$  respectively) rated BBC Arabic News TV more highly than did males ( $M=3.19$  and  $2.96$  respectively) for 'Enthralling' news

media (t test:  $t(132) = -3.584, p < .01, 2\text{-tailed}$ ) and news media 'Objectivity' (t test:  $t(156) = -3.589, p < .01, 2\text{-tailed}$ ).

### 8.7.2 Age Group Differences

The study applied a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to examine differences between age groups in their perceptions of the credibility of Arabic TV news channels. The data indicated that there were a number of significant age differences. These occurred for ratings of Al-Jazeera and BBC Arabic News TV Channel in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain only. No significant age differences occurred among participants from Qatar.

In Saudi Arabia, mature age news consumers ( $M=3.79$  and  $4.43$  respectively), gave higher ratings to Al-Jazeera news for being 'Public-Oriented' and for 'Objectivity' than older age participants ( $M=3.63$  and  $4.23$  respectively) or younger age participants did ( $M=3.58$  and  $4.17$  respectively; ANOVA:  $F(2,581) = 5.104, p < .01$ ) and (ANOVA:  $F(2,595) = 3.395, p < .05$ ).

In contrast, older age news consumers in Saudi Arabia ( $M=4.16$  and  $3.65$  and  $3.83$  respectively) rated BBC Arabic News TV Channel higher for news media 'Accuracy', and 'Enthralling' than did younger age ( $M=3.72$  and  $3.44$  respectively) or mature age news consumers ( $M=3.36$  and  $3.11$  respectively) (ANOVA:  $F(2,124) = 3.666, p < .05$ ) and (ANOVA:  $F(2,133) = 3.949, p < .05$ ).

The results for Bahrain, on the other hand, showed that older age participants ( $M=4.74$ ), who were aged 51 years and older, rated Al-Jazeera higher for 'Accuracy', than did those of mature age ( $M=4.52$ ), between 31-50 years old, or younger age news consumers ( $M=4.43$ ), between 18-30 years old (ANOVA:  $F(2,133) = 3.949, p < .05$ ).

### 8.7.3 Annual Income Differences

There were differences in perceived credibility of the Arabic TV news channels linked to income. These differences were restricted to perceptions of Al-Jazeera among viewers in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain viewers.

In Saudi Arabia, participants with medium level annual incomes ( $M=3.78$  and  $2.24$  respectively) rated Al-Jazeera higher for 'Public-Oriented' and news media 'Objectivity' than did those who had high incomes ( $M=3.75$  and  $2.23$  respectively) or low level annual incomes ( $M=3.60$  and  $2.08$  respectively) (ANOVA:  $F(2,580) = 3.143, p < .05$ ) and (ANOVA:  $F(2,594) = 3.851, p < .05$ ).

In contrast in Bahrain, news consumers who had low incomes ( $M=4.53$  and  $4.19$  respectively) rated Al-Jazeera higher for media 'Accuracy', and media 'Objectivity' than did those who had high incomes ( $M=4.36$  and  $3.80$  respectively) or who had medium level annual incomes ( $M=4.23$  and  $3.83$  respectively) (ANOVA:  $F(2,507) = 5.242, p < .05$ ) and (ANOVA:  $F(2,532) = 4.904, p < .05$ ).

### 8.7.4 Political Orientation Differences

The data illustrated that the political orientation category produced significant differences for perceived credibility of the Arabic news TV channels in all three countries. The ideology category, which was subdivided into liberal, neutral, and conservative news consumers, revealed that there were a number of significant differences for the perceived credibility of Al-Jazeera News TV in Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, but no significant differences in Bahrain. However, significant differences were found for the BBC in Bahrain.

In Saudi Arabia liberal news consumers ( $M= 4.52$ ) rated Al-Jazeera higher on 'Enthralling' compared with conservatives ( $M=4.46$ ) and neutral news consumers ( $M=4.31$ ) (ANOVA:  $F(2,584) = 4.060, p < .05$ ). On the other hand, conservative news consumers in Qatar ( $M=3.53$  and  $4.07$  respectively) rated Al-Jazeera higher for 'Public-

Oriented' and 'Objectivity' compared with those who considered themselves neutrals ( $M=3.39$  and  $3.72$  respectively) or liberals ( $M=3.11$  and  $2.34$  respectively) (ANOVA:  $F(2,584) = 6.837, p <.01$ ) and (ANOVA:  $F(2,584) = 9.108, p <.00$ ).

In contrast, the news consumers in Bahrain who identified themselves as liberals ( $M= 3.78$ ), rated BBC Arabic News TV Channel higher for being 'Enthralling' than did participants who considered themselves conservatives ( $M=3.32$ ), or as neutral news consumers ( $M=3.16$ ), (ANOVA:  $F(2,133) = 5.245, p <.01$ ).

The results of the study showed that males rated Al-Jazeera's credibility slightly higher than did females. However, females rated BBC Arabic News's credibility higher than did males. Moreover, mature and older news consumers rated Al-Jazeera news higher for 'Public-Oriented', 'Objectivity', and 'Accuracy'. Older age news consumers rated BBC Arabic News TV Channel higher in terms of 'Accuracy' and for being 'Enthralling'. Furthermore, those with mid-level and low-level incomes rated Al-Jazeera higher for being 'Public-Oriented', 'Objective', and for 'Accuracy'. Finally, liberal and conservative news consumers rated Al-Jazeera higher for being 'Enthralling', 'Public-Oriented' and for its 'Objectivity', while liberals rated the BBC Arabic News TV Channel higher for being 'Enthralling'.

The findings of this study are consistent with several previous studies in measuring Arab audiences' demographic profiles and their perceptions of the credibility of Arabic news TV services (Arab Advisors Group, 2004; Auter et al., 2005; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008). The study conducted by Johnson and Fahmy (2008) showed that Al-Jazeera viewers rated the network as highly credible on all measures. They rated BBC high on expertise, but ranked them low on trustworthiness. Moreover, their findings indicated that the more the viewers rely on Al-Jazeera news the more likely they were to judge it as credible. The findings also showed that younger viewers were more likely to

view the Al-Jazeera news channel as more credible than older viewers (Johnson and Fahmy, 2008). Auter et al. (2004, 2005) indicated that the average Al-Jazeera viewer tended to be male, young, highly educated, Muslim, and neutral in their political stance.

### **8.8 Credibility Predictors of Viewing News TV Channels**

To answer the last research question, it was explored as to whether the specific variables predicted the reported frequency of Arabic TV channels credibility ratings. To do this, a further stage of analysis was conducted using stepwise multiple regression analysis for samples from each of the three countries. Stepwise multiple regression analyses were used with two dependent variables upon which the regressions were run, which Al-Jazeera and the BBC Arabic News TV Channel. Other news services and news TV channels were excluded from the measurement because of low rates of response to the survey questioners.

Stepwise multiple regressions analyses were conducted in several stages to find out if there were any relationships between one predicted (dependent) variable and a selection of predictor variables (Brace et al., 2009). One block of predictor variables comprised questions asked about the frequency with which participants used each of eight different news sources: local TV channels, Arabic news satellite TV channels (e.g., Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya), non-Arabic satellite TV news services (e.g., CNN, BBC, International), the Internet, radio, newspapers, magazines and mobile devices.

The frequency with which participants said they watched the news on local TV channels (Saudi Arabia TV, Kuwait TV, Bahrain TV, Qatar TV, UAE TV, Oman TV), Arabic satellite TV news channels (Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, BBC (Arabic), Al-Hurra, and France 24), and non-Arabic TV channels (CNN, BBC News, Euro News) represented another block of predictor variables.

Credibility variables were also entered as potential predictor factors: be fair to all sides, unbiased, tells the whole story, is always factually accurate, respects people's privacy, cares about what the audience thinks, concerned with the community's well-being, separates facts from opinions, can be trusted, does not sensationalize the news, has a clear moral code, news that makes the service profitable, reporters are well trained, is not afraid to give its own opinions about news issues, makes the news exciting for people, and is up-to-date with the latest news developments. Each of these items was rated along a four-point scale: strongly agree (5), agree (4), no opinion (3), disagree (2) and strongly disagree (1). Finally, demographic variables were entered as potential predictor factors. Personal detail questions asked participants to report on their age, gender, highest level of education, gross annual household income, and political orientation.

All six regression analyses yielded statistically significant predictor models for claimed viewing of Al-Jazeera and BBC (Arabic) for the samples from all three countries. The outcome of this analysis is shown in table 8.4 below.

### **8.8.1 Credibility Predictors of Viewing Al-Jazeera**

In Saudi Arabia the findings indicated that claimed viewing of Arabic news satellite TV channels was the strongest predictor variable for watching Al-Jazeera. It was also found that Al-Jazeera news was as a credible source by the viewers because it had 'a clear moral code'. Furthermore, political issues such as the 'Israel/Palestine Conflict' and 'Arab-Arab conflict' were predictor factors for the consumption of news from Al-Jazeera. Moreover, age (being young, from 18 to 30 years old) was more likely to be a predictor variable of perceived credibility of viewing Al-Jazeera TV. The only negative predictor variable for claimed viewing of Al-Jazeera was reading less news in Arabic

magazines. A significant model emerged ( $F_{6, 359} = 23.817, P < .001$ ) and explained 27 per cent of the variance (adjusted  $R^2$  value = .28).

In Bahrain, claimed viewing of Arabic Satellite TV news was the strongest predictor variable for regarding Al-Jazeera as a credible news source. The viewers in Bahrain believed that Al-Jazeera was not afraid to give its own opinions about news issues when it covered 'Arab-Arab conflict' and about 'Politics in the Arab world'. A significant model emerged ( $F_{3, 294} = 82.11, P < .001$ ) and explained 45 per cent of the variance (adjusted  $R^2$  value = .46).

In Qatar, similarly to Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain, claimed viewing of Arabic TV news channels was also the strongest predictor variable for watching Al-Jazeera news. The audiences in Qatar believed that Al-Jazeera was a trusted news source when it covered 'Politics in Arab world' and 'Human Rights issues'. A significant model emerged ( $F_{4, 307} = 73.96, P < .001$ ) and explained 48 per cent of the variance (adjusted  $R^2$  value = .49).

### **8.8.2 Credibility Predictors of Viewing BBC (Arabic)**

Claimed viewing of BBC (Arabic) was predicted in Saudi Arabia by three variables: coverage of current events in Saudi Arabia, not afraid to give its own opinions about news issues, and claimed viewing of Arabic News Satellite TV. A significant model emerged ( $F_{3, 77} = 15.20, P < .001$ ) and explained 32 per cent of the variance (adjusted  $R^2$  value = .34). In Bahrain, claimed viewing of BBC (Arabic) was predicted by four variables: claimed viewing of Al-Hura TV channel, politics in Arab world, and up-to-date with the latest news developments; and less frequent claimed viewing with 'Iranian nuclear weapons'. A significant model emerged ( $F_{3, 108} = 14.09, P < .001$ ) and explained 36 per cent of the variance (adjusted  $R^2$  value = .39).

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In Qatar, claimed viewing of BBC (Arabic) was predicted by three credibility variables: respect people's privacy, has a clear moral code, and claimed viewing of Al-Hura TV and none-Arabic satellite news TV channels. A significant model emerged ( $F_{4, 110} = 17.517, P < .001$ ) and explained 36 per cent of the variance (adjusted R<sup>2</sup> value = .38).

**Table 8.4 Credibility Predictors of News TV Channels**

Model	Saudi		Bahrain		Qatar	
	AJE	BBC	AJE	BBC	AJE	BBC
Not afraid to give it own opinions about news issues		.25*	.17***			
Can be trusted					.16**	
Has a clear moral code	.20**					.24*
Up-to-date with the latest news developments				.19*		
Respects people's privacy						.25**
Politics in Arab world			.14**	.24*	.12*	
Israel/Palestine Conflict	.19**					
Arab-Arab conflict	.14**		.27***			
Human rights issues					.10*	
Current events in your country		.42***				
Iranian nuclear weapons				-.32*		
Arabic satellite news TV channels	.23***		.54***		.52***	
None-Arabic satellite news TV channels		.23*				.19*
Magazines	-.12**					
Al-Hura				.37***		.20*
Age	.09*					
Variance explained (adjusted R <sup>2</sup> )	.27	.32	.45	.36	.48	.36
R <sup>2</sup>	.28	.34	.46	.39	.49	.38

Stepwise regression, beta scores \*P < .05, \*\*P < .01, \*\*\*P < .001.

Note: Scores for news question were collapsed and reversed to 4= daily and 1= Never.

- The positive scores in the table indicated more consumption/use of these channels, while negative scores indicated less frequent use of these channels

### 8.9 Summary and Discussion

This chapter explored how audiences in the Arab Gulf States relied on news services for obtaining objective news and information and whether they perceived Arabic news TV channels as credible news sources. The research questions considered in this chapter investigated the perceptions of the credibility of specific Arabic TV news channels, the relationships between perceived credibility of specific news in general, and Arabic news TV channels in particular, and their consumption, whether these relationships differed

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between the three Gulf countries, and the importance of demographic factors in relation to perceived credibility of news and use of news sources.

Previous studies pointed out that audiences mainly relied on the medium that provided them with most accurate information and knowledge (Schweiger, 2000; Choi et al., 2006; Flanagin & Metzger, 2007; Lin, 2008). The public are more likely to be persuaded when the source presents itself as credible (Hovland et al., 1953; Ohanian 1991), while highly credible sources produced a more positive attitude than sources that were considered less credible (Hovland and Weiss 1951; Ohanian 1991; and Schumann 1983). Previous studies on Arab media emphasized the importance of the elements of credibility to follow Arabic media and news services by audiences (Al-Makaty et al., 1994; Al-Habib, 1995; Albuloushi, 2000). Several studies also used the application of the credibility measurements scale to examine the attitude toward Arabic news TV services among Arab audiences (Gaziano & McGrath, 1986; Meyer, 1988; Ohanian, 1991; Ganahl, 1994; Wanta & Hu, 1994).

The findings showed that while overall news credibility profiles did not differ greatly between these countries, credibility variables were associated with or predictive of news consumption patterns in different ways among participants from these countries. News consumers in Arab Gulf states valued media services that provide credible news and information. The results showed that credibility factors such as up-to-date news and information, accuracy, trustworthiness, believability, fairness, and expertise were highly rated by audiences in the Arab world for viewing Arabic news outlets (Auter et al., 2004, 2005; Jamal & Melkote, 2008; Johnson and Fahmy, 2008, 2009). The findings of the study were consistent with other studies and showed that there were significant relationships between credibility and claimed different news consumption (Mingxin, 2006; Armstrong & Collins, 2009). Moreover, the credibility

factors were highly associated with 'Arabic News TV' compared to other media outlets in the Arab world. Similar studies indicated that Arabic news TV services were highly rated as credible sources of information (El-Nawawy, 2003; Auter et al., 2004; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008).

This study found that Al-Jazeera and BBC (Arabic) TV were rated as highly credible sources by audiences in the Arab Gulf States. Mature age news consumers and older age consumers in Arab Gulf countries highly rated Al-Jazeera news for being public-oriented, objective, and accurate. Older age news consumers highly rated the BBC Arabic News TV Channel for its news media accuracy, and because it was enthralling. Furthermore, those with mid-level incomes and low-level incomes highly rated Al-Jazeera for being public-oriented, objective, and accurate. Finally, liberal and conservative news consumers highly rated Al-Jazeera because it was enthralling, public-oriented and objective. Liberals highly rated the BBC Arabic News TV Channel for being enthralling. The results here were consistent with earlier studies measuring the credibility and objectivity of Arabic news TV services, which showed a clear majority of Arab audiences judged Al-Jazeera to be believable, accurate, trustworthy, and its reporters well-trained (Auter et al., 2004; Johnson and Fahmy, 2009). Auter et al. (2004) found that heavy viewing of Al-Jazeera indicated higher levels of credibility. Johnson and Fahmy (2008) showed that Al-Jazeera rated as highly credible on all measures, while BBC was highly rated on expertise, but ranked low on trustworthiness. Arab audiences rated the credibility of Al-Jazeera higher than BBC (Johnson and Fahmy, 2008). Males rated Al-Jazeera credibility slightly higher than females, while females gave more credibility to BBC Arabic News than males. Moreover, younger viewers are more likely to view the Al-Jazeera news channel as more credible than older ages (Johnson and Fahmy, 2008). Furthermore, Al-Jazeera viewers tended to be

overwhelmingly male, young, highly educated, Muslim, and neutral in their political stance (Auter et al., 2004, 2005).

The findings of regression analyses showed that the viewing of Al-Jazeera and BBC (Arabic) channels is associated in all Arab Gulf States. News credibility was associated with claimed viewing of Al-Jazeera and BBC (Arabic) in all three countries, but not in the same ways. In Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, greater viewing of Al-Jazeera was linked to that channel having 'a clear moral code', and because it was believed to be not afraid to give its own opinions about news issues when it covered politics in the Arab world, particularly the Israel/Palestine conflict and the Arab-Arab conflict. While in Qatar, greater viewing of this channel was linked to trust in Al-Jazeera as a news source. Moreover, in Saudi Arabia, greater viewing of Al-Jazeera was predicted by audiences who were aged between 18 to 30 years old. However, greater viewing of BBC (Arabic) was linked to its coverage of current events, and because it was believed to be not afraid to give its own opinions about news issues, for covering politics in the Arab world, and because it allowed viewers to be up-to-date with the latest news developments in Bahrain. In Qatar, watching more of this channel was predicted by respect for people's privacy and because it was believed to have a clear moral code.

In conclusion, it can be seen from the findings of the study that perceived credibility of news sources in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar did not differ greatly between these countries. The findings enhanced the previous literature and findings that showed audiences in the Arab world tended to seek news from media that they believed provided them with accurate and credible news and information (Auter et al., 2004, 2005; Zayani, 2005; Arafa el al., 2005; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008; Jamal & Melkote, 2008). Arab news consumers valued news TV services that provided accurate and

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unbiased news, up-to-date news and information, accuracy, trustworthiness, believability, fairness, and expertise.

The findings from the study support previous research which suggested that perception of credibility was considered to be an important factor in the choices of news sources for consumption (Schweiger, 2000; Choi et al., 2006; Flanagin & Metzger, 2007; Lin, 2008). The results from this study are similar to previous studies that demonstrated that pan-Arab news services received higher credibility ratings and were the most trusted and consumed media compared to other news media, such as newspapers, radio, and magazines (Auter et al., 2004, 2005, Zayani, 2005; Arafa et al., 2005, Johnson & Fahmy, 2008; Jamal & Melkote, 2008). Moreover, this study was in agreement with previous studies that found that Arab news TV channels such as Al-Jazeera and BBC Arabic as new news suppliers received higher credibility ratings than older suppliers sources, such as Arabic local and national TV channels (Auter et al., 2004, 2005; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008; Jamal & Melkote, 2008).

Further, the findings extend previous studies on Arab news media by applying the credibility measurements scale in different Arab countries. The credibility measurements scale appeared to be valid scale and can be used in different cultures and countries to examine audience attitude toward news media (Gaziano & McGrath, 1986; Meyer, 1988; Ohanian, 1991; Ganahl, 1994; Wanta and Hu, 1994; Auter et al., 2004, 2005; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008).

The next chapter deals with discussion and conclusions; the chapter discusses the aims of the study, research findings, limitations of the study, and recommendations.

## **Chapter 9 Discussion and Conclusions**

### **9.1 Introduction**

This research was designed to enhance understanding of the rapidly evolving news media markets and infrastructure in the Arab world. The research investigated the profiles of news consumers across three Arab Gulf States in terms of their demographic attributes, their media (and most especially news) consumption habits, their news seeking motivations, and their attitudes towards news suppliers. Further, the study measured audience perceptions of the credibility of different televised news sources. This chapter discusses the study's aims, findings, research limitations, conclusions, and presents some recommendations for future study.

### **9.2 The Emergence of Arab News TV Channels**

The onset of satellite news channels after the crisis of the Gulf War and the distinguished coverage of the American CNN station of the war, the liberation of Kuwait, and the ousting of Iraqi forces from Kuwait by the Alliance Forces resulted in the spread of public and private satellite stations with various broadcasting material ranging from news to entertainment (Amin, 2001; Bahry, 2001). Most prominent among these channels has been the Al-Jazeera channel, established in 1996, which has become the most influential and prolific news service in the Arab World.

Al-Jazeera gained worldwide attention after covering the Palestinian uprising and the American war on terror, its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the wars in Palestine, Lebanon, Somalia and many other hot spots in the world. Following its success, several other satellite stations such as the Saudi Arabia Al-Arabiya channel, the American Al-Hurra, the British BBC, and channels by the Russian, Chinese and French governments, respectively, were established (Tawil-Souri, 2008). Seib, (2011) points out that Arab satellite stations like Al-Jazeera contribute to shaping world politics and

culture. He maintains that the existence of more than 500 Arab satellite stations indicates the shrinking of government influence over media, which seems to have decline permanently due to the fact that governments stand helpless in their confrontation with the huge volume of information pouring from satellite stations and the Internet; the most such governments can do is to prosecute some of these stations and track some Internet users. These satellite stations have also proved to their sceptical audience that there is no need to resort to Western stations for information about important events (Johnson & Fahmy, 2008; Andersen, 2011; Al-Mahdi, 2011; Pintak, 2011).

The most recent events in the Arab World have shown that in the light of the global media and the proliferation of radio and TV satellite stations, as well as Arab and non-Arab Internet websites, media have spiralled out of the control of Arab governments; their control is now confined only to the media outlets they possess. Such outlets are rarely viewed except on important national occasions (El-Nawawy & Iskander, 2002) Hence, Arab media restrictions have dwindled in the light of new technologies and global media (Zayani, 2005). Nevertheless, what determines the impact of satellite news media is closely connected with the degree of the society's development and awareness, and it is unwise to promulgate general judgments detached from the nature of the society, its institutions and systems which differ from one Arab country to another (Rugh, 2004; Lynch, 2006). Likewise, coverage of these satellite TV stations differs in terms of vastness, depth, sequence, accuracy, impartiality and objectivity (Zayani & Sahraoui, 2007). Consequently, the Arab audience has not relied on a single media outlet regardless of its capabilities, as a source of news and analysis, which was evident in the coverage of Arab revolutions breaking out in one country after another. The audience balanced this coverage and kept moving from a station to another

to rule out prejudice and arrive at a more objective appraisal to the events occurring across the region and changing its political, economical, geographical and media map (Habib, 2011; Khairy, 2011; Fandy, 2011; Pintak, 2011).

This study investigated the news consumption patterns and the attitudes of Arab viewers in three countries of the Gulf region toward various media news services, and their news-related motives and perceptions of some of the inherent qualities of news provided by identified news sources. The significance of this study lies in the fact that the Arab Gulf region is home to the two most important satellite news stations in the Arab world: the Al-Jazeera network in Qatar and the Al-Arabiya news channel, funded by Saudi Arabia and broadcast from Dubai in the UAE. Although this study was conducted before the outbreak of the Arab revolutions, its results describe the Arab news media scene and what role it plays, as well as the attitude of the Arab viewers toward following news, and the reasons why some Arabic news satellite stations have become the first choice of the Arab viewer as a source of information and knowledge about current events.

### **9.3 Patterns News Media Consumption**

The study surveyed audiences in three countries – Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. It found that news consumers' demographic profiles did not differ greatly between the three countries. In gender, the major participants of the study were reported to be more male (78.6%) than female (21.4%). The majority audiences were young (under 30 years old), better educated and had bachelor degrees, were employed, and earned up to 25,000 US dollars per year. Politically they did not display extreme or polarised political orientations. Even though the samples were not random and therefore probably not representative of the general viewing populations of these countries, the findings of the study were consistent with other contemporary data conducted using a similar

methodology on audiences from other academic studies, that showed Arab viewers tended to be mostly male, young, highly educated, Muslim, and neutral in their political stance (Auter et al., 2004, 2005; Johnson and Fahmy, 2008, 2010; Jamal & Melkote, 2008).

The most used news source nominated by participants on a daily basis was 'Arabic News TV', followed by the 'Internet', 'Newspapers', 'Local & National TV', 'Mobile', 'Radio', 'Non-Arabic News TV', and 'Magazines'. This finding was consistent with the results of previous studies that have shown that even though Arab audiences turned to different media resources to get news and information, they tended to view Arabic News satellite TV channels more than other media (Amin, 2001; Bahry, 2001; Guaaybess, 2002; Rugh, 2004; Sakr, 2007).

Further, this study found that the most popular news topics were related to the 'Israel/Palestine conflict' in all three countries, followed by interest in 'world-wide politics', 'business and financial issues', and 'entertainment'. Previous research showed that 'Arab politics', particularly the 'Israel/Palestine conflict', were the most popular news topics on Arabic news TV services (Ayish, 2001).

This study also addressed which TV news services participants identified as their most preferred, and any differences associated with demographics and national market. The findings indicated that the most viewed Arabic News TV channel on a daily basis was 'Al-Jazeera TV' channel followed by 'Al-Arabiya TV', 'BBC (Arabic) news TV channel', 'France 24 (Arabic)' and 'Al-Hurra TV'. In terms of 'International News TV', the most frequently viewed channel was 'BBC (International) TV', followed by 'CNN' and then 'Euro News TV'. Finally, the least watched services were 'Local & State TV' channels which included: 'UAE TV', 'Qatar TV', 'Saudi Arabia TV', 'Kuwait TV', 'Bahrain TV', and 'Oman TV'.

Evidence emerging from this study clearly underlined the emergence of Arabic news TV services across the Arab world. Early studies showed that mistrust of Western media such as CNN and the BBC, made Arab audiences flock to Arab news services as sources for more ‘accurate’ analysis of current affairs (Miladi, 2006). Several studies have shown that the Al-Jazeera news channel has emerged as the leading channel watched by Arab viewers in the Arab world region or by Arab diasporas across the world (Auter et al., 2004, 2005; Miladi, 2006). Al-Jazeera has been the most popular and controversial TV channel broadcasting in the Arab world since its started in 1996 as the first Arabic news TV channel. Al-Jazeera managed to break taboos in the Arab media by tackling issues of Arab conflicts, human rights, hosting Arab dissidents, and creating a new Arab public sphere (Lynch, 2006; Miladi, 2006). Moreover, Al-Jazeera’s method of covering international conflicts such as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has marked it as a counter-hegemonic news outlet. For the first time, the flow of news went from South to North (Ayish, 2004, 2006; El-Nawawy, 2003; El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002; El-Nawawy and Powers, 2008; Miles, 2005).

In the light of these findings one can conclude that Arabic news TV channels could be driving audiences in Arab world way from their local and national channels, particularly when it comes to broadcasts concerning Arab political issues and international news (Zayani, 2005; Auter et al., 2004, 2005; Fahmy & Johnson 2009, 2010).

#### **9.4 Motivations of Arabic News Media Exposure**

The study applied a uses and gratifications model to determine the motivations and needs of these Arab news audiences. The uses and gratifications model is concerned with how people use the media to satisfy specific needs. Most uses and gratifications

research derives from the West and this raises the question of its relevance to understanding audience behaviour in non-Western cultures. However, research about the use of Arab media has found that this model has usefulness in assessing Arab news audiences particularly when applied to the use of traditional media such as newspaper, radio, and television (Al-Attibi, 1986; Al-Heezan, 1993; Al-Amoudi, 1990; Marghalani et al., 1998; Yousef, 1999).

A number of media scholars have pointed out that the uses and gratifications model can also provide a useful framework from which to study new communications media (Kuehn, 1994; December, 1996; Morris & Ogan, 1996). Ruggiero (2000) argued that uses and gratifications has provided a “cutting edge theoretical approach” in the early stages of new communications media. Recent studies in the Arab world have shifted their attention from traditional media to the study of Arabic news satellite TV channels, new media communication, and the Internet (Abdulrahim, 1999; Al-Shaqsi, 2000; Auter et al., 2005; Jamal & Melkote, 2008).

The current research indicated four categories of motivations linked to news media use: ‘Free Marketplace of News’, ‘Parasocial Interaction & Surveillance’, ‘Discussions & Judgments’, and ‘Trustworthy Source’. The results revealed that the fulfilment of cognitive needs (information-seeking) was one of the most widely endorsed motivations for Arab news audiences in relation to watching Arabic news TV services. These findings are consistent with past studies (Auter et al., 2004, 2005; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008; Jamal & Melkote, 2008).

Furthermore, the findings showed that viewing of Al-Jazeera and BBC (Arabic) channels was associated in all three countries with a tendency to watch other non-local Arab and non-Arab TV news services. It is interesting to note that seeking quality coverage of current events in their own country led Saudi participants to watch BBC

(Arabic) more than Al-Jazeera. The results differed to those of other studies, and showed a range of diversity among Arab audiences regarding the motivations for viewing different news channels (Al-Shaqsi, 2000; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008; Jamal & Melkote, 2008).

One of the more significant findings to emerge from this study was that news motivational factors predicting viewing TV news services were associated with claimed viewing of Al-Jazeera and BBC (Arabic) in all three Arab countries, but not in the same ways. In Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the importance of news source credibility predicted greater reported viewing of Al-Jazeera, while in Bahrain greater viewing of this channel was linked to the need for up-to-date information. However, greater viewing of BBC (Arabic) was predicted by needing the news to show the real work of Arab governments among Saudi participants, and for the news to help to judge Arab governments by participants in Bahrain. In Qatar, watching more of this channel was predicted by the need for good visual coverage of events.

The results of this study enhance our understanding of the various assumptions of the uses and gratifications model. The results suggest that audiences may be driven by one set of motives for watching Arabic news TV channels, such as it being a trustworthy source and free marketplace of news (Jamal & Melkote, 2008). The results may indicate that the motivations for following news do not change according to different news media. Instead, Arab audiences choose specific news media to satisfy specific fulfilment needs such as information seeking, discussing Arabic political issues, parasocial and social interaction, and surveillance (Marghalani et al., 1998; Al-Amoudi, 1990; Al-Attibi, 1986; Al-Heezan, 1993; Yousef, 1999; Al-Shaqsi, 2000).

This study suggested that Arabic news TV services such as Al-Jazeera and BBC (Arabic) have changed the features of the Arab media and have created a free

marketplace of ideas and information, making them trustworthy sources for Arab news audiences. Several studies showed that the authoritarian governments in the Arab world began to realize how Arabic news TV services are changing the way news and information is produced and how news consumers behave (Jamal & Melkote, 2008). Moreover, after decades of the flow of information being controlled by Arab ministries of information, the Arab news audiences have started to express their ideas and exchange views, questioning governments' policies and demanding political and social reform (Zahrana, 2001). Jamal and Melkote (2008) indicated that Al-Jazeera TV created a free marketplace of ideas and information that would eventually engender Arab audiences to speak for themselves rather than allow governments or authorities to speak for them. Fahmy and Johnson (2007) found that almost eight in ten believed Al-Jazeera TV has led to an increase in press freedom in the Arab world.

### **9.5 Perceived Credibility of Arabic News Media**

Credibility is an important issue to study because the public do not seek news media they do not perceive as credible (Johnson & Kaye, 2000, 2004). Credibility plays an important role in media use because audiences tend to rely on news sources that they believe provides them with the most accurate information and knowledge (Schweiger, 2000; Choi et al., 2006; Flanagin & Metzger, 2007; Lin, 2008). Schweiger (1998) indicated that credibility is considered an important heuristic for content selection at a time of information overload. A high credibility source is more effective in causing attitude change than a low credibility source (Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Kelman & Hovland, 1953; Bochner & Insko, 1966). The lack of trust in information obtained from the new media could keep it from becoming an even more important and influential news source (Johnson and Kaye, 1998).

The study adopted media source credibility as a theoretical framework, which states that people are more likely to be persuaded when the source presents itself as credible (Hovland et al., 1953). The study applied a credibility measurement scale used by previous studies (Gaziano and McGrath, 1986; Meyer, 1988; Ganahl, 1994; Wanta and Hu, 1994; Ohanian, 1991) to explore the attitudes towards credibility of Arabic news media held by Arab audiences in Arab Gulf States. A number of studies have examined source credibility and audiences (Hovland et al., 1953; Chaiken, 1994; Austin & Dong, 1995; Slater & Rouner, 1997; Johnson & Kaye, 1998; Sundar, 1998). Hovland et al. (1953), for example, identified objectivity and trustworthiness as components of credibility. Previous studies in the Arab world also utilized credibility measurement scales to examine the credibility and objectivity of Arabic media and news services among different audiences (Al-Makaty et al., 1994; Al-Habib, 1995; Albuloushi, 2000). The study conducted by Al-Makaty et al., (1994), found that the most trustworthy sources of information about the 1991 Gulf War were broadcasting outlets, particularly those of Western origin such as Voice of America, the British Broadcasting Corporation World Service, and Radio Monte Carlo Middle East. However, the study conducted by Al-Habib (1995) found that the Saudi elite perceived the BBC and Voice of America, respectively, as more credible and satisfactory than the Jordanian elite.

This research identified a series of factor variables that represented credibility constructs associated with news consumption. The findings identified four categories for perceived credibility which included: 'Accuracy', 'Public-Oriented', 'Enthralling', and 'Objectivity'. While overall perceived news credibility profiles did not differ greatly between the samples from Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, credibility variables were associated with or predictive of news consumption patterns in different ways among participants from these countries. Arab news consumers in all three countries

reported that they valued media services that provided credible news and information (Auter et al., 2004; Ayish, 2004; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008, 2010).

The results showed that credibility factors such as up-to-date news and information, accuracy, trustworthiness, believability, fairness, and expertise were highly rated by audiences in the Arab world as factors determining viewing of Arabic news outlets (Auter et al., 2004, 2005; Jamal & Melkote, 2008; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008, 2009, 2010). These findings were consistent with other studies which showed that there were significant relationships between credibility and claimed patterns of news consumption (Mingxin, 2006; Armstrong & Collins, 2009). There was a positive correlation between media use and perceived media credibility (Kiouis, 2001). Moreover, the credibility factors were highly associated with reported use of 'Arabic News TV' compared to other media outlets in the Arab world. Similar studies indicated that Arabic news TV services were highly rated as credible sources of information (El-Nawawy, 2003; Auter et al., 2004; Ayish, 2004; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008, 2010). Even though the credibility ratings of all media have declined over time, television has frequently been named as the most credible medium (Finberg & Stone, 2002).

Furthermore, this study found that Al-Jazeera and BBC (Arabic) TV were rated as highly credible sources by audiences in Arab Gulf States. The results here were consistent with earlier studies that measured the credibility and objectivity of Arabic news TV services that showed that a clear majority of Arab audiences judged Al-Jazeera to be believable, accurate, trustworthy, and that its reporters are well trained (Auter et al., 2004; Ayish, 2004; Johnson & Fahmy, 2009). Ayish (2004) indicated that Al-Jazeera received the highest credibility score among participants randomly selected from the University of Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates. Johnson and Fahmy (2008) illustrated that Arab audiences rated the credibility of Al-Jazeera higher than that of the

BBC. Another study by Johnson and Fahmy (2010) found that online participants rated credibility measures of Al-Jazeera news TV higher than credibility measures for Al-Arabiya, Al-Hurra and local Arab stations.

One key finding that the current study found was that news credibility was associated with claimed viewing of Al-Jazeera and BBC (Arabic) in all three countries, but not in the same ways. In Saudi Arabia, greater viewing of Al-Jazeera was linked to that channel having 'a clear moral code', fairly covering 'politics in the Arab world', particularly the 'Israel/Palestine conflict' and 'Arab-Arab conflict', and that it was also predicted by audiences who were aged between 18 and 30 years old. While in Bahrain greater viewing of Al-Jazeera was linked to that the channel being a credible news source and not being afraid to give it own opinions about news issues when it covered 'Arab-Arab conflict' and 'Politics in the Arab world'. Whereas, in Qatar, greater viewing of this channel was linked to the fact that Al-Jazeera was perceived as a trusted news source in its coverage of 'Politics in Arab world' and 'Human Rights issues'. By contrast, claimed viewing of BBC (Arabic) in Saudi Arabia was linked to that channel's coverage of 'current events in the country'. While in Bahrain greater viewing of BBC (Arabic) was linked to the factor that the channel widely covered 'Politics in Arab world' and because it was also 'Up-to-date with the latest news developments'. Finally, in Qatar, watching more BBC (Arabic) was predicted by the factor 'respect people's privacy' and because the channel had a clear moral code.

The current results showed the importance of the elements of credibility in the following of media and news services by audiences (Hovland et al., 1953; Ohanian, 1991; Schweiger, 2000; Choi et al., 2006; Flanagin & Metzger, 2007; Lin, 2008). News audiences largely depended on the media that provided them with the most accurate and trustworthy information (Ohanian, 1991; Ganahl, 1994; Wanta & Hu, 1994). Prior

studies indicated similar findings; that Al-Jazeera was rated as highly credible, while the BBC was rated highly on expertise but ranked low on trustworthiness (Johnson & Fahmy, 2008). Reliance on news media emerged as the strongest predictor of credibility of both the Arab- and English-language versions of the Al-Jazeera websites (Fahmy & Johnson, 2009). Audiences who perceive television to be highly credible as a news medium can become highly dependent on that medium (Hovland et al., 1953; Ohanian 1991; Schweiger, 2000; Choi et al., 2006). Auter et al. (2004) found that heavy viewing of Al-Jazeera indicated higher levels of credibility. The Al-Jazeera audiences have tended to be overwhelmingly male, young, highly educated, Muslim, and neutral in their political stance (Auter et al., 2004, 2005). While male viewers between 25 and 35 were more likely to rate the Al-Jazeera news channel as more credible than older viewers were (Johnson & Fahmy, 2008, 2010).

The results have added to the growing number of media studies on uses and gratifications and media credibility research in the Arab world. Uses and gratifications and media credibility frameworks help to explain the phenomenon of why people choose a certain news medium (McQuail, Blumler & Brown, 1972). Audiences choose what they want to watch or believe from the news and programmes to fulfil their sought gratifications (Schweiger, 2000; Choi et al., 2006; Flanagin & Metzger, 2007; Lin, 2008). Credibility can influence the journalistic and commercial success of a medium (Schweiger, 2000), while audiences concerned about sources of information and its trustworthiness, objectivity, and believability, will seek sources of news that are reliable and credible (Abdulla et al., 2002). Applying the uses and gratifications and the media credibility research in this study has shown that Arab audiences seek information from media sources, mostly Arabic news TV services, they deem to be credible and capable of gratifying their need for news and information. The finding of this research showed

that audience motivations for media usage and perceive credibility were highly associated with claimed viewing of pan-Arab TV news channels.

Further, this study applied credibility measurements among audiences in different parts of the Arab world to examine Arab audiences' perceptions of news media services. Despite the fact that the credibility measure was originally tested in Western countries, the scale was found to be applicable and usable in different cultures (Gaziano & McGrath, 1986; Meyer, 1988; Ohanian, 1991; Ganahl, 1994; Wanta & Hu, 1994; Auter et al., 2004, 2005; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008).

### **9.6 Limitations of the Study**

This research has several limitations that need to be taken into account when considering the nature of the study and its contributions. First, the participants to this study were not selected on a random basis. Therefore, the findings from the research sample cannot be generalized to the general population because they were generated by self-participants to an online survey (Goodwin, 2002).

Second, this study was informed by uses and gratifications research. Some critics argue that uses and gratifications research focuses too much on individual motives in media use, while other researchers believe that uses and gratifications research focuses mostly on audiences instead of the media content itself (Littlejohn, 2001). Furthermore, critics have noted that the audience is not always as active as was once originally thought. However, it has also been pointed out that a "valid view of audience behavior lies between the extremes of being passive and expected to be influenced by the communicated messages and being active and expected to make decisions about what media content to accept and reject" (Rubin, 1993, p. 101).

Third, the research also applied a media credibility scale to obtain evaluations of Arabic TV news services. Several studies have previously noted that the perceived

credibility of news media could change over time (Ganahl, 1994; Wanta & Hu, 1994; Auter et al., 2004, 2005; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008, 2009, 2010). The study of Cronkhite and Liska (1976) found that most of the credibility studies “have not engaged the possibility that a listener’s perceptual structure may change over time, so that it may differ depending upon whether it is measured before, during, or after the speech” (p. 92). This study was conducted before the recent uprisings began in the Arab world. These events have resulted in some changes of government, changes to political systems and consequent changes in media landscapes across the Arab region. The events have also affected Arab public opinion about the news media and in some cases shifted attitudes towards specific news suppliers, such as Al-Jazeera (Auter et al., 2004, 2005; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008, 2009, 2010). It is feasible therefore that if this study was repeated now, the profiles of news consumption and opinions about new suppliers might have changed from those recorded in the current research. There might also be variations in regard to these shifts between the three countries from which participants were sampled. In two of these countries there were no uprisings (Saudi Arabia and Qatar). One observer noted that numerous viewers in Bahrain believed that Arabic news TV channels such as Al-Jazeera and BBC (Arabic) were biased when they covered political unrest in Bahrain (Gulf Daily News, 2012).

### **9.7 Recommendations for Future Research**

The study investigated the profiles of news audiences across three Arabic Gulf countries - Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar. It examined the emergence and evolution of Arabic news satellite TV channels on Arab Gulf states audiences and explored Arab viewers’ attitudes toward Arabic news TV channels. This study applied uses and gratifications and media credibility measurements in this context. Other studies used a different approaches to examine the motivations and credibility and their links to audiences’

reliance on news media (e.g., Wanta & Hu, 1994). Future research thus should consider conducting comparative studies among the different Arabic news TV services, which may contribute to enhancing our understanding about the roles and impacts of Arab news TV channels in shaping Arab politics, media, and society.

New research might apply mixed methodology combine the quantitative and qualitative approaches to gain deeper insights into the public's perceptions of different news suppliers and personal needs that can be gratified by the news. It would also be valuable to conduct in-depth interviews with news professionals about the roles and responsibilities of news in the Arab world and about the impact upon journalism of the changes that have recently occurred in the region.

Some studies have already placed a spotlight on the English versions of Arabic news TV channels such the Al-Jazeera TV channel and website. Al-Jazeera English (AJE) is already accessible in over 100 million households worldwide. Even though Al-Jazeera gained popularity in the United Kingdom when it was broadcast via the Freeview service on British television, it has not targeted a large audience in the West because of a general lack of cable distribution and thus a weak audience for Al-Jazeera English in the US market and Canada especially (Chalala, 2008).

More studies need to examine different Arabic news TV channels which have increased gradually inside and outside the Arab world. Most the studies, up to now, have focused on Al-Jazeera Arabic news TV channels. Those studies have examined the content of Al-Jazeera television through empirical investigation (Johnson and Fahmy, 2008, 2009), evaluated its role in public discourse and media diplomacy (El-Nawawy, 2003), and studied the demographics of its audience (Auter et al., 2005), as well as its political influence among Kuwaitis (Jamal & Melkote, 2008; Iskandar & El-Nawawy, 2003). Therefore, further studies should be conducted on other Arabic news TV

channels, such as Al-Arabiya, Al-Hurra, France24, Russia Today (RT), EuroNews, and China Arabic.

Surveying the Arab and Western academic media studies that have investigated media outlets in the Arab world in the last ten years, it can be asserted that we are living through a media revolution in the Arab World, given the role the satellite news channels and new media are playing in covering Arab revolutions that began in January 2011 in Tunisia and spread to other Arab countries (Al-Mahdi, 2011). The power of the new news media in the Arab world, led by mainstream Arabic news TV stations and social networking which are controlled by citizens on the ground rather than by large media conglomerates, has started to surpass official power and pave the way for changes that embody nations' dreams of individual freedom, rights, and dignified life after a long time of living under totalitarian and dictatorial Arab regimes that do not sanction freedom, human rights, freedom of expression or the establishment and practicing of democracy (Rugh, 2004; Lynch, 2006; Habib, 2011; Khairy, 2011). Despite examining the emergence of new news media in Arab Gulf countries, this study was unable to provide deeper insights into issues related to the impact of the Internet in the Arab World. More studies need to investigate the emergence of the Internet in the Arab world, Arab audience perceptions of the Internet, and the political impact of the Internet in Arab countries, and compare the Internet to traditional news outlets and Arabic news TV stations.

Additional studies might be conducted to extend the work which has focused on satellite TV news channels to examine new media applications such as blogs, YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter. The new media played a pivotal role in the Arab uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia before and after the revolutions, and in other country like Libya, Yemen and Syria. The number of Facebook users in Egypt by January 25 2011 was 4.2

million but increased by 23.8 per cent after the revolution to 5.2 million by March 2011. The number of Twitter users was 26,800 before the revolution, but afterwards increased to 44,200. Therefore, more studies need to be carried out to investigate the role of new media, social networks, and cell phone on mobilization, empowerment, shaping opinions and influencing change in the Arab world.

## **9.8 Conclusions**

The present study was designed to address the emergence and evolution of news media in Arab Gulf states, the phenomenon of Arabic news satellite TV channels and their success in the Arab world. The main findings from this study were supported by several pieces of previous research (El-Nawawy, 2003; Auter et al., 2005; Sakr, 2007; Zayani & Sahraoui, 2007; Jamal & Melkote, 2008; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008, 2009, 2010), that showed the emergence of new Arabic news TV services has changed the media scene in the Arab world in the following ways.

(1) *The liberalization of the Arab audiences of foreign news sources.* Arab audiences used to turn to foreign news stations like the BBC, Voice of America, Monte Carlo radio or CNN for accurate information and credible news since news and information was censored and control by most Arab governments. This situation has changed significantly in recent years after the birth of the pan-Arab satellite broadcasting network. Events are now reported live by sight and sound, without suffering from the permeating influence of Arab governments or relying on foreign news sources. This is a major and important development that has helped restore the trustworthiness and believability of Arab news channels, especially Al-Jazeera. Over and above, some foreign news sources have started to rely on Arab media outlets when reporting on events in the Arab world (Guaaybess, 2002, Sakr, 2007; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008, 2009, 2010).

(2) *Intensifying of media influence on the Arab and foreign political establishments.* A positive outcome of the emergence of Arab news TV stations is that their impact has started to influence different Arab issues and political institutions. If a news channel hosts a speaker with a different point of view to that of an Arab government, the political establishment in that country would view this show with suspicion. Regardless of the intra-Arab disputes resulting from the satellite TV channels, the impact of satellite TV stations has reached foreign political establishments. For instance, the new Arabic TV channels such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya have aroused the ire of the US administration since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 through their detailed coverage of the war and exposing the facts in terms, for example, the number of innocent civilians killed. This has occurred to an extent that prompted former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to warn Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya not to continue their coverage of events in the war in Iraq and accused them of incitement against US troops (Kraidy, 1998; Auter et al., 2005; Sakr, 2007; Zayani & Sahraoui, 2007; Johnson & Fahmy, 2008, 2009, 2010).

(3) *Working to raise Arab audiences' awareness.* Arab news satellite TV services have worked to raise the level of Arab audience's awareness through producing documentaries chronicling events and challenges facing the Arab publics and their future repercussions. Arab satellite TV news services, such as Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, and BBC (Arabic), have exclusively searched for witnesses to important events and turning points in Arab history wherever they were, interviewed them and given them a platform to narrate the events as they saw them in a way that has made these programmes historical documents that can be displayed to spread political awareness. For instance, the Palestinian cause was at the core of such programmes, which helped accentuate its details in addition to revealing the essence of the call to reform by

Western countries, its aims, its objectives, its tools of implementation and the extent to which it suits the Arab situation or not (Ghareeb, 2000; Sakr, 2007; Zayani & Sahraoui, 2007; Johnson and Fahmy, 2008, 2009, 2010).

(4) *Communicating with regional and international events.* There is no doubt that the news Arabic TV channels have caused a dramatic increase in Arab awareness of global events in terms of political, economic, social, and culturally significant events (Lynch, 2006; Alterman 1998).

This study investigated the Arabic news media landscape in the Arab Gulf States in order to enhance our understanding of the rapidly evolving news media markets and infrastructure in the Arab world. The research explored the profiles of news consumers across three countries - Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar - and examined their attitudes toward Arabic news TV services. As already observed, new media and Arabic TV news channels have significantly altered the media landscape and opened up a new type of news agenda to Arab audiences. These services have challenged the media status quo in which national news services were editorially controlled by governments and restricted in the types of news they could present, and in their style of news reporting. Pan-Arab world news reporting by channels such as Al-Jazeera have succeeded in distancing itself from the controlling influences of ruling elites and has also placed an Arab news supplier centre stage in the global news marketplace (Ghareeb, 2000; Alterman 2000; Rugh, 2004).

## **9.9 Postscript**

The spark began in a forgotten Arabic city in the depths of the Tunisian countryside. A policewoman prevented a young male college graduate from selling vegetables without a license, but the young man explained that he was destitute and that even the holders of university degrees need to earn a living just like others, but she was adamant and would

not let him sell in a market where all other sellers obtained a license. As the argument became more intense, the policewoman slapped the young man on the face, overturned his carriage and told him to leave. Humiliated and helpless, the young man set fire to himself in front of the municipality building, igniting the flames of protests and an overwhelming revolution demanding a change of regime and raising the motto of “Go Away” to the president as a response to what they deemed as deterioration of the economic situation, the high rate of unemployment, absence of social justice and the spread of corruption in the ruling regime (Andersen, 2011).

The spark of a mass uprising in Tunisia spread swiftly to other Arab countries like Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain. This wide-scale eruption has been dubbed the “Arab Spring of Change” in the Arab world, and Arabic news TV channels and new media have played a large part in making it real (Al-Mahdi, 2011; Fandy, 2011; Pintak, 2011). Nevertheless, similar incidents have occurred in this part of the Arab world previously such as Algeria, but there has been no effect and they were forgotten over time. But circumstances have changed recently due to the fact that Arabic News TV media were present with their cameras and reporters were transmitting the news around the clock to the entire world, which was improbable before because of censorship and sanctions imposed by Arab regimes on media, locally and abroad (Pintak, 2011; Khairy, 2011). These revolutions of social and political actions are the major results of the change which has been brought by satellite TV channels and new media, evidenced by the fact that any popular movement outside the spotlight of satellite TV channels died in its cradle.

The most prominent stage in the march of Arabic satellite TV channels was their embracing and supporting of youth revolts in Arab countries that demanded change; this was exemplified by Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya and the BBC Arabic TV satellite channel

(Khairy, 2011; Pintak, 2011). Despite this, Al-Jazeera, which deposed president Hosni Mubarak once described as a box of matches, was able to cover the revolution which ousted the president and his regime after 23 years in power. Arabic satellite television channels and new media such as Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and other social networking websites helped the uprising to succeed. However, surveys conducted by Gallop indicated that, contrary to what has been circulated that Egypt's revolution relied on the social networking capabilities of the Facebook and Twitter websites, the Egyptians' dependence on these two communication outlets only amounted to 8 per cent, and demonstrators who had access to the Internet constituted only 17 per cent of the total. In comparison, 63 per cent claimed their reliance was on Al-Jazeera to get the news (Gallop, 2011). Therefore, investigation must continue across different academic fields to examine the role that new media outlets play in the transformative changes that are shaping the future of the Arab world.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix 1: Questionnaire in English

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Arabic News TV Services</b> <b>Attitudes Survey</b></p>
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#### **Statement of Procedure:**

Thank you for your interest in this research project being conducted by Khalid Al-Jaber of the Department of Media and Communication, University of Leicester. This survey is primarily interested in finding out about your opinion toward news media services, the use of Arabic satellite TV news channels, and your attitudes towards those channels. This questionnaire will also ask you questions about your more general news consumption and media habits. Your participation in this study is voluntary and the data you provide are anonymous. Completion the online survey takes approximately 20 minutes. During the survey you can stop at any time and close the questionnaires. Your answers will automatically be saved for you and you can resume your survey at any time. You can skip questions you do not want to answer. You may also choose not to continue your participation in the study at any time.

Thank you again for your participation and interest.

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#### **Participation Agreement:**

I acknowledge that I have been informed of, and understand, the nature and purpose of this survey, and I freely consent to participate. I understand that my participants to this survey are confidential and anonymous, and will not be traced back to me in any way.

## **Section (1): Frequency of Media Consumption**

First, we would like to ask you a few questions about the media you use to get news information.

1. So thinking about the sources to which you turn to get your news, how frequently do you use each of the news sources listed below for news nowadays? [Please tick one number for each option]

News	Daily	Most days	A few times a week	Once a week	A few times a moth	Less than once a month	Don't use
Local TV channels	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Arabic news satellite TV channels (Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Non-Arabic news satellite TV channels (CNN, BBC, Word)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Internet viacomputer	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Radio	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Newspapers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Magazines	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Mobile Devices	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

2. How frequently do you consume each of the following TV channels nowadays? [Please tick one number for each option].

News	Daily	4-6 days per week	1-3 days per week	Less than once a week	Never
<b>A- Local &amp; National TV</b>					
1. Saudi Arabia TV	1	2	3	4	5
2. Kuwait TV	1	2	3	4	5
3. Bahrain TV	1	2	3	4	5
4. Qatar TV	1	2	3	4	5
5. UAE TV	1	2	3	4	5
6. Oman TV	1	2	3	4	5
<b>B- Arabic news satellite TV channels</b>					
7. Al-Jazeera TV	1	2	3	4	5
8. Al-Arabiya TV	1	2	3	4	5
9. BBC (Arabic)	1	2	3	4	5
10. Al-Hurra	1	2	3	4	5
11. France 24 (Arabic)	1	2	3	4	5
<b>C- News on channels broadcast from Non-Arabic-channel</b>					
12. CNN News (English)	1	2	3	4	5
13. BBC World (English)	1	2	3	4	5

14. Euro News (English)	1	2	3	4	5
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### **Section (2): Your News Interests**

3. Thinking about news coverage in general, how much do agree or disagree that it is important for a high quality news service to provide news on each of the topics listed below? [For each statement, please circle the response that best represents your interests].

<b>News Topics</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>No opinion</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>
Human interest stories	5	4	3	2	1
Politics in Arab world	5	4	3	2	1
World-wide politics and current events	5	4	3	2	1
City, business and financial issues	5	4	3	2	1
Current events in your country	5	4	3	2	1
Entertainment	5	4	3	2	1
Crime news	5	4	3	2	1
Consumer affairs	5	4	3	2	1
Sports news	5	4	3	2	1
Travel news	5	4	3	2	1
Weather news	5	4	3	2	1
Human Rights issues	5	4	3	2	1
Minority issues	5	4	3	2	1
Youth issues	5	4	3	2	1
Iranian Nuclear Weapon	5	4	3	2	1
Israel/Palestine Conflict	5	4	3	2	1
Terrorism issues	5	4	3	2	1
Sunnis and Shias	5	4	3	2	1
Arab-Arab conflict	5	4	3	2	1
The Iraq conflict	5	4	3	2	1
The Afghani Conflict	5	4	3	2	1
Darfur Conflict	5	4	3	2	1
Financial crisis	5	4	3	2	1
Europe issues	5	4	3	2	1
American issues	5	4	3	2	1
Latin American Issues	5	4	3	2	1
Asia issues	5	4	3	2	1
Africa issues	5	4	3	2	1

4. Thinking about the news in general, how much do you agree or disagree that it is important to you for news services today to satisfy each of the needs or gratifications listed below.

<b>News Service</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>No opinion</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>
1. It is a credible source of news.	5	4	3	2	1
2. It provides me with information about what is going on.	5	4	3	2	1
3. It helps me make up my mind about the important issues of the day.	5	4	3	2	1

4. I use its discussions of issues as ammunition in discourse with others.	5	4	3	2	1
5. It helps me judge what kind of job the Arab government officials are doing.	5	4	3	2	1
6. It provides me with uncensored information.	5	4	3	2	1
7. The channel is free to discuss any political issue.	5	4	3	2	1
8. It shows the real work of Arab political rulers and governments, including their misconduct.	5	4	3	2	1
9. It covers news and issues those Arab political leaders and governments try to hide.	5	4	3	2	1
10. It gives different political points of views the chance to exist.	5	4	3	2	1
11. It keeps me informed about the current issues and events.	5	4	3	2	1
12. It discusses issues and presents news in exciting and thrilling ways.	5	4	3	2	1
13. It presents news events with thorough and in-depth analysis.	5	4	3	2	1
14. I enjoy watching their news anchors.	5	4	3	2	1
15. I enjoy watching their news reporters.	5	4	3	2	1
16. I watch its news to compare my own ideas to what the commentators say.	5	4	3	2	1
17. It provides good visual coverage of news events.	5	4	3	2	1

5. Thinking about the standards you expect of news reporting in general, please say for each of the news values listed below, how important you think it is for news services to achieve the highest standards of performance.[For each statement, please circle the response from (very important, quite important, not very important, not at all important)]

News Services	Very important	Quite Important	Not very important	Not at all important
Be fair to all sides	4	3	2	1
Unbiased.	4	3	2	1
Tell the whole story	4	3	2	1
Is always factually accurate	4	3	2	1
Respect people's privacy	4	3	2	1
Care about what the audience thinks	4	3	2	1
Concerned with the community's well-being	4	3	2	1
Watches out for your interests	4	3	2	1
Separates facts from opinions	4	3	2	1
Can be trusted	4	3	2	1
Sensationalizes the news	4	3	2	1
Has a clear moral code	4	3	2	1
Produces news that makes the service profitable	4	3	2	1

Has well trained reporters	4	3	2	1
Not afraid to gives it own opinions about news issues	4	3	2	1
Making the news exciting for people	4	3	2	1
Produces news that is relevant to me	4	3	2	1
Is up-to-date with the latest news developments	4	3	2	1

**Section (3): Opinions about the News Topics on Arab TV News Services**

6. Thinking about the news presented on Al-Jazeera, how much do you agree or disagree that it provides good coverage of each of the news topics listed below? **(If you don't watch Al-Jazeera, or you don't want to answer this question, Please go to the next question)**

News Topics	Strongly Agree	Agree	No opinion	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Human interest stories	5	4	3	2	1
Politics in Arab world	5	4	3	2	1
World-wide politics and current events	5	4	3	2	1
City, business and financial issues	5	4	3	2	1
Current events in your country	5	4	3	2	1
Entertainment	5	4	3	2	1
Crime news	5	4	3	2	1
Consumer affairs	5	4	3	2	1
Sports news	5	4	3	2	1
Travel news	5	4	3	2	1
Weather news	5	4	3	2	1
Human Rights issues	5	4	3	2	1
Minority issues	5	4	3	2	1
Youth issues	5	4	3	2	1
Iranian Nuclear Weapon	5	4	3	2	1
Israel/Palestine Conflict	5	4	3	2	1
Terrorism issues	5	4	3	2	1
Sunnis and Shias	5	4	3	2	1
Arab-Arab conflict	5	4	3	2	1
The Iraq conflict	5	4	3	2	1
The Afghani Conflict	5	4	3	2	1
Darfur Conflict	5	4	3	2	1
Financial crisis	5	4	3	2	1
Europe issues	5	4	3	2	1
American issues	5	4	3	2	1
Latin American Issues	5	4	3	2	1
Asia issues	5	4	3	2	1
Africa issues	5	4	3	2	1

7. Thinking about the news presented on Al-Arabiya, how much do you agree or disagree that it provides good coverage of each of the news topics listed below? **(If you don't watch Al-Arabiya or you don't want to answer this question, Please go to the next question)**

News Topics	Strongly Agree	Agree	No opinion	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Human interest stories	5	4	3	2	1
Politics in Arab world	5	4	3	2	1
World-wide politics and current events	5	4	3	2	1
City, business and financial issues	5	4	3	2	1
Current events in your country	5	4	3	2	1
Entertainment	5	4	3	2	1
Crime news	5	4	3	2	1
Consumer affairs	5	4	3	2	1
Sports news	5	4	3	2	1
Travel news	5	4	3	2	1
Weather news	5	4	3	2	1
Human Rights issues	5	4	3	2	1
Minority issues	5	4	3	2	1
Youth issues	5	4	3	2	1
Iranian Nuclear Weapon	5	4	3	2	1
Israel/Palestine Conflict	5	4	3	2	1
Terrorism issues	5	4	3	2	1
Sunnis and Shias	5	4	3	2	1
Arab-Arab conflict	5	4	3	2	1
The Iraq conflict	5	4	3	2	1
The Afghani Conflict	5	4	3	2	1
Darfur Conflict	5	4	3	2	1
Financial crisis	5	4	3	2	1
Europe issues	5	4	3	2	1
American issues	5	4	3	2	1
Latin American Issues	5	4	3	2	1
Asia issues	5	4	3	2	1
Africa issues	5	4	3	2	1

8. Thinking about the news presented on BBC (Arabic), how much do you agree or disagree that it provides good coverage of each of the news topics listed below?  
**(If you don't watch BBC (Arabic) or you don't want to answer this question, Please go to the next question))**

News Topics	Strongly Agree	Agree	No opinion	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Human interest stories	5	4	3	2	1
Politics in Arab world	5	4	3	2	1
World-wide politics and current events	5	4	3	2	1
City, business and financial issues	5	4	3	2	1
Current events in your country	5	4	3	2	1
Entertainment	5	4	3	2	1
Crime news	5	4	3	2	1
Consumer affairs	5	4	3	2	1
Sports news	5	4	3	2	1
Travel news	5	4	3	2	1
Weather news	5	4	3	2	1
Human Rights issues	5	4	3	2	1
Minority issues	5	4	3	2	1

Youth issues	5	4	3	2	1
Iranian Nuclear Weapon	5	4	3	2	1
Israel/Palestine Conflict	5	4	3	2	1
Terrorism issues	5	4	3	2	1
Sunnis and Shias	5	4	3	2	1
Arab-Arab conflict	5	4	3	2	1
The Iraq conflict	5	4	3	2	1
The Afghani Conflict	5	4	3	2	1
Darfur Conflict	5	4	3	2	1
Financial crisis	5	4	3	2	1
Europe issues	5	4	3	2	1
American issues	5	4	3	2	1
Latin American Issues	5	4	3	2	1
Asia issues	5	4	3	2	1
Africa issues	5	4	3	2	1

9. Thinking about the news presented on France 24 (Arabic), how much do you agree or disagree that it provides good coverage of each of the news topics listed below? **(If you don't watch France 24 (Arabic) or you don't want to answer this question, Please go to the next question)**

News Topics	Strongly Agree	Agree	No opinion	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Human interest stories	5	4	3	2	1
Politics in Arab world	5	4	3	2	1
World-wide politics and current events	5	4	3	2	1
City, business and financial issues	5	4	3	2	1
Current events in your country	5	4	3	2	1
Entertainment	5	4	3	2	1
Crime news	5	4	3	2	1
Consumer affairs	5	4	3	2	1
Sports news	5	4	3	2	1
Travel news	5	4	3	2	1
Weather news	5	4	3	2	1
Human Rights issues	5	4	3	2	1
Minority issues	5	4	3	2	1
Youth issues	5	4	3	2	1
Iranian Nuclear Weapon	5	4	3	2	1
Israel/Palestine Conflict	5	4	3	2	1
Terrorism issues	5	4	3	2	1
Sunnis and Shias	5	4	3	2	1
Arab-Arab conflict	5	4	3	2	1
The Iraq conflict	5	4	3	2	1
The Afghani Conflict	5	4	3	2	1
Darfur Conflict	5	4	3	2	1
Financial crisis	5	4	3	2	1
Europe issues	5	4	3	2	1
American issues	5	4	3	2	1
Latin American Issues	5	4	3	2	1
Asia issues	5	4	3	2	1
Africa issues	5	4	3	2	1

10. Thinking about the news presented on Al-Hurra, how much do you agree or disagree that it provides good coverage of each of the news topics listed below?  
**(If you don't watch Al-Hurra or you don't want to answer this question, Please go to the next question)**

News Topics	Strongly Agree	Agree	No opinion	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Human interest stories	5	4	3	2	1
Politics in Arab world	5	4	3	2	1
World-wide politics and current events	5	4	3	2	1
City, business and financial issues	5	4	3	2	1
Current events in your country	5	4	3	2	1
Entertainment	5	4	3	2	1
Crime news	5	4	3	2	1
Consumer affairs	5	4	3	2	1
Sports news	5	4	3	2	1
Travel news	5	4	3	2	1
Weather news	5	4	3	2	1
Human Rights issues	5	4	3	2	1
Minority issues	5	4	3	2	1
Youth issues	5	4	3	2	1
Iranian Nuclear Weapon	5	4	3	2	1
Israel/Palestine Conflict	5	4	3	2	1
Terrorism issues	5	4	3	2	1
Sunnis and Shias	5	4	3	2	1
Arab-Arab conflict	5	4	3	2	1
The Iraq conflict	5	4	3	2	1
The Afghani Conflict	5	4	3	2	1
Darfur Conflict	5	4	3	2	1
Financial crisis	5	4	3	2	1
Europe issues	5	4	3	2	1
American issues	5	4	3	2	1
Latin American Issues	5	4	3	2	1
Asia issues	5	4	3	2	1
Africa issues	5	4	3	2	1

**Thank you. Please continue to the next section.**

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#### **Section (4): Motivations of News**

We would like to ask you for reasons to watch the news in Arabic news satellite TV channels. [For each statement, please circle the response (SA, A, N, D, SD) that best represents your reasons for watching Arabic news satellite TV channels listed below which is (Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, BBC (Arabic), France24 (Arabic), Al-Hurra)].

11. **Al-Jazeera:** Please circle one number for each statement that best reflects your reasons for watching **Al-Jazeera** news. **(If you don't watch Al-Jazeera or you don't want to answer this question, Please go to the next question)**

<b>Al-Jazeera</b>	Strongly Agree	Agree	No opinion	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1. It is a credible source of news.	5	4	3	2	1
2. It provides me with information about what is going on.	5	4	3	2	1
3. It helps me make up my mind about the important issues of the day.	5	4	3	2	1
4. I use its discussions of issues as ammunition in discourse with others.	5	4	3	2	1
5. It helps me judge what kind of job the Arab government officials are doing.	5	4	3	2	1
6. It provides me with uncensored information.	5	4	3	2	1
7. The channel is free to discuss any political issue.	5	4	3	2	1
8. It shows the real work of Arab political rulers and governments, including their misconduct.	5	4	3	2	1
9. It covers news and issues those Arab political leaders and governments try to hide.	5	4	3	2	1
10. It gives different political points of views the chance to exist.	5	4	3	2	1
11. It keeps me informed about the current issues and events.	5	4	3	2	1
12. It discusses issues and presents news in exciting and thrilling ways.	5	4	3	2	1
13. It presents news events with thorough and in-depth analysis.	5	4	3	2	1
14. I enjoy watching their news anchors.	5	4	3	2	1
15. I enjoy watching their news reporters.	5	4	3	2	1
16. I watch its news to compare my own ideas to what the commentators say.	5	4	3	2	1
17. It provides good visual coverage of news events.	5	4	3	2	1

12. **Al-Arabiya:** Please circle one number for each statement that best reflects your reasons for watching **Al-Arabiya** news on each statement. **(If you don't watch Al-Arabiya or you don't want to answer this question, Please go to the next question)**

<b>Al-Arabiya</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>No opinion</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>
1. It is a credible source of news.	5	4	3	2	1
2. It provides me with information about what is going on.	5	4	3	2	1
3. It helps me make up my mind about the important issues of the day.	5	4	3	2	1
4. I use its discussions of issues as ammunition in discourse with others.	5	4	3	2	1
5. It helps me judge what kind of job the Arab government officials are doing.	5	4	3	2	1
6. It provides me with uncensored information.	5	4	3	2	1
7. The channel is free to discuss any political issue.	5	4	3	2	1
8. It shows the real work of Arab political rulers and governments, including their misconduct.	5	4	3	2	1
9. It covers news and issues those Arab political leaders and governments try to hide.	5	4	3	2	1
10. It gives different political points of views the chance to exist.	5	4	3	2	1
11. It keeps me informed about the current issues and events.	5	4	3	2	1
12. It discusses issues and presents news in exciting and thrilling ways.	5	4	3	2	1
13. It presents news events with thorough and in-depth analysis.	5	4	3	2	1
14. I enjoy watching their news anchors.	5	4	3	2	1
15. I enjoy watching their news reporters.	5	4	3	2	1
16. I watch its news to compare my own ideas to what the commentators say.	5	4	3	2	1
17. It provides good visual coverage of news events.	5	4	3	2	1

13. **BBC (Arabic):** Please circle one number for each statement that best reflects your reasons for watching **BBC (Arabic)** news on each statement. **(If you don't watch BBC (Arabic) you don't want to answer this question, Please go to the next question)**

<b>BBC (Arabic)</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>No opinion</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>
1. It is a credible source of news.	5	4	3	2	1
2. It provides me with information about what is going on.	5	4	3	2	1
3. It helps me make up my mind about the important issues of the day.	5	4	3	2	1
4. I use its discussions of issues as ammunition in discourse with others.	5	4	3	2	1

5. It helps me judge what kind of job the Arab government officials are doing.	5	4	3	2	1
6. It provides me with uncensored information.	5	4	3	2	1
7. The channel is free to discuss any political issue.	5	4	3	2	1
8. It shows the real work of Arab political rulers and governments, including their misconduct.	5	4	3	2	1
9. It covers news and issues those Arab political leaders and governments try to hide.	5	4	3	2	1
10. It gives different political points of views the chance to exist.	5	4	3	2	1
11. It keeps me informed about the current issues and events.	5	4	3	2	1
12. It discusses issues and presents news in exciting and thrilling ways.	5	4	3	2	1
13. It presents news events with thorough and in-depth analysis.	5	4	3	2	1
14. I enjoy watching their news anchors.	5	4	3	2	1
15. I enjoy watching their news reporters.	5	4	3	2	1
16. I watch its news to compare my own ideas to what the commentators say.	5	4	3	2	1
17. It provides good visual coverage of news events.	5	4	3	2	1

14. **France24 (Arabic):** Please circle one number for each statement that best reflects your reasons for watching **France24 (Arabic)** news on each statement. **(If you don't watch France 24 (Arabic) or you don't want to answer this question, Please go to the next question)**

<b>France24 (Arabic)</b>	Strongly Agree	Agree	No opinion	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1. It is a credible source of news.	5	4	3	2	1
2. It provides me with information about what is going on.	5	4	3	2	1
3. It helps me make up my mind about the important issues of the day.	5	4	3	2	1
4. I use its discussions of issues as ammunition in discourse with others.	5	4	3	2	1
5. It helps me judge what kind of job the Arab government officials are doing.	5	4	3	2	1
6. It provides me with uncensored information.	5	4	3	2	1
7. The channel is free to discuss any political issue.	5	4	3	2	1
8. It shows the real work of Arab political rulers and governments, including their misconduct.	5	4	3	2	1
9. It covers news and issues those Arab political leaders and governments try to	5	4	3	2	1

hide.					
10. It gives different political points of views the chance to exist.	5	4	3	2	1
11. It keeps me informed about the current issues and events.	5	4	3	2	1
12. It discusses issues and presents news in exciting and thrilling ways.	5	4	3	2	1
13. It presents news events with thorough and in-depth analysis.	5	4	3	2	1
14. I enjoy watching their news anchors.	5	4	3	2	1
15. I enjoy watching their news reporters.	5	4	3	2	1
16. I watch its news to compare my own ideas to what the commentators say.	5	4	3	2	1
17. It provides good visual coverage of news events.	5	4	3	2	1

15. **Al-Hurra:** Please circle one number for each statement that best reflects your reasons for watching **Al-Hurra** news on each statement. **(If you don't watch Al-Hurra or you don't want to answer this question, Please go to the next question)**

<b>Al-Hurra</b>	Strongly Agree	Agree	No opinion	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1. It is a credible source of news.	5	4	3	2	1
2. It provides me with information about what is going on.	5	4	3	2	1
3. It helps me make up my mind about the important issues of the day.	5	4	3	2	1
4. I use its discussions of issues as ammunition in discourse with others.	5	4	3	2	1
5. It helps me judge what kind of job the Arab government officials are doing.	5	4	3	2	1
6. It provides me with uncensored information.	5	4	3	2	1
7. The channel is free to discuss any political issue.	5	4	3	2	1
8. It shows the real work of Arab political rulers and governments, including their misconduct.	5	4	3	2	1
9. It covers news and issues those Arab political leaders and governments try to hide.	5	4	3	2	1
10. It gives different political points of views the chance to exist.	5	4	3	2	1
11. It keeps me informed about the current issues and events.	5	4	3	2	1
12. It discusses issues and presents news in exciting and thrilling ways.	5	4	3	2	1
13. It presents news events with thorough and in-depth analysis.	5	4	3	2	1
14. I enjoy watching their news anchors.	5	4	3	2	1

15. I enjoy watching their news reporters.	5	4	3	2	1
16. I watch its news to compare my own ideas to what the commentators say.	5	4	3	2	1
17. It provides good visual coverage of news events.	5	4	3	2	1

**Thank you. Please continue to the next section.**

### **Section (5): Quality of News**

Now we would like to know how you feel overall about news coverage on the following Arabic news channels in general (Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, BBC (Arabic), France24 (Arabic), Al-Hurra).

Below are a series of opposite statements. The numbers in between represent the range from one statement to its opposite. For each item, circle the number that most represents your opinion overall

For example, if one of the ranges was:

Exciting      1      2      3      4      5      Dull

And you feel that BBC News is somewhat exciting, you might choose to circle "2".

16. Please circle the number that best represents your feelings about **Al-Jazeera** news on each of the following series of statements. **(If you don't watch Al-Jazeera or you don't want to answer this question, Please go to the next question)**

	1	2	3	4	5	
Fair						Unfair
Unbiased	1	2	3	4	5	Biased
Tells the whole story	1	2	3	4	5	Does not tell the whole story
Accurate	1	2	3	4	5	Inaccurate.
Respects people's privacy	1	2	3	4	5	Invades people's privacy
Does care what the audience thinks	1	2	3	4	5	Does not care what the audience thinks
Concerned with the community's well-being	1	2	3	4	5	Not concerned with the community's well-being
Separates facts from opinions	1	2	3	4	5	Mixes together facts and opinions.
Can be trusted	1	2	3	4	5	Cannot be trusted
Doesn't sensationalize	1	2	3	4	5	Sensationalizes
Moral	1	2	3	4	5	Immoral
Produces news that makes the service profitable	1	2	3	4	5	Produces news that does not make the service profitable
Reporters are well trained	1	2	3	4	5	Reporters are poorly trained.
Not afraid to give its own opinions about news issues	1	2	3	4	5	afraid to give its own opinions about news issues
Does make the news exciting for people	1	2	3	4	5	Does not make the news exciting for people
Produces news that is relevant to me	1	2	3	4	5	Does not produce news that is relevant to me
Is up-to-date with the latest news developments	1	2	3	4	5	Not up-to-date with the latest news developments

17. **Al-Arabiya(If you don't watch Al-Arabiya or you don't want to answer this question, Please go to the next question)**

Fair	1	2	3	4	5	Unfair
Unbiased	1	2	3	4	5	Biased
Tells the whole story	1	2	3	4	5	Does not tell the whole story
Accurate	1	2	3	4	5	Inaccurate.
Respects people's privacy	1	2	3	4	5	Invades people's privacy
Does care what the audience thinks	1	2	3	4	5	Does not care what the audience thinks
Concerned with the community's well-being	1	2	3	4	5	Not concerned with the community's well-being
Separates facts from opinions	1	2	3	4	5	Mixes together facts and opinions.
Can be trusted	1	2	3	4	5	Cannot be trusted
Doesn't sensationalize	1	2	3	4	5	Sensationalizes
Moral	1	2	3	4	5	Immoral
Produces news that makes the service profitable	1	2	3	4	5	Produces news that does not make the service profitable
Reporters are well trained	1	2	3	4	5	Reporters are poorly trained.
Not afraid to gives it own opinions about news issues	1	2	3	4	5	afraid to gives it own opinions about news issues
Does make the news exciting for people	1	2	3	4	5	Does not make the news exciting for people
Produces news that is relevant to me	1	2	3	4	5	Does not produces news that is relevant to me
Is up-to-date with the latest news developments	1	2	3	4	5	Not up-to-date with the latest news developments

18. **BBC (Arabic)(If you don't watch BBC (Arabic) or you don't want to answer this question, Please go to next the question)**

Fair	1	2	3	4	5	Unfair
Unbiased	1	2	3	4	5	Biased
Tells the whole story	1	2	3	4	5	Does not tell the whole story
Accurate	1	2	3	4	5	Inaccurate.
Respects people's privacy	1	2	3	4	5	Invades people's privacy
Does care what the audience thinks	1	2	3	4	5	Does not care what the audience thinks
Concerned with the community's well-being	1	2	3	4	5	Not concerned with the community's well-being
Separates facts from opinions	1	2	3	4	5	Mixes together facts and opinions.
Can be trusted	1	2	3	4	5	Cannot be trusted
Doesn't sensationalize	1	2	3	4	5	Sensationalizes
Moral	1	2	3	4	5	Immoral
Produces news that makes the service profitable	1	2	3	4	5	Produces news that does not make the service profitable
Reporters are well trained	1	2	3	4	5	Reporters are poorly trained.
Not afraid to gives it own opinions about news issues	1	2	3	4	5	afraid to gives it own opinions about news issues
Does make the news exciting for people	1	2	3	4	5	Does not make the news exciting for people
Produces news that is relevant to me	1	2	3	4	5	Does not produces news that is relevant to me
Is up-to-date with the latest news developments	1	2	3	4	5	Not up-to-date with the latest news developments

19. **France24 (Arabic)(If you don't watch France24 (Arabic) or you don't want to answer this question, Please go to the next question)**

Fair	1	2	3	4	5	Unfair
Unbiased	1	2	3	4	5	Biased
Tells the whole story	1	2	3	4	5	Does not tell the whole story
Accurate	1	2	3	4	5	Inaccurate.
Respects people's privacy	1	2	3	4	5	Invades people's privacy
Does care what the audience thinks	1	2	3	4	5	Does not care what the audience thinks
Concerned with the community's well-being	1	2	3	4	5	Not concerned with the community's well-being
Separates facts from opinions	1	2	3	4	5	Mixes together facts and opinions.
Can be trusted	1	2	3	4	5	Cannot be trusted
Doesn't sensationalize	1	2	3	4	5	Sensationalizes
Moral	1	2	3	4	5	Immoral
Produces news that makes the service profitable	1	2	3	4	5	Produces news that does not make the service profitable
Reporters are well trained	1	2	3	4	5	Reporters are poorly trained.
Not afraid to gives it own opinions about news issues	1	2	3	4	5	afraid to gives it own opinions about news issues
Does make the news exciting for people	1	2	3	4	5	Does not make the news exciting for people
Produces news that is relevant to me	1	2	3	4	5	Does not produces news that is relevant to me
Is up-to-date with the latest news developments	1	2	3	4	5	Not up-to-date with the latest news developments

20. **Al-Hurra: (If you don't watch Al-Hurra or you don't want to answer this question, Please go to the next question)**

Fair	1	2	3	4	5	Unfair
Unbiased	1	2	3	4	5	Biased
Tells the whole story	1	2	3	4	5	Does not tell the whole story
Accurate	1	2	3	4	5	Inaccurate.
Respects people's privacy	1	2	3	4	5	Invades people's privacy
Does care what the audience thinks	1	2	3	4	5	Does not care what the audience thinks
Concerned with the community's well-being	1	2	3	4	5	Not concerned with the community's well-being
Separates facts from opinions	1	2	3	4	5	Mixes together facts and opinions.
Can be trusted	1	2	3	4	5	Cannot be trusted
Doesn't sensationalize	1	2	3	4	5	Sensationalizes
Moral	1	2	3	4	5	Immoral
Produces news that makes the service profitable	1	2	3	4	5	Produces news that does not make the service profitable
Reporters are well trained	1	2	3	4	5	Reporters are poorly trained.
Not afraid to gives it own opinions about news issues	1	2	3	4	5	afraid to gives it own opinions about news issues
Does make the news exciting for people	1	2	3	4	5	Does not make the news exciting for people
Produces news that is relevant to me	1	2	3	4	5	Does not produces news that is relevant to me
Is up-to-date with the latest news developments	1	2	3	4	5	Not up-to-date with the latest news developments

**Thank you. Please continue to the next section.**

### **Section (6): Personal Characteristics**

Finally, we would like to ask a few questions about you and your background.

21. How old are you. (Please fill in box.)

1) 18-25 years old
2) 26-30 years old
3) 31-40 years old
4) 41-50 years old
5) 51 or Older

22. What is your gender? (Select one.)

1) Male
2) Female

23. What is your highest level of education? (Please select from the options below.)

1) Less than high school
2) High school degree
3) College graduate
4) Bachelor's Degree
5) Master's Degree
6) Ph.D, J.D., etc.
7) Others

24. What is your gross annual household income level in U.S. dollars?

1) No income
2) Below \$15,000
3) \$15,001 to \$25,000
4) \$25,001 to \$35,000
5) \$35,001 to \$45,000
6) \$45,001 to \$55,000
7) \$55,001 to \$75,000
8) Over \$75,001

25. What is your Employment Status?

1) Student
2) Employee
3) Unemployed
4) Unemployed in part-time work
5) Not work at all

26. What is your country of origin?

1) Your country is: .....
---------------------------

27. Please select the option that best describes your marital status.

1) Single, never married
2) Married
3) Divorced
4) Widowed

28. How do you generally consider yourself to be (Political Orientation)?

1) Extremely liberal
2) Liberal
3) Neutral
4) Conservative
5) Extremely conservative

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Thank you again for your assistance in this research. Your contribution helps us understand this phenomenon is greatly appreciated. Again, any information obtained from this study will only for academic purpose and remains strictly confidential. If you are interested in the results, please feel free to contact me by e-mail.

## Appendix 2: Questionnaire in Arabic

### استبيان حول استخدام وسائل الإعلام الإخبارية العربية

شكرا لاهتمامكم بهذا المشروع البحثي العلمي والذي يشرف عليه الطالب في مرحلة الدكتوراه خالد الجابر من كلية الإعلام والاتصال في جامعة ليستر في المملكة المتحدة (بريطانيا).

يهدف هذا الاستبيان إلى بيان استخدامك للمحطات ووسائل الإعلام الإخبارية العربية و توجهاتك نحو هذه القنوات. كما يطرح عليك الاستبيان أسئلة تتعلق بتعاملك بشكل عام مع الأخبار وعاداتك في استخدام وسائل الإعلام.

إن مشاركتك في هذا الاستطلاع تطوعية والبيانات التي تقدمها لا تحمل اسمك.

تستغرق الإجابة عن أسئلة الاستطلاع 20 دقيقة، الرجاء الإجابة حتى الصفحة الأخيرة.

لديك الخيار في عدم الإجابة على كل الأسئلة بل فقط تلك المتعلقة بوسائل الإعلام أو المحطات الإخبارية الفضائية العربية التي تفضل أن تتابعها وتشاهدها. كما يمكن للمشاركة في الاستبيان الإلكتروني أن يتوقف ويتابع الإجابة لاحقا أو الانسحاب وعدم إكمال أسئلة البحث في أي وقت.

سيتم نشر نتائج الاستبيان في المجلات الأكاديمية الدولية والهدف هو عرض وإبراز المواضيع والقضايا والتي تشغل المشاهد والرأي العام في العالم العربي.

#### اتفاقية المشاركة

اللوائح والأنظمة الخاصة في الجامعة تتطلب منا الحصول على موافقتك بالمشاركة في هذا الإستفتاء كما هو موضح أدناه:

"أقر أنني اطلعت وفهمت الهدف من هذا الاستطلاع. وأوافق باختياري على المشاركة. وأفهم أن أجوبتي على أسئلة الاستبيان ستكون سرية. ولا تحمل اسمي. ولن تكون هناك محاولة بأي طريقة كانت لمعرفة او تعقب صاحب الأجوبة المشاركة في هذا البحث."

إذا كنت موافقا الرجاء وضع علامة صح (√) في خانة الموافقة أو علامة (X) في خانة عدم الموافقة.

في حالة عدم الموافقة الرجاء عدم الإجابة على أسئلة الاستبيان.

شكرا لكم مرة أخرى للمشاركة في هذه الدراسة العلمية.

## القسم (1) استخدام وسائل الإعلام الإخبارية

في البداية نود أن نطرح عليك بعض الأسئلة حول وسائل الإعلام التي تستخدمها للحصول على الأخبار.

(1) فيما يتعلق بالمصادر الإعلامية التي تستخدمها للحصول على الأخبار. كم مرة تستخدم كلا من المصادر التالية للحصول على الأخبار بشكل مستمر؟ (الرجاء وضع علامة تحت عدد المرات التي تنطبق عليك)

المصادر	يوميًا	معظم الأيام	عدة مرات في الأسبوع	مرة في الأسبوع	عدة مرات في الشهر	أقل من مرة في الشهر	لا استخدم
قنوات التلفاز المحلية							
قنوات التلفاز الإخبارية الفضائية العربية مثل الجزيرة أو العربية							
قنوات التلفاز الإخبارية غير العربية مثل سي ان ان أو بي بي سي العالمية							
الإنترنت							
الراديو							
الصحف							
المجلات							
الهاتف المحمول							

(2) كم مرة تشاهد المحطات والقنوات التلفزيونية التالية؟ (الرجاء وضع علامة تحت عدد المرات التي تنطبق عليك)

المصادر	يوميًا	4-6 ايام في الاسبوع	1-3 ايام في الاسبوع	أقل من مرة في الاسبوع	لا اشاهد
<b>المحطات المحلية والحكومية</b>					
(1) تلفزيون السعودية					
(2) تلفزيون الكويت					
(3) تلفزيون البحرين					
(4) تلفزيون قطر					
(5) تلفزيون ابوظبي					
(6) تلفزيون عمان					
<b>المحطات الإخبارية العربية</b>					
(7) قناة الجزيرة					
(8) قناة العربية					
(9) قناة بي بي سي العربية					
(10) قناة الحرة					
(11) قناة فرانس 24 العربية					
<b>المحطات الإخبارية الأجنبية</b>					
(12) قناة سي ان ان					
(13) قناة بي بي سي الدولية					
(14) قناة يورو الأوربية					

## القسم (2) تغطية وسائل الإعلام الإخبارية

(3) عند التفكير في التغطية الإخبارية بشكل عام، ما مدى موافقتك أو عدم موافقتك على أهمية تغطية المواضيع التالية لرفع مستوى الخدمة الإخبارية التي تقدم للمشاهد. (الرجاء وضع إشارة حول اختيارك أهمية المواضيع التي يجب تغطيتها لكل عبارة)

المواضيع	أوافق بشدة	أوافق	محايد	معارض	معارض بشدة
أخبار تتعلق بالقضايا الإنسانية					
السياسة في العالم العربي					
السياسة الدولية والأحداث الجارية					
قضايا المال والأعمال والاقتصاد					
الأحداث الجارية في بلدك					
أخبار التسلية					
أخبار الجريمة					
شؤون المستهلك					

					أخبار الرياضة
					أخبار السفر والرحلات
					أخبار الطقس
					قضايا حقوق الإنسان
					قضايا الأقليات
					قضايا الشباب
					السلاح النووي الإيراني
					الصراع الإسرائيلي-الفالسطيني
					قضايا الإرهاب
					السنة والشيعية
					الصراعات العربية-العربية
					الصراع في العراق
					الصراع في أفغانستان
					الصراع في دارفور
					الأزمة المالية العالمية
					القضايا الأمريكية
					القضايا الأوروبية
					قضايا أمريكا اللاتينية
					قضايا آسيا
					قضايا إفريقيا

(4) عند التفكير بالتغطية الإخبارية بشكل عام، ما مدى موافقتك أو عدم موافقتك على أهمية توفر البنود التالية في الخدمة أو الوسيلة الإخبارية لتلبية احتياجاتك ورضائك عن مستوى الخدمات الإخبارية. (الرجاء وضع إشارة حول اختيارك مقابل كل عبارة)

الدوافع والحوافز	أوافق بشدة	أوافق	محايد	معارض	معارض بشدة
ان تكون مصدرا موثوقا للأخبار					
توفر لي معلومات حول ما يجري					
تساعدني على اتخاذ رأي بشأن القضايا اليومية المهمة					
أستخدم مناقشاتها لمختلف القضايا في نقاشي مع الآخرين					
تساعدني على فهم ما طبيعة العمل الذي يقوم به المسئولون العرب					
توفر لي معلومات غير خاضعة للرقابة					
اخبار القناة حرة في طرح و مناقشة أي موضوع سياسي					
تظهر العمل الحقيقي لدى الحكومات العربية حتى سوء سلوكها					
تعرض أخبارا وموضوعات يحاول القادة العرب والحكومات العربية أن يخفوها					
تتيح الفرصة للآراء السياسية المختلفة لكي تتواجد					
تبقيني على اطلاع على الأحداث والقضايا الجارية					
تناقش القضايا وتقدم الأخبار بطريقة مثيرة وتبعث على السرور					
تقدم الأخبار مع تحليلات متعمقة					
استمتع بمشاهدة مقدمي الأخبار					
لدى القناة أفضل مراسلي الأخبار في الميدان					
أشاهد الأخبار لكي أقارن آرائي بما يقوله المعلقون					
تقدم تغطية مصورة جيدة للأحداث					

(5) عند التفكير بالمقاييس التي تتوقعها من الأخبار، ما مدى أهمية القيم التالية في نقل الأخبار بشكل عام لتحقيق أعلى مستوى للأداء والجودة. (الرجاء وضع إشارة حول اختيارك مقابل كل عبارة تعتقد انها المقاييس الصحيح التي يجب أن تكون عليه الأخبار)

التقييم والجودة	أوافق بشدة	أوافق	محايد	معارض	معارض بشدة
منصفة لجميع الأطراف					
غير متحيزة					
تنتقل القصة بالكامل					
دقيقة في نقل الحقائق					
تحتزم خصوصية الناس					
تهتم برأي المشاهد					
تراعي مصالح المشاهد					

					تحرص على مصلحة المجتمع
					تميز ما بين الآراء والحقائق
					يمكن الوثوق بها
					لا تعتمد الأثارة
					لديها قانون أخلاقي واضح
					تنتج أخبارا تجعل الخدمة الإخبارية مربحة
					لديها محررون مؤهلون جيدا
					تعرض الأخبار بطريقة مثيرة للمشاهدين
					لا تخشى من التعبير عن رأيها حول القضايا
					تقدم أخبار من صلب اهتمامي
					تتابع الأحداث والمتغيرات بدقة

### القسم (3) التوجهات نحو تغطية المحطات الإخبارية العربية

في هذا القسم من الدراسة نهدف فيه إلى التعرف على توجهاتكم نحو تغطية المحطات الفضائية الإخبارية العربية للمواضيع المختلفة والمتنوعة وهي: قناة الجزيرة، قناة العربية، قناة بي بي سي العربية، قناة فرانس 24 العربية، وقناة والحررة.

(6) عند التفكير في التغطية الإخبارية في قناة الجزيرة بشكل عام، ما مدى موافقتك أو عدم موافقتك في أن القناة تقوم بتغطية جيدة للمواضيع التالية في القائمة أدناه: (الرجاء وضع إشارة حول الاختيار الذي يمثل تقييمك في كل عبارة)  
ملاحظة: إذا كنت لا تشاهد قناة الجزيرة، أو لا ترغب في الإجابة، الرجاء الذهاب إلى السؤال الذي بعده

المواضيع	أوافق بشدة	أوافق	محايد	معارض	معارض بشدة
أخبار تتعلق بالقضايا الإنسانية					
السياسة في العالم العربي					
السياسة الدولية والأحداث الجارية					
قضايا المال والأعمال والاقتصاد					
الأحداث الجارية في بلدك					
أخبار التسلية					
أخبار الجريمة					
شؤون المستهلك					
أخبار الرياضة					
أخبار السفر والرحلات					
أخبار الطقس					
قضايا حقوق الإنسان					
قضايا الأقليات					
قضايا الشباب					
السلاح النووي الإيراني					
الصراع الإسرائيلي-ال فلسطيني					
قضايا الإرهاب					
السنة والشيعية					
الصراعات العربية-العربية					
الصراع في العراق					
الصراع في أفغانستان					
الصراع في دارفور					
الأزمة المالية العالمية					
القضايا الأمريكية					
القضايا الأوروبية					
قضايا أمريكا اللاتينية					
قضايا آسيا					
قضايا إفريقيا					

(7) عند التفكير في التغطية الإخبارية في قناة العربية بشكل عام، ما مدى موافقتك أو عدم موافقتك في أن القناة تقوم بتغطية جيدة للمواضيع التالية في القائمة أدناه. (الرجاء وضع إشارة حول الاختيار الذي يمثل تقييمك في كل عبارة)  
**ملاحظة: إذا كنت لا تشاهد قناة العربية، أو لا ترغب في الإجابة، الرجاء الذهاب إلى السؤال الذي بعده**

المواضيع	أوافق بشدة	أوافق	محايد	معارض	معارض بشدة
أخبار تتعلق بالقضايا الإنسانية					
السياسة في العالم العربي					
السياسة الدولية والأحداث الجارية					
قضايا المال والأعمال والاقتصاد					
الأحداث الجارية في بلدك					
اخبار التسلية					
اخبار الجريمة					
شؤون المستهلك					
أخبار الرياضة					
أخبار السفر والرحلات					
أخبار الطقس					
قضايا حقوق الإنسان					
قضايا الأقليات					
قضايا الشباب					
السلح النووي الإيراني					
الصراع الإسرائيلي-الفالسطيني					
قضايا الإرهاب					
السنة والشيعه					
الصراعات العربية-العربية					
الصراع في العراق					
الصراع في أفغانستان					
الصراع في دارفور					
الأزمة المالية العالمية					
القضايا الأمريكية					
القضايا الأوروبية					
قضايا أمريكا اللاتينية					
قضايا آسيا					
قضايا إفريقيا					

(8) العربية عند التفكير في التغطية الإخبارية في قناة بي بي سي العربية بشكل عام، ما مدى موافقتك أو عدم موافقتك في أن القناة تقوم بتغطية جيدة للمواضيع التالية في القائمة أدناه. (الرجاء وضع إشارة حول الاختيار الذي يمثل تقييمك في كل عبارة)  
**ملاحظة: إذا كنت لا تشاهد قناة بي بي سي العربية، أو لا ترغب في الإجابة، الرجاء الذهاب إلى السؤال الذي بعده**

المواضيع	أوافق بشدة	أوافق	محايد	معارض	معارض بشدة
أخبار تتعلق بالقضايا الإنسانية					
السياسة في العالم العربي					
السياسة الدولية والأحداث الجارية					
قضايا المال والأعمال والاقتصاد					
الأحداث الجارية في بلدك					
اخبار التسلية					
اخبار الجريمة					
شؤون المستهلك					
أخبار الرياضة					
أخبار السفر والرحلات					
أخبار الطقس					
قضايا حقوق الإنسان					
قضايا الأقليات					
قضايا الشباب					
السلح النووي الإيراني					
الصراع الإسرائيلي-الفالسطيني					
قضايا الإرهاب					

					السنة والشعبة
					الصراعات العربية-العربية
					الصراع في العراق
					الصراع في أفغانستان
					الصراع في دارفور
					الأزمة المالية العالمية
					القضايا الأمريكية
					القضايا الأوروبية
					قضايا أمريكا اللاتينية
					قضايا آسيا
					قضايا إفريقيا

(9) العربية عند التفكير في التغطية الإخبارية في قناة فرنس 24 العربية بشكل عام، ما مدى موافقتك أو عدم موافقتك في أن القناة تقوم بتغطية جيدة للمواضيع التالية في القائمة ادناه. (الرجاء وضع إشارة حول الاختيار الذي يمثل تقييمك في كل عبارة)  
**ملاحظة: إذا كنت لا تشاهد قناة فرنس 24 العربية، او لا ترغب في الإجابة، الرجاء الذهاب الى السؤال الذي بعده**

المواضيع	أوافق بشدة	أوافق	محايد	معارض	معارض بشدة
أخبار تتعلق بالقضايا الإنسانية					
السياسة في العالم العربي					
السياسة الدولية والأحداث الجارية					
قضايا المال والأعمال والاقتصاد					
الأحداث الجارية في بلدك					
أخبار التسلية					
أخبار الجريمة					
شؤون المستهلك					
أخبار الرياضة					
أخبار السفر والرحلات					
أخبار الطقس					
قضايا حقوق الإنسان					
قضايا الأقليات					
قضايا الشباب					
السلاح النووي الإيراني					
الصراع الإسرائيلي-ال فلسطيني					
قضايا الإرهاب					
السنة والشعبة					
الصراعات العربية-العربية					
الصراع في العراق					
الصراع في أفغانستان					
الصراع في دارفور					
الأزمة المالية العالمية					
القضايا الأمريكية					
القضايا الأوروبية					
قضايا أمريكا اللاتينية					
قضايا آسيا					
قضايا إفريقيا					

(10) العربية عند التفكير في التغطية الإخبارية في الحرة بشكل عام، ما مدى موافقتك أو عدم موافقتك في أن القناة تقوم بتغطية جيدة للمواضيع التالية في القائمة ادناه. (الرجاء وضع إشارة حول الاختيار الذي يمثل تقييمك في كل عبارة)  
**ملاحظة: إذا كنت لا تشاهد قناة الحرة، او لا ترغب في الإجابة، الرجاء الذهاب الى السؤال الذي بعده**

المواضيع	أوافق بشدة	أوافق	محايد	معارض	معارض بشدة
أخبار تتعلق بالقضايا الإنسانية					
السياسة في العالم العربي					
السياسة الدولية والأحداث الجارية					
قضايا المال والأعمال والاقتصاد					
الأحداث الجارية في بلدك					

					أخبار التسليحة
					أخبار الجريمة
					شؤون المستهلك
					أخبار الرياضة
					أخبار السفر والرحلات
					أخبار الطقس
					قضايا حقوق الإنسان
					قضايا الأقليات
					قضايا الشباب
					السلاح النووي الإيراني
					الصراع الإسرائيلي-الفلسطيني
					قضايا الإرهاب
					السنة والشيعية
					الصراعات العربية-العربية
					الصراع في العراق
					الصراع في أفغانستان
					الصراع في دارفور
					الأزمة المالية العالمية
					القضايا الأمريكية
					القضايا الأوروبية
					قضايا أمريكا اللاتينية
					قضايا آسيا
					قضايا إفريقيا

شكرا لكم الرجاء متابعة الاجابة

#### القسم (4) دوافع متابعة الأخبار في المحطات الإخبارية العربية

في هذا القسم من الدراسة نهدف فيه الى التعرف على الدوافع التي تحملكم على متابعة المحطات الفضائية الإخبارية العربية التالية: قناة الجزيرة، قناة العربية، قناة بي بي سي العربية، قناة فرانس 24 العربية، وقناة والحررة.

(11) ما هي الأسباب التي تدعوك الى مشاهدة قناة الجزيرة الفضائية؟ (الرجاء لكل عبارة ضع إشارة حول الاختيار الذي يمثل تقييمك) ملاحظة: إذا كنت لا تشاهد قناة الجزيرة الفضائية، او لا ترغب في الاجابة، الرجاء الذهاب للسؤال الذي بعده

الدوافع والحوافز	أوافق بشدة	أوافق	محايد	معارض	معارض بشدة
لأنها مصدرا موثوقا للأخبار					
توفر لي معلومات حول ما يجري					
تساعدني على اتخاذ رأي بشأن القضايا اليومية المهمة					
أستخدم مناقشاتها لمختلف القضايا في نقاشي مع الآخرين					
تساعدني على فهم ما طبيعة العمل الذي يقوم به المسئولون العرب					
توفر لي معلومات غير خاضعة للرقابة					
أخبار القناة حرة في طرح و مناقشة أي موضوع سياسي					
تظهر العمل الحقيقي لدى الحكومات العربية حتى سوء سلوكها					
تعرض أخبارا وموضوعات يحاول القادة العرب والحكومات العربية أن يخفوها					
تتيح الفرصة للآراء السياسية المختلفة لكي تتواجد					
تقيني على اطلاع على الأحداث والقضايا الجارية					
تناقش القضايا وتقدم الأخبار بطريقة مثيرة وتبعث على السرور					
تقدم الأخبار مع تحليلات متمعة					
استمتع بمشاهدة مقدمي الأخبار					
لدى القناة أفضل مراسلي الأخبار في الميدان					
أشاهد الأخبار لكي أقارن آرائي بما يقوله المعلقون					
تقدم تغطية مصورة جيدة للأحداث					

(12) ما هي الأسباب التي تدعوك الى مشاهدة قناة العربية؟ (الرجاء لكل عبارة ضع إشارة حول الاختيار الذي يمثل تقييمك)  
ملاحظة: إذا كنت لا تشاهد قناة العربية، او لا ترغب في الإجابة، الرجاء الذهاب للسؤال الذي بعده

الدوافع والحوافز	أوافق بشدة	أوافق	محايد	معارض	معارض بشدة
لأنها مصدرا موثوقا للأخبار					
توفر لي معلومات حول ما يجري					
تساعدني على اتخاذ رأي بشأن القضايا اليومية المهمة					
أستخدم مناقشاتها لمختلف القضايا في نقاشي مع الآخرين					
تساعدني على فهم ما طبيعة العمل الذي يقوم به المسئولون العرب					
توفر لي معلومات غير خاضعة للرقابة					
اخبار القناة حرة في طرح و مناقشة أي موضوع سياسي					
تظهر العمل الحقيقي لدى الحكومات العربية حتى سوء سلوكها					
تعرض أخبارا وموضوعات يحاول القادة العرب والحكومات العربية أن يخفوها					
تتيح الفرصة للآراء السياسية المختلفة لكي تتواجد					
تقيني على اطلاع على الأحداث والقضايا الجارية					
تناقش القضايا وتقدم الأخبار بطريقة مثيرة وتبعث على السرور					
تقدم الأخبار مع تحليلات متعمقة					
استمتع بمشاهدة مقدمي الأخبار					
لدى القناة أفضل مراسلي الأخبار في الميدان					
أشاهد الأخبار لكي أقارن آرائي بما يقوله المعلقون					
تقدم تغطية مصورة جيدة للأحداث					

(13) ما هي الأسباب التي تدعوك الى مشاهدة قناة بي بي سي العربية؟ (الرجاء لكل عبارة ضع إشارة حول الاختيار الذي يمثل تقييمك).  
ملاحظة: إذا كنت لا تشاهد قناة بي بي سي العربية، او لا ترغب في الإجابة، الرجاء الذهاب للسؤال الذي بعده

الدوافع والحوافز	أوافق بشدة	أوافق	محايد	معارض	معارض بشدة
لأنها مصدرا موثوقا للأخبار					
توفر لي معلومات حول ما يجري					
تساعدني على اتخاذ رأي بشأن القضايا اليومية المهمة					
أستخدم مناقشاتها لمختلف القضايا في نقاشي مع الآخرين					
تساعدني على فهم ما طبيعة العمل الذي يقوم به المسئولون العرب					
توفر لي معلومات غير خاضعة للرقابة					
اخبار القناة حرة في طرح و مناقشة أي موضوع سياسي					
تظهر العمل الحقيقي لدى الحكومات العربية حتى سوء سلوكها					
تعرض أخبارا وموضوعات يحاول القادة العرب والحكومات العربية أن يخفوها					
تتيح الفرصة للآراء السياسية المختلفة لكي تتواجد					
تقيني على اطلاع على الأحداث والقضايا الجارية					
تناقش القضايا وتقدم الأخبار بطريقة مثيرة وتبعث على السرور					
تقدم الأخبار مع تحليلات متعمقة					
استمتع بمشاهدة مقدمي الأخبار					
لدى القناة أفضل مراسلي الأخبار في الميدان					
أشاهد الأخبار لكي أقارن آرائي بما يقوله المعلقون					
تقدم تغطية مصورة جيدة للأحداث					

(14) ما هي الأسباب التي تدعوك الى مشاهدة قناة فرانس 24 العربية؟ (الرجاء لكل عبارة ضع إشارة حول الاختيار الذي يمثل تقييمك).  
ملاحظة: إذا كنت لا تشاهد قناة فرانس 24 العربية، أو لا ترغب في الإجابة، الرجاء الذهاب للسؤال الذي بعده

الدوافع والحوافز	أوافق بشدة	أوافق	محايد	معارض	معارض بشدة
لأنها مصدرا موثوقا للأخبار					
توفر لي معلومات حول ما يجري					
تساعدني على اتخاذ رأي بشأن القضايا اليومية المهمة					



التغطية الاخبارية						
عادلة	1	2	3	4	5	غير عادلة
غير متحيزة	1	2	3	4	5	متحيزة
تنقل القصة بالكامل	1	2	3	4	5	لا تنقل القصة بالكامل
دقيقة	1	2	3	4	5	غير دقيقة
تحتزم خصوصية الناس	1	2	3	4	5	لا تحتزم خصوصية الناس
تهتم برأي المشاهد	1	2	3	4	5	لا تهتم برأي المشاهد
تراعي مصالح المشاهد	1	2	3	4	5	لا تراعي مصالح المشاهد
تحرص على مصلحة المجتمع	1	2	3	4	5	لا تحرص على مصلحة المجتمع
تميز ما بين الآراء والحقائق	1	2	3	4	5	لا تميز ما بين الآراء والحقائق
يمكن الوثوق بها	1	2	3	4	5	لا يمكن الوثوق بها
لا تعتمد الأثرية	1	2	3	4	5	تعتمد الأثرية
اخلاقية	1	2	3	4	5	غير اخلاقية
الخدمة الإخبارية مريحة	1	2	3	4	5	الخدمة الإخبارية غير مريحة
لديها محررون مؤهلون جيدا	1	2	3	4	5	ليس لديها محررون مؤهلون جيدا
الأخبار مثيرة	1	2	3	4	5	الأخبار مملة
تعبر عن رأيها بشجاعة	1	2	3	4	5	لا تعبر عن رأيها بشجاعة
تقدم أخبار من صلب اهتمامي	1	2	3	4	5	لا تقدم أخبار من صلب اهتمامي
تتابع الاحداث والمتغيرات بدقة	1	2	3	4	5	لا تتابع الاحداث والمتغيرات بدقة

(17) الرجاء وضع إشارة حول الاختيار الذي يمثل رأيك حول تغطية الاخبارية في قناة العربية الفضائية. لديك مجموعة من العبارات الرجاء اختيار الاجابة المناسبة التي تعكس توجهاتك.  
ملاحظة: إذا كنت لا تتابع الاخبار في قناة العربية، او لا ترغب في الاجابة، الرجاء الذهاب للسؤال الذي بعده

التغطية الاخبارية						
عادلة	1	2	3	4	5	غير عادلة
غير متحيزة	1	2	3	4	5	متحيزة
تنقل القصة بالكامل	1	2	3	4	5	لا تنقل القصة بالكامل
دقيقة	1	2	3	4	5	غير دقيقة
تحتزم خصوصية الناس	1	2	3	4	5	لا تحتزم خصوصية الناس
تهتم برأي المشاهد	1	2	3	4	5	لا تهتم برأي المشاهد
تراعي مصالح المشاهد	1	2	3	4	5	لا تراعي مصالح المشاهد
تحرص على مصلحة المجتمع	1	2	3	4	5	لا تحرص على مصلحة المجتمع
تميز ما بين الآراء والحقائق	1	2	3	4	5	لا تميز ما بين الآراء والحقائق
يمكن الوثوق بها	1	2	3	4	5	لا يمكن الوثوق بها
لا تعتمد الأثرية	1	2	3	4	5	تعتمد الأثرية
اخلاقية	1	2	3	4	5	غير اخلاقية
الخدمة الإخبارية مريحة	1	2	3	4	5	الخدمة الإخبارية غير مريحة
لديها محررون مؤهلون جيدا	1	2	3	4	5	ليس لديها محررون مؤهلون جيدا
الأخبار مثيرة	1	2	3	4	5	الأخبار مملة
تعبر عن رأيها بشجاعة	1	2	3	4	5	لا تعبر عن رأيها بشجاعة
تقدم أخبار من صلب اهتمامي	1	2	3	4	5	لا تقدم أخبار من صلب اهتمامي
تتابع الاحداث والمتغيرات بدقة	1	2	3	4	5	لا تتابع الاحداث والمتغيرات بدقة

(18) الرجاء وضع إشارة حول الاختيار الذي يمثل رأيك حول تغطية الاخبارية في قناة بي بي سي العربية. لديك مجموعة من العبارات الرجاء اختيار الاجابة المناسبة التي تعكس توجهاتك.  
ملاحظة: إذا كنت لا تتابع الاخبار في قناة بي بي سي العربية، او لا ترغب في الاجابة، الرجاء الذهاب للسؤال الذي بعده

التغطية الاخبارية						
عادلة	1	2	3	4	5	غير عادلة
غير متحيزة	1	2	3	4	5	متحيزة
تنقل القصة بالكامل	1	2	3	4	5	لا تنقل القصة بالكامل
دقيقة	1	2	3	4	5	غير دقيقة
تحتزم خصوصية الناس	1	2	3	4	5	لا تحتزم خصوصية الناس
تهتم برأي المشاهد	1	2	3	4	5	لا تهتم برأي المشاهد
تراعي مصالح المشاهد	1	2	3	4	5	لا تراعي مصالح المشاهد

تحرص على مصلحة المجتمع	1	2	3	4	5	تحرص على مصلحة المجتمع
لا تميز ما بين الآراء والحقائق	1	2	3	4	5	تميز ما بين الآراء والحقائق
لا يمكن الوثوق بها	1	2	3	4	5	يمكن الوثوق بها
تعتمد الأثارة	1	2	3	4	5	لا تعتمد الأثارة
غير أخلاقية	1	2	3	4	5	أخلاقية
الخدمة الإخبارية غير مربحة	1	2	3	4	5	الخدمة الإخبارية مربحة
ليس لديها محررون مؤهلون جيدا	1	2	3	4	5	لديها محررون مؤهلون جيدا
الأخبار مملة	1	2	3	4	5	الأخبار مثيرة
لا تعبر عن رأيها بشجاعة	1	2	3	4	5	تعبر عن رأيها بشجاعة
لا تقدم أخبار من صلب اهتمامي	1	2	3	4	5	تقدم أخبار من صلب اهتمامي
لا تتابع الأحداث والمتغيرات بدقة	1	2	3	4	5	تتابع الأحداث والمتغيرات بدقة

(19) الرجاء وضع إشارة حول الاختيار الذي يمثل رأيك حول تغطية الإخبارية في قناة فرنس 24 العربية. لديك مجموعة من العبارات الرجاء اختيار الإجابة المناسبة التي تعكس توجهاتك.

**ملاحظة: إذا كنت لا تتابع الأخبار في قناة فرنس 24 العربية، او لا ترغب في الإجابة، الرجاء الذهاب للسؤال الذي بعده**

التغطية الإخبارية						
عادلة	1	2	3	4	5	1
غير متحيزة	1	2	3	4	5	2
لا تنقل القصة بالكامل	1	2	3	4	5	3
غير دقيقة	1	2	3	4	5	4
لا تحترم خصوصية الناس	1	2	3	4	5	5
لا تهتم برأي المشاهد	1	2	3	4	5	6
لا تراعي مصالح المشاهد	1	2	3	4	5	7
تحرص على مصلحة المجتمع	1	2	3	4	5	8
لا تميز ما بين الآراء والحقائق	1	2	3	4	5	9
لا يمكن الوثوق بها	1	2	3	4	5	10
تعتمد الأثارة	1	2	3	4	5	11
غير أخلاقية	1	2	3	4	5	12
الخدمة الإخبارية غير مربحة	1	2	3	4	5	13
ليس لديها محررون مؤهلون جيدا	1	2	3	4	5	14
الأخبار مملة	1	2	3	4	5	15
لا تعبر عن رأيها بشجاعة	1	2	3	4	5	16
لا تقدم أخبار من صلب اهتمامي	1	2	3	4	5	17
لا تتابع الأحداث والمتغيرات بدقة	1	2	3	4	5	18

(20) الرجاء وضع إشارة حول الاختيار الذي يمثل رأيك حول تغطية الإخبارية في قناة الحرة. لديك مجموعة من العبارات الرجاء اختيار الإجابة المناسبة التي تعكس توجهاتك.

**ملاحظة: إذا كنت لا تتابع الأخبار في قناة الحرة، او لا ترغب في الإجابة، الرجاء الذهاب للسؤال الذي بعده**

التغطية الإخبارية						
عادلة	1	2	3	4	5	1
غير متحيزة	1	2	3	4	5	2
لا تنقل القصة بالكامل	1	2	3	4	5	3
غير دقيقة	1	2	3	4	5	4
لا تحترم خصوصية الناس	1	2	3	4	5	5
لا تهتم برأي المشاهد	1	2	3	4	5	6
لا تراعي مصالح المشاهد	1	2	3	4	5	7
تحرص على مصلحة المجتمع	1	2	3	4	5	8
لا تميز ما بين الآراء والحقائق	1	2	3	4	5	9
لا يمكن الوثوق بها	1	2	3	4	5	10
تعتمد الأثارة	1	2	3	4	5	11
غير أخلاقية	1	2	3	4	5	12
الخدمة الإخبارية غير مربحة	1	2	3	4	5	13
ليس لديها محررون مؤهلون جيدا	1	2	3	4	5	14
الأخبار مملة	1	2	3	4	5	15

16	تعبر عن رأيها بشجاعة	5	4	3	2	1	لا تعبر عن رأيها بشجاعة
17	تقدم أخبار من صلب اهتمامي	5	4	3	2	1	لا تقدم أخبار من صلب اهتمامي
18	تتابع الأحداث والمتغيرات بدقة	5	4	3	2	1	لا تتابع الأحداث والمتغيرات بدقة

شكرا لكم الرجاء متابعة الإجابة

### القسم (6) المعلومات العامة

ختاماً، نود معرفة بعض المعلومات العامة عن مشاركتنا الكرام المشاركين في هذا الاستبيان

(21) العمر (الرجاء الاختيار من القائمة)

1	18-25 سنة
2	30-36 سنة
3	31-40 سنة
4	41-50 سنة
5	أكبر من 51 سنة

(22) الجنس (الرجاء الاختيار من القائمة)

1	ذكر
2	انثى

(23) المستوى الدراسي (الرجاء الاختيار من القائمة)

1	أقل من الثانوية عامة
2	درجة الثانوية العامة
3	دبلوم كلية
4	درجة البكالوريوس
5	درجة الماجستير
6	درجة الدكتوراه
7	أخرى

(24) الدخل السنوي او ما يعادله بالدولار الامريكي (الرجاء الاختيار من القائمة)

1	لا يوجد دخل
2	اقل من 15 الف دولار
3	من 15 الى 20 الف دولار
4	من 25 الى 35 الف دولار
5	من 35 الى 45 الف دولار
6	من 45 الى 55 الف دولار
7	من 55 الى 75 الف دولار
8	فوق 75 الف دولار

(25) ما هي وظيفتك الحالية (الرجاء الاختيار من القائمة)

1	طالب
2	موظف
3	غير موظف
4	عمل بدوام جزئي
5	لا اعمل

(26) ما هي الدولة التي تحمل جنسيتها (الرجاء كتابة اسم الدولة في المربع)

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(27) ما هي حالتك الاجتماعية (الرجاء الاختيار من القائمة)

1	اعزب لم يسبق له الزواج
2	متزوج
3	مطلق
4	ارمل

(28) ما هي توجهاتك السياسية (الرجاء الاختيار من القائمة)

1	منفتح جدا / ليبرالي
2	منفتح / ليبرالي
3	محايد/ معتدل
4	محافظ
5	محافظ للغاية

شكرا جزيلاً لكم للمشاركة في هذه الدراسة الأكاديمية حول استخدام وسائل الإعلام الإخبارية والمحطات التلفزيونية العربية. نؤكد لكم مرة أخرى أن المعلومات التي تقدمتم بها لن يتم استخدامها في أغراض أخرى غير تلك المرتبطة بأهداف البحث العلمي.