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by

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Abstract

This dissertation is an investigation into the office of the Lord Lieutenancy of the county of Cambridgeshire under the reign of Charles I, 1625-1640. The main goal of this dissertation is to examine the county using the Lord Lieutenancy and its control of both militia affairs and its function as the key instrument of royal policy within the shire. In addition, it will examine the Lord Lieutenant, Theophilus Howard, 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk, and his deputy lieutenants who formed the foundation of a ruling elite for Caroline Cambridgeshire. It was this ruling elite which was able to hold down faction and turmoil within the shire and perform the myriad of divisive and constitutionally objectionable tasks handed down from the crown, such as collection of the forced loan and the expansion of ship money into inland counties. Through this examination, the findings are that the Lord Lieutenant had almost no real contact with the shire he was in charge of, leaving the year-to-year running of militia and local government to his deputy lieutenants. It was the deputy lieutenants with their long family history of residency and office holdings within the shire, that formed a core of officials who were able to use their position within the Lieutenancy to shield the shire from distasteful crown policies while still being able to supply Charles with men and money on time and in full when other shires in England were falling into chaos and riots. However, this influence could only withstand so much, and in the end, Charles's reliance on his Personal Rule and fiscal innovations made these tasks impossible to perform and forced the institution into collapse.

## Acknowledgements

While the deficiencies in this work are mine and mine alone, there are many people to whom I owe a large debt of gratitude. To Dr Nigel Aston, I offer heartfelt thanks for all of his patience and advice without which this thesis would not have been possible. I would also like to thank the staff of the University of Leicester for their support as well as the staff at the Cambridge County Record Office, the British Library and the Bodleian Library for making researching this work much easier than it would have been without their assistance. Finally I would like to give special thanks to Dr Nicholas Cull for his friendship and advice. I would not have been able to get through the doldrums without it. Thank you all.

## **Table of Contents**

	page
Acknowledgements	iii
Introduction	1
Chapter 1: The History and Evolution of the Lord Lieutenancy	20
Chapter 2: Office and Officeholders	38
Chapter 3: Pressing and Collecting: The Lieutenancy from 1625-1628	67
Chapter 4: Musters and Peacetime Regime	88
Chapter 5: Cambridgeshire Lieutenancy and the Bishops' Wars	111
Conclusions: The Lieutenancy of Cambridgeshire Assessed	141
Appendix	153
Bibliography	206

## **Appendix**

	page
<b><u>Lord Lieutenants</u></b>	
Tenure Table	153
Biographical information	154
Howard family Influence Map	171
<b><u>Deputy Lieutenants</u></b>	
Tenure Table	172
Biographical information	173
Influence Map	188
<b><u>Cambridge Certificates</u></b>	
Nov 1628	202
April 1639	203
April 1640	204
June 1640	205

## **Abbreviations**

APC - Acts of the Privy Council

BL - British Library

CSP - Calendar of State Papers

ODNB - Oxford Dictionary of National Biographies

PRO - Public Records Office

VCH - Victoria County History

## Introduction

For decades, historians have struggled to explain how England descended into civil war and regicide in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Over the years, many arguments have been put forward to explain this breakdown. Some try to look at the whole of the three kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland, while others have chosen to look at specific counties as entities unto themselves to explain the rift. Yet despite all the arguments put forward, none has proven to be definitive in explaining the reign of Charles I and the path to civil war. This thesis will look at Cambridgeshire and in particular the institution of the Lord Lieutenancy in an effort to shed more light on the road to civil war and the political breakdown. Through the Lord Lieutenancy and its role as the main agency of royal authority and policy in the shire, we may be able to explain the breakdown as it occurred or did not occur in Cambridgeshire. In the process, we will highlight the similarities and differences with other counties and the functioning of their Lord Lieutenancies to place Cambridgeshire within its proper context among the wealth of studies that precede this one. For many historians, prior to the 1960s, the Civil War held a prime position in the linear evolution of Britain towards liberal democracy, religious toleration, and world leadership. As late as the 1960s, many scholars accepted some versions of this “progressive” interpretation, whether Marxist or Liberal in tone. For the Liberal or “Whig” historians, the monumental work of S. R. Gardiner served as the foundation for their interpretations. In his ten-volume work, *The History of England from the Accession of James I* (1883), Gardiner interpreted the Civil War as a constitutional and political struggle between an authoritarian, arbitrary monarchy and the rule of law, the property

rights, and religious liberties of individuals. Therefore, the Civil War was the result of inevitable long-term causes that date back to the sixteenth century. These deep-seated changes forced an opposition based particularly in the House of Commons to emerge. It stood for the true laws, liberties of England and for a staunch English Protestantism against the superstitious, at times Roman Catholic religious tendencies of Charles I. The call to arms in 1642 was then the culmination of a long period of increasing tension, from the last years of Elizabeth I, when the queen's political skills deserted her, to the eleven years of tyranny under the "personal rule"<sup>1</sup> of Charles I. Although Gardiner does not answer many of the questions that future historians raised, his factual accuracy is so complete and his scale so broad that his work has remained an unchallenged record of the events for the early Stuarts. Gardiner's mastery of the available sources and his narrative gifts led other historians who followed in his footsteps to call him the finest scholar ever to have worked on the period. However, reverence for his abilities did not keep future historians from challenging his views.<sup>2</sup>

The assumptions of both inevitability and long-term causes carry over from Whig to Marxist interpretations. Both Marxism and nineteenth-century "Whiggery" emerged out of the same intellectual climate. Formed during the middle of the nineteenth century, when the writings of Charles Darwin were in fashion, the idea of inevitable progress and

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<sup>1</sup>Charles I's personal rule refers to the eleven-year span between 1629 and 1640 in which he did not call a parliament. After dissolving his third Parliament (meeting in 1628-9), Charles proclaimed that Parliamentary abuses had driven him from meeting with them. He was forced to abandon the personal rule because of his need for support for the Bishop's Wars in April of 1640.

<sup>2</sup>Conrad Russell, *The Origins of the English Civil War* (United Kingdom: The Macmillian Press Ltd., 1973) pg. 4-31; S. R. Gardiner, *The History of England from the Accession of James I*, 10 vol.(New York:

evolution were main components to both ideas. Although Marxist interpretations share the Whig devotion to progress and inevitability, Marxist accounts place almost exclusive emphasis on the social and economic changes that eventually force political change. The Civil War then becomes a “bourgeois revolution” and a critical step in England’s transition from a feudal to a modern capitalistic society. Historians such as Christopher Hill, R. H. Tawney, and as well as non-Marxist like Lawrence Stone, used these social and economic determinants to explain the conflict.<sup>3</sup>

Hill characterizes men as creatures who do not easily break with past ideologies. When they do, they must have a completely new body of ideas and beliefs to replace those of the past. In his books, *The Intellectual Origins of the English Civil War* and later in, *Intellectual Consequences of the English Revolution*, Hill sees an “intellectual revolution” creating a new set of beliefs that supersede the feudal ideals of old. It is this new climate that for Hill helps to explain the Civil War. He tries to show links between the patronage of Francis Bacon, Sir Walter Raleigh, and Sir Edward Coke and some Puritan-parliamentarian intellectuals in the Long Parliament.<sup>4</sup> In addition, because these men were in varying measure the heirs to these new ideals, they were more likely to defy the hierarchy, to abolish the monarchy, bishops and the House of Lords, as well as support the eventual execution of Charles I. Instead of explaining the origins of the revolution,

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AMS Press, 1965); Christopher Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution: Studies in Interpretation of the English Revolution of the 17th Century* (New York: Schocken Books, 1958) pg. 4-6.

<sup>3</sup>G. R. Elton, *Studies in Tudor and Stuart Politics and Government*, vol. II, Parliament/Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974) pg. 164-82.; Russell, *The Origins of the English Civil War*, pg. 5-6.

<sup>4</sup>The Long Parliament was first called after the years of Charles’ personal rule. Long Parliament would sit until Pride’s Purge and the creation of the Rump Parliament.

Hill seems to see the new intellectual emphasis as helping to bring about the conditions in which the events of the Civil War were possible, or at least imaginable.<sup>5</sup> Other Marxist interpretations have focused more on economic factors.

Tawney began to examine the economic origins of the Civil War in his 1940 study of the English gentry. He discerned a change in property ownership occurring in the century before the Civil War. It was through this process that the entrenched landed gentry decayed, and a new elite class ascended to preeminence. He attributed this shift to the differences in the degrees of adaptability to estate management and rising prices, to new markets and agricultural techniques, and partly to the presence or absence of non-agrarian sources of income. The events of the Civil War were then a shift to accommodate the power of a new gentry. They were seeking to achieve a political power to match their new economic power.<sup>6</sup>

Years later in 1953, Trevor-Roper's *The Gentry 1540- 1640* (1953) refuted Tawney's rising gentry theory. Instead of a rising gentry, Trevor-Roper saw a declining agrarian elite whose incomes were diminishing, or not keeping pace with inflation. Those families who did rise owed their fate not to the overall rise of their class, but to obtaining government office and the lucrative income those offices provided. Trevor-Roper

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<sup>5</sup>Christopher Hill, *Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution* (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 1965); Christopher Hill, *Some intellectual consequences of the English Revolution* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980)

<sup>6</sup>Lawrence Stone, *The Causes of the English Revolution 1529-1642* (London: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972) pg. 26-27.; R. H. Tawney, "Rise of the Gentry," *Economic History Review* XI (1941) pg. 23-67.

interpreted the war as a protest of the declining class against the loss of its fortune and influence.<sup>7</sup>

In more recent years, both interpretations on the rise or fall of the gentry have been discounted. In studying members of the Long Parliament, J. H. Hexter demonstrated that there was no correlation between a member's wealth and his allegiance during the Civil War. Also, other studies indicate that the rise and fall of individual families owed more to the mortality rates of their tenants than other economic factors. Since mortality rates determined the frequency of newer and more lucrative lease agreements, it also determined a particular family's ability to deal with the effects of inflation. Therefore, Hexter and others have concluded that neither the rise nor the fall of the gentry occurred as Tawney and Trevor-Roper had suggested.<sup>8</sup>

More recently, both versions of the progressive interpretation came under considerable assault. The Civil War's place as a progressive landmark in the development of English political institutions fell under the weight of revisionist criticism. Now the Civil War seems to be an embarrassing exception to the view of England's development, in which change takes place by gradual increments and sometimes subtle mechanisms.

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<sup>7</sup>Russell, *The Origins of the English Civil War*, pg. 6-31; Hugh Trevor-Roper, *The Gentry 1540-1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953) passim.

<sup>8</sup>Russell, *The Origins of the English Civil War*, pg. 6-31.; J. H. Hexter, "Storm over the Gentry," in *Reprisals in History* (London, 1961) pg. xvii.

Although generally united in their dismissal of Marxist and Liberal interpretations, revisionist historians do not necessarily accept the argument that they form a “revisionist school”. They have shed the yoke of old interpretations and no longer see the Civil War as a defining event in the evolutionary path of England’s development. The conflict now is viewed as an accident that did little to alter the broad contours of English society. Following World War II vast new resources of primary documentation emerged from private archives and family libraries. Revisionist historians utilized the creation of new county record offices, as well as the new-found family archives to construct local or regional studies that at present have provided some of the most debate-provoking interpretations of the causes of the English Civil War.<sup>9</sup>

Local studies have been able to show that ideological commitments were not all-important to the gentry and who did not neatly divide into royalists and parliamentarians, a pattern Progressive interpretations often assumed. By studying the localities, the hesitation and reluctance with which the gentry approached the war could now be fully appreciated. It is for those reasons that the study of local activities and loyalties, in combination with their regional complexity and diversity is crucial to a fuller understanding of the Civil War.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>Howard Tomlinson, “The Causes of the War: A Historiographical Survey,” in *Before the English Civil War: Essays on Early Stuart Politics and Government*, ed. Howard Tomlinson (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984) pg. 7-26.

<sup>10</sup>Anne Hughes, “Local History and the Origins of the Civil War,” in *Conflict in Early Stuart England: Studies in Religion and Politics 1604-1642*, eds. Richard Cust and Anne Hughes (London: Longman, 1989) pg. 224-253.

Conrad Russell's work has done much to further the study of the early Stuart period with a number of significant works. In, *Parliaments and English politics, 1621-1629*, Russell highlights the lack of continuity between the Parliaments of the 1620's and the 1640's as well as the changing nature of the Caroline court and the detrimental effect it had on the relationship many MPs had as a point of contact for the localities in Parliament. In subsequent works, Russell tackles not just court politics, but the entirety of the civil war. In, *The Causes of the English Civil War*, Russell uses local studies of men and specific situations to help place the events of the war into a broader national and European interpretation. Russell saddles some of the blame on the failings of Charles I. If that had been the end of the story, then the essence of the discussion would have been a deposition, not civil strife. For Russell, the war should be ascribed to a conjunction of several events or non-events.<sup>11</sup> In that respect, the war clearly contains a fortuitous element. Yet, the conjunction of these events and their timing was not a matter of fortune alone. Russell cites three long-term causes of instability that also led to the war. All of them existed at the accession of Charles I and had troubled other European monarchies as well. These three enduring causes were the problems of multiple kingdoms, religious division, and the breakdown of financial and political systems in the face of inflation and the rising cost of war. No one of these forces was sufficient; it required the convergence

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<sup>11</sup>Those several events were: Why there were Bishop's Wars, Why England lost them, Why there was no political settlement in England, Why the Long Parliament was not dissolved in 1641, Why England divided into parties, Why there was no serious negotiations for peace, and why respect for the majesty of the monarch was so greatly diminished?; Conrad Russell, *The Causes of the English Civil War: Ford Lectures Delivered in the University of Oxford 1987-1988* (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 1990), introduction.

of all three, accompanied by other events or non-events to draw the nation into a civil conflict.<sup>12</sup>

Russell's notion of an irrational and accidental conflict brought about by the conjunction of a number of developments left many historians searching for different explanations. It has been said that great events do not necessarily have great causes, but it is natural for historians to search for them.<sup>13</sup> Other revisionists stopped looking for the causes on the national level and began to investigate the individual counties as unique entities. They searched for explanations of local circumstances without regard to the nation-wide situation.

This approach was pioneered in Alan Everitt's *The Community of Kent and the Great Rebellion 1640-1660* (1966). In his study of the shire of Kent, Everitt undermines any Liberal or Marxist notion of the Civil War as a social conflict, simply because seventeenth century Kent was without conflict. The gentry formed a tightly knit group, or "county community," and despite an ancient centralized government, the England of 1640 resembled a union of partially independent county communities, each with its distinct ethos and loyalty. Not only were they cohesive units, but they were ill informed regarding the wider political issues and simply not concerned with affairs of state.

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<sup>12</sup> Conrad Russell, *Parliaments and English politics, 1621-1629* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1979); Conrad Russell, *Causes of the English Civil War: the Ford Lectures delivered in the University of Oxford, 1987-1988* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) passim.

<sup>13</sup>G. R. Elton, *Studies in Tudor and Stuart Politics and Government*, pg. 164-82.

Rather, their political horizons were limited and extended only to the boundaries of the shire.<sup>14</sup>

Everitt investigates the social and cultural experience of the county gentry by looking at a few crucial variables: the patterns of gentry marriage, particularly the extent of intracounty alliances, the relative antiquity of the gentry within the shire, the sources of their wealth, and the ties of friendship and hospitality among them. He concludes that their insularity and solidarity was the result of their roots in their native soil. In his words, the county was one great cousinage, united by elaborate ties of kinship and vertical social links forged by local loyalties. This harmonious society and the unity of the county community lasted until 1642. Under the extreme pressure of national political events, two small cliques of genuine royalists and ultra-parliamentarians emerged within the conservative Kentish gentry, which at its heart truly wished to remain neutral. These factions shattered county unity and drew the aristocracy unwillingly into the fire of the war.<sup>15</sup>

Although Everitt's influence has been substantial, he along with every other historian of the Civil War has many detractors. For example, Clive Holmes has questioned Everitt's contentions. Instead of being isolated and excessively inbred communities, Holmes shows that the gentry's social and cultural experiences were not limited to the county alone. He criticized Everitt for overemphasizing those elements that suggest local

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<sup>14</sup>Alan Everitt, *The Community of Kent and the Great Rebellion 1640-1660* (Bristol: Leicester University Press, 1966); Hughes, "Local History," pg. 225

autonomy and neglecting evidence to the contrary. Holmes believes that the social experience of the gentry would have been widened beyond their local shire by their formal education at Oxford, Cambridge, or Inns of Court. This would have produced a gentry melting pot and created a common culture among the educated. Visits to London on legal business, however infrequent, could only serve to broaden social contacts and horizons as well.<sup>16</sup>

By participating in county governmental institutions, the gentry would be constantly reminded of the fact that England was a centralized polity, governed by common law, and frequently confronted with major legal issues. County elections and special royal commissions, especially those to exact extra-parliamentary revenues, would often remind the local gentry of constitutional issues as well as their place in the larger national polity. Although Holmes does not deny some of the merits of the county community school, he does want to show that seventeenth-century England was not the union of partially independent county communities that Everitt had suggested. Instead, Holmes supports the idea of an informed and deeply concerned gentry that participated in national affairs.<sup>17</sup>

Anne Hughes continued the assault on the county community school in her study, *Politics, Society and Civil War in Warwickshire 1620-1660*. She employs many of Holmes' criticisms and reveals that the gentry of Warwickshire were not isolated and

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<sup>15</sup> Alan Everitt, *The Community of Kent and the Great Rebellion 1640-1660*, passim.

<sup>16</sup> Clive Holmes, "The County Community in Stuart Historiography," *Journal of British Studies* 19 (September 1980) pg. 54-73.

<sup>17</sup> Clive Holmes, "The County Community in Stuart Historiography", pg. 54-73.

ignorant of national concerns. On the contrary, they were profoundly aware of the need to have patrons with influence at court. These men with national and local influence served a valuable purpose in the resolution of conflicts for the localities and served as a voice in the court of Charles I in attempts to gain royal favor. In Elizabeth's reign, the Dudley brothers, the Earls of Warwick and Leicester, provided an important channel of communication between Warwickshire and the central government. With their deaths, local connections within the central government were weaker than they had been for some seventy years. The narrowing influence base of the court under Charles I meant that it was increasingly out of touch with the localities. This kind of court-country division was not a result of localism, as Everitt would say, but was due to the changing nature of the court under the early Stuart monarchs.<sup>18</sup>

In refuting Everitt in this way, Hughes uses one of the most influential interpretations of the Civil War, one that suggests a development of an opposition to the central government based in the country. Hughes' Warwickshire study may be unique to that shire, but her work does fit quite well into the court-country division first put forth in Perez Zagorin's *The Court and the Country*. Zagorin believes that the revolution was not fought because of a class conflict or to reorganize the social structure. It was a revolt within the governing class against the crown. The body politic had been split into factions by the narrowing of court favoritism and influence under James I and Charles I.

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<sup>18</sup> Ann Hughes, *Politics, Society and Civil War in Warwickshire 1620-1660* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Anne Hughes, "Warwickshire on the Eve of the Civil War: A County Community?," *Midland History* VII (1982) pg. 42-72.

Men such as the Duke of Buckingham<sup>19</sup> and Archbishop Laud<sup>20</sup> were able to gain control of the machinery of patronage and drive a wedge between the court and the country. The influence of newly created nobles<sup>21</sup> without ties to the localities, and a Catholic element centered around the king's wife, Henrietta Maria,<sup>22</sup> served to alienate the conservative, largely anti-Catholic country nobility.<sup>23</sup>

The country opposition was centered on the offices of the government. The sheriffs, justices of the peace, lord lieutenants and more notably their deputy lieutenants governed the localities as unsalaried officers of the crown. These men needed to hold influence at court to be able to support their positions. Once Charles I cut off that channel of influence, a rift developed between the court and country and crippled Charles' government. Subsequent events, such as the forced loan of 1626-27, the collection of ship money in 1635-40 (both in response to the financial needs of war), and the outbreak of the Bishop's Wars,<sup>24</sup> served to exacerbate the growing division. As a result of fiscal and religious policies and stresses of war, parliamentary support broke up and

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<sup>19</sup>George Villiers, 1st Duke of Buckingham, was a powerful court favorite during the reign of James I and Charles I. His control over the council and patronage was a source of tension within the central government.

<sup>20</sup>William Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury, was one of Charles' chief ministers. He is considered by many one of the reasons for the breakdown of the religious consensus.

<sup>21</sup>Between 1615-1628, the period of most frequent creations, the peerage grew from 81 to 126, earldoms alone rose from 27 to 65; Victor Stater, *Noble Government: The Stuart Lord Lieutenancy and the Transformation of English Politics* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1994) 24-44.

<sup>22</sup>Youngest daughter of Marie de Medici and Henry IV of France. Her Catholicism provided an easy scapegoat for the failures of Charles.

<sup>23</sup>Perez Zagorin, *The Court and Country: The Beginning of the English Revolution* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969) pg. 15-200.

<sup>24</sup>The Bishop's Wars were in response to the Scottish Prayer Book Rebellion of 1637. Charles mobilized the nation to overawe the Scots. Important to this is Charles' failure to achieve a successful result leading to his need to call what would become the Long Parliament.

disaffection against the leaders of the House of Commons set in. This then superseded the court-country split and provided the two parties, which led the country into civil war. The division between the court and country, however, represented the precipitating issue.<sup>25</sup>

Although at times Zagorin has been faulted for not acknowledging local aspects, subsequent historians such as A. Hassell-Smith, Diarmaid MacCulloch, T. G. Barnes, Mark Charles Fissell, Victor Stater and Thomas Cogswell have followed in his academic footsteps. Each study looks at local responses to divisive issues. Although each work has a different focus, each shows that the country opposition was a reality, and that it clearly surfaced in times of stress.

In his study of Elizabethan Norfolk in *Country and Court: Government and Politics in Norfolk 1558-1603* (1974), Hassell-Smith clearly shows that the opposition Zagorin wrote about not only was present during the reign of Charles I, but was evident in Elizabeth's reign. He examines the reactions of the sheriffs, justices of the peace, and especially the lord lieutenants to late Tudor policies. He illustrates how the battle between the Puritans and Catholics, as well as a constant threat of invasion from Spain, forced implementation of policies that created strife within the shires. Hassell-Smith's work shows the evident mistrust of the central government in Norfolk indicating that the court-country split may have started long before the reign of James I and Charles I.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Zagorin, *The Court and Country: The Beginning of the English Revolution*, pg. 15-200.

MacCulloch follows on with his study, *Suffolk and the Tudors: Politics and Religion in an English County 1500-1600*. He clearly shows that within both Suffolk and Norfolk county communities had been there for decades, and only re-emerged in the absence of a dominant peer following the execution of the 4<sup>th</sup> Duke of Norfolk in 1572. The two separate communities in Suffolk and Norfolk developed radically different political atmospheres without the Duke of Norfolk's influence in part because of the levels of influence he had in both communities. In Norfolk, he had absolute domination and therefore left a more serious power vacuum than in Suffolk. Norfolk then descended into political infighting and conflict, whereas Suffolk developed a more tranquil and cooperative style of local politics. The gentry of Suffolk took great pride in the peacefulness of their community and went to great lengths to preserve it by avoiding quarrels and bickering. This is important to any study of Cambridgeshire for a number of reasons. First, Cambridgeshire would be without a dominant peer following the death of its Lord Lieutenant, Roger Lord North, in 1599 creating a similar power vacuum. This left the Lord Lieutenancy in the hands of Thomas Howard, 1<sup>st</sup> Lord Suffolk,<sup>27</sup> and second son of the attainted and executed 4<sup>th</sup> Duke of Norfolk, who had very little influence within Cambridgeshire. Also, the close proximity of these counties is worth noting. Did Cambridgeshire in fact have a county community like Suffolk that was dominated by

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<sup>26</sup>A. Hassell-Smith, *Country and Court: Government and Politics in Norfolk, 1558-1603* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974) *passim*.

<sup>27</sup> He was created 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk on 21 July 1603 by James I.

Lord North, and did it re-emerge following his death or descend into political infighting?<sup>28</sup>

T. G. Barnes takes up the discussion of local administration in *Somerset 1625-1640: A County's Government During the Personal Rule* (1961). He contends that those who served in local government during the reign of Charles I had to endure more hard work of an increasingly disagreeable nature under a stricter master than they, their fathers, or even their grandfathers had ever known. Events such as the forced loans, and the collection of ship money resulted in growing reluctance of the Somerset gentry to serve in local administration. The programs also forced men to choose between the desires of their neighbors and the demands of their sovereign, creating a country opposition in Somerset. Barnes also highlights the factional conflicts and fights for supremacy within the deputy lieutenants and the shires gentry that serve to destroy the hopes for peaceful and orderly local government given the monumental demands placed on them by the crown.<sup>29</sup>

Unlike Barnes, Fissell considers a specific event and the division it caused in bringing on war. In *The Bishop's Wars: Charles I's campaigns against Scotland, 1638-1640* (1994), Fissell looks at the effect the wars had on the English body politic. For Fissell, the king's decision to beat the drum of war in the cause of ecclesiastical uniformity made political stability impossible. The demands of war once again sparked the flame of opposition in

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<sup>28</sup> Diarmaid MacCulloch, *Suffolk and the Tudors: Politics and Religion in an English County 1500-1600* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) pg. 83-124.

<sup>29</sup>T. G. Barnes, *Somerset 1625-1640: A County's Government during the Personal Rule* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961) passim.

the country. Although not the cause of the Civil War, by forcing administrators of local government to raise men and money for war, Charles I in effect invited rebellion. The wars against the Scots forced an irreparable breach between himself and his subjects, but also among his subjects as well, leading eventually to Civil War.<sup>30</sup>

Victor Stater's concern is the lord lieutenancy, which provides yet another approach to the court-country debate. In *Noble Government: the Stuart Lord Lieutenancy and the Transformation of English Politics* (1994), Stater argues that, because of its strong local ties, the lieutenancy was a prime candidate to take on numerous local duties. In the years 1625-1628, the lieutenancy was forced to aid in the collection of two parliamentary subsidies, a privy seal loan, a benevolence, and a forced loan. Add to this the financial strain of collecting coat-and-conduct money and ship money and the result was an unhappy gentry. The lieutenancy's reluctance to press their neighbors to pay unpopular levies clearly indicates a division between the court and country. The final straw was once more, the Bishop's Wars. The lieutenancy, as the administrative head in charge of supervising and training the militia, was forced again to levy taxes and press men for military service. Under this stress, the Lieutenancy cracks, and the division between the court and country was revealed when individuals chose between local or central loyalties.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup>Mark Charles Fissell, *The Bishop's Wars: Charles I's Campaigns against Scotland. 1638-40* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) passim.

Thomas Cogswell follows on from Stater with his work, *Home Divisions: Aristocracy, the State, and Provincial Conflict*. Cogswell focuses on Henry Hastings, the 5<sup>th</sup> Earl of Huntingdon and his role as the Lord Lieutenant for Leicestershire. Cogswell shows that Huntingdon was a prime example of an active, resident, and diligent Lord Lieutenant who managed the militia matters for the shire with skill and dedication. However, Huntingdon, like many Lord Lieutenants, struggled with the court/country rift while implementing the crown's increasingly unpopular policies. This study also highlights the pressures faced by the Lieutenants who were forced to make choices between keeping the crown happy, and keeping their locality happy leading to its collapse in 1640. This is of a key interest to Cambridgeshire again because of the proximity of Leicestershire. Also, it had a similar Lord Lieutenant in the form of Lord North, but how did the Lieutenancy and local government of Cambridgeshire function without its dominate, resident and very active Lord Lieutenant.<sup>32</sup>

All of these studies shed light on the collapse of Caroline government and have elements in common with Cambridgeshire. This thesis will now try to place Cambridgeshire within the historiographical debate to determine whether or not only whether a county community existed within Cambridgeshire, but also to find out if there was in fact an alienation of the localities from the court in the form of a court/country divide. This thesis will also try to trace the evolution of the office of the lieutenancy within the shire

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<sup>31</sup>Victor Stater, *Noble Government*, pg. 1-44.

<sup>32</sup>Thomas Cogswell, *Home Divisions: Aristocracy, the State, and Provincial Conflict* (Trowbridge: Manchester University Press, 1998) passim.

from its inception as well as take a biographical look into the men who occupied the office in Cambridgeshire to gain insight into the year-to-year workings of the militia operations of the shire. The primary aim is to determine how a shire that was soon to become a Parliamentary county, the county who returned Oliver Cromwell to the Long Parliament, and a vital part of the Eastern Alliance in the Civil War, was able to return men and money in full on the eve of civil war, when other shires all over England, and their lieutenancies were descending into collapse and chaos.

In order to do this, the Harlian MS 4014<sup>33</sup> will be heavily used. Harlian MS 4014 contains copies of Lieutenancy correspondence from 1626-1640. The value of the manuscript is immeasurable as it shows the amounts and types of communication between the Privy Council, lord lieutenants, and the deputy lieutenants of Cambridgeshire under Charles I, however it is limited in the fact that it does not contain correspondence from the deputy lieutenants to the constables and captains which if available would further illuminate the Cambridgeshire story. That being said, its certificates and muster rolls, along with the everyday communication of the Lieutenancy provide an invaluable look into the workings and mindset of the Lieutenancy under Charles I which does not exist in other shires leading into the civil war.

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<sup>33</sup> Study of the lieutenancy owes a great deal to the Cutts family as it is believed that both Harley MS 6599, and 4014 were compiled by the Cutts family. Harley MS 6599 was most likely compiled by Sir John Cutts (d.1615) who was a deputy lieutenant for Cambridgeshire under both Roger, Lord North and Thomas Suffolk. Although it is impossible to be certain, Harley MS 4014 was most likely compiled by Sir John Cutts (d. 1646) or Sir John Millicent. Both men were deputy lieutenants for the shire during the period in question, and the limited amount of correspondence from the deputy lieutenants to either the captains of the horse and foot bands or constables bears both their names. The fact that Cutts' father had Harley MS 6599 copied and bound for the years 1595-1605 points strongly to him as the compiler of Harley MS 4014;



## **Chapter 1: The History and Evolution of the Lord Lieutenancy**

Much has been written about the lord lieutenancy and its place in local government under Charles I and the role it played in the years leading up to the civil war.<sup>1</sup> What is needed is an in depth examination of the history, evolution, duties, as well as the men behind the office in Cambridgeshire who were charged with much more than just militia affairs in the years leading up to the civil war and the collapse of the Lieutenancy. Lieutenancies in other shires appear to be bitterly divided with factions based on influence and religion hindering its normal operations. Cambridgeshire appears to be different possessing a long history of consensus and stability under the Lord Lieutenancy from its Edwardian beginnings until 1640. Therefore an examination of the history and evolution of the Lieutenancy needs to be done.

First appointed by the Duke of Northumberland as an ad hoc response to the political turmoil of the later 1540s, the office of lord lieutenant was formally acknowledged in the Militia Act of 1558, and saw its first use in Cambridgeshire with the appointment of Roger Lord North in 1569. Although very few original commissions survive to verify its use before 1585, the office of the Lieutenancy continued to exist in various counties throughout the rest of the Tudor period.<sup>2</sup> The lord lieutenant had the monarch's particular favor and were peers whom the monarch trusted above all else to ensure stability and order in times of rebellion and strife because their authority rested solely upon royal prerogative. The lord lieutenant faced not only the daunting task of

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<sup>1</sup> Victor L. Stater, *Noble Government : the Stuart lord lieutenancy and the transformation of English politics*, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1994), Thomson, Gladys Scott, *Lords Lieutenants in the sixteenth century : a study in Tudor local administration* (London : Longmans, Green, 1923), Thomas Cogswell, *Home Divisions: Aristocracy, the State, and Provincial Conflict* (Trowbridge: Manchester University Press, 1998).

<sup>2</sup> Victor Stater, *Noble Government*, pg . 20-50.

managing local military and political forces, but also the larger task of maintaining good order for the crown in localities in which the crown had little if any direct control. After all, a stable community was obviously in the best interest of the crown and the shires.<sup>3</sup>

The office, although extant before 1585, was not a permanent part of the county government. The commissions handed out before 1585 were temporary in nature and were not intended to remain in place after the disturbances that warranted the commission had subsided, as was the case with the first appointment for Cambridgeshire in 1569 of Roger Lord North which lasted only a year. However, in 1585, the nature changed. The lord lieutenants commissioned in 1585 and thereafter continued to exercise authority until their death or replacement. During the years from 1585 to 1590, lord lieutenants were commissioned for all of the counties of England and Wales, including the permanent nomination of Roger Lord North as lord lieutenant on 8 April 1588. However, in the later of years of Elizabeth's reign some lord lieutenants were not replaced upon their death and the office was left vacant. At the accession of James I there were sixteen counties in which the Lieutenancy had been left vacant for three years or more,<sup>4</sup> and in seven of them it had been vacant for at least a decade.<sup>5</sup> James I remedied any lapse in appointments, and in the first five years of his reign he either replace or recommissioned all of the existing lord lieutenants. By 1607 new appointments had been made for twelve of the vacant

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<sup>3</sup> Victor Stater, *Noble Government*, pg. 9.

<sup>4</sup> Buckingham, Chester, Cumberland, Durham, Essex, Hertford, Lincoln, Middlesex, Norfolk, Northampton, Northumberland, Nottingham, Stafford, Suffolk, Warwick, and Westmoreland; J. C. Sainty, "Lieutenants of Counties 1585-1642," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research: Special Supplement #8*, (May 1970) pg. 4.

<sup>5</sup> Buckingham, Chester, Middlesex, Northampton, Nottingham, Stafford, Warwick; Sainty, "Lieutenants of Counties 1585-1642", pg. 4.

counties.<sup>6</sup> Although the remaining four counties had to wait longer to have lord lieutenants named for them,<sup>7</sup> it was clear that by the death of James I the Lieutenancy had found a permanent place in the fabric of society and local government.<sup>8</sup>

Why was the Lieutenancy recognized as being so important and why did it gain a permanent place in Stuart local government? The Lieutenancy performed a myriad of official and unofficial functions that held the delicate balance of the early modern political structure together. The formal duties of the lord lieutenants were primarily military. The commissions required them to act as commanders of the militia within the limits of their particular Lieutenancy. Although the office was martial in character, the lord lieutenants officially required little or no training. On the whole they were not even military men. Their birth and social standing gave them their position. In fact only thirteen lord lieutenants under James I and Charles I had seen any type of military service. What passed for soldiering among these thirteen was typically a short stint as a volunteer for the Protestant cause in the 1610s or 1620s. However, the Cambridgeshire lord lieutenants had more experience. Thomas Howard, (future 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk) volunteered for the fleet sent to oppose the Spanish Armada, and was knighted at sea by his cousin, the Lord High Admiral on 25 June 1588 for his valor. Afterwards he was made captain of a man-of-war, and made commander of a squadron that attacked Spanish treasure ships off the Azores. In May 1596, he was admiral of the third squadron in the fleet sent against Cadiz. His ability and courage commended him to the favor of the queen, who referred to him in a letter as 'good Thomas'. Theophilus, 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk, also had some experience, but far

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<sup>6</sup> Essex, Lincoln, and Warwick in 1603; Hertford, Norfolk, and Suffolk in 1605; Buckingham, Chester, Cumberland, Lancaster, Northumberland, and Westmoreland in 1607; Sainty, "*Lieutenants of Counties 1585-1642*", pg. 3-4.

<sup>7</sup> Stafford in 1612; Durham in 1615; Middlesex in 1617; Nottingham in 1626; *Ibid*, pg. 4.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*, pg. 3-4.

less than his father did. He served as a volunteer at the siege of Juliers in 1610, but saw no military action.<sup>9</sup>

Lord lieutenants were charged with repelling invasions, suppressing riots, and disturbances, ordering musters, training and arming the crown's forces. Lord lieutenants were also responsible for the stores of armor and furniture, the stocking of provisions of powder, shot, lead and victuals for the soldiers as well as the maintaining and watching of beacons in case of invasion. During peacetime these duties were accomplished with relative ease, however war would strain the Lieutenancy like nothing else would. These were simply the institution's official functions. The Lieutenancy held many other unofficial duties that were just as vital, if not more important to the political survival of the early modern state.<sup>10</sup> These men often charged with the execution of numerous other administrative chores. They were not only called on to defend the public order, represent the crown in the localities, and carry out the orders of the Privy Council, but also to supervise the sale of mulberry trees, Virginia Company lottery tickets, the sale and consumption of meat during Lent, drunkenness in alehouses, and the price of loaves of bread. One special duty entrusted to lord lieutenants was the work of monitoring recusants and sending them to the bishop or Privy Council. In addition, they were called on to adjudicate local disputes, settle dangerous feuds, and build consensus within the shire. In other words, a multitude of military and ad-hoc administrative business fell to the lord lieutenant.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Theophilus, 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk, is more notable for engaging in a notable quarrel with Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury. It was apparently after a drunken argument that Walden was challenged to a duel, but authorities prevented the duel, ODNB, *Theophilus Howard*; Stater, "Noble Government", pg. 16.

<sup>10</sup> G. S. Thomson, "The Origins and Growth of the Office of Deputy Lieutenant," *TRHS 4<sup>th</sup> series*, 5 (1922) pg. 151-152; Stater, "Lord Lieutenant", pg. 316

<sup>11</sup> Thomson, "The Origins and Growth of the Office of Deputy Lieutenant," pg. 163.

As the most important unofficial function, the Lieutenancy served as a 'point of contact' between the crown and the localities. In a political system based on a patron-client relationship, the lieutenancy proved to be a valuable conduit of information both from the crown to the localities, and from the localities to the crown. The lord lieutenant could press local issues at court as well as explain the rationale behind royal mandates to his shire. This was especially valuable during the reign of Charles I and his personal rule, when recourse to Parliament ceased and the only form of redress available to the localities was through their lord lieutenant and his place at court.<sup>12</sup>

With all of these official and unofficial tasks heaped upon them, at first the lord lieutenants still had no paid subordinates or officials to help them carry out these duties. The lord lieutenant was told that he had to rely on the leading gentlemen of the counties within his shire. Naturally, there were men of high standing within the area who could be of special use to the lord lieutenant. These men, often tied to each other by marriage or client-patron relationships, would become the first deputy lieutenants.<sup>13</sup>

It is hard to say exactly when the first deputies were commissioned. References to deputies exist in letters as early as 1558,<sup>14</sup> and certain appointments made as early as

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<sup>12</sup> During this time, 34 of the 64 lord lieutenants held one or more high places at court with only 14 holding minor offices or none at all in addition to their lieutenancy. For more detail on this see, Kevin Sharpe, "Crown, Parliament and Locality: Government and Communication in Stuart England," *EHR* 101 (1986).

<sup>13</sup> Thomson, "The Origins and Growth of the Office of Deputy Lieutenant," pg. 152-3.

<sup>14</sup> In a letter sent by Lady Jane Grey to the Marquis of Northampton, the letter was addressed to "The Marquis of Northampton, our Lieutenant of our County of Surrey and our trusty and well-beloved the Deputies of that Lieutenancy and the Sheriff and Chief Justices of the Peace and the Worshipful of the shire.," Thomson, pg. 153.

1569.<sup>15</sup> Methods of naming deputies varied and a lack of numerous examples due to few surviving commissions make it difficult to say precisely how they were named. Yet by 1585, deputies were named by inserting a clause of deputation within a lieutenancy commission. From 1585-1603 all commissions except one<sup>16</sup> were made out with no provision for deputies at all or with a clause of deputation with the names of the deputies already inserted. This was the case for Cambridgeshire in 1588 and 1598 when the commissions were renewed for the alteration of the deputies.<sup>17</sup>

During the reign of Elizabeth I, the nomination of deputies was under the control of the crown. The central government, more specifically the Privy Council, exercised almost complete formal control over the deputies who were appointed. Lord lieutenants had the opportunity to suggest to the council candidates whom they considered deserving, but they could not insist that specific individuals be chosen as their deputies. From 1585 to 1603, with one exception,<sup>18</sup> commissions were sent out either without provisions for deputies or the names of the deputies were inserted in the clause of deputation. But, as the Lieutenancy evolved under James I, certain lord lieutenants gained the power to nominate and name their own deputies.<sup>19</sup>

During the reign of James I, deputies began to appear in counties that had never before had deputies. Along with this came the power to nominate and name their

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<sup>15</sup> Deputies were listed for 11 counties: Cornwall, Devon, Hampshire, Hertford, Norfolk, Northampton, Oxford, Somerset, Surrey, Warwick, and Worcester; Sainty, pg. 1-12; Cambridgeshire named three deputies in 1569 commission under Roger Lord North: Francis Hinde, John Hatton, and Robert Peyton; Eugene J. Bourgeois, "The Queen, a Bishop, and a Peer: A Clash for Power in Mid-Elizabethan Cambridgeshire," *Sixteenth Century Journal XXVI/1* (1995), pg. 4.

<sup>16</sup> 1590, Sir Christopher Hatton was given unrestricted right to appoint his own deputy lieutenants.

<sup>17</sup> Thomson, "The Origins and Growth of the Office of Deputy Lieutenant", pg. 153-5.

<sup>18</sup> In 1590, Sir Christopher Hatton was given unrestricted right to appoint his own deputies; Sainty, "*Lieutenants of Counties 1585-1642*", pg. 8.

<sup>19</sup> For example, in 1598, Roger Lord North secured the nomination of his son Sir Henry as a deputy lieutenant for the Isle of Ely division within his lieutenancy; Bourgeois, "Meeting the Demands of War", pg. 134.

deputies. The lord lieutenant of Cambridge, Thomas Howard, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk, was given the power to name his own deputies when his Lieutenancy was renewed on 18 July 1605. By 1623, the Privy Council retained control over nominations in only four counties: Chester, Devon, Essex and Lancaster. Later in the same year, the central government resumed control over the naming of deputies by renewing all commissions with the names of deputies already inserted. This reclamation of control by the Privy Council was short-lived, and in May 1625, the commissions were renewed again with each lord lieutenant having the power to name his deputies without restriction. This control was not to be relinquished by again until the outbreak of the civil war in 1642.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, by 1626 every county in England had a lord lieutenant who was assisted by deputies either singly or joined with a neighboring county.<sup>21</sup> Despite the relatively brief history of the office, it had become a vital point of contact between the court and the localities, and an examination of the lord lieutenants who served under Charles I reveals certain characteristics that were an important part of the office.

Suitability was not determined by ideological tests, but instead was determined by social standing or lineage. Lord lieutenants had to be leaders in their shires and most were not only from ancient noble families, they were most often from the upper reaches of the peerage. During Charles' reign forty-nine of the sixty-four lord lieutenants were no less than earls. Like their superiors, deputy lieutenants were men of exceptional pedigree. They too were from the most distinguished families among the local gentry, with some family lineages spanning back two to three hundred years

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<sup>20</sup> Sainty, "*Lieutenants of Counties 1585-1642*", pg. 7-9.

<sup>21</sup> This was the case for the lieutenancy of Cambridgeshire from 1602-1640 when it was joined with Suffolk. At one time or another it also was joined with Dorset, Cumberland, Northumberland, Westmoreland, and the Cinque Ports under the Howard Family; Sainty, "*Lieutenants of Counties 1585-1642*", pg. 13,15,18,19,32, and 40.

within their shire. Rank was essential to be a lord lieutenant or a deputy because he had to be able to command the obedience and respect of all the shire's factions.

Although a relatively new institution, certain families already held a firm grip on the office within their shires.<sup>22</sup> Three successive generations followed each other into the office in Bedford (Grey), Leicester (Hastings), Derby (Cavendish), Huntingdon (St. John), and Suffolk (Howard).<sup>23</sup> This sort of hereditary claim to the Lieutenancy was never acknowledged by the crown, but the tendency was clear even when wealthier families existed within a shire, the trend was to maintain the hereditary nature of the office. The office could be either a sign of royal favor to an ascending family (such as Villiers) or the last tenuous connection at court for a family whose influence was on the decline (such as Hastings). Certain counties were immune from this hereditary dominance. It appears to have little or no influence on the appointments in Buckingham, Essex, Middlesex, Nottingham and Stafford; however, the Howard Family illustrates this trend well.<sup>24</sup> Thomas Howard, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk, was commissioned lord lieutenant of Cambridgeshire on 17 July 1602 following the death of Lord North. His son, Theophilus Howard, 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk, assumed the office following the death of his father on 15 June 1626. Theophilus Howard was also named lord lieutenant for Suffolk and Dorset, an office also held by his father as well. James Howard, 3<sup>rd</sup> earl of Suffolk, followed his father and grandfather into the Lieutenancy of Suffolk on 16 June 1640, but he did not hold any of the other offices that his forefathers had held. This was a signal of the decline suffered by the Howard family. Loss of office and mismanagement of accounts forced the sale of many of the

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<sup>22</sup> Stater, *Noble Government*, pg. 12-20.

<sup>23</sup> The Howard family also held Cambridgeshire for two successive generations from 1602-1640, as well as Dorset from 1611-40; Sainty, "*Lieutenants of Counties 1585-1642*", pg. 13, 15.

<sup>24</sup> Stater, *Noble Government*, pg. 13.

family's lands including Suffolk House on the Strand in London, and Lulworth Castle in Dorset and the Lieutenancy was the family's last tenuous link to court.<sup>25</sup>

Along with ancient lineage, wealth and position were common among most lord lieutenants and some deputies. Only eight of the lord lieutenants under Charles I had rentals that provided less than £2200 per annum, thus raising them head and shoulders above their gentry neighbors. Although at times deputy lieutenants were not on the same financial level as their exalted lords, they were nonetheless among the wealthiest men in their shires. They more often than not had rental incomes of over £1000 per annum.<sup>26</sup> Many lord lieutenants also combined their local offices with high offices at court. Of the sixty-four lord lieutenants under Charles I, twenty-nine were privy councilors<sup>27</sup>, thirty-four held one or more important offices at court, twenty-five were created knights of the Garter<sup>28</sup> and virtually all of them were knights of the Bath. The proximity to the king and court that these positions gave was crucial to the Lieutenancy. During the Stuart period, when recourse to Parliament was rare, the Lieutenancy had the closest connections to the court and was therefore able to better press the case of the localities.<sup>29</sup>

Deputy lieutenants held many other offices to supplement their income and influence as well. Many of these men served as sheriffs within their shire, although the two offices were never held concurrently. Any deputy that was nominated to serve as

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<sup>25</sup> Sainty, "*Lieutenants of Counties 1585-1642*", pg. 13,18,19,40.

<sup>26</sup> Stater, *Noble Government*, pg. 14-15.

<sup>27</sup> Roger Lord North, Thomas Howard, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk and Theophilus Howard, 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk were all privy councilors.

<sup>28</sup> Both the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk were knights of the garter; Bodleian Library Carte MS 121 fol. 9-10; 123 fol. 20.

<sup>29</sup> Stater, *Noble Government*, pg. 14-15.

sheriff resigned his commission, and a sheriff was never named as a deputy lieutenant.<sup>30</sup> Deputies were also closely associated with the commissions of the peace within their shire and often served as members of Parliament at the nomination of their lord lieutenant. Deputies almost always served as justices of the peace and were invariably of the quorum. These were not simply country gentlemen, and like their lord lieutenants these men had interests that reached beyond the limits of their shire. Many owned lands in counties outside their own and had extensive family ties either by marriage or lineage. Many had also studied at one of the universities in England and therefore had relationships with men of greater or equal standing throughout the realm. All of these various connections allowed deputies to preserve their own and the counties interests, as well as maintain contact at court.<sup>31</sup>

The Lieutenancy became an integral part of local government for many reasons. Possibly the most important factor leading to its entrenchment in the English political system was the hostility that existed between Elizabeth I and the king of Spain. It is for this reason that 1585 and the years immediately following seem in many respects to have been the crucial turning point in the survival and eventual permanent status of the Lieutenancy. Threats of Spanish invasion necessitated that a certain state of defense and readiness be maintained. Apprehensions of a Spanish invasion did not cease with the defeat of the Armada in 1588 and the crown was forced to raise armies for service in Ireland and abroad. These apprehensions and the need for forces abroad forced the tenures of the lord lieutenants to be more prolonged and their deputies to be more numerous.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Thomson, "The Origins and Growth of the Office of Deputy Lieutenant," pg. 157.

<sup>31</sup> Stater, *Noble Government*, pg. 20-22.

<sup>32</sup> Forces were called for service in Ireland to put down the Tyrone Rebellion in 1595, but were also called to serve abroad in the Portugal Expedition of 1589, the Cadiz Expedition of 1596, and in support

Because of heightened political tensions, deputies became more important to the military preparedness of the shires. Because lord lieutenants held such lofty social status and many during this time were privy councilors, they spent more and more time away from their shires. Cambridgeshire under Charles I was a prime example of this trend. Theophilus Howard, 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk, as well as his father, were both lord lieutenants for Cambridgeshire, Suffolk and Dorset, and held numerous other offices at court.<sup>33</sup> Further exacerbating this was the fact that Theophilus Suffolk, although in charge of Cambridgeshire, spent scarcely any time in the shire. All communications from Suffolk to his deputies came from his home, Suffolk House in London, Dover Castle, or from his other residences in Essex or Dorset. This lack of residency and attention transformed the nature of the deputies from assistants to the principle agents of local government with the shire.

Because of the ever increasing work load, the lord lieutenants were forced to expand the number of deputies within the shires. This expansion also came about because of a growing number of prosperous men who eagerly sought the appointment to such offices as the deputy lieutenant as a confirmation of their status within the local gentry. Competition was sometimes fierce for such appointments and a lord lieutenant had to be judicious in his appointments so as not to devalue the nomination, even though there was significant pressure within the shire to reward loyal clients. A simple nomination could turn a potential enemy into a valuable ally who could be called upon in times of turmoil.<sup>34</sup> When first named under Elizabeth I there were

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of the rebels in the Netherlands under the command of the earl of Leicester in 1585; Thomson, "The Origins and Growth of the Office of Deputy Lieutenant," pg. 163-5.

<sup>33</sup> For a full account of the various offices held by these men at court, see appendix.

<sup>34</sup> Thomson, "The Origins and Growth of the Office of Deputy Lieutenant", pg. 155.

between two and five deputies named per shire in those shires that warranted deputies. By the end of the 1630s, all counties had deputies numbering from five to fifteen. This was especially true of Cambridgeshire. When first named in 1569, Cambridgeshire commissioned only three deputies.<sup>35</sup> By the 1630s, Cambridgeshire's deputy lieutenants had doubled in number, routinely commissioning six to seven deputies,<sup>36</sup> in part to cover the ever-growing demands of dealing with Charles' militia policies, fiscal innovations, as well as to cover for the non-residence of the lord lieutenant.

Threats of invasion and war lingered into the reign of James I but his determination to stay out of costly continental wars and the cessation of hostilities in Europe made his intentions easier to fulfill.<sup>37</sup> This had a direct effect on the Lieutenancy because for almost twenty years the lord lieutenants were able to build up goodwill within the shire. They were able to act on behalf of the shires while being able to shield the localities from overbearing and unpopular policies from the central government. During this time, the lord lieutenants and the deputies were given a great deal of authority and prestige while required to spend very little effort. Musters were held only sporadically and except for the campaign of 1624,<sup>38</sup> there were no large armies raised within England. James' intention to stay out of continental wars allowed the Lieutenancy to avoid the problems that came with provisioning of troops, and through

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<sup>35</sup> They were Francis Hinde, John Hutton, and Robert Peyton, Eugene J. Bourgeois, "The Queen, a Bishop, and a Peer", pg. 4.

<sup>36</sup> Men included in the later commissions include Thomas Hatton, Miles Sandys, Edward Peyton, John Cutts, John Millecent, William Allington, Thomas Chichely, and Dudley North; BL Harley MS. 4014 fol. 30-57.

<sup>37</sup> 23 June 1603, James I made a proclamation ending the war with Spain. This was settled with the Treaty of London in 19 August 1604 formally ending the war with Spain. Also the Twelve Years' Truce between Spain and the Netherlands began on 9 April 1609, and solidified on 17 June 1609 when the alliance with the Netherlands and France guaranteed the truce.

<sup>38</sup> Ernst of Mansfield's failed expedition to recover the Palatinate.

the benign neglect of the crown, the Lieutenancy became even more localistic in its orientation.<sup>39</sup>

The Lieutenancy became a legitimate and respected part of local government because the lord lieutenant sat atop a vast network of patronage that cemented his place as the chief arbiter of disputes and dispenser of financial largess within the shire. Although the deputy lieutenant appointment was the highest plum in the lord lieutenant's patronage tree, it was not the only one. By 1638, the English trained bands numbered over 73,000 foot and almost 5, 000 horse. By being the administrator of these forces, the lord lieutenant was in charge of appointments of all lesser officers. Captains and colonels of militia regiments had to be named and there was no shortage of status hungry men scrambling for the posts. Depending on the size of the county, a lord lieutenant could name from six to twenty colonels, and at times as many as forty-four captains. Each company also had its own lieutenant and ensign whose appointments also came under the discretion of the lord lieutenant. In addition, there were slots for noncommissioned officers such as sergeants, corporals, lance corporals, harbingers, clerks and drummers, and again there were no shortage of men from the lesser gentry willing to take on the sometimes onerous tasks associated with these offices. Any office was a way to separate oneself from the others and appointment decisions in each shire were at the discretion of the lord lieutenant. These officials while affirming the claims of one family and denying the aspirations of others always needed to keep a keen eye on conflicts that could be created.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Stater, *Noble Government*, pg. 10-14.

<sup>40</sup> Stater, *Noble Government*, pg. 20-24.

The lieutenant's powers of patronage were not limited to the granting of offices. Maintenance of the trained bands and providing for the county magazines required substantial financial expense. Powder, match, shot, and lead along with other various supplies were to be kept in supply. This meant periodic purchases to keep the magazines in good order. In coastal counties also had the responsibility for the watching and replenishing of the beacons. All of these offered considerable opportunity for lordly patronage by financial awards of contracts for these supplies and services further cementing the Lieutenancy's place in local government.<sup>41</sup>

Although there are many similarities between the ways that the Lieutenancy evolved in other shires, Cambridgeshire is still unique in the way that the people of the Lieutenancy came to dominate the local government of the shire. The existence of the ancient liberty of the Isle of Ely, headed by Bishop Cox (1559-81), as well as two other traditionally exempt precincts, (Cambridge borough and Cambridge University) would make exercising royal authority within the whole of the shire very difficult. Roger Lord North was sole resident peer within the shire and was the son of a former privy councilor, who would later become a member of the Queen's chamber, treasurer of the royal household as well as a privy councilor in his own right. Lord North ranked first in the shire magistracy from 1559 and on the Isle of Ely's Bench from 1573, and by 1570, he had emerged as the leading secular figure in Cambridgeshire government and politics. Lord North also held the office of high steward of Cambridge and the Isle of Ely, the later representing an encroachment into the Bishop of Ely's domain. However, the key to the crown and Lord North's plan to exercise more direct control within the various liberties would come with North's appointment

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<sup>41</sup> *Ibid*, pg. 24-25.

as lord lieutenant in 1569. North served as the lord lieutenant for Cambridgeshire from 1569 till his death on 3 December 1600,<sup>42</sup> and in that time he was able to consolidate almost all aspects of local government through the agency of the lord lieutenant. The new office gave him jurisdiction within the previously exempt liberty. In 1565, North and other muster officials had been accused of breaching the Isle's privileged status by interfering in the area's military affairs,<sup>43</sup> but as lord lieutenant North could claim a higher authority to do so by virtue of the commission.<sup>44</sup>

The struggle for power and jurisdiction would continue between Lord North and Bishop Cox throughout the 1570s, with Lord North gradually gaining ground on the ageing bishop. The dispute resulted in numerous scathing letters, court cases and an appearance before the council in 1575.<sup>45</sup> By his death in 1581, Bishop Cox had been forced to relinquish many of the very wealthy manors previously controlled by the bishopric of Ely, including Ely house, at Holborn, London to the queen's favorite, Sir Christopher Hatton. After Cox's death, the bishopric was left vacant for eighteen years enabling North to even further consolidate power within the former liberty.<sup>46</sup> By 1580, North's power had ascended to previously unprecedented heights for a Cambridgeshire peer in the Tudor era. It was achieved through his status as the sole

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<sup>42</sup> In the years from his first appointment in 1569, the appointments were temporary in nature and it was not until 1585 that the permanent commission of lord lieutenant of Cambridge.

<sup>43</sup> In July 1565, North, Hutton, Hinde, and Sir Giles Allington attempted to muster horses within the Isle of Ely as well as the shire. Bishop Cox successfully obtained a conciliar explanation of the orders which forbade North and his colleagues from intervening in the military affairs of the Isle of Ely for the time being.

<sup>44</sup> For a more detailed account of the disputes between the Bishop and Lord North see, Eugene J. Bourgeois, "The Queen, a Bishop, and a Peer: A Clash for Power in Mid-Elizabethan Cambridgeshire," *Sixteenth Century Journal XXVI/1* (1995). Eugene J. Bourgeois, "The Queen, a Bishop, and a Peer,"

<sup>45</sup> Eugene J. Bourgeois, "The Queen, a Bishop, and a Peer," pg. 4-5.

<sup>46</sup> Although jurisdiction had been settled within Isle of Ely, relations between shire officials and the town of Cambridge improved, but relations between the university and county officials remained unsettled.

resident peer, his power brokerage at the local level, and assistance of higher authorities, namely the queen. Lord North enhanced his standing through the exercise of local patronage. In 1581 and 1584 he secured the return to Parliament by Cambridge of his two sons John and Henry respectively, the first 'outsiders' to represent the borough in the 1500s. Each son later served as senior knight for the shire. John Goldwell and Robert Shute became chief justices in the Isle of Ely through his patronage. His largess was not limited to gift of office alone; Lord North also protected the catholic Coke family from religious persecution at the hands of Bishop Cox, and backed them long after Cox's death. However, his greatest form of patronage was in the selection of his deputy lieutenants.<sup>47</sup>

For his deputy lieutenants in 1569, Lord North chose Francis Hinde, John Hutton, and Robert Peyton. If Lord North stood alone as the sole resident peer, these men were part of a small group of the county's gentry or 'ruling elite' that existed within Cambridgeshire who were tied to the peer and each other through bonds of kinship, friendship and shared religious sympathies.<sup>48</sup> These men by virtue of their lineage and ties to each other were able to dominate local government and office holding throughout the Tudor and early Stuart period. Family names such as Hinde, Peyton, Allington, Millecent, and Cutts dominated the commissions of the peace and quarter sessional attendance, indicating that they were not only named to the commissions, but actively involved in the local governance of the shire throughout the Tudor and early Stuart era. And with the consolidation of power under Lord North and the

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<sup>47</sup> Eugene J. Bourgeois, "Meeting the Demands of War," pg. 134.

<sup>48</sup> Other than shared office holding as JPs and commissioners for musters and subsidies, North and Peyton were brothers-in-law through their marriage to daughters of Richard Lord Rich. Hinde and Hutton were similarly related by way of Hutton's marriage to Lady Sibyll Cuttes Hinde. Also despite common puritan sympathies, religion does not seem to play a factor in office holding, with only one catholic, Sir John Cotton, deprived of office because of religion.

agency of the Lord Lieutenancy, these families continued to dominate local government by providing deputy lieutenants for the shire.<sup>49</sup>

This domination of local government by the ruling elite increased following the death of Lord North. North was an active and meticulously involved resident peer who oversaw every aspect of local government and militia matters. His replacement as lord lieutenant was Thomas Howard, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk, and although he was the second son of Thomas, 4<sup>th</sup> Duke of Norfolk,<sup>50</sup> who had previously held the high stewardships of Cambridge and the Isle of Ely, Suffolk's influence and interest in Cambridgeshire was much more hands off than that of Lord North's. Thomas Suffolk was a committed courtier and owed much of his fortune to his involvement at court and his business as Lord High Treasurer and a privy councilor. His son, Theophilus, 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk, followed him into the job and continued this pattern of non-residence and court involvement which would have allowed the deputies to further entrench themselves as the key men in local government of the shire and become more localistic in nature, shielding the shire wherever possible due to the lack of involvement from the lord lieutenant.

However, it is important now to take a more detailed look at the men who held office in the Lieutenancy of Cambridgeshire, in order to see how much they reflect the norm for office holders across the nation as well as to find out more about the men of the ruling elite of Cambridgeshire. Why were they chosen, or did their position and place

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<sup>49</sup> A much broader account of the families and their place in the ruling elite will be outlined in the next chapter which will examine their ancestral ties to the shire, intermarriage, and land holdings and wealth.

Eugene J. Bourgeois, "A Ruling Elite: The Government of Cambridgeshire, circa 1524-1588" (Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge University, 1988), ch.3-5; BL Harley MS. 4014 fol. 1-80.

<sup>50</sup> Later attained and executed for his part in attempt to overthrow Queen Elizabeth by marrying Mary, Queen of Scots.

make them the natural selection for the shire, and to what extent does their selection tell us about the Lieutenancy as an institution.

## **Chapter 2: Office and Officeholders**

So what can we say about the families that occupied the lord lieutenancy of Cambridgeshire? All of them were of exceptional pedigree, and standing at both court and in the countryside, as well as patron/client or friendship bonds with other members of the peerage ranging across the whole of the country. The men who were chosen as Lord Lieutenants were from the upper echelon of the peerage, head and shoulders above their county gentry neighbors with interests that made them a vital part of court as well as country life, and in this aspect, Cambridge was no different. Roger, Lord North was the first lord lieutenant to be appointed on a temporary basis in 1569, and later held the office with a permanent commission from 1588 to 1600. During his time in office he was able to consolidate power and influence into the office of the lieutenancy, fighting battles with the Bishop Cox of Ely, as well as the town and university of Cambridge over jurisdiction within the various liberties of the shire. Only the University remained outside the purview of the Lieutenancy at the end of Lord North's tenure as Lord Lieutenant, and it would be the men that followed Lord North who would benefit from the power he and his deputy lieutenants struggled to gain over the various liberties within the shire.<sup>1</sup> Thomas Howard, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk (1602-1626), Theophilus Suffolk, 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk (1626-1640), and William Lord Maynard (June 1640-Dec 1640) were the men that would benefit over the next 40 years from Lord North's hard work, yet their families and power bases were different than North's as would be the pattern for their lieutenancies.<sup>2</sup> The Howard and Maynard families were courtier based, not in Cambridgeshire as Lord

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<sup>1</sup> Eugene J. Bourgeois, "The Queen, a Bishop, and a Peer: A Clash for Power in Mid-Elizabethan Cambridgeshire," *Sixteenth Century Journal XXVI/1* (1995) pg. 3-15.

<sup>2</sup> J. C. Sainty, "Lieutenants of Counties 1585-1642," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research: Special Supplement #8*, (May 1970) pg. 1-5.

North had been, and represented a shift in high office holding towards courtiers and a growing divide where trust and office were monopolized by courtiers, alienating the traditional links between the court and the country.<sup>3</sup>

The Howard family especially symbolizes the court/country divide that was emerging in the Stuart Era. The Howards were committed courtiers and spent little time within the shire they were placed as lord lieutenant over. Only brief stints entertaining the king at Cambridge University, or serving as a collector for the forced loan meeting at Newmarket would have to serve as contact with Cambridgeshire for the 40 years of lieutenancy under the earls of Suffolk. However, these men and their families were the model for the lord lieutenants under the early Stuarts, sharing not just peerages and titles with the other lieutenants, but also social, familial and educational links that drew them together. Therefore this chapter will aim to show that despite slight differences in family history and paths taken to the office, the North, Howard, and Maynard family lieutenants all share common elements that are reflected across the men holding the office of Lord Lieutenant and these certain commonalities existed on a smaller scale for the deputy lieutenants of Cambridgeshire. And it is especially the Howard family, and their relations within the lieutenancy who illustrate the growing court/country divide that developed during the Early Stuart monarchies. In terms of the Lieutenancy, the positions of the North, Howard and Maynard families are emblematic of not only how families can rise to high office, or redeem a tarnished lineage, but also sheds light on the narrowing of office holding by an increasing minority of courtiers, to the detriment of the country gentry, and the ever growing

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<sup>3</sup> For detailed discussion of this trend see: Perez Zagorin, *The Court and the country : the beginning of the English Revolution* (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969).

divide between court life and the localities that emerged during the early Stuart monarchs.<sup>4</sup>

### **Lord Lieutenants**<sup>5</sup>

As detailed in chapter 1, there are a number of prerequisites needed to occupy the office of Lord Lieutenant under the Stuarts. Social and familial connections, court offices, common educational backgrounds, and military experience were all part of the make up of the early Stuart Lord Lieutenant, and the men who presided over Cambridgeshire lived up to that standard in virtually every way. Social and familial links were the most important with intermarriage forming a basis for gaining wealth, advancement and solidifying social ties, and for all of these families, their familial, whether through marriage or blood, were extensive.

Edward Lord North was able to secure very favorable matches for his two daughters into noble families with Mary to Henry Scrope, 9<sup>th</sup> Baron Scrope, and Christian to William Somerset, 3<sup>rd</sup> earl of Worcester. His son, Roger Lord North married, Winifred Rich, not only daughter of Richard Rich, 1<sup>st</sup> Baron Rich and Lord Chamberlain under Edward VI, but also the widow of the eldest son of the 1<sup>st</sup> duke of Northumberland, and aunt of the 1st Earl of Warwick.<sup>6</sup> Although a native of London, Edward Lord North rose through various offices including clerk of Parliaments, and treasurer of the court of augmentations. A knighthood followed in January 1542 and in 1544, he was subsequently named as joint chancellor of augmentations with Sir

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<sup>4</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/93/80; ODNB, *Thomas Stuart, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk*.

<sup>5</sup> For additional biographical information, see appendix.

<sup>6</sup> Cokayne, G. E., *The complete peerage of England, Scotland, Ireland, Great Britain, and the United Kingdom*, 8 vols. (1887–98)

Richard Rich, who died 3 months later, leaving Lord North the head of the largest of royal revenue courts. He purchased Kirtling manor<sup>7</sup> of Cambridgeshire in 1533 and quickly ingrained himself into county affairs becoming one of the leading gentlemen in his adoptive shire. In 1542 he served as sheriff for Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire, as well as representing the shire in the parliaments of 1542, 1547 and March 1553. During this time he actively speculated on monastic lands and profited greatly from his offices, even being summoned before Henry VIII to defend his financial dealings, but seemed to suffer no ill effects from the charge after his clearance as he was named an executor of Henry's will who bequeathed him £300. Edward was admitted to the privy council by Protector Somerset in March of 1547, and despite some initial lack of support of Mary's claim to the throne<sup>8</sup>, he was elevated to the peerage in April 1554 as 1<sup>st</sup> Baron North. Lord North entertained Elizabeth I on a number of occasions at the Charterhouse,<sup>9</sup> but was never to return to the council despite many visits to his London home. Lord North spent the remaining years at his Cambridgeshire estates, and upon his death on 31 December 1564, the Earls of Norfolk and Leicester acted as supervisors for his will, leaving Roger to succeed to the title.<sup>10</sup>

Roger Lord North, made good use of his father's influence at court, and was able to continue his father's friendship with the Queen, lavishly entertaining her during her

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<sup>7</sup> In addition to his Cambridgeshire estates, he purchased the Charterhouse in London in April 1545, which is notable because it passes to the Howard family and the 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk via the 4<sup>th</sup> duke of Norfolk.

<sup>8</sup> North initially backed the attempt by the duke of Northumberland to place Lady Jane Grey on the throne in July 1553.

<sup>9</sup> Upon her arrival in London following her accession in Nov 1558, Elizabeth I lodged for five days at the Charterhouse as the guest of Lord North, and again in July of 1561 for several days.

<sup>10</sup> One of the supervisors of his will was the Duke of Norfolk. It would be the duke's second son, Thomas Howard who would succeed his son in the Lieutenancy for Cambridgeshire as well as residence in the Charterhouse in London, sold in 1564, later renamed Howard House. ODNB, *Edward North*

progress through East Anglia in the summer of 1578, calculating that the two day visit cost him £762 including a gift of jewelry worth £120. He also presented her with an annual new year's gift of £10 of gold in a silken purse, as well as often recording in his accounts the amounts he lost to Elizabeth playing cards, one such entry totaled £32.<sup>11</sup> He was employed on various diplomatic missions from 1567 to 1574 with Thomas Radcliffe, 3<sup>rd</sup> Earl of Sussex and Francis Walsingham until the defense of the realm called him back to his duties of as lord lieutenant of Cambridgeshire. As the sole resident peer, his influence on local government was strong. He became the Lord Lieutenant for Cambridgeshire in 1569<sup>12</sup> and high steward for Cambridge in 1572. He was also made *custos rotulorum* of the Cambridge bench in 1573 and JP for Isle of Ely in 1579. It was during this time that he also clashed frequently with university and the bishop Cox of Ely over jurisdictional authority within Cambridgeshire and the Isle of Ely.<sup>13</sup> Lord North also formed close ties with the earl of Leicester, appointing him steward of his Middlesex estates and taking the waters with him at Buxton in 1578, and Bath in 1587. Leicester trusted him implicitly, asking North to witness his marriage to Lettice Dudley in September 1578, and North also had custody for a time of Leicester's illegitimate son, Douglas Sheffield, by dowager Baroness Sheffield, and was godfather to Robert Dudley, Baron Denbigh. Despite his failing health and increasing deafness, he was made a privy councilor and treasurer of the household by his old card-playing companion on 30 August 1596, but bad news was soon to follow. His son and heir John North preceded his father in 1597, leaving his grandson as heir while at the age of 15, putting a hold on the significant influence of the North family

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<sup>11</sup> F. Bushby, *Three Men of the Tudor Time*, pg. 105.

<sup>12</sup> The commission was not meant to be permanent and expired a year after the date of the commission as per the queens orders. J. C. Sainty, "Lieutenants of Counties 1585-1642," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research: Special Supplement #8*, (May 1970), pg.2-15.

<sup>13</sup> Eugene J. Bourgeois, "The Queen, a Bishop, and a Peer," pg. 3-15.

had built within Cambridge. His death in 1600 forced the crown to find another family for the next lord lieutenant for Cambridgeshire.<sup>14</sup>

The Howard family was exceedingly well connected across the length and breadth of the nation, both by blood and marriage. Under Charles I, either Thomas Howard, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk, or his sons Theophilus, 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk and Thomas, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Berkshire, were placed in charge of seven different county lieutenancies at one time<sup>15</sup> as well as having cousins, Charles Howard, 2<sup>nd</sup> Earl of Nottingham and Lord Admiral, Thomas Howard, 14<sup>th</sup> Earl of Arundel, and his son, Henry Fredrick Howard, Lord Maltravers, subsequently 15<sup>th</sup> earl of Arundel, in charge of an additional five counties, allowing the Howard family vast influence within the Lieutenancy reflecting their strong position at court.<sup>16</sup> (See map 1) Not only were the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> earl connected by blood, because of their prestigious family history, they were able to link themselves to other ancient families. Thomas, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk, married twice, first to a daughter of Thomas Lord Dacre, and secondly into an influential Suffolk family and daughter of Henry Knyvett of Charlton,<sup>17</sup> and it was this union that produced the Theophilus, 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk and Thomas, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Berkshire.<sup>18</sup> At considerable strain to his purse, the 1<sup>st</sup> earl was able to secure favorable matches for many of his ten children. Theophilus, 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk, married Elizabeth Home, daughter of George Home,

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<sup>14</sup> ODNB, *Roger North*; E. J. Bourgeois, *A Cambridgeshire lieutenancy letterbook, 1595–1605*, (Great Britain: E & E Plumridge Ltd., 1997) pg. 11-13.

<sup>15</sup> Either in sole charge as in Cambridge, Suffolk, Norfolk, and Oxford, or jointly as was the case with Westmoreland, Cumberland and Northumberland; Sainty, “*Lieutenants of Counties*”, pg. 6-40.

<sup>16</sup> Charles Howard serving for Sussex and Surrey, where Thomas and Henry Frederick served (usually in conjunction with each other) for Norfolk, Surrey, Sussex, Westmoreland, Cumberland and Northumberland; Sainty, “*Lieutenants of Counties*”, pg. 6-40

<sup>17</sup> Knyvett a courtier, soldier, gentleman of the privy chamber, and sometime ambassador to the emperor Charles V was also able to secure marriages of two additional daughters to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Earl of Lincoln, and the 6<sup>th</sup> earl of Rutland.

<sup>18</sup> Thomas married the daughter and co-heir of William Cecil, 2<sup>nd</sup> Earl of Exeter, niece of Viscount Wimbeldon, and it was this union that would have helped secure his Lieutenancy for Oxfordshire.

earl of Dunbar,<sup>19</sup> and Thomas, 1<sup>st</sup> Earl of Berkshire, married a daughter of William Cecil, 2<sup>nd</sup> Earl of Exeter,<sup>20</sup> as well as marrying his daughters to the earls of Banbury, Essex, Somerset, and Salisbury, all of whom held high positions at court and within the lieutenancy.<sup>21</sup>

Despite the controversies that would engulfed his father, sister and brother-in-law, Theophilus Howard was able to continue to secure his families influence by again marrying well and securing prominent matches for his children as well. Of his 9 children, he was able to secure for his son and heir, a match with a daughter of Henry Rich, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Holland,<sup>22</sup> as well as married his daughters to George Stuart, Seigneur d'Aubigny (cousin to James I and Charles I), Algernon Percy, 10<sup>th</sup> earl of Northumberland,<sup>23</sup> as well as a relative of the Duke of Buckingham, all of these would further serve to increase his political influence both at court and within the lieutenancy.

Thomas Howard, then Lord Howard de Walden, was a presence at court under Elizabeth, named as constable of the Tower of London on 13 February 1601. He was also sworn high steward of Cambridge University in that same month. In recognition of his East Anglian heritage, he was appointed lord lieutenant for Cambridgeshire and the Isle of Ely from 17 July 1602, following the death of Roger, Lord North. Further office followed as he became acting lord chamberlain of the royal household in

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<sup>19</sup> A significant power in the borders and it was likely this match that secured him his first lieutenancy in 1614 for Cumberland, Westmoreland and Northumberland.

<sup>20</sup> Lord Lieutenant of Northampton 1623-40. Sainty, "*Lieutenants of Counties*", pg. 6-40.

<sup>21</sup> William Knollys, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Banbury was lord lieutenant for Oxfordshire 1596-32; Robert Devereux, 3<sup>rd</sup> earl of Essex, lord lieutenant for Staffordshire 1612-27, 1629-1642; William Cecil, 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Salisbury, lord lieutenant for Hertford 1612-42; G. E. Cokayne, *Complete Peerage*; Sainty, "*Lieutenants of Counties*" pg. 6-40.

<sup>22</sup> Lord lieutenant of Berkshire and Middlesex 1628-42. Sainty, "*Lieutenants of Counties*", pg. 6-40

<sup>23</sup> Lord lieutenant of Cumberland, Westmoreland, and Northumberland 1626-39, and Sussex 1635-42. Sainty, "*Lieutenants of Counties*", pg. 6-40.

December of 1602 and continued the tradition of lavishly entertaining Elizabeth at Howard House, formerly the Charterhouse, in January 1603,<sup>24</sup> but it was the accession of James I which brought wealth and office to Lord Howard de Walden. James I immediately favored Howard, and 4 May 1603 while on his way south from Berwick, made him a privy councilor and appointed lord chamberlain of the household<sup>25</sup> and two months later was created 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk on 21 July 1603. Thomas's star was rising at court as he was named joint commissioner for the office of earl marshal of England,<sup>26</sup> and in the following year, he helped discover the Gunpowder plot,<sup>27</sup> as well as having the lord lieutenancy of Suffolk added to Cambridgeshire on 18 July 1605. By the autumn of the same year, it was clear that Suffolk had emerged as one of the king's most trusted privy councilors.<sup>28</sup>

In the following years he continued to accumulate offices at court being named as captain of the band of gentlemen pensioners in November 1605<sup>29</sup>, joint lord lieutenant of Dorset and the town of Poole on 5 July 1611. Following the death of the earl of Salisbury, he was one of four commissioners the king entrusted the treasury to on 16 June 1612, and was to become sole lord lieutenant of Dorset on 19 February 1613. Upon the death of his uncle, Sir Henry Howard, earl of Northampton, Suffolk was elected chancellor of the University of Cambridge on 8 July 1614, and even prevailed

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<sup>24</sup> Not only had his father the 4<sup>th</sup> Duke of Norfolk entertained there, but Roger Lord North had done it there as the previous owner of the house on two separate occasions.

<sup>25</sup> a post he would hold until 10 July 1614.

<sup>26</sup> The office of earl marshal has a long history within the Howard family dating back to 1509, and has remained either in a committee, or solely in the hands of a descendant of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Duke of Norfolk to the present day.

<sup>27</sup> After receipt of an anonymous letter at Whitehall, Suffolk as Lord Chamberlain conducted a tour of inspection of the palace of Westminster to ensure that all was ready for the opening of parliament, where he spotted a large pile of brushwood. Upon further investigation by Suffolk's brother-in-law Sir Thomas Knyvett, keeper of the palace, the barrels of gunpowder were discovered. Suffolk subsequently served as one of the commissioners who investigated the conspiracy as well as tried the plotters on 27 January 1606. ODNB, *Thomas Suffolk, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk*.

<sup>28</sup> ODNB, *Thomas Suffolk, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk*.

<sup>29</sup> Following the downfall of the earl of Northumberland, Suffolk was allowed to hand over the office to his son Theophilus on 11 July 1614.

upon the king to visit the university in March 1615. Suffolk reportedly spent £1000 a day on hospitality staying at St. John's College, while his wife hosted receptions at Magdalene, a college founded by Suffolk's grandfather, Lord Audley. On 11 July 1614, Suffolk reached his peak at court when he was made lord high treasurer of England and formally held the office until 19 July 1619.<sup>30</sup> By August 1615, fortunes began to change for the earl of Suffolk. James I was already beginning to favor George Villiers, the future duke of Buckingham, and his son-in-law, the earl of Somerset, lost his status at court following the couples implication and subsequent conviction for the murder of Sir Thomas Overbury.<sup>31</sup> Determined attempts were made to implicate the earl of Suffolk in the Overbury's poisoning and James even accused Suffolk of attempting to suppress the initial investigation of the scandal. However, he would escape the scandal and continue as lord treasurer but only for a short time as grave irregularities were discovered at the treasury, and Howard was suspended from his office in the fall of 1618.<sup>32</sup>

Despite all his offices, Suffolk's lifestyle at court nearly bankrupted him numerous times. He was saved from financial ruin by the accession of James I, the re-grant of some of the sequestered Howard estates, as well as the timely deaths of various relatives, most notably, his uncle Henry, Lord Northampton in 1614 who left him his luxurious London home, Charing Cross. This was to be later known as Suffolk House under his son and heir Theophilus, and replace the Charterhouse that Suffolk had been

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<sup>30</sup> ODNB, *Thomas Howard, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk*.

<sup>31</sup> He was a friend and adviser to Robert Carr, the earl of Essex, an Oxford acquaintance. The two quarreled violently when Overbury disapproved of Carr's marriage to Frances Howard. Overbury's hostility was so marked that the Howard family brought pressure to bear, and James I had Overbury imprisoned in the Tower, where he was slowly poisoned. Carr and Frances Howard were convicted of his murder. Their lives were spared by the king, but they were imprisoned in the Tower and freed in January 1622 and would never return to court.

<sup>32</sup> ODNB, *Thomas Howard, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk*.

forced to sell in 1611. Not only did he live an extravagant lifestyle at court, but he also built extensively upon his estates<sup>33</sup> as well as secure his eleven children with advantageous matches, further encumbered his estates. At the time of his death on 28 May 1626, Suffolk had never been able to clear his debts, rumored to be near £50,000, leaving his heir Theophilus Howard, 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk, seriously encumbered with financial difficulties.<sup>34</sup>

Considering his father's rising status at court, Theophilus Howard's success and acquisition of offices there was a forgone conclusion. He was named lieutenant of the band of gentleman pensioners in 1605 and the following year he received a joint stewardship of several royal manors in Wales. Along with other prominent courtiers, he had an interest in colonization and in 1609 became a member of the council of the Virginia Company and in 1612 was a charter member of the North-West Passage Company. He was returned as MP for the borough of Maldon, Essex on 4 November 1605 and served there until on 8 Feb 1610 when he was summoned to the upper house as Baron Howard de Walden. In March of 1612, Walden married Lady Elizabeth Home, a daughter of the George Home, earl of Dunbar, who was a strong regional power in the borders, and it was most likely this match that secured him his first joint lord lieutenancy in 1614 for the counties of Cumberland, Northumberland and Westmorland, serving jointly with Francis Clifford, 4<sup>th</sup> earl of Cumberland.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> He built Audley End in Essex, begun in 1603 and finished in 1616, it was easily the largest private house in England and Suffolk told the king that including all the furniture, it had cost him £200,000, although that sum seems exaggerated. He also added a front wing fronting the Thames to Charing Cross, later renamed Suffolk House. The upkeep alone on both homes would become a serious financial burden in the future.

<sup>34</sup> ODNB, *Thomas Howard, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk*.

<sup>35</sup> Then subsequently, he was joined with Henry, Lord Clifford (1618-1639), Algernon Percy, 4<sup>th</sup> Earl of Northumberland (1632-1639), Thomas Howard, 14<sup>th</sup> earl of Arundel (1632-1639), and Henry Howard, Lord Maltravers (1632-1639): Sainty, "*Lieutenants of Counties*" pg. 15-16; ODNB, *Theophilus Howard*.

Although Theophilus Howard survived the scandal with ensnared his sister Frances and her husband, the earl of Somerset, he was unable to hold his places at court following the fall of his father as he was stripped of his captaincy of the band of gentlemen pensioners. However, Walden was able to hold onto his lieutenancies in Westmorland, Northumberland, and Cumberland so the damage of his father's fall was limited and as it turns out, relatively brief. Following his father's submission to James I, and the reinforcement of Buckingham's supremacy as court favorite, Walden was able to use a relationship with Buckingham to regain favor at court, as well as, have Buckingham stand as godfather to Walden's son in January 1620. Given the loss of his father's influence at court, Walden would need to find another supporter to further his career, and he found that in Buckingham. Evidence of such a relationship is found in a letter from Walden to Buckingham in 1623 where Walden expresses his desire to serve by saying "...it is the part of every friend to pay your Lordship the tribute of their pens in testimony of a further desire to do you service..." as well as pleading his case for advancement by asking Buckingham "...to present my most humble service to the prince" and finally signs the letter "your Lordships affectionate kinsman and humble servant."<sup>36</sup> Walden's pleading and submission did not go unrewarded, and his close connections to Buckingham would ensure that he remained a force at court.

Following his father's death in 1626, Walden not only assumed the title, 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk, but also was named to the privy council<sup>37</sup> as well as the lieutenancies of Cambridge, Suffolk, and Dorset, as well as his earlier lieutenancies in Cumberland, Northumberland and Westmorland. He was also awarded Order of the Garter in 1627

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<sup>36</sup> BL Stowe MS 743, fol. 46.

<sup>37</sup> Suffolk's seat on the council was believed by some to be the result of the king's need for reliable and loyal peers to press the forced loan forward, a job that Suffolk worked hard at and performed well.

and stood with the King as godfather to Buckingham's son and heir. As a reward for his friendship, Buckingham resigned his place as Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports in favor of Suffolk, and also appointed him constable of Dover Castle. It was however, the death of Buckingham that marked a turning point for Suffolk. The loss of his friend and patron as well as his own failing health and ruinous financial situation began to take its toll. Despite having an income of over £10,000 a year, including the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports which brought in an estimated £1700 a year, Suffolk's debts continued to mount reaching a total over £130,000 by 1640. Just like his father, Suffolk was unable to control his extravagance at court, losing £1500 at bowls in a single day, and as a result he was forced to sell land worth more than £36,000 to remain solvent. Suffolk was unable to maintain his father's massive mansion at Audley End, spending all his time either at Suffolk House in London (formerly Charring Cross) or at Lulworth Castle in Dorset. By 1635, Suffolk health had been in decline for a number of years<sup>38</sup> and he had given up his court offices, but retained his lieutenancies as well as remained Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports. He spent his final years staving off financial ruin with little success. He died at Suffolk House in London on 2 June 1640 at the age of fifty-five and was succeeded by James Howard, 3<sup>rd</sup> earl of Suffolk. As a mark of how much the family's fortunes had diminished, James was only able to retain the lieutenancy for Suffolk out of the six counties that his father had held and was unable to keep the Lord Wardenship of the Cinque Ports either, epitomizing the fall of a once powerful family clinging to the lieutenancy as a singular shred of royal favor and status.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> He was excused on numerous occasions from attending functions of the Order of the Garter, first in 1633, and again in 1635, and 1637 due to ill health; Bodleian Library, Carte MS 123 fo.20-22.

<sup>39</sup> ODNB, *Theophilus Howard*.

As for the Maynard family, despite being newly ennobled, the Maynard family married well. William Lord Maynard married Frances Cavendish, daughter of William Cavendish, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Devonshire<sup>40</sup> while his younger brother married the daughter of Sir Thomas Middleton, Lord Mayor of London in 1613. Their social contacts were wide as well, all through the hard work of his father Sir Henry Maynard. He served as secretary to Sir Nicholas Bacon, the lord keeper of the great seal, until the mid 1570's then was chief secretary to Lord Burghley, until his death in 1598. After Burghley's death it was rumored Maynard would be appointed principal secretary, if Robert Cecil, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Salisbury, was promoted to the lord treasurership, but this never materialized. Instead, Maynard was appointed secretary to the Lord Admiral, Charles Howard, earl of Nottingham. Maynard developed strong ties to Essex and to the town of St Albans, serving as a deputy lieutenant for Essex from 1603 till his death in 1610. Maynard was able to build up a landed estate in Essex through gratuities, wardships, and privileges obtained during service to Lord Burghley, with his estate surrounding his house, Easton Lodge, in Little Easton, Essex, including manors, parks, woods, and messuages in nearby parishes. He also owned or leased land and houses in London, St Albans, and Warwickshire. Maynard had sufficient funds to lend £5000 to Sir Horatio Palavicino in 1593 as well as leaving £2000 to each of his daughters upon his death on 11 May 1610, indicating he had made good use of his connections at court to enrich his son and heir.<sup>41</sup>

William Lord Maynard used relationships with the Duke of Buckingham and Archbishop Laud to advance himself at court. He followed his father as deputy lieutenant for Essex from 1613-28, at the age of 28, and was an MP for St Albans. In

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<sup>40</sup> Lord Lieutenant of Derby, and his heirs dominated the shire for 3 generations. Sainty, "*Lieutenants of Counties*" pg. 2-15.

<sup>41</sup> ODNB, *Henry Maynard*

1620 Maynard was awarded an Irish peerage, 1st Lord of Estaines and Turrin, and took his place in the House of Lords for the Parliament of 1628. It was in October of that same year the Lord Maynard resigned his commission as a deputy lieutenant from Essex, just months after another long serving deputy lieutenant following the difficult years of European involvement. Lord Maynard built upon his inheritance to extend his estates in Tothill Street, Westminster, as well as acquire the holdings of Edward Peyton of Isleham by 1637. After seven years out of the lieutenancy commission, Lord Maynard was brought back, this time as joint lord lieutenant with the Robert Rich, 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Warwick, by the king's special favor. The appointment aggrieved Warwick greatly as he was annoyed not only at being joined again on the commission, having longed to be named as the sole lord lieutenant for years, but also resented Lord Maynard as he considered him an inferior. Maynard was subsequently named as lord lieutenant of Cambridgeshire following the death of the 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk, in a move in which Maynard's widow believed brought about her husband's early demise in December 1640 due to the stress of the two lieutenancies of Cambridgeshire and Essex. Although it is clear that the newly ennobled Maynard could represent a narrowing of country influence by courtiers, he did make significant efforts to consolidate holdings in his new shire of Cambridge. As well as having wealth, Maynard possessed an attention to the duty that would have allowed him to work well in Cambridgeshire lieutenancy, had he survived more than 6 months past his appointment.<sup>42</sup>

Education also played a great linking role in the lives of the gentry with sons of the great families gathering from all over the country to expand their social contacts.

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<sup>42</sup> The Maynard lieutenancy book, 1608-1639 / edited by B.W. Quintrell, (Chelmsford : Essex Record Office, 1993) pg. 1-40.

This does not necessarily mean that they stayed long, or achieved a degree during their time at either Oxford or Cambridge, but like a grand tour of Europe, it served to round out their social network and experience, as they would be shoulder to shoulder with the sons of the peers of the realm. Over 90% of the men who occupied places as Lord Lieutenants under Charles I spent time at either Oxford or Cambridge, with only a few families like the Cecils securing private tutors for their children and royal wards. Although not much is known about Lord Maynard's education, the North and Howard family had extensive ties to Cambridge University.<sup>43</sup>

Given both families traditional power bases were based in East Anglia, it is not surprising that both families developed strong ties with the University of Cambridge. Although there are no records to document, it is likely that Roger Lord North spent some time at Peterhouse college, Cambridge, like his younger brothers. His father was also a benefactor to the college, leaving the rectory of Ellington in Huntingdonshire to the college, and Lord North sent his own sons there, so it is very probable that he studied there. He was admitted to Lincoln's Inn, London 4 November 1542, a special admission to the inn was recorded two years later, on 16 July 1544, probably reflecting his social status. Lord North would further continue his family's link with the university, serving as high steward in 1572.<sup>44</sup>

Thomas Howard, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk, spent time at St John's College, Cambridge, and was later granted honorific admission to Gray's Inn on 2 February 1598, then in 1605 was created MA at Cambridge and subsequently incorporated at Oxford. The 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk was sworn high steward of Cambridge University in February 1601, when

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<sup>43</sup> J. C. Sainty, "*Lieutenants of Counties*", pg. 2-15.

<sup>44</sup> T. A. Walker, *A biographical register of Peterhouse men*, 2 vols. (1927–30), W. P. Baildon, ed., *The records of the Honorable Society of Lincoln's Inn: admissions*, 1 (1896)

Cecil succeeded Essex as chancellor, and continued in the post until 1614. Suffolk was elected chancellor of the University of Cambridge on 8 July 1614, and even prevailed upon the king to visit the university in March 1615, with his wife hosting receptions at Magdalene College, founded by Suffolk's grandfather Lord Audley. The 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk followed in his families footsteps by matriculating at Magdalene College, Cambridge but did not graduate and was created MA at Cambridge in 1605 and was admitted to Gray's Inn in March 1606.<sup>45</sup>

Furthermore, while at Cambridge, the 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk would have likely been in contact with future lord lieutenants and privy councilors such as his cousin, Thomas Howard, 14<sup>th</sup> Earl of Arundel, Thomas Wentworth, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Strafford, Henry Hastings, 5<sup>th</sup> Earl of Huntingdon, and Robert Rich, 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Warwick all of which attended Cambridge at some point in the years from 1600-10, as well as William Cecil, 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Salisbury (the 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk's brother-in-law), and Henry Rich, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Holland and Algernon Percy 10th earl of Northumberland (both would marry a daughter of the 2<sup>nd</sup> earl). This contact would have further extended the 2<sup>nd</sup> earl's already extensive social network, serving him well in his future at court.<sup>46</sup>

Military experience was very strong for the lieutenants of Cambridgeshire with North, and the 1<sup>st</sup> earls of Suffolk having significant and valorous military service. Roger Lord North served with the earl of Leicester in the Netherlands with the English forces sent to assist the Dutch rebels in their fight against Phillip II. Despite being fifty-four years old and the fact that Leicester did not have a post for him, the queen had ordered him to go, serving without pay. Although he was viewed by some as one

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<sup>45</sup> ODNB, *Theophilus Howard, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk*

<sup>46</sup> ODNB, *Thomas Howard, earl of Arundel, Thomas Wentworth, Henry Hastings, Robert Rich, William Cecil, Henry Rich, Algernon Percy.*

of Leicester's chief cronies, he behaved with great bravery and valor in the summer of 1586 after suffering a wound to the knee from a musket shot at the battle of Sutphen. Upon hearing that the enemy was once again engaged, he had himself carried to a horse and went back into battle 'with one boot on and one boot off...'. North went on to serve in a number of other campaigns displaying similar capabilities and valor including a number of months under Peregrine Bertie, 13<sup>th</sup> Baron Willoughby de Eresby, who recommended North as one of the four men best suited to replace him as captain-general. However, defense of the realm called him back to Cambridgeshire where he was obliged as lord lieutenant of Cambridgeshire to begin defensive preparations for the anticipated Spanish Invasion, and during the Armada commanded part of the queen's bodyguards accompanying her to Tilbury.<sup>47</sup>

Thomas Howard showed much of his great grandfather's (the 3<sup>rd</sup> duke of Norfolk) zest for military service when he captained the *Golden Lion* in the fleet fending off the Spanish Armada. He was also knighted on the *Ark* on 26 July 1588 by the Lord Admiral, his cousin Charles Howard, Lord Howard of Effingham, following the decisive attack on Calais. In May 1596, he was admiral of the third squadron in the fleet sent against Cadiz, and upon his return he was created knight of the Garter on 23 April 1597. It was his ability and courage which commended him to the favor of the queen, who in letters to Lord Essex referred to him as 'good Thomas'.<sup>48</sup> Much like the 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk, many more of his generation would have significant military experience, with six future lord lieutenants owing their knighthood to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Earl of Essex in expeditions against Rouen and Cadiz.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> ODNB, *Roger North*.

<sup>48</sup> APC 1595-7, pg. 453; ODNB, *Thomas Howard*.

<sup>49</sup> Robert Radcliffe, 5<sup>th</sup> earl of Sussex (lord lieutenant for Essex, 1603-29), Edward Conway 1<sup>st</sup> Viscount Conway & 1<sup>st</sup> Viscount Killulta (lord lieutenant for Hampshire, 1625-31), Robert Bertie, 1<sup>st</sup>

However, the 2<sup>nd</sup> earl's military experience was much more limited, having merely served as a volunteer with the English forces at the siege of Juliers in which the noteworthy event was that he engaged in a quarrel with Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbry. It was apparently after a drunken argument that he was challenged to a duel, which never occurred as authorities prevented the fight. However, the 2<sup>nd</sup> earl represented a trend of the narrowing of practical military experience within the lieutenancy as more and more courtiers were appointed to the lieutenancy under Charles I as the court/country divide grew. Further illustrating the fact is William Lord Maynard's lack of experience and apparent disdain for martial affairs. Despite serving as a deputy lieutenant for 15 years and lord lieutenant for a further five years, Nehemiah Wallington recorded Maynard's lack of stomach for the rowdy and unruly soldiers intended for Scotland: "Lord Maynard...being afraid of the soldiers because they came about him...took out a handful of money and hurled it on the ground, and so set the soldiers scrambling for it, and then set spur to his horse and rode away with all force he could." This type of attitude was in stark contrast to his joint Lord Lieutenant, Richard Rich, 2<sup>nd</sup> Earl of Essex, and would further reinforce his opinion of Lord Maynard as an inferior.<sup>50</sup>

One key difference between the families that served as lord lieutenants for Cambridgeshire is the path that the various families took in rising to prominence and high office. North and Maynard families both came to high office in the same way as

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earl of Lindsay (lord lieutenant for Lincolnshire 1629-42), William Herbert, 3<sup>rd</sup> earl of Pembroke (lord lieutenant for Somerset, 1630-40), Robert Carey, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Monmouth (lord lieutenant for Staffordshire, 1627-9), Thomas Jermyn (lord lieutenant for Suffolk, 1640-1). ODNB, *Robert Radcliffe, Edward Conway, Robert Bertie, William Herbert, Robert Carey, Thomas Jermyn*.

<sup>50</sup> The Maynard lieutenancy book, 1608-1639 / edited by B.W. Quintrell, (Chelmsford : Essex Record Office, 1993) pg. 1-40.

many others like the Knollys and Cecil families. An earlier ancestor used a minor office under Henry VII or VIII and used that influence to gain small but steady advancement and office for his following generations. Perhaps it is because the families were not of ancient lineages with vast estates and court offices, but both Roger Lord North and William Lord Maynard were effective and conscientious Lord Lieutenants<sup>51</sup> working effectively and promptly with the deputy lieutenants of Cambridgeshire to ensure good order and proper organization of the militia and crown policy within the shire. Both of the men lived within the shire, North a long time resident of his family's seat at Kirtling, and Maynard had taken up residence in the Isleham, Cambridgeshire, following the acquisition of the estates of Edward Peyton, former deputy lieutenant for Cambridge. The purchase was completed in 1637, giving him a substantial foothold in the shire and justifying his selection as Lord Lieutenant following the death of the earl of Suffolk.<sup>52</sup> Families such as the Hastings in Leicester and Rutland, Cavendish in Derby, and Stanley in Chester and Lancaster further illustrate that there was still a place for traditional country magnates on the lieutenancy, but their days seemed numbered. Henry Hastings, the 5<sup>th</sup> earl of Huntingdon, was in serious financial decline and without the income to maintain a presence at court,<sup>53</sup> while the William Cavendish, the 1<sup>st</sup> duke of Newcastle, remained on the fringes of court, unable to gain high office despite the enormous funds spent on entertaining the king at Welbeck in hopes of future office,<sup>54</sup> and James Stanley, 7<sup>th</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> For a more complete account of Roger Lord North's operation as Lord Lieutenant of Cambridgeshire, see Eugene J. Bourgeois, *A Cambridge Lieutenancy Letterbook 1595-1605*, (Great Britain: E & E Plumridge Ltd., 1997). For account of Maynard's tenure in Essex see *The Maynard lieutenancy book, 1608-1639* / edited by B.W. Quintrell, (Chelmsford : Essex Record Office, 1993)

<sup>52</sup> VCH vol. 10, pg. 427-34.

<sup>53</sup> At one point, the earl's yearly income was a paltry £37/p.a. ODNB, *Henry Hastings*.

<sup>54</sup> One such visit in 1633 cost the Duke of Newcastle around £4000. ODNB, *William Cavendish, 1<sup>st</sup> Duke of Newcastle*.

earl of Derby, remained marginalized from court due to his opposition to the crown's ecclesiastical policies and Archbishop Laud.<sup>55</sup>

The Howard family had a completely different path to office holding and influence, as well as a different commitment to the office. The Earls of Suffolk came from one of the most ancient lineages in the English peerage, albeit one filled with court intrigue, attainders, and executions, but the family name still commanded enormous respect and influence, both in East Anglia, as well as at court. The Howards would have had limited personal contact with the deputy lieutenants of Cambridgeshire as only a brief stint entertaining the king at Cambridge University, and serving as a collector for the forced loan meeting at Newmarket would have to serve as contact with the Cambridgeshire area, with no evidence showing that the 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk ever traveled to Cambridgeshire while acting as lord lieutenant. In addition to having lieutenancies all over the country, the Howards owned estates spread all over Suffolk, Essex, London, and Dorset. The Howards were committed courtiers and spent little time within the shires they were placed as lord lieutenant over with the bulk of correspondence coming from either Suffolk House, or Audley End. However the earls of Suffolk were not unusual in their hands off approach to the office of the lieutenancy. Other lord lieutenants such as, Francis Russell, 4<sup>th</sup> earl of Bedford for Devonshire from 1623-41 and Spencer Compton for Gloucester and Warwickshire from 1630-42, had little or no real contact with their shires or deputies during their time in charge.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Thomas Cogswell, *Home divisions: aristocracy, the state and provincial conflict* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), passim; B. Coward, *The Stanleys, lords Stanley and earls of Derby, 1385-1672: the origins, wealth and power of a landowning family* (Chetham Society, 3rd ser., 30 (1983) passim.

<sup>56</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/93/80; BL Harley MS 4014, passim; ODNB, *Francis Russell, Spencer Compton*.

Despite the differences in coming to the office, or the different vigor with which the office is performed, the criteria necessary for holding the office of Lord Lieutenant which holds true under Charles I. Whether a rising family or declining family, the office of the Lieutenant represented either a mark of special preferment for a rising family, or the last lingering connection to court of declining one, either way, the lord lieutenancy of Cambridgeshire fit into this mold very well and sheds light on the court/country divide that was growing as the civil war approached. Given the lack of active involvement of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk the question becomes, who was really running the lieutenancy within Cambridgeshire, because given all the other offices and business that the 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk was involved in under Charles I, his contact with his deputies would be very limited, and almost non-existent within Cambridgeshire. It is therefore necessary to look at the deputies, their connections to not only the shire, but also each other.

### **Deputy Lieutenants**<sup>57</sup>

At the time of the accession of Charles I, the Tudor ruling elite that controlled shire administration and the deputy lieutenancy under Elizabeth I was still very much in place. 16<sup>th</sup> century stalwarts like the Cutts, Peyton, and Hinde families were still providing the shire with leadership, now in the form of deputy lieutenants. In the mid 30's, a few new members were added to the commission to replace the deceased or

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<sup>57</sup> For more extensive genealogical and background information on the deputy lieutenants of Cambridgeshire, see Appendix.

infirm, yet these too were from the same ruling elite families. The Millicent, Allington, Chicheley, North, and Cotton families continued their service within the shire, now as deputy lieutenants. All of these families had provided MPs and JPs for the last century, but now were becoming involved in the higher office of deputy lieutenants. While either serving at the accession of Charles I or near the collapse of the lieutenancy in 1640, the majority of the men who served were from prestigious families long established in the shire with substantial land holdings and family pedigrees necessary to place them head and shoulders above the rest of the shire's gentry and made them the natural choice to serve as deputy lieutenants. There is the natural ebb and flow of members on and off the commission, but all who were named to the commission were of the ruling elite, or had close ties to the two difficult liberties within the shire making their selection necessary in order to gain further control over the potentially difficult areas. Of the six men on the commission at the accession of Charles I, four of the families represent the Tudor ruling elite with holdings and a history of activity in local government of the shire dating back to Henry VIII if not Henry VII. With these lineages and familial ties, they bring prestige and a history of office holding experience to the lieutenancy for Charles I. Sir Miles Sandys and Sir Simeon Steward are the exceptions to the ruling elite within the lieutenancy and yet they are not rank outsiders with the Steward family residing in the Isle of Ely since the accession of Elizabeth I, and Sir Miles Sandys being a fellow of Queens' College, Cambridge from 1581. Both of their inclusions could be explained by the need for increased support both within the Isle of Ely as well as within the University of Cambridge, as both lived in the Isle and had significant links to the university.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> BL Harley MS 4014, passim; VCH vol. 4, pg. 98-154; John Twigg, *A history of Queens' College*,

Infirmity and death soon claimed members of the lieutenancy and in the mid 30's replacements had to be found for Sir John Peyton, Sir Edward Hinde, and Sir Simeon Steward. Sir Thomas Hatton and Sir John Millicent joined the lieutenancy to make up for their loss. This seemed to be adequate to handle the amount of work during the peace of the personal rule. However, with the coming of the Bishop's Wars, more deputies were needed to handle the increased workload as well as to cope with the death of long serving deputy, Sir John Carleton. William Allington, Sir Edward Peyton, Sir Thomas Chicheley, and Sir Dudley North were added to the commission by 1638. In the final days of the lieutenancy as a functioning entity within the shire, the crown was in need of deputies as well as staunch support within the shires and Sir John Cotton and Samuel Thornton were added to the commission in the later half of 1640, swelling the commission's number to nine deputies, by far the highest number of officers. Given the disputes with fen drainage, ship money, and the levies for the Bishops wars, it is not surprising that the men named were both confirmed royalist, committed to the crown's efforts within Cambridgeshire.<sup>59</sup>

The purpose of this discussion is not to argue that the ruling elite of Cambridgeshire represent the type of social and political homogeneity of Alan Everitt's Kentish gentry, or even to prove the existence of a county community as a whole within the shire, but instead to show that some elements of the Kentish gentry, in addition to the Warwickshire, Somerset, and Sussex gentry are represented in some ways within the shire,<sup>60</sup> placing Cambridge in the middle of the county community debate. It is clear

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*Cambridge 1448-1986* (Woodbridge : Boydell, 1987)

<sup>59</sup> BL Harley MS 4014, passim; VCH vol. 6, pg. 71.

<sup>60</sup> For more details see: Alan Everitt, *The Community of Kent and the Great Rebellion 1640-1660* (Leicester : Leicester University Press, 1966); Anthony J Fletcher, *A county community in peace and*

that there did exist a core of elite families that dominated office holding in the shire, whether as JPs or deputy lieutenants, and had inter-related social and business interests that held together the normal operations of the lieutenancy within the shire under Charles I.<sup>61</sup> Despite the difficulty in discerning whether there was a collective attitude among the ruling elite, the lack of conflicts or bitter feuds for places as in Somerset, and Leicester, seems to indicate that the ruling elite recognized the equal status of each other and shared religious toleration, although most had moderate puritan or Anglican leanings.

The ruling elite definitely had the ancient lineage within the shire and men who served as deputy lieutenants. Of the 13 families represented on the commission under Charles I, five were resident within Cambridgeshire in the 15<sup>th</sup> century,<sup>62</sup> with two tracing their lineage back to the 14<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>63</sup> Two other families were active in the shire during the reigns of Henry VII<sup>64</sup> and Henry VIII.<sup>65</sup> The only relatively new entries into the shire who served as deputy lieutenants took up residence in the shire during Elizabethan times and had either accumulated significant holdings in the Isle of Ely, or had close links with the University<sup>66</sup> and therefore could be seen as the crown trying to gain better control over the two liberties within the shire. And the only rank outsider who served was the Sir John Carleton, second husband of Anne

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*war : Sussex 1600-1660* (London : Longman, 1975); T. G. Barnes, *Somerset, 1625-1640 : a county's government during the 'personal rule'* (London : Oxford University Press, 1961); Ann Hughes, *Politics, society and civil war in Warwickshire, 1620-1660* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1987)

<sup>61</sup> Study of the lieutenancy owes a great deal to the Cutts family as it is believed that both Harley MS 6599, and 4014 were compiled by the Cutts family. Harley MS 6599 was most likely compiled by Sir John Cutts (d.1615) who was a deputy lieutenant for Cambridgeshire under both Roger, Lord North and Thomas Suffolk; Eugene J. Bourgeois, *A Cambridge Lieutenancy Letterbook 1595-1605*, (Great Britain: E & E Plumridge Ltd., 1997) pg. 3.

<sup>62</sup> Hatton, Millicent, Chicheley, Cotton and Thornton families.

<sup>63</sup> Allington and Peytons of Isleham.

<sup>64</sup> Cutts family

<sup>65</sup> Hinde and North families.

<sup>66</sup> Sandys, Peytons of Doddington, and Steward families.

Cotton, and into a family with a minor heir who traced their roots in the shire back to the 1420's and therefore his inclusion is justified as well.<sup>67</sup>

To go along with the long history within the shire, the families were to an extent interlinked socially. The benefit of an outsider marrying into an ancient family in the shire and reaping benefits from it is clearly represented in the form of the Hatton and Allington families. Sir Thomas Hatton married into the Allington family in c.1634 when he married Mary Allington, daughter of Sir Giles Allington of Horseheath.<sup>68</sup> With the marriage, Sir Thomas cemented his family's place in the shire and secured his nomination as a deputy lieutenant that followed quickly after his marriage to Mary Allington.<sup>69</sup> But by far the family that made the best use of marriage to secure their place in the shire was the Hinde family, who arrived in the shire in the reign of Henry VIII, and quickly married two daughters into the Cutts and Chicheley families. Unfortunately, the male heirs of the Hinde family tended to die quite young, leaving an infant daughter, Jane, as sole heir. She was later to marry Sir John Cotton, joining two of the ruling elite families and thereafter all Hinde estates were to devolve with the Cotton family thereafter. Two branches of the Peyton family were united when Sir John Peyton (d. 1635) married his cousin, Alice, who was the second daughter of Sir John Peyton of the Isleham branch of the family in Cambridge. Along with specific instances of intermarriages, the families were also united by shared religious sympathies that were built up during the Lieutenancy of Roger Lord North. He gathered men around him as deputy lieutenants, JPs, or in his household during the reign of Elizabeth I who were well affected to the godly religion. Even the Cotton family who had been recusants early on in Elizabeth's reign, seemed to accept the

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<sup>67</sup> Cambridge Record Office 588/T/82, 588/T/131; VCH, vol. 1-10, *passim*.

<sup>68</sup> Father of William Allington, deputy lieutenant for Cambridgeshire 1632-40.

<sup>69</sup> VCH vol. 8, pg. 14-20; vol. 9, pg. 197-125; ODNB, *John Peyton*.

religious settlement and were welcomed back into office after enjoying the protection of Roger Lord North. It is Roger Lord North who deserves credit for forming a sense of the ruling elite in Cambridgeshire for bringing together many of the families together in his household and forming the basis for the collective idea of the lieutenancy with his disputes with the town and university of Cambridge as well as the liberty of Ely. In fighting to consolidate power and authority under the lieutenancy, he created a legacy that existed long after his death and is part of what held the lieutenancy together during the turbulent years under Charles I.<sup>70</sup>

Despite the elements that united the ruling elite of the shire, these men certainly were not inward looking and unaware of life outside the shire. The close proximity of other shires to Cambridgeshire would necessarily keep the deputy lieutenants informed of news from other shires and the shires location on the main road from London to Kings Lynn would have kept them well informed of not only business in London, but also the different religious and political ideas emanating from London and East Anglian Clothiers. The university would also serve as a center for learning and news for the shire and most of these men would have either attended Cambridge or have links with the town keeping them well versed in the knowledge and thinking of the day, although there is little evidence to suggest that the deputy lieutenancy reflected the staunch Puritanism that, although diminished, still existed in some parts of the university at the time. Also, a good many of the deputy lieutenants had traveled in Europe as part of their education, which certainly would have included time at Cambridge and possibly one of the Inns of Court to further expose them to the world

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<sup>70</sup> For more detailed discussions on North's influence over Cambridge see: Eugene J. Bourgeois, *The Ruling Elite of Cambridgeshire, England* (Edwin Mellen Press, New York, 2003); Eugene J. Bourgeois, *A Cambridge Lieutenancy Letterbook 1595-1605*, (Great Britain: E & E Plumridge Ltd., 1997)

outside of the shire. For the men where educational information is available, Sir Simeon Steward, Sir John Peyton, Sir Edward Peyton, and Sir Thomas Chicheley all attended Cambridge at some time with Edward Peyton and Chicheley being awarded MAs in 1618, and 1636 respectively. In addition to that, both Simeon Steward and Edward Peyton attended Gray's Inn in 1593, and 1611 respectively, and the political and religious influence to Peyton's literary career suggests an involvement in events far beyond the borders of the shire alone. Peyton's books, *The King's Violation of the Rights of Parliament* (1641), and *A discourse concerning the fitnessse of the posture necessary to be used in taking the bread and wine at the sacrament* (1642) in which he defended his right to partake standing or sitting are examples of his political and religious commentary through literature, show not only his awareness events, but his active criticism of the crown and its policies.<sup>71</sup>

Most of them held land and office in other shires including serving as MPs for other counties. They also formed their own contacts at court however limited they were and despite the lack of Lord North as the active link to the court, they still had avenues of redress but nowhere as effective as Lord North had been further exacerbating the court/country divide. Examples such as Sir John Cutts who courted the patronage of the Duke of Buckingham, but even such powerful support was not able to guarantee a return to Parliament for Cutts as he was defeated by Sir Edward Peyton in 1624. However, Buckingham was able to compel the resignation of Peyton two years later from the *custos rotulorum* for Cambridge in favor of Cutts. The Cutts family also had wide ranging landed interests in Essex and Hertfordshire that were

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<sup>71</sup> VCH vol. 10, pg. 427-34; Stephen Bondos-Greene, "The End of an Era: Cambridge Puritanism and the Christ's College Election of 1609" *The Historical Journal* 25, 1985, pg. 197-208; ODNB, *Edward Peyton, Simeon Steward, Thomas Chicheley, and John Peyton*.

sold in a consolidation around their county seat in Childerly hall.<sup>72</sup> Sir John Peyton had traveled extensively throughout Germany, Switzerland and Italy. He had also served as lieutenant to his father while governor of Jersey intermittently from 1607 till his father's death in 1630.<sup>73</sup> Sir Simeon Steward was at times better known for his poetic interests and links to Cambridge University, but he had also strong Scottish roots that are reflected in the elaborate monument in Ely Cathedral tracing their heritage. No matter his literary interests, he represented three different shires as a Member of Parliament, Shaftsbury, Dorset in 1614, Cambridgeshire in 1624, and again for Aldeburgh, Suffolk in 1627.<sup>74</sup> Sir Edward Peyton not only represented Cambridgeshire in Parliament, but made significant waves while doing so. As MP for Cambridgeshire in Charles I's first parliament again in 1626, Peyton served on various committees, but frequently drew the ire of not only Buckingham for defeating John Cutts, but also for instigating troubles within the shire. Peyton was summoned before Star Chamber in 1632 for instigating a fight with neighbors, and later summoned in 1638, to appear before Archbishop William Laud and the high commission, presumably for his puritanical views. It must have been his difficult demeanor that kept him from the commission until 1637, and hastened his exit from it a year later, possibly due to the end of Thomas Chicheley's service as sheriff of Cambridgeshire. The example of Edward Peyton is important, as it shows that no matter of lineage or wealth (based in Isleham since the 14<sup>th</sup> C. and controlling nearly the entire parish), and those who did not fit into the ruling elite consensus would be excluded from office holding with the shire. As these few examples show, even though these men were not on the grand scale of their exalted lord lieutenants, they still had extensive

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<sup>72</sup> Including a room that was by the 1740's called King Charles' Chamber because it was believed that Charles I occupied it in 1647 when he stopped in Childerley on 6-7 June while being brought from Holmby House to the army near Newmarket; VCH vol. 9, pg. 44; vol. 5, pg. 7.

<sup>73</sup> VCH vol. 4, pg. 112; VCH vol. 9, pg. 981-2.

<sup>74</sup> ODNB, *Symeon Steward*.

interests and influence outside the shire. There was a distinct lack of conflict and bickering that marred the lieutenancies of other shires such as Somerset and Leicester, with only minor competition for returns to Parliament serving as conflict under Charles I. Cutts, Sandys, Steward, and Peyton were all competing for returns to Parliament and despite a contested election result, the lack of protracted litigation and malice seems to indicate that things within the shire were peaceful and that the men of the lieutenancy were able to find the balance and work effectively together.<sup>75</sup>

Therefore, despite only touching a small segment of the gentry from Cambridgeshire, they seem to show limited aspects of both sides of the county community argument in that they were to a degree interrelated and of ancient standing within the shire, however, they were involved in matters outside the shire and without the resident Lord Lieutenant they found tenuous links to court but lack of court office or connection doesn't seem to have affected their status in the shire? The shire also illustrated the growing court/country divide that would eventually render the position of the deputy lieutenant impossible to perform. The loss of that avenue to court, in the form of the resident peer serving as Lord Lieutenant and the lack of contact with the earls of Suffolk would serve to increase the deputy lieutenants willingness to work, however grudgingly, for the crown but not at the expense of the shire, a trend that will be shown in the first 10 years of the reign of Charles I.

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<sup>75</sup> ODNB, *Edward Peyton*.

### **Chapter 3: Pressing and Collecting: The Lieutenancy from 1625-1628**

The accession of Charles I brought not only a change in monarch, but also a change in foreign policy. Gone were the days of the 'rex pacificus' of James' rule, as Charles was to pursue a more active foreign policy that he believed that the people had been calling for, and also believed that he would have the whole-hearted love and support of his people and Parliament. The decision to use force in assistance of his sister and brother-in-law in the reclamation of the Palatinate would have dire consequences for not only Charles, but also it would poison his relationship with Parliament and pave the way for the Personal Rule. Most impressions of the first three years of Charles' reign are ones of European warfare and constitutional challenges forcing the Petition of Right from the Commons in a protest against innovations and evil advisors of the king. But how did this affect individual shires and was the amount of animosity and conflict shown in the Commons reflected in the shires? There was wide spread resistance to the early fiscal innovations of Charles I as well as to the forced loan that followed to supply the monetary needs of war. Individual counties reacted quite differently, from the riots and martial law in Dorset, to the peaceful and efficient administration of Huntingdonshire that drew the king's special commendation.<sup>1</sup> But how did Cambridgeshire react to these events and where does it fit in the spectrum of other counties' reactions, and how much control did the ruling elite and the deputy lieutenants have in dealing with the situations within the shire? The deputies had direct control over the levying and mustering of men for the crown, as well the administration of the privy seal loans in '25 and the benevolence in '26, and indirect involvement outside the framework of the Lieutenancy in their roles as JP's or as

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<sup>1</sup> APC June'26 - December '26, pg. 221.

collectors of the forced loan in '27. The part played by the deputy lieutenants of Cambridgeshire would be key in keeping both the crown and the county happy, and the deputy lieutenants played their role in the link between the crown and shire perfectly and were able satisfy the crown while shielding the shire from the burden of the early fiscal innovations of Charles through lax administration without ever drawing the full anger of the council or experiencing the disorders that other shires went through, including Dorset and Suffolk under the Lieutenancy of the earl of Suffolk.

### **1625: Cadiz and the impetus to pay for it**

The beginning of the reign signaled a very busy time for the Lieutenancy which was charged with executing the fiscal and military preparations for Charles. Quick on the heels of the miserable failure of the Mansfeld's Expedition that was doomed to failure by the inaction of James and the incompetence of the duke of Buckingham, Charles sent out a levy for an army of 10,000 men on 5 May 1625, for an expedition against Spain destined for Cadiz. The deputy lieutenants were to gather 150 men out of Cambridge and rendezvous at Plymouth within a mere 20 days.<sup>2</sup> This was the beginning of a year that saw the various lieutenancies in England not only pressing men and organizing the normal mustering of the trained bands, but also collecting subsidies, a privy seal loan, preparing for coastal invasions, as well as dealing with renewed calls for the disarming of recusants. This was quite a heavy workload after 20 years of a relaxed peacetime routine for the Lieutenancy.

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<sup>2</sup> Suffolk was to press 300 men, Norfolk 400 and Dorset 250; APC March '25 - May '26, pg. 42.

At the opening of his first Parliament, Charles had expected a quick vote of supply that would allow the new king to pay for the preparations already in progress for a war that he was sure that the country and Parliament wanted. Both the 1621 and 1624 Parliaments, of which Charles had direct experience of, had both urged James to take up the call for war and lead the Protestant cause in Europe, however, James was reluctant to take up this call to action. But Charles had underestimated the distrust and fear of both Buckingham, and the French marriage. Also hindering Charles' effort for supply was the feeling that the previous years grant of three subsidies was more than sufficient for the present needs of the crown, especially since the promised account of how the funds had been spent had yet to be brought forward. The Commons simply assumed that any further grant would only need to be limited in extent. However, the true state of the crown's treasury was not well understood. By the time of James' death, he had committed England to an annual expenditure of £720,000, most in support of various European powers. Mansfeld's expedition was due £150,000 in arrears, and Charles was now committed to pay Mansfeld a further £20,000 a month as long as he kept his troops in the field, as well as paying his uncle, the King of Denmark, £40,000 a month for the same purpose. Therefore, supply was urgently needed, but the sums voted by Parliament were in no way sufficient for Charles' needs.<sup>3</sup>

Parliament did not believe the state of the royal coffers was as bad as had been stated and therefore elected to grant only two subsidies which eventually brought in £127,000, nowhere near the necessary sums. His attempt to obtain the grant of further

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<sup>3</sup> Derek Hirst, *England in Conflict, 1603-1660* (Arnold Press, London, 1999) pg. 111; Roger Lockyer, *The Early Stuarts: a Political History of England 1603-1642* (Longman, London, 1999) pg. 258-281; Richard Cust, *The forced loan and English politics, 1626-1628* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) passim.

subsidies was hindered by its unusual nature (although not unprecedented, the voting subsidies twice in one session was very rare), as well as the depleted numbers in the Commons as members fled London to escape the plague. Therefore, he adjourned Parliament on 11 July with the notice that it would reconvene later in the summer. To that end, he opened a second session on the first day of August in Oxford, which was free of the plague. Sir John Coke, Buckingham's right-hand man in naval affairs, put the crown's case forward in the Commons revealing that the fleet was at sea, going to pick up the 10,000 troops at Plymouth who were already in the King's pay, and that over £400,000 had already been spent and the king's coffers were empty. However, continued distrust of the duke of Buckingham ruined the chance of additional supply, as the attacks upon him gathered speed. Sir Edward Coke may have reflected the mood of the house that had become increasingly angered at the monopoly of power and office held by Buckingham when he declared that "multiplicity of offices to be held by one man is a great prejudice to the merit of honour and his majesty's well deserving subjects." Despite the second session, the matter of supply was never put to a vote and the Commons drifted into a state of *de facto* paralysis of which James had often complained about, therefore, Charles dissolved Parliament and turned to the Lord Lieutenancy in his efforts to find the money he so desperately needed.<sup>4</sup>

Having already been compelled to levy the men months earlier, the Lieutenancy would now be asked to find the money to pay for them. While the king and Commons were arguing over supply of funds, the various lieutenancies were busy carrying out the council's instructions sent on the 5<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> of May for both the pressing of 150 foot and the normal mustering of the trained bands. Following the

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<sup>4</sup> Lockyer, *The Early Stuarts*, pg. 258-81.

dissolution of Parliament, the pressure and the workload increased on the various counties of England. On 28 August, the council ordered fourteen coastal counties<sup>5</sup> (including Suffolk and Dorset) to take renewed precautions against invasion, which included forming a regiment of 1000 horse and foot to be rapidly deployed in the event of an invasion. The earl of Suffolk in a letter to the council on 4 September 1625 complains of a general want of arms, powder and munitions, as well as slackness and inattention to his commands in both Suffolk and Dorset. However, Cambridgeshire draws his praise saying that the county is “more ready to perform the commandments for service.”<sup>6</sup> In the same week, the council called upon the Lieutenancy to gather the supply that Parliament had failed to grant. In a letter sent out to the lieutenants of every county, the crown requested, “to borrowe of such of our subjectes as shalbe of abilitie some competent sommes of mony by letters under our privy seale” and the lieutenants were directed to take the advice of the deputy lieutenants “as persons best acquainted and experienced with the state of the countries where they dwell” and to inform them of “the number of such persons as shalbee of ability to lend within the severall precinctes of their lieutenancye, and what somme shalbee meet to bee required of each of them.” The deputies were therefore required to make up lists and schedules of those fit to lend and return them promptly to the council.<sup>7</sup>

On 12 September, the council sent out a request for additional troops to rendezvous at Plymouth with all possible speed, as the Cadiz expedition had yet to leave Plymouth. 500 additional foot were requested from Dorset (100), Devon (200), Somerset (150)

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<sup>5</sup> The counties were Suffolk, Dorset, Cornwall, Somerset, Devon, Southampton, Sussex, Kent, Essex, Norfolk, Lincoln, York, Northumberland, and Pembroke. APC March '25 - May '26, pg. 141.

<sup>6</sup> More than likely this commendation refers to the pressing of men gathered in Plymouth as well as well as the routine mustering of the trained bands; PRO CSP Domestic 16/6/16.

<sup>7</sup> APC March '25 - May '26, pg. 167.

and Cornwall (50). These counties had already supplied 1200 foot (Dorset-250, Devon-400, Somerset-400 and Cornwall-150) for the 5 May levy and to supply additional men would have surely been a huge burden for the shires listed.<sup>8</sup> Suffolk was not to be spared either, on 20 September, the earl of Warwick sent the earl of Suffolk a letter from Secretary Conway dated 13 September requiring Suffolk to draw down 1,000 of the trained bands to Landguard fort in Harwich. On 22 September, the earl of Suffolk replies that as lord lieutenant of Suffolk, “he dare not let any forces pass out of his counties to any other place upon Lord Warwick’s or Lord Conway’s letter, but must have a warrant from the king or the council”. The lack of any further mention of the request for troops could mean that either the matter was dropped, or that the delay for a new letter from either the council or the king would have delayed the arrival of the men and therefore make them unable to sail with the rest of the force that set sail for Cadiz in October.<sup>9</sup>

With regard to the privy seal loan, bad news began streaming back to the council with news of refusals to lend, and slackness in collecting the sums. On 31 October, the earl of Suffolk reported to Secretary Conway the state of the privy seal loan within his lieutenancies. The Suffolk returns were not all in, but he predicted that they would amount to nearly £6000, which was in his words, cheerfully done. He reported backwardness in Dorset while Cambridgeshire was lagging behind as well. Despite his earlier praise, the deputies were just now returning a list of those thought fit to lend money within the county with no collection started.<sup>10</sup> Cambridgeshire was not the only country that was reluctant. Devon deputies complained that the loan was distasteful and against the stream of their own natures, while the backwardness the

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<sup>8</sup> APC March '25 - May '26, pg. 172; pg. 42.

<sup>9</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/6/98.

<sup>10</sup> APC March '25 - May '26 pg. 288; PRO CSP Domestic 16/8/74.

earl of Suffolk had referred to meant that deputies in Dorset had simply not replied to the demand for assessment. In Warwick, the deputies allowed the loan to “sleep awhile”, whereas Herefordshire was able to avoid it altogether by refusing to assess the privy seal loan as the council’s letters went to the earl of Northampton in his capacity as Lord President and Lieutenant of the Welsh counties, stating that “this county is none of the counties of the principality of Wales”<sup>11</sup>

As 1625 came to a close, the council once again took the opportunity to remind some shires of the importance of this task in a letter on 28 December, citing the shires of Buckingham, Middlesex, Glamorgan, Monmouth, Gloucester, Warwick, York, Essex, Northumberland, Cumberland, and the towns of Newcastle and York for neglecting the collection of the privy seal loan stating that “he [the king] cannot but take it ill that in all this time after three months expired no manner of answer or certificate is made by your lordships either to his majestie or to us” and urging them to waste no more time in returning their certificates to the council.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, 1625 saw the Lieutenancy go from an institution with maximum prestige and social standing for a minimum of effort over the past twenty years, to an institution that was simultaneously pressing men, renewing recusancy efforts, as well as collecting the two subsidies voted by Parliament, and rating and collecting money from their neighbors for the privy seal loan.

Cambridgeshire’s deputies while revealing where their true interests lie, with the shire, had performed well with musters and troops sent to Plymouth. They were able to provide men for Charles and Buckingham to take to Cadiz, and the lack of

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<sup>11</sup> Victor Stater, *Noble Government: The Stuart Lord Lieutenancy and the Transformation of English Politics*, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1994) pg. 33-36.

<sup>12</sup> APC March ‘25 - May ‘26, pg. 288; pg. 296.

recrimination would mean that they were on time, in full and suitable for the task assigned. As for the loan, the delaying of certificates and tax collection by the deputies was no doubt to protect the shire, but their work was far better than some other examples. It was only natural that the deputies would try to shield the shires from the innovations of Charles that were a source of great irritation, as the Commons would demonstrate loud and clear upon the opening of the next Parliament on 6 February 1626.

### **1626: Collections Continue**

After the dismal failures of the Mansfeld and Cadiz expeditions under the military planning of the duke of Buckingham, the Commons was in no mood to grant further supply to the king without a redress of grievances, and the chief grievance seemed to be the duke of Buckingham. The Commons declared that they had every intention to assist the king in such a way as to make him “safe at home and feared abroad”, but first they wished to reveal to him the causes of “these great evils which have occasioned your majesty’s wants and your people’s grief”. Nothing was to deter the Commons from going after what they believed, in Buckingham, to be not only the cause of past failures, but also a guarantee of future ones. Therefore, on 8 May they drew up a list of charges against Buckingham and presented them to the Lords. The Commons declared their willingness to assist the king, but made the provision of three subsidies and three fifteenths conditional upon the redress of grievances. They would not pass the subsidy bill until Buckingham was “removed from intermeddling with the great affairs of state”. It was Charles’ dogged determination to hold onto his favorite that forced the decision to eventually dissolve Parliament on 15 June, and it was this session of Parliament where hints towards the Personal Rule could be seen in his

statement to the Commons reminding them to: “remember that parliaments are altogether in my power for their calling, sitting, and dissolution. Therefore, as I find the fruits of them good or evil, they are to continue or not to be.”<sup>13</sup> While Parliament and the crown debated supply in London, the Lieutenancy was still busy. The privy seal loans were continuing to be collected albeit very slowly, and in addition to that effort, or lack thereof for some counties, the Lieutenancy was also reminded of the importance of mustering as well as the instructions for the officers sent into the shires for the training of the trained bands in a letter on 27 June.<sup>14</sup> In addition, the troops returning home from Cadiz were to be billeted in the southern coastal counties further increasing the burden that the harried deputy lieutenants of those counties.<sup>15</sup>

In despair following the dissolution of Parliament, and the continued slow progress of the privy seal loans, Charles decided on a new tactic for the supply of his financial needs, a benevolence. On 26 July and 1 August, the crown sent out letters asking for a free gift from the country for the obtaining of a competent sum for the defense of the realm.<sup>16</sup> This task again fell to the Lieutenancy to administer and collect while still maintaining the trained bands, and putting into action renewed invasion plans as was ordered in letters sent on 10 and 15 July respectively. The renewed invasion plans are important, as they no longer concerned only the coastal counties.

Depending on the point of landing, inland counties like Cambridge would be forced to contribute to the defense of the coast by supplying anywhere from 300 to 500 men.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Lockyer, *The Early Stuarts*, pg. 264-8.

<sup>14</sup> the officers sent into Cambridgeshire were Antoine Pagmore, and John Woodwarde.

<sup>15</sup> Somerset, Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Southampton, Sussex, Kent, Essex, Suffolk, and Norfolk; APC March '25 - May '26, pg. 326.

<sup>16</sup> APC June '26 - December '26, pg. 133; pg. 154.

<sup>17</sup> If landing at Plymouth, Poole, Isle of Sheppy, or any other place in Kent, Cambridgeshire would contribute 500 men. If landing at Yarmouth or any place in Suffolk, Cambridgeshire would contribute 300 men. APC June '26 - December '26, pg. 87.

This would have been yet another burden thrown onto the shoulders of the deputy lieutenants of Cambridgeshire as they had yet to plan for invasions as the rest of the southern coastal counties had done the previous year.

In the next few months, the deputy lieutenants of Cambridgeshire were allowed to relax a bit. Despite being busy with the benevolence, and the normal mustering and ordering of the trained bands, Cambridgeshire was peaceful and calm compared to other shires of England and even the other shires under the earl of Suffolk's Lieutenancy. By far the most troubled county and by virtue the most troubled deputies were those of Dorset. The musters held in early August were very defective with only 1500 of the 3000 trained bands mustered and completely armed. In addition to that, the 1000 troops to be moved from Devon and Cornwall into Dorset had to be relocated around the shire to avoid outbreaks of the plague, which affected both Suffolk and Essex as well. And if avoiding the plague was not enough, commissions of marshal law were drawn up for not only Dorset, but also for Kent, Sussex, and Northampton to stop the abuses and insolences committed by troops billeted in those counties.<sup>18</sup> By this standard, the deputies of Cambridge were having an easy time of it and were performing the function that made the institution such a valuable part of local administration by acting as a buffer between the shires and the crown and shielding their neighbors from the unpopular and burdensome privy seal loan and benevolence by simply doing enough work to not draw the anger of the council as other shires did. Angry letters from the council to eleven<sup>19</sup> counties called for them to act with all possible speed as "hee [Charles] cannot but take it ill that in all

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<sup>18</sup> APC June '26 - December '26 pg. 185; pg. 261; pg. 267; pg. 221.

<sup>19</sup> Buckingham, Middlesex, Glamorgan, Monmouth, Gloucester, Warwick, York, Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmoreland, and Essex.

this time after three months expired no manner of answer or certificate is made by your Lordshipp either to his Majestie of to us [the council]”.

Despite not being named in that letter, Cambridgeshire deputy lieutenants were clearly not very enthusiastic in extracting the desired funds from their neighbors. This was where the Lieutenancy had its weakness, as far as the crown was concerned. The compact nature of the institution seemed like the ideal choice to administer these loans as the administrative framework was already in place and accustomed to collecting subsidies, but it was that same compact nature that made the shielding of the shire from the loans that much easier, and the local interests of the deputies doomed the privy seal loan and benevolence from the start, not just in Cambridgeshire, but over the whole of England.

A letter from Cambridgeshire on the 22 September illustrates the problem concerning the privy seal loan and the benevolence when the justices from Cambridge wrote to the council and to inform them that although the inhabitants generally have agreed to give by way of a benevolence to the king, they have still found great difficulties. They go onto say that the collectors have been appointed but they await further instructions from the council. A brilliant way to appease the crown while still delaying collection and protecting the shire, yet still a far cry from the pleas of poverty, depression, and outright refusal of other shires.<sup>20</sup> The delaying and avoiding although successful in Cambridge was in vain, as Charles turned to another method of

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<sup>20</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/36/39.

extracting his needed funds effectively from the shires in the form of the forced loan, and it was this issue that was to dominate the shires for the remainder of the year.<sup>21</sup>

The king had decided that another loan was to be gathered, but this one would be prosecuted much more vigorously than the last. To that end, the responsibility for its assessment and collection was to be spread beyond the Lieutenancy. In addition to the lord lieutenants, privy councilors with local connections were made commissioners (the earl of Suffolk was commissioner for Essex, Cambridge, and Suffolk), and the deputy lieutenants were joined with JP's and other prominent local gentlemen. Implicit in this decision is the realization that the Lieutenancy was too tied to its local interests to be a useful agent in collecting the forced loan and a more forceful means of coercion was needed. Charles believed that by virtue of appointment, each commissioner was to take a personal stake in the loans progress as failure might call into question his honor or the refusal of a neighbor to lend might be an affront to his dignity. Though no longer solely responsible for the collection of the forced loan in the shires, the deputy lieutenants would have an indirect impact on the loan by virtue of being included in the commissions as well as acting as collectors for the loan within their shires, and therefore the performance of the loan in the various shires has a great deal to say about the moods within the various counties and the performance of the deputy lieutenants in and around an increasingly disgruntled and disaffected gentry.<sup>22</sup>

To that end, on 14 and 21 September, the council sent out a call for the forced loan stating that this was the only way to supply the king's needs as time did not allow the

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<sup>21</sup> for a complete discussion of the forced loan and its impact on England see, Richard Cust, *The forced loan and English politics, 1626-1628* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).

<sup>22</sup> Stater, *Noble Government*, pg. 36-39.

traditional recourse to Parliament.<sup>23</sup> In little over a month, the news began to feed back into the council from the shires and further letters from the council prodding the commissions for the loan into action. A growing distaste and reluctance to further press neighbors is indicated in letters from commissions detailing that some gentry are reluctant to not only subscribe to the loan, but also outright refusal to act as collectors for the forced loan.<sup>24</sup> Letters went out from the council to the lord lieutenants and rest of the commissioners for the loan on 21 December commending the “great forwardness” of them and urged them to ensure that the collectors exercise the same diligence in collecting the loan in the various shires. The letter was sent to eight different counties in the southeast of the country, Southampton, Cambridge, Suffolk, Kent, Essex, Surrey, Hertfordshire, and Middlesex, however only the last 5 counties had included in their letters the marginal clause of “but it is found that the collectors are verie slack in their collections.” This would mean that Cambridge along with Southampton and Suffolk, despite being slow with their returns and collections, still avoided the council’s consternation for the slow pace at which their loans progressed.

The year 1626 saw continued delay with regard to the privy seal loans, benevolence, and the forced loan showing that despite good performance in 1625, Cambridgeshire was beginning to feel the strain under the burdens of the crown’s need for supply. Subsidies, loans, and benevolence collections were dividing the shire with the Lieutenancy in the middle trying to shield the county while appeasing the crown. Cambridgeshire did this quite well, yet the deputies of Cambridgeshire were not under the many additional burdens of some of its coastal neighbors.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> APC June '26 - December '26, pg. 268; pg. 286.

<sup>24</sup> APC June '26 - December '26, pg. 388; pg. 427.

<sup>25</sup> APC June '26 - December '26, pg. 429.

### **1627: Loans and Levies**

The new year would prove to be another very busy year for the country and the Lieutenancy with two major issues dominating the nation; the forced loan, and the levying of men. The forced loan was proving to be more successful due to the expansion of the numbers of people charged with collecting the loan, as well as throwing the full weight of privy councilors out into the shires to ensure that things went better than the efforts of 1625 and 1626. However, there were still problems all across the country. News started flowing in about the state of the forced loan in the various counties bordering Cambridgeshire. Suffolk was particularly hard hit over the past two years and the tension was showing. The earl of Suffolk reported to the council on 5 January that the loan was going slowly in Suffolk due to a lack of collectors within the shire, and the council ordered them to appoint as many as needed to get the job done quickly. The appointment of more collectors proved to be problematic as four Suffolk gentlemen<sup>26</sup> were ordered to be summoned before the council to answer for their refusal to act as collectors for the loan on 22 January. They later gave their submission to the earl of Suffolk and avoided an appearance before the council, but it goes to illustrate the mood in neighboring Suffolk regarding the loan and the two previous years of hard work given to the king in not only collecting money, but also in preparing for invasions, pressing men, billeting troops and ordering the trained bands.<sup>27</sup> The remainder of the country was in the same situation with over seventy-six gentlemen and one earl imprisoned, and four peers removed from local office over resistance to the loan. Charles even drew up a signet

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<sup>26</sup> Sir John Barker, Thomas Cornwallis, Nicolas Revet, and William Naunton.

<sup>27</sup> APC January '27 - August '27, pg. 4; pg. 29.

letter ordering 150 Gloucestershire refusers to be pressed for service abroad, but the moderates on the council ensured that the letter was never sent.<sup>28</sup>

Cambridgeshire on the other hand, had fared far better the previous two years and had escaped the billeting and insolences committed by those troops and had been levied the relatively small sum of 150 men for the Cadiz expedition. Cambridgeshire had to make limited real provisions, if any at all, for the defense against invasions, and had been very slow in the pursuance of the privy seal loans as well as the benevolence and suffered no outbreaks of plague or martial law. As a whole the shire had avoided the truly difficult work and what work it did accomplish, it did in a way that the shire would not be overly burdened and remain relatively peaceful. The same can be said when describing their reaction to the forced loan as well.

There were no reports of difficulties in appointing collectors, but there was the same slow application of royal demands as there had been with the previous requests for supply. On 17 January, the council sent out a strongly worded letter directed to 17 various counties in the south,<sup>29</sup> including Cambridgeshire, admonishing them for the lack of speedy progress in forwarding the loan. Directing the letter to the individual collectors, the council scolded them for their lack of effort citing that “although the businesse of the loanes hath already succeeded in some measure and monies are thereupon come in, yet there is no account thereof given nor the instruccions in that behalf performed.” The council goes on to put further pressure on the collectors by

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<sup>28</sup> For a more detailed account of the shires reactions to the forced loan see: Richard Cust, *The forced loan and English politics, 1626-1628* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); Hirst, *England in Conflict*, pg. 120-125; Richard Cust, *Charles I* (Pearson-Longman, Harlow England, 2005) pg. 65-7.

<sup>29</sup> Berkshire, Bedford, Buckingham, Cambridge, Essex, Kent, Middlesex, Oxford, Hertford, Gloucester, Southampton, Somerset, Stratford, Suffolk, Surrey, Warwick, and Nottingham. APC January '27 - August '27, pg. 22.

saying that “if from henceforth there shalbe anie default in anie of those points which are thus committed to your charge, hee will lay the whole blame upon you, having received so good satisfaction already out of some counties.” One of those counties was another of Cambridgeshire’s neighbors, Huntingdonshire. It was in the following week when the council wrote to the commissioners for the loans in Huntingdon praising their readiness and forwardness shown, going on to say that “you not only gave good example to others by lending the summes by that commission required, but used such speede, care and diligence in the business.” It was in between quick compliance and outright opposition where Cambridgeshire lay, as the letters from the council served to quicken the pace of action within the shire. In late January, Cambridgeshire returned a list of the number of defaulters for payment of the loan in the shire but over the course of the year, none were called before the board to answer for their default.<sup>30</sup>

Other shires were having the same problems. Norfolk informed the council in February of its difficulties with the loan, as men who after being warned about their default, failed to appear; or those who appeared and promised to pay the sum required, but had yet to pay. The problem was so widespread that additional letters were sent out from the council on 30 June, and 20 August to the commissioners for loans in over 30 counties strongly admonishing the lack of pace in collecting the loans. The letters complained of the small sums that had been paid in the last term and that the council must “lett you know his Majestie imputes the fault rather to you who are instructed as commissioners then those that are to lend”.<sup>31</sup> This was an effort to raise the stakes and force the commissioners to speed the collection of the loan.

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<sup>30</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/52/58, 16/52/59.

<sup>31</sup> APC January '27 - August '27, pg. 21; pg. 31; pg. 78; pg. 387; pg. 492; PRO CSP Domestic 16/52/58.

And it seemed to work in Cambridgeshire as at the end of October, Cambridgeshire commissioners had paid in nearly £1850 with defaulters still owing just under £500. This seems to be a large amount, but in a return of commissioners from various counties, 25 in total,<sup>32</sup> just under 20 percent of the total amount submitted was owed by defaulters. In Cambridgeshire, although higher with defaulters owing 25 percent of the total, it still did not draw a full-scale rebuke from the council concerning the lack of collection.<sup>33</sup> There is no arguing that Cambridgeshire was faulty in respect to delaying the progress of the loan, but the lack of numbers called before the board or men imprisoned for refusing the loan as in other counties shows that the deputies acting as collectors were once again shielding the shire without drawing the wrath of the council. But what is clear, is that the relative success of the forced loan in Cambridgeshire came at a heavy price to the harmony of the shire and the social standing of the men involved in its collection. Richard Cust has argued this point in his book, *The forced loan and English politics, 1626-1628*, and that despite the forced loan being a success in fiscal terms, that success would come at a severe political cost, forcing Englishmen to think of constitutional propriety and leading towards the Petition of Right and other legal challenges to the crown's authority.<sup>34</sup>

In a more accustomed role, the pressing of men, the deputies continued their attempts to protect the shire with lack luster levies that drew criticisms from the officers at their ports of rendezvous both for their number but also for their condition, forcing other deputy lieutenancies especially Essex to pick up the slack. On 28 February, the

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<sup>32</sup> Nottingham, Middlesex, Derby, Oxford, Northampton, Lancaster, Wiltshire, Lincoln, Suffolk, Cumberland, Westmoreland, Hereford, Surrey, Stafford, Leicester, Bedford, Buckingham, Hertford, Warwick, Kent, Essex, Somerset, York, Pembroke, and Carnarvon; PRO CSP Domestic 16/83/56.

<sup>33</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/78/63, 16/81/31.

<sup>34</sup> Richard Cust, *The forced loan and English politics, 1626-1628* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) passim.

council sent out a levy to the county of Cambridge to raise 100 foot for the service of the King of Denmark, and have them at the port of Harwich by 25 March, leaving just under a month to gather and march the levied troops. Despite being for only 100 men, 1624 and 1625 had seen 250 men leave Cambridgeshire in the crown's service for Mansfeld and the Cadiz expedition, and given that the men rarely returned unscathed from service, if they returned at all, it is understandable that few were eager to be pressed into the crown's service. They arrived on time in Harwich, but on 26 March the officers there began sending reports to the council about the condition and quality of the men sent from Cambridgeshire. The 250 foot from Cambridge and Leicester were without money and Captain Richard Salenstone, who was in charge of all companies of men at Harwich, described the men from Cambridge as defective in number and persons with many of them being runaways while further more were "impotent and unserviceable". To remedy the problem, the deputy lieutenants of Essex with Capt. Salenstone were to press the requisite number of men to make up for the deficiencies in Cambridgeshire's men as well as distribute the required funds collected out of the forced loan to provide for the troops without funds from Cambridge and Leicestershire.<sup>35</sup> Once gathered, the troops in Harwich were very disorderly, causing disturbances, stealing, as well as huge numbers running away each day. The deputy lieutenants of Suffolk and Essex were set with the task of controlling the men gathered and chasing up the ones who fled daily from their companies, heaping more work on the already heavily burdened deputy lieutenants. But once again, Cambridge was able to simply provide 100 men of questionable quality for the crown's service, without conduct money and let other county's deputies make up the numbers and supply funds as they allowed the gentry of Cambridge to escape

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<sup>35</sup> APC January '27 - August '27, pg. 100; pg. 167; PRO CSP Domestic 16/58/32.

payment while other shires continued to have serious problems with billeting, plague, and ordering the men who were rendezvoused there. Other shires also struggled to produce the full numbers allocated to them from the council. Hampshire produced 200 men whose poor quality outraged the king's sergeant major general, Sir George Blundell who characterized 130 of the 200 men as "the basest beggars and poorest boys and lowly rascals that I ever did see sent for soldiers." Suffolk's contingent fared little better as one of the king's conductors said that they were "for the most part unfit for service both in respect of their age and person as also the diseases with which many of them are annoyed". Leicester too was less meticulous about the men that they sent as some had either lame arms, broken ribs or a "great rupture in his belly."<sup>36</sup>

But the levies did not stop there. On 31 July, there was another call for an additional 3,800 men from the shires with 100 foot coming out of Cambridgeshire to be levied and marched to Plymouth by 10 September followed by the additional request from the council for 24 archers on 24 August. Presumably, conductors left Cambridgeshire with 100 men; however, by the time they reached Plymouth, there were 82 men left. Cambridgeshire was not alone in being short of numbers as virtually every shire was without a proportion of its men. Wiltshire was 100 men short, Suffolk short 150, while Surrey managed to gather only 28 of its required 200. From the midlands, a group of 685 men lost 115 along the march to Plymouth, while deputies from Dorset asked leave to resign over the press which in their opinion depriving them of their honor in the eyes of their countrymen.<sup>37</sup> With this kind of opposition across the country, it seems reasonable for Cambridge to have only lost 18 men in the march to

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<sup>36</sup> APC January '27 - August '27, pg. 214-8; Stater, *Noble Government*, pg. 42-3.

<sup>37</sup> APC January '27 - August '27, pg. 455; pg. 500; APC September '27 - June '28, pg. 14; Stater, *Noble Government*, pg. 42-3.

Plymouth, and with the lack of derisory comments on the state of the men, it must mean that the Cambridgeshire men were at least fit for service on this occasion.

The abject failures of the various attempts to assist the Huguenots, at Rhé and La Rochelle, left a bitter taste in the mouths of the various counties that was forced over the previous 3 years to provide men and money for disastrous expeditions on the continent under the guidance of the duke of Buckingham. It was this bitterness that was evident at the opening of Parliament on 17 March 1628. The conflicts over redress of grievances and the Petition of Right signaled the end for any purposeful attempt for Charles to live up to the promises he had made to his sister in helping to recover the Palatinate.<sup>38</sup> The Parliament of 1628 opened with attacks on the king's use of billeting, martial law, the forced loan, and imprisonment without cause which were directed at the heart of the king's use of prerogative, and therefore the Lieutenancy as an institution based solely on prerogative. The deputy lieutenants of Cambridge would fair better than some other shires due to the fact that the shire was not subjected to many of the most onerous tasks that fell to the deputies of Suffolk, Dorset and Essex, to name just a few, as well as escaping many of the heavier burdens associated with coastal invasion preparations and defense. Cambridge deputies were asked to press a large number of men within a relatively short period of time (350 foot and 24 archers between 1625 and 1627) for European involvement, however in 1627, the deputies clearly sought to escape the more burdensome aspects of the levies by sending unfit, and ill-funded men to Harwich, as well as loosing 20 percent of their men on the march to Plymouth.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> The end of England's involvement in European warfare was finalized with peace treaties on 24 April 1629, Treaty of Susa ending war with France, on 15 November 1630, Treaty of Madrid ending war with Spain.

<sup>39</sup> APC January '27 - August '27, pg. 455, pg. 500; APC September '27 - June '28, pg. 14.

Because Cambridge was not asked to bear the full brunt of the crown's policies as the coastal counties did, the deputy lieutenants were better able to perform the crown's requirements with less danger to their social standing within the shire. Not to say that they were model subjects as they failed at times to provide funds and serviceable men for the king's use, it just means that the deputy lieutenants were performing the role that made them such a valuable part of local government and helped the institution of the Lieutenancy cement its place in the social fabric of the shire. They were working for the good of the crown, just not at the expense of the shire. Working well enough so as not to draw the full brunt of the council's anger and not to hinder the crown's efforts, while shielding the shire in official capacity of the Lieutenancy or outside that framework when appointed collectors of the forced loan. They did all this while other members of the gentry were pressed into the army, or imprisoned, yet no one from Cambridgeshire suffers such ignominy. The Petition of Right and events of Parliament in 1628 would seal Charles' opinion about the usefulness of Parliament, and set the stage for the Personal Rule, which would see Charles' rule without recourse to Parliament for the next eleven years, and would bring new challenges and opportunities to the Lieutenancy and the ruling elite of Cambridgeshire. But what is clear is that, the deputy lieutenants of Cambridgeshire would clearly welcome England's exit from the Thirty Years wars and a return to peace that would allow them to rebuild their social standing and regain the affection of their friends and neighbors.

#### **Chapter 4: Musters and Peacetime Regime**

Following the events of Charles' third Parliament, the assassination of the Duke of Buckingham and the eventual capitulation of La Rochelle, the impetus for European involvement and war had faded. The constitutional debates resulting in Charles' acceptance of the Petition of Right with its subsequent controversies regarding the printed version of the petition, as well as the continued wrangles over the Parliamentary grant of Tonnage and Poundage had left the Commons deeply distrustful of Charles and more particularly, the Duke of Buckingham, whom the Commons viewed as the chief architect of the country's ills. The removal of the Duke on 23 August and the eventual surrender of the Huguenots at La Rochelle would severely weaken the war party at court and open the possibility of a more peaceful foreign policy, relieving much of the pressure not merely on the crown's finances, but also on the institutions of the government which were breaking under the strain of constitutional challenges and war. England's involvement in the continuing European wars was over, as the Treaties of Susa (24 April 1629) and Madrid (15 November 1630) formally ended hostilities with both France and Spain.<sup>1</sup> Although Parliament would continue to meet until its eventual dissolution in March 1629, at the end of 1628, the lieutenancy looked forward to the return of the benign neglect that it and the militia enjoyed under James I.

Unfortunately, the involvement in the European conflicts had highlighted the glaring inadequacies of the militia system as it stood under James I, and the crown turned its attention to the better equipping and instructing of the trained bands of the militia to

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<sup>1</sup> Roger Lockyer, *The Early Stuarts: a Political History of England 1603-1642* (Longman, London, 1999) pg 258-281.

bring them more in line with the more modern weaponry and tactics of their continental neighbors. In what would be termed under Charles as the 'exact' militia, the forces of England were to be trained according to modern fashion so that the forces would become "the sure and constant bulworke and defence of this kingdome upon the strength and peace of which the safety of the rest of doth principally depende"<sup>2</sup> However, the drive for perfecting the militia following the tumultuous 3 years previous meant that it was met with a range of responses by the lieutenancy from active employment, indifference to outright resistance across the shires of England. And in this, Cambridgeshire's lieutenancy was once again right in the middle of the responses from across England. There is very little evidence with regards to musters in the shire but what there is suggests that neglect from their lord lieutenant, outbreaks of the plague and other circumstances allowed the Cambridgeshire deputy lieutenants to rebuild their local standing, which had been damaged in the previous years as well as shield the shire once again from the burden and expense of constant mustering and training. They simply did enough so as not to draw the wrath of the council or lord lieutenant while avoiding putting the shire to additional expense and inconvenience, which would doom the crown's 'exact'<sup>3</sup> militia policy from the outset not only in Cambridgeshire, but other shires across England. And despite causing significant uproar and disturbances in other shires, these did not occur in Cambridgeshire, but that is not to say that some of Charles' innovations or initiatives did not cause problems within Cambridgeshire. The drainage of the fens

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<sup>2</sup>BL Harley MS 4014, fol. 1.

<sup>3</sup> The term exact comes from a letter sent out to various lieutenants in 1623 and stated that the king "hath observeth that the manner and trayninge & arminge hitherto, generally used in this kingome, is not so exact and serviceable as the course held both by all strangers & by his owne subjectes being in foraigne employment." The term exact would soon become a catch phrase from that letter; APC 1623-5, pg. 8.

and the extension of ship money to non-coastal counties would definitely upset the peace within the shire.<sup>4</sup>

The push for reform of the trained bands had its origins in the last years of James' reign and as the Thirty Years' War spread, initiatives began to surface aimed at making the defensive equipment more serviceable.<sup>5</sup> A series of parliamentary debates held in the 20's, aimed uniformity in muskets and their bores, as at the time there was no law to prevent men from showing a musket of one bore and bullets of another at musters. These early initiatives advocated by privy councilors and lord lieutenants highlighted the need for improvement and had some effect on certain shires, but overall they had limited impact on the nation as a whole, and in particular on Cambridgeshire. The earl of Arundel, Viscount Wimbledon, the earl of Northampton, Lord Conway as well as the Duke of Buckingham (along with proposed naval reform represented the few constructive points of Buckingham's policies) all voiced support for such efforts to James, and aside from a new drillbook distributed throughout the country in 1623, their advice and efforts came to little. It would not be until Charles took the throne that the drive for an 'exact' or 'perfect' militia would gain expression.<sup>6</sup>

The proposed program for the 'exact' militia would be straightforward enough; however, its ambitiousness appeared in the quick and comprehensive implementation

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<sup>4</sup> This neglect would show in the arms of the men put forward from Cambridgeshire for the Bishops Wars, as the reformation of muskets and armour was lacking, to be discussed further in Chapter 5. For a complete discussion of the militia under Charles I see: Lindsay Boynton, *The Elizabethan militia, 1558-1638* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967).

<sup>5</sup> In 1621, 'serviceable' was specified as a musket of 4 foot in length, with a bore large enough to take a bullet weighing 11 to the pound, a light musket and a petronel were to take 14 and 17 to the pound respectively: Boynton, *The Elizabethan militia, 1558-1638*, pg 239.

<sup>6</sup> Boynton, *The Elizabethan militia, 1558-1638*, pg 239-43.

that was expected in the localities. The attempt to reform the trained bands while the Lieutenancy were preoccupied with the crown's other demands of men for the Mansfeld, Cadiz and Rhé, as well as billeting and the various expediciencies to pay for them, left the lieutenancy with no time or inclination for the reformation of the trained bands. Nevertheless, the crown did try to implement its military reform policy while undertaking the rest of its foreign policy. In late June 1626, the crown endeavored to better train the militia by sending veteran sergeants who had experience fighting in the Low Countries out into the shires to "shew and exercise the officers and soldiers of the trained bandes in this kingdome."<sup>7</sup> The intention was to keep the sergeants in the shires for a maximum of three months in order to put the militia on the right track. Drawing from a pool of 84 sergeants, shires were allocated 2-4 according to size, with Cambridgeshire being allocated 2, Anthony Poyne, and John Wooddard. Evidence is not available to suggest how effective the men were in Cambridgeshire, but with outbreaks of plague in neighboring shires of Essex and Suffolk in September of 1626,<sup>8</sup> it is likely that the Cambridgeshire deputy lieutenants would avoid gathering large numbers together from across the shire to avoid spreading infection. It is possible that the men would have been instructed in smaller groups in various locations across the shire, as was done in Somerset,<sup>9</sup> but this would naturally limit their effectiveness as it was imperative to train in large groups to get the movements synchronized and correct.

That being the case, there were other shires that were more active and the state of the trained bands improved. Lancaster, Chester, Leicester, Northampton, Hertford,

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<sup>7</sup> APC June '26-December '26, pg. 26.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*, June '26- December '26, pg. 261; pg. 267.

<sup>9</sup> T.G. Barnes, *Somerset, 1625-1640: a county's government during the 'personal rule'* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961) pg. 244-82.

Derby, Norfolk, and Staffordshire all reported men in 'reasonable good readiness' towards the end of 1626 as some shires kept the sergeants for longer than the intended 3 months in order to garner extra training. These results are not surprising as the lord lieutenants of these counties were all either proponents of earlier militia reforms under James,<sup>10</sup> resident magnates who were keenly active in local affairs,<sup>11</sup> or privy councilors who were already well regarded for their military prowess.<sup>12</sup> On the other hand, there were shires where the sergeants were not so welcomed as the extra expense of them was a source of irritation, and they were quickly sent back after the 3 month period ended. In Somerset, Sir Robert Phelips refused to allow the sergeants to train with his regiment over a perceived slight to his honor. He complained that he was not informed of the arrival of the sergeants, and as the senior colonel, he felt that they should have reported to his regiment first. His difficult demeanor and behavior resulted in the swift removal from his command, having already been removed from the deputy lieutenancy for the same reason.<sup>13</sup> But in Cambridgeshire, it is likely that the shire went through the motions of training, descending into time wasting and roll calling as the need for inspecting of weapons and armor as well as the administration of the oaths of supremacy and allegiance would require, if done at all. The state of the men sent out of Cambridgeshire for the Cadiz and Rhé expeditions indicated a lack of complete readiness and reformation within the shire by the deputy lieutenants due to the poor quality of their equipment and furniture. Once the experienced officers had gone, the local companies ceased whatever form of drilling as had been

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<sup>10</sup> The earl of Arundel for Norfolk, and the earl of Salisbury for Hertford.

<sup>11</sup> The earl of Derby for Lancaster and Chester, and the earl of Huntingdon for Leicester.

<sup>12</sup> The Duke of Newcastle for Derby, the earl of Essex for Stafford, and the earl of Exeter for Northampton.

<sup>13</sup> Boynton, *The Elizabethan militia, 1558-1638*, pg. 240-55; Barnes, *Somerset*, pg. 247-53.

the previous year and the officers and men alike abandoned their brief flirtation with serious training.<sup>14</sup>

No matter what the state of the foot bands were, the horse bands were in far worse shape, and attempts were made to remedy the horse companies as well. The council was under no illusions as to the true state of the horse companies in the country and in 1628 made preparations for a nationwide horse muster, viewed personally by Charles I, to better reform the neglects and supply the defects of the horse in the country. The first letters for this grand undertaking went out on 10 January 1628, asking for two to three times per week training in various locations across each individual shire with an eye for a 7 May horse muster on Hownslowe Heath in London,<sup>15</sup> or 5 other locations across the country. However, it soon became apparent that the defects in horse were so great that they could not be reformed in such a short time and therefore the muster was postponed in a letter on 13 March from the council, stating that the deputy lieutenants have asked that “the meeting may be adjourned to some further convenient tyme, they doubt not but to bring the troupes compleate, both for number and furniture.” With that, the muster was postponed until 11 June 1628. As another month passed and the defects continued and other issues distracted the council (ie. Parliament and the Petition of Right), on 25 May, the council sent out letters postponing the proposed horse muster “untill you receive other direccion from his Majestie or this Board,” and with that, the matter was never revived. Therefore, the

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<sup>14</sup> Barnes, *Somerset*, pg. 247-55.

<sup>15</sup> Bedford, Berkshire, Oxford, Buckingham, Middlesex, Cambridge, Suffolk, Essex, Hertford, Huntingdon, Kent, Northampton, Southampton, Surrey, Sussex, and London were to supply men at Hownslowe Heath, with all other shires meeting on the same day in either Shaftsbury, York, Leicester, Denbigh or Cardiff. APC Sept '27- June '28, pg. 227.

militia was neglected to some extent until the lieutenancy could give it undivided attention at the end of European involvement.<sup>16</sup>

It would however be wrong to say that the efforts of 1625-8 had no effect on the lieutenancy of Cambridgeshire and its musters. In the only certificate extant for Cambridgeshire under Charles I, the deputy lieutenants reported the state of the trained forces on 4 November 1628. If the certificate can be trusted, present at the muster were 1000 foot, 461 corslets 539 muskets, and 80 horse, 50 dragoons and 30 carbines, still 13% short of what the crown would require 10 years later for the Bishops Wars of 1/3 corslets and 2/3 muskets, but considering the circumstances at the end of 1628, it is a reasonable showing from the shires and deputy lieutenants.<sup>17</sup> However, the deputies do complain of the great contempt of the lieutenancy within the shire hindering their efforts and request that the earl of Suffolk “take a course that an example may be made of some of these.” To that end, a list of defaulters was summoned to appear before the board from Cambridgeshire, however records only exist to show that Samuel Goslin and Robert Hagar made any appearance or submission to the earl of Suffolk which could mean that the two that appeared were made examples of and the others were allowed to avoid further bother or appearance.<sup>18</sup> This evidence supports the argument of Anthony Fletcher put forward in, *Reform in the Provinces*, which states the crown desperately needed the support of the local magistracy for any of the reforms to be implemented and maintained. The central government and the Lieutenancy could only nudge the deputy lieutenants and magistrates, not coerce, and only in a direction in which they were willing to travel. The resumption of infrequent and lax mustering policies shows that frequent and

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<sup>16</sup> APC Sept '27- June '28, pg. 347, pg. 445.

<sup>17</sup> BL Harley MS 4014, fol. 4v.

<sup>18</sup> APC July '28- April '29, pg. 263, pg. 316; APC May '29 - May '30, pg. 247.

costly musters and training was not a direction the local gentry, including the deputy lieutenants, were in favor of going towards.

The orders for musters in 1629 to 1634 lacked the imperative tone of the previous years and now reflected a king freed from both warfare and parliament. The muster orders that came to the deputy lieutenants of Cambridgeshire seemed to reflect the pacific nature that had come over the council. Gone were the extensive demands for the bands to be ready on an hour's warning and for the deputies to enroll all men aged 16 to 60. They were replaced with acknowledgement of the importance of the harvest and the allowance to schedule the musters at times convenient to country affairs, leaving the time and place of the musters to the deputy lieutenants discretion.

Whatever the state of the forces of the shire in the years prior to 1630, that summer would obliterate whatever improvements in the trained bands that had been gained as plague returned to East Anglia and hit Cambridgeshire particularly hard.<sup>19</sup>

The plague affected a number of areas across England to some extent, but its arrival would cripple both the town and the shire of Cambridge. During the summer, the town was left without provisions of food and water and other necessities that were normally supplied by the surrounding regions. Travel of people, carts, and merchandise was severely restricted to avoid the spreading of infection, including barring any people or products from traveling into London from Cambridgeshire. Instructions even went out in response to a letter to the council from Lord Maynard (acting as a deputy lieutenant for Essex) concerning a printer from Cambridge who repeatedly traveled into Essex with his wife and others. Officials were instructed that

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<sup>19</sup> Barnes, Somerset, pg. 255-60; BL Harley MS 4014, fol. 5-20.

the man and his family were to be shut in and kept in by force if necessary to prevent the trepidation of the inhabitants of Essex, as fear of infection had grown so great.<sup>20</sup> The restriction on market and trading within Cambridge was to stay throughout the summer with the county having to organize voluntary contributions from immediate area for relief of the town, to the tune of over £200 a week.<sup>21</sup> It is only natural that this would have a crippling effect on the shire's efforts to hold musters as even the council noted in its routine letters for holding of musters on 30 June 1630, to the earl of Suffolk as they wrote much later in the year, for fear of spreading infection. Also they give orders to the deputy lieutenants to spare the country affairs and harvest in holding their musters, which would give all the justification the deputies would need for not holding musters. This trend continued for the following years as the muster orders for 1630-35 were brief and did little more than refer the deputies to previous orders. Due to the fact that no certificates or returns remain, we are unable to determine whether the musters actually occurred, but there is evidence to suggest that the deputies were very lax in sending returns or did not bother sending returns at all. One letter in those five years from the earl of Suffolk to his deputies touches on the returns from musters asking them to be sent "more timely than hath beene of late."<sup>22</sup> Aside from that ambiguous remark, it would not be until 1635 that any real indication about the performance of the deputies would be given by Suffolk.

The year of 1635 would see the pace and language change in the mustering instructions in response to the changing situations in Europe and Ireland. The earl of Suffolk reprimanded his deputies in a letter on 27 April 1635 in saying that "spetiall notice taken of your remisse carriage in executinge the former directions sent unto

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<sup>20</sup> APC May '29 – May '30, pg. 383, pg. 385, pg. 398, pg. 407.

<sup>21</sup> APC June '30-31, pg. 323.

<sup>22</sup> BL Harley MS 4014, fol. 15v.

you which hath moved his Majesties high displeasure". This type of reprimand would seem to indicate that the deputies had gone for a number of years without sending returns or mustering at all, however, a lack of other information will not allow that conclusion to be drawn. What is clear is that the deputies were very lax in mustering and exercising the trained bands, but they were certainly not alone in the relaxed nature for the first half of the decade. Somerset<sup>23</sup> deputies were far less active during this time as well, with even the active deputies sliding into a comfortable routine. Deputy lieutenant, Sir Robert Phelips, attended only one muster for the period between 1631-36, which was to serve a letter of dismissal on a captain who had offended him. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that the deputies submitted at least one false return to the Earl of Pembroke, their lord lieutenant, which gives rise to suspicion that there may have been other false returns from Somerset.

Leicestershire<sup>24</sup> demonstrates this as well. Normally, the vigilant and meticulous earl of Huntingdon let nothing get in the way of the exercising and equipping of the trained bands. In 1628-9, neither the fall of La Rochelle or the subsequent Anglo-French peace treaty disrupted the county's cycle of training and musters with the earl of Huntingdon attention to detail forcing the corporation of Leicester to replace nineteen caps, eleven swords, twenty-five scabbards, two bandoliers and a pike, as well as pay for extensive repairs to twenty-one swords and four pikes in 1629. Yet, as orders for musters came into Leicestershire in the 1630's, their trained bands remained inactive, mustering only once in 5 years with the muster of 1632 marred by serious defaulting within the horse troop. This failure left the earl of Huntingdon deflated and inactive with regards to musters for yet another 2 years, and it was this

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<sup>23</sup> For a full account of Somerset during Charles I, see T.G. Barnes, *Somerset, 1625-1640: a county's government during the 'personal rule'* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961) pg. 244-82.

<sup>24</sup> For a full account of militia matters under Charles I, see Thomas Cogswell, *Home divisions: aristocracy, the state and provincial conflict* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998) pg. 189-221.

type of inactivity and dissatisfaction which was evident in the lax administrations of other shires.

At the root of some of the militia malaise was the scrutiny that Parliament had given to militia affairs and the lieutenancy, especially since the repeal of the 1558 Arms Act in 1604 without implementing a replacement act which highlighted its lack of statutory grounding and its basis in royal prerogative.<sup>25</sup> Also, the Petition of Right had highlighted the prohibition of non-parliamentary taxation, which could well apply to prerogative taxation and militia rates without statutory basis. It was this dubious legal standing, which gave urgency to old questions about the necessity of a professionally trained peacetime militia and caused many shires to resist or outright refuse to assess rates to pay for the muster masters and turning it into a constitutional issue in many shires. Especially as musters became more casual, the wisdom of paying a cadre of professional officers was openly debated across the nation. In Dorset, the local gentry refused to pay the muster master rate alleging that there was no legal basis for such a tax, and the problem escalated to such an extent that in 1631, the council had to remind all shires of the importance of employing one leaving many shires who had survived the 1620's without a muster master encumbered with one.<sup>26</sup> Instead of outright refusal, many shires simply did not summon the militiamen and therefore avoided paying the muster master, or let the pay accumulate in arrears for years as in Suffolk whose deputies owed their muster master over 2 years of back pay, totaling over £200. Buckingham, Shropshire, Somerset, and Hereford deputy lieutenants all dealt with the muster master salary as a running sore point within the

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<sup>25</sup> For more information, see: A. Hassell Smith, 'Militia Rates and Militia Statutes 1558-1663', *The English Commonwealth, 1547-1640 : essays in politics and society presented to Joel Hurstfield*, edited by Peter Clark, Alan G.R. Smith and Nicholas Tyacke, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1979)

<sup>26</sup> Cogswell, *Home Divisions*, pg. 180-200.

shire, including two separate court challenges, a Hertfordshire grand jury in 1629, and the grand jury at the Shrewsbury quarter sessions in 1635.<sup>27</sup>

In Cambridgeshire the peacetime mustering or muster master rates did not seem to generate the same amount of animosity or headlines. This could be due to a lack of factional parties within the shire willing to challenge the deputy lieutenancy as in Somerset and Hertfordshire, or it could mean that because the shire was not burdened with the heavy demands of other shires during 1625-28, they were more receptive to the small amount needed for the muster master pay and it didn't cause such a constitutional furor. Or they simply did not employ a muster master, or let the pay go uncollected and in arrears? There is a lack of evidence to know for certain, aside from the brief references in the routine letters from the Earl of Suffolk, but what does exist points towards the notion that Cambridgeshire did employ a muster master but did not summon the militiamen to make much use of him and therefore did not generate much constitutional opposition to his rate, however small. In his instructions to the deputy lieutenants in '29, the earl of Suffolk instructs them to use their "best means to procure him [muster master] paye as hath been accustomed"<sup>28</sup> and in '30 the deputies were required to return a certificate to the board detailing what the pay for the muster master had been in the past as well as how they planned to levy and collect the amount by 20 February 1630.<sup>29</sup> There are additional hints at a muster master employed in 1631 when the earl of Suffolk "requires you [deputy lieutenants] to give the muster master of your cuntry notice of the time of your musters and to require his attendance on them accordingly" and "to make out your warrants to the cunstable of

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<sup>27</sup> APC May '29 – May '30, pg. 316; APC June '30 – June '31, pg. 34; Fletcher, Anthony J, *Reform in the provinces : the government of Stuart England*, (New Haven, Mass.: Yale University Press, 1986) pg. 280-315.

<sup>28</sup> BL Harley MS 4014, fol. 5.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*, fol. 9.

each hundred and division within the sayd county for collectinge the sayd muster master pay as formerly it hath been done, and that you alsoe give them a straight charge to collect the same in as short a time as conveniently may be in regaurd they have beene soe longe forborne.”<sup>30</sup> The following year, 1632, Suffolk again instructs to them to give notice of the time and place of their musters so that he may send them a muster master to perform the services required of him by the crown, implying that a new muster master was needed. The final reference for a muster master is in the routine instructions from Suffolk to the deputies in 1634 where he simply reminds them to give notice to the muster master of the times and places of the musters so that he may discharge his duties.<sup>31</sup> None of this proves the employment of a muster master in Cambridgeshire, but the absence of any further rapprochement from the earl of Suffolk or the council means that these things were done at least to their wishes, or that the neglect of the Cambridgeshire militia was even greater than previously thought.

All in all, the mustering of the Cambridgeshire trained bands could be called infrequent at best, with several reprimands from both the council and the earl of Suffolk with regard to defects and delays of certificates. Given the fact that Harley 4014 was most likely composed by Sir John Cutts<sup>32</sup> who served continuously on the commission and the inclusion of the 1628 certificate leaves little room for the idea

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<sup>30</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 12v.

<sup>31</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 14, fol. 16v.

<sup>32</sup> Study of the lieutenancy in Cambridgeshire owes a great deal to the Cutts family as it is believed that both Harley MS 6599, and 4014 were compiled by the Cutts family. Harley MS 6599 was compiled by Sir John Cutts (d.1615) who was a deputy lieutenant for Cambridgeshire under both Roger, Lord North and Thomas Suffolk. The limited amount of correspondence from the deputy lieutenants to either the captains of the horse and foot bands or constables always bears his name, as well as, the fact that Cutts' father had Harley MS 6599 copied and bound for the years 1595-1605 points strongly to him as the compiler of Harley MS 4014. Eugene J. Bourgeois, *A Cambridge Lieutenancy Letterbook 1595-1605*, (Great Britain: E & E Plumridge Ltd., 1997) pg. 3.

that certificates were sent but not included. Therefore, we are left with a shire that was off to a good start with the muster in 1628, but slid into a very lax routine given the lack of pressure from the council and the destructive outbreak of the plague in 1630, and simply shielded the shire from the burden of musters and muster master rates. Regardless, the normal mustering and muster master's rate does not seem to have become a constitutional issue as in other shires, but this is not to say that Cambridgeshire was peaceful during the personal rule. Other initiatives of Charles I occurring within the shire at the direct or indirect responsibility of the lieutenancy would serve to cause disruption to the normal order of the shire that the militia failed to cause.

The decision of Charles to embark upon the draining of the fens across Cambridgeshire, Lincoln, Norfolk, Suffolk and Huntingdon as well as the expansion of ship money collection to non-coastal counties would lead to conflict and division within not just Cambridgeshire. Although neither of the two issues were the direct domain of the Lieutenancy, the control of the ruling elite over local office holding meant that these issues would fall to men who occupied the deputy lieutenancy by virtue of their other offices held in the shire, and these issues would have a bearing on the attitude of the county towards the crown and the lieutenancy in the coming years.

Although the Romans appeared to have made some attempts at embanking, and fen drainage was contemplated as early as the 14<sup>th</sup> century, little was accomplished until the 17<sup>th</sup> century. James I began investigations into drainage, appointing a commission to examine the issue in 1607, declaring that for the honor of his kingdom, "he would not any longer suffer these countries to be abandoned to the will of the waters, nor let them lie in waste and unprofitable." Attempts followed from engineer Thomas

Lovell, with the backing of the Cecil family, but local opposition and inadequate technology prevented the venture from accomplishing the feat. Much like the exact militia, the accession of Charles I, brought new impetus to the project, as well as, Dutch engineer, Sir Cornelius Vermuyden,<sup>33</sup> who along with Francis Russell, 4<sup>th</sup> Earl of Bedford,<sup>34</sup> spearheaded the project for the next decade. The project proved to be a success after initial difficulties, reclaiming thousands of acres across Cambridgeshire, and with that success came severe disruption to the centuries old way of life of the fenland people.

It is clear that the crown neither knew nor cared for the fenland traditions or communities, which were still somewhat isolated, involved in subsistence farming that was untouched by the wider agricultural specialization and industrialization in other areas across East Anglia. The locals long enjoyed rights to pasture cattle on the rich common fenland, and harvested willows, reeds, and sedge for basket making and thatching. Fish and eels were also gathered from the fens and their mention dates all the way back to the Domesday book. The people of the fens were largely distrustful of outsiders and strangers, while those outsiders regarded them as barbarous, surly, and ignorant.<sup>35</sup> Of the dry ground that did exist across the fens, the Isle of Ely in Cambridgeshire and the Isle of Axholme in Lincolnshire, share the same pattern and the draining of the fens would cause not only disruption to the traditions of the area, but would lead to legal challenges, violence and riots. From the beginning, it was clear that the project had the full backing of the crown. The privy council ensured

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<sup>33</sup> knighted by Charles in 1629

<sup>34</sup> brought in by Charles to supervise the overall works in 1629; Holmes, Clive. *Seventeenth-century Lincolnshire* (Lincoln: Committee for the Society for Lincolnshire History and Archaeology, 1980) pg. 121-30.

<sup>35</sup> Holmes, Clive, *The Eastern Association in the English Civil War* (London : Cambridge University Press, 1974) pg 1-15; Holmes, *Seventeenth-century Lincolnshire*, pg. 121-30.

that riots were suppressed with imprisonment and heavy fines, and the Court of Exchequer showed little interest in the legal challenges of the fenmen's legal claims. The crown was prepared to use the full weight of royal authority to crush the peasantry who were forced to watch the dismemberment of their traditional economies and way of life. The troubles tended to follow cycles both in Lincolnshire and in Cambridgeshire, as legal moves were made and summarily dismissed, then action would be taken in the form of attacks on works, threats to workmen, mobs, nocturnal sabotage to sluice gates, ditches or fences.<sup>36</sup>

In the Isle of Axholme, the fenmen faced the loss of two-thirds of their common lands and the destruction of their traditional patterns of husbandry. They possessed a deed dating back to 1360 in which the lord of the manor, John de Mowbray, bound himself and his heirs to make no further 'improvement' within the isle. The fenmen claimed that this deed prevented the King from implementing the drainage policy. Popular anger resulted in riots as work pressed ahead despite failing to secure a resolution to the legal issues. Materials were destroyed, and workmen were beaten, stoned or thrown into rivers. Works engineer, Cornelius Vermuyden reacted swiftly, instructing his men to carry weapons, which in a subsequent incident resulted in the workmen opening fire and killing a man. However, the royal authorities in the area were indifferent to the killing and the crown put their full resources behind Vermuyden. While the lesser members of the mob were imprisoned locally, the ringleaders were summoned to Star Chamber and saddled with crushing fines of £1000, financially blackmailing them to stifle resistance. Although the vigor and sheer absence of

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<sup>36</sup> Lindley, Keith, *Fenland riots and the English Revolution* (London : Heinemann Educational, 1982) pg. 115.

scruples with which the drainage was carried out in Lincolnshire was not present in Cambridgeshire, the troubles were similar.<sup>37</sup>

The trouble in Cambridgeshire began in the 1620's as Lord Chief Justice Heath began to transform the Soham economy<sup>38</sup> by enclosing and draining its fens, with an estimated c. 9,400a. of Soham's commons being lost to the fenmen by the enclosure and drainage. In 1630, Heath's agents tried to take possession of those allotments, employing workers to embank and fence them. The villagers, especially those from around Barway, resisted fiercely with women at the forefront of the disturbances. Armed with cudgels and pitchforks they threatened those setting out the inclosure boundaries and ignored prohibitions against commoning cattle there. Some threw down the banks by night. The disorders continued until mid-1632 with neither the neighboring J.P.s. nor men from adjoining villages, called out to help make arrests, acted effectively against the 'beggarly cottagers'.<sup>39</sup>

In the summer of 1632 in Soham, the locals had "riotously cast down certain ditches and fences made by Lord Chief Justice Heath." Warrants were sent out from the privy council to for the arrest of the leaders of the riotous acts, named as Thomas Hills, John Lowes, Roger Langham, and Anne Doves of Soham, but the execution of the warrants was prevented by a mob that gathered and surrounded Thomas Hinson, Thomas Clarke, and Richard Peachey, preventing them from executing the warrant. The council even called the three to the board to account for their failure to execute the warrant saying that their actions tended to the encouragement rather than the suppression of the offenders, as Hinson and Clarke withdrew at the first sign of

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<sup>37</sup> Holmes, *Seventeenth-century Lincolnshire*, pg. 120-25.

<sup>38</sup> Following an inquiry in 1627-8 the Exchequer decreed the lands to be Heath's and works began.

<sup>39</sup> VCH vol. 10, pg. 15.

opposition, leaving Peachey and Daniel White, a servant of Lord Chief Justice Heath, unarmed and in the hands of the mob. The situation simmered until a crowd of Soham's poor halted Queen Henrietta Maria's coach passing through Soham on its way from Newmarket to Ely, perhaps to present a surviving petition for a return to Duchy control, Charles I finally ordered the sheriff, Anthony Cage (knighted by Charles in 1634) in September 1633 to suppress the supposed 'rebels', and the issue was quieted.<sup>40</sup>

However, the quiet would not last, as unrest and violence re-emerged across the whole of the Isle of Ely in 1638. Outbreaks of violence against the drainage projects occurred in both Wicken and Littleport and drew men and women from Burwell, Coveney, Ely and even as far as Lakenheath. In Wicken, messengers of the king's chamber, trying to enforce a warrant against John Moreclack, were warned by a local constable not to go into Wicken as the people gathered there were prepared to resist with the assistance of commoners from Burrack and Sopham. Against advice and with the minister of the parish, they entered the town on horseback and the people came out with pitchforks and poles, and the women got together with heaps of stones to throw at the messengers and drove them out of town, scoffing and abusing them as they left. And in Littleport, days of assemblies of over 500 men from all over the Isle of Ely, ostensibly gathered for a football game,<sup>41</sup> resulting in six men committed to the gaol in Ely over 2 days, which managed to disperse the assemblies but not before considerable damage was done to the works. Later there was talk of a prison break to release the men forcing additional watches to be placed at night to ensure the security

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<sup>40</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/218/40, 16/219/1, 16/220/22, 16/225/35.

<sup>41</sup> "Fen Football was where people from two or more villages would meet together at some open air spot, ostensibly for a game of football, but really to attack drainage works and enclosures. Opposition to the work was so intense that some of the locals were coined 'fen tigers.' Lindley, Keith, *Fenland riots and the English Revolution* (London : Heinemann Educational, 1982) pg. 115

of the prison. All of this forced Sir Miles Sandys to write to the council about his fear that “if present order be not taken, it will turn out to be a general rebellion in all the Fen towns.”<sup>42</sup>

All of this unrest and tumult across the Isle of Ely forced the council to enlist the deputy lieutenants to calm the riots. At a meeting one week later at Newmarket, the deputies wrote to the council that they found the principle agents of the various riots, questioning them before a jury sending only Thomas Shipp to prison at Cambridge Castle. Before being imprisoned, Shipp gave the names of 13-14 others who were involved in the various tumults across the shire, but found that all was now quiet in the towns and divisions of the county. But lack of further mention of riots and tumults indicate that the calling out of the deputy lieutenants was sufficient to quiet the unrest in the fens. The peace was short lived as in May 1641 up to 160 villagers took advantage of the collapse of the lieutenancy and royal authority to throw down the fences around Heath's enclosures and put in their cattle, later mowing that area and in September felling the trees planted on the Mereside holts, and filling in the ditches again.<sup>43</sup>

Similarly, the other issue that was to trouble the peace during this time was Charles' decision to extend the Ship Money levy to non-coastal counties, which would again lead to resistance and violence towards royal policy. For the years of 1636 and 1637, the amounts that went uncollected were negligible from Cambridgeshire, with 100% collection in '36 and only 96% collected in '37. However, this high collection rate was not without difficulty. Despite being the domain of the sheriff, deputy lieutenants Sir John Carleton and Sir Thomas Chicheley were left off the deputy commission to

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<sup>42</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/390/89, 16/392/28, 16/392/54.

<sup>43</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/375/46, 16/392/28, 16/392/45, 16/392/54, 16/409/50

serve as the sheriff for these two years and both complained to the council about the backwardness of the county, and that “little or no moneys can be got but by distress and forcible means.” Despite their complaints, the collections were effective and proceeded without disturbances. For the next years, the uncollected amounts remained relatively low in 1638 with 12% uncollected, but dropped significantly for the 1639 writ with 65% not being collected within Cambridgeshire. With the drop in effectiveness, came a rise in resistance to the levy as well as an increase in violent opposition. In June 1640, the troubles began, centered around Melbourne where over 100 residents grievously wounded 6 of the sheriff’s bailiffs. In a letter to the Council, Sheriff Thomas Pychard states that the men were lucky to escape with their lives and they are now fearful to continue to levy ship money rates or any other service for the king. Further adding to the troubles, Pychard later writes in August to the council that numerous gentlemen of rank, including high constables and others, in the county are refusing to pay, and that their example is having a detrimental effect on the rest of the shire. Further illustrating the extent of the opposition to the ship money levy was the trial resulting from the Melbourne disturbance, where despite testimony from 5 witnesses, including that one William French incited the crown to throw stones at the bailiffs, the jury failed to convict anyone of any crime concerning the disturbance at Melbourne, demonstrating the great discontent the locals felt towards the fiscal innovations of Charles I.<sup>44</sup>

Cambridgeshire was not the only shire suffering this sort of violence and disaffection. In fact, the shire consistently maintained some of the highest collections rates of any of the inland counties in the midlands.

% collected by Nov. '39

collected by  
Nov'40

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<sup>44</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/349/50, 16/395/92, 16/457/55, 16/457/104, 16/461/24, 16/463/43.

	'36 levy	'37 levy	'38 levy	'39 levy
<b>Cambs.</b>	100%	96%	88%	36%
<b>Leics.</b>	100%	91%	95%	38%
<b>Yorks.</b>	100%	89%	88%	0%
<b>Notts.</b>	100%	100%	80%	20%
<b>N'hants.</b>	89%	70%	61%	0.5%
<b>Lincoln</b>	100%	72%	72%	18%

-taken from Holmes, *Seventeenth-century Lincolnshire*, pg. 134<sup>45</sup>

Percentages of ship money collected from Cambridgeshire's neighbors clearly demonstrates this. For the years of 1636-38, the percentages left outstanding were relatively low across the midlands as a whole, with Northampton and Lincolnshire as the only two shires to stay above 80% for those years.

As constitutional challenges mounted and despite court cases ruling in favor of the crown as to the legality of the levy of ship money, numbers were falling in other shires and protests were increasing as men who had heard of others reluctance to lend, then decided in their mind that even if they did not mind giving, they would not be the first to give and certainly were not going to give their money easily. Leicestershire was the only shire to perform better than Cambridgeshire, which was administered and run by its Lord Lieutenant, Henry Hastings, 5th earl of Huntingdon, who much in the model of Roger Lord North administered and managed even the smallest aspect of local government, therefore, Leicestershire's ability to perform at the same comparatively high level as Cambridgeshire is not surprising. However, 1639 and Charles' preparations for war with the Scots would kill any hope for any shire collecting any subsequent levy at a high percentage, and yet Leicester and

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<sup>45</sup> Holmes, *Seventeenth-century Lincolnshire*, pg. 134.

Cambridgeshire were the only two shires in the midlands to even approach a 40% collection rate.<sup>46</sup>

Cambridgeshire did have some resistance to the levy in '39, mainly in the form of collective opposition to the distraint of goods made in lieu of payment, but there were other shires where collective opposition went beyond threats and opposition. The Suffolk sheriff Sir Simonds D'Ewes revealed much about his attitudes towards the legality and practicality of the levy in both his autobiography, as well as his more practical feelings during his term as sheriff. During his term as sheriff, he never let his feelings be known with regards to his private doubts about the legality and constitutionality of the levy, however, his ambiguity was revealed in his attention to the task and the shire and in the less than enthusiastic way he failed to refer defaulting constables to the board which resulted in less than 10% of the overall levy being collected for the levy of '39.<sup>47</sup>

In Somerset, it was a different story. Instead of a lax attention to detail from the sheriff, they had made good selection of their sheriffs for most years, and yet the shire's collection of the levy was fraught with difficulty and dispute, almost from the outset. The factional conflict that plagued the militia and lieutenancy operations had an effect on this levy as well. The problems began almost immediately as over the years there were no less than thirty different occasions in which one or more hundreds, towns or parishes launched outcries against various assessments and ratings, which were heard in Whitehall, not to mention the various other disputes and grumblings, which would have never made it to the council. Leading the opposition

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<sup>46</sup> Holmes, *Seventeenth-century Lincolnshire*, p.134.

<sup>47</sup> Salt, S.P., "Sir Simonds D'Ewes and the Levying of Ship Money 1635-1640, *The Historical Journal*, 37, 2 (1994) pg. 253-287.

once again was Sir Robert Phelips, deputy lieutenant as well as justice of the peace for Somerset, and the shire's opposition quickly went from legal challenges to violent resistance of ratings and distraint of goods as early as the 1637 levy, starting out small but soon escalated. Gentlemen sued the constables at common law for distraining animals, while others simply broke open pounds to drive their animals home, while others were willing to commit violence to prevent goods from being taken as a sheriff's bailiff nearly died from a pike wound suffered while attempting to distraint goods. Less overt acts of violence were also taken as men would either starve their cattle or wound them as they were driven off by the bailiffs taking away their distraint value. Given impetus by the example of Hampden's case, this type of resistance was taking place in other shires as well and by 1640, the levy was all but uncollectable in Somerset. Similar problems existed with the levy in other shires as the sheriff of Yorkshire was put under close arrest for his failure to pay even half of the amount due, and the sheriff of Lincolnshire was prosecuted and fined £300 for corruption associated with the levying of the ship money levies. These are just a few examples which indicate the varied and peculiar difficulties emerging in the various shires as resistance to the levy grew.<sup>48</sup> Despite the growing resistance to the collection of ship money, Charles was about to make it impossible in shires like Somerset, and particularly difficult in more peaceful shires like Leicester and Cambridgeshire. Charles' decision to pursue a military course of action in dealing with the Covenanters in Scotland would have disastrous implications for the collection of ship money and more importantly, for the viability of the Lieutenancy as a working institution.

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<sup>48</sup> Barnes, *Somerset*, pg. 212-23.

In conclusion, it is clear that crown policies did much to cause the riots and tumults within not only Cambridgeshire, with its extension of ship money to inland counties as well as fen drainage, however serious opposition and discord did not take place until after 1637. Therefore, the example of Cambridgeshire during the personal rule does much to support Kevin Sharpe's assessment in his work, *The personal rule of Charles I.*<sup>49</sup> The majority of the people of Cambridgeshire remained loyal to the king and the government pre-1637, and it was only the larger issues of foreign policy and ship money which led the problems in the years to come. Yet even when these plans did incur wrath of fenmen, ratepayers, or soldiers; the deputy lieutenants were able to suppress those riots as well as ensure proper collection of the levies. The proof of their effectiveness and ability to compel compliance from the shire would be sorely tested in the coming years in response to the King's call for war against Scotland.

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<sup>49</sup> Kevin Sharpe, *The personal rule of Charles I* (London : Yale University Press, 1992)

## **Chapter 5: Cambridgeshire Lieutenancy and the Bishops' Wars**

The Lord Lieutenancy was developed primarily to enforce royal policy and foster stability by means of social leadership while also serving to defend the interest of the country at court; however, its weakness was dealing with the division and dissent caused during wartime. This dissent had been evident during the Parliaments of 1625-28 where the Lieutenancy's legality was called into question as well as coming under severe criticism, but the institution escaped relatively unscathed following Charles' acceptance of the Petition of Right and the dissolution of Parliament. However, war was the toughest challenge faced by the Lieutenancy and the outbreak of the Bishops' wars would push the institution to collapse all across England. The significance of the wars lies not in actual fighting, but in how they exposed and aggravated the political and religious divisions within Britain, which for the most part had been camouflaged by the Personal Rule, and led to the eventual collapse of the institution of the Lord Lieutenancy. Charles I forced the issue in the name of religious uniformity and the Lieutenancy was asked to respond to produce men and money to supply the army charged with enforcing Charles' desire for religious homogeneity. The deputy lieutenants of Cambridgeshire responded with levies for 800 men, 80 horse and £2430 in the short span of fourteen months which stood as a truly impressive performance given the response of many of the other shires in England. However, the performance was not easy, and caused significant disruption to a shire that had become accustomed to years of Charles' Personal Rule.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 28-58; Mark Charles Fissell, *The Bishop's Wars: Charles I's Campaigns against Scotland. 1638-40* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) pg. 1-3

It also exposed the nature of the Lieutenancy and showed exactly where the loyalties of the deputy lieutenants rested. Despite performing their duty and achieving all the targets that were set for them, the deputies took every chance to shield Cambridgeshire from the onerous levies that Charles I called for. As many historians have argued,<sup>2</sup> the lieutenancy was at its heart localistic in nature and used its position as a link between the court and countryside to the county's advantage, so long as it did not draw the disapproval of the Crown or Privy Council, and Cambridgeshire was a prime example of this. Charles expected institutions like the Lieutenancy to perform at unreasonably high levels of efficiency despite shortages of personnel, precipitous decisions that gave insufficient notification to royal servants expected to perform difficult tasks and a dearth of funding, all results of the Personal Rule. Ultimately, it was Charles who insisted not once but twice that he should prosecute an ill-advised and badly financed war against Covenanter Scotland. Therefore, this chapter will show that Cambridgeshire was able to consistently supply Charles with the men and funds he asked for on time and in full, despite the enormous cost of raising 800 men, 80 horse, and £2430. But, this accomplishment once again made the lieutenancy a source of discontent for Parliament as it had in the 1620's, and led to its eventual demise.<sup>3</sup>

Charles' intentions to pursue a military path in dealing with the Covenanters first became apparent as early as late 1637. The simple fact that the Privy Council sent instructions for the ordering and mustering of the trained bands is not remarkable,

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<sup>2</sup> Victor Stater, *Noble Government: The Stuart Lord Lieutenancy and the Transformation of English Politics*, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1994); G. S. Thomson, *Lords Lieutenants in the Sixteenth Century: a Study in Tudor Local Administration*, (Longmans, Green, 1923); Thomas Cogswell, *Home Divisions: Aristocracy, the State, and Provincial Conflict*, (Manchester University Press, Trowbridge, 1998); Eugene J. Bourgeois, *The Ruling Elite of Cambridgeshire England, c.1520-1603*, (Edwin Mellen Press, New York, 2003)

<sup>3</sup> Mark Charles Fissell, *The Bishop's Wars*, pg. 1-3; Stater, *Noble Governemnt*, pg. 32-65.

however, the timing and wording of the letter indicates something more. In the previous 5 years, instructions concerning musters had been sent in either March, April, or May, to utilize the summer weather as well as to avoid disrupting any normal country activity. Instructions for the shire's normal yearly musters were sent from the Privy Council to Suffolk on 24 March 1637, and later forwarded from Suffolk to his deputy lieutenants on 8 April 1637.<sup>4</sup> These instructions were much the same as had been in all peacetime musters. The change came in August of 1637, when on 17 August 1637 the Privy Council sends to Suffolk instructions for the exercising of the trained bands and ordering of the stores of gunpowder and shot. The Privy Council stated that Suffolk and his deputies were to "...take effectuall order that the magazine of those counties, be with all possible expedicon replenished and furnished with the wonted and competent proportion of gunpowder and that your Lordshipp cause the trayned bonds of those counties to practise and exercise their armes to the end that they may be the more ready and xpert in the use of the same".<sup>5</sup>

In the forwarding letter from the earl of Suffolk to his deputies, the plans and change in tone became more evident. Suffolk orders the deputies "...to take fit courses for the strengthening and defense of the [kingdom]", and that Charles' order is out of his "...princely and vigilant care for the safeguard of his kingdome and subjects."<sup>6</sup> When compared to the instructions sent earlier in the year which simply stated that, "These are therefore to pray and require your lordshipp to give speedy and effectuall order to your deputy lieutenants to cause an exacte view and muster to be taken of all the trayned bands both horse and foote within those counties and to persue therein the directions of our letteres of the 27<sup>th</sup> of April 1635, excepting only that for the ease of

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<sup>4</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 23v.-24.

<sup>5</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 26.

<sup>6</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 25v.

the counties as much as may be of all unnecessary charge and trouble.”<sup>7</sup> The change in language and the unusual September and October activity show that Charles was already considering military action or the appearance of military action to force the Scots into submission. He could afford to show these outwardly aggressive preparations, as he did not believe that the Scots would take the initiative and invade England, and risk uniting all of England against them and inflaming anti-Scottish animosity.<sup>8</sup>

1638 brought more of the same. On 30 June 1638, the Privy Council sent its normal, yearly instructions to Suffolk, which were forwarded to the deputy lieutenants on 8 July 1638, concerning the mustering of the trained bands. However, the urgency of last fall is gone. The instructions were late due to the Privy Council’s concern about spreading the plague, which had since passed. They instructed the deputies to “...give order for the mustering and exercising of the trayned bonds at such convenient times as may be least imcommodious to them in respecte of their harvest, and other cuntry affayres” and “. . . to spare the muster in such parts of the said counties where any infection of the plague is”.<sup>9</sup> However, these hardly sound like the instructions of a government preparing for war.

Later in the year, Charles’ instructions point back towards a bellicose plan of action. In a letter dated 18 November 1638, the Privy Council is clearly signaling a course of military action by writing that “. . . His Majesty in his watchfullnes for the defence of this kingdome and for the safety of his people in these times of action hath signified his expresse will and pleasure to be that instantly uppon the receipt heerof you cause

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<sup>7</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 24.

<sup>8</sup> Fissell, *The Bishop’s Wars*, pg. 4.

<sup>9</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 26v.-27.

an exact view and muster to be taken and made of all armes and trayned forces,” and that they should be able to gather upon a day’s notice with their arms and provisions. Yet again, the Privy Council leaves the mustering at the discretion of Suffolk stating: “Where your Lordshipp shall find it inconvenient eyther in respecte of the unseasonablenes of the weather or any other considerable circumstance, to draw together from remote places, and to exercise the trayned bonds in compleat bodies, we leave it to your discretion provided that the worke be effectually donne.”<sup>10</sup> Given the fact that Suffolk is non-resident and not involved in day to day oversight of the ordering of militia matters for Cambridgeshire, the matter would be left up to the discretion of the deputy lieutenants as to if and when musters were to be held. The deputies would have the opportunity to spare the shire from the truly dreadful task of a full muster in the cold and wet of December. The fact that this had occurred previously and was likely to happen again is hinted in Suffolk’s letter forwarding the Privy Council’s instructions. Suffolk points out to the deputies of the slack nature of previous years by saying “. . . I find very few or seldome any returnes made whereby reformation might be had of those that be refractory.”<sup>11</sup> Therefore, Charles could be relying on the performance of the trained bands, who within Cambridgeshire, might have been allowed to escape regular musters and exercises for the past 5 to 6 years.

Suffolk again wrote to his deputies in Cambridge to compel them to bring defaulters to account for their failures. He states that “...you [deputy lieutenants] are to observe that the sparing of some persons is taken notice of to be a hinderance to the service, and soe I have founde that you have beene slow in makinge your returnes of defaulters, whereof I did put you in minde in my last letteres and now againe pray you

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<sup>10</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 28v-29.

<sup>11</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol.27v.

heerafter not too spare any but to returne the defaults in particuler.”<sup>12</sup> The prodding appears to have registered with the deputies as there were three separate certificates sent to the Privy Council regarding defaulters in January 1639.<sup>13</sup> The defaulters had made their submissions to the deputy lieutenants, and on each occasion, the deputies petitioned the Privy Council for the discharge of individual defaulters with promises of future conformity, saving them the embarrassment and expense of a trip to London. The slackness in returning defaulters to the Privy Council and punishing them could be due to a number of reasons, but most likely is that the deputies were simply protecting the residents of the shire from the expensive burden of musters during times of peace. And as no records of punishments are apparent,<sup>14</sup> it makes one wonder if any of the defaulters were punished at all.

As the Scottish crisis deepened in December of 1638, Charles began preparations for war. The crown’s aggressive plans were signaled with a strong proclamation against the rebels: “The great and considerable forces lately rayed in Scotland . . . by the instigation of some factious persons ill affected to monarchiall government who seeke to cloake their too apparent rebellious designes under pretence of religion hath moved us to take into our royall care to provide for the preservation and safety of this our kingdome of Englande which is in apparent danger to be annoyed and invaded.” This letter and subsequent orders to prepare men and money for the First Bishops’ War set a daunting task for the lieutenancy as a whole, and in the early months of 1639 it was

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<sup>12</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 30.

<sup>13</sup> All dates are new style unless otherwise stated; PRO CSP Domestic 16/409/46, 16/410/106, 16/410/107.

<sup>14</sup> Examination of the CPS, APC, as well as Star Chamber records fail to turn up records of defaulters punished for Cambridgeshire.

asked to supply Charles with an army of over 20, 000 men; far and away the largest force raised since the Stuart accession.<sup>15</sup>

The preparations for war began in February 1639 and these preparations would quickly heap mountains of work and misery upon the shoulders of the deputy lieutenants and the shire's gentry. A letter dated 18 February 1639 from the Privy Council to Suffolk, subsequently forwarded to the deputies on the 26 February, required them to select 400 foot and 40 horse out of the trained bands to be weekly exercised so that they would be able to march to their point of rendezvous as soon as the order was received.<sup>16</sup> This order was carried out in due course as the deputy lieutenants sent letters dated 7 March, and 21 March respectively to the captains of the foot companies and the captain of horse companies to inform them of the Privy Council's orders.<sup>17</sup> In the following weeks both the crown and Privy Council of War sent Suffolk letters detailing further instructions for the selected men. On 19 March and 20 March, both Charles and the Council of War sent letters to Suffolk informing him that 300 men were to be sent to Yarmouth by no later than 12 April 1639 "...to be embarked for such place in the northern parts as shall be directed by the Earl Marshal."<sup>18</sup> These letters were forwarded to the deputies by Suffolk on 21 March leaving the deputy lieutenants scarcely three weeks to organize, equip, and march 300 men to Yarmouth.<sup>19</sup> If that was not difficult enough, simultaneously the Privy Council and Charles sent out letters to Suffolk dated 15 March and 18 March requiring the press of an additional 250 men for the king's service. The deputies were told not to take the men out of the trained bands, which they were to keep full, and to

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<sup>15</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 32-33; Victor Stater, *Noble Government*, 53-55.

<sup>16</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/413/111, 16/413/112; Harley MS 4014 fol. 32-33.

<sup>17</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 33v.-34.

<sup>18</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/414/132, 16/414/157.

<sup>19</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 36v.-38.

have the men gathered and marched to Selby in Yorkshire by the first of April if possible, but not to fail to be there by 15 April. These instructions were forwarded to the deputy lieutenants by Suffolk on 19 March, again leaving them barely three weeks to press and organize the march to Selby.<sup>20</sup> These instructions were forwarded to the chief constables in due course, but this time with a serious warning attached stating, "...we require you not to fayle as you tender the fartherance of his Majesties service and will answere your neglecte or contempte heerof at your uttermost perils".<sup>21</sup> The serious tone of this message to the constables reflects growing pressure on the deputies from the Privy Council or Council of War, especially given the cordial and routine nature of correspondence from the Privy Council during the Personal Rule.

The Council of War decided to load even more pressure onto the heavily burdened deputy lieutenants by requiring a levy of 30 horse and 10 carters for the train of artillery and for the carriage of ammunition and other requisite provisions. This order was sent out from the Privy Council to Suffolk on 29 March, and the horse and carters were to rendezvous in Newcastle-upon-Tyne by 20 April.<sup>22</sup> Additionally, on 9 April, Edward Norgate wrote directly to the deputy lieutenants requesting that they review the stores of butter, cheese, oats, and beans for use by the royal army. They were to return an account in writing of the places and persons where such provisions could be found within Cambridgeshire by 25 April.<sup>23</sup> In total, the crown had asked Cambridgeshire to contribute 550 men, 30 horse, and 10 carters to the war effort, all within the span of a month, and each time the crown gave the lieutenancy barely three weeks to raise the troops and the funds for such requests. Although as we shall see,

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<sup>20</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 34v.-36.

<sup>21</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 39.

<sup>22</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/415/67; BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 44.

<sup>23</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 43.

each order was handled on time and in full, their efforts were encumbered with difficulties.

On 8 April 1639, the deputy lieutenants wrote to Suffolk asking to be freed from the charge of 30 horse and 10 carters. They maintain that the earlier levies had already cost the shire £1500 and 550 men, which was over half of their trained forces, and claimed poverty. They go on to plead that:

“...our country people are so weak in their estates as for the most part it must be a town charge and chiefly from those who have already disbursed great sums for the hiring of men to save themselves; some £10 and some more. If the Lords did know the poverty of our country they would never have thought of us for any further charge. There has been so much trouble and borrowing one of another little sums to raise this levy lately gathered as we did much fear we should not have been able to go through with it in time, upon which difficulties we examined our chief constables, enquiring into their diligence, and we found that divers of them had adventured to disburse good sums of money to make up the levy, expecting to get it again when they can. Assuredly my lord we are the poorest county of England, and yet the most forward and the most willing, as you may remember we were the first of all the counties that began in the great benevolence, so have continued in the shipping money, without any refractoriness. Yet our ill fortunes are to be rated commonly above proportion with other countries far richer than we are, which will plainly be demonstrated, not only by the ship-money, but also by the very charge; for we send out 550 men, being more than the number of half our trained forces. We desire you also to consider that at this time we are a thoroughfare country lying upon the road [to the north], being hardly able to supply the postmasters with horses, being an usual and as yet a daily practice to fetch 16 and sometimes 20 out of a town. So that, having so much use for those few we have, we beseech the Lords to think of some other counties that lie at more ease. We mover for ease no further that where we find a necessity of it, misdoubting we shall sink under it, having found this last newly past so difficult a work to perform.”<sup>24</sup>

Although the claim to be the poorest county of England may have been a bit of an overstatement, as the following chapter will show, the gentry of Cambridgeshire, possibly because of its position on the route to Yarmouth where troops were billeted,

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<sup>24</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/417/64.

was being asked to shoulder a heavier burden than some other shires of similar wealth. However, they were to be disappointed in their request for some relief from the levies placed on the shire.

The deputy lieutenants moved quickly to accomplish the tasks given to them by the crown. Copies of certificates and muster rolls<sup>25</sup> show that 250 men were impressed to send to Selby, as well as £1000 levied to equip them and the other 300 foot taken out of the trained bands sent to Yarmouth. A second certificate shows that the deputy lieutenants did not receive the relief that they had petitioned Suffolk for, and were forced to levy a further £500 for horse and carters.<sup>26</sup> Suffolk commended the work done by his deputies in a letter on 10 April, stating, "I have received your letteres by your messenger wherin you have expressed much care and diligence in the great and important affayre which hath proved very acceptable to the lords of the Councell." Although there were no reported problems in organizing the levies, some problems did arise with the nature and repair of their arms when the 300 troops reached Yarmouth.<sup>27</sup>

On 4 April 1639, the Council of War ordered deputies of Henry Rowland, his Majesty's gunsmith, to Yarmouth to gauge the arms of the counties of Kent, Suffolk, Essex, Norfolk, and Cambridge.<sup>28</sup> In a letter to Secretary Windebank on 18 April, Simon Harcourt states that he has received the full number of his 1700 men, who are well-clothed and able-bodied, but finds that the arms are very faulty, with some being old ship muskets and therefore far too heavy for the present service. He goes on to

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<sup>25</sup> See appendix pg. ; BL Harley 4014 fol. 41-45.

<sup>26</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 38v., fol. 41-43, and fol. 44v.

<sup>27</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 39v.

<sup>28</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/417/28.

say in a postscript that the men that came out of Cambridge are “...number compleat, but they are altogether very ill-armed, both musketeers and pikes.”<sup>29</sup> On 28 April, Edward Sherburne wrote to Secretary Windebank disparaging the arms out of Norfolk saying that many of them were defective. He continues: “yet those out of Cambridgeshire were far worse, not one head-piece being either fashionable or serviceable, and the rest of the arms correspondent.”<sup>30</sup> It is entirely possible that this assessment of the arms sent out of Cambridgeshire is accurate, but the deputies had made monetary allowances to have the poor quality of their arms repaired or new ones purchased.

The deputy lieutenants received word from Suffolk that a complaint had been made by the Marquis of Hamilton to the Privy Council and that he was displeased with the soldiers delivered to his officers. Hamilton was dissatisfied with the men for reasons of defects as well as negligence by the deputy lieutenants for not accompanying the men personally, as deputies from Suffolk had. In a letter to Suffolk dated 17 May, the deputy lieutenants strongly defended themselves, writing that they had given the “...best expressions we were able to make of our loyal and faithful affections to the service”, and suggested other reasons for why complaints had been made against them. They wrote “...ill-dealing of the captains and inferior officers we conceive was the cause of their beginning to frame a complaint against us to the Marquis, to prevent our complaint against them, for which we had so just cause.” In fact, the deputy lieutenants of Cambridgeshire had sent £170 with the 300 men to Yarmouth; £140 for defective head pieces, £15 for drums (for which they had been excused from

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<sup>29</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/418/1.

<sup>30</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/418/83.

providing by the Privy Council<sup>31</sup>) and £15 for 5 missing men (paid at a rate of £3 per man) of which two of the men returned two days before they were to be received by their officers. Yet the officers would not deliver back any of the money paid to them by the deputy lieutenants. As for the complaint of ill-carriage and neglect for not accompanying the men, the deputies pleaded that their county is remote,<sup>32</sup> and many of the deputies were in poor health due to the extremely foul weather. For that reason, they sent six conductors when normally three would suffice. At the end of the letter, they state that, “This declaration of the truth of the whole proceedings we have taken the boldness thus at large to represent to you, hoping that you [Suffolk] and the rest of the Lords of the Council will give credit hereunto, and excuse us from have justly deserved any reprehension on this behalf”.<sup>33</sup> There is however, evidence of widespread use of exemptions and substitutes within the bands that went to Yarmouth. Simon Harcourt pointed to it when he stated in his letter to Secretary Windebank on 18 April that: “Neither are the men of the old trained bands of the county, but almost all hired, raw and inexpert in the use of their arms, and consequently unfit for present service.”<sup>34</sup> This was followed by a letter from the Privy Council to the deputies of various counties, Cambridgeshire included, complaining of “great and intolerable exactions taken for exempting of divers of the trained men from that service,” and the deputies are to find out “...what sum or sums of money, or other considerations have been taken from any trained men, to free them from the said service, or to put others in their room.”<sup>35</sup> The deputies of Cambridgeshire responded to this letter on 17 May with a detailed explanation of the

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<sup>31</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 39v.

<sup>32</sup> The remoteness would apply to the Isle of Ely, which at this time was undergoing significant drainage and land reclamation efforts, but still would have made travel difficult in times of infirmity or inclement weather.

<sup>33</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/421/56.

<sup>34</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/418/1.

<sup>35</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/420/112.

way that exemptions had been given, and the statement that they knew of no one who had abused the exemptions process from Cambridgeshire. That is not to say that the deputies prevented the abuse of the system in the favor of their friends and neighbors; they just claimed that they knew nothing of it.<sup>36</sup>

Other letters seem to support the claims of the Cambridgeshire deputy lieutenants that their men and arms were not as defective as claimed. Edward Sherburne's letter of 28 April indicates that the purchase and repair of arms had begun in Yarmouth. He writes "...I understand from Capt. Parkinson (who has 100 of the 300 men) that the counties have issued moneys to buy new arms, and to amend the rest, which, as he told me, he had in part provided before his departure from Yarmouth."<sup>37</sup> Also, in a letter to dated 12 May, Edward Norgate while reporting the news from the north to Robert Read<sup>38</sup> states that the King rode out to see the foot companies of Oxford, Cambridge, Hertford, Warwick, and Huntingdon, totaling about 4500 men, and states that: "I think Europe cannot show braver fellows in person or arms, and otherwise well ordered and appointed."<sup>39</sup> These would either indicate that the supposedly serious defects in the arms of the men from Cambridgeshire never existed, or that more likely, the funds sent with the men were sufficient to replace or repair the defects. Either way, Cambridgeshire was not the only county to present defective arms,<sup>40</sup> as the years of peace and sporadic mustering throughout England had left the militia arms in general in a poor state. Nevertheless, a lack of further admonition

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<sup>36</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/421/55.

<sup>37</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/418/83.

<sup>38</sup> Robert Read was the secretary and nephew of Secretary Windebank and Edward Norgate was his cousin and with the King's court in the North.

<sup>39</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/420/161.

<sup>40</sup> A comparison with other shires will follow in the chapter.

from Charles I or the Privy Council suggests that the serious defects claimed by the officers no longer existed.

Although the hard work of March and April was over, and the lieutenancy had accomplished the monumental task of sending out 550 men and £1500 from the shire, the crown still had tasks for them to perform. On 17 May, Suffolk forwarded a letter from the Privy Council requiring the deputies to cause a general muster to be held (as a matter of course for their annual musters), and a perfect and exact muster roll and certificates concerning the muster should be returned to the Privy Council before the end of Michaelmas term.<sup>41</sup> And, to add insult to the already weakened<sup>42</sup> lieutenancy, 300 arms from Cambridgeshire were not returned from the fruitless expedition to the North. Initial inquiries brought no leads to their whereabouts. George Clarke wrote to the Privy Council in August 1639, stating that arms belonging to Norfolk, Essex, and Kent definitely shipped on his vessel, *the White Lion*, but he neither received nor shipped arms from the county of Cambridge.<sup>43</sup> On 24 October, the Officers of the Ordinance reiterated the stance of George Clarke in saying that they had no record of the missing arms, only acknowledgements pertaining to the arms returned to Norfolk, Essex, and Kent.<sup>44</sup> Finally, in response to a complaint from Cambridgeshire, the Privy Council acknowledged that the shire had not had the arms sent to Yarmouth returned. The Privy Council wrote that they:

“...are fully satisfied the cuntry hath not received the said armes backe againe as they ought to have done and that the money by the county disbursed for the repaire of the 300 armes was duly payd, though we cannot yet discover whither the same were accordingly employed, and because aswell the money soe disbursed as the armes which were carefully sent backe to our very good lord, the Lord Marquesse

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<sup>41</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 45v.

<sup>42</sup> Stater, *Noble Government*, pg. 59.

<sup>43</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/427/118.

<sup>44</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/431/55.

Hamilton, have passed through the hands of many persons divers of whom are now absent hence, soe we cannot suddainly discover in whom the default doth rest.”

It was never fully discovered what happened to the arms that Cambridgeshire sent out, however, the Privy Council then goes on to say that, it is unfit that the county should remain disarmed; therefore the deputy lieutenants should provide fit arms for the trained bands until they can discover the “authors of the former losse.”<sup>45</sup> Therefore, not only do the deputy lieutenants have to hold a general muster during the summer, but also they have to find replacement arms for 300 hundred of the trained band. There is no evidence that this muster was held, and the lack of further correspondence about the lost arms would suggest that the Cambridgeshire deputies were able to re-arm their trained bands but at what social and financial cost.

The year saw a remarkable achievement as in May 1639 as Charles I moved north with an army of over 20,000 men. This was far and away the largest military force raised in England since the Stuart accession, dwarfing those of the 1620s. Charles’s army was a victory for the Lieutenancy as an institution across England, but that victory came at a considerable cost, both social and political. However, the crown failed to take advantage of this achievement by signing a treaty at Berwick in June. Violence had been avoided, with only an inadvertent skirmish taking place, but in doing so wasted the months of hard work, the thousands of pounds spent, and the immeasurable social disruption caused by the press went for naught. The deputy lieutenants of Cambridgeshire had struggled and worked to provide Charles with men

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<sup>45</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 46v.

and money at great personal risk to their fortunes and social standing only to be asked to repeat it again the following year.<sup>46</sup>

The following year brought renewed effort from Charles to enforce religious uniformity in his kingdoms, and a new attempt to raise an army to fight the Covenanters. However, this time the strain of the levy would exact an even heavier political toll on the country and the Lieutenancy. Charles turned to Parliament for financial support to gather another army to take north against the Scots, however, members of the Short Parliament made it very clear that supply would only come after the redress of eleven years of grievances. Members voiced their discontent loudly and Charles dissolved Parliament after only three weeks upon realizing that supply would not come quickly. Instead, he was forced to rely again on the Lieutenancy to repeat its performance of the previous year, but unfortunately, 1640 would not resemble the relatively well-ordered and effective preparations of 1639.<sup>47</sup>

In a letter dated on 1 April 1640, the earl of Suffolk forwards a series of instructions from both the king and his Privy Council contained in three letters. The first is an order from Charles on 17 March ordering the levy of 300 able and serviceable men to be levied out of Cambridgeshire but without instructions. The second one is dated 26 March from the Privy Council. The Privy Council's instructions repeat the order for 300 men from Cambridgeshire, and include a full set of instructions from the Privy Council for the muster and rendezvous of the 300 men from Cambridge. They are to rendezvous in Cambridgeshire on 25 May and remain there until 5 June when they are to march to Yarmouth, thus putting the county liable for at least 7 days pay for the

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<sup>46</sup> Stater, *Noble Government*, pg. 55.

<sup>47</sup> Mark Charles Fissel, "Scottish War and English Money: the Short Parliament of 1640," *War and Government in Britain, 1598-1605* ed. Mark Charles Fissel (Manchester University Press, 1991)

men before they enter the crown's pay. The third letter forwarded, again dated 26 March, contained the Privy Council's instructions for the levying of 50 strong and able horses and 17 carters to be gathered in Newcastle by 15 June.<sup>48</sup>

Although calling for the raising of 300 foot and 50 horse and nearly £1000 of coat and conduct money, the instructions given by the Privy Council allow the deputies to again shield local and 'country affairs' from the hardships of the levy just as in the previous year. In their instructions, the Privy Council allowed the deputies to use, and possibly abuse exemption clauses to the shire's advantage.<sup>49</sup> The Privy Council instructed that the deputies were to

“ . . . take espetiall care that there be a very good choyce made of the men out of the trayned bonds there that they be of able bodies and yeeres meet for this employment. Where any freholder hath used to have his armes borne by another man, that other man is to be pressed to serve if he be of able body, and where a freeholder hath served with his owne armes, and is not fit or willing to serve himselfe, he is to finde another able man to serve in his place, and if he cannot procure another then your Lordshipp or your deputy lieutenants are to cause another able man to be pressed to serve, and where any man hath used to beare the common armes of the parish if he be fit and able of body, he is to be taken, but if he be unfit, a suffitient man to be pressed in his stead. Your Lordshipp is espetially to take care that in the liberty given to change men to serve in the place of trayned soldiers there be not any rewards or money taken which was an abuse to much practised in the last yeere in some counties”<sup>50</sup>

This once again would give the deputies the ability to shield their friends and neighbors as they had done in the previous year, much to the benefit of the shire, but to the great detriment of Charles' army.

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<sup>48</sup> Cambridge seems to bear a higher percentage of this levy, Suffolk was called on to provide only 60 horse and 20 carters, while Dorset only supplied 20 horse and 7 carters. Given the fact that Suffolk was charged for 600 men and Dorset was charged for 300 men, Cambridge seems to have rated quite highly for this muster; BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 47v.-51.

<sup>49</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol.47v.

<sup>50</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 48v.

On 22 May 1640, Suffolk dispatches a letter to Lord General Northumberland reporting on the state of the levies in Cambridgeshire. He wrote that:

“I forthwith endeavoured to inform myself, by such of my deputy-lieutenants as are here in town, of the true state of this business. They affirm to me that in Cambridge the men are weekly mustered at their several rendezvous according to my former directions, and that warrants have been made out for levying coat and conduct-money, of which they conceive the whole or most part is levied accordingly, for that they hear not that any do deny payment of it.”<sup>51</sup>

Therefore, from this letter, the Privy Council and Lord General Northumberland believe that the 300 foot and 50 horse from Cambridge are prepared and will be at Yarmouth and Newcastle-upon-Tyne at their appointed dates.<sup>52</sup> Suffolk died on 3 June 1640 at Suffolk House in London, and his death would complicate matters appreciably in the execution of the king’s levy in Cambridgeshire.<sup>53</sup>

This was an opportunity for the deputy lieutenants to attempt to extricate themselves from a very difficult position. Avoiding the wrath of angry neighbors and protecting their social standing was foremost in the minds of all the Lieutenants and deputies across England and Cambridgeshire was no different. They had been caught in the middle between the crown and the locality and had expended much effort executing burdensome and unpopular crown policies, and they now had a way out of it. In a letter to Lord General Northumberland that quickly followed news of Suffolk’s death, the deputy lieutenants of Cambridgeshire blandly explained that they were not going

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<sup>51</sup> Suffolk’s deputies were also present at the meeting at Suffolk House in London and affirm the same willingness to comply with the levies as well. As for Dorset, the earl of Suffolk states that “...at my coming thither I listed the 600 men, and made out warrants under my own hand for levying coat and conduct money” indicating that the shire was quite defective at the time. As for the Cinque Ports, he says that he “...has given command for levying the 300 men and warrants have been issued for the coat and conduct money; I know not to the contrary, but they be also ready.”; PRO CSP Domestic 16/454/65

<sup>52</sup> The men from Cambridge are expected no later than 10 June in Yarmouth, and horse are expected 15 June in Newcastle-upon-Tyne.

<sup>53</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/456/20.

to continue with the levy, as they had no authority to do so.<sup>54</sup> The frustration of the heavy workload is clear within the letter to Northumberland.

“We have been most careful to raise the 300 men imposed upon us and kept them together at our great charge above this month, that they might be at all times in readiness at your command; yet now by the death of our lord lieutenant [Theophilus earl of Suffolk], being disabled to proceed further in this service, having no authority but under him, we beseech you not to take it amiss from us, that at this time your officers receive them not, for we conceive there is no power remaining in us either to keep them longer together or to supply any wants where need shall be, to deliver any soldiers by indenture or to return any to you, since all the directions we have received have only been [addressed] to the lord or deputy-lieutenants, we now being none. May it therefore please you not to conceive this to proceed from any negligence towards the king’s service or disrespect to your Lordship, whom we most especially honour, and we have just occasion to esteem this coming down of your officers as a great favour, being what we very lately earnestly desired when we were capable to receive it.”<sup>55</sup>

This was a very clever ploy by the Cambridgeshire deputies. By interpreting the strict letter of the law, they might have been able to avoid enforcing the levies. Since they had received their commissions and authority from their Lord Lieutenant, Theophilus, earl of Suffolk, and all authority they had was derived through his commission, which ended upon his death. The Cambridgeshire deputies were not the only ones looking for a way out of these unpleasant tasks. A news letter from Edward Rossingham to Edward, Viscount Conway mentions a recent Act of Parliament forbidding deputy lieutenants from resigning their deputation upon any circumstance without the king’s permission. In doing so, that deputy would “incur his Majesty’s heavy indignation.”<sup>56</sup> In the broader sense, the timing of his death offered them the opportunity to avoid

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<sup>54</sup> The Cambridgeshire deputies were not alone in this sentiment. The deputies from Suffolk wrote to the Council on 8 June 1640 to say that they would have trouble executing and enforcing the levies as they have “now only the power of justices of peace” which indicates that they too considered their commission as deputy lieutenants to be terminated upon Suffolk’s death, however they were willing to continue in their tasks, unlike their counterparts in Cambridgeshire, as best they could; PRO CSP Domestic 16/456/42; Stater, *Noble Government*, pg. 59.

<sup>55</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/458/77.

<sup>56</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/457/104.

enforcing a levy that would bring another round of hardship upon an increasing disgruntled county.

In response, the Privy Council quickly wrote back to the deputies on 12 June 1640. In this letter, the Privy Council further emphasized the nature of the Lieutenancy as purely a prerogative office which before had been a strength, but after eleven years of the Personal Rule, contentious issues like the levying of ship money, the Lieutenancy, both associated with royal prerogative were proving to be a source of annoyance. The letter states:

“We have been acquainted with a lettere from some of you the deputy lieutenants of that county to our very good lord, the earl of Northumberlande, lord generall of his Majesties army, and wheras we find that the leavies of the soldiers, the raysinge coate and conducte money, and other particulers incident to that service formerly committed to the care of you the deputy lieutenants by the Ea. of Suffolk, deceased later lord lieutenants of that county, is by you for the present like to be retarded in regard (as by your lettere is intimated) you conceive your power as deputy lieutenants is determined by his lordshipp's death. These are therefore in his Majesties name, and by his expresse commaunde to authorise and enable you not only to pceed in the said leavies and raysinge of the coate and conducte money and putting in execution of all other particulers apperteyning to that service according to such directions as have beene formerly givem from this Boarde and communicated to you from time to time by letteres or otherwise from his Lordshipp, but alsoe farther to authorise and enable you with full power and in as ample manner to use and execute the office and authority apperteyning to deputy lieutenants uppon all occasions whatsoever importing the service of his Majesty or the publique within that county.”<sup>57</sup>

The Privy Council moved quickly to replace Suffolk by naming William 1<sup>st</sup> Lord Maynard<sup>58</sup> as the new Lord Lieutenant for Cambridgeshire on 17 June 1640. Maynard had been jointly serving as a Lord Lieutenant for the past 5 year in

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<sup>57</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 51v.

<sup>58</sup> See Chapter 2 for a discussion of Lord Maynard's connections to Cambridgeshire and the reasoning for his nomination as Lord Lieutenant.

neighboring Essex.<sup>59</sup> However, it would take Maynard some time to begin acting upon his duties as Lord Lieutenant of Cambridgeshire, and he would only serve a few months before his own death in December 1640.<sup>60</sup> In the meantime, the deputies had the King's express command and authority to act in the furtherance of his orders. Having tried to avoid the unpleasant task of sending men and money out of their shire, the deputies proceeded to perform their job, as they had the year before. The result was levies for 297 foot, 50 horse and £930 dated on 26 June 1640 showing that the deputies were able to supply crown demands despite growing disaffection and hardships, albeit a few weeks late due to the death of Suffolk.<sup>61</sup>

Although the deputies were able to raise the men and the funds, problems continued. The disaffection with the wars and the levies began to show when a report was made about disorder within the gathered troops while awaiting their conduction to Yarmouth.

“Saturday last the 300 pressed soldiers in Cambridgeshire fell into great disorder in Cambridge, they pressed the deputy-lieutenants for somewhat, which was granted them, and when they saw they got their desire so easily they pressed for somewhat else, which the deputy-lieutenants neither might nor could grant; these soldiers becoming unruly threatened them, which made them call 50 men with halberts to be their guard, but the soldiers soon disarmed them; whereupon some of the trained soldiers were called to come with their arms, but they were disarmed also. All this time the soldiers have only threatened their deputy-lieutenants if they have not what they want. A commission of oyer and terminer was ordered to be drawn, and Lord Maynard, lord lieutenant of that county was ordered to go down with it to Cambridge to examine this disorder and to punish the delinquents”<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> J. C. Sainty, “Lieutenants of Counties 1585-1642”, *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research: Special Supplement #8* (May 1970): pg. 13, 20.

<sup>60</sup> Dudley 3<sup>rd</sup> Lord North was appointed jointly with Maynard on 22 October 1640, but with the convening of Long Parliament and the collapse of the Lieutenancy, there is no evidence that he took part in any militia activity which had by this time ceased; Sainty, pg. 13.

<sup>61</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 52-55.

<sup>62</sup> Unfortunately, no further reference has been found regarding the punishment of the pressed troops; PRO CSP Domestic 16/457/104.

Maynard even wrote to the Privy Council pleading for the troops gathered near Braintree to be shipped out of the county as soon as possible, “lest they should commit greater mischiefs.” The disorders were not limited to Cambridgeshire and not limited to pressed men awaiting transport. In Suffolk, Essex and other surrounding shires, pressed soldiers were committing ‘various insolences’ including assaulting their conductors and deputy lieutenants.<sup>63</sup> Within Cambridgeshire, there were numerous reports of resisters and rioters to the levying of ship money, and although the collection of ship money fell to the sheriffs and constables, the physical resistance to the collection goes further to prove the growing state of discontent within the shire.<sup>64</sup>

Lord Maynard finally wrote to his new deputies on 20 August 1640 informing them of his intention of traveling to Cambridge on Thursday, 27 August at one o’clock in the afternoon to meet with them and determine what should be done to further the king’s service in the shire. He also included that, “thereupon I hope to have a commission of array the better to inable us in the discharge of our duties in this and such like services recting.”<sup>65</sup> This letter is important, namely for the fact that Maynard was hoping to have a commission of array, indicating that the institution of the Lieutenancy was showing its weakness, as well as for the fact that Maynard was simply traveling to Cambridgeshire, especially since, it is unlikely that Suffolk even set foot in Cambridgeshire in the last ten years of his life.. This indicates that the lord lieutenant’s presence was needed to sort out county business, which had not been

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<sup>63</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/461/24.

<sup>64</sup> See Chapter 4 for discussion of ship money resistance.

<sup>65</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 55v.

needed for decades and further indicates that the Lieutenancy was failing.<sup>66</sup> Because commissions of array were based on a statute of Henry IV, they seemed to offer a way around the difficult question of the Lieutenancy's legal authority and its basis in the royal prerogative. Commissions of array were issued for ten counties; Norfolk, Surrey, Sussex, Hampshire, Leicestershire, Rutland, Hertfordshire, Middlesex, Stafford, and Cumberland. Cambridgeshire was left out of these commissions indicating that no matter what problems existed, the Privy Council didn't consider Cambridgeshire to be on par with its more disobedient and troublesome neighbors.<sup>67</sup> Maynard wrote to the Privy Council following his meeting with the deputy lieutenants saying that he finds

“ . . . them all most willing to advance that weighty service so much importing the honour and safety of his Majesty and this kingdom, and we have ordered general musters. Some things they have entreated me to represent to you beforehand: first, that consideration may be had of the numbers to be required of them, both because in late levies, with all readiness performed, they have sustained a greater burden in proportion than other counties in the number of men and draught horses, and in the loss of their arms, of which not one has been yet returned: and that the county lying in the passage to the North may not be disabled to repress the pilfering of other troops which must of necessity pass through their country. Secondly, there is no mention in his Majesty's letter of any warrant for levying money for this service, and they therefore wish that if there shall be occasion both they and I may be authorised to levy it as has been used heretofore.”<sup>68</sup>

This letter does reflect the attitude of the shire and its lieutenancy, in the fact that they had produced a substantially higher number of men and money compared with other shires, especially in respect to horses.<sup>69</sup> In addition, the fact that the arms from last year's fruitless expedition against the Scots had yet to surface would be another issue

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<sup>66</sup> Examination of all the correspondence both to and from the earl of Suffolk indicates that he resided in either London, Dorset, or Dover for the last 10 years of his life, and made no trips into Cambridgeshire. He had also ceased to reside at Audley End, Essex as the upkeep on the massive home was too expensive for his financially strained estate to manage.

<sup>67</sup> Stater, *Noble Government*, pg. 59.

<sup>68</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/465/57.

<sup>69</sup> Detailed comparisons will be discussed in the following chapter.

to cause unhappiness. Also, it appears that for the first time in years, the deputies of Cambridgeshire had a responsive Lord Lieutenant to act as a link with the Privy Council and redress grievances which had not been the case under Suffolk, but Maynard died quickly thereafter on 19 December. However, by that point the Lieutenancy had ceased to be a functioning body. The Long Parliament had convened and all the former members of the Lieutenancy were anxiously trying to avoid their ties to the institutions and its basis in royal prerogative.<sup>70</sup>

What needs to be shown now is the remarkable nature of the performance in supplying men and money in full by comparing it to other shires that either could not produce or refused outright to provide for the king's service. Cambridgeshire was able to hold its local governmental structure together for longer and produce men and money for an unpopular monarch when other shires around it failed. Comparison must be made with the other shires surrounding Cambridgeshire as well as the other shires under the charge of Theophilus, earl of Suffolk to show the effectiveness of the shires deputies at producing the results required by the crown despite the enormous difficulties they faced.

### **Cambridgeshire Compared**

Shires which were under the control of the earl of Suffolk were struggling to stand up to the achievements of the Cambridgeshire levies. Dorset was by far the most delinquent and as such was the only shire under the earl of Suffolk's control to have him personally take an active roll in the field of sorting out the militia operations at any time. When news of the levies progress from Dorset reached the earl of Suffolk,

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<sup>70</sup> Stater, *Noble Government*, pg. 36-59.

it was less than encouraging. Once again, as for the levies of the 1620's<sup>71</sup> the Dorset gentry were again proving to be ill prepared and disorganized. Word filtered back to the earl that the trained bandsmen were simply refusing to accept the king's shilling, arguing that if they left their shire to fight the Scots, then the coast would be left undefended. The earl of Suffolk upon arriving on the scene in Dorset wrote to Secretary Windebank on 4 May, reassuring him that things in the shire will be made right, and that he found that there was no remissness within the people of the shire, and that the problem rested with the deputy lieutenants of the shire, namely one, Mr. Napper. He asked Sec. Windebank to keep Mr. Napper in London until the earl's return so that he may deal with him personally.<sup>72</sup> The fact that the earl of Suffolk is out in the shire dealing with these issues personally is a testament to the difficulties that were being experienced within the shire, as the ageing earl had been in poor health for years and would succumb to his maladies scarcely one month later.

Suffolk, as the other lieutenancy held by the ageing earl, was a slightly different story than the seriously defective example provided by Dorset. There were in fact problems associated with the collection of coat and conduct money within the shire as well as restless troops that created problems upon their mustering, and yet the deputies of Suffolk held much the same line as the deputies from Cambridgeshire. They had been able to draw the full complement of troops under the levies, and coated them, but they had failed to provide adequate funds for their conduct and upkeep while still in the counties charge, as the shire was simply refusing to pay the levy. The deputies tried to escape their posts upon the death of the earl of Suffolk on 6 June 1640, reminding the Council of the death of the earl of Suffolk and the expiration of their commissions

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<sup>71</sup> See Chapter 3 for more information on Dorset's failures in the 1620's

<sup>72</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/451/5, PRO CSP Domestic 16/452/24; Stater, *Noble Government*, pg. 37-59; PRO CSP Domestic 16/452/24

as deputy lieutenants. However, they also said that they would work to the best of their abilities for the advancement of the crown's levies but feared what would happen when the entire contingent from Suffolk was gathered together, as they no longer had the power to raise arms to suppress riots and to execute martial law, but instead were limited by, as they considered, the lesser powers of JP's which in their words "would hardly be obeyed by such a rude multitude."<sup>73</sup> Their concerns turned out to be a moot point as the council quickly moved to provide the deputies with the adequate authority under the Crown's prerogative to carry out the office, which is what they did, and functioned quite well, much in the same manner as their Cambridgeshire counterparts.

Of the shires outside of the earl of Suffolk's control in the midlands, Leicestershire stands alone as the single bright spot for the 1640 levies. Henry Hastings, 5<sup>th</sup> earl of Huntingdon, was singled out for his commitment and diligent efforts in ensuring that the Leicestershire contingent of 400 foot were not only on time, in full, and immaculately equipped, but also the exhausting mobilization had not taken away his fondness for adding a special touch to his levies, as each man was equipped with special knapsacks. It was reported that 'by his Maiesties expresse direction, wee doe give you hartly thanks for the same'. Charles himself even professed that he 'hath therein bene confirmed in the ipression, which he formerly had of your affection and Care of his Service'.<sup>74</sup> However, Huntingdon's effort cost him dearly when the elections for Long Parliament came around. He was being challenged in all parts of the countryside by his rivals and his candidates were defeated despite his nominations, which before the levies for the Bishops Wars would have been more

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<sup>73</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/456/42

<sup>74</sup> Coggsell, *Home Divisions*, pg. 264-272.

than enough to secure a return to Parliament. Therefore, the earl of Huntingdon was to learn the political cost of his zealous support for the Caroline regime. He had forgotten to take into consideration the mood of his shire and the needs of his locality; and was therefore forced to take his seat in the House of Lords knowing full well that there was virtually no one in the Commons with his family's interests at heart.

In the south of England, Somerset continued to be a hotbed of dissent and discord with these levies stoking the fires even further. The army which marched north in '39 had been made up largely of troops from counties north of the Trent river, so therefore, the Somerset militia got off lightly in that year. However, the lieutenancy did not. They were still required to select, muster and train the required troops, supply them with coats, exercise them weekly and be ready to march upon an hours warning, but their preparations and financial outlays would all come to naught as the Pacification at Berwick ended the war almost before it began. In 1640, the levy was doomed before it even got started as on three occasions, deputies sent out warrants for coat and conduct money which were returned each time with barely one-quarter of the sums required, despite multiple threats to the local constables. When commanded to report the names of those who refused to pay, the constables replied that in some hundreds, they would have to bring in the names of every man residing there. In fact there were so many that the deputies did not think fit to trouble the council with so many. Yet this pattern was being repeated all over the south as the council had summoned 330 defaulters from Surrey, 44 from Gloucester, and countless others from Essex, Northampton, and Herefordshire.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>75</sup>PRO CSP Domestic 16/459/7, 16/457/50; Barnes, *Somerset*, pg. 263-280.

When the deputies finally did gather the required troops together, the troubles really started. The troops were brought together a month early because of delayed letters from the privy council, and as a result, over £600 was wasted on the troops early muster, therefore by June, there were no more funds left, and the county was refusing to give anymore. Far fewer than the intended two thousand foot had rendezvoused, and ones who did stay were only orderly, as long as the money held out. Without funds to pay them, the men deserted in droves, and soon the mass desertion turned to vandalism, and in other shires across the south of England even murder. The Berkshire forces disbanded, while the Wiltshire forces broke open the gaol to liberate those who were committed for not paying coat and conduct money, and a Romanist lieutenant was flayed to death by Devonshire troops who then dragged his remains through the streets while the constables and citizens stood by.<sup>76</sup>

All across the England, bad news was pouring into the council. Hampshire deputies informed them that they found it impossible to levy coat and conduct money, and that a great number of the men levied were either so unfit for service that they had to be refused, or that they had run away. In Cheshire, Lord Strange feared that his five hundred men might mutiny for lack of supply and wages, and even normally reliable Lincolnshire was reporting that men had fled to the hills and armed themselves in order to avoid the press. Surrey simply stopped pressing troops in light of refusals to contribute coat and conduct money, and the Kentish militia mutinied despite the pleas of their deputy lieutenants.<sup>77</sup> All of these examples show a picture of a country in crisis and an institution that could no longer perform the function which it was charged. The levy of 1640, without a satisfactory end to the Scottish Crisis, had

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<sup>76</sup> PRO CSP Domestic 16/460/5, 16/460/56; Barnes, *Somerset*, pg. 270-80.

<sup>77</sup> Stater, *Noble Government*, pg. 47-65.

effectively killed the popular support for the Lieutenancy. Charles's decision to extend the collection of ship money to inland counties, and to pursue a military course of action in Scotland, all while without recourse to Parliament, had proven disastrous. The first inkling of this was shown when Charles summoned the Short Parliament, and eleven years of grievances were brought forward, forcing Charles to abandon Parliament after only three weeks. Parliament's return in the fall was to signal the death of the lieutenancy because by that point the lieutenancy had ceased to be a functioning body. The Long Parliament convened and all the former members of the lieutenancy were anxiously trying to avoid their ties to the institutions and its basis in royal prerogative, and there are no records to indicate that any shire held musters at any time following the seating of the Long Parliament. The lieutenancy was to be hijacked by Parliament and abandoned by the king in favor of the use of commissions of array to raise his army. The lieutenancy of the previous 50 years was dead.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> Stater, *Noble Government*, pg. 36-59.

## **Conclusions: The Lieutenancy of Cambridgeshire Assessed**

In the course of examination of the Cambridgeshire Lord Lieutenancy under Charles I, a great deal of information has been brought to light on a number of historiographical questions as well as the general operation of militia affairs within the shire. This study has tried to offer an insight into the growing court/country divide that emerged under the early Stuarts as well as on the question of whether or not there was a county community that existed within Cambridgeshire. The historiography aside, this study also paints a picture of Cambridgeshire not as a Puritan hot spot, or a Parliamentary shire soon to be part of the Eastern Alliance during the Civil War. Instead, Cambridgeshire appears as a shire whose local government is effectively controlled and managed by the group of the ruling elite represented by the deputy lieutenants of the shire who did all within their power to run the militia operations and hold down the discord and dissent which plagued other shires and was growing to a breaking point all over the country. The fact that the Cambridgeshire lieutenancy was able to function longer and more effectively than other shires speaks to the monumental job accomplished by the deputies of Cambridgeshire.

### **Historiographical**

The court/country divide clearly was a creation of the early Stuart monarchs and the Duke of Buckingham, and is represented in the evolution of the Lord Lieutenancy as it became the key instrument for disseminating royal policy into the shires under the early Stuart monarchs. While it was being relied heavily upon to force acceptance of royal fiscal innovations, the power base that it depended on for its authority and leverage within the localities was being eroded as more and more court favorites and

newly ennobled families with little or no influence in certain localities were being installed as lords lieutenants for the shires. Families like the Howards, Cecils, Wentworths, and Herberts were occupying multiple lieutenancies without holding property or influence within these shires thus eroding the traditional patron/client relationship and narrowing the access to royal patronage and largess. Cambridgeshire was a prime example of this trend as an active and resident lord lieutenant in the person of Roger Lord North was replaced upon his death with Thomas Howard, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk. The Howard family was not a complete outsider, as the family had a deep history<sup>1</sup> in East Anglia, but the earl of Suffolk was in no way an adequate replacement for the Lord North, who had fought for years to concentrate power and influence within the office of the lieutenancy and gain control over the various liberties within the shire. The fact that Howard was non-resident in Cambridgeshire and owed much of the financial and political redemption of his family's name to his presence at court would be a sore point as the deputy lieutenants would begin to complain almost immediately about the delays in forwarding orders and its effect on the operation of the shire. This trend continued to worsen under Charles I, as Theophilus Howard, 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk continued to acquire office and favor at court through his relationship with the Duke of Buckingham, taking his attention further and further away from Cambridgeshire as he was charged with either sole or joint lieutenancy over six shires at one time.<sup>2</sup> It is also impossible to find any reference to the earl of Suffolk even setting foot in Cambridgeshire from the late 1620's until his death. Instead the ageing earl spent all of his time either at court or his other more southerly residences of Audley End, Suffolk House, or at Dover Castle. This certainly had an effect on the operations of the Lieutenancy within the shire as the

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<sup>1</sup> See Chapter 2 or biographical appendix.

<sup>2</sup> Cambridgeshire, Suffolk, Dorset, Cumberland, Westmoreland, Northumberland, as well as Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports.

small number of families who formed the ruling elite under Elizabeth I, were left to manage the shire with little or no personal involvement from the earl of Suffolk, as well as left to search for new and different paths to patronage and influence at court, further widening the growing divide between the crown and the localities.

The examination of the Cambridgeshire Lieutenancy also sheds light on the county community debate, as Cambridgeshire appears to have aspects evident of both sides of the argument. Alan Everitt has argued by putting the county community argument forward that the gentry of Kent were ill informed or simply not concerned with national affairs and in an England that was described as “a union of partially independent county states” or county communities, where localism flourished and took precedence over national affairs. Patterns of marriage, ancient lineage, and friendship ties were used to describe Kent as one of these communities which were inwardly looking and unconcerned with outside affairs. Despite not looking at a wide swath of the Cambridgeshire gentry as Everitt has, the ruling elite of Cambridgeshire does show some common bonds with Everitt’s arguments in Kent. The ruling elite of Cambridgeshire were a recognizable set of families in control of office-holding within the shire for the previous 100 years. They were linked by friendship bonds as well as a series of mutually beneficial marriages and business deals, as well as shared protestant beliefs fostered under Roger Lord North with majority of the families serving in the Lieutenancy having a history of landed wealth within the shire for over a century, if not over three centuries. So there certainly was a circle of elite families who controlled local government for over a century, but there is no evidence that county community existed in the manner in which Everitt argued for Kent. Other historians like Ann Hughes maintain that shires like Warwickshire were far from

overly inbred and unconcerned about national affairs. University, Inns of Court, as well as European trips would have given the gentry of shires with a wider appreciation of national affairs and the need for connections at court to further even the most modest of gentry ambitions, and the Cambridgeshire deputy lieutenants certainly shared many of these characteristics.

To that end, there are a number of factors that made the development of such a community impossible. The shire's geography, and history of separate legal and administrative set ups with the shire would have prohibited the idea of a community within the gentry. The fens of northern Cambridgeshire served as a natural barrier between the north and the south and it would not be until the great leveling of the fens in the later half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century that any inroads were made into the fens by outsiders. Further physical factors of the shire would prevent its development of a community. The relatively small and narrow size of the shire would naturally encourage links with the other East Anglian shires, as well as the course of the London to King's Lynn road, taking it strait through Cambridge, would naturally keep it informed of events both in London as well as in the Low Countries, which were a vital part of the cloth trade that was crucial to some areas of both Norfolk, Suffolk and Cambridgeshire. Even the mixed agricultural and economic pursuits of the various areas within Cambridgeshire would further serve to divide the area instead of uniting it into an inwardly looking community.

Also the separate legal and jurisdictional administration of Cambridgeshire and the Isle of Ely, which was only brought under the unified control of the Lieutenancy by Roger Lord North in the later half Elizabeth's reign, would serve to further divide the

shire. Also, the more difficult liberties of the town and university would keep tensions between town and countryside high, as well as promote further divisions between residents. The University would also bring in news from all over the country as the privileged sons of the peerage would come from all over the country and bringing news with them, as well as serving as a center for puritan learning which would at the very least keep the members of the Cambridgeshire gentry who studied there<sup>3</sup> informed or merely aware of the wider world and religious and academic thought within it.

Another further factor hindering the development of a community was the history of landholding within the shire. Following the dissolution of the monasteries, the land distributed by Henry VIII was leased or granted outright to courtiers<sup>4</sup> and other outsiders who then set up colleges and made bequests of land within the shire to universities, not only reducing the amount of freehold land available to the gentry, but also further placing the university at the center of difficulties between the shire and university due to the various liberties and ratings exemptions that the colleges held. The difficult relationship with the university and the shire is reflected further in the need to appoint specific deputy lieutenants who had strong ties to the university in order to increase the Lieutenancy's ability to control and govern the shire.

So, the historiographical picture of Cambridgeshire clearly shows the existence and widening of the court/country divide and narrowing of patronage around a close cadre of courtiers much to the detriment of the local gentry, as well as, the lack of a county

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<sup>3</sup> See chapter 2.

<sup>4</sup> The Wendy family, whose patriarch served as personal physician to Henry VIII profited greatly from the dissolution of the monasteries with lands in Cambridgeshire, but was never resident within the shire. VCH vol. 1-10, *passim*.

community due to a combination of natural factors as well as the wider awareness and involvement of the ruling elite of the shire.

### **Operational**

The effectiveness of the Cambridgeshire Lieutenancy was seen within its primary function and purpose as the head of the militia within the shire. During the reign of Charles I, the Lieutenancy would face major challenges following 20 years of the lax administration of James' I reign and his commitment to a diplomatic and passive course of international diplomacy. A new monarch brought an aggressive and interventionist course of foreign policy and with that course came the levies for men and money for England's involvement Thirty Years Wars and the Bishops Wars. The Lieutenancy's response to these demands from Charles I reflects both the Lieutenancy's strengths and weaknesses, as well as its attitude towards the crown and its policies, and the shire's willingness to provide men and money for the crown.

In terms of European involvement, the lax administration of James' administration left the lieutenancy ill equipped and unprepared for European warfare and unwilling to fully meet the demands of the crown especially when these demands went against the local interests that the lieutenancy had been protecting for so many years previous. The levies of a mere 350 men between 1625-28 for which Cambridgeshire was liable were modest in comparison to the demands placed on other shires, yet on a number of occasions, the men put forward were seriously lacking in military fitness as well as monetary support. The men were characterized as unserviceable by the king's own officers and sent without the necessary coat and conduct money, leaving other shire's deputy lieutenants, namely Essex and Suffolk, to make the numbers complete as well

as levy the additional funds to make up for the shortfall from Cambridgeshire upon reaching their places of billeting.

This could be an indication of a lack of support within Cambridgeshire for the crown's European involvement which would cause them to give lukewarm support for policies, but more likely is the fact that the deputy lieutenants were protecting their local interests by sending cheaper, less equipped men and delaying the collection of both the privy seal loan, benevolence as well as the forced loan, complying with the crown's demands eventually but not with any pace so as to not overly burden the shire. This course would have ensured the deputies would be able to protect their local standing by not showing whole-hearted support for Charles' unpopular fiscal innovations while not drawing serious recriminations from the crown or the council.

The earl of Huntingdon in Leicestershire showed the dangers to a peer's local standing by fully supporting the Caroline regime at the expense of his locality.

Cambridgeshire was lucky to escape the uproar and serious challenges to these policies, but this can not be solely attributed to the control of the deputy lieutenants or a supposed peaceful nature of the shire, as Cambridgeshire was lucky to escape the truly onerous tasks of billeting of troops for long periods of time during the European involvement, as well as not being subject to martial law, or having men imprisoned without just cause, as a few other shires had to during the times of unrest following these novel fiscal innovations leading to the showdown in Parliament and Charles' forced acceptance of the Petition of Right.

The next call for men and money would come nearly a decade later after spending much of the Personal Rule recovering their lost goodwill and avoiding the rigors of

the exact militia program and peacetime mustering. The deputy lieutenants of Cambridgeshire were called upon again to produce for the crown, but this time for domestic defense in the form of the Bishops Wars, and under a number of extenuating circumstances that would attempt to make this round of levies much more difficult to perform. For the Bishops Wars, Cambridgeshire responded by producing 800 men, 80 horse and £2430 in the short span of fourteen months on time and in full, a truly massive achievement given the set of circumstances it was performed under and the given the performance of many of the neighboring shires. The commission not only lost the lord lieutenant in June 1640, but it also in previous years lost such long serving stalwarts like Sir John Carleton, and Sir John Peyton. In their place, the addition of relatively youthful and inexperienced deputy lieutenants in the persons of Sir Thomas Chicheley, Sir John Cotton and Sir William Allington (all of whom were of the ruling elite and therefore this place was their birthright once of age) sought to make up for the lost influence and experience, and as the performance of the lieutenancy shows, these men performed exemplary while other shires in the country were failing to produce less than half of the crown's requests for men and money, not to mention, descending into chaos, riots and the eventual collapse of the Lieutenancy.

This is not to say that Cambridgeshire was not without disorder or strife. Disputes and violence over the Earl of Bedford's plans for draining of the fens created widespread protests and violence not just in Cambridgeshire, but all across Huntingdon, Suffolk, and Lincoln as well. The collection of ship money in the inland counties again was met with violence and protests, and once again Cambridgeshire was not alone in these problems either. Although the deputy lieutenants of Cambridgeshire were not directly charged with the administration and collection of

such levies, due to the dismal failure of the collections of the 1620's, the influence and authority that the deputy lieutenants possessed within the shire was so great that when they were called into service in aid of these tasks, either as sheriff<sup>5</sup> or in suppression of the subsequent riots as deputy lieutenants, they were able to collect ship money in full and on time, in better numbers than any of the surrounding counties,<sup>6</sup> as well as prevent the spread or further occurrence of riots within the shire. In short, they were able to perform the most unpleasant tasks and force compliance from their neighbors in a way that future sheriffs, or collection officers were unable to do, and it is this ability to compel action and obedience, which made them so effective as deputy lieutenants.

However, there is evidence that the workload and the coercion necessary to perform these tasks was taking its toll on the deputy lieutenants, like it was on so many other commissions across the country. Upon the death the earl of Suffolk, in a letter to Lord General Northumberland, the deputy lieutenants of Cambridgeshire blandly explained that they were not going to continue with the levy, as they had no authority to do so and asked the Lord General "not to conceive this to proceed from any negligence towards the king's service or disrespect to your Lordship", but they had no further authority to act but under their commission from the earl of Suffolk which was now expired upon his death. Suffolk deputies also wrote similar letters upon the earl's death as well, but offered to keep working to the best of their ability under their authority as JP's but that their authority was limited. The privy council quickly moved to rectify the situation authorizing them to act with full authority of the office of deputy lieutenant by his Majesty's special command, and despite the wrangling and

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<sup>5</sup> Sir John Carleton in 1636, and Sir Thomas Chicheley in 1637.

<sup>6</sup> See Chapter 4.

clear desire to avoid pressing their neighbors further, upon hearing back from the council, they produced the levy in full, a mere two weeks behind the proposed date. This would be the final constructive achievement of the lieutenancy within the shire, as all the good will built up with the shire was now exhausted and the distasteful nature of the job and its effects on them who relied on their social standing within the shire to perform the lieutenancy's functions, had seen it eroded week by week to its final point of collapse.

That being said, despite the difficulty of the tasks asked of them and the growing discontent with Charles and his fiscal innovations, even within the lieutenancies of other shires, there was only one confirmed parliamentarian who served on the lieutenancy commissions of Cambridgeshire; Sir Edward Peyton. Peyton's reasons for their siding with Parliament were obvious. He had been a long time critic of the crown and its religious policy and difficult member of the Commons. Of the remaining members of the commission, a number of them did not survive long enough to have a declared allegiance or tried to remain out of politics altogether. Of the men who were declared royalists, and survived to the Restoration, Chicheley, Allington, and Cotton, all had their estates suffer heavily but upon Restoration obtained titles and the restoration of wealth that their loyalty had deserved.

### **Final Analysis**

Therefore, Cambridgeshire under Charles I represents a shire whose gentry were becoming increasingly divided from court as well as a diverse county, disparate, and outwardly looking possessing a well informed gentry with financial and cultural interests outside the shire. With regards to the day to day operation of the militia of

the shire, it was overseen by a lord lieutenant who took little or no active participation in the management of the shire's militia, instead leaving the details to his deputies who represented a group of core families who had been involved in the governance of the shire for at least a century prior to the rule of Charles I, with significant land holdings and ancient lineages within the shire, or intimate relations with one or both of the problematic liberties within the shire.

Working in the lieutenancy's favor was the fact that because of the university's presence as well as the Isle of Ely, the amount of freehold land was lessened and that the number of wealthy gentry resident in the shire was lower than in other shires of similar size, and following the death of Roger Lord North, the shire was without the services of a resident peer, but instead of creating a fight for power and influence, it left a gentry that banded together to keep faction and strife down.<sup>7</sup> Consequently there was an absence of the discord that plagued the operations of shires like Leicester and Somerset, where competing gentry, all squabbling for power and influence severely retarded the smooth operation of the militia and local government. All of the men on the commission had wealth and influence, far and away above the other resident gentry but not far enough away from one another to cause conflict or divisions. In fact, the Lieutenancy and its members seemed to exclude those who did not fit into the moderate and tolerant mold of the commission. Sir Edward Peyton's family had been resident at Isleham since the 14c. with substantial holdings and familial history to place him in the ruling elite, but it was his difficult and intractable personality which was demonstrated in his literature and dealings with the

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<sup>7</sup> As was the case for Suffolk following the execution of the duke of Norfolk under Elizabeth I, leaving a huge power vacuum in East Anglia, to which the gentry responded by banding together to keep faction and strife down. Diarmaid MacCulloch, *Suffolk and the Tudors : politics and religion in an English county, 1500-1600* (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1986), passim.

government which kept him off the lieutenancy for much of his life. His lone inclusion on the commission can be accounted for by the earlier death of his cousin, Sir John Peyton, and the one year hiatus of Sir John Carleton to serve as sheriff for Cambridgeshire. That one instance aside, the commission worked for balance, stability and placed the shire's interests first but not at the expense of the crown. Repeatedly, the deputy lieutenants either delayed or dodged onerous policies of the government in favor of the shire as shown in the lukewarm response to the Thirty Years Wars, the exact militia campaign, as well as the program of peacetime mustering. However, when crucial demands came from the government, the Cambridgeshire lieutenancy was there in full and on time to support the crown because of localist path in the previous years which had given them the credibility and authority to command the residents of the shire in a way that other deputies in other shires were unable to do, leading to the eventual collapse of the lieutenancy in certain areas while Cambridgeshire was able to function effectively. The Cambridgeshire Lieutenancy performed exactly as the office was intended to despite serious obstacles which the deputies had to overcome, but in the end, it was the previous century's ruling elite which formed the core of the Lieutenancy and gave them the knowledge and social prestige to hold local government and social order together while other shires were descending into the chaos of the English Civil War. Yet even this had to eventually run out and with the sitting of Long Parliament, the Lieutenancy was dead, not just in Cambridgeshire, but all across the country, it had ceased to be a viable and functioning entity. From that point, the ruling elite in Cambridgeshire had lost the trust and confidence of the shire and was no longer able to hold order as the shire spiraled into Parliamentary territory and as part of the Eastern Alliance in the Civil War.

## Cambridgeshire Lord Lieutenants

	1626	1627	1628	1629	1630	1631	1632	1633	1634	1635	1636	1637	1638	1639	1640
Sir Thomas Howard <b>1st earl of Suffolk</b>															
Sir Theophilus Howard <b>2nd earl of Suffolk</b>															
Sir William Maynard <b>1st Lord of Estaines and Turrin</b>															



indicates time served as a deputy lieutenant for Cambridgeshire

## **Lord Lieutenants Biographical Background**

**North Family:** Upon his first appointment as lord lieutenant for Cambridgeshire in 1569, Roger Lord North was simply following in his father's footsteps of service to the crown and influence both at court and in the countryside. Edward, Lord North (c. 1504-1564), the sole son of a merchant and haberdasher, native to Nottinghamshire, was born in the London Parish of St. Michael-le-Querne. Upon his father's death at the age of four, he entered St. Paul's School where he studied with future fellow councilors William Paget and Thomas Wriothesley, and later may have matriculated at Peterhouse, Cambridge<sup>1</sup> before being admitted to Lincoln's Inn on 1 July 1522. North then came to the attention of Sir Brian Tuke, treasurer of the chamber, and in February 1531, he joined Tuke as clerk of Parliament. He also worked for Thomas Cromwell and benefited from his influence to succeed Sir Thomas Pope as treasurer of the court of augmentations where he was charged with handling the substantial income generated by the dissolution of the monasteries. A knighthood followed in January 1542 and in 1544 he was named as joint chancellor of augmentations with Sir Richard Rich, who died 3 months later, leaving Lord North the head of the largest of royal revenue courts.<sup>2</sup>

Although a native of London, North purchased Kirltling manor<sup>3</sup> of Cambridgeshire in 1533 and quickly ingrained himself into county affairs as a JP in 1536 and becoming

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<sup>1</sup> This point cannot be proven, but based on a latter bequest to Peterhouse and subsequent children being sent there seems to support the idea.

<sup>2</sup>ODNB, Edward North, pg 84-85.

<sup>3</sup> In addition to his Cambridgeshire estates, he purchased the Charterhouse in London in April 1545, which is notable because it passes to the Howard family and the 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk via the 4<sup>th</sup> duke of Norfolk.

one of the leading gentlemen in his adoptive shire. In 1542 he served as sheriff for Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire, as well as representing the shire in the parliaments of 1542, 1547 and March 1553. During this time he actively speculated on monastic lands and profited greatly from his offices, even being summoned before Henry VIII to defend his financial dealings, but seemed to suffer no ill effects from the charge after his clearance as he was named an executor of Henry's will who bequeathed him £300. Edward was admitted to the privy council by Protector Somerset in March of 1547, and despite some initial lack of support of Mary's claim to the throne<sup>4</sup>, he was elevated to the peerage in April 1554 as 1<sup>st</sup> Baron North although he did not return to the council. He continued to be active in court affairs and serving on numerous important commissions, including one mysterious service where Lord North allegedly approached a poor London woman on the behalf of the council in an effort to purchase her newborn son to pose as the desperately desired prince during the queen's phantom pregnancy in June 1555.<sup>5</sup>

The death of Mary seems to signal the end to Edward, Lord North's court life. North continued to entertain Elizabeth on a number of occasions at the Charterhouse<sup>6</sup>, yet he was never to return to the council, and despite many visits to his London home; Lord North spent the remaining years at his Cambridgeshire estates. Edward, Lord North died on 31 December 1564 leaving his eldest son Roger to succeed to the title.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> North initially backed the attempt by the duke of Northumberland to place Lady Jane Grey on the throne in July 1553.

<sup>5</sup> ODNB, Edward North, pg 84-85.

<sup>6</sup> Upon her arrival in London following her accession in Nov 1558, Elizabeth I lodged for five days at the Charterhouse as the guest of Lord North, and again in July of 1561 for several days.

<sup>7</sup> One of the supervisors of his will was the Duke of Norfolk. It would be the duke's second son, Thomas Howard who would succeed his son in the Lieutenancy for Cambridgeshire as well as residence in the Charterhouse in London, sold in 1564, later renamed Howard House. ODNB, Edward North, pg 84-85.

Roger, 2<sup>nd</sup> Lord North was born on 27 February 1531 in the parish of St Thomas the Apostle in London. He was the first child in a family of two sons and two daughters, and went on to become the leading nobleman and sole resident peer within Cambridgeshire, as well as dominate county politics for decades. He was a successful courtier and diplomat, but spent more of his time and effort on county affairs rather than matters at court. Like his father and his brothers, it is probable that he spent some of his early years at Peterhouse, Cambridge. Although there is no evidence of this, the fact that his father was a benefactor of the college (having left the rectory of Ellington in Huntingdonshire to Peterhouse, Cambridge), and sent his own sons there suggests that he spent some time there. Again following in his father's educational footsteps he was admitted to Lincoln's Inn on 4 November 1542, and appears to have been introduced at court from an early age, serving as a page of honor or learning to joust, a sport at which he excelled. He married well in 1547 to the daughter of Richard Rich, 1<sup>st</sup> Baron Rich, with whom Edward, Lord North was named joint chancellor of augmentations in 1544.<sup>8</sup>

Lord North made good use of his father's position at court as well as his own ambition so that by the time he succeeded his father as 2<sup>nd</sup> Lord North, he had already begun to compile an impressive political career. At the age of 24, he was elected the senior knight of the shire for Cambridgeshire to the Parliament of 1555; he was created a knight of the Bath at Elizabeth's coronation, as well as being returned again to Parliament in 1559 and 1563. He also was appointed to the chamber in 1558 and named JP for Cambridgeshire for the year 1558-9. Although he spent much of the first five years of Elizabeth's reign at court, six months following his father's death,

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<sup>8</sup> There is a portrait of the youthful North dressed, unusually, for a tournament with a scarf of red silk tied around his left arm, which Princess Elizabeth is traditionally said to have affixed. ODNB, Roger North, pgs 111-113.

he sold the Charterhouse in London to Thomas Howard, 4th duke of Norfolk, then retreated to his Cambridgeshire estate of Kirtling and began to focus his energies on local government.<sup>9</sup>

As the sole resident peer, his influence on local government was strong. He became the Lord Lieutenant for Cambridgeshire in 1569<sup>10</sup> and high steward for Cambridge in 1572. He was also made *custos rotulorum* of the Cambridge bench in 1573 and JP for Isle of Ely in 1579. It was during this time that he also clashed frequently with university and bishop Cox of Ely.<sup>11</sup> North proved an energetic and skillful administrator in all areas of county business and cultivated a personal relationship with the Queen that saw him used in a number of diplomatic missions on behalf of the crown. In 1567 he was sent as special ambassador with Thomas Radcliffe, 3<sup>rd</sup> earl of Sussex, on an embassy to Vienna to invest Emperor Maximilian II with the Order of the Garter. He was also sent to Lyons in the fall of 1574 with letters of congratulations to Henri III on his accession following the death of Charles IX. It is also possible that he was sent with Francis Walsingham to France in 1570 in an attempt to secure greater toleration for the Huguenots. North was also able to continue his long standing friendship with Elizabeth by lavishly entertaining her during her progress through East Anglia in the summer of 1578, calculating that the two day visit cost him £762 including a gift of jewelry worth £120. He also presented her with an annual new year's gift of £10 of gold in a silken purse, as well as often

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<sup>9</sup> ODNB, Roger North, 111-113; VCH vol. 10, pgs63-69.

<sup>10</sup> The commission was not meant to be permanent and expired a year after the date of the commission as per the queens orders. J. C. Sainty, "Lieutenants of Counties 1585-1642, "Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research: Special Supplement #8," (May 1970), 2-15.

<sup>11</sup> Eugene J. Bourgeois, "The Queen, a Bishop, and a Peer," 3-15.

recording in his accounts the amounts he lost to Elizabeth playing cards, one such entry totaled £32.<sup>12</sup>

Along with the social connections and long pedigree, Lord North had extensive military experience unlike some of the lord lieutenants of his day. He served with the earl of Leicester in the Netherlands with the English forces sent to assist the Dutch rebels in their fight against Phillip II. Despite being fifty-four years old and that Leicester did not have a post for him, the queen had ordered him to go and he was forced to serve without pay. Although he was viewed by some as one of Leicester's chief cronies, he behaved with great bravery and valor in the summer of 1586 after suffering a wound to the knee from a musket shot at the battle of Sutphen. Upon hearing that the enemy was once again engaged, he had himself carried to a horse and went back into battle 'with one boot on and one boot off...'. North went on to serve in a number of other campaigns displaying similar capabilities and valor including a number of months under Perigrine Bertie, 13<sup>th</sup> Baron Willoughby de Eresby, who recommended North as one of the four men best suited to replace him as captain-general. However, defense of the realm called him back to Cambridgeshire where he was obliged as lord lieutenant of Cambridgeshire to begin defensive preparations for the anticipated Spanish Invasion, and during the Armada commanded part of the queen's bodyguards accompanying her to Tilbury. Despite his failing health and increasing deafness, he was made a privy councilor and treasurer of the household by his old card-playing companion on 30 August 1596. This good news was quickly followed by tragedy as his elder son died on 5 June 1597, leaving as heir his grandson Dudley North who was only seventeen at the time of his succession as 3<sup>rd</sup> Lord North,

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<sup>12</sup> F. Bushby, *Three Men of the Tudor Time*, pg. 105.

leaving the crown in need of a peer capable of assuming the power vacuum left by the death of Roger, Lord North on 3 December 1600.<sup>13</sup>

**Howard Family: 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> earls of Suffolk:** The Howard family was not new to East Anglian politics and therefore was the natural choice to succeed the North family in the absence of a peer residing in Cambridgeshire. Thomas Howard was the 2<sup>nd</sup> son of the 4<sup>th</sup> Duke of Norfolk who along with his grandfather, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Duke of Norfolk had dominated East Anglian politics during the 16<sup>th</sup> century and had been among the most powerful peers in the realm. Despite being based in Norfolk, the Howard family had long ties to Cambridgeshire and the North family, even serving as one of the supervisors to Edward, Lord North's will. The 3<sup>rd</sup> duke of Norfolk was a powerful regional magnate, the controller of parliamentary boroughs in Norfolk and Sussex, and the wealthiest English peer of his time. He profited greatly from service under Henry VIII and speculation on monastic lands in Norfolk and Suffolk, as well as putting himself at the center of court politics by marrying two of his nieces, Anne Boleyn and Katherine Howard, to the king. Despite being attainted by statute on 27 January 1547, and his estates heavily plundered, the accession of Mary brought a return to favor, office and wealth. Throughout his career, Norfolk served the crown as a soldier and exhibited boldness and bravery, as well as tact in dealing with not only the Scots or the French, but also with revolts at home.<sup>14</sup>

Following from his father's, Henry Howard, styled Earl of Surrey, execution for treason in 1547; Thomas Howard III became heir and ascended to the title on 25

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<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* 121; ODNB, Roger North, 111-113.

<sup>14</sup> ODNB, Thomas Howard, 3<sup>rd</sup> duke of Norfolk, pg 423-29.

august 1554. The young earl was still a minor at the time of inheritance of the title of the 4<sup>th</sup> duke of Norfolk, and as such his inherited estates, including some fifty-six manors, were held by the crown until he came of age. An Act of Parliament forwarded by the Lord Chancellor, the earl of Arundel (Norfolk's father-in-law) and the bishop of Ely gave Norfolk the right to his estates as a minor and was made into law in October of 1555. Norfolk spent much of his early years in public service, ceremonial duties and activities at court as well as compiling an impressive list of offices and honors. As earl marshal he was head of the College of Arms, elected high steward of Cambridge in 1554 and in 1558 he was appointed lord lieutenant for Norfolk and Suffolk. Although he was made lieutenant-general of the north in 1559 in an attempt to remove French political and military presence from Scotland, he was reluctant to take part and showed none of the zeal for military affairs like his grandfather. His role was a showy but limited one, and he played very little part in military operations. Norfolk instead displayed a marked preference for the country over the court. Along with the time he spent enlarging his Norwich residence, the untimely death of his first wife following the birth of his first son, Phillip Howard (who was to become the earl of Arundel in 1580) allowed him to marry his cousin Margaret Dudley who was the widow of Lord Henry Dudley and sole heir of Thomas, Lord Audley of Walden. Margaret brought a rich inheritance, including Audley End<sup>15</sup> in Essex, into the Howard Family. He also enlarged the Charterhouse in London, renaming it Howard House, after purchasing it from Lord North in 1564.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> The Title and manor of Audley End would both come to figure in the future of Norfolk's second son and grandson following his attainder and execution, as they would go on to assume the name and title and carry on the Howard name at court and within the lieutenancy.

<sup>16</sup> ODNB, Thomas Howard, 4<sup>th</sup> duke of Norfolk, pg 429-36.

Norfolk by virtue of his wealth and position was the protector and patron of the East Anglian gentry network, as well as patron for eighteen borough seats in the Commons for the counties of Norfolk and Suffolk. He was appointed privy councilor in November of 1562 along with Robert Dudley, and jostled for places at court with not only Dudley, created earl of Leicester in 1564, but also William Cecil. While at home on the tennis court at Norwich, Norfolk was a 'king in his country' and it was this status as England's wealthiest and most eligible peer<sup>17</sup> of the realm which led him into attainder and execution on 2 June 1572 for his treasonous involvement in the unsuccessful marriage to Mary, Queen of Scots. His execution as well as the attainder of his eldest son, Phillip, earl of Arundel, left Thomas Howard at the head of the family. Despite being the second son of the 4<sup>th</sup> Duke of Norfolk, Thomas Howard was able to continue the family's heavy involvement at court as well as in East Anglian local government. Thomas Howard apparently spent a short time at St John's College, Cambridge, was later granted honorific admission to Gray's Inn on 2 February 1598, then in 1605 was created MA at Cambridge. He also inherited the estate of Saffron Walden and other properties from his maternal grandfather upon his mother's death on 10 January 1564, but it wasn't until he was restored in blood as Lord Thomas Howard in December of 1584 that his star began to rise.<sup>18</sup>

Thomas Howard showed much of his great grandfather's zest for military service when he captained the *Golden Lion* in the fleet fending off the Spanish Armada. He was knighted on the *Ark* on 26 July 1588 by his cousin Charles Howard, Lord Howard of Effingham, following the decisive attack on Calais. In May 1596, he was admiral of the third squadron in the fleet sent against Cadiz, and upon his return he was

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<sup>17</sup> On 10 January 1564, childbirth again took the life of his second wife but not before she bore him another son, Thomas Howard, Lord Howard de Walden and later earl of Suffolk.

<sup>18</sup> ODNB, Thomas Howard, 4<sup>th</sup> duke of Norfolk, pg 429-36.

created knight of the Garter on 23 April 1597. It was his ability and courage which commended him to the favor of the queen, who in letters to Lord Essex referred to him as 'good Thomas'.<sup>19</sup> On 5 December 1597 he was summoned to Parliament as Baron Howard de Walden, as well as an admiral of a fleet on 10 August 1599, and constable of the Tower of London on 13 February 1601. He was also sworn high steward of Cambridge University in that same month. In recognition of his East Anglian estates, he was appointed lord lieutenant for Cambridgeshire and the Isle of Ely from 17 July 1602, following the death of Roger, Lord North. Further office followed as Thomas, Lord Howard de Walden, became acting lord chamberlain of the royal household in December of 1602 and continued the tradition of lavishly entertaining Elizabeth at Howard House, formerly the Charterhouse in January 1603.<sup>20</sup>

James I immediately favored Howard, and 4 May 1603, while on his way south from Berwick, made him a privy councilor and appointed lord chamberlain of the household on the following day, a post he would hold until 10 July 1614. He was created 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk on 21 July 1603 and made one of the commissioners for making knights of the Bath at the coronation of the king and queen four days later. Thomas's star was rising at court as he was named joint commissioner for the office of earl marshal of England, as well as joint commissioner to expel Jesuits, seminary and other priests both in 1604. In the following year, he helped discover the Gunpowder plot,<sup>21</sup> as well as having the lord lieutenancy of Suffolk added to

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<sup>19</sup> CSP Domestic 1595-7, p453; ODNB, Thomas Howard, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk, pg. 436-39.

<sup>20</sup> Not only had his father the 4<sup>th</sup> Duke of Norfolk done it, but Roger Lord North had done it there as the previous owner of the house on two separate occasions.

<sup>21</sup> After receipt of an anonymous letter at Whitehall, Suffolk as Lord Chamberlain conducted a tour of inspection of the palace of Westminster to ensure that all was ready for the opening of parliament, where he spotted a large pile of brushwood. Upon further investigation by Suffolk's brother-in-law Sir

Cambridgeshire on 18 July 1605, and by the autumn of the same year, it was clear that Suffolk had emerged as one of the king's most trusted privy councilors.<sup>22</sup>

In the following years he continued to accumulate offices at court being named as captain of the band of gentlemen pensioners in November 1605<sup>23</sup>, as well as, councilor of Wales in 1608, high steward of Ipswich on 6 June 1609, and joint lord lieutenant of Dorset and town of Poole on 5 July 1611. Following the death of Salisbury, he was one of four commissioners the king entrusted the treasury to on 16 June 1612, and was to become sole lord lieutenant of Dorset on 19 February 1613. Upon the death of his uncle, Sir Henry Howard, earl of Northampton, Suffolk was elected chancellor of the University of Cambridge on 8 July 1614, and even prevailed upon the king to visit the university in March 1615. Suffolk was reported to have spent £1000 a day on hospitality staying at St. John's College, while his wife hosted receptions at Magdalene, a college founded by Suffolk's grandfather Lord Audley. On 11 July 1614, Suffolk reached his peak at court when he was made lord high treasurer of England and formally held the office until 19 July 1619.<sup>24</sup>

Howard also looked to extend his families influence through marriage. He linked the Howard and Cecil families earlier in 1608 by marrying Salisbury's son and heir, William to his third daughter Catherine. Also, his eldest daughter, Frances Howard desired a divorce from Robert Devereux, 3<sup>rd</sup> earl of Essex, so that she may marry Scottish royal favorite Sir Robert Carr. The marriage took place in December of 1613

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Thomas Knyvett, keeper of the palace, the barrels of gunpowder were discovered. Suffolk subsequently served as one of the commissioners who investigated the conspiracy as well as tried the plotters on 27 January 1606. ODNB, Thomas Suffolk, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk, pg 438.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid*, pgs 436-39.

<sup>23</sup> Following the downfall of the earl of Northumberland, Suffolk was allowed to hand over the office to his son Theophilus on 11 July 1614.

<sup>24</sup> ODNB, Thomas Howard, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk, pg. 436-39.

to the newly created earl of Somerset who almost immediately succeeded his father-in-law as lord chamberlain, and it appeared that the extended Howard family now again dominated the court. But like his father and great grandfather, Howard was to reach the heights of court only to suffer a fall from grace. By August 1615, James I was already beginning to favor George Villiers, the future duke of Buckingham. Also, his son-in-law lost his status at court following the couples implication and subsequent conviction for the murder of Sir Thomas Overbury.<sup>25</sup> Determined attempts were made to implicate Thomas, Lord Suffolk in the Overbury's poisoning and James even accused Suffolk of attempting to suppress the initial investigation of the scandal. However, he would escape the scandal and continue as lord treasurer but only for a short time as grave irregularities were discovered at the treasury, and Howard was suspended from his office in the fall of 1618.<sup>26</sup>

Suffolk was accused of having embezzled large sums of money collected from the Dutch for the cautionary towns, as well as defrauding the king of £240,000 in jewels and extorting money from the king's subjects. Lady Suffolk was charged with extorting money from person having business at the treasury when it emerged that creditors owed money by the crown found themselves badgered by Lady Suffolk, and large bribes were necessary before payment was made out of the exchequer. As allegations mounted, Suffolk was removed as lord treasurer on 19 July 1619 and prosecuted with his wife and a fellow exchequer official, Sir John Bingley, for

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<sup>25</sup> He was a friend and adviser to Robert Carr, the earl of Essex, an Oxford acquaintance. The two quarreled violently when Overbury disapproved of Carr's marriage to Frances Howard. Overbury's hostility was so marked that the Howard family brought pressure to bear, and James I had Overbury imprisoned in the Tower, where he was slowly poisoned. Carr and Frances Howard were convicted of his murder. Their lives were spared by the king, but they were imprisoned in the Tower and freed in January 1622 and would never return to court.

<sup>26</sup> ODNB Thomas Howard, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk, pg. 436-39.

corruption in the court of Star Chamber.<sup>27</sup> On 13 November 1619, they were found guilty on all counts, fined £30,000, commanded to restore all the money wrongfully extorted, and sentenced to be imprisoned apart in the Tower at the king's pleasure.<sup>28</sup>

After only ten days in the Tower, they were released, but not without paying a heavy price. After initial attempts to avoid the fine by pleading poverty and signing over large parts of his estates to his son-in-law, the earl of Salisbury, Suffolk made a humble submission and promise to pay the entire fine, after being threatened with another Star Chamber bill despite being over £50,000 in debt. Suffolk was not the only one who suffered from this. Both of his sons, Theophilus, Lord Howard de Walden (future 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk) and Sir Thomas Howard were dismissed from their places at court. It was only after Buckingham had been convinced that the Howard family interests at court had been thoroughly destroyed, that he arranged an audience and in February of 1620, where Suffolk was allowed to kiss the king's hand and have his fine lowered to £7000 which James ordered to pay the debts of a Scottish courtier, Lord Haddington. Suffolk would never return to high office at court, but he retained his chancellorship of Cambridge and his lord lieutenancies in Cambridge, Suffolk and Dorset, as well as being reappointed to the offices by Charles I in 1625. Suffolk attempted to return to favor in 1623 by arranging the marriage of his seventh son to the daughter of a Buckingham client, but to little avail. It would however prove beneficial to his son, Theophilus Howard, 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk, as he would become a friend and client of Buckingham in the years after Thomas Howard's fall

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<sup>27</sup> They were prosecuted under five headings: fraud in jewels, indirect dealing concerning the ordnance, abuse in the alum works, misemployment of the king's treasure, and extortion upon the subjects.

<sup>28</sup> ODNB Thomas Howard, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk, pg. 436-39.

from office and bring back some of the families lost influence at court, yet the Howard family would never again reach the heights of previous generations.<sup>29</sup>

Despite all his offices, Suffolk's lifestyle at court nearly bankrupted him numerous times. He was saved from financial ruin by the accession of James I, the re-grant of some of the sequestered Howard estates, as well as the timely deaths of various relatives, most notably, his uncle Henry, Lord Northampton in 1614 who left him his luxurious London home, Charing Cross. This was to be later known as Suffolk House under his son and heir Theophilus, and replace the Charterhouse that Suffolk had been forced to sell in 1611. Not only did he live an extravagant lifestyle at court, but he built extensively upon his estates<sup>30</sup> as well as secure his eleven children with advantageous matches, further encumbered his estates. At the time of his death on 28 May 1626, Suffolk had never been able to clear his debts, rumored to be near £50,000, leaving his heir Theophilus Howard, 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk, seriously encumbered with financial difficulties.<sup>31</sup>

Theophilus Howard was baptized on 13 August 1584 at Saffron Walden, Essex. Educationally, he followed in his families footsteps by matriculating at Magdalene College, Cambridge but did not graduate and was created MA at Cambridge in 1605 and was admitted to Gray's Inn in March 1606. Much like Roger, Lord North, the Howard family's prominence at court assured Theophilus' success there, along with his constant presence at masques and jousts. It was a tilt in honor of Henry, prince of

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<sup>29</sup> ODNB Thomas Howard, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk, pg. 436-39.

<sup>30</sup> He built Audley End in Essex, begun in 1603 and finished in 1616, it was easily the largest private house in England and Suffolk told the king that including all the furniture, it had cost him £200,000, although that sum seems exaggerated. He also added a front wing fronting the Thames to Charring Cross, later renamed Suffolk House. The upkeep alone on both homes would become a serious financial burden in the future.

<sup>31</sup> ODNB, Thomas Howard, 1<sup>st</sup> earl of Suffolk, pg. 436-39.

Wales which won him high praise: “the Lord Walden [his courtesy title] carried away the reputation for bravery that day”. Offices soon followed as he was carried along with his father’s rise at court. He was named lieutenant of the band of gentleman pensioners in 1605 and the following year he received a joint stewardship of several royal manors in Wales. Along with other prominent courtiers, he had an interest in colonization and in 1609 became a member of the council of the Virginia Company and in 1612 was a charter member of the North-West Passage Company. He was returned as MP for the borough of Maldon, Essex on 4 November 1605 and served there until on 8 February 1610 when he was summoned to the upper house as Baron Howard de Walden. He was named governor of Jersey and Castle Cornet on 26 March 1610, and later in the same year he served as a volunteer with the English forces at the siege of Juliers in which he engaged in a notable quarrel with Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbry. It was apparently after a drunken argument that Walden was challenged to a duel; however the authorities prevented the fight. In 1611 Walden became keeper in reversion of the Tower of Greenwich on 2 July 1611, keeper of Greenwich Park shortly thereafter. In March of 1612, Walden married Lady Elizabeth Home, a daughter of the George Home, earl of Dunbar, who was a strong regional power in the borders, and it was most likely this match that secured him his first lord lieutenancy in 1614 for the counties of Cumberland, Northumberland and Westmorland. Walden served jointly with Francis Clifford, 4<sup>th</sup> earl of Cumberland (1607-1639), Henry, Lord Clifford (1618-1639), Algernon Percy, 4<sup>th</sup> Earl of Northumberland (1632-1639) and Henry Howard, Lord Maltravers (1632-1639). In that same year, he was also promoted to captain of the gentleman pensioners.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Sainty 15-16; ODNB, *Theophilus Howard, 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk*, pg. 419-20.

Although Walden survived the scandal which ensnared his sister Frances and her husband, the earl of Somerset, he was unable to hold his places at court following the fall of his father as he was stripped of his captaincy of the band of gentlemen pensioners. However, Walden was able to hold onto his lieutenancies in Westmorland, Northumberland, and Cumberland so the damage of his father's fall was limited and as it turns out, relatively brief. Following his father's submission to James I, and the reinforcement of Buckingham's supremacy as court favorite, Walden was able to use a burgeoning relationship with Buckingham to regain command of the gentlemen pensioners as well as have Buckingham stand as godfather to Walden's son in January 1620. Given the loss of his father's influence at court, Walden would need to find another supporter to further his career, and he found that in Buckingham. Evidence of such a relationship is found in a letter from Walden to Buckingham in 1623 where Walden expresses his desire to serve by saying "...it is the part of every friend to pay your Lordship the tribute of their pens in testimony of a further desire to do you service..." as well as pleading his case for advancement by asking Buckingham "...to present my most humble service to the prince" and finally signs the letter "your Lordships affectionate kinsman and humble servant."<sup>33</sup> Walden's pleading and submission did not go unrewarded, and his close connections to Buckingham would ensure that he remained a force at court.

Following his father's death in 1626, Walden not only assumed the title, 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk, but also was named to the privy council<sup>34</sup> as well as the lieutenancies of Cambridge, Suffolk, and Dorset, as well as his earlier lieutenancies in Cumberland,

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<sup>33</sup> BL Stowe MS 743, fo. 46; ODNB, Theophilus Howard, 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk, pg. 419-20.

<sup>34</sup> Suffolk's seat on the council was believed by some to be the result of the king's need for reliable and loyal peers to press the forced loan forward, a job that Suffolk worked hard at and performed well.

Northumberland and Westmorland. He also became the high steward of Ipswich and was awarded Order of the Garter in 1627. In 1628 Suffolk stood with the king as godfather to Buckingham's son and heir, and as a reward for his friendship, Buckingham resigned his place as Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports in favor of Suffolk, and also appointed him constable of Dover Castle. It was however, the death of Buckingham that marked a turning point for Suffolk. The loss of his friend and patron as well as his failing health and ruinous financial situation began to take its toll. Despite having an income of over £10,000 a year, including the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports which brought in an estimated £1700 a year, Suffolk's debts continued to mount reaching a total over £130,000 by 1640. Just like his father, Suffolk was unable to control his extravagance at court, losing £1500 at bowls in a single day, and as a result he was forced to sell land worth more than £36,000 to remain solvent. Suffolk was unable to maintain his father's massive mansion at Audley End, and therefore, spent all his time either at Suffolk House in London (formerly Charring Cross) or at Lulworth Castle in Dorset. By 1635, Suffolk health had been in decline for a number of years<sup>35</sup> and he had given up his court offices, but retained his lieutenancies as well as remained Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports. He spent his final years staving off financial ruin with little success. He died at Suffolk House in London on 2 June 1640 at the age of fifty-five and was succeeded by James Howard, 3<sup>rd</sup> earl of Suffolk. As a mark of how much the family's fortunes had diminished, James was only able to retain the lieutenancy for Suffolk out of the six counties that his father had held and was unable to keep the Lord Wardenship of the Cinque Ports either, epitomizing the fall of a once powerful family clinging to the

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
<sup>35</sup> He was excused on numerous occasions from attending functions of the Order of the Garter, first in 1633, and again in 1635, and 1637 due to ill health.

lieutenancy as a singular shred of royal favor and status. Subsequent years saw the loss of more land and estates including Lulworth Castle in Dorset.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Bodleian Library, Carte MS 123 fo.20-22. ODNB, Theophilus Howard, 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk, pg. 419-20.

# Howard Family Lieutenantcy Influence under Charles I



-  Shires Directly Controlled by 2<sup>nd</sup> earl of Suffolk
-  Shires Controlled by Blood Relatives of 2<sup>nd</sup> Earl of Suffolk
-  Shires Controlled by husbands of sisters or daughters of 2<sup>nd</sup> Earl of Suffolk

## Cambridgeshire Deputy Lieutenants

	1626	1627	1628	1629	1630	1631	1632	1633	1634	1635	1636	1637	1638	1639	1640
Sir John Cutts															
Sir Miles Sandys													**		
Sir John Carleton											***				
Sir John Peyton(y)															
Sir Edward Hinde															
Sir Thomas Hatton															
Sir Simeon Steward															
Sir John Millicent															
William Allington esq.															
Sir Edward Peyton															
Sir Thomas Chicheley															
Sir Dudley North															
John Cotton															
Samuel Thornton															

\*\* absence has yet to be determined, possibly due to ill health

\*\*\* absence is the result of serving as the sheriff for Cambridgeshire

 indicates time served as a deputy lieutenant for Cambridgeshire

## Deputy Lieutenants Biographical Background

**Sir John Cutts**<sup>1</sup> (kt. 1603, d. 1646) was the longest serving member of the lieutenancy for Charles I, serving from beginning to end without absence. He served as sheriff for Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire in 1619, benefited financially from a relationship with the Duke of Buckingham, although even he was not able to secure a place for him in parliament in January 1624 as he lost out to Sir Edward Peyton,<sup>2</sup> and lost a second election on 18 March to Sir Simeon Steward. Buckingham was however able to place him as *custos rotulorum* for Cambridge in 1627 after dismissing Sir Edward Peyton and replacing him with Cutts.<sup>3</sup>

The Cutts family was active in Cambridgeshire local government as early as the reign of Henry VII and had a long history of providing local officeholders from that early date. The family of six successive sons named John<sup>4</sup> oversaw a portfolio of properties centered on their holdings in Childerley<sup>5</sup> in east Cambridgeshire that ranged across several East Anglian counties. Sir John Cutts (d.1615) settled the family in

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<sup>1</sup> Study of the lieutenancy owes a great deal to the Cutts family as it is believed that both Harley MS 6599, and 4014 were compiled by the Cutts family. Harley MS 6599 was most likely compiled by Sir John Cutts (d.1615) who was a deputy lieutenant for Cambridgeshire under both Roger, Lord North and Thomas Suffolk. Although it is impossible to be certain, Harley MS 4014 was most likely compiled by Sir John Cutts (d. 1646) or Sir John Millicent. Both men were deputy lieutenants for the shire during the period in question, and the limited amount of correspondence from the deputy lieutenants to either the captains of the horse and foot bands or constables bears both their names. The fact that Cutts' father had Harley MS 6599 copied and bound for the years 1595-1605 points strongly to him as the compiler of Harley MS 4014. Eugene J. Bourgeois, *A Cambridge Lieutenancy Letterbook 1595-1605*, (Great Britain: E & E Plumridge Ltd., 1997), pg. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Edward Peyton will follow later in the chapter.

<sup>3</sup> ODNB, Edward Peyton, pg. 977

<sup>4</sup> John (d. 1521), John (d. 1528), John (d. 1555), John, (d. 1615), John (d. 1646), John (d.1670). The baronetcy dies out and lands descended in the eighth generation from Richard, brother of John (d. 1521). Richard died without issue, and his younger brother John, later Lord Cutts sold the whole of Childerley based estates in 1686. VCH pg 43

<sup>5</sup> The holdings included ownership of virtually all of four parishes, Childerley, Dry Drayton, Lolworth, Boxworth and Swavesey, in eastern Cambridgeshire, as well as small minor holdings in southern and eastern Cambridgeshire as well.

Childerley Hall (construction began circa 1560's) sometime in the 1580's after selling off Horham Hall in Essex and residing for a brief time at Shenley Hall in Hertfordshire. Childerley Hall was a large home that in 1670 included six well furnished and tapestried rooms for the family and their guests, as well as some 20 other rooms for inferiors or servants. Only part of the home, the south wing, remains including a room that was by the 1740's called King Charles' Chamber because it was believed that Charles I occupied it in 1647 when he stopped in Childerley on 6-7 June while being brought from Holmby House to the army near Newmarket.<sup>6</sup>

The family was long established following grants of estates from Henry VII to Sir John Cutts (d.1521) while serving as under-treasurer of the Exchequer in 1508. Further expansion and consolidation following the dissolution of the monasteries allowed the Cutts family to expand their holdings to control virtually all of five parishes in eastern Cambridgeshire (Childerley, Dry Drayton, Lolworth, Boxworth and Swavesey) culminating in Sir John Cutts' (d. 1555) elevation to a knight of the bath at Edward's coronation placing him and his family socially above almost all within the shire, a place they would remain for the next century. The Cutts family had shared familial and business ties with some of the other Cambridgeshire elite, most notably the Hinde family. Intermarriage and sales of estates ensured that they remained close. John (d. 1615) married a daughter of Sir John Hinde (d. 1550) as well as purchasing a number of estates in Borough Green and Bourn parishes in the 1570's, and Sir Francis Hinde was also an executor of his will. Sir John also shared

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<sup>6</sup>Eugene J. Bourgeois, *The Ruling Elite of Cambridgeshire, England* (Edwin Mellen Press, New York, 2003) pgs. 93, 142. VCH, vol 9, pg 44; vol 5, pg 7.

the puritan views of Roger, Lord North, and actively supported puritan ministers in the county.<sup>7</sup>

**Sir Miles Sandys** (kt. 1603, bt. 1612, d. 1644) represents a departure for the lieutenancy by adding a man who was not one of the longstanding families within Cambridgeshire. Sandys is the third son of Sir Edward Sandys, Archbishop of York (b.1516-1588) and although not of the Tudor ruling elite, Sir Miles Sandys appears to have served for the length of Charles' reign, and served as an MP for Cambridgeshire, as well as sheriff for Cambridgeshire and Huntingdon in 1615. However, his name was absent from letters sent out to the deputy lieutenants in 37-38, but this could be explained by ill health, as in '38 Sir Miles asked his son to make his excuse to the council for not attending at the board to explain disturbances around Wicken concerning the draining of the fens, due to ill health.<sup>8</sup> The Sandys family despite being new to the shire, held lands across 4 parishes, mostly within the Isle of Ely, which could further explain his inclusion into the commission. His representation of the University of Cambridge in Parliament could also indicate a need to engender better relations with the University and the Lieutenancy, which had always been problematic at best. Sandys was able to acquire lands in Stretham and Thetford parish, as well as Mepal, and Littleport parishes following the alienation of the estates in 1600 from the bishopric of Ely, which were granted to Sandys by the queen. Despite royal grants of land, delays in the drainage of the fens cost his estates dearly and his income was already on the decline before his ill health forced a less active service within the lieutenancy. His baronetcy became extinct when his son and heir,

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<sup>7</sup> VCH vol 5, pg 7, vol 9, pg 44; Bourgeois, ruling elite, pg 72-93.

<sup>8</sup> CSP 16/392/54.

Sir Miles Sandys (kt. 1626, d. 1654) died without issue, and the Sandys family lands were purchased by various other families.<sup>9</sup>

**Sir John Carleton** (d. 1637) was the nephew of Dudley Viscount Dorchester, the crown's ambassador to The Hague. Sir John Carleton, although not of the traditional ruling elite, he married into it by becoming the second husband of Anne Cotton, widowed when Sir John Cotton passed in 1620 leaving a minor heir, John, aged 5. The Cotton family was one of the most ancient families in Cambridgeshire dating back to 1428 when London mercer Walter Cotton and his brother Thomas Cotton began acquiring manors in Landwade, which was to become the family's seat for the next 200 years. By 1450, the Cotton family had acquired not only Landwade parish, but also, large portions if not the entire parishes in Cheveley and Woodditton. The Cotton family was heavily active in local government supplying MP's as early as William Cotton esq. in 1453, sheriffs on six different occasions from the reign of Edward IV, as well as Sir John Cotton (d.1620) serving as a deputy lieutenant. Carleton, by virtue of marrying into the Cotton family while young John was a minor, was therefore the natural selection as the male head of a household that had provided local government officers since before the Tudor era. Sir John Carleton served continuously as a deputy lieutenant until his death in 1637 with only a one-year absence when he served as sheriff for Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire in 1636. Sir John also served as a MP for Cambridge in 1628 with Sir Miles Sandys, so despite not being of the Cambridgeshire ruling elite, he assumed the office holding duties expected of a member of the Cotton family who was of the ruling elite.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> VCH vol 4, pg 98-154.

<sup>10</sup> Sir John Cotton (bt. 1641, d. 1689) will be separately referenced later in this chapter when he served briefly as a deputy lieutenant for Cambridgeshire in 1640. VCH vol 10, pg 30-90.

**Sir John Peyton** (1579-1635) was the only son of Sir John Peyton (1544-1630) who served the crown as Lieutenant of the Tower of London in 1597 and later Governor of Jersey from 1604. This lesser branch of the Peyton family based in Doddington came to the shire when Sir John (elder) acquired Beaupre Hall, Outwell, Norfolk with his first marriage. His wife's large properties gained Sir John (elder) position and wealth. He served as a deputy lieutenant for Roger, Lord North in 1596 and continued in the position under Thomas Suffolk in 1602.<sup>11</sup> Sir John paid over £4,500 for Doddington and Littleport manors having acquired them and several other manors granted away from the see of Ely by Bishop Heton upon his appointment in 1602. Doddington became the family's principle residence following the death of his wife in 1605, and remained in the Peyton family until the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Upon Sir John's death in 1630, Sir John (younger) already 51, and had traveled extensively throughout Germany, Switzerland and Italy. He had also served as lieutenant to his father while governor of Jersey in 1607 and intermittently from 1618 till his father's death. He was married on 25 November 1602, to a cousin, Alice, who was the second daughter of Sir John Peyton of the Isleham branch of the family in Cambridge. He was knighted on 28 March 1603 and served as deputy lieutenant for Cambridgeshire from the beginning of the reign of Charles I till his death early in 1635. His inclusion could further represent the need for balance within the deputy lieutenancy and to have effective representation for the lieutenancy within the Isle of Ely.<sup>12</sup>

**Sir Edward Hinde** (kt. 1615, d.1633) came from a family that had been established in Cambridgeshire for over a century dating back to his grandfather, Sir John Hinde (d. 1550). In 1520, Sir John served as the recorder of Cambridge and began adding to

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<sup>11</sup> ODNB, John Peyton, pg 981-2.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. 981-2; VCH vol 4, pg. 112.

his considerable holdings in Girton and Madingley. He was later appointed as a justice in king's bench in 1541<sup>13</sup> and was able to further consolidate his holdings there to the point that by the time of his death in 1550, the Hinde family held virtually all of both parishes. The holdings would descend with the Hinde family from the mid 16<sup>th</sup> century until the mid 19<sup>th</sup> century. Sir John's legal prowess and his affiliation with the town of Cambridge brought him into contact with local administration, and he then further cemented his place in the shire by marrying two of his daughters into established families, the Cutts, and the Chicheleys. John also benefited from powerful friendships, like his with Thomas Cromwell where he served as a friend and trusted legal servant. Offices followed for him as he served as the *custos rotulorum* for Cambridgeshire and as counsel on the northern assize circuit<sup>14</sup>

His son and heir Sir Francis (kt. 1578, d. 1596) was already the leading freeholder of the manor of Doddington, and upon his father's death, began to sell smaller holdings across the shire to fund the construction of Madingley Hall, consisting of some 20 hearths in 1689, started by his father in 1546 and completed by Sir Francis sometime around 1590. The holdings sold by Sir Francis ranged across the whole of the shire and represented a consolidation of the family's holdings centering on Madingley and western Cambridgeshire.<sup>15</sup> Francis served the shire as an MP for Cambridgeshire in three parliaments and served as sheriff for the shire on three separate occasions in 1561, 1570, and 1589, as well as being selected by Roger Lord North as a deputy lieutenant, continuing the family's tradition in local administration. Upon his death in 1596, Madingley hall passed to his eldest son, Sir William (kt. 1603, d.1606) who

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<sup>13</sup> Bourgeois, *Ruling Elite*, pg 275.

<sup>14</sup> Bourgeois, *ruling elite*, pgs. 74-5, 115, and 123.

<sup>15</sup> Lands were sold from North Witchford, Chesterton, Papworth, Longstow, Armingford, Wetherley, Thriplow, Whittlesford, and Stain hundreds.

again quickly took his father's place in shire local administration serving as a sheriff in 1600, and as a deputy lieutenant, as well as maintaining contacts at court by having two of his sisters as maids of honor to Queen Elizabeth. Sir William died just 10 years after his father childless, leaving his brother Sir Edward as heir. Edward served as sheriff in 1612 and becomes the third member of his family to serve as a deputy lieutenant for the shire under both Thomas and Theophilus Suffolk. Edward's male heirs tended to die young with his son passing in 1612 while fighting in Denmark, leaving a minor son, Edward. In 1627, the estates were settled upon Edward by his grandfather upon his marriage to Agnes Maples, but he died accidentally in 1631, leaving an infant daughter Jane. Jane survived to marry Sir John Cotton of Landwade<sup>16</sup> c. 1647 and from that point the entirety of the Madingley estates and Hinde holdings join the Cotton family who move their family seat to Madingley.<sup>17</sup>

**Sir Simeon Steward** (kt. 23 July 1603, d. c.1630) from Stuntney in the Isle of Ely is better known for his poetry than for his involvement in Cambridgeshire local government, however his family was resident within the Isle of Ely from the 1560's with the purchase by his great grandfather, Symeon Steward<sup>18</sup> of manors there. He was knighted by James I with his father, Sir Mark Steward (kt. 23 July 1603, d. 1604) whose elaborate monument in Ely Cathedral traces their Scottish roots.<sup>19</sup> Simeon consolidated the family holdings within the Isle after his grandfather Robert Steward (d. 1571) made a very complicated entail of his manors between a dozen relatives,

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<sup>16</sup> Cotton will be noted later on in this study as his family too has a long history of service in Cambridgeshire, as well as Sir John serving briefly as a deputy lieutenant in 1640.

<sup>17</sup> Bourgeois, *ruling elite*, pg. 235; VCH vol. 9, pgs 94-172.

<sup>18</sup> Symon Steward was one brother and Nicholas Steward another. Symon married the daughter and heiress of Edward Bestney of Soham. Nicholas Steward farmed Barton manor and was great-grandfather of Oliver Cromwell, whose mother was a Steward. *Cambs. and Hunts. Arch. Soc. Trans.* v, 372.

<sup>19</sup> ODNB, Symeon Steward, pg. 615-16

including his father. Upon his father's death, the Coveney and Manea manors were reunited and held for the nearly 50 years under Sir Simeon until they leave the family line in the 1649 when Sir Simeon's grandson and last in the line, Thomas, passed the manors out of the family.<sup>20</sup>

Sir Simeon served Cambridgeshire as sheriff in 1611, sat as MP for Cambridgeshire in 1624, in addition to his place as deputy lieutenant under Thomas and Theophilus Suffolk until his death in 1630. Sir Simeon was also returned to parliament from Shaftsbury, Dorset in 1614, as well as for Aldeburgh, Suffolk in 1627. Despite limited holdings and lack of connection to the ruling elite, his inclusion in the commission could again be in response to a need for better relation with the university. Sir Simeon lived at Trinity Hall, Cambridge as a fellow-commoner following his knighthood where his coat of arms remained displayed in his chamber as late as the 1730 before being lost by 1886.<sup>21</sup>

**Sir Thomas Hatton** (bt. 1641, d. 1658) was the younger brother of the Sir Christopher Hatton (d. 1619) of Kirby Hall (Northants.), male heir of Sir Christopher Hatton, Lord Chancellor for Elizabeth I who died without children. The Hatton family controlled Long Stanton as resident squires for over 200 years. Sir Chris began acquiring manors in Long Stanton and they transferred to his young son Christopher who was of age by 1630. In 1630, Sir Thomas Hatton purchased Long Stanton, Cheyneys, Walwyns, and Colvilles manors from his nephew, and they transferred with his baronetcy until it became extinct in 1812. Sir Thomas Hatton

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<sup>20</sup> VCH vol. 4, pg. 137.

<sup>21</sup> ODNB, Symeon Steward, pg. 615-6

married into the Allington family in c.1634 when he married Mary Allington, daughter of Sir Giles Allington of Horseheath.<sup>22</sup> With the marriage, Sir Thomas not only acquired new manors in Bassingbourn, but also married into one of the oldest families in Cambridgeshire and part of the ruling elite, cementing his family's place in the shire and his nomination as a deputy lieutenant that followed quickly after his marriage to Mary Allington.<sup>23</sup>

**Sir John Millicent** (d. 1641) was a member of a family whose ancestors had been prosperous yeomen at Linton since the early 15<sup>th</sup> century. The family's fortunes increased in the 1540's following John Millicent's (d. 1577) vehement support for Thomas Cromwell and the dissolution of the monasteries, and the protestant reforms. In fact, Millicent narrowly escaped lynching at the hands of Lincolnshire rebels in 1536 for that support, and went on to serve both Edward, Lord North and Roger, Lord North in county administration. His son, Robert (d. 1609) followed in the same path serving as JPs for the shire, and in 1610, Robert's son and heir, Sir Roger (kt. 1607, d.1621) served as sheriff for Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire. His son and heir, Robert dies in 1631 leaving a son, John, aged 10. Sir John Millicent (d. 1641) as the second son of Sir Robert (d. 1609) and given the minority of his cousin, he was the choice to represent the family as deputy lieutenant for Cambridgeshire in 1635 when space came up on the commission, serving till the collapse of the institution in 1640. His inclusion is a bit of an elevation for the family who had been reliable minor office holders throughout the Tudor era, but given the minority of the heirs of the Cotton, Chicheley, and Allington families, it was understandable. The Millicent family had been a members of the ruling elite since the 1550's and although not as wealthy as his

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<sup>22</sup> Information regarding the Allington family will follow in this chapter.

<sup>23</sup> VCH vol. 8, pgs.14-20; vol. 9, pgs. 197-125.

fellow deputies, the Millicents had made good use of shared religious sympathies with his fellow deputies and their association with Roger Lord North, serving in his household and cementing their place in the ruling elite.<sup>24</sup>

**William Allington** (created Lord Allington 1642, d. 1648) was first named to the lieutenancy in 1637 and served until the collapse of the institution. William was from a family with a history within in the shire dating back to the 1397 with the acquisition of the family seat at Horseheath. William's ancestors included two members who served as Speaker in the Commons during the 15<sup>th</sup> century and serving as JPs and MPs for the shire almost continuously throughout the 16<sup>th</sup> century, including his great-great-grandfather, Sir Giles Allington (d.1586) who served on the county commission in six decades with only occasional breaks in service. Over this time, the family acquired significant amounts of land within Horseheath parish, to the point that by 17<sup>th</sup> century, the Allington family controlled every manor in the parish except one, as the family's residence at Horseheath spanned five centuries. The family also acquired significant holdings during the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries in Melbourne, Swaffham Bulbeck, and Bottisham parishes to confirm their status within the shire. William was the only surviving son and heir (fourth son, of nine children) at the time of his father's, Sir Giles Allington (d.1638) death. Although he served in the lieutenancy for only a few years, having been appointed a deputy lieutenant in 1637, it came at a critical time for the lieutenancy and represented a need for the lieutenancy to replace the trusted deputies that had been lost in previous years. Also it reflected a desire to widen support within the shire by including long standing families in the lieutenancy who had not been previously been named earlier in the Charles' reign, a

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<sup>24</sup> VCH vol. 6, pgs. 87-88; Bougeois, ruling elite, pgs. 91,194.

trend that was repeated with other additions to the commission in the crisis years of the Bishops Wars.<sup>25</sup>

**Sir Edward Peyton** (kt. 1596, bt. 1611, d. 1657) was named to the commission in 1637 and served less than two years as a deputy lieutenant as the head of the Isleham branch of the Peyton family. This branch of the family had a long history of service to the shire throughout the 16<sup>th</sup> century and Edward himself had served as sheriff in 1622, as well as MP for the shire in the parliaments of 1624 and 1626. He was appointed to numerous committees and served well but drew the disapproval of Buckingham for defeating a client of his, Sir John Cutts, for a seat in the 1626 Parliament, and thus was removed as *custos rotulorum* for Cambridgeshire, replacing him with Cutts. This might explain the exclusion of Peyton from the lieutenancy, as the Cutts family was key members of the institution from its inception and clients of Buckingham, however there is no evidence of further dispute. There is evidence of Peyton's strong puritan views that putting him into conflict with the crown as well as his neighbors. He was summoned before Star Chamber on 10 October 1632 for instigating a fight with his neighbors, as well as being ordered to appear before Archbishop Laud and the high commission in 1638, presumably for his puritan views. It would be seem that the combination of disagreement with neighbors and Buckingham's disapproval would keep the wealthy gentleman off the commission until support was greatly needed in 1637, but following his summons by Archbishop Laud, he was removed from the commission and made his anti-crown feelings well know in his numerous writings published following the outbreak of the civil war.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Bourgeois, ruling elite, pgs. 97-99; VCH vol. 8, pgs. 16-72.

<sup>26</sup> Some of his writings include, (1641) *The King's Violation of the Rights of Parliament*, (1647) *The High-Way to Peace*, (1652) *The Divine Catastrophe of the Kingly Family of the House of Stuart*. ODNB, Edward Peyton, pg. 978.

The family had a long history in eastern Cambridgeshire dating back to the 1380's in Wicken parish, until the family settled in their seat of Isleham in 1438. The estate in Isleham was extensive and by 1600, the Peyton family controlled all lands within the parish not owned by universities. This domination was short lived as by 1638, Sir Edward Peyton was in financial crisis, owing over £7000, forcing him to alienate his family seat and all other manors held there, with Sir John Maynard, now lord lieutenant of Cambridgeshire following the death of Theophilus Suffolk, had acquired all of the Peyton family lands in Isleham and occupied Isleham Hall, leaving the Peyton family financially ruined and occupying only small estates in Wicken parish.<sup>27</sup>

**Sir Thomas Chicheley** (kt.1670 , d. 1699) was a direct descendant of the archbishop of Canterbury and his family was settled at Wimpole in Henry IV's reign. Estates in Wimpole passed from the Archbishop, Henry Chicheley to his great nephew Henry. From there the family seat at Wimpole passed through six generations of the Chicheley family who expanded and consolidated the family holdings in the southwest of the shire so that by 1600 the family controlled virtually all of Arrington, Wendy and Wimpole parishes. The Wimpole estates on their own accounted for almost £1300 in rents alone in the 1600s (not to mention the income from the 2 other parishes owned by the Chicheley family) making the Chicheley family one of the wealthiest in Cambridgeshire. The estates were settled on Sir Thomas Chicheley in 1592, and upon his death in 1616, they fell to Sir Thomas who was only 2 years old at the time. Upon his majority, he immediately took up his family's tradition of office

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., pg. 978; VCH vol. 10, pgs. 430, 556-7.

holding in Cambridgeshire, serving as sheriff in 1637 and encountering the difficult task of collecting ship money from the increasingly embittered shire.<sup>28</sup> Following this service, he was appointed as a deputy lieutenant in 1638, perhaps would have been named earlier, but the office of sheriff and deputy lieutenant were never held consecutively. Sir Thomas Chicheley also was returned to Parliament for his county in 1640. He was a committed royalist, and one of the wealthiest members of the Commons, offering to be bound for £1000 to support the loan in November 1640. This would explain his addition to the commission in a time when the crown was in desperate need of wealthy, influential support in the localities. He and his estates were made to suffer until the Restoration where he found favor at court and was knighted in 1670, made a privy councilor and master-general of the ordnance for Ireland in 1674. He once again represented Cambridgeshire in parliament and his long-standing loyalty to the crown was rewarded when he was made chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster in 1682. However, his extravagant lifestyle forced the sale of the estates in Wimpole in 1686, yet he continued to represent the shire in the parliament of 1689 and remained deeply in debt till his death in 1699.<sup>29</sup>

**Sir Dudley North**, 4<sup>th</sup> Baron North (kt. 1616, d. 1677) was the great-grandson of Roger, Lord North (previously noted in this chapter) and was first named as deputy lieutenant in 1638. Although previously a MP for Horsham (Sussex) in the 1628-9 Parliament, he represented Cambridge in both the Short and Long parliaments. He was created a knight of the Bath in honor of Prince Charles's creation as prince of Wales, and like previous generations of his family traveled extensively throughout Europe and served in various military campaigns in the Palatinate and the Netherlands

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<sup>28</sup> See Chapter 4 for further details of Chicheley's activities as sheriff dealing with the collection of ship money.

<sup>29</sup> ODNB, Thomas Chicheley, pgs. 378-9; VCH vol. 5, pg. 265, vol. 8, pg. 137-9.

in the 1620's. Although the North family fortune had diminished significantly from its height due to a lack of court office and ruinous spending at court, the family still held the majority of its lands in Cambridgeshire centered on the family seat of Kirtling and numerous other parishes in the southeast of Cambridgeshire. These lands would descend with the Lord North title for the next 400 years. Neither Dudley (d. 1677) nor his father was able to maintain their ancestor's careers at court, however they still maintained a presence there, but high office remained out of reach. Sir Dudley North's inclusion into the lieutenancy would again represent a desire to draw support from royalist families who still had wealth and influence within the shire, as well as share the burden of the increasing work load falling onto the lieutenancy with the coming of the Bishops wars.<sup>30</sup>

**Sir John Cotton** (bt. 1641, d. 1689) is the heir to Sir John Cotton (d. 1620) and while a minor was replaced on the commission by his father-in-law Sir John Carleton, therefore, Cotton family history has been previously cited in this chapter. Upon achieving his majority, he promptly took up his family's local administration service as a deputy lieutenant in 1640, created baronet and served as sheriff for Cambridgeshire in 1641. Due to his royalist sympathies, he was forced into exile during the Protectorship but was able to return in 1661 and resume possession of his estates.<sup>31</sup>

**Samuel Thornton** (d. c.1660) was again another royalist sympathizer whose family had built up significant non-manorial holdings while residing at Soham since the mid 15<sup>th</sup> century. Samuel Thornton also held lands in Snailwell, and Stretham and

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<sup>30</sup> ODNB, Dudley North, 4<sup>th</sup> Baron North, pg. 77-9; VCH vol. 10, pgs. 46-67.




<sup>31</sup> VCH vol. 10, pg. 471.

Thetford parishes, but his holdings were clearly below the level of his fellow deputies and his nomination clearly demonstrates the need for committed deputies loyal to the crown to help in the increasingly difficult jobs that were falling to the lieutenancy.<sup>32</sup>

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
<sup>32</sup> VCH vol. 10, pgs. 480-501; vol. 4, pgs 178-190.

# Sir Edward Peyton




 Indicates Parishes with family history of residence or land holding for the last three generations.

# Samuel Thornton




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# Sir Dudley North




 Indicates Parishes with family history of residence or land holding for the last three generations.

# Sir Edward Hinde




# Sir John Carleton




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# Sir John Cotton



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# Sir John Cutts




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# Sir John Millecent



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# Sir John Peyton




Hundreds

Ch - Chesterton

Ca - Cambridge &  
**CAMBRIDGE CITY**


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# Sir Miles Sandys




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# Sir Simeon Stewart




 Indicates Parishes with family history of residence or land holding for the last three generations.

# Sir Thomas Chicheley




 Indicates Parishes with family history of residence or land holding for the last three generations.

# Sir Thomas Hatton



 Indicates Parishes with family history of residence or land holding for the last three generations.

# Sir William Allington



 Indicates Parishes with family history of residence or land holding for the last three generations.

**Certificate of the mustered forces of Cambridgeshire—November 1628<sup>1</sup>**

[fol. 4v] The certificate of Sir Miles Sandys, Sir John Carleton, knights and baronets, Sir John Cutts and Sir Edward Hynde, knights, deputy lieutenaunts to the right honorable, the Earle of Suffolke, lord lieutenaunt of this county of Cambridge made the 4th of November 1628.

	captaines	lieutenants	number of men	corslets	musquet
<b>The East</b>	Sir Edward Hynde, knt.	Christopher Norton, gent.	190	87	103
<b>Syde</b>	Sir John Millecent, knt.	Robert Richardson, gent.	161	81	80
<b>The West</b>	Edward Hynd, esqr.	Robert Patterson, gent.	237	113	124
<b>Syde</b>	Symon Watson, esqr.	Samuel Pepis, gent.	162	82	80
<b>The Isle of</b>	Sir Simeon Steward, knt.	Robert Steward, esqr.	150	60	90
<b>Ely</b>	Robert Balam, esqr.	Charles Balam, esqr.	100	38	62

1000

the number of carbines -----30\

of horse dragoones-----50/

Mr Robert Millecent, Cap.

<sup>1</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 4v.

**Certificate for 250 men and money out of the county of Cambridge--April 1638<sup>2</sup>**

[*fol. 38v*] An assesment made for the setting out of 250 imprest soldiers and 300 trayned soldiers out of the county of Cambridge for his Majesties employment in the Northern parts of this Kingdome.

	<i>li.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>	men imprest
<b>The West Side</b>				
Armingord hundred	92	10	00	20
Long Stow	70	00	00	20
Witherly	55	00	00	10
Thriplow	61	05	00	10
Papworth	43	15	00	20
North Stow	43	15	00	10
Chesterton	33	15	00	10
	<u>400</u>	<u>00</u>	<u>00</u>	<u>100</u>

<b>The East Side</b>				
Staplehow	60	00	00	15
Staine	42	00	00	11
Flendish	42	00	00	11
Wittleford	42	00	00	11
Chilford	52	00	00	11
Radfield	42	00	00	11
Cheavely	20	00	00	05
	<u>300</u>	<u>00</u>	<u>00</u>	<u>75</u>

<b>The Isle of Ely</b>				
Ely	50	00	00	13
Wisbeach	100	00	00	26
Wichford	150	00	00	36
	<u>300</u>	<u>00</u>	<u>00</u>	<u>75</u>

	<i>li.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
The total summe of this leavying}	1000	00	00

<sup>2</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 38v.

**Copy of a levy for funds to send 30 horse and 10 carters out of Cambridge for service in the Northern parts--April 1640<sup>3</sup>**

[fol. 44v] A leavy made for the sending out of 30ty carthorse and ten carters for his Majesties impoyment into the Northerne parts.

<b>The West Side</b>	<i>li.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
Armingford hundred	46	05	00
Longe Stow	35	00	00
Wetherly	24	10	00
Thriplow	30	12	06
Papworth	21	17	06
North Stow	21	17	06
Chestertom	16	17	06
	<u>200</u>	<u>00</u>	<u>00</u>

<b>The East Side</b>			
Staplehow	30	00	00
Stane	21	00	00
Flendish	21	00	00
Wittleford	21	00	00
Chilford	26	00	00
Radfield	21	00	00
Cheavely	20	00	00
	<u>150</u>	<u>00</u>	<u>00</u>

<b>The Isle of Ely</b>			
Ely	25	00	00
Wisbeach	50	00	00
Wichford	75	00	00
	<u>150</u>	<u>00</u>	<u>00</u>

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<sup>3</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 44v.

**Copy of a levy made for the sending out of 300 soldiers and 50 horse for service in the Northern parts--June 1640<sup>4</sup>**

[fol. 52] A leavy made for the setting out of 300 soldiers and fifty carthorse for his Majesties imploment into the Northerne parts made<sup>5</sup> by Sir John Millecent, knight, William Allington and Thomas Chichely, esquires.

<b>The East Side</b>	<i>li.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>	horse	men
Staplehon hundred	55	10	00	03	25
Stane hundred	40	10	00	02	20
Flendish hundred	39	00	00	02	10
Cheavely hundred	17	05	00	02	04
Radfield hundred	39	00	00	02	10
Chilford hundred	46	10	00	02	11
Wittlesford hundred	42	00	00	02	10
	<u>279</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>00</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>90</u>

<b>The West Side</b>					
Armingford hundred	85	10	00	04	25
Long Stow hundred	65	05	00	04	25
Wetherly hundred	51	15	00	02	15
Thriplow hundred	55	15	00	03	15
Papworth hundred	40	10	00	02	15
North Stow hundred	40	10	00	03	15
Chesterton hundred	31	10	00	02	10
	<u>372</u>	<u>00</u>	<u>00</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>120</u>

<b>The Isle of Ely</b>	<u>279</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>90</u>
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<sup>4</sup> BL Harley MS 4014 fol. 52.

<sup>5</sup> made was interlined.

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