FROM MASSIVE RESISTANCE TO NEW CONSERVATISM: OPPOSITION TO COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAMS IN MISSISSIPPI, 1965-1975

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Emma Folwell

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University of Leicester

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From Massive Resistance to New Conservatism: Opposition to Community Action Programs in Mississippi, 1965-1975 by Emma Folwell.

Abstract

This thesis uses the War on Poverty's Community Action Programs as a prism through which to examine the evolution of post-1965 Massive Resistance and its interconnection with the emerging new conservatism. In examining the white relationship with Mississippi's antipoverty programs, this thesis traces an 'evolving resistance' that utilised some of the methods and mechanisms of the earlier Massive Resistance, but which also drew on ostensibly race natural articulations of opposition to social welfare and saw a return to the paternalism characteristic of earlier Southern race relations. In examining the grassroots development of the colour-blind rhetoric that would become a significant trope of conservative opposition to social welfare, this thesis adds a new dimension to the rural Deep South's contributions to the emerging national conservatism. Further, this thesis offers new insights into the failings of the War on Poverty at the grassroots by placing racial discrimination and intra-racial class divisions at the heart of its analysis of four Community Action Programs. The Community Action Program Southwest Mississippi Opportunities highlights how OEO failings at the local, regional and national levels perpetuated racial discrimination. The white response to Jackson's Community Action Program, Community Services Association, reveals how interracial middle-class coalitions developed through the program and perpetuated a destructive racial discrimination. Case studies of two state-wide programs, Mississippi Action for Progress and Strategic Training and Redevelopment showcase how intra-racial class divisions aided white supremacists shape antipoverty programs from conduits for community action into mechanisms to suppress black activism, as well as offering new insights into the role of white moderates in Mississippi's altered racial landscape. Finally, this thesis explores the destructive impact of the nascent Mississippi Republican Party and the Nixon Administration on the War on Poverty at the grassroots.

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Abbreviations

APWR	Americans for the Preservation of the White Race
CAA	Community Action Agency
CAB	County Advisory Board
CAP	Community Action Program
CDGM	Child Development Group of Mississippi
CLS	Community Legal Services
CSA	Community Services Association
CSA-NYC	Community Services Association Neighbourhood Youth Corps
HCCC	Hinds County Community Council
HCPHS	Hinds County Project Head Start
HEW	Department of Health, Education and Welfare
HUAC	House Committee on Un-American Activities
KKK	Ku Klux Klan
MAP	Mississippi Action for Progress
MCHR	Mississippi Council on Human Relations
MFDP	Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party
MISS	Mississippi Industrial and Special Services
MRP	Mississippi Republican Party
NAACP	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
MSSC	Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission
NMRLS	North Mississippi Rural Legal Services
NYC	Neighbourhood Youth Corps
OCD	Office of Child Development
OEO	Office of Economic Opportunity
PAC	Poor Area Committee
SEOO	State Economic Opportunity Office
SMCDC	Southwest Mississippi Child Development Council
SMO	Southwest Mississippi Opportunities
SNCC	Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee
STAR	Strategic Training and Redevelopment
TAR	Target Area Representatives
UKA	United Klans of America

Introduction

This thesis is a state-level study of the War on Poverty, using the opposition and accommodation of white Mississippians to local antipoverty programs as a prism through which to examine the post-1965 evolution of Massive Resistance and the interconnected development of new conservatism. In its exploration of the white response to the War on Poverty's Community Action Programs (CAPs), this study places racial and class divisions at the heart of the failings of the War on Poverty. As the Civil Rights Movement fragmented in the wake of the 1964 and 1965 Civil and Voting Rights Acts, many activists turned to antipoverty programs as part of their move from protest to politics, using CAPs to pursue economic justice. In examining the nature of white opposition to CAPs, this thesis will add a new dimension to recent studies of the intersection of the Civil Rights Movement and the War on Poverty by providing a more nuanced account of the white response to CAPs that traces the complexities, contradictions and divisions evident in white Mississippians' relationships with antipoverty programs. Standing at the intersection of the War on Poverty and the Civil Rights Movement, white opposition and accommodation to CAPs in Mississippi thus provides an ideal opportunity to trace the evolving methods, mechanisms and rhetoric of earlier Massive Resistance to the Civil Rights Movement after 1965.

Far from abandoning opposition to African American advancement in the wake of the Civil and Voting Rights Acts, this thesis argues that remarkable continuities can be traced alongside the evolution of some of the methods and mechanisms of earlier Massive Resistance that enabled whites to take control of CAPs and utilise them to control and subvert black activism. Examining this previously unexplored opposition and accommodation to Mississippi CAPs by powerful Democratic politicians and the emerging Mississippi Republican Party showcases how the methods, mechanisms and linguistic tropes of Massive Resistance became part of the new conservatism. In particular, this thesis traces the development of an ostensibly race neutral discourse that became central to the emerging national conservatism. This language masked the determination of white supremacists to preserve their racial and class privileges – a determination that lies at the heart of the new conservatism. Further, in exploring the interaction of local, state, regional and national actors under the Nixon Administration,

this thesis offers a new insight into Nixon's destructive impact on the War on Poverty at the grassroots from the outset of his presidency.

War on Poverty

The War on Poverty was the centrepiece of President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society, introduced by Johnson in his 1964 State of the Union address as a means of eliminating the paradox of poverty amid plenty.[1] Created under the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act, the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) administered a range of new programs designed to combat poverty, and its Director R. Sargent Shriver was given the authority to coordinate all federal antipoverty efforts.[2] Urban and rural CAPs lay at the heart of the War on Poverty: created under Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act, they channelled federal funds directly to local communities in order to address poverty at the grassroots. The concept of community action evolved from the Mobilization for Youth program and other 'gray areas projects' developed to address juvenile delinquency as part of President Kennedy's New Frontier. CAPs, operated through Community Action Agencies (CAAs) were designed to achieve the maximum feasible participation of the poor, by involving poor people in the planning and operation of their local antipoverty efforts.[3] CAPs themselves were diverse: they could be unique projects tailor-made to address local poverty conditions or single-purpose programs based on an OEO template, such as Head Start. As the Civil Rights Movement fragmented in the mid-1960s, CAPs quickly became a conduit for Civil Rights activists seeking the economic justice that would give meaning to their newly acquired political rights. For these activists, CAPs provided an opportunity to mount an attack on the political exclusion of black Americans, and the call for maximum feasible participation was an organisational

[1] Lyndon B. Johnson, 'Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union', 8 January 1964, in G. Peters and J. T. Woolley, *Papers of the President*, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26787 [accessed 5 October 2013].
[2] In addition to CAPs, the other War on Poverty programs created under the Economic Opportunity Act were: Job Corps, Neighbourhood Youth Corps, Work Study, Adult Basic Education, Voluntary Assistance for Needy Children, Loans to Rural Families, Assistance for Migrant Agricultural Employees, Employment and Investment Incentives, Work Experience and Volunteers in Service to America.
[3] R. D. Plotnick and F. Skidmore, *Progress Against Poverty: A Review of the 1964-1974 Decade*, (Academic Press: New York, 1975), pp.4-5. Popular and political attention on poverty resulted in large part from the publication of M. Harrington, *The Other America*, (Macmillan: New York, 1962).

opportunity to mount an attack on political poverty.[4] The requirement for maximum feasible participation and the design of CAAs, which ensured that vast sums of federal funds bypassed city halls and other entrenched political interests in favour of community groups that often included newly enfranchised blacks, ensured CAPs were politically unpopular and mired in controversy from the outset of the War on Poverty. This controversy and political opposition was compounded by the administrative shortcomings of OEO. It led early analyses of CAPs, which were written mainly by social scientists – many of whom had been architects of the Economic Opportunity Act – to explain why CAPs had failed only two years after their inception when most programs were still struggling to find their feet.[5] For Sar Levitan, Ralph Kramer, Kenneth Clark and Jeanette Hopkins participation of the poor was at best limited. While some CAPs were innovative in giving a 'voice to the poor', they failed to reach the 'hard-core, unaffiliated poor'.[6]

Of these early studies of the War on Poverty, the interpretation that exercised the most powerful grip on the academic and public perception of CAPs was written by Daniel Moynihan, a prominent antipoverty architect, influential advisor in the Nixon administration and later neoconservative Senator. Harshly critical of CAPs, Moynihan coined the phrase 'maximum feasible misunderstanding' to argue that CAPs were 'not understood and not explained'.[7] His view, that CAPs resulted in needless 'social losses' which were compounded in new layers of bureaucracy that created more problems that they solved, became a theme of many critiques of the War on Poverty, notably in the work of fellow neoconservative, Nathan Glazer.[8] Whether arguing the failure was due to misunderstanding, racial antagonism, or poor design and implementation of the programs at the grassroots, these early studies nearly all see the legacy of CAP as

[4] P. E. Peterson and J. D. Greenstone, 'Racial Change and Citizen Participation: the Mobilization of Low-Income Communities through Community Action', in R. H. Haveman (ed.), *A Decade of Federal Antipoverty Programs: Achievements, Failures and Lessons*, (Academic Press: New York, 1977), pp.242, 248; J. C. Donovan, *The Politics of Poverty*, (Pegasus: New York, 1967), p.107.
[5] E.g. D. P. Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty*, (Free Press: New York, 1st paperback ed. 1970); F. F. Piven and R. A. Cloward, *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail*, (Pantheon Books: New York, 1977).
[6] K. B. Clark and J. Hopkins, *A Relevant War Against Poverty: A Study of Community Action Programs and Observable Social Change*, (Harper & Row: New York, 1969), p.229; S. A. Levitan, 'The Community Action Program: A Strategy to Fight Poverty', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 385, No. 63 (1969), p.63; R. M. Kramer, *Participation of the Poor: Comparative Community Case Studies in the War on Poverty*, (Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, 1969), pp.256-7.
[7] Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible*, p.xiv.
[8] Ibid.; N. Glazer, *The Limits of Social Policy*, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1988), p.5.

negative. Clark and Hopkins argue that their failure contributed to 'profound social instability'.[9] Likewise, Peter Marris and Martin Rein see the failure of CAPs as having a profoundly disruptive impact.[10] These works assess the programs empirically without an analysis of the historical context, an approach that has obvious limitations. However, the data utilised and the perspectives of those closely involved in the programs offer a valuable insight. Not least because some of these studies, such as Moynihan's *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding*, served a political and ideological purpose in shaping both Nixon's welfare policy and early neoconservative thought. Although these early analyses underestimate the complexity of the War on Poverty and are too dismissive of its successes, they reflect one of the most significant legacies of the War on Poverty: the politicisation of poverty, welfare and welfare reform.

This interpretation of community action as being founded on misunderstanding, lacking clarity of purpose, ultimately failing to achieve any meaningful participation of the poor and leaving a bitter legacy has endured in the historiography, amongst social scientists and in popular memory. Such conclusions persist partly because they were perpetuated by right wing critiques of the 1980s and 1990s that depicted Great Society as a high water mark of destructive federal activism. First among these was George Gilder's *Wealth and Poverty*, which argues that a 'pervasive welfare state' demoralises the poor and 'erodes work and family and thus keeps poor people poor'.[11] Lawrence Mead was equally critical of the welfare state, arguing that fundamental to the lack of success of the Great Society was that it attempted to provide equal opportunity without recognising the need for equal obligation.[12] Myron Magnet suggests it was the cultural revolution of the 1960s, led by the liberal elite that created the underclass.[13] Chief among the right-wing critics of welfare is Charles Murray who also argues social welfare harms the poor. He believes black progress against poverty had begun in the early sixties, but was halted by the implementation of the Great Society social welfare reforms.[14] Murray sees the failure of CAPs as 'very nearly universal', due to the 'faith

[9] Clark and Hopkins, *Relevant War*, p.256.
[10] P. Marris and M. Rein, *Dilemmas of Social Reform: Poverty and Community Action in the United States*, (Routledge and Kegan Paul: London, 2nd ed. 1972), p.261.
[11] G. F. Gilder, *Wealth and Poverty*, (Buchan & Enright: London, 1982), pp.12, 128.
[12] L. M. Mead, *Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship*, (Free Press: New York, 1986), p.256.
[13] M. Magnet, *The Dream and the Nightmare: the Sixties' Legacy to the Underclass* (Encounter Books: San Francisco, 1st paperback ed. 2000), pp.1, 231.
[14] C. Murray, *Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950-1980*, (Basic Books: New York, 2nd ed. 1994), p.63. Murray was the co-author of R. J. Herrnstein and C. Murray, *The Bell Curve: Intelligence*

in spontaneity and in *ad hoc* administrative arrangements'.[15] These analyses provided conservatives with an 'authoritative argument against direct government spending to combat the undeniable growth of poverty'.[16] However, scholars have comprehensively shown how these arguments are mistaken in their analysis and fundamentally incorrect in blaming social welfare for creating a 'permanently crippled class of dependants'.[17] Political scientist John Schwarz directly challenges the conservative assertion that antipoverty programs had proved 'counterproductive for the poor' and the suggestion that growth of the private sector would have been more effective than government programs in tackling poverty.[18] Schwarz clearly shows 'the private sector was itself incapable of making more than a marginal dent in poverty' and concludes somewhat optimistically that 'the post Eisenhower era was in fact an age of distinguished public achievement'.[19]

Whether from a conservative or liberal perspective, the majority of analyses of the War on Poverty written in the final decades of the twentieth century remained limited to explanations of why it had failed. For Allan Matusow, the War on Poverty was 'one of the greatest failures of twentieth-century liberalism'.[20] While noting the lack of studies of CAPs at the grassroots, Matusow sharply criticises CAPs as a tragic failure whose modest attempts at redistribution of power were quickly quashed by the Administration.[21] In a similar vein, Thomas Jackson argues the Great Society failed because it did too little, not too much, 'to overcome racial segregation, economic

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and Class Structure in American Life, (Simon & Schuster: New York, Free Press Paperbacks ed. 1996), a book at the centre of controversy over claims of scientific racism; he wrote *Losing Ground* while at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research and later became a fellow of the American Enterprise Institute.

[15] Murray, *Losing Ground*, p.36.

[16] M. B. Katz, *The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare,* (Pantheon: New York, 1989), p.144.

[17] A. O'Connor, *Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy and the Poor in Twentieth Century US History*, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2001), p.5; J. Quadagno, *The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty*, (Oxford University Press: New York, 1994), p.178; Katz, *Undeserving*, p.153; G. D. Davies, *From Opportunity to Entitlement: The Transformation and Decline of Great Society Liberalism*, (University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, 1996), p.7; I. Unger, *The Best of Intentions: The Triumphs and Failures of the Great Society under Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon*, (Doubleday: New York, 1996), p.357.

[18] J. E. Schwarz, *America's Hidden Success: Reassessment of Twenty Years of Public Policy from Kennedy to Reagan,* (Norton: New York, 1988), pp.2, 31.

[19] Ibid., pp.31, 69.

[20] A. J. Matusow, *The Unravelling of America: A History of Liberalism in America in the 1960s*, (University of Georgia Press: Athens, rev. ed. 2009), p.220.

[21] Ibid., pp.255; 270.

subordination and the obstacles to self-determination in urban black communities'.[22] Despite its failures, however, Michael Katz suggests it is important not to diminish the achievements of the Great Society, as 'between 1965 and 1972 the government transfer programs lifted about half the poor over the poverty line'.[23] Edward Berkowitz and Gareth Davies take a broad view of the Great Society in the context of the breakdown of the post-war liberal consensus.[24] Though for Godfrey Hodgson – who originally posited the liberal consensus thesis in 1976 – the liberal consensus never included race and race relations, the failure of the War on Poverty was a prime example of the breakdown of the liberal consensus and community action, the 'master idea behind the liberal strategy against poverty' was 'intellectually discredited and politically a pariah'.[25] Berkowitz likewise suggests that while the post-war consensus 'gave the nation a war on poverty', this war failed and 'bequeathed a sense of crisis to the conservative era that followed'.[26] Davies also emphasizes the pervasive optimism out of which the War on Poverty was born, making reference to a 'buoyant pride in America', before tracing the transition from a 1964 position of espousing opportunity to an emphasis on entitlement by 1972: understandable, he argues, in the context of a wider crisis in American liberalism.[27] This thesis moves beyond questions of why CAPs failed, instead tracing the remarkable continuities in the white response to Mississippi's CAPs from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s and bringing into question the dichotomy outlined by Berkowitz and the transition posited by Davies.

The involvement of Civil Rights activists was heralded in early analyses of CAPs as complicating the implementation of the programs, creating controversy and engendering 'retaliation from the larger white community', thus rendering programs controversial and subject to 'discontinuation without notice' by Washington bureaucrats.[28] The role of race in antipoverty programs was limited to a depiction of Black Power activists seizing federal funds to facilitate their violent protests and push

[22] T. F. Jackson, 'The State, the Movement, and the Urban Poor: The War on Poverty and Political Mobilization in the 1960s', in M. B. Katz (ed.), *The Underclass Debate: Views from History,* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1993), p.406.
[23] Katz, *Undeserving*, p.113.
[24] E. D. Berkowitz, *America's Welfare State: From Roosevelt to Reagan*, (Johns Hopkins University Press: London, 1991); Davies, *Opportunity.*
[25] G. Hodgson, *America In Our Time: From World War II to Nixon What Happened and Why,* (Vintage Books: New York, First Vintage Books ed. 1978), p.474.
[26] Berkowitz, *Welfare State*, p.149.
[27] Davies, *Opportunity*, pp.43, 235.
[28] Levitan, 'Community Action', p.65; Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible,* p.135.

for separatism.[29] Written during the conservative ascendancy, as the 'silent majority' responded to Nixon's emphasis on law and order, such works focus on the small minority of urban CAPs which were captured by militant African Americans to serve a political purpose.[30] Clark and Hopkins do recognise the complexity and diversity of black involvement in CAPs; however, they largely dismiss Civil Rights groups' 'erratic and inconsistent influence' on the programs. While recognising the desire of Civil Rights activists to avoid close involvement with the political structure and the class divide between the poor people helped by community action and the largely middle-class Civil Rights organizations, their analysis fails to address the significance of these divisions.[31] Levitan and Robert Taggart however, writing five years later when CAPs had survived Nixon's dismantling of the OEO, recognise a relatively successful legacy of CAPs lay in the vital political exposure and administrative experience that the programs had provided to future black political leaders.[32]

More recently, historians have placed race at the centre of their analyses of the War on Poverty. Dona Hamilton and Charles Hamilton demonstrate how national Civil Rights organisations have, since the 1960s, combined social welfare and Civil Rights into one goal.[33] Jill Quadagno, in her study of race and welfare argues that the War on Poverty resulted from the 'well-intended but poorly executed effort' to address racial inequality.[34] While Quadagno justly gives race centre stage in her analysis, her argument – that CAPs failed because they bypassed local political structures and ensuring integration would occur thus provoking the vehement opposition of the white elite – overlooks the complexity and diversity of the African American and white relationship with and within CAPs.[35] In the last decade, studies which place race at the heart of their reading of the War on Poverty have utilised the framework of the 'long Civil Rights Movement'.[36] For the liberals of Oakland California, Robert Self argues,

[29] For example, D. P. Moynihan, 'Professors and the Poor', *Commentary*, 46, No.2 (1968), p.19.
[30] Plotnick and Skidmore, *Progress*, p.25. However, in the South 75 per cent of CAPs were rural.
[31] Clark and Hopkins, *Relevant War,* pp.167-9.
[32] S. A. Levitan and R. Taggart, *The Promise of Greatness*, (Harvard University Press: London, 1976), pp.185-6; Peterson and Greenstone, 'Racial Change', p.269, also make this point.
[33] D. C. Hamilton and C. V. Hamilton, *The Dual Agenda: The African-American Struggle for Civil and Economic Equality,* (Columbia University Press: New York, 1997).
[34] Quadagno, *Welfare,* p.4.
[35] Ibid., p.197; N. A. Cazenave and K. J. Neubeck, *Welfare Racism: Playing the Race Card Against America's Poor,* (Routledge: New York, 2001), p.11. Neubeck and Cazenave see race as playing an even greater role in welfare.
[36] J. Dowd Hall, 'The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past', *Journal of American History*, 91, No. 4 (2005), pp.1233-63; S. K. Cha-Jua and C. Lang, 'The "Long Movement" as

'new federal antipoverty efforts seemed a logical extension of the Civil Rights Movement'.[37] Susan Ashmore also shows how CAPs, with their emphasis on 'people coming together to fix local problems and the maximum participation clause' provided an opportunity for Civil Rights activists to pursue economic justice in Alabama, albeit unsuccessfully.[38] William Clayson pursues the connection between the Civil Rights Movement and the War on Poverty further, utilising Texas' War on Poverty to trace the rise of militant values among Civil Rights activists and the 'march to the right' of conservative Democratic Party in Texas.[39] James Leloudis and Robert Korstad trace the development of the North Carolina Fund from its pre-War on Poverty origins in 1963 to its demise in late 1968, concurrent with a 'resurgent politics of race' in which the state's CAPs became a target for Republican politicians.[40]

Kent Germany, however, examining the Great Society in New Orleans, traces the continuity of liberalism at the local level and shows how CAPs gave predominantly African American neighbourhoods 'the votes, the organisation and the access to government to have an historic impact on elections and policy'.[41] In Elna Green's collection, historians focus on the often rewarding interconnection of the black freedom struggle and social welfare in the often overlooked decades after the New Deal and after

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Vampire: Temporal and Spatial Fallacies in Recent Black Freedom Studies', *The Journal of African American History,* 92, No. 2 (2007), pp.265-288; E. Crosby, 'The Politics of Writing and Teaching Movement History', in Crosby (ed.), *Civil Rights History from the Ground Up: Local Struggles, a National Movement,* (University of Georgia Press: Athens, 2011), pp.1-42. While Emilye Crosby (among others, notably Cha-Jua and Lang) critique recent long Civil Rights scholarship, Crosby emphasizes the importance of local studies in shaping a new understanding of the movement, including the nature and persistence of white resistance.

[37] R. O. Self, *American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Post-war Oakland,* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2003), p.198.

[38] S. Y. Ashmore, *Carry It On: The War on Poverty and the Civil Rights Movement in Alabama, 1964-1972,* (University of Georgia Press: London, 2008), pp.294, 85. Others studies of the close link between the Civil Rights Movements' post-1965 goal of economic justice and the War on Poverty: T. F. Jackson, *From Civil Rights to Human Rights: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Struggle for Economic Justice* (University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, 2007); R. Bauman, *Race and the War on Poverty: From Watts to East L.A.,* (University of Oklahoma Press: Norman, 2008), p.6. Bauman examines the War on Poverty in a multi-racial context, emphasizing the significance of the challenge antipoverty programs posed to traditional gender as well as racial relationships.

[39] W. Clayson, *Freedom is Not Enough: the War on Poverty and the Civil Rights Movement in Texas,* (University of Texas Press: Austin, 2010), pp.7-9.

[40] J. L. Leloudis and R. Korstad, *To Right These Wrongs: The North Carolina Fund and the Battle to End Poverty and Inequality in 1960s America,* (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 2010), p.8.

[41] K. B. Germany, *New Orleans After the Promises: Poverty Citizenship and the Search for the Great Society,* (University of Georgia Press: Athens, 2007), p.16.

the Great Society.[42] Noel Cazenave's study of community action emphasizes CAPs legacy of 'greater citizen participation in community decision making'.[43] Jon Hale explores the development of Mississippi's state-wide Head Start program, the Child Development Group of Mississippi (CDGM), from Mississippi's Freedom Schools, while Amy Jordan emphasizes its positive long-term legacy.[44] Annelise Orleck and Lisa Harzirjian's 2011 edited collection brings together recent War on Poverty scholarship, providing new insights into the complexity and diversity of the programs. While accepting that the War on Poverty failed to live up to the aspirational rhetoric of President Johnson, the volume's authors suggest the positive legacy of many antipoverty programs has been purposefully overlooked.[45] In addition to exploring the local political battles that shaped programs, many of these studies focus on the destructive impact on CAPs of discrimination against African Americans, Mexican Americans, Asian Americans, Native Americans and women.[46] This volume contributes a great deal to our understanding of the War on Poverty at the grassroots; however, like the majority of the recent literature on race and the War on Poverty it diminishes the white response by depicting it as merely a backlash. Some historians, such as Clayson, Hale, David Carter and Thomas Kiffmeyer pay more attention to the white response, though none sufficiently explore the depth and complexity of its many facets, focusing instead on its superficial, reactionary nature. Carter examines the interaction of federal, state and grassroots including a case study of CDGM to argue that the War on Poverty served to alienate 'Civil Rights activists, grassroots foot soldiers and national leaders alike' even as it failed to moderate the white backlash, while Clayson explores local

[42] E.g. J. Quadagno, and S. McDonald, 'Racial Segregation in Southern Hospitals: How Medicare "Broke the Back of Segregated Health Services"' in E. C. Green (ed.), *New Deal and Beyond: Social Welfare in the South Since 1930*, (University of Georgia Press: Athens, 2003), pp. 119-137.
[43] N. A. Cazenave, *Impossible Democracy: The Unlikely Success of the War on Poverty Community Action Programs*, (State University of New York Press: Albany, 2007), pp.180-1.
[44] J. N. Hale, 'The Struggle Begins Early: Head Start and the Mississippi Freedom Movement', *History of Education Quarterly*, 52, No. 4 (2012), pp.506-534; A. Jordan, 'Fighting for the CDGM: Poor People, Local Politics and the Complicated Legacy of Head Start' in A. Orleck and L. G. Hazirjian (eds), *The War on Poverty: A New Grassroots History 1964-1980* (University of Georgia Press: Athens, 2011), pp.280-307.
[45] A. Orleck, 'Introduction: The War on Poverty from the Grassroots Up', in Orleck and Harzirjian (eds), *War on Poverty*, p.8.
[46] K. B. Germany, 'Poverty Wars in the Louisiana Delta: White Resistance, Black Power and the Poorest Place in America', pp.231-255; W. Clayson, 'The War on Poverty and the Chicano Movement in Texas: Confronting "Tio Tomás" and the "Gringo Pseudoliberals"', pp.334-358; K. M. Tani, 'The House That "Equality" Built: the Asian American Movement and the Legacy of Community Action', pp.411-436; D. M. Cobb, 'The War on Poverty in Mississippi and Oklahoma: Beyond Black and White', pp.387-210; R. Bauman, 'Gender, Civil Rights Activism and the War on Poverty', pp.209-230, all in Orleck and Harzirjian (eds), *War on Poverty*.

white politicians responses to Texas' CAPs.[47] Kiffmeyer's case study of the Appalachian Volunteers, a CAP targeted by the local power structure, illustrates how the white political establishment used red baiting techniques and anti-Civil Rights sentiment to mobilise against antipoverty programs which were attempting to alleviate some of the worst consequences of child poverty.[48] Hale briefly identifies the connection between Massive Resistance and the emerging conservatism in white opposition to CDGM, but does not go beyond this initial, failed white response to explore the longer term evolution of Massive Resistance.[49] This study will contribute a new dimension to this recent wave of scholarship by restoring the complexity and diversity of the white response to the War on Poverty, placing the evolving mechanisms of white opposition in the context of the wider Massive Resistance to the Civil Rights Movement.

In addition to this recent explosion of grassroots studies, historians have continued to address the War on Poverty and community action from a national – and international – perspective.[50] Prominent local programs have received attention which provides a wealth of detail, though does not address the wider significance of the programs' successes and failures.[51] The high-profile elements of the War on Poverty, notably Community Action, Head Start and Legal Services have also been the focus of studies, often written by those involved in the development of these programs which describe the political, legal and bureaucratic national battles.[52] The bureaucratic complexity and the vast extent of the War on Poverty necessitate a state level study. By focusing on Mississippi's War on Poverty, this thesis will provide a detailed insight into the mechanics of local antipoverty programs – including various CAPs and single-

[47] D. C. Carter, *The Music has Gone Out of the Movement: Civil Rights and the Johnson Administration, 1965-1968,* (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 2009), pp.31-49; Clayson, *Freedom,* pp.136-156.
[48] T. J. Kiffmeyer, 'From Self Help to Sedition: The Appalachian Volunteers in Eastern Kentucky', *Journal of Southern History*, 64, No. 1 (1998), pp.65-94.
[49] Hale, 'Struggle Begins', p.531.
[50] E.g., F. Stricker, *Why America Lost the War on Poverty – and How to Win It,* (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 2007); A. Goldstein, *Poverty in Common: The Politics of Community Action During the American Century,* (Duke University Press: Durham, 2012).
[51] P. Greenberg, *The Devil Has Slippery Shoes: A Biased Biography of the Child Development Group of Mississippi (CDGM), A Story of Maximum Feasible Poor Parent Participation,* (Youth Policy Institute: Washington, D.C., rev. ed. 1990).
[52] Among others: R. F. Clark, *The War on Poverty: History, Selected Programs and On-going Impact,* (University Press of America: Lanham, 2002); E. Johnson, Jr., *Justice and Reform: the Formative Years of the American Legal Services Program,* (Transaction Books: New Brunswick, 2nd ed. 1978); M. A. Vinovskis, *Birth of Head Start: Preschool Education Policies in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations,* (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2008).

purpose Head Start and Legal Services programs – while placing them in broader historical context. This broad context places white opposition to the War on Poverty at the centre of the evolving Massive Resistance and emerging conservatism, providing a new examination of the relationship between race and antipoverty programs and a new interpretation of the impact of the War on Poverty at the grassroots.

Massive Resistance and New Conservatism

Literature on the African-American struggle for freedom during the Civil Rights Movement is vast and still expanding. It includes biographies of national and local leaders, community and state level studies, as well as assessments of the role of international political developments, gender and class in shaping the movement.[53] In particular, studies of the movement in Mississippi are numerous, from the state-level works of John Dittmer and Charles Payne to county-level studies by Emilye Crosby and J. Todd Moye and numerous biographies and autobiographies of activists.[54] Studies of the opposition to that struggle – the story of white supremacists violently opposed to desegregation – are far fewer. Massive Resistance remains ill-defined: early interpretations restricted their definition to a political backlash to school desegregation in Virginia, while more recently historians have taken a more expansive view, incorporating a broad time frame and a range of white strategies of opposition to black advancement. This thesis takes a broad conception of Massive Resistance as a complex and evolving phenomenon. It explores Massive Resistance beyond its traditionally accepted limitations by identifying the methods, mechanisms and rhetoric of Massive Resistance – such as the tactics of the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission, use

[53] See for example A. Fairclough, 'Historians and the Civil Rights Movement', *Journal of American History*, 24, No. 3 (1990), pp.387-398; C. Eagles, 'Toward New Histories of the Civil Rights Era', *The Journal of Southern History,* 66, No. 4 (2000), pp.815-848; S. F. Lawson, 'Freedom Then, Freedom Now: The Historiography of the Civil Rights Movement', *The American Historical Review,* 96, No. 2 (1991), pp.456-57.

[54] J. Dittmer, *Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi,* (University of Illinois Press: Urbana, 1994); C. M. Payne, *I've Got the Light of Freedom: the Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle,* (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1995); E. Crosby, *A Little Taste of Freedom: The Black Freedom Struggle in Claiborne County, Mississippi,* (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 2005); J. T. Moye, *Let the People Decide: Black Freedom and White Resistance Movements in Sunflower County, Mississippi, 1945–1986* (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 2004); C. Evers and A. Szanton, *Have No Fear: The Charles Evers Story,* (J. Wiley & Sons: New York, 1997); U. Blackwell with J. P. Morris, *Barefootin': Life Lessons from the Road to Freedom,* (Crown Publishers: New York, 2006).

of white supremacist violence and linguistic tropes that, for example, drew on anticommunism and fears of miscegeny – which became central aspects of white Mississippians opposition to antipoverty programs.

Early studies of Massive Resistance limited their interpretation of Massive Resistance to the political manoeuvres and social mobilisation in opposition to proposed school integration. The formative study on white opposition to the Civil Rights Movement was Numan Bartley's 1969 *The Rise of Massive Resistance.* Bartley's study articulates the complex and multi-faceted white response to the Supreme Court's ruling in *Brown vs. Board of Education* against which Massive Resistance emerged, tracing what he sees as a neo-bourbon, elite led movement to its climax after the Little Rock crisis in 1957.[55] Neil McMillen's 1971 study of White Citizens' Councils follows white supremacists' subtler forms of intimidation, arguing that their demise was inevitable once it became apparent that some degree of desegregation was unavoidable.[56] Francis Wilhoit argues resistance became 'truly massive' when Southern congressmen introduced the Southern Manifesto on 12 March 1956, reaching its peak in 1959. Like McMillen, Wilhoit takes a determinist view, arguing the failure of Massive Resistance was inevitable due to the extremist nature of the movement, leading to conflict with federal authority and ultimately the 'whimper of gradual abatement' after the passage of the Civil and Voting Rights Acts.[57] Following Bartley's line, James Ely and Robbins Gates took Massive Resistance to refer only to the period of opposition to school desegregation in Virginia.[58] This lack of clarity on the definition of the term has persisted.[59]

As noted by Charles Eagles, for nearly thirty years following the works of Bartley, McMillen and Wilhoit, new studies of Massive Resistance were virtually non-

[55] N. V. Bartley, *The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South during the 1950s,* (Louisiana State University Press: Baton Rouge, 2nd ed. 1999), pp.26, 32, 189-190, 277.
[56] N. R. McMillen, *The Citizen's Council: Organised Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 1954-1964,* (University of Illinois Press: Urbana, 2nd ed. 1994), pp.360, 326, 361-362.
[57] F. M. Wilhoit, *The Politics of Massive Resistance* (G. Braziller: New York, 1973), pp.51, 162, 227-8.
[58] J. W. Ely, Jr., *The Crisis of Conservative Virginia, the Byrd Organization and the Politics of Massive Resistance,* (University of Tennessee Press: Knoxville, 1976); R. L. Gates, *The Making of Massive Resistance: Virginia's Politics of Public School Desegregation, 1954-1956,* (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 1964).
[59] M. D. Lassiter and A. B. Lewis, 'Massive Resistance Revisited: Virginia's White Moderates and the Byrd Organisation', in Lassiter and Lewis (eds), *The Moderates' Dilemma: Massive Resistance to School Desegregation in Virginia,* (University Press of Virginia: Charlottesville, 1998), p.14.

existent.[60] Recently, however, there have been a number of studies of Massive Resistance which challenge the earlier interpretations of its origins, scope and demise. Drawing on lessons from Civil Rights literature, Massive Resistance has been studied from various perspectives: religion; gender; Cold War; through community movements and the institutions of white supremacy; as well as the more traditional studies of 'flash points' of the Civil Rights Movement and biographies of segregationists.[61] Two studies utilise community focus and expansive time frames: Moye's study of the Civil Rights Movement and white resistance in Sunflower County highlights the importance of class distinctions within the black community, but too often portrays white resistance as merely reactionary; Jason Sokol's study of white southerners highlights the complexity and diversity of the white southern response to the Civil Rights Movement and illustrates how the lives of white southerners were recast by the social and economic upheavals in the region.[62] Studies of the impact of the Cold War on Massive Resistance have shown how important anticommunism was to white southerners, not just as a 'rhetorical bridge to a national audience' or a weapon against black activists, but also a real fear that pervaded their understanding of the Civil Rights Movement.[63] David Chappell and Jane Dailey both examine the role of religion in the Massive Resistance movement. Whereas Chappell sees religion as a disappointment to segregationists by failing to provide the cultural legitimacy to segregationists, Dailey focuses on the way

[60] Eagles, 'Toward New Histories', p.842. Exceptions include; E. Jacoway and D. R. Colburn (eds), *Southern Businessmen and Desegregation,* (Louisiana State University Press: Baton Rouge, 1982); J. Roche, *Restructured Resistance: the Sibley Commission and the Politics of Desegregation in Georgia,* (University of Georgia Press: Athens, 1998); D. T. Carter, *The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics*, (Louisiana State University: Baton Rouge, 2nd ed. 2000); D. M. Chappell, *Inside Agitators: White Southerners in the Civil Rights Movement,* (Johns Hopkins University Press: London, 1994).

[61] E.g. a study of institutions of white supremacy: Y. Katagiri, *The Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission: Civil Rights and States' Rights* (University Press of Mississippi: Jackson, 2001).

[62] Moye, *Let the People*, pp.25, 172; J. Sokol, *There Goes My Everything: White Southerners in the Age of Civil Rights, 1945-1975,* (Vintage Books: New York, 2007), pp.282-283.

[63] J. Woods, *Black Struggle, Red Scare: Segregation and Anti-Communism in the South, 1948-1968* (Louisiana State University: Baton Rouge, 2004), pp.1, 5-6; G. Lewis, 'White South, Red Nation: Massive Resistance and the Cold War', in C. Webb (ed.), *Massive Resistance: Southern Opposition to the Second Reconstruction* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005), pp.119, 122; see also G. Lewis, *The White South and the Red Menace: Segregationists, Anticommunism and Massive Resistance, 1945-1965,* (University Press of Florida: Gainesville, 2004), and S. Hart Brown, 'Communism, Anticommunism, and Massive Resistance: The Civil Rights Congress in Southern Perspective', in G. Feldman (ed.), *Before Brown: Civil Rights and White Backlash in the Modern South,* (University of Alabama Press: Tuscaloosa, 2004), pp.170-197; M. L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy,* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2000), p.28.

theology was successfully used in the defence of segregation, through 'the language of miscegenation'.[64]

Drawing on these studies, which view Massive Resistance as a complex, evolving social, economic and political movement in which post-*Brown* political opposition was but one facet, historians have begun to delineate a long segregationist movement which was central to the rise of the new conservatism.[65] This "long Massive Resistance" pre-dates *Brown* and extends past the passage of the Civil and Voting Rights Acts. Historians including Tony Badger and George Lewis have challenged Michael Klarman's suggestion that Massive Resistance was galvanised by *Brown.* For Klarman, *Brown* led white southerners to outright defiance, which he believes halted gradual racial change and destroyed racial moderation.[66] However, Badger sees *Brown* as less important than the long-term social and economic developments in the South.[67] Likewise, Lewis does not accept that Massive Resistance, which he describes as 'disordered, complex and even muddled' could have been ushered in by a 'single landmark event'.[68] As Glenn Feldman has illustrated, Massive Resistance not only pre-dated *Brown*, but it was also central to the rise of the Republican Party in the Deep South.[69] More recently, Jason Morgan Ward has described a long Massive Resistance that emerged in tandem with the African American freedom struggle from the rise of the New Deal.[70] Recent scholarship has likewise extended the end date of Massive Resistance past the demise of its "classic" phase in 1964. Analyses of the suburban Sunbelt by Matthew Lassiter and Kevin Kruse both illustrate the evolution of Massive Resistance into a more successful rhetorical stance based on the language of rights,

[64] D. L. Chappell, 'Disunity and Religious Institutions in the South', in Webb (ed.), *Massive Resistance,* p.142; see also D. L. Chappell, *A Stone of Hope: Prophetic Religion and the Death of Jim Crow,* (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 2003); J. Dailey, 'Sex, Segregation and the Sacred after Brown', *Journal of American History,* 91, No. 1 (2004), p.132.
[65] J. M. Ward, *Defending White Democracy: The Making of a Segregationist Movement and the Remaking of Racial Politics, 1936-1965,* (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 2011), p.2.
[66] M. J. Klarman, 'Why Massive Resistance?', in Webb (ed.), *Massive Resistance,* pp.23, 34.
[67] A. J. Badger, 'Brown and Backlash', in Webb (ed.), *Massive Resistance,* pp.40, 51; A. J. Badger, *New Deal/New South: an Anthony J. Badger Reader* (University of Arkansas Press: Fayetteville, 2007), p.71. Badger argues 'liberal fatalism' destroyed southern racial moderation.
[68] G. Lewis, *Massive Resistance: the White Response to the Civil Rights Movement,* (Hodder Arnold: London, 2006), p.24.
[69] G. Feldman, 'Ugly Roots: Race, Emotion, and the Rise of the Modern Republican Party in Alabama and the South' in Feldman (ed.), *Before Brown,* pp.268-310.
[70] Ward, *Defending White Democracy,* p.2.

freedoms and individualism.[71] As Earl Black shows, after 1965 white elites found 'ways to appeal to anti-black prejudices without describing themselves as segregationist'.[72] Lewis also suggests the 'traditional' understanding of Massive Resistance dying in the face of federal legislation is incomplete; rather, he argues that segregationists were 'brought seamlessly into the new currents of developing national conservatism'.[73] Joseph Crespino likewise looks beyond the failure of 'symbolic last stands' by massive resisters to the success of 'subtle and strategic accommodations' made by conservative white southerners. He shows that neither Mississippi nor the South were exceptional – while the country rejected the 'ugly white racism' of the Citizens' Councils, they 'implicitly and explicitly embraced the quiet protectionism that preserved the racial and class privilege of suburban America'.[74] Frank Parker examines the barriers whites erected to black political participation after 1965 as a Massive Resistance strategy of the entrenched white political leadership seeking to perpetuate its power.[75]

This thesis builds on these recent historiographical developments which challenge the origins and demise of the "classic" 1954 to 1965 phase of Massive Resistance as well as expanding its scope. Scholars have long differed in their interpretations and definitions of what, precisely, Massive Resistance entailed, not least because a number of the many strands that were to coalesce in opposition to Civil Rights activity in the 1950s and 1960s dated back to slavery and in some forms are still present today. In the narrowest of those definitions, it has been argued that Massive Resistance equated only with attempts to oppose the desegregation of southern schools.[76] Others have sought to broaden that narrow focus, by seeking to class Massive Resistance as a concerted attempt by southern segregationists to forestall concerted federal forays into the former Confederate states in support of the goals of an indigenous Civil Rights Movement. As most would now argue, these strands of opposition became progressively more potent dating from the 1948 Dixiecrat Revolt to

[71] K. M. Kruse, *White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism,* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2005), pp.6-8 and M. D. Lassiter, *The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South,* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2006), pp.3-4.
[72] E. Black, *Southern Governors and Civil Rights: Racial Segregation as a Campaign Issue in the Second Reconstruction,* (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1976), p.304.
[73] Lewis, *Massive Resistance*, p.26
[74] J. Crespino, *In Search of Another Country: Mississippi and the Conservative Counterrevolution*, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2007), pp.276, 271.
[75] F. R. Parker, *Black Votes Count: Political Empowerment in Mississippi after 1965,* (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 1990), pp.2, 34-77.
[76] For this narrow view, see for example Ely, *Crisis of Conservative Virginia*.

reach their zenith in the decade following the passage of *Brown.* As Lewis notes, for example, resistance to African American advancement became truly massive due to the scope, breadth and diversity of that resistance and, most importantly, the resistance was massive because it operated at both the federal and local levels.[77] While many of these strands of opposition – notably the structures of Massive Resistance such as the south's State Sovereignty Commissions – began their slow and unsteady demise after the passage of the Civil and Voting Rights Acts, white opposition to African American advancement after 1965 remained massive.

Segregationist southerners drew on these strands of opposition to build structures of opposition – structures that operated most powerfully during the classic phase of Massive Resistance – and from which segregationists were loath to turn away in the aftermath of federal legislation in 1964 and 1965. As is clearly showcased in this thesis, white opposition to the War on Poverty drew on many of the methods and mechanisms of the classic phase of Massive Resistance – and indeed, white opponents honed these tactics to even greater levels of success against, and eventually through, CAPs. Most significantly, white opposition to the War on Poverty retained that central characteristic of Massive Resistance: it was a battle against African American advancement that was occurring simultaneously on the federal and local levels. Indeed, CAPs embody this crucial nexus, as locally created and operated programs funded by the federal government, often over the opposition of the state. White opposition to these programs was correspondingly broad in scope and diverse, ranging from the manoeuvring of Mississippi's politicians to control the direction of OEO funds to the often violent tactics of local whites to undermine CAPs at the grassroots. While some of the methods and mechanisms of the classic phase of Massive Resistance were diminishing after 1965, these strands of opposition declined at different rates thus making it impossible to pinpoint an end date of the long Massive Resistance. The scope of this thesis – ending in 1975 – is by no means an end date of the long Massive Resistance. While the structures and political last-stands characteristic of the classic phase of Massive Resistance were all but demolished by this date – the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission, for example ceased functioning in 1973, although it was not dissolved in 1977 – some of the methods and mechanisms of Massive Resistance persisted and many evolved, becoming central to the emerging new

[77] Lewis, *Massive Resistance*, p.24.

conservatism.[78] By exploring the evolving resistance after 1965, this thesis thus adds a new dimension to our understanding of Massive Resistance as a complex, multifaceted and – most significantly – evolving phenomenon encompassing intersecting economic, political and social facets that was by no means limited to the classic phase during the decade after *Brown*. This evolving resistance drew on strands of opposition to African American advancement stretching back over a century – notably incorporating racialised opposition to social welfare evident in white southern opposition to the New Deal and still evident in opposition to Obamacare – and it remained massive: drawing on the tactics and tropes of the classic phase of Massive Resistance and broad and diverse in scope as it operated at the federal and local levels.

In exploring the connection between the evolving resistance and new conservatism through white opposition to antipoverty programs this thesis also seeks to add a new dimension to the development of Deep South Republicanism. The 'Southern Strategy' casts the rise of the Republican Party in the South as a top-down political strategy, devised by Goldwater, honed by Nixon and fully utilised by Reagan in 1980. Dan Carter describes Nixon as sympathizing with, and appealing to, 'the fears of angry whites without appearing to become an extremist and driving away moderates'.[79] This theory has many proponents with differently nuanced arguments: Carter stresses the significance of Wallace; Godfrey Hodgson argues that the Goldwater campaign was a very important recruiting ground for modern conservatism, while Bartley and Hugh Graham argue Goldwater 'warped' the emerging two-party system.[80] Jack Bass and Walter De Vries trace the origins of a two-party south to the Dixiecrat revolt; Kari Frederickson sees this movement, despite its political failure, as providing the 'organizational and ideological framework' for future efforts to stymie racial progress and as a stepping stone for voters in their move from the Democratic to the Republican Party.[81] Dewey Grantham argues the 1952 election marked the origin of a two-party

[78] Katagiri, *Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission,* p.226.
[79] D. T. Carter, *From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative Counterrevolution, 1963-1994,* (Louisiana State University Press: Baton Rouge, 1996), pp.30-1; also see K. P. Phillips, *The Emerging Republican Majority* (Arlington House: New York, 1969).
[80] Carter, *Politics of Rage*; G. Hodgson, *The World Turned Right Side Up: A History of the Conservative Ascendancy in America,* (Houghton Mifflin: Boston, 1996), p.108; N. V. Bartley and H. D. Graham, *Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction,* (Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 1975), p.185.
[81] J. Bass and W. De Vries, *The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social Change and Political Consequences since 1945,* (Basic Books: New York, 1976), p.5; K. A. Frederickson, *The Dixiecrat*

south, while Michael Flamm and Mark Smith emphasize the importance of 'law and order' and economic rhetoric respectively.[82] However, they delineate a similar central theme: that the growth of southern Republicanism was the result of a strategy 'skilfully crafted' by politicians, from Goldwater and Wallace to Nixon and Reagan.[83] According to proponents of this southern strategy, Goldwater's success in the Deep South in 1964 then evolved through the rhetoric of Wallace and Nixon into the 'racially nuanced targets' of affirmative action and welfare so successfully utilised by Reagan.[84] Bass and De Vries, amongst others, cast Nixon as the key to nationalising the southern strategy when as President he challenged the Supreme Court ruling that busing could be used to achieve public school desegregation. Nixon, 'found a message that encompassed the position of a growing majority of white Americans who had come to believe that the denial of basic citizenship rights to blacks was wrong, but who were opposed to the prospect of substantial residential and educational integration'.[85] Some historians have cited the 'nationalisation' of the Southern Strategy to argue that American politics has become southernised politically and culturally – a 'conservative temper' that has spread into the heart of the nation.[86]

Bass and De Vries and Earl and Merle Black all refute the idea of southern Republicanism as a result of grassroots mobilisation, citing the lack of southern Republican elected officials throughout the 1960s and 1970s.[87] However, recent studies have shown the true growth of the Republican Party in the south and west came from grassroots mobilisation of the segregated suburbs – especially neighbourhood and

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Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1968 (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 2001), p.9.

[82] D. W. Grantham, *The Life and Death of the Solid South: a Political History,* (University Press of Kentucky: Lexington, 1988), p.127; M. W. Flamm, *Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s* (Columbia University Press: New York, 2005), p.5; M. A. Smith, *The Right Talk: How Conservatives Transformed the Great Society into the Economic Society,* (Columbia University Press: New York, 2005), p.202.

[83] E. Black and M. Black, *The Rise of Southern Republicans,* (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 2002), pp.210-11; also see Carter, *From George Wallace*; M. Kazin, *The Populist Persuasion: An American History,* (Cornell University Press: London, rev. ed. 1998), p.246.

[84] T. B. Edsall and M. D. Edsall, *Chain Reaction: the Impact of Race, Rights and Taxes on American Politics,* (Norton: New York, 1991), p.10; Badger, *New Deal,* p.175.

[85] Bass and De Vries, *Transformation,* p.30; Edsall and Edsall, *Chain Reaction,* p.75. Others argue similarly; Carter, *George Wallace,* p.31; Hodgson, *World Turned,* p.123; S. Lubell, *The Hidden Crisis in American Politics* (Norton: New York, 1971), p.88.

[86] Firstly by J. Egerton, *The Americanization of Dixie: The Southernization of America* (Harper's Magazine Press: New York, 1974), p.131; also P. Applebome, *Dixie Rising: How the South is Shaping American Values, Politics and Culture,* (Times Books: New York, 1996), pp.10, 347 and Hodgson, *World Turned,* p.123.

[87] Bass and De Vries, *Transformation,* p.33; Black and Black, *Southern Republicans,* pp.210-11.

parents' organisations of middle-class whites, and student movements.[88] These studies, along with works on the racial construction of the urban environment, such as Thomas Sugrue's *Origins of the Urban Crisis* have shown the rise of new conservatism had deeper roots and greater complexity than white racist voters responding to the racially coded rhetoric of Republican politicians, a rejection of New Deal liberalism or the perceived excesses of the Great Society, as well as refuting the idea of the southernisation of American politics.[89] As Gary Gerstle notes, Sugrue and Arnold Hirsch convincingly articulate a 'massive resistance' amongst urban working-class whites in the 1940s, and a conservative populism that drew on the grievances so successfully articulated in opposition to Great Society liberals.[90]

Kruse, Crespino and Lassiter among others outline a 'suburban strategy', arguing that the southern strategy thesis 'reduces a complex phenomenon of national political transformation to another familiar story of southern white backlash'.[91] All three stress the importance of incorporating the 'dynamic growth of the metropolitan Sunbelt' and account not only for the significance of race but also the centrality of class ideology in the outlook of suburban voters.[92] Building on the work of Hirsch and Sugrue, Lassiter and Kruse use a suburban approach and grassroots methodology to trace the origins of new conservatism in the suburban Sunbelt. Kruse traces the evolution of Massive Resistance from a political ideology based on 'tradition, populist and often starkly racist demagoguery', into a 'new conservatism predicated on a

[88] L. McGirr, *Suburban Warriors: the Origins of the New American Right,* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2001), p.4; J. Schoenwald, *A Time for Choosing: The Rise of Modern American Conservatism* (Oxford University Press: New York, 2001), p.4; J. A. Andrew, *The Other Side of the Sixties: Young Americans for Freedom and the Rise of Conservative Politics,* (Rutgers University Press: London, 1997), p.209; N. Bjerre-Poulsen, *Right Face: Organizing the American Conservative Movement, 1945-65,* (Museum Tusculanum: Copenhagen, 2002), p.20; M. C. Brennan, *Turning Right in the Sixties: The Conservative Capture of the GOP,* (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 1995), p.3; M. Dallek, *The Right Moment: Ronald Reagan's First Victory and the Decisive Turning Point in Modern American Politics,* (Free Press: New York, 2000), pp.x, 241.

[89] T. J. Sugrue, *The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Post-War Detroit,* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2005), pp.267-8; A. R. Hirsch, *Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago 1940-1960,* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1983). Also see R. P. Formisano, *Boston Against Busing: Race Class and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s,* (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 1991); L. Cohen, *A Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Post-war America,* (Knopf: New York, 2004); K. Jackson, *The Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States,* (Oxford University Press: New York, 1985); K. Phillips-Fein, *Invisible Hands: The Businessmen's Crusade Against the New Deal,* (W. W. Norton: New York, 2010).

[90] G. Gerstle, 'Race and the Myth of the Liberal Consensus', *Journal of American History,* 82, No. 2 (1995), p.582.

[91] M. D. Lassiter and J. Crespino, 'Introduction: The End of Southern History', in M. D. Lassiter and J. Crespino (eds), *The Myth of Southern Exceptionalism,* (Oxford University Press: New York, 2010), p.6.

[92] Ibid., p.6; Crespino, *In Search,* p.7; Lassiter, *Silent Majority,* p.4; Kruse, *White Flight,* p.7.

language of rights, freedoms and individualism' through the white flight to Atlanta's suburbs.[93] Lassiter argues the growth of southern Republicanism owed more to middle-class 'corporate economics' than 'working-class politics of racial backlash'. Like Kruse, Lassiter shows how a 'color-blind defence of consumer rights and residential privileges' succeeded where 'overtly racialized tactics of southern strategy had failed'.[94] While also studying the grassroots origins of new conservatism, Crespino suggests 'conservative color-blindness' was not an invention of white suburbanites, but had always been a part of segregationist politics in a Deep South state such as Mississippi'.[95] Crespino emphasizes the continuity of both language and racial conservatism from the era of Jim Crow to the 'suburban metropolitan racial struggles of the 1970s and 1980s'. His account of Mississippi demonstrates how white Mississippians did, in the words of singer-songwriter Phil Ochs, create for themselves 'another country to be part of' and how through 'strategic accommodations' white Mississippians were able to link their racial conservatism with the 'broader, insurgent conservative movement in the 1960s and 1970s'.[96] This thesis amends Crespino's argument, adding a new dimension to Mississippi's contribution to the emerging new conservatism while reinstating the rural Deep South in the rise of southern Republicanism.

In tracing the evolving resistance, this thesis will illustrate how the racial, class and gendered articulations of opposition to CAPs in the rural Deep South became central to the emerging national conservatism. Other historians have convincingly linked race and conservatism – Nancy MacLean shows how conservative leaders have 'systematically exploited fear and prejudice to acquire power', with the aim of safeguarding the 'advantages of those long privileged – whether by class, race, gender, religion or sexual orientation'. Donald Critchlow, conversely, argues that conservatives gained power because their 'commitments to individualism, free markets, limited government, traditional family values… were best suited to the emerging post-industrial Sun Belt anchored suburban society'.[97] Chris Danielson, tracing the development of black politics and the white response to the movement's return to legal activism in the

[93] Kruse, *White Flight*, p.6.
[94] Lassiter, *Silent Majority*, p.227.
[95] Crespino, *In Search*, p.8.
[96] Ibid., pp.277-8, 3, 11, 13.
[97] D. T. Critchlow, and N. MacLean, *Debating the American Conservative Movement 1945 to Present*, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, 2009), pp.vii-viii.

1970s suggests that the focus on class and economics does not adequately explain the rise of the Republican Party in Mississippi, which remained largely rural.[98] Despite a narrow, top-down approach, Joseph Lowndes elucidates the 'long term process' by which conservatives 'attempted to link racism, anti-government populism and economic conservatism into a discourse and institutional strategy'.[99] Robert Smith, despite emphasizing the Southern Strategy, is even more compelling in linking racism and conservatism, showing how application of the core ideals of American conservatism: limited government, states' rights and individualism, have resulted in racism.[100] This thesis seeks to augment the scholarship linking race and conservatism by exploring the connection between the evolving resistance and new conservatism as seen through grassroots articulations of economic and racial conservatism in the rural Deep South in opposition to the War on Poverty.

While race was central to the rise of conservatism, the origin of conservatism does not lie in the white backlash against the radicalism of the 1960s. Lowndes, MacLean and Kimberley Phillips-Fein have shown the roots of conservatism lie in opposition to the New Deal.[101] These studies are part of a broader move to bring the political economy back into the narrative of the rise of conservatism. Most analyses on the rise of conservatism focus on cultural politics, suggesting white working class support for Republicans was won because of their social conservatism, in spite of their support for economic measures such as deregulation and the end of the social welfare state.[102] The work of Lowndes and Phillips-Fein also illuminates the thread of conservative opposition to social welfare originating in opposition to the New Deal, building through an 'emotionally powerful, racially-coded conservative discourse' which appealed to 'racial resentment and patriarchal "family values"' and reaching its epoch with Reagan's highly successful depiction of the mythical welfare queen.[103] While the focus of national attention on poverty and social injustice 'proved the most

[98] C. Danielson, *After Freedom Summer: How Race Realigned Mississippi Politics, 1965-1986,* (University Press of Florida: Gainesville, 2011), pp.3-6.
[99] J. E. Lowndes, *From the New Deal to the New Right: Race and the Southern Origins of Modern Conservatism,* (Yale University Press: New Haven, 2008), p.4.
[100] R. C. Smith, *Conservatism and Racism and Why in America They Are the Same,* (State University of New York Press: Albany, 2010).
[101] Lowndes, *New Deal;* Critchlow and MacLean, *Conservative Movement*; Phillips-Fein, *Invisible Hands.*
[102] Phillips-Fein, *Invisible Hands,* p.xii.
[103] E. Reece, *The Welfare Backlash: Past and Present,* (University of California Press: Berkeley, 2005), p.133.

significant obstacle to the Right's success', it would also be a powerful formative factor in southern conservatism.[104] As Governor of California during the War on Poverty, Reagan had successfully linked his attacks on welfare to fear of increased taxes and he had exercised his power to veto CAPs in his state more times than any other Governor.[105] Reagan had been drawing on this constructed image of welfare dependency, popularised by the mythical Cadillac driving 'welfare queen' whose race was never mentioned but never in doubt, since 1964.[106] Nixon, too, had utilised coded language in ostensibly race neutral appeals to the Silent Majority during his 1968 election campaign. Political Scientist Scott Spitzer demonstrates how southern conservatives shaped Nixon's use of the racialised anti-welfare rhetoric that remained a powerful component in efforts to draw together a new Republican majority coalition.[107] By 1980, Republicans had 'artfully forged racial hostility with conservative economic policy', successfully tapping into the fear and hostility white Americans felt toward African Americans and people on welfare.[108] This thesis, in tracing white opposition to CAPs thus forges powerful linkages between the racially based conservative opposition to social welfare from the New Deal to the rise New Right.

Scope of the Thesis

This thesis thus stands at the confluence of a number of historiographical traditions and will provide new insights into debates on the failure of the War on Poverty, the role of the rural Deep South in the rise of new conservatism and the nature of post-1965 Massive Resistance. It traces an evolving resistance that drew on many of the methods, mechanisms and rhetoric of earlier Massive Resistance to the Civil Rights Moment and which also utilised increasingly subtle and complex methods to control and subvert

[104] N. MacLean, 'Neo-Confederacy Versus the New Deal: The Regional Utopia of the Modern American Right' in Lassiter and Crespino (eds), *Southern Exceptionalism,* pp.311-312; J. T. Patterson, *Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress 1933-1939,* (University of Kentucky Press: Lexington, 1967). Patterson describes how opposition to the New Deal had been the formative factor in the conservative coalition.
[105] Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas [hereafter LBJL]: WHCF EX-FG 150 1/1/67 Box 213, Folder FG 150 10/19/67-1/31/68 EX, Orville Freeman to President Lyndon Johnson, 'Weekly Roundup', 1 December 1967.
[106] '"Welfare Queen" Becomes Issue in Reagan Campaign', *New York Times,* (15 February 1976), p.51.
[107] S. J. Spitzer, 'Nixon's New Deal: Welfare Reform for the Silent Majority', *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 42, No. 3 (2012), p.477.
[108] Quadagno, *Welfare,* p.196.

black activism – methods which were inextricably tied to the emerging new conservatism. In tracing the evolution of Massive Resistance through white opposition and accommodation to Mississippi's CAPs, this thesis seeks to add a new dimension to Crespino's 'subtle and strategic accommodations'; to highlight the role of ostensibly race neutral opposition to antipoverty programs in the rise of the Mississippi Republican Party; to provide a new interpretation of Nixon's impact of the War on Poverty at the grassroots, state and national levels; and to emphasize the centrality of race, class and gender in shaping Mississippi's response to the War on Poverty, but also the nature of the evolutionary resistance and new conservatism.[109]

This thesis will add a new dimension to the grassroots rise of Deep South conservatism, drawing on the class based approach of Lassiter and incorporating the racial focus of Kruse to explore the rural Black Belt contribution to the emerging national conservatism. Crespino briefly addresses the Mississippi Republican Party's attempts to use its connection to the White House to 'monitor and amend the local implementation of antipoverty programs in ways that would help win Republicans influence among the state's white voters'; however, he does not fully examine the significance, complexity and variety of those attempts.[110] Examining the largely unexplored white response to Mississippi's CAPs, this thesis will complicate Crespino's narrative of white Mississippian's journey to the heart of the 'conservative countermovement' by exploring the white accommodations and opposition to CAPs that were at times neither subtle nor strategic.[111] The rural Deep South not only originated the sophisticated 'color-blind' meritocratic language which suburbanites perfected but also, as the cross-class white opposition to antipoverty programs will illustrate, the Black Belt remained at the forefront of evolutionary resistance. However, the evolution of Massive Resistance was not always successful and it is in an exploration of the successes and failures of this evolution that this study provides a new understanding of the development of partisan politics in Mississippi and the rhetorical and tangible links between the rural Deep South and the Nixon Administration. Exploring the changes in the goals, institutions, grassroots organisations, ideology and rhetoric of Massive Resistance in Mississippi after 1965 will place the Deep South back

[109] Crespino, *In Search,* p.4.
[110] Ibid., pp.224-6; Danielson, *Freedom Summer*, pp.35-6. Likewise, Danielson's study of the struggle for black political access only briefly mentions the War on Poverty.
[111] Crespino, *In Search,* p.4.

into a national story of long Massive Resistance, overcoming false north-south pre-1965, post-1965 dichotomies.[112]

Examining white opposition to CAPs also sheds new light on the development of the Mississippi Republican Party and the impact of President Nixon on the War on Poverty as Mississippi Republicans utilised their close relationship with the Nixon White House in order to enhance white control over antipoverty programs and thus win Republican support at the white grassroots. This thesis will explore the impact of the Nixon Administration on the War on Poverty at the grassroots, challenging the flawed interpretation that suggests Nixon proved detrimental to the War on Poverty only in his second term.[113] It will examine the 'indirect assault' perpetrated by Nixon and successive OEO directors on antipoverty programs that Leloudis, Korstad and Kenneth O'Reilly describe, but whose mechanisms and impact at the grassroots have yet to be fully explored.[114] The manoeuvring of the Mississippi Republican Party exposes an unexamined aspect of the party's strategy to position itself as the true conservative party and to undermine the attempts of Johnson's White House to utilise CAPs to mobilise black voters.[115] The attacks of the Mississippi Republican Party on CAPs are at the heart of a conservative populism that a number of historians have shown to be central to the rise of the New Right. Kazin traces the movement of populism from the left to the right beginning in the 1940s, Lisa McGirr sees the penultimate phase in the rise of national conservatism as populist conservatism, 'piloted by Reagan' post-1966, attacking 'liberal "permissiveness," "welfare chiselers"… and "big government"', and Ronald Formisano depicts the 'reactionary populism' of the anti-busing campaign.[116] This thesis traces the interconnection of the racial conservatism and anti-authoritarianism that appealed to Deep South whites with the economic conservatism that had been attracting white collar suburbanites since Eisenhower.

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[112] As described in M. D. Lassiter, 'De Jure / De Facto Segregation: The Long Shadow of a National Myth', p.27; J. F. Theoharis, 'Hidden in Plain Sight: The Civil Rights Movement Outside the South', p.51 and J. Crespino, 'Mississippi as Metaphor: Civil Rights, the South and the Nation in the Historical Imagination', p.109, all in Lassiter and Crespino (eds), *Southern Exceptionalism*.

[113] Clark, *War on Poverty*, p.159; A. Orleck, 'Conclusion: The War on the War on Poverty and American Politics since the 1960s', in Orleck and Hazirjian (eds), *War on Poverty*, pp.349-440.

[114] Leloudis and Korstad, *To Right,* p.338; K. O'Reilly, *Nixon's Piano: Presidents and Racial Politics from Washington to Clinton,* (Free Press: New York, 1995), p.315. O'Reilly briefly addresses Nixon's impact on OEO, arguing that Nixon's people 'chipped away at OEO nearly every day until the President's resignation'.

[115] Crespino, *In Search*, p.224.

[116] Kazin, *Populist Persuasion,* p.4; McGirr, *Suburban Warriors,* p.16; Formisano, *Boston Against Busing,* p.3.

Most significantly, local Republican opposition to CAPs tapped into the racial resentment and fear of white Mississippians, thus making a significant contribution to the racial coding of the phrase 'people on welfare' that was central to national conservatism.[117] While antipoverty programs were distinct from welfare programs, in Mississippi in the 1960s and 1970s this distinction was largely irrelevant. The white establishment maintained its control over public welfare departments and their entrenched racially discriminatory practices excluded African Americans. Occasional attempts to alter the racial discrimination of the Department of Public Welfare, including instances of withholding Social Security, had no effect.[118] Antipoverty programs were the only black-operated programs that received federal funds, thus posing a unique threat to Mississippi's white establishment and becoming the target for specific as well as generalised anti-welfare rhetoric as well as offering an opportunity for whites to extend states' rights arguments – the rhetorical centrepiece of earlier Massive Resistance – into the 1970s. The development of this ostensibly colour blind language, which was the direct result of the conflation of race and antipoverty programs, is one of the most significant and enduring legacies of white opposition to CAPs. Leloudis and Korstad have shown the manoeuvring of the post-Goldwater generation of North Carolina Republicans to "colour" antipoverty efforts black, making community action little more than a cover for 'racial intrigue'.[119] In Mississippi, no effort was required on the part of Republican or Democratic politicians to make CAPs appear black – poor whites simply refused to be involved in programs that required their children's or their own attendance in integrated facilities. Politicians used this white opposition to CAPs to forge powerful linkages between white grassroots opposition to African American advancement, the seemingly race neutral middle-class articulations of opposition to federal intervention and social welfare, and wider national themes of conservatism beyond the limited political manoeuvring of the Nixon Administration.

As recent studies have shown, the Civil Rights Movement and the War on Poverty destabilised traditional race and class relationships and intensified growing

[117] F. Slocum, 'White Racial Attitudes and Implicit Racial Appeals: An Experimental Study of 'Race Coding' in Political Discourse', *Politics and Policy*, 29, No. 4 (2001), p.667.
[118] R. H. Boehm, J. H. Bracey, Jr., and A. Meier (eds), *Papers of the NAACP. Part 20: White Resistance and Reprisals, 1956-1965*, (University Publications of America: Frederick, 1996), Reel 2, fr.0137-0140.
[119] Leloudis and Korstad, *To Right*, p.8.

class tensions, not only among African Americans but also among other non-white minority groups.[120] There were around 1400 Chinese immigrants and their decedents living in Mississippi by 1970. First generation immigrants had found an 'economic niche' operating grocery stores in the Delta that catered to African Americans, while the second and third generations were more Americanised, better educated and increasingly likely to pursue economic opportunities outside Mississippi; as such, there was no Chinese involvement in the state's CAPs.[121] There was, however a significant poor population among the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians based in Neshoba, Leake, Kemper and Newton counties who, as Cobb explains in his study of the Choctaw antipoverty program benefitted greatly from the creation of its own CAP. Federal funding combined with their relative isolation gave the Choctaw program the ability to 'circumvent the South's white power structure'.[122] Bauman and Clayson have examined the complicating impact of a multiracial constituency on local programs; however, outside of the Choctaw reservation Mississippi's CAPs remained a biracial battleground.[123]

While race lies at the heart of this study of Mississippi's CAPs, it is the intersection of race and class that was most significant in shaping the white and black response to antipoverty programs and the nature of the evolving resistance and emerging conservatism. There is a danger in making racism 'too broad and trans-historical'; however, racism was saturated in the post-World War Two 'consumer society' and inextricably linked with class.[124] By the mid-1960s, the earlier largely middle-class Civil Rights Movement had given way to the second phase of Civil Rights activity – a poor people's movement that reflected the intra-racial class divisions that were especially intense in Mississippi.[125] Martin Luther King Jr. acknowledged the 'evils' of the class system, recognising 'the need for empowerment as a key to ending… poverty' in his strong support for maximum feasible participation of the poor in

[120] Ashmore, *Carry It On*, p.15; R. Bauman, 'The Black Power and Chicano Movements in the Poverty Wars in Los Angeles', *Journal of Urban History,* 33, No. 2 (2007), p.281.
[121] J. W. Loewen, *The Mississippi Chinese: between Black and White,* (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1971), pp.154-184; R. S. Quan with J. B. Roebuck, *Lotus Among the Magnolias: the Mississippi Chinese* (University Press of Mississippi: Jackson, 1982), pp.3, 146-154.
[122] Cobb, 'War on Poverty', pp.392-395.
[123] Ibid.; Clayson, *Freedom*, pp.100-120.
[124] Sugrue, *Urban Crisis*, p.8; Cohen, *Consumers' Republic,* p.227.
[125] Moye, *Let the People,* p.25.

CAPs.[126] Bartley's now discredited idea of the neo-bourbon elite led movement made class central to Massive Resistance; however, since then the role of class has been largely overlooked.[127] Class was important in the formation of Massive Resistance at its most basic level – certain White Citizens' Councils pointed to their middle-class membership to 'promote an image of political respectability'. The *Brown* ruling had served to unite a broad cross-section of the community in protest, while CAPs ignited a more complex response that varied along class lines.[128] The socioeconomic divisions evident among white Mississippians in their response to CAPs – from the sustained and often violent opposition of poor whites and the reluctant accommodation of white businessmen to the politically-motivated opposition of some middle-class whites – paradoxically often served to enhance rather than diminish white control over CAAs.[129] The class divisions evident in earlier phases of the Civil Rights Movement between the established middle-class leadership of Civil Rights organisations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and groups such as the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) further complicated the racial landscape in which CAPs operated. In emphasizing the 'class based coalition in the metropolitan Sunbelt' over the mass grassroots appeal of rural Black Belt Massive Resistance, Lassiter simplifies rural Black Belt Massive Resistance and diminishes its role in the formation of national conservatism.[130] Rather than positing class over race, this thesis examines the complex intersections of class and race in Mississippi's relationship with CAPs that renders the rural Deep South more, not less complex.

Gender – particularly in combination with race and class – is a significant analytical category in the confluence of these historiographies. Women, particularly African American women, were central to the War on Poverty (especially in Head Start programs) and became a focal point of opposition as welfare increasingly came to be understood in gendered as well as racialised terms as a program benefitting black women, even though African American women were a minority of welfare

[126] Jackson, *From Civil Rights*, p.275.
[127] Bartley, *Massive Resistance*, pp.26-7.
[128] C. Webb, 'Introduction' in Webb (ed.), *Massive Resistance*, pp.4-6.
[129] Delta State University: Charles W. Capps, Jr. Archives and Museum, Civil Rights Oral Histories, Ambrose Webster II interview with C. M. George, 21 June 2001, http://www.deltastate.edu/pages/1297.asp [accessed 22 April 2011].
[130] Lassiter, *Silent Majority*, pp.28-9.

recipients.[131] Women had been overlooked by the male-oriented New Deal, but beginning with their involvement in the War on Poverty, African American women organised at the grassroots and worked tirelessly to improve the quality of services in their neighbourhoods.[132] In the male-dominated world of Deep South white supremacy, women's political roles were defined through their motherhood, 'invested in and even empowered by' white supremacy.[133] Karen Anderson examines the role of women in providing a veneer of respectability and nonviolence to the working-class Massive Resistance movement in Little Rock.[134] In Virginia, white mothers supported segregation up to but not including the point of school closures – 'basement mothers' arranged temporary classes until public schools could be reopened.[135] Dailey examines how fears of miscegenation through a 'sexualised theology shaped the nature of the struggle between segregationists and desegregationists'.[136] Recent scholarship has highlighted the central role of women – white middle-class women – to the formation of national conservatism: as grassroots organisers in Orange County and the anticommunism of 'populist housewives' from across Southern California and prominent anti-Equal Rights Amendment campaigners and feminists.[137] While the focus of this thesis lies primarily at the intersection of race and class, black and white women – as poverty warriors, as targets of the evolving sexualised rhetoric of Massive Resistance and as grassroots conservative activists articulating an ostensibly race neutral opposition to CAPs – stand at the centre of the intersecting racial, class and gendered articulations of massive resisters, southern conservatives and opponents of the War on Poverty.

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[131] P. Nadasen, *Welfare Warriors: The Welfare Rights Movement in the United States*, (Routledge: New York, 2005), p.xvi.
[132] A. Orleck, *Storming Caesars Palace: How Black Mothers Fought Their Own War on Poverty*, (Beacon Press: Boston, 2005), p.3.
[133] E. G. McRae, 'White Womanhood, White Supremacy and the Rise of Massive Resistance', in Webb (ed.), *Massive Resistance*, p.181.
[134] K. S. Anderson, 'Massive Resistance, Violence, and Southern Social Relations: the Little Rock, Arkansas, School Integration Crisis, 1954-1960', in Webb (ed.), *Massive Resistance*, p.215.
[135] P. M. Gaston and T. T. Hammond, 'Public School Desegregation: Charlottesville, Virginia, 1955-1962', reproduced in R. Boehm (ed.), *Congress of Racial Equality Papers, Part 2: Southern Regional Office, 1959-1966*, (University Publications of America: Frederick, 1983), Reel 2, fr.0106.
[136] Dailey, 'Sex, Segregation and the Sacred', p.138.
[137] McGirr, *Suburban Warriors*, p.4; M. M. Nickerson, *Mothers of Conservatism: Women and the Post-War Right* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2012), p.xix; D. T. Critchlow, *Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism: A Woman's Crusade*, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2007), p.7; C. E. Rymph, *Republican Women: Feminism and Conservatism from Suffrage through the Rise of the New Right*, (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 2006).

The breadth and scope of the War on Poverty – particularly its bureaucratic complexity, which produced a vast array of source material – necessitates a single state case study approach. Mississippi is an ideal location for this study, and for an exploration of Massive Resistance and Deep South conservatism for a number of reasons. As the location for the most intense and sustained resistance to desegregation, the birthplace of White Citizens' Councils and home to the most powerful manifestation of state sponsored white supremacy, Mississippi was the nucleus for the violent and vocal Massive Resistance of the late 1950s and early 1960s and at the forefront of the evolving resistance after 1965.[138] Mississippi has been variously characterised as a 'closed society', the 'most southern place on earth' or a microcosm of American society.[139] Racial segregation that was devastatingly institutionalised and seemingly irrevocably entrenched in local leadership and the grassroots manifested itself in different ways across the country. Mississippi's Massive Resistance is unique and important, but not exceptional. Thus an analysis of Mississippi's distinctive resistance sheds new light on the threads of commonality in the evolving resistance and emerging conservatism, clearest and most persistent of which is the sustained struggle to preserve the racial, class and gender privileges of white Americans.[140] With little urbanisation and less suburbanisation, this study of Mississippi augments the Sunbelt thesis by exploring the rise of the Republican Party outside the Sunbelt suburbs. In Mississippi, Republicanism drew less on a shared environment than on a basic conservative cultural, racial and religious foundation which has yet to be fully explored. The level of 'ideological cohesion' between the segregationist Democratic politicians and new Republicans was greater in Mississippi than any other state, as the 'overtly racial features of the old Mississippi politics [were] absorbed into a broader economic and social conservatism'.[141] Black, Black and Clayson suggest it was the divide between the national liberal and southern conservative Democrats that broke down the Solid South, rather than the 'inherent grassroots strength of the Republicans'.[142] Kazin, however, suggests that the work of grassroots conservatives was essential to harness mass resentments and provide a home for 'white refugees from the liberal crack up', of which

[138] Crespino, *In Search*, p.4.
[139] J. W. Silver, *Mississippi: the Closed Society*, (Harcourt, Brace & World: New York, 1964); J. C. Cobb, *The Most Southern Place on Earth: The Mississippi Delta and the Roots of Regional Identity*, (Oxford University Press: New York, 1992).
[140] Dowd Hall, 'Long Civil Rights Movement', p.1238.
[141] Black and Black, *Southern Republicans*, p.119.
[142] Ibid., p.136; Clayson, *Freedom*, p.24.

CAPs were a prime example.[143] Thus a study of Mississippi provides a valuable opportunity to examine the work of these previously overlooked grassroots conservatives as they combined the evolving resistance with ostensibly race neutral articulations of opposition to CAPs, to the advantage of the Mississippi Republican Party.

Mississippi, with a poverty rate over twice the national average, also serves as an ideal location for a case study of antipoverty programs. 55 per cent of Mississippi's population lived beneath the poverty threshold in 1960, compared with 22 per cent of the national population.[144] This poverty threshold had been developed in the early 1960s by Social Security Administration worker Mollie Orshansky based on data from the 1960 census and the USDA's economic food plan.[145] Adopted by the OEO in 1966, the threshold was based on family size, the gender of the head of the house and the area – farm or nonfarm, ranging from $1,138 for a single woman living in a farm area to $5,335 for a male-headed family of seven in a nonfarm area.[146] As the poorest state in the nation and the focus of intense Civil Rights activism that had generated much national attention, Mississippi was granted a disproportionately large share of OEO funds for a host of CAPs and three state-wide single purpose programs: two Head Start programs including the nation's largest, earliest and perhaps most controversial Head Start program CDGM, and a manpower training program.[147] While Mississippi was home to a number of antipoverty programs, it is not among the number of southern states that have been the focus of recent studies of the intersection of the War on Poverty and the Civil Rights Movement. Some of Mississippi's antipoverty programs, notably CDGM, the Tufts-Delta Health Centre at Mound Bayou and the Choctaw CAP

[143] Kazin, *Populist Persuasion,* p.246.
[144] US Census Bureau, 'Persons by Poverty Status in 1959, 1969, 1979, 1989 by State', http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/census/1960/index.html [accessed 30 July 2013]. By 1970 the population of Mississippi and the nation living in poverty had fallen to 35 and 14 per cent respectively, but Mississippi's poor population as a proportion of its total population remained the highest in the nation.
[145] G. M. Fisher, 'The Development of the Orshansky Poverty Thresholds and Their Subsequent History as the Official U.S. Poverty Measure', (May 1992, rev. September 1997), http://www.census.gov/hhes/povmeas/publications/orshansky.html [accessed 5 July 2013].
[146] Ibid.; US Census Bureau: Poverty Thresholds, 1966, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/threshld/thresh66.html [accessed 5 July 2013]; 'Shriver Announces New Yardstick to Determine the Standard of Poverty', *New York Times,* (3 May 1965), p.24. This level was adjusted in 1969, utilising the Consumer Price Index as basis for the annual adjustment in poverty thresholds. Fisher details the controversy surrounding this change and the subsequent updates to the poverty threshold, including Nixon's attempts to shift the terminology from 'poor' to 'low-income'.
[147] LBJL: Office Files of Fred Panzer, Box 158, 'Summary: Federal Social Economic Programs, State Program Summary FY1967'.

have already been the focus of academic study.[148] Although valuable, these studies address high-profile programs in isolation, thus benefitting neither from the broader context this thesis provides nor from the insights gained through an examination of the low-profile, rural CAPs. This thesis shares the approach of the works of Jordan, De Jong and Cobb in focusing on the historical and political context at the grassroots rather than an economic analysis; however, its focus on rural CAPs provides an opportunity to examine this overlooked aspect of the War on Poverty.[149] Providing this broader context necessitates an approach that, while somewhat fragmented, engages with wide a range of interconnected themes and tropes in the course of the four case studies.

Chapter one addresses the renewed phase of Massive Resistance that was sparked by the failure of Mississippi's white establishment to terminate CDGM, by tracing white accommodation and opposition to the Group's biracial state-wide replacement Head Start program, Mississippi Action for Progress. It traces the ways in which white middle-class involvement in the biracial program became a veneer under which whites sought to use the program to control and contain black activism. The chapter also explores the wider white response to the program, which showcases an evolving resistance that combined the methods, mechanisms and tropes of earlier Massive Resistance with an ostensibly race neutral language of opposition. Chapter two explores another facet of this evolving resistance, as the rural CAA Southwest Mississippi Opportunities became a federally funded extension of the white establishment through which local whites undermined black political and economic progress. Chapter two also examines the role of the Mississippi Republican Party in establishing white control of CAAs, both before, and more significantly and successfully, during Nixon's presidency. Strategic Training and Redevelopment, a state-wide manpower training program is the focus of chapter three. It explores the interracial middle-class coalition that perpetuated a destructive racial discrimination throughout the program and signalled a return to the paternalism characteristic of earlier

[148] J. F. Findlay, 'The Mainline Churches and Head Start in Mississippi: Religious Activism in the Sixties', *Church History*, 64, No. 2 (1995), pp.237-250; Jordan, 'Fighting for the CDGM', pp.280-307; G. De Jong, 'Plantation Politics: The Tufts-Delta Health Center and Intraracial Class Conflict in Mississippi, 1965-1972', pp.256-279; Cobb, 'War on Poverty', pp.387-410, all in Orleck and Harizjian, *War on Poverty.*

[149] L. M. Rice, 'In The Trenches of the War on Poverty: The Local Implementation of the Community Action Programs 1964-1968', Unpublished PhD Thesis, (Vanderbilt University, 1997); J. D. Greenstone and P. E. Peterson, *Race and Authority in Urban Politics: Community Participation and the War on Poverty*, (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1976).

Southern race relations. Further, chapter three offers a reinterpretation of the impact of the Nixon Administration on the War on Poverty, illustrating his deliberate but covert attempts to undermine antipoverty programs at the grassroots. The final chapter is a case study of the state's only urban CAA, Community Services Association. Operating in an intensely racially polarised environment, Community Services Association illustrates the centrality of race to the failings of CAPs by exploring the ways in which the program exacerbated intra-racial class divisions. This chapter also examines the white establishment's local and national struggles against the Legal Services program – struggles which showcase the intersection of the evolving resistance and emerging conservatism at the grassroots and national levels.

Chapter One

Mississippi Action for Progress

This chapter explores white Mississippi's relationship with Head Start, through the failed Massive Resistance campaign against CDGM and the opposition and accommodation to CDGM's biracial, state-wide replacement program Mississippi Action for Progress (MAP). This chapter outlines the Massive Resistance campaign against CDGM, showcasing the evolution in the language of opposition that would be central to the white response to Mississippi's War on Poverty programs. The failure of this Massive Resistance to CDGM sparked a new phase of Massive Resistance – an evolving resistance against antipoverty programs in Mississippi that drew on methods and mechanisms of the earlier Massive Resistance but which also incorporated streams of racialised and gendered opposition to social welfare programs that are a central part of the emerging conservatism, from the New Deal to Reagan. The creation and reluctant white accommodation to the OEO-mandated biracialism of MAP showcases this evolving resistance. In exploring the complex and often contradictory white response to MAP, this chapter illuminates a web of violent and non-violent opposition to MAP that, while neither coordinate nor organised, nonetheless served to cripple the program. An examination of the white response to MAP's African American female Executive Director illustrates the confluence of the evolving resistance and the racial, class and gendered opposition to the War on Poverty. A county-level case study illustrates the evolution of Massive Resistance at the grassroots, as MAP became a mechanism through which local whites attempted to contain African American advancement. Further, this chapter places race at the heart of the MAP's failings and illustrates how white Mississippi's reluctant accommodation to MAP was far from an acceptance of the unavoidable post-1965 racial realities. The reluctant accommodation was a biracial veneer under which the methods and mechanisms of earlier Massive Resistance were combined with an ostensibly race neutral language of opposition to perpetuate white supremacy through MAP.

Massive Resistance to CDGM

CDGM's battle for survival has been well-documented: in a first-hand account by CDGM worker Polly Greenberg, by Civil Rights and War on Poverty historians, and by social scientists.[150] However, one of the most significant aspects of this battle has remained unexplored. White opponents of CDGM utilised the methods, mechanisms and rhetoric of the classic phase Massive Resistance as well as incorporating New Deal era and Dixiecrat rhetoric opposing social welfare programs and federal intervention. This Massive Resistance campaign against CDGM was neither a complete success, nor was it a total failure. White Mississippi was unable to secure CDGM's demise; however, the campaign significantly damaged the Group's ability to function effectively and substantially decreased its size, level of federal funding and its operational independence. The failure of the Massive Resistance to CDGM – and in particular the failure of many of the tactics of the classic phase of Massive Resistance combined with the success of the newer rhetorical tropes utilised by the Group's opponents – marked a hugely significant shift in white opposition to African American advancement. The campaign against CDGM was the first and last "classic" Massive Resistance campaign that white Mississippi would fight against a War on Poverty program. White Mississippians learned from this campaign, incorporating the successful tropes and tactics of the classic phase of Massive Resistance into an evolving resistance to the War on Poverty, and combining them with streams of racialised and gendered opposition to social welfare that drew on central conservative tenets and were couched in an ostensibly colour-blind rhetoric predicated on a language of rights, freedoms and individualism.

First funded in May 1965 with a $1.4 million OEO grant for a summer Head Start program, CDGM operated 84 centres across 20 Mississippi counties for 6,000

[150] Greenberg, *Devil,* pp.289-326; Carter, *Music has Gone,* pp.31-49; Dittmer, *Local People,* pp.363-388; Jordan, 'Fighting for the CDGM', pp.280-307; K. T. Andrews, 'Social Movements and Policy Implementation: The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and the War on Poverty, 1965 to 1971', *American Sociological Review*, 66, No. 1 (2001), pp.71-95; K. Mills, *Something Better for My Children: The History and People of Head Start*, (Dutton: New York, 1998), pp.58-75; P. Greenberg, 'Three Core Concepts of the War on Poverty: Their Origins and Significance in Head Start', in E. Zigler and S. Styfco (eds), *The Head Start Debates,* (Paul H. Brookes: Baltimore, 2004), pp.61-84.

poor African American pre-school children.[151] Head Start was designed to provide educational and nutritional services to poor children, and to encourage parent involvement in the program in order to address the educational and social disadvantages facing poor children starting school. Through CDGM however, Head Start became more than simply a pre-school program for poor children. CDGM not only addressed children's educational, nutritional and medical needs but also – and more worryingly for the white establishment – the Group gave poor African Americans a new measure of power and control over their own lives. Evolving from Freedom Summer's Freedom Schools, CDGM combined the Civil Rights activism of the white 'outside agitators' who founded the program and the black grassroots staff who operated its centres with the federal funding of the War on Poverty.[152] Further to this threat of federally funded Civil Rights activism, the Group mobilised a new raft of poor African Americans to community activism, incorporating constituencies – primarily poor black mothers – untapped in earlier phases of movement activism. African American women were central to Mississippi's movement and many of these women, such as Fannie Lou Hamer, were essential to early efforts to establish Head Start centres in counties across Mississippi in the face of considerable opposition. However, CDGM's educational agenda appealed to many black women who had previously been unwilling to become involved in political activism. Thus the Group mobilised a significant new wave of community activists who would go on to fight against white establishment attempts to control or eradicate their local Head Start centres and play a significant role in the development of Mississippi's pre-school education system.[153]

Mississippi's white establishment responded in force to the perceived threat to white supremacy posed by this federally funded activism. Led by one of the architects of Massive Resistance, Senator John C. Stennis, white Mississippi mobilised many of the mechanisms, methods and rhetoric of Massive Resistance in fierce opposition to CDGM. Senators Stennis and James O. Eastland wielded their political power in

[151] LBJL: Office Files of Harry McPherson, Box 14, Folder Poverty (1966) [2 of 2], 'Proposal for a Full Year Head Start Program of CDGM', c.1966. Poor whites refused to send their children to integrated Head Start classes.
[152] Wisconsin Historical Society Freedom Summer Digital Collection: Lucile Montgomery Papers, 'Mississippi Action for Community Education Project Description', May 1965, http://cdm15932.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p15932coll2/id/32629 [accessed 20 October 2013].
[153] Greenberg, *Devil*, p.87; Hale, 'Struggle Begins', p.516; Jordan, 'Fighting for the CDGM', pp.301-2.

Washington in attempts to secure the defunding of CDGM.[154] At the local level, CDGM centres and staff became the target of violent white supremacists attacks – shots were fired into CDGM centres and crosses were burned outside the Group's Mt. Beulah office and other local centres.[155] Local white segregationists evicted sharecroppers for enrolling their children in CDGM's classes and refused to extend credit to participating black businesses.[156] The Sovereignty Commission – the state-funded anti-integration watchdog – employed its spy network to infiltrate and threaten the Group. Commission investigators paid informants for information from inside CDGM Central Office and local centres, compiling a dossier of information that ran into the hundreds of pages, accusing staff of corruption, incompetence and of participating in Civil Rights activities on CDGM time using CDGM resources.[157] Used by Senator Stennis in his press briefings and Senate statements, the Sovereignty Commission reports provided a wealth of material for the local media to construct an image of Head Start as corrupt, a waste of tax dollars and as a source of funding of Civil Rights activism. Local reporters called for "responsible Mississippians" to run local programs, frequently referring to the lack of judgment of administration bureaucrats and of the generous distribution of tax money – carefully constructed language which not only avoids overt references to race, but which draws on powerful Southern tenets opposing federal interference and concerns over the redistribution of wealth.[158] The mechanisms of earlier Massive Resistance were thus combined with a new language which echoed the conservative rhetoric of Senator Barry Goldwater, drawing on his extensive base of support in the state.[159]

The Sovereignty Commission and local press employed the Massive Resistance rhetoric of "outside agitators" and charges of communism, linking their opposition to CDGM to wider national concerns. Charges of communistic activity failed to have any

[154] Dittmer, *Local People*, p.372.
[155] Ibid., p.371.
[156] Hale, 'Struggle Begins', p.510.
[157] E.g. Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Series 2515: Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Records, 1994-2006, [hereafter MSSC Records], SCR ID # 6-45-1-91-1-1-1, Report by Tom Scarborough, 15 September 1965, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=images/png/cd06/046379.png&otherstuff=6|45|1|91|1|1|1|45696|# [accessed 8 July 2013]; SCR ID # 6-45-1-92-1-1-1, E. Johnston to H. Glazier, 7 September 1965, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=images/png/cd06/046380.png&otherstuff=6|45|1|92|1|1|1|45700|# [accessed 8 July 2013]; Greenberg, *Devil*, p.223-229.
[158] LBJL: Papers of Bernard L. Boutin, Box 20, Folder RS Southeast Region, 'More Bad Apple Money,' *Unknown Newspaper*, 5 March 1966.
[159] Crespino, *In Search*, p.1. In the 1964 Presidential election, the first following the passage of the Civil Rights Act, Goldwater received 87.14 percent of Mississippi's popular vote.

weight with OEO, as accusations were even more unlikely than earlier charges of communism against Civil Rights activists.[160] With the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) in decline and the Vietnam War increasingly unpopular, appealing to anticommunism was becoming less successful. However, such accusations found favour with the local press, who reported frequently on the red influence on OEO programs. More successful was the utilisation of the new threat of Black Power – in the wake of the Watts riot local reporters drew on this fear, depicting CDGM as 'an instrument of the black separatist movement'.[161] One of the most potent aspects of all phases of Massive Resistance had been politicians' and reporters success in linking the overt racism of the Deep South with wider concerns. Both the Dixiecrat revolt and opponents of school integration drew on national concerns of the expanding power of the federal government; anticommunism provided a rich vein of hysteria to exploit. Now the menace of Black Power replaced the threat of communism as local whites seized on fears of Black Nationalism to articulate grassroots white fears about an outside alien force in a way that had national resonance.

This evolution of the language of Massive Resistance was one of the most significant and potent legacies of white opposition to CDGM and became a central and successful tactic of post-CDGM white opposition to Mississippi's War on Poverty. However, not all of the elements of Massive Resistance to CDGM proved as successful; while the violent attacks faced by the Group's staff perpetuated Mississippi's climate of racial oppression they served to bolster national support for CDGM. The mechanisms of Massive Resistance, drawing on the climate of oppression perpetrated by violent white supremacists operated most successfully in a "closed society", not under the spotlight of national attention. Local reporters persisted in utilising aggressively racist rhetoric, describing Head Start as 'one of the most subtle mediums for instilling the acceptance of racial integration and ultimate mongrelization ever perpetuated in this country'.[162] Such inflammatory language did not aid the attempts of Stennis to maintain the appearance of opposition based on evidence of fiscal malfeasance. However, Stennis wielded sufficient political power to pressure the Johnson Administration and

[160] MSSC Records, SCR ID # 6-45-5-25-2-1-1, E. Johnston, Memo to File, 29 May 1967, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd06/047421.png&otherstuff=6|45|5|25|1|1|1|46731| [accessed 7 July 2013].
[161] R. Evans and R. Novak, 'Radicals Fighting to Keep State Poverty War Control', *Clarion Ledger* (30 January 1967); V. Riesel, 'Red Influence Seen in Unrest', *Commercial Appeal,* (30 July 1967).
[162] Dittmer, *Local People,* p.370-1.

OEO Director Sargent Shriver into defunding CDGM in October 1966.[163] Shriver's capitulation to the blatantly racially motivated demands of Mississippi's white establishment provoked a barrage of damaging criticism directed at Shriver, OEO and the Johnson Administration. Shriver was especially damaged by the CDGM controversy, during which CDGM's supporters directed their attacks at Shriver personally, most notably in a full-page advert in the *New York Times* emblazoned with the cry 'Say It Isn't So, Sargent Shriver' and signed by CDGM's numerous high-profile supporters.[164] Indeed, Shriver's desire to avoid further adverse publicity shaped OEO's future role in Mississippi.[165] This public pressure combined with the remarkable perseverance and dedication of CDGM staff in the face of considerable adversity and animosity resulted in a reversal of Shriver's decision only two months later that partially restored CDGM's funding. However, white Mississippi's campaign had irreversibly damaged CDGM and robbed the Group of its ability to be an instrument for social change.[166] The majority of the counties under CDGM control had been siphoned off into the replacement program or left without funds – either way, vulnerable to coordinated white attacks designed to destroy or control the local Head Start remnants. The funds left under CDGM control brought with them a raft of new conditions that immobilised CDGM staff, curtailed the programs' operational independence and deepened internal divisions between Black Power advocates and white outsiders.[167]

The mechanisms and rhetoric of Massive Resistance – notably the state Sovereignty Commission and language drawing on national tropes such as anticommunism – were potent weapons in the campaign against CDGM.[168] Their failure to ensure the Group's demise reflected the need for a change in white supremacist tactics, especially now the state was operating under the continuing glare of national attention. While CDGM's opponents – led by Stennis, the Sovereignty Commission and Mississippi's Governor – did begin to utilise new and more powerful rhetoric, including fears of Black Power and opposition to social welfare, they relied too much on mechanisms from the classic phase of Massive Resistance, unaltered to

[163] Ibid., p.377.
[164] W. R. MacKaye, 'Politics Behind OEO's Fund Cutoff', *Washington Post*, (5 October 1966); 'Say It Isn't So, Sargent Shriver', *New York Times*, (19 October 1966).
[165] S. Stossel, *Sarge: the Life and Times of Sargent Shriver*, (Smithsonian Books: Washington, D.C., 2004), pp.462-467.
[166] Tom Levin quoted in Greenberg, 'Three Core Concepts', pp.80-1; Payne, *Light of Freedom*, p.347.
[167] Dittmer, *Local People*, p.381.
[168] Carter, *Music Has Gone*, p.36.

reflect post-Civil and Voting Rights Act racial realities. However, this failure had potent and long-lasting consequences. The resultant evolving resistance shaped the nature of the Mississippi's War on Poverty, of post-1965 race relations and of Mississippi's contributions to the developing new conservatism. White opponents of Mississippi's antipoverty programs would draw on the mechanisms and methods of Massive Resistance that had been successful in opposing CDGM, while making strategic accommodations in their attempts to curtail the violent extremism and aggressively racist rhetoric that had been detrimental to their campaign against the Group. The evolving resistance would utilise some of the tactics and tropes of the classic phase of Massive Resistance alongside a newer language of ostensibly race neutral opposition that drew on central conservative tenets and on streams of racialised opposition to social welfare evident in Mississippi since the New Deal. The first stage of this evolving resistance was the creation of MAP, CDGM's biracial state-wide replacement manufactured by the Johnson Administration to ensure the continued provision of Head Start in the state and temper criticism of its handling of CDGM. While the Massive Resistance campaign had materially damaged CDGM, it was the creation of the MAP that would ultimately destroy the grassroots base of support for Head Start that CDGM had inspired.

Creating Mississippi Action for Progress

In the Massive Resistance campaign against CDGM, Mississippi's white supremacists had failed to adapt their tactics and make the changes that were required in light of the altered racial landscape and the national attention that had been focused on Mississippi since Freedom Summer. The white response to MAP was, in large part, shaped by this failure. In their reluctant accommodation of MAP, powerful white Mississippians sought to entrench white control of Head Start, accepting an integrated board in order to avoid another losing battle with OEO and national supporters of CDGM. To maintain a veneer of biracialism over this control, white Mississippians couched their opposition to Head Start and to MAP in new ways, utilising an ostensibly race neutral language that drew on central tenets of conservatism. This white domination of MAP destroyed the grassroots base of support for Head Start in Mississippi and deepened the intra-racial

class divisions that were undermining the potency of black activism. Thus while the outright Massive Resistance to CDGM had failed to secure the Group's demise, the evolving resistance evident in the white response to MAP quietly shaped a program designed to educate and feed poor children into a mechanism to control and suppress black activism.

The public mishandling of the CDGM debacle by both OEO and the Administration had made Head Start in Mississippi a matter of national interest. President Johnson was eager to pacify both CDGM's national supporters – a Great Society coalition of national Civil Rights, union and church groups – and CDGM's opponents, particularly Mississippi's powerful Senators. Stennis in particular posed a significant threat: as a ranking member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, he was in a position to threaten appropriations for the War on Poverty and the Vietnam War.[169] Johnson was already coming to regret the increasingly controversial community action concept; however, he remained supportive of Head Start. Not only did the program appeal to him personally, but Head Start was also politically valuable – particularly in southern states – for its potential to provide a base around which to rebuild a Democratic Party including moderate whites and newly enfranchised African Americans.[170] Creating MAP and populating its new board to oversee the provision of pre-school classes for Mississippi's poor children thus became a matter of national political significance. Johnson's Special Advisor Harry McPherson personally oversaw the recruitment of a biracial board that aimed to appease the Administration's critics and Mississippi's powerful politicians, as well as provide a building ground for an integrated Democratic Party. In fashioning a new board to meet these political ends, McPherson relied on the advice of Douglas Wynn, a Mississippi lawyer and Regular Democrat who vehemently opposed CDGM. In correspondence with McPherson, Wynn evoked a threatening spectre: a coalition of the Delta Ministry, CDGM and Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, which he claimed had been trying in every possible way to 'defeat the moderate right thinking people of Mississippi'.[171] In his attempts to use MAP to rebuild the Democratic Party, McPherson excluded those whom Wynn and his

[169] Dittmer, *Local People*, p.372.
[170] LBJL: Recordings and Transcripts of Conversations and Meetings, Lyndon B. Johnson and Roy Wilkins, 5 January 1964, Tape WH6601.03, Citation #9429. Ladybird Johnson was a very prominent public supporter of Head Start.
[171] LBJL: Office Files of Harry McPherson, Box 14, Folder Poverty (1966) [2 of 2], Douglas Wynn to Harry McPherson, 2 April 1966; Crespino, *In Search*, pp.209-210.

fellow white Mississippians perceived as extremists, such as SNCC activists – who had moved from inclusive to exclusionist policies as the 1960s progressed – and MFDP members. In doing so, McPherson ensured the removal of the only remaining challenge to white middle-class domination of the board. More significantly, the exclusion of these activists removed the only potential board members who had an understanding – or at least an awareness – of poverty that was completely lacking among the middle-class members of McPherson's board, both black and white. McPherson instead recruited Regular Democrats such as industrialist Owen Cooper and plantation owner Oscar Carr, Jr., moderate whites such as Mississippi Young Democrats founder and *Delta Democrat Times* editor Hodding Carter III, and middle-class African Americans such as NAACP State President Aaron Henry and Rev. Merrill W. Lindsey.[172] McPherson's involvement had ensured white Mississippi's acceptance of a biracial board – an important achievement given the racial hostility that characterised Mississippi in 1966. More significantly however, McPherson had given white middle-class control over the program the administration's stamp of approval and had deprived MAP of its potential to engage with Mississippi's poor population in any meaningful way.

Conservative by national standards, the new board was nonetheless controversial in Mississippi. Stopping just short of allegations of communism, local reporters raised the spectre of socialism in opposing MAP, utilising ostensibly race neutral language that drew on conservative opposition to the expanding welfare state. Concerned at the involvement of Carter, *Jackson Daily News* columnist Tom Ethridge accused the Young Democrats of representing left wing elements of the Great Society who would soon have Head Start children 'law-suiting their school sponsor because their filet mignon's are underdone'.[173] Such rhetoric fed back into the popular image of Head Start as federal largesse run out of control – the product of an overbearing federal government that would harm not help Mississippi's poor. Local politicians reinforced this ostensibly colour blind opposition to Head Start and the wider War on Poverty. Senator Eastland wore his vigorous opposition to the Great Society's intent to squander

[172] Mississippi Department of Archives and History: Owen Cooper Papers [hereafter Cooper Papers], Subgroup 3, Series 13, Box 76, Folder 1A, 'Cooper Named Head of MAP Program', *The Baptist Record*, (27 October 1966); Payne, *Light of Freedom*, p.343. Six white and six African American board members were joined by six Target Area Representatives – Payne describes MAP's board as a 'recycling of loyalist Democrats', right down to its middle-class constituency.
[173] T. Ethridge, 'Mississippi Notebook', *Jackson Daily News*, (22 February 1967).

public funds and create a strong central government as a badge of honour.[174] Governor Paul B. Johnson took every opportunity, in correspondence with Shriver and in his public statements to malign CDGM and OEO.[175] The appearance of opposition to "socialistic" programs was a pragmatic rather than an ideological decision for Mississippi's Governor and Senators. Stennis distrusted what he called the 'very unwise and too costly' antipoverty programs which he believed represented an unsound trend in government; however, it was the demands of his constituents to end the alleged use of federal funds for Civil Rights activities that compelled him to act.[176] Historians have identified the 'complex and ultimately symbiotic relationship' between political elites and grassroots constituents: what Hirsch described as a community level vigilantism that 'precipitated and complemented the organised, peaceful efforts in the political arena'.[177] Opposition to antipoverty programs developed in a similar pattern – a feedback loop of grassroots opposition that necessitated and supported political opposition from the local to the federal level.

Eastland had long benefitted from the federal funds flowing into his home county despite maintaining his public opposition to federal interference in his state. Indeed, he had a hand in drafting the legislation that ensured he and other wealthy planters in Sunflower County could benefit from the money meant to aid destitute sharecroppers.[178] In their reluctant acceptance of MAP, Stennis and Eastland maintained their facade of opposition to antipoverty programs while they employed their extensive networks of power and influence in order to keep OEO funds in white hands. Both Senators petitioned to increase Mississippi's Head Start funding in private, while maintaining public opposition to increased OEO appropriations.[179] State

[174] Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Jackson: Mississippi Council on Human Relations Records 1960–1980 [hereafter MCHR Records], Box 14a, Folder Republicans, C. M. Hills, 'Eastland Lashes GOP's CR Votes', *The Clarion Ledger*, (30 September 1966).
[175] Cooper Papers, Subgroup 3, Series 13, Box 76, Folder 1A, 'Johnson Backs Biracial Group for Mississippi Head Start', *Times Picayune*, (11 October 1966).
[176] Mississippi State University, Congressional and Political Research Center, Starkville: John C. Stennis Papers [hereafter Stennis Papers], Series 25, Box 15, Folder 22, Senator John C. Stennis to A. A. Roebuck, 3 May 1965.
[177] Lewis, *Massive Resistance*, p.95; Hirsch, *Second Ghetto*, p.216.
[178] Moye, *Let the People*, p.168.
[179] University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill: Southern Historical Collection, Southern Oral History Program Collection, A-0104, Ken Dean interview with Jack Bass, 28 March 1974, p.13, http://dc.lib.unc.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/sohp/id/9290/rec/12 [accessed 4 August 2013]. Dean recalls Eastland saying, '"It's one of these things I've got to vote against, but you fellows understand that I've already done more work prior to the time the vote's taken to make sure we get what we want than anybody's one vote will mean."'

Economic Opportunity Office (SEOO) Director Martin Fraley rallied the local white establishment to signal their public acceptance of MAP, arranging for telegrams supporting MAP signed by a number of newspaper editors and State Democratic Party officials to be sent to Shriver.[180] However, away from the public eye, the spy networks of Mississippi's earlier Massive Resistance efforts were brought to bear against MAP. The Sovereignty Commission remained highly suspicious of the program, not least because of the involvement of Henry; however, fear of the consequences of the survival of CDGM overrode its opposition to the presence of moderate African Americans.[181] The powerful white board members meant the Sovereignty Commission was not compelled to infiltrate MAP as it had done CDGM, but its investigators kept the program closely monitored. Eastland, likewise suspicious of Henry's involvement, set his own spy to keep watch on MAP while expanding white control over antipoverty programs by creating more CAPs in 'his' counties.[182] The manoeuvring of Mississippi's political elite, supported and necessitated by a cross-section of white Mississippi utilised an evolving resistance to entrench white control over MAP.

MAP's biracial board not only served as a veneer under which the white establishment secured control of the program's funds, but also fractured Mississippi's movement along class lines and deepened the divisions which had been present since before Freedom Summer. The response of black Mississippians to MAP illustrates both the formative impact of class and race on antipoverty programs, and the detrimental impact of these programs on black activism. CDGM had been shaped by its conscious rejection of middle-class involvement, as its leadership embraced the separatism of the MFDP and SNCC and excluded middle-class NAACP representatives from CDGM's board and staff.[183] The dislike was mutual: NAACP's national leadership was united with state NAACP leaders Henry and Charles Evers in their aversion to CDGM. Despite this, Henry and Evers – supported by the Mississippi State NAACP Conference – gave their public support to CDGM's bid to secure refunding, even as Henry agreed

[180] MSSC Records, SCR ID #99-57-0-7-1-1-1, Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Minutes, 11 October 1966.
http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd10/082481.png&otherstuff=99|57|0|7|1|1|1|81439| [accessed 7 July 2013].
[181] E. Johnston Jr., *Mississippi's Defiant Years, 1953-1973: An Interpretive Documentary with Personal Experiences* (Lake Harbor Publishers: Forest, 1990), p.290.
[182] Greenberg, *Devil*, p.819.
[183] SNCC activists, however, refused to become involved in a program dependent on federal funds.

to participate in MAP in order to ensure the survival of Head Start in Mississippi.[184] For CDGM and the MFDP, this was a sell-out to the white power structure and they responded by calling for a boycott of MAP centres.[185] Already bitter at Henry for accepting the compromise in Atlantic City, the MFDP saw Henry's involvement as undercutting of its base of support in favour of the Regular Democrats. Fannie Lou Hamer said of NAACP involvement in MAP, '"We aren't ready to be sold out by a few middle-class bourgeoisie and some of the Uncle Toms who couldn't care less."'[186] New CDGM Director John Mudd also evoked the language of betrayal by drawing comparisons with post-Reconstruction era plantations complete with a white leader and "head nigger," an anger that was echoed in local fliers which called on African American to demonstrate in opposition to the 'third era of slavery'.[187] CDGM had achieved genuine poor participation: despite its alleged radicalism and focus on Civil Rights activism, the Group secured the involvement of poor parents who had previously been unwilling to become involved in movement activism.[188] MAP undercut this poor participation and fractured the grassroots base of support for Head Start that CDGM had generated, deepening the class divisions that were undermining the potency of black activism.

The creation of MAP produced a wave of bitterness and cynicism among poor black people in Mississippi.[189] CDGM staff and supporters directed their anger at local MAP staff and centres. In Wayne County former CDGM personnel threatened parents and staff. MAP parents were afraid to send their children to school and the teachers were given the idea that if they tried to walk the children from the centre to their cars they could be hurt.[190] CDGM supporters threatened a boycott of local MAP Head Start centres and in Greenwood their supporters disrupted the local MAP County Advisory

[184] R. H. Boehm, J. H. Bracey, Jr., and A. Meier (eds), *Papers of the NAACP Part 28: Special Subject Files, 1966-1970, Series A, Africa – Poor People's Campaign,* (University Publications of America: Frederick, 1996), Reel 10, fr.0834-5, 0705-6.
[185] MSSC Records, SCR ID #6-45-4-4-1-1-1, MFDP Flier 'Why Are We Here?', 8 October 1966, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd06/047013.png&otherstuff=6|45|4|4|1|1|1|46325| [accessed 26 October 2012].
[186] Dittmer, *Local People*, p.378. This NAACP-MAP / MFDP-CDGM class divide reflects the black class divisions that deepened as black political progress gained pace in the 1970s.
[187] Mississippi State University, Mitchell Memorial Library Special Collections, Starkville: Hodding Carter III Papers [hereafter Carter Papers], Box 2, Loose Materials, M. Hoffman, and J. Mudd, 'The New Plantation', *The Nation*, (24 October 1966), pp.411-415; 'Flyer 3', c.October 1966.
[188] Greenberg, *Devil,* p.87.
[189] Carter Papers, Box 2, Loose Materials, Statement by Owen Brooks, n.d.
[190] Mississippi State University, Mitchell Memorial Library Special Collections, Starkville: Patricia Derian Papers [hereafter Derian Papers], Box 1, Folder 4, P. Derian Report, 26 January 1967.

Board (CAB) elections. Local media seized upon the incidents, claiming CDGM was waging tenacious guerrilla warfare against biracial moderates, conveniently forgetting their own opposition to MAP.[191] MAP struggled to gain a foothold in the face of grassroots African American opposition. After two months MAP, with its $3 million grant, had only opened five centres in two counties for 100 children, while CDGM kept 60 centres for 4,000 children open on a voluntary basis.[192] Ultimately, in the first few months of its existence MAP failed to live up to any of the expectations of its creators or supporters. Mississippi's politicians and press had drawn on race neutral language to articulate their opposition to MAP, drawing on conservative fears of socialism to perpetuate an ostensibly colour blind but highly racialised perception of Head Start. Rather than uniting poor African Americans in support of the national Democratic Party, MAP had undermined black enthusiasm for Head Start and deepened intra-racial class divisions. The support of powerful whites was a veneer over a thinly veiled suspicion that would soon give way to open hostility.

Even as MAP received its first grant, appropriations for the War on Poverty were waning. Economic Advisor Walter Heller tried to persuade the President to keep the Great Society growing at least modestly in 1966, despite the rising costs of Vietnam. 'A billion or two... could spell the difference between progress and stagnation of the Great Society' and, Heller argued, could do a lot of good in strengthening the economic and political base for Vietnam.[193] However, opposition to the bill from Republicans and southern Democratic politicians was compounded by the interdepartmental bickering which was resulting in internecine warfare in local communities and increasingly bad publicity for the War on Poverty, not least over CDGM.[194] President Johnson's administration gave the 1966 antipoverty bill a low priority in its lobbying resulting in delayed passage, a cut in appropriations and restrictions written into the community action budget.[195] Despite this, Head Start appropriations increased. Head Start programs were initially funded under CAPs, but

[191] J. Biggers, 'Civil Rights Agitators Block Delta MAP Election', *The Clarion Ledger,* (24 January 1967); S. Criss, 'Militant Groups Delay Action for Leflore Poverty Program', *Commercial Appeal,* (24 January 1967).
[192] Carter Papers, Box 2, Loose Materials, 'Shriver Comes Across', *The New Republic,* (7 January 1967), p.10.
[193] LBJL: Confidential File: WE/MC Box 98, Folder WE9 Poverty Program (Great Society) 1964-1966, Walter Heller to President Lyndon B. Johnson, 21 December 1965.
[194] LBJL: WHCF EX LE/WE7, Box 165, Folder LE/WE9 EX, Phillip S. Hughes to Joseph Califano, 6 August 1966.
[195] J. A. Loftus, '$20,000 Donated to Poverty Unit', *New York Times,* (11 December 1966).

due to the magnitude of the program and the substantial degree of public interest in it, those funds were ring-fenced in 1966 and set at $310 million.[196] By 1967, CDGM's renewed funding and the creation of MAP ensured that Mississippi was receiving a disproportionately large share of OEO funds.[197]

The Limitations of Biracialism

Historians as diverse as Kramer, Moynihan and Murray have illustrated the detrimental impact of the multitude of administrative shortcomings in CAPs, as well as in OEO's regional and national offices, on the War on Poverty. Alongside claims of a misguided ideology and misunderstood purpose, administrative failings and bureaucratic complexity have most often been blamed for the failure of the War on Poverty.[198] Many of the accusations levelled against CDGM stemmed from alleged administrative errors, but numerous CAAs suffered the same initial failings as CDGM and some, most notably the Harlem Youth CAA in New York, were more genuinely Black Power oriented.[199] It was only where there was a political agenda that such failings were brought to light. The nature of biracialism in MAP reveals how the program's administrative shortcomings were further complicated by race. More significantly, however, a biracial veneer masked the perpetuation of racial discrimination through MAP – in individual acts of discrimination and a pervasive culture of racial antagonism – ensuring that such issues were never sufficiently addressed by OEO. Further, MAP's administrative failings were seized upon by disgruntled employees as part of an ostensibly race neutral opposition to the program that proved far more effective than the overtly racialised campaign to destroy CDGM. Exploring the true nature of the biracial cooperation within MAP thus undermines the emphasis that many historians have

[196] LBJL: Papers of Bernard L. Boutin, Box 14, Folder FI Finance, Phillip S. Hughes to Sargent Shriver, 23 March 1966.
[197] LBJL: Office Files of Fred Panzer, Box 158, 'Summary: Federal Social Economic Programs, State Program Summary FY1967'. Mississippi received $40.2 million OEO funds in 1967; only $6.9 million less than Texas (the state with the largest number of poor people in the country) and significantly more than Georgia's $31.4 million, Alabama's $18.4 million and Tennessee's $21.4 million. Each of those states had greater numbers of poor people than Mississippi.
[198] Kramer, *Participation*, p.186; Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible*, p.203; Murray, *Losing Ground*, p.36.
[199] 'HARYOU Report Finds Huge Sums Missing', *New York Times*, (30 March 1967); 'Question of Credibility', *Washington Post*, (16 October 1966), p.E6. Huge sums of money were reported missing from HARYOU-ACT, the nation's largest antipoverty program, in its first two years of operation but HARYOU-ACT had the support of Senator Adam Clayton Powell.

placed on CAPs administrative failings. It also reveals an evolving resistance through which white staff and board members entrenched their control over the program – control that damaged its ability to engage with and provide services for the poor children it was created to serve.

From its inception, MAP encountered problems amongst its biracial staff at the central office in Jackson and in centres throughout the state, including accusations of discrimination from black and white employees, personal antagonisms and destructive rumour-mongering. The complications of race were more debilitating than the initial administrative failings. White executive MAP staff were convinced of their own colour-blindness. Believing their own propaganda, or equating opposition to the vociferous racism of Governor Ross Barnett to a lack of prejudice, former employee John Ott assured Executive Director Walter Smith that if the whites in the MAP organisation could not be depended upon to be objective then no white in the country could.[200] When MAP employee Harold Jason complained he was being blocked in his ambitions 'because he is Negro', executive staff dismissed his complaint as resulting from Jason's lack of cooperation based on the conviction of their unimpeachable commitment to racial equality. White MAP staff also made claims of racial discrimination, most often directed at the hiring and firing practices of African American Executive Director Helen Bass Williams. White MAP employees Lucy Morris and Woody Carter voiced familiar complaints that white employees were being fired while black employees were being retained. Writing to the white Board Chairman Owen Cooper, Morris removed all reference to race in her complaint, claiming that newcomers were replacing older employees.[201] In her statements to Williams, Morris was less circumspect, relating instances which Williams felt could indict MAP for the promotion of racism and prompting Williams to urge the board to discontinue Morris' services.[202] Woody Carter claimed to be the last white Area MAP Supervisor forced out by Mrs Williams.[203] Morris and Carter were by no means the only complainants amongst old employees being 'exterminated' to make room for a "Negro appointee".[204] So many grievances

[200] Carter Papers, Box 1, Loose Materials, John Ott to Walter Smith, 17 May 1967.
[201] Carter Papers, Box 2, Loose Materials, Lucy Morris to Owen Cooper, 18 November 1967.
[202] Cooper Papers, Subgroup 3, Series 13, Box 78, Folder 1b, Helen Bass Williams to Owen Cooper, 22 November 1967.
[203] Cooper Papers, Subgroup 3, Series 13, Box 78, Folder 1a,W. D. Carter to Owen Cooper, 8 January 1968.
[204] Cooper Papers, Subgroup 3, Series 13, Box 78, Folder 1a, Report, 18 November 1967.

were filed that MAP's Legal Adviser Francis B. Stevens recommended Cooper create a second grievance committee to manage the workload.[205] Such complaints, assiduously collected by the Sovereignty Commission as part of its investigations, often drew on popular white fears and misconceptions of Head Start. Former staff members who were bitter at their dismissal used familiar language which drew on white fears that the program was becoming "blacker", claiming that white MAP employees were under pressure not to dismiss blacks. When Donnie Hammack complained of her dismissal from her position at MAP as a key punch operator to Congressman Sonny Montgomery, she appealed not only on her own behalf but on behalf of the many white taxpayers who, she asserted, were footing the bill, utilising race neutral language which drew on conservative opposition to federally funded programs.[206]

In local MAP centres, such attitudes created tensions and animosity which severely impacted on the operation of Head Start classes. White staff members were unconcerned with even the appearance of equality. In Yazoo County, where the still highly segregated and isolated Delta communities came under constant attack from local elected officials and threats of violence from Klansmen, the centres were being eroded from within by white employees. White staff persisted in their use of the word "nigger" despite repeated training on the unacceptability of the term. Unfounded rumours that Douglas Tuttle, MAP Deputy Director of Administration, advised white and Negro staff not to eat together had a destructive effect on the tentative progress that was being made toward even the appearance of interracial cooperation.[207] Other rumours had at least a basis in truth and eroded the limited trust and cooperation amongst MAP staff at the central office, such as the unwritten agreement between Tuttle, former Executive Director Walter Smith and regional supervisors never to integrate the centres, 'unless there is NO way to avoid it'.[208] The passage of time led not

[205] Cooper Papers, Subgroup 3, Series 13, Box 78, Folder 1b, Francis B. Stevens to Owen Cooper and Leroy Percy, 9 November 1967; J. Ward, 'Covering the Crossroads with Jimmy Ward', *Jackson Daily News*, (27 October 1966). This reflects a nationwide trend in complaints of race and gender discrimination: the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission expected 2000 complaints of discrimination in its first year of its operation, it actually received 8672.
[206] MSSC Records, SCR ID #6-45-6-74-2-1-1, Donnie Hammack to Sonny Montgomery, 13 March 1969, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd07/047855.png&otherstuff=6|45|6|74|2|1|1|47160| [accessed 22 March 2012].
[207] Carter Papers, Box 2, Loose Materials, 'Report on Conditions in Northeast Mississippi, Yazoo County, Central Office Personnel', by Walter Smith, 15 May 1967.
[208] Derian Papers, Box 1, Folder 15, Helen Bass Williams to Owen Cooper, Roy Wigfield, William Zierden and Pat Derian, 26 June 1967.

to progress in trust and cooperation between black and white MAP staff, but to the pervasive and entrenched suspicion and distrust and a very distinct separation of the races in the MAP central office.[209] Inspecting MAP in September 1968, OEO consultant Timothy Kirkby found the attitudes of both races worrying. Staff members of both races accused each other of showing compassion and camaraderie to Head Start parents of their own race, while treating those not of their race with coldness and indifference.[210] While the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. had shattered hopes of achieving interracial harmony in biracial programs and organisations across the country, there was little change in race relations in MAP. Biracialism was a political necessity for whites on the board and an unwelcome but unavoidable reality of their job for white MAP employees. Statistics showing equal numbers of African American and white MAP staff were lauded as signs of racial progress by the White House and national media.[211] Such statistics, however, fail to convey the true nature of biracialism in MAP. The attitudes of white and black staff hampered their ability to administer MAP and the actions and attitudes of the white executive staff bolstered white control of Head Start while maintaining the appearance of interracial cooperation.

Lincoln County

A case study of MAP in Lincoln County provides a vivid illustration of the potency of the evolving resistance, as it transformed MAP from a program designed to provide assistance to poor children and engage with their parents into an extension of the white establishment. This county level case study also demonstrates the true nature of the failure of the War on Poverty: not misunderstanding or mismanagement but the systematic use of CAPs as a mechanism to suppress black activism. A cross-section of Lincoln County's population drew on some of the methods and mechanisms of earlier Massive Resistance to exclude poor African Americans from any meaningful participation in the program, perpetuate racial and class discrimination, and preserve racial segregation. MAP in Lincoln County endured blatant corruption of the CAB, white violence and intimidation, staff conflicts, and the indifference of MAP central

[209] Cooper Papers, Subgroup 3, Series 13, Box 77, Folder 5b, General Staff Conference Minutes, 1 October 1968.
[210] Carter Papers, Box 2, Loose Materials, Timothy S. Kirkby to Mary M. Miller, 30 September 1968.
[211] E.g. 'Henry Sees Racial Advance in New Antipoverty Group', *Commercial Appeal*, (2 October 1966).

office in addition to the staff shortages due to declining MAP funding. Some of these difficulties were suffered by MAP centres throughout Mississippi, each contributing in varying degrees to the failure of integration, the white domination of the program or in some cases the closure of centres. Not a microcosm of Mississippi, Lincoln County was rather a crucible in which all of these pressures, conflicts and mechanisms of opposition were brought to bear against the program.

Lincoln County is in many ways representative of the 25 counties in which MAP centres operated. The high rate of poverty – Lincoln County's poverty rate was 29.3 per cent, almost double the national poverty rate – and heavily racially skewed perceptions of poverty reflect conditions across the state. While rural, non-farm dwelling whites accounted for the largest number of the county's poor population, poverty disproportionately affected the county's African American population. One-third of the county's residents were African American and 80 per cent of those black residents were poor.[212] The pervasive power of violent white supremacist organisations – particularly concentrated in the southwest of the state – remained potent in Lincoln County into the late 1960s, perpetuated by local chapters of the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), the United Klans of America (UKA) and the Americans for the Preservation of the White Race (APWR).[213] Alongside these groups, the local white establishment played a prominent role in suppressing black activism. In 1955 Lamar Smith, an African American attempting to register voters, was shot dead in broad daylight outside the courthouse in Brookhaven, Lincoln's county seat. Though three white men were brought to trial, the all-white grand jury refused to indict them.[214] Brookhaven was also the home of District Court Judge Tom P. Brady, author of the pamphlet condemning "Black Monday" and the figurehead of the White Citizens Councils.[215] By 1966 – the year MAP was created – despite the Civil Rights legislation, federal investigations and Supreme Court rulings, race relations had changed little in Lincoln County. As such, the white response to MAP in Lincoln County illustrates

[212] LBJL: Office Files of Fred Panzer, Box 49, OEO Information Center 1966 Community Profile of Lincoln County. The average poverty rate in Mississippi in 1966 was 34 per cent. For an average family farm family of four in Lincoln County the poverty threshold was $2,868.
[213] M. Newton, *The Ku Klux Klan in Mississippi: A History*, (McFarland & Company: Jefferson, 2010), p.129. While the AWPR claimed to be non-violent, 'so many KKK members belong to the APWR in certain areas of South West Mississippi that it is impossible to tell where one stops and the other begins'.
[214] University of Southern Mississippi, McCain Library and Archives, Special Collections: Will D. Campbell Papers, Box 54, Folder 16, NAACP pamphlet, 'M is Mississippi and Murder', November 1955, http://digilib.usm.edu/cdm/ref/collection/manu/id/2834 [accessed 26 March 2012].
[215] McMillen, *Citizen's Council,* p.265.

remarkable continuities from earlier Massive Resistance. Brookhaven schools were forced into token desegregation in 1966, enrolling five black students into the town's public school system. However, the Klan's intimidation of black and white parents combined with the blatant racism of the county school supervisor to ensure that no desegregation occurred in Lincoln's county schools until 1970.[216] Thus MAP centres remained at the frontline of the white supremacists' battle to prevent the integration of the county's children, and lay at the heart of the evolving resistance.

Class played a central and largely overlooked role in shaping white and black Mississippians' relationships with antipoverty programs. At the grassroots, the intra-racial class divisions deepened by antipoverty programs proved particularly destructive to MAP. In Lincoln County, the ostensible acceptance of integrated MAP classes by the white middle-class CAB members and the seemingly contradictory rejection of an integrated Head Start program by poor whites combined to enable local establishment control of the program. CABs, which controlled and operated MAP at the county level, were populated largely by middle-class members of both races.[217] White middle-class CAB members were willing to accept the token integration of the county's Head Start classes, as their children were unlikely to be affected by this OEO-mandated integration. However, this acceptance masked a determination to use their board membership to maintain their racial, class and gender privileges. In the place of the required Target Area Representatives (TARs), African American CAB members were more often middle-class members of the established black leadership, who had no vested interest in improving the opportunities and conditions of the poor community. Indeed, their interests were better served by yielding to the wishes of the white segment of the board. Numerous letters sent to the MAP chairman from poor Brookhaven parents testify to the corruption of the CAB and the systematic exclusion of poor African Americans from the board.[218] This interracial, middle-class domination of the

[216] C. C. Bolton, *The Hardest Deal of All: The Battle over School Integration in Mississippi, 1870-1980,* (University Press of Mississippi: Jackson, 2005), p.155. The County school supervisor, when asked why he had failed to distribute the Freedom of Choice forms, informed Department of Health, Education and Welfare officials that 'Nigra's can't read publications anyway'.

[217] Carter Papers, Box 2, Loose Materials, Jule Sugarman to Owen Cooper, 5 November 1966. Each county in which MAP operated had its own CAB, required to include representatives of the county's local officials, private organisations and poor population and to reflect the racial composition of the county. It was the aim of MAP and OEO that eventually these CABs would take over the operation of their local centres, and MAP central office and board would cease to exist.

[218] Cooper Papers, Subgroup 3, Series 13, Box 76, Folder 9a, Edna Phillips to Owen Cooper, 28 August 1968; Mary Louise Wilson to Owen Cooper, 14 August 1968.

CAB entrenched white control over the county's MAP centres even as it accepted a measure of integration as unavoidable. However, the county's poor white population rejected even a token integration of MAP classes. This refusal to send their children to integrated centres was both supported and necessitated by the local white supremacist organisations. The KKK and the APWR in Lincoln County counted among their members local elected officials and businessmen – their influence even extended into the local churches. While still in the minority, these extremists ruled the county. The white community was in fear of possible grave consequences were it to defy the Klan, while many were in sympathy with their aims, if not their methods. Poor whites, the least willing to entertain the idea of integration, faced retribution from the Klan even if they did: a white child enrolled in one of the all-black MAP centres in the county was soon frightened away.[219]

In addition to manipulating the CAB in order to maintain their racial and class privileges, the middle-class white board members drew on powerful, ostensibly race neutral opposition to Head Start. Despite being tired of racial violence impeding the county's economic progress, the middle-class white businessmen and local officials of the CAB did not see Head Start as an aid to the county's economic development. Believing the image of Head Start constructed in the local and occasionally national media, middle-class whites opposed Head Start's perceived excessive salaries and high rents as being a waste of tax payers' money.[220] OEO attempted to stem such attacks, recognising the damage they inflicted on the antipoverty programs. OEO Director of Public Relations DuPree Jordan asked *Jackson Daily News* reporter Tom Ethridge to stop repeating old rumours and gross distortions, but to no avail.[221] Drawing on these popular myths of Head Start and the wider War on Poverty gave local whites an "acceptable" form of opposition to a program which, while originating in fear of the changing dynamic of race relations in their local communities, couched opposition in colour blind language that utilised conservative opposition to the expanding federal government. Antipoverty programs were providing African Americans with the money and organisation to build on their newly-won political rights, meaning whites could no

[219] Carter Papers, Box 1, Folder Executive Session, M. Bryant, 'Fact Sheet: Problems and Victories of Lincoln County MAP Head Start Program', 29 November 1967.
[220] Ibid.
[221] Cooper Papers, Subgroup 3, Series 13, Box 77, Folder 11, DuPree Jordan to Tom Ethridge, 9 February 1967. Ethridge was by no means the most conservative reporter in Mississippi.

longer rely on poverty and lack of work to encourage African American migration north.[222] Gubernatorial Candidate (and future moderate Governor) William Waller drew on such ostensibly colour blind rhetoric when he charged the federal government of being in a conspiracy to keep welfare seekers and unemployable people in Mississippi, wasting hard earned tax money by providing uneducated house servants work as alleged school teachers in Head Start.[223] Angry at the national Democratic Party and, post-Goldwater, lacking a national political outlet for their outrage, middle-class whites articulated their opposition in race neutral terms wider conservative opposition to social welfare programs and federal taxation that drew on Goldwater's base of support in the state.[224]

As the earlier exploration of biracialism in MAP's central office illustrated, race significantly complicated and worsened the program's administrative shortcomings. At the county level, administrative shortcomings and funding cuts served to deepen racial divisions, which had severe consequences for the operation of local centres. The administrative failings and the temporary and uncertain nature of CAP funding fostered hostility amongst staff. Consulting Analyst Timothy S. Kirby reported that job insecurity created belligerent feelings as MAP staff 'have been jockeying to design job slots of power and money into which they themselves hope to be placed'.[225] In Lincoln County, budget cuts closed seven of its 18 Head Start units and reduced its personnel by almost one-third.[226] The cuts also provided an opportunity for the local white establishment to tighten its control of the program as the middle-class dominated CAB systematically excluded TARs.[227] The county's officials played on the administrative and financial problems facing MAP in their attempts to gain greater independence for the CAB – localism that would remove the only obstacle remaining to white control of the operation of MAP in Lincoln County.

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[222] Mississippi State University, Mitchell Memorial Library Special Collections, Starkville: Mississippi Republican Party Records [hereafter MRP Records], Series VI, Box F-6, Folder MRP-OF 1967/68, Adams County, W. T. Wilkins to G. W. Gulmon, 17 November 1967; 'Residency Laws for Reliefers', *Chicago Tribune*, (14 November 1967); Greenberg, *Devil*, p.199.
[223] 'Waller Raps US Tactics', *The Clarion Ledger*, (14 May 1967).
[224] It was on a platform strongly opposing federal taxation that Goldwater garnered 87 per cent of Mississippi's vote in 1964.
[225] Cooper Papers, Subgroup 3, Series 13, Box 77, Folder 5b, General Staff Conference Minutes, 1 October 1968.
[226] Cooper Papers, Subgroup 3, Series 13, Box 78, Folder 1a, Percy Howard to Owen Cooper, 24 January 1968.
[227] Cooper Papers, Subgroup 3, Series 13, Box 76, Folder 9a, Mary Louise Wilson to Owen Cooper, 14 August 1968; Clara Bell Kelly to Owen Cooper, 14 August 1968.

White violence played a significant role in opposing and compelling white opposition to MAP across the state. In Lincoln County, the failure of the ostensibly race neutral articulations of opposition from the white middle-class, the refusal of poor whites to attend integrated centres and the manoeuvring of the local establishment to prevent integration resulted in white supremacist violence. Helen Bass Williams, whose tenure as executive director was already being marred by white opposition to her attempts to increase poor participation in the program, was unwilling for MAP to be subjected to the accusations of discrimination levelled at CDGM.[228] When Williams instructed that the MAP centre in Pearlhaven be integrated, the county's white supremacists responded with violent attacks on MAP centres. Brookhaven's Mayor W. W. Godbold Jr. had received warning the Pearlhaven centre would be attacked and asked MAP Area Supervisor Milton Bryant to close the centre temporarily. However, the centre remained open and was burned to the ground. This violence, sparked by the threat of integration, spread to other MAP centres in the county. At Bogue Chitto, MAP had just moved from the local African American church to a purpose built centre, which was burned. Godbold maintained an angry and defensive stance in the face of suggestions the local police did not do enough to protect the children and their centres, incensed that the centre was integrated without the local community's permission.[229] Godbold had encouraged MAP to set up centres in his county, feeling secure in the power of the local white establishment to maintain segregation and certain he could direct the flow of federal funds to his political advantage. He alternated between blaming Bryant for not closing the centre on his advice and drawing on the unlikely claims originated by a Commission investigator that the fire was caused by wiring defects. The resurgence of Klan violence signified the local establishment's failure to control MAP and maintain segregation, leading Godbold to abandon his involvement in the program, distancing himself and all city officials from MAP and the political damage it was doing to him.[230]

The Klan did not limit its activity to violent attacks on integrated centres – local Klansmen also joined the state-wide wave of Klan violence directed at white MAP

[228] Carter Papers, Box 2, Loose Materials, Statement by Jack B. Price, n.d.
[229] Carter Papers, Box 2, Loose Materials, Minutes of MAP Board of Directors Meeting, 30 November 1967. At the time of the arson, Brookhaven had five white policemen and three black policemen with, according to Godbold, the same authority as whites.
[230] Ibid.; Stennis Papers, Series 39, Box 4, Folder 62, Memo to File by Erle Johnston, 30 November 1967.

employees. Royce A. Nevels, a white MAP Payroll Clerk who would later publicly decry the mismanagement and corruption in MAP, suffered economic and violent retribution from the White Knights of the KKK in Brookhaven for his involvement with MAP. Zelma Calhoun, the white secretary to MAP Area Supervisor Leon Scarbrough, had also been receiving obscene telephone conversations. Investigation by the FBI traced the perpetrator in both cases as Garland White, whom they identified as 'one of the big white Knights of the KKK' in Brookhaven.[231] The experience of MAP in Lincoln County illustrates mechanisms and tropes of opposition that MAP faced across the state, showcasing the evolving white resistance. The complementary grassroots mechanisms of opposition to MAP incorporated a cross-section of the community: poor and middle-class whites; violent extremists and businessmen; politicians and local officials. MAP's diverse range of opponents constructed a multifaceted and often violent web of opposition which drew on the mechanisms of earlier Massive Resistance combined with a newer, race neutral language of opposition that prevented the successful operation of MAP centres for children of both races. More than this, the white supremacist violence directed at MAP in Lincoln County was one of the earliest and most destructive instances in what would become a wave of violence against antipoverty programs across the South. Helen Bass Williams' involvement in the dispute over the Pearlhaven centre and the Sovereignty Commission's resulting investigation marked a significant development its campaign to undermine her leadership and re-establish white control of MAP.

Helen Bass Williams

Helen Bass Williams, MAP's African American Executive Director faced violent threats and harassment from Mississippi's white community. Nonetheless, it was not until MAP's board, staff and CABs began to systematically erode her authority with the assistance of the Sovereignty Commission that she was forced to resign. Her involvement with MAP serves as a clear cut illustration of the potency of the race and gender discrimination that undermined the War on Poverty. The role of the state-sponsored, tax-payer funded Sovereignty Commission reveals the evolution of Massive

[231] Carter Papers, Box 1, Folder Harassment and Negative Attitudes, Statement by Royce A. Nevels, n.d.

Resistance: Sovereignty Commission Director Erle Johnston selected a range of tactics honed during earlier phases of Massive Resistance, particularly his use of a gendered language of opposition, while also developing new methods and rhetoric that signalled a shift to a subtler form of opposition. The collaboration of MAP Board Chairman Owen Cooper with Johnston's campaign against Williams, despite his racial moderation and involvement in the integrated program, illustrates the detrimental impact of even the relatively benign motivations of white businessmen on antipoverty programs in Mississippi's fraught racial landscape.

Born in southern Illinois, Williams studied at the University of North Carolina before working in the South Carolina Department of Health, Education and Welfare.[232] In Mississippi, Williams taught at Tougaloo College then worked briefly as Health Director at CDGM and OEO consultant in Sunflower County before replacing Walter Smith as executive director of MAP in June 1967. A controversial appointment, Williams had extensive knowledge of education and Head Start but lacked administrative and managerial experience. She excelled at working with mixed race groups and was committed to the belief that poor blacks could and would gain power in integrated groups if they persevered.[233] During her brief time with CDGM Health Services, Williams' skill in dealing with the white establishment enabled her to secure funds for CDGM through the Mississippi Department of Public Health, which frequently let federal money go rather than integrate. However, Williams rejected the separatism of the MFDP and CDGM. She was uncomfortable with the prejudice against the middle-class that was, according to the account of CDGM employee Polly Greenberg, like a religious cult during the summer of 1965.[234] Williams saw Head Start as an opportunity for blacks to learn about running organisations and work with whites in what she called an integrative approach.[235] She remained committed to this approach,

[232] S. J. Hale, *Williamson County Illinois Sesquicentennial History*, (Turner Pub.: Paducah, 1993), p.304; MSSC Records, SCR ID #6-45-6-13-1-1-1, 'Note', 9 January 1968, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd06/047709.png&otherstuff=6|45|6|13|1|1|1|47018| [accessed 7 March 2012]. Typical of the inaccuracies in the reports of Commission investigators Tom Scarborough and Leland Cole, it took them six months to establish, incorrectly, that Helen Bass Williams was from South Carolina.
[233] M. O'Hara, '"Let It Fly": the Legacy of Helen Bass Williams', Unpublished PhD Thesis, (Southern Illinois University, 2004), p.200; Cooper Papers, Subgroup 3, Series 13, Box 76, Folder 5b, Jack E. Harper to Owen Cooper, 26 June 1967. Jack E. Harper Jr., of Sunflower County Progress congratulated Cooper for appointing a 'tireless dedicated and fair-minded person… [who] will make an everlasting contribution toward tranquil relations in our state'.
[234] Greenberg, *Devil*, pp.181-191.
[235] O'Hara, 'Let It Fly', p.175.

even in the face of violence, intimidation and a prolonged campaign by the Sovereignty Commission to have her fired.

By the time of the Commission's investigation into Williams' role in integrating the Pearlhaven centre, its investigators had already begun an intensive campaign to discredit her. Johnston, who had originally been the Commission's Public Relations Director, had pushed for years to advance the public relations function of the Commission and to rename the group to reflect that aspect of their work which he considered most important.[236] Now, as the Governor and other prominent leaders including Mississippi's Economic Council pushed Mississippians to accept that a measure of integration was unavoidable, Johnston was left with the task not of selling Mississippi's beliefs to the rest of America, but selling integration to Mississippians. Clearly Johnston had not become a pro-integrationist over night; rather he described himself as a 'practical segregationist'.[237] Far from willing to accept full integration and equal rights for African Americans, Johnston recognised in the face of overwhelming national pressure and federal legislation that a continued commitment to maintaining absolute segregation was injurious to white Mississippi. A measure of acceptance, though resulting in token desegregation, would ensure whites remained in control of the process and of Mississippi's economic and political future.[238] Johnston's limited acceptance of Head Start was based on the same philosophy. When questioned about Head Start he drew on the tropes of earlier Massive Resistance when informing a Rotary Club meeting that if the Federal government and the courts were going to force integration of the schools, it would be better that Negro children be taught the basics of hygiene, cleanliness, and concern for one another – all three of which he claimed were part of a Head Start curriculum.[239] Johnston's belief in the unavoidability of Head Start and the undesirability of CDGM combined with the Governor's reluctant acceptance of MAP to ensure that Johnston cooperated with MAP's first executive director, Walter

[236] University of Southern Mississippi, Center for Oral History and Cultural Heritage: Orley B. Caudill interview with Erle Johnston, 30 July 1980, http://digilib.usm.edu/cdm/ref/collection/coh/id/3986 [accessed 8 July 2013].
[237] Johnston, *Defiant Years*, p.292.
[238] Caudill interview with Johnston, 30 July 1980. These changes were not all for publicity – in 1965 the Sovereignty Commission also stopped donating funds to the White Citizens Councils. John C. Satterfield created a plan labelled 'Project B.I.G' (Business, Industry and Government), for the Commission to disseminate information to local Mississippi communities and correct the lies that had been told by outsiders coming into the state.
[239] Johnston, *Defiant Years*, p.298.

Smith.[240] Under Smith's leadership MAP posed no threat to white supremacy. Indeed, Johnston believed that Smith's MAP could be held up as a model program, an example for OEO of what might replace programs functioning without the support of the state.[241] Williams, an African American woman committed to developing meaningful grassroots involvement, threatened both white control of MAP and its model program status. Intent on removing her from MAP, Johnston initiated a relentless campaign to have her removed as soon as Williams' appointment was confirmed.[242]

MAP was lauded as a new era of interracial cooperation. However, its biracial board masked the determination of Mississippi's white establishment to maintain tight control over the program. An integrated board, staff and centres were acceptable but when Williams began to promote meaningful black community participation in the program, the board led by Cooper began to tighten its control of the program. Cooper utilised the Commission and the antagonism of white staff members to undermine Williams' leadership. He had little involvement with the Sovereignty Commission until Williams was appointed executive director, when he contacted Johnston and utilised the language of earlier Massive Resistance to express his desire to cooperate with the Sovereignty Commission in 'weeding out the agitators and revolutionaries'.[243] The relationship of Cooper and Smith with Johnston was not unusual – Civil Rights and antipoverty workers in Mississippi found it necessary to deal in some way with the Commission. Mississippi Council of Human Rights Director Kenneth Dean and Johnston quietly shared information in the late 1960s. Indeed, Dean urged Williams to cultivate a relationship with Johnston, but cautioned her to keep such a connection private. Though the racial troubleshooting of the Commission in the mid-1960s did help to blunt the extremism of the APWR and Klan, for Johnston his connection with antipoverty workers was simply another opportunity to entrench white control.[244] He

[240] While Smith did not actively promote black community participation, he was by no means an unreconstructed racist; he was the husband of newspaper editor Hazel Brannon Smith, famous for speaking out against the White Citizens Council.
[241] Cooper Papers, Subgroup 3, Series 13, Box 78, Folder 8, Kenneth Dean to Owen Cooper, 28 August 1967.
[242] MSSC Records, SCR ID #6-45-5-35-1-1-1, Memo to File, 16 June 1967, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd06/047438.png&otherstuff=6|45|5|35|1|1|1|46748| [accessed 6 March 2012].
[243] MSSC Records, SCR ID #99-48-0-489-1-1-1, Memo to File, 5 October 1967, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd10/081217.png&otherstuff=99|48|0|489|1|1|1|80181| [accessed 24 August 2012].
[244] Cooper Papers, Subgroup 3, Series 13, Box 78, Folder 8, Kenneth Dean to Owen Cooper, 28 August 1967; Crespino, *In Search,* p.143.

attempted to use MAP to shield the Governor from bad publicity and accusations of genocide in the Mississippi Delta, though Williams refused.[245]

Cooper proved to be a more rewarding connection. He covertly sent reports on MAP board meetings and other information to the Commission through his employee at the Mississippi Chemical Corporation, Joe Pritchard – material which was a useful source of inside information for Johnston. In return, Johnston provided Cooper with information on Williams with the understanding the source would remain anonymous. Cooper utilised this information to undercut Williams' standing with the board and her co-workers.[246] A devout Baptist, Cooper was motivated by his Christian duty to aid those less fortunate.[247] In addition to serving for ten years as chairman of the MAP board, Cooper founded Mississippi Industrial and Special Services (MISS), an organisation into which he and 49 other prominent Mississippi businessmen put their own money combined with grants from the Federal Housing Administration, Housing and Urban Development and OEO to build low cost housing for the poor. Cooper, like the other 'men of goodwill' with conservative backgrounds, was responding to his perceived Christian duty and to a pragmatic realisation that Mississippi's economy would only suffer if the state continued to cling to segregation.[248] These powerful and rich men, members of MISS and of CAA boards across the state, often genuinely wanted to alleviate the terrible conditions of Mississippi's poor people and contributed greatly to their local communities.[249] However, neither their pragmatism nor religious convictions led them to cede any more control than was necessary to satisfy OEO guidelines. Under Cooper, MAP enriched the lives of thousands of poor children but his

[245] MSSC Records, SCR ID #99-48-0-494-1-1-1, Helen Bass Williams to Erle Johnston, Jr., 25 July 1967, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd10/081223.png&otherstuff=99|48|0|494|1|1|1|80187| [accessed 13 August 2012].
[246] MSSC Records, SCR ID #99-48-0-484-1-1-1, Memo to File, 17 October 1967, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd10/081212.png&otherstuff=99|48|0|484|1|1|1|80176| [accessed 24 August 2012].
[247] University of Mississippi, J. D. Williams Library, Archives and Special Collections, Oxford: Nash and Taggart Collection, Hodding Carter III Interview with J. Nash, n.d. Carter spoke of the religious motivation of many of MAP's white board members, 'for whom conscience suddenly became larger than being the toast of the country club'. Of Cooper, Carter believed he was, 'impelled, I mean a very conservative past, by his Christian conscience... Owen truly was a Christian'.
[248] Cooper Papers, Subgroup 2, Series 12, Box 74, Folder 10, Mississippi Industrial and Special Services, Inc. Charter, December 1967; J. Nelson, 'Mississippians Set Up Biracial Poverty Panel: Business Leaders Say they are Tired of State's War with Federal Government', *Unknown Paper*, n.d.
[249] Cooper Papers, Subgroup 3, Series 13, Box 76, Folder 8b, John Dean to Owen Cooper, 29 January 1968. Cooper was awarded OEO's Urban Service Award in 1968 not just for his involvement in OEO but for services to his community, particularly to the poor in urban areas.

actions in undermining Williams' limited the extent of genuine grassroots participation that she had fostered, halted progress toward racial parity in the staff and firmly established white control of the program. Cooper was determined not to disrupt the racial status quo: he used his position to ensure that federal funds went to segregated centres and allowed CABs to operate with little accountability for their discriminatory activities, actions redolent of the paternalism characteristic of earlier Southern race relations.

Cooper was by no means the only MAP Board member or employee looking to secure Williams' removal. The pervasive distrust, resentment and anger amongst MAP staff provided the Commission with numerous informants. MAP consultant Bruce Nicholas made a series of accusations against Williams, including accusing her of 'creating an atmosphere of distrust and anxiety throughout the... organisation', encouraging staff to report on their colleagues, monitoring telephone conversations and reading the mail of Department heads. Angry at Williams because she accused him of having an affair with 'some woman', Nicholas no doubt exaggerated when he claimed Williams destroyed the interracial harmony that existed prior to her arrival. Not even the most optimistic observers could claim, as Nicholas did, that in 1967 native white Mississippians worked without incident under Negro supervision and employees, or that both black and white worked harmoniously together on the basis of equality.[250] White CAB members were quick to add their accusations. The Yazoo County Advisory Committee, headed by State Senator and Sovereignty Commission Public Relations Director Herman DeCell made an official complaint against Williams in January 1968, referencing her vulgar and obscene language completely unbefitting a woman, her lies and 'intra-MAP spies reminiscent of King Louis XV and his court'.[251] Williams had angered the Yazoo County board with her leadership in the area of involving parents in the community which had resulted in a stronger program for the organisation.[252] For the white establishment that dominated Yazoo's Head Start program, a program strengthened by genuine community participation threatened its control. In the central

[250] MSSC Records, SCR ID #6-45-6-58-1-1-1, Bruce Nicholas to MAP Board, 26 January 1968, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd07/047820.png&otherstuff=6|45|6|58|1|1|1|47125| [accessed 24 August 2012].
[251] Cooper Papers, Subgroup 3, Series 13, Box 78, Folder 1b, David Highbaugh to Whom it May Concern, 24 January 1968.
[252] Cooper Papers, Subgroup 3, Series 13, Box 76, Folder 9a, Owen Cooper to Helen Bass Williams, 26 September 1968.

office, Williams' attempts to move toward racial parity heightened tensions between black and white employees and awakened the worst fears of the white establishment: that MAP would become controlled by African Americans and 'degenerate to the level of the old CDGM'.[253] Such efforts led to Williams being accused of firing white employees while doubling the central office payroll by hiring a number of consultants and advisors to patronize her friends, who became her "spy network" inside MAP, in order to build a Civil Rights Empire out of the MAP organisation.[254] Trawling through their extensive records, mostly containing press clippings and dubious reports based on hearsay and malice, Commission investigators Tom Scarborough and Leland Cole compiled new reports on Helen Bass Williams' spies, finding nothing more to accuse them of than lapsed SNCC membership and an arrest for breach of peace during a sit-in at Walgreens in 1962.[255]

While the Sovereignty Commission made tenuous reports on Williams' corruption and attacked her character, Johnston largely overlooked the very real problems caused by her divisive leadership and her often corrosive micromanagement. Drawing on unsubstantiated allegations of DeCell, the Commission compiled a report comprehensively attacking Williams' character. In the report, ironically entitled 'Evidence (or indication) of Race and Black Power tactics used by Mrs Helen Bass Williams', investigators attacked Williams' leadership, conduct and morality. The report made wild and unfounded accusations, claiming Williams was 'preoccupied with SEX' (their capitalisation).[256] Accusations of immorality particularly related to sex was a trope of earlier Massive Resistance usually directed at men. Williams, as an African American and a woman, was doubly vulnerable to such attacks directed at her conduct and morality.[257] Continuing over three pages, the report claimed all conversation with her included something to do with race, that she cried on cue, used profane, vulgar and

[253] Stennis Papers, Series 39, Box 4, Folder 62, Johnston to File, 27 February 1968.
[254] MSSC Records, SCR ID #6-45-5-76-4-1-1, Memo to File, 30 January 1968, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd06/047554.png&otherstuff=6|45|5|76|2|1|1|46864| [accessed 8 March 2012].
[255] 'Two Charged in Greenwood Gun Incident', *Jackson Daily News*, (5 March 1965); Stennis Papers, Series 39, Box 4, Folder 62, Report on James Travis, 15 November 1967.
[256] Stennis Papers, Series 39, Box 4, Folder 62, 'Evidence (or Indication) of Race and Black Power Tactics Used by Mrs Helen Bass Williams', n.d.
[257] While women were more often in positions of power within antipoverty programs – Kathleen O'Fallon was the first and only female executive director of Southwest Mississippi Opportunities, Inc. and Marjorie Baroni was the assistant director of Adams Jefferson Improvement Corps – it was still highly unusual for a woman to be an executive director, let along in control of MAP, a state-wide program with millions of dollars of funding and an extremely high profile nationwide.

coarse language, made derisive comments about board members to MAP staff and forced integration through a policy insisting same sex personnel travelling together must occupy one double hotel room.[258] The recent wave of War on Poverty scholarship has identified the destructive impact of gender discrimination on antipoverty programs, from the male-dominated Washington and regional offices of OEO, local board members and the wider community.[259] Against Williams this gender discrimination was combined with tropes of earlier Massive Resistance that couched opposition in heavily gendered and racialised terms – attacks which proved highly beneficial to the campaign against her.

The constant battle with white staff and the board, the Sovereignty Commissions' crude harassment campaign combined with her own ill health was beginning to take a serious toll on Williams. Despite the flaws in her leadership she remained dedicated to Head Start and to biracialism. Williams pursued this goal in the face of the Sovereignty Commission crusade, betrayal by her staff and the violence, harassment and intimidation of white Mississippi. Like many employed in antipoverty programs in Mississippi, Williams worked under the constant threat of violence and harassment. While working for CDGM, Williams was accosted by four white men who spat in her mouth and made her swallow – an incident she later recalled with feelings of debasement and terror.[260] As an OEO consultant in Sunflower County, Williams received death threats and as MAP director she was subject not only to harassment directed at her but also to the consequences of the harassment directed at her staff. Not long before her death in 1991, Williams recalled an incident which was characteristic of the indignities and injustices which MAP workers endured. When an African American MAP employee, having obtained a mortgage in order to purchase a house in a neighbourhood that was 'just turning' went to take possession of his new house, he found every surface in the house – walls, windows and floors – had been covered in human excrement by the former owners, making the house totally unfit for habitation and almost impossible to clean. The police refused to help, telling him the owners had gone out of state. His bank also refused to help. Left with no home for his family and

[258] Stennis Papers, Series 39, Box 4, Folder 62, 'Evidence (or Indication) of Race and Black Power tactics used by Mrs Helen Bass Williams', n.d.
[259] Orleck, 'Introduction', pp.18-22.
[260] O'Hara, 'Let It Fly', pp.192-3.

faced with a job he could not do, he killed himself.[261] Though the Klan kept many white Mississippians in line and perpetrated a wave of violence against white MAP employees in 1967, African Americans continued to suffer most under a reign of terror perpetrated by a cross-section of white society working in concert.

By January 1968, Johnston had set the stage for Williams' departure and ensured Commission involvement remained undercover, assuring Executive Assistant to the Governor Herman Glazier that the Commission's tracks were well covered.[262] Using the reports of the Commission anonymously, combined with unfounded accusations of MAP staff and the very real disruption Williams' management had wrought, Cooper systematically deprived Williams of her authority. An executive committee of the board took over some of her responsibilities and rescinded many of her policies and decisions, firing a number of MAP employees to whom the Commission objected, including her alleged spies Ted Lawler and Calvin Williams. By June, power and authority diminished and her decisions and actions questioned at every turn, Williams was demoted to Deputy Administrator in charge of Program and Training. A move to relieve her of the 'burdensome and emotionally straining duties', which Cooper paternalistically described as being in the best interests of the organisation and Williams' physical health.[263] Helen Bass Williams resigned on 31 August 1968. In her memo to the MAP staff and CABs on her resignation, Williams remained dedicated to the 'integrative approach'. She spoke of the honest confrontation she felt MAP was producing between the races which she believed would bring 'honest solutions... to alleviate poverty in Mississippi'.[264] Despite her shortcomings as an administrator and leader, under Williams MAP expanded parent participation in centres across the state and at least began to move toward creating an integrated program. The Commission's campaign, drawing on the racial and gender discrimination she faced on a daily basis from board members, colleagues and CABs illustrates the success of the evolutionary resistance and the limitations of white accommodation to MAP's biracialism. The Commission had moved from orchestrating supremacist violence to

[261] Ibid., pp.188-190.
[262] Stennis Papers, Series 39, Box 4, Folder 62, Erle Johnston to Herman Glazier, 23 January 1968; Erle Johnston to Governor John Bell Williams, 22 January 1968.
[263] Carter Papers, Box 1, Folder Hodding Carter III, Owen Cooper to Board of Directors, 20 June 1968.
[264] MSSC Records, SCR ID #6-45-6-67-1-1-1, Helen Bass Williams to MAP Staff, 3 September 1968, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd07/047847.png&otherstuff=6|45|6|67|1|1|1|47152| [accessed 29 March 2012].

character assassination – a move made necessary by the limited acceptance of racial integration but one which helped turn MAP into a mechanism of white control.

Boycotts

Poverty had become big business in Mississippi: by 1967 the state had received over $40 million of OEO funds, 90 per cent of which funded Head Start programs.[265] This money, in the hands of local African Americans, had a revolutionary impact on the relationship between poor blacks and local white store-owners. Civil Rights activist and Head Start worker Unita Blackwell recalls how whites encouraged the Head Start staff to buy from the local people 'like we had never been run off from local stores'.[266] Examining the intersection of federal antipoverty funds and ongoing Civil Rights activism through MAP's involvement in selective buying campaigns provides an opportunity to explore this revolutionary change in race relations. Adding the weight of the CAP's federal funding to boycotts had the potential to make them more effective; however, MAP's involvement in selective buying campaigns across Mississippi more often provoked renewed white efforts to subvert black activism and undermined the reluctant white accommodation of MAP. The limited acceptance of antipoverty programs by white store owners stemmed from the economic advantages of federal funds flowing into their local communities. The threat of these funds being withheld as part of the ongoing Civil Rights activism provoked a calculated and highly successful white opposition. Drawing on mechanisms of the earlier Massive Resistance combined with powerful and ostensibly race neutral tropes of opposition to social welfare, the white response to MAP's involvement in boycotts proved detrimental both to MAP and to Civil Rights activism.

Selective buying campaigns had been a successful tactic for Mississippi's Civil Rights activists in forcing concessions from local whites, and continued to prove

[265] Mississippi State University, Mitchell Memorial Library Special Collections, Starkville: Vertical Files OEO [hereafter Vertical Files OEO], P. J. Cotter, and W. J. Miller, 'Report on Review of OEO Programs in Mississippi', 5 December 1967.
[266] Blackwell, *Barefootin'*, p.149.

effective into the late 1960s.[267] As a state-wide program that channelled millions of federal dollars directly into Mississippi's small rural communities, MAP's support for these boycotts was sought by Civil Rights activists. MAP's involvement in the boycotts, whether actual or alleged, undermined the limited acceptance the program received from the black and white middle-class CAB members. In Humphreys County, the white community was convinced that MAP was promoting a boycott, causing the majority of the white CAB members to resign. Local white store-owners and the wider community were incensed that federal funds were contributing to Civil Rights activities, and threatened to boycott MAP centres in retaliation.[268] MAP involvement in boycotts not only provoked a renewed white opposition that threatened the successful operation of local centres, but also deepened tensions between African American MAP staff unwilling to participate in boycotts and members of the local black community who supported the boycott. MAP's involvement in the longstanding NAACP-led boycott of white stores in Port Gibson heightened racial tensions and damaged MAP's reputation and its ability to operation Head Start centres in the town. White merchants, who had been suffering from the boycott in operation since 1 April 1966, attempted to enlist the help of MAP in opposing the boycott, spuriously claiming the boycotters were creating more poverty and disharmony between the races.[269] The African American community – led by the local Deacons for Defense group, the Black Hats – also solicited MAP support for their cause. Most African Americans in Port Gibson, including many local MAP staff, joined the boycott to achieve justice and equal opportunity, though some African Americans adhered to the boycott out of fear of retribution from the Black Hats.[270] MAP's involvement further intensified these inter- and intra-racial tensions when Area Nutritionist Jack Price arranged for food for the centres to be purchased

[267] A. O. Umoja, '"We Will Shoot Back": The Natchez Model and Paramilitary Organization in the Mississippi Freedom Movement', *Journal of Black Studies*, 32, No. 3 (2002), pp.271-72.
[268] Carter Papers, Box 1, Loose Materials, Minutes of MAP Board of Directors Monthly Meeting, 18 April 1968.

[269] Derian Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, M. Sherman to Walter Smith, 16 January 1967 and Derian Report, 17 January 1967; *NAACP et.al. v. Claiborne Hardware Company et.al.,* (1982), http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/US/458/458.US.886.81-202.html [accessed 9 August 2012]. Over the three years of the boycott Justice Stevens found that frequent pickets and protest marches were 'uniformly peaceful and orderly'.
[270] Danielson, *Freedom Summer,* p.50; NAACP et.al. v. Claiborne Hardware Company et.al., (1982); L. Hill, *The Deacons for Defense: Armed Resistance and the Civil Rights Movement,* (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 2004), pp.184-215. Named the Black Hats for their distinctive black cowboy hats, members of the organization engaged in "store watching" and other "enforcement" activities, and some individuals who belonged to the group committed acts of violence. Boycott violators faced social ostracism, threats and violent retribution.

from white and black stores in Port Gibson, placing the African American Head Start staff in the path of retribution from the Black Hats.[271]

Angry at the involvement of MAP staff in the boycott, whites employed the tactics of earlier Massive Resistance to enforce unity of opposition on the white community and undermine the boycott. White merchants pressurised white CAB members to end their involvement with the program. White extremists made threats referring to a recently burned church in Greenwood if the Head Start centre was not closed.[272] With the town on the verge of bankruptcy, Port Gibson Mayor Ed Davis grasped at any straw that would help extricate the town from its dilemma, accusing MAP of corruption in the hope that MAP central office would act in his favour. Davis enlisted the help of the Sovereignty Commission and provided investigators with "evidence" of corruption. He claimed that drivers were being paid vast sums of as much as $100 week to transport children to MAP centres in their own cars – Port Gibson's Sherriff claimed the centre staff were charging MAP for milk daily, but only buying it every other day.[273] The Commission passed their accusations, as fact, to Eastland and Stennis.[274] Under the guise of advising and consulting with local officials, the Commission seized the opportunity to discredit MAP, claiming MAP was an exact parallel with the old CDGM and was dominated and controlled 'in a supervisory capacity' by the NAACP and the Deacons of Defense. Drawing on their extensive files on Civil Rights activists, Commission Investigators focused on two MAP employees, Calvin Williams and James Travis, drawing on familiar Massive Resistance stereotypes to depict them as cheating, immoral and violently dangerous.[275]

Calvin Williams had long been a target of the Sovereignty Commission due to his affiliation with both Helen Bass Williams and with the Deacons for Defense. In 1968 the Commission had successfully brought about Calvin Williams' dismissal as MAP Area Supervisor but he was rehired only two months later as a county project officer. Calvin Williams' involvement in MAP in Claiborne County and as leader of the

[271] Derian Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Derian Report, 24 January 1967.
[272] Ibid.
[273] Stennis Papers, Series 39, Box 4, Folder 62, L. E. Cole to Erle Johnston, 29 December 1967.
[274] MSSC Records, SCR ID # 3-18A-0-166-1-1-1, Erle Johnston to William Spell, 1 March 1968, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd04/025727.png&otherstuff=3|18|0|166|1|1|1|25234|A [accessed 30 March 2012].
[275] Stennis Papers, Series 39, Box 4, Folder 62, Report on MAP by L.E. Cole, 5 January 1968.

boycott led to renewed scrutiny by the Commission. Johnston informed Eastland that the 'most obstinate and contrary leader of the complaining Negro leaders' was drawing a regular salary from the federal government through the OEO. Claiming Calvin Williams was the 'chief goon' in charge of directing the boycott, Johnston appealed to Eastland for his assistance in bringing pressure on Calvin in his salaried position.[276] Though the Commission was unable to manufacture Williams' dismissal a second time, harassment of Calvin Williams in his work for MAP continued into the 1970s.[277] Utilising familiar Massive Resistance tactics and linguistic tropes, the Commission was unable to secure Calvin Williams' permanent dismissal or to halt the boycott. A different approach was required which would reflect the new racial landscape in Mississippi that had been altered not only by the passage of federal legislation in the mid-1960s, but also by the influx of antipoverty dollars that, as Blackwell noted, had a profound effect on race relations at the grassroots.[278] Local whites found an alternate route to punish MAP for its involvement in the boycott. A law suit filed by local white merchants against the NAACP, MAP and various individuals claimed the post-April 1969 boycott was illegal could have resulted in MAP's funds being seized in order to recompense the merchants, had their case been successful.[279]

In Leflore County MAP also became embroiled in a conflict over its involvement in a boycott resulting in well-publicised controversy. On 12 April 1968, African American MAP Field Service Assistant Isadore Montgomery sent a memo to MAP centres in Leflore County, instructing MAP personnel not to make any purchases from white merchants until further notice.[280] Mississippi's local press responded angrily: the *Jackson Daily News* questioning, 'are Head Start funds being used in Mississippi in a rank and glowing case of racial discrimination?' and condemning such

[276] MSSC Records, SCR ID # 7-0-11-129-1-1-1, Erle Johnston to Senator James O. Eastland, 27 August 1969, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd08/057953.png&otherstuff=7|0|11|129|1|1|1|57163| [accessed 24 August 2012].
[277] Cooper Papers, Subgroup 3, Series 13, Box 77, Folder 5b, Geneva Collins to Owen Cooper, 15 August 1974; Folder 6a, Memo of Telephone Call, Kenneth Vaughn to M. K. Lewis, 25 September 1974. In 1974 a white candidate for Chancery Clerk of Port Gibson made false claims that Calvin Williams was using Head Start resources in his attempts to force her off the ballot. Although Williams was suspended during the investigation into these accusations, he was later exonerated and reinstated.
[278] Blackwell, *Barefootin',* p.149.
[279] NAACP et.al. v. Claiborne Hardware Company et.al., (1982); Crosby, *Little Taste*, pp.112-168, 199-206, 224-254, provides extensive detail on the boycott.
[280] Carter Papers, Box 1, Folder Mr. Hodding Carter III, Isadore Montgomery to MAP Staff in Leflore County, 12 April 1968.

anti-competitive, anti-American practices.[281] At central office, MAP staff were concerned that such controversy could kill the effectiveness of the program. Montgomery defended his actions, as he believed the black community would picket MAP if it failed to adhere to the boycott. In the increased state- and nation-wide tensions following Martin Luther King Jr.'s assassination, Montgomery understood how such a situation could rapidly escalate. He told the MAP executive staff and board that he knew 'what our centers would be in for if one of our people made a purchase at the wrong place'.[282] White CAB members were equally determined to keep MAP out of any boycott activities. They wrote to Cooper restating their recommendation that MAP employees should not participate in the boycott during their working hours or use the name of MAP in connection with the boycott, requesting Helen Bass Williams visit Leflore County to make this point clear.[283] The Sovereignty Commission applied behind the scenes pressure on the MAP board to take action and the additional pressure from extensive negative publicity of the event led to a change in MAP policy. Owen Cooper issued a new directive, stating that food must be purchased from the lowest bidder of equal quality, effectively forcing MAP to break NAACP boycotts.[284] This directive encouraged the purchase of goods almost exclusively from white vendors. By 1973, black vendors had to beg for the opportunity to bid on merchandise being purchased by MAP, discriminatory practices that were encouraged by the MAP board and which violated OEO's requirement to give preference to minority-owned vendors.[285]

The Commission employed a combination of tactics to undermine the boycotts, supplying their powerful supporters with reports and pressuring the MAP board to capitulate to their calls for a change in policy, though they failed to prevent MAP's involvement in the Port Gibson boycott. The local conservative press ironically charged racial discrimination against whites and couched their outraged opposition to MAP's involvement by accusations of un-American activity, producing a seemingly race-

[281] 'Aid Funds Boost Boycott', *Jackson Daily News*, (14 May 1968), p.6.
[282] Carter Papers, Box 1, Folder Mr. Hodding Carter III, MAP Conference, n.d.
[283] Cooper Papers, Subgroup 3, Series 13, Box 78, Folder 4c, W. M. Whittington, Jr., to Owen Cooper, 21 May 1968.
[284] Carter Papers, Box 1, Loose Materials, MAP News Release, 20 May 1968; MSSC Records, SCR ID # 6-45-6-56-1-1-1, Erle Johnston to Herman Glazier 21 May 1968, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd07/047814.png&otherstuff=6|45|6|56|1|1|1|47119| [accessed 28 March 2012].
[285] Cooper Papers, Subgroup 3, Series 13, Box 77, Folder 3b, J.G. Wells to Owen Cooper, 20 July 1973.

neutral language which fed into national conservative opposition to the socialistic antipoverty programs. MAP's involvement in Port Gibson's boycott also provoked vehement opposition from the grassroots. Limited acceptance of MAP by local whites was due in no small part to the money antipoverty programs brought into struggling local economies. MAP's participation in Civil Rights boycotts turned the white community's veiled suspicion and reluctant acceptance into outright hostility. Ultimately, white control was re-established through MAP's internal mechanisms of control that had been established with the assistance of the Sovereignty Commission and were now operating independently, if tentatively.

Violent and Non-Violent Opposition

White hostility toward MAP encompassed a broad range of responses from a cross-section of white Mississippi, from the reluctant accommodation of some prominent businessmen and the race neutral opposition of middle-class whites to the rejection of the program by poor whites who refused to send their children to integrated centres and the violent opposition of white extremists. Drawing on a variety of methods of opposition with a range of motivations, the white response to MAP does not constitute a coherent, unified response in line with Crespino's 'subtle and strategic accommodations'.[286] However, this disparate and often contradictory set of responses combined to entrench white control over MAP and diminish the role African Americans played in the operation of the program. Exploring the diversity of this white response to MAP reveals largely unexplored continuities in white supremacist violence, directed against antipoverty programs across the Deep South. Further, it showcases the interconnection of the racialised and gendered opposition to CAPs and the gendered tropes of earlier Massive Resistance. Most significantly, examining this white hostility places racial and class divisions at the heart of MAP's failure to achieve the meaningful participation of the poor and exposes the grassroots evolution of a colour-blind language of opposition to antipoverty programs that would become central to the emerging national conservatism.

[286] Crespino, *In Search,* p.11.

Historians have illustrated how the Klan's role as violent oppressor was diminishing in the late 1960s.[287] While pockets of intense Klan activism remained – most notably in southwest Mississippi – state- and region-wide Klan numbers and influence lessened significantly. The Klan relied on a network of complicity in its local communities or at least the unwillingness of local officials to prosecute or convict Klansmen. As several historians have noted, by 1966 state and nation-wide investigations had to some extent undermined this network of support. HUAC investigations, while naming many Klansmen and embarrassing some with details of their criminal records or shady finances, had minimal impact.[288] The FBI's COINTELPRO White Hate investigation's infiltration was more effective in exposing Klan activities and exploiting factionalism.[289] Local officials showed increased willingness to take action against the Klan. Alabama's Attorney General Richmond M. Flowers published his report on Klan groups in his state in the hope that publicising the evil nature of the organization would hasten its demise.[290] However in 1967, white extremist violence was once again spreading across Mississippi. Unlike earlier Klan violence against African Americans, the new wave was directed at white antipoverty workers, and has yet to be reflected fully in the historical record. MAP employees encountered the most intense reaction: as the largest antipoverty program in Mississippi, MAP was a visible target – although whites involved in other antipoverty programs were also targeted.[291] Nor was this violence limited to Mississippi. In Alabama in 1966, when white banker and White Citizens Councilman Victor Poole agreed to serve as area director of a biracial poverty program, he 'received a visit' from the Klan.[292] In the Louisiana Delta, both black and white antipoverty staff, particularly Head Start workers, faced sustained violent opposition.[293] The integration of young children was a particularly volatile issue, as many communities set about ensuring the

[287] D. M. Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism: The History of the Ku Klux Klan*, (F. Watts: New York, 2nd ed. 1980), p.396.
[288] Newton, *Ku Klux Klan*, p.163.
[289] Ibid., p.392; J. Drabble, 'The FBI, COINTELPRO-WHITE HATE, and the Decline of the KKK Organisations in Mississippi, 1964-1971', *Journal of Mississippi History*, 46, No. 4 (2004), pp.353-402.
[290] University of Mississippi, J. D. Williams Library, Archives and Special Collections, Oxford: Ku Klux Klan Collection [hereafter KKK Collection], Folder 3, 'Preliminary Results of Investigations: Alabama', by Richmond M. Flowers, 18 October 1965.
[291] University of Southern Mississippi, McCain Library and Archives, Special Collections, Hattiesburg: Johnson Family Papers [hereafter Johnson Family Papers], Box 149, Folder 1, Charles E. Snodgrass to Chief A. D. Morgan, 31 March 1967. Forrest-Stone Area Opportunities white executive staff faced violence, harassment and intimidation.
[292] Ashmore, *Carry It On*, p.131.
[293] Germany, 'Poverty Wars', pp.231-255.

Freedom of Choice plan resulted in no public school desegregation, or resorted to establishing segregated academies. MAP, as a federally funded organisation requiring the integration of its centres became a focal point for extremist opposition.

White extremists burned Head Start centres, not only those of Pearlhaven and Bogue Chitto in Lincoln County, but also across the state. In Hot Coffee, a small unincorporated community near Mount Olive in Covington County, a Head Start centre was burned. In Jackson, the home of Head Start employee Wallis Schutt was bombed.[294] The Hinds County Head Start program was subject to further intimidation, including a burning cross which was set at the site of their staff training centre at Mt Beulah in Edwards that June.[295] In Washington County, extensive threats were made against Head Start, including threats to shoot children and staff using the outdoor play area on the "white" side of the street, in Leland.[296] In Calhoun County, white Head Start teachers received ultimatums from White Knights to 'resign or be destroyed'.[297] In Wayne County, two white men entered a MAP centre, searching for the white MAP teacher. When the men found he was not at the centre, they verbally threatened the absent white MAP employee, before pulling a knife and threatening to kill African American Head Start teacher William D. Carter in front of 13 Head Start children and their teachers. The incident resulted in the temporary closure of the centre. Initial outrage led to Cooper's insistence that the Highway Patrol should investigate the incident, and called on local law enforcement to step up their protection of the centre. While Johnston sent Leland Cole to Waynesboro to investigate, he urged the local white leaders to use their influence to discourage any future incidents, playing on fears that the breakdown of MAP could lead to the arrival of 'outside irresponsibles' to take over the MAP responsibilities.[298] Despite his initial call for action from the Commissioner for Public Safety to ensure the safety of MAP children and staff, Cooper was quick to

[294] Derian Papers, Box 1, Folder 5, Derian Report, 13 February 1967.
[295] Derian Papers, Box 1, Folder 6, Derian Report re Violence, 1 June 1967; J. F. Findlay, *Church People in the Struggle: the National Council of Churches and the Black Freedom Movement, 1950-1970*, (Oxford University Press: New York, 1997), pp.120, 166. The history of Mt Beulah is complex, but at the time it was used as a Head Start training centre it was being rented by the Delta Ministry.
[296] LBJL: Papers of Bertrand M. Harding, Box 43, Folder Conference File: Washington, D.C. John Doar, Justice re Violence in South, DeLoach (FBI) 23 March 1967, Weekly Situation and Status Report – Region III, 7 February 1967.
[297] 'Threats Against Teachers Challenge Johnson's Plan', *Commercial Appeal*, (10 July 1966).
[298] Carter Papers, Box 2, Loose Materials, Erle Johnston to Mayor Frank P. Ellis, 16 February 1967.

back down in the face of a terse response from the Commissioner, and was unwilling to challenge the establishment.[299]

Johnston was practising 'practical segregation': ironically using the influence of the Sovereignty Commission to prevent further acts of white violence against MAP. Johnston feared such violence would attract unwanted national attention – scrutiny which would threaten the mechanisms of white control being established in and through MAP. Despite Johnston's efforts, the violence was so extensive in the southeast region, particularly in Mississippi and Alabama in early 1967 that concerns were raised in the OEO in Washington. Shriver, always concerned about negative press, reacted angrily to an article by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak which detailed the escalating KKK campaign, the article expressed outrage at violence directed not at 'militant Negro Civil Rights organisations' such as SNCC, but at white moderates who were, according to the reporters 'sensibly and bravely trying to make biracialism work'.[300] Bertrand Harding, due to meet with Deputy Director of the FBI Cartha DeLoach and Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights John Doar, was told by Shriver to 'please get the FBI actually moving!' However, the FBI did little to address this violence and the limit of OEO involvement was to request the assistance of Governor Johnson and, ironically to accept the assistance of the Sovereignty Commission in getting local police to work on these matters.[301]

The involvement of white women in the Head Start programs provoked an angry, but not violent response.[302] In place of violence, white supremacists employed

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[299] MSSC Records, SCR ID # 2-42-0-35-1-1-1, T. B. Birdsong to Owen Cooper, 20 February 1967, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd02/009170.png&otherstuff=2|42|0|35|1|1|1|8950| [accessed 21 August 2012] and SCR ID # 2-42-0-35-2-1-1, Owen Cooper to T. B. Birdsong, 23 February 1967, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd02/009172.png&otherstuff=2|42|0|36|1|1|1|8952| [accessed 21 August 2012].

[300] Carter Papers, Box 2, Loose Material, R. Evans and R. Novak, 'Extremists Aim Attacks at Moderates', *Pascagoula Paper,* (6 March 1967).

[301] LBJL: Papers of Bertrand M. Harding, Box 43, Folder Conference File: Washington, D.C. John Doar, Justice re Violence in South, DeLoach (FBI) March 23, 1967, Memos between Bertrand Harding and Sargent Shriver, March 1967.

[302] G. S. Murray, 'White Privilege, Racial Justice: Women Activists in Memphis', in Murray (ed.), *Throwing Off the Cloak of Privilege: White Southern Women Activists in the Civil Rights Era,* (University Press of Florida: Gainesville, 2004), p.222; J. Todd Moye, 'Discovering What's Already There: Mississippi Women and the Civil Rights Movement', in E. A. Payne, M. H. Swain and M. J. Spruill (eds), *Mississippi Women: Their Histories, Their Lives, Volume 2,* (University of Georgia Press: Athens, 2010), pp.256-60. White Mississippi women involved in Head Start were not unique, but drew on a legacy of white southern women activists. Murray details how white women involved in Head Start

gendered tropes of earlier Massive Resistance. This language drew on the gendered opposition to the War on Poverty that was especially prevalent in opposition to Head Start, as a program dominated at the grassroots by women – those employed and volunteering in local centres, and participating Head Start mothers. In Yalobusha County, local whites distributed hate sheets attacking the white women who were involved with MAP centres. In a vitriolic tirade entitled 'a paper for pariotic [sic] citizens', the author raises the familiar fears of miscegeny, mixed with pious religiosity and patriotism: 'the worst thing is to mix with the niggers by teaching in Nigger schools, and espailly [sic] those who are teaching in Head Start. Do you people want a Nigger for a son in law or a daughter in law or even worse a nigger grandchild?' before listing the names and addresses of nine local white women working for MAP.[303] The campaign of Yalobusha County's White Knights of the KKK to break up the Head Start schools yielded the resignations of two white MAP employees and the removal of seven white children from Head Start centres in the county. In Greenwood, Klan hate sheet *A Delta Discussion* named three white women faculty members of a white school in Itta Bena as Head Start teachers, questioning their readers 'do you want them teaching your children next year?'.[304] Directing their vitriol at women and playing on still powerful fears of miscegeny, white extremists were successful in enlisting the outrage of local whites and directing that pressure onto whites involved in MAP.

Increasing racial tensions nation- and state-wide spurred the violence directed at white MAP employees. While some incidents were reported to the local law enforcement officers, and many more reported to Area Supervisors and MAP's central office, many incidents of harassment went unreported, as the white targets were unwilling to provoke further attacks. White MAP employee John Ott was unwilling to make an official complaint, despite being harassed by two white men at his apartment and later following his two children and harassing them at their school.[305] When

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in Memphis were met with the harassment and paternalism that African Americans had been facing for years. Moye shows how a small minority of white women in Mississippi had been working to undermine Jim Crow since the 1930s, while in the 1960s some white women organised in order to manage the changes that were becoming inevitable.

[303] Carter Papers, Box 1, Folder Harassment and Negative Attitudes, Flyer entitled 'The Leader', n.d.

[304] Georgia State University, Southern Labor Archives, Atlanta: Mississippi State AFL-CIO Records [hereafter Mississippi AFL-CIO Records], Box 2132, Folder 1, 'Issue V of a Series', *A Delta Discussion*, n.d.

[305] MSSC Records, SCR ID # 6-45-4-33-1-1-1, Note to File, 23 November 1966, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd06/047088.png&otherstuff=6|45|4|33|1|1|1|46399| [accessed 24 August 2012].

African Americans demonstrated in Corinth following the alleged beating of a young African American by the Police Chief in a "white" park, local tensions ratcheted up. The white Area Nutritionist Jack Price had been receiving threatening telephone calls, and following the weekend demonstration, Price's car was followed – the white driver drew alongside him, and shouted "nigger-lover" at Price before firing four shots into his car.[306] As the summer of 1967 approached, grave tensions in Mississippi were heightened by the state's gubernatorial election and reflected growing nation-wide tensions that were particularly explosive in northern urban ghettoes.[307] This was not only white on white violence, either: in May, 1000 African Americans demonstrated on the campus of Jackson State College after police attempted to arrest a speeding African American driver.[308]

KKK violence was not expanding in isolation, for such extremist actions were the product of the complicity of the local white community, complicity born of the very real fear of Klan retribution and often sympathy for their goals if not their methods. While many white Mississippians would no longer condone murder, opposition to integrated Head Start programs was widespread. In Wayne County, an indication that the Klan was unhappy with MAP staff attempting to recruit white children for Head Start provided sufficient grounds for the president of the local school board to demand that MAP staff stop the recruitment of white children or lose the lease for the centre. [309] This complicity ensured that Mississippi's white extremists felt secure in their immunity from prosecution as rumours that the Klan was under the protection Senator Eastland were widespread and widely believed. Local law enforcement rarely took action against the perpetrators of violence against Head Start centres and the many published doubts of William Harold Cox, Chief Judge of the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi about the position of in presenting Civil Rights

[306] Derian Papers, Box 1, Folder 6, P. Derian Report, 21 June 1967.
[307] Derian Papers, Box 1, Folder 19, Pat Derian to Bob Martin, William Holland, Hugh Saussy, 6 August 1967.
[308] S. F. Lawson (ed.), *Civil Rights During the Johnson Administration, 1963-1969, Part V: Records of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission)*, (University Publications of America: Frederick, 1987), reel 24, fr.0596.
[309] Derian Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Derian Report re Assignment MAP, 26 January 1967.

violations cases to the Grand Jury meant even if arrested, the perpetrators were unlikely to face a trial.[310]

As well as being the impetus for a renewed wave of KKK activity, MAP contributed to tensions and frustrations in Mississippi's black communities. Unlike the earlier Massive Resistance era, in which white Mississippi faced greater unity from black activists led by the middle-class NAACP to the exclusion of the majority of poor African Americans, antipoverty programs had deepened intra-racial class divisions. As program designed for poor children, MAP catered to a markedly different constituency than the middle-class oriented Civil Rights organisations such as the NAACP. Head Start parents – less likely to have been directly involved in earlier activism – were in direct economic competition with poor whites and thus less likely to benefit from the gradualism espoused by organisations such as the NAACP. As OEO Consultant Patricia Derian reported in the summer of 1967, poverty programs' steps to include white children in Head Start 'angered many Negroes who think that their priorities are so high they deserve all the jobs and all the children's places'.[311] Thus, only nine months after its creation, MAP had ignited a wave of KKK violence directed against whites, and exacerbated anger and divisions in the African American community. The program itself remained largely segregated and unpopular with many black and white Mississippians. In July 1967, cities across the US exploded in riots. Mississippi did not experience such riots, lacking the urban environment which, with its complex and intractable problems and compact geography, provided ideal conditions for the rapid spread of violence. In Jackson, Mississippi's only city, the poverty and squalid housing was not compressed into a ghetto and confined to a few city blocks and high rise tenements but spread out in neighbourhoods of single level dwellings. Leadership was also lacking for African Americans in Mississippi. The Civil Rights community was riddled with divisions – including the worsening class tensions and the fragmentation of the movement as SNCC and other groups pursued separatism rather than the NAACP's biracial approach – and whatever the contentions of the Sovereignty Commission, Black Power elements in Mississippi remained limited and lacking in power and were

[310] LBJL: Papers of Bertrand M. Harding, Box 43, Folder Conference File: Washington, D.C. John Doar, Justice re Violence in South, DeLoach (FBI) 23 March 1967, Weekly Situation and Status Report-Region III, 7 February 1967.
[311] Derian Papers, Box 1, Folder 19, Confidential Memo, Pat Derian to Bob Martin, William Holland, Hugh Saussy, 6 August 1967.

unable to mount a sustained violent challenge against a white power structure still exercising tight control over Mississippian society.

Local white communities did not just rely on the violent extremist minority to oppose integrated Head Start centres. When MAP staff recruited five white children in Lauderdale County, for example, an anonymous donor paid for their tuition at a private nursery school.[312] Middle-class whites were affluent enough to avoid having their children attend integrated classes, at pre-school or school, and were able to use their affluence to ensure the white integrity of their local communities. Poor whites showed the greatest animosity towards Head Start, based upon both a historic aversion to using "Negro" facilities and their inability to pay for private schooling, their children the first and often only white children to experience integration.[313] Poor whites, whose socioeconomic status was most threatened by black advancement and who were likely to be the most affected by integration were the most violently opposed to any change in racial customs, and the most receptive to influence by political demagoguery which exploited the race issue. Industrialist W.W. McMillan recognised this trend with concern, informing Senator Stennis that within one generation these poor whites would replace blacks as 'the lowest human being on the social economic and educational scale in our south'.[314] McMillan believed that poor whites had to take advantage of the antipoverty programs and Stennis, already aware of this trend acted to reinforce white control of antipoverty programs. While such efforts did not require the wielding of his Senatorial power, nor garner the headlines of his campaign against CDGM, his actions resulted in local white communities tightening their control of CAAs. More damaging to meaningful African American involvement in programs, Stennis' complaints against a Philadelphia Head Start centre led to an OEO investigation which resulted in greater white representation on the CAB.[315]

In many instances, local whites did not need the assistance of powerful Senators to assert their control over their program. State Senator Mohamed of Humphreys County directed the complaint of members of the CAB to Owen Cooper opposing the involvement of outsiders in running their Head Start centres. Utilising the familiar

[312] Carter Papers, Box 2, Loose Materials, Central Staff Meeting of MAP, Inc., 5 June 1967.
[313] Vertical Files OEO. Cotter and Miller, 'Report on Review of OEO Programs', 5 December 1967.
[314] Stennis Papers, Series 1, Box 4, Folder 17, W. W. McMillan to Senator John C. Stennis, 7 April 1967.
[315] Carter Papers, Box 1, Folder Mr. Hodding Carter III, 'OEO Report Summary: MAP Centers Investigation Philadelphia, Mississippi', 27 June 1968.

Massive Resistance rhetoric of outside agitators, Mohamed was referring to George Jamison, an African American MAP employee not from out of state, but from outside Humphreys County.[316] The antipoverty creators' intention to create a grassroots attack on poverty was giving rise to another unintentional consequence: a startling localism that was contracting white control mechanisms from national to state, and now, county level. While grassroots Civil Rights activism remained important, this localism was denying local poor blacks access to even state mechanisms of support and unity and served to strengthen the power of the local white officials and the CAB. When a MAP Area Supervisor provided substandard food for a local Head Start centre until an inspection was announced, the CAB threatened the centre staff with terminating their employment should they voice complaints at the inspection. The MAP employee who reported this incident was so fearful of retaliation, she refused to allow her name to appear on the report, which was kept out of OEO files.[317] Such incidents point not only to the successful transplanting of the white power structure into MAP's new and untested administrative structures, but also illustrate how MAP served in many instances to bolster the power of the local white establishment.

While poor whites opposed involvement in Head Start on overtly racist grounds, wealthier whites drew on notions of the deserving poor to frame their opposition to Head Start. General Practitioners Dennis and Mary Ward were approached by MAP Medical Services Director Emma Mason to be involved in the health services offered through MAP, but declined based on their belief that Head Start was designed primarily for getting additional votes for the 'left wing section of the Democratic Party'. Further, they already treated any truly indigent person free of charge and expressed the belief many of the Head Start children were not indigent at all and that many parents used it for a free, glorified babysitting program. Drawing on the popular conservative construction of Head Start as merely a babysitting service abused by welfare queens not deserving of assistance and designed to garner support for the Democratic Party, middle-class whites constructed an ostensibly race neutral discourse to oppose Head Start. Though their precise actions at the ballot box remain unknown, the Wards were

[316] National Archives and Record Administration, Atlanta, Georgia, Records of the Community Services Administration Region IV, Record Group 381 [hereafter RG 381]: Box 8, Folder: CAP-Yazoo City, R. B. Harris to Owen Cooper, 20 December 1967 and Owen Cooper to R. B. Harris, 28 December 1967; Cooper Papers, Subgroup 3, Series 13, Box 76, Folder 8b, Ollie Mohamed to Owen Cooper, 28 December 1967.
[317] Derian Papers, Box 1, Folder 9, Carol Hinds to Patricia Derian, 9 May 1967.

forging a new kind of grassroots conservatism: they distanced themselves from what they termed hardnosed conservatives while elucidating an ostensibly colour blind language of conservatism opposed to the 'sickness of the so-called great society which is strangling the country to death by socialistic bureaucracy'.[318]

1967 was a significant year for race relations and for OEO both state and nationwide. In the wake of the rioting across America, Congress passed the Economic Opportunity Amendment, which included an amendment introduced by Congresswomen Edith Green that would have a significant impact on antipoverty programs. For Nixon's emerging silent majority, race riots confirmed the worst fears about Black Power. Indeed, Nixon would draw on these fears when he ran his campaign on restoring law and order. While no riots occurred in Mississippi, the national riots had a powerful impact on both black and white Mississippians. In Sunflower County, where the African American Head Start program run by MFDP and SNCC activists had been locked in a battle with the white establishment CAA, the race riots had the effect of making the black activists more tractable.[319] White extremist violence had also abated by 1968. As the white community bolstered the white MAP employees and the board's control over MAP centres, particularly over the extent and timing of integration, it became less necessary to resort to violence to impose white supremacy. The immunity of the perpetrators of violence to prosecution was becoming uncertain. While Mississippi's District Court judges remained unwilling to prosecute Civil Rights cases, the Department of Justice succeeded in trying the high-profile case against the murders of Chaney, Schwerner and Goodman, who were found guilty in October 1967 of depriving the men of their Civil Rights.[320] Led by middle-class white and black CAB members and the powerful white businessmen of MAP's board, white Mississippi executed a slow and reluctant, but increasingly non-violent accommodation to the program's limited biracialism, though it came at the cost of meaningful poor black participation in the program and an increasingly divided African American community.

[318] Carter Papers, Box 2, Folder Hodding Carter III, Dennis and Mary Ward to Emma Mason, 16 August 1967.
[319] LBJL: Office Files of Harry McPherson, Box 23, Folder Poverty (1968), 'Report on Sunflower County Progress', 1968.
[320] LBJL: WHCF EX HU 2/ST 24 7/17/64-1/20/69, Box 27, Folder HU2/ST24 2/15/66-EX, 'Racial Climate is improving in Mississippi', *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, (8 March 1967).

Chapter Two

Southwest Mississippi Opportunities

The white campaign to destroy CDGM had profound and long-lasting consequences for antipoverty programs in Mississippi. Beyond the national scrutiny that impelled a reluctant accommodation of CDGM's biracial state-wide replacement, MAP, the legacy of white opposition to CDGM – in particular the failure of the white campaign to destroy the Group – lies in the unexplored struggles of many of the newly-defunded former-CDGM programs. As white Mississippi responded to Stennis' calls for 'local responsible people' to establish CAPs and sit on CAA boards, the African American-operated programs served as a prominent reminder of the white establishment's failure to destroy CDGM and the threat to white economic and political supremacy posed by federal antipoverty funds in the hands of African Americans.[321] As such, these CDGM-remnants were uniquely vulnerable to renewed and often violent opposition by local whites. This chapter will explore this legacy, focusing on the white establishment CAA Southwest Mississippi Opportunities (SMO) that was created to wrest control of antipoverty funds from the area's CDGM-remnant, Southwest Mississippi Child Development Council (SMCDC). Examining the relationship between the white CAA and the CDGM-remnant in southwest Mississippi – an area with a concentrated Klan presence, relative anonymity of Civil Rights activists and high level of rural poverty – will provide new insights into the complexities of the white community's response to SMO and SMCDC, the diversity of post-1965 Massive Resistance and the grassroots rise of the Mississippi Republican Party.

White Mississippi's response to MAP was characterised by a reluctant accommodation to its biracial board and integrated centres. Although those accommodations were not as orderly, uniform or refined as the descriptors "subtle" and "strategic" suggest, the evolution of the methods and rhetoric of Massive Resistance was evident.[322] White opposition to the CDGM-remnant programs across Mississippi was deeply redolent of earlier Massive Resistance, employing tactics ranging from the violence of white extremists to manipulation by means of economic power wielded by

[321] Stennis Papers, Series 25, Box 7, Folder 51, Senator John C. Stennis to Clyde Smith, 19 October 1967. This is one example of Stennis' calls for 'responsible people' to create CAPs.
[322] Crespino, *In Search*, p.11.

Citizens Councillors and the spy-tactics of the Sovereignty Commission. The national attention and the involvement of moderate whites – mostly businessmen – had provided an ameliorating influence on Mississippi's 'closed society' in earlier periods of the Civil Rights Movement and had helped ensure the survival of CDGM and the limited biracialism in MAP.[323] However, these were absent from the small rural communities in which CDGM-remnants operated. The absence of nationally renowned Civil Rights figures such as Aaron Henry in MAP and Charles Evers in the neighbouring CAA Adams-Jefferson Improvement Corporation has meant the counties that SMO served – Pike, Amite and Wilkinson – have also remained largely overlooked in academic literature. As such, this is an ideal location to explore the experience of a CAP that was nationally unnoticed and strategically unimportant. SMO, achieving neither notable success nor suffering complete destruction is more representative of the experience of CAAs in Mississippi than those which have received greater publicity and academic attention. As well as utilising remarkably unchanged Massive Resistance tactics, CDGM-remnants faced an additional challenge. As they struggled to function under intense and violent white opposition, limited support and unreliable funding from OEO, and threats of destruction from establishment CAAs, politicians seized upon these CDGM-remnants as a method of securing – or obtaining – political credit. For Eastland and Stennis, who maintained a public opposition to the War on Poverty while privately working to increase Mississippi's share of federal antipoverty funds, it remained a matter of political necessity to be publicly active in ensuring these funds remained under white control. Even more threatening for the CDGM-remnants was the growing Mississippi Republican Party, which seized on opposition to African American run programs as a means of building a base of white grassroots support. Thus this study of SMO provides an opportunity to explore the impact of partisan politics on the War on Poverty at the grassroots and sheds new light on the development of the nascent Mississippi Republican Party.

[323] Silver, *Mississippi,* p.6; E., Jacoway, 'An Introduction', in Jacoway and Colburn (eds), *Southern Businessmen*, p.14.

The Legacy of CDGM

Historians as well as participants in CDGM have emphasized the program's positive long-term legacy, from a constructive impact on Mississippi's pre-school education system to a tradition of grassroots activism in addition to the anger and bitterness in the immediate wake of CDGM's defunding.[324] However, the most potent legacy of CDGM is the unexplored impact of the failure of the white establishment led by Stennis, to ensure the eradication of the Group. This failure resulted in both an evolving white response to biracial antipoverty programs in Mississippi, showcased by the reluctant accommodation to MAP, and in the relationships between CDGM-remnants and newly-established white establishment CAAs. Stennis utilised ostensibly race neutral language in his calls for local responsible people to establish CAAs. Which in essence were little more than a thinly veiled request for whites to enact a 'defensive localism' which would enable them to re-establish white control over African American advancement.[325] The result was the participation of local officials, middle-class whites and white businessmen in CAAs across the state: a mass white mobilisation facilitated by Shriver, who funded this host of newly created white-controlled CAAs to appease Mississippi's powerful politicians in the wake of the CDGM debacle.[326] Battles between these white establishment CAAs and CDGM-remnants differed in intensity, duration and outcome dependent on intensely local variations including the local political climate, presence of violent white organisations and Civil Rights activists, the local economy and the presence of moderate whites, most notably businessmen. Collectively, however, they all reveal the extent to which the post-1965 evolving resistance continued to draw heavily on the mechanisms and tropes of earlier opposition, showing no sign of accommodation, either subtle or strategic.[327]

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[324] Jordan, 'Fighting for the CDGM', pp.280-307; Greenberg, *Devil,* p.786; Dittmer, *Local People,* p.381; Payne, *Light of Freedom*, p.347; Hale, 'Struggle Begins', p.507.

[325] Sugrue, *Urban Crisis,* p.210. Sugrue described a 'defensive localism' in the actions of white homeowners in post-war Detroit in their attempts to limit the social and economic advancement of African Americans.

[326] LBJL: Office Files of Fred Panzer, Box 565, Folder OEO, 'OEO Status of Programs as of 1 January 1966: Mississippi'; D. C. Colby, 'Black Power, White Resistance, and Public Policy: Political Power and Poverty Program Grants in Mississippi', *The Journal of Politics*, 47, No. 2 (1985), pp.579-595. For Colby, the distribution of antipoverty funds in Mississippi is an illustration of the power of the white elite.

[327] Crespino, *In Search,* p.4.

In the wake of Stennis' failure to secure the defunding of the Group, white Mississippi was newly awakened to the perceived threat of War on Poverty funds flowing into the hands of African American activists and unprotected by their powerful Democratic politicians who, in turn, were unable to halt or control this flow of funds. For the Mississippi Republican Party, Stennis' failure and the resultant mobilisation of many middle-class whites provided an opportunity to extend their influence in local communities. Most significantly, it provided the potential to succeed where Stennis and other Mississippi Democratic politicians had so publically failed. Mississippi Republicans capitalised on the failure of Mississippi's Democratic politician's to eliminate CDGM, successfully harnessing white opposition to these CDGM-remnants in order to undercut Mississippi Democratic politicians by linking the state party with the liberalism of the Administration. The funds flooding into the state under the War on Poverty provided an opportunity to attack those involved, as federal funds 'drew liberals out of their holes' and to reinforce Mississippi Republican's conservative credentials – an opportunity to 'out conservative' the Mississippi Democratic Party.[328] The involvement of Republican supporters, party members and politicians in CAAs began as early as 1965.[329] The party's blatantly racially motivated efforts to minimise African American control over antipoverty funds would bring them the support of the rural whites who would form the majority of Republican supporters in Mississippi. However, the role of the white middle-class supporters – the businessmen and professionals sitting on CAA boards – at this early stage in the development of the party played a vital role in establishing a Republican voice in the use of federal antipoverty funds across the state. This small but slowly increasing middle-class constituency indicates that despite lacking the Sunbelt suburbs which Kruse and Lassiter have shown to be central to the rise of southern Republicanism, the experience of the Mississippi Republicans was not completely removed from that of the Sunbelt. In a state with a struggling economy, small amounts of state funding for public welfare and extensive poverty, a seat on the board of directors of even a small antipoverty program proved beneficial to the nascent Mississippi Republican Party, not least as a way to prevent

[328] MRP Records, Series VI, Box F-6, Folder MRP-OF 1965/66 Coahoma County, Unsigned handwritten note, c. October 1965.
[329] Mississippi State University, Mitchell Memorial Library Special Collections, Starkville: Gilbert E. Carmichael Papers [hereafter Carmichael Papers], Series I, Box 1, Folder 22, Henry Damon to Don Rumsfeld, 14 August 1970. For example future Republican candidate for the Senate Gil Carmichael was heavily involved in the creation of the CAA Lauderdale Economic Action Program.

CAPs being used to build support for the Democratic Party amongst newly enfranchised blacks.[330]

As historian Lisa McGirr has shown, women – particularly suburban women – played a central role in grass roots organising that provided a strong base for the rise of the party.[331] Though lacking in suburbs, Mississippi did have Republican women's groups, which organised through coffee mornings and potluck dinners to contribute to the burgeoning base of grassroots support for the Mississippi Republican Party. These grassroots Republican groups successfully harnessed white opposition to the War on Poverty in order to undercut Mississippi Democratic support by linking the state party with the liberalism of the Administration. In Forrest County in 1966, the Republican women's organisation held a potluck party featuring 'true conservative' James Moye speaking about LBJ and the Great Society. The Forrest County Republican women invited 'poor pulverised patriots' to help fight the War on Poverty by voting Republican and defeating President Johnson, utilising language that contained no reference to race but which instead couched antipoverty programs as un-American – against God, freedom and independence.[332] While not as extensive or as integral to the rise of the Republican Party in Mississippi as the women of Orange County California, these women played an important role in linking "true" conservatism with ostensibly race neutral opposition to the War on Poverty. Such rhetoric was essential to the slow but steady growth of the state Republican Party and once Nixon was elected, the impact of Mississippi Republicans' opposition to CAAs became significantly more potent.

[330] I explore the relationship between the Mississippi Republican Party and CAPs more fully in, 'From Massive Resistance to New Conservatism: Community Action Programs and the Mississippi Republican Party', in T. Packer and P. Davies (eds), *American Conservatism Since the New Deal: Rethinking the US Right*, [forthcoming].
[331] McGirr, *Suburban Warriors*, p.4.
[332] MRP Records, Series VI, Box F-6, Folder MRP-OF 1965/66 Forrest County, 'Help Fight the War on Poverty' flyer, c.1965/6.

Illustration 2.1: *Help Fight the War on Poverty, c.1965/6.*



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POVERTY POTLUCK PARTY

For
Poor Pulverized Patriots
Y.W.C.A. October 20 7 P.M.

We can't qualify for the Great Society's Anti-Poverty Program, so please bring your own covered dish. We do promise to furnish fun along with cokes, coffee, and a true Conservative speaker, James Moye, who will tell you what he thinks of L.B.J. and the Great Society. Be prepared with questions. He knows the answers.

You may bring your God-Fearing, freedom loving, Independent minded friends too, plus nickels, dimes, and quarters. We might have to pass the hat.

Wear last years clothes. We can't afford new ones either.

Forrest County Republican Women

Co-Chairmen

Cola Emmons 2-3396
Grace Hamilton 2-4332

PLEASE PHONE IF YOU CAN'T COME

HELP DEFEAT L.B.J.
VOTE REPUBLICAN

Source: Mississippi State University, Mitchell Memorial Library, Special Collections, Starkville: Mississippi Republican Party Records, Series VI, Box F-6, Folder MRP-OF 1965/66 Forrest County.

At the state level, the Republican Party utilised their connections to the Nixon Administration to assist white CAAs to gain control over the CDGM-remnants even as Mississippi Republican Party Chairman Clarke Reed sought to distance the party from Nixon's failure to live up to his campaign promises. Reed cultivated a relationship with OEO Director Donald Rumsfeld and Cary Hall, Southeast Regional Director of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), which had been administering Head Start since 1969.[333] Reed and Party Executive Director W. T. Wilkins used these connections to great effect, assisting Republicans mayors, politicians and supporters to extend white control over African American Head Start programs. In Yazoo City, Republican Mayor Jeppie Barbour (one of only four Republican Mayors in the state in 1969) received Reed's help in gaining OEO's support for the segregationist activities of the local CAA, Yazoo Community Action.[334] In Sunflower County, the machinations of Wilkins and HEW's Regional Office of Child Development (OCD) staff destroyed the independence of the county's African American Head Start program by placing it under the control of the white establishment CAA, Sunflower County Progress. In both of these segregated Delta counties the role of the Mississippi Republican Party proved decisive in re-establishing white control over burgeoning African American economic advancement – control which undermined African American involvement in antipoverty programs and proved politically beneficial for the nascent party.[335]

In southwest Mississippi, no political manoeuvring by the state Republican Party was necessary to bring the CDGM-remnant under white control. The local "responsible" whites of southwest Mississippi responded to Stennis' call by establishing SMO, a CAA designed to extend white control over the area's defunded CDGM remnant. The agency, first funded by OEO in October 1966 with a year-long $713,000 grant, also operated a number of component programs, including Emergency Food and Medical Services, Home Service Aid and Neighbourhood Youth Corps.[336] SMO's white leaders – Executive Director Kathleen O'Fallon (a former State Senator) and Board Chairman Maxie Sturgeon – shaped the CAA into a mechanism of white control,

[333] In 1970, the Office of Child Development was created within HEW to oversee Head Start.
[334] MRP Records, Series VII, Box G-4, Folder PATA/FA OEO (March-August) 1969-1970, Clarke Reed to Don Rumsfeld, 28 April 1969; Mayor Jeppie Barbour to Clarke Reed, 8 July 1969.
[335] For a fuller development of the legacy of CDGM in Sunflower and Bolivar Counties see my argument in 'The Legacy of the Child Development Group of Mississippi: White Opposition to Head Start in Mississippi, 1965-1972', *Journal of Mississippi History*, [forthcoming].
[336] Mississippi State University, Congressional and Political Research Center, Starkville: Charles H. Griffin Collection, Series 5, Box 45, Folder OEO, Grant Announcement, 17 December 1968.

drawing first on the network of white opposition in the county and then later on state mechanisms of Massive Resistance to control and suppress black activism through SMO. The moderate whites whose role had been significant in earlier phases of the movement and in accommodation to MAP were largely absent in southwest Mississippi. The struggling rural economies of SMO's three counties left powerful white landowners in the place of moderate white businessmen, and in doing so, brought to the fore men with a vested interest in maintaining the racial, social and economic status quo.

This opposition from the area's powerful whites was alternately bolstered and necessitated by the pervasive Klan influence which continued to brutally suppress black activism and demand white adherence to strict segregation. A small moderate presence in SMO, notably Steve Reed, the forward-looking leader of Wilkinson County Board of Supervisors, and local African American NAACP leaders did ensure a small but significant level of interracial cooperation in SMO.[337] However, Sturgeon dominated the program's creation, overseeing the structuring of a board that excluded poor African American participation.[338] Sturgeon and his fellow white board members subverted the intent if not the letter of OEO's requirements that the board reflect the racial composition of the area and that one-third of its members be democratically elected representatives of the poor community. SMO's TARs were not truly representative of the poor community. Their elections were often disputed by the very members of the poor communities they were intended to represent, and once on the board, TARs were either excluded from decision making or controlled by whites who wielded their economic power or threatened violent retribution.[339] African American members of SMO's board were middle-class men with pre-existing relationships with the white community and a vested interest in maintaining those relationships, and who had little knowledge of the needs or conditions of the poor.[340] The involvement of these middle-class African American Mississippians on biracial antipoverty boards was undoubtedly

[337] Derian Papers, Box 1, Folder 14, Mississippi Task Force Community Profiles and Recommendations, September 1966-January 1967: Amite, Pike and Wilkinson. Reed had prevented the Board of Supervisors from cutting off county support for the food distribution program in retaliation for a Civil Rights boycott.
[338] RG 381: Box 7, Folder CAP Southwest Mississippi, CAP Application: 'III: Characteristics of Applicant Agency – General Public Representation', 9 September 1969.
[339] RG 381: Box 13, Folder Mississippi: SMO, Education, Richard Marger to Robert W. Saunders, 'Civil Rights and Equal Opportunities Review of SMO', 8 June 1970.
[340] RG 381: Box 6, Folder CAP Southwest Mississippi, Roy L. Jones, 'SMO Inc. Status Report', 12 May 1969.

a significant step forward in race relations, particularly in the volatile racial atmosphere that characterised the southwest of the state. While it is clear that the impact of the relationship between these middle-class African American board members and white board members was often detrimental to the poor black community that SMO was intended to serve, the motivation for their involvement is not so easy to divine. It is evident that there was a significant economic and social advantage to be gained from such biracial cooperation, through the maintenance of profitable economic relationships with powerful local whites and the preservation of their leadership of the black community. However, it is clear from the steps taken by board members such as local NAACP leader C. C. Bryant that the middle-class black involvement on CAP boards was not entirely self-motivated and that their moderating impact on the vociferous white racism did, to a limited extent assist in stabilising race relations and perhaps even ameliorating the worst excesses of racial violence.

Employees of the former CDGM program reacted angrily to the prospect of their program being controlled by whites. Reconstituting the former CDGM Area Council as SMCDC, the group submitted an application to OEO to operate Head Start as a delegate agency of SMO.[341] It was common under early OEO guidelines for delegate agency arrangements to fund only one organisation per area. Delegate status provided former CDGM groups with a measure of independence: the delegate agency retained its own board which controlled program operation and staffing, while ultimate authority over the delegate agency remained with the CAA through which the delegate was funded. Under the Nixon Administration, OEO would reject the notion of delegate agencies, but under President Johnson and Sargent Shriver, delegate agency status for the former CDGM group meant protection from the complete destruction that would have been the result of direct control by SMO. O'Fallon and Sturgeon unsurprisingly objected to this proposal, drawing on the language of earlier Massive Resistance in their claims that SMO could administer Head Start better than the 'dangerous radicals' of CDGM.[342] However, SMO was unable to thwart the persistent CDGM influence. An OEO Rural Task Force called in to mediate in the dispute and whose members O'Fallon

[341] 'Characteristics of Applicant Agency – Organizational Structure'.
[342] MSSC Records, SCR ID # 6-67-0-34-1-1-1, L. E. Cole, 'Pearl River CAA Inc., Columbia, Mississippi', 18 November 1966, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd07/050229.png&otherstuff=6|67|0|34|1|1|1|49510| [accessed 10 July 2013].

claimed favoured former CDGM personnel, provided protection, albeit of a limited nature to SMCDC. Thus, it fell to state mechanisms of Massive Resistance to eradicate the "radicalism" of CDGM in southwest Mississippi.[343]

The Sovereignty Commission turned its attention toward southwest Mississippi as another front in its on-going battle against CDGM and former CDGM programs across the state. Adding increasing layers of complexity to the state / federal battle that shaped the South's relationship with the federal government, the state-funded group utilised its resources to undermine SMCDC. Despite a reluctant acquiescence to MAP's biracialism, the on-going campaign waged by Johnston and his investigators against CDGM and CDGM-remnant or affiliated programs or personnel illuminates the continuation of Massive Resistance tactics against Civil Rights activists, actual or alleged. The Sovereignty Commission investigation into SMO and SMCDC reveals the cross-section of white Mississippi both at the state and grassroots level that worked in concert to undermine not only the threat of CDGM but also to eliminate African American involvement in the program altogether. The tactics of the Commission investigators combined with the efforts of the white board members of SMO to exclude those they deemed radical from the program and bring SMCDC – its funds, activities and staff – under total control.

The Commission's investigation was instigated in response to a news report claiming that 22 members of the SMCDC board had previously worked for CDGM.[344] Worse still, Johnston learned from SEOO Director Martin Fraley that SMO's grant had been announced prematurely in order to appease the former CDGM group. On investigating, Commission Investigator Leland Cole found that only two members of the new board had been affiliated with CDGM: A. Marks, a former CDGM centre chairman and CDGM employee Loyce Duncan and that neither were troublemakers.[345]

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[343] RG 381: Box 12, Folder SMO, Inc., Woodville, Mississippi, W. John King to Edward Shell, 'On-site Evaluation of SMO, Inc.', 7 May 1968.

[344] MSSC Records, SCR ID # 6-67-0-2-1-1-1, E. Johnston, 'Memo to File', 18 October 1966, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd07/050102.png&otherstuff=6|67|0|2|1|1|1|49385| [accessed 10 July 2013]; SCR ID # 6-67-0-9-1-1-1, E. Johnston, 'Memo to File', 13 October 1966, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd07/050113.png&otherstuff=6|67|0|9|1|1|1|49396| [accessed 10 July 2013].

[345] MSSC Records, SCR ID # 6-67-0-12-1-1-1, L. E. Cole, 'SMO, Inc.', 20 October 1966, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd07/050121.png&otherstuff=6|67|0|12|1|1|1|49404| [accessed 10 July 2013].

Nonetheless, Cole persisted in his investigation directing his attention to the "troublemakers" and "outsiders" identified by local whites. Using a combination of spurious but well-crafted accusations, unreliable witnesses and character assassination, Cole set out to eradicate the possibility of radical CDGM influence in the program, rather than merely to prove its existence. By discrediting the role of the OEO Task Force and maligning CDGM supporters, Cole harnessed the racial discrimination that permeated the law enforcement officers, SMO staff and community combined with some African Americans' fear of retribution in order to undermine the influence former CDGM workers had in SMCDC. Practicing 'practical segregation', Johnston accepted that he would not be able to exclude African Americans from SMO entirely, and settled instead for excluding CDGM's subversive influence.[346] O'Fallon named Reverend Harry Bowie – an African American Episcopalian priest and former Delta Ministry worker from New Jersey now resident in Amite County – as the chief troublemaker.[347] Seizing on the accusation, Cole began a witch hunt against Bowie, involving local law enforcement officers, the SMO board and SMCDC staff. Digging into Bowie's background, Cole requested information on Bowie's record in New Jersey and asked the commission director to request an FBI rap sheet.[348] Finding no evidence of criminal activity, Cole gathered together gossip and malicious accusations as witness statements claiming Bowie had embezzled money donated to McComb Community Centre during a trip to Washington D.C. in December 1964.[349] Bowie, as the figurehead for the former CDGM program during the negotiations between SMO and SMCDC, was an ideal target for the Commission's smear campaign. Using a handwritten note allegedly found in Bowie's office, Cole claimed that CDGM Director John Mudd had given orders for former CDGM staff to 'mess up' SMO in any way possible.[350] The Commission's

[346] Johnston, *Defiant Years*, p.292.
[347] Cole, 'SMO, Inc.', 20 October 1966; M. Newman, *Divine Agitators: The Delta Ministry and Civil Rights in Mississippi*, (University of Georgia Press: Athens, 2004), p.20.
[348] MSSC Records, SCR ID # 6-67-0-11-1-1-1, L. E. Cole, 'SMO, Inc.', 24 October 1966, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd07/050119.png&otherstuff=6|67|0|11|2|1|1|49402| [accessed 10 July 2013].
[349] MSSC Records, SCR ID # 1-116-0-9-1-1-1, Ernest Nobles 'Statement', n.d., http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd02/008788.png&otherstuff=1|116|0|9|1|1|1|8574| [accessed 10 July 2013].
[350] MSSC Records, SCR ID # 6-67-0-33-3-1-1 'Changes in Present Proposal' and attached handwritten note, n.d., http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd07/050228.png&otherstuff=6|67|0|33|3|1|1|49509| [accessed 10 July 2013]; SCR ID # 1-116-0-8-1-1-1, L. E. Cole, 'SMO, Inc.', 14 November 1966, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd02/008786.png&otherstuff=1|116|0|8|2|1|1|8572| [accessed 10 July 2013].

investigation drew on familiar Massive Resistance tactics and allegations to oppose Civil Rights activists and served to eliminate the involvement of many former CDGM personnel from the new program, decreasing the number and influence of sources of opposition to white control over SMCDC.[351]

Despite Governor Johnson's reluctant acceptance of MAP, he remained vehemently opposed to CDGM and deeply concerned about the Group's persistence and influence. Johnson vetoed SMO's initial grant based on his euphemistically phrased concerns that the delegate arrangement did not give SMO full 'organisational control' over SMCDC.[352] Johnson's stated opposition – that the African American program was not fully under the authority of the white CAA – was predicated on his fear that continued funding for CDGM affiliates would enhance the political power of African Americans, a deeply ingrained opposition to threats to the racial status quo and a political pragmatism that necessitated his very public stance opposing the War on Poverty. However, Johnson's veto (which was overridden by Shriver) was based on a misreading of the situation. By the time of his veto, the complementary state and grassroots mechanisms of Massive Resistance, led by the Sovereignty Commission had been utilised in opposition to CDGM-remnants across the state. They ensured that SMO gained strict control over the operation of SMCDC to the exclusion of any former CDGM staff and supporters such as Bowie.[353]

Southwest Mississippi

Battles for white control of Head Start funds across the state illustrate the critical conjunction of the grassroots, local and state mechanisms of white supremacy. As such,

[351] Katagiri, *Sovereignty Commission*, pp.152-157, for example details Johnston's role in the removal of Tougaloo College President Dr. A. D. Beittel.
[352] Stennis Papers, Series 1, Box 4, Folder 15, Paul B. Johnson to Sargent Shriver, 15 November 1966.
[353] MSSC Records, SCR ID # 2-110-0-64-1-1-1, 'Woodville, Mississippi and Wilkinson County', 21 April 1967, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd05/037173.png&otherstuff=2|110|0|64|1|1|1|36588| [accessed 10 July 2013]; SCR ID # 1-116-0-13-1-1-1, L. E. Cole, 'Rev. W. F. Summers', 14 June 1968, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd02/008793.png&otherstuff=1|116|0|13|1|1|1|8579| [accessed 10 July 2013]. Commission investigators kept tabs on Bowie. Reports in 1967 and 1968 reveal O'Fallon and investigators on-going concerns of CDGM influence in SMCDC, despite lack of evidence.

the local variations in the racial and economic landscape in which these battles occurred had a significant impact on their outcome. In Sunflower County the assistance of the Republican Party bolstered the local mechanisms of white supremacy. In Bolivar County, Republican attempts to assist the white CAA in asserting control over the county's Head Start program was neutralised by the strength of local movement networks.[354] In Pike, Amite and Wilkinson Counties the success of SMO in securing white control over federal funds owed much to local conditions: the lack of a strong network of Civil Rights activists and the absence of a significant white moderate presence; the struggling, rural economy and extreme prevalence of poverty; and most especially the widespread and pervasive nature of Klan influence.

The counties of southwest Mississippi were home to some of the poorest people in the country. OEO's 1966 survey showed the severity of poverty, the sufficiency of housing and economic activity in Amite and Wilkinson Counties was worse than in 90 to 99 per cent of counties in the country. With declining agricultural economies, under-industrialisation, small tax bases, high illiteracy and unemployment and a declining population, opportunities for Amite and Wilkinson's population – both black and white – were extremely limited. The high African American populations (54 per cent in Amite and 70 per cent in Wilkinson) meant that African Americans, who were always disproportionately impacted by poverty, were numerically the largest poor group. Neighbouring Pike County fared slightly better: home to a railroad maintenance and repair industry, only 63 per cent of its population lived in rural areas as opposed to 100 per cent in Wilkinson and Amite.[355] The nature of this extreme rural poverty not only made addressing poverty extremely challenging but also provided fertile ground for the proliferation of violent white extremist organisations.

Southwest Mississippi was home to a variety of these organisations and a selection of Civil Rights groups: multiple Klan factions, APWR, White Citizens Councils, the NAACP, SNCC and the Delta Ministry had all been active in the area at varying times since the mid-1950s. NAACP branches in southwest Mississippi weathered the repression of the 1950s better than many other branches in the state, exemplified by Walthall County's NAACP becoming the first in the state to file a

[354] Andrews, 'Social Movements', pp.88-89.
[355] LBJL: Office Files of Fred Panzer, Box 49, OEO Information Center 1966 Community Profile of Amite, Wilkinson and Pike Counties.

desegregation suit.[356] However, despite determined voter registration drives spearheaded by the NAACP, SNCC and later the Delta Ministry they made little headway.[357] President of Amite County's NAACP, E. W. Steptoe, was the first and only African American to open his home to SNCC workers when they began their Deep South voting project in 1961, but he was only able to register to vote himself in 1965, 11 years after his first attempt. From law enforcement officials and local politicians to Klansmen and Citizens Councillors, whites in the southwest of Mississippi comprehensively and often violently oppressed African American activism.[358] Attempts at voter registration were met with the usual police stop and arrest tactics, while white against black violence up to and including murder went uninvestigated and unpunished.[359] Steptoe lived fewer than 100 yards away from E. H. Hurst, a former member of the Mississippi State Legislature and a White Citizens Councilman who shot and killed Herbert Lee, an African American man from Amite County active in the voting drive in Liberty in 1961. An African American witness to this shooting was found shot dead outside his home on 1 February 1964.[360]

The longevity of Civil Rights activism in the area and the Klan's entrenched influence ensured that race relations in the mid-1960s remained characterised by violence or the threat of violence. The passage of the Civil and Voting Rights Acts had done little to change the reality of daily existence for African Americans. Local activists – such as Steptoe and his Pike County counterpart C. C. Bryant – remained the targets of bombings and cross burnings, incidents which the local police and occasional Sovereignty Commission investigations routinely dismissed as publicity stunts by Civil Rights activists and subversives.[361] School integration requirements had resulted in the

[356] Dittmer, *Local People*, pp.112-130.
[357] Payne, *Light of Freedom*, p.113; Newman, *Divine Agitators*, pp.68-83.
[358] Dittmer, *Local People*, p.306; Crespino, *In Search*, p.124. For example the bombing of the home of MFDP activist Aylene Quin, which spurred President Johnson to call for federal action in McComb, and rallied the local white establishment to mobilise the Sovereignty Commission to suppress black activism.
[359] MSSC Records, SCR ID # 10-13-0-4-1-1-1, 'A Mississippi Negro is First Registered after 11 Trying Years', *The Worker*, (15 August 1965), http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd08/063728.png&otherstuff=10|13|0|4|1|1|1|62894| [accessed 10 July 2013]; SCR ID # 1-71-0-1-1-1-1, A. L. Hopkins to Aubrey Bell and attached report on Robert Moses, 19 April 1963, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd01/004878.png&otherstuff=1|71|0|1|2|1|1|4758| [accessed 10 July 2013].
[360] 'Mississippi Negro is First Registered', *The Worker*.
[361] 'Police Probing Blasts', *The Clarion Ledger* (24 June 1964); MSSC Records, SCR ID # 2-36-2-13-1-1-1, Virgil Downing, 'Bombing Activity in McComb, Mississippi', 7 May 1964, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/p

creation of private white academies operated by the area's Citizens Councils, leaving the formerly all-white public school systems in Amite and Wilkinson Counties all black, while Pike County's attempts at school integration faired only a little better.[362]

The Klan remained highly active and highly visible in the counties of southwest Mississippi in the late 1960s. Klan influence in the local communities of Pike, Amite and Wilkinson Counties, a nebulous but powerful force, shaped and defined the experience of the antipoverty program with destructive effect. The intensely local variations in the power and influence of the Klan played a significant role in the diversity and nature of white opposition to CAPs. While MAP, with centres across the state, was subject to that wave of Klan violence in 1967, the Klan did not shape the entire experience and direction of MAP as it did in the smaller, county level programs. In particular the depth, extent and longevity of Klan influence in southwest Mississippi that went far beyond individual acts of violence or harassment shaped the actions of white and black CAP staff and the response of the local community to SMO and SMCDC.

The KKK had been conspicuously absent in Mississippi even as it gained strength in many Deep South states in the 1950s and early 1960s. In the mid-1960s, with the waning influence of Citizens Councils, the threat of Freedom Summer, and the first steps toward integration, the Klan was on the rise in the Magnolia State. Once again, it was the symbol and instrument of 'last ditch resistance' against integration.[363] By 1964, the counties of southwest Mississippi were home to the Alabama-based UKA (which made Adams County a base from which to invade the state), the ultra-violent White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi (which originated as a break-away faction of the Louisiana-based Original Knights of the KKK) and multiple chapters of the APWR.[364] The high concentration of violent white supremacist organisations, estimated at over one hundred Klansmen in two Klaverns in McComb by August 1964,

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ng/cd01/006747.png&otherstuff=2|36|2|13|1|1|1|6580| [accessed 10 July 2013]; SCR ID # 2-36-2-14-1-1-1, Virgil Downing, 'Dynamite Bombings of Negro Homes in McComb, Mississippi', 25 June 1964, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd01/006753.png&otherstuff=2|36|2|14|1|1|1|6582| [accessed 10 July 2013].

[362] RG 381: Box 13, Folder Mississippi SMO Education, 'OEO Composite Evaluation Report of SMO', 8-10 April 1970.

[363] A. Forster and B. R. Epstein, *Report on the Ku Klux Klan,* (Anti-defamation League of B'nai B'rith: New York, 1965), p.7.

[364] M. R. Belknap, *Federal Law and Southern Order: Racial Violence and Constitutional Conflict in the Post-Brown South,* (University of Georgia Press: Athens, 1987), p.130.

is reflected in the scale of racial violence in the area. In McComb alone during 1964 there were 18 bomb blasts at African American homes and churches, and Civil Rights workers were beaten and threatened with shotguns.[365] Local law enforcement officials did little to counteract this violence. Although three Klansmen were arrested in connection with some of these bombings in October 1964 and found guilty, they were given only suspended sentences.[366] The Klan dominated a large swathe of Mississippi, from Wilkinson and Adams Counties spreading north east to Lauderdale and Kemper Counties. Klan influence extended into Sheriff's offices and spread amongst Highway Patrolmen. Known Klansmen included a Sheriff in Adams County and two Deputy Sheriffs in Copiah and Holmes Counties, whilst those suspected of Klan involvement included two Sheriffs in Amite and Walthall Counties.[367] Those not affiliated with or sympathetic to the Klan lived in fear of reprisals as they took over 'the guidance of thought patterns' in local communities. Campaigns of terror were unleashed against whites and blacks who dared to defy their regime.[368]

Historians, including Newton, Chalmers, Drabble and Lewis have shown how a combination of factors served to loosen the Klan's strangle hold on Mississippi – and the wider South – after 1964. HUAC's Klan investigations publicising the identity of Klansmen and revealing the multiple examples of the defrauding of Klan members by their superiors, the FBI's infiltrations of the Klan and the increased willingness (and ability) at the federal – and later local – level to prosecute racial murder, all served to weaken the Klan.[369] While there was no state-wide investigation in Mississippi into the extent and political influence of the Klan akin to that conducted by Alabama's Attorney General Richmond Flowers, some Mississippi businessmen and local politicians did act

[365] Ibid., p.138.
[366] KKK Collection, Box 1, Folder 11, '"Reorganisation" of the KKK Revealed', *Vicksburg Evening Post*, (1 November 1966).
[367] Johnson Family Papers, Box 142, Folder 1, Roy K. Moore to Governor Paul B. Johnson, 31 March 1966.
[368] KKK Collection, Box 1, Folder 10, 'The Ku Klux Klan – 1965', in *Facts*, 16, No. 3, May 1965. Reverend Clay Lee, Methodist minister in Philadelphia said, 'for all practical purposes, the Klan... has controlled what was said and what was not said'.
[369] Newton, *Ku Klux Klan,* pp.127-182; Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, pp.386-423; Drabble, 'FBI, COINTELPRO', pp.353-402; G. Lewis, '"An Amorphous Code": the Ku Klux Klan and Un-Americanism, 1915-1965', *Journal of American Studies*, 47, No.4 (2013), pp.1-22. Though Drabble argues the FBI Operation also had unintended consequences, in the hard-core Klansmens' contribution to the neo-Nazism, Christian Identity, para-militarization and anti-federal government rhetoric prevalent in 1970s Mississippi, Lewis shows how the HUAC investigations were successful in recasting the Klan as un-American.

to lessen the damage done by Klan violence to their economic prospects.[370] In Laurel, a Klan stronghold in Jones County, newly elected mayor William Henry Bucklew launched a campaign in 1966 to end the Klan's reign of terror in his town. Himself a die-hard segregationist (he had been director of George Wallace's 1964 presidential campaign in Maryland, North Carolina and Virginia), Bucklew faced strong opposition in his public confrontation of the Klan. Though no prosecutions resulted, Bucklew did succeed in securing the public support of law enforcement officials, local businesses and churches in his campaign to end Klan violence. The campaign did serve to temporarily decrease instances of Klan violence in Laurel. However, the Klan 'mentality' remained: in 1966 no schools were integrated, white collar jobs remained off limits to African Americans and most African Americans in Jones County were too afraid to participate in the limited activism of the local NAACP chapter. Bucklew, determined to maintain segregation but unwilling for the local economy to suffer as a result of Klan violence, was happy to reap the benefits of the oppressive atmosphere the Klan projected. In doing so, he fostered the conditions and the complacency if not the complicity, that sustained the Klan so racial violence in Laurel could again flourish.[371] No such attempts were made in Amite, Pike or Wilkinson Counties to lessen the stranglehold of the Klan and the lack of industry – the total absence of it in Amite and Wilkinson Counties – meant there were very few businessmen with a vested interest in stabilising race relations. While there were some whites, such as Reed, on SMO's board who were willing to make efforts towards biracial cooperation their involvement was aimed at controlling and containing moves toward racial integration and had no effect on ameliorating the pervasive and threatening atmosphere of violent white supremacy in southwest Mississippi.

Although Klan violence and the Klan's power in Mississippi were decreasing, in southwest Mississippi white extremist influence remained potent and widespread. There was friction between southwest Mississippi's rival Klan factions (the UKA, White Knights and Original Knights of the KKK), which were rife with suspicion and discord not least due to the extensive infiltration of their ranks by the FBI, along with dwindling membership numbers, all of which served to lessen their power and influence. By 1967,

[370] KKK Collection, 'Race Violence Work of Klan, Flowers Says', *Birmingham News,* (17 October 1965).
[371] Johnson Family Papers, Box 142, Folder 1, A. Schardt, 'A Mississippi Mayor Fights the Klan', *The Reporter,* (27 January 1966).

UKA membership was down to 500 from its 1964 peak of 3000, while the White Knights had 200 dues paying members from a 1964 peak of 2000.[372] The diminishing Klan influence and membership did lead to a decrease in the levels of racial violence; it did not, however, translate into a decrease in the powerful grip of white supremacists. Other white supremacist organisations active in the area, including APWR and White Citizens Councils siphoned members from the Klan factions. The APWR was most active in southwest and central Mississippi, organising 'buy-ins' (occasionally in collaboration with the Klan or White Citizens Councils) to support white merchants suffering under NAACP boycotts.[373] Unlike the Klan, the APWR attempted to cultivate a non-violent facade. In the wake of the bombings in McComb in 1964, Police Chief George Guy told Sovereignty Commission Investigator Virgil Downing that the local APWR group had been 'very cooperative' and assisted him in enforcing the law in every way, although the Klan, he conceded, did contain some radical members who had taken the law into their own hands.[374] In reality, the APWR contributed to an atmosphere permissive of violence and its members were linked to brutal acts of racial violence, including murder.[375] White Citizens Councils, though never as widespread in the hill counties of the southwest as in the Delta, remained active in the area at the end of the 1960s. Responding to the declining membership of the Klans, the Pike County Citizens Council staged a successful membership drive in 1968. The Councils continued to hold yearly meetings which attracted prominent segregationist speakers, who expounded remarkably static anticommunist and anti-federal government rhetoric.

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[372] KKK Collection, Box 1, Folder 11, J. Bonney 'Associated Press Investigation Shows Klan's Mississippi Empire is Crumbling', *Meridian Star,* (24 March 1967).

[373] MSSC Records, SCR ID # 6-36-0-58-1-1-1, 'Continued Investigation of the Boycott of White Merchants in Edwards, Mississippi and buy-ins sponsored by the AWPR in this town', 27 October 1966, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd06/044457.png&otherstuff=6|36|0|58|1|1|1|43799| [accessed 10 July 2013]; SCR ID # 6-36-0-57-1-1-1, A. L. Hopkins to E. Johnston, 7 November 1966, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd06/044455.png&otherstuff=6|36|0|57|1|1|1|43797 [accessed 10 July 2013]. The efficacy of these buy-ins was questionable. Indeed, a Sovereignty Commission investigator looking into the impact of the NAACP boycott on Edwards, in Hinds County found that not only did APWR and KKK buy ins not increase the amount of money the merchants took, but they also discouraged the few African Americans who had been breaking the NAACP boycott from purchasing.

[374] Crespino, *In Search,* p.134; MSSC Records, SCR ID # 2-36-2-14-2-1-1, Virgil Downing, 'Dynamite Bombings of Negro Homes in McComb, Mississippi', 25 June 1964, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd01/006754.png&otherstuff=2|36|2|14|2|1|1|6586| [accessed 10 July 2013].

[375] 'APWR Trying to Raise Money for Defense', *The Clarion Ledger,* (29 February 1968). Several of the 12 men accused of murdering Vernon Dahmer had links with the APWR; Clifford Wilson had been President of the Jones County APWR. The Laurel APWR held a dinner featuring guest speaker Asa Carter in order to raise money for the accused men.

However, the Councils' publication, *The Citizen* reflected the pragmatic changes to the groups' focus, with editorials on the more practical considerations of avoiding – rather than preventing – the inevitable school desegregation. Council run segregation academies were highly successful in preventing school integration, even in the poverty-stricken Amite and Wilkinson counties where parents could ill afford the costs of private education. This success left Head Start on the front line of opposition to integrated education. SMCDC, then, had become the focal point for vocal and violent white opposition to the integration of children's classes.

While the Klan's influence in southwest Mississippi did decline after 1964, it did not diminish entirely. Its social and political influence continued, and with it instances of racial violence and even murder. The Klan supported arch-segregationist candidates like Jimmy Swann for Governor in 1967 and continued to provide a bloc vote for Senator Eastland.[376] By 1967, the unit vote controlled by the Klan was only slightly smaller than the unit vote of African Americans in Mississippi.[377] Far from fading away, a resurgence of the Klan in response to the perceived threat of Black Power and the riots of 1967 saw a wave of violence sweep across Mississippi directed at integrated antipoverty programs, particularly at whites involved in those programs. However, the Klan did not continue along a steady decline. The violence was concentrated in the southwest of the state, making particular targets of Head Start centres in Lincoln, Amite and Pike counties.[378] Though short-lived, this violence had a profound impact on the antipoverty programs attacked. While popular support for the violent extremism of the Klan had diminished, the community response to the attacks on antipoverty centres in southwest Mississippi indicate the continued and widespread support for the enforcement of white supremacy. The continued presence and even growth of other white supremacist organisations, such as the APWR and Citizens Councils, served to maintain the atmosphere in which the Klan flourished. Together these white supremacists, through the rise and decline in their influence, membership and popularity levels served to maintain and bolster the power of white supremacist

[376] Mississippi State University, Mitchell Memorial Library, Special Collections, Starkville: Russell C. Davis Papers [hereafter Davis Papers], Box 44, Folder Ku Klux Klan, 'Jackson Police Department Intelligence Division Special Investigative Report', n.d. In 1967, Klansmen were reportedly discussing a plan to 'blow up a Negro' in order to create racial friction to benefit Swan's gubernatorial campaign.
[377] MCHR Records, Box 15 Folder KKK, Memo for Council Files re 'Interest Groups and Voting Trends as Regards Race Relations in Mississippi', 6 January 1967.
[378] Greenberg, *Devil,* p.592.

ideology and reality, centred on southwest Mississippi. As the renewed wave of Klan violence peaked early in 1968, the APWR declined, and most APWR chapters were eventually taken over by the Klan.[379] The Klan in Mississippi continued to experience peaks and troughs in its membership and influence into the 1970s. In 1971, the Klan had once again placed a price, albeit a modest one, on Aaron Henry's head.[380] While Klan fortunes fluctuated, their pervasive presence, damaging violence and powerful influence had played a central role in establishing patterns of white response to SMO and SMCDC that proved impossible to overcome.

SMO and SMCDC

The failure of antipoverty programs to achieve maximum feasible participation, minority involvement and, in the worst cases, their failure to have any positive impact in addressing the problems created by poverty has often been assigned to administrative shortcomings at the national, state and local levels.[381] As with many CAAs across the country, SMO and SMCDC were beset by such failings, which included a lack of training for staff and directors, funding delays and inadequate administrative practices. However, in southwest Mississippi the omnipresent attitude of white supremacy had a far more detrimental impact on the programs than any administrative shortcomings. Systemic racism not only undermined the potential CAPs provided for African American advancement, but it also destroyed the program's potential to address poverty, exacerbated the administrative failings and over time shaped SMO into an extension of the white establishment that suppressed African American advancement and activism.

O'Fallon was instrumental in shaping the program into a mechanism of white control by ensuring African Americans were excluded from the program or coerced into cooperation with her. O'Fallon had been the source of many complaints to Sovereignty Commission investigators in her unsuccessful attempts to ensure that SMO gained

[379] Crespino, *In Search,* p.134.
[380] MCHR Records, Box 15, Folder KKK, 'Klan Upsurge Reported', *Delta Democrat Times,* (18 January 1971). Discussing the price the Klan had put on his head, Henry told the reporter wryly, 'it deflated my ego – I ought to be worth more than $1000'.
[381] Kramer, *Participation*, p.186.

direct control over the operation of Head Start. She bitterly opposed the SMCDC board's appointment of African American Head Start Director Henrene Matthews. Although Matthews was eventually appointed, the SMO board referred to him as the "Program Co-ordinator," instead of the standard "Program Director" title, the first in a series of manoeuvres by O'Fallon and the board that would systematically strip Matthews of authority.[382] Matthews only kept his job by the constant fight he, SMCDC Board Chairman Leo Whaley and the SMCDC staff collectively put up against the constant pressure from SMO to replace him with a white director.[383] O'Fallon took every opportunity to undermine Matthews, before OEO inspectors, program staff and the board. She placed staff on Head Start centre payrolls without Matthews' knowledge or consent, reprimanded SMCDC employees without informing Matthews and refused to allow Matthews his rightful control over Head Start finances.[384] This lack of control over their own funds combined with the usual administrative shortcomings of antipoverty programs at the local, regional and national level which held up the allocation of funds and left SMCDC centres without even the most basic equipment. Even when money was available, O'Fallon's refusal to allow Head Start business to be transacted in the Head Start office, instituting a disputed method of payment of SMCDC staff and constant undermining of Matthews' authority left SMCDC centres inadequately equipped and staffed.[385]

In spite of the lack of facilities and equipment, and the extreme poverty of the black community, Matthews worked hard to engage with the local community and encourage participation from Head Start parents. In Wilkinson County, Head Start fathers had made three large swings for their local centre, while in Pike County, the Magnolia centre director had established a sewing project with Head Start mothers making dresses for their daughters.[386] However, O'Fallon even managed to curtail this SMCDC activity which was not only legitimate but was central to OEO's philosophy. When Matthews attempted to strengthen parent participation with a staff directive to encourage work with parents after normal working hours, O'Fallon sent a resolution to

[382] King to Shell, 'On-site Evaluation of SMO, Inc.', 7 May 1968.
[383] RG 381: Box 6, Folder CAP Southwest Mississippi, Robert W. Saunders to William W. Suttle, 13 November 1968.
[384] King to Shell, 'On-site Evaluation of SMO, Inc.', 7 May 1968.
[385] RG 381: Box 12, Folder SMO, Inc., Woodville, Mississippi, Maxine Thurston, 'Evaluation Report: Social Services, Parent Participation and Volunteer Services, SMCDC', 29 April-2 May 1968.
[386] Jones, 'SMO Inc. Status Report', 12 May 1969.

the board prohibiting any night work by Head Start employees. O'Fallon's only community outreach efforts were limited to assuring white residents that they would not disrupt the status quo.[387] The tactics used by O'Fallon in her constant opposition to Matthews undermined his authority, had a negative impact on the quality of the Head Start program and excluded the few poor African Americans willing to risk the wrath of violent white supremacist groups to become involved with the program.

In addition to the controls that she imposed on SMCDC, O'Fallon demanded the allegiance of the white staff or commanded their fear. The only work that took place in SMO was ordered directly by her, with the result that African American Deputy Director Will Johnson could only do the work she let him, which by his own admission was nothing.[388] SMO staff altered the mileage data of SMCDC drivers, causing unauthorised changes to information sent to SMO without the consent or knowledge of Matthews. The SMO Bookkeeper refused to issue reimbursement for the legitimate expenses of SMCDC staff, exerting her control beyond the remit of her job in order to demoralise SMCDC staff. The attitude of O'Fallon and the board meant many white central and local office staff members felt they did not have to work with African Americans in the Head Start program or local communities.[389] The day-to-day racism prevalent in the area infused the program. Black SMCDC employees were forced to eat lunch in the Head Start office because no restaurants would serve them while white SMCDC employees ate out at lunch. When an OEO Inspector commented on this to the SMO executive staff, they voiced surprise that she would even notice.[390] The failure of OEO to address these routine acts of racial discrimination that were flagged by successive inspectors indicates serious OEO shortcomings, the impact of which will be addressed later. The lack of evidence for any NAACP lawsuits being brought by African Americans in the area points not only to the NAACP's ubiquitous funding problems, but also to a more insidious perpetuation of Civil Rights era economic threats. In such a poor area, African Americans were unlikely to put their jobs under threat by pursuing discrimination suits when white domination, both inside and outside the program remained so entrenched.

[387] Thurston, 'Evaluation Report', 29 April-2 May 1968.
[388] Ibid.
[389] RG 381: Box 6, Folder CAP Southwest Mississippi, Don Allen to Henrene Matthews, 17 July 1968 and enclosed material prepared by the OEO Evaluation Team.
[390] Thurston, 'Evaluation Report', 29 April-2 May 1968.

The controlling white members of SMO's board also played a significant role in shaping SMO into a mechanism of white control while inter-county feuds prevented the formation of an interracial, moderate coalition in opposition to this dominating faction. TARs were deprived of a voice in the running of the program either through their lack of knowledge (which was never remedied due to the lack of training for board members) or the deliberate manoeuvring of the powerful whites who wielded considerable economic power.[391] Decision making was restricted to the executive committee of the board, a six-man group with a quorum of 50 per cent that left white supremacist chairman Maxie Sturgeon in control of the program. White moderates such as Reed and *Magnolia Gazette* editor Charles Stogner made attempts to check the dictatorial and discriminatory activities of Sturgeon and O'Fallon; however, these voices of moderation were drowned out by board members – both black and white – who were content to use their membership to gain political or economic advantage, primarily by ensuring the program did not disrupt the racial status quo.[392] Although Stogner succeeded Sturgeon as board chairman, his moderating influence was limited and he failed to offer dynamic leadership. Stogner used his position to block attempts to create more meaningful community participation and faced accusations from the Board's Vice Chairman, Pike County NAACP President C. C. Bryant that he abused his power with unwarranted influence in the operation of SMO.[393] Stogner perpetuated O'Fallon's campaign against Matthews, utilising the language of earlier Massive Resistance in his public criticism of Matthews and the Head Start program to draw on white fears of Civil Rights activism and to intimidate African Americans in order to prevent poor participation in SMCDC.[394]

Hostility and antagonism between Amite and Wilkinson County representatives and those from the more progressive and industrialised Pike County served to intensify racial divisions and further paralyse the board, thus increasing the power of the chairman. Members from Amite and Wilkinson Counties resented what they saw as Pike County's attempts to take over the program. These attempts were encouraged – or

[391] RG 381: Box 19, Folder Mississippi SMO, Inc., 'Onsite Evaluation of SMO, Inc.', 4-7 May 1971.
[392] Mississippi Task Force Community Profiles: Amite, Pike and Wilkinson. Reed and Stogner were moderate in comparison to the white supremacist attitudes of Sturgeon and O'Fallon. In relationships with African Americans this racial moderation manifested as a benign paternalism.
[393] RG 381: Box 6, Folder CAP Southwest Mississippi, Marc V. Biscoe to Kathleen O'Fallon, 'Report of Courtesy Visit', 26 May 1969 and C.C. Bryant to Kathleen O'Fallon, 6 September 1969.
[394] Ibid.; 'Poverty Agencies in Disagreement', *McComb Enterprise-Journal,* (27 August 1969).

least approved – by OEO, which saw the direction of representatives from the more economically progressive Pike County as the only chance the program had for success. Amite and Wilkinson members refused to relent, with Steve Reed telling an OEO inspector that he would rather see the program destroyed than let Pike County take control. The extent of this dissent was such that it almost led to the election of an African American man as board chairman. In the 1970 elections for chairmanship of the board, J. W. Ashley, a white man from Pike County, tied with African American candidate James Jolliff, forcing a second round of voting. Though Ashley won the second round the near-success of Jolliff, who was disliked by the white establishment of Wilkinson and Amite Counties due to his NAACP activity, is a clear indication of the depth of Amite and Wilkinson County's opposition to Pike County.[395] This inter-county tension had been present in the board since the programs creation. In response, the powerful Wilkinson and Amite County board members' tightened their control over their fellow representatives, both black and white. Although Pike County had been identified by OEO representatives as the only hope for the program, during his tenure as board chairman Ashley ensured the SMO remained a service-oriented program that excluded poor black participation.[396]

The majority of the board members of both races were middle-class, lacking any knowledge of or interest in the needs and conditions of the poor. It was in the interest of the middle-class African American board members to maintain their pre-existing economic relationships with the controlling white board members. CAA boards were significant in perpetuating the intra-racial class divisions which had a detrimental impact of the black freedom struggle in all phases of activism.[397] Membership on these boards and collaboration with their powerful white colleagues enabled many middle-class African Americans to maintain their economic relationships with whites, suppress black activism in favour of maintaining the racial status quo and prevent the emergence of new community leadership to threaten their positions. Through membership on SMO's board, middle-class African Americans allied with middle-class whites to

[395] RG 381: Box 13, Folder Mississippi SMO, Education, 'Composite Evaluation Report of SMO, Inc., Findings: Conduct and Administration', 8-10 April 1970.
[396] Ibid. A saw mill operator originally elected to the board as a TAR, Ashley's desire to aid poor blacks was paternalistic and, according to OEO Inspectors, his election was a worrying development for the future of the program.
[397] Dittmer, *Local People*, p.73. C. C. Bryant experienced such class divisions when he was first appointed NAACP President in 1954 – not a 'member of the elite', Bryant was rejected by the established black leadership.

exclude the perceived radicalism of former CDGM staff such as Harry Bowie.[398] With a middle-class 'Horatio Alger attitude', white (and a majority of the African American) board members had no understanding of, let alone interest in, the function of the program or the concept of community action. Most board members, indeed most of the wider program staff, local establishment and community believed the purpose of the program was as a funds dispensing organisation which would support the local segregated economy. Moderate groups such as the Neighbourhood Facilities in McComb and Woodville, the Miss-Lou Cooperative, religious organisations and business leaders remained underrepresented on the board.[399] While this middle-class domination of the board did not stem directly from racial antagonism or discrimination, it served to further both. The apathy of these middle-class board members toward poverty and the structure of the board, combined with local rivalries and inadequate methods of electing poor representatives, created an indifferent board that served only to entrench in the program the racial norms of the area. This domination of the board by the middle-classes was not limited to SMO. SMCDC's board, while all black, was likewise dominated by middle-class members. Thus SMCDC's board similarly had little understanding of the causes of consequences of poverty and an aversion to enabling the development of new community leadership. Its composition further divided the poor African American community, many of whom were angry at the lack of true poor representation on either board. The result of this middle-class domination was a board willing to leave the program leaderless while its white leadership attempted to circumvent the appointment of African American Deputy Director Will Johnson as O'Fallon's successor. Unsuccessful in this endeavour, the board finally appointed Johnson after a ten month delay but cut his salary to $50 per month less than O'Fallon had been paid because, in their words, that was 'enough for him'.[400]

Internal divisions in the board coupled with the class-bound attitudes of the majority of board members and the discriminatory activities of O'Fallon and her staff to cripple both SMO and SMCDC. The constant fight between the delegate and SMO, from its board chairman and co-ordinator to centre volunteers and Head Start parents, not only facilitated dissent and division with the local black community but also served

[398] RG 381: Box 19, Folder Mississippi: SMO, Inc., 'SMO On-Site Evaluation Report', 21 October 1971.
[399] Ibid.
[400] Marger to Saunders, 'Civil Rights and Equal Opportunities Review of SMO'.

to undermine what self-determination had been achieved by the area's CDGM program. It deepened intra-racial class divisions, as middle-class African Americans and whites used their involvement in the program to further their own interests and suppress poor African American activism that had found an outlet only through CDGM. Not only did this racially-driven determination to control every facet of the program undermine African American community engagement with the program, it also exacerbated the administrative failings inherent in antipoverty programs, rendering both programs ineffectual.

Community Response

The control over SMCDC exercised by O'Fallon and the board through their exclusion of, and discrimination against, African Americans did not occur in isolation. A broad cross-class coalition of white society bolstered and necessitated O'Fallon and the board's actions. Although not always united in purpose, motivation or methods poor and middle-class whites, Klansmen, Citizens Councilmen, local politicians and businessmen formed a wall of solid opposition to SMO and SMCDC. Poor whites drew on blatantly racist language in their refusal to allow their children to attend integrated Head Start centres, providing opposition which was both reinforced and necessitated by Klan violence and intimidation. White middle-class opposition, despite being shrouded in ostensibly race-neutral language opposing federal intervention and espousing American values, drew on the same well-spring of racist sentiment. This class-bound opposition reveals the divisions in white society that antipoverty programs served to expose, and which in some areas of Mississippi, African American programs were able to benefit from.[401] The racially charged environment of southwest Mississippi provides a vivid illustration of these divisions in both the white and African American communities. However local conditions, including the lack of industry, severe and widespread poverty, the relative weakness of the local movement exacerbated by deepening black class divisions, and the pervasive power and influence of white supremacists meant that the diverse racial and class interests were served by the ruthless

[401] Andrews, 'Social Movements', pp.88-89.

suppression of the threat that SMO and SMCDC posed (or was perceived to pose) to white supremacy and to the interests of the established black leadership.

Despite the extent and severity of poverty in southwest Mississippi, the poor white community remained uniformly opposed to the program. The success of white opposition to school integration had resulted in the mass exodus of white students to newly created private segregated academies operated by the Citizens Councils, leaving Amite and Wilkinson's public school system one hundred percent black.[402] Thus, SMCDC became the front line in the battle to prevent integration. Klansmen and policemen perpetuated the intimidation of black staff and board members, and the violence directed at SMCDC – bullets were fired into its Liberty office and one of its centres was bombed – also reinforced unity of opposition on the white community.[403] Alternately bolstered and intimidated by the pervasive influence of the Klan, poor whites refused to enrol their children in a "black" program. Despite coming close once or twice when white parents verbally agreed to send their children the next year before later backing out, Matthews' failure to integrate the program left him vulnerable to accusations of discrimination from SMO and the censure of OEO inspectors.[404] In addition, such attempts served to alienate the poor black community which felt it was the sole duty of SMCDC to be actively involved in helping the poverty stricken African Americans become a part of the mainstream. Many poor blacks felt betrayed by SMCDC accepting delegate agency status, while others rejected SMCDC for not truly representing their community.[405] The actions of the middle-class African American SMCDC board members added to this sense of betrayal. Rather than fostering community action, or even engaging with the problems created by the severe poverty, these board members used their position to suppress the development of new black leadership and oppose any threat to the racial status quo.[406] It is difficult to divine the motivation of the middle-class SMCDC Board members, whose voices in the historical record are at best muted. However, it is clear that while threatened by the potential new black leadership SMCDC could foster, many of SMCDC's staff and board – such as

[402] University of Mississippi, J. D. Williams Library, Archives and Special Collections, Oxford: John C. Satterfield Collection, Box 37, W. J. Simmons, 'How to Organize a Private School', *The Citizen,* (Special Educational Issue), 14, No. 4, (January 1970), pp.5-10.
[403] Marger to Saunders, 'Civil Rights and Equal Opportunities Review of SMO'.
[404] RG 381: Box 6, Folder CAP Southwest Mississippi, William L. Holland to Charles Stogner, 9 October 1968.
[405] Allen to Matthews, 17 July 1968 and enclosed material.
[406] RG 381: Box 19, Folder Mississippi: SMO, Inc., 'SMO On-Site Evaluation Report', 21 October 1971.

Leo Whaley and Henrene Matthews – were motivated by a desire to address the poverty that was so widespread in Amite, Wilkinson and Pike Counties. The actions of Whaley and Matthews indicate a commitment to this goal and a pragmatic desire to avoid provoking further Klan violence by limiting the threat SMCDC posed to the racial status quo that, while not conducive to promoting community action nonetheless served to create and maintain a Head Start program for some of the poorest children in the state in the face of long-term threats and harassment from O'Fallon, SMO staff and the wider white community.

In an area suffering under such extreme poverty with an African American population unable to gain even the limited rights guaranteed under the Civil and Voting Rights Acts, Head Start provided more than simply a subsidised kindergarten run by the local community. It provided the first medical and dental checks of children's lives and provided them with balanced nutrition and hot meals. More importantly, under CDGM the local Head Start program had for the first time given African Americans a measure of power and control over their own lives. O'Fallon and the board had systemically deprived African Americans involved in SMCDC of that control, while southwest Mississippi's white professionals deprived SMCDC children of the medical and nutritional benefits. In all three counties, many doctors refused to cooperate with or participate in the program, while local merchants over-charged SMCDC while providing them with poor quality food.[407] The low-level opposition from poor whites in their hostility toward whites working in the program and lack of participation combined with the more destructive opposition of middle-class whites, both on the board and in the wider community, to create an impenetrable network of opposition. White class divisions produced seemingly conflicting forms and languages of opposition to antipoverty programs. Middle-class opposition was more often based on opposition to social welfare while poor white opposition drew on the solely racially motivated fear of losing their perceived social and racial superiority over poor blacks. However, in southwest Mississippi the potency of Klan influence and the unchallenged belief in white supremacy ensured opposition to African American advancement subsumed these class divisions. For the black community, the antipoverty program not only exposed but

[407] RG 381: Box 6, Folder CAP Southwest Mississippi, 'Minutes of SMCDC Board Meeting', 12 July 1968.

also deepened these class divisions, even as it unified the diverse sources and mechanisms of cross-class white opposition to SMO and SMCDC.

As such, opposition did not just come from "expected" sources such as Klansmen and poor parents. White Mississippians not associated with SMO or SMCDC and unaffected by the potential integration in Head Start classes or the employment of African Americans in white collar jobs in SMCDC and SMO came to resent the interference of the federal government and the corruption of white American values of individualism, capitalism and enterprise. SMCDC had materially changed the nature of fund distribution to the poor, despite its imposed limitations. While local public welfare departments routinely discriminated against poor blacks, SMCDC not only provided for African Americans with jobs, community engagement and opportunities for their children, but staff had also succeeded in educating Head Start parents about their rights and attempted to challenge the discriminatory actions of their public welfare departments. When in 1970 a county attorney threw a rock through the window of the Head Start building, he claimed to be opposing 'ineffectual government give away programs', alleging federal funds were being used to foment trouble against the government authority on all levels.[408] Middle-class whites opposing the antipoverty programs used different language from poor whites and Klansmen, who relied on the cruder, explicit demagoguery of earlier eras. The new language of opposition incorporated this racial opposition, tapping the abundant hostility toward African American advancement (particularly advancement involving biracial cooperation) without explicitly referencing it – for the residents of southwest Mississippi, Head Start was a black program and SMO was the mistrusted integrated funnel for federal funds to SMCDC. The overt references to the perceived socialism of the Great Society and federal encroachment on states' rights were not merely a veneer over the racist core, but layers of opposition that drew on historic linkages between race and welfare and the belief intrinsic to the American ideology that rendered poverty the fault of the poor. Thus fusing together the language of Massive Resistance and opposition to social welfare to cast African Americans and antipoverty programs as un-American. In Mississippi, where African Americans were still largely excluded from social welfare by the discriminatory practices of local public welfare departments, antipoverty

[408] RG 381: Box 13, Folder Mississippi: SMO, Education, 'Local Attorney Pleads Guilty to Malicious Mischief', *Southern Herald*, (7 May 1970).

programs became the focus of this wider opposition to the socialist excesses of Great Society liberalism as the language of this opposition fed into the emerging national conservatism.

Although widespread and diverse, white opposition to SMO was not uniform or all-encompassing. The inter-county social and economic disparities that wrought such tensions in SMO's board were reflected in the willingness of the moderate white leaders and businessmen of Pike County to embrace a certain level of interracial cooperation. Outside of SMO, integrated programs and even a measure of community action did exist.[409] The determination of O'Fallon and successive board chairmen to ensure SMO and SMCDC did not disrupt the racial status quo stifled any opportunity for genuine community action and prevented all of SMO's component programs (not just SMCDC) from having a significant impact on poverty in the area. While the controversial community action concept has been blamed for the failure of the War on Poverty, ironically in southwest Mississippi it was the failure of O'Fallon to engage with the few willing moderate whites and poor blacks that contributed to the rejection of the program by all segments of southwest Mississippi.[410] SMO remained ignored by the majority of the local establishment and the focus of the ire of the extremist elements of the white community due to its integrated board and connection to the perceived radicals of the black community. However, not all of SMO's component programs were met with opposition. Although Head Start was typically an all-black program, those programs run directly by establishment CAAs were usually dominated by whites and thus attracted less white criticism. SMO's Neighbourhood Youth Corps was operated by whites mostly for whites, providing jobs in 39 sites across the tri-county area including public schools, city and county agencies. Although widely accepted by the local community, this program still drew complaints from local authorities in Wilkinson and Pike counties who criticised the work of the counsellors and claimed no work was done by enrolees.[411] Lacking black involvement, opposition was targeted at the nature of the program, drawing on the perception of those receiving public welfare as lazy – rhetoric

[409] 'OEO Composite Evaluation Report of SMO', 8-10 April 1970. Community action was, according to an OEO Inspector, evident in the Miss-Lou Cooperative – a majority black farmer's cooperative involving seven white farmers that collects and sells vegetable produce from small farms to markets both inside and outside the area and helped to force a rise in market prices inside the area with its ability to ship produce elsewhere.
[410] Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible*, p.xiv.
[411] RG 381: Box 13, Folder Mississippi: SMO, Inc., Woodville, Mississippi, 'Official Report of Onsite Findings, SMO, Inc.', 29 April-3 May 1968.

that was significantly less potent than when it was combined with the language of earlier Massive Resistance and directed at African American involvement.

The diverse but complementary response of a broad cross-section of whites in southwest Mississippi to SMCDC created a network of opposition that deepened African American class divisions, crippled the operation of SMCDC and assisted SMO's leadership in creating a program that suppressed and controlled African American advancement. The refusal of professional as well as poor whites to participate in SMCDC, the violent opposition of the Klan and the middle-class articulations that couched opposition to the program in ostensibly race neutral language which drew on conservative rhetoric opposing social welfare and federal interference stemmed from diverse and often contradictory sources of opposition. However, this opposition successfully combined earlier tactics and mechanisms of Massive Resistance with the newer language of opposition, language which did not mask the racist origins of the opposition but rather tied racial hostility to a constructed image of social welfare as un-American. Despite the hopes of the Sovereignty Commission, the continuing battle for control of Head Start did not entirely divert efforts from Civil Rights activism. Although Cole reported in 1968 that Civil Rights workers in McComb were not creating any of the usual dissent because they were 'too busy making easy money through Head Start', his reading of the situation was hopelessly flawed.[412] Local NAACP representatives, particularly C. C. Bryant engaged in the on-going power struggles with O'Fallon and Sturgeon. Civil Rights activism, though somewhat muted did endure.[413] However, this complex and diverse network of white opposition prevented SMCDC being used as a base from which to promote activism or further black political progress and reinforced SMO's function as a mechanism of white control.

[412] Cole, 'Rev. W. F. Summers'.
[413] RG 381: Box 6, Folder CAP Southwest Mississippi, C. C. Bryant to Kathleen O'Fallon, 17 January 1968; Kathleen O'Fallon to Clyde James, 4 September 1969; C.C. Bryant to Kathleen O'Fallon, 6 September 1969; Kathleen O'Fallon to Harold Tate, 9 September 1969. Bryant was involved in a dispute with O'Fallon and other board members over allegations of nepotism when his sister in law Elnora Bryant was appointed SMCDC's Director of Evaluation, despite C. C. Bryant having nothing to do with her appointment.

Failure of OEO

The bureaucratic – and more significantly for Murray and his fellow conservative critics, the ideological – errors of OEO have long been held as a significant factor in bringing about the failure of the War on Poverty.[414] However, as many historians have convincingly argued, the War on Poverty did not fail.[415] Even SMO – through which Mississippians subverted the intent of the Economic Opportunity Act and deprived poor African Americans of economic opportunity – remains in operation today.[416] The most significant failing of the War on Poverty lay in OEO's inability – and often, unwillingness – at the national, regional and state levels to prevent the racially discriminatory activities of white CAAs such as SMO. Many of the individual instances and systematic perpetuation of racial discrimination in SMO against SMCDC should have been dealt with by OEO, through yearly inspections and investigations conducted by the Office's Civil Rights Department. The shortcomings of OEO's inspection system – from frequent staff changes, the weakness and bias of individual inspectors to the unrealistic grant conditions that reflected a lack of understanding of local conditions – were evident in its dealings with CAAs across Mississippi, and the country.[417] However, the oppressive atmosphere of southwest Mississippi and pervasive Klan influence exacerbated OEO's systemic failings. SMO thus provides an ideal opportunity to showcase the way in which OEO's failings contributed to the systemic racial discrimination that pervaded white establishment CAAs relationships with their delegate agencies and ultimately undermined the intent of the Economic Opportunity Act. OEO was riddled with bureaucratic failings, over-blown expectations and hampered by idealism amongst its enthusiastic but inexperienced staff that proved impossible to translate into reality. While such shortcomings did hamper the efforts of local people to establish and operate viable let alone successful antipoverty programs, these failings were an obstacle to success not the ultimate cause of failure. Antipoverty programs by their design were intensely local and largely autonomous and it is at the local level – and often at the centre level – the racial roots of the failure of the programs become clear. Examining the interaction of OEO's failings with the omnipresent racial

[414] Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible,* pp.158-9; Murray, *Losing Ground,* p.34.
[415] Orleck, 'Introduction', p.8. The prominent War on Poverty scholars in this volume all follow the premise that Orleck outlines.
[416] Mississippi Department of Human Services: 'CAAs for Community Services Block Grant, FY13', http://www.mdhs.state.ms.us/pdfs/cs_commactdirectory.pdf [accessed 6 August 2013].
[417] E.g. Ashmore, *Carry It On,* p.270/1.

oppression of southwest Mississippi throws into clear distinction the true weight of OEO's shortcomings.

Successive SMO inspection reports reveal serious program deficiencies, including ongoing non-compliance with Civil Rights regulations, training deficiencies amongst staff and board members and irregularities in the CAA-delegate relationship. Each year inspectors made basic training grant requirements that went unfulfilled.[418] The basic training requirements deemed as urgent in the first inspection of May 1968 to provide board members with at least a basic understanding of the function of the program had still not been implemented by 1970. As years passed the condition of the program only worsened, reflected in one inspector's warnings that if training was not undertaken there was little hope that SMO would grow beyond federal dependency and every likelihood that the program would collapse under its own weight of discord. OEO did initially make efforts to address SMO's non-compliance.[419] When the recommendations of the first inspection had not been acted upon by October 1968, OEO District Supervisor William Holland assigned Senior Field Representative Phil Davis to act as a special advisor to SMO. Davis, who was the OEO Field Representative for Northeast Mississippi, oversaw the enactment of some of the more quantifiable recommendations and reported on a limited amount of implementation. However, many of OEO's requirements were unrealistic, or reflected a poor understanding of the complexity of the racial situation in southwest Mississippi. The requirement that all white staff members learn and use the proper pronunciation of the word 'negro' (pronounced 'nigger' by most Mississippi whites), a recommendation made to many Mississippi CAAs, however laudable, was all but impossible to enforce. Frequent changes in personnel in OEO, often caused by changes higher up in the organisation leading to promotions and redistributions of personnel meant problems noticed by one Civil Rights inspector were left unaddressed by his successor, for nearly six months. Even after initial, blaring failures to comply with Civil Rights were addressed, SMO remained in violation of OEO's requirements because it did business with local banks in the tri-county area which were not equal opportunity employers.[420]

[418] Inspectors were both black and white, usually from the same state or region as the program they inspected.
[419] RG 381: Box 6, Folder CAP Southwest Mississippi, 'Narrative Report on SMO', 31 December 1968; Jones, 'SMO Inc. Status Report', 12 May 1969; 'Onsite Evaluation of SMO, Inc.', 4-7 May 1971.
[420] Jones, 'SMO Inc. Status Report', 12 May 1969.

Holland's requirements that SMCDC made vigorous efforts to enrol white students into Head Start, while in line with OEO's philosophy to use antipoverty programs to enforce the Civil Rights Act, reflects a lack of understanding – bordering on wilful ignorance – of the racial realities of the area. Despite the inadequacy of many OEO requirements, it was the failure to enforce these requirements that ensured SMO's executive staff and board continued to ignore them. OEO was unwilling to defund SMO because of the extent and severity of poverty in the area, meaning that any effort – even that of SMO – was in the words of one inspector 'better than nothing'.[421] While OEO's failure to enforce Civil Rights compliance gave license for SMO to continue its oppressive activities, this unwillingness to deprive the area of its only source of antipoverty funds left OEO helpless in the face of SMO's discriminatory practices.

Racial discrimination also had a direct impact on OEO's inspection process. While both white and African American staff members were involved in the reviewing progress, the race of inspectors did not guarantee their impartiality or professionalism. Ima Jean Harris, who had been a Home Management Supervisor with the Farmers Home Administration from 1935 to 1947 in Wilkinson County, was knowledgeable about agriculture in the area and shared in the racial discriminatory mindset of the area's white residents. Her racial attitudes were clearly evident in her report, implying many of the poorer families could grow hot pepper and sweet potatoes – good money crops – if only they would try. Harris felt the opening of a Farmers Home Administration office in Woodville that was imminent would be helpful to the sort of people who need help in many ways if they really want to work. Reinforcing the American ideology (a predominantly white middle-class construction) that blamed poverty on the poor because they lacked those American values of hard-work and enterprise and overlooking the blatant racism of the Farmers Home Administration that more often than not meant that poor blacks were denied the assistance they so desperately needed. Harris' attitude – that many people were not doing what they could to help themselves – was reflective of the attitude of the white board of directors of

[421] RG 381: Box 6, Folder CAP Southwest Mississippi, William L. Holland to Charles Stogner, 9 October 1968.

SMO and fails to take into account the situation of poor blacks, the oppression and the devastating psychological impact of poverty.[422]

The intensity of the conflict between SMO and SMCDC also resulted in disagreements amongst the inspection team over fundamental questions of SMCDC failures and O'Fallon's performance. During the first inspection in May 1968, Maxine Thurston reviewed the Head Start program. Her resultant report focused on the immense difficulties created by the attitudes of the SMO staff and board. The head of the team, Pattye Kennedy praised Thurston's report, acknowledging the difficulties involved in its undertaking. However fellow inspector John W. King, while concurring with the content of Thurston's report, believed that 'despite Mrs O'Fallon's dictatorial methods, it must be recognised that she is operating under conditions (racial and political) that are more severe than other areas, even in Mississippi'. The final report, while critical of O'Fallon and the board, did not, according to Kennedy, adequately reflect the urgency and the futility of the situation.[423] Despite the weaknesses Kennedy perceived in her report, O'Fallon and the board utterly rejected the content of the report and refuted its conclusions. O'Fallon refuted almost every point of the evaluation, except where the report was critical of the delegate agency and the actions of Henrene Matthews. Where O'Fallon acquiesced to the presence of certain problems, she placed the blame squarely on the shoulders of SMCDC's staff – for action or inaction. O'Fallon and the board felt the inspectors were biased toward SMCDC and had spent too much time listening to the gripes of the delegate agency. She responded to the criticism in the 1968 report with a bitter letter to OEO's Acting Regional Administrator Hugh Lassiter accusing the inspection team of being in such a rush to catch their plane that they failed to spend enough time discussing the situation with the executive staff and board.[424] In addition to the failure to enforce changes that would have gone some way toward improving the quality of SMCDC and SMO, these inspectors further alienated SMO's board and director from OEO representatives whom O'Fallon believed were complicit with SMCDC in placing too much emphasis on race in order to serve their own purposes.

[422] Marger to Saunders, 'Civil Rights and Equal Opportunities Review of SMO'.
[423] RG 381: Box 12, Folder SMO, Inc., Woodville, Mississippi, Comments on SMO Report, Pattye Kennedy and John W. King, 3 May 1968; Thurston, 'Evaluation Report', 29 April-2 May 1968.
[424] RG 381: Box 12, Folder SMO, Inc., Kathleen O'Fallon to Hugh Lassiter, 12 July 1968.

OEO's failings exacerbated pre-existing divisions and failings within SMO, undermined SMCDC staff's belief in the program and facilitated ongoing racial discrimination by SMO's white staff against African Americans employed by and involved with programs operated by SMCDC and SMO. However, the extent and longevity of this discrimination was not solely the result of OEO's failures. In other programs in Mississippi and in other states in the southeast region, OEO's failings are manifest but did not produce similar crippling levels of discrimination and oppression evident in SMO. It was the pervasive and omnipresent racism of the area, coupled with administrative failings in the program itself that magnified OEO's shortcomings. Most debilitating to OEO's ability to enforce or even to track changes in program policy and training was the lack of records. Information that OEO inspectors required, including transactions that should have been recorded with correspondence and statements were completely missing, while reports that did exist were filled with discrepancies and there was little or no specific filing system in place. This lack of record keeping (whether purposeful or not) made it almost impossible for inspectors to accurately assess changes implemented. Even in southwest Mississippi, OEO's involvement with SMO and SMCDC was not entirely futile. Some progress was made when a Technical Assistance Panel assigned to SMO resulted in a better degree of coordination of federal and state agencies.[425] Assistance from the panel smoothed the channels of communication for advisory groups from target areas. Such groups were freed to express themselves, making it possible for the agency to ask for assistance where assistance was needed in an effort to alleviate an 'undesirable state'.[426] While such progress is minimal, it was a significant step for SMO and SMCDC, given the state of race relations in southwest Mississippi.

The most grievous failing of OEO was the failure of its staff in the Atlanta regional office and in Washington D.C., to respond to the complaints of African Americans in southwest Mississippi. Letters of complaint and pleas for help, sent to OEO over a number of years from a variety of sources, including SMCDC's board chairman, program coordinator, centre staff and Head Start parents illustrate the detrimental impact of SMO. These letters begged OEO for its help in relieving SMCDC of the weight of what they referred to as 'O'Fallon's dictatorship'. Whaley warned

[425] Jones, 'SMO Inc. Status Report', 12 May 1969.
[426] RG 381: Box 6, Folder CAP Southwest Mississippi, 'Statement of Agreement', 18 February 1969.

OEO that there was a danger of the program being completely destroyed if SMO did not cede some authority to the delegate, while local residents more starkly informed OEO representatives in Mississippi that SMO 'won't let us operate, they are robbing us from jobs and privilege to speak'.[427] OEO's response was to recommend putting their problems before the grievance committee – singularly unhelpful advice when the problems were stemming from discrimination inbuilt into the program, including its board and committees.[428] Further complaints were met, ironically with an assurance that the forthcoming inspection would address their concerns.[429] OEO was restrained from direct interference in response to these complaints due not only to its internal mismanagement but also an unwillingness to perpetuate a potentially public entanglement in the racial and political complexities of the state and local area. This failure, more than any other shortcomings of OEO that exacerbated SMO's racial oppression of SMCDC staff served to undermine the potential of antipoverty programs to provide an opportunity for African Americans to make their newly won political rights meaningful.

[427]RG 381: Box 6, Folder CAP Southwest Mississippi, William W. Suttle to Leo Whalley and Henrene Matthews; John Dean to Geneva Anderson, 4 April 1968.
[428]'Narrative Report on SMO', 31 December 1968; Jones, 'Status Report', 12 May 1969; RG 381: Box 6, Folder CAP Southwest Mississippi, John Dean to Francis Greene, 4 April 1968 and Francis Greene to Don Miller, n.d.
[429]RG 381: Box 6, Folder CAP Southwest Mississippi, William W. Suttle to Sallye Mae Jackson, 15 April 1968.

Chapter Three

Strategic Training and Redevelopment

The response of white and black Mississippi to the state-wide adult education and manpower training program, Strategic Training and Redevelopment (STAR), showcases a markedly different facet of the evolutionary resistance than has been examined thus far. STAR operated 18 centres located across the state, providing poor Mississippians with basic literacy education and skills training, alongside job placement services including job counselling and guidance. As an integrated program and visible presence of unwanted federal interference, STAR faced hostility from a cross-section of white Mississippi. However, as a manpower training program funded in part by the Department of Labor, STAR's emphasis on job placement exempted the program from connections with welfare and played into concepts of Americanism that even the staunchest of segregationists found acceptable. This chapter illustrates the limitations of white acceptance – limitations which stemmed from class as well as racial oppression – by exploring the internal and external racial discrimination that plagued STAR and the black class divisions which undermined the program's operation. These class divisions, as historian Greta De Jong has shown, are central to understanding struggles for social justice in the South, and the intersection of these racial and class (as well as gendered) tropes fed into the developing rhetoric of the new conservatism.[430] This examination of STAR also provides a new insight into the role of businessmen and other white moderates. It updates the 1950s and early 1960s paradigm identified by historians including Elizabeth Jacoway, James C. Cobb and Gavin Wright that emphasizes the moderating impact of whites concerned about their local community or state's economic prospects.[431] While this moderating influence is evident within STAR to a certain extent, white moderates contributed to the creation of an integrated program that systematically undermined the involvement and influence of the poor. The role of the

[430] De Jong, 'Plantation Politics', pp.256-279; O'Reilly, *Nixon's Piano,* p.281. Orleck, 'Conclusion', p.447; '"Welfare Queen" Becomes Issue in Reagan Campaign', *New York Times*, (15 February 1976), p.51. O'Reilly describes Nixon's use of racial code words. Reagan had been drawing on this constructed image of welfare dependency since 1964, popularised by the mythical Cadillac driving 'welfare queen' whose race was never mentioned but never in doubt.

[431] Jacoway, 'An Introduction', p.3; J. C. Cobb, *Selling of the South: the Southern Crusade for Industrial Development 1936-1990,* (University of Illinois Press: Urbana, 1993), pp.127-8; G. Wright, 'Economic Consequences of the Southern Protest Movement', in A. L. Robinson and P. Sullivan (eds), *New Directions in Civil Rights Studies,* (University Press of Virginia: Charlottesville, 1991), pp.176-7.

Mississippi Catholic Church in STAR illuminates both the continuation of the Church's complex relationship with activists in earlier phases of the movement as a supporter and a restraining influence on perceived radical activism, and the development of a new more nefarious impact in the context of Mississippi's evolving racial landscape. This chapter will also provide a new interpretation of the impact of President Nixon on the War on Poverty at the grassroots, through an exploration of the application of the Green Amendment under Nixon and the delegation of programs out of OEO and into established government departments. While there was little of the interaction between the Mississippi Republican Party and the Nixon Administration that was so detrimental to CDGM-remnants, STAR was unable to withstand the combination of grassroots white opposition, the systemic racial discrimination which white moderates and middle-class blacks helped perpetuate and the covert but destructive attacks on the War on Poverty by the Nixon Administration.

President Nixon and Delegation

Plans to delegate or transfer War on Poverty programs out of OEO into established government departments had originated in Johnson's Administration. President Johnson wanted to use delegation to preserve the popular segments of the program while maintaining OEO. For President Nixon, on the other hand, delegation became a way to fragment and undermine the War on Poverty. Under Nixon and Rumsfeld, CAPs were no longer the innovative and inclusive means to address poverty at the grassroots. Instead, OEO staff eased the way for local political establishments to extend their control over CAPs in what OEO Assistant Director Frank Carlucci referred to as a 'natural partnership'.[432] Daniel Moynihan, who had been involved in formulating the War on Poverty and was now Nixon's Counsellor for Urban Affairs, made assurances that he would, 'personally undertake to see that all political activity by CAP is

[432] Archives of the Catholic Diocese of Jackson, Mississippi: Papers of Bishop Brunini [hereafter Brunini Papers], Folder STAR Inc., Descriptions, Incorporation, By-Laws, Interoffice Memos, 21 January 1969-25 March 1970, Frank Carlucci, 'Speech before the Conference of Mayors, Denver, Colorado', 16 June 1970.

stopped'.[433] This stealth attack on the integrity of War on Poverty programs at the national level was a facet of President Nixon's campaign to destroy the OEO that was not, as some historians have argued, limited to his second term in office.[434] Delegation had profound consequences for antipoverty programs at the grassroots – as a result STAR was at the centre of a bitter dispute between two government agencies and vulnerable to their machinations and often contradictory requirements.

The War on Poverty, though run by the newly-created OEO, was designed to be a hub of interdepartmental cooperation involving the Department of Agriculture in rural programs, the Department of Labor in Job Corps and manpower training programs, the Department of Housing and Urban Development in the Model Cities program and HEW in education and nutrition programs. While CAPs administered programs that fell under the remit of many of these agencies, it was the unique nature of the CAAs in providing the community outreach lacking in all other federal agencies that drew the departments together. STAR, as a manpower training and adult education program, fell under the remit of both the Department of Labor (which administered the Neighbourhood Youth Corps and the Manpower Development Training Act programs) and the OEO. This arrangement left STAR funding and administration at the mercy of often intense interdepartmental disputes and complicated the relationship between the program and the Governor, SEOO Federal-State Coordinator Lee Sutton and the funding agencies.[435] While early efforts at coordination between OEO and Labor, HEW, and Housing and Urban Development departments achieved limited success, strains soon became evident – resulting in disputes and divisions that would have a damaging impact on antipoverty programs at the grassroots.[436]

The nature of OEO as a newly created agency, the "outsider" status of many of its staff, the centralisation of programs under OEO that had previously been under the remit of the other departments, and most significantly the controversy of the CAPs all

[433] MRP Records, Series VII, Box G-4, Folder PATA/FA OEO (March-August) 1969-1970, P. M. Flanigan to Harry Dent, 11 March 1969; O'Reilly, *Nixon's Piano,* p.291, quotes journalist Chuck Stone calling Moynihan the 'apostle of "benign neglect" for blacks'.
[434] Orleck, 'Conclusion', p.439.
[435] LBJL: Papers of Bertrand M. Harding, Box 39, Folder Reading File – September 1966-December 1966, OEO – BMH [Book 12], Sargent Shriver to Williard Wirtz, 14 December 1966; Mississippi AFL-CIO Records, Box 2134, Folder 5, Lee G. Sutton to Claude Ramsay, 27 October 1972.
[436] LBJL: Papers of Bertrand M. Harding, Box 39, Folder Reading File – September 1966-December 1966, OEO – BMH [Book 12], OEO Press Release: 'Wirtz and Shriver Announce Coordinated Manpower Plan', 14 December 1966.

led to calls for OEO to delegate its programs to the established departments.[437] Cooperation between the departments, particularly Labor and OEO, rapidly disintegrated to the point where staff in the Department of Labor refused to provide OEO with the information required to carry out an audit of its antipoverty programs. As OEO's CAP Director Bertrand Harding reported to Shriver in January 1967, 'our people and Labor's just can't seem to agree on anything'.[438] In their reports to Congress in 1966 the Secretaries of Agriculture, Labor, the Interior and HEW were so critical of OEO in their attempts to get Congress to dismantle OEO that President Johnson's Special Assistant Joseph Califano and Bureau of the Budget Director Charles Schultze recommended that the President make arrangements for all major statements submitted to Congress by these agencies to be reviewed in the future, in order to provide a 'favorable presentation of the Administration's programs and accomplishments'.[439] The controversial CAPs, with their vague but contentious mandate for the participation of the poor, had created trouble across the country by organising protests against their local political establishments making the mayors, as McPherson reported to the President, 'as sore as hell, justifiably'. McPherson recommended folding CAPs into manpower training and the Neighbourhood Youth Corps – under the control of the Department of Labor – and providing a 'new tough mandate and a specific description of what CAP should be all about'.[440] Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz was eager to take control of at least some aspects of the War on Poverty, but the President, supported by the National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity, was unwilling to let OEO be 'broken up by spin offs [or] transfers' as it would look like a defeat.[441]

By 1968, however, criticism of the War on Poverty in general and CAPs in particular had forced the reluctant Johnson to begin serious consideration of transferring

[437] LBJL: Papers of Bertrand M. Harding, Box 51, Conference File Washington, D.C. Meeting in Califano's Office Re Job Corps and Head Start Students December 4, 1968, 'Job Corps Task Force Report', 19 November 1968.
[438] LBJL: Papers of Bertrand M. Harding, Box 40, Folder Reading File – January 1967-May 1967 OEO – BMH [Book 13], Bertrand M. Harding to Sargent Shriver, 13 January 1967.
[439] LBJL: WHCF EX FI 4 5/25/68, Box 25, Folder FI 4 / FG 11-15 11/23/63-6/12/67 EX, Joseph Califano to Lyndon B. Johnson, 18 July 1967.
[440] LBJL: WHCF EX WE9 7/13/67-11/21/67, Box 30, Folder WE9 7/13/67-6/15/67 EX, Harry McPherson to Lyndon B. Johnson, 10 August 1967.
[441] LBJL: Papers of Bertrand M. Harding, Box 43, Conference File: Washington, D.C. White House Meeting (Califano's Office), Bertrand M. Harding to Sargent Shriver, 17 April 1967; LBJL: Office Files of James Gaither, Presidential Task Force Subject File, Box 26, Folder National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity, Joseph Califano to Lyndon B. Johnson, 14 October 1967 and attached letter from Morrie Leibman and the National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity to Lyndon B. Johnson, 12 October 1967.

or delegating Head Start to HEW to protect its funding.[442] Nixon had been notably quiet on the OEO during his campaign, although running mate Spiro Agnew was vocal in his desire to end the 'waste and boondoggling' and particularly CAPs. Despite President Johnson's request in his final budget address for a two year extension and a $2.18 billion appropriation for Fiscal Year 1969, when Nixon took office, the question seemed to be not if OEO would be dismantled, only when and how.[443] In Mississippi and nationwide, reporters rehashed old OEO scandals, predicted the condemnation of a much anticipated General Accounting Office report on OEO (the release of which had been delayed from 1968 to March 1969) and raised hopes Nixon would 'methodically defang the OEO'.[444] However, the circling vultures, whether press or political, Republican or Democratic, were disappointed by both the rather dull critique of the General Accounting Office report which landed no-one in jail, and by Nixon's failure to 'defang' the OEO. In what was a very smooth transition from the Johnson to Nixon administration, OEO's experience stands out as particularly bumpy, compounded by Nixon's delay in appointing a director, signalling his and the Cabinet's indecision over the future of the agency.[445] The transition was also complicated by Moynihan's appointment as Nixon's Counsellor for Urban Affairs and the subsequent media frenzy surrounding the publication of his book *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding*, which was highly critical of the War on Poverty and CAPs.[446] Instead of abolishing the Job Corps as he had promised during his campaign, Nixon instead began moving programs out of OEO, among others delegating Job Corps to the Department of Labor and Head Start to HEW. While the presence of Head Start had been important in seeing OEO through some difficult times in Congress the delegation of both programs – as opposed to their outright transfer – was far better than many OEO staff had anticipated as it left

[442] LBJL: WHCF GEN WE9 4/1/68-1/20/69 and EX WE9-1 11/22/63-1/20/69, Box 45, Folder WE9-1 6/16/67-5/31/68 EX, Wilbur J. Cohen to Jim Jones, 30 April 1968.
[443] LBJL: Personal Papers of Robert Perrin, Box 1, Folder Published and Unpublished Articles 1970-1973, R. Perrin, 'Sic Transition Gloria OEO', 1970. Perrin also notes that Humphrey, who had been one of the biggest supporters of OEO during the Johnson Administration would not take the political risk of public support for OEO – though he would praise individual, less controversial programs like Head Start and Upward Bound.
[444] Vertical Files OEO, Folder OEO, P. Pittman, 'Mississippi Poverty Activities Tip-Off to OEO Downgrading', *Daily Journal (Tupelo),* (8 October 1969).
[445] J. Hoff-Wilson (ed.), *Papers of the Nixon White House, Part 7: President's Personal Files, 1969-1974,* (University Publications of America: Frederick, 1992), fiche 7-173-0043. A draft of an August 1969 speech by Nixon included a comment that the charter of the OEO was 'fundamental commitments of this Administration' – tellingly this was cut out of the final draft.
[446] Perrin, 'Sic Transition Gloria'.

OEO with certain fiscal and policy controls.[447] Nor did Nixon plan to take the political risk of destroying CAPs – despite the huge controversy surrounding them, they were the flagship programs of the War on Poverty and thus attracted powerful supporters. Soon after taking office, Nixon and his advisers decided to do what they could to 'quiet them down' but leave them in OEO.[448]

The delegation of these programs not only provided the appearance of Nixon taking action to alter the War on Poverty and weaken the OEO (together the two programs took 700 employees and $560 million funds out of OEO), but also had serious implications for the programs at the local level.[449] Under HEW Secretary Robert Finch, Head Start programs no longer had the protection of Shriver and the OEO against Governor John Bell Williams' racially-motivated vetoes, while Secretary George P. Schultz closed three-fifths of the existing Job Corps centres immediately on the program's transfer into Labor.[450] For President Johnson, delegation had been about preserving the successful programs from being tainted with the false but damaging allegations that were being levelled at CAPs, while giving OEO the space to learn from its early mistakes. For Nixon, delegation was the chance to bring the War on Poverty programs under tighter control but, most importantly, to project the appearance of change. Early in his presidency, despite Nixon's ambivalence about the future of OEO, meetings with his advisers reflect the importance they all placed on being seen to take action and 'be different' from Johnson.[451] While Republicans and some southern Democratic politicians pushed Nixon to dismantle OEO, Nixon was content to manage the agency's appearance to minimise its detrimental impact on his administration.

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[447] Ibid.; LBJL: Papers of Bertrand M. Harding, Box 62, Folder Office Files: Job Corps Closures, Press Release from US Department of Labor, 11 April 1969; J. Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered,* (Basic Books: New York, 1994), p.62. Nixon made it clear to HEW Secretary Robert Finch in a personally written memo that Head Start had been transferred for house-cleaning, not house-keeping purposes.

[448] J. Hoff-Wilson (ed.), *Papers of the Nixon White House, Part 5: H. R. Haldeman, Notes of White House Meetings, 1969-1973,* (University Publications of America: Frederick, 1992), fiche 5-1-93.

[449] Ibid., fiche 5-2-18; Perrin, 'Sic Transition Gloria'. White House Chief of Staff R. H. Haldeman's notes reflect the importance Nixon placed on the appearance of change because 'the country is sick of it [OEO]'.

[450] LBJL: Papers of Bertrand M. Harding, Box 62, Folder Office Files: Job Corps Closures, Robert J. Golten to Bertrand M. Harding, 11 April 1969; O'Reilly, *Nixon's Piano,* p.299. HEW's liberal reputation persisted into the 1970s; according to O'Reilly, Finch was a leading member of the 'desegregation compliance faction', but OEO's position as an agency somewhat outside the control of the Administration provided protection against racial discrimination that HEW could never ensure. Golten, of OEO's Office of General Counsel opposed Labor's decision to close three-fifths of existing Job Corps centres and asked OEO to resist this, 'as vigorously as time and propriety would permit'.

[451] Hoff-Wilson, *Nixon White House, Part 5,* fiche 5-1-93.

Dismissing the idea of changing the agency's name, Nixon wanted to ensure that Democratic politicians continued to share in the misfortunes of OEO's bad press.[452]

The appointment of Donald Rumsfeld, an up-and-coming Republican who not only held the position of OEO director but also presidential adviser, secured OEO's immediate future – a future that would alter the nature of OEO from innovator to incubator along the lines of the visions outlined by Moynihan in *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding*.[453] However, Nixon's reluctant request for a two-year extension of OEO did not automatically translate into Republican support in Congress. Republican Congressmen William Ayres (Ohio) and Albert Quie (Minnesota) joined forces with OEO's long-term opponent, Democratic Congresswoman Edith Green (Oregon), in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to turn control of antipoverty programs over to the states, a move which would turn OEO into 'little more than a federal faucet for antipoverty funds to be used as states wished'.[454] For Acting Deputy Director Robert Perrin and other OEO employees the prospect of turning CAPs, Legal Services and other antipoverty programs 'over to statehouses in Mississippi, Alabama, California and other states with varying degrees of social unconsciousness was truly appalling'.[455] Although OEO's protection for poverty warriors striving to use CAPs to address racial discrimination in Mississippi had proved demonstrably poor, OEO had at least provided some protection. However, staff in the Departments of Labor and HEW had a vested interest in cooperating with the local political establishment. Far from protecting and supporting those advocates of social change, these departments had their own entrenched racially discriminatory patterns which were often imposed on programs directly or through their connections with local Republicans. Thus from its outset, STAR suffered from the worst of both worlds as a point of dispute between the feuding departments. STAR's manifest failings – most significant of which was the entrenched racial discrimination that crippled the program – went unaddressed as the administrative failings of OEO combined with the indifference of the Department of Labor.

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[452] J. Hoff-Wilson (ed.), *Papers of the Nixon White House, Part 6A: The President's Office Files,* (University Publications of America: Frederick, 1992), fiche 6A-10-44.
[453] Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible,* p.193.
[454] Perrin, 'Sic Transition Gloria'. Green was still accusing OEO of subverting her 1967 amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act and had introduced another amendment in 1968, which transferred the popular Upward Bound program out of OEO.
[455] Perrin, 'Sic Transition Gloria'. Despite lukewarm support from Nixon for the extension, the Green-Quie-Ayres Amendment was defeated in the House although a separate amendment secured a separate veto for Legal Services programs.

Creation of STAR

STAR was conceived as a two-year demonstration program funded jointly by a $1.6 million grant from the Department of Labor and a $5.3 million grant from OEO, with a $500,000 contribution in kind from the sponsoring Catholic Diocese of Natchez-Jackson (mostly through the use of facilities). Its aim, according to Shriver, was to transform 25,000 families 'from tax liabilities to self-sustaining citizens' by providing the training and education that would enable poor Mississippians to move from welfare rolls and into jobs in the state's slowly developing industrial sector, saving taxpayers billions of dollars in direct welfare payments.[456] Most reporters in Mississippi adopted a cynical and dismissive tone in addressing early antipoverty programs, labelling them as 'nutty' and 'great for laughs' if not for the fact taxpayers have to live with them and pay for them.[457] Thus, Shriver's use of language in heralding STAR was hugely significant. In emphasizing the program's value in saving taxpayers billions of dollars and creating 'self-sustaining' citizens, Shriver pitched the program in race-neutral language designed to evoke the white middle-class ideals at the heart of the American ideology regarding citizenship and responsibility, distancing the program from association with the hugely unpopular, racially-connoted concept of welfare.[458] Shriver paved the way for white Mississippi's acceptance of the program that was at its essence designed to address issues which had affected Mississippi's African Americans to a greater extent than whites – the deficiency of education of over one-third of Mississippians and the mass unemployment due to the mechanisation of agriculture and lack of industrial development. In 1965, nearly two-fifths of Mississippi's adult population had less than eight years of education – a lack of education that was heavily racially skewed.[459]

The adult orientation of STAR, the language used by Shriver and the dire need for manpower training and adult education meant the initially cool reception from

[456] Stennis Papers, Series 25, Box 7, Folder 6, OEO Press Release, n.d.
[457] LBJL: Papers of Bernard L. Boutin, Box 20, Folder RS – Southeast Region, 'A Double Dose at OEO?', *Bolivar Commercial*, (27 January 1966).
[458] This focus on ensuring economic improvement that would hopefully lead to a positive change in race relations reflected the split evident in earlier phases of the Civil Rights Movement between moderates such as the NAACP who favoured focusing on economic progress first and the "radical" groups such as SNCC who believed race relations must be addressed before there could be economic improvement.
[459] Mississippi AFL-CIO Records, Box 2224, Folder 9, 'STAR Progress Report 1', 13 August-30 November 1965. The median education level of Mississippi white adults compared favourably with the rest of the nation, while the median educational level of adult African Americans was almost half that of whites.

Mississippi's press, politicians and public gave way to a limited acceptance of the program from a cross-section of Mississippians. One reporter expressed the hope that this sort of program could 'cut out the boon-doggling, that is reminiscent of the New Deal days and see if the Great Society can't be more constructive'.[460] Such a response, if only from a limited section of Mississippi's press, reflected a cautious and unsure but not unwelcoming white population. Even Governor Johnson, in the midst of a vehement campaign against CDGM, showed an acceptance of STAR that went beyond his reluctant accommodation of MAP. While politically compelled to uphold an outward facade of opposition to the 'boon-doggle' programs of the Great Society, STAR propelled the Governor to show increasing behind the scenes support for OEO programs and to build good relations with its staff. Early on in its existence, STAR also helped forge more positive relations at the local level. In December 1965, for example, outgoing STAR Executive Director James J. Hearn thanked the Governor for his 'insight' and support of the goals of the program.[461] STAR exemplifies both the contradictory nature of southern opposition to federal interference as anathema to their much vaunted states' rights and the Governor's slow but definite moves toward acceptance, if only in private, of the necessity of racial integration for the sake of Mississippi's economic development. While Governor Johnson continued to decry federal intervention in his state publicly, STAR, which promised to turn Mississippi's uneducated and unproductive population into trained industrial workers albeit on a biracial basis, compelled Johnson's support and cooperation. Far from a 'subtle and strategic accommodation', Johnson's acceptance of STAR was reminiscent of the earlier paternalistic relationships between powerful white planters and blacks that resulted in 'reciprocal accommodations' to protect white economic interests.[462]

OEO squandered Johnson's goodwill with its failure to coordinate with the Governor's office and keep it informed and later, due to Shriver's divisive decision to refund CDGM. However, at the local level STAR continued to find favour with businessmen, industrialists and to a certain extent the political establishment. STAR received support and encouragement from many business owners, state officials and

[460] LBJL: Papers of Bernard L. Boutin, Box 17, Folder MC Meetings, Conferences, [No Title], *The Reveille*, (20 January 1966).
[461] Johnson Family Papers, Box 119, Folder 7, James J. Hearn to Paul B. Johnson, Jr., 1 December 1965.
[462] Crespino, *In Search*, p.4; W. H. Chafe, *Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina and the Black Struggle for Freedom*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1981), pp.38-41, 67-70; J. M. Bloom, *Class, Race and the Civil Rights Movement*, (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 1987), p.4.

STAR enrolees. Letters expressing thanks to Paul Busby, STAR's Job Development Specialist, came from various sources, many echoing one hotel manager's praise for the 'services rendered by the people trained by your program' and STAR's 'highly satisfactory personnel'.[463] STAR continued to train its enrolees to high standards: in 1969 the Manager of Taylorsville Manufacturing Company thanked the organisation for 'training people to become capable workers for our company' and asking that STAR send more personnel.[464] In 1971, the President of Solar Hardware Corporation acknowledged the successful relationship between STAR and his company, which resulted in the one hundred percent retention of his STAR-trained employees.[465] The dynamic of the business-program relationship between Mississippi's burgeoning industries and STAR was markedly different from the business-community relationship in which businesses had lead calls for moderation in earlier phases of movement activism. Mississippi's businesses became involved in a reciprocal and on-going relationship with STAR, which required the maintenance of a delicate balancing of race relations in the slowly integrating workforce in order to preserve their economic interests. Thus, the "moderating influence" of white businessmen became tied to white accommodations that accepted a certain level of integration in antipoverty programs but which, at their best, were manifested as a benign paternalism that prevented any genuine black voice in CAPs. As STAR board members, moderate businessmen removed any STAR staff members, black or white, whose influence was seen as representing the interests of the poor.

STAR's focus on adult education and training, despite controversies surrounding the daily training allowance paid to its enrolees, as well as the involvement of a larger proportion of whites than in other antipoverty programs ensured its relationships with the white establishment were less antagonistic than CDGM or local African American operated programs.[466] STAR cooperated with local public welfare departments, working with their welfare clients and with local Head Start staff and parents to widen awareness of and access to the adult education program. The level of white acceptance of and involvement in STAR was the result of a range of factors: a reflection of the severity of poverty across Mississippi; the absence of the perception of

[463] Stennis Papers, Series 1, Box 4, Folder 42, Neil Rosenbaum to P. M. Busby, 26 August 1966.
[464] Stennis Papers, Series 1, Box 4, Folder 42, F. J. McGill to Paul Busby, 14 March 1969.
[465] Stennis Papers, Series 1, Box 4, Folder 42, William J. Anderson to Paul Busby, 21 April 1971.
[466] Stennis Papers, Series 1, Box 4, Folder 42, Marion D. Gambrel to Paul Busby, 25 June 1970.

STAR as black and radical (a perception that plagued Head Start); and, most significantly, the adult nature of the program. While the vast majority of poor white parents were unwilling to let their children attend integrated classes, the promise of training and potential employment overcame some white Mississippians' unwillingness to attend integrated classes themselves. STAR was not without connections to the more controversial programs; however, the program's early success and lack of connection with Civil Rights activists garnered praise even from mayors and boards of supervisors in the Klan-dominated areas in southwest Mississippi.[467] After its initial two years of operation, STAR's grant was extended for an additional two years, reflecting increasing job placement numbers as the staff's experience and knowledge, as well as public acceptance of the program grew and the national economy continued to prosper.[468] The voices of liberal white Mississippians still muted, but slowly increasing in number and volume singled STAR out for praise. When the *Delta Democrat Times* asked its readers for their opinion of the War on Poverty, the only responses that mentioned specific programs referred to STAR, applauding the 'opportunity and encouragement' the program provides.[469]

STAR avoided the explosive issue of integrating children's classes and lacked the public perception of a 'black' program or connection to Black Power. Its potential to transform tax "burdens" into tax-payers and bolster Mississippi's weak economy fed into the desire of the increasing number of white moderates, Mississippi's industrialists and businessmen and even the political establishment to forge a future for Mississippi's economy that would be, by necessity, integrated. Preoccupied with vitriolic attacks on Head Start, Mississippi's press – and to a certain extent its white population – accepted STAR. The vast sums of money brought into the state through the program served to bring whites and blacks to the conference table, where they could 'discuss problems of

[467] Stennis Papers, Series 1, Box 4, Folder 42, Rosa H. King to O'Neil Hudson, 2 August 1971; Mississippi AFL-CIO Records, Box 2224, Folder 12, Mayor J. J. Nosser to John Cameron, 31 August 1966 and Arlie C. Warren to Marjorie Baroni, 2 September 1966. STAR forged connections between CAPs by providing education for staff – in 1970 over 60 MAP employees received the General Educational Development certificate, with over 150 MAP personnel enrolled for the following year.
[468] Brunini Papers, Folder STAR, Inc., 1966-1973, File 15, C. L. Stahler to Bishop Joseph B. Brunini, 26 November 1968.
[469] Mississippi AFL-CIO Records, Box 2225, Folder 3, 'Readers Give Their Views On', *Delta Democrat Times,* (9 April 1967).

mutual interest'.[470] However, the relatively uneventful first two years of the program's operation masked problems and divisions that were gradually deepening and that would, by 1971, bring the program to the brink of collapse. As CDGM and the wider Head Start program in Mississippi was more than just a pre-school program, STAR was more than merely a labour training program. With the potential to train and educate the vast, poor segment of workers on which Mississippi's former economic strength had rested and who had previously been denied access to education and job training, STAR had the potential to alter the very culture of the state and to disrupt every aspect of life – from the rigid racial and economic structure of the state to the daily realities of family life. In preparing poor Mississippians for urban industrial jobs, STAR transformed the nature of the relationship between the poor and white landowners, undermining a relationship that had defined rural life in the Delta for decades.[471] For OEO this was an advantage – Shriver pointed to STAR's effective effort to tie literacy training to job training, home improvement and informed consumer practices that had a tangible impact on students' lives.[472] However, the threat STAR posed to the established racial structure coupled with its potential to provide African Americans with the economic stability that would render their newly acquired political rights meaningful worried many white Mississippians.

Diocese of Natchez-Jackson

The relationship between STAR and the sponsoring Catholic Diocese of Natchez-Jackson was complex. At times it was contentious and damaging to the Diocese, STAR and most especially to the program enrolees, whilst at others it was beneficial and even essential to STAR's operation. The Diocesan connection with STAR reveals continuities in the relationship of the Catholic Church with activists during earlier phases of the Civil Rights Movement as a supportive yet constraining influence, exemplified by the actions of Archbishop Patrick O'Boyle at the March on

[470] Mississippi AFL-CIO Records, Box 2225, Folder 3, 'Statement Delivered by Claude Ramsay, President, Mississippi AFL-CIO before the US Senate Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower and Poverty in Jackson, Mississippi', 10 April 1967.
[471] J. Carr, 'STAR Hits the Widening Gap Caused by High Unemployment', *Delta Democrat Times*, (9 April 1967).
[472] Mississippi AFL-CIO Records, Box 2224, Folder 12, Judy Carlile to W. T. Bush, 23 September 1966.

Washington.[473] As historian Andrew Moore has shown, the Civil Rights Movement had a significant impact on the Catholic Church which was especially evident as it 'undermined the culture of segregation and the racial hierarchy that had dictated the Church's relationship to southern culture', resulting in increased activism of priests, nuns and laity to implement Catholic social doctrine.[474] STAR provides an opportunity to explore this impact, as through STAR activist clergy and laity transitioned from renegade to institutionalised, but not professionalised social activism – a transition that proved to be a double-edged sword. The relationship also illuminates a renewed use of Massive Resistance tactics as Catholic involvement in STAR provoked opposition from white Protestants and Catholics, who drew on the linguistic tropes of earlier Massive Resistance to articulate their opposition. Although the relationship was not wholly destructive, the interaction of the clergy's earlier moderating influence with the evolving white accommodations to STAR in combination with the unregulated activism of the Catholic STAR staff served to perpetuate racial discrimination inside STAR and undermine the Diocesan commitment to social justice.

The role of the Mississippi Catholic Church in earlier phases of the black freedom struggle had been 'on-again, off-again', constrained by the segregationist sentiments of parishioners, the intimidating tactics of violent white extremists and the caution of the Diocese of Natchez-Jackson's Bishop, Richard O. Gerow.[475] However, individual activism amongst the laity and clergy slowly increased throughout the 1950s and was given episcopal authority with the 1958 National Catholic Bishop's statement rejecting compulsory segregation as irreconcilable with Christian teaching.[476] By the early 1960s, the Diocese was involved in the small but significant biracial calls for moderation: Gerow, for example, was prepared to condemn lawlessness but not speak out against Jim Crow.[477] His successor, Bishop Joseph B. Brunini, was a long-time

[473] Patrick O'Boyle, 'Invocation', in D. W. Houck and D. E. Dixon (eds), *Rhetoric, Religion and the Civil Rights Movement, 1954-1965,* (Baylor University Press: Waco, 2006), p.583. O'Boyle threatened not to participate if SNCC leader John Lewis did not temper the militant tone of his address.
[474] A. S. Moore, *The South's Tolerable Alien: Roman Catholics in Alabama and Georgia,* (Louisiana State University Press: Baton Rouge, 2007), p.6.
[475] Payne, *Light of Freedom,* p.325; M. Newman, 'The Catholic Church in Mississippi and Desegregation, 1963-1973', *Journal of Mississippi History,* 47, No. 4 (2005), p.343.
[476] 'Discrimination and the Christian Conscience: U.S. Bishops on Segregation', *Catholic Herald,* (21 November 1958), http://archive.catholicherald.co.uk/article/21st-november-1958/8/discrimination-and-the-christian-conscience [accessed 2 August 2013].
[477] P. T. Murray, 'Father Nathaniel and the Greenwood Movement', *Journal of Mississippi History,* 72, No. 3 (2010), p.284.

opponent of racial segregation but his actions were likewise constrained. Even African American Catholics provided him with little encouragement to advance desegregation of parochial schools: black converts to Catholicism were largely middle-class and held themselves aloof from the Civil Rights Movement.[478] Thus, the Diocesan involvement with STAR was, superficially at least, a marked change in the church's approach to race relations. It reflected Brunini's racial moderation, the institutionalisation of formerly renegade activism on behalf of some members of the clergy and laity, the impact of Vatican II and perhaps most significantly the changes which involvement in the earlier phases of the Civil Rights Movement had wrought on the Catholic Church.[479] For the Department of Labor, the choice of the Diocese to sponsor a proposed state-wide manpower training program was pragmatic. Of all the private organisations in Mississippi, only the church had the resources to take on the program. For OEO, the Diocese offered an alternative to the state institutions that would prevent the program from being racially integrated.[480]

Catholic involvement in STAR served to detract from the initial appeal of the program to some white Mississippians. White opposition to the federal funding flowing through the Diocese drew on a long legacy of religious animosity between the majority Protestant population and minority Catholics, as well as a dislike of the Catholic church's involvement in the Civil Rights Movement, which collectively exposed STAR to renewed Massive Resistance rhetoric opposing "outsiders". Responding to constituent complaints of STAR funding being overseen by the Diocese, Congressman Thomas Abernethy grouped the Catholic Diocese with the 'bunch of left-wing carpetbagging' activists also funded by the Johnson Administration, echoing earlier accusations of communism against southern Catholics to augment their outsider status.[481] Writing to Senator Eastland in 1967, the mother of a white Head Start employee in Gulfport went even further. She blended rhetoric familiar from late 1950s Massive Resistance with the menace of Black Power to equate the Catholic Priest

[478] M. Newman, 'The Catholic Church in Mississippi and Desegregation, 1963-1973', *Journal of Mississippi History*, 47, No. 4 (2005), pp.338-340.
[479] J. T. McGreevy, 'Racial Justice and the People of God: The Second Vatican Council, the Civil Rights Movement and American Catholics', *Religion and American Culture,* 4, No. 2 (1994), pp.224-5; Moore, *Tolerable Alien,* p.6.
[480] Newman, 'Catholic Church', p.344.
[481] University of Mississippi, J. D. Williams Library, Archives and Special Collections, Oxford: Thomas G. Abernethy Collection, Box 181, Folder OEO STAR Inc., Gladys McDearmon to Thomas G. Abernethy, 17 August 1965; Moore, *Tolerable Alien,* p.130.

involved in that program with 'black power thinkers' and 'Communist-negro white haters', including with her letter a cartoon from her local paper depicting 'Reds in Cuba' ordering a black OEO employee in Nashville to 'spread the word', to which the OEO worker responds 'I am!'.[482] Dislike of Catholics was widespread in a state dominated by evangelical Protestantism and drew on a range of opposition from the violent and vitriolic anti-Catholic propaganda of the KKK to the historic grouping together of any outsiders whether black, Catholic or Jewish. As historians such as Moore and Randy Sparks have shown, although there was no coherent southern Catholic response to post-war Civil Rights activism, opposition to outsiders who threatened the racial status quo had provided southern Catholics with an opportunity to overcome their own outsider status and find common ground with segregationist Protestants.[483] However, involvement with movement activism in the 1950s and 1960s had revitalised white Protestant opposition to the Catholic Church, which in Mississippi focused on Father Nathaniel.[484] Hate sheets distributed to white houses in Greenwood drew on tropes of earlier Massive Resistance in their attacks on Father Nathaniel, claiming he and his 'Negro... harem' were running the St Francis Mission, which they termed a 'cesspool... a hotbed of integration and agitation'.[485] While Father Nathaniel's involvement with STAR did not attract such vitriolic attacks, his was a masterly understatement when, recalling his involvement with STAR on his retirement in 1981, he commented 'many people got very angry with me for letting the world know there were illiterates in Mississippi'.[486]

Many white Catholic laity also opposed the increasing social and particularly racial activism of their church: in 1968 Father Maloney received a petition from his parishioners asking him to disassociate from the St Francis Mission because of on-

[482] University of Mississippi, J. D. Williams Library, Archives and Special Collections, Oxford: James O. Eastland Collection [hereafter Eastland Collection], File Series 3 Subseries 1 Box 45 Folder 1967 Civil Rights, L. B. Taylor to James O. Eastland, 8 August 1967 and attached cartoon 'Go Out and Spread the Word!', *Unknown Paper,* c.August 1967.
[483] R. J. Sparks, *Religion in Mississippi,* (University Press of Mississippi: Jackson, 2001), p.202; Moore, *Tolerable Alien,* p.130.
[484] Murray, 'Father Nathaniel', pp.277-312; A. L. Koehlinger. *The New Nuns: Racial Justice and Religious Reform in the 1960s* (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 2007). Father Nathaniel Machesky of the St. Francis Mission was merely the most visible of the activist clergy and laity that included Kate Jordan in Greenwood, Marjorie Baroni in Natchez and Koehlinger's 'new Nuns'.
[485] Mississippi AFL-CIO Records, Box 2132, Folder 1, 'Issue V of a Series', *A Delta Discussion*, n.d.
[486] Brunini Papers, Folder Machesky, Nathaniel, S. Sheridan, 'Father Nathaniel Machesky to Leave Greenwood', *The Greenwood Commonwealth,* (20 August 1981).

going activities to promote racial justice and racial peace in Greenwood.[487] Such activism threatened the somewhat tenuous position many white Catholics had gained in their local communities by allying with white Protestants against racial change. Thus, individual Catholic activists from the clergy and laity as well as the Diocese faced vocal opposition from both Catholics and non-Catholics. Marjorie Baroni, a white Catholic woman from Natchez, took an active role in the local movement. She was the driving force behind the creation of the area's CAA Adams Jefferson Improvement Corporation, briefly a STAR employee and later aide to Charles Evers during his tenure as mayor of Fayette.[488] Baroni contributed to broader trends of Catholic activism on behalf of the poor and disfranchised – her friendship with Catholic activist Dorothy Day led to Baroni's contributions to *The Catholic Worker*. Her activism led to her family being 'smear [sic], ostracized and threatened'. Their house was shot into, FBI agents moved into their street in order to protect them and for three years no one spoke to Baroni's husband at his workplace in the local Armstrong plant.[489] While her faith was a significant driving factor in her activism and she received support from her local Priest, the majority of her fellow church-goers were active participants in her ostracism. At Sunday mass, people would avert their heads from the Baronis' – Marge recalled '"with the Host in their mouths... they keep their bitter looks"'.[490]

Baroni's belief in the significance of 'the poor being always with us' and the blatant contradiction between the inclusive teachings of Christianity and the racial discrimination of Natchez led to her work on behalf of the poor and disfranchised. Baroni's experience as a pioneering Catholic activist, CAA founder and board member is reflective of the experience of the wider church during its highly public association with and support of STAR. Despite the problems he encountered during his tenure as STAR executive director, which culminated in the board requesting his resignation, Monsignor Roland T. Winel remained firm in the belief that Diocesan involvement was a moral imperative. Winel believed that in becoming involved in STAR, the Diocese

[487] Brunini Papers, Folder Greenwood – St. Francis File 15, Joseph B. Brunini to Walter Maloney, 7 May 1968.
[488] University of Mississippi, J. D. Williams Library, Archives and Special Collections, Oxford: Marge Baroni Papers, Box 20, Folder 3, Susan Sullivan and Tim Murphy Interview with Louis Baroni, 7 February 2000.
[489] University of Mississippi, J. D. Williams Library, Archives and Special Collections, Oxford: Marge Baroni Papers, Box 20, Folder 1, S. Sullivan, 'Marjorie Baroni: Ordinary Southern Women, Extraordinary Activist', 4 October 2000. The same plant outside which Wharlest Jackson was killed by a car bomb.
[490] Ibid.

'took on a responsibility which rightfully it should have assumed'. The lack of sympathy for the poor that is shown by others who have 'made their own way' was compounded in Mississippi because of race but to do anything less would, Winel felt, have been to 'abandon [their] mission'.[491] However, these instances of individual activism remained muted by the demands of segregationist parishioners and the resultant racial moderation was subsumed under white accommodations which served to further the racial discrimination endemic in STAR.

Despite the numerous and vocal opponents of the Diocesan involvement with STAR, the association was not entirely detrimental for either STAR or the Diocese. The endorsement of Bishop Brunini provided useful connections and a powerful, respected front for STAR's message. However, these connections with the white establishment although useful in securing funds for STAR also served to entrench white control of the program. The Brunini family's close friendship with Senator Stennis ensured a mutual 'respect' was transmuted into Stennis' support for STAR.[492] Beneath the exchange of pleasantries in correspondence between Stennis and Brunini, their association provided a means of indirect assurance for Stennis that STAR remained under white control.[493] This was the kind of patronage politics that both powerful Mississippi Senators relied upon – here an old family connection was serving to ensure Stennis could keep an inside view of the racial power play at work in STAR's board and centres. Nonetheless, Brunini's 'courageous leadership' won him new respect from black Mississippians. Father Nathaniel, still at work in St Francis mission reported to Brunini in 1971 that due to STAR Brunini's 'stature with them [black people] has grown tremendously'.[494] Such praise was reflected in the Catholic Press, outside of the racially-fuelled atmosphere of Mississippi, Catholic support of STAR was seen as heralding the future of Mississippi.

[491] Brunini Papers, STAR, Inc., 1966-1973, File 15, Roland T. Winel to Joseph B. Brunini, 15 January 1971.
[492] Stennis Papers, Series 1, Box 4, Folder 42, John Hamner to General McDonnell, 23 August 1971. Stennis and Ed Brunini attended Law School together; Ed Brunini's law firm also provided free legal services for STAR until the legal demands of the program became too great.
[493] Stennis Papers, Series 1, Box 4, Folder 18, Joseph B. Brunini to John C. Stennis, 25 May 1967 and John C. Stennis to Joseph B. Brunini, 20 June 1967.
[494] Brunini Papers, Folder STAR, Inc., 1966-1973, File 15, Nathaniel Machesky to Joseph B. Brunini, 23 August 1971.

One journalist for Catholic newspaper *Divine Word Messenger*, having visited STAR centres, reported that Mississippi's future 'is built upon such programs as ... STAR'.[495]

Bishop Brunini's endorsement of STAR, though a worthwhile public facet of Catholic support for the program which gave it a vital caché with powerful white Mississippians did not equate to behind-the-scenes support for the increasingly excluded poor blacks and their white supporters in STAR. The incompetence and discriminatory attitudes of STAR's Catholic staff – and particularly Brunini's inaction to address their shortcomings – had a destructive impact on the program. The failings of Msgr. Winel as executive director prompted the board to request his resignation, blaming the 'turmoil and bickering' in central office on Winel's failures of administrative management and supervision.[496] Sister Donatilla's tenure as STAR's Director of Education was marked not only by her patronising attitude toward the African American enrolees but also by failures to perform her duties. Despite manifest failings, Sister Donatilla remained in her post and both Winel and Donatilla received the support of Bishop Brunini.[497] The shortcomings of Winel and Donatilla (stemming partly, in Donatilla's case, from her openly racist attitude) speak to the lack of professionalism of the Catholic staff in STAR – a lack of professionalism that was only allowed to continue due to the peculiarities of the sponsor-program relationship and the support of Bishop Brunini. In addition to this failure to address the inadequacies of the Catholic STAR staff, Brunini resolutely stayed out of any dispute he saw as being 'among black men'. This inaction, according to the African American Director of Manpower Richard Polk, led to the Bishop being 'totally insensitive to the hardships being created on the STAR personnel and trainees during the time of an inclement funding period when they went for several weeks without money of any kind'.[498] More than just insensitivity, Brunini's inaction under the façade of direction and racial justice served to prop up a situation in which there was 'no crevice in the most remote section

[495] Mississippi AFL-CIO Records, Box 2225, Folder 6, W. J. Kelley, 'Mississippi's STAR program', *Divine Word Messenger*, July-August 1967.
[496] Mississippi AFL-CIO Records, Box 2226, Folder 9, Cornelius Turner to Roland T. Winel 5 August 1970.
[497] Brunini Papers, Folder STAR, Inc., 1966-1973, File 15, Joseph B. Brunini to Elliott Strum, 5 January 1971.
[498] Derian Papers, Box 8, Folder 166, Transcript of the NAACP Hearing into STAR, (7 December 1970), testimony of Father George Broussard, p.49; testimony of Richard Polk, p.34.

of personnel practices and supervision that provided for a Negro to function programmatically and maintain any resemblance of dignity'.[499]

These vital flaws in the Diocesan involvement with STAR, despite the dedication of the Catholic members of the board and staff, and the generosity of the in-kind contributions played a significant role in the perpetuation of racial discrimination and the increasing disillusionment of staff and enrolees. Further, the diplomacy that was central to Brunini's role as Bishop was ill-suited to the demanding and controversial situations that arose in the administration of antipoverty programs – problems that were intensified and complicated by Mississippi's racial environment. This diplomacy and lack of willingness to become involved in controversial racial issues prevented Brunini acting at important moments when his voice may have had an impact on the direction of the program.[500] The Catholic Church's involvement in STAR – and indeed STAR itself – stemmed from the activism of its laity; however, white accommodation to the biracial board and the white board members cooperation with an African American chairman altered the racial realities in Mississippi to such an extent that the Church's support for even moderate Civil Rights organisations' calls to address the discrimination in STAR went largely unheeded. While the Catholic hierarchy was willing to support moderate, indirect Civil Rights activities earlier in the decade now the colour lines were beginning to blur, Bishop Brunini and the Diocese retreated to the safety of inaction.

The Diocese played a significant role in STAR, including providing the impetus and apparatus that enabled the program's creation. However, the relationship served to perpetuate the racial discrimination endemic in STAR and undermine the support the Mississippi Catholic Church had shown for moderate Civil Rights activists in the early 1960s. Mississippi was not the only location where the War on Poverty and religion came together and certainly not the only instance in which that relationship created controversy. Across the country the flow of federal funds into the hands of churches raised questions about violating the separation of church and state, while many Protestants criticised Catholic programs and *vice versa*. In a 1967 interview, Catholic OEO Director Sargent Shriver placed denominational efforts on the front line of the battle against poverty – efforts which he argued demonstrate how the war on poverty is

[499] Derian Papers, Box 8, Folder 165, Richard Polk to Roland T. Winel, 17 November 1970.
[500] Brunini Papers, Folder STAR, Inc., 1966-1973 File 15, Joseph B. Brunini to Aaron Henry, 4 December 1970.

'a people's war – America's war, not the federal government's war'. Skating over suggestions that this use of antipoverty funds violates the separation of church and state, Shriver argued churches are ideally placed foot soldiers because of their pre-existing involvement in local communities and their almost intra-regulatory nature. The Catholics are not going to 'get away with something' Shriver suggested, because the Protestants will be watching them.[501]

Southern Baptists were particularly prominent in their involvement and support of the War on Poverty. President Johnson, for example, appointed Southern Baptist Minister Bill Crook the director of VISTA. In 1967, Baptist Evangelist Billy Graham visited Washington to speak before over 100 Congressmen and 45 of the nation's leading businessmen, supporting the War on Poverty which was under attack from Republicans hoping to dramatically curtail its funding under Economic Opportunity Amendments, announcing 'antipoverty efforts [are] a major teaching of the Bible'.[502] While the comments of Shriver of denominational programs being "intra-regulatory" and Graham's usage of scripture to support the programs, both reflect a naive and idealistic interpretation of the reality in the trenches of the War on Poverty. Shriver's blithe and perhaps purposeful willingness to hand over millions of dollars of funding to a Catholic church in Mississippi shows a lack of awareness of the religious and racial realities of the state. In funding STAR through the Catholic Diocese, OEO both underestimated the level and extent of opposition to the Catholic activism in Mississippi – from within the Church and outside – and overestimated the institutions' commitment to securing racial equality. While individual Catholic activists, such as Father Nathaniel and Marge Baroni had blazed a trail of commitment to social justice and racial equality, the institution was more conservative and unwilling to be an instrument of racial change at the expense of its parishioners. Thus, a lukewarm commitment to pursuing social justice was covered by a veneer of racial goodwill that while genuine, was not powerful or deep enough to challenge the institutionalised racism of Mississippi's white establishment and white population.

[501] University of Southern Mississippi, McCain Library and Archives, Special Collections, Hattiesburg: Papers of William M. Colmer, Series I, Subgroup 1, Box 120, Folder 7, W. Knight 'Shriver Interview: The Church and the Poverty War', *Home Missions,* (June 1967), pp.6-11.
[502] Eastland Collection, File Series 1, Subseries 17, Box 8, Folder OEO, Sargent Shriver to James O. Eastland, 12 July 1967 and attached clipping, W. B. Garrett, 'Graham Says He's Been Converted on Poverty War', *Capital Baptist,* (22 June 1967).

Racial Discrimination

STAR has been largely ignored by historians of both the War on Poverty and Mississippi. Those who have touched on it, namely Namorato and Quadagno focus on its positive aspects: Namorato commends STAR for its record tackling African American illiteracy, while Quadagno praises STAR's integrated staff and centres.[503] Mark Newman, however, does recognise the program's failings both in its lacklustre employment and training record and its role in perpetuating racial discrimination.[504] A closer examination of this racial discrimination, as seen through the previously untapped 1970 NAACP Hearing into STAR reveals the intra-racial class divisions, the nature of white accommodation and the damaging interaction of the racial moderation of some board members with those determined to utilise STAR to perpetuate white supremacy. The administrative failings which have been too often blamed for the failure of antipoverty poverty programs are shown to be damaging, but only truly destructive when they maintained the racial discrimination endemic in STAR. The failure to enact the recommendations of the NAACP panel exposes the intra-racial class divisions and the failure of white moderation to prevent the widespread culture of white supremacy that enveloped STAR. The board became a biracial veneer for widespread and systemic racial discrimination perpetrated by 'pseudo-liberal' whites and 'ultra-conservative' African Americans who used STAR to undermine black activism and prevent the development of black leadership. These labels – 'pseudo-liberal' and 'ultra-conservative' – were used by Richard Polk to describe members of the controlling 'clique' of STAR's board. For Polk, the pseudo-liberals were establishment whites such as AFL-CIO State Chairman Claude Ramsay and Catholic Priest Msgr. McGuff whose ostensible commitment to biracial cooperation masked a determination to use their involvement with STAR to preserve their racial, class and gender privileges. Board Chairman Cornelius Turner was, for Polk the archetypal 'ultra-conservative' African American – a man from the established 'Negro ruling class' who was unwilling to jeopardise his relationship with establishment whites by pursuing an agenda they opposed.[505] Polk utilised these labels in order to pursue his objective of undermining the controlling clique and thus while evocative, they lack sufficient nuance to describe or

[503] M. V. Namorato, *The Catholic Church in Mississippi, 1911-1984: A History,* (Greenwood Press: Westport, 1998), p.85; Quadagno, *Welfare,* p.42.
[504] Newman, 'Catholic Church', p.345.
[505] Polk to Winel, 17 November 1970.

explain the complex and contradictory motivations of both 'pseudo-liberal' whites and 'ultra-conservative' blacks. However, it is clear that both black and white members of this controlling clique cooperated in utilising STAR to suppress black activism and protect their own interests, which in turn perpetuated the omnipresent racial discrimination in all levels and areas of STAR operation.[506]

Antipoverty programs were an ideal target for Mississippi's segregationist politicians as they combined the threat – or at least the perception of the threat – of Civil Rights activism, or even more menacingly Black Power, with unwelcome federal intervention in the state as well as proving African Americans with the economic independence that would make their newly-won political rights meaningful. STAR was no exception. The state's sole Republican Congressman Prentiss Walker sent his constituents' complaints of black domination and corruption in STAR to OEO. However, compared with the white response to CDGM and to a lesser extent to MAP, opposition to STAR was relatively muted, especially in the local press. While STAR's board contained a greater number and proportion of African Americans than MAP, this lack of racially-based opposition in the early years of STAR reflected the less-controversial nature of STAR: it was an integrated program for adults not children; moderate African American and white board members exercised control over the program; there was a higher level of white involvement in STAR due to the desperate need for adult education and employment; and the job-training nature of the program fed into the American ideology of individualism and an aspirational, Protestant work-ethic. Even Walker's accusation was more focused on allegations of nepotism toward Democratic Governor Johnson's cousin (an antipoverty program centre director in Holly Springs) than on allegations of 'Negro domination' of STAR.[507] Indeed the exclusion of so-called militant activists from STAR had led Governor Johnson to make it clear to the Mississippi Chamber of Commerce that he approved of STAR.[508]

[506] Dittmer, *Local People*, p.376. As journalist Christopher Jencks noted, the "moderation" of many of the black CAP Board members was 'manifested by their invariable habit of agreeing with whatever their white counterparts said'.
[507] MRP Records, Series VI, Box F-6, Folder MRP-OF 1965/66 Johnson, Paul, William G. Phillips to Prentiss Walker, 13 June 1966.
[508] MSSC Records, SCR ID # 2-61-2-22-1-1-1, Erle Johnston to George Woods, 12 September 1966, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd03/024015.png&otherstuff=2|61|2|22|1|1|1|23537| [accessed 20 July 2013].

STAR's controlling white faction of the board, in alliance with middle-class African Americans such as Turner, used the program's biracialism to veil the systematic exclusion of poor blacks from having a voice in the operation of the program. The board cultivated the acceptance of the white establishment by eschewing the perceived radicalism of militant activists and side-lining the NAACP and Delta Ministry board members. STAR staff made it clear in their interaction with local NAACP leaders that their 'sincerity in making available any future employment opening regardless of race' was reliant on dealing with a 'responsible leader of the… Negro community'.[509] The board promised to couple unavoidable but controllable integration with much needed federal funds to aid the state's struggling economy. More than simply sidelining poor blacks, STAR's funding was manipulated to their detriment, which provoked the anger of the African American community. Activists planned to target STAR because, according to activists speaking at a mass meeting in 1966, STAR 'hires only "up" people to look down on the poor' and is controlled by the power structure.[510] Anonymous fliers reflecting concern that African Americans had been 'cheated again' over STAR were joined by specific accusations from Civil Rights organisations, including the Delta Ministry, NAACP and the National Sharecroppers Fund.[511] Mississippi Representative of the National Sharecroppers Fund James N. May alleged that STAR was not only failing the rural poor but also accused the program's Executive Director William T. Bush and board of racial discriminatory hiring practices, while the Delta Ministry's concerns of the power structure's control over STAR became fodder for public debate.[512] Although Bush angrily dismissed such accusations, accusing complainants of wanting to undermine the program, both the complaints and evidence of widespread and systemic racial discrimination in STAR mounted.[513]

By 1970, STAR's board and executive staff had subverted the program from the original intent of the drafters of the Economic Opportunity Act. Instead of a program that contributed to change in Mississippi, STAR had become an extension of the white establishment that embraced racially discriminatory hiring, firing and pay practices and

[509] Stennis Papers, Series 1, Box 4, Folder 42, Donald L. Speir to Rev. R. S. Porter, 3 July 1969.
[510] Stennis Papers, Series 29, Box 7, Folder 21, Sovereignty Commission Report, 6 January 1966.
[511] Mississippi AFL-CIO Records, Box 2224, Folder 8, Flyer 'We Have Been Cheated Again', c.August-September 1965.
[512] Brunini Papers, Folder STAR, Inc., 1966-1973, File 15, 'Delta Ministry's Position', *Delta Democrat Times,* (29 March 1966).
[513] Mississippi AFL-CIO Records, BOX 2224, Folder 11, James N. Mays and Ted Seaver to William T. Bush, 22 February 1966; William T. Bush to James N. Mays, 23 March 1966.

wielded STAR's power to suppress black activism.[514] STAR failed to contribute to the War on Poverty because, as MAP Executive Director Aaron Shirley somewhat ironically articulated, 'to be a war against poverty in the state has to also be a war against the establishment, because the establishment has seen fit to foster poverty in Mississippi among blacks and whites alike'.[515] Over 400 complaints were sent to the NAACP complaining of racial discrimination within STAR. In response, the NAACP organised a hearing into STAR which was held on 7 December 1970. Headed by State NAACP Field Representative Alex Waites, complainants and STAR board and staff members were called before a panel including a cross-section of Civil Rights representatives such as Aaron Henry, Mississippi CAP-affiliates such as OEO consultant Patricia Derian and Community Education Extension Director David Rice, as well as Mississippi's only black legislator, Representative Robert Clark. [516] The extensive transcript of the day-long hearing reveals the way in which a controlling clique utilised mechanisms of earlier Massive Resistance such as intimidation, threats and character assassination to entrench racial discrimination and render STAR divided and unable to function effectively as a manpower training and adult education program.[517]

Amongst STAR's executive staff, Education Director Sister Donatilla and Fiscal Controller Lee G. Spainhour were some of the worst offenders, and certainly the most visible examples of the culture of racial discrimination in the program. Sister Donatilla 'failed to relate to a totally racially integrated situation', with black employees and enrolees complaining of multiple instances of their unkind, unfair and unjust treatment under her supervision. She caused confusion between centres by spreading misinformation and false information regarding programs and personnel. Sister Donatilla was also party to the efforts of some board and staff members to secure the resignation or dismissal of Richard Polk, whose tenure with STAR was marked by notable success in the program's activities under his department until a determined

[514] Brunini Papers, STAR, Inc., Correspondence 20 February 1969-1 May 1973, P. Thames to the STAR Grievance Committee, 8 July 1970.
[515] Transcript of the NAACP Hearing into STAR, testimony of Aaron Shirley, p.177.
[516] Transcript of the NAACP Hearing into STAR, p.2. Community Education Extension was the successor organisation to CDGM.
[517] Transcript of the NAACP Hearing into STAR.

character assassination against him that resulted in his dismissal from STAR.[518] Polk alleged that Sister Donatilla used her status as a nun as a shield to deflect the accusations of racial discrimination. Writing to Msgr. Winel in 1970, Polk claimed, 'ensconced in her "Habit" she uses its connotation of inviolability to distort the truth'.[519] Despite the evidence of many enrolees and staff – both white and African American – testifying to Donatilla's racism and destructive influence in the program, her 'inviolability' and the support she received from the board and Bishop Brunini secured her position within STAR. Together with Spainhour, they made attempts to undermine Polk and the staff in his department including Equal Employment Officer Jane Sample (whom they described as 'black activists and their friends') before the board while perpetuating 'subtle underminings [sic] that frustrate, bedevil and beset'.[520]

The most serious and sustained racial discrimination occurred within the finance office and was perpetuated by the successive fiscal controllers. They systematically undermined, bullied and eventually ensured the dismissal of the department's only African American employee, Nancy Huff, while using their power as fiscal controller to undermine any staff they perceived to be a threat. STAR's first Fiscal Controller Silas Jones refused to give Huff the 6-month pay raise that everyone else in the department received. When Huff sent him a memo querying this omission, Jones 'stood there in my face and ripped it into pieces and put it into the garbage while I was standing there and naturally I just returned to my desk'.[521] Huff clearly felt she had no recourse, and her tone in discussing the on-going harassment she faced indicates the length of time she endured this discrimination. At the NAACP Hearing, former OEO Project Officer for STAR Don Miller testified to the destructive power of this group:

> There developed within the STAR central office a well-defined white caucus that met regularly to develop strategy for controlling STAR and impeding the progress of the program as outlined by OEO. This caucus revolved around the fiscal department of STAR, included several former STAR employees who then worked in the Governor's office, and was led by the Fiscal Controller Silas Jones and Robert Norseworth. This group regularly fed information outside the program and acted as a pressure group on executive decisions using the power of the finance department as a lever and lobbying with board members outside

[518] MCHR Records, Box 37, Folder STAR Controversy, 'STAR Program receives $2 million in refunds', *The Clarion Ledger*, (18 December 1970). The article notes that STAR has been 'especially successful' in its employment training programs.
[519] Transcript of the NAACP Hearing into STAR, testimony of Richard Polk, p.19.
[520] Transcript of the NAACP Hearing into STAR, testimony of Owen Brooks, p.4; Derian Papers, Box 8, Folder 166, Statement of Leola Williams before the NAACP Hearing, 7 December 1970.
[521] NAACP Hearing into STAR, (7 December 1970), testimony of Nancy Huff, pp.151-156.

> channels, establishing a precedent that some board members have perpetuated. This group's goal was to insure that STAR be an educational program only and not be involved in efforts to create social change in the state.[522]

Despite OEO being aware of the activities of this white caucus, OEO did little to break the control of these executive staff and board members who had the support of the Governor and who harassed central office staff and black centre directors active in community work, such as Leola Williams. The confusion, disorganisation and high personnel turnover at the OEO regional office coupled with a reluctance of those regional office staff to 'unduly upset the political structure of Mississippi' ensured that the discriminatory practices that violated OEO policy and (in the case of salary and employment discrimination) the illegal discrimination continued unabated for most of STAR's existence.[523] Jones' successor fired Huff while she was on maternity leave – an indication of the gendered as well as racialised nature of this discrimination – against OEO regulations but with the support of Executive Director Charles Stahler. When Huff was reinstated on appeal to the grievance committee, everyone else in the department including the controller and 'all the whites' resigned. Spainhour, the last fiscal controller, barraged Huff with rudeness, discrimination and harassment, which culminated in Huff resigning because she felt unable to face any more 'inhumane treatment'.[524]

Although Spainhour and Donatilla were singled out in the hearing as the worst offenders, the board served to reinforce the widespread culture of white supremacy and practice of discriminatory activities among the staff. The power of the executive committee kept the decision making in the hands of a powerful few who wielded their influence against staff they deemed too involved in Civil Rights activities and who intimidated staff members to force them to adhere to their discriminatory directives. Initially, board interference in the program was limited to opposition on an issue-by-issue basis. By 1968, however, board member involvement was becoming more frequent, blatant and more damaging to staff morale and program effectiveness. Powerful board members attempted to 'domesticate STAR to the Mississippi

[522] Derian Papers, Box 8, Folder 166, Statement of Don Miller before the NAACP Hearing, 7 December 1970.
[523] Ibid. Aside from the practical considerations that prevented action, there is little evidence to suggest that OEO regional office staff felt any ideological compulsion to address this discrimination.
[524] Transcript of the NAACP Hearing into STAR, testimony of Nancy Huff, pp.151-156; Mississippi AFL-CIO Records, Box 2227, Folder 1, Lee G. Spainhour to Roland T. Winel, 8 September 1970 and Jane D. Sample to Roland T. Winel, 23 September 1970.

establishment and remove or harass those persons in the program committed to carrying out the OEO mandate and the goals of the agency'.[525] A 'powerful clique of Jacksonians', consisting of African Americans led by Board Chairman Cornelius Turner and white board members Jack Welsh, Robert Travis and Claude Ramsay, with the sometime participation of Msgr. McGuff and the liaisons from the Governor's office, were increasingly determined to exercise absolute control over the program. For the middle class African Americans such as Turner, involvement secured their profitable, established relationships with white businessmen and politicians and prevented the programs being 'spawning ground for new leadership' which could jeopardize their leadership position.[526] The determination of the Turner and his fellow African American board members to ensure that the privileges of their middle-class lifestyle would not be threatened by radical activists or black leadership newly developed through antipoverty programs combined with white accommodation to entrench systematic discrimination against poor blacks.

Crespino's 'subtle and strategic accommodations' were not in evidence among those Polk termed 'pseudo-liberal' whites of STAR's board, who accepted an integrated board and program only because it was an unavoidable requirement of federal funding.[527] White board members exploited African American class divisions to establish their control over the board and program's staff. In place of either subtle or strategic accommodations was a return to the paternalism characteristic of Southern race relations, under the cover of OEO-mandated integration. White domination of the decision-making process of the board was institutionalised by the executive committee, which was empowered to act for the board in between the board's quarterly meetings, resulting in one or two members of this clique making all the important decisions regarding STAR operation. This group was determined to eradicate all Civil Rights activism from the program, creating instead a program in line with Governor John Bell Williams' wishes: a 'nice program educating the colored folk'.[528] White board members utilised threats and intimidation to keep white STAR staff in line, renovating tactics reminiscent of the earlier, violent white supremacists in a manner that maintained their

[525] Statement of Don Miller before the NAACP Hearing.
[526] MCHR Records, Box 37, Folder STAR Controversy, Statement of Owen Brooks before the NAACP Hearing, 7 December 1970.
[527] Crespino, *In Search*, p.4.
[528] Statement of Don Miller before the NAACP Hearing.

intimidatory value but stopped short of outright violence. When Jane Sample, the Equal Employment Opportunities Officer, attempted to address buying practices that were supported by the board but violated OEO regulations as they came from non-equal opportunities suppliers, board members intimidated her into conforming to their wishes. Several staff members recalled intimidation of staff by board members to be a regular occurrence, but also that they had no protection from these tactics and no one to whom to report them. Sample's colleague Geraldine Kelly was told by board member Robert Travis 'that he knew what she was up to… and that he knew how to handle her'.[529] When Sample reported this intimidation to the board chairman no action was taken. Instead, Turner remarked in board meetings that Sample was 'too Civil Rightsy' and that she had 'gotta go'.[530]

The clique maintained its control through frequent power plays, coordinated by Turner and Claude Ramsay, State AFL-CIO President and STAR board member who perpetrated illegal board manoeuvres to ensure their continued control over the executive committee. Turner secured his re-election as board chairman by a combination of his manoeuvring and his race. The newly seated board members joining the reconstituted board in line with the Green Amendment were unfamiliar with Turner's affiliations, and voted for him over the white candidate Father George Broussard because he was black.[531] Turner and Ramsay made determined efforts to destroy the reputation of Richard Polk, levelling public charges against his competence and integrity, despite OEO's attestation of Polk's previous successes. Indeed, the organisation had tried twice to recruit Polk and regarded him as the 'main reason for the success of STAR training and job development efforts'.[532] The actions of Turner led to a complete breakdown in respect for executive authority, while he and his clique 'buttressed Civil Rights compliance violations, blatant racial discrimination in hiring and promotion practices and recognizable racism in supervision of Negro personnel at the central office level'.[533] In such a racially charged environment and facing such severe and widespread poverty, STAR's successful operation required a 'harmonious relationship among staff members and the effective functioning of all strata of the

[529] Transcript of the NAACP Hearing into STAR, testimony of Jane D. Sample, pp.115-6.
[530] Ibid., p.121.
[531] Transcript of the NAACP Hearing into STAR, testimony of Alex Sanders, p.125.
[532] Statement of Don Miller before the NAACP Hearing.
[533] Polk to Winel, 17 November 1970.

program'. The discriminatory actions of executive staff and the powerful controlling influences of the board of directors undermined the efficient operation of the program: 'just as the soft dripping of water can eventually wear away the hardest of rock, so can constant disruptions created by insensitive administrators and board members niggle away the efforts of centre staff and subvert the glorious goals of STAR'.[534]

The administrative failings within STAR also served to prop up the discriminatory activities of many of the state office and centre staff, and enhanced the direct control that the executive director and board had over program operation. The actions of successive executive directors circumvented the involvement of the poor and served to position staff favourable to the board in local centres against OEO regulations.[535] STAR's executive staff and board continued to intimidate staff who engaged in community activism or attempted to uphold the Civil Rights Act in the employment of staff, as at the local level the pressure from the white community reinforced white domination of the program. In Yazoo City, the STAR centre came under pressure from local whites to operate in a way they found acceptable, ensuring that, until the centre changed its policies, they had great difficulty in enrolling anybody in the program. Unable to operate without enrolees, the centre director in Yazoo City, Connie Moore, altered STAR policies to bring the recruitment process under the control of the area's powerful whites and operate the program in a way the city's board of supervisors 'would be proud of it'. Instead of recruiting enrolees on the basis on their educational requirements and status, STAR staff received suggestions from the white establishment in Yazoo City, notably landowners, plantation managers and heads of businesses whom they believed would be interested and who could benefit from training.[536] This action brought the education of poor African Americans back under the control of local powerful whites, undermining the intention of OEO programs. Thus, the actions of STAR's board and staff did not occur in isolation, but in a broader context of the white establishment's desire to maintain control over antipoverty funds flowing into the state and to contain and control the pace of racial change. OEO and

[534] Statement of Leola Williams before the NAACP Hearing.
[535] RG 381: Box 7, Folder CAP – STAR, Inc., P.J. McLoene to Clyde James, 30 June 1969. Executive Director Colonel C. L. Stahler appointed a new Director of the DeLisle centre without the knowledge, advice or involvement of the DeLisle Advisory Committee, whose first centre Director had also been appointed in the same highhanded manner.
[536] Mississippi AFL-CIO Records, Box 2225, Folder 5, 'Supervisors Hear Report on STAR, Inc.', *The Yazoo City Herald,* (22 June 1967).

STAR staff failed to ensure STAR's centres were abiding by Civil Rights law and OEO requirements, which were under their direct control. In the private firms and state departments to which STAR delegated parts of its manpower training program, racial discrimination was deeply entrenched, yet OEO and the Department of Labor had barely sufficient manpower to investigate these cases.[537]

The rejection of the NAACP Hearing's findings and recommendations by the board – led by Turner and Ramsay – heralded the continuation of the entrenched patterns of racial discrimination that endured until STAR's demise. Turner claimed that the NAACP had allowed itself to be used by 'scurrilous individuals led by Richard Polk' to make untrue and unfounded accusations against Turner, the Catholic diocese, the Bishop and the State AFL-CIO.[538] Turner's final attempt to dismiss the 'troublemakers' in STAR's equal opportunities office – Jane Sample and her colleagues Geraldine Kelly and Robert Coleman – were soon overturned by the program's grievance committee.[539] Despite Turner's resignation the following month and an influx of new board members, the racial turmoil in STAR was far from over.[540] Gerald Davis, who replaced Winel as executive director, perpetuated the culture of discrimination and racism within STAR (prompting Aaron Henry to threaten public demonstrations against Davis and STAR) and was dismissed after only six weeks in his post.[541] STAR was becoming an extension of the white establishment, increasingly coming under the control of the Governor's office and the SEOO. Although Governor William Waller's attempts to veto STAR's 1972 grant were unsuccessful, the SEOO led by Lee Sutton monitored STAR carefully.[542] Under Sutton, the SEEO had 'grown into a deep seeded front of segregation, a segregated workplace in which all communication in and out of

[537] RG 381: Box 1, Folder CAP – Civil Rights Violation Report, 'Investigation of Allegations of Civil Rights Violations by the Mississippi State Employment Service in Carrying Out the Delta Concentrated Employment Program', OEO Civil Rights Division, 23-26 June 1969. Inspectors noted this widespread discrimination 'adversely affects the STAR program and the CAAs in the Delta counties, all of which are involved in the Delta Concentrated Employment Program and are directly funded by OEO'.
[538] Brunini Papers, STAR, Inc., Correspondence 20 February 1969-1 May 1973, Statement by Cornelius Turner, 14 December 1970; Mississippi AFL-CIO Records, Box 2227, Folder 3, Resolution of the STAR Executive Committee, 19 December 1970.
[539] Brunini Papers, STAR, Inc., Correspondence 20 February 1969-1 May 1973, Gerald F. Davis to Jane D. Sample, Geraldine Kelly and Robert Coleman, 26 January 1971.
[540] Brunini Papers, Folder STAR, Inc., 1966-1973, File 15, Cornelius Turner to STAR Board, 25 February 1971.
[541] Brunini Papers, Folder STAR, Inc., 1966-1973, File 15, Aaron Henry to Gerald F. Davis, 17 February 1971.
[542] Brunini Papers, STAR, Inc., Correspondence 20 February 1969-1 May 1973, Alfred H. Rhodes, Jr., to Lee G. Sutton, 22 May 1972.

the office was monitored by Sutton and only white staff members allowed to go to her office.[543] SEOO staff member Clovis Williams developed a rewarding relationship with W. Webb Burke, Johnston's successor as Sovereignty Commission director, which he used to gain access to reports monitoring black STAR staff and board members including new Executive Director Al Rhodes and Delta Ministry Director Owen Brooks.[544]

AFL-CIO

Labour unionists had a formative impact on the War on Poverty, in drafting the Economic Opportunity Act, shaping the early months of the OEO and on local antipoverty programs. President Johnson appointed Jack T. Conway, the Executive Director of the Industrial Union Department in AFL-CIO, as OEO's first deputy director. Conway utilised the skills and experience he had gained in the labour movement to shape community action, a big part of which Conway believed to be the facilitation of African American participation in the South.[545] At the grassroots, the impact of union activists on CAPs was equally significant and has remained largely overlooked. Union activism and community action interacted in mutually beneficial, if controversial ways in many antipoverty programs in Mississippi and across the country. However, the involvement of the Mississippi AFL-CIO – led by Claude Ramsay – in STAR proved detrimental to program and the poor people it was designed to involve and assist. Ramsay, one of Polk's 'pseudo-liberal' white STAR board members, illustrates how racial moderation interacted with white accommodations to biracialism in a racial landscape altered by the passage of the Civil and Voting Rights Acts and

[543] Brunini Papers, STAR, Inc., Correspondence 20 February 1969-1 May 1973, Alfred H. Rhodes, Jr., to Msgr. Bernard Law, 6 July 1972.
[544] MSSC Records, SCR ID # 2-46-0-102-2-1-1, W. Webb Burke to Herman Glazier, 'Addendum to April 21, 1970 Memorandum', 21 April 1970, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd02/011263.png&otherstuff=2|46|0|102|2|1|1|11030| [accessed 20 July 2013]; SCR ID # 1-117-0-12-1-1-1, W. Webb Burke to Clovis Williams, 4 March 1971, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd02/008820.png&otherstuff=1|117|0|12|1|1|1|8606| [accessed 20 July 2013]; SCR ID # 2-157-2-59-1-1-1, W. Webb Burke to Clovis Williams, 3 March 1971, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd07/049213.png&otherstuff=2|157|2|59|1|1|1|48505| [accessed 20 July 2013].
[545] LBJL: Transcript, Jack T. Conway Oral History Interview I with Michael Gillette, 13 August 1980; Ashmore, *Carry It On*, p.68.

complicated by the presence of federally funded antipoverty programs to perpetuate racial discrimination.

At the grassroots, many CAA boards, Poor Area Committees (PACs) and CABs contained labour union representatives. Indeed, in a pamphlet produced by the AFL-CIO entitled 'Labor's Role in the War on Poverty', labour was referred to as being 'inherently a part' of the War on Poverty, while membership on CAA boards was 'essential both to the poor and to the union membership'.[546] In Mississippi, some union activists saw the CAAs as an ideal opportunity to extend the presence of unions. Beginning a drive to unionize all antipoverty program workers in Mississippi, African American activist Jessie Epps told about 300 members of two Head Start groups – CDGM and the Mid-Delta Education Association – that only through unity could antipoverty employees sway Congress to expand the antipoverty program.[547] Epps, a long-time labour union activist and deputy director of child development in the CAA Coahoma Opportunities Inc., asserted that membership in his AFL-CIO union offered such unity, plus strength in numbers.[548] However, union activity in antipoverty programs caused huge controversy: in Florida, for example, a CAP staff member found to have participated in union activity and used the program to promote union membership became the target of critical opposition by local politicians and press.[549] Equally damaging controversies arose from conflicts between CAAs and labour unions, particularly in northern cities in which many CAP staff personally objected to the majority-white, powerful unions. Although journalist Victor Riesel exaggerated the involvement of the New York CAA Council Against Poverty in opposition to the striking United Federation of Teachers, by 1968 there was increasing friction between the labour movement and antipoverty programs.[550]

Controversy and opposition was nothing new for the AFL-CIO in Mississippi. Union activists advocating integration were targets of Klan threats and in some cases of

[546] University of Southern Mississippi, McCain Library and Archives, Special Collections, Hattiesburg: Papers of Victoria Gray Adams, Box 4, Folder 12, 'Labor's Role in the War on Poverty... an AFL-CIO Guide', c.1965.
[547] 'Antipoverty Group Discusses Unionization', *Jackson Daily News*, (6 September 1967).
[548] Mississippi AFL-CIO Records, Box 2132, Folder 7, Resume of Jessie Epps, 18 February 1967.
[549] Cooper Papers, Box 76, Folder 5a, '2 Florida Poverty Programs Blasted for Union Activity', *The Miami Herald*, (29 May 1967).
[550] LBJL: Confidential File WE/MC Box 98, Folder WE9 Poverty Program (Great Society) 1967- [1 of 2], Joseph Califano to Lyndon B. Johnson, 12 October 1968 and attached V. Riesel, 'Inside Labor: Bayonets on the Streets?', (27 September 1968).

violent attack, such as assault on Otis Matthews.[551] Ramsay also came under particular criticism from the local press for his political and union activities in addition to his support for moderate Civil Rights organisations.[552] Historian Alan Draper's examination of Ramsay and the Mississippi AFL-CIO's relationship with the local movement opens with an account of Civil Rights activists and politicians attending Ramsay's 1986 funeral and concludes with the awards he received in the 1980s for his advocacy of Civil Rights and an explanation of why he did not succumb to the racism that surrounded him.[553] Such an interpretation suggests a moral or at least pragmatic dedication to achieving black enfranchisement and integration that is not apparent in his role in STAR. The vitriolic opposition Ramsay faced from Klansmen, white union members, the local press, the Sovereignty Commission and many white Mississippians was based on the perception of a relationship between Ramsay's AFL-CIO and Civil Rights organisations that was in reality very limited. Across much of the South, labour unions remained segregated and nationally the AFL-CIO made efforts to remain apart from Civil Rights activities such as the March on Washington – until 1965 Ramsay had very little personal contact with any Civil Rights activists.[554] Ramsay undoubtedly supported racial enfranchisement at a time when such support threatened his job, the strength of the AFL-CIO in Mississippi and his life. However, Ramsay's role within STAR – like his relationship with the Mississippi Freedom Labor Union – illustrates the inconsistency of this support.[555] His motivation for supporting black enfranchisement, which Draper acknowledges was to overhaul the Mississippi Democratic Party, was a

[551] KKK Collection, Box 1, Folder 10, 'The Ku Klux Klan – 1965', in *Facts*, 16, No. 3, May 1965; Mississippi AFL-CIO Records, Box 2132, Folder 1, Anonymous postcard to Claude Ramsay, n.d.; A. Draper, *Conflict of Interests: Organized Labor and the Civil Rights Movement in the South*, (ILR Press: Ithaca, 1994), p.141. In November 1964, a gang of masked men kidnapped and beat Otis Matthews before pouring corrosive liquid onto his wounds. Matthews, the financial secretary of the local AFL-CIO International Woodworkers of America was attacked because the union had approved a Federal order giving Negroes equal treatment at the Masonite plant in Laurel. The Klan sent threatening messages to Claude Ramsay, for example a postcard from the 'grand drag-on' warning Ramsay to 'quit messin [sic] around in other peoples buziness [sic]', and a former Klansman later admitted he had been assigned to kill Ramsay.

[552] T. Etheridge, 'Union Folks Think for Themselves and it has Labor Leaders Worried', *The Clarion Ledger*, (12 September 1968).

[553] Draper, *Conflict*, pp.122-160.

[554] Ibid., pp.3, 146; Johnson Family Papers, Box 149 Folder 2, Restricted Sovereignty Commission Report, 4 April 1967. An April 1967 Sovereignty Commission report to Governor Johnson reflects the fear of the link between Ramsay and black activists, claiming Ramsay was gathering blacks together to register so 'he can make a grasp for political power'.

[555] M. Newman, 'The Mississippi Freedom Labor Union', in S. W. Jones and M. Newman, *Poverty and Progress in the US South since 1920*, (VU University Press: Amsterdam, 2006), p.140. Newman illustrates the damaging impact of Ramsay's 'moderation' on the efforts of the Mississippi Freedom Labor Union in their 1965 strike.

goal he spent much of the late 1960s pursuing at times in collaboration with NAACP and the MFDP.[556] This quest for increased support for, and influence of, the AFL-CIO in Mississippi politics led Ramsay to embrace a coalition with the board's controlling clique to the detriment of program enrolees, both white and black, African American activism and to the goal of creating better and more widely available adult education and manpower training.

Ramsay felt a preoccupation with race had harmed Mississippi and prevented the state from sorting out its true problems. The 'race question' had held back the Mississippi AFL-CIO for years. Local unions dominated by White Citizen's Council disaffiliated from the Mississippi AFL-CIO, while even the 'predominantly Negro' labour unions remained unaffiliated with it.[557] In a speech in 1967, Ramsay blamed ignorance, preoccupation with race and historic legislation against labour for Mississippi's low economic status.[558] For Ramsay, addressing the labour laws and other issues that were less racially-charged – notably adult education – which held back Mississippi's economy, were of primary importance.[559] This belief in the importance of adult education resulted in Ramsay's close association with STAR, from the inception of which he served as a member of the board's executive committee. In 1965 he told a reporter STAR was 'probably one of the best [antipoverty programs] to come out of OEO', emphasizing the significance of the support the program had from 'all segments of the community' by pointing to his membership and that of the head of the Jackson Chamber of Commerce on the board of directors.[560] Ramsay also spoke eloquently in defence of STAR and the importance of adult education before the Senate hearings in Jackson in April 1967, and received OEO's Rural Service Award in 1968.[561] However, by 1970 Ramsay had become a central actor in the "clique" of the board of directors as he participated in character assassinations of African American staff, manipulated board regulations to ensure his continued presence within the executive committee and

[556] Draper, *Conflict,* pp.146-160; T. Etheridge, 'Union Folks Think for Themselves and it has Labor Leaders Worried', *The Clarion Ledger*, (12 September 1968). Etheridge ridicules Ramsay's efforts on behalf of Hubert Humphrey in 1968, claiming it would benefit rivals Richard Nixon or more likely, Etheridge claimed George Wallace.
[557] Mississippi AFL-CIO Records, Box 2225, Folder 2, Claude Ramsay to Ransom P. Jones III, 15 January 1968.
[558] Ibid.; 'One Third of Population is Illiterate, Is Statement', *The Times-Picayune*, (29 January 1967).
[559] 'Union Urges Compulsory Education', *The Clarion Ledger*, (22 June 1967).
[560] Mississippi AFL-CIO Records, Box 2132, Folder 1, Charles H. Walters to Claude Ramsay, 25 October 1965; Claude Ramsay to Charles H. Walters, 28 October 1965.
[561] Mississippi AFL-CIO Records, Box 2133, Folder 4, Thomas A. Gee to Claude Ramsay, 12 July 1968.

perpetuated the executive staff's racially discriminatory actions. In his involvement with this group who attempted to restrict STAR to an adult education program acceptable to the Governor, Ramsay chose to throw his weight and that of the state AFL-CIO behind the white establishment. Ramsay and Turner worked with Spainhour, the staff's white caucus and with the Governor's representatives to limit the program's activities to adult education, in line with the Governor's remit.[562] In so doing, he completely disrupted the STAR program. In order to increase the number of votes available to the clique, Ramsay sought to be selected as a centre representative to the Edwards PAC so Thomas Knight, his employee, could be on the board of directors thereby increasing his voting power.[563] Although the Edwards PAC later went to considerable effort to remove Ramsay from its board because he never attended a PAC meeting, the two AFL-CIO votes on the board supported the practices that buttressed Civil Rights compliance violations and blatant racial discrimination in hiring and promotion practices.[564] Ramsay participated in the character assassination of Polk, accusing him of contributing money to the 'political machine' of Charles Evers – to which the national AFL-CIO had contributed – and labelling Polk a black militant. Polk responded scathingly that 'to them [Turner and Ramsay] a militant is anyone who says no to oppression or oppressive and intimidating tactics of the Governor', giving an indication of the shift in perception of what constituted activism and militancy. Any African Americans or whites unwilling to participate in the biracialism that amounted to capitulation to the establishment were depicted as radical.[565]

Ramsay's machinations within and through STAR were detrimental to the enrolees and activists. Nonetheless, his actions were in line with his belief in the importance of education, manpower training and above all the AFL-CIO over racial progress. His association with the powerful clique indeed reflects pragmatism – the changing racial realities forged by white accommodations as exemplified in the Governor's acceptance of the integrated program, providing he had a say in its operation. The formation of an alliance with Turner provided an opportunity for Ramsay to forge associations, influence policy and provided greater access to channels

[562] MCHR Records, Box 37, Folder STAR Controversy, Statement of Owen Brooks before the NAACP Hearing, 7 December 1970.
[563] Mississippi AFL-CIO Records, Box 2227, Folder 2, John Crockett to Claude Ramsay, 19 October 1970.
[564] Polk to Winel, 17 November 1970.
[565] Ibid.

of power. Moreover, involvement with this clique provided Ramsay – as it did the Catholic Diocese to a lesser extent – the opportunity to be an "insider". Both the Catholic Church and the labour union in Mississippi had the onus of being classed as "outsiders", a status that united them loosely with Civil Rights activists and had prevented Ramsay from making inroads in the state. Ramsay's actions in STAR then were for him not a betrayal of the Civil Rights organisations he had supported peripherally in earlier phases of the movement but the best way to secure his goal of expanding adult education, Mississippi's industrial economy and securing the AFL-CIO's place within Mississippi's economy and politics.

The Green Amendment

At the grassroots, the politicisation of STAR and the systemic racial discrimination within the program had a damaging impact on the programs' efficacy, particularly on its ability to fulfil OEO's mandate to reach out to, and engage with, the poor community. The failure of OEO under the Johnson Administration to address these violations was damaging and resulted largely from administrative failings of OEO staff at the regional and national levels. However, under Nixon the failure of OEO staff to address such violations became one facet of a covert and systematic attack on antipoverty programs at the grassroots. Historians such as Orleck have suggested that Nixon's actions and attitude toward OEO during his first administration were at worst a case of benign neglect.[566] Nixon's unwillingness to dismantle the OEO during his first term was a pragmatic decision based on his reluctance to risk political capital with direct, public attacks on the War on Poverty programs which had gained political momentum with the support of Civil Rights organisations. Indeed, Rumsfeld accepted his appointment as director of OEO on the condition the agency would not been dismantled from underneath him.[567] However, the actions of both Nixon and Rumsfeld quietly undermined antipoverty programs at the local level, subverting the intent of the drafters of the Economic Opportunity Act.[568] The implementation of the Green

[566] Orleck, 'Conclusion', pp.438-439.
[567] Perrin, 'Sic Transition Gloria'.
[568] Donald Rumsfeld to John D. Ehrlichman, 'Actions Taken at OEO – May 26 to July 7, 1969', c.July 1969, *The Rumsfeld Papers,*

Amendment by Rumsfeld's OEO provides a clear illustration of this quietly destructive campaign. At the state and local level, Rumsfeld's OEO facilitated the use of the Green Amendment by city halls to control CAPs. For STAR, this meant OEO support for increased white control of and the further exclusion of poor African Americans from the board of directors.

One of the most significant aspects of the War on Poverty and central to CAAs was their intent to redistribute power from city halls to non-profit organisations representing the poor. The riots that swept across America's cities in the summer of 1967 provided politicians with the perfect opportunity to blame maximum feasible participation for fomenting the riots. This view persisted, despite the findings of the Kerner Commission, which provided proof that many CAPs and their staff had, in fact, helped to calm rioters.[569] Under pressure from local mayors and their constituents, Democratic and Republican politicians pushed amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act that would curb and control the participation of the poor and extend the influence of city halls in antipoverty programs. The 1967 Amendments included the Green Amendment, introduced by Oregon's Democratic Congresswoman Edith Green, which required CAA Boards to be designated by local elected officials, increasing the control and representation of the establishment in CAAs and introducing a requirement for the rearrangement of board representatives. The original Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 had required only that one-third of the members of a CAA board be TARs. While the 1967 Amendment did not alter that requirement, it included specific requirements about length of service on the board, quorum requirements and most significantly dictated that board composition consist of one-third public officials, with the remaining third representatives of the community, such as representatives of business, labour, minority and religious organisations.[570] These amendments were designed to encourage local governments to take control of CAAs. In Mississippi they resulted in the increased influence of the white establishment on antipoverty programs,

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http://papers.rumsfeld.com/http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/583/To%20John%20Ehrlichman%20re%20Actions%20Taken%20at%20OEO%20-%20May%2026%20to%20July%207%201969.pdf [accessed 21 July 2013]. This memo, reporting on Rumsfeld's initial activities as OEO Director details his efforts to strengthen the authority of the director and to tighten control over CAPs.

[569] *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*, (US Government Printing Office: New York, 1968), p.62.

[570] LBJL: Papers of Alfred H. Corbett, Box 18, Folder Response to 1967 Legislation, William Bozman to OEO Regional Directors and CAP Regional Administrators, 'Draft Implementation of the Green Amendment', 9 January 1968.

incorporation of the programs into the traditional power structure and the ingraining of established patterns of racial discrimination.[571]

STAR had been exempt from implementation of the Green Amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act in 1967 because the Amendment referred to CAAs, rather than single-purpose programs like STAR. Compliance with the Green Amendment would remove the influence that poor people had in the running of the program, which was tenuously maintained only through numerical superiority. Two-thirds of the board were democratically elected TARs, with the result that implementing Green would significantly reduce their voice in the running of the program.[572] Reorganising STAR's board in accordance with the Green Amendment was made a special condition of the program's funding in October 1970. The requirement caused huge controversy, provoking a strong reaction and engendering a great deal of confusion at the local and state levels.[573] PAC members and STAR centre staff feared that their PACs would be reconstituted in line with the Green Amendment with fewer poor representatives and more elected officials. While Green was intended only for state boards, the fear remained that this leeching of the voice of TARs would seep down from the board into PACs.[574] Ironically, the requirement to implement Green united the warring factions of the board (the ruling 'clique' and activists) in opposition to the condition. The executive committee of the board put on record its rejection of any reorganisation of its board in line with the amendment, which threatened not only the presence of TARs but also that of several powerful whites. Implementing Green required the resignation of several members of the dominating 'clique' as they had served on the board for longer terms than allowed under the Amendment's restrictions. Civil Rights activists such as STAR's Board Secretary Owen Brooks objected to the amendment because it would undermine

[571] P. Gelfand, R. Lester, and M. P. Schipper (eds.), *The War on Poverty, 1964-1968, Part 1: White House Central Files* (University Publications of America: Frederick, 1986), Reel 13, fr.0778-0779.
[572] Derian Papers, Box 8, Folder 165, Joseph B. Brunini to STAR Board of Directors, 12 January 1971.
[573] Mississippi AFL-CIO Records, Box 2227, Folder 2, Roland T. Winel to Cornelius Turner, 21 October 1970.
[574] Brunini Papers, Folder STAR, Inc., 1966-1973, File 15, Roland T. Winel to Connie R. Moore 16 October 1970; Mississippi AFL-CIO Records, Box 2227, Folder 2, Connie R. Moore to Roland T. Winel, 22 October 1970. Moore, Director of the Meridian STAR centre suggests that 'strong protest would emerge from all centers' should the Green Amendment be implemented on PACs.

the voice of the TARs, while increasing the control of the political establishment over the program.[575]

The Green Amendment requirements formed a significant talking point during the NAACP Hearing in December 1970, with Brooks claiming the condition on STAR's grant was part of a 'regional pattern which seems to be developing within the OEO to restructure independent programs such as STAR and force them to conform to Green Amendment restrictions'.[576] The Green Amendment had become a central part of the drive of local white communities and the establishment to bring CAPs under their control. While CAPs had no choice but to adhere to the requirements, STAR had been exempt for three years and OEO's attempts to impose the requirements in 1970 were perceived by TARs as a return to their subordination and powerlessness. For Civil Rights activists and STAR supporters such as Brooks, implementing the Green Amendment was more significant than simply altering board composition and tightening quorum requirements. It would destroying the last opportunity for the development of black leadership and setting the stage for a 'second post-reconstruction regression into dependency' – closing the last avenue for African Americans to give meaning to their political rights as the outside interest and support for Civil Rights and for southern blacks diminished.[577]

STAR provides an excellent example of how the Green Amendment, having been only sporadically implemented under the Johnson Administration, was utilised under Nixon and Rumsfeld systematically to strip the poor of their say in the running of antipoverty programs.[578] However, this impact was not limited to STAR. The changes implemented in OEO under Rumsfeld – from the significant staff changes, administrative procedural shifts to changes in the poverty threshold – included a simplification of the Green Amendment to make it easier for mayors across the country to take control of the local CAPs and change the focus of the program.[579] Under Nixon and Rumsfeld, the Green Amendment became a way to curb the independence and

[575] MCHR Records, Box 37, Folder STAR Controversy, Statement of Owen Brooks before the NAACP Hearing, 7 December 1970.
[576] Ibid.
[577] Ibid.
[578] Stennis Papers, Series 1, Box 4, Folder 25, Carol M. Khosrovi to John C. Stennis, 13 May 1970.
[579] Mississippi AFL-CIO Records, Box 2226, Folder 6, 'OEO Instruction: Revised OEO Income Poverty Guidelines', 30 January 1970.

activism of CAAs and curry favour with local politicians who hoped the Republican Administration would address the "socialism" of the War on Poverty. Mississippi Republican Party Chairman Clarke Reed sent to Mississippi Republicans a memo from OEO Director Frank Carlucci in which Carlucci delineated efforts by the Nixon administration to implement the often ignored Green Amendment to 'give public officials and responsible citizens a strong hand in governing OEO funded program'. Reed urged Republican leaders in Mississippi to convince these 'responsible citizens' to serve on poverty program boards in order for the Green Amendment to have a 'beneficial effect'.[580] Race is never mentioned in discussions of the Green Amendment by Rumsfeld's OEO, Nixon's White House or even the Mississippi Republican Party. However, the language used such as the emphasis on the importance of 'responsible citizens' in governing programs clearly indicates the racial dimension to Green that was always present but never explicitly articulated, as well as emphasizing the responsibilities of the "citizen" who was able to – and expected to – vote.

Termination of STAR

The covert campaign of Nixon during his first term to end the War on Poverty without risking his political capital had proved damaging to STAR through delegation and the aggressive implementation of the Green Amendment. However, it was the increasingly overt efforts of Nixon to destroy the OEO as his presidency progressed that would bring about STAR's demise. Combined with the racial discrimination that was materially damaging the program at the grassroots and the increasing conservatism of OEO staff, STAR became an early casualty of Nixon's developing opposition to the War on Poverty. Like many antipoverty programs, STAR suffered from funding cuts and delays for much of its existence. A decrease in its grant in the 1968 program year resulted in the dismissal of many of STAR's administrative staff and the suspension of operations at some of its centres, while delays in submitting refunding applications in 1970 coupled with Governor John Bell Williams' refusal to sign STAR's grant package

[580] MRP Records, Series VII, Box G-5, Folder PATA/FA OEO 1971, Clarke Reed to 'Key Leaders', Internal Republican Party Memo, 24 March 1971 and attached article by Frank Carlucci, 12 February 1971, in which Carlucci outlines the history and purpose of the Green Amendment and how it should be administered and what it was intended to do.

delayed funding by over three months.[581] By 1971, STAR's persistent failure to address issues raised in several inspections including, on-going Equal Opportunities non-compliance, resulted in OEO's decision to defund the program. Although the board, staff and supporters managed to gain STAR a reprieve, deep cuts to OEO's budget combined with the program's poor record to ensure the program's demise in 1973.

On 2 August 1971, OEO's Southeast Regional Director Roy Batchelor informed STAR's board of his tentative decision not to refund STAR based on a series of problems which the program's staff and board had failed to address. The problems Batchelor cited included alleged failures of the board to provide stable direction and minimum standards of administration, a failure to operate programs in a manner to bring about the most meaningful benefits to the poor, allegations that the program provided overwhelmingly for black women and claims of inadequate record keeping, amongst many others.[582] These accusations – especially allegations that STAR provided overwhelmingly for black women – reflect the growing conservatism of OEO staff, as Rumsfeld replaced Democratic appointees with his own selections. Batchelor's allegations fed back into the racial and gender discrimination that whites on the grassroots had been drawing on to oppose the War on Poverty from the outset. Now emanating from OEO regional offices, this racialised and gendered opposition resonated with the conservative depictions of the mythical welfare queen. STAR did involve a disproportionate number of African American women, largely due to the migration of many working-age black men from the poorest areas of Mississippi and the severity which combined poverty and racial and gender discrimination affected Mississippi's African American female-headed households.[583] Far from cause for STAR's termination, this alleged bias toward poor African American women eventually became one of the program's more positive legacies.

Bishop Brunini, Executive Committee Chairman Alix Sanders and the board reacted angrily to these allegations, sending Batchelor a detailed letter that refuted the allegations point by point, at times very convincingly.[584] Faced with what they

[581] 'STAR is back in operation in Greenwood', *The Clarion Ledger*, (2 February 1968); RG 381: Box 7, Folder CAP – STAR Inc., Roland T. Winel to Bruce Fausner, 14 January 1970.
[582] Stennis Papers, Series 1, Box 4, Folder 42, Joseph B. Brunini to Roy Batchelor, 11 August 1971.
[583] Derian Papers, Box 8, Folder 167, 'Transcript of the Proceedings Hearing Before the Honourable Hamah King, Hearing Examiner: Non-Refunding Hearing in the Matter of STAR, Inc.', 31 August 1971.
[584] Stennis Papers, Series 1, Box 4, Folder 42, Joseph B. Brunini to Roy Batchelor, 11 August 1971.

perceived to be a personal attack on the integrity of board members, program staff and the Diocese, Brunini and Sanders called on the connections that STAR and the Diocese had cultivated with the white establishment to rally in support of the program. Brunini called on Senators Stennis and Eastland to urge OEO to reconsider their decision while Sanders wrote to Congressman Carl Perkins and other public officials requesting their support.[585] Stennis did urge OEO to give STAR a hearing, although he made it clear that his support was due to his friendship with the Bishop's brother, Attorney Ed Brunini. The Senator was not willing to go against the Governor in support of STAR.[586] The pressure from powerful supporters combined with the board's claims that its reconstitution after the NAACP hearing had reformed the program, ensured that STAR secured a hearing with the regional OEO in Atlanta on 31 August 1971. Held before Attorney Hamah King, those giving evidence included Executive Director Al Krumlauf, Bishop Brunini, board members including Father Broussard and Owen Brooks, and program staff including Leola Williams. The hearing revealed on-going problems with STAR's administration, board and equal opportunity compliance. However, King found that OEO inspectors had failed to take into account the positive steps the new board was taking and reassessed STAR's relationship with poor black women as positive.[587] As a result, Batchelor reversed his tentative decision and refunded STAR from October 1971 at its previous funding rate of $2.2 million.[588] Despite STAR's patchy record of adhering to OEO's grant conditions, implementing the required administrative procedures and its manifold Civil Rights non-compliance by late 1971, STAR's board was beginning to make some headway. While in no way a vehicle for community action, and still excluding African Americans and whites considered to be "militant" activists, the decision to defund STAR was not justified. Batchelor's decision was reflective of the increasing conservatism of the OEO, particularly the regional offices who had increasing power and control over the fate of the antipoverty programs. This

[585] Stennis Papers, Series 1, Box 4, Folder 42, Russell C. Davis to John C. Stennis, 13 August 1971; Joseph B. Brunini to John C. Stennis, 16 August 1971; Eastland Collection, File Series 3, Subseries 4, Box 38, Folder Mississippi OEO, Joseph B. Brunini to James O. Eastland, 16 August 1971. Mayor Davis urged Stennis to intervene in support of STAR at least to get a 'full and impartial hearing' while Bishop Brunini requested Stennis' personal intervention with OEO in Washington to get the decision reversed.
[586] Brunini Papers, Folder STAR, Inc., 1966-1973, File 15, Telegram from John C. Stennis to Joseph B. Brunini, 18 August 1971; Stennis Papers, Series 1, Box 4, Folder 42, John Hamner to General McDonnell, 23 August 1971.
[587] Derian Papers, Box 8, Folder 167, 'Transcript of the Proceedings Hearing Before the Honourable Hamah King, Hearing Examiner: Non-Refunding Hearing in the Matter of STAR, Inc.', 31 August 1971.
[588] Brunini Papers, Folder STAR, Inc., 1966-1973, File 15, 'Decision on STAR Changed by OEO', *Unknown Paper,* (n.d.).

change in atmosphere at OEO was the result of Nixon's covert attempts to subvert the intent of the Economic Opportunity Act and quietly dismantle the OEO, while propagating a gendered and racially charged image of social welfare to appeal to his silent majority. STAR, the *Delta Democrat Times*, reported had been caught in a 'game of bureaucratic chess with the poor the obvious losers' that was being played by the Nixon Administration.[589]

Nixon's determination to terminate OEO after his re-election in 1973 has been described elsewhere: the appointment of Howard J. Phillips as director and other right-wing, Young Americans for Freedom and Committee to Re-elect the President staff in the place of the senior OEO staff members whose resignation he demanded; withholding millions of dollars of congressionally-allocated funding; and removing OEO from his 1974 Budget.[590] Ironically, continued funding for OEO received bipartisan support despite Nixon's deliberate omission. Many Democratic politicians pushed for the War on Poverty's survival, while some conservative Democratic and Republican politicians recognised that a sense of entitlement amongst the poor had developed after a decade of federal funding and feared potentially violent consequences should the programs cease.[591] The sense of entitlement that Davies blamed for the failure of the War on Poverty here provided OEO with a brief stay of execution.[592] While the actions of Nixon were later ruled illegal and his appointment of Phillips as director was overturned, for STAR the reversal came too late.[593] By late 1972 decreasing OEO appropriations had already decided STAR's fate and this time the only negotiations that took place between the STAR board and OEO was to decide the length and conditions placed on STAR's phase out grant.[594] The program was given six months to spin off its functions and create a manpower programming structure that could be operated through Mississippi's CAPs.[595] STAR was an early casualty of the

[589] MCHR Records, Box 37, Folder STAR Controversy, 'OEO Ponders STAR cut off', *Delta Democrat Times,* (1 September 1971).
[590] O'Reilly, *Nixon's Piano,* pp.313-315. O'Reilly quotes Charles Colson saying Phillips, as OEO Director, was appointed to be a 'human bomb and walking target'.
[591] Korstad and Leloudis, *To Right,* p.348.
[592] Davies, *Opportunity,* p.235.
[593] B. Kovach, 'Judge Halts Move to Disband OEO', *New York Times,* (12 April 1973), pp.1, 19.
[594] Eastland Collection, File Series 3, Subseries 4, Box 38, Folder Mississippi OEO, William "Sonny" Walker to Donna Myhre, 21 September 1972.
[595] Brunini Papers, STAR, Inc., Correspondence 20 February 1969-1 May 1973, Donna Myhre to William Sonny Walker, 10 April 1973.

decreased funding of the War on Poverty, but many antipoverty programs in Mississippi and the nation soon followed.

Chapter Four

Community Services Association

As the CAA serving Jackson, the only city in both Hinds County and Mississippi itself, Community Services Association (CSA) encountered a diverse set of challenges.[596] The program faced a complex political structure, a powerful and institutionalised white supremacy that came into frequent conflict with the extensive networks of movement activism and widespread urban and rural poverty that was heavily racially skewed. CSA faced a mammoth task in attempting to develop and operate projects to serve Hinds County, which had a population of approximately 215,000 in 1966, and a racial composition of roughly 40 per cent black and 60 per cent white.[597] CSA developed a close connection to the county's complex political structure, which was based on five county supervisors, one elected from each of the county's five beats, and a separate three man commission which governed the city. In addition, the several municipalities within the county such as Bolton, Terry, Raymond and Edwards each had its own Mayor, Alderman and city clerk.[598] This relationship, and the urban nature of many of the problems CSA addressed, made it different from the programs studied thus far. Although Jackson lacked the sprawling, high-rise nature of many cities, CSA was closer to the CAAs operating in urban centres across the country that have been the traditional focus for historians and social scientists studying the War on Poverty.[599] This chapter thus offers the opportunity to contrast not only urban and rural programs, but also how the experience of an urban CAA in Mississippi differed from that of urban programs elsewhere. Jackson was also the headquarters of the Citizens Council of Mississippi, leading one OEO Inspector to comment in 1969, 'in Jackson Mississippi CSA stands

[596] CSA operated a broad range of programs, not all of which were successfully refunded over the course of its existence including: Head Start; Neighbourhood Service Centres; Neighbourhood Youth Corps; Legal Services; Family Planning; an Emergency Food and Medical program; and a Sickle Cell Anaemia screening program, making CSA one of the most comprehensive CAAs in the state.

[597] C. Gibson and K. Jung, 'Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals By Race, 1790 to 1990, and By Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, For The United States, Regions, Divisions, and States', Population Division, U. S. Census Bureau, Working Paper Series No. 56, (2002), http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056/twps0056.html [accessed 3 August 2013]. This racial composition reflects the state-wide composition in 1960: 57.7 per cent white, 42 per cent black, 0.1 per cent Asian and 0.1 per cent American Indian. The small Chinese population in Jackson is not mentioned in OEO reports on the county population, nor were they involved in CSA; the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians was concentrated in Neshoba and its neighbouring counties.

[598] RG 381: Box 3, Folder CSA, Jackson, Mississippi, 'Official Report of On-Site Findings: CSA, Jackson, Mississippi, 27-29 May 1969'.

[599] Kramer, *Participation;* Rice, 'In the Trenches'.

for Confederate States of America; it also represents Community Services Association. Whether this relationship is purely accidental is subject to conjecture, but considering the general situation in the city and the county in which it is located, it is probably not'.[600] Thus this study of opposition and accommodation to an antipoverty program in one of the strongholds of segregationist resistance will illuminate the continuities and changes in the evolving resistance.

Despite the complications resulting from the white supremacist political structure, Hinds County fared significantly better than the rest of the state in terms of economic activity, employment conditions and the extent of poverty. In Mississippi in 1966, 34 per cent of families were poor while in Hinds County the poverty level was 20.2 per cent. Similar to other Mississippi counties, poverty in Hinds County was disproportionately affected African Americans: in 1960, 34 per cent of the population of the county was black, of whom 67 per cent were poor. Only ten per cent of the white population was poor, meaning there were over three times more poor African American families in the county than poor white families.[601] The level of movement activism in Jackson left a legacy of activists – local whites and African Americans as well as out-of-state activists – who were well versed in utilising their limited power to challenge the establishment. However, as their experience opposing white control over CSA illustrates, these efforts were frustrated not only by the power and influence of local whites but also by the breakdown of the already tenuous cooperation amongst activists disillusioned with the lack of progress in the wake of the 1964 and 1965 Civil and Voting Rights Acts and increasingly divided by race and class as local black activists rejected white leadership. This chapter traces the limited accommodations of white Hinds County to CSA, which though emanating from a cross-section of the white community were by no means subtle or strategic.[602] More complicated than simply white response to black activism, CSA vividly illustrates the intra-racial class divisions and interracial middle-class coalitions that complicated the operation of CSA. The experience of CSA's component and delegate programs showcases the destructive impact of the racial discrimination that was pervasive in the CAP and bolstered by the

[600] RG 381: Box 3, Folder CSA, Jackson, Mississippi, Edwin Marger, 'Evaluation Report: CSA', 30 May 1969.
[601] LBJL: Office Files of Fred Panzer, Box 49, 'OEO Information Center: Community Profile', Mississippi Volume I of VI, Hinds County.
[602] Crespino, *In Search,* p.4.

wider community in Hinds County. Opposition to CSA's Legal Services program illustrates the way methods and mechanisms of earlier Massive Resistance became central to emerging national conservatism. The final section of this chapter describes the grassroots impact of Nixon's transition from covert to overt attacks on the War on Poverty.

Creation of CSA

From its creation, CSA was controlled by whites and closely connected to the political establishment in Jackson. Groups of 'concerned citizens' in Hinds County began organising as early as 1964 in response to the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act. Activists, agitators, community leaders, the established black leadership and those affiliated with the white power structure all scrambled to gain control of the promised federal funds. Two groups emerged with the potential to establish viable organisations: a biracial group founded by members of the established black leadership such as Rev. R. L. T. Smith and 'liberal' whites including Rev. Donald Thompson and former President of Tougaloo College, Dr. A. D. Beittel; and a white group handpicked by Governor Johnson and led by Attorneys Dan Shell and Shelby Rodgers.[603]

Both Shell and Rodgers had connections to the segregationist establishment: Shell was a partner in the law firm Satterfield, Shell, Williams and Buford, which was involved in many law suits opposing the desegregation of schools and facilities in Jackson. John C. Satterfield had drafted legislation for White Citizens Councils and was legal advisor to the Sovereignty Commission and the Coordinating Committee for Fundamental American Freedoms – in 1969, he was described by *Time* Magazine as 'the most prominent segregationist lawyer in the country'.[604] Shell himself was chairman of the Legal Advisory Committee for the Jackson Citizens' Council. Shelby Rodgers was a White Citizens Councilman and had been co-chairman of Paul B.

[603] MCHR Records, Box 25, Folder CAP, T. Seaver and N. Levin, 'How to Perpetuate the Racist Power Structure in Mississippi using Federal Funds… or the Atlanta Regional OEO in Action', 14 June 1966, p.9.
[604] Crespino, *In Search,* p.93.

Johnson's 1963 gubernatorial campaign.[605] Their group was populated by equally powerful white men, including political allies of or workers for, Governor Johnson, White Citizens Councillors, Mayors, and business leaders such as the director of the Mississippi Power and Light Company.[606] Recognising the necessity of establishing an integrated board if they were to be successful in securing OEO funding, Shell and Rodgers' group decided to accept integration on the proviso that the African Americans they appointed would be under their control. Less a 'subtle and strategic accommodation' than a continuation of the earlier white tactics of paternalism combined with economic intimidation, African Americans were appointed by the white membership from a list of people 'acceptable to the white power people' and 'considered safe' to the white establishment. The black members were figureheads, unable to carry the legitimate concerns of the poor black community to the board because such actions would, according to one TAR, come at the cost of her livelihood.[607] While Dr. Beittel's group was met with rebuffs and delays in response to their appeals to the white establishment for support as well as struggling with internal disputes, Shell and Rodgers' group was met with immediate acceptance. In a move condemned by community leaders in Hinds County as a 'murder of public trust' in response to the flagrantly white supremacist nature of Shell and Rodgers' group, they were granted a charter by Governor Johnson on 16 June 1965. The power of the white group's members and their ties to the political establishment in Jackson ensured they wielded influence not only with the Governor but also with the OEO regional office, thus enabling the creation and funding of an antipoverty program that functioned as an 'arm of the economic and political power structure'.[608]

Opposition to the CSA's board by black and white members of the community did not cease with CSA's charter or successful grant application. The Hinds County Community Council (HCCC), a biracial organisation established in 1965 including representatives from Civil Rights organisations and community leaders, escalated its protests when it was clear that the OEO regional office had done little to address the white supremacist domination of the board of CSA. In a pamphlet entitled 'How to Perpetuate the Racist Power Structure in Mississippi Using Federal Funds… or the

[605] Seaver and Levin, 'How to Perpetuate', pp.1-2; Derian Papers, Box 1, Folder 14, Mississippi Task Force Community Profiles and Recommendations, September 1966-January 1967: Hinds County.
[606] Seaver and Levin, 'How to Perpetuate', p.2.
[607] Ibid., p.14; Crespino, *In Search*, p.4.
[608] Seaver and Levin, 'How to Perpetuate', p.14.

Atlanta Regional OEO in Action' prepared by Ted Seaver of the Michael Schwerner Memorial Fund and Nancy Levin, legislative chairperson of the Mississippi League of Women Voters in conjunction with HCCC, and sent to OEO's Southeast Regional Director Frank K. Sloan, the group documented the segregationist nature of the board and the persistent exclusion of white moderates and the poor. In response to OEO regional office requests that HCCC cooperate with the blatantly unresponsive CSA board and executive director, the HCCC accused regional OEO staff of 'ignoring the needs, wishes, ambitions, anger and frustration of the poor' and 'cautiously avoiding contamination by the white liberals and moderates'.[609] CSA's newly-appointed white Executive Director Colonel H. F. Frank became the symbol of white domination of CSA to the exclusion of poor blacks and local activists. Frank persistently excluded HCCC from discussions of the new program. When he finally relented at the insistence of regional OEO and agreed to a meeting in which HCCC and the poor community would have the opportunity to discuss the programs, Frank arbitrarily changed the meeting time and location without notifying HCCC to ensure, he claimed, that the meeting would not be disrupted by the presence of 'irresponsible people' who would ask rowdy questions.[610] A cartoon of Frank, published in *Hinds County Freedom Democratic Party News* illustrates the popular perception of Frank as withholding federal funds from the poor.

[609] MCHR Records, Box 25, Folder CAP, HCCC to Frank K. Sloan, n.d. The HCCC make these accusations in a letter to Sloan which accompanied the pamphlet.
[610] Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Jackson: Charles Horwitz Papers [hereafter Horwitz Papers], Box 4, Folder 42, James Mays, Richard Anderson and Aaron Evans on behalf of the HCCC to the CSA Board of Directors, n.d.

Illustration 4.1, *Who is Holding Up the Poverty Program Anyway?*

Source: Mississippi Department of Archives and History: Series 2515, Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Records, 1994-2006, SCR ID # 6-65-0-4-1-1-1, Cartoon, *Hinds County Freedom Democratic Party News*, 1, No. 11 (25 March 1967), http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd07/049825.png&otherstuff=6|65|0|4|1|1|1|49110| [accessed 23 July 2013].

Frank further angered many CSA staff, board members and the HCCC when he became involved in a controversy surrounding allegations that whites in Mississippi were deliberately starving African Americans. Frank's remarks – that far from any effort to drive the poor from the county there was 'a sincere concern for the poor and conscientious efforts to come to their aid' – were published in a pamphlet produced by the Mississippi Republican Party that rejected the allegations by visiting physicians and Congressmen as the 'irresponsible accusations' of 'bigoted elements'.[611] They prompted the Delta Ministry's Charles Horwitz, also a board member of CSA and a member of HCCC, to complain to OEO. OEO's response was limited; ruling that Frank had not broken any OEO regulations or the Hatch Act because there was no evidence, according to OEO's General Counsel, that Frank had intended his statement for use in partisan political literature.[612] Such a response failed to take into account the damaging impact that Frank's attitude towards poverty and African Americans had on the local poor population. He alienated the Hinds County poor when CSA's programs had barely begun to operate by demanding give and take on either side and simultaneously excluding any community activists or poor representatives from having a say in the running of the program.

In the development of CSA, the OEO regional office failed the local poor community by not ensuring that the new board followed even the letter of OEO regulations requiring poor and minority representation, much less the spirit of the Economic Opportunity Act. Although the poor administrative capabilities that plagued OEO's national and regional offices could account for its failures, the consistency of their actions speak more of an unwillingness to oppose the influential whites involved in, and supportive of, the program. However, when OEO's 1966 inspection revealed the board was still violating OEO requirements, its demand for board restructuring did at least ensure the appointment of democratically elected poor representatives and some white liberals to the board. Responding quickly to this perceived threat, white Mississippi mobilised some of the mechanisms and language of earlier Massive

[611] Carmichael Papers, Series I, Box 1, Folder 8, 'Are They Deliberately Starving Negroes in Mississippi?', August 1967; Payne, *Light of Freedom*, p.344. Responses from Owen Cooper and Hodding Carter III were also included in the pamphlet; Cooper commented that the 'preponderance of people in Mississippi are men of good will' and Carter acknowledges the extent to which Mississippi has 'failed its Negro citizens' but calls the allegation of deliberate starvation 'an utterly fantastic indictment'. Frank's response was moderate in comparison to Governor Johnson's comments that 'nobody is starving in Mississippi. All the Nigra women I see are so fat they shine'.
[612] Horwitz Papers, Box 3, Folder 41, Alex P. Bouxstein to Charles Horwitz, n.d.

Resistance, spearheaded by the Sovereignty Commission. Johnston targeted the perceived 'number one troublemaker' and 'chief burr under the saddle of most of the white segregationists and moderates of Jackson and Hinds County', Ted Seaver.[613]

Seaver arrived in Mississippi in June 1965 as the director of Vermont in Mississippi, Inc., a Civil Rights project sponsored by the Vermont Civil Rights Union, before becoming coordinator of the Community Development Agency Michael Schwerner Memorial Fund and also a key figure in HCCC and a CSA board member.[614] He was also active in the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, authoring articles in the Hinds County Freedom Democratic Party newsletter and publishing flyers advocating poor participation in CSA.[615] As an 'outside agitator' already on the Sovereignty Commission's radar, Seaver was the ideal target to blame for stirring up trouble amongst local Mississippians. Johnston had been keeping tabs on Seaver since his arrival. In 1966, for example, he wrote an editorial in the *Scott County Times* documenting Seaver's record of activism, such as his involvement in the Greenville Air Force Base sit-in, support for CDGM, opposition to STAR and his connections to communists in the hope it would undermine public support for Seaver and Vermont in Mississippi. When Seaver became a CSA board member the Commission expanded its spying activities to include CSA, with investigators attending CSA meetings and making an unsuccessful attempt to have Seaver removed as a member of the board.[616] Unlike the Commission's relative success at infiltrating the MAP board of directors, it

[613] MSSC Records, SCR ID # 6-65-0-15-1-1-1, Erle Johnston, Memo to File, 28 August 1967, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd07/049842.png&otherstuff=6|65|0|15|1|1|1|49127| [accessed 23 July 2013]; Mississippi Task Force Community Profiles: Hinds County; Carter, *Politics of Rage*, p.201. "Burr heads" was a common segregationist derogatory term for African Americans – as Carter notes it was most prominently used by George Wallace.

[614] MSSC Records, SCR ID # 2-156-0-35-1-1-1, Erle Johnston, 'Editorial: M.I.V. vs. V.I.M.' *Scott County Times*, (23 February 1966), http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd07/048405.png&otherstuff=2|156|0|35|1|1|1|47705| [accessed 23 July 2013].

[615] MSSC Records, SCR ID # 2-156-0-20-4-1-1, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd07/048351.png&otherstuff=2|156|0|20|4|1|1|47652| [accessed 23 July 2013]; SCR ID # 6-65-0-4-1-1-1, T. Seaver, 'Evans Votes Against Poor People', *Hinds County Freedom Democratic Party News*, 1, No.11, (25 March 1967), http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd07/049825.png&otherstuff=6|65|0|4|1|1|1|49110| [accessed 23 July 2013].

[616] MSSC Records, SCR ID # 6-65-0-15-1-1-1, Erle Johnston, Memo to File, 28 August 1967, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd07/049842.png&otherstuff=6|65|0|15|1|1|1|49127| [accessed 23 July 2013]; SCR ID # 1-125-0-17-1-1-1 Telephoned Report, 29 August 1967, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd02/009024.png&otherstuff=1|125|0|17|1|1|1|8809| [accessed 23 July 2013].

failed to gain the same level of intelligence or wield the same level of influence in the CSA's board. Johnston was too focused on Seaver – as an 'outside agitator' he was representative of a particularly detested group – and too intent on utilising Massive Resistance tropes that were now significantly less potent. By 1967, linking Seaver to Communism and raising the spectre of his past Civil Rights activism failed to generate earlier levels of hysteria and opposition. With HUAC in terminal decline and increasingly unpopular amongst Mississippians in the wake of its Klan investigations, appealing to anticommunism was becoming less and less successful.

Johnston, Frank and the controlling faction of CSA's board failed to grasp the complexity of the relationships between those they were content to group together as 'extremists'. Far from deploying Crespino's 'subtle and strategic accommodations', such white accommodation was barely present in CSA beyond a reluctant acceptance of the unavoidable presence of African American TARs.[617] The white founding members and board members of CSA instead controlled the program through a combination of their influence and economic power, establishment connections and the incompetence or, more worryingly, the collaboration of the regional OEO. In 1967, white businessman and CSA's Board President Tom B. Scott Jr., complained to OEO's Southeast Regional Director Frank Sloan that 'extremists' were undermining the achievements of CSA by 'openly and blatantly intimidating the representatives of the poor to the point that they have no freedom in the board meetings and dare not vote in opposition to the Civil Rights activists under threat of dire results'.[618] Stennis, to whom Scott's letter was copied, commiserated with him but warned that unfortunately this was now an 'old story'. While Stennis had called for businessmen such as Scott – the "responsible" Mississippians – to become involved in their local antipoverty programs in the wake of the CDGM debacle, Stennis had since lost confidence in the ability of white Mississippians to succeed in controlling the programs in the face of Shriver and President Johnson continuing to 'let (or direct) the programs be used as a Civil Rights activity'.[619]

Stennis, Johnston, Scott and the majority of his fellow white board members were happy to cast the deteriorating state of CSA as the fault of a liberal OEO unwilling

[617] Crespino, *In Search,* p.4.
[618] Stennis Papers, Series 25, Box 15, Folder 22, Tom B. Scott Jr., to Frank K. Sloan, 28 June 1967.
[619]Stennis Papers, Series 25, Box 15, Folder 22, John C. Stennis to Tom B. Scott, Jr., 21 July 1967.

to check extremists who had manoeuvred their way onto the board, and who were attempting to utilise government funds for Civil Rights activism. The reality of CSA was far from simplistic. OEO's requirements for a board reshuffle had allowed the introduction of white liberals and Civil Rights activists onto CSA's board; however, these new members were by no means a unified coalition setting out to control unsuspecting TARs and undermine white power control as Scott claimed. African American A. B. Evans, representing West Jackson on the CSA board, defied the expectations of his beat when he voted three times with the 'rich whites and against the poor people' in the first meetings of CSA's board in March 1967.[620] Though white members of CSA (and of antipoverty boards across Mississippi) had shown themselves to be adept at utilising economic controls to manipulate blacks, the controlling faction of CSA's board failed to take advantage of the growing divisions between former allies, black and white, Mississippian and outsider. Indeed, neither Frank nor the board seemed to recognise such divisions existed, continuing to dismiss them as a group of extremists merely on the basis of race or perceived radical activism. Local African American activists such as CSA's Neighbourhood Youth Corps counsellor and Assistant Director Don Jackson rejected the leadership of white 'liberals' purporting to represent the African American community such as Seaver, along with the actions of 'Uncle Toms' such as CSA Deputy Director E.L. Lipscomb and the established middle class blacks of CSA's board such as Dr A. D. Beittel, reflecting both the intra-racial class divisions which antipoverty programs served to expose and the decreasing receptivity of the black community to the intervention of whites, especially in leadership capacities.[621] Despite their failure to capitalise fully on these growing divisions, by 1967 the white establishment had secured control over CSA using a combination of economic intimidation, manipulation of OEO requirements facilitated by an unresponsive regional OEO and the pervasive power of CSA's controlling white board members.

[620] Seaver, 'Evans Votes Against Poor People'.
[621] 'Official Report of On-Site Findings: CSA, Jackson, Mississippi, 27-29 May 1969'.

Neighbourhood Youth Corps

CSA's Neighbourhood Youth Corps (CSA-NYC) showcases the impact of this white supremacist leadership on the program and its enrolees as CSA became, for the CSA-NYC trainees, an extension of the white establishment. As a means of expressing their opposition to this perceived racism and to illustrate how little had changed in Jackson by 1967, CSA-NYC trainees made him the target of direct action protests. CSA-NYC did suffer due to the administrative incompetence and mismanagement characteristic of many antipoverty programs; however, it was the actions of Frank and white board members that crippled the faith the trainees and the wider poor black community had in the program, and destroyed its ability to function according to its remit. This is the only observable instance of Civil Rights protest being used to oppose a CAA, reflecting both the persistence and organisation of activists in Jackson and Hinds County, and the extent to which CSA's board and executive staff served to perpetuate established patterns of racial discrimination.

Neighbourhood Youth Corps (NYC) began operating as a work experience and training program for young people aged 15 to 21 in January 1965. Created under Title IB of the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act, NYC was administered by the Department of Labor and operated through CAAs with the goal of breaking the cycle of poverty by providing opportunity to the nation's poorest and most disadvantaged youths in cities and rural areas. By 1970, more than 1.5 million youths across the country had been enrolled in NYC programs.[622] The program provided trainees with paid work experience ($1.25 per hour for 30 hours per week) and 'work readiness training' including basic numeracy and literacy skills training, imparting 'self-respect and good habits as a worker' as well as compulsory weekly meetings with an NYC counsellor. By 1967, CSA-NYC had 58 (predominantly black) trainees enrolled. Despite the program's work training emphasis providing additional appeal and a distinction from welfare, poor whites remained reluctant to enrol in a program perceived as black.[623] The lack of involvement of poor whites in CSA-NYC contrasted with the willingness of

[622] Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Jackson: Records of the Governor's Office, Series 1001, Community Development Files, 1966-1975 [hereafter Community Development Files], Box 2260, Folder CSA Programs Descriptives, 'The Purpose of Neighborhood Youth Corps', 2 February 1970.
[623] MCHR Records, Box 25, Folder CAP, Don Jackson, 'NYC – A Broken Promise? A Preliminary Examination of CSA-NYC with some Immediate Recommendations Submitted by Don Jackson, June 1967'.

middle-class whites to become CSA board members, in part to extend white control over the pace of racial change and in part to protect their own economic or political interests. These intra-racial class tensions had a powerful impact on the nature of antipoverty programs. The acceptance of integration by middle-class whites on the board and staff masked the endurance of Massive Resistance tactics that suppressed black advancement through force of numbers, influence or by wielding their economic power. Poor whites, lacking these sources of power to dictate and control their relationships with African Americans faced the prospect of being on equal footing with poor black enrolees or, worse, being under the authority of black CSA employees such as CSA-NYC counsellor Don Jackson.[624] The collaboration of the black middle-class board members with these controlling white board members in order to preserve their leadership positions within the African American community and secure their economic relationships with the white community perpetuated historic patterns of class and race discrimination through CSA.

NYC was riddled with administrative failings and training deficiencies. Nonetheless, the most damaging problem facing enrolees was the omnipresent racism of the majority of CSA-NYC and CSA staff, co-workers and supervisors at job placements.[625] The CSA-NYC trainees were sent to placements in publicly owned and operated agencies such as the Game and Fish Commission, Naval Reserve, Mississippi National Guard Headquarters, Veterans Administration Centre and Inland Revenue Office. Placement in these agencies, in which very few African Americans were employed, put black trainees under existing mechanisms of white supremacy.[626] In the majority of placements, CSA-NYC enrolees were given only menial chores, whilst at the Game and Fish Commission trainees were subject to abuse and profane language from their supervisor and were not provided with any training. At the National Guard, trainees were used to sweep up and clean around the airplane hangar and did not receive their pay. When their supervisor went on a two week trip, the trainees were left under the supervision of a man who had no idea what NYC was or the purpose of the trainees'

[624] The lack of white involvement in CSA-NYC was seen across the CSA (and in antipoverty programs across Mississippi), most destructively in CSA's Head Start program, where the lack of white staff and children threatened the programs funding.
[625] Jackson, 'NYC – A Broken Promise?'.
[626] Ibid. It was not until July 1967 that the board and program director reluctantly accepted placements through private organisations which did regularly employ blacks, such as the Poor People's Commission, National Sharecroppers Fund, Michael Schwerner Fund, Delta Ministry and Jackson Urban League

employment.[627] Some of these failings, notably the failure to ensure trainees received pay reflect administrative errors characteristic of many antipoverty programs. However, the most significant problem facing CSA-NYC trainees was the way racism – one of the causes of the very problem NYC was trying to fight – tainted the program, through the actions of work placement supervisors and reinforced by CSA staff. When CSA-NYC's Acting Director Stephen Canon was informed that one of the black trainees working at the Game and Fish Commission wanted to transfer away from the corrosive working conditions, Canon utilised a linguistic trope of Massive Resistance when he accused the trainee of 'acting like a savage'.[628]

Alongside this destructive racism was a widespread mismanagement of the CSA-NYC program. CSA-NYC staff too often failed their trainees, not just by failing to find meaningful job placements but also failing to detect when vulnerable youths were in need of their assistance.[629] The lack of care taken by some members of CSA-NYC staff was hugely damaging to the trust that was essential to such an undertaking, as well as to the self-respect that the program was intended to instil into poor youths. Together, the racism and staff failings undermined the intent of NYC's creators while the administrative deficiencies of CSA destroyed the structural integrity of the program. Jackson repeatedly raised such concerns with the NYC director and Colonel Frank. In June 1967, he compiled a pamphlet of information on the failings of the program entitled 'NYC: A Broken Promise?' at the request of some CSA board members, including Seaver, which outlined the impact the racist actions of CSA staff and job placement supervisors was having on the trainees.[630] The only response to Jackson's well founded complaints was the termination of Jackson's employment, based on what Jackson rejected as 'lies and misleading statements' based on 'spotty, incorrect and often scurrilous evidence'.[631] It was Jackson's alleged 'identification with the Black Power movement' that was the actual cause of his employment being terminated. Thirty three African American NYC enrolees occupied Colonel Frank's office in a peaceful sit-in protest at Jackson's dismissal, demanding that he be rehired immediately. Frank responded by calling the police who arrested the youths. The group also demanded the

[627] Jackson, 'NYC – A Broken Promise?'.
[628] Ibid.
[629] Horwitz Papers, Box 3, Folder 38, Carol Hinds to Fred Alexander, 13 September 1968.
[630] Jackson, 'NYC – A Broken Promise?'.
[631] Ibid.; MCHR Records, Box 25, Folder CAP, Don Jackson to the CSA Board, Colonel H.F. Frank and Stephen Canon, 21 August 1967.

resignation of Frank whom they accused of being a 'white racist', and Lipscomb and Rev. William Easterling whom they labelled 'Uncle Toms'. The group made other demands aimed at improving the working conditions for CSA-NYC trainees: asking for better jobs; a pay increase to minimum wage of $1.40 per hour; and 'an end to being coerced and called names like Nigger by white supervisors'. The jailing of the youths provoked an angry response from the black community. A flier authored by the *ad hoc* Committee of Black Youth in Hinds County called for unity in opposing the actions of Frank, questioning 'how long will it be before we get together and stop these white racists by any means necessary???'[632] Jackson characterised Frank's actions as,

> the crowning disrespected for the law and for the rights of these Negro kids' who took the action they did because they are tired of being disrespected, tired of being coerced, tired of being given "nigger-work" jobs and no training, tired of seeing the people who defended their rights being disrespected. In short, they're tired of being treated like niggers and of what you showed total disrespect for the roles and the stated goals of the NYC. [633]

While angry at the actions of the "white racists" and "Uncle Toms" among CSA's board and staff, further perceived betrayal came from the actions of white moderates 'who refused to lift one finger or loan us one dollar to help us get our children out of jail'. In particular the actions of Ted Seaver, whose attempts to negotiate for the youths release were conducted at least partially with an eye to the personal benefit he could gain from the situation, undermined the loose coalition of white liberals and emerging black community leadership who had been united in opposition to the white supremacist leadership of CSA.[634] Such internal strains in the program and board ensured no cohesive response was forthcoming to challenge white supremacist control of the program. Although Frank later dropped the charges against the youths, for Jackson and his CSA-NYC trainees CSA had become 'just another plantation system with modernised slave masters and automated Uncle Toms'.[635] CSA-NYC thus illustrates the destructive nature of the white racism that saturated Mississippi's antipoverty programs. This omnipresent racial discrimination worsened the program's

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[632] MSSC Records, SCR ID # 2-160-0-8-1-1-1, Release by the *Ad Hoc* Committee of Black Youth in Hinds County, c.August 1967. http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd07/051449.png&otherstuff=2|160|0|8|1|1|1|50722| [accessed 24 July 2013].

[633] MCHR Records, Box 25, Folder CAP, Don Jackson to the CSA Board, Colonel H.F. Frank and Stephen Canon, 21 August 1967.

[634] Ibid. A somewhat muted reflection of the rejection of the white leadership of the earlier phases of Civil Rights activism by African Americans nationwide.

[635] Ibid.; 'Charges Dropped Against Negro Sit In Group', *Jackson Daily News,* (24 August 1967).

administrative inadequacies while the growing Black Power-esque rejection of white leadership by some black CSA board and staff members ensured the middle-class white domination of the program remained intact, despite the attempts of the CSA-NYC enrolees to utilise the tactics of earlier phases of movement activism. CSA staff utilised the mechanisms of earlier Massive Resistance to fashion the program into a vehicle of white supremacy that undermined the intent of the War on Poverty and exacerbated black class divisions.

Hinds County Project Head Start

Hinds County Project Head Start (HCPHS) began operating classes before CSA was funded, combining the Jackson Area Head Start with former CDGM centres. Part of the motivation of the white establishment for creating CSA that had been to assert its control over the Head Start funds already flowing into the county.[636] HCPHS was a grassroots, community-led program operated, staffed and attended almost exclusively by African Americans. Calls for community participation in the program were made by Civil Rights activists and couched in the language of the movement. A flyer written by Horwitz urged local people to 'group together' and participate in HCPHS and was signed 'yours for freedom now', setting HCPHS firmly in the context of the black freedom struggle.[637] Once CSA had been granted its charter and initial funding, HCPHS became its delegate agency but its staff and children remained almost entirely black. As a result, HCPHS gained greater involvement and acceptance from the poor black community than any other CSA program.[638] The delegate status of HCPHS – which ensured the program retained its own board and a measure of control over the program's operation – provided the Head Start staff and children with some protection from the destructive racial discrimination that faced CSA-NYC staff and trainees. Instead HCPHS was met with a renewed paternalism characteristic of earlier Southern race relations under a veneer of biracialism that undermined the development of black community leadership. Existing as a delegate agency that was run by a majority black

[636] Mississippi Task Force Community Profiles: Hinds County.
[637] Horwitz Papers, Box 3, Folder 60, Charles Horwitz, 'How to Start a Head Start Centre in your Community', n.d.
[638] Horwitz Papers, Box 3, Folder 50, Community Meeting at New Mt Zion Baptist Church, 10 August 1970.

board and that had staff serving only African American children in an intensely hostile environment created other problems for the agency. HCPHS faced similar administrative and leadership failings to many antipoverty programs, which coupled with opposition from the white community, CSA and the establishment hampered the program's ability to operate. In addition, the lack of in-kind contributions and extremely limited white involvement in the program meant HCPHS's federal funding was continually under threat.

HCPHS faced problems analogous to those faced by CSA and, indeed, delegate agencies and CAAs across the country. A power struggle between the Head Start board and Program Director Richard Brandon resulted in a lack of leadership compounded by administrative weaknesses.[639] The inexperience of key staff members resulted in little guidance being provided to teachers and teacher aides, which proved detrimental to the quality of classes provided.[640] HCPHS failed to address these problems, leaving the program with serious shortcomings such as 'grossly neglected' routine administrative decision, unkempt centres and problematic educational services.[641] However, the most serious challenges facing HCPHS were caused by race. While HCPHS was protected to some extent from the day-to-day racial discrimination that faced those African American staff and poor African Americans who participated in CSA-NYC, problems stemming from race were the most challenging to the operation and at times survival of the Head Start program.

As a program run by and for African Americans operating in a poverty-stricken community, HCPHS struggled to get the in-kind contributions that OEO and OCD required to account for 20 per cent of the program's funds. The local community had neither the money nor the ownership of facilities which HCPHS could use rent-free. The local white community refused to have any association with the program, leaving HCPHS without adequate facilities in which to operate. HCPHS and CSA tried unsuccessfully to secure adequate facilities from many sources, appealing to local

[639] Horwitz Papers, Box 3, Folder 53, Barbara Whitaker to Dean Miller, 11 March 1970 and attached Evaluation Report of HCPHS.
[640] Ibid.
[641] Horwitz Papers, Box 3, Folder 37, Ann F. Johnson of the CSA Self-Evaluation Committee to the CSA Executive Committee and the Board of Directors, 11 April 1972; Horwitz Papers, Box 3, Folder 48, CSA Evaluation Committee to CSA Board of Directors, 4 January 1971.

charitable organisations and the Mayor's office for assistance, but to no avail.[642] When some whites began renting their properties to HCPHS, it was the monetary incentive that compelled their cooperation rather than a willingness to become involved with or contribute to the program: their 'philosophical opposition to the antipoverty program', in other words, was overcome by a strengthened economic position.[643] Frequent criticism in OEO and OCD reports of the lack of white involvement prompted attempts to recruit white children and white employees to the Head Start program. However, the few white children whose attendance had been secured simply failed to attend, while potential employees dropped out because of 'intimidations from other whites'.[644] In 1968, 885 African American children and only 30 white children attended classes run by HCPHS and by 1970 that ratio had changed little, with 840 African American to 35 white children while the program employed 179 African American staff and only 11 white staff.[645]

The lack of involvement of poor whites also left HCPHS vulnerable to opposition from Governor John Bell Williams, a staunch opponent of Head Start who utilised any objection available to veto Head Start grants. Governor Williams included HCPHS in his 1970 mass veto of four Head Start programs, citing HCPHS's racial imbalance as the reason for his objection.[646] Arriving soon after HCPHS had suffered a debilitating funding delay of over four months, during which time the 300 HCPHS employees worked without pay, the Governor's veto nearly crippled the already struggling program.[647] Head Start staff operated the centres on a voluntary basis while many were being evicted from their homes. Despite the hostility of much of CSA's board to the Head Start program, a liberal faction led by Horwitz attempted to rally the board to support the Head Start staff in its commitment to keep the program operating voluntarily while urging them to make a public stand opposing the Governor's

[642] Community Development Files, Box 2259, Folder Board CAP CSA and Response by Lipscomb, E.L. Lipscomb to James L. Harrison, 30 July 1970.
[643] 'Official Report of On-Site Findings: CSA, Jackson, Mississippi, 27-29 May 1969'.
[644] Horwitz Papers, Box 3, Folder 37, HCPHS Board of Directors to CSA Board of Directors, 2 March 1970.
[645] 'Mrs. Harvey is Chairman Hinds CSA', The Clarion Ledger, (30 January 1968); Stennis Papers, Series 53, Box 18, Folder Head Start Program (Clarksdale), J. W. Upchurch to John C. Stennis, 27 February 1970 and attached petition signed by Upchurch and other 'working wives and mothers' and 'poor white voters' supporting Governor Williams veto.
[646] MRP Records, Series VII, Box G-3, Folder PATA/FA: HEW Head Start Programs 1969-1970, John Bell Williams to Cary Hall, 12 February 1970.
[647] Horwitz Papers, Box 3, Folder 51, E.L. Lipscomb to CSA Board of Directors, 4 December 1969.

'inhuman act'.[648] The HCPHS board also urged the CSA board to support the program and 'our children' who were 'in jeopardy at the mercy of a racist society'.[649] Although some members of the executive committee opposed open opposition of the Governor and indicated to HCPHS that they should meet the Governor's demands or face the possibility of having no funds, Horwitz led a motion that was eventually passed by the CSA board urging white 'confidence and faith in the ability of blacks to do their things their way' and encouraging all CSA employees to support Head Start employees, parents and friends in a peaceful constructive picketing against Governor Williams.[650] The attempts of white liberals such as Horwitz to urge the controlling white board members into a more moderate stance resulted in a renewed paternalism that belittled the protests of grassroots activists and undermined the efforts of HCPHS staff to stimulate community action. The board, at Horwitz's urging, also passed a motion to begin a federal law suit against the Governor and HEW Secretary Robert Finch alleging the Governor's veto was 'unlawful and illegal' and 'directed against blacks'.[651] Head Start employees and parents picketed outside the Governor's Mansion for six days, circulating hate sheets denouncing the Governor and HEW Southeast Regional Director Cary Hall as racists, until news of Finch's override was received.[652] Despite the override, the hiatus in funds resulted in difficulties for the staff, uncertainty of future funding and the lack of supplies which left a legacy of deprivation and weakened the functionality of the program.[653]

While HCPHS's delegate status did protect it from some of the most severe effects of both the racism endemic in CSA and the white supremacist philosophy pervasive in the controlling faction of the board, the program remained subject to attacks from CSA's board and executive staff. HCPHS's Social Service Director R. Hunter Morey became the target for such opposition. Morey, a former SNCC activist

[648] Horwitz Papers, Box 3, Folder 54, Ansleum J. White to Richard Brandon, 18 February 1970.
[649] Horwitz Papers, Box 3, Folder 37, HCPHS Board of Directors to CSA Board of Directors, 2 March 1970.
[650] Horwitz Papers, Box 3, Folder 42, Minutes of CSA Board Meeting, 2 March 1970.
[651] Ibid.
[652] MSSC Records, SCR ID # 1-94-0-21-1-1-1, Report on Picketing of Governor's Mansion, 3 March 1970, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd02/007798.png&otherstuff=1|94|0|21|1|1|1|7594| [accessed 25 July 2013]; SCR ID # 6-45-6-86-2-1-1, Flyer: 'The Facts About Head Start', n.d., http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd07/047873.png&otherstuff=6|45|6|86|2|1|1|47178| [accessed 25 July 2013].
[653] Horwitz Papers, Box 3, Folder 54, Ansleum J. White to Richard Brandon, 18 February 1970.

and CDGM employee, ran a progressive and effective program with a 'keen perception of the root causes of poverty and powerlessness' producing a 'sophisticated notion of the social action aspect integral to the project's underlying theme'.[654] However, this positive move toward development community action provoked only criticism from some HCPHS staff and board members, due to their fear of negative reaction from CSA's board. The chairman of the HCPHS board opposed the activism encouraged by Morey because he feared 'certain whites might become "concerned" and act unfavourably toward the program as a result of this emphasis on community action'.[655] They were right to fear the response of 'certain whites', as the activism encouraged by Morey made him a target of a smear campaign that resulted in his resignation.[656] The administrative failings and funding insecurities that have so often been held to blame for the failure of antipoverty programs were detrimental to HCPHS but only truly destructive when caused by, combined with or worsened by the atmosphere of racial oppression. Racial discrimination was not the sole factor however. The experience of HCPHS illustrates that even a program somewhat protected from the machinations and control of the white establishment was vulnerable to problems created by race. The depth and extent of poverty left the African American community unable to provide the required in-kind contributions, while poor white opposition ironically left the program vulnerable to criticism for being segregated. Further, the interaction of liberal whites and white accommodations resulted in a renewed paternalism that undermined the development of grassroots community leadership and prevented a successful coalition of these liberal whites and African American activists from forming to challenge white domination of the program.

[654] MSSC Records, SCR ID # 3-18A-0-147-1-1-1, Erle Johnston Jr., to Congressman John Bell Williams, 23 September 1966, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=images/png/cd04/025680.png&otherstuff=3|18|0|147|1|1|1|25187|A# [accessed 7 October 2013]; 'Official Report of On-Site Findings: CSA, Jackson, Mississippi, 27-29 May 1969'.
[655] Ibid.
[656] Horwitz Papers, Box 3, Folder 40, Peter Sherman to Ray Turner through Clyde James and Hugh Saussy Jr., 16 July 1969.

Systemic CSA Problems

CSA was beset by problems from its creation. The board, in its various incarnations, was ineffective, incompetent and indifferent. Some staff members were likewise uninterested in achieving any community action or social change while conflict between apathetic staff and board members and their more engaged and activist colleagues resulted in a program fraught with tension.[657] In addition, administrative problems, leadership failures and widespread racial discrimination against staff and poor people involved in CSA's various programs crippled the agency. Such failings were common to antipoverty programs across the country. In CSA, however, these problems were exacerbated by the omnipresent racism amongst program staff, the board and in the wider community. The close connection between the board and the local and state political establishment and the unwillingness of the majority of the board members and executive staff to take any action that would upset the status quo resulted in a program that did little to help the poor, actively avoided any form of community activism or even community engagement and maintained a racial and social situation acceptable to the establishment.

The commitment to segregation of Jackson's Mayor Allen C. Thompson, the harsh attitudes and actions of the Jackson Police Department and the influence of segregationist papers the *Jackson Daily News* and *The Clarion Ledger* ensured the city remained tightly segregated in the late 1960s. Thompson, an unreconstructed segregationist, met the 1961 Freedom Riders with thinly veiled threats and in anticipation of Freedom Summer, expanded and armed the Jackson Police force – dubbed 'Allen's Army' – the centrepiece of which was 'Thompson's Tank', a newly-acquired 13,000-pound armoured battlewagon.[658] As a result, Jackson had been the nerve centre for Civil Rights activity across the state since 1961 and was home to a number of Civil Rights activists and organisations as well as moderate groups such as the Mississippi Commission on Human Rights.[659] Although Civil Rights activities had

[657] The apathy of many CSA staff was reflective of both the poor hiring practices of the board and the devastating impact on staff morale of on-going job insecurity and program ineffectiveness, as well as the extent of unemployment in the county.
[658] Payne, *Light of Freedom*, p.286; R. Arsenault, *Freedom Riders: 1961 and the Struggle for Racial Justice*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2006), pp.370-1; D. McAdam, *Freedom Summer* (Oxford University Press: New York, 1990), pp.27-8.
[659] Mississippi Task Force Community Profiles: Hinds County.

faded by 1965, Hinds County remained home to many black citizens 'experienced and skilled in the fine arts of voter registration [and] poll watching' whose efforts and example positively affected the antipoverty program.[660] However, racism and poverty continued to 'work together hand in glove to deny black people the benefits guaranteed to them by federal law', while black engagement in Civil Rights activities continued to diminish. A survey conducted by Tougaloo College's Political Science Department in 1969 found that over 19 per cent of respondents were not registered voters, while 88 per cent admitted they had never signed a petition to City Hall for anything and less than 29 per cent knew there was a black legislator in the state capitol. As a result the expectations of the poor communities remained low, with many poor communities in Hinds County reporting satisfaction with the service provided by the few programs, but remaining unaware of the purpose and even existence of the majority of CSA's programs.[661] Middle-class white and African American board members remained firmly in control of the program to the exclusion and detriment of the poor citizens of Jackson and Hinds County. In part, the failure to advertise CSA's programs was due to the board's determination that the program be unable to alter the racial status quo, in addition to the unwillingness of the local press to publish information about antipoverty programs. Activism in the latter stages of both the long Civil Rights Movement and Massive Resistance in the longue durée was fragmented by class divisions, a decline in national leadership and rapid changes in Mississippi's racial landscape. However, Mississippi's massive resisters were able to regain some control over the pace of racial change by utilising their newest forum for resistance – antipoverty programs – in their attempts to limit black advancement.

While intra-racial class divisions continued to have a detrimental impact on black activism, the diverse but complementary methods and mechanisms of white opposition – from the hostility of poor whites, to the reluctant acceptance of middle-class whites and the manoeuvrings of powerful white board members – strengthened white control over antipoverty programs. Poor whites were unwilling to become involved in any CSA programs and showed a particular hostility toward HCPHS, while

[660] 'Official Report of On-Site Findings: CSA, Jackson, Mississippi, 27-29 May 1969'.
[661] Community Development Files, Box 2260, Folder CSA Charter 1970/1, 'Draft Conclusions of CSA Public Meetings, July and August 1970'.

a reluctant acceptance from middle-class whites was increasingly evident by 1970.[662] For powerful whites involved in the creation of CSA and sitting on its board – the attorneys, business leaders and local officials – involvement in CSA provided the opportunity to wield control over vast federal funds coming into the county which, although they required the involvement of an integrated board, left intact their control over the nature of race relations. While this involvement in an integrated program was ostensibly the newest manifestation of a tradition of federal funds softening the white supremacist stance, for Jackson's powerful whites their board membership was a mechanism of control over black activism and served to contain the influence and impact of liberal whites. The lack of involvement of whites in CSA's programs, as employees and participants, violated OEO requirements for antipoverty programs to reach out to all poor people in the county, regardless of race.[663] However, many CSA staff members were simply unaware that this was even a concern, despite repeated warnings from OEO. Where there was an awareness of the need for greater white participation there was a complete lack of knowledge of how to achieve it.[664] The only significant involvement of poor whites occurred when, responding to repeated requests from OEO, the multipurpose program organised a neighbourhood centre in the poor white community – a move which ensured that de facto segregation remained intact.[665]

White middle class responses to the program were less hostile than those of poor whites, although the lack of whites employed by CSA reflected the unwillingness of whites of any social strata to associate with the antipoverty program. By 1970, the dominant faction of the board had secured control over the program and ensured that CSA posed no threat to the racial status quo. As a result, an increasing acceptance of the program by middle-class whites was evident. In July 1970, CSA Executive Director E.L. Lipscomb became the first African American to speak at a meeting of the Jackson

[662] Community Development Files, Box 2259, Folder Board CAP CSA and Response by Lipscomb, 'Response by Lipscomb to Inspection Report', c.October 1969. HCPHS drew particular opposition as a program for children that was widely perceived as being dominated by African Americans.
[663] Ashmore, *Carry It On,* pp.54-71. Ashmore describes OEO's internal divisions, particularly the conflict between the Inspection Division and the Civil Rights Division which resulted from contradictory interpretations of what constituted an acceptable level of African American involvement in CAPs. This conflict, combined with wishful thinking and unrealistic expectations of racial progress allowed many southern CAPs to employ the Massive Resistance tactic of 'token desegregation'.
[664] 'Official Report of On-Site Findings: CSA, Jackson, Mississippi, 27-29 May 1969'.
[665] Community Development Files, Box 2260, Folder CSA Charter 1970/1, 'Draft Conclusions of CSA Public Meetings, July and August 1970'.

Altrusa Club, a women's community organisation.[666] In his speech, Lipscomb informed the group of the activities and purpose of CSA, emphasizing that CSA was committed to aiding all the poor of Hinds County and urging them to speak favourably about CSA to affluent and indigent citizens and, where possible, to request their assistance in securing facilities 'conducive to white participation' in which Head Start classes might be held.[667] Such progress was minimal: the lack of white involvement in CSA continued, serving to maintain the perception that poverty was black and perpetuating the paternalistic tenor of race relations within CSA.

One of the most significant problems facing CSA was the failure of its board to provide any direction or long-term planning for the program. An interracial coalition of middle-class board members controlled and manipulated fellow board members, exerting their economic and political influence to ensure that the major goal of CSA was to 'keep the social temperature of Jackson at a controllable level'.[668] Comprising 36 members in three groups – 12 each in Groups A, B and C – the board existed in a state of conflict, rendering it unable to address itself effectively to the challenges that it faced. Group A consisted of the mostly white representatives of industry and state agencies. Group B was populated by representatives of local civic organisations such as the NAACP and Jackson AFL-CIO, including some white liberals, conservative whites and members of the established black leadership. Group C, finally, comprised TARs. Although this OEO-mandated composition was intended to provide local poor communities with a voice in the operation of the program through their TARs, Group C was rendered ineffective by the manoeuvrings of a coalition of powerful Group A and B members. While the election of TARs was ostensibly democratic, a number of poor people reported to OEO inspectors that these representatives had 'reneged on their obligations to express the real views of the poor'.[669] Head Start employees and parents questioned the democracy of the elections, when limited publicity meant a large segment of the population did not have an opportunity to nominate candidates for the

[666] Lipscomb replaced Frank as the executive director when he retired in December 1967. Lipcomb's involvement was facilitated by CSA Fiscal Officer Doris Brannon, who was a member of the Jackson Altrusa Club.
[667] Community Development Files, Box 2259, Folder Board CAP CSA and Response by Lipscomb, E.L. Lipscomb to the Ladies of Altrusa, 10 August 1970.
[668] 'Official Report of On-Site Findings: CSA, Jackson, Mississippi, 27-29 May 1969'.
[669] Ibid.

election of representatives.[670] Once elected, the TARs were unwilling or unable to use the power they had on the CSA board to effect meaningful change.

White Group A board members employed economic intimidation against TARs, while the failure to provide training for board members left Group C members at a substantial disadvantage to the more affluent, formally educated members of Groups A and B. Group C members were manipulated and unable to get the CSA board to act on the requests of the target area constituency. Unfamiliar with the protocol of board meetings, TARs found that the meetings were conducted at too fast a pace with too little explanation provided.[671] Thus the interracial middle-class coalition of board members were able to undermine the voice of poor representatives to an extent that the resulting incompetence and general disinterest in the causes and solutions of poverty amounted almost to criminal negligence, according to an OEO inspector.[672] While the appointment of a clergyman as the new chairman in January 1969 heralded a potentially positive change for the board and program, the influence of his white affluent congregation ensured that was not the case. 'Largely or perhaps solely as a result of his association with the antipoverty agency', the clergyman did not have his contract renewed resulting in his departure from Jackson in July 1969 which represented a 'major loss' for CSA.[673]

While the impact of both middle-class and poor white opposition to CSA proved damaging to the program, middle-class African Americans had an especially destructive impact on community and staff morale as well as program operation. The 'Uncle Toms' throughout the agency – from Executive Director E.L. Lipscomb, Multipurpose program Director Walter Vinson to Ira Singleton, who replaced Vinson as Multipurpose Director – proved damaging in three ways: program operation, public perception of the agency and the poor community's faith in the program. When Singleton chaired a meeting with the Citizens Advisory Committee of Hinds County Department of Public Welfare, he 'insulted most of the people present by continually deferring to one of the most conservative white members present, even though as vice chairman in absence of

[670] Community Development Files, Box 2260, Folder CSA Charter 1970/1971, 'Head Start Parents and Community People' to Leland Speed, 4 February 1970.
[671] Community Development Files, Box 2260, Folder CSA Charter 1970/1971, Draft Conclusions of CSA Public meetings, July and August 1970.
[672] 'Official Report of On-Site Findings: CSA, Jackson, Mississippi, 27-29 May 1969'.
[673] Ibid.

the chairman, he should have used that opportunity to aggressively push for the interest of the poor'. Delta Ministry representatives complained that Singleton continually sided with the 'tiny right wing minority' and attempted to sway the meeting against allowing more participation of the poor, while the Delta Ministry found Singleton resistant to any of their repeated attempts to cooperate with them to encourage community action.[674] The lack of leadership neutered the program. Vinson was considered by many to be either an Uncle Tom or simply incompetent, while his Deputy, white attorney Matelyn Hines, had a problem with alcohol which rendered her ineffective. Under Vinson's direction, the multipurpose program was limited to welfare, charity and social service instead of the true purpose of community action and organisation.[675] Lipscomb, who, like Vinson, was also repeatedly accused of being an Uncle Tom during his initial role as deputy director, provided 'unusually unimaginative' leadership during his tenure as executive director from January 1968 to his resignation in June 1973.[676] A report by the program committee of CSA concluded that, as executive director, Lipscomb did not make his voice heard in preventing on-going injustices, nor did he have the influence and independence necessary to force the power structure to negotiate.[677]

CSA's problems were not limited to incompetent leadership, a preponderance of Uncle Toms and lack of target area say in the running of the programs. With Group C effectively excluded from meaningful participation, conservative middle-class control of the board was opposed by white and black community activists mainly drawn from Group B and led by Horwitz. The Horwitz faction demanded more effective leadership of the black community, activities which lead it to be cast by OEO Field Representative Peter Sherman as the 'militant aggressive faction'.[678] Sherman was an employee of the OEO regional office, which – as has been illustrated – had a history of undermining community engagement with the program in favour of the white establishment. He supported the conservative faction, made up of whites who wanted use CSA as a means of controlling the pace of integration and limiting black advancement and middle-class

[674] Horwitz Papers, Box 3, Folder 38, Chairman of the Program Committee of the Delta Ministry to E.L. Lispcomb, n.d.
[675] 'Official Report of On-Site Findings: CSA, Jackson, Mississippi, 27-29 May 1969'.
[676] Horwitz Papers, Box 3, Folder 38, Don Miller to S.L. Richmond, 19 January 1971; Davis Papers, Box 26, Mayoral Files, CSA 1973, Philip M. Catchings, Jr., to Russell C. Davis, 10 April 1973.
[677] Community Development Files, Box 2260, Folder CSA Charter 1970/1971, Draft Conclusions of CSA Public meetings, July and August 1970.
[678] Horwitz Papers, Box 3, Folder 40, Peter Sherman to Ray Turner, through Clyde James and Hugh Saussy Jr., 16 July 1969.

African Americans who wanted to maintain their profitable economic relationships with the white community and prevent the emergence of new black community leaders. Sherman compiled a report of dubious accuracy which vilified the Horwitz faction and depicted the conflict as one between responsible black leadership and white militant activists. Utilising the language of earlier Massive Resistance, he portrayed activists as militant, devious and unsavoury, even raising the spectre of interracial relationships, claiming Horwitz had a 'black mistress and child in the county' (Horwitz was married to STAR Instructor Carol Hinds) and accused other members of the faction of 'deviant activities' including homosexuality. Sherman claimed the faction perpetrated 'unscrupulous manipulations' and questioned the right of Horwitz and several other Group B members to serve on their board, alleging the organisations they claimed to represent were in fact either defunct or had not elected the relevant board members to represent them. The situation that Sherman described in the report bore only passing resemblance to the reality of the situation, and reflected a comprehensive character assassination but was nevertheless reinforced by the Governor's opposition to any CSA program not explicitly accepted by the conservative white board members.[679]

The administrative shortcomings and leadership failures were evident in antipoverty programs across the country and in many cases were so severe that they resulted in the failure of the program.[680] However, it is clear that even though the CSA was situated in the midst of a complex political system and was affected by administrative and leadership problems, it was nonetheless damaged most severely by the combination of racial and class conflict. CSA was created to function as part of the establishment and despite the efforts of local community activists such as Horwitz, Seaver and Jackson, the program remained part of the establishment. The failure of these activists was due in part to the pervasive and inescapable consequences of racism and poverty, conflicts between the community- or self-appointed leaders and the power, influence and connections of the dominating interracial middle-class coalition seeking to preserve their racial and class privileges. While CSA did make some improvements to the lives of poor people in Jackson and Hinds County it served to suppress community activism and perpetuate the race and class discrimination that was in large part responsible for the poverty the program was designed to address.

[679] Ibid.
[680] Kramer, *Participation*, pp.256-7.

Legal Services

The Legal Services program was one of the most controversial aspects of the War on Poverty, especially reviled by southern politicians and conservatives who viewed it as 'government sponsored radicalism'.[681] The program had a tumultuous history that has been recounted by those involved in the creation and operation of Legal Services and by historians who have focused mainly on the program's tribulations at the national level: early struggles for independence under Director E. Johnson Jr.; successive crises under Rumsfeld; opposition from southern conservatives; and battles with Governor Ronald Reagan over Legal Services' flagship program, California Rural Legal Assistance.[682] In Mississippi, Legal Services programs suffered from the same co-ordinated attacks by the state Republican Party, powerful Democratic Senators, the Governor and the white community – in this case led by influential attorneys – that faced many CAAs in the state. Placing these local struggles against Legal Services into context illustrates the way in which the methods and language of earlier Massive Resistance became part of a national conservative discourse articulated by southern conservatives – both the old guard Democratic Party and the emerging Mississippi Republican Party. Genuine concerns over wasted federal funds were expressed in ostensibly race neutral language that masked the true purpose of opposition to Legal Services programs: to neutralise this potential threat to white supremacy.[683] Mississippi Republican Party officials, seeking to 'out-conservative' powerful Mississippi Democratic politicians, utilised opposition to Legal Services programs to distinguish themselves from the failure of Eastland and Stennis to control OEO.[684] In so doing, Reed turned to the Republican

[681] Crespino, *In Search,* p.225.
[682] Johnson, Jr., *Justice and Reform*; Clark, *War on Poverty,* p.177-197; K. Shepard, *Rationing Justice: Poverty Lawyers and Poor People in the Deep South*, (Louisiana State University Press: Baton Rouge, 2007); R. Pious, 'Advocates for the Poor: Legal Services in the War on Poverty', Unpublished PhD Thesis, (Columbia University, 1976), pp.180-260.
[683] Shepard, *Rationing Justice,* p.63-4; LBJL: Papers of Bertrand M. Harding, Box 60, Folder Office of Civil Rights, Samuel F. Yette, 'Draft Guideline on Civil Rights Cases', 15 December 1966. The perceived threat was threefold, in providing federal funding for lawyers to: assist poor people in challenging the discriminatory activities of local, state and federal programs; fight cases which sought to 'remove racial barriers to employment, education, housing, and other economic and social rights'; and represent Civil Rights activists who were increasingly returning to legal challenges after 1965 and who, without federal assistance, lacked the necessary funds.
[684] MRP Records, Series VI, Box F-6, Folder MRP-OF 1965/66 Coahoma County, Unsigned handwritten note, c.October 1965.

White House and OEO for assistance even as Nixon's concern for his re-election prospects halted his plans for regionalisation.[685]

OEO's Legal Services program was endorsed by the American Bar Association, National Defenders Association and Negro American Bar Association as welcome support for the continuation of the legal profession's effort to provide legal services for all. The price for the cooperation of the American Bar Association was a strong influence on the program's board of directors. The resultant heavy involvement of the legal establishment minimised the institutional changes and legal reforms achieved by the program. However, their support ensured Legal Services was 'among the most respected products of the War on Poverty'.[686] In its first year, the program made over $27 million of grants in 43 states and opened over 500 new law offices serving the poor all of which lead McPherson to conclude in 1966 that it had 'been one of the most useful poverty programs'.[687] However, Legal Services soon became problematic on a number of fronts: it created difficulties for other War on Poverty programs as federally funded lawyers brought suits against antipoverty programs; it was the target of criticism from southern conservatives who opposed wasteful spending and the loss of local control; and internally, the actions of Legal Services staff created additional complications for successive OEO directors and Presidents. The machinations of Democratic hold-overs in OEO's Legal Services department and widespread conservative criticism of the program caused Nixon – always concerned about his re-election prospects – much anxiety. However, the status of the program as the 'sacred cow' of congressional liberals with powerful supporters in the legal establishment, combined with the belief of Nixon and his aides (with the exception of Howard Phillips) in the value of Legal Services, ensured the survival of the program.[688] The ideal solution for Nixon was regionalisation, 'a favourite Southern devise for blocking

[685] Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered,* pp.62-3.
[686] Clark, *War on Poverty,* p.179; M. Gillette, *Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History*, (Oxford University Press: New York, 2nd ed. 2010), p.282; Shepard, *Rationing Justice*, p.70.
[687] LBJL: WHCF, EX WE 9 9/1/66-3/23/67 Box 28, Folder WE9 9/1/66-10/14/66 EX, Harry McPherson to Marvin Watson, 28 September 1966; WHCF, GEN JL6 12/6/67-1/20/69, Box 41, Folder JL7 Lawyers-Legal Aid EX, First Annual Report of the Legal Services Program of the OEO to the American Bar Association at Annual Convention, Montreal, August 1966.
[688] Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered,* p.61; Johnson, *Justice and Reform,* pp.xiv-xvii. Although Nixon vetoed the OEO legislative package in December 1971, his target was not Legal Services but a proposed new multi-billion dollar child development program.

unwanted reforms' that would hand power over the funding and administration of Legal Services programs to the OEO regional offices and silence conservative critics.[689]

Reed was one of many southern Republicans who endorsed regionalisation. Their fears over the misuse of federal funds originated in genuine concerns but were ultimately merely a façade for attempts to wrest control of the program from the "radicals" in OEO's Legal Services department and at the local level who would use Legal Services funds to pursue social reform.[690] Even the conservative Senate Appropriations Committee opposed the regionalisation plan as it would be 'stripping [Legal Services] of the political independence it needs if it is to retain its vitality'.[691] For Rumsfeld, however, regionalisation was an ideal solution: his predecessor had warned him of the dangerous propensity of the Legal Services staff to attempt to gain advantage for their program at the expense of OEO.[692] As director, Rumsfeld found that Legal Services had constituted 'five per cent of [his] budget and fifty per cent of [his] headaches'.[693] He sacked Legal Services Director Terry Lenzner and his deputy, Mississippi-born African American Frank N. Jones in November 1970 because they were 'either unwilling or unable' to carry out his policies. Rumsfeld sought to portray Lenzner as a 'wild-eyed radical', an accusation Lenzner publically challenged, claiming he had simply tried to provide lawyers to help poor people.[694] Such linguistic tropes were echoed by southern conservatives who drew on the white supremacist clarion call of states' rights and the tactics of earlier Massive Resistance in their opposition to alleged "radicals" at the local and national levels. In concert with Nixon's electioneering and Rumsfeld's dictatorial leadership, Reed and his colleagues almost succeeded in ensuring local control over the Legal Services program, control which would have resulted in the domination of local programs by segregated state Bar organisations across the South. However, damaging leaks of the proposed plans,

[689] J. Anderson, 'OEO Lawyers Under Pressure', *Washington Post*, (1 November 1970).
[690] MRP Records, Series VII, Box G-5, Folder PATA/FA OEO Rural Legal Services (April-August), Roy Batchelor to W. T. Wilkins, 29 May 1970. Batchelor urged Wilkins and Reed to encourage Rumsfeld to implement the planned regionalisation.
[691] Anderson, 'OEO Lawyers Under Pressure'.
[692] LBJL: Papers of Bertrand M. Harding, Box 41, Folder Reading File 3, March 1969-June 1969 OEO BMH [Book 19], Bertrand Harding to Don Rumsfeld, 6 May 1969.
[693] Johnson, *Justice and Reform*, p.xii.
[694] A. Cockburn, *Rumsfeld: An American Disaster*, (London, 2007), pp.17-19; MCHR Records, Box 5, Folder OEO, 'Fired Executive says OEO is Run by "Southern Bigots"', *Unknown Paper*, (22 November 1970). One of Rumsfeld's first acts as OEO Director was to establish an internal security unit charged with 'sniffing out "revolutionaries" who might be funnelling government funds to "subversives"'.

including a letter from Reed urging Rumsfeld to implement regionalisation made it a politically inexpedient proposition for Nixon and Rumsfeld to pursue.[695]

For southern conservatives such as Reed, this national campaign was merely one of many fronts in the battle to wrest control of local Legal Services programs from black and white radicals who were using federal funds to pursue class actions and achieve lasting social change. In their battles against local programs, the mechanisms and tropes of earlier Massive Resistance combined with the ostensibly race neutral language that drew on white southerners' genuine fears over the misuse of federal funds. The battle waged by the Mississippi State Bar, aided by the Mississippi Republican Party to gain control over Mississippi's earliest and largest Legal Services program, North Mississippi Rural Legal Services (NMRLS), was couched in this colour blind language. The Bar claimed NMRLS was 'socialism in its purest form' used for 'crusading and political objectives rather than serving the poor'.[696] The Bar asserted, in the best tradition of white supremacists wilful self-delusions, that they would 'in reality, furnish legal services to the poor regardless of race, creed or color' – an ironic claim from a segregated Bar whose members had spent most of the last few years fighting against desegregation cases.[697] The language of opposition was an attempt to mask the true motivation of the Bar, which was to neutralise a potentially potent threat to white supremacy posed by NMRLS's focus on class action litigation for its mostly black clientele.[698] In opposition to CSA's Legal Services program, Community Legal Services (CLS), all of the mechanisms that maintained white supremacy aligned. The Hinds County Bar Association utilised tactics redolent of the Sovereignty Commission in opposing CLS, Democratic politicians wielded their influence at home, and Reed's attempts to utilise his connections in Washington coincided with the politicking of Rumsfeld and later, Phillips. In Mississippi, local reporters derided CLS's activities while white CSA board members exploited their newest mechanisms of white control: antipoverty programs.

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[695] Anderson, 'OEO Lawyers Under Pressure'; Crespino, *In Search*, pp.225-6.
[696] MRP Records, Series VII, Box G-5, Folder PATA/FA OEO – Rural Legal Services (April-August), Clarke Reed to Donald Rumsfeld, 22 October 1969.
[697] MRP Records, Series VII, Box G-5, Folder PATA/FA OEO – Rural Legal Services (April-August), Clarke Reed to Dick Cheney, and attached report by the Mississippi State Bar, 20 March 1970.
[698] M. Landon, *The Honor and Dignity of the Profession: A History of the Mississippi State Bar, 1906-1976*, (University Press of Mississippi: Jackson, 1979), p.161.

From the submission of its funding application to OEO in April 1969, CLS faced opposition from a cross-section of white Mississippi. The Hinds County Bar Association rejected CLS's proposed program for many surface level reasons outlined by their President, Cary E. Bufkin, including CLS's failure to adhere to the rules and regulations the Mississippi State Bar had established on the operation of Legal Services for the poor. Bufkin claimed the CLS application provided a 'largely general and ill-defined' proposal which was 'an indictment of the entire system of government... more intent on remaking it in your own image' than providing legal services to the poor and, most significantly Bufkin claimed CLS equated Civil Rights and poverty.[699] Bufkin's intent was to portray CLS as a radical organisation filled with Civil Rights activists who were intent on overthrowing the government, assertions that were familiar from earlier Sovereignty Commission reports on CDGM. The majority of Bufkin's complaints were hyperbole or simply untrue. The Hinds County Bar Association was utilising all the weapons at its disposal to prevent the funding of CLS while the State Bar was working equally hard to create and enforce a framework within which it could contain and constrain the OEO funded Legal Services programs.

Mississippi Republican Party officials also feared CLS would be utilised to stir up political support for the Democratic Party amongst newly-enfranchised blacks. Reed's determination to assist in Hinds County Bar Association's campaign against CLS reflected the potential political credit to be gained by its success and concerns about the use of the federal funds by CLS. Most significantly however, failing to prevent CLS's funding tapped into Reed's fears that the state party would be unable to capitalise on having a Republican President, while the Democratic hold-overs in control of OEO used federal funds to build a new base of Democratic support in Mississippi. The party carefully cultivated a relationship with Dick Cheney, Rumsfeld's executive assistant. The leaking of Reed's letter to Rumsfeld undermined the connection, however, as CLS was funded in 1970 over the opposition of Reed and Governor John Bell Williams.[700] Reed publicly condemned OEO's decision to fund CLS over the Hinds County Bar's program as 'an exercise of poor and irresponsible judgment destined to aid political activists more than the poor'. It represented, Reed asserted, 'a

[699] Eastland Collection, File Series 3, Subseries 4, Box 19, Folder Hinds County, MS, Cary E. Bufkin to E. L. Lipscomb, 9 June 1969.
[700] MRP Records, Series VII, Box G-5, Folder PATA/FA OEO 1970, W. T. Wilkins to Dick Cheney, 9 July 1970.

callous insensitivity to the needs of the poor on the part of the OEO', alleging the group was 'politically motivated and reads like the membership list for radical Young Democrats'.[701] The Hinds County Bar Association echoed Reed, claiming CLS was 'supported by the ultra-liberal Young Democrats... the radical revolutionary groups, and militant civil rights groups' and that 'obviously the best interest of the poor people, both black and white in Jackson and Hinds County will be served by the program proposed by the Bar Association' which, they claimed would 'receive the cooperation and support of the vast majority of both black and white citizens of this county'.[702] While such a program was unlikely to attract the support of poor blacks, the overblown rhetoric and inflammatory language used to cast CLS as radical reflected and amplified the fears of the white establishment and local white community.

CLS's funding was met with outrage from controlling white members of CSA's board and later by disparaging reports in the local press. One reporter criticised CLS's activities in which 'one federally funded agency sues another federally funded agency on behalf of people who benefit from both'.[703] CSA Group A board member Joe Jack Hurst attempted to use his position inside the program to suggest to Governor Williams that CLS did not have the support of CSA. Hurst used ostensibly colour-blind language which drew on fears of Civil Rights activism threatening law and order, claiming CLS's funding would 'encourage the influx of outside radical elements' that would 'harass and cause trouble for public officials and our law enforcement agencies'.[704] While Group B and C members of CSA's board were appalled at Hurst's blatant violation of the board's trust, the support of Group A members ensured that far from being removed from the board, the only reprimand Hurst received was a strongly-worded letter from the CSA executive director.[705] Opposition to CLS remained. Governor Williams' 1970 and 1971 vetoes were both overruled, but in 1973 Governor William Waller's veto was sustained by new OEO Director Howard Phillips. Phillips, who publicly expressed 'great delight in his assigned demolition task' of OEO paid special attention to Legal

[701] MRP Records, Series VII, Box G-5, Folder PATA/FA OEO – Legal Services News, 1971, Press Release, 26 February 1971.
[702] MRP Records, Series VII, Box G-5, Folder PATA/FA OEO – Legal Services News, 1971, B. B. McClendon Jr. to William E. Timmons, 23 February 1971.
[703] Community Development Files, Box 2262, Folder Legal Services Correspondence, 1969-1971, J. Culbertson, 'Free Lawyers for Poor is Expanding its Practice', *The Clarion Ledger*, n.d.
[704] Davis Papers, Box 26, Mayoral Files, CSA 1968-1970, Joe Jack Hurst to John Bell Williams, 16 February 1971.
[705] Davis Papers, Box 26, Mayoral Files, CSA 1968-1970, Alfred H. Rhodes Jr. to Joe Jack Hurst, 24 February 1971.

Services, all-but inviting Governors to veto Legal Services grants.[706] He redirected CLS's funds to Hinds County Bar Association's proposal for a Legal Services program which had been attempting to secure OEO funding since 1970. Waller's veto – the culmination of years of white establishment and community opposition to CLS spearheaded by the Hinds County Bar Association – had finally coincided with the overt efforts of Nixon to dismantle OEO. However, CLS's funding was restored when a federal judge ruled that Phillips had acted beyond his legal authority because Nixon had not submitted his name to the Senate for confirmation.[707]

Local struggles against Mississippi's Legal Services programs stand at the confluence of Massive Resistance and new conservatism, exemplified by the extent to which the newly developing discourse – which was ostensibly race neutral and which was deployed by the growing Mississippi Republican Party – drew on tropes of earlier Massive Resistance. These Massive Resistance tactics flowed seamlessly into themes of emerging national conservatism and were a central part of the opposition of successive OEO directors against Legal Services at the national and local levels. While this diverse and potent opposition meant CLS faced an arduous struggle during the first five years of its existence the extensive nature of that opposition rallied powerful supporters in defence of the programs. In a reverse of the fate of African American delegate agencies that were undermined by white establishment CAPs across the state, CLS absorbed the establishment program, Hinds County Bar Association Legal Services in 1976.[708] The ability of CLS to withstand this barrage of opposition from a cross-section of white Mississippi and OEO resulted partially from the resilience and commitment of its staff, but more significantly from the support of the national Legal Services program – national support which had been entirely lacking for the majority of Mississippi's CAPs facing destruction under the combined and complementary weight of white supremacist control and national as well as state Republican opposition.

[706] Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered*, p.61; Davis Papers, Box 26, Mayoral Files, CSA 1973, 'Antipoverty Chief Looking Forward to OEO Shutdown', *Unknown Paper*, (2 February 1973).
[707] B. Kovach, 'Judge Halts Move to Disband OEO', *New York Times*, (12 April 1973), pp.1, 19; Shepard, *Rationing Justice*, p.80.
[708] Ibid., p.81.

CSA and the Nixon Administration

The impact of Nixon's Presidency on the War on Poverty has too often been simplified and cast as either mildly positive or benign during his first Administration, when his focus on domestic affairs combined with a concern of the impact of his actions on his re-election prospects, and a destructive second term when he launched a full scale attack on the War on Poverty and set in motion his plans to dismantle OEO.[709] The cuts to OEO's budget and to the budget of other antipoverty programs already delegated or transferred into other departments did significant damage to many programs, as did the lack of protection afforded to the programs moved out of OEO. While Rumsfeld's appointment as OEO director was delayed, it did secure OEO's survival from immediate dismantling. However, his tenure only served to strengthen white control over CAAs in Mississippi and undermine OEO's support for African American operated delegate agencies.[710] Successive budget cuts to antipoverty programs during Nixon's presidency had a severe impact on programs at the local level: CSA and HCPHS operation, for example, suffered from the funding cuts and delays which fostered insecurity.[711] Under OCD, Head Start programs in Mississippi, operated by delegate agencies of white controlled CAAs, lost the meagre protection they received from OEO. Although HCPHS was able to avoid losing the safety of its delegate agency status, it was not due to protection from OCD. An examination of CSA and HCPHS recasts the impact of Nixon on the War on Poverty during his first term, and place the overt attempts to dismantle OEO during his second term into context as the continuation of the subtler attacks on War on Poverty programs that began in 1969. It also showcases the central role of race as the unspoken subtext to Nixon's, Rumsfeld's and Phillips' opposition to the War on Poverty that the Mississippi Republican Party was quick to recognise, and from which it was equally quick to make political capital. Most importantly, it illustrates the destructive impact of the regionalisation that was the legacy of Nixon's presidency.

[709] Clark, *War on Poverty*, pp.13, 157-159.
[710] Cockburn, *Rumsfeld*, p.16; Leloudis and Korstad, *To Right*, p.338. It was 'politically impossible' for Nixon to dismantle the War on Poverty in 1969, but he wanted a 'politically reliable operative' as OEO Director to rein the programs in: Rumsfeld, an up-and-coming Republican whom Nixon characterised as a 'ruthless little bastard' accepted his post on the condition that Nixon would not defund OEO from underneath him.
[711] While funding cuts came at the instigation of both the President and Congress, the change in the impetus of OEO and the usage of these fund was at Nixon's direction.

Head Start, particularly in the Deep South, was perceived as a black program with undesirable, radical connotations embodied by CDGM. Reed and Wilkins were cognizant of the potential political credit to be gained by exploiting this perception: they assisted white CAAs in getting black grassroots Head Start programs under their control and utilised their connections to the Republican OEO and White House in order to capitalize politically on their efforts. This recognition was not one way, however, for Nixon too recognised the significance of the perception of Head Start in the South and acted swiftly once elected to complete the long debated move of Head Start out of OEO and into HEW. While this move separated the popular Head Start from controversial CAPs, it resulted in an important but largely unrecognised consequence at the local level. The limited but nonetheless significant protection that OEO had provided for African American delegate Head Start agencies evaporated under HEW, leaving the groups vulnerable to the attacks of white establishment CAAs. In Hinds County, when the regional OCD threatened the delegate status of HCPHS, it was only the actions of the moderate faction of the board that enabled the HCPHS to retain the delegate status that provided partial protection from the destructive racism of CSA. In response to the administrative and board failings of HCPHS identified in a March 1970 evaluation, OCD Assistant Regional Director Barbara Whitaker temporarily revoked the program's delegate status until the program complied with special conditions laid down by OCD.[712] This threat to HCPHS's limited independence and protection was part of a pattern of OCD actions to undermine Mississippi's delegate African American Head Start programs. In collaboration with Reed and Wilkins, Whitaker had succeeded in stripping Sunflower County's African American Head Start program of its independence resulting in its incorporation into the establishment CAA.[713] Taking their cue from Whitaker to capitalise on HCPHS's weakened position, the CSA board initiated an action to permanently terminate delegate status. HCPHS's staff and board strenuously objected to an action that would give the controlling white faction of CSA's board direct control their program. They claimed the recent changes in program personnel and procedure had resulted in an improvement in the program's quality that at least warranted another opportunity to function as a delegate agency. However, OCD

[712] Community Development Files, Box 2260, Folder CSA Board Correspondence 1971, Minutes of CSA Executive Committee Meeting, 1 June 1970; Horwitz Papers, Box 3, Folder 53, Barbara Whitaker to Dean Miller, 11 March 1970, and attached Evaluation Report of HCPHS by John Mouton and Weston Hare.

[713] MRP Records, Series VII, Box G-4, Folder PAT DHEW – Head Start Programs, William T. Wilkins to Clarke Reed, 10 February 1971 and attached letter from Barbara Whitaker to Jimmy Herron.

did not accept this reasonable request. Only the deft manoeuvring of the liberal faction of CSA's board enabled HCPHS to retain its delegate status, and only on the condition that the delegate work closely with CSA's liaison committee.[714]

Given Head Start's popularity with Democratic politicians and its backing from powerful national supporters, Nixon was unwilling to risk political capital or his re-election chances with overt opposition. However, the funding cuts during Nixon's first administration did have a significant impact on CSA and HCPHS. Despite HCPHS's 1971 funding level being cut by $125,282, OCD demanded that there be no reduction in the number of children served. The cut necessitated combining centres and placing 18 to 20 children in each class, a move which reduced the quality of the program and severely reduced parent involvement in Head Start.[715] Such cuts provoked the worst fears of War on Poverty supporters. In June 1971, Democratic Congressman William D. Ford (Michigan) told a national meeting of CAP directors that the War on Poverty was 'floundering' because of 'decisions made in the Executive Office of Management and Budget to provide too little money and to disperse too widely the authority for planning and carrying out the battle'.[716] Clearly, it was not just the funding cuts that were worrying supporters of the War on Poverty, but also the shift in emphasis away from community action. More significant than the decreasing funding when considering the impact of the Nixon Presidency on the War on Poverty is the shift in intent, exemplified by the manoeuvring of programs out of OEO into established government departments and the subsequent power the regional offices of these departments exercised to the advantage of the white establishment in Mississippi. While HEW was reviled by white Mississippi as the author of school desegregation, the regional OCD had proven far more receptive to the demands of Mississippi's white politicians in its administration of Head Start. This trend was beginning to have an impact at the local level in Jackson. In February 1971, Lipscomb told the CSA board of directors of the worrying new trend of the Nixon administration, the 'shift of community action to special revenue sharing or

[714] Horwitz Papers, Box 3, Folder 42, Minutes of CSA Board of Directors Meeting, n.d.
[715] Davis Papers, Box 26, Mayoral Files, CSA 1971-1972, William R. Bechtel to E. L. Lipscomb, 20 October 1970. A further $21,828 cut was made to CSA's funding for Conduct and Administration, Family Planning, Neighbourhood Centres and Youth Development funds which greatly affected the programs' ability to mobilise the white poor and include other eligible poor not currently served by CSA.
[716] Community Development Files, Box 2261, Folder General Correspondence 1971, Speech of William D. Ford at the National CAP Directors Meeting in Chicago, 10 June 1971.

other resources available at the community level'.[717] Nixon wanted to implement Special Revenue Sharing in order to return responsibilities and resources to States and localities as part of his "New Federalism", a move that in Mississippi would be even more destructive to community and minority participation in CAPs than the existing level of regionalisation.[718]

The decision by HEW to equalise funding between states in 1972 had further detrimental impacts on the funding of Head Start programs in Mississippi. Due to historic inequities in the distribution of funds across Region IV Mississippi had received the major share of funds each year since 1965.[719] By Fiscal Year 1970 Mississippi received 43 per cent of the full year's Head Start funds allocated to Region IV and 41 per cent in Fiscal Year 1971. In a bid to correct this inequity, HEW collected data on the number poor of children eligible for Head Start by state and allocated funds accordingly. Florida had the highest number of eligible children (89,900) and South Carolina the lowest (26,940), with Mississippi coming fifth with 58,370 eligible children resulting in substantial cuts in funds for Head Start in Mississippi in Fiscal Year 1972. HCPHS's funding was cut by $72,000.[720] However, OCD once again required the program to serve the same number of children served in 1971 and maintain the same standards of child care. As a result, Head Start centres were consolidated by moving classes from local communities and into bigger, centralised locations, which had the potential to destroy the community nature of the Head Start program and decrease the opportunities for parent participation that was one of the most significant aspects of the program.[721]

After Nixon secured his re-election in 1972, his plans to dismantle OEO accelerated. The President had been vetoing OEO funding sent to him by Congress since 1971, and in his 1974 Budget message delivered on 29 January 1973, he did not

[717] Community Development Files, Box 2259, Folder Correspondence Minutes of CSA Board of Directors Meeting, 22 February 1971.
[718] Brunini Papers, STAR, Inc., Correspondence 20 February 1969-1 May 1973, William Sonny Walker to CAA Board Chairmen and Executive Directors, 29 January 1973 and attached 'Summary of Provisions for OEO Programs in the President's FY1974 Budget'.
[719] Region IV (previously designated Region III) contained Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee.
[720] Community Development Files, Box 2261, Folder HEW Correspondence 1971, Barbara Whitaker to Marvin Hogan, 29 October 1971.
[721] Community Development Files, Box 2261, Folder Head Start Correspondence 1971, Benjamin H. Bradley to Providers of Head Start Facilities, n.d.

request any funds for OEO.[722] While the attempts of Nixon – and Phillips – to dismantle OEO and end the War on Poverty were halted by Judge William B. Jones in April 1973, for many CAAs the damage that had been done during the funding delays was irreversible.[723] In addition to defunding CLS, Phillips delayed CSA's $208,900 grant, causing 100 employees to go without pay and prompting the board to appeal to Nixon for 'intervention in this bureaucratic chaos to give immediate financial relief to this agency and its dedicated outreach workers'.[724] It was only when a combination of Mississippi Republican Representative Thad Cochran and the 'old guard' Mississippi Democratic Senator Stennis worked together that CSA finally received its funds after a six and a half month delay.[725] With the overturning of Nixon and Phillips' attempts to bring a swift end to the War on Poverty, the organisation instead underwent a slow demise. OEO was left with only the most controversial programs, CAPs and Economic Development, with the rest delegated or transferred to other departments by 1974.[726] While the War on Poverty, if not the OEO, survived both covert and overt attacks from Nixon, his Presidency had devastating and largely unexplored consequences at the local level. It allowed whites who had been attacking undesirable antipoverty programs to finally seize control and exclude any persons who wanted to ensure community engagement or activism. It removed the (albeit limited) protection OEO had provided to those attempting to engage and involvement the poor, decreased funding levels and increased funding insecurity. Most damagingly, Nixon's legacy of regionalisation increased the control of the local establishment over the disbursement and usage of federal funds, undermining poor black involvement in local programs and strengthening white control over CAAs.

[722] P. L. Kesaris (ed.), *Papers of the Republican Party Part II: Reports and Memoranda of the Research Division of the Headquarters of the Republican National Committee, 1938-1980*, (University Publications of America: Frederick, 1986), Reel 12, fr.0129.
[723] B. Kovach, 'Judge Halts Move to Disband OEO', *New York Times*, (12 April 1973).
[724] R. Reed, 'Mississippi Antipoverty Group Urges Nixon to Release Funds', *New York Times*, (3 May 1973).
[725] Community Development Files, Box 2264, Folder South-Eastern Association of CAAs, Joe Hemingway to Howard A. Bount, 29 June 1973.
[726] Stennis Papers, Series 1, Box 4, Folder 32, Leighton Sattler to John C. Stennis, 9 January 1974.

Demise of CSA

The continual insecurity surrounding CSA's future funding amplified the program's administrative, staff and board problems. The board's lack of cohesion and ineffectiveness, caused by the on-going battles between an interracial middle-class coalition and the "Horwitz faction", was partially addressed with the mass resignations of board members and its resultant reorganisation in February 1973.[727] However, the proposed dismantling of OEO and funding delays combined with deteriorating internal affairs in the program undermined any potential the new board promised. The board's incompetence resulted in a lack of proper planning and program development and more damagingly their lack of control over operations and personnel. The board's inefficacy resulted from a number of interrelated causes, most significantly the domination of the middle-class interracial faction, which was more concerned with opposing any liberal white, or activist black members and suppressing TARs than the efficient operation of the program. This abdication of responsibility by the board was exacerbated by the incompetence of Lipscomb, whom disenchanted Group A board member Philip M. Catchings Jr. described as an 'honorable and well-meaning man' who unfortunately lacked leadership qualities required of an executive director.[728] Ironically, it was the lack of these leadership qualities that had enabled Lipscomb to remain in his post as long as he did without facing opposition from Group A board members. Upon his resignation, Lipscomb was replaced as executive director by his white deputy Joe Hemingway, who attempted to exert authority over the disruptive staff and inept board.[729] A liberal by Mississippi standards, Joe Hemingway had been a member of the Young Democrats and was a strong leader. Nonetheless, he was unable to overcome the divisions within the board and staff that sprung from racial, class and ideological divides.[730]

While in theory OEO's board requirements ensured a cross-section of the local community was represented, in reality CSA's board failed to find the unity of purpose

[727] Davis Papers, Box 26, Mayoral Files, CSA 1973, Sonny Walker to Russell C. Davis, 8 February 1973.
[728] Davis Papers, Box 26, Mayoral Files, CSA 1973, Philip M. Catchings, Jr., to Russell C. Davis, 10 April 1973.
[729] Davis Papers, Box 26, Mayoral Files, CSA 1973, Joe Hemingway to CSA Board of Directors, 28 June 1973.
[730] MSSC Records, SCR ID # 9-31-8-61-1-1-1, Commission Report, Chicago, Illinois, 25-31 August 1968, http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd08/064865.png&otherstuff=9|31|8|61|1|1|1|64027| [accessed 28 July 2013].

needed to make use of the disparate skills and knowledge each group brought to the board. Group A members had administrative ability and experience in abundance, though lacked knowledge of the 'dynamics of poverty' and too often a damaging lack of understanding of the needs of the poor. Group B members were drawn from groups 'likely to be socially conscious and administratively knowledgeable' but still lacked perspective in balancing ideals with organisational priorities, whereas Group C members had little administrative experience and were given no training by CSA meaning their 'potentially valuable first-hand knowledge' was not utilised.[731] In CSA, as in other Mississippi CAAs, race and class further complicated the situation, frustrating any attempts at board unity as many in Group A exerted their control over the board often through pressurising Group C members to comply with their wishes to reduce community engagement and focus on service provision. Group B members included Civil Rights activists and community leaders in CSA's early years. By the mid-1970s, however, many of these activist members who had fought for community action had resigned or been pushed from the board.

By late 1973, the infighting that had characterised the CSA board of the late 1960s had ceased, replaced with apathy. White Group A board members such as Catchings still placed the blame with so-called 'activist' board members, employing the by-now tired rhetoric of Massive Resistance to label board members such as African American A. B. Evans 'rabble rousers' who encouraged the 'disruptive and subversive elements' among the staff.[732] In the wake of the unpopular HUAC investigation into the KKK, appealing to anticommunism had become a less successful trope of post-1965 Massive Resistance – by 1973, the Cold War détente robbed such language of its remaining potency. The fact that Evans, who had opposed the earlier activism and voted against board measures that would assist the poor people he was meant to represent, was being characterised as radical signals the growing conservatism of all segments of the board. In addition to blaming radical board members, 'agitators on the staff' and OEO for the failure of CSA, Catchings identified community involvement – what he euphemistically referred to as the 'decentralization of authority' – as one of the major contributing factors.[733] It was an ironic accusation: the very purpose of CAAs was to

[731] Davis Papers, Box 26, Mayoral Files, CSA 1973, Philip M. Catchings, Jr., to Mayor Russell C. Davis, 10 April 1973.
[732] Ibid.
[733] Ibid.

involve the community in the program's operation, yet here that involvement was blamed for the failure of the program with the claim that it had led to the erosion of "respect for authority", a euphemism for white control.

CSA's slow demise was caused by a number of inter-related factors: a combination of short-lived executive directors with poor or at least unsuccessful administrative and leadership abilities (after only three months in post, Hemingway was followed by Ben Bradley and Emma D. Sanders, neither of whom lasted for more than a year); an uncertain future; a lack of unity amongst staff and board members; and a pervasive climate of hostility toward CSA from the white community. In April 1975, Sanders was fired by the board for a multitude of administrative failings most serious of which was her failure to spend half of CSA's yearly grant.[734] The opposition CSA faced from a cross-section of white Hinds County combined with the control asserted over the program by the interracial middle-class coalition had brought the program to the brink of collapse. Now the white establishment moved in to bring CSA under complete control.

Hinds County Board of Supervisors had become CSA's sponsor in 1974, but by February 1975 the state of affairs at CSA had become so grave that OEO had temporarily suspended the agency. Those who had previously provided CSA with support, albeit of a limited nature, now used the program's vulnerability as an opportunity to attack. As the Assistant Federal Programs Coordinator informed Jackson Mayor Russell C. Davis, the SEOO had 'a field day with threats and innuendoes, rumors and grandstand plays'.[735] Davis had a close relationship with the program since its inception, but ignored the repeated appeals for assistance from the staff and board. Instead he chose to stand back and 'let it die' before stepping in and taking over the administration of federal funds, so they would not be obligated to the current CSA staff.[736] Governor Waller took the opportunity to bring an end to the program and vetoed CSA's $152,988 grant. In an exhaustive explanation of his veto, Waller alleged there were over 20 instances of administrative, leadership, board and program failures.

[734] Davis Papers, Box 26, Mayoral Files, CSA 1973, Joseph Hemingway to Russell C. Davis, 11 September 1973; Rev. J.L. Brown to Emma Sanders, 29 April 1975. Hemingway resigned having 'reached the point of frustration with the Board of Directors that refuses to meet its obligations'.
[735] Davis Papers, Box 26, Mayoral Files, CSA 1974-1975, Albert J. Price to Mayor Russell C. Davis, 14 February 1975.
[736] Davis Papers, Box 26, Mayoral Files, CSA 1974-1975, Handwritten notes on a letter from John Crockett to Russell C. Davis, c.July 1975.

Despite OEO's willingness to give the board and staff more time to address the shortcomings, Waller concluded that CSA was working to the detriment of the poor.[737] The Board of Supervisors utilised the opportunity to establish complete control over the federal funds entering Hinds County. Rather than extend its sponsorship of CSA, the county Board of Supervisors was unwilling to sponsor the program again unless they could appoint a majority of the CSA board in order to stop 'radicals from radical organizations' from dominating the public sector section of the board membership.[738] On 24 November 1975, the Board of Supervisors created its own CAA, the Hinds County Human Resource Agency over which it exercised complete power. The Board of Supervisors selected two-thirds of the new program's board – five members were drawn from the Board of Supervisors and five appointed by the Board of Supervisors from private organisations and interest groups. The remaining five members were TARs, thus removing the slight moderating influence achieved by the Group B members of CSA's board and ensuring the complete exclusion of the poor representatives from decision making in Hinds County's new antipoverty program.

[737] Davis Papers, Box 26, Mayoral Files, CSA 1974-1975, William Waller to William Sonny Walker, 5 June 1975.
[738] J. Oglethorpe, 'Hinds County May "Hitch Up" with Poverty Program', *Jackson Daily News,* (18 July 1975).

Conclusion

In his final State of the Union address in 1988, President Ronald Reagan announced that the War on Poverty had been won by poverty. This statement – which was met with laughter from the assembled representatives – was the culmination of over twenty years of conservative attacks on the War on Poverty.[739] Since running for Governor of California, Reagan had been the 'standard bearer for the conservative critique of the War on Poverty'. Indeed, his "welfare queen" personified the gender, racial and class hostilities against the War on Poverty which he rode to the White House.[740] However, this powerful construction was the work of neither one man nor his political advisors. Reagan drew on a grassroots hostility that had been slowly developed by a network of local activists, state and local politicians and the media. Tracing white Mississippi's opposition and accommodation to the War on Poverty at the grassroots has illustrated the development of this ostensibly race neutral discourse and its connection to an evolutionary Massive Resistance. Further, this thesis has provided new insights into the nature and limitations of that evolving resistance, the failings of CAPs and the impact of Nixon on the War on Poverty.

Mississippi provides an ideal insight into the grassroots development of this discourse and its connection to the evolving resistance – trends that were nationwide in occurrence and significance. As historians such as Feldman, Hirsch and Sugrue have noted, Massive Resistance – broadly defined as a complex and evolving phenomenon encompassing economic, social and political facets – cannot be geographically or temporally confined.[741] The interconnection between the evolving resistance and emerging conservatism that this thesis has examined through white opposition and accommodation to antipoverty programs was not limited to Mississippi. Indeed, as Kruse and Lassiter have shown, the development of the language of the emerging national conservatism found more fertile ground in the Sunbelt suburbs than the rural Deep South.[742] As such the intra-racial class divisions exacerbated by CAPs and the ostensibly colour-blind language of opposition were extant – and potentially

[739] Ronald Reagan, 'Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union', 25 January 1988, in Peters and Woolley, *Papers of the President*, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=36035 [accessed 18 March 2012].
[740] Orleck, 'Conclusion', p.446.
[741] Feldman, 'Ugly Roots', pp.268-310; Gerstle, 'Race and the Myth', p.582.
[742] Lassiter, *Silent Majority*, p.4; Kruse, *White Flight*, p.7.

correspondingly more potent – in the antipoverty programs of the Sunbelt suburbs.[743] Likewise the racial, class and gendered tensions that crippled many of Mississippi's CAPs have been shown to play a central role in the breakdown of many northern, urban CAPs, and continued to hamper women's fights for welfare reform into the 1970s.[744] While the relationship between CAPs, the evolving resistance and the emerging conservatism needs further examination – in other states and during the often overlooked 1970s – it is clear that the connections this thesis has identified in Mississippi resonated, perhaps even more powerfully, in other states across the South, and across the nation.

This thesis has placed race at the heart of the failure of Mississippi's CAPs to improve local poverty conditions, encourage community action or even to involve or engage with local poor communities. Racial discrimination pervaded Mississippi's antipoverty programs and crippled the operation of the majority of its CAPs. It served as a tool to exclude poor African Americans, it worsened omnipresent administrative failings, and it undermined the work of dedicated CAP staff, both black and white, who opposed their program being used to entrench discrimination against poor African Americans. As an early biracial program lauded as an example of racial progress, MAP was impacted by race in a number of contradictory but debilitating ways. MAP's integrated board and staff served as a biracial veneer under which racial discrimination was entrenched but disguised, while this biracialism made the program a target for opposition from a cross-section of white Mississippi: from Klan violence to the ostensibly race neutral articulations of opposition from middle-class whites. The ubiquitous administrative failings of Mississippi's CAPs were only brought to light when there was political, or more commonly racial motivation to undermine the program – a trend echoed in CAPs across the nation.[745] The white establishment in southwest Mississippi used SMCDC's administrative failings to exert their control over the program through SMO, making the antipoverty program into a mechanism of white supremacy. Thus, the failure of antipoverty programs to engage with the poor communities they were designed to serve, or to address local poverty conditions in any meaningful way, stemmed more from the racially discriminatory actions of board

[743] Clayson, *Freedom,* pp.136-156.
[744] Orleck, *Storming Caesars Palace,* p.3.
[745] 'HARYOU Report Finds Huge Sums Missing', *New York Times,* (30 March 1967).

members, staff and the local community than any administrative failings. The racial discrimination experienced by STAR employees and enrolees was not simply the result of individual acts of overt racism by STAR board and staff members. These individual destructive acts of racism were perpetuated and bolstered by the environment created by an interracial middle-class coalition consisting of members of the white establishment and the established black leadership. This coalition utilised antipoverty programs such as STAR to maintain a racial status quo that was to its political and economic advantage. Indeed, this study has shown that the most significant failure of OEO, rather than administrative incompetence or misunderstanding or a misguided ideology was its failure, at the national, regional and state levels to address racial discrimination in local CAPs. While the impact of this failure was most clearly illustrated by the experience of SMO and CSA, OEO's failure to address racial discrimination had a similarly destructive impact on CAPs nationwide.

This study has sought to explore the centrality of Mississippi's contributions to the emerging national conservatism and to provide a more nuanced interpretation of the evolution of Massive Resistance than that which currently exists. As becomes clear through the lens of the state's CAPs, Crespino's 'subtle and strategic accommodations' framework simply does not do justice to the complexity and diversity of a "long" Massive Resistance.[746] The white response to antipoverty programs showcases a Massive Resistance that was at times remarkably unchanged from its Civil Rights-era heyday. The Massive Resistance campaign against CDGM showcases the shortcomings of this unchanged resistance, as white Mississippians were unsuccessful in utilising the mechanisms and rhetoric of the classic phase of Massive Resistance against the Head Start program. The failure of Massive Resistance to CDGM resulted in white accommodation to MAP, which was impelled by national attention and political pressure. A reluctant acceptance of unavoidable integration became a biracial veneer – an attempt to conceal the continuation of efforts to establish white control over Head Start, which drew on tactics and tropes of earlier Massive Resistance combined with a new language of opposition that utilised the grassroots legacy of Goldwater conservatism. The previously unexplored legacy of white Mississippi's failure to destroy CDGM – one of the 'symbolic last stands' past which Crespino urges us to look for the true source of continued white supremacy in Mississippi – is central to the

[746] Crespino, *In Search,* p.4.

subsequent white response to CAPs.[747] Far from any type of accommodation, this failure sparked a renewed and often violent campaign of opposition to African American advancement which drew on the violent extremes of white supremacy as well as state and local mechanisms of Massive Resistance. The experience of SMO and SMCDC was characterised by a return to the earlier era of Klan domination that compelled and bolstered a perpetuation of white supremacy through SMO that was never adequately addressed by incompetent – or perhaps, occasionally, complicit – officials in the regional and national OEO.

White Mississippi's accommodations to CAPs were thus not uniform or universal, and were certainly often neither subtle nor strategic. The white response to STAR and CSA showcases another facet of white accommodation, as the reluctant acceptance of OEO-mandated integration in these antipoverty programs interacted with the influence of white moderates to produce a return to the benign paternalism and black subordination characteristic of earlier Southern race relations under a veneer of biracialism.[748] Indeed, Lee Alston and Joseph Ferrie argue that this Southern paternalism was the reason President Johnson had been able to pass social welfare legislation. The mechanisation of cotton had made a large, unskilled dependent labour force unnecessary and thus for planters, federal antipoverty programs were potentially beneficial by offering the hope of black outmigration from the South which would reduce both the tax burden and the number of black voters. While southern politicians remained mostly hostile toward social welfare, their opposition was directly proportional to the level of control they retained over the funds.[749] Thus, Crespino's notion of 'subtle and strategic accommodations' is an inadequate depiction of the white response to CAPs, which illustrates at times a remarkably unchanged Massive Resistance, a patchy and often contradictory evolution of some of the earlier methods and mechanisms of white supremacy as well as a return to a paternalism reminiscent of earlier Southern race relations.[750]

[747] Ibid., p.276.
[748] Bloom, *Class, Race*, pp.3-5.
[749] L. J. Alston and J. P. Ferrie, *Southern Paternalism and the American Welfare State: Economics, Politics, and Institutions in the South, 1865-1965*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1999), pp.140-1.
[750] Crespino, *In Search,* p.4.

Examining the evolution of Massive Resistance through opposition to CAPs has revealed the extent of its contribution to, and interconnection with, emerging national conservatism. The earlier methods and mechanisms of Massive Resistance combined with an ostensibly colour blind language that was itself a legacy of earlier white supremacist rhetoric. Massive Resisters utilised opposition to CAPs to draw on a conservative ideology which opposed federal taxation and social welfare programs – tapping into Goldwater's extensive base of support – and which was expressed in race neutral terms. Such language was central to the image of Head Start that white middle-class Mississippians had constructed, combining the conservative rhetoric opposing the wastage of tax-payers money with the Massive Resistance tropes that evoked fears of radicalism and outside agitators to form a powerful opposition to MAP. This therefore linked the unquestionably – but rarely expressed – image of antipoverty programs as black with this white middle-class, Protestant articulation of un-American social welfare to appeal to poor as well as middle-class Mississippians. Thus, Deep South conservatism was not lacking the middle-class supporters that were so important in Sunbelt suburbs, though they were manifestly fewer in number here. The white middle-class response to CAPs – and particularly the use of this response by the emerging Mississippi Republican Party to gain political credit – signifies a complexity to Deep South conservatism too often overlooked. By harnessing opposition to CAPs that drew on a diverse, class-bound response encompassing the often violent rejection of antipoverty programs by poor whites to the use of CAA board membership by middle-class whites as a mechanism of white control, the Mississippi Republican Party was able draw on middle-class and poor white constituencies. As the opposition to CLS and the wider Legal Services program has illustrated, the language, which drew on the earlier tropes of Massive Resistance, became central to the appeal of an emerging national conservatism for the middle-class and poor whites for whom it resonated.

This contribution was not unique to Mississippi. As Dan Carter and others have shown, Republicans used race 'crudely' in the 1960s and 1970s to strengthen the perception of poverty and welfare as black.[751] However, examining Mississippi's role in the process is significant in highlighting the invalidity of casting Mississippi as exceptional. Further, it places both Mississippi and the Deep South at the centre of the

[751] D. T. Carter, 'Southern Conservatives: Race and Poverty, 1980-2006', in Jones and Newman, *Poverty and Progress*, p.191.

emerging national conservatism. Gendered opposition to antipoverty programs further showcases the interaction of tropes of earlier Massive Resistance and the developing language of the new conservatism. Gender was a significant factor in opposition to CAPs across the country – in Mississippi this was articulated by drawing on gendered tropes of earlier Massive Resistance opposing the involvement of African American and white women. The experience of Helen Bass Williams illustrates the success garnered by her white opponents in combining the racialised and gendered opposition to the War on Poverty with the gendered tropes of earlier Massive Resistance. This combination of gendered opposition to the War on Poverty and gendered linguistic tropes of Massive Resistance contributed to a gendered, racialised image of CAPs that became an important rhetorical tool for national conservative politicians.

This thesis emphasises the centrality of class as well as race to the failure of Mississippi's CAPs, most pointedly the intersection of class and race through the intra-racial class division and interracial middle-class coalitions that served to entrench white control of CAPs to the exclusion of poor blacks. Intra-racial class divisions played a central role in establishing white control over Mississippi's CAAs. CSA and SMO showcase the way in which CAPs across Mississippi and across the county exacerbated existing black class divisions, fracturing and muting African American opposition to the white domination of the antipoverty programs. Both the white and black response was complicated by class, but where white class divisions were subsumed under a commitment to maintaining their racial privileges, black class divisions undermined racial unity and contributed to the exclusion of poor African American from antipoverty programs. As Bauman has shown, black class divisions that had long been at least partially muted by African Americans' exclusion from full participation in the American economy were becoming increasingly significant as the Civil Rights Movement had provided new opportunities, particularly for middle-class blacks.[752] Antipoverty programs not only exposed but also magnified African American class divisions. Membership on boards of antipoverty programs was an intermediary step toward these new opportunities, providing middle-class African Americans with the chance to stabilise race relations in the wake of the tumultuous early 1960s, to maintain profitable economic relationships with the white community and to prevent the emergence of new black community leadership that had the potential to usurp their

[752] Bauman, *Race and the War on Poverty*, p.15; Dittmer, *Local People*, p.426.

power and position. The collaboration of the black middle-class in the systematic denial of participation and opportunity that CAPs were meant to provide for poor African Americans was thus a product of class tensions. The role of STAR's African American Board Chairman Cornelius Turner – a middle-class member of the established black leadership – illustrates the extent to which interracial middle-class collaboration served to entrench white control and perpetuate racial discrimination through CAPs. The refusal of poor whites to participate in antipoverty programs such as SMO – despite the depth and extent of poverty in Mississippi – reflected their unwillingness to accept integration which would threaten their racial privilege, and left them to cling to the only remaining sense of "superiority" they had over poor African Americans. Middle-class whites showed a greater acceptance of CAPs as they were unlikely to be negatively impacted by the required integration of Head Start classes, adult education centres or neighbourhood facilities. Instead, membership on CAA boards offered a unique opportunity to advance their control over the pace of black advancement. Jackson's white supremacists moved swiftly and effectively in order to establish and control CSA, despite the opposition to federal interference that had long been the clarion call of these White Citizens Councillors. This study offers a reassessment of the impact of white moderates in the latter stages of the long Civil Rights Movement. STAR provides the clearest illustration of the impact of these white moderates on CAPs – a pattern that was repeated in many antipoverty programs, not limited to Mississippi. White businessmen, Catholics and AFL-CIO representatives had played significant roles moderating the violent excesses of white supremacists in earlier phases of activism. However, antipoverty programs provided a framework in which this racial moderation interacted with the accommodations of controlling white board members and their middle-class African American allies to entrench white control over the programs in the name of stabilising race relations and pursuing economic prosperity.

The focus of this study has also allowed it to recast the impact of President Nixon on the War on Poverty. The 'Headstart, Economic Opportunity, and Community Partnership Act' was the first bill signed into law under Gerald Ford's administration on 4 January 1975, bringing an end to the OEO but ensuring the survival of the War on

Poverty through a new agency, the Community Services Administration.[753] This bill was the culmination of Nixon's efforts to control and contain the War on Poverty through regionalisation, under the euphemistic and often recycled guise of New Federalism. Nixon's concern for his re-election prospects had constrained his first term opposition to the War on Poverty to covert manoeuvres designed to undermine antipoverty programs at the local level. Through the transfer and delegation of programs out of OEO, Nixon quietly but successfully undermined any protection OEO provided to grassroots antipoverty programs against white establishment attacks. The Green Amendment, as applied by Rumsfeld's OEO systematically stripped TARs of their opportunity to provide a voice for the poor community in the operation of STAR and other CAPs across the state, and across the country. Overt attempts to dismantle OEO during his second term had been overturned, and, despite Nixon's best efforts, Watergate drained both his attention and political capital in the final years of his Presidency. These constraints, combined with the War on Poverty's powerful supporters and the altered discourse on welfare in the wake of the expansion of the welfare state under Johnson, saved antipoverty programs from destruction. However, Nixon's efforts had robbed Mississippi's CAPs of any remaining community action, engagement with poor communities or meaningful African American participation. Programs such as MAP and CSA's successor, which had survived funding cuts, an on-going lack of support from OEO and attacks from a cross-section of white Mississippi had become a part of the white establishment, and were little more than a further mechanism to be used by an interracial middle-class coalition to control the rate of poor African American advancement. Leloudis and Korstad, among others, have identified the detrimental impact of Nixon on antipoverty programs from the outset of his Presidency.[754] This thesis provides an examination of the nuances and severity of this impact at the grassroots, against SMO, STAR and CSA, showcasing the destructive impact of Nixon and Rumsfeld that affected CAPs across the nation. Nixon was consistent in his opposition to the War on Poverty, from his interaction with the Mississippi Republican Party to the delegation of programs out of OEO, the destructive impact of Rumsfeld's implementation of Green and the declining protection OEO provided for vulnerable African American delegate agencies to the intersection of local

[753] Gerald R. Ford, 'Statement on Signing the Headstart, Economic Opportunity, and Community Partnership Act of 1974', 4 January 1975, in Peters and Woolley, *Papers of the President*, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4761 [accessed 24 April 2013].
[754] Leloudis and Korstad, *To Right*, p.338.

and national in opposing the Legal Services program. Far from a benign neglect in his first term – or even an unwilling President helpless to prevent Congressional cuts to OEO's budget – giving way to destruction under Phillips, Nixon's actions are recast as deliberately and consistently, if initially covertly destructive.

Finally, this thesis has analysed the previously unexplored impact of local partisan politics, most significantly the use of opposition to CAPs, in the development of the nascent Mississippi Republican Party. While not as prominent as other racialised issues such as school desegregation, the relatively lower-profile of CAPs – and crucially its connections to economic conservatism drawing on widespread opposition to federal expansion and taxation – provided the Mississippi Republican Party with an opportunity to capitalise on its connections in the Republican Administration. The failure of prominent Mississippi Democrats to secure the destruction of CDGM or the eradication of Head Start provided Mississippi Republicans with a chance to capitalise on that failure. The Mississippi Republican Party was able to manipulate and exploit the regionalisation of power under Nixon, the delegation of programs out of OEO and the administrative failings of OEO to reinforce white control over antipoverty programs and undermine African American delegate agencies. This thesis has highlighted the impact of the Mississippi Republican Party on CAPs in southwest Mississippi and in Yazoo County; however, these were only two of many instances in which the state Party gained political credit from its role in bolstering white control of antipoverty programs. The actions of the Mississippi Republican Party brought it political credit with a cross-section of white society – from poor whites opposed to CAPs based on vitriolic racism to the middle-class whites attempting to utilise CAPs for their own economic benefit. While not entirely successful, these efforts undoubtedly contributed to the grassroots growth of Republicanism that would prove to be so important to a state party which failed to receive much needed support from its national representatives. Mississippi's Republican Party was perhaps the most successful, but certainly was not the only state Republican Party that gained political capital from drawing on the evolving resistance through which local whites fashioned antipoverty programs into federally funded extensions of the white establishment.[755] Thus the relationship between the nascent Mississippi Republican Party and the state's CAPs is illustrative of a significant and largely overlooked region-wide – and perhaps nationwide – trend.

[755] Clayson, *Freedom*, pp.136-156; Leloudis and Korstad, *To Right*, p.8.

Much remains to be done in exploring the evolving methods and mechanisms of white supremacy, the development of grassroots conservatism and racialised connotations of social welfare from the New Deal to Reagan and beyond.[756] Recent studies have shown the value in tracing the development of conservative thought, institutions and support over time. Phillips-Fein's study has shown the significance of the 1930s to the development of conservatism, while Crespino illustrates that the race-neutral language that Kruse and Lassiter identified in the Sunbelt suburbs actually has a long history in Mississippi dating back at least to the 1920s.[757] Other areas of the War on Poverty that remain largely overlooked would potentially provide fascinating insights into the process. In particular, Title III programs addressing rural poverty had significant impact in Mississippi through the Department of Agriculture's Farmers Home Administration, even as that institution became increasingly politicised and racial discrimination more firmly entrenched throughout the 1960s.[758] Pete Daniel has shown that the passage of Civil Rights legislation led to local Department of Agriculture staff employing a 'passive nullification', an 'accretion of prejudice [that] festered and ultimately grew into a plan to eliminate minority, women, and small farmers by preventing their sharing equally in federal programs'.[759] CAPs themselves remain a fruitful area for investigation: despite systematic attacks on their funding and administrative independence by Nixon and Ford – and successive Republican, and later Democratic Presidents – over 1000 CAPs are still in operation in the US today. Most analyses of the War on Poverty end in the early 1970s, or in 1980 at the very latest, although CAPs were not all destroyed with the demise of the Community Services Administration and the creation of the Community Services Block Grants.[760] In Mississippi, many antipoverty programs are still in operation today: MAP operates 61

[756] J. Blake, 'Return of the "Welfare Queen"', *CNN*, (23 January 2012), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/23/politics/weflare-queen [accessed 6 August 2013]. Racially connoted social welfare and its links to conservatism remains a potent issue in US politics and at the forefront of new historiographical developments, for example, I. Haney-Lopez, *Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals Have Wrecked the Middle Class*, (Oxford University Press: New York, forthcoming); K. Osgood and D. E. White (eds), *Winning While Losing: Civil Rights, the Conservative Movement and the Presidency from Nixon to Obama*, (University Press of Florida: Gainesville, forthcoming).
[757] Phillips-Fein, *Invisible Hands*; Crespino, *In Search*, p.8.
[758] Ken Dean interview with Jack Bass, 28 March 1974, pp.2-7.
[759] P. Daniel, *Dispossession: Discrimination Against African American Farmers in the Age of Civil Rights*, (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 2013), p.xii; rural CAPs are also explored in D. Torstensson, 'Beyond the City: Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty in Rural America', *Journal of Policy History*, 25, No. 4 (2013), pp.587-613.
[760] E.g., Orleck and Hazirjian, *War on Poverty*.

Head Start centres employing more than 1200 people, SMO is likewise still in operation, as is CSA's successor, Hinds County Human Resource Agency.[761]

[761] 'CAAs for Community Services Block Grant, FY13'; Hinds County Human Resources Agency, 2013, http://hchra.org/ [accessed 4 August 2013]; Mississippi Action for Progress, Inc., 2013, http://www.mapheadstart.org/ [accessed 1 August 2013]; MS Legal Services, 'Who We Are', 2013, http://www.mslegalservices.org/who-we-are [accessed 5 August 2013]. There are currently 18 CAAs operating in Mississippi, including Hinds County's CAP and SMO, in addition to MAP and three Legal Services programs.

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