

THE EFFECTS OF THE KURDISH QUESTION ON TURKEY'S FOREIGN AND
SECURITY POLICY WITH REFERENCE TO THE WESTERN WORLD

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Yasin BOR
Department of Politics and International Relations
University of Leicester

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ABSTRACT

Yasin Bor

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The main topic of this thesis is the influence of the Kurdish Question on Turkey's relations with Europe and the USA. Aiming to develop a triplex framework of (1) the Kurdish Question in Turkey, (2) Turkey's Foreign and Security Policy, and (3) Turkey's Relations with Western Society, this thesis specifically studies the international dimension of the Kurdish Question. It has two basic arguments: first, the Kurdish issue is the major cause of the deterioration in the relationship between Turkey and the West, in spite of alliances that go back over half a century. Second, Turkey's Foreign and Security Policy is the main catalyst of that long-lasting troublesome relationship.

The Kurdish Question is evaluated using empirical data that examines its impact on the relationship between Turkey and the West in the period 1989-2007. Within this the problem is examined by applying a normative approach and analyses that are carried out within a theoretical framework provided by a constructivist approach. In order to present research questions by empirical evidence, discourse analysis is used that goes in hand with the theoretical approach.

Three Foreign and Security Policy norms are examined, namely "Sèvres Syndrome" - the suspicion of influence of external powers and interests on Turkey, the principle of "Status Quo" applicable in FSP and internal security arrangements, and finally, the "Westernism" that foresees being pro-Western in foreign policies and internal socio-political field. Findings suggest that those three norms played significant roles in shaping Turkey's Foreign and Security Policy for decades, while important changes occurred within the recent years.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Ak Party Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)

ANAP Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party)

CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)

CoE Council of Europe

CoGS Chief of General Staff

CoLF Chief of Land Forces

DEP Demokrasi Partisi (Democracy Party)

DP Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party)

DSP Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party)

DYP Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party)

EC European Community

EEC European Economic Community

ECHR European Convention on Human Rights

ECtHR European Court of Human Rights

EP European Parliament

EU European Union

FSP Foreign and Security Policy

GNAT Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Grand National Assembly of Turkey)

HADEP Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (People's Democracy Party)

KQ Kurdish Question

MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party)

MIT National Intelligent Agency of Turkey

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NSC Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council)

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PACE Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

PTA Prevention of Terrorism Act

RP Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)

SSC Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemesi (State Security Court)

TAF Turkish Armed Forces

INTRODUCTION

The formation of the Kurdish Question (KQ) in Turkish territories dates back to the early 20th century. Historically, Kurds have never established an independent state. During the entire Ottoman State history, Kurds were an indispensable part of the nation, and had never initiated an uprising against authority. Establishment of an independent Kurdish State was first discussed by British delegates at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. This Conference was followed by the Treaty of Sèvres that clearly stipulated that the Ottoman State should be partitioned and a Kurdish state established. Despite these discussions and decisions, the Kurds rejected the Sèvres Treaty and, being from the same religion, were actively involved in the Independence War that took place between 1919-1923 under the leadership of General Mustafa Kemal and supported the national struggle against the Western Countries. When the war ended and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) was first set up on April 23rd 1920, of the 324 representatives, 74 were Kurds.

After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk pursued the politics of westernization, militant secularism and Turkish nationalism. As a result of this policy, and particularly because of *Turkification* efforts, teaching in languages other than Turkish was prohibited. While schools that provided religious education were being closed, references to an area called “Kurdistan” were erased from maps and official documents. Kurdish towns and villages were renamed with

Turkish names.¹ These changes, however, especially the removal of *Khalifat*, were disliked by Kurds, and the first uprising organised by the Kurds began in 1925. During the early history of the Turkish Republic, a total of 17 uprisings were held, and they were harshly suppressed by the administration.

The repressed society of Kurds could not initiate any action until the Turkish left was radicalized in the 1960's. The Kurdish left, together with the Turkish left, had organised various militant actions against the state. In mid-1974, there was a divergence of opinion between the Kurdish left and their Turkish counterparts. The former accused the latter of disregarding class problems, while the Turks argued that it was the right time for a proletariat revolution. The PKK, (*Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan* – Kurdistan's Workers Party), a Kurdish Marxist-Leninist organization which later became a single representative of Kurdish revolutionary movement, was set up against this background on October 27th, 1978. The PKK continued its organized, armed attacks against military and government as well as civilian targets after its first attack in 1984. The KQ is widely regarded as a terrorist problem that has caused various tensions and discussions with the West, and it has been on the Turkish Government's agenda for the last three decades.

This thesis evaluates KQ aims to create a three-dimensional framework targeting topics such as the KQ in Turkey, Turkey's FSP and Turkey's relationship with the West. This work particularly focuses on the influence of KQ on international level. Hence, this

¹Taspinar.O, *Kurdish nationalism and political Islam in Turkey : Kemalist identity in transition*. (New York ; London, Routledge 2005) p. 79-80

thesis has two main arguments; the first is that, despite lasting alliances that the West and Turkey have been sharing for a long period, the KQ was the main root of problems between the two; and second, Turkey's FSP was the main medium with which to maintain those problems between the two. While KQ remains a subject whose many aspects are yet to be studied, this work will evaluate its impact on the relationship between Turkey and the West, as there is no other work that highlights, specifically, this topic. This work will be the first study that examines this aspect of KQ and its impact on Turkey's FSP and relationship with the West by using discourse analysis as the method and a constructivist approach as the theoretical framework. As a result, it will be unique and will contribute to the relatively scarce literature on the topic.

This work is not about evaluation of Turkey's FSP as a whole, but rather a study looking into international aspects of KQ with specific coverage of the post-1980s period, as this is the time when the KQ is considered to be the cause of the increased violence. The KQ is settled in the minds of the masses, including specific groups, due to mainly dogmatic norms in the country's FSP, norms that were inherent since the early days of the Republic and fed into the mainstream ideological machine. This feed is controlled and driven by a certain minority group, who will be referred to as the ruling elite/establishment. In the years starting from 1987, one can notice the changes in these norms. Turkey's democratisation process gained speed towards the end of the first decade of the 21st century, under the influence of the KQ, international institutions and Western partners. They all helped the normative changes in Turkey. These changes peaked in 2007 when a pro-democracy majority became players in hegemonic discourse.

In evaluating the issue of KQ, empirical data that shed light on the impact of the issue of relationships between Turkey and the West will be applied. With that purpose, the normative approach and analyses will be carried out within a theoretical framework provided by a constructivist approach. The theoretical framework in question was first applied by Peter Katzenstein in his book “Cultural Norms and National Security” that looked into Japan’s security strategy in the post World War II period.

Constructivist approach has been considered as the most suitable method to look into KQ issue of Turkey and its impact on the country’s FSP with regards to the West. Although other theories of international relations, i.e. neo-realism, neo-liberalism and international political economy, also highlight some aspects of the issue, they were not seen as appropriate for the purposes of this research, due to their ontological and methodological aspects. One of the foremost reasons is that domestic agents have to be considered during the evaluation process, along with other sovereign states and international systems. Notwithstanding, Turkey’s problems with the West that came in waves, did not take place, due to conflict of interests or struggle for dominance in certain geopolitical regions, but rather due to normative structure that has a great influence on decision makers of the country and the struggles in domestic politics, partially influenced by KQ’s reflections on international arena. In this respect, this study evaluates mainly developments in the domestic political arena, and the social constructivist approach will be applied as it is assumed to be the most suitable approach. Deriving from that, this study argues that domestic FSP norms dictate Turkey’s FSP as a whole.

To argue the research questions by way of empirical evidence, the discourse analyses, concomitant with a theoretical approach, will be used in this study. However, discourse analysis has been used with the purpose of showing repetitiveness and commonalities of FSP norms throughout the research period. Systematic analyses of certain patterns of speech and writings, that are different applications of discourse analyses method, were not carried out, neither has the language used been evaluated in depth. Discourse analysis was also used to show strong political trends that lasted throughout the research period, derived from speeches and writings of hegemonic individual agents - carriers of Turkish FSP norms.

However, the hegemonic discourse used in this work is a methodological categorisation. It is not a theoretical tool as Gramsci proposed. Hegemony is a vital tool in explanation of political changes. One can argue that Gramsci's use of hegemonic discourse explains how political coalitions use certain ideologies to form certain policies and mobilise particular groups. However, the term can also be used as a projection of discourse of a ruling elite, dominant agent of political system of the time.

To avoid and eliminate the bias, this research has heavily used publications in newspapers with different stances, official statements of agents of political processes, parliamentary minutes and documents by transnational organisations. Usage of large collections of newspaper clippings and long parliamentary debates provides the

opportunity to employ impressive amounts of original material and provides solid grounds to support arguments put forward in this thesis.

Three major norms – Status quo, Westernism and the Sèvres Syndrome, were all used by the ruling elite (consisting of civilian and military bureaucracy, judiciary and the intelligentsia) to propagate their discourse - are examined. Such a normative framework very often limited Turkish governments' efforts for solutions.

According to the "Sèvres Syndrome", the West is constantly on the way to reinstating the conditions of the Sèvres Treaty which, in turn, has the purpose of driving the country. As per a Status Quo norm, the FSP is to be drawn and controlled by "bureaucratic elite" from, as well as beyond, the elected civilian government, not disregarding the Military. Usually, the "elite" includes such agents as President, civilian-military bureaucracy and high levels of the Judiciary, as well as elected governments.

Although Westernism is not directly linked to the KQ as part of an FSP research topic, nonetheless, it will be regarded and evaluated as one of the most important norms of the country's FSP as it is linked to the status of the ruling elite, who are seen to be the main cause of KQ being taken to the international level, which in turn led to straining, from time-to-time, of the relationship with its Western allies. The importance of including this norm into the study of the FSP lies in the establishment's calls to live western life styles while, at the same time, their position on the KQ led to worsening

of their relationship with the West. Democratic reform conditions put forward by the EU, as part of membership negotiations and continued violence by PKK, despite US invasion of their safe zone camps in Northern Iraq, have deepened the atmosphere of distrust created by the establishment.

The data will be evaluated in four main chapters. In the first chapter, as one of the most influential agent on Turkish FSP, the EU will be examined. The second chapter will look into KQ as it affects Turkey's relationship with international organisations and individual European states who were and remain influential on the issue of KQ. The third and fourth chapters examine the relationship between Turkey and the USA, one of the important agents in the KQ.

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The main topic of this thesis is the influence of the KQ on Turkey's relations with Europe and the USA. The research question is *"To what extent did the Kurdish Question in Turkey play a role in shaping Turkey's Foreign and Security Policy in relation with the European Union, Western Europe and the USA between 1989-2007?"* Thus, its aim is to analyse Turkey's Foreign and Security Policy (FSP) in the post-Cold War period with reference to the KQ, to define its inability to match the newly emerged international relations-structures and to study the increasingly strained relations between Turkey and the West.

This research first and foremost argues that the Kurdish issue served as a major contributing factor to the worsening relationship between Turkey and Western Europe and the USA. Turkey has been in alliance with these countries, which from a Turkish perspective can be referred to as “The West”, since the beginning of the Cold War. A poll carried out by USAK² that sought to discover Turkish attitudes towards the relationship with America found that the majority of those surveyed (74%) regarded the Turkish-American relationship as an alliance. While only 16% of those questioned considered themselves anti-American, more than half the respondents (58%) were not in favour of this alliance. 79% of those who answered said they did not have any hatred towards Americans, against a mere 4% who said that they did.

The most important statistic of all is that 75% of those surveyed said that the biggest obstacle to the Turkish-American relationship is the location of the PKK separatist group in US-controlled Northern Iraq. Second to this, cited by 9%, was the USA’s Kurdish Policy in the Middle East.³ Similar results for the KQ are not found in EU-related polls, such as the survey carried out by Ankara University in January 2010.⁴ This showed that 27.91% saw the struggle against terrorism as the primary problem affecting relations with the USA, whereas the problem facing a relationship with the EU was perceived by 32.4% as a “faith and identity difference”. Support for terrorism by EU states was only the fourth most important factor, but in the discourse of the FSP

² USAK (ISRO), International Strategic Research Organization, is Turkey’s one of the prominent think-tank established in 2004 in Ankara. <http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/>

³ ISRO (The International Strategic Research Organization), 12 March 2005, Turkey-USA Relations Survey Results, http://www.turkishweekly.net/us-tr_eng.pdf (accessed 15 October 2008).

⁴ Ankara University European Research Center, January 2010, Public Opinion and Turkish Foreign Policy Survey, <http://ataum.ankara.edu.tr/anket.pdf> (accessed 15 October 2010)

decision makers, the EU and the USA are lumped together without distinction under the heading of “the West”.

These differences of opinion caused by the KQ are not entirely Turkey’s mistakes with Western partners, but are caused by Turkey’s FSP which was laid down during the establishment of the Turkish Republic, and which has continued to provide a source of ideological inspiration. Prior to considering details of this argument it is worth examining one important point in Turkey’s relationship with the West. The Kurdish issue may be the most important contributory factor in Turkey’s suspicious attitude to the West, but it cannot alone explain the worsening relationship. The fall of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century and the support provided by the West to Armenians, Greeks and Kurds caused serious trauma to Turkish Western-oriented policy-makers and society, which continues its influence even today. On the other hand, the new Republic quickly reinstated her relations with Europe which until recently was the enemy entity, and even built all its state structure based on Western culture. The alliance between Turkey and the West started in the aftermath of World War II, and during the Cold War period Turkey took the frontline position against the Soviets. Alongside this, Turkey constantly followed a Western oriented FSP by participating in Western organisations such as the Council of Europe (CoE), EEC, OECD and NATO. Despite all these alliances, relationships and common policy, such as dismantling the Jupiter missiles on its territory following the Cuban Missile Crisis⁵, the

⁵ Jupiter Missiles were deployed in Italy and Turkey in the beginning of 1960’s for security reasons within NATO. However, after the crisis with the Soviet Union because of Soviet missiles deployed in Cuba, the US made a secret agreement with the USSR in 1963 and dismantled missiles from Turkey and Italy in exchange for dismantling Soviet Missiles deployed in Cuba.

crises it had with the USA related to opium plantations⁶ in Turkey, the Cyprus action⁷, strained relationships following the Johnson letter⁸ and the position taken by the West against the Armenian terror group Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)⁹ between 1973-1984. It was evident that Turkey was in a relationship that was based on the use of its strategic geographical location rather than an alliance based on mutual interests. Thus, while the Kurdish issue forms the biggest part in the deterioration of relations with the West, other problems inherited from the Ottoman Empire should also be taken into account.

This work is not a study that evaluates the entire Turkish FSP, but a case study examining the international dimension of the KQ. The KQ will be evaluated using empirical data that examines its impact on the relationship between Turkey and the West in the period 1989-2007. Within this the problem will be examined by applying a normative approach and analyses will be carried out within a theoretical framework provided by a constructivist approach. In drawing up this theoretical framework, Peter Katzenstein's constructivist approach was followed, which he applies in the book "Cultural Norms and National Security" that examines Japan's security strategy following World War II. In his study, Katzenstein linked Japan's friendly foreign policy

⁶ After three years of prohibition, Turkey has permitted opium plantation since July 1st, 1974, in specific areas despite US's pressure. US claimed that Turkey exports the raw materials of drugs

⁷ The Turkish Military made an intervention to various targets in Southern Cyprus using its guarantor role in 1974. The reason for this invasion was that Greek military junta was backing a coup in Cyprus. This action has been the cause of a couple of embargoes against Turkey.

⁸ US President Johnson's letter, dated June 5, 1964, included the fact that the US was against a possible Turkish invasion and if any invasion were made, US aid would be cut. The US was anxious about any possible conflict between two NATO countries, Greece and Turkey.

⁹ A radical leftist and ultra nationalist terrorist organization, it organized armed attacks against Turkish administrative authorities and diplomatic missions abroad in 16 different countries between 1973 and 1985.

in the post World War II period to “accepting as a norm accumulation of economic, rather than military power”. In a similar way, Turkey’s problems with its post Cold War allies that have been experienced due to the KQ will be examined, and an argument will be proposed that they arose due to Turkey’s FSP failure to adapt to new conditions that emerged following the end of the Cold War, as discussed in the theoretical framework in Chapter 2. In order to present research questions by empirical evidence, discourse analyses will be used that goes in hand with the theoretical approach.

SUMMARY OF THE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE RESEARCH SUBJECT

In researching a country’s FSP, applying only one variable to changing international relationships will not produce a desirable outcome. In opposition to this, the Kurdish issue provides a different character. First and foremost is the historical coincidence of the emergence of Kurdish Nationalism with the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Support for Kurdish nationalism was at the forefront of such international platforms as the Paris Conference of 1919, and the Kurdish uprising that took place immediately after the end of the national struggle for freedom ensured that Turkish policy makers had to consider the KQ. While nation states were being founded in the Middle East following the end of World War I, the issue of Kurdistan, split among 4 states – Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria – was internationalized and became the reason for monitoring on each other’s territory. This became one of the most important issues in the FSP agenda of each of these states, and the assimilation of the Kurds became an issue for the newly emerging nation-states which were trying to forge a unified national identity.

For historical reasons, it was easier for the Kurds to establish a separate identity in those parts of the country that were controlled by Iran, Iraq and Syria. On the other hand, during the War of Independence, the founders of the Turkish Republic maintained a more positive and promising relationship with Kurds and pro-Islamic groups. Following the establishment of the Republic in 1923, these two groups were branded as an “internal threat” in the state’s FSP and became major targets of the Republic’s “Turkification and secularization” program¹⁰.

In Turkey, the start of the Cold War and transition to a multi-party system coincided. While religious and ethnic demands did not end despite the application of revolutionary approaches during the establishment of the nation state, they did not surface during the Cold War period, while having a limited appearance in mainstream politics within the left versus right struggle.¹¹ In addition, policies applied to these social demands did not receive serious criticisms from the West, due to the country’s strategic location that was especially useful during the Cold War, particularly in the period up to 12th September 1980 when the country witnessed its third military coup d’etat.

Kurdish nationalists have for a long time been in the ranks of leftist parties and movements. Turkey’s intolerance to any “Kurdish” politics eventually led some Kurdish nationalists to resort to violence in their political struggle, hence the creation of the

¹⁰ For analyses of this dual threat and an understanding of Turkey’s security policy, please see: Taspinar.O, *Kurdish nationalism and political Islam in Turkey : Kemalist identity in transition* (New York ; London, Routledge 2005)

¹¹ Ibid. p.12

PKK. Mistreatment and torture of Kurdish inmates in prisons, particularly in the infamous Diyarbakir prison, and prohibitions on the use of the Kurdish language following the 1980 coup assisted the PKK in recruiting large numbers of Kurds. While the military regime received silent acceptance from the USA due to Turkey's strategic importance in the Cold War, the country received heavy criticism from Western European countries that put the issues of human rights at the centre of their foreign policy.¹²

Despite external pressure from Europe and internal pressure from the ruling elite, the Ozal-led government continued to attempt to become a member of the European Economic Community (EEC). An application was made for full membership of the EEC in April 1987. On December 17, 1989, the EEC rejected Turkey's application, and stated that, "As for the issue of democratization in Turkey, while the Commission acknowledged the steps taken in the field of human rights and the recognition of the identity of minorities, in its opinion these have not yet reached the level required in a democracy".

The 1980s were also a period of rising Kurdish population and influence in Europe. The PKK gained strength thanks to the support of Kurdish ethnic minorities who, since the mid-80s, had lived abroad, and in parallel with increased terror attacks which it carried out in Turkey; it started distancing itself from the left-leaning groups with which it had co-operated until that time.

¹²Bardakci. M, *Europeanization and Change in Domestic Politics* (Duisburg, Department of Political Science Essen University, PhD Thesis, 2007) p.111

By the 1990s, Turkey's KQ had become influential in both domestic policies as well as on international levels. The decade is seen as the most difficult for the country, due to the KQ, the pro-Islamist government versus military tensions that arose in the mid-1990s, the economic crises, unstable coalition governments and new international crises brought about by the end of the Cold War. The PKK followed their strategy of military struggle, and carried out terror operations throughout the 1990s, taking them to the most sophisticated levels. In addition, widespread human rights violations during anti-terror operations led to a marked deterioration in EU-Turkish relations.

Another important development that took place in the early 1990s was the establishment of the People's Labour Party (HEP) by pro-PKK Kurdish nationalists. As a result of gaining 10% in national elections, 22 MPs of Kurdish origin entered parliament and formed an alliance with the Social Democratic People's Party (SHP). Before too long, the HEP was disbanded by the Constitutional Court of Turkey, as would be her successors, on the grounds that it followed separatist/ethnic politics. The closure of Kurdish nationalist parties led to certain developments that severely shattered Turkey's relationship with Europe. The establishment of a Kurdish Parliament-in-Exile in Europe was set up under the leadership of the ex-MPs of Democracy Party (DEP)¹³

When the Ecevit government came into power in 1999, they placed great emphasis on EU membership-directed reforms, and in December 1999, the country gained official

¹³Ergil.D, 'The Kurdish question in Turkey', *Journal of Democracy* 11(3): (2000) p.131, Kirisci.K., *The Kurdish Question and Turkish Foreign Policy*, (Cambridge: MA: MIT Press. 2004) p.165

candidate status. The status of candidacy gave added support to pro-EU circles advocating democratic reforms. As mentioned by Bardakci, however, without solving the PKK issue, it was really difficult for Turkey to meet the Copenhagen criteria which outlined the economic and political measures a candidate country should take before joining in the EU.¹⁴ On the other hand, Eurosceptics, particularly among the military, argued that these changes could lead to greater separatism and result in potential disintegration of the country. For the first time, it is openly proposed that this could lead to the development of a relationship with Russian and Iran as an alternative to the alliance with the West. In 2001, Turkey has seen the toughest economic crises in its history. These developments channelled public opinion in favour of a newly established Justice and Development Party- Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Ak Party).

The Ak Party government came to power on November 3rd, 2002 with a majority in parliament. It directed all its efforts and energy to getting a date to begin formal negotiations to join in the EU. Among the major reforms carried out early in its administration were legalization of learning and broadcasting in languages other than Turkish, and the lifting of the death penalty. They needed to tackle with a number of issues in terms of KQ with the EU and the USA.

¹⁴ Bardakci. M, *Europeanization and Change in Domestic Politics* (Duisburg, Department of Political Science Essen University, PhD Thesis, 2007) p.271

METHODOLOGY

In this thesis the historical, sociological and political aspects of the KQ will be evaluated, taking into account the political actions of the decision-makers of the Turkish FSP and opposition discourses. This work will concentrate on the post-1980 period, when the Kurdish issue in Turkey gave rise to violence. The approach to the Kurdish issue is mainly derived from the unchanging norms of the Turkish FSP, which started to see changes towards democracy between 1989-2007, when finally in 2007, the supporters of democracy became hegemonic discourse players. Thus, this period makes up the research period of this work. All other developments relevant to the research will be described in the historical background section.

There are many differing aspects to the KQ. There is, however, almost no work that covers its impact on Turkey's relationship with the West. An examination of related works will show that they cover mainly the relationship of Kurds with the governments of their host, neighbouring or hegemonic countries in the world. On the other hand, research held in Turkey concentrates on ethnicities, problems experienced between Kurds and the Turkish Republic, and the PKK side of the KQ. As well as answering the research question, this research aims to eliminate such shortcomings in the literature. While the problem's impact on Turkey's relationship with the West will be evaluated, the making of Turkey's FSP and the issue of foreign politics, hegemony and opponents in the domestic struggle will also be considered. Social, historical and terrorist aspects will only be touched on where relevant.

The need to show actor limitations arises from the problem's large geographical area and the fact that it affected various regional and world powers, such as the ruling elite in control of the Turkish FSP; the opposition; the US government; the EU governing institutions and other European trans-national organisations; and, where appropriate, individual European states. Other parties who could be influential over the problem include regional states such as Iran, Iraq and Syria, and they will be considered when they have a bearing on the relationship with other nations and interest-groups, together with the Talabani and Barzani-led Kurdish groups.

First and foremost, this work is not a piece of research examining Turkey's FSP and providing theoretical approaches, although it considers the KQ-Turkish FSP relationship and its effect on the country's relationship with the West.


The last limitation that needs to be considered is related to sources. The research's hypothesis, the theoretical framework built on it and the research material used will be Turkey-centred. When necessary, however, reference will be made to the documents of European trans-national organisations as well as the US official documents. Reference to as many sources as possible in analyses of such a wide-scale discourse will provide the most reliable and valid results. Reference to visual media sources and newspapers could prove an important source of information as the information published in written media is subject to greater editing over a longer period of time. On the other hand, because speakers express themselves spontaneously, their message could be more immediate and representative.

Unfortunately Turkey's archives are not set up sufficiently systematically to facilitate

such research –a centralised archive system does not exist. In most cases, each radio and television station has its own archive. Nevertheless, even if such a body of information were available, its evaluation by a single person would exceed the scope of this work. Thus, the work is limited to newspapers with different points of view, official statements, parliamentary minutes and where necessary reference is made to documents issued by trans-national organisations in order to eliminate bias.

The sources used in this thesis can be divided into three categories: a) Three main newspapers, b) Archival studies-Official Documents, c) Books and articles.

Table-1 Circulation Rates of Selected Newspapers According to the Changes of Country Population and Total Circulation (1990-2012) Newspaper Reader Rates**



Circulation Rates, Population, and Reader Rates (Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, and Zaman Daily)

Years	Milliyet	Turkey's Population	Milliyet Reader Rate*	Cumhuriyet	Cumhuriyet Reader Rate*	Zaman	Zaman Reader Rate*
1990	360634	56473000	0.64	116727	0.21	47000	0.08
1995	634488	60614000	1.05	56039	0.09	312481	0.52
2000	428775	67768000	0.63	44282	0.07	188914	0.28
2005	252614	72065000	0.35	56218	0.08	514228	0.71
2010	240439	72561000	0.33	53959	0.07	815132	1.12
2012	133484	74724000	0.18	50907	0.07	980958	1.31

* Reader Rate: (Circulation*100)/Population

**Source: Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information

Newspapers: The news articles and columnists of the following newspapers: *Cumhuriyet* Daily¹⁵ - representative of hegemonic discourse; *Milliyet* Daily¹⁶ –which caters for liberal and statist audiences; and *Zaman* Daily¹⁷ – whose readers are mainly conservative and/or religious. Over the 17 years that this study considers, these publications did not experience significant changes in their ownership, while retaining strong influence over public opinion and decision makers, particularly on issues related to the research topic. The changes in the circulation rates of newspapers analysed in this study demonstrate a similar pattern with the normative changes of Turkish FSP.

These newspapers were selected for several reasons. First, they all represent different views which have many supporters. Second, these newspapers had the highest circulation rates among other newspapers supporting similar views. Third, all three newspapers had the oldest and most reliable archive systems which eased the research process.

¹⁵Centre-left, ultra nationalist newspaper, founded in 1924 right after the foundation of Turkish Republic. Some refer to the *Cumhuriyet* Daily as the “Local Pravda” (newspaper of USSR, and official organ of Communist Party) of Turkey. Despite its relatively low circulation rate, the ruling elite and prevailing opinion is represented by *Cumhuriyet*. It appears to have a steady circulation rate. When the increase of the country’s population and the total number of newspaper readers is taken into account, the number of *Cumhuriyet* readers has been steadily decreasing over the reasearch period. The number of readers is recorded as 56,039 in 1995; 44,282 in 2000; 56,218 in 2005. At the beginning of 2012, the rate was recorded as 50,907 (Table-1).

¹⁶Kemalist, centre-left. Founded in 1950. It was a popular newspaper in the 1990’s. However, the circulation rate is sharply decreasing. The circulation rate has been recorded as 634,488 in 1995; 428,775 in 2000; 252,614 in 2005. The circulation rate in 2012 is only 133,484 (Table-1).

¹⁷Conservative, supports democracy, and has a moderate worldview. Supported by -the biggest moderate Islamic Group-Gulen Movement. Founded in 1986. It has an increasing circulation rate. Its readership has been recorded as 312,481 in 1995; 188,914 in 2000; 514,228 in 2005. It has the highest newspaper circulation rate for the last few years in Turkey, at 980,958 in 2012 (Table-1).

The relevant data have been obtained by scanning and taking photos of articles from hard copies and where available, the internet web pages of these publications were searched using key-words.

Archival Studies-Official Documents: In acquiring the texts of parliamentary debates, the resources of library of the Parliament of the Republic of Turkey have been used. Texts of meetings were obtained from the GNAT Library, and key word searches were applied in identifying relevant materials. Miscellaneous speeches by politicians and other bureaucrats were obtained from relevant establishments, media groups and internet publications. Moreover, the resources of other newspapers were used, although not for discourse analyses, but to obtain memoirs and speech texts that could not be obtained from the other sources. It was not possible, however, to access such important sources as the archives of the Turkish MFA as the information was classified for academic researchers and the public. This was particularly the case for official information. As the research is based on analyses of discourses easily available to the public, such shortcoming will not affect the reliability and validity of the work.

Books and articles: In fact, as mentioned earlier, secondary sources of information are also very limited as there was no significant research done in the given field. The most important reason for that was the difficulty of producing an objective publication on the issue of the KQ. The fact that the period in question is fairly recent is also a limiting factor. However, works, especially by Western authors, highlighting historical background events, are very important. Articles, although limited in scope, take a modern approach to the subject.

The examination of large collections of newspaper clippings and long parliamentary debates offer the opportunity to develop findings from impressive resources of original material and gives a chance to support arguments put forward in the thesis. At the same time, however, the scale of the task – the example presented in this research involved an archive totalling over several thousand items – also presents an array of potential pitfalls and methodological challenges. To overcome this, the data will be filed according to hegemonic-subjugated discourse and historical turning points of the KQ.

It has been argued, though, that the more aggressive the media, the more influential the noise it creates over the issue, thus expanding the political discourse and feeding the language of government officials and other players.¹⁸ The positions of ultra-nationalist (both Turkish and Kurdish) and radical Islamist sources, who evaluate the KQ from the point of view of total anti-westernization, were not taken into account due to the same aggressive thoughts being repeatedly reiterated by groups they belong to, as well as these sources not finding any community support and not having any influence over decision makers.

¹⁸Ferrazzi. G, 'Using the "F" word: Federalism in Indonesia's decentralization discourse', *Publius*, 30(2): (2000). p65

STRUCTURE

In addition to the introduction and conclusion, this thesis will be composed of comprise four chapters.

Chapter 1 will provide a brief historical overview of the KQ in Turkey from the late Ottoman Empire until the birth of Kurdish ethnic identity in the early 20th century. In this chapter, events unfolding just before and after World War I will be studied in detail due to their profound influence, especially on Turkish FSP, in the following decades. This will be followed by a consideration of Kurdish-related events and people in countries established in the Middle East, i.e. Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria, after World War I. In this chapter, historical developments will be considered together with issues that are covered in the research chapters. This chapter will also cover the historical backgrounds of some of the norms that have driven Turkish FSP.

Chapter 2 will lay out the theoretical framework and methodology used in the research. This chapter will critically evaluate social constructivism's contribution to the field and draw its theoretical boundaries. Lastly, the discourse analysis method and its relation with constructivist IR will be presented.

Chapter 3 will analyse the Turkish perception of the EU. Within this framework, Turkey's EU membership application period from 1959 to the early 1990s will be briefly studied. Developments will then be summarised under four categories: Issues

associated with human rights, tensions between EU and Turkey, EU's recognition of PKK as a terrorist organization, and ongoing processes in which EU recognises the KQ.

Chapter 4 will summarise how Turkey has faced the European Council and Western European Countries with reference to the KQ, particularly in the areas of human rights, and the struggle against terrorism.

Chapter 5 will analyse the Turkish perception of the USA with regard to the KQ. The two main categories based on the First and Second Gulf War periods will be developed to make this chapter differ from the EU study part. The USA is given a separate importance because the KQ bears an important role in Turkish-American relationships in the post-1980s period.

Chapter 6 will detail the developments between Turkey and the USA after the Ak Party government came to power in 2002. This process coincides with the US's second occupation of Iraq, and therefore, it is important to shed light on how and why the USA, the biggest ally of the Kurds, became one of the most important players in the KQ.

CONCLUSION

Aiming to develop a triplex framework of (1) the KQ in Turkey, (2) Turkey's FSP, and (3) Turkey's relations with Western Society, this thesis specifically studies the international dimension of the KQ. It has two basic arguments: first, the KQ is the major cause of the deterioration in the relationship between Turkey and the West, in spite of alliances that go back over half a century. Second, Turkey's FSP is the main catalyst of that long-lasting troublesome relationship.

Current reflections of the KQ were grounded in the first years of the Turkish Republic. Despite the collective struggle, together with Kurds and pro-Islamic groups against the enemy states on the War of Independence, the first Turkish governments branded these two groups as an "internal threat" to the state's FSP and became the major targets of the Republic's "Turkification and secularization" program.¹⁹ After the foundation of the Republic, both Kurds and Pro-Islamist groups initiated uprisings; however, they were suppressed harshly. Kurdish political movements could take place only after the 1960s. Nevertheless, a terrorist organization, claiming to represent the only voice of the Kurds, eliminated all other Kurdish political movements after the 1980s.

¹⁹For analyses of this dual threat and an understanding of Turkey's security policy, please see: Taspinar.O, *Kurdish nationalism and political Islam in Turkey : Kemalist identity in transitio*. (New York ; London, Routledge 2005)

KQ in Turkey's history has become a more problematic field especially after the 1980s. Moreover, this problem is not just extended by the activities revolutionist terrorist organization, and not but just because of faults of Western countries, but many other agents and figures within Turkey facilitated a suitable climate for a growing KQ.

This study sheds lights on how these figures were very influential by using anti-Western perceptions in Turkey due to foreign and security policy norms. Three major norms (status quo, Westernism, and The Sèvres Syndrome) were utilized by the elite composition of civilian-military security bureaucracy, judiciary and the thinking class of society. This normative framework usually barricaded Turkish governments' initiatives whenever they attempted a solution.

Although the contemporary history of the KQ is inextricably interwoven with that of the PKK, the KQ is of course related to many social, political, economic, cultural, and international issues as well. Readers of this thesis will find an opportunity to understand the KQ, Turkish FSP, and international reflections of the KQ and FSP. Since it is the first study investigating this phenomenon using discourse analysis as the method and a constructivist approach as the theoretical framework, it will be an original piece of research and a contribution to the literature of international relations.

CHAPTER I: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION

Kurds populate the area that lies in the middle of a region that is predominantly Turkish, but which also takes in part of Iraq, Iran, Syria, Armenia and Azerbaijan. This area is referred to in Western literature as “Kurdistan”, but this is a relative concept that identifies an area that is lived in by the Kurds, and which has no political autonomy. Kurds live in mountainous terrain, share the same routes and are predominantly Sunni Muslims, but speak different dialects and follow different religious practices and are thus unable to form a single political entity. For centuries, these people had lived an isolated life within the Ottoman and Persian Empires, segregated and far from the centre, and this led to disagreements on various issues.²⁰

This Chapter summarizes historical events in terms of the KQ during the Ottoman Empire as well as in the modern Republic of Turkey. It can be claimed that Kurds have become “a problem” only during the last century. The reasons for this shift, the historical developments and discussions of the KQ are examined in this chapter.

²⁰For a concise overview of Kurdish history: Arfa.H, *The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study*, (London: Oxford University Press. 1966), Bulloch.J, Harvey.M, *No Friends but the Mountains: The Tragic History of the Kurds*, (New York: Oxford University Press. 1992), McDowall.D, *A Modern History of the Kurds* (London ; New York, I.B. Tauris : Distributed by St. Martin's Press. 2004), Jwadih.W, *The Kurdish National Movement Its Origin and Development*, (NewYork: Syracuse University Press. 2006)

1.1 KURDS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Although in the past, several Turkish states have influenced the area inhabited by the Kurds, the existing relationship began when the Ottoman Empire took over the region, which happened in the first half of the sixteenth century as a result of a combination of diplomacy and successful military campaigns. During this period, as a result of the 1514 Caldiran war between the Ottomans and the Shia Safavids, the existing Turkish-Iranian borders were defined (with minor variations) and were, later, confirmed by the Kasr-i Sirin Agreement of 1639.²¹ Another important result of this division was the separation of Kurds living in this area between Ottoman and Iranian (Safavids') States. This became the first step towards today's division of the Kurds. Later, in 1828, an Agreement between Russia and Iran resulted in the Kurds who live today within modern Armenia and Azerbaijan remaining under the hegemony of Russia.

When the region was taken over by the Ottoman Empire, three main cities, Diyarbakir, Rakka -in Syria- and Mosul, were established. The administrative divisions were subject to taxes and military obligations that were applicable in other areas of the Empire. This lasted until the nineteenth century, and the vast majority of Kurdish uprisings were the result of a failure to fulfil these duties. The hard to reach areas were totally left autonomous; their leaders were recognised by the state, and these

²¹ Bruinessen. M. v., *Agha, Shaik and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan* (Istanbul: Iletisim Publication. 2006) p.205, 217

positions became hereditary. These areas were also exempt from paying taxes and from any military obligations to central government.²²

As part of a policy of strengthening the central government's authority at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the historical structure of Kurdish administrative divisions had been abolished and replaced by a centrally appointed governor. These governors could not, however, establish their authority and from the second half of the nineteenth century a new structure appeared that was able to establish its authority over Kurdish areas, namely the Nakshbandi and Kadiri networks. Their authority was as much religious as political. These developments coincided with the Ottoman Empire's newly crowned Sultan Abdulhamid's Pan-Islamist politics. By taking into account the structure of Kurdish society, and by recognising the leadership of the Agha and the Sheikh, he ensured that the Kurds would take the side of the empire. The period of Abdulhamid thus became the time of the establishment of a Kurdish ethnic identity, and the first Kurdish newspaper was printed then. It was during his reign, however, that the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), who by a coup ended the Hamid Regime in 1908, and who saw that the state was being split by ethnic uprisings as a result of 1912-13 Balkan Wars, prohibited any ethnic organisations. This situation became the reason for Kurdish movements to take on a more nationalistic character and for Kurdish nationalist groups to start up in the Eastern areas.

While the war was underway, the entente Powers were trying to come to an agreement over how to split up the Ottoman Empire. This could be identified as the

²²Ibid. p.239-241

starting point of the KQ taking on an international dimension, through the negotiations of the Sykes-Picot agreement, which was concluded in 1916. According to the Sykes-Picot agreement, the Ottoman State was to be split between Britain, France and Russia. Mosul Wilayah²³ was split between the French and the British. The French wanted to create a buffer zone between Russia, which was allocated today's Eastern Turkey, and Britain, which was allocated control of Mesopotamia. A week after the Mondros Armistice of 31st October 1918, Britain invaded the areas left to the French, as a result of which the area populated by the Kurds became recognised internationally.

The creation of a Kurdish state was initially based on the 1906 publication of a map by the British Royal Geographic Society and it was put on the agenda as a result of the report by the Crane Commission at the Paris Peace Conference that started on January 10th, 1919.²⁴ The biggest role in this was played by Britain, who did not want a Kurdish State that for geographical reasons would not be able to maintain its own security, which would antagonise Iranian Kurds and most importantly, which would create an enlarged Kurdish state that would include areas rich in natural resources.²⁵ With this aim, Britain prevented representatives from areas of today's Iraq from taking part in the conference.²⁶ Kurdish interests were represented by General Cherif Pasha, a representative of the Istanbul-centred Kurdish Teali Society, and former Ottoman

²³This was a Mosul region under Ottoman rule and included large areas around existing city of Mosul – Please refer to Map 1

²⁴Attar. A. R. S., *Kurds, Regional and Extraterritorial Powers (Kürtler, Bölgesel ve Bölge Dışı Güçler)* (Istanbul: ANKA Publication. 2004) p. 87-91

²⁵Ibid. (p.87-91)

²⁶Eskander, S. 'Britain's Policy in Southern Kurdistan: The Formation and the Termination of the First Kurdish Government, 1918-1919' *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 27(2): 139-163. (2000)

ambassador to Sweden. Because the Sèvres Agreement between Cherif Pasha and the Head of the Armenian delegation Bogos Nubar Pasha gave away extensive land concessions when it came to the Kurdish state's borders, the conservative Kurds refused to give their support to an "agreement with an Armenian infidel".²⁷ As a result of a series of conferences held between February 12th and July 11th 1920, the allies agreed to decisions that envisaged the partitioning of Ottoman Empire and invited the Ottoman delegates to Sèvres.²⁸

The position of the Anatolian Kurds was raised at the Treaty of Sèvres, signed between Ottoman Empire and the Entente powers on August 10, 1920, after the Paris Conference. However, the Sèvres Treaty, which had provided for local autonomy for the Kurdish people, was never ratified. This event had a great influence on Turkish western vision and created the-so-called "Sèvres Syndrome" that exists even now. Articles 62-64 of Chapter III of the Sèvres Treaty²⁹ were drafted in the light of US President Wilson's call to recognise the rights of minorities, envisaged creation of an independent Kurdistan in Anatolia.

By ensuring that they wanted independence and through the promise of being able to receive it if they applied to the League of Nations, a Kurdish autonomous area was

²⁷ For detailed information on this period please refer to Yildiz.H, *Kurdistan into Sevres-Lusanne-Mosul Triangle in French's Official Documents (Fransiz Belgeleriyle Sevr-Lozan-Musul Üçgeninde Kürdistan)* (Istanbul: Doz Publication. 2005)

²⁸ Oran.B, *Turkish Foreign Policy (Turk Dis Politikasi)*. (Istanbul: Iletisim Publication. 2002) p.118-124

²⁹ See Appendix-2 for the details of these Articles).

envisaged with clear Southern and undefined Northern borders³⁰. Oran makes clear that the insertion of such an agreement was a British ploy to create an area under its control, and most particularly, that Britain wanted control of the oil-rich southern Kurdish regions.³¹

Meanwhile, Kurdish nationalists considered the Sèvres Treaty as the most appropriate time for the creation of an independent Kurdistan.³² In response to this, the leader of the National struggle M. Kemal Atatürk, who on 19th of May 1919 moved from Istanbul to Ankara, got in touch with leading Kurdish figures. By using the argument of the Paris Conference that later led to the idea of creating an Armenian state that would include large parts of the Kurdish-populated areas, Atatürk called on the Kurds for unity by putting forward and stressing brotherhood based on common religious values. Major Edward Noel, the first British political figure to negotiate with Kurdish leaders, who had meanwhile met local leaders in order to try and mobilise Anatolian Kurds in favour of British interests, but was unable to gain their support.³³

Between 23 July and 07 August 1919, the first regional congress was held in Erzurum, attended by 22 Kurdish delegates.³⁴ Then, on 22nd October 1919, the group who were leading the national struggle, signed the Amasya Protocol with the Ottoman government which proclaimed that it had been decided to provide “ethnic and social

³⁰ The borders of the Armenian state to be established were left to be defined by the USA, during the Paris Conference

³¹ Ibid. p.131

³² Chaliand. G, *A People without a Country : The Kurds and Kurdistan*, Olive Branch Press. 1993) p.40-41

³³ Mesut. A, *Kurdistan into British Official Documents -İngiliz Belgelerinde Kurdistan*, (Istanbul: Doz Publication. 1992) p.70-73

³⁴ Taspınar, O. (2005).p.75

support wherever and in whatever form necessary for free development of Kurds”³⁵ In the first parliament that established the Turkish State on 23rd April 1920, 74 representatives from Kurdish areas were present. Hur argued that the reason why Ataturk gave such promises to the Kurds was because of Britain’s activities in the region through Noel.³⁶

As if proving Ataturk’s worries, uprisings took place between February 1920 and June 1921 as a protest against the way MPs were elected and the inaction of MPs with regards to the Sèvres Treaty in today’s Tunceli area.³⁷ The uprising that took place during the time when the struggle was on the Western front with Greek forces was regarded by Ankara as British-instigated insurgency. Hur argues that the rebels requested help from the British and French aggressor powers, but this request was turned down by them due to the fear of facing the ever growing powers of the Kemalist movement.³⁸

The new era starts with the invasion of the Greek army, who used the decisions of the Paris Peace Conference on Eastern Anatolia as a pretext for their invasion. They were then defeated by the Turkish army on September 9th, 1922. The Ankara government represented Turkey at the Lausanne conference that ended both the Turkish-Greek and First World wars. The issue of who should represent Turkey at the

³⁵ Selek.S, *National Resistance (Milli Mucadele)*. (Istanbul: Orgun Publication. 2002) p.328

³⁶ ‘Kurds from the Ottoman to the Present’ Taraf, 21.10.2009

³⁷ For details on the uprising refer to Kahraman.A, *Kocgiri Popular Movement : 1919-1921 Kurdish Uprisings -Kocgiri Halk Hareketi: 1919-1921 Kürt İsyanları*), (Istanbul: Komal Publication. 2004) p.267-275

³⁸ ‘Kurds from the Ottoman to the Present’ Taraf, 21.10.2009

Conference was decided by the Parliament in Ankara that concluded the end of the Ottoman Government in Istanbul on 1st November 1922.³⁹ The Agreement that was signed on 24th July 1923 was an important milestone in the way that the Kurdish issue would develop. Ismet Inonu, the Turkish representative at the Conference, introduced himself as the representative of “Turks and Kurds”. The status of minorities was given to only Christian and Jewish communities -Greeks, Armenians and Jews; while Muslim Kurds were considered native citizens.

Mosul’s status is another important topic that was raised but not resolved at the conference. Oran⁴⁰ argues that in January 1923, prior to end of Lausanne conference, Ataturk was of the opinion that because of, the Sèvres agreement, Mosul could not be taken from Britain. The Turkish-Iraqi border was drawn up accordingly, which resulted in a division of the Kurds. The Mosul issue was solved on 05 June 1926 in Ankara by the “Agreement on Turkish – Iraqi borders and Friendship” drawn up between Turkey, Iraq and Britain, which defined the final Turkish – Iraqi borders.

³⁹Oran, B. (2002) p. 215-216

⁴⁰Ba, A.D., Hoffmann.M.J. *Contending Perspectives on Global Governance : Coherence, Contestation and World Order*, (London: Routledge. 2005) p.223

1.2 THE KURDISH QUESTION IN THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY⁴¹

The Turkish Republic that was proclaimed on 29th October 1923 replaced the Sultanate that was physically ended prior to the Lausanne conference. From this date to the death of Atatürk in 1938, however, seventeen Kurdish uprisings took place. The main reason for these uprisings was the formation of the new republic which solved a great deal of external problems but caused rapid internal revolution. This revolution was, in Taspinar's words, "authoritarian and elitist".⁴² It was brought about against the nation's will, and led to the secularisation of society, and the homogenisation of a single "Turkish" nation. Kurds were used to having a certain degree of autonomy under Ottoman rule. At the same time a new taxation system by central government was being imposed. Previously, the Khalifat movement, which had helped the Turks after the Treaty of Sèvres, had been a unifying factor, but this had now collapsed.⁴³ The nationalist and centralist approaches that were now being adopted created unease among the Kurds and at the same time, factors such as common beliefs and a perception of common danger were being eroded. In spite of this, principles of

⁴¹ For Kurds and Politics in Modern Turkey: Barkey, H., 'Turkey, Islamic Politics, and the Kurdish Question' *World Policy Journal* 13(1): 43-52. (1996), Barkey, H. J. and Fuller, G. E., 'Turkey's Kurdish Question: Critical Turning Points and Missed Opportunities' *Middle East Journal* 51(1): 59-79. (1997), Gunter, M. M. 'The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development' *Middle East Journal* 61(1): 167-168. (2007), Gunter, M. M. 'The Unwelcome Neighbour: Turkey's Kurdish policy' *Middle East Journal* 62(1): 167-168. (2008), Gunter, M. M. 'Blood and belief: The PKK and the Kurdish fight for independence' *Middle East Policy* 15(1): 172-175. (2008), Kirisci, K. and Winrow, G. M., *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict*. (London: Frank Cass. 1997), Kirisci, K., *The Kurdish Question and Turkish Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: MA: MIT press. 2004), Lundberg, A., *The Unwelcome Neighbour Turkey's Kurdish Policy*. (London: I.B.Tauris. 2007), Olson, R. W., *The Kurdish nationalist movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East* Lexington, Ky., University Press of Kentucky (1996), Robbins, P., R. Olson, *More Apparent than real? The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky. 1996), Tachau, F., 'The Kurds and the Future of Turkey' *American Political Science Review* 92(4): 961-962. (1998), Taspinar, O., *Kurdish nationalism and political Islam in Turkey: Kemalist Identity in Transition*. (New York: London, Routledge. 2005)

⁴² Taspinar, O. (2005) p.77

⁴³ Oran, B. (2002). p.266-267

common belief were used as a basis for the struggle against Armenian and other foreign invaders and there was a certain degree of recognition of Kurdish identity.

The politics of westernisation, militant secularism and Turkish nationalism that were pursued by Ankara during those years totally estranged the Kurds. The 'Turkification' that was implemented through education particularly affected the Kurds because it prohibited teaching in other than Turkish. While schools that provided religious education were being closed, the expressions that referred to area called "Kurdistan" were erased from maps and official documents. Kurdish towns and villages were renamed, and given Turkish names.⁴⁴

In response to these changes, and because of the collapse of the Khalifat, the Sheikh Said uprisings began on 13th February 1925. The characteristics of these uprisings were important from the point of view of the KQ in today's Turkey. Referring to relevant records from the Cabinet of Ministers, Hur argues that the Ministry of Defence, assessing the situation "as a hospitable environment for propaganda from internal and external enemies" requested the Cabinet of Ministers "... to take all necessary actions ..." "to make the riots spread on the reactionary grounds and misleading rather than on the grounds of discrimination".⁴⁵ By this, of two characters: Kurdish and reactionary, the reactionary character is being put forward. And this has been reflected in the history books up until recently. In official history books the "Kurdish"

⁴⁴ Taspinar, O. (2005) p. 79-80

⁴⁵ 'Kurds from the Ottoman to the Present' Taraf, 21.10.2009

side of the uprising is hardly touched. However, Sheikh Said explains the reasons for the uprising as follows: “

*“With the Turks, we had a common religion and a state based on Sharia and the Khalif. The Khalifat was ended, however, by a one-sided decision taken by the Turks, and our common aim has disappeared. It was from this that was born the desire of the Kurds to follow our own path, gain independence and build our own future.”*⁴⁶

It is evident that the uprisings were fed by both religious and nationalistic emotions. The widespread view of the importance of this uprising from the point of view of international relations was that Turkey was left out of negotiations on Mosul, whose future was left for further discussion by Britain and not included in the Lausanne Agreement. The point of view that prevailed within the Turkish government was that both during the Mosul uprising, and later during the Nesturi uprisings in Hakkari, the British government, through propaganda and international relations, tacitly encouraged the break out of the Sheikh Said uprisings in the provinces and beyond.⁴⁷

This reflected the widely accepted view of the “existence of the West behind the Kurdish uprising” that started with Sèvres and continues today. On the other hand, it would have been a mistake for Britain to have encouraged Kurdish nationalism that could have split over into areas that were under its own control, as the Sheikh Mahmud Barzanci Kurdish riots in Mosul city had only recently been suppressed. Yet, prior to establishing the Republic of Turkey, US president Woodrow Wilson, who had

⁴⁶ Kahraman, A. (2004) p. 74

⁴⁷ Inonu, I. *Memories (Hatıralar)*. (Istanbul, Bilgi Publication. 2006) p.202

great influence in defining British politics in the region, argued that the best way to serve British interests was by way of separation of Ottoman Kurdistan from Southern Kurdistan and the creation of two Arab cities of Baghdad and Basra that would make a single state under British rule.⁴⁸ The only person from among the British officials who objected to the idea was Major Edward Noel.⁴⁹ Noel advocated more autonomy for the Kurds and wanted the areas inhabited by the Kurds to be considered in their entirety; however this approach was not shared by the British government.⁵⁰

The Turkish Republic's insistence on the Mosul issue and the military campaigns of the Turks against the British during the Lausanne negotiations, were based on the fear that the British were about to grant independence to the Kurds living in Iraqi territories. The Turks worried that if the Kurds in Iraq were granted autonomy, then the Kurds living in Turkish territories would also demand autonomy. As a precaution, the British announced that they would not uphold their promise to give greater autonomy to the Kurds as was considered during the Sèvres Treaty negotiations, and officially proposed to the Turks that all the Kurdish-inhabited territories should be united in Mesopotamia-Iraq.⁵¹

In the correspondences of the British government dated 22nd April 1925, concerning Sheikh Said's uprising, it is reported that there was evidence and witness statements confirming British involvement in the uprisings. These accusations must have been

⁴⁸ Eskander, S. (2000) p.146, 148

⁴⁹ Known among Kurds as Lawrence of the Kurds.

⁵⁰ Ibid. p.146, Mesut, A. (1992) p.59

⁵¹ Ibid. p. 141

related to British activities in the region during 1919-1920s, however, and there could not have been any evidence of British involvement in Sheikh Said's uprising.⁵² During the same period, the son of Sheikh Said, Ali Riza, met the British ambassador to Iran/Tabriz and expressed his wish to travel to London via Baghdad to ask for support from the British government to establish an independent Kurdish state. He, in turn, was told that the British government was already aware of the issue and that his trip to Britain would not serve any purpose.⁵³ During the Uprising, the Turkish Air Force was noted as being inadequate and plans were put into place to develop it. With this purpose, in accordance with an agreement signed on 5th of June 1925 between the Republic of Turkey and the British Empire, a report was prepared by the British and Italian attachés in Istanbul. Despite the traditional historical view that Britain backed the riots, Hur finds it "meaningful" that there was military co-operation with Britain to win the struggle.⁵⁴ Oran, moving from the outcome to the cause, argues that although there is no clear evidence of Britain's instigation of the riots Britain stood to make large gains from them, and he therefore concludes that the British instigated the uprisings.⁵⁵ Contrary to these approaches, according to Kaymaz, there is no clear evidence of a British role; however it is very likely that the British intelligence officer in the region, Dobbs, was involved. During the uprising, Dobbs was unusually silent, and Kaymaz argues that where there is no documentary evidence, silence can in itself be revealing.⁵⁶

⁵² Ibid. p. 181

⁵³ Ibid. p. 189-191

⁵⁴ Hur.A, 'Turkish Air Force Training Area: Kurdish Uprisings' Taraf, 22.11.2009

⁵⁵ Oran.B., *Ataturk's Nationalism, Study Beyond Official Ideolog-Ataturk Milliyetciligi, Rresmi Ideoloji Disi Bir Inceleme*, (Ankara, Bilgi Publucation. 1999) p. 214-220

⁵⁶ Kaymaz, I. S. *The Musul Question-Musul Sorun*, (Istanbul: Otopsi Publications. 2003) p. 468-495

The uprisings were regarded by the newly established Turkish state as an attempt to overthrow it. By the “Plan of Reforms of the East” that was announced immediately after the uprisings in 1925, the region’s leading figures were sent into exile. This policy was adopted on a greater scale following the law passed in 1927. The uprisings were religion in character, and they were followed by many changes, such as the transfer of the alphabet from Arabic to Latin characters, and prohibition of religious dress. In 1928, the provision declaring Islam the official religion of the Turkish Republic was repealed, and the Constitution became secular.

In 1927, former members of what had previously been known as the Kurdistan Teali Society, together with tribal leaders and members of the Armenian Tashnak Committee established a Xoybun (Independence) organisation in Lebanon. This new organisation was accepted as the replacement for all the earlier organisations, and in 1928 it claimed the establishment of a Kurdish state by setting up an army of several thousand people under leadership of a former Ottoman soldier, Ihsan Nuri Bey, in the surroundings of Mount Agri. The organisation also sought ways of making agreement with the Iranian State and decided to establish good relationships with the French in Syria and the British in Iraq. The Turkish State concluded that it would not reach any agreement by way of negotiations and started a military campaign on 11th June 1930. After heavy losses, the leader of the Kurdish groups, Ihsan Nuri, sought refuge in Iran.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ Jwaideh, W. (2006)p. 418-426

The last riots of the early days of the Republic took place in January 1937 in the Dersim Region, and it was characteristically quite similar to the first serious riots of the Kochgiri Uprisings. Yet it started in Alevis, an area populated by more secular minded Shia Kurds. This insurgency broke out as a result of the demolishing of the feudal system in the Kurdish-populated regions and the implementation of policies aiming to assimilate the Kurds into Turkey by means of forceful relocation. The riots ended in 1938 following heavy losses as a result of a large scale campaign by the Turkish forces followed by the surrender and subsequent execution of the rebels' leader, Said Riza.

The KQ was the cause of much trauma, especially at policy-making level, and was the reason behind such international agreements as the Sadabat Pact made in the East of Turkey. The Sadabat Pact, which was signed during the Dersim uprisings, aimed to resolve the border issue between Iran and its neighbouring countries. The signatories of the Pact, Turkey, Iran and Iraq, shared the common worry of how to take control of the Kurdish tribes, as the rebels were seeking refuge in neighbouring countries which caused problems for their host nations.⁵⁸

The politics of converting everybody into Turks as part of an overall philosophy applied to the region by the Turkish state continued until the transition of the political system of the country to a multi-party system in 1945. The aim of the policy was to incorporate communities of different ethnic backgrounds into an environment where

⁵⁸ Oran, B. (2002) p. 253

race was not at the forefront, and which was based on a common morality, history and geographical borders.⁵⁹

During 1940s, developments in the international arena such as gaining membership of the UN, choosing the West, as opposed to Russia, as an ally and being included in the Marshall Plan , sped up its transition into a multi-party political system. The first elections held in 1950 were won by the Democratic Party-Demokrat Parti (DP) established in 1946. The first attempt to democratize society ended when the Military, on 27th May 1960, carried out a coup that was aimed at removing the DP following, as was announced, the introduction of authoritarian politics. During this coup, the Kurds faced treatment similar to that meted out during the early stages of the establishment of the Republic, by members of the coup who were afraid that the riots started in 1958 in Iraq would spill over into Turkey.⁶⁰

Ironically, the 1961 constitution, despite being the result of a coup, laid the foundation for an even more liberal political environment. The Turkey Labour Party (TWP) was established, and even though it did not openly promote programmes aimed at Kurdish ethnicities, a number of Kurdish intellectuals became involved with this party. It played a great role in shaping the ideological foundation of future Kurdish politics and its accompanying armed struggle, which lay behind the Kurdish explanation that the

⁵⁹ Taspinar, O. (2005) p. 82

⁶⁰ Ibid. p. 88

problem grew out of socio-economic deprivation and a class struggle, rather than ethnic discrimination.⁶¹

In the 1970s, while the Turkish left was radicalizing for revolutionary purposes, most Kurds in the TWP started setting up a new organization based on ethnic grounds. The Revolutionary Cultural Hearts of the East RCHE was one of them. RCHE created a large network, in Eastern Anatolia, that was rooted in Marxist ideology and Kurdish ethnicity. However, in March 1970, the RCHE was dissolved and a number of its members were imprisoned for fear of spreading the problem onto its own territories following the Baath-Barzani peace deal in Iraq.⁶² In mid-1974, differences started appearing between the Turkish left and the Kurdish left by the former accusing the latter of disregarding class problems, and the latter arguing that the preconditions for carrying out a proletariat revolution on their ethnic territories were right.

When the left leaning groups raised their voices all over Turkey, Eastern Anatolia was no exception. The leftist groups in South-Eastern Turkey asserted their superiority by discussing the role of the “Tribes” in the region. Tribal superiority had always been a societal problem of that region. Tribe Leaders, also known as “*Aşiret Ağaları*”, had the only authority over the region’s people. Nobody could do anything without getting authorization from the Tribe Leader.

⁶¹ Ibid. p. 90

⁶² Ibid. p. 93

This situation was taken advantage of by Kurdish leftist groups such as the *Talebeler* (students) in cities such as *Şanlıurfa*. The Talebeler were younger people with a high school or university education who existed alongside local gang leaders until they were transformed into another group, the PKK – the Kurdish Marxist Leninist organization. The PKK was set up on 27th October 1978, and later became the single representative of Kurdish revolution. The PKK was also known as “Apojular” after their leader Abdullah Ocalan, and since the cold war was not over yet, were seen as being under Soviet influence.⁶³

The fact that the leadership of the PKK was in Syria, a country that had close relationships with Soviet Union, was a factor that reinforced these suspicions. In 1987 “hot pursuit” agreements were signed concerning security with Syria and military operations on its territory with Iraq. In response to this, Syria denied the presence of the organisation’s leader on its territory and following the agreement arranged a meeting between Ocalan and Soviet representatives.⁶⁴

More than any other Kurdish movement, the PKK made establishing a united and independent Kurdish state its primary goal. The movement, established by its founder Abdullah Ocalan who was known to have supported Mao’s “People’s Revolution”, was not widely known until August 15th 1984 when it carried out its first large protest. The grip of a struggle between right and left that led to military intervention which resulted in the 1980 coup. It was followed by the implementation of a new

⁶³ ‘Apocular and the Soviets Have Common Aims’, *Milliyet*, 25.11.1984

⁶⁴ Ibrahim, F.. *The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey*, (St. Martin’s Press. 2000) p. 123, 174

Constitution and other amendments in legislation that brought greater restrictions on freedom of speech – a move that was particularly targeted at the Kurds. In addition, a number of people, some of them leaders of existing Kurdish organisations, were jailed and tortured in Diyarbakir Prison. Some even lost their lives for belonging to illegal organizations. These events increased the PKK's influence and enabled them to spread their ideological propaganda and continue their recruitment activities.

CONCLUSION

It can be stated that the KQ is the result of a transformation of the world at the beginning of the twentieth century. For many historians, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was one of the most important changes in world history. The leading countries of the world in the 1900s, particularly the Allies, had been very influential in shaping the world's political design.

This is the period when KQ appeared on the international agenda. While the Ottoman state was collapsing and the maps of areas inhabited by Kurds were re-drawn, Britain did not support establishment of a Kurdish state and, instead, pursued the politics of gaining control over oil reserves. Hence, the Kurds living in Iraq and those living in today's Turkey have, politically, split.

The Kurds of the Ottoman Empire, and later of the Turkish Republic, had been offered a status that was neither independent nor self-determined. Only by the 1920s Sèvres agreement could the Kurds living within Turkey were be seen in the light of autonomy.

While the policies pursued by the West at the time were leaving permanent marks on Turkish state and the society, the so-called Sèvres Syndrome, that in the further chapters will be examined as the cause "of suspicion towards politics pursued by the West. The politics of the Turkish Republic to create the national identity centred on Turkishness and secularisation of the society destroyed the unity between Kurds and Turks that was created with newly emerged Turkish state during the independence

war. As a result, history witnessed a number of Kurdish uprisings by the end of 1930s. Within the Sèvres Syndrome norms, ruling elite argued that the West lies behind these upraising. In all pacts with neighbouring states, the idea of preventing the establishment of a Kurdish State was at the forefront of negotiations.”

As Turkey was moving to a multi-party political system in the post WWII period, it also sided with anti-USSR alliance. While the footprints of Kurdish identity were being erased, Turkey, as an important ally against the USSR, had policies on KQ that were not questioned by the West. As with many other countries of the world, the socialist waves of the 1960s affected Turkey, and several left-wing derogative actions against the Turkish state took place. While there was no process of establishment of an independent Kurdish movement since the 1930s up until this period, the Kurdish groups, consisting, particularly, of university students, started seeing themselves within these left movements. The Kurdish groups in question that increased their activities from the mid-1970s played an important role in establishing the PKK, which from 1978 started claiming to be representing interests of all Kurds and which had taken Mao’s proletarian revolution as a role model for itself.⁶⁵

This chapter briefly evaluates the background history of Kurdish movement and is important as it will help to better understand theoretical frameworks and research chapters of this study. FSP norms that paved the way to problems that Turkey experienced in its relationship with the West in the post Cold War period of between

⁶⁵See Appendix-1 for KQ history

1989 and 2007, were driven by the KQ, and have been mainly shaped by the historical events in question. In the following chapter, the theoretic framework and the methodological vehicles created by it that altogether made the normative work possible, will be evaluated.

CHAPTER II: THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

The most important rationale for conducting this study is to fill in the gap in the international relations literature on the root causes of problems in Turkey's relations with the West as it relates to the KQ. In this regard, this study uses a constructivist theoretical framework in order to explain Turkey's FSP. The study argues that domestic norms and domestic idealistic structure are the most determinative factors on Turkey's FSP. Moreover, domestic normative/idealistic structure is effective in forming common discourses, via the KQ, causing negative ideas and opinions about the West. These norms can easily be observed in the hegemonic discourse of Turkey's security and foreign policy establishment whenever the KQ is on the agenda of Turkey and the West. In this framework, this study will examine the discourse used by the Turkish FSP establishment in the 1990s, how the KQ changed and shaped Turkey's FSP, and attitudes of the public towards the KQ. Besides, subjugated discourse, as a critique of hegemonic discourse, will be analysed to see whether it affects discussions on the KQ and normative changes in Turkey. In addition, Turkey's relations with the European Union will be examined since Turkey has signed a Custom Union Agreement with the EU and the EU has been the most effective instrument on Turkey's KQ. The study will also look into to what extent the CoE and some European countries are effective on the Kurdish issue. On the other hand, although the US involvement in the KQ seemed to have started in the 1980s, its direct engagement in this issue occurred during the Gulf War and the Iraq invasion of 2003. These developments will be examined in the last chapters.

Before detailing the theoretical approach adopted by this study, it would be useful to provide a brief discussion regarding why other mainstream international relations theories such as neo-realism, neo-liberalism, and international political economy (IPE) fall short in explaining Turkey's KQ and its effects on Turkey's FSP towards the Western world.

First of all, neo-realists do not consider states as primary actors of the international system. The outcomes of foreign policy are shaped by an international structure that has influence over a state's choices and actions, thus being also referred to as "structural realism". This international structure has been accepted by neo-realists as anarchical. For neo-realists, power matters and contains a very useful and effective means in shaping the state policy. Thus, military security overrides economic policies.¹ In its interpretation of the international system, the neo-realist school of thought focuses its attention on the structure of the system, rather than the processes, very often interactive and immersive, that take place within it.² In neo-realism, there is no place for international cooperation or impact of international institutions. Neo-realism also disregards the concept of social power, because power is equal to material capabilities that can be owned and used or passed on to others by a state.³

¹Thies, Cameron. G. Are two theories better than one? A constructivist model of the neorealist-neoliberal debate. *International Political Science Review*, 2004, 25, 159-183. p 162, Waltz, K. N. *Theory of international politics*, Reading, Mass. ; London, Addison-Wesley, 1979 p 126.

²Tarzi, Shah M. Neorealism, neoliberalism and the international system. *International Studies* 2004, 41, 115-128. pp. 116-9.

³Fabbri, Claudia M., *Social Constructivism and the Role of Ideas: The Construction of Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Cooperation, 1979-1991*, (Warwick, University of Warwick, PhD Thesis, 2005), p 6

In the neo-liberal view, individual states are the most important actors, and they engage in relationships for gains. However, in contrary to the neorealist perspective, this engagement does not end up with clashes, but in cooperation and prosperity. According to the neoliberal view, the bad results in human behaviour are the result of bad arrangements.⁴ Like neo-realists, neoliberals view the structure of the interstate system as anarchical; however, this does not prevent them from arguing that this continuous character of world structure further promotes interaction among states.⁵ World politics has reached a certain point and consists of not only wars and conflicts, but also cooperation and partnership.⁶ The neo-liberal view has also argued that increasing links among states and their mutual interdependence cause states to obtain more information about each other, thus, preventing the growth of hostility among them.⁷ Thus, neo-liberalism highlights positive outcomes of world politics, especially among the liberal democracies.

This, in turn, leads to a conclusion that, neo-liberalism draws the argument's attention on the role of international actors, the impacts of interdependence, and the effects the existing global business and overall globalisation have on the behaviour of sovereign states.⁸

Transnational economic institutions and interest groups, trans-governmental organisations as well as states positively shape international politics.⁹ By this, new areas of interest and market opportunities emerge as dominating focus points, rather than military and security interests.¹⁰ Also, the bureaucratic structure of a state is considered as non-unitary, but

⁴Demirtas-Coskun, B. Turkey, *Germany and the Wars in Yugoslavia*. Berlin, Freie Universitat Berlin, 2006, p.42

⁵Thies (2004) p 162

⁶Demirtas-Coskun, B. (2006), p 42

⁷Ibid p45

⁸Tarzi (2004), p 119

⁹ibid p119

¹⁰Demirtas-Coskun, (2006), p 42

consisting of various interest groups. Thus, foreign and security policy consists of constant negotiations among relevant interest groups, and this can be summarized as foreign and security policy with its transnational structures is an end product of negotiation periods of interest groups functioning within a state.¹¹

While, in neo-realism it is the structure that is on the foreground, in neo-liberalism it is the process that is the focus of attention. In both approaches the field of international relations is anarchical; however, they have differing views on anarchy. According to neo-realists, the state of anarchy pushes states to behave in the environment of self-survival; in other words, the state behaviour is more about gains than anything else. Neoliberals, on the other hand, argue that cooperation in key issues will lead to more productive outcomes in the anarchic environment. For them, absolute gains are achievable primarily through international cooperation.¹² However, the differences do not end here. The uneven distribution and possession of power and resources is seen by neo-realists as driving force for the formation and functioning of the international system, whereas, neo-liberals regard international rules and institutions to be at the heart of the international system.¹³

On the other hand, IPE, according to some scholars, covers everything in IR that falls beyond security studies. Others go even further by arguing that IPE is not discipline within IR, but vice versa—IR is a discipline of IPE.¹⁴ IPE offers an interdisciplinary approach that is used in

¹¹Ibid. p.43

¹²Thies, (2004), p 160-161

¹³Tarzi, (2004),p 117

¹⁴Harvey, Frank P. and Brecher, Michael; *The Essence of Millennial Reflections on International Studies, Millennial Reflections on International Studies*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002; Project MUSE. Web. 20 Mar. 2013) p 19

analysing economy, law, and politics. Political institutions examine ways in which economic system and public groups influence each other. In conflict analyses, with the purpose of conflict prevention and conflict resolution, it is important to take into account economic reasons while attempting to understand sources and dynamics of conflicts. While the role of economic factors is being evaluated, it is necessary to study such economic factors as economic deprivation and uses of insufficient resources. Apart from that, the alternative gains, power and defence systems created by interstate conflicts are topics among others in the field of IPE.¹⁵ While, on the one hand, the new economic fields created by these conflicts make it easier to understand the nature of these conflicts, on the other hand, they can influence whether the conflicts would continue or not.¹⁶ Besides, any international issue or topic that has an economic dimension, such as causes of war and peace resting on economic interests or the economic outcomes of conflicts, all fall within the study area of IPE.¹⁷

As seen in the aforementioned discussion, the mainstream IR theories deal with state-level interactions. However, when it comes to the KQ, not all subjects are states and they can be political and non-political organizations of various sorts at the domestic and international levels. For instance, the US, the EU, Turkey's neighbours such as Iraq, Iran and Syria, regional Iraqi Kurdish leaders, the PKK terror organization, and many other state and non-state agents are involved in the KQ to some extent, with different purposes and different interests. Because the mainstream IR theories focus on relationships in the international

¹⁵Ballentine, Karen- Sherman ,Jake, *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*, editor: Karen Ballentine, Jake Sherman, International Peace Academy, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, 2003, p.1-2

¹⁶Schlichte, Klaus: *State Formation and the Economy of Intra-State Wars*, in: Dietrich Jung (ed.): *Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts and New Wars: A Political Economy of Intra-State War*, London and New York: 2003, Routledge

¹⁷ Harvey and Brecher, (2002), p 19

system, it is impossible to make a sound analysis of the domestic facade of the KQ, which in turn influences domestic politics as well as Turkey's international relations. It is obvious that it is about domestic factors and forces, especially norms forming Turkish FSP, and since neo-realism disregards domestic politics—or considers it as already formed—it cannot provide a useful theoretical framework for this study. In addition, neo-realism's notion of security and its achievement by ultimate military superiority over other states creates a mathematical formula by which there is always a loser and a winner. Due to absence of cooperation in the anarchical world order, states will clash with each other. However in the Kurdish problem, there is no need for actors to be forced into clashes; in other words, it is possible for parties (or majority of actors) to find a common ground that would satisfy every agent involved.

It is also clear that Turkey's stance towards the EU and the US cannot be explained by neo-realism's materialistic point of view based on the structure of capabilities. Because the US and the EU are not Turkey's competitors as they have bilateral as well as alliance relations in a number of security and economic organizations. Thus, the relationship cannot be explained by mutual balance of powers. For example, the US received support from Turkey during the first Gulf War, and Turkey did not oppose the invasion of Iraq in 2003—although Turkey did not allow the deployment of American troops via Turkish soil. At the same time, the EU is not, as neo-realism argues, a state, but has a structure that is above the state. It has normative powers, even over Turkey as Turkey is a candidate state. The EU does not have an authority to apply military power; it does not have the necessity to do so, either. On the other hand, IPE does not provide a healthy analysis framework for the purpose of this study. Because IPE gives more weight to economic factors and because the KQ has to do with political issues rather than economic ones, it can be said that IPE is incapable of

providing a detailed analysis of factors that led to deterioration of Turkey's relations with the West, due to the KQ.

As a result, we can say that none of the mainstream IR theories discussed above have provided a detailed theoretical explanation with regards to Turkey's KQ, because of the aforementioned reasons. Therefore, this study adopts a constructivist approach to examine the KQ and its effects on the Turkish FSP. The constructivist approach takes the domestic agents together with the international systems and states into account in determining foreign security policy. According to this approach, not only are power balances and benefits vital, but also domestic and international idealistic structures are important. In short, in this study, we argue that Turkey's problems with the Western world in terms of the KQ are not because of the conflict of interests or power balances between Turkey and the West. It is the ideational factors working at the, mainly, internal level that shape the Turkish FPS decision-making process and their reflections of the KQ in the international arena.

In this framework, firstly the major arguments of constructivism will be discussed and then importance of norms in the constructivist approach will be examined in the following sections. Three major norms related to the KQ and Turkey's FSP will also be elaborated in the ensuing sections. A section that briefly summarizes discourse analysis method in order for a better understanding of normative structure will also be included in this chapter.

2.1 CONSTRUCTIVISM

2.1.1 GENERAL FEATURES OF CONSTRUCTIVISM

Social constructivism is used as an umbrella term for a range of assumptions focusing on culture and society.¹⁸ It has been introduced as a mainstream theoretical approach in the early 1990s. The term was first used in the international relations literature by Nicholas Onuf in 1989 in his work “Worlds of Our Making”.¹⁹ Onuf points to a new approach of international theory as an alternative to neo-realism and neo-liberalism, dominant in IR, which until the end of the Cold War were resting on ideas of positivism and rationalism. By Onuf’s terms, in such an approach, the agent and structure maintains a mutually constitutive relationship. The world, with its social and material characteristics, consists of what we make of it and as an agent – not as an actor – while we are making the world, the world is also making us.²⁰

Relevance of the realist and neo-realist theories have been questioned after the Iron Curtain collapsed. Thus, constructivism increasingly gained popularity on the criticisms of the realist and neo-realist theories. However, even supporters of the theory prefer referring to it as an “approach” rather than a “theory” as a widespread argument. It is usually seen as a mid-range theory that lacks a clear paradigm to explain all round aspects of the realm of the

¹⁸Jørgensen, M. and L. Phillips *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, (London, SAGE 2002). p. 4

¹⁹Onuf. N., *Worlds of Our Making*, (Columbia, S.C., University of South Carolina Press. 2002)

²⁰Ibid. p.119, Reus-Smith.C., *Constructivism*, (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan. 2005) p. 188

world politics. Thus, it portrays more as a philosophically and theoretically informed approach to the empirical study of international relations.²¹

The first and foremost aspect of constructivism that has to be mentioned is its ontology.

Constructivists who see idealistic factors as the basis of international relations vary from rationalist theorists who argue that the IR system is based on material gains and anarchy.

Although, realism assumes that states act on the basis of their power, constructivism points that states do what they can and they suffer what they must.²² Constructivism perceives

that the environment in which states operate during the course of their interaction is made up of social factors. It concentrates on the social structure of states, rather than

materialistic issues. Ontologically, this theoretical approach takes the role of culture,

identity and norms of political life into consideration in the field of international politics. As stated by Ruggie “constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international

life”.²³ On the other hand, as much as constructivism can be defined by the importance it

pays to the normative side, it can also be defined by the equal importance it allocates to the material structure that maintains mutually constructive relationships between the agent

and the structure. According to the constructivists, material resources are only meaningful

when they are applied in the human action “through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded.”²⁴

²¹Ruggie.J.G., ‘What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge’ *International Organization* 52(4): 855-856. (1998) p. 856

²²Farrell.T., ‘Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program’ *International Studies Review* 4(1): 49-72. (2002) p. 52.

²³Ruggie, J. G. (1998) p. 856

²⁴Wendt.A., *Social Theory of International Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1999) p. 309, Checkel, J. T. ‘The constructivist turn in international relations theory’, *World Politics* 50(2): 324-348. (1998) p. 325 Katzenstein. P. J. *The Culture of National Security : Norms And Identity In World Politics*, (New York: Chichester, Columbia University Press, 1996) p. 33, Farrell, T. (2002) p.52

It is worth drawing attention to the point that neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism rest their principles on the microeconomics. As for the social constructivism, since there is no corresponding theory for it to simply import, it remains under the influence of sociological tradition. Ruggie argues that the constructivism roots can be extended to dominant sociologists, Durkheim and Weber, who identified “ideational factors in social life” and its effect on social behaviour. Finnemore²⁵ credited most of the intellectual developments of constructivism to sociology, while Price and Reus-Smith acknowledged that constructivism is the branch of critical international theory where “agent is inherently social, its identities and interests are constructed on social values and are the products of inter-subjective social structures”. This could potentially lead to the interpretation that its theoretical creation can be seen as original and heterodox.²⁶

The constructivist foreign policy theory draws attention upon two main research traditions. Transnational constructivism emphasizes on the influence of the norms that are shared by the international society or by subsets of that the society as embodied by regional or function-specific international organizations. International law, the resolutions of international organizations and the final acts of international conferences are the indicators for international norms. The social constructivism, on the other hand, stresses the importance of norms that are shared within the domestic society. Indicators for the social norms are constitutional and legal order, party programs and election platforms,

²⁵Finnemore, 1996, p.193-5

²⁶Ruggie, J. G. (1998)p. 858-62

parliamentary debates, publications of written or visual media, and public opinion data.²⁷

On the other hand, Reus-Smith, combining these two, extracts the third form – Holistic constructivism.²⁸ Given that the research question of this study involves developments in mainly domestic areas, the social constructivist approach is considered as appropriate to be applied in the study. Thus, it is claimed in this study that Turkey's FSP is dominated by domestic FSP norms.

According to the social constructivists, international relations and politics consist of inter-state relations as much as the normative or ideational structures within those states.

Katzenstein argued that states are separate individual entities whose actions derive from their interests, thus leaving them without the right to claim power and sovereign control.²⁹

However the decisions taken by states seen on the international arena are in fact the result of close interaction of agents and influential ideational structures within those states. Such agents are governmental institutions –such as the military, police, judicial authorities, political parties, social elite, foreign policy experts, interest groups and NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations).³⁰ The policies of above mentioned agents, excluding exceptional cases when these agents directly interact with international institutions, i.e. NGOs. For example, sometimes, Turkey's opposition political parties take their arguments to the EU or Council of Europe.

²⁷Boekle, Henning, et al, 'Constructivist Foreign Policy Theory' in Volker Rittberger (ed.) *German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies*, (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press. 2001)p.105-137

²⁸Reus-Smith.C. (2005) p. 195

²⁹Katzenstein, P. J. (1996-b) p.51

³⁰Ibid. p.51

As pointed by Katzenstein “states are rather abstracts and it is not them who act, but governments”.³¹ In fact, although the two approaches look different from each other, Wendt’s and Katzenstein’s approaches to states and agents are alike. This is because, although Wendt notes that states do not get down to the level of individuals that make up the states, he accepts that there is an internal decision-making structure within them. According to Wendt, the individuals institutionalise mutual interaction among themselves with the purpose of collective action – something that comes automatically. However, such collective action will last as long as it is efficient. On the other hand, such cooperation among individuals will be maintained by “authorizing effect” of internal decision structure. By “authorizing”, it is meant that actions of individuals are treated as collective actions³². The point that makes Wendt’s theory differ from that of Katzenstein’s is that he argues that actions of a state cannot be reduced to individual levels.

It must, however, be noted that Wendt uses such statements for societies with fully functioning democracies. Evaluating state behaviour of countries such as Turkey, where democracies very often face abruptions and where bureaucrats take imperative institutionalised forms of over decision-makers, influence of individuals and institutions dominating domestic politics will influence the government’s foreign policy. In his work on Japan’s security policy, Katzenstein states that this relationship is: “within the state, between the state and society -or polity-, and between the polity and some features of the

³¹Ibid. p.33

³²Wendt, A. (1999) p. 218-221,

international environment”.³³ Katzenstein’s approach that gives great importance to domestic agents in drawing the FSP, will be the main theoretical basis of this study.

According to the theoretical base mentioned above, the importance of a state in world politics has not been totally disregarded. This is based on the argument that state being the bearer of the ultimate power to wage the war, holds the ultimate authority to exercise it on international levels. With ever growing role of transnational agents, constant attempts of weakening the state autonomy by international regimes and economic interdependence, states continue their existence and are in constant search for self discovery. For example, although Turkey, being an EU member-candidate or CoE member, transferred a number of its authorities, i.e. prosecutions in KQ field, to transnational organisations, the role of a state agent still remains great.

2.1.2 IMPORTANCE OF NORMS IN CONSTRUCTIVISM

The constructivists claim that ideas, norms, institutions and threats that are defined by Wendt as “cultural formations” make up the distribution of power on systematic level and these ideas lurk behind the notion of interest. In addition to this assumption, it is claimed that institutionalized norms shape the interests of political agents in a world of uncertain choices. Importance of institutionalized norms particularly evident in defining political interests as in the times of large scale changes in structures and situations send clear signals to decision makers defining security interests of states.³⁴ Norms play a key role in defining

³³Katzenstein, P. J. (1996) p.2

³⁴Katzenstein, P. J. (1996-b) p. 18. 201.

commonly accepted standards of appropriate behaviour that shape social identities. They serve as a bridge between human values and solutions to their problems. Norms suggest ways to organize action rather than end them. They lead to creation of precedents in interpretation deriving from experience.³⁵ Despite of norms being implemented by individual practices and social communication, they cannot be reduced to individual levels, so they are produced for the entire society.³⁶ For example, while there may not be an equivalent of set of norms used in this research on individual level, nonetheless they have direct influence over individual agents that draw the FSP. When ideas serve as norms they not only constrain agent's action but also constitute them and enable their action.³⁷

In order to evaluate the normative and ideational structure's influence on shaping agent's identity and interests, there are three mechanisms: *imagination, communication and constraint*. The first shows the permissible limits that non-material structure applies to agent's actions. In other words "the way the agent thinks he should act, what the acceptable limitations on their actions are and what strategies they should apply to achieve their objectives."³⁸ There is a permissive relationship between norms and political action, when norms set permissible boundaries for an action while not dictating the action.³⁹ When it comes to communication, both the individual and the state always try to justify their behaviour. To do that, they will first refer to already established sets of norms of legitimate conduct. Lastly, constraints would apply sizeable limitations on agent's conduct, if and when

³⁵Ibid. p. 17.

³⁶Ibid. p. 22.

³⁷Farrell, T. (2002) p. 50

³⁸Finnemore.M., *National Interests in International Society*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1996-a), p.198

³⁹Finnemore.M.et al, 'The Culture of National Security:Norms and Identity in World Politics' in Katzenstein. P. J.(ed.) *Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention*, (New York: Colombia University Press, 1996-b) p. 158.

normative and ideational structures are unable to influence agent's behaviour by restraining its imagination or when communication fails to act as linguistic or moral court of appeal.⁴⁰ In this work, Turkish normative structure requires the agent to look onto the KQ from security point of view and choose the FSP that rests on hard power and deny any cultural and political rights –*all part of imagination*. To justify and legitimise their such actions, agents, put forward arguments such as Kurds not being a different nation, thus, arguing that all their rights are granted to them, calling the armed struggle put up by Kurds as terrorist activity and that the actions are acknowledged by international community as terror activity – *an example of communication*. And lastly – those who act beyond such normative framework or those who suggest acting in such a way are called traitors or terrorists – *application of constrains*.

Norms are seen as defining or making the agent's identity, stimulating their behaviour or dictating to do or not to do certain behaviours to them. In that sense, norms serve dual purpose: they “qualify and correct, thus representing a positive technique of intervention and reformation. Therefore, the reification of the norm signifies its gradual endorsement by a group, and the failure to accept the norm is equated with a pathology or deviation. The norm becomes a principle of conformity, which is contrasted with irregularity, disorder or eccentricity”.⁴¹ Norms can function on a variety of levels of politics such as “organizational, national, transnational, and worldwide,” it may also work in combination or could be conflicting with each other.⁴²

⁴⁰Finnemore.M., (1996-b) p.198

⁴¹ Makarychev,.A., ‘Rebranding Russia: Norms, Politics and Power’ SSRN eLibrary. CEPS Working Document No. 283. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337619>, 19.02.2008,. (accessed 15 October 2009)

⁴²Farrell, T. (2002) p.72

Changes, that constantly evolve, and ability to impose certain ones over others, create new norms.⁴³ They are the result of political conflict and change at certain political breaking points in history. It is because international or domestic shocking events provide power to those who support changes. Those shocking events convince people that policy needs to be changed with better ones. In this way, former norms are devalued, while the new policies are put into effect. Otherwise, “change is likely to be slow and incremental.”⁴⁴ They are shaped into their existing forms through institutionalization and exist external to agents.

In contrast to headlines of daily politics that can constantly change, norms usually have a more stable position, as historical events that shape the agent identity tend to carry a deeper sense. Changes in norms can appear as a trend that goes from top to bottom and occurs by the initiators of changes, “norm entrepreneurs”, who by nature of their field of activity involved in one way or the other with the international agents, mobilize their tools, i.e. the elite groups of the society or general public, at home, to make them believe that the latter needs to change their interests for certain reasons. The normative changes imposed by the way of “conditionality” by the EU to a candidate state of Turkey can serve as an example to that.⁴⁵

⁴³Tocci.N. *Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor?*, The European Union and Its Global Partners (C. f. E. P. Studies. Brussels: 2008) p. 336

⁴⁴Kowert, P and J. Legro. et al, ‘The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics’ in Katzenstein. P. J.(ed.) *Norms, Identity and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise*, (New York: Colombia University Press, 1996) p.473

⁴⁵Haas, P. M. ‘Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination Introduction.’ *International Organization* 46(1): 1-35. quoted in Noutcheva, G. e. a., Ed. (2004). ‘Europeanization and Secessionist Conflicts: Concepts and Theories’. *Europeanization and Conflict Resolution: Case Studies from the European Periphery*. (Brussels, Academia Press/Centre for European Policy Studies/ULB. 1992)..p. 14

In the security studies, there are two methodological problems for the normative approach. They are proof of the existence of norms and evidence of the impact of norms on behavioural outcomes. The first problem arises from the belief by constructivists in that norms possess objective existence. In other words, norms are not abstractive ideas; rather they are shared beliefs that show themselves in meanings they give to physical objects and relevant outcomes. However, while social practices may be observed directly, the shared beliefs they embody do not necessarily have same characteristics. Thus, the question of how to prove the existence of the shared beliefs arises naturally, especially if the agents are “hostile, distant or long dead.” However, the constructivists pay greater importance to shared and represented ideas, and we will look in details at these in the methodology part by following ideas represented through raw material examples while bearing in mind their repetitiveness and decisiveness.⁴⁶ For the constructivists, ideas, norms and other meanings, require interpretative methodology.⁴⁷ Since meanings that make actions happen are attached to each other. And as these meanings have been shaped by pre-existent language and other symbols, their effects over human action can be understood not as measurable variables but by interpretation.⁴⁸

To measure the impact of norms, the constructivists, propose a number of generic ways and the three main criteria are applied for such a purpose:

- Clarity in codification,
- Resistance against time and criticisms
- How popular the norm has been.

⁴⁶Farrell, T. (2002) p. 60

⁴⁷Reus-Smith, C. (2005) p. 203

⁴⁸Taylor.A., *Understanding and Social Inquiry*, (Notre Dame: 1997) p.111

Naturally the norm will be powerful when it is “clearly stated, firmly established and widely endorsed.”⁴⁹ Yet, the question of what criteria to apply to measure clarity, resistance and popularity remains unanswered. Moreover, they do not provide suggestions to where the evidence of norm codification, perseverance and acceptance can be found. However, there are attempts to address such challenges by other followers of the theory who suggest that the evidence of “norm salience” may be found in domestic political discourse, national institutions, procedures and law, and national policies. The share of the norm occupied in discourse, its influence over institutions, and the degree of their implementation in policies, as much as the degree of conditionality attached to it, determines the strength of the norm.⁵⁰

2.1.3 TURKISH FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY NORMS

In this section, three most popular FSP norms will be examined, namely “Sèvres Syndrome” - the suspicion of influence of external powers and interests on Turkey, the principle of “Status Quo” applicable in FSP and internal security arrangements that is usually mentioned along with Atatürk’s famous slogan “Peace at Home-Peace in the World” by existing state structure, and finally, the “Westernism” has nothing in common with the wordings of the name. It foresees being pro-Western in foreign policies and internal socio-political field. While studying these norms, it will be show in the research how they institutionalized in the media, the judiciary and legislative branches of the state governing, shape interests and

⁴⁹Legro.J. W., *Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-American Restraint during World War II* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 1995) p.33, Katzenstein, P. J. (1996-b) p.16

⁵⁰Cortell, A. P., Davis.W. Jr., James ‘Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda’, *International Studies Review* 2(1): 70-82. (2000), Farrell, T. (2002) p.61

political outcomes of governments and corporate agents, as proposed by Katzenstein.⁵¹ This in turn will show that the external policy fragmentations and problems blamed on the KQ are created and driven more by the country's domestic norms rather than influenced by the foreign partners.

2.1.3.1 SÉVRES SYNDROME

Since the mid-1980s, Turkish State position had been in denial of the existence of the "Kurdish Question". The issue was called by the ruling elite – nationalist, as well as bureaucratic and military circles – not the "Kurdish Question", but as a terrorism issue. The PKK has always been portrayed as an externally supported organization whose aim is to weaken and divide Turkey'. Such an approach of the establishment is referred in the literature on Turkey's FSP as the "Sèvres Syndrome" and considered as intrinsically linked to the KQ.⁵² This term claims that Turkey's enemies have the sole purpose of dividing it and are attempting to reinstate the conditions of the Sèvres Treaty.⁵³

It is considered as "the red line" of the ruling elite and regarded as a threat within the framework of Turkish FSP. The notion of such threat and hostility is constantly re-produced and kept alive in minds of the society by means of education ranging from primary to pre-university levels, by speeches of populist or nationalist politicians and bureaucrats and by means of print and visual media. Thus, the decision makers always find themselves under

⁵¹Katzenstein, P. J. (1996-b) p. 17

⁵²For Sèvres Syndrome and Foreign Policy, please refer to: Bilgin, P. 'Turkey's changing security discourses: The challenge of globalisation.' *European Journal of Political Research* 44(1): 175-201. (2005).

⁵³Kirisci, K. (2004) p. 284. The treaty was drawn at the end of World War I and divided the remaining parts of the Anatolian regions of the Ottoman Empire among parties victorious in the War

the pressure of such constraint when defining their policies regarding the Kurdish Issue. In cases when they choose a policy different to the red line politics they can be easily branded as traitors, no matter what their position is, whether they are President or Prime Minister-, the EU or European states and the USA in the sense of “Kurdish Question” are accused with attempting to break up Turkey’s unitary structure.

While evaluating the Kurdish issue, no matter from what professional field or management level it is spoken, the topic is being evaluated from almost the same discourse framework of “threat of being divided”. Naturally these kinds of expressions, when being said by people who possess the elite status in the society, receive general acceptance and take the truth shape without consideration of actual facts. Both the direct influence of such elite groups’ choices of electorate, who are left under the influence of these groups, can be regarded as defining and restricting factors of political outcomes.

2.1.3.2 STATUS QUO

In fact “Status Quo” is a term in international relations that refers to “the existing state of affairs”, in other words preserving the existing status. In the Turkish FSP it refers to politics, institutionalized definitions and methods started with establishment of the new Republic during the 15 years of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s reign in power and that still continue without much changes.⁵⁴ This issue is expressed by Atatürk’s motto of “Peace at home – Peace in the World”.

⁵⁴Kurkcuoglu.O., *Turkish Foreign Politics by Interviews-Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası*, (Ankara, USAK Publishing, (2009) p.21

Status Quo norm refers to maintaining Turkey's interests accepted the policies and political machinery. Such Status Quo character of the Turkish FSP, to a great extent is the result of fear that was being addressed since the establishment of the Republic. They vary from that the country lives at constant threat of being divided or threat of overthrowing the existing regime. This threat is claimed to be supported by foreign powers. The country where the civilian population is not enough and has a potential to trait, where foreign politics and security are separate from daily politics to the unique geographical location that the country enjoys. It also refers to the paradoxical state being the result of the country not being able to solve these issues for so many years and more over foreseeing the endlessness of the situation, such as the KQ.

The idea of status quo supports the idea that the FSP, or at least some of their aspects, to be dictated by established "bureaucratic elite" within the government and such elite also includes the Military. This term, usually, has reference to agents made of President, civilian-military bureaucracy and the high levels of the Judicial, on the top of the elected government. One can argue that the elite will have interests of their own that may not go in hand or even go against the interests of the democratically elected government. In state politics there may be issues that could be beyond ability of the government, however, it must not mean that they are beyond the reach of the state. As an example the Parliament is unable to interfere in some issues. The KQ and secularism are being at the top of the list and such issues being defined not by daily politics but by selected members of the state. Oran argues that Status Quo can be evaluated from two perspectives: first -continue existing borders, and second -to continue existing political balances. Despite of the statements made

claiming its abolishment following the total change of the World System at the end of 1990, Status Quo remains the bottom line of Turkey's Foreign Politics.⁵⁵

While Status Quo was gaining character of constancy with help of military coups, the system of military bureaucracy developed an ideological system, appropriate to its discourse, with regard to protection against internal and external enemies. Such ideas are built in the environment of open or hidden propaganda, by building the atmosphere of reliable military versus unreliable politicians, and the fragile issues of the FSP surrounding the KQ. By this, while strengthening position of civilian-military bureaucracy making up the "ruling elite-establishment", in most cases, anti-democratic activity and operations were legitimized. In the process of strengthening the Status Quo, the military does not regard itself as "state bureaucrat" appointed by the politicians, but regards itself, as a "statesman" and sees itself among the state decision-makers. Such condition is especially evident in the National Security Council (NSC), where important decisions on the FSP are being taken. It is as if the military sees itself as a balancing power against civil leadership, and attends the meetings as a team of 5 headed by the Chief of General Staff (CoGS) and puts their views not through hierarchic but direct channel. In such framework, the politicians -especially the ones who do not work in synergy with ruling elite- are seen as potential collaborators.

Another reflection of Status Quo can be expressed as geographical determinism, in other words, it is necessary to take into account special conditions of Turkey's geographical location, status of democracy, political approaches and so the FSP must match these

⁵⁵Oran, B. (2002) p. 48

defining factors.⁵⁶ Such view is used to legitimize certain national security concepts that prevent further democratization of the society. Thus, “the assumption of geographical determinism, which such statements are built upon, glosses over the essentially political character of conceptualizing security, formulating security policies and practicing security”.⁵⁷ To a large extent, geographically driven Kurdish problem is being linked to the country’s geographical location and feeds the argument of possessing, besides the political interests, permanent and constant characteristics. Giving an example, during negotiation period of the EU related legal adjustments some military officials were saying that “Turkey is faced by threats not like any other European country and that the Copenhagen criteria should be implemented “taking into consideration the interests and realities of the country”.⁵⁸

As a result, the Status Quo in the Turkish FSP is the idea of “maintaining existing state of affairs” without taking much risk and without spending much effort in resolving problems. The effects of Status Quo on Kurdish related FSP carries characteristics of implementing policies of controlled monitoring of the issues rather than providing solutions.

2.1.3.3 WESTERNISM

The fear of establishment of faith-based state is Westernism emerged as a result of pursuing internal reforms that bore pro-western lines particularly in the socio-political field and had

⁵⁶Kosebalaban, H. ‘Turkey’s EU Membership: A Clash of Security Cultures’, *Middle East Policy* 9(2): 130-146. (2002).

⁵⁷Bilgin, P. (2005) p.180

⁵⁸Jenkins.G., Context and Circumstance : The Turkish Military and Politics. (Oxford: Oxford University Press for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001) p. 56

the purpose of preserving the secular norms of the newly established Republic. While not being directly linked to the KQ as part of the FSP research topic, Westernism will be considered as one of the primary and most important norms of Turkey's FSP from the point of view of dual-uncertain position of the ruling elite that is considered to be the cause of KQ becoming an international problem and leading the country to experience uneasy relations with its allies. It is important to study this norm's influence on the FSP while the ruling elite, in other words establishment, calls to and claims to live modern and western lifestyles, ironically, its stance on the Kurdish Issue leads to country's worsened relationship with its Western allies.

To study the Ottoman Empire's fallback during its last hundred years, particularly in the field of military, against the West, the emissaries, made of military and civilian bureaucracy, are being forwarded to the west. Consecutive generation of both military and civil bureaucracy of the Ottoman Empire and its successor – the Turkish Republic, are graduates of western universities and will have been taught subjects such as public administration, medicine and military sciences, according to western models established in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.⁵⁹ Turkish Republic was established on the remaining, from the remaining soil of the Ottoman Empire. The latest period reforms of the Empire were based on Western models and after the Ottoman Empire, Republican government under Atatürk's leadership attempted to adopt the institutions and the values of the West in order to accelerate the process of modernization and economic development.⁶⁰ From such angle,

⁵⁹Heper.M., 'The European Union, the Turkish Military and Democracy', *South European Society and Politics* 10(1): 33-44. (2005).

⁶⁰Mustafa.A., 'Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs', *Middle Eastern Studies* 35(4): 152–186. (1999)., Onis.Z. and Yilmaz.S, 'The Turkey-EU-US Triangle in Perspective: Transformation or Continuity?' *Middle East Journal* 59(2): 265-284. (2005).

contrary to its revolutionary appearance, the “Kemalist Revolution” was in many aspects rather a continuation than a clear break with the Ottoman past. At the same time, Oran argues that the West, idealized by Atatürk, was Anglo Saxon west and that Turkey has chosen that.⁶¹

However, the Westernism started by Ottomans and continued to the Republican period, has an idealistic feature that is absent in other countries who experienced similar interaction with the West. The fall of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century and the support provided by the West to Armenians, Greeks and Kurds left a serious trauma in Turkish Western oriented policy-makers and the society that continues its influence even in recent times. The West, that was to blame for the fall of the Empire and its consecutive invasion is, firstly, taken as a role model, and secondly, the friendly relationship with the West started in the early years of establishing Republic, grows into alliance following the end of impartiality period during the World War II. There is, however, an argument stating that the impetus for Turkey's shift to Western alignment did not come from the West, but rather resulted from its reaction to Soviet pressures.⁶² Although Turkey's own dictatorial regime was matching the Soviet Union's style thus making it more sensible to build relationships with the East. Turkey, instead had chosen to strengthen ties with the west, despite of being invaded by the West earlier. Besides, Turkey's NATO membership and EU candidacy is regarded as part of the same political understanding.

⁶¹Oran.B. (2002) p. 50

⁶²Mustafa.A. (1999) p. 175

The democratic, from western point of view, governments were not supporting the idea of westernization in Turkish FSP. While western type of governance and legislative processes, system of education and philosophy, were idealized from social point of view, they were not given any value by democratic governments due to ruling elites' influences. The biggest reason for such a condition is as it was pointed out in the previous two norms, the ruling elite's fear of devising of the country and removal of secularism. Thus, the westernization started to be seen not in its full socio-political scope, but as a way of life. Historically, the country was being subjected to attacks by the West, and despite of having alliance relationships during the cold war, the fact that the country was left on its own during Cuban and Cyprus crises resulted in developing distrust towards the West. Factors such as democratic reforms conditions put by the EU within the KQ framework, and continuation of the PKK's terror activities despite of the USA invading the base territories of the group in Iraq, led to the escalation of such distrust. As a FSP norm the "Westernism", despite attempts to make it a role model and attempts to join the club, deep inside it bears multi-form characteristics and is surrounded by doubts and it does not clash with previous two norms.

That normative limitation is accepted by academics along with its attached minor differences. The difference is not in the content of norms but in their naming. Oran divided these norms into two basic categories: Status Quo and Westernism. According to him, Status Quo, can be summarized by willingness to continue to maintain existing boundaries and international political balance of powers that take place in them, being satisfied by them, and unwillingness to change them. The phrase "Peace at Home-Peace in the World", which does not carry any justification beyond the boundaries of western built structure

based on a notion of a single nation, is its basic slogan. Oran, in this work, expressed the norm referred to as Sévres Syndrome, indirectly within the Status Quo norm. Sévres Syndrome is evaluated in the Status Quo as an out branch of the structure based on a single nation – denial of separate Kurdish identity. According to Oran the Status Quo, remained as the core of the Turkish FSP even following the late 1990s when its existence at the time the World System collapsed. Westernism refers to belonging to Anglo Saxon West envisioned by Atatürk. The wish to belong to the Western club that was coming from the times of the Ottoman Empire, was maintained by heir-bureaucrats of the Empire who became founders of the modern day Turkish state. Oran, argues that intellectuals who received Western education throughout the Republican period, admirers of the West, and who could not think of any alternatives in foreign policy beyond western dictated views were the carriers of this norm.⁶³ On the other hand, Gozen made a triangle classification made of Westernization, Status Quo and “Peace at Home-Peace in the World”. In his classification, the term Westernization is the name given to the aim of modernization. At the same time it refers to development of cooperation with the West, rather than fighting with it, to withstand its policies of occupation and control by catching up with it through modernization. On the other hand, the Status Quo refers to defending territorial boundaries drawn by the Republic and if necessary by remaining indifferent to lands once belonging to the Ottoman Empire. According to Gozen intentions to create a Kurdish state in N. Iraq and the PKK’s activities in that direction paved the way to Turkey following the policies in line with Status Quo. And lastly, the “Peace at Home-Peace in the World” norm set forth the FSP that would promote peace in the region and in the world.⁶⁴

⁶³Oran.B. *Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1980 Vol I*, (Ankara: İletişim Publication. 2001), p. 46-53

⁶⁴Gözen.R., *Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası*, (Ankara: Palme Yayıncılık: 2009) p. 46-50

The FSP norms foreseen by Sander are similar to norms highlighted by other academics. According to Sander, the main characteristic of Turkish Foreign policy is in its Western orientation. Such orientation provides shocking constancy. Although Sander is not openly referring to it, the word “constancy” bears equal meaning to Status Quo in the sense of maintaining existing conditions. Sander argues that the “Peace at Home-Peace in the World” policy followed since establishment of the Republic, aimed at protecting modern internal political and social system while occupying a seat in the western club representing contemporary civilization⁶⁵. Erhan argues that the Turkish foreign policy has a single basic norm -Westernism. Although he does not deny the hegemonic status of the establishment in the Status Quo that is run in parallel, nonetheless he does not accept it as the basic norm.⁶⁶ While, in addition to above mentioned, there are other norms; nonetheless, they are not so widespread. For example Kirisci, who expressed the view that the Turkish FSP was being evaluated through fears of the Sèvres Syndrome, mentioned that norms of the Turkish foreign policy also rested on pragmatic behaviour, action within the international laws and on avoidance of war and violence⁶⁷ Lastly, Dedeoglu⁶⁸, took opinion that the basic characteristic of the Turkish Foreign Policy was “deterrent action” in the foreign policy.

To conclude, the Westernism and Status Quo are the norms agreed upon by a number of scholars. The Sèvres Syndrome that is being evaluated in the research is done so not directly but as part of the Westernism or Status Quo norms.

⁶⁵ Sander.O., et al, ‘Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası’ Fırat.M (Ed.) *Avrupa'daki Hızlı Gelişmeler Açısından Türk Dış Politikası*, (Ankara: Imge. 1998).

⁶⁶ Erhan.C., *Turkish Foreign Politics by Interviews-Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası*, (Ankara, Usak Publishing, (2009) p.53-55

⁶⁷ Kirisci.K. Türkiye Daima Kendisini AB'ye Yakınlaştıracak Politikalar İzlemelidir, eds. Habibe Ozdal, Bahadır Dincer, and Mehmet Yegin, *Mülakatlarla Türk Dis Politikasi*, (Ankara, USAK Publishing, 2009) p.7-9

⁶⁸ Dedeoğlu, B. (2009). Türkiye'nin Türk Dünyası İle İlişki Kurması Rusya'ya Rağmen Olamaz eds. Habibe Ozdal, Bahadır Dincer, and Mehmet Yegin, *Mülakatlarla Türk Dis Politikasi*, (Ankara, USAK Publishing, 2009)

2.1.4 DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTS IN TURKEY AND THE KURDISH QUESTION

The KQ is not only the issue of foreign policies and security, but also has social and political aspects. As the research evaluated the KQ from security and foreign policy perspective, while the fields in question (social and political aspects) do not possess enough detailed examinations, the democratisation of the country played the most important role in these normative changes.

The economic growth that led to increase the general population's income per capita, the government's policy to take the manufacturing and business beyond Istanbul into provinces, its encouragement for export in all possible fields of manufacturing and services, the trend of urbanisation of the population in the first decade of 2000s, increased levels of education and developments in the fields of communications, broadcasting and media in general resulted in the country and the society becoming more democratised than ever before. As a result, the KQ was discussed in a democratic environment and solutions were sought within democratic frameworks. Democratic development itself is the main catalyst of the normative changes in Turkey.

If one of the definitions of democracy is that, it allows presentation of all types of views and ideologies, without discrimination, to unite into organisations, and represent all types of social layers and views in parliament as a political figure and power, the KQ can be examined, from among the modern democracy theories, within "Participatory Democracy Theory".⁶⁹

⁶⁹For detailed definitions of Participatory Democracy see: Pateman, Carole, *Participation and Democratic Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970, C. B. Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal*

The notion of “participatory democracy” entered into the literature with Pateman and Macpherson’s works in the 1960s and 1970s. The term of participatory democracy sees the participation of various members of society in political decision making processes as central and vital aspects of the functioning democracy.⁷⁰ It aims to eliminate social and economic inequality⁷¹ and foresees widened political practice and citizenship compared to a representative system.⁷² Participatory democracy has an educational function that aims to increase social and political capacities of each individual⁷³ underlines that significant increase in knowledge possession of social groups who were not able to appreciate an education is also the element that has driven the need for participation.

However, as argued by Sartori, simple participation in elections and voting should not be viewed as “participation”. In fact, “participation” is not the resulting action of someone’s mobilization by external power, particularly beyond the person’s own will. It is the participation with the person’s own willingness and consent.⁷⁴ As those who hold the voting rights aim to expand their sphere, their public speeches influence the participation and activities in decision making processes.⁷⁵ In other words, politics is not something applied to

Democracy Oxford: Oxford University Press 1977, Barber, Benjamin R. *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age* Berkeley: 1984, Mouffe, Chantal *Dimensions of Radical Democracy* London and New York: Verso 1992, Phillips, Anne “*Democracy and Representation: Or, Why Should It Matter Who Our Representatives Are?*” in Anne Phillips (ed.), *Feminism and Politics*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998, Keane, John, *Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998

⁷⁰Vitale, Denise, Between deliberative and participatory democracy: A contribution on Habermas *Philosophy Social Criticism* 2006 32: p.749

⁷¹Macpherson, C.B. (1977) p.94

⁷²Barber, B.R.(1984), p136, 154

⁷³Pateman, C. (1970) p42-44, Schmidt M.G. *Demokrasi Kuramlarına Giriş-Introduction to Democracy Theories* (Translate M.Emin Koktas) Ankara, Vadi Publications, 2001 p.167, 172, 174

⁷⁴Sartori, Giovanni, *Theory of Revisited Democracy*, Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1987 p 124-125

⁷⁵Schmidh, (2001), p 164-165

citizens, but something realised by the citizens.⁷⁶ From this perspective, the civil organisations and movements/NGOs hold an important place in participatory democracy.⁷⁷

The KQ entered widely in Turkey's agenda in 1980s as a problem of terrorism. Therefore, the Kurdish Movement in Turkey of 1980s mainly rested on terror activities and triggered by the PKK's armed oppression. Alongside with this, Kurdish political movements that were established in the 1990s acted in parallel with PKK. These parties were closed by Court decisions on several occasions, enabling Kurds to heavily take part in political processes. Although Kurds have been represented in Turkish Politics well before, it was not as an identity-based independent movement, but was within the mainstream political parties. The closure of Kurdish political parties and prevention of Kurdish political representation within politics, by the ruling elite, led to establishment of political parties based on Kurdish identity.

In the post 1980s, due to a PKK-led long armed struggle and activities by political organisations who widely applied print and other types of media, a visible political awakening could be noticed in the areas populated by Kurds. Particularly, the success achieved by political parties united around Kurdish identity serves as a good example of that and KQ needs to be evaluated within the framework of participatory democracy. In addition, highlighting the KQ by democratic means by national and international Kurdish organisations played an important role in development of interests of Kurds from the

⁷⁶Barber, B.R.(1984), p 177

⁷⁷Young, Iris Marion, *Inclusion and Democracy*, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000, p.180,

perspective of participatory democracy. These processes are related to a “participatory democracy vs. education” relationship.

Lastly, the western states that brought their foreign policies in line with policies of institutions like the EU and CoE that envisioned prevention of human rights abuses and development of democracy encouraged political participation of Kurds in Turkish politics. Such encouragement was possible by the direct political support of Kurds as well as by supporting democratisation in Turkey via normative powers that they held. Today, it can be argued that even if PKK’s propaganda was to be removed, the individual participation based on Kurdish identity will continue. The developments summarised above show that changes in the Turkish FSP directed at KQ was influenced to the great extent by the country’s democratisation process.

2.2 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS - AS THE METHODOLOGY

This study uses discourse analysis as its method. It is taken as a relevant methodology as discourse analysis and social constructivism foresees the agent as the principal object of existing environment and emphasizes the relationship between those agents beyond the material world. In constructivism, “an agent is considered to be laid deep within social structure of the society with constant need to communicate and interact while at the same time rooted in local culture. On the other hand, constructivists apply less direct, discursive analyses rested in historical experience.”⁷⁸

⁷⁸Reus-Smit.C., (2005) p. 195

The hegemonic discourse, which this study uses as a term affecting FSP, is an important agent in presenting formal ideology and shaping public opinion. Discourse, especially hegemonic discourse, is a framework offered by Gramsci⁷⁹, who uses it to explain the way coalitions use ideology to form and to mobilise. Hegemonic classes cannot implement whatever policy plans by force. Without an ideological hegemony, it is impossible to establish a long-term policy in a society. Therefore, people are needed to be convinced one by one ideologically. He claims that previously discovered facts and realities can be extended to the entire society by raising thought and moral systems as part of life. By doing so, a higher consciousness will be created among the public. In such a society, people then be aware of their political consciousness.⁸⁰

Gramsci underlines the fact that a group of people will not differentiate themselves from others until they are organised, and cannot feel as “independent”. This organizational movement can only be achieved by a “cultural hegemony” in which people believe in ideologies, not just only in economic and political beliefs.⁸¹ He commonly refers to necessity for a coalition of various bodies/organizations in the formation of a conscious society. In this way only, he argues, communal mobilisation can be achieved and a revolution can be possible by participation of not only workers, but also by villagers, women, and elements of a society. Hegemonic discourse has a critical importance in organisation of various social groups in the ideological framework. This thesis uses a looser definition of hegemony, keeping the term but not seeing it as rooted in class mobilisation and power.

⁷⁹ Gramsci, Antonio, *Prison Letters. Issues on Philosophy and Politics*, Ankara: Belge Publishing, 2011, p.31.

⁸⁰ Slattery, Martin, *Key Ideas in Sociology*, Nelson Thornes Ltd., 2003 p.241

⁸¹ Slattery, (2003). p.242

In the case of Turkey's FSP it is assumed that discourse analysis is used to interpret anti-western feelings, defining norms that contributed to the FSP's emergence. As a method, the discourse analysis foresees that the truth cannot be achieved outside the discourse scope and that the analyses of discourse have to be the object as such.⁸² This illustrates us the way textual and social processes are essentially linked to each other and to describe, in specific context, implications of such connection to the way we think and act in the contemporary world.⁸³ Language is seen as a social practice, a way to execute actions.⁸⁴ In other words discourse analyses focus on the end result rather than the talk itself.⁸⁵

A discourse is formed by multiple sources that form a system of signification, i.e. construction and organization of content that in turn gains meaning and value to the social world.⁸⁶ Discourse shapes preferences and interests as well as it paves the way to public acceptance of a certain course of action for the agent.⁸⁷ Discourses stimulate permissible and non-permissible words, thus creating the foundation for policy preferences, interests and goals. It serves the dual purpose of constraint and of creative force in shaping policies.⁸⁸

⁸²Jørgensen. M. and L. Phillips (2002) p. 21

⁸³George.J., *Discourses of Global Politics : Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations*, (Macmillan P. 1994) p. 191

⁸⁴Wood.L.A. and Kroger.R.O., *Doing Discourse Analysis : Methods for Studying Action in Talk And Text*, (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications 2000)

⁸⁵Milliken.J., 'The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods.' *European Journal of International Relations* 5(2): 225-254. (1999)., Wood.L.A. and Kroger.R.O. (2000), Sjøstedt.R. 'The Discursive Origins of a Doctrine. Norms, Identity, and Securitization under Harry S. Truman and George W. Bush' *Foreign Policy Analysis* 3(3): 233-254. (2007).

⁸⁶*Ibid.* p. 237

⁸⁷Milliken.J. (1999) p. 225–254

⁸⁸Larsen.H., 'British and Danish European Policies in the 1990s: A Discourse Approach', *European Journal of International Relations*, 5: 451-83, (1999), p. 453

Discourse analytical approaches tend to highlight the tenuous and fragile character of our knowledge and practices. The background conditions and the applied language that made possible any change are considered in discourse analyses, rather than an approach that creates causal relationships.⁸⁹ Such an approach results in creation of an environment that is built on conventions, shared rules, story lines and narratives as opposed to causal relations. The content of relationship is made not of actions of physical beings that are driven by their logic, but rather by social beings that are in constant contact with each other.⁹⁰

Discourse is viewed as an undeniable part of the social interaction, making it an active element that shapes its environment as well as being shaped by it. Based on this, discourse consists of three interdependent components:

- Language use,
- Transmission of beliefs,
- Social interactions".⁹¹

Discourse analyses consider the way they are created, the circumstances of their emergence, authority and legitimacy of the speaker, ultimately the audience, in order for the analysis to reflect the social and political reality.⁹²

⁸⁹Checkel.T. J. 'Constructivist Approaches to European Integration', ARENA Working Paper, No.06. (February 2006), (accessed 12 December 2007) p. 5

⁹⁰Wood.L.A. and Kroger.R.O. (2000) p. xii

⁹¹Le.E., 'Human rights discourse and international relations: Le Monde's editorials on Russia', *Discourse & Society* 13(3): 373-408. (2002), p. 373

⁹²Sjostedt, R. (2007) p.242

By comprehensive textual analyses to be carried out, the linguistic account of norms will be defined. This method identifies regularized process and multiple levels of speech: speech events (gesture, facial expressions), words, phrases, clauses, sentences and finally texts. All these “textual instruction devices –including analogies, metaphors and varied forms of negation or emphasis- serve as definitional way posts in the construction of discourse.” As the natural result of discourse-agent relationship, the speaker’s expressions serve as reflections of a hegemonic or subjugated discourse. Since social meanings derive from practical language applied by individuals they have sound normative and constructive effects.⁹³

Hence the assumption related to such discourse analyses, explains the methodological question of how texts or words of individuals or agents represent ideas that are discussed in the discourse analyses and constructivism related works, belong to the collective agent.

In the research, discourse that represents norms linked with the FSP is scrutinized through review of written media, parliamentary debates and public statements of politicians and other bureaucrats. The news articles and columnists of such newspapers as Cumhuriyet Daily - representative of hegemonic statist discourse, Milliyet Daily – who feeds the liberal and statist audiences, and Zaman Daily – whose readers are mainly made of liberal and Islamist audiences have been evaluated. These newspapers are selected as they are published according to the international standards, have strong influence over public opinion and decision makers on the issues related to the research topic. The concerned data have been obtained by scanning and taking photos of articles from hard copies and their

⁹³Kowert & Legro, (1996) p. 480

soft copies in the GNAT library. In acquiring parliamentary debate texts, the resources of the library of Parliament of Republic of Turkey have been used, texts of meetings were obtained and key word searches were applied in identifying the relevant materials. Miscellaneous speeches by politicians and other bureaucrats were obtained from relevant establishments, statements by above mentioned media groups and internet publications. The examination of large collections of newspaper clippings and long parliamentary debates offer the opportunity to develop findings from impressive resources of original material and a chance to make generalization.

CONCLUSION

Throughout this study, it is argued that the problems that Turkey experienced in its relationship with the West with respect to the KQ were to a great extent due to FSP norms that were effective during the whole period of research and almost have not been subjected to any changes. It means that the idealistic structure was more influential over Turkey's FSP than any other factors, although with the influence of the latter also being considered.

As opposed to other alternative theories, Constructivism, by taking into account international system and material structure, allows analyses of the role of the idealistic structure in drawing the FSP. As Constructivism plays important roles - in political life - in culture, identity and importance of norms in international relations, its contribution to this research, that has a normative approach, is very important. Another advantage of Constructivism is that it allows domestic political structure and individual agents to be included into FSP analyses.

Constructivism's biggest downside is the absence of clear and multi-angled explanations of the realm of world politics, and therefore, it should be overcome during research by applying, concomitant with constructivism, discourse analyses method and arguing that the sets of norms were self-repeating throughout research period and were having great influence over decision-makers.

Constructivism's two greatest advocates – A. Wendt and P. Katzenstein – disagreed with each other on the aspect of the theory that state FSPs can or cannot be reduced down to individual levels. This research takes Katzenstein's position as its basis and did not ignore the idea that individuals, by the way of using the institutions they belonged to as channels, as agents, shaped the decisions of states they represented. Particularly, in countries like Turkey, where democracy has not fully developed, and where individuals are more influential in state politics, the persons who have been influential in drawing the FSP have been included into analyses. However, such an approach must not be interpreted as if individuals and domestic institutions act totally independently from each other. Their field of activity, directions and boundaries are drawn by the FSP norms. Norms provide agent conformity by showing how to behave in crises situations.

However norms are not non-changeable. They may become subjected to amendments in the face of political conflict, historically breaking points or other shocking events. As will be observed in the following chapters, Turkey's democratisation process gained speed towards the end of the first decade of the 21st century, under the influence of the KQ, international institutions and Western partners. They were all helped the normative changes in Turkey. There are two basic problems that one comes across when carrying out normative studies: showing the existence of norms and their influence over political decisions. The empirical examples taken from the period covered by the study, the existence of norms in Turkish FSP and their influence over political outcomes will be demonstrated.

The influence of three basic sets of norms: Sèvres syndrome, Status quo and Westernism, on the Turkey-West relationship, from the point of view of the KQ is argued in the research.

The existence, consistency and influence over FSP norms of these norms, whose definitions are given in this chapter, will be shown in the following chapters by a discourse analyses system.

However, the discourse analyses in this case have been used only as a methodological tool. They were not used as theoretical analysis frameworks as performed by Gramscians. Two discourses – hegemonic and subjugated – will be examined and existence and self-repetition of Turkish FSP norms embedded in agent's discourses throughout the research period will be evaluated.

CHAPTER III: THE EU-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE SHADOW OF THE KURDISH QUESTION

INTRODUCTION

Turkey has had problems with various European Countries (Greece, Germany, Denmark etc.) in relation to the KQ. According to Turkish claims, some countries chose to host Kurds who had fled from Turkey and who were sympathisers or militants of the PKK. Other countries were blamed for direct or indirect economic and political support of the PKK. The European countries for their part blamed Turkey for not having a comprehensive human rights policy, and accused Turkey of disregarding human dignity and applying systematic torture to the Kurds.

This research could only include issues directly related to the KQ, and therefore did not examine any other issues. Even investigating all the issues connected with the KQ is beyond the remit of this study, so I have chosen to use specific examples and developments that are directly relevant to Turkey's FSP. I believe that these examples clearly demonstrate how a normative structure affects FSP with specific European countries, despite the European Union's notional common foreign policy¹.

¹For more information and detailed discussions please refer to Alexander.Y., Brenner.E., & Krause, S.T. *Turkey: Terrorism, Civil Rights, and the European Union*. (Routledge. 2008).

3.1 TURKEY-EUROPE RELATIONS

The relationship between Turkey and Europe has a multi-dimensional perspective. The ruling elite, inspired by the founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, has always seen Turkey's state of belonging to the European world as the ultimate goal for the country's modernisation and westernisation and that this would consequently lead to a secure and prosperous Turkey.² Turkey's FSP looks towards the West, particularly Europe, and from a European point of view, the advantage of an alliance with Turkey is that it stands as a bulwark against both the Middle East and the old communist bloc.

The KQ bears critical importance from the point of view both: security in the region where Turkey is located, preservation and development of democratic values and human rights as well as from the point of view of orientation of Turkey's FSP.³ Developments related to Kurdish population spread into Middle Eastern countries with various characteristic features, affect not only the countries in question but through conflicts, abuses of human rights, refugee crises, protests, economic instabilities directly influence western societies too. The EU has not accepted Turkey for economic, political and social reasons. It formalized its justification in the Copenhagen treaty which laid down criteria which would be applicable to all candidate states.⁴

²Tocci, N. *Resolution in the Neighbourhood Comparing the Role of the EU in the Turkish-Kurdish and Israeli-Palestinian Conflicts*. Centre for European Policy Studies CEPS Working Document No. 221 (March 2005) p.15

³Tocci, N. et al, 'The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard' Tocci.N. (Ed.) *Ebbs and Flows in the Europeanization of Turkey's Kurdish Question. The EU and Conflict Resolution* (Routledge. 2007) p. 53

⁴In 1993, at the Copenhagen European Council, the Union took a decisive step towards the fifth enlargement, agreeing that "the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union." Thus, enlargement was no longer a question of 'if', but 'when'. Concerning the timing,

From a Turkish perspective, from its early stages, the KQ has been regarded within the scope of PKK terrorist activity, and this has been reflected in FSP. The PKK might be regarded by the EU as a terrorist organisation, but it is impossible for the EU to bring the KQ within the remit of its foreign policy as there is no such thing as a single European foreign policy.

The strongest resistance to adopting a European approach to the KQ comes from officials from among state prosecutors, civil and military bureaucrats, some academics, journalists and NGOs. All bureaucrats, members of the military establishment and other members of the ruling elite who have preserved their position since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, and who have enjoyed more influence than elected governments, are aware that they will lose their privileged status if the EU recommendations endorsed by the Copenhagen Criteria are implemented. These groups did not change even with the end of the cold war. Consequently, any request made to Turkey by the international community was regarded by these groups as a threat to their privileged status.

the European Council states: "Accession will take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required." At the same time, it defined the membership criteria, which are often referred to as the 'Copenhagen criteria'. Membership criteria require that the candidate country must have achieved;

- Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities (Political Criteria);
- The existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;
- The ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic & monetary union.

(http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accesion_process/criteria/index_en.htm)

These groups do not, however, have public opinion on their side, so that their influence during the negotiating period was limited. The problem of the Kurds, unsolved since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, gained more prominence with the emergence of the PKK after the 1980 military coup, and has since become more pressing. Attempts to solve the problem by peaceful democratic means were thwarted by an increase in violent armed clashes. The politicians had the initiative on the Kurdish issue snatched away by the bureaucrats or by similarly aggressive policies that suited them. The above mentioned bureaucratic structure legitimized policies of violence by stressing concerns over the break-up of the country, and was influential over each elected government.

Turkey was criticized, especially from the early 1990s, for the methods it applied to suppress an increase in terrorism. However, the negotiation period and the Copenhagen Criteria would have a significant impact on these groups. Within this framework, questioning of Turkey's democratic structure and legal system by the EU led to doubts about the legitimacy of the "ruling elite" who were dominant in the existing system as well as the relative reduction in efficiency of reforms during the negotiation period. It became important to solve the KQ by democratic means in the light of new legal reforms and the reduction of military influence over politics. By passing amendments to legislation on human rights, the rights of minorities, and the rule of law, the influence of the ruling elite over the Kurdish issue was greatly reduced.

In this chapter, the processes, in which KQ and EU relations of Turkey intersected, are examined. Special attention is given to the establishment's point of view at this nexus. Negative and positive developments within Turkey's candidacy process are analyzed. How

KQ became a tool for the establishment to suppress the visible steps in democratization efforts is another discussion point. Political framework, especially after 2002 elections, is explained and how the new government has played a key role in the changes of the democratization process is presented. All these issues are organized in a chronological order.

3.1.1 HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS IN THE EU-TURKEY AGENDA

While Turkey's relationship with the EU date back to half a century, the KQ starts appearing on the agenda of this relationship from second half of 1980s. The fact that such topic has not surfaced the agenda earlier than that lies in that basic terms of democracy and human rights remained subordinate in Europe, while strategic considerations of the Cold War period dominated the headlines. This issue, particularly became the instrument of foreign politics in 1980s, after endorsement by the EU following the US's shift in foreign policy in the Post-Vietnam War period that concentrated on human rights.⁵ As a result of lessons drawn from Vietnam War, the US foreign policy took a more idealistic shape with emphasis on human rights and democratic values, as the US policy makers came to conclusion that the country's FSP was missing the moral value. Inevitably, such shift affected both: the East-West relations and the foreign policies of America's western European allies, who were, indirectly forced to adopt the new values too that underlined human rights and democracy

⁵Bardakci.M. (2007) p. 111

3.1.2 1980 MILITARY COUP

While Turkey's relationship with the EU dates back half a century, the KQ does not appear on the agenda until the second half of the 1980s. The fact that this topic did not surface earlier is due to the fact that Human Rights issues took second place to the threat posed by the Communist bloc. The headlines at the time were dominated by the Cold War. Human Rights now became the instrument of foreign politics during the 1980s, after endorsement by the EU following the US's shift in foreign policy in the Post-Vietnam War period that concentrated on human rights.⁶

This all happened at a time when human rights abuses reached their peak in Turkey following the coup-de-état of 12th September 1980. Western Europe, which had remained silent over previous coups that had taken place in Turkey in 1960 and 1971, took a harder line this time. The first coup led to the death of the prime minister and two other ministers, who were hanged by order of military. This was perceived as unjust, and after the prosecution of the perpetrators, the country swiftly returned to a democratic path. The violence applied, particularly to leftist groups, during the 1971 coup, did not draw attention from abroad as a topic of human rights violations due to the Cold War. After the 1980 coup, however, the European Parliament (EP) and the CoE took a much more serious view of human rights abuses, particularly in comparison with individual European member states, who did not regard this as quite such a serious matter. Among other reasons for such a shift in position were obvious attempts by the military to impose a total change on society through suspending democracy, executions, ill-treatment of prisoners and those held in

⁶Ibid, p. 111

custody, suppression of workers' rights and tight control over the free media. Activities of left-wing and Kurdish activists who fled to the West following the coup also had an influence in drawing the West's attention to what was going on in Turkey.

3.1.3 ISSUES RELATING TO CYPRUS-ARMENIA

During this time, Turkey was also under pressure from the West due to the Cyprus and Armenian issues. In response to the Greeks' policies of assimilation applied to Turks living on the island of Cyprus, Turkey, by using its guarantor status over the island, was able to carry out a military operation on Cyprus in 1974. As a result, Cyprus became split into Turkish and Greek parts, and under the pretext of protecting Turkish Cypriots, Turkey maintained a military presence on the island. Greece, following acceptance into the EEC, constantly kept the issue of the presence of Turkish military forces in Cyprus on the agenda, and continually attempted to block aid for Turkey by using Greek lobbying powers located in the USA.

It must be remembered that during the late Ottoman Empire in 1915, the Armenians residing in the Anatolian region were moved from their habitual places of residence in areas such as present-day Armenia, Syria and Lebanon due to their collaboration with occupying forces. This led to the deaths of scores of Armenians, which has become known in many countries as the "Armenian Genocide". The Armenians demanded that Turkey, too, which they regard as a continuation of the Ottoman Empire, should accept this definition and acknowledge this "Armenian Genocide."

Armenian lobby groups in the USA and Western Europe, constantly took this issue as well as the matter of Armenian terrorism to western institutions and parliaments. All these developments increased following the coup and created an overall sense of blockade. One of the columnists who described this situation wrote that “such a situation has not been experienced in the history of the republic; the situation is one of being under siege, only a siege different from war in that it is made of hatred, outrage and hostile feelings. The hostile circle against Turkey and the Turks has widened, and this has arisen from the Turks possessing a character that no other nation has.”⁷

3.1.4 HUMAN RIGHTS IN OZAL’S TIME

Despite new civilian government who came to power in the 1983 free elections, criticisms from Europe on the democratisation process and human rights issues did not decrease. During this period the EP used its own tools to delay the revival of the association agreement. The EP used the Kurdish issue to accuse the Turkish government of instigating a systematic campaign against the Kurdish minority.⁸ During these years the criticisms concentrated on human rights abuses not entirely relevant to Kurdish issue, but included the ill treatment of people advocating both right and left wing ideologies. Europe’s criticisms did not stop there and in November 1984 the EP decided to withdraw the EEC country support package from its 1985 budget, accusing Ozal’s government of systematic abuses of human rights.⁹

⁷Halman.T. ‘We are under siege’, *Milliyet*, 08.10.1984

⁸Bardakci. M. (2007) p. 136

⁹ ‘The decision of EP is expected’, *Milliyet*, 18.01.1985

There was constant criticism of Turkey by the European institutions, which took a negative stance on the issue of Turkey's EEC membership. This had important repercussions, and a hostile interpretation of Europe's justified criticisms by hegemonic discourse leaders in Turkey found its reflection in public opinion. In a survey carried out in 1986 it was established that only 13% of Turks trusted EEC countries. The survey showed that Turks trusted mostly themselves and the Japanese, while a similar survey carried out in the EEC found that despite all the negative developments in Turkey, 22% of Europeans trusted Turkey.¹⁰

As the position of neither EEC, nor its parliamentary wing the EP, had changed, however, the Kurdish issue started to appear more often. For example, Ulbrughs, a member of the Belgian Socialist Party, in the April 1986 draft of the decision wrote that *"14 million people live in the North-West of Kurdistan, thousands of them are subject to torture, the region remains under strict control, and these people are denied identity rights"*.¹¹ In the draft, it was proposed that a report on the Kurdish Issue should be written for the EP, that a committee should be set up to investigate claims in the field, and that member states should take the issue to the UN for discussion.¹²

As a result of Turkey's fighter jets' attacks against PKK militia bases in Northern Iraq, a Belgian Parliamentarian Vandemeulbroucke filed a draft decision to the EP's political commission arguing that Turkey was planning to take over the Mosul-Kirkuk areas and to apply large-scale oppression to Kurds living in the area, and that such an approach was

¹⁰'We have no trust in Europeans,' *Milliyet*, 24.08.1986

¹¹'Kurdish draft', *Milliyet*, 03.04.1986

¹²Ibid.

similar to the treatment applied to the Armenians. When the draft proposal was not included on a list of issues to be discussed urgently by the EP's ministerial committee, the news was reported as "the diplomatic attack backfired"¹³ The EP accepted claims of Armenian genocide proposed by the Greek parliamentarian "Cunis that he submitted in June 1987¹⁴.

Following the EP decision, within the same month, the PKK carried out a terrorist attack which took lives of thirty people, sixteen of whom were women and six children. The President Kenan Evren reacted to this by making a direct link to the EP decision, saying, *"This massacre is the result of the EP's decision. It did not take long for the decision taken against Turkey to show its outcome. These bastards traitorously killed thirty of our citizens in Mardin-Pinarcik"*. With reference to the EP decision, Ecevit said *"The decision taken by the EP boosted the confidence of foreign powers who dream of dividing our country and who want to create obstacles to our transition to democracy."*¹⁵ The events in Pinarcik can be evaluated as the first and most important event that clearly links the Kurdish issue with the West. In the following days, Evren suggested that Turkey's NATO membership should be reviewed, as he claimed that some NATO countries wanted to give parts of Turkey to other countries. The Turkish MFA called the ambassadors of the EEC countries to warn them that Evren wanted to review Turkey's NATO membership, and requested that the EP should change its decision over refusing to consider Turkey's bid for membership of the EEC. As well as this, the BBC were issued with a protest notice for their claim that "the PKK *is guided*

¹³ 'Diplomatic attack', *Milliyet*, 07.03.1987

¹⁴ European Parliament Resolution on a Political Solution to The Armenian Question Doc. A2-33/87, June 18, 1987

¹⁵ 'Evren: We are bleeding', *Milliyet*, 22.06.1987

by Turkey's intelligence services against the civilian population", a claim that was repeated in following years. And lastly, the political argument stating that "the MFA does nothing but express condolences, which does nothing to help the soldiers who are suffering from the instability of local economic conditions" gave the military an excuse to interfere and set themselves up as a political opposition and gave them the right to criticise the politicians.¹⁶

In the media such news was reflected in headlines such as "Shame on the supporter of Kurdish discrimination, the EP - this is a massacre". The article that highlighted the invitation to all the ambassadors stated that the message was "the result of an Armenian-Greek-Kurdish holy union and carried all the conditions of the Sèvres Agreement".¹⁷ While it is interesting to note that the Turkish ruling elite approached this issue from the point of view of the Sèvres agreement, it is ironic that while in the dominant discourse the notion of a "Kurd" did not exist, it was referred to in the criticisms and Kurds who were citizens of the same country were referred to as "others". On the other hand, portraying the EP's decision as important when in fact it was only a recommendation that had no binding force remained part of the discourse that was often referred to in later years.

3.1.5 EUROPE'S CONDITIONAL AND RENEWED RELATIONS WITH TURKEY

With the purpose of reviving the "Friendly Relations" between Turkey and the EP that were frozen following the 12th September 1980 military coup, on 15th September 1988, the EP approved Turkey's report in its General Assembly. Accordingly, the relationship that had

¹⁶ 'A lot of talks but no action', *Milliyet*, 23.06.1987

¹⁷ 'Warning to Europe', *Milliyet*, 23.06.1987

been frozen for the last eight years was restarted on condition that Turkey would have to make further progress over the issue of the Kurds.¹⁸

Another issue that brought Turkey onto the EU agenda in 1991 was Saddam's attack on the Kurds that led to thousands of Iraqi refugees fleeing to the Turkish border. While Turkey was accused of keeping its borders closed for too long to refugees and not distributing humanitarian assistance quickly enough, in Turkey the problem was that the public were not informed about Western humanitarian assistance. At the same time, Kurds who resided in Europe, especially those living in France and Germany, attracted local public attention by holding demonstrations and hunger strikes.¹⁹ One of the results of these developments was that on 18th April 1991, the European Parliament made a decision *"that countries hosting Kurds have to recognise their existence and their identity"*. The decision did not mention the right to establish a Kurdish state. Iran and Turkey were requested to provide assistance in delivering allocated humanitarian aid and to open their borders for humanitarian organisations. It also requested that the Kurdish groups and all countries concerned should attend a conference to discuss the KQ.²⁰

As the KQ moved to the headlines of the international political agenda, the Turkish MFA decided to strengthen its position and work out a more influential policy to put forward on international platforms. It was decided to promote the idea that "Kurds were not a mere minority and did not have the status of a second-class nation". According to this argument, minorities were communities of nationalities of other countries residing in Turkey, such as

¹⁸'A conditional visa from Europe', *Milliyet*, 16.09.1988

¹⁹'Again Turkey could not satisfy the West', *Cumhuriyet*, 08.04.1991

²⁰'Green light for Kurdish sovereignty', *Cumhuriyet*, 19.04.1991

Armenians and Greeks. Kurds, however, were part of a multi-cultural mosaic that were represented in every field of social life including high-level government positions; they resided in various different parts of the country; they were not found wishing to leave the country and they cast votes for Turkey's political parties. Also legislation removing a ban on the use of the Kurdish language in public places and permission to distribute Kurdish recordings was used as argument in support of this policy.²¹

The removal of restrictions on the distribution of Kurdish recordings was not implemented due to the long bureaucratic process in the Ministry of Cultural Affairs. Finally, the parliamentary bill proposed by Kurdish MP Alinak that "programmes should be broadcast in Kurdish and other languages on state owned TRT" was rejected by both the government and the state owned TRT on the grounds that *"this sort of broadcasting would destroy the unitary state structure"*.²²

3.2 EUROPE: PKK IS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

On November 21st 1991, the EP, known for its hard-line position against Turkey on the Kurdish issue, passed a resolution that described the PKK's actions as terrorism. At the summit in Maastricht on 9-10th December 1991, during the signing of union treaty, the EC demanded to end to the terrorist tactics of the PKK. The same proposal demanded sovereignty for Iraqi Kurds, which underlined the fact that the same conditions could not be applied to Kurds residing in neighbouring countries.²³ The PKK, while remaining a threat to

²¹'Kurdish thesis is being strengthened'. *Cumhuriyet*, 18.05.1991

²²'NO to Kurdish from TRT'. *Cumhuriyet*, 30.05.1991

²³'PKK is terror arsonist', *Cumhuriyet*, 21.11.1991

Turkey, also posed a threat to the Kurdish groups who were trying to group together in Iraq. The EP's declaration that *"the Parliament condemns the PKK's barbarian actions that do not stop at killings of the security forces but also pave the way to ever-increasing losses of civilian lives in Turkey, and at the same time jeopardise the activities of the Iraqi Kurds in obtaining sovereignty"* could be interpreted as evidence of that. Also, Turkey's presence in Northern Iraq due to PKK activities was regarded negatively by these groups. Whatever the reasons behind it, however, recognition of the PKK as a terrorist organisation was seen as a very important step.

Another development took place following the Nawroz events²⁴. The EP's judgement of 9th April 1992 stated that *"Turkish Armed Forces(TAF) applied excessive powers during the Nawroz event; fights against terrorism must not neglect fundamental human rights and with that purpose a state must avoid resorting to military power and is requested to start an international enquiry"*.²⁵ The judgement provoked a reaction from coalition parties (Dogru Yol Partisi-DYP and SHP). While President Demirel made a strong statement that said, *"By showing respect to human rights, our European friends have sided with terrorism"*, Erdal Inonu of SHP said, *"Condemnation of the struggle that the security forces are putting up to stop the bloody actions of the PKK as something that violates basic human rights is an unacceptable position far from reality"*.²⁶

²⁴ It means "new day" or "daylight." Nawroz is a holiday that is celebrated in every 21st March in Turkey. That day, however, is often abused by PKK to initiate uprisings by use of violence.

²⁵ European Parliament Decision, Decision Number 92-308 DC, Nawroz condemnations to Turkey', *Cumhuriyet*, 10.04.1992

²⁶ 'A contr-attack to the PKK', *Cumhuriyet*, 12.04.1992, In this new period, when cross border discourse with Europe toughened, writers who had previously resigned such as Mumcu and Selcuk again started publishing their articles in *Cumhuriyet*, as the liberal writers left the paper. During this period, anti-European articles concerning the Kurdish problem were noted to be considerably decreased in number, except for news articles.

On 19th November 1992 the EP passed a proposal regarding the military operation carried out by the TAF in Northern Iraq a month earlier and allocation of its tank divisions in Northern Iraq. According to the proposal, Turkey was requested to “end its operations in Northern Iraq and withdraw its forces”. Turkey listened to the call and pulled out its tanks from Northern Iraq. An agreement was, however, signed with Northern Iraqi Kurds, for joint protection of the common border, to maintain border security.²⁷

3.2.1 THE ARRESTS OF KURDISH POLITICS

Increasing pressure from the ruling elite on the government and the parliament resulted, by all-party consensus, in a vote in GNAT on 2nd March 1994, to strip the DEP MPs of their parliamentary membership. This case would surface in the future on a number of occasions and would bring great damage to Turkey’s relationship with the Western world. While the State Security Court (SSC) instructed the police to be ready to arrest the MPs as soon as they lost their immunity, one of the judges decided that a principle of the constitution, that MPs cannot be held liable for speeches made in parliament, was not applicable in the case of one of the arrested MPs. Although this statement contravened the Constitution, it sounded more like a political statement than a legal decision. The way the MPs were arrested was also heavily criticised. MPs were removed from parliament in a degrading manner by the police, who forced them into police vehicles.²⁸

²⁷‘Armoured units are returning from N.Iraq’, *Cumhuriyet*, 20.11.1992

²⁸Balbay.M., ‘Taking a revenge from DEP’, *Cumhuriyet*, 03.03.1994

Europe responded to the arrests quickly and harshly. In a EP report of 10th March 1994, it was requested that Turkey should immediately release the arrested MPs and accord “sovereignty” rights to the Kurds. The report also said that in the South East of Turkey, the elected MPs were not given freedom of speech which in turn pushed the population towards increased support of the PKK. The MFA responded to the report by rejecting it and described the report, which spoke of “Kurdish minority” and “sovereignty”, as prejudiced and full of errors, thus demonstrating that the official state did not take it seriously.²⁹

The Turkish politicians, however, came back with the stock response. The Minister of Defence, Golhan, underlined that *“the West was pursuing the Sèvres agenda”*; Prime-Minister Ciller said *“these are internal matters: when the time comes we will explain our just cause to the World”*. Karayalcin, another partner in the coalition government, used even tougher rhetoric by saying that *“stripping off immunity from DEP MPs would create a reaction as has already been seen; however, they will not be allowed to interfere in Turkey’s internal affairs”*.³⁰ President Demirel said that by using increased nationalist discourse the *“aim of terrorism is to split Turkey. The Sèvres plans are again being put forward... to stop foreign support for terrorism. All necessary means of diplomacy and politics were and are being utilised. Turkey’s unity cannot be sacrificed for the sake of the World”*³¹

Despite external pressure from abroad as well as internal pressure from within the country, the SSC continued the trials of the arrested MPs, who were accused of “intention to split the country”, a charge which carried the death penalty. The case of the DEP MPs caused a rift

²⁹‘Europe condemned Turkey’, *Cumhuriyet*, 11.03.1994

³⁰‘A strong reaction to Europe’, *Cumhuriyet*, 12.03.1994

³¹‘We will not allow demolition of Turkey’s unity’, *Cumhuriyet*, 13.03.1994

between government coalition partners too. The cooling relationship that started with Karayalçın's statement that the arrests were ill-considered, reached its peak with Prime-Minister Ciller's complain to the Military that *"the legal amendments that would make the security forces more efficient in the fight against terror"* could not be drafted into legislation because of opposition from the SHP, the government's partner in the coalition .³² This was also important from the point of view of an evaluation of the position that the civilian-military relationship reached as a result of increased clashes during the 1990s.

3.2.2 WELFARE PARTY AND A REPRODUCED THREAT: RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

In fact, the government stance was aimed at gaining public support prior to the local elections that took place on March 27th, 1994. The SHP suffered heavy losses, and the coalition began to look shaky. These elections also allowed the military to promote religious extremism as a priority threat. Refah Partisi-RP's (The Welfare Party) victory gave credence to this. The military was faced a dilemma, because while on one hand a political party they considered "a virus that had entered the system" was gaining success across the country, on the other hand, that same party was winning in provinces that the PKK depended on for support. The Turkish General Staff responded, however, by saying that "religious extremism is more dangerous than the PKK", and so drew the boundaries of the next battlefield for the second half of the 1990s.³³ Another important point of the March 1994 election was that it marked the start of the political rise of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the most influential politician of the 2000s, who was then elected as Mayor of Istanbul.

³²Ciller complained to military about SHP', *Cumhuriyet*, 19.03.1994

³³The military is unhappy with Welfare Party', *Cumhuriyet*, 01.04.1994

Both the KQ, and the new threat of religious extremism, was disturbing not only to the CoGS, but also to the business world that was another pillar of the establishment. Vehbi Koc, the owner of Turkey's largest holding pointed out that *"Turkey was face to face with internal and external political threats and this in turn led to a bottle neck of economic difficulty for the country"*.³⁴ A similar call to Koc's was issued in a country-wide statement from the Prosecutors in which they said that *"actions and movements against secularism will be followed with great scrutiny and all necessary legal action will be applied. Friends and foes should pay heed to this"*. In response to this statement, the CoGS Gures called the Justice Minister while he was attending a conference where all prosecutors were present, and congratulated them all for the statement. The message of CoGS was welcomed by a standing ovation and was responded to by a message that said: *"we support, from the bottom of our hearts, the Commander of TAF, our CoGS, in his fight against terrorism and as a prosecution service we once again reiterate that we stand shoulder to shoulder with him"*.³⁵

Another development that made Turkey's position even more difficult at a time when the country was experiencing substantial problems with the West over the Kurdish issue took place in Ankara, when Mumtaz Soysal, a person with ultra- nationalist views was appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs. His appointment was met with a great deal of concern in Western circles, and Prime Minister Ciller tried to wave these concerns away by saying, *"Turkish Foreign Policy will continue to be multi-dimensional and multi-lateral"*.³⁶ Soysal took

³⁴'A call for unity from Vehbi Koc', *Cumhuriyet*, 14.04.1994

³⁵'Secularism warning from prosecutors', *Cumhuriyet*, 23.04.1994, 'I congratulate secular prosecutors', *Cumhuriyet*, 24.04.1994

³⁶'Ciller: Turkish Foreign Policy will not change' *Cumhuriyet*, 26.07.1994

a more rigid position with regard to EU negotiations, and the first thing he did was to change the Ambassador in Brussels who was in charge of negotiations. Then he took an uncompromising position on the issues including assistance for Turkey, removal of anti-dumping and other quotas in relation to Turkey, and after accession to the Customs Union, he wanted Turkey to gain full member status on all Council meetings. Soysal's political views gained such widespread popular support that even opposition parties such as ANAP, DSP, CHP and RP started supporting Soysal's policies.

In October 1994, the DEP filed an application to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), on the grounds that the party had been shut down because of its views. The SSC had issued its verdict on the DEP in December 1994 and sentenced eight MPs to 11 years of imprisonment. The first reaction from European parliamentarians was that *"Turkey had closed the door to Europe"*. President Demirel's reply to that was *"while Europe was protesting against the decision, it should know that the decision was given by an independent court"*. Ciller said, *"Turkey is not the only European state that has imprisoned its parliamentarians; the decision can be appealed in the ECtHR"*.³⁷

The Military, who were also influential at NSC, decided to start a counter propaganda activity against Kurdish groups in Europe who were using Europe-based institutions and organisations to further their cause following the closure of the DEP. Everybody agreed that the MFA should work more actively over this.³⁸ Unlike the politicians and military leaders, the Turkish MFA was looking at events more constructively and they pointed out that harsh

³⁷Reaction to DEP sentence *Cumhuriyet*, 10.12.1994

³⁸Anti-propaganda to PKK, *Cumhuriyet*, 31.12.1994

punishments would gain the Kurdish movement more sympathy in the international arena.

A CoE report was written by the Italian Socialist parliamentarian La Russa on the human rights environment in Turkey in which he underlined the existence of human rights abuses and highlighted insufficient progress in the processes of democratisation. This added to criticisms led by the EU and the EP.³⁹

3.2.3 OBSTACLES ON THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Demirel, while lining up his ideas about Europe, was also trying to protect the establishment's position. For that purpose he objected to the government's attempts to amend The Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) by saying *"The Military has to be consulted with over this"*. The bill considered freedom of expression within the scope of terrorism. Balbay wrote that *"Demirel, being the highest ranking person in the country said those words out of consideration for the military."* Balbay also quoted the words of a high-ranking military officer, with whom he had had an interview and who said, *"The PTA is important from the point of view of morale. We cannot predict what will happen when terrorist cases are considered in the civil courts. Anything can happen. At the moment it is advantageous to keep these cases within the jurisdiction of SSCs"*. When even Demirel's moves did not produce any results, Corekci, the second in command in the CoGS held a briefing for the media in which he said: *"The PTA is very important for us. As for us it should not be changed. If it is amended with something better, however – then we don't know. The coherence within the TAF is perfect. However, the fight against terrorism requires an all-out unity and there are problems in that. The government must avoid steps that could boost the morale of*

³⁹Balbay.M., 'Test on Human Right', *Cumhuriyet*, 06.02.1995

terrorist organisations. Each concession will bring a new demand. The TAF is one of the organisations which tops the list of those who want Turkey's integration with the West. We will not be an obstacle to things necessary for integration. However, we will not give up Turkey's unity and Ataturk's teachings" and by that made clear to the government the army's position.⁴⁰

The Coalition partners reacted to the army's move by making the following statements. CHP said, *"The decision and the will on this issue rest with parliament"* while the DYP said, *"Making the TAF a party to political debates would be wrong"*.⁴¹ Following the reaction from the government, Selcuk, the editor of the Cumhuriyet Daily wrote an article addressed to the army in which he wrote, *"amendments to the SSC are in fact supporting the PKK, they are making heroes of those who wanted to split the country contrary to what was being said"*.

The changes stalled because of the behaviour of "establishment" MPs and Europe sent messages that pointed to risks of the collapse of the Customs Union. None of the political parties, however, wanted to risk the relationship with Europe and later be blamed for that. Thus, the package of amendments was ratified by GNAT although with amendments to some of the articles. Among the rejected articles, one would have allowed prosecution of the Sept 12th coup organisers, and the military were pleased that it had been rejected because it meant that they could not be prosecuted. When the bill passed the GNAT, serving

⁴⁰Crime under the Eiffel Tower', *Milliyet*, 05.01.1988

⁴¹Cetin: the will is with Parliament', *Cumhuriyet*, 03.07.1995

and retired military personnel rang up Prime Minister Ciller to thank her for her actions.⁴²

Following the amendments into the constitution, the SSC related articles also quickly came before Parliament and were ratified.

To avoid internal friction in the party and using the positive atmosphere developed through the possibility of entry into the Customs Union, on 24th December 1995 Ciller's government decided to call a general election. Ciller's plan to turn the Customs Union treaty into votes was dealt a heavy blow. The Welfare Party came out as the leader in the elections and although Ciller herself would be able to take part in future governments, her heyday had come to an end.

3.2.4 SUSURLUK: THE DEEP STATE'S ACCIDENT

Creation of DYP-RP coalition following 1995 general elections and appointment of RP leader Erbakan as PM increased the military's edginess towards the RP. Despite of continued terror actions by PKK, the army insisted that the main threat was deriving from political Islam, rather than PKK. A traffic accident that happened in a small town, Susurluk, at the time, showed a striking evidence that a DYP MP, who at the same time represented one of Turkey's strongest tribes who was fighting against PKK along with the state, a leader of the most famous nationalist mafia clans and a high ranking official, known for his leftist orientated views, from Istanbul Police Directorate were acting together. The accident, named "Susurluk Accident" served as one of the turning points in Turkish Republican history. The investigation into the accident revealed that the DYP Minister of Internal Affairs Mehmet Agar, also was part of the organisation that carried out a large number of killings of

⁴²The Military appreciation to Ciller', *Cumhuriyet*, 25.07.1995

people under the veil of fight against PKK, and that these actions were carried out with full knowledge among the highest ranks of the state.

The facts revealed by investigations caused a wide spread reaction among civil organisations and the public in general who demanded that the state revealed its illegal activities. Soon after that, Prime Minister Erbakan's inaction with regards to these protests, him not bringing to justice those guilty, turned these protests against the government. The Susurluk Accident's importance from strategic point of view lies in that the investigation that made volumes of evidence, represented the end of anti-terrorism strategy –violence against terror- started during Ciller term. On the other hand, as a result of the same investigation and its revelations, a notion that the state must act within legal boundaries, even if the matter is about fighting terrorism, became embedded in the public opinion.

3.2.5 EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE PKK

During Ciller-Erbakan period, Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD), published a report in which it made recommendations to solve the Kurdish problem.⁴³ The report was taking the issue up from the point of view of democratisation, and was stressing that democratic and cultural rights of Kurds have to be recognised. However, the report, as its predecessors, was heavily criticised by the hegemonic discourse. Toker argued that the purpose of terrorism is to divide the country, thus granting cultural and democratic rights will not end the violence. He also insisted on the use of the term Kurdish Problem rather

⁴³Tanor.B., Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey, Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association. (Istanbul:TIBA Publication. 1997) p. 31

than Problem of the South-East. The term Problem of the South-East was one of terms propagated to the media by the army in 1994.⁴⁴ In the days following the report, the government proposed to issue an amnesty to members of PKK who did not commit killings. However, member of the coalition government – Ciller, opposed the proposal arguing that it would hurt families of martyrs. During the same period of time, the government is preparing an operation involving Turkish security forces and the MIT, to kill Ocalan, who, at the time was in Syria. However, as these plans leaked to Ocalan, were left without implementation. One of the leaks was done by a general heading intelligence unit of the TGS. Apart from that, while TGS started withdrawing MIT's temporary staff dispatched for participation in the operations and for training of fellow MIT staff, the information about explosives provided by TGS to MIT started leaking to press.

That was pointing to TGS's unwillingness for Ocalan's capture beyond its initiatives. The most important reason for TGS's such behaviour was due to its concerns that in case of the successful outcome of the operation, it would place the government in the winning seat and gain major winning vote for it in the next general elections and fear to lose the single handedness in the fight against PKK that the army has been enjoying since the beginning. During the same period, PKK leader Ocalan announced that the organisation received a signal that some circles within the military started showing signs of meltdown. In his statement he said that the military, thanks to its increasing role in the politics, was taking the lead in the initiative, and if things would continue the same way, the organisation also would join the political process.⁴⁵ In fact, Ocalan's such statement pointed to struggle taking

⁴⁴Toker.M., 'Where Does the Kurdish Problem Lay in the Problem of the South-East?', *Milliyet*, 02.02.1997

⁴⁵'APO: We received the message of softening of stance', *Milliyet*, 02.04.1997

place among security forces operated by government and the Army as part of fight against PKK terrorism.

In the same period, villages that were providing logistical support to PKK were being forcefully evicted as part of strategically planned campaign. Also, the TGS, by embedding heavily armed units in the areas of heavy fights in 1993 as part of “territory control” strategy, tried to cut PKK’s manoeuvre abilities. Forced eviction of villages being one of them would pave the way to a number of serious social problems in the future. While inhabitants of the region not prone for agriculture were living by livestock farming – they had to leave their habitual lifestyles in villages and were forced to relocate to cities. For example, the city of Diyarbakir’s population has risen from 300 thousand to 1,5 million people within merely a couple of years. As a result, while the unemployment rates has risen, the youth in the urban areas got easier opportunities of engaging with PKK and a generation matured earlier and that grew up with prejudices from the early ages appeared on demographic arena. In other words, while it was being tried to eliminated logistical support for PKK from rural areas, new conditions were laid down for the organisation to better organise itself in urban areas. As a matter of fact the discourse developed during this period was a foundation for steps to end DYP-RP government.

3.2.6 THE POST-MODERN COUP: FEBRUARY, 28th

TGS started, as soon as the coalition government was established. While openly opposing the RP, the army was using every opportunity to provoke the RP. For example, an Army

General erected a monument to Atatürk in one of the streets of Istanbul boroughs governed by RP. Later, the TGS filed a complaint, against a Minister who expressed the view: *“a man with his shoulders full of stars, and with a weapon in his hand turned up and erected the monument”*. The case filed under pretext of insulting the TGS and the General, at the same time was the first case filed against a serving cabinet Minister in Turkish republican history. The establishment’s approach, during this time, to political Islamic movements, shows how much influential was it in drawing the FSP. Suddenly, KQ disappears from the agenda and is being replaced by the notion of “Fight with Political Islam”.

PKK also strategically used the fact that the KQ was downgraded in its importance and reduced its attacks. By that, the establishment concentrated on the Republic’s second most important threat – Political Islam. The media and the judiciary, concentrated their work on supporting, very often forcefully, the TGS-led “fight against Political Islam”. The period ended in June 1997 with resignation of Erbakan-led government and closure of Muslim lenient RP, which in turn led to worsening of relationships between Turkey and the EU. The EU then strongly criticised negative developments in the field of human rights and democratisation and laid partial blame on the Turkish military.⁴⁶

President Demirel assigned the task of setting up a new government not to the DYP leader Ciller, who got the most votes after the RP, but to DSP leader Ecevit. Despite supporting anti-western discourse, Ecevit did not propagate his views this time for fear that if Turkey’s 1997 EU application were rejected, the country would slide into radical Islam. The PKK used this sensitive period in Turkish-EU relations to keep the KQ the European agenda by

⁴⁶Kirisçi.K. (2004) p. 290

regularly shipping, in late 1997, groups of Kurdish asylum seekers to Europe via Italy. This led to a series of statements in Europe that such waves of Kurds to Europe could only be stopped by addressing the KQ, and the migrations were linked to “non-recognition of human rights” in Turkey. To that, hegemonic discourse interpreted the European states’ stance as a veiled attack on Turkey, and stated that “by recognising minority rights of the Kurds, the European states were aiming to implement Sèvres and split the country.”⁴⁷ Problems with immigrants in Italy led the German Chief Prosecutor of the Federal Court to declare that from now on, the PKK would be treated as a criminal rather than terrorist organisation, and this further fuelled anti-Western feeling.

3.3 FROZEN RELATIONS WITH EU

Ecevit’s Government’s actions were deemed insufficient, and not without influence on Italy’s immigrant problem, Turkey’s membership-candidate status request was turned down at the 1997 Luxemburg summit. The fact that the newly-emerging post-Soviet bloc countries were given more hope of EU membership, while Turkey, a long-time ally was told to wait, caused a strong reaction within government and among the public, stirring discussions questioning Turkey’s European identity. As a result of both the Luxembourg summit decision and increasing anti-European sentiment, Turkey decided to suspend political relations with the EU and with the EP in particular. According to Kirisci, such move by the Turkish authorities cost the EP more than it could have gained otherwise, and in a bold step, EP delegates were denied access to Ocalan in prison.⁴⁸ President Demirel stated that “by

⁴⁷Arcayurek.C., ‘Sèvres is again on the scene’, *Cumhuriyet*, 06.01.1998

⁴⁸Kirisci.K. (2004) p. 290

supporting separatist organisations, Europe wanted to accomplish what they could not achieve by Sèvres.⁴⁹ Kirisci noted that the EU Commission Report of November 1998⁵⁰ concerning accession to the EU on the basis of the political criteria adopted at the Copenhagen Summit in June 1993 had caused a similar reaction.⁵¹ Regarding the KQ, the report noted that “Turkey will have to find a political and non-military solution to the problem.”⁵² President Demirel expressed his unease about certain parts of the report that Turkey needed to meet the Copenhagen Criteria on minority rights.

3.3.1 CAPTURE OF OCALAN

Rejection of Turkey’s membership candidate status strengthened the establishment’s hand and enabled it to apply to the courts in March 1998 to have the Kurdish-leaning People’s Democracy Party- Halkin Demokrasi Partisi (HADEP) party closed down. At the same time, Syria started to occupy the headlines, following an interview with the PKK leader in Middle East Quarterly in June 1998, where mention was made of PKK-Syria links.⁵³ The Turkish media too followed this line. Although Ocalan was living in Syria, he did not want Syria to become the centre of attention, so on September 1st 1998, he announced a unilateral ceasefire and stated that “the PKK wanted to start political negotiations; they were not

⁴⁹ ‘Germany is not supporting PKK’, *Zaman*, 24.08.1998

⁵⁰ Progress Report from the Commission on Progress towards Accession by each of the candidate countries, November 4, 1998.

⁵¹ Kirisci.K., (2004) p. 192

⁵² Regular Report from the Commission on Progress towards Accession: Turkey. Brussels, European Commission. (November 1998)’

⁵³ Unknown, ‘Abdullah Öcalan: We Are Fighting Turks Everywhere’, *Middle East Quarterly* V(2): 79-85., (June 1998)

claiming autonomy, or sovereignty or demanding a separate state, and they would not make a political issue of Turkey's territorial boundaries".⁵⁴

Turkey ignored all criticisms directed at it, which Kirisci interpreted as a "nothing more to lose" approach by hard-liners following the rejection of Turkey's EU-bid.⁵⁵ Turkey gave further demonstration of its willingness to ignore European opinion when it imposed tough economic sanctions against Italy, as a result of the PKK's announcement that the next Kurdish Parliament-in-exile's sitting of 1998 would take place there. Turkey's relationship with the EU and its stance towards Italy in particular was intended to give the message that where Syria was concerned, "measures could also be taken which would go beyond the purely diplomatic".⁵⁶

In a speech made at the opening ceremony of GNAT, President Demirel sent a message that was openly hostile, saying, *"I declare to the World that we reserve the right to retaliate against Syria because of its active support of PKK terrorism and our patience is running thin"*.

The "Why now?" question was answered by the fact that until 1998 the civil authority was responsible for decisions, and only now, with the interference of the military had there been any results. This legitimised the military's anti-democratic position following the 1997 soft

⁵⁴'We will not push the national borders', *Milliyet*, 30.08.1998

⁵⁵Kirisci.K., (2004) p. 292

⁵⁶'Strong reaction to Syria', *Cumhuriyet*, 02.10.1998

coup-de-état, and highlighted the failure of the civilian authorities to solve the KQ as well as blaming the opposition media for taking a pro-Arab stance.⁵⁷

Although Turkey's pressure on Syria was not welcomed by Arab countries, the PKK leader was forced to leave Syria. Ocalan tried to seek refuge in Russia and Greece, but continuing pressure from Turkey compelled him to go to Italy, where the Italian government was coerced by Turkey and the USA into removing him without even allowing his asylum request to be processed. Ocalan fled to Kenya and took up residence in the Greek embassy there, but US intervention forced him to leave even that safe haven, and he was captured by the Turkish secret services and returned to Turkey on 13th February 1999.

The parties in the coalition government led by the DSP decided to capitalise on Ocalan's capture and called for an early election on 18th April 1999. As was expected, the Socialist DSP led the polls with the nationalist MHP-Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party) coming second. The election results were important from the point of view of how much influence the KQ had on domestic policies, public opinion and the electorate in Turkey. Both parties were elected not according to their manifestoes, but as a direct result of Ocalan's capture.

Ocalan was tried, found guilty and condemned to death, which provoked strong criticism from the EU and its member states, which led to anti-European rhetoric in hegemonic

⁵⁷'Turkish Unions: why now?', *Zaman*, 05.10.1998, Acar.O., 'Why we were awakened now?', *Cumhuriyet*, 13.10.1998

discourse.⁵⁸ The establishment's agenda regarding the KQ was firmly focused on relationships between the PKK and the West. The idea that at a time when the PKK's leader had been captured, the problem could be solved once and for all was not even considered. Following his capture, Ocalan, who knew that a solution would be sought within the framework of Democratic Republic principles, instructed all armed units of the PKK to leave Turkey.⁵⁹

3.3.2 EU RELATIONS REVISITED

The KQ had been influential in shaping the newly elected government, with the two nationalist parties holding the balance of power, and had again indirectly influenced FSP. Following the elections, however, there was a shift of position in favour of Europe. Ecevit decided – somewhat surprisingly, in view of his coalition with the MHP – to concentrate his efforts on reviving relationships with Europe, in order to speed up the process by which Turkey could become a candidate member state, and thanks to his personal efforts, in June 1999 the country gained candidate-member status. This was partly due to US efforts, which will be looked at in the next chapters.⁶⁰

The extent of Kurdish support for Turkey's EU membership went so far that Kurdish groups in Europe demonstrated in favour of Turkey's EU bid and Kurdish TV stations stopped broadcasting news and programmes against Turkey. Turkey's new EU candidate-member status increased the influence of the EU and of Western Europe in general on Turkish FSP as far as the KQ was concerned. Kurdish efforts to appease Turkish public opinion were,

⁵⁸Gurses.E., 'PKK and the West', *Cumhuriyet*, 03.07.1999

⁵⁹'PKK is leaving Turkey', *Milliyet*, 06.08.1999

⁶⁰Helsinki European Council of December 1999

however, regarded as a threat by the establishment, who once more tried to plant the idea that Europe was giving support to the PKK.⁶¹ Thanks to the efforts of Ismail Cem, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Ecevit's government, the language applied by the EU in the EU Accession Partnership document of November 2000 was much more conciliatory than had previously been the case. It stated that Turkey would be bound by Copenhagen political criteria, but an expression such as "Minority Rights" was replaced by "Cultural Rights". Kirisci argued that such softened rhetoric could be an advantage to moderates, and could bring about an end to the vicious circle that had developed, and which was often referred to in subjugate discourse.⁶² The National Intelligence Service (MIT) officials stressed that the people of the region had to be reached out to, by means of TV broadcasts in Kurdish, and at the same time, the Kurds had to be encouraged to study the Turkish language.⁶³

Despite its fatal attacks, the organisation was not, however, included on the list of designated terrorist organisations at the EU Ministers of Internal Affairs and Justice summit held in Brussels in September 2001. Provoked by Turkish reaction, the PKK was listed among potential terrorist organisations, but it was not included in another list of organisations whose assets were subject to confiscation. Naturally, hegemonic discourse interpreted this as the practice of double standards on the part of the EU.⁶⁴

3.4 A FRESH AIR IN TURKISH FSP: THE AK PARTY ERA

⁶¹ EP again opened its arms to PKK', *Milliyet*, 07.10.2000

⁶² Kirisci.K., (2004) p. 195

⁶³ Bila.F., 'A statement by undersecretary of MIT to send shockwaves', *Milliyet*, 28.11.2000

⁶⁴ Bila.F., 'Europe's terrorist', *Milliyet*, 29.12.2001

Turkey's FSP underwent drastic changes following a landslide victory of the Ak Party in November 2002, and the appointment of Hilmi Ozkok as CoGS in August 2002 sped up this process. Ozkok restricted the movements of lower level staff, even those whose views were that of hegemonic discourse, and prevented them from making moves outside democratic boundaries. Another development that directly influenced the KQ, the US invasion of Iraq, took place during this period. It would soon be followed by the start of formal negotiations for Turkey's EU membership in 2004.

3.4.1 EU REFORMS

Before the formal negotiations started, both the former coalitions and Ak Party governments put great effort to step up the EU membership process. Since most of the criticism towards Turkey focused on human rights issues and related to KQ, following paragraphs will summarize what Turkey achieved on human rights issues under the name of EU reforms. These initial reforms have been put into force through 8 reform packages that included several amendments in the Constitution and other laws between 2002 and 2004.⁶⁵ After 15 years of implementation, State of Emergency Situation in the Southeast of Turkey has been abolished in 2002. Following this drastic change, the Ak Party government issued a circular to compensate harms occurred due to terror or counter-terrorism practices. As a result, those who were forced to leave their villages by State or PKK could find opportunity to return their homelands.

⁶⁵ Turkish Prime Ministry, Political Reform in Turkey, Adaptation Packages and Current Developments, 2007

Obstacles on TV and Radio broadcasting in languages other than Turkish have abolished. So, broadcasting is no longer prohibited. State channel, TRT, opened up a new TV Channel, called TRT SES, broadcasting in Kurdish. In the following years, a couple of radio stations are also opened.

Perhaps the most important reform has been the normalization of the military-civil relations. One important change was made in the role and structure of General Secretariat of National Security. In this regard, the General Secretary's executive powers were eliminated.⁶⁶ Furthermore, the most striking step was that the Ak Party government declared a "zero tolerance policy to torture." Parallel to this policy, UN Convention on Eliminating All Kinds of Discrimination has been adopted in the Turkish Parliament and put into force. With a change in the Turkish Penal Code, the definition of torture and ill-treatment has been replaced with the ones that are prescribed in the international conventions.

In addition to the above changes, there have been developments in the procedures of prosecution. With a change in the Criminal Procedure Code, duration of stay in police custody for organized crime and terror suspects was reduced from 7 days to 4 days. Relatives of these suspects will be informed immediately and evidence collected against the law will not be accepted as a valid document in the court.⁶⁷ Regulation on Apprehension and Taking into Custody was changed. Duration of stay of regular criminals in police custody was

⁶⁶European Commission, Regular Progress Report, 2004.

⁶⁷General Secretariat for European Union, Political Reforms-II, 2011.

reduced; physical conditions of custodies were developed. The response time for applications related to human rights was reduced from 90 days to 60 days.

3.4.2 AK PARTY GOVERNMENT AND THE KURDISH QUESTION

As had been the case with every previous government, the Ak Party government that was sworn into power in November 2002 had to face the KQ. When it came to European relations, the KQ was at the top of the agenda, together with differences over Greece and Cyprus. In a briefing to the newly established Cabinet, the TGS raised the KQ when it said that “Europe was continuing its support for the KADEK as it did not regard it as a successor to the PKK; and through various political initiatives Europe showed that it supported the establishment of a Kurdish state”⁶⁸ This was a signal to the government that the ruling elite had not changed its position towards Europe when it came to KQ. As a result of the new government’s initiatives, in March 2003, Germany recognised the KADEK as a successor to the PKK and banned its activities in that country. The demand that the PKK should be denounced as a terrorist group succeeded because of the atmosphere created by the Madrid train bombings of 11th March 2004, three days before the Spanish General Election. A Brussels summit held on 25-26th March 2004 added the Kongra Gel and the KADEK to the list of terrorist organisations, thus meeting Turkey’s demands.⁶⁹ Once the PKK and its affiliates had been added to the list of terrorist organisations, action was taken against it across Europe. In Germany and the Netherlands, discussions opened on the issue of whether high-level members of the organisation who were held in prison should be

⁶⁸PKK-KADEK has not changed its target', *Cumhuriyet*, 10.12.2002

⁶⁹The European Council Presidency Conclusions , 16/17 December 2004, 16238/1/04

returned to Turkey. For the first time, warnings from the EU to the PKK became more insistent.

Dumanli, from a subjugate discourse point of view, argued that the PKK, which until now received assistance from EU member countries, seemed much less likely to get support from now on. In the days when Turkey was knocking at the door of the EU, It is difficult to determine what their aim is, and whose purposes they are serving. PKK actions served the interests of those who did not want Turkey's EU membership.⁷⁰ Zubeyir Aydar, who was elected as the new leader of the Kongra-Gel at a second extraordinary meeting held between 16th and 26th May 2004, confirmed these claims. Aydar, who announced the end of the ceasefire on May 30th, said, "The end of the ceasefire would axe Turkey's negotiations with the EU.

Within the framework of solving the KQ, thanks to legal developments backed by ECtHR judgements, it became clear that political prisoners such as Leyla Zana, a Kurdish political prisoner and member of the DEP, would be entitled to a re-trial.⁷¹ This was not welcomed by the establishment, because it was feared that this ruling would also apply to members of the PKK. Following the release of the DEP MPs by a decision of the Prosecution Service, Ozcan, a researcher and journalist and former soldier who holds TGS views, stated that "The PKK/Kongra-Gel's political ideas are centred on Abdullah Ocalan, so it is not surprising that they are not willing to cease their terrorist activities. The idea that the PKK would give up such activities is naive, and the members of the DEP are evidence of that. The organisation

⁷⁰Dumanli. E., 'Attention to the South-East!', *Zaman*, 03.06.2004

⁷¹The Council of Europe ECHR Decision, *Zana v. Turkey*, 18954/91, Date of Judgment: 25.11.1997

has to fight to preserve its unity. If it didn't, it would start listening to itself and degenerate". Ozcan argued as far as the relationship with the EU was concerned, the tactic was "to be a step ahead", the implementations of policy were opposed by the government, and the public was not being listened to.⁷² Bila wrote that "the EU had imposed conditions that were the same as those demanded by the PKK/Kongra-Gel, namely, freedom to speak Kurdish, the setting up of Kurdish language courses, TV broadcasting in Kurdish and release of political prisoners. However, the organisation was still was not satisfied when these conditions were met".

Professor Ergil agrees that the acceleration of EU reforms actually reduced the West's assistance to the Kurdish political movement thanks to the concentration of effort and attention to the political, economic and cultural sides of the problem. The perception in the West was that it was this that had caused the armed struggle. When these causes were eliminated, those Kurdish politicians who could not show clear-cut opposition to the PKK were demonstrating that they were acting together with them.⁷³ Cemal, who approached the issue from an even more uncompromising stance, wrote, "For Turkey, which is speedily approaching Europe and knocking on EU doors for the start of formal negotiations, to take up arms again, would be either stupidity or would be compared to becoming a subcontractor of, for example, the "Red Apple Coalition".⁷⁴

⁷²Ozcan.N.A., 'The terror actions will not end', *Cumhuriyet*, 11.06.2004

⁷³Ergil.D., 'The DEP MPs lose their reputation in the eyes of the EU', *Zaman*, 06.07.2004

⁷⁴It refers to the ultra nationalist movement which appeared after the election of the AK Party government. It consists of different groups and political parties whose only common characteristic is a shared anti-Western and anti-AK Party view. Nationalist forces from both sides of the political axis, Cemal.H., 'APO's jetton', *Milliyet*, 19.08.2004

Prior to the decision to start formal negotiations for EU membership candidacy, the EU Expansion High Commissioner Gunter Verheugen expressed his wish to visit Diyarbakir to meet the government, and asked the Turkish MFA Abdullah Gul whether the government would have any objections to such a meeting. Gul replied: *"Turkey is an open society. Meet whoever you want. Go where ever you want"*.⁷⁵ Such a reply showed the difference of approach between the government and the ruling elite towards the KQ, because previously, visits of even the lowest level diplomats to the region were met with great suspicion. While Verheugen was holding his meetings, the PKK/Kongra-Gel carried out an attack on a police station located between Diyarbakir and Sanliurfa and killed two policemen. The TGS tried to weaken the government's position in the negotiations by increasing anti-European feeling, and drew parallels between the PKK attacks and EU membership. During that time, top generals used the funerals of soldiers as a platform for anti-government propaganda.

In 2004 the EU progress report⁷⁶ and the Prime-Minister's Human Rights Advisory Council (PMHRAC) presented their reports to the public. This increased tensions and slowed down the accession negotiations.⁷⁷ The Progress report stated that, as had been mentioned in the Lausanne Agreement, as well as Jews, Armenians and Greeks, other nations, particularly Kurds, were also residing in Turkey, and it was still necessary to do more to secure their minority, education and cultural rights. It was stressed that the TGS still maintained its strong influence through various informal channels. The PMHRAC wrote in its report that the rights prescribed by the Lausanne Agreement could not be implemented and the direct link made between cultural rights and the state's unity could very often lead to reactions

⁷⁵ Akyol.T., 'Kurds and Europe', *Milliyet*, 08.09.2004

⁷⁶ Regular Report on Turkey's progress towards accession, SEC(2004) 1201, Brussels, 6.10.2004

⁷⁷ Ibid. p. 15, 48, Turkish Prime Ministry Human Rights Councilation CommitteeIHDK Report: 6. 12.03.2001

under the Sèvres Agreement. Phrases in these report that called for greater freedoms for minority groups led the military and President Sezer, who was acting in line with them, to toughen their criticisms of the EU. Sezer declared, *“The state recognises the right of its subjects to hold any identity they like in private. The richness of diversity of its subjects is the richness of the state as a whole”*, thus underlining that demands for a separate political identity would be illegal. CoGS Ozkok said, *“The process of the establishment of a nation-state by Ataturk following the Great War of Liberation was built on a notion of a single “Nation of Turkey” regardless of the faith and ethnicity of its subjects. And that process has not yet been completed.”*⁷⁸ Bila wrote that the EU was trying to justify those who sought to establish a separate Kurdish identity, whereas Sezer and Ozkok opposed such moves.⁷⁹ The Ankara Chamber of Commerce tried to open up a new discussion around “the identity issue”.⁸⁰ All these developments were efforts by opponents of the EU to delay the formal negotiation period decision by applying various pretexts that ranged from the Cyprus issue to the question of Kurdish identity. Due to the Ak Party’s decisiveness, however, these efforts did not produce any results and at the summit of EU member state governments and heads of states on 17th December 2004 it was decided that these negotiations should begin in 2005.⁸¹

The events of 2005 turned everybody’s attention back to Northern Iraq and Turkish-American relationships, due to renewed armed clashes that had been silent since 2000. A meeting was held between EU Ambassadors and Prime-Minister Erdogan in Ankara in June

⁷⁸ Bila.F., 'Republic and the identity', *Milliyet*, 30.10.2004

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Retrieved from (<http://www.atonet.org.tr/yeni/index.php?p=250&l=1>) (accessed 12 March 2011)

⁸¹ The EU Council Presidency Conclusions –December 2004

2005. At the meeting the Ambassadors drew attention to operations in the South-East, reiterated that military action could not serve as a final solution and criticized the government's failure to create a civil alternative. Despite government explanations, the Dutch Ambassador signalled that he wanted *"to see the end of military operations against the PKK"*. These words strengthened Turkish views that the unity of the country was being jeopardized by the EU.

At such a period of increased PKK violence, the military, who could not directly criticise the EU and whose authority had significantly diminished, raised the question of difficulties experienced in the fight with the PKK, and following a PKK attack in which five soldiers were killed, CoGS Ozkok said, *The TAF are urgently fighting the separatist organisation despite limited authority*".⁸² While the government spokesman said that he did not know what such words from the CoGS meant and promised to raise the issue at the next NSC meeting, the meaning of the statement was reflected in subsequent hegemonic discourse. Bila wrote that the "restricted authority" that the CoGS was referring to was the result of legal adjustments made in a period when EU negotiations were taking on increasing speed, and they were brought in to meet EU conditions as specified in EU reports.⁸³ To the public, the EU, and particularly the Copenhagen Criteria, were blamed for increased violence. Birand's writing was representative of subjugate discourse when he wrote that *"Turkey has to differentiate the PKK from the Kurdish problem; it should address the root causes of the Kurdish problem by bringing in socio-economic and cultural reforms while punishing terrorism, and when such policy proves successful, it would please Brussels, restrict options for Kurds lobbying in the EP*

⁸²TAF's authority has been limited', *Cumhuriyet*, 06.08.2005

⁸³Bila.F., 'Two outcomes of terrorism', *Milliyet*, 06.08.2005

and relax Washington".⁸⁴ According to Yilmaz, the Ak Party's election win in 2002 meant that the old regime, namely the establishment, disappeared with the old political parties. Although the Ak Party was a fairly new and inexperienced party, it implemented EU reforms and the IMF programme. Over the KQ, they managed to break the link between the PKK and the Kurdish issue as a result of steps undertaken to meet EU conditions. The new political and social reality was, however, opposed by military bureaucrats and others who held similar traditional views. EU negotiations were not only leading to wider democratisation, but were also removing the advantages that the old bureaucracy of Turkey had enjoyed.⁸⁵ An increasingly democratic political environment undermined PKK propaganda, and Gulerce argued that increased terrorist actions were the result of opposition within Turkey that was working with the PKK with the aim of slowing down the EU negotiations that had started in October 2005.⁸⁶

3.4.3 ERDOGAN'S 2005 DIYARBAKIR SPEECH

The government tried to be objective in its evaluation of these developments. Prime-Minister Erdogan, in a meeting held with intellectuals, said, *"We recognise the reality of the Kurdish problem and accept that a solution can be achieved within a democratic, republican and constitutional framework, but it will require large-scale democratisation reforms. The KQ is one of a number of problems that can be solved by democratisation"*. Erdogan, like his predecessors Ozal and Ciller, faced similar opposition when he used the term "the Kurdish Question". Opposition came from both within his party and from hegemonic discourse

⁸⁴Birand. M.A., 'Erdogan's speech in Diyarbakir is very important', *Milliyet*, 10.08.2005

⁸⁵PKK mines on the way to the EU', *Zaman*, 25.08.2005

⁸⁶Yilmaz.M., 'Kurdish issue and terrorism', *Milliyet*, 11.08.2005

where the expression “there is no KQ, there is PKK terrorism” was preferred. Erdogan, however, who had both greater influence and was more powerful than his predecessors, was not much affected by such criticism.⁸⁷

The chauvinistic stance of opposition party leaders and newspaper editors was criticised by Mahcupyan, a journalist writing for Zaman Daily. He accused them of undermining the government by their arguments that terrorism could not be prevented by democratisation, and therefore democratisation should not be pursued. These government critics, who were totally anti-EU, argued that the government’s EU policies increased the influence of the PKK. Thus, the way out of the situation was to stop the democratisation process and to pursue the fight against the terrorism by remaining outside the EU. This argument was a totally illogical, however, because it at once ignored PKK violence, while demanding that the Kurds should leave the armed struggle.⁸⁸ At the same time, statements in support of Mahcupyan’s analyses came from the EU. The Co-Chair of the EU-Turkey joint Parliamentary committee Joost Lagendijk, addressed Kurdish politicians in Turkey before the Kurdish Conference at the EP and said, “Cut your relationship with the past and the PKK leader Ocalan, and get involved with Turkish politics”.⁸⁹

Criticisms of the PKK and the TAF continued to come from Europe. ColF Gen. Yasar Buyukanit gave a strong reply to EP Member Andrew Duff, who described military operations by the TAF as “aggressive”. Buyukanit said, “It is with regret that I have to condemn the views of those who call our fight against terrorism “aggressive”. Those who

⁸⁷Crises of the KQ', *Cumhuriyet*, 16.08.2005

⁸⁸Mahcupyan. E., 'We are seeking peace', *Zaman*, 16.09.2005

⁸⁹Cut your links with Ocalan', *Milliyet*, 17.09.2005

say such things want to see a divided national identity, and a Turkey that is ready to be partitioned.” He further argued that every reaction by Turkish state to the issue of sovereignty and against PKK terrorism was interpreted as “Turkish nationalism is on the rise”.⁹⁰ Despite the positive developments that saw the army’s gradual departure from the political arena, an army general had been able to reply to an MEP who criticised Turkey, and this demonstrated the army’s interference in both the political arena, and Turkey’s FSP.

Turkey’s membership negotiations with the EU started without any trouble on 3rd October 2005. However, when the PKK did not get any signals from the EU that its demands would be met, on 7th October 2005 it announced that it was ending the ceasefire and was starting a new concept that it called “active legitimate defence”. The interesting point about this announcement was that the EU was threatened along with Turkey. The written statement drawn up by PKK’s new political unit, Koma Komalen Kürdistan (KKK), said that Turkey and the EU were being warned for the last time and “once again the Kurds had been betrayed by the EU. This is a repetition of Europe’s policy that has been going on for the last 200 years.” What the KKK meant by this was the Lausanne Treaty that was based on a denial of the existence of the Kurdish nation.⁹¹ According to hegemonic discourse, the KQ could not be solved by peaceful means, but the government wanted to show that it could be, and had won EU backing for this. The PKK’s ending of the ceasefire and subsequent threats had demonstrated its violent nature to the EU. Such a development also showed the total changes in Turkish FSP. The West was no longer regarded as an entity that was trying to

⁹⁰ ‘The message in Buyuanit Speech has been decrypted’ *Milliyet*, 25.09.2005

⁹¹ ‘Terror organisation ended the ceasefire’, *Cumhuriyet*, 07.10.2005

divide Turkey, but had acted rationally and become Turkey's contributory partner, even over the KQ.

As a result, within this framework, in the EC's progress report on Turkey, it was stated that the reason progress in the South East could not be achieved was due to renewed PKK attacks. By expressing this, the EU showed that it regarded the PKK as an obstacle to solving the KQ.⁹² Following the report, at a conference entitled "Strategic Factors in Turkey's EU initiatives" arranged in Brussels by the European Political Centre, the members of the European Commission in charge of Turkey and Cyprus, Jean-Christophe Filori, pointed out that one of the major obstacles to the development of the South East was the PKK. Filori even argued that as long as the PKK continued its attacks, it would not be possible for any progress to be made in the region.⁹³

Following military responses to increased bombings in the Eastern provinces in late 2005, PKK attacks started in cities, too, and attacks reminiscent of the 1990s were witnessed. In a protest that took place in Diyarbakir in March 2006 following the funeral of PKK members who had been killed, three protesters died, and 130 protesters and 120 security force members were injured. This event was reflected in subjugate discourse as "recognition of the PKK as a terrorist organisation by the EU and support of a political movement that tried to stay independent of the PKK, pushed the PKK to create a fresh environment of conflict".⁹⁴ It was argued that in order to overcome these acts of violence, "it was necessary to

⁹²The EU Commission Turkey 2005 Progress Report. Brussels, The EU Commission. SEC (2005) 1426: 42. 09.11.2005

⁹³The EU Commission', *Cumhuriyet*, 15.11.2005

⁹⁴Dagi.I.D., 'What do kurds want?', *Zaman*, 31.03.2006

concentrate on steps to develop basic rights and freedoms drawn up by the EU".⁹⁵ As the EU criteria were pointed to as a solution, the increased violence caused both Turkey and the PKK to receive warning messages from the EU Commission and the EP. MEPs held both the Turkish state and the military responsible for the Diyarbakir violence. The 46 MEPs who sent a letter of condemnation of the Diyarbakir events to Prime-Minister Erdogan argued that recognition of the rights of the Kurdish population was a condition for Turkey's EU membership.⁹⁶ The EU Commission in turn cautioned, "The PKK is a terrorist organisation and is on the list of EU terrorist organisations. Terrorism cannot be justified in any way... Turkish security forces should not apply excessive force when tackling events".⁹⁷ Prime-Minister Erdogan used strong words in his reply to the letter from the European Parliament, and said that "those who write such letters should have to live through such events".⁹⁸

Prime-Minister Erdogan addressed the DTP who took the same line as the PKK by saying, *"If your actions are legal, if you want to pursue a democratic life, ... you would come to the table without weapons, and you would be able to discuss anything you want. At this point, once and for all, the DTP has to accept the PKK as a terrorist organisation"*.⁹⁹ By that he let all armed groups know that the government was prepared to start a dialogue with any of them subject to the giving up of their weapons. This invitation, however, provoked a reaction from the establishment before the DTP were able to respond. The CHP leader Baykal expressed his party's opposition to a political solution to the KQ by saying, "The Prime-Minister's confusion in the fight against terrorism is reflected in his language. His call

⁹⁵'The only force to crash the devious plans in the south east', *Zaman*, 31.03.2006

⁹⁶'A caution on negotiations from the EP', *Cumhuriyet*, 06.04.2006

⁹⁷'Two MEPs expressed condemnations', *Cumhuriyet*, 07.04.2006

⁹⁸'Praise to security forces', *Zaman*, 07.04.2006

⁹⁹'A table invitations from Erdogan', *Cumhuriyet*, 07.04.2006

for negotiations damages Turkey's fight against terrorism. Today, when even Europe calls the PKK "a terrorist organisation that should not be negotiated with," the Prime-Minister's call for negotiations seriously damages Turkey's fight against terrorism". The rejection of the government's proposal without even a discussion, points to the heavy influence of the status quo norm. By that, the establishment aimed to push the government into deadlock on an issue that was extremely sensitive for the public, particularly when Presidential elections were looming a year later, with general elections following that – which served as a yardstick in defining Civil-Military bureaucratic divisions. The ultimate goal of such a step was to weaken the Ak Party's position in the elections which would ultimately lead to maintenance of the establishment's influence over state politics. Lagendijk, the EU Commissioner, drew everyone's attention to the fact that Europe was watching the above clash and that it was obvious that all political parties were seen as unwilling to solve the existing problem.¹⁰⁰

All these developments in favour of Turkey did not find due importance in hegemonic discourse. The most important reason was that all events were evaluated applying Sèvres Syndrome norm. From this perspective, there was a hidden agenda in any step taken by Europe. It was also claimed that the USA, who were opposed to military action in N.Iraq despite increased levels of violence there, focused on Europe as a means of distracting attention from the Middle East. Another reason why this was not seen as important in the discourse that those arrested in Europe were not being extradited to Turkey on the grounds of absence of fair trial, and soon they were released. No matter what the reason, Europe

¹⁰⁰ Lagendijk.J., 'The Reformists, Would you please stand up?', *Zaman*, 21.04.2006

provided substantial support to Turkey in the fight against the PKK, and this led to greater relaxation and flexibility in the FSP pursued by Turkey.

CONCLUSION

Starting a candidacy process for EU in the 1960s, Turkey historically had a continuing relationship with European countries. Despite military coups in 1960, 1971 and 1980, Turkey seems to keep its direction towards becoming a political and economic part of Europe. Turkey's wish, however, could not be achieved due to various developments in Turkey as well as in Europe. The most significant of them that Turkey faced during the 1980s and later was, definitely, the KQ.

On one hand, the recommendations made to Turkey in the field of democracy and human rights within the Copenhagen Criteria framework, were directly related to KQ. On the other hand, Turkey's terrorism problem affected domestic politics as well as the public interest. For instance, in Turkey, some European countries have been perceived as PKK's supporters. This belief is raised and widely used by the ruling elite. Often, hegemonic discourse was devoted to discrediting Europe, and to banish European culture and values from Turkey. Such a position of the ruling elite was caused by its fear of losing its privileged and dominant status as a result of reforms that were needed to resolve the issue of KQ. The ruling elite's influence over the country's FSP was greatly reduced due to amendments to legislations on human rights, minority rights, and the rule of law. As will be seen from the analyses of the ruling elite's discourse throughout this period, its anti-EU stance rested more on baseless idealistic considerations of country's division, rather than economic, political or other materialistic interests. Thus, it will be seen that constructivism provides a more efficient analytical framework for studying Turkish FSP during the period in question.

Alongside that, the KQ came to the Turkish agenda in the early 1980s, via the military junta who took power on 12 September 1980 and stopped the EEC integration process, but it did not play a major role in Turkey-EEC relationship. However, in Ozal's term of office which started in 1983, his attempts to re-ignite the EEC integration process and finally the country's full membership application in 1988, brought the KQ into the EEC agenda. This made the EEC one of the major international agents with regards to KQ. While the EEC displayed a more criticizing position towards Turkey, particularly under influence of left-wing groups, these criticisms resulted in the ruling elite's reaction against EEC membership, due to the Sèvres syndrome norm. This is the period when the West, for the first time, started being referred to as the igniters of KQ in Turkey, by the high-level decision makers. The EP's request for recognition of "existence and identity" of Kurds in countries beyond Turkey, reinforced the ruling elite's fear that Turkey's existing borders would change.

Such approach by the EEC and the EP, led to that the ruling elite, who were under influence of FSP norms, to advocate the thesis that "Kurds were not a separate ethnic group". By that, it was endeavoured to show that KQ not as an issue of human rights and democracy, as was seen in the West, but as an issue related to terrorism. The free usage of Kurdish language, broadcasting Kurdish programs on state TV, and other similar activities, which were Ozal's personal initiatives, were later banned by the ruling elite.

Turgut Ozal, during his short term in the office of the President until 1993 started large-scale fundamental reforms that had an enormous impact on the country's political and social structures. Under his leadership, Turkey switched to neoliberal economy. In the period of 1987 EU membership application, there were signs of improvement in the fields of human

rights and parliamentary democracy. If judged by his policies, having a leading role for politicians that followed him and the political environment of the time, it can be said that on the issue of KQ, Ozal was a leader with a far-reaching vision.

Following the times after Ozal's death in 1993, the EU recognised the PKK as a terrorist organisation. However, Turkey's abuses of human rights during fight with terrorism and military operations in Northern Iraq did not drop from the EU agenda. Consecutive Turkish governments that came to power after Ozal and who gave total weight to hard-power politics, followed policies directed at sidelining Kurds from state politics and included such activities as closing and banning political parties and arrests of politicians. These issues made KQ a European problem as well.

The hard policies of the ruling elite increased the military's – ruling elite's strongest agent – influence over civilian governments. The President Demirel's individual initiatives were also playing a key role in establishing such an environment. Demirel acted together with the military in preventing legislative amendments related to KQ that were requested by the EU as part of a negotiations process to enter the Customs Union, that was seen as a step towards becoming a full member. However, under the influence of the strongest norm over FSP – the Westernism, the ruling elite did not create further obstacles in legislative changes. His was apparently due to the fear of a possible non-attachment (disengagement) with the West. The rise of Islamist Welfare Party in the second half of the 1990s, made the ruling elite push the KQ to the second plan and concentrate their attention on religious extremism. The WP-TTP coalition ended in 1997 under pressure from the ruling elite.

The rejection of Turkey's full membership application at the 1997 Luxembourg EU Summit reignited the Sèvres Syndrome through arguments that the EU was trying to split Turkey by using KQ. On the other hand, the consecutive governments who lost hope on EU membership, developed policies at resolving the KQ by tough actions. These policies ended with capture of PKK's leader in 1999 with US assistance.

Due to economic crises started in 2001 and political instability during 1999-2002, a new political party, AK Party, came to power in 2002. AK Party materialised their reforms – most of them were related to KQ – by including them into the EU negotiation program. Such conditions weakened the ruling elite's opposition, due to the Western norm. The state of emergency in Kurdish populated areas has been removed, broadcasting in Kurdish was made freely available, the state television established a Kurdish channel, while the General Council of National Security was demilitarised, a policy of zero tolerance towards torture was stated, and amendments were brought in favour of suspects and detainees rights.

While AK Party was carrying out these reforms, the work was underway to bring an end to PKK activities and recognition of it as a terrorist organisation. The government largely succeeded in these, especially after the anti-terrorism wave following 9/11. These policies applied by AK Party show that traditional FSP norms – except Westernism – have changed to great extent. The EU supported AK Party, who carried out its reforms and EU negotiation process played not a minor role, by denouncing PKK's terrorist actions and publicly supporting Turkey's policies on KQ.

The ruling elite vehemently came against the AK Party reforms, including those directed at KQ, of 2002-2007. Efforts to close down the AK Party and the election of the President were of paramount importance in the struggle between AK Party and the Ruling elite. Using the KQ and the Cyprus issue, ruling elite also tried to undermine the EU negotiations process. The EU openly criticised the PKK since it harms Turkey's negotiations and application of necessary reforms. However, the ruling elite linked increased PKK attacks to Turkey's reforms carried out as part of membership application process and relationships created with the EU. However, Turkey remained steadfast on its course to finding a democratic solution to KQ, something that was started by Ozal in the 1990s and was continued by AK Party. In 2005, despite all counter efforts and initiatives, the country gained the status of a candidate state.

There are other European agents on the issue of KQ apart from the EU and the EP, although it is necessary to note that their role is not at the same level as the earlier two. The most important among them are CoE and ECHR. Apart from that, the contributions of some individual states are also worth noting. In the next Chapter, Turkey's relationship with these agents on KQ will be examined.

CHAPTER IV: COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND TURKEY RELATIONS ON KURDISH QUESTION

INTRODUCTION

Individual European states and other European institutions, such as the CoE and the ECtHR, need to be taken into account during this research. These establishments both influenced European decision making institutions and governments, and have been instruments to apply political pressure on Turkey. Kurdish groups and PKK members could have chances to bring their cases via these institutions in daily politics.

Turkey, a member of CoE since the beginning, starting from the 1980s, became subject to CoE's criticisms, due to, mainly, human rights abuses following the military coup. The KQ, in the international arena, first entered the CoE agenda with lobbying of the left and communist MPs in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). The common features that stood apart in all PACE resolutions were: solution of the KQ by peaceful means, recognition of cultural rights for Kurds, to fight against the PKK within the provisions of the ECtHR and legal framework of rule of law, and Turkey to carry out legal reforms to adapt to the Convention. In addition, the PACE decisions were supportive of the argument of recognising Kurds as an ethnic minority.¹

¹ Kurubas.E., *Kurt Sorununun Uluslararası Boyutu ve Türkiye 1960'lerden 2000'lere-The international dimension of the Kurdish Problem and Turkey from 1960's to 2000*, (Ankara, Nobel Publications 2004)

Alongside with PACE, the European Commission on human rights and the Council, that later turned into ECtHR in 1998, made decisions that were met with fierce criticisms in Turkey, and also led to a number of fundamental normative changes.

4.1 DEVELOPMENTAL RELATIONS BETWEEN COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND TURKEY ON KURDISH QUESTION

4.1.1 COUNCIL OF EUROPE: AN INFLUENTIAL AGENT ON TURKEY AFTER THE 1980 COUP-D'ÉTAT

The relationship between Turkey and the CoE almost came to an end following the 1980 coup. The CoE closely followed the developments and kept pressure over the newly built government. Following the “Ludwig Steiner” report in October 1980, with the close watch over the country and in the possibility of not reinstating the democratic system, it was decided to end the membership. Following the research carried out in Turkey in February 1982, the European Legal Commission, decided to give Turkey some time until it produced the new Constitution.²

The leader of the coup – Kenan Evren, who later became the president, addressed these criticisms in meetings designed to promote the new constitution to the masses. Evren, while remaining silent towards those who created unease prior to the coup, expressed his disappointment of criticisms of prosecution of some people by the new government, and by complaints filed to European Commission of Human Rights by “*friendly and allied*

²“Will history repeat itself?”, *Milliyet*, 03.01.1985

countries".³ At the same time, CoE held discussions on the expulsion of Turkey from among its members, however, the decision was postponed to allow the coup government to go into free elections.⁴ In response to such developments, Evren wanted *"-Council members who have not seen periods prior to the coup and who look as being under the influence of those who run away from the country, under the influence of those who are stateless, and those whose aim is to divide the country- to make decisions together with real Turkish citizens in Turkey"*.⁵

Due to the CoE's decision of not being able to accept the newly elected Turkish parliamentarians, the leader of the coup vowed that *"he would be, even if the CoE would not, and that Europe has always been interfering into Turkey's internal relations ever since Ottoman times"*.⁶ Despite such strains in the relationship between the Council and Turkey being eliminated later, the importance of these arguments lies in the amount of such heavy criticisms, concentrated on human rights issues, on Turkey from Europe shows the start of Europe's influence on domestic policies of individual states as a normative power and addressing these criticisms to the post-coup military establishment. No doubt, the position held by Europe during those years brought forward important changes in the military establishment's views towards Europe.

Ilter Turkmen, who was appointed as MFA of Turkey following the coup, also made comments in support of such a position. Turkmen pointed out that as decisions of CoE are

³ Balci.K., 'Drums and funfair are not good enough for them', *Milliyet*, 25.06.1983

⁴ Birand.M.A., 'The decision on Turkey has been postponed until election', *Milliyet*, 01.10.1983

⁵ Oral.S., 'Attendance (to elections) will be over 90%', *Milliyet*, 09.10.1983

⁶ 'Turkey will exist, as part of the European Council or outside of it', *Milliyet*, 04.10.1983

not taken seriously by anybody, Turkey, too, cannot take them seriously. He acknowledged that *“the relationship between Turkey and the West weakened, however, the outer world was not an isolated space, and that the relationship with the USA and Western European countries was important for Turkey and that the relationship is being maintained on government levels”*.⁷ Ihsan Dagi argued that despite all criticisms deriving from generals towards the EU’s stance against Turkey, the country decided to return back to democracy as the means did not justify the end, particularly taking into account Turkey’s position in the West and historical backgrounds of Turkish-European relationships.⁸

Although the coup leader was uneasy about CoE’s critical stance, the Country could not drift away from the Westernism norm. Such detail was showing the mighty power of FSP against a not less powerful military coup. While KQ was not directly reflecting upon CoE documents, the reports commissioned by the CoE for the Parliamentary Assembly into conditions of Kurds in the prisons they were held in, also just mentioned that *“the rights of inmates were observed”*, and did not provide much detail of those conditions.⁹

As a result of increasing pressure from the CoE Turkey approves, in early 1985, individual applications were made to the European Commission of Human Rights. Turkey, who signed the 1954 Human Rights agreement, did not officially recognise individual applications. On the other hand, in order to override negative impressions created against Turkey among European institutions, Turkish MFA started setting up lobby groups. Among them was the

⁷ Birand.M.A., '(MFA) Turkmen ... tells about his Ministry (Foreign Office)', *Milliyet*, 11.12.1983

⁸Dagi.I., 'Democratic Transition in Turkey: 1980-1983: The Impact of European Diplomacy', *Middle Eastern Studies* 32(2). (April 1996) p. 5

⁹Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Stituation in Turkey, Resolution 822, PACE. 10.05.1984

“Friends of Turkey” group, set up in EP.¹⁰ The name chosen for the group attracts particular attention. “Friend” and “enemy” are two notions most commonly used in the discourses of Turkish foreign policies, particularly, in addressing public opinion. Such an approach, that carries light emotions and from which ultimate loyalty is expected and one that reflects the Eastern way of doing politics, was proving hard to justify to public opinion the crises that were being experienced, especially with the allies. By applying hegemonic discourses, the person, country or an institution criticising democratisation processes and human rights conditions was placed into the category of hostile entities and the criticisms would be branded as unjustified and, in fact, the issues raised were portrayed as non-existent in Turkey. The constant to the hegemonic discourse approach was being applied, particularly to criticisms coming from the EU, in the media. For example, France, who complained to the CoE about Turkey’s abuses of human rights, was cited as the country that does not respect human rights, itself showing an example of it by withholding, according to the article 15th of European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Act, justification of the violence in New Caledonia. Thus, the argument was how a country which does not fully appreciate human rights can blame Turkey for the same problem.¹¹

On the other hand, in Turkey, where the leaders of the coup-d'état were still very influential, the decision-making powers in the field of foreign policies remain weak in the hands of political authority, despite their coming to power, following the elections. In addition to such a restricted voice of the elected government, the strong political pressure applied by Western Europe, particularly in the field of human rights, was narrowing the

¹⁰‘Friends of Turkey meet in Strasbourg’, *Milliyet*, 14.02.1985

¹¹‘It complained about Turkey, however ...’, *Milliyet*, 12.02.1985

space for manoeuvre more than the pressure from the ruling elite. This was due to the amendment proposals, despite the majority in parliament, which would bring confrontation with the establishment which saw security above human rights. Such a condition was stressed in an annual report prepared by the German Parliament following the 12 September coup. According to the report, *“Turkey must not be considered only from security and export points of view, but the negative stance taken against Turkey could damage the democratisation transformation processes attempted by Ozal’s government”*.¹²

4.1.2 COUNCIL OF EUROPE INTERFERENCE IN KURDISH QUESTION: HEAVY CRITICISMS TO TURKEY

A year later, after the start of PKK attacks in 1984, Kurdish groups in Europe, along with members of Turkish Communist Party succeeded in the EP and the controversial Balfe report of the Political Affairs Committee concluded that Turkey is not meeting “the most elementary standards” in the field of human rights and recommended to extend suspension of creation of Turkey- Community Joint Parliamentary Committee in late 1985.¹³ The government, who did not want to worsen the relationship, following the Balfe Report, issued an official statement to five members of the CoE -France, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden- that it will resolve the issues mentioned in the human rights case started by them on 01 July 1985 by friendly means, which led to these countries withdrawing their applications on 07 December 1985. While Prime-Minister Ozal and MFA Halefoglu regarded this as a success, the large parts of media and supporters of the

¹²‘German support to Ozal’, *Milliyet*, 14.02.1985

¹³The European Parliament Report, B. (OJ 1985 C 343/60), Birand.M.A., ‘Doors closed at Turkey’s face’, *Milliyet*, 25.10.1985

hegemonic discourse heavily criticised the government and the EP. DYP Deputy Leader Baki Tug stated that *“one day those who allowed foreign countries to interfere into Turkey’s internal issues will be held accountable for their actions. We are totally against any concessions”*.¹⁴

There were some internal political improvements in 1986, which helped to ease the Turkey ties between both sides. The main extra-parliamentary opposition parties, the SODEP and TPP, started to be represented in the GNAT, the ban on the public speeches of former political leaders were removed, a partial amnesty was issued resulting in the release of the detainees of the Peace Association trials, and the ratification of death sentences by the Parliament was put at an end. Following the necessary amendments by the Turkish government in the field of criticisms led to satisfaction that the basic requirements were met and Turkey, in 1986, took over from Italy the CoE ministerial committee governing. Although Turkey started being fully represented in CoE, the armed conflict started by PKK in 1984 and lobbying of Kurdish groups in Europe in parallel to it, led to highlighting, for the first time, of the fact that minorities could not speak their native language and practice their culture freely in a report prepared for CoE by its “Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights”.¹⁵

The tough security policies applied in Turkey in response to increasing PKK terrorism since 1990s, found their answers in CoE. In one of the reports prepared by PACE, it was underlined that due to prohibition of use of Kurdish language, ignoring basic rights and

¹⁴ EreI.T., ‘Opposition front could overjoy’, *Milliyet*, 21.12.1985

¹⁵Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Mr.Stoffelen).Opinion-Stituation in Turkey, Resolution 860-Doc. 5547, PACE. 09.04.1986

freedoms of Kurds and denial of their identity was leading to increased joining of ethnic Kurds of PKK and that the country was on the course to a civil war. The report, while condemning the PKK, stressed that there were, among Kurds, those who rejected terrorism and were working on a peaceful resolution of the conflict, and if a European model of certain sort of regional autonomy would be exercised towards the Kurds, along with recognition of their cultural and language freedoms, the problem could be resolved.¹⁶ Based on this January 1992 report, in June 1992, PACE called Turkey to recognise cultural rights of Kurds, ratify ECHR and fight with terrorism within the framework of the rule of law.¹⁷ To CoE's such call, parliamentarians representing Turkey in CoE boycotted the session by saying: "you are pushing on Turkey too much".¹⁸

To the arrest of Kurdish origin DEP MP, the PACE showed reaction in line with the previous call. According to that, it requested release of the arrested MPs, not to close the party and to seek a peaceful solution to the KQ.¹⁹ Following this call, Turkish Ambassadors in the relevant countries were called to Turkey for consultations. With the purpose of carrying out a more effective diplomacy in their appointed countries, the ambassadors were taken to areas where KQ was being lived the most, to see the situation on the ground.²⁰ From this development it is seen that, instead of seeing the flaws in KQ related FSP, Turkey was thinking that it was misunderstood by the West. However, the PACE's decision did not

¹⁶ Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Mrs Lentz-Cornette, a. M. B.-S. On the situation of human rights in Turkey, Report Doc. 6553, PACE. 30.06.1992

¹⁷ Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, On the situation of human rights in Turkey Resolution 985 PACE. 30.06.1992

¹⁸ 'Our Parliamentarians boycotted', *Milliyet*, 30.06.1992

¹⁹ Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, On the arrest and detention of six members of the GNAT on 2 and 3 March 1994 Resolution 1030 PACE. 13.04.1994

²⁰ 'Ambassadors are called to Ankara', *Milliyet*, 27.04.1994

influence the establishment and the Constitutional Court, on 17 June 1994, closed the DEP.

In response, PACE made another decision in which it requested Turkey to carry out Constitutional reforms and improve DEP MP conditions.²¹

By request of French Socialist MPs, the CoE too, started considering closing down DEP. By that, as in the case of the 12th September 1980 coup, the issue of suspending Turkey's Council membership was raised again.²²

KQ entered the CoE agenda not only because of developments in Turkey, but also due to military operations against PKK in Northern Iraq. However this time, CoE parliamentarians did not just warn the Turkish parliament. If Turkey would not pull troops out of N. Iraq, would not find a peaceful solution to KQ and would not bring in necessary amendments into legislation within democratisation process, then, Turkey was cautioned, in a meeting of CoE Ministers in June 1995, Turkey's membership would be suspended.²³ Instead of condemning PKK, the decision referred to PKK as an "armed struggle of Kurdish nationalists". Turkish parliamentarians, in return, said that they would boycott the meeting. Such CoE decision was the strongest caution to Turkey since September 12th coup-de-etat, however, it was rejected by the CoE Committee of Ministers.

²¹ Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, On the consequences of the dissolution of the Party for Democracy (DEP) in Turkey Resolution 1041 PACE. 30.06.1994

²² 'Closing down DEP is on CoE agenda', *Cumhuriyet*, 29.06.1994

²³ Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe PACE Resolution 1266 On Turkey's Military Intervention In Northern Iraq And On Turkey's Respect of Commitments Concerning Constitutional And Legislative Reforms, 26.04.1995, 'Pressure on Turkey from Socialists', *Zaman*, 05.10.1994

One of the most important developments that brought CoE and Turkey against each other was increasing numbers of Kurdish asylum seekers in Europe. The states of which Italy headed the list as the refugees' first destination, reaction to this increase in numbers was reflected in the CoE's decision. In its decision, the CoE strongly condemned PKK terrorism and policies of displacements from villages and burning of villages by Turkish security forces that led to an increase in numbers of refugees, listed its recommendations to peacefully resolve KQ in the most detailed and clear decision by far.²⁴ Although this decision was disturbing, due to its citing of the burning of villages by the army and the number of demands²⁵, it did not occupy much space in the hegemonic discourse. The biggest reason for this was that the establishment replaced the top of the daily agenda by the threat of radical Islam and would not let other issues distract from it.

4.1.3 CoE SUPPORT TO TURKEY ON KURDISH QUESTION

Starting from 1999, it has been noted that the KQ did not appear on CoE's agenda as much as it used to, prior to it. The biggest causes of this were the reduced numbers of terror attacks by the PKK to prevent application of capital punishment to its captured leader Ocalan, in February 1999, and a pause in its propaganda activities abroad as well as gaining by Turkey in late 1999 the status of an EU membership candidate state. Along with the member candidate status, the KQ started appearing in all EU annual progress reports and the EU's normative pressure on Turkey became even greater than that of CoE.

²⁴ Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Recommendation 1377 Humanitarian Situation Of The Kurdish Refugees And Displaced Persons In South-Eastern Turkey And Northern Iraq, 25 June 1998, 05.10.1994

²⁵ Kohen.S., 'Avrupadan farklı bir yaklaşım', , *Milliyet*, 26.06.1998

With the purpose of application of fair trial following the capture of Ocalan, the CoE sent its observer and when the court issued capital punishment, it requested the decision not to be implemented. During this period the SSC were lifted and the military's participation in it was brought to an end. Ocalan was spared from execution despite the court ruling. Following obtaining the status of a candidate state and the reforms highlighted in the previous chapter, PACE issued a resolution in which it stated its satisfaction with progress in Turkey.²⁶ The following year it recommended starting dialogue with Kurds, to recognise their cultural and social rights and to find peaceful solution to KQ.²⁷ In its Turkey related 2004 report, the CoE expressed strong satisfaction with reforms carried out by Ak Party government.²⁸ In the latest decisions, along with KQ being mentioned in them, the criticisms, particularly regarding TAF and human rights abuses, were observed to be reduced. However, Ak Party's stance regarding the KQ was very different from that of the previous governments and did not contain any reaction to criticisms by FSP norms.

As a result, the events that took place in March 2006 in Diyarbakir and led to deaths of several of protesters, The Turkish Government's actions in the days following the Prime Minister's statement reflected a significant change in Turkish FSP since the days of the start of PKK terrorism. Particularly, in a move started at CoE, where Turkish parliamentarians were also present, it passed the declaration that condemned PKK and called for it to "unconditionally drop weapons" signed by a majority of 153. Such a move showed diversion

²⁶Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe PACE Resolution 1256 Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Turkey 28.06.2001

²⁷Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Recommendation 1563 Humanitarian Situation of the Displaced Kurdish Population in Turkey 2002

²⁸Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution 1380 Honouring of obligations and commitments by Turkey 22.06.2004

from the FSP norms that criticised the West and became a classical form of foreign policy. It was a display of passing its cause in the fight against terrorism by democratic means, rather than making unfounded criticisms of the West. At the same time it proved that when Turkey, in its fight against terrorism, followed international norms, its arguments would be acknowledged. In its latest decision at the end of 2006, the CoE requested Turkey to take all necessary steps to improve conditions regarding cultural rights of Kurds.²⁹

4.1.4 ECtHR AND KURDISH QUESTION: NEGATIVE

Another CoE body, besides PACE, that monitored the KQ, was ECtHR. While the establishment held a position that the ECtHR decisions reflected the West's prejudices against Turkey, these decisions played an important role in hegemonic discourse. The biggest reason for this was that the ECtHR was making decisions on individual levels and the decisions were bearing legal, rather than political, outcomes³⁰ and in general the human rights abuse related cases led to compensation payments.

On the other hand, along with decisions against Turkey, it recognised that the Turkish state was facing a real PKK threat that threatened social stability, and statements in support of terrorism and terror group were being considered beyond the framework of freedom of speech. The first case against Turkey in 1996 at the ECtHR was followed by cases in 1997, 1998 and 1999 with, respectively, increasing numbers of 365, 2453 and 2818. 2/3 of these

²⁹ Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe PACE Resolution 1519 The cultural situation of Kurds 4 October 2002

³⁰ Kurubas.E.(2004) p.316

cases were filed by Kurdish origin citizens. Turkey's argument that its own internal justice system transition was not completed yet and that the applicants were abusing their appeal rights was rejected by the ECtHR.³¹

The ECtHR decisions damaged Turkey's image in the international arena, and resulted in creation of normative pressure over the country to take necessary steps to solve the KQ. As a result of the reforms carried out as part of EU adaptation process in the field of KQ, the number of complains in the ECtHR related to the issue have been significantly reduced.

4.2. KURDISH QUESTION AND RELATIONS WITH EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

In this part, examples will be given for discourses applied against individual states during crises periods in dual relationships, rather than examination of roles these states played regarding KQ.³²

The area where KQ was frequently entering political agenda, besides Kurdish populated areas, was Western Europe. There is a big share of political struggle put up by the Kurdish population, whose numbers exceeded millions, in this, along with the sensitivity that existed in Western European states regarding human rights. Germany, a country with the largest population of Kurds – as well as Turks - was a country where the KQ was being discussed the most. It is being followed by the UK, France and Scandinavian countries, respectively. The interest in the Kurdish problem in these countries is directly related to the numbers of the

³¹Kurubaş.E., (2004) p. 319-321, 324

³² For chronological study of dual relationship with European states on KQ please refer to ibid.

Kurdish population within them. It can be seen that the relationships with Turkey of the three biggest agents in the EU on the KQ – Germany, France and the UK – were based on strategic interests of these countries, while the smaller countries approached the issue under the influence of socialist, greens and leftist groups on a normative level.

4.2.1. GERMANY

The KQ, apart from European international institutions, surfaced on Turkey's FSP agenda, most often in relationships with Germany. Sometimes, this would be reflected in Turkey's cross-border military operations targeting PKK targets, sometimes it would be PKK actions against German's or Turks, and other times it would be evident in statements by German politicians-statesmen, or Turkish politicians-bureaucrats. Germany's increased interest to the region and its intention to be involved in the region is evident.

From early 1980s, the PKK started making headlines in territories such as Germany, France and Sweden, where they had less control, but large activities, not by lobby activities but by their terror. Turkey's new military operations on PKK in Northern Iraq from the second half of the 1980s started bringing new results. The supporters of the organisation in Europe, Germany in particular, started organising protests against Turks. This could be interpreted as not only protests, but also point to increased propaganda activity by the organisation in Europe. Specialist in foreign politics, Kohen, was predicting that, while in order not to let the

Turkish position worsen, the Turkish MFA should have spent more effort in the field, Turkish expats and Turkey's FSP were going to prevail the European agenda for decades to come.³³

The PKK, who gained strength thanks to support of Kurdish ethnic minority representatives, who, since mid-80s, were living abroad, started distancing itself from left-leaning groups with whom it cooperated up until that time. The PKK refused a joint call by 6 such groups in September 1985 with the words: *"they started the war, if they wish, those who made the call can join the PKK"*.³⁴ In parallel to their activities in Turkey, PKK who at the same time also gained strength in Europe organised armed attacks to other Kurdish and left leaning groups to establish their ultimate rule. Due to its struggle with other leftist and Kurdish groups, several European countries - Germany being at the forefront, attempted to take control over the PKK. The group reacted to such attempts by killing, on 04th of January 1988, the German diplomat, Siegfried Wielsputz in Paris. This became PKK's first criminal offence in Europe committed against a foreign citizen.³⁵ However, PKK denied its involvement in the case and no one has been arrested since then.³⁶ Additionally, they blamed Turkey and the CIA about the case.³⁷

During the 1980s, the terror activities of the PKK and military retaliations of the Turkish State in 1987-89, brought numbers of political asylum seekers to the Western Europe to 90 thousand people. This condition, while increasing the number of PKK supporters in Europe,

³³ Kohen.S., 'A New Front in Foreign Policy, *Milliyet*, 21.08.1986

³⁴ 'PKK undermined the union', *Milliyet*, 04.09.1985

³⁵ 'Crime under the Eiffel Tower', *Milliyet*, 05.01.1988

³⁶ Charters, D.A., *The deadly sin of terrorism*, (University of Brunswick Center for Conflict Studies 1994)

³⁷ Gunter. M. M., 'Transnational Sources of Support for the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey', *Conflict Quarterly* 11(2): 15. (Spring 1991)

created serious concerns among several states in the West, Germany being one of the main ones, about potential floods of migrants if Turkey was to join the EU.³⁸

In August 1991, an increase of PKK attacks and Turkey's response to that by organising military operations in Northern Iraq, coincided with the kidnapping of a group of German tourists in Mus area. State of Emergency (SoE) governor Kozakcioglu's approach to such an extraordinary situation shows the ruling elite's position in such circumstances. According to Kozakcioglu, all strings of this kidnapping back traced back to Germany and is a scenario involving German citizens. There was no kidnapping and the disappearance was done in cooperation with the PKK. The Governor was basing his statement on photos seen by him where the tourists were dancing traditional dances with PKK terrorists, and that the tourists were allowed to take all of their belongings when they were being kidnapped.³⁹ While the German Ambassador was referring to such statements by saying that *"such statements are made of wrong and nonsense interpretation"*, German Ministry of Foreign Relations called the Governor's words, *"speculation"*.⁴⁰

Turkey's military operations to Northern Iraq in October 1991 called a very fierce reaction from German MFA and German Defence Ministry who, in an official statement said that they *"strongly condemn bombing of villages in Northern Iraq by Turkish military planes, and if Turkey continues abusing human rights, Germany will question its military support to Turkey within NATO"*. Turkish MFA responded by a statement saying *"Turkey condemns criticisms directed at its fight with terrorism"* which, by that time already became a classical term.

³⁸'The explosion in numbers of asylum cases in Europe', *Milliyet*, 16.10.1989

³⁹'Kidnapping of Germans is a scenario', *Cumhuriyet*, 15.08.1991

⁴⁰'The PKK shadow on dual relationship', *Cumhuriyet*, 16.08.1991

Positions taken by government and political opposition on the issue reflected in Parliament too, and soon after that, the Bundestag *“demanded that human rights of Kurds would be respected in the countries of their habitual living”*.⁴¹ With that scope, the Parliament voted for military aid cuts to Turkey equalling 25 million Deutsche Mark. Despite Inonu’s – the fellow coalition party’s chairman – letter to German SDP Chairman Engholm in which he asked the government to overturn the decision on the grounds of that “such move, which was not seen even during military rule in Turkey, will damage the mutual relationship between the two countries”, the decision was approved, and not without participation of the SDP.⁴²

Starting from DYP-SHP coalition, the following governments, along with opposition parties, also started seeing the West as PKK supporter. Minister of Internal Affairs, Sezgin, in his statement, mentioned three European states: Germany, France and Sweden along with Syria, Iran and Iraq, as providing support to PKK.⁴³ Despite all criticisms, the Minister of Internal Affairs – Sezgin, did not change his discourse, and in a statement, published in Cumhuriyet Daily following the events of Newroz of 1992, wrote that *“the West wants to materialise what it could not do in Sèvres by applying different tools; that the PKK receives professional training and it is not a small movement that is being fed from outside and has the ultimate goal of establishing a Marxist-Leninist state.”* Sezgin drew particular attention to that, although Turks living in Germany were being victims of PKK and the country

⁴¹ ‘Germany requested from Turkey a dialogue with Kurds’, *Cumhuriyet*, 08.11.1991.

⁴² ‘Problems with Germany over Kurdish Issue’, *Cumhuriyet.*, 03.12.1991

⁴³ ‘West supports PKK’, *Milliyet*, 04.01.1992

recognised the organisation as a terrorist movement, Germany failed to denounce it as an illegal organisation.⁴⁴

As a result of increasing violence in Turkey, the methods the country was using to tackle it and particularly following the heavy criticisms of German government with accusations of supporting the PKK, Germany stopped its supply of weapons to Turkey. German Minister of Foreign Affairs Genscher, in turn, accused Turkey of starting war against the civilian Kurdish population, calling the European Community to condemn Turkey by one united statement and proposed the issue to be considered at Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) meeting.⁴⁵ While on the one hand the German government was making diplomatic attempts, on the other hand, it has stopped supplying military equipment and even recalled a ship with military supplies, destined for Turkey, from the Mediterranean Sea. While Norway joined Germany's weapons embargo, President Demirel increased the tensions by replying to Genscher's accusations, saying: *"we are doing to PKK exactly what Germany did to Baader-Meinhoff terror group"*.⁴⁶

Despite mutual softening of the sides, Germany continued applying its arms embargo and stopped delivery of 45 RF43 jets that were previously planned to be provided as assistance. This showed that the embargo applied was linked not only to the latest Nawroz events, but generally, to the KQ. Such decision received criticisms from the military earlier than from politicians. Officials at TGS, while saying that *"such move will not affect Turkey's battle*

⁴⁴'PKK is a tool of the West', *Cumhuriyet*, 23.03.1992

⁴⁵'Kurdish struggle with Germany', *Cumhuriyet*, 27.03.1992

⁴⁶'Demirel made a harsh statement to Germany', *Cumhuriyet*, 28.03.1992

capabilities”, at the same time started putting more weight into the political arena, particularly on Kurdish related issues.⁴⁷

During a search of lorries transporting goods from Germany to North Iraq, Turkey claimed to find missile launch pads and a radar system. Germany argued that the item referred to as a missile launch pad was in fact a vehicle tow-bar and not military equipment.⁴⁸ As a matter of fact, out of a 40-long convoy of lorries, goods on four of them could gain military significance if some conversions were made. However, the Internal Affairs Minister Sezgin, artificially exaggerated the issue and blew it up into a crisis. Mumcu referred to this in his article as Germany was another country after the USA and Britain which had interests in the Middle East and each interest represented assistance for Kurds.⁴⁹

PKK killed 33 soldiers who were on transfer without their weapons, in Bingol area on 25 May 1993. It was the worst loss of life during the PKK terror history for Turkish army. After the incident, a large scale of military operations was conducted within Turkey and N.Iraq and the army intensified its attacks over the PKK militants. This led to large scale demonstrations in Western Europe. In 11 German Lands, Turkish diplomatic missions were attacked, 19 and 2 people were taken hostage in Munich and Marseille Consulates, respectively, 1 person died during a demonstration in Bern, Turkish Airlines offices in Denmark, offices of Turkish banks in the UK and offices of tour operators in Sweden were left in tatters. Attacks in Germany sparked heavy criticisms from German authorities and raised the issue of banning the organisation in the country. However, such reaction worsened the situation by leading

⁴⁷‘The embargo will not affect the military’s capabilities’, *Cumhuriyet*, 18.04.1992

⁴⁸‘The assistance scandal’, *Cumhuriyet*, 27.05.1992.

⁴⁹Mumcu.U., ‘Their own publications’, *Cumhuriyet*, 30.05.1992

to an increase of attacks by PKK. On 27th June 1993, PKK, for the first time attacked tourist attractions in Antalya, a popular resort among Germans – which left many tourists injured. Germany reacted to this by pressing on organisations, which held similar to PKK views, at the same time applying restrictions to numbers of political asylum seekers.

German MFA displayed a strong reaction to these attacks. Germany banned the PKK and closed 35 organisations linked to it. Following the ban of PKK by Germany, the EC Ministers of Internal Affairs and Ministers of Justice met in a meeting to develop an “action plan” on terrorism within the EC and to set up a task force. Meanwhile, the EC countries were discussing the banning of PKK.⁵⁰

After the developments which took place in the EU reforms, PKK, who was not leaving violence, despite Turkish government’s constructive steps, have started getting condemnations, not only from EU institutions, but also from representatives of political groups who have been supporting them since 1980s. A member of the German Green Party Angelika Beer, who was proclaimed a “PKK supporter” by Turkey’s official circles for walking into TGNA in a yellow-red-green hair band and bracelet as member of Defence Commission of German Parliament in 2001, said regarding PKK: “they did not understand the change, became isolated from the rest of the world, great majority of Kurds do not support their actions”.⁵¹

⁵⁰‘EC Countries-PKK’, *Cumhuriyet*, 30.11.1993

⁵¹‘A friend of PKK Beer: PKK doesn’t stand a chance’, *Milliyet*, 12.12.2005

4.2.2. FRANCE

The Saddam regime accused Iraqi Kurds as being in cooperation of the latter with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war and on 16 March 1988 carried out a massacre of Kurds by unleashing chemical weapons on the village of Halabja. As a result, seventy thousand Northern Iraqi Kurds sought refuge in Iran and Turkey. The lack of international assistance, as well as Turkey's limited resources in providing assistance to refugees, drew international attention, particularly in Europe. However, the highlighting of Kurdish history in the Turkish media that used references to the Sèvres Agreement stirred an unexpectedly strong reaction. Articles in *Le Figaro*, *Le Monde*, *Observer*, *Sunday Times* and *New York Times* were reporting that the West was "trying to bring the Sèvres Treaty back on table".⁵² Birand, by drawing attention to increased interest in Europe towards the PKK and Iraqi Kurds, rang bells of warning in Europe's position in the issue of the KQ.⁵³ The issue of refugees started being discussed even more often, following the visit of Danielle Mitterrand, the then First Lady of France and later referred⁵⁴ to as 'la mère des Kurdes', visited the refugee area in 1989 to discover appallingly unsanitary conditions. This visit played a key role in the new formulation of the KQ in Turkey with an uncompromising Kurdish nationalist ideology component in Europe.⁵⁵

In October 1989, Mitterrand led "French Organisation for Freedoms" organised a conference in Paris named "National Identity of Kurds and Their Human Rights". While the

⁵² 'The West is digging into Kurdish Problem', *Milliyet*, 14.09.1988.

⁵³ Birand.M.A., 'The West is Moving on the issue of Kurds', *Milliyet*, 31.01.1989

⁵⁴ Dunder.C., 'To the Kurds...', *Milliyet*, 29.03.2003

⁵⁵ Hugh.P.&N., *Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey;Ataturk and After*,(London: Murray. 1997) p.263

conference was attended by Northern Iraqi Kurds and other representatives on the level of Assistants of Ministers, naturally drew reaction in Turkey that showed the complexity of the Kurdish issue, came from a PKK speaker. The speaker said that the meeting: *“was organised by people who were detached from masses, did not believe in national freedom and military struggle and that (their) real purpose was to gain sovereignty for Kurds by destroying the PKK.”*⁵⁶ What led the organisation to such a view was putting Northern Iraqi Kurds, led by KYB leader Talabani, before them. As a matter of fact, in his statement, the PKK leader Ocalan said that *“the Kurdish institutions in European countries were managed by brainwashed, by those countries standards, kids. That when it comes to France, they support the USA thesis and that these groups were all brought together by the CIA”*. It is interesting that Ocalan said something that was against a widely spread notion in Turkey that *“Sweden, Germany, France, the UK, and the USA were supporting the PKK competitors and were trying to destroy the PKK itself.”*⁵⁷ These words show distrust towards the West, not only among the ruling elite in Turkey, but also among the separatist organisation. The speaker of Turkey’s MFA evaluated the conference as a *“move that gave the floor to speakers of the separatist movement and channelled to break up Turkey’s territorial unity”*. A former foreign Minister Hayrettin Erkmen, reacted by saying: *“it is an attempt to give a fresh start to the Sèvres Treaty and to establish a Kurdish state dependent on the West”*.

⁵⁶ Sever.A., ‘A strong Reaction from PKK’, *Milliyet*, 17.10.1989

⁵⁷ ‘Apo’s blame to Madame’, *Milliyet*, 29.10.1989

4.2.3. RELATIONS WITH SOME OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ON KURDISH QUESTION

The KQ did not just cause a tensioned relationship with Germany and France. Turkey faced various problems with some other European States such as UK, Sweden, The Netherlands, and Greece.

One of the most problematic relationships was experienced with UK. The support provided by the British nation to Kurds who were subject to Saddam Hussein's attacks was portrayed by the establishment as "The West's support to Kurds and a reflection of Sèvres Syndrome". Within this scope: A "Simple Truth" concert held at Wembley stadium and broadcast by the BBC to 37 countries in support of Kurds was seen as proof of that.

In late May 1992, two British diplomats were captured by special police forces in Cizre – one of mainly Kurdish populated areas of Turkey. The Ministry of Internal Affairs in a statement released following the case said that, normally, the diplomats who provide their trip itineraries in this case applied such measures due to a mistake. On the other hand, the British Embassy announced that there was no problem.

In addition to problems with the UK, KQ became a problematic area with Sweden. As a result of a joint Swiss-German police operation, 10 people were arrested. In response to this, by taking over Sweden's Embassy in Amsterdam, the followers of the group, in October 1984 took their actions to another level. It will be seen that the countries who were in contact with the organisation, took a milder and more open-to-dialogue approach towards

the organisation, in order not to destabilise their own internal stability. This, in turn, while attracting Turkey's reaction allowed for the organisation to develop actions that would take into account weaknesses and sensitive sides of the West.

On 15-17 March 1991, a conference, "Swedish Committee for Rights of Kurdish Nation", was organised in Sweden. The conference was attended by representatives of 20 different Kurdish groups and the meeting concluded that "*Kurds in Turkey need to be given cultural independence.*"⁵⁸ Mumcu, in turn, argued that the coming together of so many Kurds with such differing political views and Marxist-Leninist backgrounds was initiated by the USA, who wanted to set up a Kurdish state in the region.⁵⁹

Turkey's KQ is also related to developments in Austria. Starting from the early 1990s, PKK terror activities also started to increase. However, due to First Gulf War, the KQ and the USA duo were in the centre of KQ agenda rather than the European related issues. One of the rare developments related to Europe on this issue was Austria's weapons embargo. In return to Austria's decision to stop sales of raw materials to Turkey on the bases of human rights abuses, Turkey applied to sanction packages in order to ban Austria's companies from defence projects. Turkey's MFA interpreted this decision as: "it looks as if such a decision that is open for abuse, is designed to protect terror circles that set their eyes on our territorial integrity"⁶⁰

⁵⁸'Cultural Independence to Kurds', *Cumhuriyet*, 18.03.1991

⁵⁹ Mumcu.U., 'Trapped gain', *Cumhuriyet*, 21.03.1991

⁶⁰'Gun reprisal for ammunition embargo', *Cumhuriyet*, 17.05.1990

Another development related to Kurdish problem was experienced in relations with Belgium. A delegation from the Belgium Parliament visited Turkey in late December 1990 and their itinerary included the South-Eastern regions of the country. Upon return to Belgium, the delegation prepared a draft bill called “Regarding Kurds and other ethnic minorities in Turkey”, which passed the Foreign Affairs Committee approval of the Belgium parliament and in which the members of the group recommended to the Belgium government that “Turkey should not be accepted as an EC member unless it recognises Kurdish national identity” and on 14th March 1991, the Belgian Parliament voted on this bill. Despite Turkey’s efforts, its EC membership, for the first time was linked to “recognition of Kurdish cultural identity”. The EP, CoE and Western European Union, previously have had a similar decision taken. However, as decisions of these institutions did not have mandatory powers, their decisions were not as influential as of the Belgian Parliament.⁶¹

After the DEP –kurdish party- was closed down on 16th June 1994, part of DEP MPs who were removed their mandates came to Brussels and expressed their wish to seek status of refugees. Arrival of DEP MPs in Europe will cause appearance of the KQ in the international arena more often and will lead to the Turkey experience, very often, in relationship crises with the EU, as well as on dual state relations. First signs of that were displayed by one of DEP MPs Mahmut Kilinc. Who in his statement said: *“From now on, DEP’s centre is its Support Centre in Brussels. As MPs, we will hold discussions with representatives of all elected layers of the community in Europe. We will carry out diplomatic function on unseen levels. We will tell what we have experienced”*.⁶²

⁶¹‘Kurdish precondition for EC membership’, *Cumhuriyet*, 15.03.1991

⁶²‘Those of DEP are after refugee status’, *Cumhuriyet*, 21.06.1994

Following landing of Ak Party in power, the positive steps made in Turkey in the field of the KQ influenced the West's view to the KQ and PKK terrorism. Belgium, known by its lenience to not only PKK, but also to ETA and IRA, blocked the press-conference to be held by the Chair of PKK Kongra Gel Aydar and said that if the latter would be arrested he would be extradited to Switzerland where he would be granted asylum. The organisation argued that Belgium took such a step under pressure from Ankara.⁶³

The Netherlands was another country that Turkey had experiences with in terms of KQ. The MPs who came to Europe following the decision of Turkish Constitutional Court to close down the party in 1995, started their work on establishing Kurdish parliament in exile. The "Parliament in Exile" that DEP MPs were trying to set up in Europe was proclaimed on 12th April 1995 in Lahey, Netherlands. The Parliament started its functioning by the swearing in of 65 MPs. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Inonu, strongly condemned Holland and in an open letter said: *"Holland's ignoring such initiative contradicts common NATO values and principles of mutual friendship of the two states"*.⁶⁴ Turkey was stressing that NATO was resting on an article of prohibition of any hostile activity on the territories of member states. Using article 4 of NATO's founding document that reads: "when one of the members becomes subject to threat it can call a NATO council", on 20th April 1995 Turkey called a NATO meeting where Turkey's representative drew everyone's attention to that, in a new NATO strategy of terrorism played the most important risk and posed the biggest threat, thus making all allies responsible for a common fight. Balbay reignited discussions on West-

⁶³'We are prohibited within European mentality', *Cumhuriyet*, 21.08.2005

⁶⁴ 'Kurdish Parliament in Exile set up in Lahey', *Cumhuriyet*, 13.04.1995

Oil-PKK relation by pointing out that *“Holland’s inaction coincided with the time when Turkey took over shares of Shell’s oil rigs in Azerbaijan and underlined that PKK was not touching Shell’s oil rigs in South Anatolia”*.⁶⁵ While Turkey was trying to apply pressure on Holland and a wider Europe, the EU made a counter move involving its defence arm – WEU. The WEU

Turkey did not have problems with Italy until 1998 when the country gave permission for the Kurdish Parliament in exile to convene in Rome. Turkey extended by applying tough economic sanctions against Italy, when PKK announced that the next Kurdish Parliament-in-exile’s sitting of 1998 would take place there. While Turkey was concentrating its relationship with the EU, and Italy in particular, based on KQ, it was also giving “Measures beyond diplomacy could also be taken on the agenda” message to Syria.⁶⁶

Turkey’s pressure on Syria, while not being welcomed by Arab countries with Egypt expressing particular concerns, forced, not without US interference on the issue, PKK leader to leave Syria. Ocalan, who went to such countries as Russia and Greece, as a result of Turkey’s follow-up and tough stance against these countries, had to go to Italy. The Turkish-Italian relationships that were already tense due to numbers of Kurdish asylum seekers and the fact of Kurdish Parliament-in-Exile’s sitting in the Italian Parliament, took another, even deeper dive. The diplomatic and legal confrontation that took place between Turkey and Italy was the first of a kind that the country entered into with a Western country; let alone with a NATO partner.

⁶⁵Balbay. M., ‘Holland-Shell-South-East’, *Cumhuriyet*, 18.04.1995

⁶⁶‘Strong reaction to Syria’, *Cumhuriyet*, 02.10.1998

Ultra-left coalition partners in the Italian government -Italian Communist Party and the Green Party- were critically important for D'Alema government and at the same time were supportive of Ocalan. However, under increasing pressure, Italy had to ask Ocalan to leave the country. During the same period, an unprecedented anti-Sèvres and anti-Western reactions took place in the hegemonic discourse. While Cetinkaya was saying that Italy was part of a bigger international project and was moving with the purpose to divide Turkey, Cindoruk, who was a recent break-away from Ciller's party and who formed a new political movement, stated that the Sèvres was being revived.⁶⁷

Greece has been the only state obviously providing direct support to PKK. PKK leader Ocalan was captured in the Kenyan Embassy in Greece and was brought to Turkey. Providing a basis for PKK training camps and direct support provided to the organisation by Greek Security Services always drew Turkey's reaction. Greece was also PKK's greatest supporter in the field of propaganda. With interference and involvement of Greek parliamentarians the KQ frequently entered politics agendas of the EU and other international bodies.

The first time when the issue of Greek support to PKK was raised was in 1993 by the then Turkish MFA Soysal.⁶⁸ In 1997, it was established that a member of the Greek secret service was collecting intelligence by using members of PKK and the member of Greek secret service Haralambus, who was hiding behind the diplomatic mask was deported. Following capture of Ocalan in 1999, President Demirel started similar sanctions to those applied to Syria and threatened Greece by saying that "if Greece is to continue illegal activities, Turkey reSèvres the right to apply justified rights to defence".

⁶⁷Cetinkaya.H., 'Those longing for Sèvres...', *Cumhuriyet*, 19.11.1998, 'Sèvres is being revived', *Zaman*, 21.11.1998

⁶⁸'External Support and Internal Obstacles', *Hurriyet*, 28.07.1993

With Turkey implementing EU reforms and its intention to be seen as a country against terrorism following the 9/11 attacks, made Greece to come against PKK separatist terror activities.⁶⁹ Despite all these developments, the Greek support to PKK still continues due to strained Turkish-Greek relations.

⁶⁹'Athens call PKK a terrorist', *Milliyet*, 22.03.2002

CONCLUSION

Positions of CoE and of certain European countries differed from that of the EU and EP on the issue of KQ. In the 1980s, when KQ came into Turkish agenda, Kurdish groups in Europe took their lobbying activities to CoE and to certain individual states, as the EU negotiation process was frozen. Left wing MPs particularly, were keen to lobby on behalf of Kurds. Thus, a number of decisions were made in PACE regarding ethnic minority groups' rights and recognition of Kurdish identity. However, as CoE does not have normative powers over Turkey, as in the case of the EU, these decisions had limited influence.

Ruling elite, who were at the peak of their power following the 1980 coup-de-etat, despite having no normative power, showed strong opposition to CoE decisions within the Sèvres Syndrome and Status Quo norms.

The most fruitful steps were taken by the Ozal (who came to power after the coup) government, in the fields of democratisation and human rights, and these policies improved Turkey's relationship with CoE.

Nonetheless, Turkey became the subject of a number of reports until the 1990s, due to restrictions on Kurdish language, ignoring basic rights and freedoms of Kurds and denial of their identity. However, since CoE had no enforcement power over Turkey, these reports were widely ignored by Turkish politics.

Another institution that was regarded by ruling elite as having prejudices on the issue of HR was European Court on Human Rights (ECHR). Two thirds of ECHR's decisions related to KQ, in the period between 1996 and 2000, were against Turkey. However, as ECHR's decisions held more legal outcomes rather than political, the institution took less space in hegemonic discourse. The normative pressure brought by ECHR on Turkey eased implementation of a number of reforms directed at trials and preventing of torture.

Other agents that Turkey faced problems on the issue of KQ with the West were individual European states. Large number of Kurds migrated to Europe mainly as labourers in the 1960s and following the 1980s coup as asylum seekers. These states saw themselves as part of the problem due to the Kurdish population that they hosted. However, these countries, particularly the EU's largest partners – Germany, France and the UK – considered their positions on the issue of KQ, based, more, on dual strategic relationships with Turkey.

Another characteristic of European states on KQ is providing facilities to promote free propaganda to PKK and raise Kurdish civil groups. By that, KQ constantly remained on the European and world agenda. As a result of Turkey's attempts to stop activities of Kurdish politicians in Turkey, the Kurdish parliament in exile was established and started to draw Europe's attention on KQ. This situation created a basis for the ruling elite to criticise Europe and sound about Sèvres Syndrome.

PKK's attacks in Europe and in Turkish resorts popular with Western tourists paved the way to Europe developing more cautious policies with regards to the issue of PKK. AK Party's policies on the issue of KQ implemented following the elections of 2002, and changes in FSP

norms, decreased negative perceptions interchanged between the West and Turkey. While implementation of reforms recommended by the West strengthened Turkey's position, it also significantly weakened those in the West who were advocating a solution to KQ by force. Despite all strains, Turkey refrained from a total cut-off of its links with the West thanks to the norm of Westernism that continued its influence into the AK Party period.

International institutions in Europe and positions taken by European countries on the issue do not alone represent Western perception of KQ in Turkey. The USA is also an important agent in drawing the FSP in Turkey, that falls within the notion of the West, and who have influence over the country. In the following chapters, the KQ into the Turkey-USA relationship will have be examined.

CHAPTER V: RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE USA RELATING TO THE KURDISH QUESTION

INTRODUCTION

Until end of cold war the KQ did not dominate Turkish-American relationships. At the same time, in hegemonic discourse, one can only find a limited number of references to American support for the Kurds. With Eastern European states proclaiming independence, the USA's support and encouragement of ethnic minority groups as part of the drive towards democratisation was as raising the possibility of opening a discussion on the issue of Kurdish rights.

The US steered clear of the Kurdish problem until the First Iraq war. Problems relating to the KQ were observed in dual relations following criticisms raised in the House of Representatives regarding Human Rights, thus raising the question of the limitation of military support. During the 1991 war, Ozal would willingly have given full support to the US invasion of Iraq, but he was hampered by establishment opposition, thus Turkey had only been able to provide military bases and to allow access to its airspace for the allied troops. However, even this much support was warmly welcomed by the US and enabled Turkey to use Northern Iraq as its own backyard until the second Gulf War of 2003. The USA's settlement in the region did, however, create serious concerns among Turkey's ruling elite, as did the international force set up to protect the Kurds after the First Gulf War, and the US support for Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq. At the same time, Kurds of the region attracted

international attention, which contributed to the internationalization of Turkey's KQ by putting it on the international agenda.

Although US support for Turkey on the issues of the EU and the PKK, and its assistance in capturing the PKK leader, reduced anti-American feelings, the ruling elite remained suspicious and hostile towards the US. Their concerns derived from the Sèvres Syndrome, and worries that the creation of a Kurdish state in the region could shift the balance of power thus eliminating the existing Status Quo. For this reason, Turkey, which supported the US in its global war against terrorism, did not authorize use of its land for the Second Gulf War invasion, which was to a great extent due to the ruling elite's influence over the newly elected Ak Party.

A great part of this was the ruling elite's fear of a negative outcome to the KQ as a result of US interference. While the two countries were going through their worst relations following the second Iraqi war, Turkey lost its initiative over the PKK in Northern Iraq. As the establishment pressed the new government on PKK issues, the government tried to seek a peaceful solution to the problem, together with the USA, in a way that went against existing FSP norms. This new strategy mainly rested on the USA's preoccupation with Iraqi rebellion and its unwillingness to start trouble with Kurdish groups. This chapter mainly argues about historical events in terms of the KQ parameter of Turkey's relations with the USA.

5.1 THE 1990S: OZAL'S EFFECTS

The USA, whose relations with the USSR had started to improve, gave signals that its attitude towards Turkey would change. In a speech at Oklahoma University on 5th May 1990, President George Bush said that “in a period when military threats are poised to disappear, the time has come for NATO to put forward its political, rather than military, face”. The USA had changed its stance towards Turkey on the Armenian issue, and the President’s speech was interpreted in Turkey as an indication that its strategic value, which had been of huge importance to the West during the Cold War, had now diminished.

As for the KQ, the USA could now expect Turkish recognition of at least some Kurdish cultural rights and Washington’s new foreign policy would give weight to values such as human rights and democracy.¹ The first signal confirming this came from Abromovitz, the USA’s Ambassador to Turkey. In one of the meetings that he attended in Washington, he said, “Turkey has to put into practice the ideals that it stands for in the field of human rights. If Turkey appreciates its own image and role in the West, issues of human rights become ever more important. Turkey’s role in a changing world cannot be regarded in isolation from democracy”.² So, criticisms from the EU and individual European states following the 1980s military coup-de-état, now came a decade later from the USA.

The first phase of Turkey’s Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement with the USA ended in 1985, and the second phase was extended on 21st February 1988 until December

¹Cemal.H., ‘Hasan Cemal’s reports from Washington’, *Cumhuriyet*, 06.05.1990

²Cemal.H., ‘Tough words from Abromovitz’, *Cumhuriyet*, 13.05.1990

1990. At the end of this phase, Turkey concluded that the USA had not fulfilled its obligations. The USA had cut down expenditure on the arms race against the USSR and at the same time cut its military assistance to Turkey, as the country was gradually losing its previous strategic importance. This negative development coincided with Congress's approval of The Armenian Bill, which since the 1970s had been a thorn in Turkey's relationship with the USA, and affected the country's stance concerning its long-term ally.

The routine Armenian bill did not pass the congress vote in 1989, but another issue related to the KQ arose. The USA had prepared a plan under the aegis of the OSCE framework to prevent ethnic tensions that were suppressed during the Cold War years and from igniting at the end of it. According to the plan, "any tensions deriving from ethnic, religious, or other differences within any of the OSCE countries will be dealt with as described in the plan". Turkey, which considered the plan in the context of the KQ, expressed its views to the USA by stating that "since representatives of Kurdish speaking families have risen to Ministerial levels and even to the level of the Presidency, talks about ethnic tensions among minority groups are irrelevant".³

The important point here is an attempt to deny any problems despite a struggle that had lasted ten years. Turkey's position on the issue during those years is seen in the expression "Kurdish speaking families", in other words, the Kurds were not regarded as a different ethnic group. On the same issue, another official at the MFA expressed the official view of the Turkish state by saying, *"The USA are keen on taking a proactive role within the OSCE; as we see it as they are inclined to represent the interests of various groups including the Kurds,*

³The USA's OSCE minorities plan', *Cumhuriyet*, 24.02.1990

and it becomes evident that the USA has long term plans for the creation of Armenian and Kurdish states in the Middle East". As a result of these developments, MFA Ali Bozer said that "the addition of ethnic minority problems to the issue of human rights has grown out of being just an internal subject of state thanks to the OSCE, and this leaves Turkey in a difficult position. And in such an environment, the MFA is working hard to explain the South-Eastern problem on an international platform, as well as making the point that terrorism and human rights has to be differentiated".⁴

Until this time, US support for Kurdish nationalism had only been hinted at, but from March 1990, the increase of PKK terrorist activities drew attention to the KQ and US support increased to the point that the country was openly mentioned as a supporter of Kurdish nationalism. This, in turn, led to hegemonic discourse abandoning the idea that the PKK was supported by the Soviets alone.

Because of the intensified PKK attacks in spring 1990, a need arose for more sophisticated combat armour to replace existing weapons that were outdated for guerrilla warfare. Thus, plans were drawn up to purchase Cobra helicopters from the USA. However, based on draft proposals presented to Congress by two members of the House of Representatives, it was requested that the deal should be cancelled unless Turkey withdrew its military presence from Cyprus. This development caused new tension between Turkey and the USA, and the Turkish Ministry of Defence and Army sources responded by saying that the deal has not

⁴Congar.Y, 'Problematic period in Turkish-American relations', *Cumhuriyet*, 23.05.1990; 'Shade of domestic politics on foreign affairs', *Cumhuriyet*, 09.06.1990

been concluded yet, and the Italian-made Agustas were also among possible options.⁵ A similar issue occurred in the same period over Turkey's purchase of F-16 planes, when the US authorities spoke against fitting Rapport electronic combat systems to Turkish-purchased aircraft.⁶

The decrease of NATO's military significance due to a series of US-USSR treaties, made the MFA bureaucracy unhappy. At that point, their foreign policy was to continue the status quo, and promote Turkey's strategic importance. A cut in the US annual assistance package to Turkey in 1991 stirred up particular unease in Ankara. Concerned bureaucrats said that they were *"open minded about the latest developments in the Soviet Union"*, but noted that *"there was no political stability there."* Thus they argued that the assistance should continue.⁷ A similar stance was taken during NATO's London meeting on 5-6 July 1990 where Turkey, the USA, Britain, the Netherlands and Norway advocated that the organisation should pursue its traditional military lines of alliance. From a Turkish point of view, NATO was seen not only as a defence, but also as part of a project of integration into the west as well as a platform on which to play a significant role in building a new, post-Cold War Europe.⁸ In other words, it could be said that in its relationship with NATO, Turkey used the "Westernism" approach of foreign policy norms.

The KQ, NATO's future and the discussion of "human rights" within the OSCE framework were all eclipsed by a single development that concerned Turkey and the issue of the Kurds

⁵Cemal.H., 'Tensions with the USA', *Cumhuriyet*, 01.05.1990

⁶'F-16 trip from the USA'. *Cumhuriyet*, 02.05.1990

⁷'Concerns in Ankara', *Cumhuriyet*, 16.06.1990

⁸'European Defence: Turkey on the conservative side', *Cumhuriyet*, 30.06.1990

as a whole: the First Gulf War. Iraq's attack of Kuwait on 2nd August 1990 was the start of a new phase for the KQ, too. At that period, the most influential politician in Turkish FSP was President Ozal. By making use of the power of the role of "Commander in Chief" assigned to him by the Constitution, he wanted to take a defining role in the war along with the USA and if possible to annex areas inhabited by the Kurds, including the oil-rich Musul-Kerkut areas of Iraq, to Turkey. For this purpose, he used the GNAT authorization which enabled him to send Turkish troops abroad and provided Turkish military bases for use by foreign forces.

The DYP and SHP opposition parties in Parliament issued a joint statement in which they expressed their strong opposition to the country's participation in military operations along with the USA by saying, *"... it seems that the country is being led single-handedly by Ozal ... and it is the task of the opposition to stop the government which is trying to take part in a war where other countries will the gain most benefits, and to inform the public of that".*⁹ In a secret meeting held in relation to the issue, Inonu, the SHP leader, expressed his opinion that *"the entire politics of the Republic is based on the principle of not attacking other countries unless Turkey is threatened. By attacking, by war, we will not gain any national interests. What needs to be done to enter the European Union is to fully establish democracy in Turkey, to strengthen the economy and topursue positive ways of joining Europe".*

Under the pressure from the military, the civil bureaucracy and the public, the opposition did not opt for Turkey's military intervention in Iraq. No doubt their decision was in part influenced by the great unwillingness of the military to take part in armed combat.

⁹'Full text of SHP-DYP statement', *Cumhuriyet*, 27.12.1990

As Turkey was not participating in military operations, Ozal made sure that Turkey supported the US by opening up NATO bases, including Incirlik, and allowing them to be used for operations. In return, the USA assured him that Iraqi unity would be preserved and that the chaotic environment would not lead to the establishment of a Kurdish state. Mumcu, however whose pessimism and distrust of the USA was undiminished wrote, *we can only estimate the trouble that will be caused by a pro-American Kurdish state that will be established in the region following the removal of Saddam.*¹⁰

It is clear that Ozal also has concerns, although not as strong as the establishment, about the likely establishment of a Kurdish state in Iraq, and even the interference of the USA towards the Kurds in Turkey. Signals from the USA only supported such concerns, and in 1991 the human rights report of the US Secretary of State included the issue of lifting the ban on speaking the Kurdish language. While negotiating with Ozal, Washington was at the same time extracting a promise from Kurdish groups that they would not start an uprising demanding full independence, in exchange for the “expanded right of representation in a fully independent and federal structure” if Saddam were deposed.¹¹

Here it can be seen that the pro-western policies pursued by Turkey thanks to Ozal, played an important role because it was due to such policies, that the USA stayed away from policies encouraging the Kurds. Moreover, in February 1991, all American embassies were sent a cable instructing that they should not meet with any person or group claiming to represent the Kurds. Even Talabani, the Secretary-General of the PUK was not given an

¹⁰Kurdish assurance from the USA', *Cumhuriyet*, 17.01.1991

¹¹Bargaining with the USA over Kurds', *Cumhuriyet*, 29.01.1991

audience by the US State Department during his Washington visit.¹² In addition, the US Senate Foreign Affairs Committee did not allow the Kurdish leaders to attend their meeting, even though they had taken part in a conference organised by Danielle Mitterand, wife of the French president a conference that remained in public agenda for a while.¹³

Ozal, who foresaw that the best way to control inevitable developments regarding the Kurds was to eliminate negative issues back at home, started reforms that until then would have been taboo in Turkey. Freedom to speak Kurdish and to distribute music and videos in Kurdish was introduced. In spite of this, written publications, education and formal correspondence and speeches in Kurdish still remained prohibited. Moreover, even such a minor change was met with criticism from the ruling elite and even from Ozal's own-established governing party, the ANAP. The military establishment expressed the view that it was a political move, but neither supported nor criticised it.¹⁴ Public reaction caused the government to take a step back: there was no parliamentary discussion of the legislation to lift the restriction on speaking Kurdish, and Ozal had to include this amendment in another bill.

Ozal continued to insist on the Kurdish matter and in a speech at Duke University he said that he was "...the first (Turkish) President to use the word "Kurd", that in all probability his grandmother had been a Kurd and that Kurds too, could become Presidents".¹⁵ Such a move from Ozal was driven not by idealism, but by pragmatism, because a proposal from the

¹²'Talabani's visit', *Cumhuriyet* Daily, 08.02.1991

¹³'The USA turned Kurds away', *Cumhuriyet*, 01.03.1991

¹⁴'Ozal's Kurdish policy is being debated', *Cumhuriyet*, 02.02.1991

¹⁵'Most probably my grandmother was kurd', *Cumhuriyet*, 28.03.1991

opposition SHP to lift the “native language speech” ban was turned down in the subcommittees of the GNAT by ANAP, without even reaching Parliament, on the grounds of promoting separatism.

By such action, Turkey was showing compliance with the OSCE conditions to which it was signatory, and was gaining sympathy within Turkey from its own Kurdish citizens as well as from Iraqi Kurds.¹⁶ Equally, Ozal was not going against pragmatic criticism channelled towards him and was even making speeches in support of it.

While trying to amend legislation prohibiting speech in Kurdish, Ozal suggested to the USA that Turkey should become involved in the Gulf War, and he proposed to send Turkish Generals to the Saudi Arabian allied base in order to support US Iraqi operations. The army, however, came out against this proposal, and it was announced that the TGS was planning to send lower ranking officers. The military said that a decision had been taken without their consent and that their appearance in the Gulf would further ignite the situation. These developments were seen by the USA as “educational” in the sense that they made clear the relationship between Ozal and the ruling elite and after that, less was expected of Turkey.¹⁷ The USA requested that Turkey should become a guarantor state by allocating three military divisions, as units of rapid response, in case of unexpected attack in the region.¹⁸ Ozal, meanwhile, had involved mediators to start talks with the Kurdish leadership starting with Talabani, with the purpose of contributing to the shaping of the Iraqi leadership. Ozal promised that Turkey would welcome a federation made up of Arabs-Kurds-Turks that was

¹⁶ANAP enquired about wellbeing of Kurds’, *Cumhuriyet*, 28.01.1991

¹⁷Generals refused to go to the Gulf’, *Cumhuriyet*, 06.02.1991

¹⁸A military role for Turkey’, *Cumhuriyet*, 08.11.1991

planned to be created in Iraq and would even serve as a guarantor of such an establishment. These meetings were, however, interpreted by the ruling elite who were in control of the MFA as an attempt by Ozal to bypass the Ministry in his meeting with Talabani.

At that time, even though the relationship between the MFA and Ozal was strained, Ozal still managed to communicate to the West Turkey's plans for the Kurds. Initially, it was planned to give greater freedom to the Kurds living in Turkey. During the second stage, the right of Iraqi Kurds would be guaranteed by Turkey. For the third stage, a region-wide joint struggle against terrorist organisations such as the PKK would be fought. And in the final stage, Turkey would move towards a federal state.¹⁹ In response to Ozal's proposal to the allies, the military establishment started new psychological propaganda. Journalists were shown around the offices of the TGS and were shown that in case of war, in the building's central command room, there was space allocated for the Prime-Minister and the CoGS, but there was no space allocated for the President. The military wanted to show that the President did not have a voice in the decision-making process. Journalists were also taken to border areas and to meet senior military commanders in order to stress that "the military was established with the purpose of self-defence, and that purpose did not include exporting it over the ocean to the USA, nor is it to be used for the strategic gain of other states".²⁰

The Americans saw the Shia uprising as pro-Iranian, and so the Shias were refused any support. While the new American strategy was to maintain a more lenient Saddam regime,

¹⁹Congar. Y., 'A stage-by-stage plan regarding Kurds from Ozal', *Cumhuriyet*, 02.03.1991

²⁰Mumcu.U., 'Hayirsiz mountains', *Cumhuriyet*, 09.03.1991

Iraqi forces were given the opportunity to gain superiority over the Shias in the South and used it to attack them. During the period of the Iraqi attacks on Shias in the South, for the first time, Kurdish leaders arrived in Ankara. Ozal's words, *"We have to be friends with the Kurds: if we maintain hostility, somebody else will use it against us"* raised few eye-brows among MFA bureaucrats and those responsible for implementing the FSP.²¹ The meeting was severely criticised by all opposition parties, and with words "will Ozal meet with Ocalan too?" Ozal's meeting with Talabani was delegitimized and portrayed as meeting with the PKK terrorist group.

The 1991 Gulf War added a different perspective to the KQ. Turkey, which until now had only had to deal with PKK uprisings within its own borders, now had to consider the Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq. In other words, a new factor was added to Turkey's KQ. This made Turkish decision-makers approach the US's activities in the region with suspicion, and Turkish objections to giving the US support at a time of war, together with suspicions of the Turkish establishment, made Turkey a questionable ally. The establishment's efforts not to take a proactive role in Iraq resulted in the decreasing of influence of Turkey over Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq. Turkey's FSP was based not on Turkish interests and maintaining the balance of power, but on ideology. The Sèvres Syndrome and Status Quo norms led to a more frequent discussion of the KQ, and rather than Turkey, together with the USA, becoming more influential in Iraq, its loss of initiative over the KQ in Northern Iraq led to an increase of attacks by the PKK.

²¹Bargaining with Kurds', *Cumhuriyet*, 13.03.1991

In March 1991, Iraqi forces regained Kerkuk in the North, and there was no counter-attack from the American forces. To that, Barzani, the KDP leader, described as “*shameful*” the words of the Commander of the American forces, *who had said, “Iraqi military aircraft that pose a threat only to American forces need to be shot down”*.²² Following the recapture of the Kurdish cities of Erbil and Dohuk by Iraqi forces, as had happened three years earlier, a wave of 200,000 refugees hit Turkey’s borders.

Previously, the refugees had had a very hard time, due to both lack of support from the international community, and Turkey’s own limited resources. In spite of this, of the 60,000 refugees that arrived in Turkey in 1988, 30,000 chose to stay in Turkey. Thus, a country that was criticised for its previous handling of the refugee crisis had to close its borders soon after the start of the wave, and of an estimated 400,000 refugees only 100,000 managed to enter the country.

The ruling elite criticised for invading Iraq and plans of establishing a Kurdish state were now criticised as a betrayal of the Kurds. This could be attributed to the establishment’s “Westernism” norm. The establishment knew that the Kurds were causing trouble in Iraq, and rationally, they should have valued the USA’s withdrawal of support for the Kurds. The “Westernism” norm in Turkish FSP, however, meant that the West was at once praised but also accused of selfishness and of betraying its allies, and thus of not being trustworthy. According to Mumcu, the wave of refugees and hardship that Turkey endured was the result

²²‘Iraq is regaining authority in the North’, *Cumhuriyet*, 29.03.1991.

of Ozal's "active foreign policy" and while the USA was winning the war, the bill was being handed to Turkey.²³

The Kurdish drama made it imperative that a new approach should be found towards the Kurdish-inhabited region. The terms "safe zone", "safe heaven" and "buffer zone" were applied by the USA, the UK and Turkey respectively. These terms were indicated adjustments that were about to be applied to the region. The British and Turkish approaches included setting up refugee camps on the Iraqi side of the border. For the USA, it was more favourable to maintain the security of the existing inhabited areas. With, this intention, a safety area was set up between the 36th parallel and Turkey. Mumcu argued that such an idea proposed by the Americans was a long term game. The USA, which had initially provoked the Kurds to rise up against Saddam, and had then betrayed them, now proposed to set up a safe zone. The proposal by the British looked like the Balfour letter that paved way to the establishment of a Jewish state and carried overtones of an "embryonic Kurdish state".²⁴

While the first multi-national forces units started entering Northern Iraq on April 21st 1991, the Kurdish leaders Talabani and Barzani signed an agreement with Saddam Hussein concerning the return of Kurdish refugees to their homeland. Ozal, in contrast to the ruling elite, advocated that international forces should remain in Northern Iraq until security was established.²⁵ By May, while the number of assigned soldiers reached 13,000, arguments started to arise about their status. The MFA alleged that these soldiers were allocated with

²³Mumcu. U., 'Ozal's policies', *Cumhuriyet*, 10.04.1991

²⁴Mumcu.U., 'Embryonic state', *Cumhuriyet*, 14.04.1991; 'Balfour', *Cumhuriyet*, 14.04.1991

²⁵'Allied forces should remain in the region', *Cumhuriyet*, 01.05.1991

Turkey's approval, and in response to this statement it was argued that if it was true, an Agreement must have been signed similar to the one regulating the stationing of NATO units.

Refugees gradually started returning from Turkey to Iraq. Their return was organised by the American forces. With the arrangement of the TGS, Mumcu participated in one of the trips to the area to see these forces. During the trip he met an American Major who spoke fluent Turkish and had even done a PhD on Ataturk and his ideology. Fluent language skills and the Major's Turkey-related PhD were enough for Mumcu to see it as evidence that the officer was assigned to the region to make preparations for the establishment of a Kurdish State in Northern Iraq. Mumcu, who had previously criticised the wave of Kurdish refugees who had come to Turkey, now interpreted the rush to repatriate the refugees to an American-controlled Iraq as an attempt to establish a Kurdish state, and to distribute the oil-generated wealth of the region by population.²⁶

In response to negative changes in Turkey's behaviour, the USA started using Sirsenk airport in Northern Iraq to supply essential materials to its troops. Mumcu wrote that such US action increased existing concerns that *"the USA was accumulating weapons in Northern Iraq"*. He further argued that a process that had started as humanitarian aid had turned into actual occupation that did not have any legal basis, and that it would last until the establishment of a sovereign Kurdish state.²⁷ While the US continued its settlement work in

²⁶Mumcu.U., 'Return', *Cumhuriyet*, 09.05.1991

²⁷Mumcu.U., 'The Iraqi plan of the USA', *Cumhuriyet*, 10.05.1991

Northern Iraq, the allied forces were deployed at Turkish Military bases in order to give them a vantage point overlooking Northern Iraq.

5.2 OPERATION POISED HAMMER

The military operation that was initially called “Poised Hammer” and later renamed “Operation Provide Comfort” would ensure that the issue of Western support for the Kurds and the PKK was kept on the agenda of daily politics. These operations would be extended by bi-annual periods, right until the second Gulf War in 2003, and the fact that these extensions came from parliament maintained their presence on the agenda. “Poised Hammer” was criticised from its inception Mumcu argued that America did this within the framework of tasks allocated to Turkey in solving the KQ and reflected the intention of the USA to use Turkish land as a base for its Middle East operations beyond NATO.²⁸ Mumcu’s perception was partly true. Ozal wanted to take Turkey’s economic and political relationship with the USA, onto a strategic level, beyond NATO. With this purpose, a strategic partnership agreement was signed within the SEIA framework, with Bush at Camp David. The aim of this was to overcome the “out of area” problem that derived from the involvement of NATO in US military operations in the Middle East. From this point on, military exercises carried out with NATO forces would be carried out on a dual level.²⁹ Against a background of widespread criticism from opposition parties, bureaucracy and the media, Ozal made an agreement with President Bush, who was visiting Turkey, to intensify

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Deger.E., 'The aim: Out of area interference', *Cumhuriyet*, 28.03.1991

cooperation between the two countries. Accordingly, it was decided to develop and institutionalise a strategic relationship with the USA beyond NATO.³⁰

Following the creation of a multi-national force in Turkey, the politics that developed within the Bush-Ozal personal relationship which foresaw a more influential role for Turkey in the Middle East, started to be interpreted as a diversion from classic FSP. According to this approach, until the Gulf War, Turkish FSP was clear, and consecutive Turkish Republican governments pursued a traditional FSP. There were claims, however, that, day after day, the ANAP government was pulling the country into a Middle Eastern swamp. The presence of the USA in the Middle East and the terrorist events experienced in Diyarbakir and its surroundings had an invisible but existent link. These developments resonated with Kurdish related difficulties that had started during Ottoman times and had continued ever since.³¹

Soysal argued that the true intention behind the USA's operation "Poised Hammer" was to create a new state on Turkish soil and the Kurds were being used as an excuse.³² Anti-American and anti-Western views that appeared among the establishment with "Operation Poised Hammer" openly started being propagated as an FSP choice. Selcuk argued that "the US's hostile behaviour towards Turkey was not a new phenomenon, that it had always wanted to split Turkey, however, pragmatically used it against the USSR. In 1990, when Russia threw in the towel over its differences with the USA, these hostile intentions re-appeared again". Ironically, while the ruling elite was arguing that the multi-national forces

³⁰'Strengthened dialogue with the USA', *Cumhuriyet*, 22.07.1991

³¹'Caution: Trap', *Cumhuriyet*, 14.07.1991

³²Soysal.M., 'Scythe and the hammer', *Cumhuriyet*, 16.07.1991

were set up with the purpose of assisting the establishment of a Kurdish state, the PKK was arguing that the same force was established against Kurdish interests.³³

The DYP-CHP coalition that replaced the ANAP government in November 1991 adopted a more flexible approach over the KQ and Northern Iraq where the USA was concerned, despite earlier opposition prior to coming to power. Hikmet Cetin, the MFA, said in his statement that criticisms, particularly on “Poised Hammer”, were related to the allocation of US forces close to the Turkish-Iraqi border, and in a new development, the forces would only be there as a deterrent and would be allocated to Incirlik and Diyarbakir as part of the NATO units there, thus the MFA did not object to such moves.³⁴

With the end of the mandate for Poised Hammer on 30th July 1992, a new anti-Western discourse developed that was routinely brought to the attention of public opinion, in which the argument was concentrated on the intention of western powers to build a Kurdish state on Iraqi soil. Balci argued that the safe zone set up as a result of Poised Hammer benefitted the PKK the most. The organisation was now able to attack Turkey, with hundreds strong units and accumulated heavy weaponry. He also criticised the coalition government for changing their rhetoric from the hardline stance they had adopted during their time in opposition, to a much more conciliatory one now they were in power. Besides, he argued, Iraqi Kurdish leaders, inspired by the Poised Hammer operation, took a harsher stance against the Iraqi government and these events all laid the foundations for a future

³³‘PKK:poised hammer is against us’, *Cumhuriyet*, 03.08.1991

³⁴‘Poised Hammer stay will be extended’, *Cumhuriyet*, 10.12.1991

independent Kurdish state in Iraq.³⁵ Mumcu, like Balci, wrote that Demirel pursued the same politics as Ozal when it came to operation Poised Hammer, and stated that “slowly, a Kurdish state was being built under an American protectorate” to the South of Turkey’s border.³⁶

The Kurds in Northern Iraq were an important factor in the USA’s policies towards Saddam Hussein following the First Gulf War. The fact that the Kurds were setting up various political parties such as the KYP and the KDP, and, the clashes between them, proved to be a problem in the job of taking control over Saddam. In May 1992, parliamentary elections took place in the Kurdish-populated areas of Northern Iraq in which Barzani and Talabani gained almost equal votes - 44.58% and 44.3% respectively- but not the absolute majority that was necessary. The 105 MPs elected to Parliament started their term by taking the public oath on 5th June, 1992. The first Kurdish government in Northern Iraq was set up under the leadership of Fuat Masum from the KYB. Out of 105 seats in the parliament, five were given to Christians and the rest were equally divided between Talabani’s KYB and Barzani’s KDP.³⁷

Following the establishment of a Kurdish government, it was noted that Kurdish leaders tried to improve relations with Turkey. Talabani, who came to Turkey with that purpose said, *“As long as the dictatorship continues in Iraq, Kurds would rather lean towards foreign countries, than become part of that dictatorship. Turkey was the most favourable of the neighbouring countries due to its democratic and secular character”*. At the same period,

³⁵ Balci.E., ‘Kurdish state’, *Cumhuriyet*, 16.05.1992

³⁶ Mumcu.U., ‘Three problems’, *Cumhuriyet*, 20.05.1992

³⁷ ‘The first Kurdish Government’, *Cumhuriyet*, 06.07.1992

both Barzani and Talabani were issued with Turkish diplomatic passports, and started making foreign trips with these documents.³⁸

In fact it was Ozal's project that foresaw the uniting of Kurds under one roof with Turkey. Mumcu fiercely opposed such an initiative and wrote that *"Talabani was one of the pawns in America's Kurdish chess game. The 1920s Sèvres treaty was being applied as Washington-London-Paris-Bonn and in Ankara's absence. The plan included the creation of a Federation with Turkey and then the setting up of a Kurdish state with parts broken off from Turkey, and this was a plan secretly developed by the CIA and implemented by the Pentagon"*.³⁹ As opposed to Mumcu's evaluations of events, the PKK were disturbed by the Northern Iraqi Kurdish leadership's emerging closeness with Turkey and the USA. This resulted in an embargo imposed by the PKK against Northern Iraq and the closing of the Habur passage that was a passing point for thousands of lorries heading to Northern Iraq. Secil Kazaz, the KDP Ankara representative referred to this situation by saying: *"the PKK embargo ended up being more effective than the one imposed by the UN and Saddam"*.⁴⁰ In this context Mumcu wrote that *"Ozal pursued his policies by promoting the KYB leader Talabani and such a policy coincided with the US Middle East policies. Consequently, the US and Ozal's policies matched each other and Bush and Ozal's policies fulfilled each other's."*⁴¹

The PKK not only tried to create obstacles to Ozal's attempts to bring Turkey and the Northern Iraqi Kurds closer, but also tried to end such an attempt by increasing its terrorist

³⁸Iraqi Kurdistan could lean towards Turkey', *Cumhuriyet*, 25.07.1992

³⁹Mumcu.U, 'Anatolian Federation', *Cumhuriyet*, 31.07.1992

⁴⁰PKK's pressure on to Northern Iraq', *Cumhuriyet*, 06.08.1992

⁴¹Mumcu.U., 'With Talabani's strings...', *Cumhuriyet*, 06.09.1992

actions. On 19th August 1992, over 1,000 terrorists attacked Sirnak province and caused large scale damage to all public buildings with heavy gun-fire. Such an action could be interpreted as frustration due to being left out of shaping the new region. Another purpose of the PKK's increase of violence was to eliminate the legitimacy of the Talabani-Barzani duo that was associated, in hegemonic discourse, with the PKK. By that they wanted to end relationship that was being built between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds.

At a time when the PKK was becoming part of the daily agenda, an important event that totally shook the Turkish-American relationship took place. On 2nd October 1992 during NATO exercises in Aegean Sea, a rocket from the US Saratoga hit a Turkish military ship the Muavenet. Five soldiers lost their lives in the incident, and from that time on, it was raised at every meeting concerning Turkish-American relationships in the field of security, and served as cause of increased public distrust towards the USA.⁴² This attack was seen as a display of US power against Turkey's anti-Western FSP. As would have been the case in any other event, in hegemonic discourse, a link was made between this incident and the KQ. Mumcu questioned the fact that it was an accident by asking whether the increase of PKK violence following start of the Poised Hammer operation in Northern Iraq was also an accident.⁴³ At the same time, Sarizeybek called this attack an attempt to scare off planned military action in Northern Iraq by Turkish forces.⁴⁴

Two months into the setting up of a Kurdish government in Northern Iraq, the KDP and KYP joined military forces and created a 50,000 strong army. On 4th September 1992, the

⁴²'Saratoga Murderer hit', *Cumhuriyet*, 03.10.1992

⁴³Mumcu.U., 'Guided missile', *Cumhuriyet*, 03.10.1992

⁴⁴Sarizeybek.E., *Kurdish Trap- Kürt Kapanı*, (Istanbul; Pozitif Publication. 2010) p.115 2010

Northern Iraqi parliament announced the establishment of a Kurdish Federal State within Iraq. Following the establishment of the Federal State, Kurdish officials requested the PKK to leave Northern Iraq, which sparked fresh clashes with the terrorist group. With regard to the creation of a Kurdish Army, the Turkish MFA stated that they were *“not against a police-type security force being set up to maintain security; however they disapproved of such a force being designated a “Kurdish army”*. They also emphasised that the Kurdish state was seen as part of a federal structure and not as an independent state. According to the Ministry’s words, an independent Kurdish state would not be tolerated, and if necessary, military means would be resorted to.⁴⁵ Mumcu wrote that by, establishing a Kurdish state, the oil reserves of Mosul and Kirkuk, would be handed over to Western and American companies through this state.⁴⁶ Turkey’s position became clearer once the federal state had been in existence for a time. The statement issued by Cabinet of Ministers read, *“We consider that the establishment of a federal state benefits neither the people of Northern Iraq, nor the region. We consider any action that could pave the way to the break-up of Iraq as inappropriate”*. Ankara, which took up a strong position over the establishment of a Kurdish state, said that it had offered assistance to Iraqi Kurds in their fight against the PKK, but that offer had been turned down.⁴⁷ Where hegemonic discourse opposed a Kurdish federal State, President Ozal said that *“A federal state does not create any threat to Turkey and it is wrong to see the Kurds as enemies and to treat them as such”*.⁴⁸ The CoGS did not

⁴⁵‘Kurds are seeking for ground’, *Cumhuriyet*, 06.10.1992; ‘Kurdish Army created discomfort’, *Cumhuriyet*, 23.09.1992

⁴⁶Mumcu.U., ‘Fight over oil...’, *Cumhuriyet*, 07.10.1992

⁴⁷‘No to Kurdish State’, *Cumhuriyet*, 09.10.1992

⁴⁸‘Kurdish State is not a threat’, *Cumhuriyet*, 10.10.1992

wait long to respond to such a statement by President and spoke out by saying that he was opposed to the establishment of a Kurdish state.⁴⁹

With the purpose of killing off the terrorists who had escaped from fights between the PKK and the Kurdish groups, the TAF started a military operation in Northern Iraq on 16th October 1992. Kurdish groups reacted by saying that there was no need for such action, and that fighter jets could not be an efficient tool in the fight against guerrillas. From this statement, it was clear that the operation was not taking place in coordination with Kurdish groups, and although it was directed against the PKK, it was also interpreted as a scare tactic for a federal Kurdish state. Despite Kurdish reaction, the Military said that they were in Northern Iraq to stay, and they would remain until border security was no longer in place. Gures, the CoGS also noted that the airspace over Turkey and Northern Iraq was controlled by Turkish forces that had been ordered to shoot down any “Poised Hammer” aircraft or helicopters that made an unauthorised flight over these territories.⁵⁰

While the debate on the nationalist front against “Poised Hammer” was increasing, as a result of the US initiatives, the MFA took a more lenient approach. Bureaucrats expressed the view that military operations in Iraq could be carried out with contributions from “Poised Hammer” for Turkey to carry it out whether by means of operational support and intelligence, or due to lack of international assistance for intended operations.

⁴⁹‘The Military is opposed to a Kurdish State’, *Cumhuriyet*, 11.10.1992

⁵⁰‘Shoot order’, *Cumhuriyet*, 29.10.1992

The event that took place towards the end of Ozal's term, and according to some commentators, caused the end of him, was his communication via Talabani with the PKK. As a result of these discussions initiated by Ozal, the PKK leader Ocalan said that they would not use terrorism as a weapon, would recognise the GNAT and were expecting that all problems would be solved within the GNAT. Demirel and Inonu, who were members of the coalition government, reacted negatively to Ocalan's notice of intended peace proposals. Demirel said, *"The bloodshed still goes on, nobody has given up any weapons"* and Inonu stated, *there is no negotiation with terrorism"*.

In a statement made on 17th March 1993, Ocalan announced an unconditional ceasefire until 15th April 1993 and called upon all sides to end the conflict and sit round the negotiation table. This call was a positive step to end the conflict by peaceful means, but for a society that, for decades, had lived with a discourse of fear of being divided, for its leadership to accept such call so easily was an impossible task. It was also unforeseeable that an official meeting could be arranged with a terrorist organisation or its leadership with any political or state institution, as under existing legislation, it would be illegal. Sezgin, the Minister of Internal Affairs, said, *"We will not sit around the table: they should surrender without any pre-conditions"*. While the MFA said *"Turkey's acceptance of Apo as a party for a dialogue would serve as example to the rest of the world to do the same and make contact with him"*, the government in Ankara decided not to reply to Ocalan's call but invited him to surrender to the judiciary.⁵¹ Ocalan summarised all these developments by saying that *"from time to time, Ozal felt close to the problem and was trying to give the solution a chance."*

⁵¹'Apo: Let's sit around the table', *Cumhuriyet*, 18.03.1993

Following Ocalan's statement of intent to call a ceasefire, Ozal arranged a meeting with leaders of the ruling political parties and the CoGS. From the development of events, it is evident that Ozal was the initiator of this meeting. For a long time Ozal had tried to solve this problem by peaceful means through Talabani. Despite the fact that Ozal was the architect of this initiative, it was seen as part of the USA's attempts to unite Kurdish groups of the region. Although Ozal's ideas and perspectives went well beyond those of America, it was seen as a US project. The Americans wanted to do what the British intended in the post WW I period – to unite the Northern Iraqi Kurds. Ozal, on the other hand, wanted to establish a structure that would unite all Kurds in Turkey under a single Anatolian Federation. This would, however, mean the total elimination of the Sèvres Syndrome and the Status Quo norms of Turkish FSP, but Ozal lacked the necessary political power to bring that about. Ozal's strategy would be that the topic would be thrown open to discussion and then he would take the lead. At the end of the meeting, Demirel said that his party would not talk to APO and the SHP leader Inonu distanced him from the peace offer by saying, *"The PKK's announcement that they would cease terrorist actions was just a propaganda trap"*. The CoGS, in line with party leaders, said that *"the KQ must be considered without the PKK, and APO's proposal must be carefully examined and evaluated"*.⁵² However, all these developments ended with Ozal's sudden death on 17th April 1993 and the PKK's killing of 33 unarmed soldiers the following month.

5.3 USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE: A PERIOD OF VIOLENCE

Following Ozal's death, Demirel, his greatest opponent, took the Presidential seat. Tansu Ciller, who initially expressed liberal views on the KQ, but later changed her rhetoric so that even the most hard-line nationalists would not dare to compete with her, became Prime-Minister. The DYP continued in coalition government with the SHP. Because of this, the situation became such that there was no authority apart from weak opposition parties, to voice any sort of opposition in drawing up the country's FSP, and even majority of them supported the hegemonic discourse. After being elected President, Demirel softened his stance in the NSC, as a result of which a number of amendments were passed. The decision to "permit the use of Radio and TV communication to Kurdish citizens" was included in the coalition Protocol. All these amendments were though, as was pointed out by Sezgin, the Minister of Internal Affairs, and an expansion of existing laws and did not represent a

⁵²Kurdish summit in Cankaya', *Cumhuriyet*, 31.03.1993

change of the state's position over this. Apart from that, this was far from Ozal's vision of a solution that would stretch as far as Northern Iraq.

However, all these plans ended when the PKK killed 33 unarmed soldiers who were on transfer, in the Bingol area on 25th May 1993. The fact that these soldiers were unarmed and unprotected, and also that the PKK leader was unaware of the incident, raised several questions with regard to the aims of the attack, and would be investigated as part of a wider counter-guerrilla investigation in 2011. As a matter of fact, the day after the incident, the President approved the Military's request to carry out a large-scale military operation in the region. In a style that became so predictable, Unal Erkan, the who was in charge of the State of Emergency, said that *"Talabani and Barzani support the PKK, and since they have established a base in Northern Iraq, and since their camps are there, it shows there is support for them. Whether we like it or not"* and diverted everyone's attention to the Northern Iraqi Kurds.⁵³

An alleged relationship between Poised Hammer and PKK discourse became a popular belief and was even mentioned in formal reports of State. In a report to the Prime-Minister by the National Police Headquarters, the USA and Europe were said to *"create foundations for an environment where there is a need for a Kurdish state. All this is done under the shield of humanitarian aid"*. In the report it was also mentioned that among financial donors to the PKK was the "World Churches Union". While the report was publicised in the newspapers,

⁵³Talabani and Barzani support the the PKK ',Cumhuriyet, 25.05.1993

the headline article was about aid provided by the “World Churches Union” and pushed forward the notion of a connection between the PKK-Christianity-the West.⁵⁴

As opposed to the developed hegemonic discourse of the USA against the PKK, the US role was very important, particularly over the issue of the changing position of European countries towards the PKK. Following a ban of PKK in Germany in November 1993, the Minister of Defence emphasised that *“it’s all about the USA. The US’s involvement and the messages it gave, in operations in Europe, were very influential. The USA pushed the button”*.⁵⁵ Such behaviour was, too, linked to the wish to extend the mandate for the Poised Hammer operation. The USA, while on one hand was supporting Turkey in its fight against terrorism, was on the other hand, in the period of increased violence during Ciller period, warning it to be cautious.

At the same time as supporting Turkey’s fight against terrorism, the USA continued publicising negative practices that were in place in Turkey. The Secretary of State, in a 1993 “Human Rights Report” said that the abuse of human rights remained at alarming levels. In the same report it said that the coalition government, soon after coming to power, made some attempts to improve Kurdish human and political rights, but failed to bring about any progress. The report, that was much more strongly critical than 1991 and 1992 reports, said that the pressure on the Kurds mounted daily, and 1993 witnessed the bloodiest clashes in South Eastern Anatolia’s history. Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Oxman, who came to Turkey after the publication of the Human Rights Report and the detention of the DEP MPs said that *“Turkey had to find a political solution to the KQ without jeopardizing territorial*

⁵⁴The source of PKK money - “World Churches Union”, *Cumhuriyet*, 28.11.1993

⁵⁵The USA pressed the button', *Cumhuriyet*, 28.11.1993

integrity” and that *“The US administration was closely following the stripping of parliamentary immunity of some DEP MPs”*. The same message came to Prime-Minister Ciller from President Clinton, who said, *“We think that the solution to the KQ has to address political and human rights aspects too”*.⁵⁶

A decrease of American assistance and criticisms in Congress reignited debates about *“Poised Hammer”*. In the NSC meeting in May, one of the high ranking commanders said that *“each time the mandate for “Poised Hammer” was extended, it increased the chances of the creation of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq.”* The meeting decided that Turkey’s national interests must be considered, taking the existing situation into account, and for the first time, the government, was advised not to extend the operation’s mandate. This step was regarded as a tit-for-tat measure against the US decision on assistance.⁵⁷ The same NSC had decided at an emergency meeting held on 6th April 1994, that on the condition of *“taking into consideration the preservation of Iraq’s territorial integrity”*, Poised Hammer should be extended. The decision to extend the mandate by the NSC was made as a result of negotiations behind the closed doors with the USA, which resulted in the US Senate’s approval of the assistance based on *“not applying any cuts to Turkey in the 1995 budget”* and the proviso that *“military assistance credit should not be used to maintain internal security”*.⁵⁸ However, Prime-Minister Ciller’s words *“if necessary we will refuse it”* made the Senate change the wording to *“US weaponry cannot be used against principles of*

⁵⁶*Kurdish Problem must be solved in Turkey*, *Cumhuriyet*, 10.03.1994; *‘4 warnings from America to Turkey’*, *Cumhuriyet*, 26.03.1994

⁵⁷*Concerns of the Military over Kurdish state to the Poised Hammer*, *Cumhuriyet*, 30.05.1994

⁵⁸*Do not use the US weaponry for internal security*, *Cumhuriyet*, 18.06.1994

international law".⁵⁹ With the assistance package having been approved, the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher warned his Turkish counter-part Cetin that "complaints of human rights abuses were increasing, and unless the country takes firm steps, Turkey's relationship with the USA and the West would be negatively affected".⁶⁰

Following the banning of the DEP in June 1994, the party was given an opportunity to express itself freely in the USA. One of the MPs stripped of his powers, Remzi Kartal, made a speech in the US Congress in Kurdish and said that *"Although the DEP has no any organisational links to the PKK it does not regard it as a terrorist organisation, either"*.⁶¹ In an OSCE meeting held in Vienna in June 1994, the US parliamentarians put forward a proposal to send a group of parliamentarians to Turkey to carry out an investigation

Communication between DEP MPs and the USA had results. Secretary of State Christopher repeated warning similar to that expressed previously and said *"Turkey's KQ is not only a military problem. The Kurds must be given a hand and ways to include the Kurds in management mechanisms should be sought. Turkey can solve the Middle Eastern problem only in co-operation with MPs elected by Kurds"*. Christopher's warning was followed by a decision from the US Congress and Senate, ratified by a mediation commission, to cut assistance to Turkey by 10 %.⁶² Soysal, who was the newly appointed MFA reacted strongly to this, and said that *"the conditions put forward by the USA will not influence Turkey's*

⁵⁹'The crises with the USA has softened', *Cumhuriyet*, 01.07.1994

⁶⁰'Warning from the USA on Human Rights' abuses', *Cumhuriyet*, 01.07.1994.

⁶¹'DEP's defence arguments for PKK', *Cumhuriyet*, 24.07.1994

⁶²'Kurdish warning from the USA to Turkey', *Cumhuriyet*, 30.07.1994

*actions. US assistance is mutually beneficial, which is why an issue is being made out of human rights".*⁶³

In response to news of the prosecution and eleven-year jail sentence handed down to the DEP MPs, the US Secretary of State made a statement in which he said, *"We are concerned by the sentence. As a friend and ally of Turkey, we are prepared to provide any assistance"*.⁶⁴

The statement was interpreted by Turkey as a proposal from Washington that they should fulfil the role of mediator in the conflict.

Soysal started to display differences not only in discourse but also by new approaches to the KQ that contrasted with policies pursued up to now. On 21st August 1994 he met his Iranian and Syrian counterparts to discuss the KQ. The participants of the meeting discussed ways-in which they could act together and issued a joint statement by which they condemned attempts by Western countries to split Iraq and to establish a Kurdish state in the North of the country. Balci wrote of the change of approach, *"Turkey has revised its policies in the light of national interests and has made necessary adjustments"*.⁶⁵ This was not to be taken as Turkey's burning bridges over the USA and Europe, but rather, the real intention was to change Iraqi policies, which until now had been consistent with the US policies. Soysal's ultimate goal was to develop a relationship with Iraq which was independent of Iraq's relationship with the USA.

⁶³'A strong note to the USA from Mumtaz Soysal', *Cumhuriyet*, 31.07.1994

⁶⁴'Washington: we are concerned...', *Cumhuriyet*, 10.12.1994

⁶⁵'Seeking new ways in Turkish Foreign Policy', *Cumhuriyet*, 26.08.1994

As a result, following the approval of military assistance that had been subject of extensive debate by President Clinton, Turkey announced that it would not use the 10% part of it that was linked to certain conditions. Soysal also warned that if Turkey were refused a line of credit, the Common Defence and Economic Co-Operation Agreement that had been drawn up with the USA, would be revised.⁶⁶ Soysal, while trying to develop relationships with Iraq, was also trying to end operation “Poised Hammer”. This was met with suspicion by the USA and Peter Tarnoff, an Undersecretary of State was sent to Turkey to shed light on these doubts. Soysal’s DYP coalition partners caused him many problems, of which “Poised Hammer” was the most significant, and as a result, he left the MFA in November 1994. His departure was followed by increased differences of views in the DYP-SHP coalition. In December 1994, the government proposed to parliament that the decision on extending the mandate for “Poised Hammer” should be delegated to a Cabinet of Ministers, a move that was rejected by Parliament.

The intention of the DEP MPs to establish, with the PKK’s support, a “Kurdish Parliament in exile” provoked a fierce reaction from the USA, which approached the issue from the point of view of Turkey’s territorial integrity. The US administration openly expressed the view that a parliament supported by the PKK, a recognised terrorist organisation, could not be legitimised and that the USA supported the territorial integrity of countries inhabited by the Kurds.⁶⁷ In fact, such an approach was at the heart of the US approach to the KQ. The US administration, while supporting Turkey against PKK activities abroad, against a background of human rights abuses, stopped sales of CBU-87 cluster bombs to Turkey. As a natural

⁶⁶‘A warning from Soysal to the USA’, *Cumhuriyet*, 14.09.1994

⁶⁷‘Reaction to Kurdish issue from Ankara’, *Cumhuriyet*, 14.01.1995

outcome of the events of 1994, the Human Rights Report of 1995 published by the Secretary of State underlined the fact that in the field of human rights, the situation in Turkey had worsened throughout 1994. These abuses were mainly directed towards those who wanted to stress their Kurdish identity.⁶⁸ While the initial reaction from the Turkish MFA was that the Report was “prepared unprofessionally”, the Ministry later produced its own report in which it wrote, *In Turkey, there is freedom for everyone to express their identity; there is no systematic practice of torture, and the cases reported were isolated ones*”.⁶⁹

Then again the Turkish MFA, just as it had done in the case of European developments on the Kurdish issue, warned the government that *“US military aid that was frozen due to human rights abuses will end totally if in the fight against terrorism the damage to civilian lives is not prevented”*.⁷⁰ According to this, Turkey played the card of the possibility of the country’s slipping into communism at the time of Soviet expansion, and wanted the West to close its eyes to human rights abuses. Then, with the rise of radical Islam in the Middle East, the country portrayed itself as a “castle of secularism” and by reminding the West of dire consequences, it again expected the West to ignore human rights abuses.⁷¹

Radical Islam became part of the daily political agenda during the Erbakan-Ciller coalition government following the 1995 elections, and moved the KQ into second place. The Erbakan government which, when in opposition had voiced serious criticisms about FSP, with “Poised

⁶⁸ ‘Accusations of Torture from the USA’, *Cumhuriyet*, 02.02.1995

⁶⁹ Balbay.M., ‘Test on Human Rights’, *Cumhuriyet*, (06.02.1995).

⁷⁰ ‘Human Rights warning from Ministry of Foreign Affairs’, *Cumhuriyet*, 20.02.1995

⁷¹ Balci.E., ‘Historical mistake’, *Cumhuriyet*, 22.02.1995

Hammer” getting the the worst of the criticism, did not go in for major changes. During this term, criticism of the USA in hegemonic discourse was also diminished. This situation was caused not only by the focus of the daily political agenda shifting to a new threat, but by the intention of the establishment to get US support against its new threat – radical Islam. Once Erbakan had been removed from power by the soft coup d’état of 1997, US support was increased once more on the issue of KQ.

5.4 THE USA AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A KURDISH STATE?

The Ecevit government that succeeded Erbakan’s had its first confrontation with the US soon after the Clinton administration brought together Northern Iraqi Kurdish groups in September 1998 in Washington. The USA’s new policy regarding Northern Iraq was based on close cooperation, and if possible, joint administration of the region by local Kurdish groups, something that was in sharp contrast to Turkey’s policies for the region.⁷² The two Kurdish party of Northern Iraq – the KDP and KYP – who came together under US leadership in 1992, witnessed scenes of unprecedented armed conflict until 1998. Although the PKK had been taken in hand, the establishment, within the framework of the status quo norm, did not voice any concerns as internal clashes among Kurdish groups reduced the possibility of the creation of a Kurdish state. From time to time, it even gave its support to the KDP. By agreement with Washington, the revival of a Kurdish parliament by the two groups under US leadership meant changes to the existing status quo.⁷³

⁷²Kirisci.K. (2004) p. 292

⁷³Ozdog.U., 'At the cross roads in Northern Iraq', *Zaman*, 17.11.1998

Hegemonic discourse started working the idea that the USA were about to implement a new plan that would unite the Kurds. With this purpose, after the war, the USA brought the Kurds who had been trained by the CIA at Guam Island back to Northern Iraq, and the CIA going intended to create a foundation for a similar project on Turkish soil.⁷⁴ Hegemonic discourse gave a message through the media that “the source of publication was the TGS, that there were aims to change Turkey into a federal state, that Fuller, a retired CIA specialist and advocate of establishing a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, was being closely monitored, and finally, that the TGS was greatly concerned by all these developments”.⁷⁵

While the establishment was reacting to developments in Northern Iraq according to the norms of the Sèvres Syndrome, the USA was actively supporting coalition government successful to DSP and ANAP’s coalition government by taking into consideration the powerful influence of the KQ over Turkey’s internal political structure. One of the main reasons for this was that the US administration was increasingly concerned about the possibility of Turkey’s disengagement from the West, hence its active support of the country’s EU membership application.⁷⁶ As an example, the USA had sided with Turkey in its standoff with Italy on the issue of the Kurdish parliament’s meeting in that country and had reminded Italy that the PKK was a terrorist organization.⁷⁷ Later, the US government actively supported efforts to capture Ocalan in Kenya and made real efforts to prevent Ocalan from being sheltered anywhere else.

⁷⁴Balbay. M., 'Guam Kurds are returning', *Cumhuriyet*, 29.09.1998: Kislali.M.A., 'CIA, Fuller and the PKK', *Radikal*, 29.09.1998

⁷⁵'The military's Fuller concerns', *Cumhuriyet*, 03.10.1998

⁷⁶Kirisci.K. (2004) p. 296

⁷⁷'A Reaction from the US administration to Roma', *Milliyet*, 01.10.1998

US support for Turkey's EU candidacy at the EU's 1998 Helsinki summit, its contribution to capturing Ocalan and Clinton's visit to Turkey in November 1999 following the earthquake reduced Turkish criticisms of the US to their lowest level. The PEW public survey carried out in 1999 established a level of public support of 52% in favour of the US— the highest rate in the history of US-Turkish relations. A similar survey carried out in 2007 had a support rate of only 9%, thus demonstrating how high public support now was for the USA.⁷⁸ This high rate of support was due to the assistance provided by the USA in capturing the PKK leader, the US's contribution to the re-creation of a Kurdish parliament by the Northern Iraqi Kurdish groups; the US's contribution to development of Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq rapidly diminished the support of Turkish public to the USA. The level of public support, which fell to 30% in 2002 and to 15% in 2003, took place despite Turkey's support of the USA in its global war on terror following the events of 9/11, which included cooperation with the US against the Taliban government and Al Qaida.

⁷⁸PEW Center, P. R. Global Public Opinion in the Bush Years (2001-2008) (18.12.2008). <http://www.pewglobal.org/2008/12/18/global-public-opinion-in-the-bush-years-2001-2008/> (accessed 23 January 2010)

CONCLUSION

The USA played a key role in Turkey's KQ issue in the post Cold War period and had great importance for Turkish governments. However, the USA did not provide any solution for KQ. This led to a wide scale disaffection towards the USA among the Turkish public.

Historically, KQ has not been a vital issue in Turkish-American relations. The tension on that issue started to raise itself in the 1990s, when criticisms were made by the US House of Representatives regarding abuse of human rights and failures in democratic processes. As the US started applying embargoes due to KQ issues, the US has been perceived as a supporter of PKK in the hegemonic discourse. On the other hand, Turkish MFA started, frequently, underlying that the country's strategic importance has not diminished and neither has its importance within NATO. Such approach is in tune with Status Quo and Westernism norms that influence Turkish FSP.

Provision of a safe zone for Kurds in N.Iraq by the USA and announcing these areas a flight-free zone following the first Gulf War caused serious reactions, both within ruling elite and Turkish public. Such reaction derived from the idea that the suggestion made by the USA at the start of the century to establish a Kurdish state in Turkey's south-east – the non-accomplished Sèvres Treaty – was given a new start. Due to this, Ozal could not implement policies of joint operations with USA in Iraq. However, Ozal's close relations with the USA, made Turkey's military operations against PKK in N.Iraq possible, despite the presence of international military forces. While this ensured US support on the issues of KQ, it also

prevented Kurds being inspired by the USA to set up an independent state. At the same time, Ozal tried to lift obstacles of free use of Kurdish language and worked on bringing legal amendments in order to allow broadcasting in Kurdish language from state television. Such an approach by Ozal's, while making him a role model for leaders that followed him, also placed him in a position of the most influential political leader in the history of the Republic on the KQ. However, in all of his projects, Ozal faced the ruling elite's opposition and in 1993, with his tragic death, all his plans came to an end.

Turkey had to consider Kurds in N. Iraq after the first Gulf War. Although operation Poised Hammer appeared not to be accepted by any political leaders that followed Ozal, it was supported by all of them as none of them wanted to hurt relations with the West. Poised Hammer provided a safety barrier for N.Iraqi Kurds, and different Kurdish groups were able to establish a parliament in N.Iraq with US support. These developments were met with scepticism, not only by Turkey's ruling elite, who were afraid of a possible neighbouring Kurdish state, but also by PKK, who did not want other groups representing Kurdish interests to gain power.

After Ozal, Turkish Governments accused the poised hammer and the USA of increased violence and human losses. Due to these criticisms, the USA supported Turkey on KQ policies and in its policies in Europe. However, even this support was interpreted by ruling elite as a basis to continue operation Poised Hammer and support of attempts to establish a Kurdish state in the N.Iraq. This is the period when the USA, for the first time in the post-Cold War period, linked some of its military support for Turkey to the issue of KQ. Turkey harshly responded to this and decided not to take the part linked to KQ.

The USA provided active support for Turkey's EU membership negotiations to prevent radicalisation in Turkey. The USA, who also increased their support to Turkey's work in ending PKK's existence in Europe, provided active assistance in capturing PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan by Turkish Security Forces in Kenya in February 1998. This event put the Turkish-American relationship into a better position after years of mutual distrust. In parallel to developments on the issue of KQ, public support for USA in Turkey reached 52%. This point alone shows the importance of KQ in the relationship of the countries. However, as this positive atmosphere was fading away due to US support to Northern Iraqi Kurdish groups, by 2002 this support has reduced down to 15%.

The relationship with the USA that had a tendency to change from time-to-time, took a different shape, compared to previous periods, with landslide victory of AK Party in 2002 elections. The relationships developed within KQ issue between Turkey and the USA during this period will be examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VI: TURKISH-USA RELATIONS DURING THE AK PARTY GOVERNMENT TERM

INTRODUCTION

The serious financial crises of 2001 in Turkey during the coalition government and the clash among coalition partners, ended with the Ak Party sweeping into government with a convincing majority. It was important for the government to declare that its policies were in line with those of the EU and the USA in terrorism-related issues since 9/11 was just occurred. As a good coincidence, right after the election of Ak Party, the USA put the PKK onto the Department of State list of terrorist organisations. This move was seen as a gesture to the Ak Party leader Erdogan who was visiting the USA at the time.¹ The USA was hoping to have Turkey on its side in the Iraq war, or at least to use Turkish soil for the anticipated Northern front. Thus it was trying to wave away Turkey's concerns on the Kurdish issue. The new government in power signalled that the USA would be able to help in that. This chapter briefly explains how Turkey's relations with the USA were shaped during the Ak Party Government and how they were reflected in KQ.

6.1 THE STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USA AND THE PKK

After the Ak Party Government has been established, information obtained by the *Milliyet* Daily put both the government and the USA into a difficult position. According to the newspaper, US officials had held meetings with the PKK and signed an agreement with them. As a result of the deal, "the USA was trying to use the PKK to establish a new

¹KADEK is in terror list' *Milliyet*, 10.12.2002

structure in the region; the PKK, on the other hand, was trying to get the USA onto its side for the sake of its own future. For that purpose, the USA would ensure that the PKK would be able to participate in democratic processes in Turkey, while the PKK would undergo a number of changes including a change of name”.² Such information, claimed to be obtained from a negotiator, served the purposes of both sides: the Turkish Security Forces whose only strategy against the PKK was armed struggle, and the PKK who would be in a difficult position when Turkey entered Northern Iraq following the war that, by then, seemed inevitable.

Following reports in the media, CoGS Ozkok let Turkey’s unease be known to the US CoGS Richard Myers. Myers replied that those involved in the meeting had no connection to the US government or related institutions. The TGS allowed Myers and his team to pass to Northern Iraq via Turkey provided they were escorted by TAF, and through the media ensured that the public learnt about it.³ By using this public relations strategy, the TGS showed its reaction to the US. By contrast, the US Embassy in Ankara “denied claims that the US had had meetings with the PKK, and said that the source of this information was a PKK militant”.⁴ The ex-Prime Minister Ecevit, who also got involved in the arguments, issued a statement in which he said, *“During my prime-ministerial period there also were signs of PKK – the USA meetings. With Milliyet’s report this has been proven!”*⁵ Birand, who approached the issue from opposing point of view, wrote, *“These statements mock the Turkish nation. The PKK is in contact with very intelligence service and the intelligence*

²Dundar.C., 'Interesting flirt: the USA - PKK meeting!', *Milliyet*, 18.01.2003

³The USA – KADEK contact', *Cumhuriyet*, 22.01.2003

⁴iPKK complain to Myers', *Milliyet*, 22.01.2003

⁵Ecevit confirmed PKK-USA meetings: “we knew that!”, *Milliyet*, 24.01.2003

*services too want to make contact with such organisations”.*⁶ As Birand pointed out, in the geographical area that the USA was about to occupy, it would be odd if it did not meet an organisation with 5,000 armed members, while on the other hand placing KADEK on a list of terrorist organisations was one of the major important developments in its denial of support for the PKK. It was undeniable, however, that the news communicated by Turkish decision makers to the public through the media created a very negative effect on public opinion towards the USA and the Iraqi invasion.

There was no decision on the issue from the Turkish Parliament to supporting the USA forces during the second Iraqi War, which caused the Turkish-American relationship to become strained, and the PKK issued a statement saying they would not fight the USA and asked the US not to bomb their camps”.⁷ While Turkey was preparing another draft discharge certificate to send troops to Iraq as sign of support for the attack in order to mend the strained relationship, Kurdish groups expressed their unhappiness to the USA about the troops that were about to be sent to Northern Iraq. The USA took into account the concerns of the Kurdish groups and told Turkey that it would ask for help if it became necessary, hence not asking Turkey to send troops to Iraq. Such developments pointed to the end of an era from the 1990s onwards when Turkey could freely intervene in Northern Iraq as a result of support provided by Ozal to the Bush administration in the first Iraqi operation.

Turkey’s struggle with the PKK within Iraq was now totally dependent on American initiatives. Besides as the establishment had foreseen, Turkey’s refusal to support the USA in

⁶Birand.M.A., 'Isn't PKK's contact with the CIA natural?', *Milliyet*, 01.02.2003

⁷'A message from PKK to the USA', *Sabah*, 28.03.2003

its Iraqi venture caused the AKP's relationship with the Americans to deteriorate, and at the same time restricted the government's political options and actual abilities that it could apply in the fight against PKK. This situation was discussed at the NSC and a note was delivered to the American administration saying *"Since you do not want us to enter Northern Iraq and preferred to enter the country yourselves, the responsibility to put pressure on the PKK, as was communicated previously, now rests with you"*.⁸ In a meeting held with Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, CoGS Ozkok said that if the USA would not uphold its assurances with regard to Northern Iraq, Turkey would review its position on the issue, and emphasised that creating favourable conditions for the PKK-KADEK terrorist organisation and initiatives directed to increase Kurdish settlements in the Musul – Kerkuk areas would be unacceptable to Turkey.⁹ In his meeting with Powell, Tayyip Erdogan told the latter that *"If there is an increase of the PKK-KADEK threat to Turkey and conflict among the Kurdish groups, Turkey will enter Northern Iraq"*.¹⁰

Despite the USA's involvement in Turkey's military operations in northern Iraq, it wanted to solve the problem by pursuing the PKK and announcing a general amnesty. The reason for this was while America was fighting in Iraq, it did not want to get involved with an organisation, in hostile geographical conditions, which had 5,000 well-armed militants and who up until then had not caused it any trouble. It also did not want to break off the relationship with the Northern Iraqi Kurdish groups who were supportive of the Americans and at the same time did not want Turkey's involvement in the region. The soft power

⁸(28.03.2003). Turkey National Security Council Note

⁹Ozkok to Powell: keep your promises...', *Milliyet*, 04.04.2003

¹⁰Erdogan to Powell: do not make us meddle with terrorists', *Milliyet*, 04.04.2003

policies applied by the American security forces towards the PKK were met with some anger in Turkey.

Strained Turkish-American relationship was overdosed following the “Sudden Suleymaniye Capture” incident on 4th July 2003 when American forces captured eleven soldiers from the Turkish Special Unit Force. The soldiers, who were arrested based on intelligence stating that an attempt on the life of one of the Northern Iraqi leaders was underway, were released 60 hours later. While the government was criticised in nationalist circles that the country’s dignity was degraded and they should have opened fire on the Americans, MFA Gul said that it was not an issue. The crises ended with the USA expressing its regret.

With the end of the crises, the issue of pardon for members of the organisation was brought back to agenda. It was claimed that the USA wanted a hundred management-level people, who could not come to Turkey due to the legal aspects of their status, to be sent to Norway. Baykal, the leader of opposition CHP party argued that *“the Confession Bill was proposed to clear Northern Iraq from terrorism and the USA’s negotiation with PKK and requesting (Turkey) to leave the area meant the terror was being imported to Turkey”*.¹¹ Despite resistance from the opposition parties and a reference from the ruling elite to the “US Creation”, the bill that was called “A Gain for the Public” was voted into law. According to this law passed at the end of July 2003, *“Members of the organisation that surrender themselves without an armed struggle, or who are captured while on the way to surrender, will be understood to have left the organisation”* and they would thus be able to profit from the bill, even though they had participated in the organisation’s activities. However, *“The general commander, members of the council of the general command, members of the*

¹¹“Terror is being imported to Turkey”, *Cumhuriyet*, 16.07.2003

central committee and of the shura", in other words those who were involved in the actual management and coordination of the organisation, were exempt from such an amnesty. Following the amnesty, in August 2003 the US officials again met the PKK leadership and asked them to go to Turkey and surrender their arms. Arcayurek evaluated these developments as *"America...using Turkey as a tool and for its own gains, sweet-talking a terrorist organisation"*.¹² The Military, in an NSC meeting held in August 2003 highlighted the fact that the bill had not produced the expected results. Apart from that it requested from the government *"to make clear their policies on Iraq and the PKK/KADEK"*. President Sezer displayed a similar position to the army and warned that *"no promises should be made without taking political decisions on the contribution or non-contribution of (Turkish) military assistance to future military forces that would be created in Iraq"*.¹³

The decision by the Army and the President reflected Turkey's unchanged FSP. This stated that the success in the fight with terrorism was measured by the number of captured or killed PKK members. In fact, thanks to a new approach applied for the first time, a crack appeared within the PKK when those hardliners who wanted to continue the armed struggle clashed with soft liners who wanted to pursue the negotiations proposed by the USA. A new wave of terrorist activities was started by the PKK leaders and followers who supported the continuance of armed struggle in order to prevent its members from deserting the organisation, and they even killed some of the PKK advocates of a negotiation process. The TGS, in order to improve strained Turkish-American relationships, rejected the call of the "Transitional Council" of Iraq to send army units and stated *"We are a state. We cannot*

¹²Arcayurek. C., 'Candle of a liar', *Cumhuriyet*, 13.08.2003

¹³'What are your policies on Iraq and KADEK?', *Milliyet*, 24.08.2003

accept an invitation from an organisation whose entity is not recognised in the international arena". Together with this, the TGS announced that if the decision to send troops were made, the units would be ready within 45 days, noting that the initiative on the matter rested with the government.¹⁴

Turkey put three conditions on sending troops to Iraq: the preservation of Iraq's territorial integrity; recognition of equal rights in government for Turkmen; and a closure of PKK camps. The request to maintain Iraq's territorial integrity was an indication that Turkey would not welcome any potential Kurdish state to its South. By putting forward the second condition, Turkey was backing the Turkmen minority in Iraq. Its priority aim, however, was to eliminate the PKK from Northern Iraq. On 7th October 2003, the GNAT gave full authorisation to the government to send troops to Iraq as part of a multi-national allied force. In September 2003, however, under pressure from its Kurdish members, the Iraqi Transitional Government decided not to request military assistance from Turkey. This proved right the expectations of the establishment, who did not want the US-Turkish relationship strengthening and which would in consequence strengthen the Ak Party government's links with the US administration. President Sezer finalised this situation by saying at the end of October 2003 that "the issue of sending troops to Iraq is over for me".¹⁵

During the debates on whether to send troops to Iraq or not, Turkish and American security officials met in September 2003 to prepare a plan of action to eliminate the PKK. The meeting concluded that there should be a constant exchange of information between the

¹⁴'A surprise summit in the Cabinet', *Cumhuriyet*, 30.07.2003

¹⁵'It is over for me', *Zaman*, 30.10.2003

two parties on movements of the PKK throughout the region, and that in the fight against the PKK consideration should be given to the line taken by Turkey.¹⁶ In return the US side noted that they did not support any armed operations against the organisation prior to the expiry date of the general amnesty in February 2004 and in order for the amnesty to succeed in its intention the group leadership had to be separated from the organisation to prevent them from creating obstacles for lower level members to surrender under the terms of the amnesty.¹⁷

The PKK/KADEK decided to change its name again to reduce pressure from the USA. At the second General Convention of the Kurdistan Congress of Freedom and Democracy (Kurdistan Ozgurluk ve Demokrasi Kongresi (KADEK), on 26 October 2003, KADEK dissolved itself and announced that the Party of Democratic Liberation (Partiya Rizgariya Demokratik-PRD) would be established instead. An important person within the organisation, Osman Ocalan, the younger brother of Abdullah Ocalan justified the name change as a necessity due to the approaching local elections scheduled for 28th March 2004. He confirmed earlier statements that the organisation's extreme margins would be eliminated.¹⁸ Both statements show that the US initiatives were producing results. KADEK's decision was reflected by new anti-western doubts in hegemonic discourse. Birgit argued that KADEK's wish to pursue a democratic, liberal model suited US and EU interests given the location. The Kurdish Confederation built in Northern Iraq by the USA and the EU, would be strengthened, and the diplomatic attacks of this confederation, particularly against Turkey, would be given

¹⁶'Action plan for KADEK', *Cumhuriyet*, 13.09.2003

¹⁷'Operation against KADEK is postponed for another spring', *Cumhuriyet*, 14.09.2003

¹⁸'PKK/KADEK's new target is local elections', *Zaman*, 13.11.2003

more prominence.¹⁹ This claim was, however, rejected by the US Secretary of State, who announced that the Kurdistan People's Congress (KPC) was a terrorist organisation that had replaced the PKK/KADEK.²⁰ This attitude from the USA was manifested at the highest levels: President George Bush, when hosting Prime-Minister Erdogan in January 2004 assured the latter that he *"will not accept the demands of the Iraqi Kurds for an ethnic federation and will not let the PKK remain in Northern Iraq"*. On the same day, the US troops in Iraq mounted an active operation against the PKK and raided the offices of the Democratic Resolution Party– the political wing of the PKK.

Following the meeting, articles were published in keeping with hegemonic discourse covering the government's position and lack of effect in the operations conducted jointly with the US authorities. Within this scope, it was argued that the public legislation that was intended to eliminate the PKK/KADEK had resulted in fiasco and the majority of applications for amnesty made under the scheme were from detained and imprisoned members of the organisation, which led to conclusion that the law did not achieve its intended purpose.²¹ The same article reported that an argument had erupted within the organisation about making use of the legislation and Engin Sincer, one of the leading names within the group of supporters of this view, was killed. It was also claimed that the younger brother of Abdullah Ocalan, Osman Ocalan, had promised American representatives in a series of meetings that the organisation would be dispersed, so long as concessions were made to relocate the high-level management of the organisation to Norway. In other words, the new strategy adopted by the USA had caused divided opinions. This in turn caused Osman Ocalan's drop

¹⁹Birgit.O., 'Just a US+EU game', *Cumhuriyet*, 12.11.2003

²⁰Washington: KPC is a terrorist group', *Cumhuriyet*, 13.11.2003

²¹'There was nobody who wanted to return home', *Cumhuriyet*, 05.02.2004

out from PKK/KONGRA-GEL with a number of prominent followers and their relocation to the Calal Talabani-controlled areas of Northern Iraq and the establishment there of the Democratic Patriots' Party.²²

The shift in US policy away from armed struggle was stressed by both Condoleezza Rice and the US Ambassador Edelman. The reality of the situation, that the USA could not afford to mount military operations against the PKK due to its struggle to control the situation in Iraq because of the insurgency, began to be accepted by Turkey.

To prevent its members from falling under the influence of the new USA strategy towards the PKK, the organisation intensified its attacks. Turkey's relationship with the USA was damaged following a leak to the media that a Commander and General of an Armoured Unit in Istanbul wrote a letter to the District Governors in which he requested that they should collect intelligence about "pro-US and EU people and members of high society". No matter how hard Ozkok tried to wave away the matter by stating that it had been necessary due to local conditions, this event was important from the point of view of evaluating the ruling elite's suspicious view of the West. While the US officials reacted to the issue by saying: "We are perplexed", the general who had ordered it retired.²³ The ruling elite's anti-western stance was not restricted to the KQ. Political reaction also posed a threat to the Turkish FSP. The establishment saw the USA and the EU as giving a great role to Turkey in Great Middle East Project (GMP). Thus the West's description of Turkey as a "model of moderate Islam" or an "Islamic Republic" sparked a great deal of reaction. The view was mounting that,

²²'KONGRA-GEL Split', *Cumhuriyet*, 14.08.2004

²³Congar. Y., 'Military Dialogue', *Milliyet*; 'Buyukanit in 2006', *Milliyet*, 06.08.2004

within the GMP, the West supported the Ak Party and was moving along with it. President Sezer said, *“Both the USA and the UE have assumed to themselves external powers and have assumed the right and authority to “tidy up” the geography of the region. To implant phrases such as “an Islamic Republic” and “Moderate Islam” into the minds of people in secular Turkey is unacceptable and out of touch”*. Sezer was warning that if “GMP created a significant imbalance in the region, Turkey could face new risks that would leave it vulnerable”.²⁴

6.2 THE MILITARY SPEAKS OUT

CoLF Commander Yasar Buyukanit, who was due to replace Ozkok as CoGS, also criticised the US strategy by saying, *“Those at Kandili Mountains are moving freely in and out of Turkey, and the USA is waiting until all the terrorists have gone into Turkey”*. Buyukanit, while stating that *“Ocalan continued to manage the organisation from captivity and he (Buyukanit) expressed his concerns regarding this to the government but did not receive any reply from the prosecution”* hinted that the Army-Politician relationship that had become part of the status quo during Ozkok’s time as CoGS would be strained when he took over.²⁵

The TGS’s view reflected on the media too. Bila argued that *“Turkey is caught in a trap between the EU, over the Cyprus issue, and America, because of the invasion of Iraq. Despite America’s lack of success in Iraq, it is still trying to destroy Turkey.”*²⁶ Ambassador Edelman did his utmost to end the increasing anti-Americanism, but was himself a source of conspiracy theories. The TGS was not satisfied by the Ambassador’s efforts. In a meeting of

²⁴Two views from Sezer: Moderate islam is the model of political islamic reaction', *Cumhuriyet*, 15.04.2004

²⁵Bila.F., 'Cankaya Messages', *Milliyet*, 31.10.2004

²⁶Bila.H., 'Dual grip', *Cumhuriyet*, 22.12.2004

the Supreme Military Council held in December 2004, the military said to the government that *“since March 2003, the USA has held over a hundred meetings with representatives of terrorist groups. And this was seen as the politicisation of the PKK”*.²⁷

At the time when news of the USA’s meetings with the PKK reached the press, in a report published by the Washington Institute, it was emphasised that *“the unwillingness of Washington to act against the PKK/Kongra-Gel created insecurity among Turkish politicians and the security elite, who have already disposed to take an anti-US stance. By taking action against the organization, the USA would create a positive image among those who are anti-American, whose numbers have steadily increased since 2002”*.²⁸ Just before the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s visit, similar views were expressed at the highest levels by Prime Minister Erdogan, who said, *“The failure by the USA to show the expected level of sensitivity towards Turkey on the issue of the PKK terrorist organization is creating negative feelings among the Turkish nation.”* The Prime-Minister’s foreign policy advisor, the MP Egemen Bagis, expressed the belief that *“in Turkey, there are those who claim that there is a wave of anti-Americanism in the country, which would take a totally different shape if the USA were to change its position towards the organisation”*.²⁹ In a period of anti-Western feeling and strong reactions against the PKK, Hitler’s *“My Struggle”* topped the list of most read books. Ozdag argued that those who read the book consisted of *“well educated layers of society from urban areas who promoted their Turkish nationalism”* who saw the Kurdish national movement as a threat.³⁰

²⁷‘100 meetings with terrorists’, *Cumhuriyet*, 01.12.2004

²⁸‘Capture the PKK leaders’, *Cumhuriyet*, 12.01.2005

²⁹‘The USA is ignoring PKK’, *Cumhuriyet*, 01.02.2005

³⁰ Who is reading Hitler? And Why?, *Aksam*, 04.03.2005

While reaction against the PKK in society was growing, the CoGS-to-be Yasar Buyukanit said: *“The capture of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan has caused the number of terrorists in Turkey to increase to 1999 levels.”*³¹ Buyukanit’s statement went beyond just informing the public about terrorism, but were aimed at increasing tensions over the forthcoming armed clashes, and by saying that the terrorist threat had gone up to previous levels, he was putting the blame on the existing government. At the same time these statements meant that the period when the PKK had *“stopped its actions because Abdullah Ocalan was held as ransom”* ended, and the conflict was soon to start again. When asked why he had made such a statement, Buyukanit replied, *“It’s part of my job to express my views and to create opinion on the issues that fall within my field of jurisdiction.”* He further accused the government of *“absence of policies towards Iraq”*. These words of the Land Army Commander were not met with silence as would hitherto have been the case. Gul, the MFA, and the Ministerial bureaucracy produced a strong reply stating that Turkey had a functioning policy on Iraq.³² The hegemonic discourse saw such exchanges as going beyond a simple warning. Oymen, a CHP MP, said that *“We find Gul’s words strange and we believe that the Commander’s words derive from his sense of responsibility in the field of duty. What is expected from the Minister is an explanation of the government’s inaction in Northern Iraq against the PKK, rather than criticism of an honourable soldier.”*³³

In the following days, during the celebration of the Kurdish spring festival of Newruz Turkish flags were burnt. The event was widely highlighted by the media and the public protested

³¹Buyukanit: the illegal crossings at the border have increased', *Milliyet*, 11.03.2005

³²Birand. M.A., 'Let the army do its job, and the civil government do its job', *Milliyet*, 19.03.2005

³³'What is important is the content of the warning', *Cumhuriyet*, 20.03.2005

against this action by flying flags at homes all over the country. The subjugate discourse of the press evaluated these developments as “provocation” and a display of increased nationalism, which should be controlled. The latter caused the hegemonic discourse to react by saying: “the reaction (to burning the flags) was democratic and reasonable, and the media was disturbed by the flags of its own country” and thus legitimized the ever-increasing waves of nationalism.³⁴ Meanwhile, the terrorist organization announced that it was dropping the name of Kongra-Gel and returning to the previous name of PKK, signalling the start of a new armed struggle. With the arrival of spring, a large-scale military operation started which, for the first time since 2000, involved war planes. The resulting loss of life diverted public attention back to the KQ and by accusing the government of being inadequate, and an attempt was made to bring it down. Prime Minister Erdogan, unlike his predecessors, used a tactic that Ozal had used during his time in office, and applied a nationalistic discourse to neutralize the propaganda that was being mounted against the government. For example, during the armed clashes of Turkish forces against the PKK following Buyukanit’s speech, Erdogan who was on an official visit to Norway said, *“It is very dirty to portray all Kurds as belonging to the PKK. The West condemns this. Do not become objects in such a game. There are those who want to divide our country, and the West is using these elements to do this”*.³⁵

³⁴ Selcuk.I., 'Those who are afraid of their own flags...', *Cumhuriyet*, 02.04.2005

³⁵ 'A strong accusation to Europe', *Cumhuriyet*, 12.04.2005

6.3 PKK ATTACKS AND THE RISE OF NATIONALISM

The nationalism that increased due to the KQ reached such levels that even the smallest trouble now blew up into a social explosion, whether or not it had any link to the issue. As a result, a left-wing student demonstration in Trabzon almost ended in bloodshed. The demonstrators only managed to escape violence at the hands of the public because of police intervention. Similar events took place in other regions of Turkey. Such reactions had been witnessed before, but not on this scale. CoGS Ozkok linked these public events with EU membership negotiations, and noted, *“By attempting to abuse the positive atmosphere created by democratic reforms carried out by the country as part of the EU negotiation process, the PKK is trying to secure its demands– the Constitution and the EU is siding with Kurdish separatism, and the existing situation could inevitably lead Turkey to armed clashes”*. The Land Forces Commander also warned that, *“The organization is obtaining C-4 type explosives, thus the attacks could increase in rural just as much as metropolitan areas”*.³⁶

Buyukanit's statement was a way of putting pressure on the government over the KQ, rather than a vision for the future. As it was not common practice within the TGS that the CoLF should make such frequent statements, he himself was heading a group of military officials in charge of taking the necessary precautions to prevent the negative developments that he was talking about. Another reason for Buyukanit's statement was the PKK's change of military strategy following the Iraqi War. Ozcan, an academic close to the TGS, wrote that *“the PKK had moved from its previous direct combat tactics, to less risky tactics such as*

³⁶Buyukanit denied the US diplomat', *Milliyet*, 13.05.2005

mines and live bombs". Ozcan evaluated this change as an organizational move from military strategy aiming for ultimate victory, to a strategy where violence would create psychological pressure. For him, the renewal of terrorist activity was caused by the dead-end situation in Northern Iraq and a lack of clarity regarding Kerkuk. He also added that the attitude of the USA contributed to PKK bravery.³⁷

Ilker Basbug, the second-in-command at CoGS supported Buyukanit's position during his visit to the USA in June 2005 by saying, *"In the fight against terrorism we share a common interest with the USA. However, concrete and active steps must be taken against the PKK. Ordinary people in the streets of Turkey are expecting the USA to take firm steps towards eliminating the PKK as a gesture of good will"*.³⁸ This statement was, like Buyukanit's statement, aimed at putting pressure on the government rather than delivering any results. The statements were released just before Prime-Minister Erdogan was due to meet president Bush, and although they put a strain on the Turkish-American relationship, they were intended to elicit a response from the Americans over the PKK during Erdogan-Bush summit. If no serious steps were forthcoming as a result of Edogan's meeting, the government would fall into a "dysfunctional trap" in public opinion. While Erdogan issued a statement concluding that "on the issue of the PKK, the USA shared Turkey's concerns, and they considered that intelligence sharing was still not good enough", it was stated in hegemonic discourse that "the meeting ended in failure" and "as the work on establishing a Kurdish state in the North of Iraq will not be realised, and resistance in Iraq will not be broken with help of Kurdish allies, the USA will not carry out any operations against the

³⁷'PKK cut the way, made the robbery', *Cumhuriyet*, 13.07.2005

³⁸'A double message from the military', *Cumhuriyet*, 08.06.2005; 'Kurds are the USA's real strategic partners', *Cumhuriyet*, 14.06.2005;

PKK".³⁹ In the subjugate discourse a written comment stated, "Erdogan has to end speculation over the Turkish-American relationship, and public opinion towards the USA will take a much more positive turn when it takes the necessary steps against the PKK".⁴⁰

While putting forward the view that PKK was slipping through the border into Turkey, the military was also trying to create an agenda for a cross-border military operation into Iraq.

The main reason for its insistence on this, despite having carried it out several times before, was to cause conflict between the Turkish and American administrations. The words of an American official in answer to a question on the subject, that "we support operations of the TAF against the PKK so long as they remain within Turkish borders" immediately concentrated everyone's attention on this. Oymen, the Assistant Chairman of the CHP, issued a statement in which he said, *"It is the same as Turkey saying that the USA is supporting Al-Qaida within its own borders, something that is against the spirit of the fight against terrorism. Such conditions could be interpreted as the PKK in Iraq being safe"*.

Another MP from the same party, Batu, said, *"The USA is, like our other neighbours, playing the PKK card. The Ak Party government is evidently losing this game"*.⁴¹ Asik further fuelled these arguments by saying, *"The PKK has been defeated. APO is held by Turkey. Silence has come to the South-East. Following the invasion of Iraq, the PKK has been taken to the Kandil mountains, had been fed, nurtured, and is now attacking our soldiers in the South-East. This action from the PKK has been instigated by America"*. Selcuk, on the other hand, argued that

³⁹'PKK is not a US priority', *Cumhuriyet*, 09.06.2005; 'The USA is keeping Kandil as an ace', *Cumhuriyet*, 10.06.2005

⁴⁰'The step taken against PKK after solving Cyprus issue, will soften views towards the USA', *Zaman*, 12.06.2005

⁴¹'Reaction from political parties: Washington is using PKK card', *Cumhuriyet*, 14.07.2005

“the Bush administration created a “hotbed” for the PKK in Northern Iraq and used it to bend Turkey to an American agenda in the Middle East and Iraq”.⁴² Over the involvement of the US, CoGS Myers said, *“Iraq is a sovereign state thus Turkey has to get engaged with Iraq”* to which Basbug, the second in command at the CoGS replied, *“Every state has a right to take precautions for its own security. If necessary a cross border operation will be made. This is our legitimate right”*.⁴³

Such a stance by the USA led to a reopening of the Sèvres syndrome among supporters of the hegemonic discourse, and reignited anti-Western arguments. While ex-President Demirel drew everyone’s attention to the issue by saying, *“For as long as the West still cannot come to terms with the Lausanne Treaty and follows policies prescribed by Sèvres; as long as the PKK movement is seen not as a terrorist organisation but as a national liberation movement, the problem will not end”*, ex-Prime-Minister Ecevit said, *“The USA took a position in support of the establishment of a Kurdish state in the North of Iraq and a position against Turkey’s preventative military actions, and is acting as if a state was being built in the South East of Turkey”*.⁴⁴

Another strong reaction that intensified the notion that the USA was being an obstacle for a cross border operation came from Tolon, the commander of the first Army, who had the largest number of land forces. He said that there are *“enemies who want to split up the country by using Sèvres”* meaning the USA, and said, *“as if somebody was asking them”*.⁴⁵

⁴²Selcuk.I., 'US-supported terrorism in the South East', *Cumhuriyet*, 14.07.2005

⁴³'If necessary we enter: if necessary the border can be crossed', *Cumhuriyet*, 20.07.2005

⁴⁴Bila.F., 'America's and the EU's stance on the Kurdish Problem', *Milliyet*, 24.07.2005

⁴⁵Tolon spoke heavily: A strong reply from Tolon', *Cumhuriyet*, 25.07.2005

While the security bureaucracy was escalating the crisis, arguments about Turkish forces clashing with American troops and Kurdish groups in case of a cross border operation came daily to the political agenda.⁴⁶ The US-Turkish armed conflict that had become the subject of a fictional novel, “Metal Storm” just a couple of years previously, was now being discussed as a possible reality. The KQ had caused this discussion, which was taking place for the first time during the whole period of allied relationship. The point that needs to be paid attention to is that despite meticulous efforts by the government to mend the relationship, hegemonic discourse was deliberately straining matters. As the security bureaucracy was not responsible for executing the country’s foreign policies, the who has the responsibility was coming head-to-head with its biggest ally, and if it did not give the reaction to the West that the establishment wanted, domestically it would be accused of not showing the necessary assertion over the Kurdish issue. The PKK, which was aware of Turkey’s difficult situation, increased its violent activities and, in a way, pushed Turkey into starting military operations in Northern Iraq. As a result of all these developments, anti-Western feelings were on the rise again. A research conducted by the PEW organisation showed that 65% of people questioned believed that “Western countries wanted to split Turkey”, while 70.5% believed that the West was assisting the PKK in building up its strength. Those who thought that the relationship between the USA and Turkey was “progressively going towards the war”. Fifty-five per cent of those polled thought that the reform conditions put forward by the EU resonated with the Sèvres conditions.⁴⁷

⁴⁶Idiz. S., 'A cross border operation could lead to clashes with Americans', *Milliyet*, 25.07.2005

⁴⁷Taspinar.O., 'Anger against the West is increasing', *Zaman*, 27.07.2005

The US's request that the Iraqi government should be consulted before cross-border operations were mounted provoked a hostile reaction, and one reason for this was because from now on, such actions would be subject to permission from a country that Turkey considered being in its back-yard. Another reason was the influence of the Kurds in the Iraqi government. Talabani, who until now had kept a low profile as far as Turkey was concerned, had become President, while Hosyar Zebari was appointed into the MFA. As a result, public discussions around the issue of cross-border operations led to Zebari making a public statement saying, *"Involvement of the Turkish army in Northern Iraq would lead to instability, thus such action would not be authorised"*.⁴⁸ Turkey acted on this statement by putting on great pressure. As a result of this increased pressure, in 2005 the USA called a three-party meeting in Washington involving Turkey and Iraq, to draw up further strategy. The meeting decided to create an action group that would also consider technical issues concerning the fight against PKK terrorism. In addition, the USA suggested that joint steps should be taken to block the PKK's institutionalisation in Europe. Although this position was reflected among the Turkish public as "we can't do anything in Kandil, so we should concentrate on Europe", the USA showed that it supported the strategy of using "non-military ways in the fight against the PKK, including the capture and prosecution of those who are guilty". The US assistant Undersecretary of State Matt Bryza's words, *"We are working on drying up the PKK's financial sources and on prosecuting those who are guilty"* reflected this position.⁴⁹

⁴⁸Bila.F., 'A terror summit call from Baykal to Erdogan', *Milliyet*, 26.07.2005

⁴⁹Bila.F., 'The USA: bombing of Kandil will not resolve the problem', *Milliyet*, 27.08.2005

Despite US efforts, establishment doubts and criticisms steadily increased. Ecevit, the leader of the DSP, whose party had gained the largest number of votes at the 1999 election, said of the capture of the PKK leader APO that had taken place during his Premiership that he did not know the real reasons why the USA had submitted the PKK leader to the Turkish authorities. Alongside this, Barkey noted that with the increase of anti-American feeling among the hegemonic discourse, the pressure on the government to interfere in Northern Iraq was building in military and civil circles. As a result of this, in the case of a PKK attack, the government would be obliged to carry out a cross-border operation to show that it was capable of protecting its citizens. Such a move, in turn, would stir up the only stable area of Iraq – the Kurdish-populated North – and would make it even more difficult for the US to carry out any operations there.⁵⁰

As if confirming Barkey's analysis, following events in the Batman region, the CoLF Buyukanit, who spoke at a reception dedicated to the Victory Day Celebrations on 30th August said, *"An attempt is being made to turn Turkey into Palestine. Everybody must take his share of responsibility. All involved must play their roles well"* and by that pointed a finger at the government, accusing it of a lack of action that might have prevented the incident.⁵¹ At this period, the activities of the top tier of the Military to influence public opinion were not limited only to words. Units that during the 1920s were referred to as "kuvvayı milliye" (national power) and were set up against occupying powers, started to emerge, and they claimed that once more the country was living through conditions similar to those experienced during the establishment of the Republic. These organisations, which

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Bıla.F., 'Tough messages at the reception', *Milliyet*, 31.08.2005

had paramilitary structures and had in their ranks, retired army officers, carried out works spreading fear of the country's division based on anti-western ideology and the Kurdish issue. The language and arguments used by them were in line with those of the TGS. These groups acted in response to provocation from the PKK when the latter burnt Turkish flags or attacked civilians in Western provinces. These groups tried to increase the conflict between the security forces and the PKK over Kurdish-Turkish ethnically-based clashes.

Despite the military's constant insistence on intervention, the USA wanted to make the most of the positive atmosphere created due to the start of EU membership talks, and used the opportunity to push for a political solution of the KQ. It came up with a plan to squeeze the PKK out in three stages. The first stage proposed to integrate the top level of command of the PKK, which together with militants living in Turkey comprised about 3,000 people, into the political process, following a general amnesty. The second stage foresaw the integration of militants living beyond the borders and making about 4,000 people, into a federal entity in Northern Iraq. And finally, it planned a joint work among the world intelligence organizations to cut the flow of money into Northern Iraq that was being filtered through over 170 organisations in Europe. With such a purpose, the USA, who were in close contact with both the Kurdish leadership in Northern Iraq and the Security and Intelligence services in Turkey, increased pressure on organisation's leadership to make them move onto a political platform.⁵² Selcuk from the hegemonic discourse argued that as Turkey had refused to assist the USA in its Iraqi operations and had even hosted the Hamas leadership in Turkey, the Turkish-USA strategic relationship was over. Using the argument of the end of the alliance between Turkey and the USA was in fact involving the PKK in the

⁵² CIA's PKK plan', *Cumhuriyet*, 20.12.2005

relationship, and was ignoring the role of US assistance in the fight against the PKK.⁵³ The discourse that appeared against the USA was reminiscent of the early 1990s. Back then, a Governor of a small province had made a statement in which he said, *“Unfortunately, the PKK is in a position where the USA is providing serious support and making use of it. Maybe it is taking revenge for the memorandum. Maybe it is being used for a purpose so that Israel could act easily in the region”*, and had thus massively overstepped his area of jurisdiction.⁵⁴ During the intensification of the criticisms of the USA in the hegemonic discourse, research into public opinion carried out by the PEW Research Centre showed that support among the Turkish public for the George W. Bush administration had fallen to 8%. This was the lowest percentage in the history of the Turkish-American relationship.⁵⁵

The establishment was still not satisfied with the words of the US’s most senior person in Turkey. During a dinner given in honour of an American parliamentarian, Sukru Elekdag⁵⁶, a CHP MP said in an argument with the US ambassador that *“the USA bolstered the PKK by not upholding its promise to carry out an operation against the organisation”* and that *“the USA must cut its logistical support for the PKK”*. To that, Wilson replied by saying that *“the USA had not promised any operations directed at the PKK”*. The following day, the US embassy in Turkey put out a written statement that said, *“During the dinner, it was said that the PKK is being “supported, bolstered and encouraged into action” by the USA. A claim so far from*

⁵³Selcuk.I., 'Strategy-Mstrategy...' *Cumhuriyet*, 31.03.2006

⁵⁴Governor of Elazig: (It) is taking revenge for the memorandum: “The USA is provoking the PKK”, *Cumhuriyet*, 06.04.2006

⁵⁵PEW Center, Center, P. R. (28.02.2006). India: Pro-America, Pro-Bush, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2006/02/28/india-pro-america-pro-bush/> (accessed 15 February 2010)

⁵⁶Elekdag served as Turkey’s Ambassador to the USA between 1979-1989. From 1989 to 2001 he regularly wrote, as a columnist, in the Turkish daily *Milliyet*

reality really is unbelievable".⁵⁷ The Ambassador's words were supported by concrete action from the USA. The visits of the heads of the CIA, the FBI and the CoGS to Ankara resulted in a secret agreement by which the American administration started to provide real-time satellite images to their Turkish counterparts. As a result of this, a large number of PKK terrorists were neutralised. The USA's initiatives extended to European states, and this also started to give results. European states which until now had adopted a softly-softly approach now changed their views about the PKK.⁵⁸

A tactic that was mentioned in the previous chapter, when the establishment played a political game prior to the 2007 Presidential and General elections, was applied in relation to the USA, too. It consisted of an insistence that military operations should be carried out, despite knowing that the USA would be against such idea. If the Turkish government would not authorise it, the information would be leaked to the public and the government would be accused of not giving sufficient importance to the fight against the PKK and of an inability to stand up to the USA. The USA did not want a military operation beyond its control to take place in Iraq, and thus wanted any operation by the TAF to be postponed until after the Iraqi elections. The US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice summarised this prior to her visit to Turkey scheduled for the end of April 2006 as follows, *"There is no change in our position. As US CoGS Pace said during his visit to Turkey earlier, Iraq's security is linked to its prosperity, the building of executive branches of power, and the fight against the PKK in which Turkey and the USA stand shoulder-to-shoulder, thus any interference in Iraq with the purpose of*

⁵⁷'A claim of support to PKK is not true', *Cumhuriyet*, 12.04.2006

⁵⁸These changes are considered, with examples, in Chapter 3

*(military) operations would be an ill-thought out step.*⁵⁹ Despite these statements, however, by the time Rice arrived in Ankara, the Turkish Special forces had already started a military campaign in Iraq.

By concentrating 200,000 soldiers on the border, the TAF showed that the operation was more than one of just 'hot pursuit'. Such a development placed both the US allies, Turkey and Iraq, in a difficult situation. Taking into account the increasing anti-American feelings among the Turkish public in the light of increasing PKK attacks, Turkey and the USA decided to sign "A Common Vision Memo". Although the document, announced during MFA Gul's visit to the USA, did not contain any commitments, it started a new period in the relationship between the two countries in the post-2003 period, when Turkey refused to allow American forces to use its territory to launch attacks onto Iraq. Following the signing of the document, the US Ambassador to Turkey was summoned to the MFA, and pointing to the example of Israel's Lebanon invasion, it was hinted that if America would not mount a military operation against the PKK, then Turkey would carry out a cross border operation itself.⁶⁰ By considering the Israeli invasion of Lebanon a right deriving from international law, however, the USA said that Turkey should not launch one-sided operations in Iraq.⁶¹ Constant losses of life among Turkish soldiers led to an increased reaction from the public, and the funerals of soldiers frequently turned into anti-government protests. To the words of the Ambassador that *"Turkey should not act alone"*, Prime-Minister Erdogan gave a strong reply and said, *"If the Ambassador made such a statement, he was wrong to do so."*

⁵⁹'Your entry into Iraq is not a good idea' *Milliyet*, 25.04.2006

⁶⁰'A Military option is on the table', *Cumhuriyet*, 18.07.2006

⁶¹'No permission from the USA: A warning from the USA on cross-border operations', *Cumhuriyet*, 18.07.2006

Ambassadors cannot make decisions. Such decision can only be made by the Turkish Republic's authorised institutions..."⁶²

The hegemonic discourse, on the other hand, played the card of the build-up of expectations of a cross-border operation into Northern Iraq, and was showed that the army had completed all the necessary preparations for it. The army was awaiting further instructions from the government and if there were no political decision, and then the operation could not be started. As a result, the blame for continued terrorist activities was laid at the government's door due to a "reluctance of the government to authorise military operations".⁶³ It was claimed that placing "the PKK and other relevant organisations onto a terrorist list" in the Common Vision Memo signed between the USA and Turkey was only made on paper and Ankara was left alone to face the threat.⁶⁴ One of the ideologists of the ultra-nationalist movement, Manisali, argued that *"despite defining the PKK as a terrorist organisation, the USA and the EU use it as one of the important vehicles in building a new order in the Middle East, and pro-Islamic politicians (a reference to the government in Turkey) cooperate with them"*.⁶⁵ Selcuk, in turn, wrote that despite the previous government handing the Ak Party a terrorist-free country *"the Ak Party together with the USA, turned the Middle East upside-down for the sake of two soldiers; the US ambassador – a supporter of Israel – spread his arms to the PKK, while the funerals of our martyrs are taking place one after the other on daily basis"*.⁶⁶ The Ex-Commander of the Gendarmerie

⁶²Unal.M., 'Funerals of martyrs', *Zaman*, 19.07.2006

⁶³TAF are already waiting in readiness', *Cumhuriyet*, 19.07.2006

⁶⁴The so-called strategic vision memorandum', *Cumhuriyet*, 26.07.2006

⁶⁵Manisali.E., 'Those who confuse terror collaborators with anti-imperialistic rebellion', *Cumhuriyet*, 28.07.2006

⁶⁶Selcuk.I., 'Astonishment!..', *Cumhuriyet*, 19.07.2006

Sener Eruygur⁶⁷ said, *“The attack on the right to live in Turkey from an area controlled by the USA deeply wounds the nation and due to that, US interests no longer match Turkey’s national interests, and the two countries cannot remain strategic partners any longer”*.⁶⁸

An increase of political tensions led to anti-Western sentiments being expressed even in the subjugate discourse. By speaking against cross-border operations, it was said that it was illogical for the USA to create an image of being a PKK defender, and risking losing an ally and its public opinion.⁶⁹

Following intense pressure on the government, Prime-Minister Erdogan called President Bush and said that *“the limits of our patience have been seriously exceeded”*.⁷⁰ Abdullah Gul, the MFA, in an interview with the Financial Times, pointed to two causes of increased anti-Western feelings: first, the hesitation that the EU was showing with regard to Turkey’s membership, particularly over the Cyprus issue. The second was the policies applied by the USA in the Middle East, whether due to Israel’s attack on Lebanon, or PKK activities in Northern Iraq. To defuse the tensions created and to expand cooperation, the USA decided to appoint a special envoy to deal with the PKK issue. The CHP however, as in any dealings with the USA or the PKK, again raised its doubts. Oymen, an MP, argued that the special envoy appointed by the USA would hold indirect talks with the PKK, before talking to Turkey, and argued that just as the special envoy appointed for the IRA had brought that

⁶⁷Sener Eruygur was the most prominent actor in 2003-2004 coup-de-etat attempts. Prior to 2007 general elections, as a Head of Organisation of Ataturk-like Thinkers, he was one of the organisers of ultra-nationalist, anti-government and anti-Western meetings

⁶⁸Sazak.D., 'We cannot be strategic partners with the USA', *Milliyet*, 24.07.2006

⁶⁹Bilici.A., 'Losing Turkey for the sake of PKK', *Zaman*, 19.07.2006

⁷⁰Erdogan’s “enough is enough” call to Bush', *Milliyet*, 21.07.2006

organisation and the British government round the table, which had led to the politicising of the IRA, so the envoy for the PKK would do exactly the same.⁷¹ Baykal, the CHP leader, said, “*The US appointment of a broker between the PKK and Turkey is an attempt to sit the government and the terrorist organisation around the same table*”.⁷² A representative of another body of the establishment, the Army, General Sariisik said in support of the CHP claims that some groups supported terrorism, which was Turkey’s biggest problem, as did some Western countries under the pretext of democracy.⁷³ The aura surrounding the appointment of a special envoy reflected the Sèvres Syndrome in FSP norms of the establishment, that there was a secret agenda of the West over the Kurdish issue and there was certainly a plan behind it to divide the country. The Turkish MFA interfered in the arguments surrounding the appointment of the envoy by noting that the wish to appoint a coordinator was their own initiative, and Turkey was considering the appointment of its own coordinator too. According to a mutual agreement between the two countries, the American administration appointed as its special envoy in the PKK issue one of the former NATO commanders, General Joseph W. Ralston, and Turkey appointed ex-Army Commander Edip Baser to the same role.

The USA, bearing in mind other delicate issues in Iraq, continued to satisfy Turkey’s demands regarding the PKK. Within this framework, in August 2006, the USA started to apply pressure on the Iraqi government and managed to achieve the closing down of the PKK’s Baghdad office, and the prohibition of their activities. This saw appointment of a

⁷¹Oymen. O., 'Brokered negotiations' *Cumhuriyet*, 08.08.2006

⁷²'Washington is spraying the flour over a string', *Cumhuriyet*, 09.08.2006; 'The USA wants to bring the government and PKK around the table', *Zaman*, 10.08.2006

⁷³Sukru Sariisik: 'The West is supporting PKK', *Cumhuriyet*, 11.08.2006

special envoy on PKK issues by Iraqi government. However, all these steps were seen by the hegemonic discourse as not channelled to PKK existence in Northern Iraq, but as smoke screen actions.⁷⁴ On the other hand the USA also intensified its efforts on peaceful resolution of the conflict. The Spokesperson for the US Secretary of State Sean McCormack called on the PKK to “end its actions and drop its weapons”. Karayilan, one of the PKK leaders, made a statement following the US call in which he said that the USA was indirectly meeting them. In the statement, the PKK leadership stressed their satisfaction at the fact that the USA now recognised them as a party, rather than as a possible solution to the problem.⁷⁵

As August was approaching, all attention was diverted to the appointment of Buyukanit as CoGS in order for the establishment to be able to continue its rule. With the end of Ozkok’s term, who had served as CoGS between 2002-2006, the establishment was looking forward to the new appointment as a chance to re-establish its influence over Turkish politics and the FSP, as Buyukanit was known for his hawkish views on the KQ and the relationship of the civil-military bureaucracy. That Buyukanit would meet expectations was shown in his first speech when he handed over command of the CoLF and accepted the post of CoGS, when he said, *“Never has Turkey faced so many threats as it does today. Fighting with threats, including terrorism, is embedded in legislation and statements on this issue should not be seen as politics. The threat of terrorism that is being fed from both within, as well as from beyond the country, will be overcome. Some circles claim that Sèvres will be re-applied – well, this is something that will never happen.”* Buyukanit’s message was intended to

⁷⁴‘Showpiece actions against PKK’, *Cumhuriyet*, 14.08.2006

⁷⁵‘Karayilan: The USA is holding meetings with us’, *Milliyet*, 24.08.2006

show that increasingly, the KQ would be surfacing on the agenda of daily politics. Apart from that, the speech is also interesting because it contained all the FSP norms of the Sèvres Syndrome, the Status Quo and Westernism that were dominating the Turkish FSP.

The KQ was not the only issue that Buyukanit mentioned in his first speech. By saying that Turkey was also facing the threat of religious extremism, he was pointing a finger at the government, and hinting that he would apply constant pressure throughout his term in office. In fact, Buyukanit's message reiterated the warnings given about secularism by President Sezer who had spoken a day earlier at the opening of the parliament. The systematic resurfacing of arguments about secularism was aimed at the 2007 Presidential elections that the establishment hoped would return a government sympathetic to its opinions, and it also wanted to prevent Prime-Minister Erdogan from taking up the post of President. Following the statement made by the Parliamentary Chairman Arinc when he said, *"Secularism must be redefined"*, Buyukanit responded with the statement, *"Aren't there those in Turkey, who at every opportunity call for secularism to be redefined? Are these people not holding the highest positions of state?"* which was aimed squarely at the Ak Party government.⁷⁶

The Presidential elections were of as much importance for the PKK as for the establishment. First of all, from the point of view of influence over Turkish FSP, the office of President was of critical importance to the KQ. One of the PKK leaders, Duran Kalkan, described the then President Sezer, who came to the post from the Chairmanship of the Constitutional Court, as *"Someone who does not understand anything in politics, a small-minded lawyer who*

⁷⁶'We will not remain silent: The threat of religious extremism continues', *Cumhuriyet*, 03.10.2006

carried into politics laws that he memorised” and added, *“Due to that, Turkey has lost seven years.”*⁷⁷ Both that particular period, as well as the personality of the President, was of great importance to the organisation. Generally, the PKK would give messages to the government in power that if there were some advantage to the PKK, and then it would allow the election period to pass without incident. The PKK leader Ocalan adopted a similar position prior to the May 2007 Presidential elections and demanded that the government should find a lasting solution to the problem, otherwise, as he warned the Erdogan government, *“I will neither be able to do anything, nor will the PKK listen to me”*.⁷⁸ However, the establishment tried to make political capital by making links between the AKP’s new strategy in favour of a non-military solution, and the PKK’s desire to gain some advantage from the Presidential elections. The establishment strategy was to try to create an idea of collaboration between the two, and by continuing armed conflict was trying to prevent a potential solution to the problem.

With the arrival of Buyukanit to the post, the level of criticism of the USA and the Ak Party by the establishment increased significantly. At a meeting attended by the US Ambassador to Ankara, Oymen, a CHP MP, criticised the fact that the US envoy Joseph Ralston had met PKK member Mesud Barzani, and claimed that it was aimed at “clearly brokering negotiations”. He reminded the US delegates at the meeting of President Bush’s address to the world when he said, *“There are no grey areas in the fight against terrorism. You are either with us or against us”*.⁷⁹ The position of coordinator in the fight against terrorism had two problems. On one side, Turkey’s military operations in Northern Iraq would cause

⁷⁷‘PKK is trying to be included to the process’, *Cumhuriyet*, 27.10.2006

⁷⁸‘Ocalan taught Erdogan an advice’, *Cumhuriyet*, 01.11.2006

⁷⁹Oymen. A., ‘Oymen: you are either with them or with us’, *Cumhuriyet*, 21.09.2006

trouble to the US with the alliance that it had established with Kurdish groups and with Talabani in particular, who was also serving as President of Iraq. On the other hand, the coordinator wanted the PKK to disarm peacefully, and was thus trying to use Kurdish groups in the region as brokers to that end. Unfortunately, this would make the Turkish establishment unhappy, because they did not believe a peaceful resolution of the KQ was possible, and their fear of the political negotiations that were being held with the PKK was setting Turkish and Kurdish groups against each other. In spite of Ralston's efforts to convince the establishment and Turkish public opinion of the US administration's good intentions, CoGS Buyukanit said, *"Turkey will not transfer its fight against terrorism to others and will continue the fight with ever increasing determination, using its own soldiers, its own police and its own state establishments"*. This let everyone know that the establishment did not support the government's new initiative started in coordination with the USA, and that the "hard power" policy pursued until now would continue.⁸⁰

Despite TGS opposition, as a result of government initiatives using the National Intelligence Agency's (MIT) channels, Ocalan called on the government to make the most of the ceasefire that was being announced for the fourth time since start of the PKK's terrorist activities, and demanded "democratic freedoms". Ocalan made four demands, subject to remaining under Turkey's unitary structure. They were: first, that the Turkish republic should be restructured, and based on two nationalities; second, that a new Constitution should be drawn up to meet the needs of this new structure; third, that Kurdish should be recognised as a language that could be used in education, and fourth, that a general

⁸⁰You do not negotiate with a terrorist', *Cumhuriyet*, 22.09.2006

amnesty should be announced. The PKK responded to Ocalan's call for a ceasefire, and announced that it would start from 1st October, 2006.

These developments were seen by the establishment as *"increasing attempts to politicise the terrorist organisation. By calling for a ceasefire, the PKK was paving its own way into politics while Turkey's position in the fight against terrorism was losing ground"*.⁸¹ In addition, the CoGS personally said, *"The ceasefire will take place between fighting states. The European Parliament and other states have made similar demands, and that a person of the status of the President of Iraq should convince the terrorist network that they should cease fire, and that terrorist organisation announced a "so-called ceasefire"*, showed in his opinion that the issue was seen as a fantasy and the TAF would continue the fight against the terrorists until the last terrorist with a gun in his hands had been eliminated".⁸² The CoLF and General Commander of the Gendarmerie who spoke similarly supported Buyukanit's stance. As a result, the military continued its operations without interruption, despite calls for a ceasefire.

6.4 GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPTS FOR A SOLUTION

The government's proposal for a solution was met with opposition not only from the military, but also from the main opposition party, the CHP. The leader of the party, Baykal, announced that his party would not take part in the proposed strategy, and said that *"they would not take part in the grand scenario that is being put forward in which a number of*

⁸¹The wish for politicisation is increasing', *Cumhuriyet*, 30.09.2006

⁸²Asik.M., 'Arguments surrounding the ceasefire', *Milliyet*, 03.10.2006

*international agents are taking part with the Prime-Minister at the centre, and a series of calls being made regarding the PKK and the whole strategy finding support among some of the other opposition parties”.*⁸³ In response to the rising opposition, coordinator Ralston argued that the one-sided ceasefire of the PKK could be turned into an opportunity for the organisation to be disarmed totally. Officials, including the military, who were in contact replied that as a result of mutually exchanged intelligence information between the USA and Turkey concerning the PKK, an armed response must begin as soon as possible, which indicated that Turkey’s FSP had not changed.⁸⁴

On the other hand, Ralston’s steps were met more positively and with greater hope by Karakas, who replied positively by saying *“Turkey, which wants to continue negotiations with the EU, has to maintain a good relationship with the USA in the Middle East, and it will be easier to work out a solution to PKK terrorism if Turkey is in good relationship with the USA”.*⁸⁵ Cemal expressed his support for the government’s new strategy by writing that *“utilising diplomatic channels would give a better outcome. Conversely military operations in Northern Iraq would cause the PKK to take up arms in earnest, would destroy political and economic prosperity and would cause a head-on clash between Turkey, the USA and the EU”.*⁸⁶ More support for the government came from Agar, the leader of the DYP opposition who said, *“Instead of fighting in the mountains, they should talk politics in the valleys as happened during our time in power. It seems that these days the military cannot speak”.*

However, the CoGS gave a firm reply to Agar’s statement by saying, *“Even if he were still in*

⁸³Baykal: it does not suit France', *Cumhuriyet*, 11.10.2006

⁸⁴The USA: Take the ceasefire seriously', *Cumhuriyet*, 12.10.2006

⁸⁵Karakas. E., 'Simple crypts of politics in Turkey', *Zaman*, 12.10.2006

⁸⁶Cemal.H., 'Black-out (3): Entering Northern Iraq!', *Milliyet*, 13.10.2006

power, we would still speak on these issues". The CoGS's statement was interpreted as a slap in the face to Agar as he was in opposition, but it also demonstrated how much the TAF's influence had risen following Buyukanit's appointment as CoGS.⁸⁷ On the other hand, the subjugate discourse responded equally strongly to the military's strong words, which could be interpreted as evidence of democracy establishing itself.

During this period, the establishment put a lot of effort to sidestepping and devaluing the coordination system. Ralston was told via the Turkish coordinator Baser that there was reliable information that US officials had made direct contact with the PKK, and if such contact had been made, then there was no point in continuing work through coordinators. While it was obvious that such a development should have been classified, it was shared with the media, in an attempt to create negative public opinion on the matter.⁸⁸ The Turkish coordinator Baser summarised the situation by saying that they were not expecting the USA to use force against the PKK in Northern Iraq and that *"expecting such thing would be utopia, a dream"*.⁸⁹ The USA, for its part, was disappointed that the Turkish state and Turkish public concentrated their attention on the Northern Iraqi side of the issue and ignored support from Europe.⁹⁰ Operations in Europe were evaluated by hegemonic discourse mainly in the context of Northern Iraq. Despite the ability of the USA to persuade, and when necessary to carry out operations, it was criticized for not being able to persuade the Northern Iraqi Kurds and the government in Baghdad to ignore Turkey's military

⁸⁷'Buyukanit spoke heavily', *Milliyet*, 14.10.2006

⁸⁸'A critical question to the USA', *Cumhuriyet*, 22.10.2006

⁸⁹'To expect the US involvement would be utopia', *Cumhuriyet*, 23.12.2006

⁹⁰'The USA are sincere in the fight against PKK', *Zaman*, 14.12.2006

operations in Northern Iraq.⁹¹ One reason for this was that the USA considered operations in Kandil Mountains as too dangerous, thus it wanted to move operations to a less risky terrain.⁹²

The constant pressure applied to the government by the establishment through the coordination mechanism annoyed Erdogan. The USA was not taking steps to satisfy Turkey, and this gave rise to analysis even within the subjugate discourse that stated that *“Turkey was wasting time with the coordination plan”*. Thus, by stating that *“the coordination plans did not give any results”* Erdogan was asking the USA to do more in this respect.⁹³ At the same time, Erdogan said that concrete results were expected from the work of the special envoys, thus the abolition of the coordinators was not an option.⁹⁴

Although the mechanism of coordination remained in force, effects it became far less effective. The major participants were the establishment, represented by the military in Turkey; the Turkish and US governments; the Kurdish groups in Iraq, and the PKK. As the army gave priority to military operations, the Kurdish groups in Turkey were against Turkey’s involvement in Iraq. Thus they were not united against the proposed US-Turkish strategy, The Turkish coordinator Baser said that the Northern Iraqi administration had lately been protecting the existence of the PKK by its statements and actions, thus making it difficult for Turkey to deal with the Iraqi administration.⁹⁵ While CoGS Buyukanit claimed that the two largest Kurdish parties in Northern Iraq were providing support to the PKK,

⁹¹Arcayurek. C., 'Ashamed', *Cumhuriyet*, 09.02.2007

⁹²Farac,.M., 'PKK transferred to Europe', *Cumhuriyet*, 09.02.2007

⁹³Laciner. S., 'Erdogan’s words signal military intervention in 2007', *Zaman*, 04.01.2007

⁹⁴Erdogan: Coordination will not be abolished', *Zaman*, 08.01.2007

⁹⁵Allegations from Baser', *Zaman*, 25.01.2007

Baykal, the CHP leader, stated that *“the establishment of a Turkish relationship with the administration in Northern Iraq would mean establishing a relationship with a separatist organisation”* and spoke out against the strategy to neutralise the PKK through its Kurdish leaders by saying, *“It is a trap. And the Prime-Minister and the MFA are about to fall into this trap.”*⁹⁶

The establishment’s attempts to press the US- Ak Party relationship through the KQ, were also troubling the PKK, who did not want to have a strong government in areas heavily populated by Kurds, thus the PKK also wanted the government to lose power through the US- Ak Party relationship. With that purpose, at a time when the establishment claimed that US officials were seeing the PKK, the PKK Kongra-Gel leader Zubeyir Aydar confirmed the establishment’s arguments by saying, *“The USA is our long distance protector. We consider that it has an important role in the region.”*⁹⁷ Such a strategy was aimed at undermining the coordination efforts set up by the US and Turkish governments, by stirring up Turkish public opinion. The establishment followed a similar path. By means of partisan journalists, the news and comments frequently claimed a US-PKK relationship, and in the post 2002 period frequently argued that the strategic partnership with the USA had come to an end.⁹⁸

While all of the establishment structures –the President, military, media, political opposition–opposed the government’s policies, news directed at undermining the policy were constantly fed into the public domain. One such item was that *“Kurdish groups acting*

⁹⁶Barzani is in the defensive: we are not providing support to PKK', *Zaman*, 19.02.2007; 'Relationship with PKK', *Zaman*, 18.02.2007

⁹⁷The USA is a friend of PKK', *Cumhuriyet*, 14.02.2007

⁹⁸Selcuk.I., 'Thumbs up to our strategic partner', *Cumhuriyet*, 29.03.2007

as mediators in an attempts to solve the KQ were used by the government and the USA to supply PKK weaponry and the Prime-Minister was told this in NSC meetings". Prime-Minister Erdogan's reply was heavily critical, and he said, "If the NSC has disclosed anything to the media, those who have done it have committed an act of betrayal and those who have broadcast it are partners in that."⁹⁹

In those days the Cumhuriyet Daily published results of a survey that showed that as far as the Northern Iraqi Kurds were concerned, the public supported Buyukanit more than the Prime-Minister Erdogan.¹⁰⁰ The fact that the President sided with the Military and the actions that were widely supported by the media point to the "status quo" norm of Turkish FSP. In order not to lose its decision-making status, the establishment directly interfered with FSP and restricted the government's area of manoeuvre. In response, the government had to work hard not to lose the initiative on drawing up the FSP, where necessary. Within this framework, the government, which had to deal with both the KQ and the Presidential elections did not back down from its commitment to solve the problem by peaceful means despite strong pressure from the establishment. Prime-Minister Erdogan announced that he had met the Iraqi Kurdish leader Talabani in one of the international meetings and they agreed to resolve the problem by way of dialogue. That meeting was seen by the establishment as a meeting with an, individual who was accused by the army and the President of being a PKK supporter and was interpreted as the government following a different path on Iraq.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹'Disclosing of Information is an act of betrayal', *Cumhuriyet*, 24.02.2007

¹⁰⁰'A support from the nation to Buyukanit', *Cumhuriyet*, 27.03.2007

¹⁰¹'Different policy from Ak Party, you do not sit around the table with the enemy when you fight with him' *Cumhuriyet*, 30.03.2007

4.8 THE RISE OF ULTRA-NATIONALISM

In order to show that the Ak Party and the PKK were acting together, Emin Sirin¹⁰², the Assistant to the Youth Party Chairman, filed a complaint to the court concerning Prime-Minister Erdogan because the latter, in one of his radio interviews on 14th January 2000, used title “Mr.” for Ocalan. The fact that the Prime-Minister had used the title “Mr” ironically, and not as a sign of respect, was not taken into account. While the first court that heard the case decided to dismiss the case for lack of evidence, the court of appeal¹⁰³ sentenced the Prime-Minister to two years’ imprisonment. The opposition leader Baykal touched on this crisis when he made a speech in which he expressed his opposition to Erdogan standing as a candidate for the Presidency. He said, *“It was extremely thoughtless for a person who is ruling the country to come before a traitor and address him respectfully as “Mr”.*¹⁰⁴ By that, Baykal was aiming to discredit Erdogan and cast doubt on his possible Presidential candidacy. When the former chief prosecutor Kanadoglu, of the establishment’s prosecution branch, stated that the Ak Party did not have a sufficient number of MPs to elect the President on its own, Baykal came out in support of this argument and said that if Erdogan were to put his name forward as Presidential candidate, his party would not attend the Parliamentary sitting. The CoGS Buyukanit also hinted that the Army did not welcome

¹⁰²Emin Sirin was elected an MP from AK Party in 2002 general elections and later resigned and joined the Youth Party. In 2007 indictment against Ergenekon Terror organization, Emin Sirin was claimed to be linked to the military, and in the Parliament, directed questions prepared by Gendarmerie to the government and also was assigned by the military to ideologically split the AK Party.

¹⁰³It was established that the Chair of the court had also links to Ergenekon group. On the other hand, the same Judge, on very disputable grounds, issued an indictment to prosecute the President, who otherwise cannot be prosecuted for cases other than treason.

¹⁰⁴‘Prime-Minister must appologies’, *Cumhuriyet*, 09.04.2007

Erdogan's candidacy by saying that the President "*must be secular not by word, but by nature*". At the same time, the Cumhuriyet Daily newspaper, under the leadership of the retired General Eruygur who was the Head of the Association of Atatürk-Minded Thinkers, who led the 2003-2004 attempted coup-de-état, started a series of "republican marches" together with the unions, political parties and universities. The marches were attended by tens of thousands of people in various cities across the country, and were aimed not only at preventing Erdogan or any other Ak Party member who shared his ideology from becoming President, but also at ending Ak Party rule at the next general election by uniting under the umbrella of the main opposition party, the CHP. This group marched under the banner of "No to the USA and the EU: we want a fully independent Turkey!" Selcuk argued that these marches targeted not only the Presidential elections, but were also anti-USA, which they thought had the Ak Party and the PKK in the palm of its hand.¹⁰⁵ Bila took an even tougher position by writing that "the USA-KYB-KDP-PKK union has been established to undermine Turkey's unity and security. And the union takes on the entire Turkish nation. These marches were a stand-off against this union and its domestic collaborators - meaning the government."¹⁰⁶ The establishment's persistence on the issue of the Presidential elections, once again, rested on the "status quo" norm. It tried hard to retain influence over the office of President because it had a decisive role in key state appointments, with the military and the prosecution topping the list.

In parallel with the "republican marches", the army, tried once more to apply pressure to the government to carry out a military operation in Northern Iraq. In a media briefing the

¹⁰⁵Selcuk.I., 'Turning point', *Cumhuriyet*, 16.04.2007

¹⁰⁶Bila.H., 'To face the truth', *Cumhuriyet*, 20.04.2007

CoGS tried to portray the government as being in a weak position on the issue of the PKK, and said that *“a military operation into Northern Iraq would be beneficial and for that a political decision needs to be made”*. Prime-Minister Erdogan, however, referred to joint work with the US and said, *“At the moment, everything is going as per schedule. The one who leaps up in anger, sits down with loss. We have experienced this. We know what steps to take. We are in discussions with the CoGS over the military scope of the issue”* and pointed out that the government did not share the CoGS’s view and was opposed to a military operation.¹⁰⁷ According to Manisali, the CoGS’s words carried deep meanings, and he was saying that the foreign policy followed by Turkey was wrong and had to be changed. Otherwise, the West’s Kurdistan project would be prevented. The country’s relationship with the EU was on the wrong track. These errors were leading Turkey to a break-up. The errors and weaknesses in foreign policy derived from the USA, the European Union and the Ak Party government. The CoGS’s latest statement that pointed to the need for a change in foreign policy was also reflected in a speech by the NSC Secretary-General Tuncer Kilinc, who in March 2002 said, *“Turkey has to balance its foreign policy by entering into cooperation with Iran and Russia”* and if it does not, it faces the threat of being split up.¹⁰⁸ Buyukanit’s statement, made a week later after the former US CoGS Myres had said that *“in the case that the Turkish military enters Northern Iraq, it may come across with American forces”*, as Manisali, a journalist, pointed out, showed the military’s – or rather the establishment’s – position towards the West. However, Manisali’s mistake was that the military had been repeating these words since the beginning of the PKK’s attacks. The only new thing was the suggestion to look for alternative allies. Both the CoGS and Manisali’s

¹⁰⁷‘Cold approach to the military operation’ *Cumhuriyet*, 17.04.2007

¹⁰⁸Buyukanit is pointing to the USA, the EU and AKP’, *Cumhuriyet*, 17.04.2007

words point to the Sèvres Syndrome and Westernism norms in Turkish FSP with the final result reflecting on the Status Quo norm for targeting the Presidential election result.

While nationalist feelings were being pumped against the West and the Ak Party by means of the KQ and republican marches, a series of attacks in the country took place that targeted foreigners and non-Muslims, starting in January 2007. It was later disclosed that the establishment, as well as applying pressure on the government through the KQ and Republican meetings, was also carrying out systematic attacks on non-Muslims and foreign missionaries via paramilitary organisations linked to Gendarmerie forces. These attacks were carried out as part of psychological movements in parallel to some NGOs' linked to establishment Christian missionary activities in Turkey. These attacks could be interpreted as a warning, because they took place at the same time as some NGOs were establishing links with Christian missionaries in Turkey. The attacks took place throughout 2007. In January, an Armenian journalist, Hrant Dink was killed; in April three missionaries, one of them German, were attacked and killed in Malatya; in June, a Priest was killed in Trabzon. In a similar incident in December the same year, a Priest was wounded in a knife attack in Izmir.¹⁰⁹ It has been argued in subjugate discourse that all these incidents were not only damaging Turkey's image abroad, but were also aimed at pumping up nationalistic feelings, and to put Turkey to its trump in its relationship with the West. The EU Commissioner Olli Rehn said that such events damaged Turkey's image on the international stage. However, in

¹⁰⁹The Ergenekon Operation that started in June 2007 established that those who carried out these attacks were linked to the Gendarmerie services

the hegemonic discourse, these events were seen as a result of 'Islamisation' of the country and the Ak Party.¹¹⁰

Against such organised pressure from the military, the opposition started publicising the anti-democratic behaviour of the army generals. One of the weekly magazines published a diary of one of the Navy Generals and by that shed light on events of 2003-4, as well as on the military Junta's ability to carry out a coup-de-état. In a similar way it exposed the fact that the CoGS categorised the media as friends or foes. By an indictment of the CoGS Court, the offices of the magazine that printed the diaries were raided by the police and the owner of the magazine was forced to close down his print business. Although such action showed the power that the establishment had over governing the country, it was, nevertheless, a diminishing power. Thus, the establishment's defining position in the country's normative structure as pointed out by Katzenstein, was proven at the country's historical breaking point – at the time of the Presidential elections. FSP was most important from an establishment point of view, and they did not want the anyone from the leading member of the Ak Party, appointed as President. In spite of this, Gul was named as a candidate for the post.

Following the announcement of Gul's candidacy, the CHP, as promised, did not attend the voting session – thus, creating grounds for a case to be filed in the Constitutional court. On the evening following the vote, the, CoGS, on its web-site, published a statement in which it said that "in the process of electing the President, the pillars of secularism were attacked

¹¹⁰'News Release' from
http://www.tsk.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_Basin_Aciklamalari/2007/BA_08.html.
(27.04.2007) (accessed 12.08.2011)

and the Army was prepared to do anything to defend it.¹¹¹ The statement was referred to as an e-memorandum as it had been communicated via an internet site and it stated that in the case that Gul was elected as President there would be military intervention. Contrary to previous governments' resignations in the face of two coups and endless memorandums, however, the following day, the Ak Party government issued a counter-statement in which it said that *"in a statement released by the CoGS, there is a serious mistake in the wording, particularly concerning its relationship with the government. That such a statement should have been released at the time of a Presidential election was highly controversial and when it comes to defending the fundamental values of the state, the first and foremost duty for that lies with elected government."* By that the government pointed out that it would not flinch in the face of such a statement and was ready to face any potential coups. This statement was the breaking point in Turkish Republican history for the government-establishment relationship, particularly in defining FSP norms. For the first time, a civilian government¹¹² announced that it would not back down against the establishment. Apart from that, the phrase *"in defending the state's fundamental pillars, the duty lies not with the military or any other institution, but with the government"* falls within framework of norms referred to as the "status quo", and it is understood that a normative change has also taken place. From that date on, the establishment's hegemonic position was replaced by the authority of civil government.

In the period that followed these statements, the establishment again attempted to block the Presidential elections, this time by means of the Constitutional court. The court stopped

¹¹¹Ibid.

¹¹²This expression used with notice that along side with elected governments, there were also army-appointed interim governments.

the election process on the grounds of insufficient votes. This in turn led to the government taking even more radical steps and building up the Presidential election by the nation in general elections. By ensuring swift and quick elections, Ak Party gained 47% of votes cast, which was enough to give it a majority. Along with legal interventions, the establishment also continued its work in the field of the KQ as part of an attempt to create obstacles to the elections. With that purpose, the CoGS who continued to insist on the necessity of a cross-border operation, said that a political directive was needed to start it.¹¹³ The government's response was no longer what it had been. The Prime-Minister responded by saying, "*Are we done with 5000 terrorists inside (Turkey) in order to get 500 abroad?*"¹¹⁴ Despite the mounting pressure from the military, the government did not authorise cross-border military action till the end of the Presidential election and referendum period. Following the election of Abdullah Gul as President, and the referendum, the authority of Parliament to authorise such actions for the military was lifted.

¹¹³ News , from <http://video.cnnturk.com/2007/haber/6/8/siyasi-direktife-ihhtiyac-var>. (05.09.2007). (accessed 15.08.2011)

¹¹⁴ Evaluation of cross-border operation from Erdogan' *Milliyet*, 12.06.2007

CONCLUSION

When AK Party government came to power, developing cooperation with USA on KQ, it provided new opportunities. However, the ruling elite did not welcome the new government's close relations with USA. The ruling elite enjoyed the decision of GNAT when it did not allow the US military to launch an assault on Iraq from Turkish soil for the second Gulf War.

Turkey, to a great extent, lost the opportunity to exterminate PKK's existence in N. Iraq after the US invasion. This situation also created hardships for AK Party's KQ-related foreign policies as well. AK Party, on one side, was under pressure from ruling elite to carry out military operations in N.Iraq due to increased violence by PKK within the country, and on the other side, it had strained relations with the USA who took all initiatives in N.Iraq.

Another point that put Turkey into difficulty was that the in Northern Iraq, inhabited by Kurds and with its absence of insurgency, was seen by the USA as the safest zone (in Iraq). The USA, who did not want any insurgency to erupt in this part of the region, renewed its support for a peaceful resolution of KQ that it started prior to the invasion. Within this framework, it put forward a peace plan that included sending PKK's leadership to Europe and a general amnesty for armed groups. In the 10 years that followed the invasion, the ruling elite would very strongly oppose this plan that will surface the political agenda on several occasions under different pretexts and modified versions. As the amnesty that was announced under this plan did not give the desired results, it strengthened the arguments of the ruling elites. However, the peace plan created a rift between hardliners and softliners

within PKK. Thus, the initial application of the peace, it can be argued, brought some results. However, as the process did not last long, it had a limited impact on PKK. At the same time, the decision taken by Turkey to improve relations with the USA to send troops to N. Iraq had to be dropped, due to opposition by Iraqi Kurdish groups. The USA did not want to upset Kurds again. This situation was another factor that reduced Turkey's influence on N.Iraq.

The Joint Turkish-American approach to KQ, changes to CoGS in Turkey, EU candidacy negotiations and approaching General and Presidential elections saw a period of lively political activities in Turkey. The army that was important part of ruling elite, tried to put the government into difficult position by pressurising it on cross-border operations against PKK and sharing this with public. While large scale demonstrations, sponsored by the ruling elite, were organised across the country, generally anti-Western, and particularly anti-American, slogans and actions increased.

An attempt was made to overcome pressure applied by the ruling elite, by signing a joint mechanism between USA, Turkey and Iraq. However, it did not bring fruitful results. Turkish and US administrations tried to overcome these failures by real-time intelligence sharing, pressure on the issue of PKK on EU countries by the USA and appointment of joint coordinators on the issue of KQ.

Against this backdrop of events, it was noted that the government, unlike its predecessors, started resisting the ruling elite and its main part – the military establishment. This is an important milestone in the changes to status quo norm of the FSP. Gul's election as President and AK Party's winning the case against it in the Constitutional Court were early

signals of new FSP norms. The fear of Sèvres Syndrome faded away from daily politics of decision makers, the status quo advocated by the establishment consisting of military and civil bureaucracy, as well as CHP and universities, has been replaced by the overwhelming notion that the state policies should be drawn by freely-elected governments and within “universal values and respect to HR and democracy”. However, at times when nationalistic rhetoric on the KQ was on the rise, the AK Party also used the same nationalistic language.

As Westernism norms were enjoyed by the country’s administration and large parts of the public, particularly EU membership and acceptance of reforms by public, maintained its importance, although not to the same extent as before, due to the government’s ability to continue them and to communicate their importance to the public at times when the relations with the West came to breaking points.

As a result of all these reforms and changes, the government completely took charge of the resolution process of the KQ and is continuing on the way to resolving it by peaceful means, although the military action has never been taken off the table. As will be noted, the West is being blamed for its share of the problem, not without grounds, although every effort is taken to avoid unnecessary tension, particularly on the issues regarding the KQ.

MAIN CONCLUSION

The main argument of this research is that the anti-Western perceptions in Turkey were due to FSP norms drawn by establishments that were composed of civilian-military security bureaucracy, judiciary, and the thinking class of society. They have overwhelmingly been influential in developing the FSP. This normative framework served as an obstacle to each elected government in pursuing their own policies in the field of KQ and ensured hegemonic dominance of the establishment over these consecutive governments.

This situation, however, changed in favour of elected governments, thanks to economic developments and, consequently, with increase of income per capita, spread of manufacturing production to areas beyond Istanbul, opening to the world in all fields, the change of rural-urban equilibrium in favour of urbanisation in the first decade of the 2000s, raise in levels of education and, most importantly, with development of means of communication with the process that started in the early 1980s. While the Ak Party government that came to power in 2002 tried to overcome social and economic hardships that the country went through in the 1990s, it also signalled that the FSP norms that have been followed during the whole history of the Republic were about to change. Within this framework, AK Party confronted the ruling elite on the issues of Cyprus and KQ, as well as being accused of becoming a focal point of a new threat, mainly regarded by the establishment, the religious extremism. Without any doubt, however, the greatest challenge has remained and still remains to be the KQ.

Since the KQ is associated with the terrorist group PKK and the parties that formed its political wings, trying to mobilise domestic and in-country political powers, as well as the Kurdish nation, were of some interest to the US, the EU and other European countries and their neighbours. Within the scope of normative changes that began in 2002, the government started taking the authority of FSP into its own hands, and it concentrated on ways, other than military, and tried to set up a relationship with the West, based on mutual interests on the Kurdish issue. The ruling elite were very dissatisfied with policies applied by the government and were increasingly unhappy with shift of powers in the country. Prior to the presidential elections in 2007, through the website of TGS, they issued an e-memo which warned the public that the new wave of extremisms were hidden under the political mask of the AK Party government. They argued that AK Party was trying to eliminate the secular character of the Republic. Although the ruling elite has put enormous pressure on the government, strong reaction put by the government and election of the MFA Abdullah Gul in the same year as the President lifted the hegemonic character of the establishment.

This transition, however, did not occur as simply as is described in a single paragraph. The difficulties experienced during the establishment of the Turkish state left their mark on its FSP. It is worthy of mention that norms such as the Sèvres Syndrome, Westernism and the Status Quo have always followed the country since the republic's first years. The Sèvres Syndrome takes its name from the Sèvres Treaty signed, but not implemented, in 1920 that served as a basis for partitioning of the Ottoman Empire. When the Sèvres Syndrome is being mentioned in Turkish FSP, the first argument that comes to one's mind is that the West, including the US, aims to split up Turkey, and to establish separate Armenian and Kurdish states. Moreover, according to the ruling elite, such plans are still alive.

The Westernisation, on the other hand, ironically clashing with the previous norm, calls for Atatürk's doctrine of civil and positivist thoughts that he propagated in the early years of the republic. A westernised lifestyle meant a constant contact with western culture, and, at the same time, held a hidden fear of religious rule.

The third norm is the status quo. As an FSP norm, the status quo meant that Turkey's foreign and security policy should be stable. Preserved by the Army, and represented by civil bureaucracy that included media, prosecution authorities, academics, and other institutions, it was imposed on elected governments of the Republic by various channels.

Turkey's fight with separatist terrorism, as well as her effort to overcome problems associated with KQ, in the last three decades was always blocked and affected by the above-mentioned norms. These norms, of course, were determining factors as far as the relations with the West were concerned. Turkey's relations with the West on several issues, as well as KQ and terrorism, were carried out through international institutions. As constructivist theory assumes that the role of culture, identity, and norms of political life are important characteristics in the field of international politics¹, international organisations are among those which are lined up within cultural norms such as integrity, peace, human rights, mutual interests, etc. Turkey, a member of international organisations such as the United Nations, NATO, and European Council, has accepted to adapt to such norms as a member. However, as a country experiencing several anti-democratic military interventions in the last 50 years, democratic values and norms could not be an indispensable part of Turkish politics in real terms.

¹Farrell, T. (2002)

Among other international issues, KQ is the most important factor in Turkey's problems that it experienced with the West and its Western allies in the field of Foreign and Security Policies following the end of the Cold War. Apart from military coup d'états, the most important threat that Turkey faces in the last decades is definitely the separatist terrorism. Various military and police interventions were made against the PKK groups in the south-east of Turkey, and all governments had to develop security policies to cope with terrorist attacks. These security programs, on the one hand, were necessary to prevent further attacks. These policies, on the other hand, brought about several human rights abuses. These negative issues were loudly voiced by anti-Turkey lobby within Turkey, as well as in Europe. As a result of it, Turkey was widely accused of being an anti-democratic country by western societies.

These criticisms on Turkey in an international arena regarding cultural rights, human rights, democratic rights and freedoms within the scope of KQ, were regarded in Turkey as part of a Western project that aims to divide the country. When PKK attacks continued until the mid-2000s, the anti-terrorism policy agenda in Turkey saw a country-wide acceptance and this agenda became like a societal norm. As coined by the constructivist approach, indicators of societal norms are constitutional and legal orders, party programs and election platforms, parliamentary debates, publications of written or visual media and public opinion data.² The influence of the ruling elite structure, also referred to as "the establishment", made up of the President, civil-military bureaucracy, high levels of Judiciary, academics and journalists, over drawing on KQ-related policies, has been highly effective. The role of

2Boekle, H. *'Norms and Foreign Policy: Constructivist Foreign Policy Theory.'* (Center for International Relations/Peace and Conflict Studies Tübingen 1999)<http://tobias-lib.uni-tuebingen.de/volltexte/2000/136/pdf/tap34a.pdf> (accessed 25.05.2010)

journalists, and the army in the process, draws particular attention. Both professions could be seen as “norm entrepreneurs” due to their strong institutionalisation, influence of the same individuals over hegemonic discourse for long periods of time, and their contribution to repeated re-creation of the same FSP norms.

Changes in norms can appear as a trend that goes from up to bottom and occurs by the initiators of changes, “norm entrepreneurs”, who by nature of their field of activity involved in one way or another with international agents, mobilise their tools, i.e. the elite groups of the society or general public, at home, to make them believe that the latter need to change their interests for certain reasons. The normative changes imposed by way of “conditionality” by the EU to a candidate state of Turkey can serve as an example of that.³

The norm will be powerful when it is “clearly stated, firmly established, and widely endorsed.”⁴ These norms followed when drawing Turkey’s FSP by the establishment were “Sèvres Syndrome” - the suspicion of influence of external powers and interests on Turkey, the principle of “Status Quo” keeping the existing state and FSP structure, and finally, the “Westernisation” that foresees being pro-Western in foreign policies and internal socio-political fields. Due to the establishment’s set of FSP views, hence seeing KQ as a terror problem, pushed it to solve the problem by violence.

It was also identified that the establishment took a certain stance in order to ensure that the FSP-related decisions taken with regards to the KQ were taken within the existing norms. These norms are included in the official programs of political parties, appeared in public

³ Haas, P. M. (1992)..p. 14.

⁴Legro.J.W. (1995) p. 33

announcements and media campaigns, and were voiced in the student protests and huge public meetings.

As Katzenstein argues, although norms are implemented by individual practices and social communication, they cannot be reduced to individual levels, thus, they are produced for the entire society.⁵ For the wide-scale adaptation of FSP norms in Turkey, “the establishment” produced anti-western discourse by using the KQ issue. The media is the most appropriate and legitimate way of producing anti-Western beliefs. Op-eds (opposite the editorial page) in major newspapers have focused on the KQ issue and the support of Western countries for PKK, for years.

The importance of institutionalised norms is particularly evident in defining political interests as in times of large-scale changes of structures and situations which send clear signals to decision-makers in defining security interests of states.⁶ KQ has clearly been a case of this in terms of Katzenstein’s above views. The FSP endorsed by the establishment and that was being imposed on governments was: not recognising Kurds as a different nationality, but referring to them as a branch of the Turkish nation; not recognising their cultural, political or social rights, hence denying them the right to be associated with any political entities; and lastly, prohibition of studying the Kurdish language, written, verbal and visual use of it and rejection of the fact that the Kurdish language is the native language of Kurds.

⁵Katzenstein.P.J. (1996-b)

⁶Ibid. p. 18, 201.

Alongside this, PKK terrorism was not associated with the KQ, but was treated as just a terrorist entity. Thus, it was a movement that should have been eliminated by using all available hard-power means. Also, as it was a foreign power supported movement, with particular support from the West, it could not be overcome. Moreover, the West's proposals for a "peaceful resolution" of KQ that rested on human rights and democratic values, is believed in Turkey, to be a stage of an old plan to partition Turkey, which dates back to Sèvres Agreement.

Katzenstein maintains that security policies are developed within the state, between state and society -or polity-, and between the polity and some features of the international environment"⁷ Several developments made Turkey's domestic problem of KQ an international one: (1) the escape of refugees from the country, particularly to Western Europe, (2) establishing contacts with leftist groups that moved to Europe following the 1980 coup, (3) establishment of groups among Kurds who migrated to Europe as a labour force, and finally, (4) putting KQ in an agenda in international institutions, such as CoE and the EU.

The PKK, who established itself first, in Syria just before the 1980s coup, then in Lebanon and from the early 1990s in N. Iraq, solidified the international feature of the problem. Hence, after the problem of KQ for Turkey's FSP has been internationalised, the official discourse focused its attention on blaming Westerners.

⁷Ibid. p. 33

Norms can function on a variety of levels of politics: “organisational, national, transnational, worldwide,” etc., and may work in combination as well as possibly being conflicting to each other.⁸ KQ constantly surfaced Turkey who saw itself “a European” within the Westernism framework, and wanted to be fully represented, in the EU, CoE and OSCE, agenda. The West always applied a normative pressure on Turkey on issues of democracy and human rights. After the PKK eliminated all other Kurdish groups in the mid-1980s, it has been the single agent in the international arena. The organisation, which made progress in lobbying, gained influence over a number of European institutions, thanks to support received from left-wing parties and Turkey’s long time foe – Greece.

According to Wendt’s argument, states organise violence on a global scale, fulfil a fundamental role in giving a meaning to world politics by being a project, driving a political program involved in designing organised violence and the reproduction of it.⁹ The support provided to Kurds by Europe led not to reforms in the fields, where Turkey was receiving criticisms, but to strengthening of Sèvres Syndrome idea within the establishment. Hence, this situation increased the voices of the establishment, which argued that solving the terror problem would be possible just by using violence. Here, the establishment, which was in a decision maker’s position on KQ, is seen not as holding the human rights-centred, supporter of broader freedom advocating power in the post-Cold War arena, but as the one who was acting by pre-Cold War period ideals.

⁸Farrell.T. (2002) p. 72

⁹Wendt.A. (1999) p. 238

The Army's ever increased operations against PKK's increased terrorism actions and the state's paramilitary activities transferred the country's government de facto into the military's hands. While the military openly criticised GNAT, by using Kurdish MPs as a pretext, an expectation arose among the opposition and hegemonic discourse that even if there will be no military coup-d'état, there will be some sort of authority overpowering the civilian-elected government that would dictate policies. In this sense, the KQ shows the military's dominance and ability to carry out a military coup. As a result of the military's constant pressure on the government and parliament, GNAT, by unanimous vote, lifted Parliamentary immunity of DEP MPs. Still awaiting the decision to be confirmed, the state security court sent police units to the Parliament. Police arrested and removed the MPs in question with public humiliation that aroused massive reaction from the West. The EP took an immediate decision that the MPs must be released and Kurds be granted autonomy. The reactions in Europe were met by hegemonic discourse with Sèvres Syndrome and anti-Western norms. The President stated that the plans laid down in Sèvres were given another breath of life and Turkey's opponents in the West, of whom we wanted to become a part, were given an ace into their hands.

One of the most influential deviations from the establishment's views was Ozal, who by then became the President, with departure from the political arena of Coup Generals, and also used the opportunity that his party was in the government's seat; started advocating reforms in the fields criticised by the West, and sought a peaceful solution to the problem. His ideas, however, did not find support, even among his own party members, excluding a very small number of liberals and journalists. This also points to a restricted power that individual agents possessed against normative structure, in drawing the FSP. Despite his

limited powers, Ozal, during his term in the office achieved an opening-up of the economy to the world, establishment of private TV and Radio stations – the field that was monopolised by the state, strengthened foundations for information exchange and communications, widespread investments into education, all of which led to the shaping of large population masses' notions of democracy and democratic values.

Saddam's use of chemical weapons against Kurds, during Ozal's term led to mass movements of refugees. The first Gulf War has caused Northern Iraqi Kurds to be voiced in the international arena. An international force was set up in 1991 to protect Kurds and continued its mandate until 2003, waking up the Sèvres Syndrome idea of the establishment. Establishment of Kurdish parliament in N. Iraq by Kurdish groups with support of the US flamed these suspicions. As the newly established parliament would change the "Status Quo" norms of existence at the times of political situations, the establishment opposed the move. With the death of Ozal in 1993, the hopes for a peaceful resolution of the problem faded away.

According to the constructivist approach, the decision makers within states constantly express themselves by using terms of military gains, needs, responsibilities and by doing so constitute the term of an agent for themselves as well as for each other.¹⁰ In the era of the DSP-ANAP government that formed a new coalition government which took a hawkish stance against PKK following the turning down in 1997 of the country's EU membership application. By making war threats to Syria, they achieved capture of Ocalan. The West's

¹⁰Ibid.p. 10, 99.

positive attitudes towards PKK in the period of Ocalan's capture, led to increased anti-western feelings. The US's assistance in capturing Ocalan that was followed by Turkey gaining EU candidate-member status at 1999 Helsinki summit, however, lifted the US support in the Turkish public to ever highest levels.

The extent to which this support was linked to the KQ, however, became evident when it drastically went down, following the news that the US supported the setting up of a Kurdish parliament in N. Iraq in 2002. The establishment's anti-US discourse swiftly pulled down the public support for the US.

As part of EU membership requirements, Turkey carried out a number of normative adjustments that were frequently mentioned by the West, between 1999-2004, that included fields of freedom of expression, teaching and broadcasting in Kurdish, changes in anti-terrorism legislation, release of imprisoned Kurdish MPs, abolishment of the death penalty, and lifting of the state of emergency. While these changes were taking place against the establishment's will, the vision of EU membership, made the "Westernism" norm channelled to integration with the West, more influential than the other two norms in KQ – "Sèvres Syndrome" and "Status Quo".

While PKK tried to capitalise on AK Party's difficulty by ending the ceasefire that was maintained since 1999, the establishment started pressing the government on solving the KQ by means of power, as required by FSP norms. By, particularly, insisting on cross-border operations, it aimed to set Turkish and American forces against each other and to put the AK

Party in a difficult situation in the international arena. When the requests were turned down, the message was given to the public that the government was not doing enough to fight against terrorism.

In the days that followed Gul's nomination for Presidency, CoGS issued a memorandum that was later called an "E-coup-de-etat", in which he noted that they - the army - "wanted a secular President". The e-memo served as a historical breaking point in FSP norms, as mentioned by Katzenstein. As opposed to previous governments, the AK Party government did not back up in favour of the military and stood up against the potential military strike. This was the point when the structure built upon previous norms lost its hegemonic character, leading to a weakening in the establishment's power to define FSP norms and to dictate daily policies in line with those norms. The AK Party's position was also largely supported by the public and the Party was re-elected with a landslide victory of 47% of votes.

The new government, by electing Gul as the President, removed from the establishment's control yet another very important decision-making position in the state governing structure. By introducing a constitutional reform, according to which the President will be elected by national vote, the democratic structure has been strengthened even further. While Sèvres Syndrome was disappearing from daily political discourse, it was being replaced by a new norm, "Zero Problem with Neighbours" by a self-confident state that aimed to build a new environment based on peaceful relations with other countries in the region. The problems foreseen by the Status Quo norm of the FSP, including the KQ, are no longer expected to last in their existing forms; hence, the establishment's influential

position is also being invalidated. By that, the notion that “even the most difficult issues could be openly discussed, and that the parliament that represented people, and the Government deriving from it, became the decision-making bodies” has been firmly established in people’s minds.

Constructivists claim that ideas, norms, institutions and threats that were defined by Wendt as “cultural formations”, make up the distribution of power on a systemic level and these ideas lurk behind the notion of interest. The normalisation process in the Turkish democracy after the election of Abdullah Gul has contributed to the changing of the “Westernism” norm from “trying to be part of the West” to “considering the universal values about human rights and democracy”.

It is clear that foreign policy fragmentations and problems, both in public opinion as well as in society, caused by the KQ, are not completely the faults of Turkey’s Western partners, but mainly the result of Turkey’s Foreign and Security Policy norms held between 1990 and 2007. In addition, the Kurdish issue served as a major contributing factor to a worsened relationship between Turkey and Western Europe and the US.

Notwithstanding, normative changes of post-2007 period fall beyond the scope of this research and will be the topic of a separate, comparative to previous terms, research, from among the changes experienced until 2011 on the KQ, diminishing of the influence of the establishment, referred to also as the ruling elite, through the analysis period, shift of the army’s position, which was the most important factor on the issue of KQ, from being the

decision-making authority to becoming the body that executed the decisions, the government's start of making decisions on the KQ without external interference, start of implementation of decisions on the KQ without fear, significant decrease of the discourse linking the West to KQ, gained of an opportunity by agents, including the USA, to act more freely on the Kurdish Issue, the move of Northern Iraqi Kurds' status from being a threat to, instead, becoming structures with whom business could be conducted, and as the fight against PKK started being carried out within the framework of human rights and democracy, minimisation of criticisms directed to Turkey in the international arena, all could be seen.


Map-1 Kurdish and Armenian States According to Treaty of Sèvres⁵³⁰




Map-2 Kurdish Inhabited Areas and Estimated Population




Turkey
Kurds: 15.4 million




Syria
Kurds: 1.3 mil.



Iraq
Kurds: 4.3 mil.



Iran
Kurds: 6.8 mil.



SOURCE: M. R. Izady, *The Kurds: A Concise Handbook*

AP

APPENDIX-1

CHRONOLOGY OF TURKISH POLITICAL HISTORY AND PKK/KURDISH QUESTION HISTORY

Turkish Political History	Date	PKK/KQ History
	1919	Paris Conference
The Start of Independence War	1919	
Foundation of Turkish Republic	1923	
	1925	Sheikh Sait Uprising
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Died	1938	
Ismet İnönü as the Second President	1938	
First Elections with Multi-Party System	1946	
Turkey joined in the European Council	1949	
Democratic Party won the election over CHP	1950	
Adnan Menderes became the Prime Minister	1950	
Celal Bayar the 3rd President	1950	
Turkey joined in NATO	1952	

Military <i>Coup-de-etat</i>	1960	
Prime Minister Menderes and two Ministers were sentenced to death and executed	1960	
Justice Party (AP) won the elections	1965	
Military Memorandum of March 12	1971	
Cyprus Peace Operation	1974	
	1976	PKK fore-fronters committed a robbery in a private hospital in Ankara
CHP won the elections over AP	1977	
	1978	PKK was established in Diyarbakır
	1979	PKK made an attack to a Urfa Parliament member and injured him
	1979	Abdullah Ocalan escaped to Syria
	1979	Ocalan and some members of PKK moved to Lebanon for training
Military <i>Coup-de-etat</i>	1980	
	1981	First PKK Conference
Gen.Kenan Evren became the President	1982	

New Constitution was approved	1982	
Motherland Party (ANAP) won the elections and Turgut Ozal became the Prime Minister	1983	
	1984	PKK launched its first attack in Siirt-Eruh and Hakkari-Semdinli, killed 1 soldier and wounded 12 people
	1987	PKK attacked a village in Mardin-Omerli, killed 11 civilian and wounded 2.
ANAP won the elections second time	1987	
Turkey applied for EU Full Candidacy Status	1987	
	1989	PKK attacked a village in Hakkari, killed 21 civilian and kidnapped 9.
Turgut Ozal became the President	1989	
5 well-known people were assassinated in separate cases	1990	
	1990	Second PKK Conference
	1990	Cevrimli Massacre; PKK attacked a village in Sirnak, killed 27 civilian and 4 security guards

Elections were made, A Coalition government (DYP-SHP) was established	1991	
	1992	PKK attacked a mosque in Diyarbakir and killed 10 people while praying
	1993	
	1993	
	1993	PKK intercepted a highway in Bingol, killed 33 unarmed soldiers
	1993	Başbaglar Massacre; PKK attacked a village in Erzincan, killed 30 civilians and wounded 25.
	1993	Yavi Massacre; PKK attacked a village in Erzurum, killed 35 civilians and wounded 50
	1994	Third PKK Conference
	1995	Fifth PKK Conference
	1996	Sixth PKK Conference
Turgut Ozal died and then Süleyman Demirel became the President		
A journalist (Ugur Mumcu) of Cumhuriyet Daily was assassinated		
Post-Modern <i>Coup-de-etat</i> of February 28	1997	
	1998	Syrian Authorities deported Ocalan

Turkey's EU Full Candidacy application was accepted	1999	Ocalan was captured in Kenya and brought in Turkey
	1999	Ocalan was sentenced to death, but not executed
	1999	
	2001	PKK recognized as a terrorist organization by the European Union Council
	2001	
	2002	
	2002	PKK was renamed as KADEK
	2003	
	2003	KADEK was renamed as PKK/KONGRA-GEL
	2004	PKK recognized as a terrorist organization by the US
Death Sentence was abolished	2004	PKK recognized as a terrorist organization by the EU
	2004	PKK concluded ceasefire and started attacks under the leadership of Murat Karayilan
	2004	
Justice and Development Party (Ak Party) won the elections		
Recep Tayyip Erdogan became the Prime Minister		
Turkey started negotiations with EU	2005	

<p>Justice and Development Party (Ak Party) won the elections for the second time</p> <p>Abdullah Gul became the President</p>	2006	<p>PKK attacked a recreation center in Diyarbakir, killed 11 civilians and wounded 17</p>
	2007	
	2007	

APPENDIX-2

SÈVRES TREATY

ARTICLE 62: A Commission sitting at Constantinople and composed of three members appointed by the British, French and Italian Governments respectively shall draft within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia as it may be hereafter determined, and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia, as defined in Article 27, II and. If unanimity cannot be secured on any question, it will be referred by the members of the Commission to their respective Governments. The scheme shall contain full safeguards for the protection of the Assyro-Chaldeans and other racial or religious minorities within these areas, and with this object a Commission composed of British, French, Italian, Persian and Kurdish representatives shall visit the spot to examine and decide what rectifications, if any, should be made in the Turkish frontier where, under the provisions of the present Treaty, that frontier coincides with that of Persia.

ARTICLE 63: The Turkish Government hereby agrees to accept and execute the decisions of both the Commissions mentioned in Article 62 within three months from their communication to the said Government.

ARTICLE 64: If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these peoples are capable of such independence and recommends that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas. The detailed provisions for such renunciation will form the subject of a separate agreement between the Principal Allied Powers and Turkey. If and when such renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised by the Principal Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent Kurdish State of the Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which has hitherto been included in the Mosul Wilayah.

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