TV COVERAGE OF THE 2010 ELECTION IN IRAQ: A STUDY OF THE EVENING NEWSCASTS OF FOUR IRAQI SATELLITE CHANNELS

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To my late father who inspired me to follow his steps

To my beloved wife, Alaa, and to my mother for all their love, care, and support

To Wejd & Rend,
with my perpetual love to my two little angels

Abstract

TV Coverage of the 2010 Election in Iraq: A Study of the Evening Newscasts of Four Iraqi Satellite Channels

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This study analysed the content of the evening newscasts of Iraqia, Furat, Hurria, and Baghdad channels from the 22nd of February to the 7th of March, 2010. These were the fourteen days that led up to the Election Day. The channels were chosen based on their affiliations; Iraqia is the state-run TV station, Furat TV belongs to Hakim's Shiite party, Baghdad channel is run by Samarai's Sunni party, and Hurria TV is managed by Talabani's Kurdish party. This study focused on investigating the way different topics and candidates were covered, the horse race issue, and the (non)-application of the principles of good journalism such as objectivity, impartiality, and balance.

The author designed three coding frames in order to fully analyse the content: (1) the programme level (2) the story level (3) and candidate/topic level (sub-story). Beside measuring the structural features of the newscasts and their individual stories such as time allotment and number of stories, the study analysed the news formats that were divided into three types: the use of verbal narratives, still images, and films. Also, the production techniques were investigated that included the various candidates' spatial relationships with others and the use of camera angles like eye/top/bottom levels and close-up positions.

The results of the study revealed that all the channels did not abide by the principles of good journalism like objectivity, impartiality, and balance. Also, the four channels presented the story topics and candidates in certain ways that echoed the agenda and beliefs of the channels' sponsors, except for Iraqia TV that was not directly involved in promoting political candidates. Finally, the four channels did not focus on the horse-race issue since they mostly limited their coverage to promote their own parties/candidates and ignored the other competing slates.

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Glossary

CMC – Communications and Media Commission (previously NCMC)

IAF - Iraqi Accord Front (Sunni slate)

IHEC – Iraqi High Electoral Commission

IMN – Iraqi Media Network

INA – Iraqi National Alliance (Shiite slate)

INC – Iraqi National Congress (Ahmed Chalabi)

KA – Kurdish Alliance

KDP – Kurdistan Democratic Party (Mas'ud Barazani)

NMC – National Media Center

RSF - Reporters Sans Frontières

PUK – Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (Jalal Talabani)

Chapter One

Iraqi TV and the 2010 General Election

1.1 Introduction

This study investigates the evening newscasts of four Iraqi satellite television channels: Iraqia, Furat, Hurria, and Baghdad for the 14 days that preceded the Iraqi general election on March 7, 2010. Iraq allegedly has a new 'liberal' and plural media that emerged after 2003 which is different from the state-controlled media during Saddam Hussein's rule (Sinjari 2006; al-Jezairy 2006, p. 3). This research seeks to examine the application and presence of the principles of good journalism practice in these newscasts based on a content analysis methodology and to see how some channels presented the news of the election campaign.

This study investigates the patterns of representation which the issues and political candidates received by the four satellite channels and whether the election coverage by Iraqi journalists was based on the 'horse-race' aspect that views the election as a 'sporting event' (Broth 1980). The horse-race aspect is concentrated on the performance of the political candidates rather than the coverage of important issues in the country. In this regard, the news on the horse-race issue tends to be entertaining and is filled with zeal and action, making TV viewers more enticed to watch election news.

This research also investigates the way the four satellite TV channels cited above presented the election news in order to project their own version of reality and/or agendas. This aspect of the research is studied in order to understand the relationship between the channels' election coverage and the policies of these channels' political/religious sponsors. The study is also expected to give answers to many questions about the norms of objectivity and fairness in reporting during election time in Iraq.

This research is significant because it deals with a contemporary issue that is of interest to media scholars and practitioners alike. It is also important because of the media system being studied. Previous scientific studies on the coverage of the Iraqi

election are non-existent. What is available are a handful of very brief and general reports on the election coverage. This is, in fact, an area that needs more research not only within the Iraqi context but in other Arab countries, too.

Probably the only published report on the Iraqi election coverage was produced in 2005 by the Communications and Media Commission (CMC), an Iraqi media body. It is entitled 'Mass Media and the Election Campaign: National, Regional and Local Elections January 30, 2005'. The report makes accusations against different media outlets without presenting the adopted methodology or referring to the use of basic requirements of content analysis. The findings of the report are stated without knowing how the author(s) reached their conclusions. Furthermore, it seems that the report was politicised since it was sponsored by the succeeding Prime Minister and was written to demean the former Prime Minister's monopoly of IMN. The report is only posted on the website of the National Media Center, Maliki-run media body. CMC investigated eight Iraqi satellite channels: Iraqia, Asharqia, Fayhaa, Furat, Kurdistan, Hurriah, and Nahrain and Diyar (CMC 2005, p. 19). The report concluded that Iraqia and Asharqia TV channels were subjective in their treatment of the then Prime Minister, Iyad Allawi. Also, it confirms that Iraqia TV, which is supposed to be an independent and non-partisan public broadcasting channel, covered the elections in a way that reflected the political views of the then Iraqi government.

1.2 Problem

In setting out the nature of the research problem to be investigated in this study, it might help at first to review the chronology of recent political and military events that has re-shaped the emergent political fabric and associated media landscape of Iraq. After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Iraqi media were shaped in a way that made them somehow unique among media systems in the Middle East in terms of their pluralistic and sectarian inclinations. In June 2003, L. Paul Bremer, the US Civil Administrator in Iraq, issued order No.6, stating the establishment of the Iraqi Media Network (IMN) which was an interim body in place of the dissolved Iraqi Ministry of Information that administered and supervised a handful of newspapers and TV channels. The US preamble stated that the intention was to 'permit the Iraqi people to develop a free, independent, responsible and reliable media' (New Iraqi Media Code). However, tens of Iraqi

newspapers were published, and later tens of radio and TV channels were broadcasting in and outside Iraq, mostly polarised as they were supported by religious/political parties and neighbouring states. The majority of partisan media channel had its own agenda and perspective toward the events. Hence, it is not an easy task to have a comprehensive understanding of the whole media scene in such a tapestry of colours.

This study sheds light on the nature of TV messages broadcast in the evening newscasts of four Iraqi satellite channels that are partisan in nature. The Iraqia TV channel is a special case though since it is government-owned, but this does not necessarily mean that it is not aligned to the ruling political party. For the purpose of this study, a partisan channel means a media outlet that is run by a political/religious party and overtly advocates the ideology of that party. In relation to objectivity in reporting, the study aims at providing some insight into the way the news is organised and presented during the election campaign especially that all the channels investigated in this study claim to present objective, fair, and impartial news.

1.3 Aims

This study investigates the issues of objectivity, fairness, and impartiality in the evening newscasts of four Iraqi satellite television channels: Iraqia, Furat, Hurria, and Baghdad. During election campaigns, journalists must be committed more than ever to present the news in a professional manner that is devoid of partiality and subjectivity. In fact, a 'good' journalist, is expected to cover the election in a 'non-partisan way', by avoiding any kind of favouritism toward some political side(s) (UNESCO 2008, p. 3), which is regarded as the ideal goal of journalism. Furthermore, the duty of a good journalist during an election campaign is to inform the public about the facts without presenting biased or imbalanced sensational information for the sake of drawing the public's attention, according to several media organisations (Reuters Foundation et al. n.d.).

All the four TV channels selected in this study have a common type of news programme in the form of their evening, flagship news broadcasts that usually reflect the editorial stance of the channel. The choice of the newscast was made because it is regarded as 'one of the most important forms of broadcast programming….; news and current affairs programmes are the key way in which most people receive political, as

well as other, information' (Article 19 et al. n.d., p. 27). In this study the evening newscast in particular was selected. Iyenger, Peters, and Kinder (1982), for instance, revealed that audiences made judgments on the US 'presidential performances' based on the positioning of problems in the evening newscast, which denotes the importance of this newscast in shaping the public opinion. However, this does not mean that the evening newscast rather than the other newscasts is the most important source of information for potential voters who are usually influenced by other media outlets like the newspaper and radio.

The main newscasts (from 8:00 pm up to 10:00 pm) were chosen; they also fall within the prime-time of Iraqi TV watching during which the largest audience watch TV. Iraqia main newscast is aired at 8:00 pm, whereas Baghdad and Furat are broadcast at 9:00 pm. Hurria airs its main newscast at 10:00 pm. There is a security risk of going out at night. According to a poll survey, TV viewership in the majority of Iraq is concentrated between 5:00 pm to 11:00 pm (IREX 2010, 24) or 5:00 pm to 10:00 (National Media Center 2009, p. 5).

The study focused on the 14 days leading up to the Election Day. According to different media studies, the few weeks (Harrop 1987) or the short time that precedes the Election Day is the most crucial for voters especially those who have not made up their minds on whom to elect (Leroy and Siune 1994; Siune 1983). The Election Day is included because there is a need to know how the news channels covered the elections after it has been finalised.

Some studies have concentrated on examining the last two weeks before the Election Day such as the research conducted by Fox, Angelini, and Gable (2005) on the US Presidential Campaign. Farnswortha, Lichter, and Schatz (2009) studied the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation coverage of Canada's 2006 Liberal Party Leadership candidates and found out that about 90% of the statements in the newscasts on or by the candidates were aired in the last two weeks of the campaign. There is also evidence that many voters usually make their decision during the election campaign itself. In the 1960s Britain, one in ten voters made up their mind during the campaign, but in the 1990s the number changed as one in four voters made a decision during the campaign (Norris et al. 1999). In the 1984 Canadian elections, 58% of Quebec voters and 47% of voters

elsewhere made a decision on whom they would vote for during the campaign (Wagenberg et al. 1988). Finally, voters who decide late are known to rely more on the visual presentation of candidates (McHugo et al. 1985; Graber 1987).

1.4 Why these Channels?

The reasons behind the choice of these particular channels are based on their popularity and importance in addition to the channels' religious, racial, and political affiliations. Also, all the channels chosen broadcast from within the country.

In Iraq, there are three main population sub-groups: Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. According to the 31/01/2009 Governorate Elections, one can have a clearer understanding of the most representative and popular parties in the Iraqi society; one can assume that the media channels sponsored by these parties play a greater role in influencing the people's minds.

In the above elections, the 'State Law Coalition' came first throughout all Iraqi Shiite governorates; this electoral list included the Shiite Dawa Party headed by Prime Minister Nouri Maliki and Muqtada Sadr's movement that does not have an official satellite TV channel. According to solid evidence that is discussed in details in chapter two, Maliki controls the official Iraqi channel, al-Iraqiya or Iraqia; hence, the author has not included Maliki's channel Afaq because both channels carry similar editorial messages. In 2009, the Iraqi National Media Center, a governmental media bureau, conducted an audience survey and found out that Iraqia TV is the most viewed Iraqi channel with an audience of 21.6% and scored second in credibility 18.4% (National Media Center 2009, p. 12). Also, IREX conducted another survey in 2010 in which Iraqia TV channel came second with 21% in the percentage of viewers' trust after Asharqia TV that scored 33%. In the Shiite-dominated Southern Iraq, Iraqia TV was the fifth most viewed channel (IREX. 2010).

In the second rank came the 'List of Independent Forces and the Martyrs of the Mihrab', headed by Abdul Aziz Hakim; hence, the choice is made to include Hakim's TV channel, Furat, which is managed now by his son, Ammar Hakim after his father's death in 2009. According to IREX audience survey in 2010, Furat TV came in number seven in terms of viewership in the Shiite dominated Southern Iraq (IREX. 2010). As for the Kurds, Masud Barazani, head of Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Jalal Talabani, Iraqi President and head of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), are both governing the

independent northern region. Barazani, who also heads the Kurdish Region, is known to be more chauvinistic than Talabani and has more popularity in Erbil and Dohuk; however, his Arabic speaking channel Taakhi TV stopped broadcasting few years ago. Hence Hurria channel which is run by Talabani was selected. Finally, the Sunni Coalition 'Iraqi Accord Front' led by the Iraqi Islamic Party was the largest Sunni bloc before 2010 and won in some Sunni dominated governorates; thus, the Baghdad TV channel was chosen.

1.5 The 2010 Iraqi Elections

The general election that took place on March 7, 2010 was meant to elect a Council of Representatives or Parliament which would choose a new Cabinet. The Iraqi High Electoral Commission (IHEC) is responsible for organising the elections. In its 2005 electoral law that was amended in 2009, IHEC stipulated that 325 seats were allocated for the Council of Representatives, 8 seats for Christians, Yazidis, and other minorities, and 7 compensatory seats for the winning slates. There are in Iraq 18 governorates that have 310 seats; each governorate has a certain number of seats allocated to it based on the number of its population (IHEC n.d.).

In the 2010 elections, the Iraqiya slate won the majority of votes with 91 seats since it got 2,851,823 votes. The slate is headed by the former Prime Minister, Ayad Allawi, who is regarded as a secular Shiite. Iraqiya slate has a Sunni majority. The second slate is the State of Law led by the present Prime Minister, Nouri Maliki. It won 89 seats with 2,797,624 votes and has a Shiite majority. The third winner is the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) that is headed by the leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Ammar Hakim. It scored 70 seats; the majority of these seats were secured by the Sadr movement that got 39 seats. INA has a Shiite majority, too. As for the fourth winner, it was taken by the Kurdish Alliance with 43 seats. It is led by Masud Barazani and Jalal Talabani. As for the remaining winners, they were as follows: Gorran (8) seats; Iraqi Accord Front (6) seats; Unity Alliance of Iraq (4) seats; Kurdistan Islamic Union (3) seats; Islamic Group of Kurdistan (3) seats (The Associated Press 2010; *The New York Times* 2010). In order to make further alliances, some slates were merged to win a majority in the Council of Representatives. Most importantly, the State of Law and the INA slates got together in June 2010 to form a Shiite majority with 159 seats.

1.6 Why Television?

Television is regarded by some media scholars as 'an educator virtually without peer' (Iyengar and Kinder 1987, p. 2) since that it shapes the way people view the world and in particular political issues around them (Kubey and Csíkszentmihályi 1990). Television is commonly endorsed by the general public in many countries as their most important source of news, and its news is the most trustworthy (Hartley 1995, p. 177). However, this does not mean that TV news presents more information on election or other events in general since newspapers can cover more details due to the nature of its publication. But TV coverage is believed to have an effect on viewers which is not only limited to 'changing everyday life', but it also alters 'public perceptions of issues and problems' (Altheide 1977, p. 27). As part of the theory of cultivation, the public share values, attitudes, and even sentiments due to the influence of television in what is called 'mainstreaming' (Huston et al. 1992, p. 35). In other words, television is regarded a cultural force that molds public opinion and social practices. Ellis asserts that television 'attempts definition, tries out explanations, creates narratives, talks over, makes intelligible, harness speculation, tries to make fit….' (2000, p. 79).

In the European Union, for example, 60% of the citizens mentioned that television news is their basic source of information on European issues and affairs (European Commission 1996-99). It is argued that television viewership in emerging democracies, such as the case of Mexico, has a very large role to play especially during election times (Lawson and McCann 2005). However, this does not mean that state-run TV channels have a direct influence on the people's political views or the way they see the world. In relation to the Arab world, there is very little research if none conducted on the role of TV in shaping political attitudes since such kinds of audience research studies are usually rejected by typical Arab governments due to their sensitive nature that usually touches on the reality of the existing political systems.

In relation to Iraq, most Iraqis prefer to take their news from TV although the number of Iraqi newspapers and radio stations far exceed that of TV channels. The US Department of State conducted a survey in October 2003 in which most Iraqis claimed they watched television more than listening to radio or reading newspapers. Almost 93% surveyed owned a TV set (CPA 2003, M-146-03). More than any other medium,

television is considered the main source of news for Iraqis, according to the Iraqi Communications and Media Commission (CMC 2005, p. 5).

In another survey conducted in 2005, 95% of the respondents said they owned a TV set more than radio and telephone devices (USATODAY 2005). This ownership finding is not proof of viewing or importance of TV in a political context. Further, 68.1% Iraqis surveyed in November 2005 said that they relied on TV to know about the events in the country more than any other medium (Iraq Center for Research and Strategic Studies 2005). Finally, the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) sponsored a poll survey in 2010 that revealed that the majority of Iraqis take their news from TV channels especially Iraqi satellite television. On a daily basis an average of 16 million Iraqis watch television (IREX. 2010, p. 9).

The main reason behind the popularity of television is that its news is fast and provides an audiovisual coverage of events, making it very appealing to viewers (Butler 2002). In Iraq's case, television covers almost all the events taking place (International Media Support 2003), including programmes on the news coverage of newspapers. Besides, security risks prevent people from moving around to buy newspapers, so many prefer to return to their homes immediately after finishing work and receive the news from TV (Ghazi 2006).

After the 2003 occupation, the number of newspaper sales relatively declined because many from the educated middle class, who mostly read newspapers, began to leave the country after the escalation of violence (al-Jezairy, 2006, p. 20). Also, newspaper distribution got affected by the prevailing violence which surely hindered the delivery of different publications to their readers.

Another factor that makes TV superior to newspapers is that not all Iraqis are literate, making TV a preferred outlet for many of them. According to UNESCO, the rate of illiteracy in Iraq skyrocketed after 2003 mainly due to violence and the government's preoccupation with security rather than education. One in five Iraqis aged between 10 and 49 years cannot read or write (UNESCO 2010). As for Internet use, Iraqis are still very much dependent on other media outlets since only 1.1% of the population use Internet. This is the lowest rate of Internet use in the whole region (Internet World Stats 2010) which is probably due of the lack of electricity and the relatively high cost of Internet.

Finally, serious content analysis based studies on the new Iraqi TV channels are very scarce. Ibrahim Al-Marashi, for instance, studied a handful of Iraqi TV stations, but his study lacks the depth of content analysis as he made some generalisations on the channels' trends and affiliations based on some statements or even words (Al-Marashi 2007). Another study was conducted by a researcher(s) associated with the Cambridge Arab Media Project (CAMP). The Sunni Cairo-based Rafidain TV and the Shiite Furat TV were examined by analysing two weekly religious shows aired by Furat and one show broadcast by Rafidain TV. However, the findings of the study, that claim that the two channels endeavour to be objective and balanced, are based on generalisations. There is neither a discussion of the methodology followed nor any details on how the researcher(s) reached his conclusion (Cambridge Arab Media Project 2010).

1.7 Research Questions

By conducting this study, I wished to answer the following questions:

1. To what extent did Iraqia, Furat, Hurria, and Baghdad TV channels apply the principles of good journalism in their election campaign coverage? How did they differ?

2. How did these channels present issues during the election campaign? Which issues were made prominent?

3. Did these channels focus on the coverage of candidates' characteristics or horse-race aspect of the General Election?

Amid the media confusion, lack of serious academic research on the Iraqi media, and the continuous accusations from different parties that some channels air unfair and subjective news, this study aims at answering to what extent the channels investigated have observed the basic principles of journalism or not. Further, one of the main topics of interest for media researchers around the world is to examine the coverage of issues and candidates and/or horse-race because they shed light on the nature of the media studied. Finally, the Iraqia channel which is expected to be an independent media outlet needs to be further scrutinized in order to determine whether it followed the ideology of the Prime Minister's party or it covered the elections based on the basic requirements of news value.

1.8 Procedures

Methodologically, this study was founded upon a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the TV newscasts that measured three main aspects: (1) the programme level (2) the story level (3) and candidate/topic level (sub-story). The rationale behind using a three-level analysis is to approach the TV messages from different angles in order to have a more comprehensive and better understanding of the explicit and implicit meaning. Hence, there is a need to have three coding frames.

In such a hierarchical research design, the author quantified different characteristics of news items at a number of different levels. As a first step, the newscast content was examined at the programme level then the story and candidate/topic levels by counting the number of stories and the time allotted to them and the issues covered by each TV channel. This was partly based on Goodyear-Grant's Ph.D. study that mostly focused on the story and sub-story levels of analysis (2007). Then, the analysis turned to the production and format techniques used with news stories. Finally, the analysis focused on the kind of language used in the newscast in terms of positive/negative attributes. This allowed the author to understand the kind of treatment a political candidate/party or topic covered by the TV channel.

Finally, comparisons and contrasts were made between the nature of the TV messages of the four channels in terms of objectivity and impartiality measures. This kind of comparison allowed the author to understand the nature of the issues/candidates TV coverage. Entman (1991) commented that comparing media channels was very important to understand how each one presented the different topics and candidates.

In order to understand the new media developments that occurred in Iraq, it is important to read about the change that occurred to the Iraqi media after 2003 and the main players who shaped this media as will be shown in chapter two.

1.9 Thesis Outline

This thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter One offers an introduction to the study and cites the research questions that need to be answered. Chapter Two gives an overview of the Iraqi media prior to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, elaborates on the Iraqi media scene after the invasion, and provides a context to the Iraqi TV channels investigated. Chapter Three discusses the principles of good journalism and how journalists should adhere to these principles especially during election times. This chapter

also sheds light on the nature of media studies on election with special emphasis on objectivity.

Chapter Four offers a background to the media studies on elections in the Arab world and then investigates the available studies and reports on the coverage of the 2005 Iraqi elections.

Chapter Five introduces the methodology followed by the author and then examines the pilot study undertaken to test the coding frames.

The results and findings of the thesis are written in Chapter Six that focuses on the programme level, Chapter Seven that discusses the story level, and Chapter Eight that investigates the candidate/topic level. Finally, Chapter Nine is the conclusion that sums up the findings of the whole thesis.

Chapter Two

The Iraqi Media after the 2003 War

This chapter offers an overview of the Iraqi media during the Baath rule of Iraq (1968-2003) and later elaborately discusses the changes that occurred to the media sector after the US-led occupation of Iraq which is the primary focus of this study. The chapter seeks to give the reader an understanding of the different types of influence that shaped the Iraqi media after 2003 and offers some analyses and conclusions on the general media trends that are prevalent in today's Iraq.

The Iraqi Media Prior to 2003

When the Baath Party took control of the country, the state-control of media channels intensified especially with the beginning of Saddam Hussein's rule in 1979. Yet, major developments occurred during this era for three main reasons: (1) the Baath Party made use of the extra oil revenues that were generated after the 1972 nationalization of oil; (2) the Baath Party's policy to expand its ideology to the Arab homeland made the Iraqi government think of ways to reach the Arab masses and develop its communication facilities; (3) the introduction of modern mass communication technologies made the Arab world closer than before. Hanna Batatu asserted that Saddam Hussein who took control of Iraq in late 1979 managed to consolidate his power with the help of the different constituents of the Iraqi society:

> It is true that the top of the present power structure rests to an important degree on solidarities based on region and kinship. It is also true that the distance between the Kurdish minority and the regime has widened. Saddam Hussein has, however, associated the Shi'is more meaningfully with his regime and extended economic benefits to their areas (Batatu 2004, pp. 221-22).

In relation to the first point, the former Iraqi Minister of Information, Abdul Ghani Abdul Ghafur, gave some figures that showed the disparity between the budgets of Iraqi radio and television channels before and after 1968. For example, the budget allocated for radio and television in 1973 was 4 million dinars (approximately $12

million), while it was 650,000 dinars (approximately $1,950,000) in 1968. INA's budget was 135,000 dinars in 1968 (approximately $405,000); yet, it reached 900,000 dinars (approximately $2,700,000) in 1973 (Abdul Ghafur 1974, p. 98). We will first have a look the nature of Saddam Hussein's media policy.

During the Baath rule, the media were generally shaped by government's policies. Social and moral values and norms such as the famous 'Faith Campaign'[1] in the 1990s were all dictated to the public via the mass media. Thompson (1990) asserts that ideology is a 'meaning in the service of power' (p. 7); hence, the official media is part and parcel of political system controlling the country. The media becomes a mere tool to convey the ideology of the ruling political party especially in totalitarian states like Iraq before 2003.

Foreign journalists were not free to move and report in the country unless they were accompanied by government minders who were mostly from the intelligence apparatus. Yet, the condition of the media in Iraq before 2003 was not unique in the Arab world because many Arab countries followed the same strict media policy (Ayish 2002, p. 138). For example, Rugh in his work on the Arab media described news presentation in Arab media as being politically biased because they were generally utilised by different Arab governments to serve their political interests (Rugh 2004a, p. 17).

According to the United Nations Arab Human Development report, there are unified features that characterise the Arab media because their 'communication policies' are similar. Most Arab governments 'employ media channels for political propaganda and entertainment, at the expense of other functions and services' (UNDP 2003, p. 65). The general characteristics of Arab media are: authoritarian, unidimensional in the sense that the media 'discourse mostly excludes the other point of view, keeping it away from the public mind', and official as most media channels wait for the official line before reporting events or never report an event unless told so by the concerned officials (UNDP 2003, p. 62).

In order to understand the media policy, it is important to have a closer look into the way the media were viewed by the authorities. The Iraqi Minister of Information during the Iran-Iraq War, Lattif Ansaif Jassim, repeatedly emphasised Saddam Hussein's

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[1] This was a religious campaign which started in the 1990s during the economic sanctions. Saddam Hussein encouraged but did not force Iraqi women to wear the veil.

famous speech which was addressed to a group of journalists working for Dar al-Jamahir in the end of 1979, saying: 'We tell you to write without limitation or hesitation or fear and whether the state is satisfied or not with what you say' (Jassim 1990, p. 152). This statement indicates the double standards held by Hussein toward the media since the reality was something completely different. Hussein himself was believed to have given an order when he was Deputy President that 'programs should not concentrate on "sad" or "negative" aspects of Iraq and that programs should strive to be more entertaining and happy' (Boyd 1982, p. 403). Hussein was described in Reporters Sans Frontières' (RSF) report as a 'predator of press freedom' who controlled the media with 'an iron fist and has given them the single mission of relaying his propaganda' (2002a, p. 3 and p. 1). Many communication experts and politicians in the West regarded Saddam's media as mere propaganda, whereas the Iraqi government thought of it as a vehicle to educate the public and convey facts. Within such a contradictory way of interpreting the nature of the media, one has to be careful in assessing media messages. What William Hatchen and James Scotton said about media messages is true here: 'one person's truth is another person's propaganda, and vice versa' (2007, p. 15).

Jassim directly and indirectly oriented Iraqi journalists to become tools used by the government to strengthen its position and policy. During the inauguration of the new headquarters of the Iraqi Journalists Syndicate on the 30th of April 1989, Jassim said:

> We will not direct this or that journalist to write in a certain way, but we direct writers to put the interests of the homeland and the [revolutionary] process above all considerations. This is important in order to avoid making a political mistake and or a mistake that might anger this or that foreign country. These are basic principles followed by journalists rather than editorial lines dictated by the parties that control the press and media (Jassim 1990, p. 190).

Jassim wanted Iraqi journalists to practice self-censorship in order to avoid falling into trouble with the authorities. Within such an atmosphere, it was understandable that the majority of Iraqi journalists and writers were living in fear least what they wrote was interpreted by a senior Baathist as 'anti-revolutionary'. Jassim himself acknowledged this fear when he once referred to a news conference held in the former Soviet Union to

criticise an arms deal with Iran, but it was not covered by the Iraqi media. Instead, it was only published in a confidential bulletin that was circulated among senior officials entitled – al-Rassid (Jassim 1990, p. 218 & p. 227). Jassim commented: 'We have to make ourselves used to considering every piece of information except what touches the national and regional security' (Jassim 1990, p. 219). Other problems were related to the fear held by journalists that they must focus their attention on the official rather than the event covered. Jassim mentioned this issue by referring to a recurrent phenomenon; a certain state minister might inaugurate an art gallery, yet the only photos that appear in the newspapers are those of the minister, while the artist and his/her works are ignored (Jassim 1990, pp. 223-4).

It is important to note that the media policies followed in Iraq were based on the doctrines of the Baath Party which used to discredit and suspect any foreign news agency or journalist working in the country. Many jargons that evolved around a conspiracy woven against the Baath Party were repeatedly used in the media such as 'imperialist powers', 'colonialist aggression', 'ugly occupation'…etc. Bengio called these jargons 'code words' and 'value loaded' expressions that were recurrent in the Iraqi media (1985, p. 9 and p. 10). Indeed, Saddam Hussein used the idea of a 'foreign conspiracy' threatening to destroy Iraq as a tool to unify the public and create an emergency state wherein more political, social, and economic restrictions could be freely applied (see for example Gray 2010). Abdul Ghani Abdul Ghafur, for example, objected to the concept of free media, claiming that 'liberal and destructive concepts that are advocated under the banner of freedom of the press together with the regressive intermediaries and foreign proxies continue spreading the spirit of despair and sluggishness among Arab citizens by what is published in the media' (Abdul Ghafur 1974, p. 57). The Baath National Policy Convention that was signed after 1968 mentioned that there must a struggle against all the concepts, theories, trends, methods that 'spread sectarianism, chauvinism, racism, regionalism, defeat, liberalism, and others that serve imperialism and its foundations' (ibid., p. 59). Baathists called for 'Revolutionary media' that can influence the Arab masses and ultimately help in achieving Arab unity. The media must 'reflect the Revolution in a detailed, forthright, and innovative manner so as to become an inspiration for the masses and the educated elite not only in Iraq but in the Arab homeland [as a

whole]' (ibid., p. 104). In fact, there were serious dangers in advocating such media rhetoric because other Arab leaders were not pleased with the idea that Iraq would lead the Arab masses. Sultan Qaboos of Oman once revealed that 'Iraqis… had arrogantly fancied themselves as the leaders of the Arab world. Consequently, Oman's relations with Iraq had never been very strong' (Wikileaks, 2008).

During the economic sanctions that lasted over ten years, the Iraqi media rhetoric became more intensified with presenting Western schemes and conspiracies against the 'Baath Revolution' that were designed by 'the American imperialists' who were 'out to punish Iraq as a nation' (Bengio 2000, 94).

After the 1968, Iraqi television remained under the same state management with stricter monitoring and censorship. During this period, the government exercised full authoritarian control over the production and flow of the mass media. The programmes were characterised as 'heavily political', for media officials devoted a major 'time to documentaries about the progressive stance taken by the government' (Boyd 1982, p. 113; Sinjari 2006, p. 479). Some media scholars categorised the Iraqi media during Hussein's rule as 'Marxist-Leninist' since 'the media were subordinate to state interest and were harnessed to serve only one political party, Baath' (Kim and Hama-Saeed 2008, pp. 579-580).

In particular, television was closely monitored by media officials and employees to filter what was aired. The author of this book spent months working as a freelance translator at the headquarters of the Iraqi TV station in Baghdad in 1996 and 1997. During that time, the Directorate of Monitoring and Translation had a notice board in which instructions were given to the employees who check everything aired on TV. Aside from political discussions, sexual scenes, and religious controversies that must be deleted, one of the striking directives was to cut any scene showing food because the government did not want Iraqis to see varieties of fruits and meat during the economic sanctions. The government used to distribute food rations through the UN Oil-For-Food Programme during which Iraqis used to get the same kinds of cheap and in many cases expired food every month. In this context, Ofra Bengio was right in saying that Saddam 'tried to inculcate patience…, an oft-praised Islamic value) in the Iraqi people and manipulate it for his political purposes especially to encourage his much-abused populace

to withstand the post-1990 sanctions' (2000, p. 92). Also, the notice board mentioned that any reference or scene that encouraged pregnancy must be deleted. This shows that the government was facing great difficulties in coping with the increasing demands of the Iraqi population living under an embargo. Due to the threats of punishment such as imprisonment or even torture, staff checking TV series and movies paid extra care to delete any potentially 'suspicious' materials. For example, a colleague who translated George Orwell's film *1984* was shocked when he knew that the authorities refused to air the film because Iraq's political system bore some similarities to Orwell's imaginary authoritarian regime especially in the way Iraqi security forces used to monitor the activities of people.

In general, no criticism against the country or the government was allowed in Iraq. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) decreed order (840) in 1986, stating that 'any person who insults or criticises the President, his entourage, the Ba'ath Party, the RCC, or even the government' faces a death penalty. In terms of press freedom in 2002, Iraq ranked 130 out of 139 countries around the world that exercised media restriction, and it was in top ten of the 'countries that were hostile to the media and journalists' (RSF 'Press Freedom Index' 2002b; RSF Report 2003, p. 2). As the government closely monitored the media, whatever was published was immediately investigated by government officials that is contrasted to what happens in Iraq after 2003, according to an Iraqi journalist (Kim and Hama-Saeed 2008, pp. 585-6).

In relation to the Iraqi TV, the Education Television Station became operational on the 17th of June 1971, and it worked in coordination with the Iraqi Ministry of Education (Al-Rawi 1992, p. 121 & p. 144). In 1972, a new TV station (Channel 7) was formed that worked as part of Baghdad TV (Abdul Ghafur 1974, p. 39). Starting from the 10th of November 1973, the hours of transmission were reduced in order to 'enable the citizens to have enough rest and assist them to work actively in the next day' (al-Rawi 1992, p. 111). Baghdad Cultural TV was formed in the 1990s that was later turned into Baghdad Satellite channel whose headquarters in Baghdad was bombed during the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. In the beginning of the second millennium, there were only four official television channels: two Iraqi National televisions, Iraqi Satellite TV, and Ashabab (Youth) TV. A couple of years before the 2003 war, the Iraqi Ministry of

Information offered a wireless subscription to more than a dozen Arab TV channels, but the service stopped after the occupation in 2003. Satellite television reception was strictly banned because information censorship was not possible; any individual caught having a satellite dish was either fined or imprisoned for few months. The state control of the media meant that messages must be directly controlled by the government and that fact are sometimes distorted such as the case of the Iraqi media coverage of the 1973 Arab War with Israel (Rugh 1975, pp. 312-315).

Yet, the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan was different. Partisan Kurdish television channels exceeded twenty, broadcasting from the northern region of Iraq in which Kurds had their own relative independence from the capital Baghdad after 1991 (RSF 2002a, p. 2). Media personnel in Kurdistan were first called 'mountain journalists' because they worked in the 1990s in propagating against the central government and in attracting Kurds to join the *Pashmerga*, the armed militia.

All media outlets from 1991 up to date are affiliated with the Kurdish parties especially the PUK and KDP. The only independent newspaper, *Hawlati*, which was established in 2000, faces great pressures from the regional government since some of its journalists were jailed for 'covering controversial stories' (Axe 2006). Another Kurdish newspaper, *Rozhnama*, published on 20 July 2010 an article which accused the ruling Kurdish parties of profiting millions of dollars by smuggling oil to Iran. As a result, the Kurdish regional government filed a defamation lawsuit against the newspaper and demanded one billion dollars in compensation, which is regarded as the largest in the history of Iraq (JFO 2010).

Furthermore, there were more than seven main daily newspapers (*al-Iraq*, *al-Jamhuriah*, *al-Qaddisiah*, *al-Thawra*, *Babel* (Arabic and English versions), *Baghdad Observer* (English), and *al-Baath Al-Riadhi* (sports)), few government and privately owned weekly newspapers (*al-Musawr al-Arabi*, *al-Zawra'*, *al-Iqtisadi* (economics), *Nabdh al-Shabab*, *al-Ra'i, Al-Zamen, Uruk Al-Siahiah* (tourism)*, Al-Ittihad*, *Al-Maw'id*, *Alwan*, *Sawt Al-Talabah*, and *Al-'Illam* (issued by the Department of Communication at Baghdad University)), some magazines (*Alif Baa'*, *Wa'i al-Umal*, *Al-Mar'ah*, *Al-Shabab*, *Ishtar*, *Al-Rafidain*, *Al-Kawthar*, *Al-Rasheed, Majalati* (children) and *Al-Mizmar* (children)), and a handful of newspapers in other governorates (*Sawt al-Ta'mim* in

Kirkuk, *Al-Nassiriah* in Dhi Qar, *Nainawa* in Mosul, *Basrah*, *Al-Furat*, *Al-Jana'in* in Babil, *Sawt al-Qadissiahtayn*, *Wassit*, *Al-Anbar*, and *Tikrit*). Aside from publishing books, the Ministry of Culture in general was responsible by its different directorates for publishing some literary and academic journals such as *Al-Aqllam*, *Al-Thaqafah Al-Ajnabiah* and *Afaq Arabiah*.

Oddly enough, media experts have not pointed out the relative freedom that the weekly private newspapers enjoyed during Saddam's rule. These publications, which can be regarded as Iraq's former yellow journalism, started to criticise some government practices and officials (without mentioning their names) since the government thought of offering channels to vent frustration due to the pressure and hardship of living under the economic sanctions (see one example in Daragahi 2003). Very few Iraqi journalists were able to criticise the government in a direct way. Dawood Al-Farhan, for example, wrote a series of articles in *Alif Baa'* magazine that were entitled 'Balad Sa'id, Balad Nazil' (One country up, one country down) in which the writer sarcastically compared between Iraq (going down) and Japan (going up). As a result, the writer was imprisoned for his cynical views and was later pardoned by Hussein. Others like Mu'yad Ni 'ma who worked as a cartoonist 'drew fire for his cartoons, which always pushed the edge of what was tolerated in the press' (Wikileaks 2005).

In relation to radio developments, Voice of the Masses radio was established on the 1st of May 1970 with emphasis on the issues related to the Iraqi armed forces. In 1974, it started broadcasting 26 hours per day, but from 1976, the radio became focused on Arab regional issues rather than the local ones (Al-Rawi 1992, pp. 74-5; Abdul Ghafur 1974, p. 39). The radio stopped broadcasting few days after the beginning of the 1991 Gulf War since it was merged with Radio Baghdad (Al-Rawi 2010, p. 200).

On the 1st of June 1972, live radio transmission from Baghdad Radio started making more listeners tuned in. During the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi government utilised all its resources to counter the Iranian propaganda and that of the Iraqi opposition parties like the Shiite Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq whose members used to operate in Iran. Iraq dramatically increased its radio transmission; about 244 thousand hours were broadcast to an average of 120 hours each day between 4th of September 1980 to the 4th of September 1986 (Al-Rawi 1992, p. 58). Iraqi journalists were involved in the

war either as soldiers or media personnel. For example, INA workers before 1980 reached 700, but only 246 journalists, editors, reporters worked for INA during the war as others served in the army (Jassim 1990, p. 227 & p. 226).

As part of the Baath Party expansionist policy that is discussed above, Iraq intensified its efforts to spread the Baath ideology with covert radio transmission, making Iraqis 'the most enthusiastic supporters of non-official radio in the Arab World' (Boyd 1982, 404). Among the radio channels established were: 'Voice of Arab Syria' (1976); 'Voice of the Arabian Peninsula People' (1973-1975) (anti-Saudi Arabia); 'Voice of the Eritrea Revolution'; and 'Voice of Egypt Arabism' (1979). Throughout the programmes aired, the Iraqi government wanted to say that 'Iraq, and Baath philosophy, should lead the Arab World' (Boyd 1982, p.405). After the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, Saddam Hussein became more enthusiastic to spread his pan-Arabism policy, making some Arab Gulf countries fear his ambition. As a result, Saudi Arabia urged Iraq to sign a non-aggression agreement in March 1989 (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 1990, p. 24) just about a year before Iraq invaded Kuwait.

As for the Internet, it was only introduced into the country in early 2000, making Iraq one of the last countries in the world to have Internet connection. It was supplied to the Iraqi public with a very limited access because it was prohibited to have unmonitored communication with the outside world. For example, ordinary Iraqis could not use Yahoo and Hotmail emails because they were restricted. The only legal email account must be created via uruklink.net which was the official Internet provider. Few days before the onslaught of the military operations on Iraq, the official website of the Iraqi government was hacked by seemingly US hackers, and an anti-Baath announcement was posted.

After the invasion of Kuwait and the bombing of the main TV and radio stations around the country, a great deterioration in the media field as a whole occurred because of the lack of the necessary funds and the required human resources. As a reaction to this reality, Uday Saddam Hussein, who once became the chairperson of the Iraqi Journalists' Syndicate established his own *Babil* (Arabic and English versions) and *Baath al-Riadhi* (sport) newspapers with up-to-date news as well as making Shabab (Youth) radio and TV channels that used to broadcast Western pirated movies and programmes in order to provide an outlet for Iraqis to the outside world.

Due to Hussein's foreign policy, many neighbouring countries had clandestine radio stations transmitting to Iraqis. Saudi Arabia, for example, established radio 'Voice of Iraq' in which Georges Mansour, an Iraqi exiled journalist, worked (Reporters without Borders 2003, A new but fragile freedom). Later, Mansour worked for the Iraqi Media Network in post-2003 Iraq. Also, Iran was very active in supporting anti-Saddam radio and television channels such as SCIRI's 'Voice of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq' which later became 'Voice of the Rebellious Iraq'. Syria was also involved in its support of clandestine radio stations such as the 'Voice of Iraq' (Al-Rawi 2010b, pp. 196-200).

Despite all the above mentioned facts, Iraqi media before the 2003 war never witnessed any kind of sectarian rhetoric, religious discrimination, or racist remarks because these practices were strictly prohibited by the law. Differences between religious and ethnic groups existed, but they were 'rarely articulated in official, public debate, nor used as a basis by politicians or religious and community leaders to criticize the others' (Al-Marashi 2007, p. 97). For example, the terms 'Shiites' or 'Sunnis' were never used (Bengio 1985, p. 13). Even the surnames of Iraqi officials were not disclosed in order not to suggest their religious or racial origins (ibid., 14), which was part of a decree issued in 1978 (Davis 2005, p. 327). In fact, Iraq is ethnically and religious very rich, having Muslims (Shiites and their various doctrines and Sunnis), Christians (Chaldians, Assyrians, Armenians…etc), Sabians, Yezidis, Jews…etc. There are also different races like Arabs, Kurds, Turkomen, Persians, Anglo-Indians…etc. In fact, Saddam Hussein was aware of the sensitivity which accompanies the issue of sectarianism especially that Iran waged a fierce propaganda campaign during the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988) to win Iraqi Shiites by its side. Hence, Shiite political parties and the flagellation ceremonies were banned, but the Iraqi government used to air speeches by famous Shiite clerics during certain religious events in order to address more Iraqis. On the other hand, Saddam Hussein's government prohibited Sunni fundamental movements like the Saudi backed Wahabism/Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhood. Many official books were published and TV shows aired to counter any extreme religious propaganda coming from abroad. As for the Kurds, the Iraqi government stood against the Kurdish race chauvinism, fearing the instability and disunity that may be ensued in the country. However, there were many Kurdish language publications, and the language itself was

taught in some high schools in Baghdad unlike the case in neighboring countries where Kurdish language was banned. In fact, Saddam Hussein's aim was to establish a secular political system that was the only guarantee to secure a unified Iraq and to avoid religious or ethnic rifts that would cost him lives, efforts, and money.

According to paragraph 200, article 2 of the 1969 Iraqi Penal Code, 'any individual who encourages sectarian or religious differences and incites violence among the sects and races or creates grudges and hatred among the people of Iraq shall be punished by imprisonment of not more than seven years'. The temporary Iraqi Constitution decreed on the 16th of June 1970 also emphasized that 'any activity that aims at disintegrating the national unity of the masses or inciting sectarian and racial differences is strictly banned' (al-Daqouqi 1986, pp. 240-1). Having in mind the strict observance of laws and the strong censorship, Iraqi journalists were not involved in these practices, at least in public. Other media regulations include paragraphs 225, 226, 227, 433, 434, 435, and 436 which deal with defamation and insult in public. The punishment varies according to the case and its circumstances, ranging from imprisonment of not more than seven years to fine payments. These strict rules entailed that journalists should be very careful when they write. A senior Iraqi journalist compared the post 2003 media in Iraq with that during Saddam Hussein's rule, saying:

> Definitely there is more press freedom now [post-Saddam], but the question is, who cares about the media reports? During the Saddam era, every single word of a journalist had to go through censorship, but there was (constant) monitoring by the government as to what was reported in the newspapers. If a certain establishment were criticized, the Baathist government would immediately investigate and correct the problems. But these days, the government rarely does anything about what the media reported (Kim and Hama-Saeed 2008, pp. 585-586).

In a basic questionnaire designed and distributed in 2011 to six Iraqi journalists who worked before 2003, the respondents agreed on the main features of the Iraqi media during Saddam Hussein's rule. For example, three out of five respondents said that their main concerns and fears were related to their safety and security, while two mentioned that their concerns were connected to their welfare. Only one journalist did not answer

this question. Two journalists mentioned that they had a security incident which was linked to their profession. Though the nature of the incidents was not clarified, most Iraqi journalists who committed mistakes whether intentionally or not were usually punished or humiliated. Also, only two out of six journalists published a critical article that either criticised the government or its officials. In relation to the journalists' welfare, five out of six respondents mentioned that the salaries given to journalists were 'not at all' enough for them. Only one journalist said that the salary was 'somehow' enough. This is mainly due to the hardship Iraqis in general had to go through during the economic sanctions. All the respondents mentioned that they had to work in a second job in order to make ends meet. Three of the respondents said that the alternative jobs were not related to the media field. Unexpectedly, four out of six respondents mentioned that there were journalistic principles like balance, objectivity, and impartiality followed at the time. The author assumes that the respondents are fully aware of the nature of these media terms since five out of six of them hold Ph.D. degrees in media and communication. Besides, four respondents mentioned that they had media training in different areas prior to 2003 which was mostly organised by the Syndicate of Iraqi Journalists. One of the striking answers was related to the editorial control of the publications. Five respondents agreed that their editor used to give the journalists the freedom and capacity to produce news. Only one respondent mentioned that Iraqi journalists received the news from INA without having the necessary freedom to write original news reports.

In brief, Iraqi journalists did not have the freedom to freely express their opinions because of the nature of the former regime. Due to the nature of the one-party rule, journalists were financially encouraged and professionally required to write on the positive achievements of the government rather than the negative policies. This was evident in the editorials written and the events covered. However, they were many exceptions that would be ignored if not detected by the censorship radar. If someone is caught crossing the official line or disseminating banned information which are both known to every Iraqi journalist, he would either be imprisoned or tortured. As for gatekeepers, they were greatly pressured to make sure that no critical views were communicated to the public.

Before discussing the Iraqi post-war media, it is important to shed light on the role of some international media organisation in documenting the media progress, improving the professional standards of journalists in Iraq, and revising the existing media codes.

2. International Media Involvement

Some international media organisations worked on media plans even before the official end of the military operations. It is not clear whether they acted alone or were motivated by the US government, since the documents released by the NSA clearly emphasised involving international media organisations in the Iraqi media. In all cases, the UN is mandated to work under international law in occupied countries, and UNESCO is the organ to implement any media project together with UNDP. After the war, about twenty media organisations were involved in the Iraqi media and they shared information in order not to duplicate efforts (Jayasekera 2003a).

The first media organisation involved was the London-based Arab Press Freedom Watch (APFW) which held a discussion in September 2002 in London on the Iraqi media after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Another APFW meeting in which the Iraqi media was discussed was in May 2003 in Cairo with the involvement of some Iraqi journalists (AFPW Report 2003, p. 2).

Other organisations that participated in developing the Iraqi media included: Index on Censorship, International Media Support (IMS), the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) Internews, Index on Censorship, Alliance Internationale pour la Justice, the Institute for War and Peace Reporting and Article 19. Before the official end of military operations, twenty media organisations met on 24 April 2003 in London to discuss future media plans in Iraq. Among the participants were representatives from Baltic Media Centre, BBC World Service Trust, Danish School of Journalism, European Journalism Centre, International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX), International Federation of Journalists, Internews International, Internews Europe, Media Action International, Media Diversity Institute, Open Society Institute, Press Now Foundation, U.S. Committee for a Free Press in Iraq, and World Association of Newspapers (International Media Support. 2003).

Between 1-3 June 2003, the US Department of State through *Internews* organised a conference in Athens, Greece to discuss the future of Iraqi media and to propose a code of conduct; however, the event took place without the presence of 'indigenous' Iraqi journalists (Price 2007, p. 7). Seventy-five media experts from twenty one countries attended the meeting. Ironically, some CPA experts, who were involved in writing the new media codes, were not aware of this conference, according to spokesperson of the Coalition, Naheed Mehta, while State Department experts did not know about the CPA's new media decrees (Daragahi 2003). This lack of coordination reflects the level of confusion at the time of restructuring the new Iraqi media.

At the Athens conference, an Iraqi Media Law Working Group was formed and co-chaired by the Shiite Iraqi exile, Hamid AlKifaey, who became the spokesperson of the Iraqi Governing Council in 2003. The Conference advocated new rules to be applied with its motto: 'A Law to Promote, Protect and Regulate Free, Independent, Pluralistic Media During the Transition to Democracy'. During the conference, it was suggested establishing the Interim Media Commission which later became CMC and a 'Press and Broadcast Council' (*Internews,* 2003). The organizers suggested having the IMN representative, Rielly, promised to take its proposals to Baghdad; however, he later abandoned the proposed suggestions due to the Defense Department's control of IMN. The aim of this gathering was stated in its report: 'To achieve a free, independent and pluralistic Iraqi media that promote and protect freedom of expression in a democratic society' (World Free Press 2003), which literally followed what the Pentagon designed in its 'White Paper' project.

Furthermore, the Institute of War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) received $109,000 in 2004 from NED in order to 'strengthen the independent media sector' in Iraq (Democracy Projects Database 2004). However, the activities of IWPR were always shown to be an initiative from the organisation itself rather than funded from another side. Other media organisations preferred to work on a small scale from outside Iraq especially in Jordan and Lebanon due to the deteriorating security situation. Finally, the government of the United States supported other NGOs in the 2002/2003 year as part of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). As a result, MEPI established two bureaus in the Arab world, one in the UAE and the other in Tunisia (Sakr 2006, p. 3). Also, Index

on Censorship was partly funded by the British Foreign Office's Human Rights Programmes Fund to support a group of Iraqi journalists to write reports that will be later published online and on paper (Jayasekera, 2003a).

In brief, some international media organisations worked closely with the US authorities to monitor the development process and to build a new media. The cooperation was meant to ensure that Iraqi journalists get a high standard training, but was also used by the US authorities to suggest that a great new change occurred in the media sector. Whether by US authorities or international organisations, millions of dollars were spent after 2003 on improving the Iraqi media. However, what has been achieved is the minimum in comparison to the money spent and the efforts exerted due to several factors.

3. CPA Media Establishment

In March 19 2003, the US-led coalition forces occupied Iraq and changed the whole political system. Tens of political and religious parties established their own newspapers and later radio and television stations, but the new media scene was characterised by its partisan nature with clear ethnic and sectarian orientation (see Appendix II). The new political system created an atmosphere wherein people started to publish newspapers freely, express their opinions in the media without fearing for their lives, and watch satellite television channels with no restrictions. For many Iraqis, this media reality opened new frontiers from which they can declare views and criticise opinions whether they were men or women (Prusher 2003 April, 6; al-Rawi 2011). Yet the honeymoon period did not last long. Due to the lack of security and the necessary infrastructure that was destroyed in the war, Iraqi journalists, who were mostly new to the profession with no media background, followed 'confused, mediocre journalistic standards' (Kim and Hama-Saeed 2008, p. 581).

On March 19 2003, operation 'Iraqi Freedom' started by US-led Coalition forces, and on May 1 2003, George W. Bush, the US President, announced the end of the military operations. US and other Coalition forces became the occupying powers, according to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483. The first US Civil Administrator, General Jay Garner, was appointed before the war as head of ORHA and started working from Kuwait, but did not stay long in office. After the removal of Garner,

President Bush appointed Paul Bremer as the head of CPA and Civil Administrator for Iraq. Bremer assumed his office on May 12.

In relation to IMN, it was supposed to replace the Ministry of Information in order to become a public service media outlet like the BBC and PBS. As for its hierarchical structure, the IMN administrator and SAIC employee, John Sandrock, reported to the CPA's director of strategic communication, John Buck. The latter, who directly reported to Paul Bremer, had a deputy called Dan Senor working as a White House liaison officer (BBC World Service Trust 2003). In April 10, 2003 IMN's radio aired its first programmes and in May 13, Iraqia TV channel started broadcasting with the help of 350 Iraqis; some of them came with the US forces as part of the Iraqi Reconstruction and Development Council set by ORHA (Dauenhauer and Lobe 2003). SAIC, the Pentagon's contractor, received $108.2 million to run the IMN, including a TV and radio station and Al-Sabah newspaper (Haner 2004). The IMN was led by Bob Reilly, who was a former director of the Voice of America, and was known for being a 'propagandist in the White House for the Nicaraguan contras' (Dauenhauer and Lobe, 2003). Reilly worked with a defense contractor called Mike Furlong (Kussi et al. 2003).

Despite having a $6 million monthly budget (Williams 2003, A14), many problems occurred in the Iraqia TV that started broadcasting on 1/5/2003 such as the availability of one studio only (IMN, 'The Network: Its Beginnings and Establishments'), the incompatibility of equipments brought from the US with the previous system, lack of documentaries and films, and low salaries given to local staff. IMN news director, Ahmed Al-Rikabi, revealed that in the beginning there was not enough furniture, so reporters had to sit and write 'reports on colleagues backs' (McCaul, 2003). In general, the US first investment in the Iraqi media was both 'misdirected and misused' (Jayasekera, 2004, p. 6), but the main problem with IMN was the CPA's interference in the editorial line. The following section discusses the CPA's communication rules and their importance in shaping the media scene.

4. CPA Media Regulations

As part of President Bush's plan for Iraq's media, the US government aimed to 'support a free, independent, and responsible Iraqi media (including television, radio, and print) that delivers high-quality content and responsible reporting throughout Iraq' (Bush

'Iraq Strategy' 2005). During its work in Iraq, the CPA stated its commitment to 'creating an environment in which freedom of speech is cherished and information can be exchanged freely and openly' (CPA/ORD/10 June 2003/14). Paul Bremer, for instance, pointed out the disparity that existed between the Iraqi media before and after the war, saying: 'Under the last regime, it was illegal to criticise the government. Now you are free to criticise whomever or whatever you want' (Jayasekera, 2003b). Hence, the original aim was to establish in Iraq the basis of democracy from which the process of democratisation in the Middle East can spread, and IMN was meant to be the model.

The CPA also appointed the British media expert Simon Haselock whose assignment came from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He previously worked as a spokesperson for the Office of High Representative in Bosnia and as its Media Commissioner for a temporary period before moving to Iraq (Price, 2007, p. 7). In June 2003, Haselock drafted some of the media regulations which were similar to the ones available in Kosovo (Williams, 2003, A14). As a result of Haselock's work, the CPA issued some regulations to organise the work of the Iraqi media though it stated that the 1969 Iraqi Penal Code would still be applied (CPA/ORD/9 June 2003/07). In other words, the media laws followed by Saddam Hussein would be functional and valid during the CPA's authority. Even after Iraq gained independence and the issuance of the 2005 Constitution, the older laws remained in effect according to Article 130. Order No. 14 issued on June 10 2003 under the title 'Prohibited Media Activity' stated that media organisations are not allowed to publish or broadcast material that incites violence against the Coalition forces. The penalties of violating these regulations vary from being arrested to paying $1000. This order created a great deal of confusion amongst journalists because it did not clarify or give details such as defining the word 'incites'; instead, the term remained vague up to this day, giving more liberty to CPA and later Iraqi officials to issue arrest warrants and imprison journalists. The other significant issue is whether the US sponsored IMN followed these regulations since its media outlets kept on calling for the elimination of Baathists from the society. In other words, it was calling for violence. However, it is not clear whether IMN played a role in instigating some groups to kill officials from the former government and senior Baathists after the occupation. Finally, the CPA issued order No. 100 which was its last decree, stating that Order No. 14

remains in effect but the Iraqi Prime Minister, instead of the CPA Civil Administrator, has the authority to enforce it (CPA/ORD/28 June 2004/100). In other words, the CPA decree is still valid in Iraq though the occupation officially ended.

On June 13 2003, the CPA selected the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) 25 members. On March 2004, the CPA issued an interim constitution known as the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) which guaranteed freedom of speech and religious expression. The TAL also stipulated that the national assembly election should be held by January 31 2005. The IGC formed later an interim government which was announced in June 2004, two days before the end of the US-led occupation, according to the UN Security Council Resolution 1546. The reason why the CPA did not hold free elections in the country to choose an interim government was mainly its fear that unfavourable Iraqi figures would emerge. Instead, Tony Blair's special envoy for Iraq, attributed the cancellation of the election to Iraq's culture that was '"too weak" for democracy' (Mahajan, 2003).

On the same assumption, the IMN was managed since the same media regulations that existed during Saddam's rule were in effect because the Iraqi culture was not ready yet for an independent media. Orayb A. Najjar confirms that the new media law in Iraq is more 'restrictive' than other regulations found in some neighbouring Arab countries like Kuwait (2009, p. 46). In a study conducted by Article 19 on hate speech in 14 countries, it found out that many governments have accused some media outlets of spreading hate and inciting violence as a pretext to silence the opposition (D'Souza and Boyle, 1992, p. 20). In other words, the US administration used the slogan of democracy and free media as a façade to convince the people that a new positive change occurred, but in reality media freedom was relatively limited. Despite the clear statements that the CPA protected free speech and defended an independent Iraqi media, there were plenty of incidents on the ground that indicated the opposite. After forming an Iraqi interim government, the overall media management went to Iyad Allawi, the former Prime Minister.

5. The Iraqi Interim Government's Media

When the CPA and IGC were dissolved, the Iraqi interim government was established to replace them. On 28 June 2004, the new political situation was presented as

if Iraq had gained its sovereignty; however, the occupation of the country continued since the US Coalition had the final say in whatever happened. The only change that occurred was placing an 'Iraqi face' to cover the occupation. The members of the new government were chosen by the IGC. The key figures were: the Iraqi President, Ghazi Al-Yawir, a Sunni Arab who held a ceremonial position and had two deputies- Ibrahim al-Ja'afari, a Shiite from Dawa party, and Rowsch Shaways, a Kurd from the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Barham Salih, a Kurd from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), worked as deputy to Allawi for national security. As for the Prime Minister, he was a Shiite but with secular orientation.

IMN became under the direct control of the Prime Minister as mentioned earlier. Instead of gaining independence from the American authorities, IMN became closely associated with the action of the government itself and tended to express its policies more than during the CPA's era especially in terms of news content and programmes on public issues (Robinson 2003, p. 10). In addition, it became clearly more pro-Shiite than before since the majority of politicians in the government were Shiites (Metcalf, 2006; Cochrane, 2006).

As mentioned earlier, the main media regulatory council was the Iraqi National Communications and Media Commission (NCMC) headed by Siyamend Othman. However, Allawi preferred to form a new media body calling it 'Higher Media Commission' (HMC) in order to exert his full control over the IMN and the Iraqi media, so he appointed his long term friend and media advisor, Ibrahim al-Janabi, as its head. The original idea of HMC came when Allawi and al-Janabi tried during Autumn 2004 to persuade the government to make IMN an official mouthpiece of state policy by setting '"aside space in news coverage to make the position of the Iraqi government, which expresses the aspirations of most Iraqis, clear"' (Index on Censorship, 2004, p. 21). As both failed in their efforts, they resorted to establishing HMC. Ideally speaking, it was supposed to perform an advisory role by 'developing policy for the government that evaluates and assesses performance, that charts new directions, and that helps to identify opportunities'. (Price, 2007, p. 17) However, Al-Janabi started to impose very strict rules on media outlets with the announcement of the state of emergency. For instance, any kind of unnecessary criticism against the Prime Minister was not tolerated.

The 'red lines' or media restrictions were varied including the mere broadcasting of a Friday speech sermon like that of Muqtada Sadr. When the latter criticised Allawi by calling him 'America's tail', al-Janabi warned that media channels that 'broadcast the sermon could be banned' (Pelham, 2004). One of the first decisions taken by Allawi's government was closing down al-Jazeera channel 'indefintely'. In November 2004, the government even declared that any journalist found reporting for al-Jazeera would be arrested. The American journalsit, Dahr Jamail, reported that his French friend, Sophie-Anne Lamouf, who covered the events in Fallujah city in 2005 was taken by Iraqi security forces from her hotel and was exiled (2007).

On the other hand, supporters of Allawi claimed that the Prime Minister was liberal and called for free media, citing one example. Sadr's newspaper, *Al-Hawza*, which was closed down by the CPA, was allowed to be republished (Pelham, 2004). Yet, what commentators overlooked was the fact that Allawi wanted to gain Sadr's movement approval for his government because of Sadr's popular appeal. Nevertheless, Allawi's effort went in vain after he approved the assault on Sadr's militia, Mehdi Army.

As for the work of CMC, it remained almost non-influential. It was originally formed to follow Western models like the US Federal Communications or the UK Ofcom with an annual budget of $6 million a year (Piper, 2004). On 27 July 2004, CMC's Interim Broadcasting Code for media outlets in Iraq was passed by the Iraqi Parliament. It was followed by an Interim Media Law which stressed that CPA's order 14 should be amended in order to be further clarified. However, the amendment remained 'vague', according to Article 19 report (2004, p. 25). The new Law added a section on fair and impartial programming, stating: 'News reporting should be dispassionate and news judgments based on the need to give viewers and listeners an even-handed account of events' (CMC 2007, p. 14).

As for IMN, CMC's regulation pointed out that Iraq's public broadcasting service should remain independent and must not 'advocate the positions or interests of any particular political, religious, commercial or other party. In doing so, the IMN must ensure the public is aware of different points of view in order to create informed public opinion' (ibid.). Besides, clear efforts should be followed to make sure that 'programmes about religion or religious groups are accurate and fair. The belief and practice of

religious groups must not be misrepresented. Programmes must not denigrate the religious beliefs of others' (ibid.). Finally, in its new law issued on November 22, 2009, the Iraqi Communications and Media Commission (CMC) insisted that Media channels should refrain from broadcasting any material that encourages hate and violence or incites sectarianism (Communications and Media Commission, 2009). Among the duties of CMC is monitoring the issues covered in different Iraqi media channels. The only three reports it publicly published were related to monitoring few Iraqi TV channels, but no further details were mentioned on the tens of other Iraqi media channels (see CMC 2010a; 2010b; 2010c).

According to Article 103 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution, CMC is 'financially and administratively independent' body. However, CMC could not live up to the expectation of Iraqis because of government pressure and interference (al-Jezairy 2006, p. 11). In December 2004, CMC drafted a Media Code for the coming elections that were held in January 2005. The Code dictated rules that should be followed by all political groups and particularly by IMN which should have remained neutral.

In early January 2005, CMC published almost all its media regulations in different newspapers especially those related to the conduct of journalists and media channels during the elections. The newspapers included *Asharq al-Awsat* (Baghdad edition), *al-Mada*, *Baghdad*, *al-Nahdha*, *al-Dustoor*, *al-Takhi*, *al-Adalah*, and *al-Itihad* (National Media Center, p. 29). Neverthless, Allawi made ample use of the Iraqia channel. For instance, he was shown on TV giving a speech as a Prime Minister and behind him was the banner of his electoral slate. Also, he started a talk show in which he answered phone calls from distressed Iraqis complaining about security issues and public services (Usher 2005a).

When a meeting was held by his slate to discuss their political programme, the channel aired it live to the public (Usher 2005a). During the second elections held in December 2005, many government Shiite ministers affiliated with ISCI and Dawa parties had their own share in Iraqia channel, making some Iraqis complain of obvious bias (Usher 2005c). An Iraqi journalist, Saad Al Saraf from Star TV Network, revealed that CMC could not successfully monitor the issue of 'media bias' particularly during the election. 'Indeed, there seems to be a sort of "look the other way" approach to enforcing

the commission's rules, such as the ban on "spreading sectarian, racial and religious sedition and strife"' (Cochrane, 2006).

One the recurrent event occurs when government officials are criticised in the media; they become irritated and start backlashing on journalists, as illustrated by examples given below. CMC's 2007 report revealed that 'journalists face the challenge of reporting on other parties critically. …Journalists who are too critical of other factions often have been subjected to blackmail and death threats, if not death itself' (2007, p. 5). For example, two journalists working in a newspaper in Wasit province were sentenced in April 2005 to prison by an Iraqi judge after criticising the provincial government and police for the lack of services and security (Finer 2005, A01).

The defamation charges were based on the Iraqi Penal Code of 1969. In 2009, Ahmed Abdul Hussein, an Iraqi journalist working for Al-Sabah newspaper, was threatened by a senior leader in ISCI during a Friday prayer speech for criticising the ISCI's party members who killed eight guards protecting a bank in Baghdad and stole $3.8 million (Middle East Online, 9 August 2009). This action led tens of Iraqi journalists to protest the kind of media freedom in the new Iraq (Middle East Online, 14 August 2009). Hence, it is very normal that other journalists would not dare to criticise and would be gradually silenced.

Despite the existence of CMC and the different calls for correcting the media line and improving the working conditions in IMN, the wave of resignations continued. After working for several months as general director of *Al-Iraqi*, Jalap al-Mehta, an Iraqi exile, resigned on November 18, 2004, saying that he was not in control of the channel because of the government's pressure and that 'the budget was being wasted on buying costly foreign programs while salaries were not being paid' (Index on Censorship 2004, 21; Price 2007, p. 17).

On 30 January 2005, the general elections in Iraq were held, as stated above, to appoint the Transitional National Assembly whose responsibility included drafting a permanent constitution. The Shiite coalition, United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), won most of the seats, and Ibrahim Ja'afari from Dawa Party was selected as the new Prime Minister. He assumed office in April 2005 and remained until May 2006. Following the second general elections in December 2005, Ja'afari remained in office representing UIA due to

the support he got from all of Sadr's members in the Assembly. However, Iraq witnessed an intense sectarian violence during Ja'afari rule due to his pro-Shiite policies and the attack that occurred against the Shiite holy Shrine in Samaraa in February 22, 2006.

With regard to IMN control, a conflict of interests happened between Allawi's loyalists and the newly elected Prime Minister's staff. When al-Ja'afari came to power, he paid careful attention to restructuring IMN by 'hiring and firing editors, and directing editorial policy' (Levinson 2006). The new government made several changes in the management of IMN such as Iraqia channel and Al-Sabah newspaper (al-Jezairy 2006, p. 11). Habib Sadr was appointed as director of Iraqia channel, and Mohammed Abdul Jabbar, editor-in-chief of Al-Sabah newspaper, was exempted from his duties because he did not follow the line of Dawa party; for instance, he did not highlight Ja'afari's activities on the newspaper's front page.

But the Prime Minister's control of IMN ceased in September 2005 when the Shiite ISCI's former leader, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, took over. However, Habib Sadr remained as director because he started highlighting the activities of his new superior (Levinson 2006). It is important to point out that most Iraqi staff working in IMN are Shiites from different political groups.

According to CMC, IMN seriously needs 'internal pluralism' which can only be achieved by 'the inclusion of women and representatives of Iraq's various ethnic, religious and political groups—among members of its board and management and among its reporters and on-air personalities' (2007, p. 42). The fact that IMN is Shiite dominated has definitely affected its neutrality. In 2006, US forces raided a hideout for militiamen and killed about 16 Shiite fighters who belonged to the Mahdi Army. Instead of showing it as the killing of terrorists as it usually does when Sunni fighters are involved, Iraqia TV pictured the raid as 'the killing of unarmed worshipers in a Shiite Muslim mosque'. The camera focused on the dead bodies and interviews with Shiite politicians who criticised the US forces (Roug, 2006).

Amongst the changes that occurred to Iraqia TV was its emphasis on showing pro-Shiite sermons, interviews with Shiite clerics, Shiite plight during Saddam's rule and after the occupation, and a popular programme called 'Terrorism in the Grip of Justice'. As a result, the channel became more popular among Shiite population but was viewed as

a mouthpiece of Shiite dominated government by Sunni Arabs. In 2006, an Ipsos Stat poll showed that Iraqia TV became the most watched channel, and in an interview conducted with Hiwa Osman, a Kurd working as a media advisor to Iraq's President, revealed that 50 per cent of Iraqis watch the Iraqia but expressed his disappointment from the channel that turned to be a 'propaganda tool for the country's leading Shiite politicians' (Levinson, 2006).

As mentioned earlier, a new programme was aired on Iraqia TV and later Al-Fayhaa, an Iraqi Shiite channel broadcasting from Dubai, called 'Terrorism in the Grip of Justice' which made a great deal of controversy. The programme involves interviews with 'terrorists' captured by US forces and Iraqi security personnel and shown on TV to confess their crimes without being tried by a judge or legal court. There were clear signs of torture seen on the interviewees' faces and they sometimes had difficulty talking. In addition, all the 'terrorists' shown are Sunni insurgents including some Arab fighters, but no Shiite militiamen from Mahdi Army or ISCI's Badr Brigade were ever interviewed though many were involved in sectarian killings and kidnappings. The programme, which was aired at 9 pm, Iraq's television prime time, presented recurrent themes involving the implication of Al-Jazeera channel as a source of inspiration for those 'terrorists' in conducting their acts or the accusation of Syrian intelligence to be behind the insurgency in Iraq (Stalinsky, 2005).

There is no coincidence that these two themes are also what the US authorities cite to explain the nature of violence in the country (Murphy and Saffar, 2005, A18). In other words, there was an indication that most of these televised confessions were actually orchestrated to serve US and Iraqi official stances; even the UK Telegraph.co.uk described the 'intelligence successes' in Iraq by citing this show (2005). Further, the programme was hailed by some Iraqi Shiite politician as evidence that the Interior Ministry headed by the infamous ISCI leader, Bayan Jabr Solagh, was able to perform its duties. Yet, human rights groups expressed concern over the nature of the programme and regarded it as a violation of basic human rights (Usher 2005b). Marie Therese called Iraqia channel 'Torture TV' because 'watching other human beings degraded and ridiculed is the time-tested way to distract the masses from thinking about their own miseries' (2005). These concerns came at a time when the UN's Special rapporteur on

torture and cruelty, Manfred Nowak, described the human rights violations in Iraq as worse than during Saddam's rule and that they were 'totally out of control'. Iraqi victims were mainly tortured in 'prisons run by US-led multinational forces as well as by the ministries of interior and defence and private militias' (BBC, 2006).

In brief, the IMN pro-Shiite sectarian policy, whose seeds were planted by the Pentagon, played a role in agitating the public and in particular the Sunnis against the government. Programmes like 'Terrorism in the Grip of Justice' only fuelled hatred and enhanced grudges from both Sunnis and Shiites. Saleh al-Mutlaq, a Sunni politician, accused IMN of being one of the factors that assisted 'to turn Iraqi society into a sectarian society' (Levinson 2006). Other media outlets became polarised and followed the mainstream by siding with either Sunnis or Shiites, mostly after the Samaraa bombing (Al-Marashi 2007, p. 100). Hence, they only increased the sectarian tension in the streets (Roug, 2006). Even Solagh, the Interior Minister, urged Iraqi journalists to follow 'objective reporting' and refrain from 'exaggerations' in order to avoid enhancing hatred and division in the society (cited in Abedin, 2006).

Paul Cochrane described the new media as the 'Lebanonization of Iraqi media' since Lebanon was torn into pieces during the civil war whose effects are still touched today (*Transnational Broadcasting Studies* 2006). Cochrane drew some similarities between the two countries, for he stressed the pluralistic nature of the media, and most importantly its negative role in disintegrating the society especially when the rhetoric is loaded with sectarian language and unsubstantiated slurs. In fact, many Iraqi channels were mostly preoccupied with their own groups, and in the process, the other was eliminated from their daily shows. But what characterised this era was the fact that these channels presented their own groups as victims. For instance, Baghdad TV, run by the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party, focused on presenting the crimes committed against Sunnis by Shiite security bodies and Mahdi Army militias. According to its director, Ahmed Rushdi, Baghdad TV should be contrasted with the state run Al-Iraqyia channel because the former had 'no sectarian bias', saying: 'We are always showing the facts as they are' (Roug 2006).

In contrast, Shiite channels like Al-Fayhaa TV, ISCI's Al-Furat TV, and Al-Iraqyia concentrated on showing the suffering of Shiites under Saddam Hussein regime

and the destruction that occurred to the Holy Shiite Shrine in Samaraa. Al-Furat TV, which is affiliated with two other channels: al-Nahrayn TV in Kut and Ghadir TV in Najaf (Metcalf 2006) that are funded by ISCI, announced that Shiites should 'stand up for their rights', indirectly suggesting killing Sunnis (Cochrane 2006). However, no action was taken against or warning given to the channel.

In general, in the midst of this highly tense situation, very few Iraqi TV channels were able to maintain independence. Mohammad Shaboot, the former editor in chief of the governmental Al-Sabah newspaper, said in this regard that Al Furat TV and Baghdad TV were both fermenting the sectarian spirit in the society, stating that 'No one has invested in a real, nationwide Iraqi channel for all Iraqis' (Roug, 2006).

Other channels that periodically broadcast talk-shows that involve hosting Iraqi figures and receiving phone calls and e-mails from Iraqis living inside and outside the country do, in fact, incite violence and sectarianism, too. Saadoun Al-Bayati, a media analyst, says that the effect of these talk-shows is 'more risky than carrying arms' (Ghazi, 2006). All these types of tensions only lead to more media polarisation and less liberties. According to Fred Vultee, the press during civil conflicts becomes more restricted than during interstate wars (2009).

Finally, the US presence was slowly diminishing from the Iraqi media since its influence became unseen due to the efforts of the Pentagon's media contractors as discussed earlier. Yet, within the confusion that occurred during Ja'afari's government, the US authorities preferred to sit still and watch. There are many questions which still need to be answered. For example, why did not the US forces close down sectarian media outlets that incited hatred between Sunnis and Shiites though they were quick in shutting other media outlets that incited violence against their soldiers? Why did not the US military react to Ja'afari's sectarian policies? Why did not the US military actively intervene to stop the violence that erupted after Samaraa event? Why did not the US authorities exert pressures on the Prime Minister to protect IMN and assist in turning it into a real public broadcasting service? Unfortunately, the US authorities were only watching and observing the events. In one incident in January 2006, an Iraqi journalist, Dr. Ali Fadhil, working for Channel 4 and The Guardian was arrested after knowing that he was investigating claims that tens of millions of Iraqi funds disappeared after being

held by UK and US authorities in Iraq (*The Guardian,* 2006). Again, this incident sheds light on the kind of freedom and independence the Iraqi media has.

6. Nouri Maliki's Media Monopoly

After exerting pressures from the United States, Dawa Party, and the Iraqi Parliament, Ja'afari stepped down to be replaced by Nouri Maliki, another prominent Shiite leader from Dawa party. Maliki assumed office on 20 May 2006 and is still holding the same post.

With the escalation of the sectarian violence, organised Shiite Death Squads roamed the streets and began arresting Sunni men. After few days, the dead bodies of those men were thrown in the streets bearing signs of severe torture. At least 100 dead bodies were found per day and taken to Baghdad morgue. Despite the fact that Maliki pledged to crack down on these Death Squads, very little action was taken. ISCI by their control of the Interior Ministry and Mahdi Army were involved in these Squads, and they both supported Maliki's election as Prime Minister.

When US forces raided a stronghold for one of these Squads, Maliki immediately protested in the media, stating that these actions were illegal and conducted without his approval. An American diplomat complained by saying that 'every time' US forces 'strike against the Mahdi Army, they are publicly scolded by the Iraqi prime minister (Ghosh 2006; Kukis 2005). However, Maliki would not react in the same manner if a US attack was directed at Sunni areas. Mohammad Shaboot refers to his disappointment with Al-Iraqyia channel because it was established to represent all Iraqis, saying: 'It was supposed to be fair, and address all the people of Iraq, but so far it hasn't succeeded in achieving this unique goal' (Roug 2006).

Furthermore, reports were published about government corruption, making Iraq in the top kleptomaniac states of the world in which petty bribes are widespread practices, according to Transparency International (2009). Indeed, what happened on the political front was directly reflected in the media scene. As for IMN, it was described CMC as a biased media body that was not reliable enough to represent Iraqis in an objective manner:

> We are not yet at the day when the IMN is credited for reporting that is truly balanced, when the IMN has independent and guaranteed revenue streams, and when it is thought effectively to

> hold the government accountable. It is currently not designed to
> resist direct and indirect political pressure (2007, p. 42).

In October 2006, Death Squads raided the building of the Iraqi Al-Shaabiya TV channel in midtown Baghdad and killed eleven of its staff including its manager, Abdul Raheem Al-Shimiri. No reports from the Iraqi police or security bodies were released to the public about these murders (Jamail 2007). As a result of IMN favouritsm, many Iraqis strongly opposed Iraqia TV, and some of its reporters were actually killed because of the channel's nature. In late 2007, the head of the Iraqi Parliament, Mahmood Al-Mashhadani, harshly criticised Iraqia TV director, Habib Sadr, for airing false news on how the Parliament approved erecting a defensive wall in the Shiite Kadhimiah city to separate it from Sunni areas. Al-Mashhadani was furious and requested that Sadr's aim behind fabricating the news be investigated by a committee from the Parliament, saying: 'This is not an Iraqi channel; instead, it works for a certain agenda to incite schism in the Iraqi society. Does the channel serve our government or does it serve the hidden hands that firstly financed it and still control it?' As Sadr was abroad, he was not summoned to answer the MP's questions. Al-Mashhadani stressed that the station was run by 'illiterate and ignorant people', and asked a series of rhetorical questions in the Parliament about the channel such as: 'Is it an Iraqi channel or an American?' and 'Who stands behind its agenda?' (*Al-Bayyna Al-Jadidah* 2007)

During Maliki's government, an Iraqi TV channel called Al-Zawraa created great controversies. It was run by Mishaan al-Jubouri, an Iraqi MP. The channel started broadcasting in Iraq but stopped because of government pressures especially after airing footage of Iraqis mourning their former President, Saddam Hussein, after his execution. Even its manager escaped to Syria as he was accused of corruption and embezzlement (McDonough 2007).

Meanwhile, the Kurds found a golden opportunity to practice their control over the northern parts of the country especially in the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk. This kind of power was manifested in the media sector, too. For example, the Kurds whose interest is to have a federal Iraq in order to annex the oil-rich city of Kirkuk into Kurdistan, tried to spread the concept of federalism in the Arab-dominated areas. Accordingly, Kurdish officials gave bribe money to some Arabic newspapers like *Wadi Ar-Rafidain*, *Al-Masar*

and *Bela Ittijah* (Al-Jezairy 2006, p. 12) that are published in Mosul to achieve this purpose. The majority of Iraqis do not trust Kurdish media outlets since they are suspicious of the Kurdish separatist motives behind federalism. As a result, the two major Kurdish parties, the PUK and KDP, started to use other media channels for disseminating about their ideology. For instance, *al-Mada* newspaper that is backed by the Iraqi Communist Party, started to publish messages favourable to the Kurds' cause after getting support from the two main Kurdish parties (Al-Jezairy 2006).

During Maliki's era, media freedom was not better than that during Ja'afari's time. For instance, Al-Sharqiya TV was closed down in January 2007 for allegedly inciting sectarianism. The channel, which is regarded as the most popular one in Iraq, showed a protest against the execution of Saddam Hussein on 30 December 2006. Afterward, a news presenter in Al-Sharqiya TV was shown wearing black as a sign of mourning (Jamail, 2007).

Due to its closure, the channel started broadcasting from Dubai but remained active in covering Iraq's news. Salahideen TV was also ordered to close down for the same reason. However, attacks against Al-Sharqiya did not cease. In September 2008, the channel aired a disturbing programme called 'Torture in Iraqi Prisons' about the atrocities committed by Shiite security forces mainly against Sunni Arabs. Six days later, Al-Sharqiya crew consisting of four men were kidnapped and killed in Mosul city. The manager of Al-Sharqiya, Ali Wajih, accused Iraqia channel to be behind the attack because the latter started a 'campaign of slander against the journalists working in Al-Sharqiya' after airing the aforementioned programme. Wajih stressed that the 'government's channel and those who stand behind it bear ethical and moral responsibility for the crime' (Agence France Presse, 2008; Gambill, 2009).

7. The National Media Center and IMN

Another change in the Iraqi media occurred in 2007 with the establishment of the National Media Center (NMC). On 19th March the Iraqi Prime Minister signed a decree No. 54, making NMC an official media body that is directly linked to the Chairman of the Minster's Council. In May 2009, the Ministers' Council ratified the law in its 18th session that allowed the Center to expand and become more influential. NMC is formed to plan and implement the media policy of the central government, the provinces and

governorates and unify their rhetoric in order to communicate media messages to local and international media. It is also responsible for creating programmes and policies to cover national ceremonies, measuring public opinion trends, representing Iraq in international conferences, following up on the activities of media bureaus linked to the government, monitoring local and international media messages, writing down news and press releases, and facilitating the work of journalists to cover government activities (Presidency Council, 2009; National Media Center, n.d).

In other words, the NMC has substituted the infamous Ministry of Information during Saddam Hussein's rule. According to several observers, NMC's is controlled by Maliki's office since its head, Ali Hadi al-Musawi, is Maliki's Media Advisor and must directly report to him. In an interview on Baghdadiah TV on January 25, 2010, al-Musawi claimed that the 'Iraqi government does not have or run any media channel' not even 'al-Iraqia TV that is like the BBC'. Al-Musawi's statement means that al-Iraqia TV is a public broadcasting station as it was first envisioned to be. Despite this claim, Zuhair al-Jazairi, who is closely affiliated with the Iraqi government, says that the NMC supervises the work of the official media channels that include al-Iraqia TV and radio as well as Assabah newspaper (al-Jazairi, 2010, p. 102).

Most importantly, Maliki paid the headquarters of IMN in Baghdad a visit on the 28th of September 2009, just few months before the 2010 election which is regarded as one way of influencing the editorial policy of the Iraqia channel. He gave a speech to the staff wherein he revealed several important points that contradicted al-Musawi's previous claims about the independence of IMN (Iraqia TV 2009).

To sum up, Maliki wanted to exercise his authority over IMN whose heads and staff vary in their allegiances and over the Communications and Media Commission by creating a more powerful media body. In reality, NMC has only complicated the Iraqi media scene since it intensified the struggle for control in the country.

7.1 More Regulations and Libel Suits

In another development, many libel suits were filed in the courts against Iraqi media outlets and journalists. For example, the Iraqi Minister of Trade filed two libel suites against Al-Mashriq and Al-Parlaman newspapers which accused him of corruption. Fortunately, the minister dropped the cases later. The daily newspaper, Al-Baynah Al-

Jadeedah, received two complaints and its managers were taken to court for libel suits filed by the Oil Ministry and Al-Mansour Company (RSF 2009b). The Prime Minister also filed a defamation suit against an Iraqi website called 'Kitabat' which is run in Germany because one of its writers, Ayad Zamili, accused the PM's chief of staff of favouritism in securing jobs for his relatives (RSF 2009c).

The Al-Diyar TV channel was ordered to pay 10 million Iraqi dinars for a defamation lawsuit filed on 19 April 2009 by the director of the Real Estate in the Ministry of Transportation. The lawsuit was brought after airing a programme in which a TV presenter read a piece of news from an Iraqi newspaper (Journalistic Freedoms Observatory 2009). Benjamin Isakhan concludes that the 'meddling in the Iraqi media sector' by the Iraqi authorities 'symptomatizes their inadequate movement beyond the framework of media interference and control that had plagued Iraq under the former regime' (2009, p. 19). The CEO of CMC, Burhan Shawi, reveals that 'there is no completely independent media in Iraq because all the channels are either related to political parties or to other sides' (*al-Sabah al-Jadeed* 2010). In other words, there seems to be no tangible results gained in the new Iraqi media.

In another development, the government issued stricter media regulations than what was seen after 2003. For instance, it decided to monitor all the publications imported into the country (Middle East Online, 14 August 2009) and to cross check any other publication inside the country before giving the green light for the publishing house to print it (Al-Hayat, 2009). Further, the government imposed new rules on the Internet service. It decided to deny access to websites that contain references to sectarianism, pornography, and terrorism (Salaheddin, 2009).

After the re-election of Maliki as Prime Minister in 2011, several protests were organised in different parts of Iraq demanding an end to corruption and joblessness. Many Iraqi news outlets harshly criticised the government and some political parties for their alleged role in the deterioration of the living standards and the spread of lawlessness. As a result, several journalists were beaten in Basrah on the 4th of March 2011 and the office of the Journalistic Freedom Observatory was destroyed by security forces in Baghdad. In the Kurdish city of Sulymaniah, Voice radio station together with Nalia Radio and Television were stormed by men wearing secutrity uniforms and were

closed down for airing the protests that were held against the main poltical party (Tawfeeq 2011; Barzanji 2011). Reporters Without Borders expressed its concern about the deterioration of the freedom of expression in Iraq in 2011 largely due to the pressures imposed by Iraqi security forces on journalists working for TV stations. RSF was particularly worried about the statement of a senior Iraqi official at the Ministry of Interior who said that the freedom of information could be a 'threat to [Iraq's] internal security' (RSF 2011). In other words, there is no improvement if not regression in the way media outlets and journalists are treated in Iraq throughout the past few years.

8. Conclusion

Based on what has been reviewed above, IMN and especially the Al-Iraqia channel has only been a tool used by the consecutive Prime Ministers and high ranking officials like al-Hakim who ruled the country after 2003. It has never attempted to alienate itself from the government nor has it criticised its policies or some of the violations committed by the US-led forces. This shows that the plan to establish independent media such as a public broadcasting station has only been wishful thinking on the part of the American government which itself worked on undermining IMN's independence. Accordingly, IMN staff were looked upon by many Iraqis as agents for the US and Iraqi governments. This fact probably justifies why IMN employees suffered the highest number of casualties among all the other media outlets operating in Iraq.

Shik Hun Kim predicted that the Iraqi media, whose previous authoritarian experience resembles that of the former communist countries in Eastern Europe, will witness a further regression into an authoritarian press instead of having a libertarian press system (Kim, 2007; Kim and Hama-Saeed, 2008, p. 592). In a meeting held with a group of Iraqi journalists invited to the USA in 2006, several mentioned that it was hard for the new Iraqi media to 'offer ordinary Iraqis a complete and unbiased picture of current affairs in their country' (Allen, 2006). This is mainly due to the lack of security and central power in the country. However, the ideological and historical basis of the Iraqi society is different from other societies in Eastern Europe, so any such prediction could be flawed. Besides, the US and other European governments that ardently supported the Iraqi government might play a major role in making sure that Iraq will not

descend into the past and restores its infamous authoritarian press. Also, international human rights and media organisations may play a positive role here.

Finally, there were positive signs that started to appear on IMN in mid 2008 with the escalating US pressures on Maliki to establish reconciliation with Sunnis and his need to include all the different groups in his government. For instance, programmes describing issues related to Sunnis and other groups in the society were shown, unlike before. As a result, Maliki decided to stop airing the distinctive Shiite call of prayer on al-Iraqia TV in 2008 (Cambridge Arab Media Project, 2010, p. 29). Amnesty International, however, reported in 2010 that about 30,000 detainees were held in the country under similar conditions to that during Saddam Hussein's rule; the majority of those prisoners were Sunni Arabs, mostly detained without trial (Amnesty International. 2010, p. 5, 6, and 20).

Despite all the media restrictions imposed by the Iraqi government on media outlets and the high number of defamation lawsuits filed against journalists, Maliki announced in May 2009 that Iraq was the best country in the Middle East in terms of press freedom. He claimed that Iraq is 'proud not to punish journalists and not to impose restrictions on their work' (Agence France Presse, 2009). Maliki was probably eyeing Article 38 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution that guaranteed freedom of speech, but what he overlooked was the report issued by Freedom House that listed the ranking of countries in terms of the freedom of press. In 2009, Iraq's media was described as 'not free' and came at number 9 out of 19 countries in the Middle East and North Africa and at number 148 out of 195 countries around the world (Freedom House, 2009).

Since World War II, Iraq has become the worst country in the world for safety of journalists after the 2003 War due to the unprecedented number of journalists killed who exceeded those murdered in the 20 years of the Vietnam War and the Algerian civil war. More than 230 media personnel died, including journalists and their assistants; amongst them 93% were men. Hundreds of other journalists were forced to flee to neighbouring countries (RSF 2009c; RSF 2010). According to Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), 136 journalists were killed as a direct result of their media work; 90% amongst them were Iraqis (CPJ 2008). For four consecutive years, Iraq has the highest number of murdered journalists whose cases have not yet been resolved. From 2001 to 2011, 92

journalists have been killed, but the government is either 'unable or unwilling to prosecute the killers' (CPJ 2011). Also, Iraq is regarded as 'the world's biggest market for hostages. Over 93 media professionals were abducted' from 2003 to 2010 and 'at least 42 of whom were later executed. Moreover, 14 are still missing' (RSF 2010). Generally speaking, Iraq became the worst country in the world to live in after 2003 not only for journalists but for people as a whole. The Global Peace Index of 2010 mentioned that Iraq came in number 143 and ranked as the worst country in the world in terms of the lack of security and peace (Institute for Economics and Peace 2010).

Maliki confessed once that there are many violations committed against Iraqi journalists mainly because we [Iraqis] have inherited from the previous regime a certain kind of mentality, scheme, and way of thinking that need time to change (Iraqia Channel, 28 September, 2009). Hence, Iraqi journalists remain in a state of fear despite the political change and the calls for democracy. Unlike the period that characterised Saddam's rule when there was relative peace and when journalists knew the red lines (politics, religion, and some socio-cultural taboos), today those journalists are exercising stricter self-censorship to avoid falling into troubles that could cost them their lives (Prusher, 2003 June, p. 6). Also, new work practices emerged such as the custom that some journalists accept small bribes from some officials in order to cover certain events or write favourably about them due to the low wages they get from their media institutions (IWPR, 25 August 2009).

To sum up, the Iraqi media that emerged after the 2003 war are complex because they do not contain one main trend or feature. One can conclude that the media channels can be divided into three main types: (1) governmental/partisan such as al-Iraqyia TV and al-Mansoor TV (2) independent/commercial such as al-Baghdadia TV, al-Rasheed TV, and al-Sumeria TV (3) regional channels that are supported by other countries/regional groups such as al-Sharqyia TV, al-Rafideen TV, Ahul al-Bayt TV, and Al Ahd TV (see Appendix II). With regard to the last type, the current head of the Iraqi CMC, Burhan Shawi, stated that some Iraqi TV channels are supported by foreign intelligence agencies, naming Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Syria as potential supporters, but the CMC cannot do a thing toward such channels because there is no party law in Iraq that forces all the political sides to reveal their sources of funding (*Al-Sabah Al-Jadeed* 2010).

Other governments such as Turkey and regional powers with sectarian affiliations such as the Wahabi/Salafi movements in Saudi Arabia, Muslim Brothers in Egypt, the Shiite Hezbollah in Lebanon, and other Shiite groups in the Arab Gulf exert their influence on the Iraqi media by different means like pouring money, spreading ideology, and enticing selected Iraqi audiences by means of fear and reward. In the end, there was more disunity in the Iraqi society and consequently more polarisation in the media. Indeed, there are different channels affected by the intervention of foreign powers, the influence of internal disputes and political interests, and the effect of ethnic and sectarian differences. According to an Iraqi observer, politics undermined the media in Iraq and made it so divided that very few journalists can express their opinions without fear (Mohammed 2010).

If a comparison is made between the Iraqi media before the war and that after it, it is apparent that Iraqis have gained a pluralistic media but not much freedom because they are still practising self-censorship. In a survey of Iraqi journalists' attitudes, it was strongly pointed out that criticising the Shiite leader of the Mahdi Army, Muqtada Sadr, or the Prime Minister, Nouri Maliki, was 'unthinkable' (Kim and Hama-Saeed 2008, p. 588).

Before the war, there were clear media regulations which were known to everyone, yet in today's media environment can hardly know where the red lines of expression are because of the various political and armed groups that control the situation. Noureddine Jebnoun puts it right when he says: 'Iraqi journalists lost in safety what they gained in freedom' (2009). By 2010, there were clear signs that CMC started to exert some power over a handful of Iraqi channels that were not supported by the major parties like al-Baghdadia TV. Also, new regulations were believed to be implemented that forced media outlets to be legally registered or their licenses be revoked. In return, CMC would offer access and protection to journalists. However, some worrying evidence emerged that linked CMC to the previous Iraqi Ministry of Information. In some cases, journalists need to have official approvals from three government bodies and an Iraqi army escort before reporting events in the country (McEvers 2010).

One hope might be that a strong and independent CMC and IMN can be built by the direct assistance of a strong and impartial government. If this is achieved, other Iraqi media outlets will respect the laws and refrain from inciting violence or hatred in the

society. Despite all the talk of bias and partisanship in the Iraqi media, there have only been unsubstantiated accusations that are not based on sound and objective methods. Hence, there are great needs to carefully examine the Iraqi media channels and determine their trends and ideologies without residing to sweeping generalizations and unfounded impressions.

In the following chapter, I will cover some of the literature on journalism practices and media studies in relation to the coverage of elections since they are relevant to the focus of this study.

Chapter Three

Journalism Practices, Media Studies and Elections

This chapter is divided into three sections; the first part discusses the meaning and importance of good journalism practices such as the concepts of objectivity, impartiality, and balance. These principles must be followed by journalists all over the world in all times. The second section focuses on reporting during elections and the need to follow the principles cited above; the media becomes very crucial for voters as it is one of the main sources of information for them. Finally, a discussion of the importance of media during election is presented. Media studies on framing, agenda-setting, and priming effects are discussed in order to understand how journalists or media institutions sometimes change or project concepts that enhance their own agenda or version of reality which ultimately becomes more or less adopted by the audience. This chapter is important because it provides the necessary background information to understand how to answer the research questions mentioned in Chapter One that are related to the application of the principles of good journalism, framing, and the horse-race issue.

1. Basic Principles of Good Journalism

One of the main principles of good journalism is objectivity which simply means reporting the facts without adding ones opinion. CMC has published several reports on the importance of following the principles of good journalism, and all the media channels operating in Iraq have allegedly signed the code of ethics which includes a pledge to report events in a balanced, objective, accurate, and fair manner (see Chapter Four for more details). The four channels investigated in this study all claim to report news in an objective way. For example, the Sunni channel, Baghdad TV, alleges in its mission that it seeks to 'inspire the public with optimism and hope, through pursuing a positive approach'. In addition, the channel believes that its mission is to 'ensure the unification of the country on an Arab and Islamic basis, with toleration of the other groups that compose the Iraqi population, through the constant reminding of the strong ties between different groups , the common history and background' (Baghdad TV website). In other

words, Baghdad TV presents itself as a representative of all Iraqis since it does not stress divisions and differences in the society. On the other hand, the Shiite Furat TV describes itself as an 'edifice of truthful and committed media'. Its slogan is a 'channel of balance and originality' which is concerned with the 'athletic, political, and social religious cultural and economic affairs of the Iraqi people'. Furthermore, the channel 'addresses all the Iraqi people with their different sects, ethnicities, religions, and groups' (Furat TV website). As for the Kurdish Al-Hurria channel, it claims to follow a balanced, logical, and reasonable rhetoric. It seeks to present objective news before breaking news 'amidst the sectarian media Iraq suffered from'. The aim of the channel is to 'represent all the constituents of the Iraqi society' and disseminate the concepts of 'liberty, democracy, and lenience among Iraqis'. Its motto is 'Boldness, Reliability, and Tolerance' (Hurria TV website). Finally, Iraqi TV was basically founded to represent all Iraqis by reporting the news in a fair, objective, impartial, and balanced way as was discussed in Chapter Two. In brief, one expects to find that the four channels investigated in this study adhere to the principles of good journalism for two main reasons; they all signed a pledge to do so and their mission statements clearly referred to the application of these principles in their TV coverage.

In relation to the concept of objectivity, it is linked to the newsroom practice of avoiding sensationalism and bias, adhering to fairness and accuracy, and presenting facts without adding personal judgments in reporting (McQuail 1992, p. 185 and 233; Iyengar and Kinder 1987, p. 131; Pavlik 2001, p. 93). As Schudson says, the 'belief in objectivity is a faith in "fact", a distrust of "values", and a commitment of their segregation' (1978, p. 6). Objectivity in reporting entails impartiality – the idea of the 'world as it is, without bias or distortion of any sort' (Stephens 1988, p. 264). Similarly, Altheide (1976) says that objectivity suggests having a '"world out there" with an inner truth' (p. 17). Furthermore, it is defined in 'negatives' which is opposite to whatever is related to bias reporting (Mindich 2000, p. 6).

In brief, objectivity, impartiality, neutrality, and balance are needed in journalism if one believes in the constructive influence of the media over the society especially in 'naturalizing dominant ideology and winning consent for hegemony' (Hartley 1982, p. 62). In other words, objectivity is achievable and is the main pursuit of journalism, and it

greatly enhances balance and fairness in reporting because by following the guidelines of fair and objective reporting journalists can realise when they are being biased or not (Golding and Elliot 2000, p. 640; Miller 2000, p. 40; Cunningham 2003; Everette and Merrill 1996, p. 113).

Historically, objective reporting started as a utopian goal in American journalism in the 19th century coinciding with changes in the ideals of the American society itself. It remains to be the 'chief occupational value of American journalism' which 'distinguishes US journalism from the dominant model of continental European journalism' (Schudson, 2001, p. 149). The percentage of objective reporting rose dramatically from 1865 to 1934 which clearly showed the importance given by journalists and editors to objectivity. In fact, objectivity became the vogue in journalism because it was a 'reaction against subjectivity' in reporting (West, 2001, p. 52). However, the term itself was first used in the 1920s as one of the ways to attract more readers to read newspapers (Streckfuss, 1990). Roshco (1975) mentioned the same claim, saying that neutral and professional reporting was profitable in order to ensure wide public reach. Others relate the media's tendency toward objectivity in terms of economic needs, suggesting that it aimed at involving more people with multiple points of view (Ognianova and Endersby, 1996; Bennett, 1988, pp. 111-2).

Some scholars refer to the 'paradox of objectivity' in the sense that the main problem with finding objectivity is the baseline itself that usually errs. In most cases, the presentation or facts unintentionally favours one person or group over the other in the pursuit for credible and authentic sources of news (Fox and Park, 2006; Jamieson and Waldman, 2003; Kuklinski and Sigelman, 1992; Tuchman, 1978; Shoemaker and Reese, 1996, p. 44; Gans, 1970). In other cases, objectivity seems to have a negative influence on the public since it is rather 'based on a moral foundation that perpetuates the public's false perception of trustworthiness' (Moss, 2004, p. 22).

Many media scholars study objectivity in order to understand its nature and how to achieve it. Ward (2005), for instance, introduces a new term in good journalism which he calls 'global objectivity'. It refers to the necessity that journalists include all the different sides of the stories they report. This implies that they should have a very good understanding of world events and a multi-cultural awareness. He says: 'Objective

reports, to be accurate and balanced, must contain all relevant international sources and cross-cultural skills perspectives. In addition, global journalism asks journalists to be more conscious of how they frame the global public's perspective on major stories and how they set the international news agenda' (Ward 2005, p. 16 and 17).

Boyer (1981) conducted a survey on how news editors view objectivity and reached the following conclusions on how to achieve it: (a) balance (b) accuracy and realism (c) comprehensive and relevant coverage (d) distinguishing between facts and commentary (e) increasing the news writer's detachment from the event (f) refraining from having an agenda or the use of bias.

Indeed, the true aim of objectivity is to make the reader/viewer/listener trust the media; this mainly occurs when reality itself is portrayed 'as accurately as possible' (Ryan 2001, p. 3). McQuail (1992) defined an objective report as one 'which is highly factual, in the sense of offering as much detailed and checkable, information as possible'. There always must be an obvious line between facts communicated and opinions voiced. Other elements of objectivity include the dependence on 'reliable sources for information' and that news must be 'neutral in tone and form of presentation. It seeks to take up an independent and disinterested position in matters of conflict' (pp. 185-6).

McQuail revealed that there is an unwritten contract with the news consumer suggesting that 'news can be believed, trusted, taken at face value, readily understood, without the need to "read between the lines"' (p. 187). Gunter (1997) states a similar definition of objectivity, saying that an objective coverage refers to 'giving a full and accurate account of events being reported which reflects as closely as possible the true facts of a matter. Thus, the facts of the matter can be independently verified and shown to be true' (p. 9). Everette and Merrill (1996) add that the advantages of objectivity are to preserve balance and fairness by allocating equal time to the different sides as well as to ensure that the news is presented without sensationalism or emotional involvement (p. 113).

The Swedish scholar Westerståhl (1983) proposed an objectivity scheme, cited by McQuail (1992). Westerståhl believes that news impartiality is needed and is possible if one separates facts from values. One can compare neutral news on specific issues with the coverage of other media channels in order to correctly assess impartiality (p. 196). He

proposes that objectivity is based on two corner stones: impartiality and factuality. Westerståhl states that impartiality 'requires the reporter (or news channel) to maintain a distance, not to take sides in matters where there are two or more points of view or different variations.

Further, news values form another part of good journalism practices. Herbert J. Gans stated that news does not only make 'reality judgements' but also echoes 'values, or preference statements' (2004, p. 39). In other words, there is an ideal assumption about how people should act, what politicians should do, and how the society must be shaped which underlies news. Despite the journalists' efforts to become objective, they cannot write and produce news without having values that govern their judgements. These values are usually implied or 'inferred' in news stories (2004, p. 40). Gans divides values in the news into two types: topical and enduring. The first one deals with the views presented about events that occur or characters that act at the moment, whereas enduring values deal with opinions that can be found in news stories 'over a long period of time' (2004, p. 41).

Harrison discussed the influence of the newsroom practices on news values in what is termed as 'newsroom socialisation'. The argument is that newly hired journalists need to adapt to the work environment, so they start learning from senior and more experienced journalists, and they try to follow the 'explicit' and 'implicit' rules dictated by the news organisation. Here, sometimes a conflict ensues between the organisation's demands for news and the principles of good journalism (Harrison 2009, p. 66).

News values are usually made up of several 'intrinsic' elements that lead to newsworthiness: effect or impact (number of people influenced); timeliness (how recent did the event occur?); prominence (information becomes important even if there are insignificant details); proximity (the geographic closeness); audience (reporters must stay in contact with their community where they operate); oddity (was the event strange enough to arouse interest?); celebrity (was there anyone famous involved?); conflict (tense situations get more coverage); sensational; and magnitude (events that attract many people must be covered) (Ryan and O'Donnell 2001, pp. 49-52; Harrison 2006, p. 137).

In relation to news selection, news values can also be the major factor in determining news selection criteria (Harcup and O'Neill, 2001; Peterson, 1981). Gans

elaborated on the concept of news selection by stating several theories. Some believe that news-selection is journalist-centered as 'news is shaped by the professional news judgement of journalists' (2004, p. 78). The second theory attributes news selection to organisational requirement such as 'commercial imperatives' (2004, p. 78). The third type is what is called event-centered on the mirror theory that suggests that journalists reflect events like a mirror when it reflects an image. The fourth theory of technological determinists states that news selection is determined by the 'technology of the medium' (2004, p. 79).

Also, balance is regarded as one component of impartiality which 'refers mainly to matters of *selection* or *omission* in respect either of facts which may imply values or of expressions of points of view on the supposed "facts" by the parties involved'. It either means that equal attention is paid to the two opposing views/contestants/ parties, or the attention paid should be proportional to the size/influence/weight of the side described (Gans 2004, p. 201). Also, Morris (1989) believes that impartiality can be achieved by 'the exercise of plain human qualities, like good manners and self discipline; a refusal to exploit the vulnerable or to betray a trust; by generosity of judgment and by reticence' (p. 24).

As for factuality, it distinguishes between facts and comments or personal opinions (see also MacLean 1981, p. 56) and demands checking on 'the reliability of reporting as a key professional, journalistic objective'; it determines 'how informative a news account has been in terms of reducing any uncertainties the public may have had about the event or issue being reported' (Gunter 1997, p. 38). McQuail (1992) adds other components needed in news accounts such as accuracy in the sense that the journalists report the exact 'numbers, names, places, attributions, times, etc'; completeness which requires that a journalist fully reports the news accounts to make them comprehensible (p. 197); avoidance of sensationalism which is manifested in 'distinctive forms of presentation designed to gain audience attention: use of large headlines, photographic illustration, much film material, sound and dramatic music, etc' (p. 233). In the case of accuracy, it can be verified by comparing the information presented in the news item with an 'independent record of "reality"' (Gunter 1997, p. 39) to make sure that no omissions or distortions of facts were made.

In relation to neutrality in reporting, it is close to balance in meaning and is regarded as one component of objectivity. It mainly means the 'use of potentially evaluative words, images and frames of reference and also of different styles'. In an attempt to find neutrality, journalists seek 'connotation rather than denotation (as in the case of balance)' (McQuail 1992, p. 201).

Studies on objective reporting are customarily linked to bias because they stand in opposite ends. But many media analysts believe that there is a problem in defining bias itself as it is argued that it is impossible to achieve objectivity in reporting. The word bias is defined in *Oxford English Dictionary* as an 'oblique road' which was used as a 'technical term at the game of bowls'. The term was first used in the 14th century to mean any kind of slanting direction the ball would take away from the baseline and was later employed to denote the meaning of prejudice starting from the 16th century (Second Edition, 1989). Hence, the basic requirement to know the occurrence of bias is to have a baseline that functions as a touchstone to test whether what is said is balanced or slanted toward any side. In other words, bias refers to the news tendency to side with one group at the expense of the other by deviating from the recognised line of objectivity and impartiality to serve personal, political or religious purposes. In general, bias is associated with the following journalistic traits: partiality, one-sidedness, unbalanced selection of presentation, tendency or inclination that prevents a fair or balanced approach, temperamental or emotional leaning to one side, favouritism that distorts reality, personalised, unreasoned judgment, and predisposition or preference (Sloan and Mackay 2007, p. 6).

W. L. Bennett believes that bias and subjectivity in the news are achieved via four methods: personalising news by turning it into human interest accounts, dramatising news to present stories with loaded action based on events, fragmenting information, and presenting one-sided stories due to over-reliance on specific news sources (1988, p. 24 and 39 and 55 and 193). Rucinski (1992) labels Bennett's definition of 'personalising news' as personalised bias. It is a reference to the media tendency to personalise political and social events by stressing angles of human interest and individual actors instead of showing the real actors and motives. Some of the above methods such as dramatising and personalising news are followed in editing television news to make it more

entertaining and engaging for the audience, and they are considered to be the basic requirements of TV news broadcasting in a highly competitive market in order to survive by drawing more audiences (Curran et al., 1980).

Measuring subjectivity, imbalance, and bias in an utterly objective way, however, is a mere fantasy. The Glasgow Media Group claimed that there was a widely held false belief in the "utopia of neutralism" (Beharrell et al., 1976, p. 1). Several other scholars confirm that absolute objectivity is impossible and unachievable (Altheide 1976, p. 198; Pavlik 2007, p. 25; Hemanus 1976, p. 102; Ognianova and Endersby 1996; Moyers 1968, p. 18), or it is difficult to achieve (Kuypers 2002, p. 12; McQuail 1992, p. 189). In some cases, objectivity is said to be superficial and a term loaded with ideology (Bagdikian, 1983; Miller, 2000; Gauthier, 1993). To further elaborate, Gans says: 'The newsman attempts to be objective, and although he knows that his choice of stories and the way he covers them involve subjective considerations, he compensates by trying to be fair…. Fairness is achieved through balance, by giving both sides when reporting' (p. 32).

In other words, neutral and balanced news is rarely found in reporting. Beard affirms that 'there is no such thing as unbiased report, no such thing as "neutral" language' (2000, pp. 17-8); Geis (1987, pp. 58-63) and McQuail (1992, p. 188) share the same conclusions. However, there are words, clichés, and expressions that are collectively viewed as negative or positive which can help media researchers determine the tone or the kind of treatment used in the unit of analysis.

Hackett and Zhao (1996) pointed out some limitations that prevent journalists from being utterly objective in reporting. These limitations include internal and external factors such as news framing, cultural bias, news production mechanisms, and the mistaken concept of journalists as mere observers though the 'media are active participants in the social and political world' (p. 49).

Shoemaker and Mayfield (1987) mentioned four similar factors that limit the achievement of objectivity and add the social and institutional factors as well as the media owners who mostly attempt to impose their ideology. In this regard, Moss (2004) believes that objectivity has two different dimensions. The first one is 'epistemological' that objectively 'defines real things that can be known, believed or felt', whereas the

second dimension is 'operational' which 'involves a personal stance toward the world of objects' (p. 19).

Since there is some kind of personal involvement in the making of news, achieving absolute objectivity becomes only a dream. Indeed, Everette and Merrill confirm that 'in no way can a journalist be detached, unprejudiced, un-opinionated, unbiased, and omniscient'' (1996, p. 112). Also, Schlesinger directly observed the way BBC journalists worked in the newsroom and was able to show that they were partial despite their opposite claim in their coverage of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Schlesinger justifies the BBC personnel's claim as follows: 'They *could not reject* the central tenet which legitimises their activity because it plays an indispensable role in their belief-system. This limits their own evaluation of what they do' (1987, p. 12). In other words, BBC journalists need to believe they are objectively reporting the events in order to continue working effectively and as fast as possible with little questioning of what and how they reported these events. In a cross-cultural study, Semetko (1996) investigated political balance in reporting in Germany, Britain and the United States and found out that journalists in these countries differ in the way they view objectivity. Specifically, they have different approaches to the objective way of organising the news during their coverage of election campaigns.

Such a claim denies the basic journalists' aspirations toward balanced, fair, and objective reporting. Herbert (2000) believes that journalists should adhere to objectivity when they report but not at the expense of the basic functions of journalism: the dissemination of factual news and its analysis as well as the investigative effort of journalists to reach the truth (p. 7 and 67-8). Besides, journalists must have an ideal to follow because 'the end of objectivity in journalism would spell the end of journalism itself' (Gauthier 1993, p. 1). Also, there is the problematic nature of bias and subjectivity when viewing news since some people may regard a specific news item as biased, whereas others may see it as objective (Eveland and Shah, 2003).

Niven (2002) addressed this problem by finding accurate and official facts and figures such as the unemployment rate and comparing it with the way the media covered the news on the US economy under various presidents. Niven tried to reach answers to some questions such as 'Does a Democrat get better or worse coverage when producing

the same result as a Republican?' (p. 74). In this way, the researcher can detect whether balanced and objective news was found when the actions of a certain president were covered as long as the researcher has raw materials to refer to.

In non-Western states, the concept of objectivity varies from what was discussed above. For example, many countries in Eastern Europe that emerged from the Communist era are still struggling suffering from a kind of advocacy journalism along their attempt to adopt Western principles of good journalism. Aumente et al. confirmed that the goal of objectivity as a non-partisan ideal was largely discarded in Eastern Europe during the Communist reign since it was regarded as an 'enemy of "truth"' (1999, p.51). The role of the media was to serve the state and journalists were viewed as mere tools to 'facilitate this objective' (p. 189). The authors describe the kind of journalism prevalent in Eastern Europe in the following words: 'It was mostly a 'see, they are wrong, again', or a 'here's the real truth' approach to journalism. A journalism of information with a measure of objectivity and verifiability, a journalism of systematic inquiry and informed opinion was not to be found or only rarely found in any East/Central European or USSR media…' (1999, p. 152). The case of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is relevant to this study because Saddam Hussein's Iraq was somehow shaped by similar socialist and anti-imperialists slogans. As will be discussed below, many old journalism practices are still followed in the post-2003 Iraq.

Yet, after the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, journalism did not witness a radical and positive change. This fact was related to the political reality since the fall of communism did not resolve all the previous hardship and difficulties; instead, new problems emerged such as government corruption (Jakubowicz and Sukosd 2008, p. 34). Though there are differences in the degree of change that occurred, most of Eastern Europe include the former USSR countries are still suffering from a media that is 'highly politicised, particularly in the case of broadcasting, and with limited independence from the political elite' (Jakubowicz 2001, p. 59). Unfortunately, the negative impact of some old political and social policies affected journalism practice which was mostly based on 'partisan advocacy rather than objectivity' (Aumente et al 1999, p. 81). For example, Romanian journalists trained by Western experts to become more balanced and fair in reporting still believe that their task is to voice their opinions in addition to fact

(Jakubowicz and Sukosd 2008, pp. 196-7). Georgiadis (2004) offers a description of post-communist Romanian media that is interestingly typical to the post-2003 media in Iraq:

> The media has diversified greatly… in post-Communist Romania. Election choices, international structures and nongovernmental agencies will continue to influence and change the political and media culture while a weak economy and authoritarian mentality in the government and legal system offer challenges to a developing free press and young democracy in Romania (p. viii).

In Poland where the press was previously polarised and centralised by the government (Kowalski 1988), Polish journalists still believe that it is 'their duty to take sides in the many divisions within Polish society and promote the cause they support' (Jakubowicz and Sukosd 2008, pp. 196-7).

In post-communist Russia, journalists are still struggling to voice their views without the fear of censorship and the influence of the past. Voltmer mentions that there are positive journalistic outcomes in the advent of the new political system, yet there are still 'high degree of subjective evaluations indicating the persistence of the historical legacy of Russian journalism' (2000, p. 469). Ironically, Russian journalists who try to follow the Western standards of objectivity and balance in reporting are sometimes labeled as 'robots' by other fellow journalists (ibid., p. 478). Oates (2006) confirms that the concepts of media freedom and objectivity are not 'central to Russian watching habits' (p. 20). Such as the case of Iraq, Oates observed that the 'problem of lack of objectivity or balance do not keep Russians from reading, viewing and listening to the mass media' (2006, p. 31).

Similar to post-communist countries but with a varying degree, the Western concept of objectivity in Latin America remains blurred. Waisbord (2000) investigates the kind of watchdog journalism that is practised in Southern America where a culture of investigative journalism was prevalent in the mainstream media in the 1980s and 1990s. The author explores how in particular the concept of objectivity was affected by the kind of advocacy journalism that is somehow prevalent in many parts of Latin America by saying:

Despite the long-standing influence of the U.S. press, neither objectivity nor 'journalism as science' acquired the status of *uber*principles in South American journalism. The view that news reporting implies a double process of assembling facts and separating facts from opinions never attained a dominant position. Consequently, the distinction between facts and opinion has been murkier than in U.S. journalism. Conventions of news reporting remained ambiguously defined (Waisbord 2000, p. 121).

The liberalisation period that followed the Second World War in Latin America did not bring with it the expected adoption of the Anglo-American concepts of objectivity. Instead, the 'tradition of journalism of opinion maintained its influence' (p. 121) and journalists looked at this concept with scepticism due to its unrealistic goal (p. 124). Since most news organisations were 'politically committed' (p. 125), following this journalistic principle was only wishful-thinking. Similar to Iraq's case, the author stresses the difficulties faced by journalists who emerged from the era of dictatorship to a political system that calls for democracy and freedom. In their efforts to conduct investigative reporting, Latin American journalists face numerous challenges such as internal obstacles in the newsroom, the fact that 'editorial boards and publishers are timid', the 'verbal and physical threats' against journalists, and the 'absence of legal mechanism to have access to official records' (p. 244). Though the situation in Iraq is more intense, there are many similarities between the two political and media systems.

To sum up, the principle of objectivity and its different components like balance, impartiality, and factuality provide a safe haven for journalists to avoid bias and one-sidedness in reporting events and investigating truth. When somebody wants to write a balanced report, (s)he needs to place all the principles and ideals of journalism reporting (fair, accurate, balanced, objective, factual) on one arm of the scale, and the news item/coverage/event on the other arm. If the two arms are equal, then the coverage is balanced and objective. Most importantly, the principles of good journalism are thoroughly scrutinised during election times more than any other period because of the significance of the election. In the following section, a discussion is made on the international guidelines on reporting during election.

2. **Reporting During Elections**

In *A Reporter's Guide to Election Coverage* (2008) published by a group of international organisations that include UNESCO, International News Safety Institute, Index on Censorship, Reuters Foundation, and Article 19, the regulations on how to cover elections are clearly stated. These rules and regulations are largely taken from the guidelines of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) that monitored election and its coverage in a number of former Communist European countries. The document was made public since its sole purpose was for distribution to Arab journalists working during election times. It stresses that journalists have a major responsibility in covering the election news in a fair and professional manner. In its definition of 'good' journalists, the document mentions that they should 'report elections in a non-partisan way, suppressing their own political views in order to allow the public to make up their minds solely on the basis of what the various candidates are offering' (UNESCO 2008, p. 3). This is surely the idealistic aim of journalism.

In a section entitled 'Reporting Elections Broadcast Guidelines: Guidelines for Election Broadcasting', the document comments that the journalists have a duty to inform the public about the facts of the election campaign like the nature of the 'political parties, candidates, campaign issues and voting processes'. Most importantly, media professionals should adhere to the requirements of balance and impartiality in their reporting, according to Guideline No. 2. All media channels whether they are public or private must not 'discriminate against any political party or candidate'. This also entails that government owned media should give equal time and emphasis for all the contestants and the government should refrain from 'using the resources of the State, including those allocated to public broadcasters, to assist it in promoting its electoral chances'.

Article 19 asserts in Guidelines 2 and 8 the same provision. 'Publicly owned or funded media are under a strict obligation to be neutral and impartial in their coverage of election events, and should never express a particular preference for one candidate or party, discriminate against a particular party or candidate, or in any other way be biased' (Ibid., 'International Standards during Elections', p. 27). Some countries go further in applying this rule such as the case of Guyana whose Media regulations state that 'media owners and practitioners who are candidates or hold office in political parties (must)

refrain from using their programmes to promote their political objectives' (Commonwealth Election Broadcasting Guidelines, 2001).

Other relevant guidelines that are important to maintain a free media in a democratic society include the provision that 'no prior censorship of any election programme' should be imposed and that the state should make it very clear to everyone that 'the media will not be penalised for broadcasting programmes merely because they are critical of the government, its policies or the ruling party'. The two guidelines above are difficult to achieve in the Arab world because of government censorship and its control of the media. Other important guidelines include the prohibition of prior censorship because it conflicts with the freedom of expression in a democratic society.

In Guideline 8 'News Coverage', there is a great deal of emphasis on government owned media that must be 'particularly scrupulous in complying with their obligations of balance and impartiality in their news and current affairs reporting'. This is very necessary to ascertain that the state-run media do not side with any group or party especially when it comes to airing editorial views. In its definition of balance, the document mentions that 'parties or candidates receive news coverage commensurate with their importance in the election and the extent of their electoral support'.

Indeed, there is no objective and accurate measure to achieve such a balanced coverage since the criteria of judging political parties and their importance differ from one region or group of people to another. The evaluation of the party's popularity applied is to assess 'the party's performance in past elections and the number of seats held in parliament'. Accordingly, proportional time is allocated to each party by an independent media committee. For example, a commission from the Romanian Parliament was formed before the 1992 Presidential election to assign the total time coverage allotted to each competing party (Guidelines for Broadcast Coverage of Election Campaigns in Transitional Democracies, n.d.).

In general, the party that possesses the power usually receives most of the media attention due to its position in the country which 'allows them more scope to manoeuvre themselves into situations where they are likely to receive news coverage' (Article 19 et al., n.d.). However, this should not occur during the election coverage. In case there is coverage of press conferences or public statements made by the politicians in power, the

competing parties have the right to reply especially if the aforementioned politicians who are delivering media messages to the public are running for office once more.

Finally, the document refers to the difficulty of achieving balance in the coverage due to the ambiguous political weight of the party in the society especially during the first election. 'Due impartiality' is the phrase used in the UK because it means that each party may not receive exactly equal airtime but that which they are judged to be due given the significance of their contribution to a story. Hence there is the suspension of parliament in the UK during the election and the implementation of the due impartiality requirement even more stringently by broadcasters when giving airtime to contending political parties. Added to this fact, 'the existence of a large number of political parties, or of shifting coalitions, as is the case in Iraq, renders such solutions difficult to implement'. Here, Iraq seems to be a problematic case because of the different political/religious parties that seek control and the confusion that occurs when one wants to assess the geographic influence of each party. In general, the different provisions cited above are mentioned in the 'Guidelines for Broadcast Coverage of Election Campaigns in Transitional Democracies' which gives more details on comparable coverage. For instance, if a government owned media channel airs a protest or a press conference organised by a particular party, this media channel must also air similar activities done by other competing parties. This does not only apply to the time coverage but also to the kind of coverage since 'Broadcasting unimportant statements or summarizing statements is not comparable to broadcasting the highlights of a candidate's speech that received the most applause or broadcasting the speaker's actual voice'.

In the case of BBC guidelines during elections, the enforced broadcasting rules entail that the BBC should be fair and balanced in its treatment of the different political parties during the three weeks that precede the election (Lange and Palmer 1995, p. 153 and 159). For the British media and the BBC in particular, the concept of impartiality is a 'guiding principle' that requires journalists to report the facts to the public without interference from the others (Gunter 1997, p. 5). As part of its policy, the BBC insists that during election, the national bulletin should reflect 'all the main parties… fairly and fully' (Gunter, 1997, p. 156). The BBC regulations, which are drawn from the UK-wide legislation on impartiality of political and election coverage, mention the silence period

that starts on the election day until the polling stations are closed. In the meantime, the only things that can be reported are the facts about the election (Gunter 1997, p. 157).

To sum up, the rules and regulations of election coverage are almost identical in all the countries around the world. They are translated into Arabic and most Arab and Iraqi journalists are familiar with them. More than the case of newspapers or magazines, these rules are usually observed and applied in a stricter manner when they are related to TV channels due to their far-reaching influence. In the following section, a discussion of the Iraqi media codes during election is made due to its direct relevance to this study. In the following section, a discussion is made on the methods of examining media content to evaluate and measure the application of the principles of good journalism mostly during election campaigns. Other studies on the media effect focused on news framing, agenda-setting, and priming as discussed below.

3. Media Studies on Elections

Media studies of election campaigns have been investigated over many years. This is mainly due to the importance of elections and the fact that specific rules must be followed during election campaigns to ensure neutral and balanced reporting. Many experts believe that the mass communications media have an important role to play during election times since the public have increasingly relied on the media to understand the election campaign. In fact, the media have become a filter positioned between the candidate and the public (Norris, 2001; Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995). Butler and Ranney mention that the media function has shifted from being a provider of information to a 'major actor in the campaigning process' (1992, p. 283). Others think that 'the media do not cover the campaign: they are the campaign' (Harrop, 1987, p. 45). What is certain is that the media especially TV stations have sometimes a pivotal role in the election.

There are basic factors that can affect the way the public view the whole election process such as viewing the news coverage of the campaign (Erbring et al., 1980; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987), the political advertisements (Patterson and McClure, 1976; Weaver and Drew, 1993), or the news coverage and political advertisements (Porto 2007). In America, television has become, more than any other media channel, the most effective medium in determining how voters behave and what they know about the election

campaign and its issues (Graber, 2005; Just et al., 1996; Zhao and Chaffee, 1995; Bartels, 1993).

In their study of the 2004 US presidential elections Drew and Weaver (2006) and based on their previous studies of previous elections (Drew and Weaver, 1990; Weaver and Drew, 1995), found out that the more exposure to the different media channels (TV news, televised debates, and news on the Internet), the more knowledge voters will get about the candidates and their political stances. According to some experimental media studies, TV viewership has an influence on the features of the candidate's image, (Patterson 1980, pp. 134-8;; Keating and Latane, 1976; Kaid and Sanders, 1978); the coverage of TV news during election times has major effects on its viewers in terms of persuasion and reasoning (Edwardson, Grooms, and Proudlove, 1981; Bartels, 1993).

Accordingly, most politicians and their parties highly value the importance of the mass media especially in projecting favourable images of themselves and sometimes trying to spread unfavourable ideas of their opponents. It is believed that if a politician gets an average of 10 seconds of media coverage in his favour, he can have additional chances to win in the election (Aelst et al., 2008, p. 194). In other words, the more politicians are shown in different media channels, the better chances they will get to secure a place in the coming government (Maddens, et al., 2006).

In general, there are three main areas of media research in election coverage: [1] the editorial approach; [2] the criteria of selecting news; and [3] the way the campaign coverage is organised (De Vreese, Jochen, and Semetko, 2001, p. 108; Semetko et al., 1991; Blumler et al., 1986). In his study of the evening news programs of CBS, NBC, and ABC, Hofstetter (1976) pointed out the two classical quantitative indicators that can be used to study the election campaign: The frequency of stories on the election and the length of each story in minutes (p. 22). Hofstetter analysed 4,349 news stories on American politics aired from the 10th of July 1972 to the 6th of November 1972; a news story is defined as 'the smallest completely self-contained message in a news program' (p. 27). In terms of position, the issues cited in the beginning of the news programme were regarded as having 'greater significance' than other issues mentioned later' (p. 31). Hofstetter concluded that there were minor differences between the TV networks'

coverage; furthermore, 'Most coverage was neutral or ambiguous rather than favorable or unfavorable' (p. 206).

The European elections have attracted the attention of many media scholars (Blumler, 1983). Comparative studies of the TV coverage of the European election were conducted. For example, Peter, Lauf, and Semetko (2004) studied the 1999 European Parliamentary elections and analysed 5,477 stories taken from the evening newscasts for two weeks. The TV stations belonged to 14 EU countries and the main focus of the study was to investigate the prominence of the campaign coverage.

De Vreese (2003) conducted a cross-national study of TV coverage of the 1999 European elections in the Netherlands, Denmark, and Britain. The research mainly focused on the role of TV channels shaping the coverage of the election news. In the findings, De Vreese mentions that the British TV news showed the agenda of politicians more than the Dutch news, whereas Danish TV news had a major role in setting the news agenda.

Furthermore, Campbell (2006) compared the terrestrial TV news programmes of the 1994 European election campaign with another European election that occurred in 2004. He defined the unit of analysis as a news item that included interview, feature, or report. The items were investigated for their prominence (position and length). The researcher employed other measures that helped him categorise the news items into other subtypes such as 'event information' and 'background information' items.

The studies cited above are mainly based on content analysis of TV messages; hence, they do not usually give us an idea about the effect of TV coverage on potential voters. Yet, Schoenbach and Lauf elaborated on the trap potential effect of television in the sense that it makes those who are not or little interested in politics vote. During the 1979 European elections campaign, television appeared to have reached and affected more people who belonged to this segment than newspapers. However, television seemed to be as equal as newspapers in terms of influence during the 1999 European elections (2004, p. 176).

In their study of the 1968 Presidential election, McCombs and Shaw (1972) made the first empirical study of agenda-setting by investigating a selection of US newspapers and the NBC and CBS evening newscast. They found a strong connection between what

the media emphasised and the voters' attitudes (p. 181). The researcher divided news stories into 15 categories and classified them into issues. The news content was divided into major and minor levels. In connection to television, stories were defined as any news items whose length was 45 seconds 'and/or one of the three lead stories' (p. 178). In analysing TV messages, the main focus was on measuring the time given to stories and their position in the newscast as a whole. After McCombs and Shaw's pioneering work, over 200 empirical studies on agenda-setting influence on the public were published (Dearing and Rogers, 1996).

Other scholars believed that the media in general have limited if no significant role in agenda-setting (Miller et al. 1990). In some cases, outside factors like world events determine the influence of the media on the election process (Semetko et al., 1991). Aelst et al. (2008) studied the way two TV channels, VRT and VTM, covered the 2003 Belgian election from April 7 to May 17 2003. The researchers investigated the TV news items and pointed out the candidates' appearance; they wanted to know whether it was the party logic or media logic that was highlighted in the coverage. Using a multivariate analysis, they found out that the two types of logic were present; however, the party logic overwhelmed the media logic. This study introduced results that contradicted Mazzoleni's research (1987) on media logic (see below). Kuhn (2005) investigated the French TV coverage of the issue of *l'ins´ecurit´e* in the 2002 French Presidential election and found that there was no indication to suggest that the media followed its own logic; instead, the coverage was mostly based on news values.

Another concept which is related to agenda-setting is priming (Scheufele 2000; Iyengar and Simon 1993). Priming denotes the influence the media exert on the people's later conduct or attitudes in connection to the content conveyed (Bryant and Zilmann 2002, p. 97). It suggests that when the media make some issues or topics more prominent than others, they will affect 'the standards by which governments, presidents, policies, and candidates for public office are judged' (Iyengar and Kinder 1987, p. 63). In general, priming has two characteristics: its intensity and recency and the fact that it fades with time. For example, if participants in an experiment are repeatedly exposed to the same messages, the priming effect fades slower than having less exposure to the same media messages. Also, when certain tasks related to judgement and evaluations are undertaken,

the priming effect lasts longer than other tasks that involve word decisions (judging whether a target is a word or a meaningless lexicon) ((Bryant and Zilmann 2002, p. 104).

In relation to the Iraqi media, for instance, if the issue of security or public services was primed on TV, the viewers would evaluate the performance of the Prime Minister based on the way these issues were presented. According to Iyengar and Kinder (1987), there is a strong connection between voting (for or against) and the evaluation of the performance of the president (see also Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Iyenger, Peters, and Kinder 1984). Hence, TV networks can sometimes have damaging effects on some candidates by indirectly labelling them as incompetent or weak.

With regard to the coverage of US Presidential elections, there are some recurrent problematic issues which include: (a) the coverage is neither fair nor balanced since some candidates receive more attention or favourable coverage than others (b) there is some kind of focus on the election coverage showing it as a 'horse-race' (Kerbel, 1998; Farnsworth and Lichter, 2007; Robinson and Sheehan, 1983; Patterson, 1994).

In relation to news framing, Iyengar defined it as the 'subtle alterations in the statement or presentation of judgement and choice of problems' (1991, p. 11), while Entman (1993) stresses that framing makes 'some aspects of reality more salient in a text in order to promote a particular "problem definition," causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described' (p. 52). Some scholars believe that news tends to be selective in the sense that particular people, events, or sources are highlighted (Semetko et al., 2000, p. 137; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000; Hofstetter and Buss, 1978, p. 518; Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar, 1993) or some candidates and their parties are favoured more than others (Lichter and Noyes 1993).

Based on Westerståhl's (1972) assumption, Kuypers suggested comparing the actual events or utterances in the example cited with what the media presented to the public to show how a specific event or person is framed by the media (2002, 18; see also McQuail, 1992, p. 207). In connection to the previous theory of agenda-setting, framing goes a step beyond to investigate 'what people talk or think about by examining how they think and talk about issues in the news' (Pan and Kosicki, 1993).

In relation to studies on the framing effect during election times, different American media outlets like ABC, CBS, CNN, and the *New York Times*…etc were

thought to be responsible for the defeat of Bush in the 1992 Presidential elections since the economy was covered in a more negative manner than the actual statistics showed (Ladd, 1993). Other studies suggest that the media's favourable treatment of Clinton during the same elections led to his victory (Hetherington, 1996; Sabato, 1993). Also, Fridkin et al. (2008) used content analysis, public survey, and an experiment to investigate the audience influence by the final presidential debate in 2004 between George W. Bush and John Kerry. The media platforms examined were TV, newspaper, and Internet. The study concluded that news was focused on the candidates rather than the important issues (horse-race), and it was generally framed in favour of Bush, making the audience think negatively of Kerry.

In another study on the privately owned TV Globo in Brazil, the political candidate, Fernando Collor de Mello, was presented in a very favourable manner during the 1989 Presidential election. This kind of coverage led to de Mello's victory (Skidmore 1993). Also, Porto (2007) studied the coverage of the 2002 Presidential elections in Brazil and found out that TV Globo's Jornal Nacional framed the issue of financial markets, leading voters to support President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's political programme. Donsbach (1997) investigated the coverage of the German Bundestag Election of 1994 and mentioned that the news framed the political process. From the 18 German news organisations - eight daily newspaper, two news magazines, four weekly papers, and four news magazines on television- Donsbach investigated, the majority followed an advocacy model in the sense that they supported/favoured a certain political candidate.

According to Mazzoleni (1987), news values play the major role in framing the election campaign. Journalists' and news organisations' selection of events are usually determined by news values. In this case, the media logic will replace the party logic. According to Semetko et al. (1991), the editorial approach followed by news organisations that cover the election campaign is of two types: *sacerdotal* and *pragmatic.* Based on the analysis and comparison of the 1983 British general election with the 1984 American presidential election, the researchers found that British journalists were rather cautious in their coverage, trying their best to make TV news somewhat 'politically innocuous' (Semetko et al., 1991, p. 53), whereas American journalists working for NBC

were more proactive, 'looking for events to report that would be laced with drama, conflict, novelty, movement and anomaly' (Semetko et al., 1991, p. 55).

The first type suggests that the elections play a significant role in shaping democratic societies; hence, the election campaign is newsworthy and politicians are usually respected in such coverage. Studies of British journalism in the 1980s show an overwhelmingly *sacerdotal* approach since journalists are usually cautious in their coverage (Blumler and Gurevitch, 2000, p. 388). As a matter of fact, journalists in the EU region have followed this approach few decades ago, by focusing on the agenda of the parties and candidates and avoiding problematic issues (Semetko et al., 1991; Asp, 1983; Siune and Borre, 1975).

Semetko and Canel (1997) called journalists who reported the agenda of political parties without critiquing it as 'agenda senders' which is opposite of 'agenda setters'. On the other hand, the pragmatic approach suggests that an election campaign is not immediately regarded as newsworthy since this event is measured against the criteria of news value (Semetko et al. 1991, p. 6).

In the 1997 general British election, journalists were more proactive, suggesting a shift to the pragmatic approach and to the American model of journalism (Blumler and Gurevitch 2000, p. 389). This new approach has been adopted by many other journalists in Europe in the recent past years (Norris et al., 1999; Blumler and Gurevitch, 1998; Semetko and Canel, 1997; De Vreese, 2001).

Despite the fact that the principles of good journalism prevent journalists from being one-sided and biased in their coverage of events, ideological beliefs tend to overrule all these principles as the news slants in the end 'toward the dominant or hegemonic perspective' (Garyantes and Murphy, 2010, p. 153) or toward supporting the views expressed in the editorials (Mann, 1974; Lichter at al., 1986).

As for the 'horse race' coverage, it is focused on the candidates rather than the issues; the candidates are presented in the media as if they competing in a race to win the election. Once they are ahead; at other times they are held up behind. The candidates are usually labelled as 'likely', 'plausible', or 'hopeless'. The 'likely' candidate is the front-runner who receives most of the coverage because (s)he has a better chance of wining, unlike the 'hopeless' candidate who receives the least coverage. As for the 'plausible'

candidate, (s)he comes in the middle (Robinson and Sheehan, 1983). The horse-race aspect in the elections has an impact on potential voters who usually choose a candidate that is more viable than others (Bartels 1988). Voters are believed to vote for a viable candidate whom they can easily recall; this is linked with the priming effect of the media as will be explained below (Iyengar 1992, p. 38).

In Britain, Brookes, Lewis, and Wahl-Jorgensen (2004) investigated 214 stories aired on the BBC and ITV evening news programme during the 2001 British General Election. The researchers concluded that two-thirds of the stories examined made references to the polls that usually show the rating of candidates and their possible success or failure in the election.

Farnsworth et al. (2009) conducted a content analysis study to investigate the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) coverage of the candidates of the 2006 Canadian Liberal Party Leadership. The duration of the study was from 23 October to 1 December when Dion was nominated as the party's leader on the 2nd of December 2006. The study focused on the 'horse-race' aspect of the coverage by comparing the way the eight candidates were covered. By classifying the issues and analysing the statements, some aspects of the coverage were studied such as the tone (positive or negative accounts of the candidates), the candidates' future prospects (horse-race) or other features such as the candidates' performance, figure, and political views.

In a cross-national study of TV coverage, Cruikshank (2009) examined 117 stories related to the 2008 US Presidential election aired on the evening newscasts of Al Jazeera (English), BBC Television, and Russia Today. The researcher found that most of the BBC and Al Jazeera coverage was centered on the horse-race aspect of the election campaign. The findings shed light on the universality of 'horse-race' coverage.

Other scholars believe that there has been an exaggeration about the role of media in election since the ultimate players are the candidates and their programmes (Mughan, 2000). Druckman compared between newspaper and television coverage of the political campaigns and found out that the two media outlets do not differ much in terms of the content conveyed. The difference was mainly related to the quantity of news coverage since newspapers tend to cover events more comprehensively. Druckman concluded that newspapers rather television channels play an important but limited role in informing the

electorate about the 2000 Minnesota Senate campaign (2005). In the following section, a discussion is presented on the concepts of agenda-setting, priming, and faming which are important to further understand the influence of the media during election times.

To sum up, the studies cited above offer a range of different methods to study and interpret media outlets. Media researchers attempted to investigate the kind of implicit and explicit media messages that usually aim at influencing viewers, listeners or readers. This has crucial importance because we need to understand the kind of influence media channels have on the receivers and in particular when it touches electorates during election times. The author of this work made use of these studies to understand the role of journalists in covering events and the responsibility they carry in informing the public.

Indeed, the principles of good journalism such as objectivity, news values, balance, neutrality, and factuality must be observed by all media channels especially during election campaigns. Also, some media channels tend to set agendas or present news in certain ways to serve special interests. For the purpose of this work, the researcher has focused on the study of TV news stories based on a content analysis method. The aim is to find out whether the different TV channels in Iraq applied the principles of objective journalism in their 2010 election coverage. It is also concerned with the analysis of the narrative and production features of the news programmes and whether these features can shed light on the way these channels presented election news. Finally, this approach was adopted to investigate whether the TV channels present different or similar news agenda.

Chapter Four

Studies on Election Coverage in the Arab World

As this study is focused on the media coverage of elections in Iraq, it is important to know about other such studies conducted in this region. This chapter is divided into two sections. In order to give a wider context, the first section of this chapter discusses media studies and reports on elections from across the Arab world, while the second section is focused on Iraq alone. These studies are based on content analysis and are mostly sponsored by or adapted from Western media organisations. They largely follow basic steps such as measuring the amount of time devoted to candidates, the position of stories in the programme, and number of reports aired. They mostly lack the in-depth analysis of the election such as investigating news presentation, the analysis of the topics' score of negative/positive/neutral attributes, the different news formats, and other production techniques like candidates' spatial relationship with others and the significance of camera angles which characterise many election studies produced in the western world.

1. Studies conducted in the Arab World

The usual research method followed is content analysis but studies on Arab media following this approach are scarce. Pintak (2008) stresses that more studies are needed to understand the nature of official media outlets. There is a new trend in some Arab countries to study election media coverage carried out by few civil society organisations. For example, there was a large-scale study that used a qualitative and quantitative measure and lasted two years to investigate the way newspapers`, television channels, and radio stations covered the elections in Tunisia, Palestine, Lebanon, and Egypt (El Fegiery, 2006). The 'observers' of 'Arab civil society organisations' whose identities were not revealed investigated the basic components of the media message: the time and space allotted to the candidates and their parties, the general tone or evaluative codes (positive, negative, neutral), and whether the political candidates have been given direct access to voice their views or are only referred to by the anchors (El Fegiery, 2006).

However, it is not clear how accurate the coding frame is especially with regard to the measurement of the tone as there is no reference to the way the coding frame was designed.

In general, the study concluded that Arab media channels in these countries are plagued by 'partisanship and a lack of professionalism in many respects'. This is evident in other Arab countries, too. But the media coverage of elections in Lebanon was the best one in terms of balance, which is related to the diverse channels that enjoy private ownership, according to the researchers. Despite this fact, media coverage faced other difficulties such as failing to meet the requirements of media 'professionalism and objectivity'.

As for Palestine, Egypt, and Tunisia, media partisanship was the most prevalent phenomenon; however, Palestinian media was 'the most balanced' amongst them. In Egypt, there was a clear development in the way some media outlets covered the 2005 Presidential Election. The most outstanding new outlets were the independent newspapers that started criticising the government more than before. But the worst case was found in Tunisia where the government exercises full control over public and private newspapers since all the newspapers favoured government candidates in their coverage (El Fegiery, 2006).

What was observed was that the four countries surveyed did not have a clear media regulation during election, and in Egypt's case the election law said nothing on the function of media. The researchers believed that these unclear and sometimes vague media rules are intended to be used as 'tools of preemptive censorship to limit critical coverage of government candidates and electoral campaigns'. In other words, there are political reasons behind following this kind of ambiguous media policy which gives the concerned governments more authority over private media channels whose practitioners will certainly practice self-censorship and cautiously avoid any criticism of the government and its candidates (El Fegiery, 2006).

What is noteworthy is that this kind of election coverage is somehow similar to the way European journalists used to cover the elections in their countries (until the late 1960s in the Netherlands; until the late 1970s in Belgium; until 1980s in Britain; throughout the *Lottizzazione* period in Italy). Media outlets followed the partisan logic

since they were careful not to offend the political parties and their candidate(s) (Gurevitch and Blumler, 1993; Brants and van Praag, 2006; Roncarolo, 2002; Asp, 1983).

Some media experts have called this kind of coverage agenda-sending since the journalists are only focused on reporting the political agenda of the competing parties without challenging the prevalent political views (Semetko and Canel, 1997). However, media coverage of election campaigns in Europe developed later by turning toward the media logic since it became proactive (*pragmatic*) instead of being reactive (*sacerdotal*) toward the political parties' agendas (Semetko et al., 1991; Nossiter, Scammell, and Semetko 1995).

Although the governmental media outlets in Egypt, Palestine, and Tunisia allow different candidates free air time to talk about their electoral programmes, more favourable treatment is often given to government candidates. The study concluded that the media in these countries is clearly subordinated to politicians at the expense of journalism principles and 'professional standards' (El Fegiery, 2006).

Maiola and Ward, in their study of Palestinian election (see below), mentioned that it is still 'premature' to discuss Arab citizens' involvement in the public sphere and the media of mass communication since they are mostly controlled by the government or political parties (Maiola and Ward 2007, p. 96). Unfortunately, officials in the government view media channels as 'propaganda' outlets which are partly used to deform opponent parties and their representatives. To give two examples, Hamas group was defamed by the government owned media in Palestine, whereas the image and figures of the Ghad (Tomorrow) Party and Muslim Brotherhood Association were distorted by the official media in Egypt. It is important to note that there is another example of such state-controlled media found in Russia which is regarded as an emerging democracy. White,

Oates and McAllister (2005) investigated the media coverage of the 1999-2000 Russian elections and found out that the state-run television supported the Kremlin, and it had a powerful role in making Vladimir Putin win the election campaign. To sum up, many Arabs countries are still at their infancy in terms of having a democratic system that safeguards the work of a free media.

Finally, in what seems to be a close resemblance to Iraq, the Lebanese private media 'tended to be subordinate to the interests of individual politicians or factions, and their coverage reflected the state of sharp polarization among factions' (El Fegiery, 2006). This conclusion corresponds with the observation of the Lebanese journalist, Amin Qamouriya, who confirmed that the media channels in general lacked impartiality during election time. 'There was hardly a media outlet that managed to observe the code of conduct they had subscribed to because most of the media organisations are owned by candidates or their supporters ('Lebanon votes: A review 2005 Elections' UNESCO 2008, pp. 3-4).

Mamoun Fandy in his work *(Un)civil War of Words* (2007) states that many Arab media channels resort to defaming political figures which is a reflection of the political tension on the ground. In other words, the media is a reflection of the political system that sponsors it. For example, before the 1991 Gulf War and during the escalation of tension between Iraq and its former leader, Saddam Hussein, on one hand and the majority of Arab leaders on the other hand, a war of words started before the actual war. This was reflected in the way Hussein scornfully described Egypt's former President Hosni Mubarak, the late King Fahad of Saudi Arabia, and the late Emir of Kuwait, Jaber al-Ahmad, and vice versa.

Maiola and Ward (2007) investigated the Palestinian Presidential elections of 2005 by comparing Pan-Arab media channels' coverage of the elections with local Palestinian channels. They used content analysis methodology by choosing a sample of media channels and conducting interviews with Palestinian media practitioners. In terms of qualitative analysis, the researchers assessed the tone of coverage given to specific candidates by the 'journalists' explicit judgment' in the different media channels (negative, neutral, and positive) as well as 'the framing (value) of coverage' (p. 109). However, it is not clear whether the two researchers managed to achieve inter-coder reliability especially when it comes to measuring the 'journalists' explicit judgment'. They observed that the amount of information on the candidates broadcast by PBC TV (Palestinian Broadcasting Cooperation) did not amount to an hour which was mostly devoted to covering the candidate, Mahmoud Abbas, in the 'context of his institutional duties' (p. 107).

In highlighting Abbas' activities, the authors did not analyse how PBC could have promoted Abbas and Fatah which he represents. The authors commended PBC for separating facts from commentary though they admitted that the channel clearly favoured Mahmoud Abbas and his Party by giving them more airtime than the other parties and candidates. Also, it seems that PBC tried to invoke the viewers' national sentiments by showing a still image that lasted six seconds of Abbas and Arafat together with the logo of the Palestinian Authority in the middle 'implying that Abbas embodied the continuation of Arafat's legacy' (p. 109). In other words, Abbas is meant to be associated with Arafat to suggest that both share the same views and have equal weight. The study concludes that critical political and social factors affect the kind of election coverage made by local Palestinian media channels.

In another study of the same election, it was noted that though few media channels tried to be impartial and objective, some other media outlets gave prominence to political candidates more than others. UNESCO's report on the 1995 Palestinian Presidential Election points out that during the election period the official Palestine TV devoted 95% of the total newscast time to Mahmoud Abbas, whereas 47% of the private al-Watan TV's programmes were on Moustafa al-Barghouthi. As for Amwaji radio station, it allotted 94% of its airtime to Bassam Salihi, another Palestinian candidate running for office. In general, the press coverage highlighted the activities and the figure of Mahmoud Abbas since he holds the power; more than 48% of the coverage was devoted to him. As for Moustafa al-Barougthi and Tayseer Khalid, they got about 14% press coverage each. The media silence that was supposed to be practised on election day was violated by the three major daily newspapers that published political advertisements and reports on the competing candidates ('1995 Palestinian Presidential Election, UNESCO 2008, p. 8).

As for the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council Elections, observers from the EU monitored the Palestinian media channels and concluded that many outlets were under the influence of some political figures. The government owned Palestine TV was biased toward Fatah whose leader, Mahmoud Abass is the Palestinian Prime Minister. Hence, the sate-run TV has not changed its 2005 editorial policy in backing the party that is in power. As for al-Watan TV, it devoted most of its coverage to Moustafa al-Barougthi's

list, the Independent Palestine, just like what happened in the 2005 elections. There were other media channels investigated:

> The public Voice of Palestine gave 56% of its elections coverage to Fatah, and 31% to Change and Reform – most of the latter was negative coverage. Private radio station Amwaj mostly covered independent candidates (58%), Fatah (17%) and Alternative (15%)….. Newspapers covered all lists, but the state-funded Al-Haya al-Jadeeda was biased in favour of the ruling Fatah, giving it 37% of space (UNESCO 2008, p. 14).

Furthermore, one of the few specialised NGOs that monitor the media coverage during elections in Arab countries is the Arab Working Group for Media Monitoring (AWGMM) that has programmes in the following states: Yemen, Sudan, Algiers, Autonomous Palestinian Territories, Lebanon, and Tunisia. There are about fourteen Arab law organisations from ten countries that established AWGMM in coordination with International Media Support (IMS). Unfortunately, Iraq is not included in AWGMM's programme probably due to the lack of security in the country. Yet, AWGMM's studies do not seem to be peer reviewed since many are written by one native researcher who is aided by a group of coders. Also, the methodology and the coding frames used seem to be fixed by IMS, and the details of the analysis of the stories are not included in the reports that are posted online, so it is difficult to understand the exact research method followed. Further, all the reports claimed that a qualitative measure was conducted by investigating the tone of the candidates/parties' coverage; however, it was not clear how this was done. In other words, there was no indication mentioned about the way the coders assigned the neutral/positive/negative candidates' attributes. In general, these studies lack the analysis of the topics' score of neutral/positive/negative attributes, types of news formats, production techniques used and the way each candidate was visually presented in the reports since the main emphasis was on measuring the amount of time devoted to the parties/candidates and the tone of the candidates' coverage.

One of the earliest studies conducted by AWGMM occurred in Bahrain in 2006 in association with the Bahrain Center for Human Rights (AWGMM, 2007). The study concluded that the government exerted great influence on the Bahraini media. The

opposing political candidates were forbidden from advertising for themselves, whereas members of the royal family had full control over the media. Further, some programmes were aired in order to demean the cause of some oppositional parties or figures without giving them the chance to respond. The coding frame used here was mainly quantitative in nature although there was a five-point scale of positive/negative/neutral qualitative measure.

The results showed that 38% of the news was devoted to the media campaign, 33% to government news, and 19% on educating the public on the election. No time was allotted to the competing political parties and candidates. Also, the election regulations were not followed in terms of media silence that is 24 hours prior to the Election Day. It was also noted that some Bahraini journalists received sums of money to publicise some candidates and that political advertisements were published in return for money without referring to them as advertisements (AWGMM, 2007).

In 2010, AWGMM conducted another study on the Parliamentary elections (3-31 October) in Bahrain and found that the government largely manipulated the election coverage by intentionally ignoring the opposition. The same methodology followed in its study of 2006 was implemented. This time, eight coders were assigned to analyse media messages aired on Bahrain's radio, newspapers, and the official television channel. The report mentioned that during the election campaign, Bahrain's TV devoted different amounts of time to cover the following: 5% to present information on the election, 18% to encourage citizens to vote, 18% to promote official figures, and 58% to cover other news programmes like interviews (AWGMM, 2011).

As for Jordan, the Jordanian Commission for Democratic Culture worked with IMS and surveyed 38,162 items in 18 media channels during the Parliamentary Election that took place between October 21 and November 19 2007. The media outlets included: five daily newspaper, four weekly newspapers, the terrestrial TV channel, Wattan satellite channel, four radio stations, and three websites. In terms of the qualitative measure, the same methodology used in the Bahraini and Algerian elections was followed. The study found that 45.7 per cent of the reporting was positive; 52.8 per cent neutral, while 1.5 per cent was negative (AWGMM, 2009b). There is no reference to

government control because the political system in Jordan is monarchic, so there is only a Parliamentary election whose members are chosen by the public.

In its 2010 report, AWGMM mentioned that 27 coders were assigned to monitor Jordanian media outlets that covered the 2010 Parliamentary election including three TV channels. The report showed that many Jordanian media channels were impartial in their election coverage. The methodology used in other AWGMM's studies was followed without any alteration (AWGMM, 2010a).

In Algeria, the Algerian League for Human Rights cooperated with IMS to monitor the April 9, 2009 Algerian Presidential Election. Eleven newspapers (four governmental and seven private) in Arabic and French, the terrestrial TV channel and Radio One and Three were monitored during the election. The study concluded that governmental outlets were biased toward Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the Algerian president. The mostly quantitative study focused on the time allotted to the president which exceeded that given to all the other candidates. The same applies to the size of coverage in the Algerian newspapers. The only qualitative measure followed was assessing the tone of the coverage (negative/positive/neutral). The study revealed that 73% of all the media channels made positive coverage of the candidates, whereas 14.1% only was negative. The remaining 12.9% was neutral coverage (AWGMM, 2009a).

In relation to Tunisia, AWGMM published a report on the October 2009 Presidential and Legislative Elections. The report mentioned that the former Tunisian President and his ruling party dominated the election campaign that was aired on three radio and two TV stations, constituting 75.83% of the amount of coverage. Although the methodology is typical to other AWGMM's reports, the authors claimed that interviews with journalists, candidates, and political figures were conducted to further understand the role of media during the election campaign (AWGMM 2009c). However, the details and results of these interviews were not incorporated in the report, so it is not clear how these interviews were used.

Also, AWGMM published a report on the 2010 multi-party elections in Sudan (April 11-15). The coders who investigated four TV channels looked into the election coverage and carefully monitored hate-speech. The report revealed that the coverage was highly biased by ignoring small political blocs and focusing on the two main political

parties: National Congress Party and Sudan People's Liberation Movement (AWGMM, 2010b).

In one of its first studies, AWGMM investigated the 2010 Parliamentary elections in Egypt by analysing ten news websites. Among the 2869 articles studied, , AWGMM's report mentioned that impartiality was the overwhelming feature that constituted 74.5% of the materials posted, while biased coverage made up 25.% of the samples chosen (AWGMM, 2010c).

In general, almost all studies cited above covered the official candidates in either neutral or positive manner since presenting those candidates in a negative way is somehow unthinkable. Also, many studies on elections in the Arab world need clearer coding frames that objectively make qualitative measurements since it is difficult for the researcher(s) to ask the coder(s) for his/her opinion on the news and expect to achieve inter-coder reliability in the end. On other hand, most Iraqi and Arab media practitioners are very much aware of the rules and guidelines that govern the coverage of election. The interest in monitoring how the election is portrayed in the media has not been an old one, but there are ambitious developments on the ground that would surely result in optimistic future prospects for reforming the Arab media. In the following section, we will have a closer look at some of the studies on the coverage of election in Iraq as they are directly related to this study.

2. Studies on Iraq

In early January 2005, the Iraqi Communications and Media Commission (CMC) published all its media regulations and codes that were designed by Western media professionals especially those related to the conduct of journalists and media channels during the elections. The newspapers that published these regulations and codes included: *Asharq al-Awsat*, *al-Mada*, *Baghdad*, *al-Nahdha*, *al-Dustoor*, *al-Takhi*, *al-Adalah*, and *al-Itihad* (CMC, 2005, p. 29). Finally, CMC, IHEC, and NMC's websites include the majority of these media regulations.

One of its first publications was a bulky document entitled 'Mass Media and the Election Campaign: National, Regional and Local Elections January 30, 2005' that attempted to organise the Iraqi mass media channels during the elections in a way that guarantees their objective, impartial, and balanced reporting. In its general assessment of

the manner some Iraqi news channels reported the 2005 elections, the report commends these channels for highlighting the 'national, historical and religious responsibility of Iraqis for voting' (CMC, 2005, p. 1). The report indirectly refers to the continuous Shiite Marja'yah's (highest religious authority) calls to cast votes on Election Day which is contrasted to the way the majority of Sunnis boycotted the elections in 2005. Amongst its other recommendations is the need to have a change in the 'political ownership of mass media channels' which is a reference to the control of political parties over the mass media. CMC admits that some political parties have a group of international experts who speak on their behalf in the media channels as well as the financial ability to buy media loyalties for temporary periods (CMC, 2005, p. 2). Also, the report mentions the necessity to reform IMN in order to make it a 'real public broadcasting means', which is a clear confession of the Iraqi government's influence over IMN.

CMC's report was unique since it presented one of the earliest assessments of some Iraqi TV stations. Due to its relevance to the current study, an elaborate account is given below. CMC monitored eight Iraqi TV channel: al-Iraqia, Asharqia, al-Fayhaa, al-Furat, Kurdistan, al-Hurriah, and al-Nahrain and some Arab satellite channels like al-Jazeera, al-Arabiya, and Al-Diyar (sic) (CMC, 2005, p. 19). In fact, Al-Diyar is an Iraqi channel run by Faisal al-Yasseri's son, though the Saudi owned Arab Radio and Television (ART) has been instrumental in establishing it.

The investigation was done on the 2005 election to select a National Assembly responsible for drafting the new Constitution using quantitative and qualitative measures though the coding frame and the details of the study are not published. The media campaign started on the 16th of December 2004 which was 45 days before the 30th of January 2005 election day. The recording, which was done during Iraqi TV prime time (from 6:00 pm to 10:00 pm) and lasted 15 days (from 15 to 30 January 2005), was limited to the newscasts and some special programmes on elections and political commentary. The investigation included documenting the place and time given the political parties and figures, the way they were presented, and the level of bias reflected on the report. There was also an evaluation of the time allotted to women in the election news. All the TV channels provided ample size for political advertisements especially during the last two

weeks leading to the Election Day when the media campaign intensified (CMC 2005, p. 22).

In its conclusions, the report mentioned that al-Iraqia and Asharqia channels were biased because they favoured the then Prime Minister, Iyad Allawi, in their reporting. However, there was no indication or reference to the methodology followed by CMC to measure this kind of bias. The general tone of al-Iraqia in reporting the election was positive and the event was shown in an optimistic and positive manner. The channel followed the government political line without introducing any criticism; the election was pictured as a tool to combat terrorism. However, there was a clear bias toward Iyad Allawi. For example, in a newscast that lasted 30 minutes, 13 minutes were devoted to the activities of the PM that were firstly shown in the newscast.

The criteria of determining the news value and its worthiness were focused on the government; for example, the official visits of the PM to hospitals and universities were mentioned before the more important developments in the security situation. But this emphasis on Allawi decreased during the last days of the campaign (CMC, 2005, p. 20). Kathleen Ridolfo of Radio Free Europe observed that Allawi 'whether by virtue of being prime minister or by intention has dominated the airwaves' (UNESCO 2008, p. 9). Due to the security threats, opinion pollsters were not allowed to come close to the polling stations. This has certainly empowered the Iraqi media channels to report accurately and fairly which were given another responsibility in 'backing up decisions on physical safety. The tone of the coverage as well as the facts reported played as much of a role in this (UNESCO 2008, p. 11).

Another problem that appeared was the use of religion and religious symbols by some political parties in their campaign. For example, the Iraqi Shiite Alliance used the picture of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the highest Shiite authority. Al-Iraqia continuously aired the statement issued by Sistani that emphasised his support for all Iraqi parties; however, when one of Sistani's aides announced that the Ayatollah supports the Shiite Alliance, al-Iraqia channel ignored the new statement and continued airing the previous one despite the fact that many Arab and international media channels broadcast it (CMC 2005, p. 21).

There was an indication that Asharqiya TV favoured secular parties like that of the Sunni Ghazi al-Yawir who headed Iraqiyun slate. But in mid-January, the channel focused on Allawi more than al-Yawir throughout its news programmes and live interviews. This stance showed a turn in its editorial policy that firstly evolved around criticising the provisional government and its achievements. As an example, the channel devoted 21 minutes out of 30 minutes of its newscast to the PM. Also, the TV crews of al-Iraqia and Asharqia were given exclusive rights to accompany the PM whenever he has some festivals or celebrations to attend. However, this kind of favouritism decreased after the Election Day (CMC 2005, pp. 22- 3).

As for al-Furat TV, it was clearly supportive of the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) slate, devoting most of its programmes to airing interviews with representatives of SCIRI. In the beginning, UIA refused to air political advertisements on TV, preferring to meet people face to face and talk to them during the Friday prayers speeches. But later, they changed their minds and aired few ads in Arabic on al-Iraqia TV and one in Persian on an Iranian channel broadcasting from Iran (CMC, 2005, p. 27).

The same point applies to the Assyrian and Turkomen TV stations that were biased to their ethnic groups. The Shiite al-Fayhaa TV also aired biased programmes toward the UIA whose figures got a high percentage of the broadcast time (CMC, 2005, p. 23). Bias was also shown on the Kurdish channels: al-Hurriah, Kurdsat, and Kurdistan TV which were clearly biased for the Kurdish Coalition. But the most balanced channel was al-Nahrain that is owned by Naguib Sawiris, an Egyptian businessman who also owned Iraqna mobile network.

In order to organise the work of media channels, CMC insists that any media outlet that violates the laws must be stopped by different ways such as: 'sending a warning, requesting an apology to be published, issuing a fine, cancelling a media license or closing a media channel' (CMC, 2005, p. 4).

In the appendix, CMC published the 'Code for Media during Elections' on December 15, 2004. The same Code was posted on CMC website by changing the date only in 2008 and 2009. This Code came into effect on the 27th of July 2004. However, there were many shortcomings in the draft. For example, the Code is said to be applied to and 'is binding upon all Media transmitted, published, received or available in Iraq in

connection with any election at the municipal, regional or state level during any and all Campaign Periods' (CMC 2005, p. 39). These regulations are to be followed by Iraqi media channels before the elections; however, many Iraqi satellite channels broadcast from abroad and target Iraqis inside the country, so it is not clear whether these channels should abide by CMC's rules or not. There are other shortcomings. For example, the Campaign period was defined in Article (1) as 'the period that precedes the elections as determined by the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC)', (p. 38) giving it the upper hand in deciding when the media channels can start their campaign. This usually results in some kind of confusion because some media channels might start their media campaign before the others since CMC has no say here.

Further and in relation to the current study, Article 3 entitled 'Fair Reporting' states that: 'In covering any Political Entity or Coalition, or any of their candidates, no Media shall engage in intentional distortion, suppression, falsification, misrepresentation or censorship of information. All Media shall ensure due accuracy and fairness'.[2] Some regulations given to media channels are important here, such as: '(3-1) ensure that the information they report is balanced and unbiased; (3-2) treat all Political Entities and Coalitions, and their candidates, fairly and impartially, showing no favour or partiality toward, or prejudice against, any of them; and (3-3) make an effort to hear and represent all sides of the question, noting where one side of a controversy has refused to make itself available' (CMC, 2005, pp. 39-40).

Despite the fact that most Iraqi media channels are partisan in nature, the Code insists that no media channel 'shall endorse any Political Entity or Coalition, or any of their candidates. In all such media, opinion shall be clearly distinguished from fact so as not to be confused with news coverage or current affairs programming'. This is too idealistic since no partisan Iraqi channel can be run in this manner.

Other Articles are also relevant. For instance, Article 7 prohibits any media channel from publishing opinion polls 72 hours prior to opening the voting stations (CMC 2005, p. 42). Article 8 states that the 'Media Silence Period' commences 48 hours before opening the polling stations until they are closed. The Code clearly states that 'there shall be no Media coverage of any political campaigns of any Political Entity or

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[2] I have depended on the English version of CMC's 'Code for Media during Election'.

Coalition, or any of their candidates' (CMC, 2005, p. 42). This is another difficult requirement since most Iraqi channels do not abide by this rule as will be shown in chapter six.

In Article 9, the Code stipulates that every broadcast media channel must 'provide equitable access, equitable presentation, and equitable coverage of Political Entities and Coalitions, and any of their candidates, including with respect to newsworthy events and election activities in which they are involved'. The equitable access mentioned above is measured by the time allotted to each candidate or political party and the placement of the news item or report, having in mind the variations that occur among political entities because of their regional and political influence over the different segments in the society (CMC, 2005, pp. 42-3). Also, equitable access suggests fairness in terms of emphasis 'prime-time versus late night broadcasts, or front-page versus back-page publication'.

In the 'Guidelines of Equitable Access as Required by the Code for Media during Elections' (CMC, 2005, pp. 45-6), CMC emphasises that 'equitable access' does not mean that 'each Political Party must be allotted equal time' since 'larger Political Parties and Coalitions should be given greater exposure' and fair access should be 'proportionate to the significance of the Political Party, taking into consideration such factors as, for example, the number of candidates in such Political Party up for election, the territorial organisation and presence of such Political Party, Coalition or candidate, and its cultural, political and historical significance'. However, the factors mentioned here are rather problematic because there are no clear or defined 'territorial organisations' of the political parties in Iraq. For example, the city of Najaf includes different parties which compete for influence such as Sadr's movement and SCIRI. Also, no one can exercise the right assessment to judge the cultural and historical significance of any party. As an example, Al-Dawa and SCIRI parties are viewed by many Iraqi Sunnis and even some Shiites as agents to Iran, making their members traitor-like figures, so they are not trustworthy. The same allegation is applied to Sunni parties that are accused of being supported by some Arab countries. In other words, it is impossible to assess the fair access of news following the above loose criteria.

Other media issues that might occur during the election are mentioned. Government officials should be given the time to talk on different media channels;

however, if they start advocating their political parties or coalition, the treatment should differ. More caution should be exercised in this case.

As for the role of the Iraqi Media Network during the election, the Code makes it very clear that IMN should not support any party and refrain from siding with any group. According to Article 5 'Educating Voters: Special Obligations of the IMN to Educate the Public', IMN media outlets must inform the public about the activities and nature of the candidates and their parties' policies by 'providing practical information relevant to voting'; such information must reach all groups. Besides, free television air time must be given and technical resources must be employed by IMN to assist candidates in reaching out to the public especially in relation to political debates and other forms of discussions.

There are strict media regulations stipulated in the 'Guidelines on Accuracy and Balance' (2007) published in Arabic and English to be followed by Iraqi journalists when covering news. For example, in the 'General Steering' (n.d.) published on CMC's website, news bias is clearly defined and clarified. Achieving accuracy and balance in the news means the avoidance of 'bad journalism' or 'propaganda', according to the document. No media channel would be given a license unless it signs a document that states the necessity to respect the rules of fairness, accuracy, and objectivity in reporting.

In the Commission's 'Vocational Charter' (n.d.), the concepts of objectivity, accuracy, honesty are described and emphasised in reporting. The document stressed that fair and balanced reporting must be achieved regardless of the political or religious background of a media organisation's owners. 'Opinion should be clearly distinguished from fact. News reporting should be dispassionate and news judgements and on the need to give viewers and listeners an even-handed account of events'. The document insisted that the ideal is to 'seek to present different and opposing views in a fair and balanced manner and in a way that is professional and far from being biased'.

Although it has not dealt with the Iraqi media, one of the few content analysis studies conducted on the coverage of the 2005 Iraqi election is done by Garyantes and Murphy (2010) that compares Al-Jazeera.net (English version) with CNN.com's coverage. The study concludes that there is an ideological slant in reporting the elections; for example, CNN.com framed the election by focusing on the positive side and

highlightining the efforts to make Iraq follow a Westernised democracy, whereas Al-Jazeera.net viewed the results of the election with doubt and questioned its legitmiacy.

As for the March 7, 2010 elections, International Media Support (IMS) reported that independent Iraqi media outlets that endeavor to maintain neutrality cannot survive because they will not have interested advertisers. IMS referred to *al-Manara* daily newspaper that shifted to a weekly publication because of the hardship of finding the necessary funds for its publication. IMS estimated that newspapers sales skyrocketed before the elections because 'Iraqis have sought to familiarise themselves with the different electoral candidates' (International Media Support, 2010), and newspapers more than any other medium can provide a great deal of information.

The Dutch director of the Independent Media Centre in Kurdistan, Judit Neurink, trained Iraqi journalists and media employees in Iraqi Kurdistan on the methods of objective and fair reporting. After observing some media channels, Neurink confessed that during the election time, 'most newspapers and all TV stations in Iraq turn into "propaganda" mechanisms for the political parties, making it virtually impossible for citizens to find any information about the issues that affect them'. She regretted the fact that there was an obvious 'return to old habits' since most journalists' sided with their preferred political parties. Neurink stated that Iraqi TV channels can be classified into three types: 'independent, semi-independent and partisan' (American University of Iraq 2010); however, she did not identify these channels.

In brief, Iraqi media practitioners are fully aware of the rules of impartial and objective reporting and the regulations surrounding the coverage of election. Almost all Iraqi TV channels assume they are objectively and accurately reporting the truth by following a Western model of objectivity. They basically agree on two things: reality should be covered objectively and violations of this norm are wrong. This study addresses this issue to see whether Iraqi TV channels endeavored to meet the principles of objectivity, impartiality, balance, and fairness in covering the 2010 election. Despite the fact that journalists in Iraq and the rest of the Arab world are aware of the principles of good journalism, they generally tend to refrain from conducting serious investigative reporting and from direct confrontation with the government. Indeed, they avoid criticising official policies especially during times of elections. This, in fact, is

reminiscent to the condition of journalists in Europe a few decades before the 1980s when journalists used to follow the *sacerdotal* editorial approach that greatly depended on the media policy of the ruling party (Semetko et al., 1991). Since most Arab countries are still experiencing their first steps in democracy and power sharing systems, we can predict that in the coming decade(s), the state of journalism in the Arab world will be similar to what is found in present time Europe in which journalists generally follow the *pragmatic* editorial approach. Although the pace of change is rather slow, the popular revolutions that swept the Arab world that started in Tunisia in late 2010 are true testimonies that better political accountability, transparency, democracies, and above all media freedoms are sooner than expected to materialise.

Based on the above review, it becomes very apparent that there are very rare if non-existent detailed and in-depth media studies on elections in the Arab world and Iraq in particular that take other measures into account such the significance of news formats, production techniques like the use of camera angle, different topics' score of neutral/positive/negative attributes, and the candidates' spatial relationship with others. Most of the previous studies followed basic and simple coding frames that usually measured the prominence and time or size given to the different candidates and parties. They have not, for example, analysed news production techniques to see nor have they touched upon the minute details of the non-verbal language, news focus, and the use of camera like many other Western studies on elections cited in Chapter Three. Besides, there are almost none on Iraqi election except for CMC's general reports that are not credible enough because they do not give any details on how the coders, if there are any, reached their conclusions and what kind of coding frames were employed to analyse the data.

Contrary to the previous studies on Arab elections, this work will fill a big gap in the systematic analysis of television newscasts by relying on solid and more comprehensive measures followed in the social science instead of presenting general assessments and speculations on the Iraqi media. Three levels of analysis are employed in this research - programme, story, and sub-story levels - in order to give a richer and more accurate assessment of the 2010 election coverage. In more specific terms, the study tackled the amount of coverage in relation to topics and candidates, the tone of coverage

and its emphasis by relying on the type of news formats used like narrative references to, films/photos of, and interviews with candidates as well as studying the news production techniques like the camera angles and candidates' spatial relationship. These aspects are fully investigated to reach a better understanding of the way four Iraqi TV channels covered the 2010 General Election.

Chapter Five

Methodology and the Pilot Study

This chapter offers an overview of methodology followed to study media messages during election times. It then discusses the coding system to be used in the current research and the theoretical rationale underpinning the measures used and details about pilot development work that was conducted to support the design of the coding frame.

1. Methods – A Review

Since this study is concerned primarily with articulating the different types of messages in the newscasts, content analysis was employed. It is important to note here that this study does not restrict itself to the quantitative content analysis approach. In order to reach a better understanding of the TV messages, this study measures more variables in the news outputs by incorporating qualitative measures in the analysis of content.

1.1. Content Analysis Research

According to Holsti, combining the quantitative and qualitative methods to analyze content is the best scientific approach (1969, p. 11). In fact, the two approaches are 'complementary' because when they are used together, they can provide a 'more balanced picture than either of the approaches could have accomplished alone' (Stroman and Jones 1998, p. 281 and 282). This will surely make the scientific approach more solid by strengthening and developing the analysis of the content.

As an example of using the two methods, Niven (2001) followed the basic tools in assessing partisan bias in newspapers that covered two US presidents. He included in his baseline the following variables: placement of the article; prominence of the president; number of articles published per month; article length; and tone (positive, neutral, negative). So, he used quantitative and qualitative methods to enhance the depth and richness of the data analysed.

Holsti (1969) calls for the minute study of language to get its deeper meanings, or what is called latent analysis (p. 12). He suggests using discourse analysis and employing coders to make sure that the analysis is objectively decoding the messages. By dividing the sentences into its smaller units, the researcher can thoroughly assess the meanings and determine the direction of attitudes; however, the process is time consuming and rather complicated when coders from different cultural backgrounds interpret the same message. Also, in the study of semiotics, symbols have varied meanings depending on the receiver and his background. Holsti says that the more quantification of language, the more trivialisation of meaning that occurs (1969, p. 10); Dominick and Fletcher agree by emphasising that the more specific the unit of analysis, the greater the distortion that happens (1985, p. 53).

McQuail (1992) noted that content analysis is a popular method for analysing media messages. The first stage of this type of analysis includes identifying the relevant content such as news bulletins, editorials, advertisements, and so on. Within these selections, smaller items should be identified and analysed following various methods: visuals or tone of speech in TV, sources or commentary in news etc. This makes the process of analysis more organised and systematic (p. 224). Goodyear-Grant analysed election news on Canadian television and mostly used two levels of analysis: story and sub-story in order to understand some gender issues. She used quantitative and qualitative content analysis methods to reach her results (2007).

In connection to content analysis, one of the earliest detailed British studies of media bias and imbalance was conducted by the Glasgow Media Group (Beharrell et al. 1976). They also made comparisons between news and government statistics, conducted interviews and participant observation, examined television production techniques, and analysed how television covered the workers' riots. Their works became 'the most detailed and influential study of television news yet published in Britain' (Harrison 1985, p. 8), and yet Harrison was also highly critical of their work.

The Glasgow Media Group stressed that 'television news represents a coherent and partisan position' (Philo et al. 1982, vol. ii, p. 7) and accused the TV channels of being selective and favouring government stances'. They claimed that the TV news staff did their best, but they were imprisoned in their own convictions and hold 'ideological

assumptions which reinforce certain stratified cultural perceptions of society and how it should, ought, and does, work' (Beharrell et al. 1976, vol. i, p. 2). The Glasgow Group affirmed that the conventional news practices followed lead to the production of subjective and biased news. In order to explain how imbalance is shown on TV, the Group summed up their discussion in the following words:

> The code works at all levels: in the notion of "the story" itself, in the selection of stories, in the way material is gathered and prepared for transmission, in the dominant style of language used, in the permitted and limited range of visual presentation, in the overall duration of bulletins, in the duration of items within bulletins, in the real technological limitations placed on the presentation, in the finances of the news services, and above all, in the underpinning processes of professionalism which turn men and women into television journalists (Beharrell et al. 1976, vol. i, pp. 10-11).

However, the Group's works came under a great deal of scrutiny and criticism by media professionals and experts. In his critique of the Glasgow Media Group, Harrison (1985) showed that their methods were biased and selective as they revealed preconceived convictions about the media's treatment of the trade union. For example, the Group claim that the word 'idle' was used negatively on TV despite that the union itself used it to describe the state of workers. In fact, he accuses the Group of using a 'totally inappropriate yardstick of assessment' and of being 'prejudicial to the trade unions specifically or the working class more generally' (p. 44). Harrison also noted that the Group did not take into account the issue of newsworthiness (ibid.), and the fact that the weaknesses of some of the BBC reports were due to the 'haste' in producing timely news (ibid., p. 139).

As for news balance, it can be investigated either as internal balance which is manifested 'within news story/item (or whole programme in the case of television documentary) or, alternatively, over a range of items and programmes (thus over time). Balance may also be assessed either "horizontally" (across different media at one point in time) or "vertically" (one or several media over an extended time period)' (McQuail 1992, p. 224).

This model presupposes that the world and the events taking place are interpreted by the media in a way that implies positive, negative, or neutral evaluation, and it is done

via two methods: first, 'selection, by their relative prominence and the degree of attention received; secondly, as an aspect of *evaluative direction*, direct or indirect, with indicators of value or favourability in language (verbal or visual)… or overall context, which can have positive or negative implication of connotation' (ibid.). In this regard, Altheide (1977) commented:

> An event may become interesting and socially significant after a lot of people know about it. The event thereby becomes more important, and in some instances, its influence may be fundamentally changed. This *implification* process is a consequence of the organization and meaning of news (p. 26).

By using a quantitative method, one can understand the total amount of attention given to specific items/figures/issues since 'more attention equals more positive' presentation. However, there are some limitations to such studies. The context is usually ignored by following such a method because the ratio level measurements that include time or space do not include evaluating the context. Also, there are other factors that interfere in rightly assessing news balance such as the occurrence of significant events inside the same country or around the world (McQuail 1992, pp. 225-226).

In observing balance, a journalist can take the numerical sum of positive and negative accounts that form a scale of which the middle point constitutes the neutral account. However, this is not a perfect method, but it is practical in comparing the presentation or coverage of two media channels (McQuail 1992, p. 227). For example, Robert Frank (1973) used a Likert-type scale to measure the favourability and unfavourability in news. He used 'hard analysis' (p. 23) to detect visual codes which depends on quantitative analysis. As for assessing the tone, theme, and context of news stories, he used 'soft analysis' (p. 23) that relies on the coders' judgments or what is known as qualitative analysis.

Aday et al. (2005) used a five-point scale in their study of TV news objectivity in the 2003 Iraq War. The researchers observed language features such as specific words, clichés, and phrases that expressed certain groups or races in their study of Al-Jazeera channel and six American TV networks. Hence, a scale was designed where 3 is neutral, and 4-5 is slanted toward support for the US led Coalition forces; 1-2 is more critical of the US invasion (p. 12). The study found that neutrality and balance were observed in the

majority of stories; however, the norm of objectivity was largely conditioned by culture and ideology rather than the actual events taking place.

There are several studies that follow the approach of counting the positive and negative news accounts. McQuail cites some of them below (p. 227); it is used to compare the coverage of US Vietnam War policy by CBS and NBC (Russo, 1971), to measure how minorities are treated in the media (van Dijk 1991) or how the Blacks are portrayed as trouble makers in the society (Hartman and Husband 1974), to assess news balance in relation to the coverage of disputes between workers and their managers (McQuail, 1977), to compare the news presentation of Israel and Arab states (Rikardsson, 1978), to assess how the German media covered the oil crisis of 1973 (Kepplinger and Roth, 1979), and to analyze media presentation of nuclear energy (Westerståhl and Anderson, 1991).

One of the main ways of detecting balance and objectivity in the news is by measuring the amount of coverage (in units of time) given to a particular issue/figure and possibly comparing it to another similar issue/figure. This could be done in analysing the newscast as a whole or the news story itself which is defined as a 'semantic entity with at least one topic delimited from another story by a change of topic' (Peter, Lauf, and Semetko, 2004, p. 420).

Watt and van den Berg (1981) noted that story prominence includes the position, size, and presentational techniques used to make it prominent. Indeed, media channels can easily distort or polish someone's image by manipulating this factor; research found that people tend to believe that a particular person is more important if there is more coverage on him (McCombs and Shaw 1972).

Wyckoff (1968) focused on the New York City Mayoral primary campaign of 1961 and quantitatively measured the 'comprehensive coverage' or total time given to each candidate as a sign of emphasis. He included the 'sound-on-film' items which is footage having its own dialogue (pp. 74-6). However, Wyckoff did not include the qualitative measures to decode TV messages.

Schiffer (2006) used the amount (number of paragraphs covering a candidate) and tone (negative/positive) of coverage to detect objectivity or bias in newspapers during the local senate election. Finally, Williams and Semlak (1978a) classified the total time aired

for each topic mentioned in the newscasts of three television network for a period of 19 days. The order of the topics was organised according to the total time. In brief, the more time devoted to the news item, the more details and impact it starts to have (Hofstetter 1976, p. 23); consequently the more important the news item becomes.

Another way of studying balance and objectivity is by observing measuring the position. For instance, lead stories in a newscast are more important than others that come later because of their position (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987, p. 4; Grabe and Bucy, 2009, p. 198). Zeldes et al. (2008) believe that the qualitative method of analysing content is mostly subjective because of the ambiguity and vagueness that surround the decoding process of tones. Instead, they rely on the quantitative method. In their study of partisan bias by TV networks during presidential elections, they investigated structural bias by focusing on story prominence and coverage emphasis. Four aspects were examined: who was first presented; who got more time for discussion; were there videos included for the activities of the candidates; and were there sound bites for the candidates. A sound bite is defined as a 'piece of audio at least in part matching accompanying video of a candidate talking. The bite can originate from a variety of settings, including a candidate speech, sit-down interview, or press conference' (Bucy and Grabe 2007, p. 660).

Some researchers have used a combination of methods to see whether the news items are objective or biased. For example, Serow (1975) studied the nightly coverage of the 1972 presidential election. She took Nixon and McGovern as her subject of study by measuring two variables: the total time of story and its placement. She compiled her taxonomy of bias by suggesting that stories are regarded as subjective if they show the following: attributing non-existent motives to a speaker or event; loaded language; source bias; suspecting the truthfulness of the speaker; the presentation of story themes that are irrelevant and out of context (pp. 200-1).

She found that ABC, CBS, and NBC showed the largest amount of unbalanced time devoted to anti-Nixon and pro-McGovern reporting. All the channels aired equal amounts of bias except for CBS that showed more anti-Nixon reporting. However, Serow ignored the study of TV visuals, claiming that they are 'extension[s] of the audio bias', and she discarded the qualitative study of intonation because it is 'too subjective to classify and would be impossible to present to the reader or independent scrutiny (p.

198). It is true that the highest amount of information in TV news is carried by the audio; however, the news presentation plays a major role in determining how much the viewers learn from the stories especially their visual aspects (Crigler, Just, and Neuman, 1994, p. 138).

Furthermore, Howard (1973) analysed the newscasts of CBS, ABC, and NBC for five days to see if there was imbalance in their coverage of different issues. He used quantitative content analysis and followed Budd's 'attention score' which includes: 'rear screen projection; action footage; interviews; satellite transmission; one or more correspondents; and story placement' (p. iv). In other words, he gave points to each of the above variables. As for the qualitative measure, Howard depended on 120 coders who were arranged into groups, and the researcher followed the following measures: adequacy or balance; bias; and favourability/unfavourability. He concluded that the three network channels were equally biased; 47% of the stories were unbalanced and two thirds of the stories contained elements of subjectivity. Finally, Howard mentions that bias is manifested via different means such as personal beliefs, news selection, news editing, imbalance of stories aired (pro-sources and anti-sources), use of certain production techniques (TV crew in the scene; action footage), and the nonverbal aspects of communication (pp. 10-11).

Some researchers like the ones cited below have tried to include the verbal language, audio/visuals, and non-verbal communication in their studies. For example, Janet Murphy (1998) in her Ph.D. thesis studied political bias in the 1996 election campaign by analysing the audio-visual and nonverbal messages and clues found in news stories. She found that the coverage of Bill Clinton was 'mostly neutral', whereas the presentation of Bob Dole was unfavourable in the amount of positive/negative coverage and story placements. In her study, Murphy's included the analysis of the visuals; for example, she cited the following: 'If… the story includes a smiling picture of Clinton superimposed over a picture of $100 bills, the story would be interjecting bias. Verbally, the story would be considered biased if the reporter referred to the president as 'conniving', or the like' (1998, pp. 19-20). The study was conducted in two phases; the first one is detecting the political bias, and the second one is a further analysis of subjective stories by focus groups. As mentioned earlier, she combines different variables

in order to strengthen her analysis by including the following: 'the candidate's name; the dominant issue covered; and the visual tone of the story for each candidate, if mentioned (favourable, neutral, or unfavourable on a 5-point scale); and perceived dominant tone of the story favourable, neutral or unfavourable on a 5-point scale)' (p. 34).

Following the study of Patterson and McClure (1976), Murphy categorised the visual and nonverbal contents: 'type of visual (over-the-shoulder graphic, still photograph, slide graphic, and taped footage); and candidate in spatial relation to other people (candidate is shown alone, touching distance to audience, speaking distance, public distance, further or unable to determine)' (1998, pp. 35-6). Finally, she discusses how omission is regarded as one kind of subjectivity especially if the information ignored is 'available, relevant, and official' (p. 20).

Further, Beharrell et al. (1980) focused in their study of TV news on analysing three areas: the story, the language, and the visuals (p. xv). With regard to language analysis or discourse analysis, the researchers detected 'the structuring of information, the imputation of causes, the pattern of interviewer questions, and the use of rhetoric'. In relation to the visuals, they classified them into a series of shots which are regarded as the basic units of analysis or what is termed "lexeme", the equivalent of visual unit (pp. xv-xvi).

Similar to Beharrell et al., Graber (2005) pointed out that the comprehensive encoding of media messages or what is called 'gestalt coding' is a trustworthy approach because it tackles many variables. It is specifically designed to assess TV messages due to their audiovisual nature, taking into account the matter (language), manner (tone and nonverbal messages), and the symbols employed. The approach includes analysing the anchor's comments before/after the story; assessing the newscast context; decoding the reporter's verbal and nonverbal editing; detecting the audiovisual messages; and understanding the influence of the interaction of stories in the newscast.

As Graber says, gestalt coding is 'grounded in research on information processing that has demonstrated that television viewers do not see, hear, and interpret each cue separately…they concentrate on the meanings conveyed' (1990, p. 136; 1991, p. 110). In fact, coding TV messages is 'holistic, focusing on the totality of the message without detailed description of visual or aural features' (2001, p. 198). Graber pointed out that

news items have verbal and audiovisual themes, focusing on intensity and clarity that coders must detect when analysing these messages. In other words, imbalance or objectivity is not manifested in one aspect of the news; instead, it is seen as a whole in its many facets.

1.2. Audience-Based Research

Empirical evidence suggests that there is an impact of the visual, audio, and audiovisual aspects of TV news on the way the viewers learn and feel about different political matters. In fact, audio by itself is as effective as the audio/visual presentation combined together. However, the subjects in the study were mostly aroused when there was a combination of audio-visual aspects in the TV story (Crigler, Just, and Neuman, 1994).

When TV news is examined, one has to take into account its three dimensions: verbal language, audio/visuals, and non-verbal communication. Most of the studies cited above ignored one of these aspects by focusing on one or two only. As for the impact of visuals, they are believed to be an important source of information for the viewers especially in relation to news stories retention (Gunter, 1980; Graber, 1990; Robinson and Levy, 1986). In general, viewers recall visual information in TV news more than the verbal one especially if the news was negative containing elements of violence, fear, or disgust (Newhagen and Reeves 1992; Newhagen, 1998).

Researchers who studied the nature of sensational news which is believed to arose emotions classified it into six categories: sex, violence, destruction, humour, celebrities, and other emotional content such as portraying people as sad, happy, angry (Zillmann, 1991; Zillmann and Cantor, 1977). In relation to destruction, it refers to images that move the viewers 'showing destruction and suffering after…… human-made devastation caused by war' (Uribe and Gunter 2004, p. 214). In other words, news that presents scenes of destroyed buildings and infrastructure caused by humans tend to have an effective impact on the viewers. Unfortunately, such scenes are shown somehow on a daily basis on most Iraqi TV channels that cover the security situation in the country. Hence, the effect of airing such images on the viewers is significant. As for the other emotional content, it is related to the discussion below on non-verbal gestures. Uribe and Gunter (2004) also investigated the presence of emotion-arousing features in TV news and found out that

crime stories do have sensational qualities and to a lesser extent political stories that carry 'high and low emotion-laden attributes'.

However, visuals are used to complement the TV message as a whole since they do not usually function alone. Empirical research suggests that the audience can recall brief headlines if pictures are used in the newscast/programme (Gunter 1979, 1980). Also, Brosius, Donsbach and Birk (1996) investigated the relation between the text and picture in TV news and found out that pictures that do not correspond to the information presented in the text do not help viewers in retaining the news content.

Baggaley et al. (1980) in their study of the psychological effect of TV viewing, concluded that 'in ambiguous situations the visual images of TV can affect assessment of… the general credibility of the verbal information they accompany' (p. 52). Most of the studies focused on the influence of visual presentation on recall rather than attitude because the latter entails a far more sophisticated mental mechanism (p. 99). Gunter, for instance, argued that moving films facilitated more recall than still images (1979). In particular, studies on the visual presentation focused on the learning activity especially in connection to educational television. These studies include Booth (1970-1971), Katz et al. (1977), and Edwardson et al. (1981). For instance, Booth stressed that there are several factors that increase recall such as the use of images to accompany the narrative, the frequency of showing/mentioning the item, and the time/size allotted to the item in the news/report (p. 604).

In relation to body language, research on non-verbal communication in politics reveals that some viewers judge a candidate based on (s)he body language and gestures since they are processed and vividly recalled by the viewers (Englis 1994; Bucy and Newhagen, 1999; Bucy, 2000). Accordingly, those viewers are influenced whether negatively or positively by these non-verbal clues. Several scholars pointed out the importance of investigating the significance of non-verbal communication in fully understanding the TV messages (Argyle, 1975; Davis, 1978). Finally, Hellweg and Phillips (1981) included nonverbal communication in their study of debates accounting for the candidates' gestures, postures, and eye contact.

1.3. Research on Production Techniques

TV messages can be enhanced by the use of certain production techniques. Inquiries into TV's visual effect have not been thoroughly investigated until recently mainly due to the high cost of the equipment (Dominick and Fletcher 1985, p. 51). In fact, the visual content of news that is achieved by the use of certain production techniques has a great meaning which complements the importance of the verbal messages (Gunter 1997, pp. 73-4). In relation to the effect of visuals on audience recall, empirical evidence shows that visuals aid the audience in recalling the topics aired (Edwardson et al. 1992).

Grabe and Bucy (2009), for example, discussed the 'visual weight' that is employed by some TV channels to particular issues or figures. They classify three news architectures that require sending a reporter and camera to the field: packages (the anchor reads an introduction to be followed by a recorded report), interviews, and VO/SOTs ('A voice-over-sound-on-tape (VO/SOT) story consists of a voice-over read by the anchor with accompanying visual material, or B-roll', which must include a sound bite). They are typically longer than other news story formats like readers ('reports that feature the anchor on camera reading live from the teleprompter, looking into the camera') as well as voice-overs which are usually accompanied by a footage or still-image. Also, they involve spending more money, effort, and time to do them, so they 'carry the most visual weight- and prestige – among reporters' (p. 198). In other words, TV channels can show more emphasis on events or figures by employing packages, interviews, or VO/SOTs.

Also, Hartley (1982) classified the visual structure or content into three elements: the newsreader; the correspondent; and the film report. As for the modes of presentation, there are four methods: the talking head (the anchor(s) is shown alone); graphics (animations, computer display) and still photograph (Chromokey); nomination (captions or verbal introduction to name people); and actuality which includes: film with voice over; the stake-out (reporter address commentary direct to the camera); and vox pop (interviewee talking full frame which adds to his prominence) (pp. 108-9).

Furthermore, Altheide (1996) mentions that in analysing TV news, it is important to point out the unit of analysis, event, date, and type of programme. There are other subprotocols that need to be documented for each segment of the newscast, including: topic, theme(s), sources, and visuals. The latter can be distinguished by its various types:

videotape, file photos, graphics, actuals, and live coverage. Furthermore, there need to be a written description of the visual aspect of news such as mentioning the scene, people or things shown, and the kind of action (running, shouting, crying) (p. 67).

Beharrell et al. (1980) emphasised the importance of investigating the use of Chromokey, or the background picture when the anchor delivers the news. In fact, the study of Chromokey has been previously discussed in details by the Glasgow Media Group (Eldridge 1995, pp. 258-261). Beharrell et al. elaborated on the different dimensions of studying the visuals, saying:

> The newscaster can read a human interest story with a smile, thus stressing its essential humour. Eyebrows maybe used to vary tone and stress. Openings and closing of items can be used and often are indicated by looking down, or away from camera. Film and video-tape can be introduced by turning down to the head of the insert, thus not allowing the performer to accurately cue the input, but also enabling the viewers to be cued as to the input (1980, p. 135).

Smith et al. (2005) stress the significance of the pictorial syntax and that the news 'story's visual content or descriptive structure is…integral to the meaning of that content' (p. 337). Many studies that tackled the visual effect of TV news on the perceived meaning stressed the importance of production techniques such as camera shots, angles, distance, and timing (McCain et al. 1977; Tiemens, 1970; Tiemens et al., 1988; Frank, 1973; Mandell and Shaw, 1973; Zettl, 1973; Kepplinger, 1982). Also, Tiemens (1978) investigated how Carter was favoured more than Ford during the 1976 presidential election by the reaction shots, screen placement, and camera angle, framing, and composition (p. 370). Indeed, empirical research showed that TV viewers' perception of the candidates are slightly influenced by the use of certain camera angles (Grabe 1996; Kepplinger 1982; Detenber et al. 1998; Kepplinger and Donsbach 1986).

Further, Kepplinger (1982, 1983) studied the visual bias that occurred during the coverage of the German election when Kohl and Schmidt competed. He showed that the eye-level angle has a positive impact, while the top and bottom angles have negative influence on the viewer. The camera in the bottom angle, however, denotes power. Kepplinger stressed that using specific camera angles and filming the positive/negative

reaction of the audience favoured some candidates over the others (nodding, smiling, yawning…etc.). In this regard, Schmidt was presented more positively than Kohl (1983, p. 75). The research pointed out the approval and disapproval points in the coverage by focusing on the non-verbal reaction of the audience. Also, Graber asserts that camera angles can affect the way the audience perceive the message; for example, 'audiences are likely to pay more attention to close-ups and identified elements' (2001, p. 197). In fact, close-ups give more details on the candidates and make the viewers identify with the candidate(s) emotional responses. In addition, 'action shots' present the candidates in an effective way that suggests 'important cues about status, viability, and physical and mental fitness for office' (Bucy and Grabe 2007, p. 653). Finally, Berger (1981) discussed the significance of the camera distance. He pointed out that the close-up or shooting the head-and-shoulders has a positive effect on the viewer, while a long shot showing the candidate as a whole has a negative impact, and a medium shot presenting the candidate from the waist up has a neutral influence (see also Banning and Coleman 2009).

Finally, Williams and Selmak (1978b) analysed the agenda setting impact of the visual dimension: use of Chromokey, sound on film, rear-screen projection, and videotape. They found that static visuals (Chromokey) had an impact on setting personal agenda (p. 350). In the following section, more emphasis is made on empirical studies of the election campaigns due to their relevance to this study. In the following section, a discussion is made on the design of the three coding frames and the pilot study conducted in order to test the validity of these coding frames.

2. Pilot Study

An initial pilot study was run to test the three coding frames that were designed to measure news attributes. This enabled the author to test out different measures for their effectiveness in representing key news elements and also to ensure they could be deployed by different coders in a reliable way. In other words, the pilot study shed light on 'the reliability and stability of the coding procedure on which the entire study is based' (Dominick and Fletcher 1985, p. 13).

But first, it is important to note that two technical errors occurred during the recording of the 56 newscasts. However, the author managed to record two other newscasts aired on the same day with only few stories that differed from the main

newscasts. The first error occurred at 9:00 pm with Baghdad TV's newscast of the 23rd of February. The second recording was made on the same day at 11:00 pm local time. The second newscast was aired by Iraqia TV on the 7th of March at 8:00 pm. The other recording was done at 12:00 pm on the same day.

As a basic rule, all the news stories that were not related to the election were discarded. During late February, it was noted that there were several stories irrelevant to the election in the beginning of the campaign, while in early March the majority of the news stories were focused on the election. This is common because the efforts of supporting the candidates and disseminating the knowledge on the election were intensified in the late campaign phase. In two newscasts, it was noticed that there were many irrelevant stories such (Iraqia TV, 25th of February, sequence 1) which lasted (2:51 minutes) and dealt with the new decree of retaining the rights of former Iraqi army officers. Also, there were other stories like (Hurria TV, 2nd of March, sequence 6) which tackled the appointment of the Iraqi Ambassador to Kuwait (34 seconds), story (Hurria TV, 2nd of March, sequence 7) which presented a report on the attack against the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2:56), and story (Hurria TV, 2nd of March, sequence 11) that dealt with an Iraqi cardinal calling for peace and unity among Iraqis (19 seconds).

Sample

The present pilot study was conducted in early December 2010 by two coders; one of whom is the author of this work who designed the coding frames. The two coders independently examined three newscasts and analysed two programme level, ten story level, and twenty candidate/topic (sub-story) level coding frames. The main evening newscasts were chosen from different phases of the election campaign and from three different channels as follows: Baghdad on the 22nd of February that was aired at 9:00 pm, Iraqia on the 25th of February that was aired at 8:00 pm, and Hurria on the 2nd of March that was aired at 10:00 pm. The author of this work first conducted a study using the three coding frames and made some changes to improve the coding measures. The following Table 5.1 provides basic information on the pilot study's data collection.

Table 5.1. News Sample

	Programme 1	**Programme 2**	**Programme 3**
Channel	**Baghdad**	**Iraqia**	**Hurria**
Time and date of transmission	9:00 pm (22 February 2010)	8:00 pm (25 February 2010)	10:00 pm (2 March 2010)
Average length of programme in relation to election news (in seconds)	2945	726	1215
Number of news stories (total)	16	12	20
Number of news stories (election)	13	7	16

Indeed, the pilot study enabled the author to make important changes to the coding frames. In relation to the Programme-level coding frame, two more story topics were added because of their frequency in the newscasts tackled. As for the story level coding frame, it was decided that two questions designed to assess appearances by 'experts' should be dropped. The reason for this decision was that most of the stories aired seem to be prepared in a hurry; it seemed that news producers did not have the time to invite experts to state their opinion. Hence, there was zero presence of experts in the twenty stories tackled. No experts were invited to state their views except for people occasionally passing by and voicing their opinions. In relation to the candidate/topic level, there were new candidates introduced but were not mentioned in the list of candidates and their political slates. This was related to space since the author preferred to write down the most important figures of each party instead of mentioning all the candidates who were in hundreds if not thousands. For example, story (Baghdad TV, 22nd February, sequence 6) introduced new names like Dr. Osama al-Tikriti and Abdul Jabbar Shalash (Code 6) from the Iraqi Islamic Party, and story (Hurria TV, 2nd of March, sequence 9) presented Abdul al-Bari al-Zibari, Hasan al-Doski, Zahida Sarhan, and Sidqi al-Umdi from the Kurdish Alliance Slate (Code 5).

Coding Frames

As a reminder, the thesis followed a three-level content analysis of the newscasts that included the programme, story, and candidate/topic (sub-story) levels. They are based on qualitative and quantitative measures that are largely taken from previous studies on election coverage. The first coding frame, programme level, measured the basic features of the newscasts such as the time allotted to the newscast as a whole, the number of stories found in the newscast, number of stories of different topic-types throughout the newscast that were related to the election, the duration of newscast time devoted to stories for each topic type, and the number of stories that featured different format types throughout the newscast. This coding frame can gave us an indication about the application of the principles of good journalism such as objectivity and balance which was directly related to the number of stories aired and the time devoted to news stories that were related to the election.

Serow (1975), Hofstetter (1976), and Williams and Semlak (1978a) investigated the impact news stories have if more time was devoted to them. Partly following Watt and van den Berg (1981), this coding frame made use of measuring stories' prominence, including the position, size, and presentational techniques used which had further implication on the kind of news framing done. This was especially true when the coding frame measured the time devoted to each topic type. Noteworthy, there were eleven topic types in the coding frames. In general, the above features reflected the kind of emphasis shown by each channel toward the election. McCombs and Shaw (1972) stressed that when there is more coverage of certain issues/people, they tend to become more important by the viewers. Finally, in relation to the classification of the eight story formats, the author partly followed Grabe and Bucy's divisions (2009).

In relation to the story level of analysis, the coding frame analysed the following: the duration of the story presented, the story's sequence in relation to the newscast as a whole, the story's topic in relation to the election, the kind of news format followed, and whether the story featured any narrative references to/ film reports or images of/ interviews with representatives of listed political parties. Finally, the coding frame investigated whether the story featured any references to 'horse-race' issues. In this coding frame, the author attempted to find more answers on the application of the principles of good journalism. Another aspect investigated was the significance of the

visual aspects of the coverage which surely completed the meaning of the verbal language used in the newscasts (Gunter 1997, pp. 73-4). This had an implication on the kind of emphasis shown by the different channels toward the election. For example, the use of candidates' narrative references alone was not regarded as important as the use of their images or airing interviews with them since interviews tend to have more influence over the viewer (Grabe and Bucy 200; Detenber, Simons, and Bennet 1998). This is mostly related to the 'compelling' effect the interview has (King and Morehouse 2004, p. 304), and it surely takes more time, effort, and even money to present interviews on TV. In other words, candidates can be seen as more important when more efforts are made to present them on screen (McCombs and Shaw 1972). In addition, news format also show importance and emphasis, so the author made use of this coding frame to understand the channels that paid more attention to covering the election.

The third coding frame, the Candidate/topic level, mainly analysed the stories' topic(s) score of terms from narratives signaling neutral/positive/negative, the candidate's score of terms from narratives signaling neutral/positive/negative, whether the candidate was shown on their own or alongside another contender, whether the candidate was shown on their own or alongside another affiliate, the candidate's spatial relationship with others (shown alone; shown with others; touching distance to audience; speaking distance; public distance; further or unable to determine), the camera angle when the candidate(s) was shown (eye level/ full top view/ bottom view), and whether the camera was in close-up position in relation to the candidate. In relation to the tone of coverage, the author followed the *evaluative direction* (McQuail 1992) to point out the way candidates/topics were presented in the newscasts by relying on the verbal language. A list of the neutral/positive/negative words, expressions, and adjectives were provided to the coders in order to make their task clearer. Further, the author followed previous research and included other measures to see whether the candidates were given attention by the use of production techniques especially in relation to the candidates' spatial relationship with others and the use of camera angles (Murphy 1998; Patterson and McClure 1976; Kepplinger 1982, 1983; McCain et al. 1977; Tiemens, 1970; Tiemens et al., 1988; Frank, 1973; Mandell and Shaw, 1973; Zettl, 1973; Berger 1981; Kepplinger 1982).

Table 5.2 The Coding Frame Structure

Programme Level (Newscast as a whole)	Story Level (Each news story)	Sub-Story Level (Candidate/Topic Attributes in each story)
Time allotment	Time allotment	Topics' score of neutral/positive/negative narratives
No. of stories	Sequence	Candidates' score of neutral/positive/negative narratives
No. of stories of different topic-types	Topic type	Candidate's spatial relationship with others
No. of stories featuring different format types	Type of news format	Camera angle in relation to the candidate
Time devoted to stories for each topic type	a. Narrative references; b. film reports or images; c. interviews with representatives of political parties	
	Reference to 'horse-race' issues	

Reliability

The aim of the pilot study was to test whether the two coders highly agree or not on the questions found in the coding frames. In order to measure this kind of agreement/disagreement, a reliability test had to be conducted. Indeed, reliability is a core concept in content analysis and refers to 'the degree to which a measure operationalizes a concept consistently over time and contexts. It is analogous to the 'precision or consistency with which a dart thrower hits the same point on the target time after time' (Williams et al. 1988, p. 61). In other words, reliability denotes that two or more coders independently analysed the same sample material in a consistent fashion (Anderson, 1987, p. 130; Adams, 1989, p. 151). According to Krippendorff (1980), reliability entails three basic elements:

1. Stability: It refers to the 'degree to which a process is invariant or unchanging over time. Stability becomes manifest under test-retest conditions, such as points in time'. If the two or more coders have disagreements over the way the same material is analysed, categorised, measured, coded, or described, then there must be some 'intraobserver inconsistencies or noise' or it might refer to the 'coder's difficulty in interpreting the recording instructions' (Krippendorff 1980, p. 130).

2. Reproducibility: It denotes the 'degree to which a process can be recorded under varying circumstances, at different locations, using different coders. To establish reproducibility, data must be acquired under test-test conditions' (Krippendorff 1980, p. 131). Reproducibility is also called intercoder reliability or intersubjective agreement or the "consensus" achieved among observers.

3. Accuracy: It points out 'the degree to which a process functionally conforms to a known standard or yields what it is designed to yield. To establish accuracy data are obtained under test-standard conditions….' (Krippendorff 1980, p. 131).

There are several ways to measure inter-coder or inter-rater reliability coefficient. One of the most famous ways was devised by Holsti (1969) whose formula is based on comparing the results of two coders analysing or categorizing the same sample material (Dominick and Fletcher 1985, p. 13):

$$CR=2M/N1+N2$$

Here, M is the number of the two coders' decision agreements; N1 refers to the number of coding decision taken by coder (1), while N2 denotes the coding decision taken by coder (2). Finally, CR is a reference to the correlation coefficient. Here, zero refers to the absence of agreement, whereas -1 denotes the maximum value of disagreement. +1 refers to the maximum value of agreement 'Usually a correlation of about +.80 (or 80 percent agreement) is considered the minimum required to demonstrate that the coding system is sufficiently reliable' (Dominick and Fletcher 1985, p. 13). In all cases, Holsti's formula of intercoder reliability is criticised for its lack of accuracy. In some cases, there is coders' agreement occurring by chance which is not usually detected by the formula (Wimmer and Dominick 1991, p. 173).

There are other measures of inter-coder reliability such as Scott (1955) who improved the *pi* index which usually 'corrects for the number of categories used and also

for the probable frequency of use' (Wimmer and Dominick 1991, p. 173). Further, there is the Pearsonian correlation coefficient which is known as Pearsonian *r*. It is a 'measure of the strength of the linear relationship between two variables' (Stempel III et al. 1991, p. 77). Like Holsti's formula, an *r* of +1 refers to perfect positive linear relationship; -1 points out to the opposite end, and an *r* 0 means there is no linear relationship. (Stempel III et al. 1991, p. 77). However, if Pearson *r* has a high value in measuring content, it may either refer to the notion that 'the coders were in agreement or that their ratings were associated in some systematic manner' (Wimmer and Dominick 1991, p. 173). Hence, there is lack of accuracy, too.

One of the most trustworthy measures to correctly analyse inter-coder reliability is called *alpha*. Krippendorff (1980) presented *alpha* which can be used for 'nominal, ordinal, internal, and ratio scales and for more than one coder'; it is called an 'all-purpose reliability measure' (Wimmer and Dominick 1991, p. 174). In order to make sure that the researcher has achieved a high intercoder reliability coefficient, there must be a minimum of 90% or higher when Holsti's formula is used, and around .75 or higher when *alpha* or Scott's *pi* is used (ibid.).

It is important to note here that there might be a high degree of agreement between the two coders not because of chance or some kind of association but mainly due to the mechanical or clerical tasks performed by the coders. This is done when coders are required to certain tasks like pointing out the exact time duration of a news story or counting the words in a sentence…etc (Wimmer and Dominick 1991, p. 174). Hence, one would expect a maximum value of agreement between the two coders 'perhaps approaching 100%, since coder disagreements would probably be the result of carelessness or fatigue' (ibid.).

For the purpose of measuring the intercoder reliability coefficient, SPSS (version 11.5) was used; Alpha measure, which is widely believed to be the most accurate method, was followed to get the results. The reliability coefficient results yielded high agreements between the two coders which are as follows:

1. Programme Level Coding: Alpha .88. The Lower Bound of this coding frame was .81, while the Upper Bound was .93 (see Figure 5.1).

2. Story Level Coding: Alpha .99. The Lower Bound of this coding frame was .99, and the Upper Bound was .99 (see Figure 5.2).
3. Candidate/topic level (sub-story) Coding: Alpha .86. The Lower Bound of this coding frame was .84, while the Upper Bound was .87 (see Figure 5.3).

Aside from the similar decisions made by the two coders, there is another reason that may explain the high degree of agreement. Most importantly, there are many variables that are sometimes irrelevant to the type of the news story examined. For example, if a story is focused on the elections in general such as story (Iraqia TV, 25th of February, sequence 6) or election monitoring (Hurria TV, 2nd of March, sequence 14), there will be no discussion on the candidate. Hence, all the relevant variables dealing with the candidate will be left. Here, the 0 or absence that is assigned by the coders counts as agreement. There are many other cases of news stories that deal with the campaign in general such as stories (Hurria TV, 2nd of March, sequence 20); (Hurria TV, 2nd of March, sequence 17); (Iraqia TV, 25th of February, sequence 2); (Iraqia TV, 25th of February, sequence 3); (Hurria TV, 2nd of March, sequence 15); or with IHEC like stories (Iraqia TV, 25th of February, sequence 5) and (Iraqia TV, 25th of February, sequence 4). Here, most of the discussion is usually neutral and there is little if no description of the candidates. As a result, there will be a high agreement between the coders. Added to this reason, most of the variables present in the coding frames are clear and direct. They only require mechanical or clerical tasks which usually yield high degrees of agreement as Wimmer and Dominick (1991) clarified above.

We can see from the results above that the highest degree of agreement was in the story-level analysis with an Alpha of .99, whereas the lowest degree of agreement was in the candidate/topic level with an Alpha of .86.

In this coding frame whose result remains acceptable in social science research, it is important to note that most of the variations in the two coders' answers occurred in the questions related to showing the neutrality/positivity/negativity of the news topic and candidate presentations. The reason behind this occasional variation is mainly due to counting the neutral/positive/negative adjectives and words that are associated with the topic/candidate. For example, in one news story (Baghdad TV, 22nd of February, sequence 1), some commentators mentioned that a particular political slate (the Iraqi Islamic Party) is very influential and important in the country because of its actions. This

was the main idea; then the commentators praised the party using different words but retaining the same meaning. One of the coders preferred to assign (4) for the score of positive attributes, whereas the second coder gave (9) for the same item.

For the purpose of simplifying the results, the author regarded the two answers as completely different, so he assigned (0) for (4) and gave (1) for (9). In many other cases, if there was only one score difference, the same procedure cited above was implemented to detect the slightest kind of disagreement and ensure the highest possible degree of accuracy in measuring intercoder reliability. The author clarified to the other coder the need to count the neutral/positive/negative words even if the same idea was repeated. Although it was a tedious and sometimes monotonous task, it was very important that the coders counted all the relevant adjectives. Besides, repetition is significant since it implies emphasis. After all, many differences were seen between the two coders in assigning different attributes to the topics/candidates.

Figure 5.1 Programme Level

```
  R E L I A B I L I T Y   A N A L Y S I S  -  S C A L E   (A L P H A)

         Intraclass Correlation Coefficients
      Two-Way Mixed Effects Model (Consistency Definition)

              ICC    95% Confidence Interval
Measure            Value   Lower Bound   Upper Bound   F-Value    Sig.

Single Rater      .8009    .6899         .8751         9.0435    .0000
Average of Raters* .8894    .8165         .9334         9.0435   .0000

Degrees of freedom for F-tests are 61 and 61. Test Value = 0.

* Assumes absence of People*Rater interaction.

Reliability Coefficients

N of Cases =    62.0              N of Items =  2

Alpha =    .88
```

Figure 5.2 Story Level

```
R E L I A B I L I T Y   A N A L Y S I S  -  S C A L E  (A L P H A)
            Intraclass Correlation Coefficients
         Two-Way Mixed Effects Model (Consistency Definition)


               ICC    95% Confidence Interval
Measure          Value  Lower Bound  Upper Bound  F-Value   Sig.

Single Rater     .9861    .9837        .9882    143.1935  .0000
Average of Raters* .9930   .9918        .9941    143.1935  .0000

Degrees of freedom for F-tests are 589 and 589. Test Value = 0.

* Assumes absence of People*Rater interaction.


Reliability Coefficients

N of Cases =    590.0              N of Items =  2

Alpha =    .99
```

Figure 5.3 Candidate/topic Level (sub-story)

```
R E L I A B I L I T Y   A N A L Y S I S  -  S C A L E  (A L P H A)
            Intraclass Correlation Coefficients
         Two-Way Mixed Effects Model (Consistency Definition)


               ICC    95% Confidence Interval
Measure          Value  Lower Bound  Upper Bound  F-Value   Sig.

Single Rater     .7551    .7361        .7729     7.1666  .0000
Average of Raters* .8605   .8480        .8719     7.1666  .0000

Degrees of freedom for F-tests are 2093 and 2093. Test Value = 0.

* Assumes absence of People*Rater interaction.


Reliability Coefficients

N of Cases =  2094.0              N of Items =  2

Alpha =    .86
```

Based on the methodology presented above, chapters Six, Seven, and Eight will discuss the results of this study. Chapter Six investigates the programme level analysis including the types of news formats used. Chapter Seven presents the results of the story level analysis, while Chapter Eight discusses the sub-story level or candidate/topic attributes as well as the results of the candidates spatial relationship with others and their presentation in relation to different camera angles.

Chapter Six

Programme Level Results

Introduction

The study involved the analysis of the evening newscasts of four Iraqi TV channels that are mostly partisan in nature. Except for the government-run Iraqia TV, the three other channels are run, supported, funded by political parties, so they are 'partisan' as explained in Chapter Two. As a reminder, Furat TV is supported by the Shiite Party, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, while Baghdad TV is run by the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party, and Hurria TV is backed by the Kurdish Party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. The fourteen days leading to the 7th March 2010 elections were the focus of this study. There were 6,172 candidates running in the general elections in order to occupy 325 Parliament seats. The candidates represented 306 political slates which formed 14 coalitions or alliances. In total, 56 evening newscasts making up 857 news stories were analysed that amounted to 121,431 seconds of programme running time (see Chart 6.1).

In this level of analysis, the data collected can give us an understanding of the way political parties/candidates and issues were represented or under-represented. Indeed, this aspect of the analysis provides a clear insight into the four TV channels' application of the principles of good journalism like balance and impartiality. Previous studies that relied on the programme level of analysis with a particular focus on analyzing the candidates' coverage were of importance here such as Schulz and Zeh (2005), Blumler (1983), and Blumler, Gurevitch, and Nossitier (1986). Siune, McQuail, and Blumler (1984) studied the 1984 European Parliamentary election and mainly focused on the attention given by television to political parties. In this regard, the researchers calculated the time devoted to the parties and made comparisons among the European countries that participated in the election (1984, p. 259). Further, Serow (1975), Hofstetter (1976), and Williams and Semlak (1978a) analysed the way news stories that discuss certain events/candidates/issues can influence viewers if more time was devoted to them. McCombs and Shaw (1972) investigated the manner by which viewers tended to regard some issues/figures as more important when there was more coverage about them.

After completing the pilot study, the analysis of newscasts started and lasted more than two months in early 2011. The content analysis used three coding frames that analysed programme content at three different levels: Programme, Story, and Candidate. This chapter focuses on the description and elaboration of the findings on the Programme Level coding frame. The numerical figures found in the different charts presented in the current chapter and in Chapters Seven and Eight were taken from raw numbers of the news stories' analysis.

In relation to the programme level, the Glasgow Media Group pointed out bias on British television by carefully examining structural features in the newscast such as time allotment and position of stories in the newscasts (Beharrell et al. 1976). Also, Altheide (1977) pointed out the '*implification* process' in which some issues/persons are emphasised by the way the news is organised and produced (p. 26). In his other study, Altheide focused on the analysis of the programme level by pointing out the unit of analysis, event, date, and type of programme. Other structural features in the news need to be written down such as the issues, sources, and visuals (p. 67). Also, Hofstetter (1976) discussed structural bias in relation to statements made by the journalists who make the news. Noyes, Lichter, and Amundson (1993) examined structural features of the overage but they have not classified their analysis based on the different competing parties involved.

Further, Bucy and Grabe (2007) concentrated on story sequence, time allotment, production techniques. Further**,** Howard (1973) investigated the newscasts aired by CBS, ABC, and NBC for five days during an election campaign to detect imbalance of different topics. He mainly used Budd's 'attention score' which focused on story prominence and news formats. In addition, Watt and van den Berg (1981) pointed out that the study of news story prominence entails investigating the position, size, and presentational techniques used in the newscast.

It is important to note here some of the difficulties of encoding. First, counting the time allotted to each topic was not absolutely an accurate measure since every news story might contain more than one topic. The measurement did not take this fact into account. For example, if a news story was made up of three topics and a total of 300 seconds, every topic was given the total time even if one of the topics was discussed for 20

seconds only. Furthermore, the assignment of topics can sometimes be problematic. For example, when the coder wanted to assign a new topic that was rarely mentioned in the different newscast, he used code (11) 'other'. In very few cases, there was more than one new code, so code (11) was assigned to more than one topic. In terms of news formats, there were few incidents when the channel aired parts of a live conference. As this format was not included in the classification of news in the coding frame, the coder assigned it as 'live interview'. Also, if a live interview was conducted by phone and the interviewee's photo was shown, it was regarded as 'live interview', too.

Also, all the channels, except for Iraqia TV that did not directly promote any party, mostly covered their own parties and candidates, so there was no point in analysing the story sequence or position. Almost all the stories were focused on candidates who belonged to one party. In relation to the issues covered, it was neither accurate not practical to investigate the story sequence because almost all the stories contained more than one issue, so it became impossible to reach a clear result about the prominence of these issues in the newscasts based on their sequence. This limitation was encountered when the author attempted to calculate the proportion of time coverage of each topic in relation to the total airtime of the channel. For instance, if we calculate the proportion of all topic types in relation to the total election airtime of Baghdad TV, we find that the percentage reaches 283.97%. However, individual high proportions can sometimes give us an indication of topic prominence in the newscast, so some references are made in the discussion below.

Though the Programme Level analysis did not provide as many details on the news stories as did the Candidate or the Story level analyses, it gave a general overview of the newscasts and the channels airing them. For example, we learned about the duration of each newscast that was calculated as the time of news stories related to the election. In other words, if a news story aired in the evening newscast was neither directly nor indirectly connected to the general election, it was not included in the analysis. The judgment was mainly based on the availability of narrative references to the general election. As stated in the literature review, more time and number of stories devoted to certain topics meant more prominence or emphasis given to these topics. Prominence is a basic part of media bias that is practiced by many TV channels. The

other two factors that determine the presence of bias include news selection and its organisation.

The other expected outputs of using the Programme Level analysis included knowing: (1) the total number of news stories (2) the various topics covered by the channels; (3) the total time allotted to each news story topic; (4) the number and type of news formats used. Indeed, the findings carried a great deal of meaning when carefully analysed. The data below will be presented in four main parts – general topic distribution profiles for each of the four TV channels, allocation of time to topics, inter-channel comparisons, and format factors.

The Four Channels

First, the investigation began with the general outcomes of the Programme Level analysis of the newscasts. The Sunni Baghdad channel aired 234 news stories which was the highest number of stories among the rest of the channels. The Shiite channel, Furat, aired 221 stories followed by the Kurdish TV Hurria with 201 stories and the state-run Iraqia channel with the same number of stories. Indeed, the four channels were close to each other in airing the number of news stories. However, Baghdad channel was more concerned with covering news and reports on the elections though the very same channel had refrained from airing news related to the election on one whole day.

In terms of time allotment (see Chart 6.1) differences were found among the four channels. The biggest differences occurred between Hurria and Baghdad channels. In fact, Hurria channel aired fewer stories because it was not the only media tool used by its owner, Jalal Talabani who is the head of PUK and the President of Iraq. The PUK's main target audience is Kurdish speakers, so it seemed that Hurria paid less attention to producing Arabic news and reports on the election than did the other channels. This was also evident in the major type of news formats used as will explained below. Unlike Hurria channel, Baghdad TV was the only Sunni channel whose sponsors were represented in the government, and it was definitely the sole television medium used by Ayad al-Samarai and his slate.

Chart 6.1 Time Allotted to News Stories in Seconds

	Iraqia 24952	Furat 36620	Baghdad 42563	Hurria 17296

Before analysing the story topics, a brief analysis of each channel was made in order to better understand its coverage of the election news. All the channels broadcast political advertisements that urged Iraqis to vote while others provided detailed instructions on how to vote that were sponsored by IHEC. Clearly, the Iraqi government paid for such promotional ads. However, a confidential US State Department cable released by Wikileaks revealed that the US National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) were, in fact, 'conducting wide-ranging voter education efforts in Iraq' (Department of State, February 2010). They also might have been involved in these paid advertisements. I will begin first the discussion on Iraqia channel.

Iraqia TV

As previously stated in Chapter Two, Iraqia TV is the state-owned channel. Like the BBC, it is supposed to be independent from the authority of the Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki and any other political or religious group in the country. There was a steady increase across the campaign in the number of stories covering the general elections (see Chart 6.2). The same applied to the time devoted to the same kind of coverage (see Chart 6.3 below). This is understandable since the coverage gained momentum, and the state-run channel was instrumental in encouraging Iraqis to participate in order to set an example that is better than the 2005 election when the majority of Iraqi Sunnis boycotted it. Noticeably, on the Election Day, Iraqia channel aired more stories, mostly praising the

elections and showing the achievements that were made. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter Eight.

Chart 6.2 Iraqia TV: Number of Stories Per Day (from 22 February to 7 March)


**Chart 6.3 Iraqia TV: Newscasts Running Time Per Day in Seconds(from 22 February to 7 March)**

As for the story topics covered, we need first to assess the number and distribution of these story topics on Iraqia channel (see Chart 6.4 below). Here, it is important to mention that 'other' topics contained different issues like media campaigns, UN and NGO's monitoring of the polling stations, foreign dignitaries visits to Iraq to follow up on the issue of election…etc. However, Iraqia channel mostly discussed the need to participate in the election as part of the state's effort to encourage people to vote. The high turnout would give credibility to the whole election process and would highlight an important landmark in Iraq's presumed new democracy. All of this would be positively reflected on the Iraqi government.

The second highest number of story topics was centred on IHEC due to its importance in the election time and the fact that it represented the official governmental body that organised the election process. IHEC was affiliated with the Iraqi Parliament,

but when al-Maliki was re-elected Prime Minister in 2010, he transferred its supervision to the Council of ministers so that he could have more authority over it in the future. Some other channels especially Furat and Baghdad tried to minimise the role of IHEC or at least discredit some of its efforts as will be shown in Chapter Eight.

Chart 6.4 Iraqia TV: Total Number of Stories on Each Topic Type

Worthy of note is the time allotted to the different topic types corresponded with the number of stories aired on each story topic (see Chart 6.5 below). The longest time was devoted to 'other' topic with 14,842 seconds, IHEC with 12,422 seconds and security/terrorism with 7,019 seconds. While the topic of election fraud took 5,289 seconds of the total time of the newscasts, Iraqia channel mainly covered the positive precautionary measures taken to counter fraud rather than point out the negative side.

Chart 6.5 Iraqia TV: Time Allotted to Each Topic Type in Seconds

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
Furat TV

The second channel analysed here was Furat TV. The Shiite leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Ammar al-Hakim, runs this channel. It is known to be a strong advocate of the rights of Shiites in Iraq after the 2003 US-led invasion. During the 2010 election, Hakim's political/religious group formed the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) which included a majority of Shiites. The channel continuously showed the party's electoral logo that looked like o'clock pointing to 8:00 and its electoral number (316) on the top corner of the screen to remind the viewers of its distinctive sign.

In some cases, promotional materials having religious insinuations were aired within the newscast in which candidates presented their political programmes, while the party promoted its past and future policies. Fear and hope were the two elements used in some of these advertisements. For example, the channel continuously reminded the viewers that voting for INA would ensure that Baathists would not return to power, indirectly reminding them of the Qaeda-linked terrorists and Saddam Hussein's crimes against Iraqis especially Shiites. Another example is cited by a confidential US State Department cable released by Wikileaks; Yuri Kim, the Acting Political Minister-Counselor at the US Embassy in Baghdad, observed that Furat TV and Afak channel, which is run by Maliki, used to air an advertisement that showed old footage of Baathists torturing Shiites from the south. Indeed, such an advertisement had clear aims in driving voters away from Ayad Allawi's slate for its allegedly suspicious ties with the Baath party (Department of State, February 2010).

According to Chart 6.6, we find that the channel continued airing more than ten stories on the election on a daily basis totaling 221 stories. Among the four channels chosen in this study, Furat came as second in the number of stories aired. Even on the media silence day, the channel broadcast 16 stories on the election process including some that violated the Iraqi media rules on promoting candidates.

**Chart 6.6 Furat TV: Number of Stories Per Day (from 22 February to 7 March)**

Chart 6.7 shows the time allotted by Furat channel to airing stories on the election; we find that the longest time was on the 5th March. This is due to the fact that on the following day, no media outlet was able to promote any political party or candidate based on regulations stipulated by the election law.

Chart 6.7 Furat TV: Newscasts Time Per Day in Seconds (from 22 February to 7 March)

In Chart 6.8, the highest number of story topics was centred on 'supporting electoral slate'. This is very understandable due to the partisan nature of Furat channel.

The second highest number of story topics was for 'other' which mainly dealt with the Shiite religious authorities' calls for participating in the election. Worthy of note is that the Shiite Ayatollahs or Marji'iah did not support any slate over the other, but they preferred to stand aloof in order not to show any kind of preference. However, there were indications that Furat channel wanted to show that the Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani backed the INA.

Chart 6.8 Furat TV: Total Number of Stories on Each Topic Type

In terms of the time allotted to each topic, there was a great gap between the different topics covered by Furat channel (see Chart 6.9 below). Interestingly, the topic of election fraud came in number three in connection to the number of stories (see above), but it scored the second rank in terms of time allotment. This is significant because it shows the channel's continuous and almost daily effort to present the election process in a way that suggests some kind of fraud or election results' manipulation done by Maliki's government. Again, the detailed discussion will come later.

**Chart 6.9 Furat TV: Total Time Allotted to Each Topic Type in Seconds**

Baghdad TV

The third channel examined was Baghdad TV. The Sunni Muslim Brothers established this channel after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The channel is run by Ayad al-Samarai, Iraq's former Parliament speaker who holds a dual passport, British and Iraqi. The channel moved its main broadcasting station from Baghdad to Amman after its headquarters was attacked by a booby-trapped car in April 2007. This is the only Sunni channel that is represented in the government. al-Rafidain channel, which airs from Cairo and is sponsored by the Muslim Scholars Association, is another Sunni TV, but it is overtly against the whole political process. Like Furat TV, Baghdad channel aired promotional materials for their candidates and their Iraqi Accord Front (IAF) slate within the newscasts and showed political advertisements to convince the viewers of their programmes. Some advertisements tried to manipulate viewers' religious sentiments by reminding them of the atrocities committed by Shiites against Sunnis after the Samaraa' event in 2006. For example, one advertisement stated: 'In order not to allow the martyrs' blood be wasted', directly suggesting to vote for this slate.

In Chart 6.10 below, Baghdad channel aired the highest number of stories throughout the period of study, though on the 26th of February the channel refrained from broadcasting major election news because of the anniversary of Prophet Mohammed's birthday. The highest number of stories on the election was on the 7th of March (Election Day) with 25 stories since the channel attempted to fully cover the way the electoral process took place.

Chart 6.10 Baghdad TV: Number of Stories Per Day (from 22 February to 7 March)

As for the time allotted to election news, there was extensive coverage of election news especially near the end of the voting day (see Chart 6.11 below). In some days such as the 2nd and 3rd of March, the election news exceeded the normal one hour devoted to the evening newscast.

Chart 6.11 Baghdad TV: Newscasts Running Time Per Day in Seconds (from 22 February to 7 March)

Just as with Furat TV, the Baghdad channel was focused on airing the topic of 'supporting electoral slate' due to its partisan nature (see Charts 6.12 and 6.13 below). There was a big gap among the number of different story topics. The third highest number of stories was centered on security/terrorism which remained a great concern to the majority of Iraqis especially Sunnis whose youth were mostly subjected to detention and random arrests.

**Chart 6.12 Baghdad TV: Total Number of Stories on Each Topic Type**

Chart 6.13 Baghdad TV: Total Time Allotted to Each Topic Type in Seconds

Hurria TV

The last channel tackled in this study was the Kurdish television, Hurria. It is owned by Talabani who formed the Kurdish Alliance (KA) with Masu'd Barazani in Iraqi Kurdistan. Together with Iraqia TV, Hurria channel had the lowest number of stories on the election with only 201 stories. This did not necessarily mean that the channel was not focused on promoting its political sponsors since the KA had several media outlets in Kurdish; Iraqi Arabs were not the main audience target, as stated above. Just like Furat and Baghdad channels, Hurria TV aired political advertisements to promote the KA programmes. Most of these advertisements reminded the viewers of the crimes committed against Iraqi Kurds during the Baath rule and promised them more benefits and rights if KA was elected. For example, one of these advertisements read: 'Yesterday, we defended Kurdistan with our blood; today, we defend it with our votes'.

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In connection to the number of stories aired by Hurria TV, there was an almost even distribution among the different days included in the study (see Chart 6.14 below).

Chart 6.14 Hurria TV: Number of Stories Per Day (from 22 February to 7 March)

In terms of time allotment, Hurria channel aired the shortest newscast time with only 17,396 seconds (see Chart 6.2 above) in comparison to the other three channels tackled in this study. Again, there was an almost even distribution to airtime devoted to election news throughout the period of study (see Chart 6.15 below).

Chart 6.15 Hurria TV: Newscasts Running Time Per Day in Seconds (from 22 February to 7 March)

As for the most news aired on the channel, Chart 6.16 below shows that it was 'other' topic which scored the highest number of stories and the longest broadcast time (see Chart 6.17). This is a miscellaneous category, but it is it not consisting of potentially many different topics. As Hurria TV is owned by the President of Iraq, it is logical that the channel's main pre-occupation was to air news reports on the necessity to participate in the election. This was surely part of the Iraqi government's continuous efforts to prove its success in uniting Iraqis to decide on a representative government.

This section revealed to us the differences and similarities among the channels in terms of the number of stories aired and the time allotted to election news. Indeed, Baghdad TV came first and was followed by Furat, while Hurria and Iraqia channels aired similar number of stories but Iraqia TV devoted more time than Hurria channel to election news. In the following section, a discussion is made on the coverage of each story topic aired by the four channels.

Chart 6.16 Hurria TV: Total Number of Stories on Each Topic Type

Chart 6.17 Hurria TV: Total Time Allotted to Each Topic Type in Seconds

Story Topics and Time Allotment

This section discusses the daily distribution and time allotment of each story topic throughout the newscasts aired by the four channels. The raw data analysed here are related to story topics' frequency and their allotted time that is calculated in seconds (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2 below and Table 1, Appendix IV for the full details). This section is important because it reveals the differences among the channels in relation to the issues covered. Indeed, this aspect of the research reflects the kind of emphasis shown by the

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four channels in covering certain topics and ignoring others which gives a clear indication of the patterns of representation followed. As a reminder, eleven topics were categorised in this study: political differences, security/terrorism, democracy, public services, corruption/violation, national unity/political dialogue, election fraud, federalism, supporting electoral slate, IHEC, and other.

1. 'Political Differences'

In relation to the details of story topics, it is important to begin with the daily distribution of these topics and time allotted to them throughout the period of study. Starting with 'political differences', this topic is very important during election time because it is one of the campaign tools that candidates use to reflect on their acceptance and openness to others and ultimately to convince voters that they are either against political differences and discord or that they stand neutral (Trent and Friedenberg 2007).

Furat channel aired the largest number of stories with (n = 37) amounting to 2 hours and 8 minutes comprising about 28.24% of its total airtime. In fact, this is the highest amount of time devoted to this topic in proportion to the total airtime. The highest number of stories on this channel was on the 26th of February with six stories (see Chart 19 in Appendix IV). Furthermore, Baghdad channel aired 30 stories on political differences with an almost balanced distribution among the different newscasts (see Chart 41 in Appendix IV). On the other hand, Hurria TV aired very few stories and little air time on political differences since most of its story topics are centered on other areas. However, it came second after Furat TV in proportion to its total airtime of covering this topic with 19.63%. Finally, Iraqia channel aired the lowest number of stories on this topic (n = 12), but the gaps between the days widen when judged on the time allotted to this topic type.

2. 'Security/Terrorism'

The second topic analysed in this study was 'security/terrorism'. Baghdad TV scored the highest number of stories on this issue with 87 reports. This topic also accounted for the third highest number of stories aired by the channel, suggesting the importance given to this vital issue that irks Iraqis on a daily basis due to the general volatile security situation in the country. The highest number of stories on this topic was aired on the Election Day with 11 stories (see Chart 43 in Appendix IV). Indeed, by

emphasising the importance of this issue, the TV channel can remind the viewers of what goes on in the streets, aiming at moving potential voters to change this reality by electing specific candidates and vice versa. As for Furat TV, it aired a total of 41 stories and was ranked second among the other channels. The topic scored the fourth highest one among the other topics it covered. As mentioned earlier, this is not an indication that the channel showed a positive or negative perspective toward the security/terror condition since this kind of assessment will be made in Chapter Eight.

In Chart 23, Appendix IV, the largest amount of time allotted to this topic came 24 hours before the media silence day, showing that the channel stressed the importance of this issue to its viewers. On the other hand, Iraqia channel aired the third highest score of this topic with a total of 59 stories. Like Iraqia TV which did not cover the security/terrorism issue in details, Hurria channel followed the same policy except on the Election Day (see Chart 65, Appendix IV) which might even be praising what the government did to secure the polling stations as will be discussed later.

However, in a country that is ranked as one of the worst in the world in terms of security, one would reasonably expect to have the topic of 'security/terrorism' placed in the highest rank. In their electoral campaigns, the candidates continued hammering on this topic by highlighting its current weakness which was an indirect criticism of Maliki's rule and his State of Law Slate and by showing their plans to restore peace and order if they got elected. Yet, these important aspects in the election were downsized and were not properly covered by Iraqia or Hurria channels. Also, not all the 'security/terrorism' stories were presented in a negative manner since many stories praised the achievements of the Iraqi government to restore peace and stability. The above discussion suggests that Iraqia and Hurria channels covered the election in a partial and imbalanced manner, clearly indicating a clear bias in terms of news values.

As for the time devoted to this issue, Baghdad TV scored the longest time devoted to it. In Chart 44 in Appendix IV, the longest time is centered in the middle with 40.31 minutes on the 1st of March. Baghdad TV was also the first among the other channels with 42.75% of its total airtime devoted to this topic. Less discussion on security/terrorism is seen on the margins since other topics like 'supporting electoral slate' was more highlighted by Baghdad TV.

3. 'Democracy'

As for the topic of democracy, Furat TV scored the highest number of stories. Also, the topic was somehow emphasised by Iraqia TV as it came as its fifth topic preference, comprising about 13.73% of its total airtime; in fact, it was a favourite topic for most Iraqi officials who usually cited it as evidence of the success of the new political system in the country. Hurria TV followed Iraqia channel in highlighting the issue of democracy in the new Iraq since both channels are closely linked to the government, as explained above. We find less attention given by Baghdad channel to this topic because it probably entailed some kind of praise to the political process particularly to Samarai's political opponent, Maliki. Hence, the channel avoided discussing this topic, suggesting that it tried to decrease any sympathy toward the other political forces that were leading the government.

In terms of the time allotted to democracy, the longest time is aired by Furat TV that centered on the Election Day with 28.78 minutes (see Chart 24, Appendix IV); this amount of time comprised 20.96% of the total airtime, making up the highest percentage among the other channels. This is due to the fact that most interviewees who participated in the election expressed their hope for change by mentioning this topic.

4. 'Public Services'

Despite the fact that Iraq was suffering from great shortages in the public service sector, Iraqia channel minimised its importance by referring to it only four times throughout the period of study. It is important to note that the main daily pre-occupation of Iraqis after the issue of security is public services. All the candidates running for the 2010 election had the restoration of 'public services' as their priority in their campaign in order to convince voters of their programmes. In February 2011, thousands of Iraqis protested in the streets following the example of other Arab countries like Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. Rather than demanding the overthrow of their government, Iraqis demanded having basic services like electricity and fresh water. In terms of the time allotted to 'public services', we notice in Chart 8 in Appendix IV the marginal nature of this topic, devoting 729 seconds only to it. This kind of intentional disregard for this topic

shows that Iraqia channel was not balanced in showing the reality as it ignored a very important aspect that was a basic part of the country's difficult situation.

The highest number of stories was aired by Baghdad channel with 65. This topic ranked fourth among the other topics covered by the same channel. In relation to the time devoted to this issue by Baghdad TV, Chart 48 in Appendix IV shows that the longest time allotted to it is in the middle on the 1st March with 1,815 seconds before the media silence day. In comparison with the other channels and in proportion to the total airtime, Baghdad TV devoted the highest amount of time to this topic with 33.25%. The high number of stories and the longest time devoted to it suggest that Baghdad channel did not only want to reflect to its viewers the reality but also to highlight the shortcomings of the then government which could not provide basic provisions to its people.

5. 'Corruption/Violation'

In relation to corruption/violation, Baghdad TV came first among the other channels in terms of the highest number of stories (n= 27 stories) and longest airtime (n = 1 hour and 6 minutes) devoted to this topic. In proportion to the total airtime, Baghdad was also ahead of the other channels with 14.32% on this topic. This is expected due to the aggressive critical attitude it undertook against the government. As stated in Chapter Two, Iraq was regarded for several consecutive years as one of the most corrupt countries in the world; the 2011 protests mentioned above were largely organised because of the widespread corruption in the different levels of the government.

As for Furat TV, the day preceding the media silence day witnessed the highest number of stories and longest time allotted to it (see Charts 27 and 28, Appendix IV). This shows the channel's desire to stress to its viewers the shortcoming of Maliki's government. Although Hurria TV aired eight stories on corruption/ violation, they only amounted to 681 seconds of airtime. Finally, the topic scored eighth out of eleven issues covered by Iraqia TV with only three stories. Once more, the channel did not give this important topic its rightful amount of attention and time (see Charts 9 and 10, Appendix IV).

6. 'National Unity/Political Dialogue'

In relation to the issue of national unity/political dialogue, Baghdad TV scored the highest number of stories and longest airtime with 30 stories and a total of 1 hour and 9

minutes devoted to this topic. In proportion to the total airtime, Baghdad TV was also ahead with 16.66%. As for Iraqia TV, the issue scored third among the four channels with 13 stories and the sixth rank in terms of the number of topics covered. However, it was not much emphasised by Iraqia channel that devoted the lowest amount of time among the other channels in proportion to its total airtime with only 6.28%. It was somehow unexpected that Iraqia TV did not pay enough attention to this important topic. Political dialogue was one of the foundations of national reconciliation which Maliki's government called for following US and international pressure to include various and underrepresented political and tribal forces in the political process. Previously, these efforts led to the establishment of the Committee of National Reconciliation in the Iraqi Parliament.

7. 'Election Fraud'

As for the election fraud issue, Furat TV came first among the other channels in airing the highest number of stories (n = 61). The channel also scored the third highest number of stories among the other topics covered since the channel kept on hammering on this important issue for several days. In proportion to the total airtime, Furat TV devoted 35.13% to this topic which scored second and was only preceded by 'supporting electoral slate'. Indeed, there seemed to be a tendency by Furat channel to discredit the election by showing Maliki's slate as manipulative of IHEC and the whole electoral process. More details, however, will be discussed in details in Chapter Eight.

As for Baghdad TV, it came second among the other channels with 38 stories. The highest number of stories was located on the Election Day, suggesting a great concern by the channel over this vital issue (see Chart 53, Appendix IV). Worthy of note is that the Programme Level of analysis did not yield the required data to point out the tendency of the channel in portraying election fraud; it could be that Baghdad TV mainly aired positive views on combating fraud rather than showing the negative side. Furthermore, on Baghdad TV, the time devoted to election fraud did not correspond with the number of stories on the same topic. The longest time allotted to it was on the 4th of March before the media silence day with 25.7 minutes. The time given to this issue gained another momentum on the Election Day with 24.9 minutes (see Chart 54, Appendix IV). For Iraqia TV, the fourth highest score of topics was 'election fraud' with

31 stories throughout the period of study. Finally, Hurria TV did not seem to pay this topic much attention despite its importance as it scored the lowest number of stories (n = 25) ones and the shortest time (39.9 minutes). In proportion to its total airtime, Hurria channel devoted the shortest percentage among the other channels with 13.86%.

8. 'Federalism'

One of the significant findings in this level of analysis is the absence of two story topics from the coverage of Iraqia channel, namely 'federalism' and 'supporting electoral slate'. With regard to federalism, this topic is of great concern to many Iraqis except for the majority of Kurds because it carries a separatist move. According to the new Iraqi Constitution, Iraq is a federal state, and Kurds, who live in the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan, prefer to have a strong federal system in the rest of the country in order to annex the oil-rich city of Kirkuk within Kurdistan. This will later ensure a stronger and a more independent Kurdish region that can easily announce its separation from Baghdad. Most Arab politicians do not prefer to discuss this sensitive topic though in the beginning some Shiite leaders like the late Abdul Aziz al-Hakim voiced his desire to have a Shiite region in the south in order to control the oil production in Basrah. But this kind of rhetoric disappeared as will be shown later in the analysis of Furat TV.

Furat channel did not pay this issue much emphasis because it might drive away voters from the Iraqi National Alliance (INA). In fact, the two stories that contained references to federalism were not directly related to the INA since the first reference was brought up by a Kurd, while an INA affiliate in one of Iraq's towns made a passing reference to this issue (see Chart 33, Appendix IV).

Like Furat TV, federalism was treated in a cautionary way by Baghdad channel since it is a very sensitive matter among Iraqi Arabs and Turkomen whether be Sunni or Shiite. There were only seven stories with 1873 seconds that referred to this issue which was greatly criticised by Samarai's political group. In proportion to the total airtime, Baghdad TV came first among the other channels with 4.40%. Finally, one might expect to find Hurria TV with the highest number of topics and the longest airtime on this topic; however, Baghdad and Hurria channels shared the same number of stories though the former exceeded the latter in the time allotment.

9. 'Supporting Electoral Slate'

Certainly, the highest number of stories was centered on the topic of 'supporting electoral slate' due to the nature of the three partisan channels. Baghdad TV came first with 141 stories on this topic and 7 hours and 38 minutes of airtime. The channel also scored the highest amount of time among the other channels in proportion to total airtime with 62.49%. Closer in number, Furat aired 106 stories making up 5 hours and 51 minutes, comprising 53.27% of its total airtime. This is normal because the two channel's aim was to promote their religious/political parties. It is very important to point out here that all the stories presented the positive side of the parties' agenda since no dissenting voices were allowed to be aired. Indeed, Furat TV and Baghdad TV shared a common feature in devoting the highest number of stories to this topic. On the other hand, Hurria TV had only 43 stories on this topic comprising 1 hour and 20 minutes, making up 25.01% of its total airtime. The topic scored the fourth highest rank among the other issues covered by the same channel. This again shows that Hurria TV was not exclusively devoted to promoting its political parties because there were other more effective means to do so. It seems that the channel's main concern was to voice the Kurds' claims and points of view to other Iraqis who speak Arabic. Finally, Iraqia TV had no score on this topic due to its allegedly non-partisan nature, as mentioned earlier.

In general, the three channels that covered this topic carefully followed the regulations of ICMC by refraining from promoting their political parties on the media silence day, though there were slight violations. For example, Furat TV showed still and moving images of its INA's candidates during this day and resorted to covering the calls of the Shiite leaders to participate in the election, regarding it as a religious duty. Some of INA candidates were presented as associates of those religious leaders. Hence, we see that the longest time devoted on this day is on 'other' topics with 1,889 seconds (see Charts 39 and 40, Appendix IV).

10. 'IHEC'

There is an interest to refer to the activities of IHEC among the four channels tackled in the study. Iraqia TV scored the highest number with 78 stories constituting 3 hours and 45 minutes that made up 49.78% of its total airtime. This was the highest amount of airtime devoted to this topic. This is justified because IHEC needed a state-owned channel to fully cover the conferences and public statements made by its officials

that were addressed to all Iraqis. In Chart 16 in Appendix IV, this topic received more attention on the 4th of March because of the voting process that took place outside Iraq and the general preparations that IHEC took for the Election Day on the 7th of March. Due to its closeness to the Iraqi government, Hurria TV scored the second highest number with 50 stories making up 1 hour and 12 minutes. Somehow similar in their coverage of the topic of democracy, Hurria and Iraqia TV shared common features in their interest to cover IHEC's activities.

In connection to Furat TV, the channel directly expressed its dissatisfaction with this governmental body. Noticeably, two days passed (1/3 & 2/3) without having any reference to IHEC despite the fact that its officials conducted several interviews and issued many press releases to different media outlets. On the Election Day, Furat channel intensified its coverage of IHEC devoting 27.21 minutes to it because of IHEC's direct involvement in organising the general election (see Charts 37 and 38, Appendix IV). As for Baghdad TV, the highest number of stories on this topic was centered on the media silence day when Baghdad TV could not air any political promotion and on the Election Day because there was no need to air the party's political programme. Most of the coverage was related to interviewing IHEC's officials (see Chart 59, Appendix IV).

11. 'Other'

Finally, Iraqia TV came also first in airing 'other' topics with 115 stories making up 4 hours and 12 minutes that comprised 59.48% of its total airtime. This was the highest amount of time devoted to covering this topic in proportion to the total airtime. Here, it is important to mention that the majority of the issues falling within this topic were centered on encouraging Iraqis to participate in the election as stated earlier. There was a steady increase in the number of 'other' topics leading to the Election Day when it started to change for appraisal of the electoral event (see Chart 17, Appendix IV). Like the case of IHEC and to a certain extent the topic of 'democracy', Hurria TV followed Iraqia channel in airing a large number of 'other' stories with 103 ones. As above, the majority of the stories were either related to praising the election or urging Iraqis to vote. As for Baghdad TV, it aired 88 stories amounting to 5 hours and 0.5 minutes on other 'topics' which were largely related to covering the UN/NGO's activities in relation to monitoring the election process or urging Iraqis to vote just like Furat TV. The latter aired 81 stories on 'other'

topics which were mainly related to encouraging Iraqis especially Shiites to participate in the election since the channel cited Shiite religious leaders whose guidance and advice are heeded by the majority.

The section above provided us with an understanding of the amount of attention shown by the four channels toward the different issues covered. This was clearly manifested in the number of stories aired, time allotment, and to a certain extent in the amount of time devoted to the topics in proportion to the total airtime. The four channels covered the issues in different degrees of prominence that reflected the kind of presentation technique practicsed as will be discussed below.

Magnitude of Inter-Channel Differences

In order to determine the significance of differences in the topics' coverage across the four TV channels, non-parametric and parametric statistical assessments were conducted. In terms of the number of stories related to topic types, a non-parametric test called Kruskal-Wallis was conducted (see Table 6.1 above and Table 2, Appendix IV) This test is regarded as the 'best-known rank-based method for more than two independent groups' since it 'tests the hypothesis that all groups have identical distributions' (Wilcox 2009, p. 277). The test revealed all the topics except for 'others' showed significant differences among the four channels that can be ranked in order as follows: (1) 'supporting electoral slate', (2) 'public services', (3) 'corruption/violation', (4) security/terrorism', (5) election fraud, (6) political differences', (7) 'national unity/political dialogue', (8) 'federalism', (9) 'IHEC', (10) 'democracy'. As expected, the highest degree of differences was on 'supporting electoral slate' be followed by 'public services' and 'corruption/ violation'. These results corresponded with the topics' differences cited above that were mainly caused by the way Iraqia TV differed from the rest of the channels in its coverage of certain topics.

The second test conducted was the analysis of variance or ANOVA in order to examine the detailed differences among the four channels in the time allotted to each topic type (see Table 6.2 above and Table 3, Appendix IV). ANOVA is a parametric test whose aim is to divide the 'total variation into different categories associated with the sources of variation as well as to illustrate interaction effects and chanced errors' (Hsia 1988, p. 403). Like the Kruskal-Wallis, there is a hypothetical assumption that the

variables investigated are distributed normally (Wimmer and Dominick 1991, p. 238). Similar to the findings of the Kruskal-Wallis test cited above, all the topics showed significant differences between the channels in the time allotment for all topics except for the topic of 'other'. Indeed, the ANOVA results largely corresponded with the previous discussion on the time allotted to the different topics aired by the four channels.

Table 6.1 Differences among the Four News Programmes in Numbers of Stories Broadcast from Different News Categories

	Iraqia TV No. of Stories	Furat TV No. of Stories	Baghdad TV No. of Stories	Hurria TV No. of Stories	Chi-square	Asymp. Sig.
Political differences	12^a	37^b	30^b (Hurria)	19^a	10.34	*p < 0.016
Security/terrorism	59^a	41^a	87^b	48^a	13.42	**p < 0.004
Democracy	24^a	34^a	9^b (Iraqia & Hurria)	22^a	6.95	***p < 0.074
Public services	4^a	39^b	65^c	21^b	26.36	****p < 0.000
Corruption/ violation	3^a	6^a	27^b	8^a	17.08	*****p < 0.001
National unity/political dialogue	13^a	24^a	30^b (Furat)	13^a	7.97	******p < 0.047
Election fraud	31^a	61^b	38^a	25^a	13.02	*******p < 0.005
Federalism	0^a	2^a	7^b (Furat)	7^b (Furat)	7.77	********p < 0.051
Supporting electoral slate	0^a	106^b	141c	43^d	30.23	*********p < 0.000
IHEC	78^a	39^b	46^b	50^b	7.02	**********p < 0.071
Others	115^a	81^a	88^a	103^a	2.40	p < 0.494

Note: Scores that share the same superscript are not significantly different at the p < 0.05 level. In few cases, the channel that does not share a significant difference with another is written between brackets though the superscript is different.

*p < 0.016 (Political differences: There is a significant difference among the channels in the number of stories covering this topic)
**p < 0.004 (Security/terrorism: There is a significant difference among the channels in the number of stories covering this topic)
***p < 0.074 (Democracy: There is a significant difference among the channels in the number of stories covering this topic)
****p < 0.000 (Public services: There is a significant difference among the channels in the number of stories covering this topic)
*****p < 0.001 (Corruption/ violation: There is a significant difference among the channels in the number of stories covering this topic)
******p < 0.047 (National unity/political dialogue: There is a significant difference among the channels in the number of stories covering this topic)
*******p < 0.005 (Election fraud: There is a significant difference among the channels in the number of stories covering this topic)

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********p < 0.051 (Federalism: There is a significant difference among the channels in the number of stories covering this topic)
*********p < 0.000 (Supporting electoral slate: There is a significant difference among the channels in the number of stories covering this topic)
**********p < 0.071 (IHEC: There is a significant difference among the channels in the number of stories covering this topic)

Table 6.2 Differences among the Four News Programmes in Time Allotment Broadcast from Different News Categories (in seconds)

	Iraqia TV Time Allotment	Furat TV Time Allotment	Baghdad TV Time Allotment	Hurria TV Time Allotment	F	Asymp. Sig.
Political differences	1565[a]	10343[b]	8014[b]	3396[a]	12.34	*p < 0.000
Security/terrorism	7019[a]	8114[a]	18196[b]	4754[a]	12.62	**p < 0.000
Democracy	3427[a]	7679[b]	1684[a]	2834[a]	4.12	***p < 0.011
Public services	729[a]	9085[b]	14153[b]	2408[c]	16.75	****p < 0.000
Corruption/ violation	311[a]	2937[a]	6096[b] (Furat)	681[a]	5.75	*****p < 0.002
National unity/political dialogue	1568[a]	5688[b]	7095[b]	1627[a] (Furat)	4.40	******p < 0.008
Election fraud	1568[a]	5688[b]	7095[b]	1627[a]	9.41	*******p < 0.000
Federalism	0[a]	159[a]	1873[b]	548[b] (Furat)	3.98	********p < 0.013
Supporting electoral slate	0[a]	19511[b]	26598[b]	4326[c]	24.06	*********p < 0.000
IHEC	12422[a]	8529[a]	10157[a]	4065[b]	4.26	**********p < 0.009
Others	14842[a]	12062[a]	18186[a]	8773[b] (Furat)	2.20	p < 0.100

Note: Scores that share the same superscript are not significantly different at the p < 0.05 level. In few cases, the channel that does not share a significant difference with another is written between brackets though the superscript is different.

*p < 0.000 (Political differences: There is a significant difference among the channels in the time allotted to this topic)
**p < 0.000 (Security/terrorism: There is a significant difference among the channels in the time allotted to this topic)
***p < 0.011 (Democracy: There is a significant difference among the channels in the time allotted to this topic)
****p < 0.000 (Public services: There is a significant difference among the channels in the time allotted to this topic)
*****p < 0.002 (Corruption/ violation: There is a significant difference among the channels in the time allotted to this topic)
******p < 0.008 (National unity/political dialogue: There is a significant difference among the channels in the time allotted to this topic)
*******p < 0.000 (Election fraud: There is a significant difference among the channels in the time allotted to this topic)

********p < 0.013 (Federalism: There is a significant difference among the channels in the time allotted to this topic)
*********p < 0.000 (Supporting electoral slate: There is a significant difference among the channels in the time allotted to this topic)
**********p < 0.009 (IHEC: There is a significant difference among the channels in the time allotted to this topic)

Pair-wise Differences: Mann-Whitney and T-Tests

In order to have a deeper look into the differences among the channels, a Mann-Whitney and T-tests were computed to investigate the degree of difference among paired channels in their coverage of topics. The non-parametric test of Mann-Whitney computes the degree of differences in terms of the number of stories aired, while the T-test computes the difference in relation to the topics' time allotment.

Iraqia and Furat Channels

Tables 6.1 above shows the differences between Iraqia and Furat channels in terms of the number of stories reported by them in respect of different news topics. We can see that there are five topics that shared significant differences between the two channels in terms of the number of stories: 'political differences', 'public services', 'election fraud', 'supporting electoral slate', and 'IHEC'. In relation to the topic of 'supporting electoral slate', a significant difference here was expected because Iraqia channel was not directly involved in promoting political parties and aired no stories on it. On the other hand, Furat channel aired 106 stories on 'supporting electoral slate' (see also Table 4, Appendix IV).

In terms of the difference between the two channels in the amount of time allotment to story topics, we find in Table 6.2 that there are six topics sharing significant differences: 'political differences', 'democracy', 'public services', 'national unity/political dialogue', 'election fraud', and 'supporting electoral slate'. If we compare the raw data in Table 6.1 above with the T-test cited in Table 5, Appendix IV below, we find the obvious similarities between the two results. For instance, Iraqia TV devoted 729 seconds to public services, whereas Furat channel aired 9085 seconds on the same topic. Also, Iraqia TV broadcast 5289 seconds on election fraud, while Furat aired 12865 seconds on this topic.

Iraqia and Baghdad Channels

More differences can be seen between Iraqia and Baghdad channels (see Table 6.1 above). This is expected because the two channels stand in almost extreme sides; Baghdad TV's general stance was somehow anti-government unlike the pro-government Iraqia channel. In terms of the number of stories, there are eight topics that have significant differences: 'political differences', 'security/terrorism', 'public services', 'corruption/violation', 'national unity/political dialogue', 'federalism', 'supporting electoral slate', and 'IHEC'. In relation to the topic of 'federalism', the two tailed Asymptotic Significance is $p < 0.016$ whereas the one tailed significance is $p < .114$ which is due to the extreme values found between the two channels (see Table 6, Appendix IV).

As mentioned earlier, Iraqia TV did not pay adequate attention to the topics of 'public services' and 'corruption/violation' unlike Baghdad TV that wanted to show the shortcomings of the Iraqi government. As for the topic of 'supporting electoral slate', Iraqia TV did not pay direct attention to it as explained above at the time Baghdad TV aired 141 stories to cover this topic. If we compare Mann-Whitney test with the raw data shown in Table 6.1, we find that the number of stories aired by Iraqia TV on 'public services' was only four, while Baghdad channel aired 65 stories. Also, Iraqia channel broadcast 3 stories on 'corruption/violation', whereas Baghdad TV aired 27 ones.

As for the time allotment, we can see from Table 6.2 above that eight topics shared significant differences between Iraqi and Baghdad channels: 'political differences' (Iraqia aired 1565 seconds; Baghdad aired 8014 seconds); 'security/terrorism' (Iraqia aired 7019 seconds; Baghdad aired 18196 seconds); 'public services' (Iraqia aired 729 seconds; Baghdad aired 14153 seconds); 'corruption/violation' (Iraqia aired 311 seconds; Baghdad aired 6096 seconds); 'national unity/political dialogue' (Iraqia aired 1568 seconds; Baghdad aired 7095 seconds); 'election fraud' (Iraqia aired 1568 seconds; Baghdad aired 7095 seconds); 'federalism' (Iraqia did not air any stories; Baghdad aired 1873 seconds); and 'supporting electoral slate' (Iraqia did not air any stories; Baghdad aired 26598 seconds) (see also Table 7, Appendix IV).

Iraqia and Hurria Channels

Table 6.1 shows that the two TV stations did not differ much in their coverage of topics. This is again expected because both channels are closely linked to the Iraqi

government. As mentioned earlier, the only significant difference between the two channels can be found in covering the topics of 'public services', 'federalism, 'supporting electoral slate', and 'IHEC'. As for the topic of 'federalism', the two tailed Asymptotic Significance is $p < 0.016$ whereas the one tailed significance is $p < .114$ which is caused by the different values found between the two channels.

To give few examples on the differences between the two channels in terms of the raw data, Hurria TV aired 43 stories on 'supporting electoral slate', while Iraqia channel aired no stories on this topic. In relation to the topic of 'public services', Iraqia TV did not pay enough attention to this topic unlike the other channels as mentioned earlier; the raw data shows that Hurria TV aired 21 stories, whereas Iraqia aired only 4 stories on this topic (see also Table 8, Appendix IV).

As for the time allotment, there are five topics that shared significant difference between the two channels: 'public services', 'federalism', 'supporting electoral slate' 'IHEC', and 'other'. In relation to 'IHEC', Iraqia channel aired 12422 seconds unlike Hurria channel that only aired 4065 seconds. As mentioned earlier, Iraqia TV covered the activities of the IHEC more than the other channels because they both belong to the Iraqi government (see also Table 9, Appendix IV).

In brief, Iraqia TV did not differ much in its coverage of topics from Furat and Hurria channels since the three TV stations are closely related to the Iraqi government. The highest degree of significant differences could be seen between Iraqia and Baghdad channels because of the different sponsors and their backgrounds, while the least amount of significant differences were between Iraqia and Hurria channels.

Furat and Baghdad Channels

We find that the significant differences between the two channels in terms of the number of stories aired were related to six topics: 'security/terrorism', 'democracy', 'public services', 'corruption/violation', 'election fraud', and 'supporting electoral slate'. Baghdad TV, for example, aired 87 stories on 'security/terrorism' and 27 stories on 'corruption/violation', while Furat channel aired 41 stories on 'security/terrorism' and only 6 stories on 'corruption/violation' (see Table 6.1 above and Table 10, Appendix IV).

In terms of the time allotment, we find in Table 6.2 that four topics shared significant differences between the two channels: 'security/terrorism', 'democracy',

'public services', and 'federalism'. Based on the raw data in Table 6.1 above, this is expected because Baghdad TV, for example, aired 18196 seconds on 'security/terrorism', while Furat channel aired 8114 seconds on the same topic. Also, Baghdad TV aired 14153 seconds on the topic of 'public services', whereas Furat channel aired 9085 seconds only (see also Table 11, Appendix IV).

Furat and Hurria Channels

In relation to the difference between Furat and Hurria channels, we find in Table 6.1 that there are three topics with significant differences in terms of the number of stories aired: 'political differences', 'election fraud', and 'supporting electoral slate'. To compare some of the results in Table 12, Appendix IV with the raw data in Table 6.1, we find a clear connection since Furat TV aired 61 stories on 'election fraud' and '106' stories on 'supporting electoral slate', while Hurria channel aired 25 stories on the first topic and 43 stories on the second one. In relation to the second topic, this result is expected because Hurria TV did not pay much attention to promoting its sponsoring political party.

As for the allotted time, Table 6.2 shows that there are six topics that showed significant differences between the two channels: **'**political differences', 'democracy', 'public services', 'election fraud', 'supporting electoral slate', and 'IHEC'. The results cited in Table 13, Appendix IV closely correspond with the raw data in Table 6.1; for example, the topic of 'political differences' was covered by Furat channel amounting to 10343 seconds, while Hurria TV aired only 3396 seconds. Also, Furat TV aired 12865 seconds on the topic of 'election fraud', whereas Hurria channel aired 2398 seconds.

Baghdad and Hurria Channels

Finally, Hurria and Baghdad channels showed significant differences in only two topics in relation to the number of stories aired: 'security/terrorism' and 'public services' (see Table 6.1 above and Table 14, Appendix IV). This was not at all expected because Baghdad and Hurria channels seemed like they stood on the two extremes. As for the time allotment, there are nine topics that shared significant differences between the two channels: 'political differences', 'security/terrorism', 'public services', 'corruption/violation', 'national unity/political dialogue', 'election fraud', 'supporting electoral slate', 'IHEC', and 'other' (see Table 6.2 and Table 15, Appendix IV).

In conclusion, it was found that the highest degree of difference among the paired channels being investigated was between Baghdad and Iraqia channels since eight topics showed significant differences in terms of the number of stories and eight topics showed a high degree of difference in relation to the time allotment. However, the highest degree of difference found among the paired channels in terms of the time allotment to topics was between Baghdad and Hurria channels that shared nine topics with significant differences. Based on the raw data firstly collected, the results cited above are expected since Baghdad TV covered the election process far more than the other channels.

On the other hand, the lowest degree of difference among the paired channels was between Furat and Hurria channels. There were only three topics that had significant differences in terms of the number of stories and six topics in relation to the time allotment. This was not expected since the two channels seemed very different in their coverage of the election. However, the lowest degree of difference among the paired channels in terms of the number of stories aired was between Baghdad and Hurria channels that had only two topics with significant differences. This was surely not expected. As for the lowest degree of difference among the paired channels in terms of the time allotment, Furat and Baghdad channels had only four topics with significant differences. This was expected because these two partisan channels extensively devoted most of the newscast time to covering similar topics.

News Formats' Distribution

The final phase of analysis in this level is related to news formats. The Glasgow Media Group stressed the significance of studying the use of Chromokey which is the background image shown when the anchor reads the newscast (Beharrell et al. 1980). Indeed, Chromokey was comprehensively analysed in The Glasgow Media Group's other publication (Eldridge 1995, pp. 258-261). Further, Altheide (1996) discussed the importance of investigating the use of visuals in the newscast which can be classified as: videotape, file photos, graphics, actuals, and live coverage (p. 67). Also, Edwardson et al. (1992) found out that visuals that accompany the audio in the news have an impact on the way the audience recall of information.

Mostly following Hartley (1982) and Grabe and Bucy's (2009) classification, the coding frame was divided into eight formats: newsreader (Talking Head); voice-over;

voice-over-sound-on-tape (VO/SOT); recorded interview; live interview; package; film report (reporter unseen); in-studio interview. The details of each code are already explained in Chapter Five.

However, it is important to point out here what Grabe and Bucy suggested with regard to the 'visual weight' or the importance of news format in shedding light on the way TV channels highlight or understate some issues. For example, a news item that only involves a newsreader is regarded as the lowest in rank because there is little effort in producing the story, whereas a news story using a voice-over requires more effort and time as it involves inserting footage or some still images while the anchorperson reads the news. Voice-over-sound-on-tape (VO/SOT) which involves sound and video/image comes after since it needs more work by the news producer. The highest rank is assigned to the 'package' because it requires more time, effort, money, and crew. It involves a newsreader that introduces an edited report done by a correspondent who is accompanied by at least one cameraman. Other news formats also has similar requirement such as live interview in which an expert/official is interviewed especially if it is done outside the studio. Surely, this requires renting time from a satellite and a great deal of follow up by the concerned channel's staff.

Chart 6.18 Number of News Formats Distributions among the Four Channels

In Chart 6.18 above, it is apparent that the highest number of stories (n = 224) were centred on voice-over which was either accompanied by a still-image or footage. This is mainly due to the fact that the voice-over involves less effort and time than the other formats, but it is regarded as more important than the 'newsreader' since the visuals that accompany the news in the voice-over format make the news more interesting and have an impact on audience recall of information (Edwardson et al. 1992). Hurria TV scored the highest number of stories among the other channels in the use of this format which partly explains the channel's tendency to lay less emphasis on its news production, as explained above. The second highest number of stories used voice-over-sound-on-tape (VO/SOT) with 183 stories. This time, Furat TV came first in using this news format with 76 stories. The third highest score of stories was centered on 'film report (reporter unseen)'. Baghdad TV scored the highest number of stories among all the other channels and other news formats with 86 stories. Rather than having a technical reason, the channel's policy seemed to avoid showing its reporters for fear of being kidnapped, assassinated, or harmed following the major attack on its station, as mentioned earlier.

On the other hand, the lowest number of story formats was related to in-studio interview with only six stories. It seems that the Iraqi channel tackled in this study did not prefer this type of format. Furthermore, the second lowest number of stories involved a newsreader (Talking Head) with only 24 stories, which is known to be the least interesting news format.

Based on the discussion above, we can conclude that the main news formats that require more time, effort, and money are: film report (reporter unseen), package, live interview, and voice-over-sound-on-tape. Hence, the channels that presented news items with more 'visual weight' can be classified according to the total number of stories shown following the codes specified above:

1. Baghdad (211 stories)
2. Furat (171 stories)
3. Iraqia (129 stories)
4. Hurria (115 stories)

The results shown above on the channels' news formats indicate that Baghdad TV was far more concerned about the impact of its news on the audience and was more

active than the other channels in promoting its candidates, suggesting one kind of bias toward its own party members. On the other hand, Hurria TV devoted the smallest amount of time and effort in promoting its candidates and showed the least kind of interest in influencing the audience.

Conclusion

The four TV channels researched covered the Iraqi general election in different ways and presented the topics in various formats. But all of them did not abide by the rules of the good journalism practices as they were one-sided and partial in one way or another in covering the election; they only presented their own views and excluded or omitted opposing voices/events/topics.

Generally, Iraqia channel covered all the topics except for 'federalism' and 'supporting electoral slate'. As part of its mandate not to side with any party, the channel showed no direct preference to any political bloc. However, there were indications that suggested that the channel was slightly subjective toward the Prime Minister, as will be shown in Chapter Eight. Furthermore, the channel showed the most emphasis among the other channels in airing stories related to 'IHEC' (number of stories and time allotment) and 'other' (time allotment) since Iraqia TV closely followed the Iraqi government's policy to cover IHEC's activities and urge Iraqis to vote in the election. The Kurdish Hurria TV showed the least keenness in promoting its Kurdish sponsors in terms of the number of stories, airtime, and news formats. Also, the channel was closer to Iraqia TV in many aspects particularly the amount of coverage on 'IHEC' and 'other' topics. This is mainly due to the fact that both channels are closely affiliated with the Iraqi government. The only topic that Hurria TV showed more interest in airing was 'federalism', though Baghdad TV shared with it the same number of stories. This is understandable since Hurria channel is owned by a Kurdish party that strongly advocates federalism.

On the other hand, Furat TV's coverage showed a typical partisan channel that was trying to promote its sponsor. There was a clear one-sided view of the events and topics covered as the other opponent parties or slates either did not appear on the channel or they were criticised. The channel showed the highest degree of emphasis on airing the topics of 'political difference', 'democracy', 'election fraud', and 'security/terrorism' (only in terms of time allotment).

As for Baghdad TV, it was not very different from Furat channel since both set for themselves the priority of promoting their parties, and they exclusively focused on covering the activities of their candidates. Both were concerned with covering the performance of the government headed by the Prime Minister who was one of their strong political opponents. Baghdad TV was ahead among the other channels in the attention it gave to the topics of 'security/terrorism' (in terms of the number of stories), 'public services', 'corruption/violation', 'national unity/political dialogue', 'federalism', 'supporting electoral slate', and 'other' (in terms of time allotment).

In brief and based on the number of stories, time allotment, and type of news formats, we can conclude the discussion above by saying that Baghdad TV came ahead in its effort to cover the election and promote its political sponsor followed by Furat channel. Iraqia channel came third in its emphasis on covering the election but not on promoting candidates, while Hurria TV was the last channel in promoting its political bloc and the least interested in covering the election.

Based on the Kruskal-Wallis and ANOVA tests computed above, the topics covered by all the four channels had significant differences except for the topic of 'other'. This fact indicates that the four channels held very different views and editorial stances which were reflected in their news output. Based on the ethnic and sectarian backgrounds of the channels' sponsors, such results were expected to occur. What is certain, though, is that all the channels presented the election in a way that suited their respective ideological bases and promoted their political frameworks.

As Mazzoleni (1987) suggested, journalists working at the media outlets determine the news value and the way the newscasts are shaped. Subsequently, the news is presented in certain ways which is, of course, dependent on the journalists' religious, ethnic, and educational backgrounds (Everette and Merrill 1996; Semetko 1996). Further, Entman (1993), Goffmann (1974), and Gitlin (1980) stressed that media outlets tend to ignore some issues and highlight others in order to draw the audience attention toward certain directions. In the case of the four Iraqi channels discussed here, we find that the channels' sponsors largely ignored the principles of good journalism like news values due and focused instead on finding the means to influence the audience in certain ways that fit into their political agenda. This is usually done by the intentional omission of certain

topics, the careful selection of other issues, and the emphasis given to some stories which clearly lead to a very biased coverage of the election. In the coming chapter, I will investigate the second stage of newscasts' analysis in this study which is the story-level assessment.

Chapter Seven

Story-Level Results

Introduction

The second stage in the content analysis of newscasts was centred on the stories themselves. Using a separate coding frame, the research analysed the stories by highlighting their prominence: time allotment, number of stories, and format type. Though there was usually a close correlation between the number of stories and time allotment, there were some variations due to the nature of stories presented.

In addition, the analysis examined the presence/absence of: (1) narrative references to political candidates; (2) featured film/image of the candidates; (3) featured interview with the candidates. This area sheds light on the emphasis laid by the channel to either promote its political candidates or pay some attention to other candidates from different parties eager to speak about their political programmes. It is important to point out the narrative reference to candidates to see the number of references that gives an indication of emphasis. Indeed, introducing still images or footage to accompany the narrative reference denotes more attention shown by the channel. Finally, interviews have more effect on the viewers than the other format types because of the effort, time, and effect they have (Grabe and Bucy 200; Detenber, Simons, and Bennet 1998; King and Morehouse 2004, p. 304). Also, viewers see the candidates as more significant when they are presented on TV. If they are repeatedly shown on screen, the candidates tend to become more important, too (McCombs and Shaw 1972). Certainly, conducting interviews with political candidates is indicative of attention and emphasis given by the channel to the politician because they entail a personalised encounter with the candidate giving him/her the chance to voice the political programme and thereby to become closer to the viewer. Less importance and influence is found in the moving film shown, but the latter has more recall effect on the viewers than the still images (Gunter 1979) or the narrative reference to the candidate.

Finally, the story-level coding frame allowed the researcher to examine whether or not some channels introduced the horse-race issue into their newscasts in order to promote some parties at the expense of others.

Balance and objectivity in the news are normally detected by measuring the number of stories (length) and amount of coverage (time) given to a particular topic/figure which could be done by the analysis of the newscast as a whole or the news stories themselves (Peter, Lauf, and Semetko, 2004, p. 420). In Chapter Six, we had a closer look at the newscasts as a whole, so it is time now to analyse the stories making up these newscasts. Williams and Semlak (1978a) measured the allotment of time on each topic investigated in the newscasts of three TV channels. It was stressed that the more time devoted to topics, the more influence they started to gain (Hofstetter 1976, p. 23). Also, Serow (1975) investigated the news coverage of the US presidential election of 1972. The researcher concluded that that ABC, CBS, and NBC devoted more time to anti-Nixon and pro-McGovern news stories. In addition to measuring the number of stories and time allotment, Watt and van den Berg (1981) added the analysis of the presentational techniques in order to detect story prominence. Indeed, topics or candidates could be seen as more important if there were more efforts to cover them (McCombs and Shaw 1972).

It is important to note that this coding frame required that codes or categories were assigned to different items especially candidates, and he was very careful in doing so. For instance, there were several narrative references to, films on, and interviews with politicians who were running in the election; however, they were not assigned a special code as competing candidates because they were presented as Iraqi officials or experts. To give two concert examples, Baghdad TV aired footage of Ayad al-Samara'i's visit to Barazani, but the two were presented as Iraqi officials, the former as chairman of the Iraqi Parliament while the latter as President of Kurdistan region, story code 133222. Also, Hurria channel aired a story in which Nouri al-Maliki was shown as a Prime Minister rather than a political candidate running in the election.

Channels' Narrative References to Candidates

This section will discuss the stories that featured narrative references to political candidates. We can see from Table 7.1 and Chart 7.1 below that Baghdad TV scored the largest number of stories with 164 and highest time allotted with 31,470 seconds that presented narrative references to candidates representing the Iraqi Accord Front IAF, the slate that sponsors the channel. The stories constituted 69.7% of the total number of stories aired by the channel. These two Charts also show that Baghdad TV rarely referred or assigned enough time to other competing political blocs. Just five stories (running time of 855 seconds) were devoted to other parties/groups that were either unknown by the public or ineffective in the society.

Furat channel came second in rank in terms of the number of stories and time allotted to its party's candidates. The channel aired 120 stories (22,665 seconds) on the party's candidates. The stories made up 54.2% of their total number that were analysed throughout the period of study. Further, the channel also aired five stories that spanned over 464 seconds carrying narrative references to Sadr's movement/candidate. This is understandable because Hakim and Sadr formed from the beginning the Iraqi National Alliance (INA), so the two Shiite groups stood together against other competing political blocs.

Hurria TV aired 43 stories (3,288 seconds) on the Kurdish Alliance (KA) that constituted 21.3% of the total number of stories aired by the channel. The channel devoted six stories (406 seconds) for Allawi's bloc, and two stories for Maliki's slate (112 seconds) and two others for Hakim's alliance (118 seconds). There were four references to Allawi's al-Iraqia slate (406 seconds) because some of its candidates were subjected to the de-Baathification process in order to exclude them from running in the election. In fact, this move created a great deal of controversy about the credibility of the government and its Accountability and Justice Commission which was led by Ali al-Lami, being himself a candidate running in the election.

Finally, Iraqia TV did not allot more emphasis to one political group over the other. Four stories (160 seconds) were devoted to Allawi's bloc. However, as we will see in the following chapter, the dominant issue related to this political group was the law suits filed against some of its candidates, as mentioned above. In presenting the different

political blocs, the channel established itself as the most balanced and objective among the four channels. A detailed discussion on Iraqia TV's coverage of the election is found in Chapter Eight.

In brief, Baghdad TV stressed the importance of its IAF candidates more than the other channels by airing more number of stories and time referring to them. Furat came next followed by Hurria TV. This conclusion confirms the previous results highlighted in Chapter Six.

Table 7.1 Number of stories by the four channels featuring narrative references to political candidates

	Iraqia TV	Furat TV	Baghdad TV	Hurria TV	Chi-square	Asymp. Sig.
Maliki	1^a	1^a	1^a	2^a	0.78	$p < 0.855$
Allawi	4^a	0^b	0^b	6^a	12.30	$*p < 0.006$
Hakim	0^a	120^b	1^a	2^a	386.20	$**p < 0.000$
Sadr	0^a	5^b	0^a	0^a	14.46	$***p < 0.002$
Talabani	1^a	0^a	0^a	43^b	110.33	$****p < 0.000$
Samarai	1^a	0^a	164^b	1^a	529.52	$*****p < 0.000$
Others	0^a	0^a	5^b	2^a (Baghdad)	8.58	$******p < 0.035$

Note: Scores that share the same superscript are not significantly different at the $p < 0.05$ level. In few cases, the channel that does not share a significant difference with another is written between brackets though the superscript is different.

$*p < 0.006$ (Allawi: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)
$**p < 0.000$ (Hakim: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)
$***p < 0.002$ (Sadr: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)
$****p < 0.000$ (Talabani: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)
$*****p < 0.000$ (Samarai: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)
$******p < 0.000$ (Other: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)

Chart 7.1 Time allotted (in seconds) by the four channels to narrative references to political candidates

Magnitude of Inter-Channel Differences

In order to establish whether differences between channels were statistically significant, a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to compare the rankings of the four channels based on the candidates/slates covered. As expected, Tables 7.1 above and Table 1, Appendix V showed significant differences among the channels in relation to all the political slates except for Maliki's slate. Based on Kruskal-Wallis analyses, the degree of significant differences was ranked in the following order: (1) Samarai due to Baghdad TV's overt emphasis on promoting its sponsor, (2) Hakim because of Furat TV's coverage of its INA slate, (3) Talabani due to Hurria channel's coverage of its Kurdish bloc, (4) Sadr mainly due to Furat TV's coverage of this movement and its candidates who formed an alliance with INA, (5) Allawi, (6) other. In other words, the major differences in the coverage of candidates among the four channels were due to the fact that most of the channels tackled in this study are owned by or affiliated to these political groups. Indeed, the ranking of the slates completely follow the sequence mentioned above based on the number of stories and time allotment.

As for pair-wise differences, we can see from Table 7.1 above that there were slight differences between the paired channels except when the political slate that supported the channel was available. For example, all the channels had a similar number of stories when it was related to the coverage of Hakim's slate but Furat TV because it is sponsored by Hakim's party. The same rule applies to Talabani's slate in relation to Hurria TV and Samarai's party in connection to Baghdad TV. We can also see that the coverage of Maliki's slate was similar among the four channels. In relation to Allawi's group,

Baghdad and Furat channels on the one hand and Iraqia and Hurria channels on the other hand did not show any significance difference in their coverage of this slate. In general, Iraqia and Hurria channels showed the highest degree of agreement with six candidates/slates having no significant differences, whereas Furat and Baghdad channels on the one hand and Furat and Hurria channels on the other hand showed the lowest degree of agreement with only three candidates/slates each with no significant difference (see also Table 2, Appendix V).

Film Reports/Images of Candidates

In this section, the discussion is centred on the stories that featured film reports or still images of candidates sponsoring the channels. Here, Baghdad TV once more finished in first place with the largest number of stories and highest time allotted to it. The 160 stories (31,130 seconds) constituted 68.08% of the total number of stories aired by the channel for fourteen days. Again, Furat TV came second with 114 stories (21,487 seconds) that comprised 51.5% of the total number of stories. Finally, Hurria channel was last with 33 stories (3,180 seconds) that formed 16.4% of the total number of stories (see Table 7.2 and Chart 7.2 below).

In general, the number of stories and time allotment that feature a film or still image of candidates from other blocs were less than the number of stories and time allotted to featuring narrative references from the same category. As cited earlier, presenting a film or still image on the channel has more impact on the viewers than just making a narrative reference; hence, the channels discussed here except for Iraqia TV wanted to stress the importance of their own candidates by paying less or no emphasis to candidates from other parties.

Table 7.2 Number of stories by the four channels featuring film/image of political candidates

	Iraqia TV	Furat TV	Baghdad TV	Hurria TV	Chi-square	Asymp. Sig.
Maliki	1^a	0^a	1^a	1^a	1.07	p < 0.785
Allawi	2^a	0^a	1^a	1^a	5.75	p < 0.125
Hakim	0^a	114^b	1^a	2^a	363.12	*p < 0.000
Sadr	0^a	4^b	0^a	0^a	11.55	**p < 0.009
Talabani	1^a	0^a	0^a	33^b	106.81	***p < 0.000
Samarai	1^a	0^a	160^b	1^a	513.36	****p < 0.000
Others	0^a	0^a	3^a	2^a	5.03	p < 0.170

Note: Scores that share the same superscript are not significantly different at the p < 0.05 level.

*p < 0.000 (Hakim: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)
**p < 0.000 (Sadr: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)
***p < 0.000 (Talabani: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)
****p < 0.000 (Samarai: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)

Chart 7.2 Time allotted (in seconds) by the four channels to film/image of political candidates

Magnitude of Inter-Channel Differences

A Kruskal-Wallis test was computed to find out the ranking of the four channels and the differences among them based on the candidates/slates covered. In Table 7.2 above and Table 3, Appendix V, we can see that the significant differences were centred on Hakim, Talabani, Samarai, and Sadr's slates, as expected. In comparison with the degree of differences in terms of narrative references to candidates, we find that there were lesser differences among the channels in relation to featuring a film/image of a candidate. As for the slates' ranks in terms of the degree of significant differences, they corresponded with the discussion cited above on the number of stories aired and their time allotment: (1) Samarai due to Baghdad TV coverage, (2) Hakim because of Furat channel's promotion of its INA candidates, (3) Talabani due to Hurria TV's coverage of its bloc, (4) Sadr due to Furat TV's coverage of this political group.

As for the pair-wise comparisons, we find again that Maliki's slate was covered by the four channels without any significant difference. This time, Allawi's slate and 'other' political groups were presented just like Maliki's slate without any major difference. As in the discussion above, the significant differences are mainly centred on

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the slates that sponsor the respective channels such as Hakim's slate covered by Furat TV, Talabani's group presented by Hurria channel, and Samarai's party covered by Baghdad TV. As for Sadr's group, Furat TV was the only channel that had significant difference from the rest of the channels because Hakim's group was aligned with Sadr movement during the election campaign. In general, Iraqia and Baghdad channels on the one hand and Iraqia and Hurria channels on the other hand showed the highest degree of agreement with six candidates/slates each having no significant difference. The lowest degree of agreement was between Furat and Baghdad channels and Furat and Hurria channels with four candidates/slates each that had no significant difference (see also Table 4, Appendix V).

Interviews with Candidates

The last part in this section deals with investigating the number of stories and time allotted to interviews with political candidates. Once more, Baghdad TV scored the largest number of stories and time allotment among the other channels (see Table 7.3 and Chart 7.3 below). There were 126 stories (25,775 seconds) making up 53.6% of the total number of stories aired on its IAF candidates. Furat channel came second and aired 42 stories (8,850 seconds) that made up 19% of the total number of stories broadcast. Hurria channel came third with only 16 stories (2,140 seconds) that made up 7.9% of stories aired.

It is noteworthy that the number of stories and time allotted to featuring interviews with candidates from other political blocs were less than the number of stories and time devoted to featuring narrative references and films or images of candidates from the same category. As mentioned earlier, conducting interviews with candidates is seen as a very effective tool to influence the viewers (King and Morehouse 2004). Furat TV, for example, never showed a story that contained an interview with a candidate from other blocs, not even from Sadr's movement. Hurria TV only aired an interview with a representative of Hakim's INA and two interviews with representatives from other smaller parties that lasted 298 seconds in total. Finally, Baghdad channel aired two interviews which took 300 seconds with candidates from other parties that seemed to be weak in influence.

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In terms of 'other parties', it seems that Hurria and Baghdad channels were more relaxed in airing interviews with candidates in this category. On the other hand, Hurria showed one short interview lasting 141 seconds with Hakim's bloc. This might have been due to the channel's awareness that future alliances must be established with other parties in order for the Kurds to get some political gains when the Parliament is established. The events following the general election support this explanation since the KA made an alliance with INA and Maliki's State of Law slate which all formed a majority in the Iraqi Parliament.

Table 7.3 Number of stories featuring interviews with political candidates

|	Iraqia TV	Furat TV	Baghdad TV	Hurria TV	Chi-square	Asymp. Sig.
Maliki	0^a	0^a	0^a	0^a	0.00	p < 1.000
Allawi	0^a	0^a	0^a	0^a	0.00	p < 1.000
Hakim	0^a	42^b	0^a	1^a	122.18	*p < 0.000
Sadr	0^a	0^a	0^a	0^a	0.00	p < 1.000
Talabani	0^a	0^a	0^a	16^b	53.15	**p < 0.000
Samarai	0^a	0^a	126^b	0^a	392.83	***p < 0.000
Others	0^a	0^a	2^a	2^a	3.94	p < 0.268

Note: Scores that share the same superscript are not significantly different at the $p < 0.05$ level.

*$p < 0.000$ (Hakim: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)
**$p < 0.000$ (Talabani: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)
***$p < 0.000$ (Samarai: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)

Chart 7.3 Time allotted (in seconds) by the four channels to interviews with political candidates

Magnitude of Inter-Channel Differences

As in the two cases above, another Kruskal-Wallis test was computed to cross-examine the differences among the four channels in the attention they gave to interviewing candidates (see Table 7.3 above and Table 5, Appendix V). In comparison with the degree of differences in terms of narrative references to and films/images of candidates, we find that there were lesser differences among the channels in relation to featuring interviews with candidates. Again, it was expected that Hakim, Talabani, and Samarai's slates would show significant differences, whereas a complete agreement with $p < 1.000$ statistical significance was found among the four channels in relation to interviewing candidates from Maliki, Allawi, Sadr, and other slates. These results confirm that Baghdad, Furat, and Hurria channels were only focused on political propaganda and were not objective and balanced in their coverage of candidates. As for the ranking of the channels, they completely corresponded with Table 7.3 and Chart 7.3 and the above discussion. The slates are ranked as follows: (1) Samarai (2) Hakim (3) Talabani.

In relation to the pair-wise comparison of channels, we can see in Table 7.3 above that all the channels did not have any significant difference in their coverage of the respective candidates/parties except when it was related to covering three slates: Hakim's group by Furat TV, Talabani's party by Hurria channel, and Samarai's slate by Baghdad TV. In terms of the degree of agreement among the channels, it seems they were divided evenly. For example, Iraqia –Furat; Iraqia-Baghdad, and Iraqia-Hurria channels had six candidates/slates with no significant difference, whereas Furat-Baghdad, Furat-Hurria, and Baghdad-Hurria channels had five candidates/slates with no significant difference (see also Table 6, Appendix V).

News Topics and Production Treatments

Another expected output of the story-level coding is insight it can offer regarding the way each topic was presented to the viewer. As there are eight format types, it is possible to know the correlation between the type of the channel's production techniques' and the topics covered. As previously illustrated, some stories have more 'visual weight' than others, and this surely affects the topic presented. In other words, the channel can emphasise a topic or an issue if it presents it in an entertaining or inclusive manner such

as using voice-over-sound-on-tape or package instead of voice-over or newsreader. In the discussion below, I will investigate the ratio of stories and time allotted to news topics aired on each channel in connection to the format used. This is done by selecting the preferred format type of each channel that has the largest number of stories and highest time allotted to each topic (see Tables 7.4, 7.5 (Iraqia); 7.6, 7.7 (Furat); 7.8, 7.9 (Baghdad); 7.10, 7.11 (Hurria) below).

1. 'Political Differences'

Starting with the topic of 'political differences,' Baghdad TV aired 23 stories using 'recorded interview'. In fact, this format was used in covering this topic more than the number of stories using other format types. The story ratio was 23:29 constituting 79.3% of the number of stories devoted to this topic. The number of stories aired corresponded with the highest time allotted by the channel to the same topic which was 6657 seconds (see charts 41 and 42, Appendix V). Baghdad channel was followed by Furat TV with 10 stories that used the 'package' format. The story ratio was 10:36 making up 27.7% of the stories aired on 'political differences'. However, the highest time allotted to this topic was centered on 'Live interview' with 3860 seconds just like the emphasis shown by Baghdad TV. This shows the importance given to interviews by the two channels (see charts 19 and 20, Appendix V). Hurria channel came in the third place with 9 stories and 1256 seconds which were presented as 'film report (reporter unseen)' format. The story ratio was 9:18 which formed 50% of the number of stories aired on this topic (see charts 63 and 64, Appendix V).

Finally, the smallest number of stories and amount of time allotted to this topic were aired by Iraqia TV. The channel mainly used 'voice-over' format to cover this topic in terms of the number of stories, whereas the highest time devoted to this topic was clustered around 'film report (reporter unseen)' format. The story ratio was 5:13 making up 38.4% of the stories tackling this topic (see charts 1 and 2, Appendix V). In brief, Baghdad TV covered this topic in more details and showed more emphasis in discussing it than the other channels. This is based on counting the largest number of stories and highest time allotted to this topic. Furat TV came second to be followed by Hurria TV. All the channels mainly used 'live interview', 'package', and 'film report (reporter unseen)' formats which are the most time and effort-consuming production techniques.

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Table 7.4 Number of stories on Iraqia TV in relation to production techniques

Topics	Newsreader (Talking Head)	Voice-over	Voice-over-sound-on-tape	Recorded interview	Live interview	Package	Film report (reporter unseen)	In-studio interview
Political differences	0	5	2	0	1	3	0	2
Security/terrorism	0	15	13	0	6	20	1	2
Democracy	0	4	5	0	3	11	1	1
Public services	0	0	1	0	2	1	0	0
Corruption/violation	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0
National unity/political dialogue	0	6	2	0	1	3	0	1
Election fraud	0	10	2	0	5	15	0	2
Federalism	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Supporting electoral slate	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IHEC	0	20	9	0	15	35	0	2
Other	0	37	13	0	17	45	2	2

Table 7.5 Time allotment (in seconds) on Iraqia TV in relation to production techniques

Topics	Newsreader (Talking Head)	Voice-over	Voice-over-sound-on-tape	Recorded interview	Live interview	Package	Film report (reporter unseen)	In-studio interview
Political differences	0	231	111	0	171	585	0	640
Security/terrorism	0	509	882	0	1382	3223	200	640
Democracy	0	370	300	0	818	2245	235	404
Public services	0	0	69	0	408	252	0	0
Corruption/violation	0	61	0	0	250	0	0	0
National unity/political dialogue	0	222	118	0	240	494	0	326
Election fraud	0	570	158	0	1679	2993	0	314
Federalism	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Supporting electoral slate	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IHEC	0	1265	694	0	4244	6406	0	510
Other	0	1163	752	0	4074	7863	435	718

2. 'Security/Terrorism'

In relation to 'security/terrorism', Baghdad TV once more scored the highest number of stories on the topic with 35 using two formats: 'live interview' and 'film report reporter unseen'. The story ratio of each format type was 35:87 making up 40.2% of the stories aired on this topic. However, the highest time allotted to this topic was centered on 'live interview' with 9465 seconds since 'film report reporter unseen' spanned over 7535 seconds only (see charts 43 and 44, Appendix V). Iraqia TV came second with 20 stories aired in 3223 seconds using 'package' format with a story ratio 20:57 constituting 35.08% of the total number of stories aired (see charts 3 and 4, Appendix V).

As for Hurria TV, the preferred manner used to cover this topic was format 'voice-over' and 'film report (reporter unseen)' with a story ratio 13:44 that formed 29.5% of the total number of stories relevant to the security/terrorism issue. However, the time allotted to these two formats were 414 and 1604 seconds respectively which did not correspond with the highest time allotted to this topic which was 1706 centered on 'package' format (see charts 65 and 66, Appendix V). Generally, the news stories produced using 'voice-over' format are generally short in nature unlike the longer news reports that require more time and elaboration. Furat channel came last in terms of the number of stories aired on this topic; the most preferred format used was 'voice-over-sound-on-tape' with 3268 seconds. Its story ratio was 11:39 that made up 28.2% of the stories tackling 'security/terrorism' (see charts 21, 22, Appendix V). In conclusion, Baghdad TV showed the highest amount of attention given to the topic of 'security/terrorism' which was evident from the largest number of stories aired and the dominant format used. This reflects the channel's preoccupation with this topic that plays a critical role in the lives of Iraqis.

Table 7.6 Number of stories on Furat TV in relation to production techniques

Topics	Newsreader (Talking Head)	Voice-over	Voice-over-sound-on-tape	Recorded interview	Live interview	Package	Film report (reporter unseen)	In-studio interview
Political differences	4	4	7	1	7	10	7	0
Security/terrorism	8	7	11	0	3	9	8	0
Democracy	3	6	10	0	3	4	12	0
Public services	8	6	17	0	1	7	10	0
Corruption/violation	2	0	4	0	0	1	3	0
National unity/political dialogue	6	3	11	0	1	5	5	0
Election fraud	3	7	8	0	10	17	15	0
Federalism	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
Supporting electoral slate	16	15	48	1	5	17	23	0
IHEC	4	6	8	0	7	8	9	0
Other	4	21	22	1	6	16	14	0

Table 7.7 Time allotment (in seconds) on Furat TV in relation to production techniques

Topics	Newsreader (Talking Head)	Voice-over	Voice-over-sound-on-tape	Recorded interview	Live interview	Package	Film report (reporter unseen)	In-studio interview
Political differences	1643	212	1958	78	3860	2345	1614	0
Security/terrorism	2917	384	3268	0	918	1797	2483	0
Democracy	1335	323	2101	0	2206	757	3413	0
Public services	3306	351	4795	0	502	1837	2986	0
Corruption/violation	2133	0	2404	0	0	271	1624	0
National unity/political dialogue	3035	142	3534	0	238	1001	1864	0
Election fraud	665	375	1070	0	4444	3625	2750	0
Federalism	0	0	159	0	0	0	0	0
Supporting electoral slate	5779	707	9767	78	1648	3870	5451	0
IHEC	1234	266	1530	0	3436	1520	1688	0
Other	693	1167	2794	78	2006	3135	2764	0

3. 'Democracy'

In relation to the topic of 'democracy', the largest number of stories were clustered around 'film report (reporter unseen)' aired by three channels though the highest time distribution slightly differed. Furat TV aired the highest time allotted to this topic with 3413 seconds. Its story ratio was 12:35 that constituted 34.2% of the stories aired on this topic (see charts 23 and 24, Appendix V). Hurria TV had a story ratio of 8:19 forming 42.1% of the stories (see charts 67 and 68, Appendix V), whereas Baghdad channel had a story ratio of 5:9 making up 55.5% of the total number of stories aired on democracy (see charts 45 and 46, Appendix V). Iraqia TV was the only channel that had the largest clustering of stories around 'package' format with 11 stories spanning to 2245 seconds. The story ratio was 11:25 which formed 44% of the total number of stories relevant to this topic (see charts 5 and 6, Appendix V). In brief, all the channels used a format type that is regarded as having significant 'visual weight' in order to cover this topic.

Table 7.8 Number of stories on Baghdad TV in relation to production techniques

Topics	Newsreader (Talking Head)	Voice-over	Voice-over-sound-on-tape	Recorded interview	Live interview	Package	Film report (reporter unseen)	In-studio interview
Political differences	0	2	3	0	23	0	3	1
Security/terrorism	0	4	16	2	35	0	35	0
Democracy	0	0	1	0	3	0	5	0
Public services	0	2	6	1	23	1	37	0
Corruption/violation	0	0	3	0	11	0	13	0
National unity/political dialogue	0	3	2	0	7	0	21	0
Election fraud	0	4	6	0	19	2	8	1
Federalism	0	0	0	0	3	0	5	0
Supporting electoral slate	0	7	25	0	48	2	63	0
IHEC	0	3	7	0	24	4	11	1
Other	1	8	19	1	31	6	27	2

Table 7.9 Time allotment (in seconds) on Baghdad TV in relation to production techniques

Topics	Newsreader (Talking Head)	Voice-over	Voice-over-sound-on-tape	Recorded interview	Live interview	Package	Film report (reporter unseen)	In-studio interview
Political differences	0	907	317	0	6657	0	902	560
Security/terrorism	0	1036	2025	180	9465	0	7535	0
Democracy	0	0	61	0	845	0	770	0
Public services	0	659	932	96	6404	328	7749	0
Corruption/violation	0	0	585	0	2832	0	2744	0
National unity/political dialogue	0	175	382	0	2491	0	4635	0
Election fraud	0	997	644	0	5306	421	1548	683
Federalism	0	0	0	0	838	0	1221	0
Supporting electoral slate	0	935	2891	0	11264	539	9752	0
IHEC	0	948	774	0	6134	787	2377	683
Other	26	1274	2194	96	8535	1325	5464	1243

4. 'Public Services'

Another important topic that deserves careful attention is 'public services'. Baghdad TV scored the largest number of stories with 37 reports and highest allotted time with 7749 seconds in tackling this topic. Its story ratio was 37:64 making up 57.8% of the total number of stories aired that covered this issue. The channel's most preferred manner of presenting this topic was 'film report (reporter unseen)' format (see charts 47 and 48, Appendix V).

Once more, Baghdad TV paid more attention to the issue of 'public services' than the other channels which is very evident in the number of stories aired, time allotted to it, and the most preferred story format used. Less emphasis on this topic is seen by Furat TV which preferred airing 17 stories in 4795 seconds using 'voice-over-sound-on-tape' format. Its story ratio was 17:39 that made up 43.5% of the total number of stories related to this topic (see charts 25 and 26, Appendix V).

Hurria TV had the preference to use 'film report (reporter unseen)' format in airing this topic more than other production techniques with a story ratio 9:19 forming 47.3% of the total number of stories (see charts 69 and 70, Appendix V). Finally, Iraqia channel showed the least interest in covering this topic as is mainly evident from the

number of stories aired and the time allotted to it. The preferred manner of covering this topic was 'live interview' format with a story ratio of 2:4 constituting 50% of the stories covering the issue of public services (see charts 7 and 8, Appendix V). As stated in the previous chapter, Iraqia TV was not balanced in covering this topic because it did not take into account the reality of public services on the ground and how much Iraqis were affected by their shortages.

Table 7.10 Number of stories on Hurria TV in relation to production techniques

Topics	Newsreader (Talking Head)	Voice-over	Voice-over-sound-on-tape	Recorded interview	Live interview	Package	Film report (reporter unseen)	In-studio interview
Political differences	0	2	2	0	0	5	9	0
Security/terrorism	0	13	7	0	0	11	13	0
Democracy	0	1	3	0	0	7	8	0
Public services	0	2	3	0	0	5	9	0
Corruption/violation	0	3	1	0	0	1	2	0
National unity/political dialogue	0	2	1	0	0	5	3	0
Election fraud	0	8	3	0	0	5	6	0
Federalism	0	5	0	0	0	1	1	0
Supporting electoral slate	0	15	5	0	0	8	13	0
IHEC	0	20	2	0	0	10	14	0
Other	0	38	17	1	1	18	20	0

Table 7.11 Time allotment (in seconds) on Hurria TV in relation to production techniques

Topics	Newsreader (Talking Head)	Voice-over	Voice-over-sound-on-tape	Recorded interview	Live interview	Package	Film report (reporter unseen)	In-studio interview
Political differences	0	62	118	0	0	805	1256	0
Security/terrorism	0	414	476	0	0	1706	1604	0
Democracy	0	48	231	0	0	1146	1051	0
Public services	0	69	148	0	0	839	1182	0
Corruption/violation	0	102	39	0	0	157	354	0
National unity/political dialogue	0	70	131	0	0	843	445	0
Election fraud	0	260	247	0	0	830	801	0
Federalism	0	240	0	0	0	161	147	0
Supporting electoral slate	0	596	553	0	0	1259	1752	0
IHEC	0	590	120	0	0	1563	1660	0
Other	0	1558	1009	74	137	2872	2397	0

5. 'Corruption/Violation'

As for the topic of 'corruption/violation', Baghdad TV again showed more interest and paid more attention to covering this topic which is clear from the number of stories aired, time allotted to it, and the format type it used. Baghdad TV's most preferred format type was 'film report (reporter unseen)' with 13 stories. Despite that the channel aired 2744 seconds on 'film report (reporter unseen),' the highest time allotted to this topic was centered on 'live interview' format with 2832 seconds. The story ratio was 13:26 making up 50% of the stories aired on this topic (see charts 49 and 5, Appendix V). The other three channels did not pay as much attention as Baghdad TV to this topic. Certainly, Furat channel came next after Baghdad TV with 4 stories spanning to 2404 seconds using 'voice-over-sound-on-tape' as the preferred news story format. The story ratio was 4:6 that made up 66.6% of the total number of stories aired on this issue (see charts 27 and 28, Appendix V). As for Iraqia and Hurria channels, they both used the 'voice-over' format as the preferred manner to cover this topic. Iraqia channel's story ratio was 2: 3 forming 66.6% of the total number of stories on this topic, while Hurria channel's story ratio was 3:7 constituting 42.8% of the stories aired. However, the highest time allotted to this topic did not correspond with the largest number of stories aired by the two channels (see charts 9, 10, 71, and 72 respectively, Appendix V).

6. 'National Unity/Political Dialogue'

As for the topic of 'national unity/political dialogue', Baghdad channel came ahead in 21 stories and 4635 seconds clustering around 'package' news format. The story ratio was 21:33 which constituted 63.6% of the total number of stories relevant to this topic. Furat TV aired 11 stories in 3534 seconds using 'voice-over-sound-on-tape' format as its preferred manner of covering this topic. The story ratio was 11:24 forming 45.8% of the total number of stories. Also, Iraqia channel's story ratio was 6:13 making up 46.1% of the number of stories related to this topic. In terms of the number of stories, Iraqia's preferred format type was 'voice-over'. Finally, Hurria channel's story ratio was 5:11 clustering around 'package' format and constituting 45.4% of the total number of stories aired (see charts 51, 52, 29, 30, 11, 12, 73, and 74 respectively, Appendix V).

7. 'Election Fraud'

In relation to 'election fraud', there was a close number of stories and some clustering by the four channels around 'live interview' and 'package' formats as their preferred way of covering this topic. Still, Baghdad TV was ahead followed by Furat channel. The channels' story ratio and preferred format types were as follows: Iraqia TV's story ratio was 15:32 with 2993 seconds grouped in 'package' format making up 46.8% of the total number of stories; Furat TV's story ratio was 17:58 with 4444 seconds clustering around 'package' format with a 29.3% percentage; Baghdad channel's story ratio was 19:37 with 5306 seconds grouped in 'live interview' format that constituted 51.3% of the total number of stories; Hurria TV's story ratio was 8:22 with 830 seconds clustered around 'voice-over' format forming 36.3% of the total number of stories covering this topic (see charts 13, 14, 31, 32, 53, 54, 75 and 76 respectively, Appendix V).

8. 'Federalism'

As for the topic of 'federalism', Iraqia TV did not refer to it, while the other channels differed in covering it. For instance, we find that Baghdad TV came first with 1221 seconds clustered around 'film report (reporter unseen)' format. Baghdad and Hurria channels both aired five stories, but they differed in the format type since the latter preferred 'voice-over-sound-on-tape' format, denoting that Baghdad TV was more interested in covering this topic. Baghdad channel's story ratio was 5:8 which made up 62.5% of the stories aired on this topic, while Hurria TV's story ratio was 5:7 forming 71.4% of the total number of stories tackling this issue. Furat TV scored the smallest number of stories and lowest time allotted to this topic (see charts 55, 56, 77, 78, 33 and 34 respectively, Appendix V).

9. 'Supporting Electoral Slate'

Surely, the most relevant topic that is related to the way each channel presented its slate is linked to 'supporting electoral slate'. As a reminder, Iraqia TV did not directly promote any slate, so it was not included. Baghdad TV came first in the attention and emphasis given to promoting its political bloc. This is clearly evident in the number of stories aired, time allotment, and the format used, 'film report 'reporter unseen'. The story ratio was 63:142 that constituted 44.3% of the total number of stories aired on this topic. However, the highest time allotted to this topic was centered on 'live interview'

format with 48 stories lasting 11264 seconds, which again shows the time given by the channel to its IAF candidates to elaborate on their political programmes (see charts 57 and 58, Appendix V). Furat channel came second for the same reasons cited above. Its story ratio was 48:106 clustering around 'voice-over-sound-on-tape' format making up 45.2% of the total stories with 9767 seconds (see charts 35 and 36, Appendix V). Finally, Hurria TV's story ratio was 15:40 clustered around 'voice-over' format forming 37.5% of the stories aired (see charts 79 and 80, Appendix V). Once more, Hurria channel did not pay much attention to promoting its block which is clear from the small number of stories aired, low time allotment and the dominant format type used. The results discussed above correspond with the findings in Chapter Six on the sequence of channels and their varying degrees of attention given to each topic.

10. 'IHEC'

As for the topic of the Iraqi High Electoral Commission (IHEC), Iraqia TV came ahead among the other channels in its coverage of this topic preferring to use 'package' format more than the other production types. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Iraqia TV was involved in covering IHEC's activities more than the other channels; hence, we could find the preference to use the 'package' format in covering IHEC topic. The channel aired 35 stories in 6406 seconds. Its story ratio was 35:78 constituting 44.8% of the total number of stories relevant to this topic. Baghdad TV came second in terms of the number of stories, time allotment, and news format. Its story ratio was 24:45 clustered around 'live interview' format making up 53.3% of the stories aired. The other two channels followed in varying degrees; in terms of the number of stories, Furat channel's story ratio was 9:39 grouped in 'film report (reporter unseen)' format making up 23.07% of the stories covered; Hurria channel's story ratio was 20:46 grouped in 'voice-over' format which formed 43.4% of the total number of stories that tackled this topic (see charts 15, 16, 59, 60, 37, 38, 81, and 82 respectively, Appendix V).

11. 'Other'

Finally, the 'other' topic largely dealt with urging Iraqis to participate in the elections. Once more, Iraqia TV came first in the number of stories it aired and the

dominant format type it mostly used. The channel's story ratio was 45:115 grouped in 'package' format constituting 39.1% of the total number of stories that tackled this topic. Though it was third in terms of the number of stories aired, Baghdad TV came first in the time allotted to this topic with 8535 seconds clustering around 'live interview' format only to be followed by Iraqia TV with 7863 seconds. Baghdad TV's story ratio was 31:91 grouped in 'live interview' format which formed 34.06% of the total number of stories that tackled the 'other' topic. Though the format used was not as important or effective as the other ones, Hurria channel showed some emphasis in covering this topic. Its story ratio was 38:94 clustering around 'voice-over' format and making up 40.4% of the stories aired. Noteworthy, the large number of stories using 'voice-over' format does not mean high time allotment because the nature of this format entails short news unlike the 'package' format. Like Iraqia TV, Furat channel mostly preferred using 'package' format in airing this topic. The story ratio was 22:80 forming 27.5% of the total number of stories dealing with this issue (see charts 17, 18, 61, 62, 83, 84, 39 and 40 respectively, Appendix V).

To sum up, Baghdad TV was ahead among the other channels in the attention and emphasis it laid on different topics. By relying on the number of stories, time allotment, and type of production technique, we conclude that Baghdad TV was in the first rank in covering 'political differences' preferring to use 'recorded interview' format and the topics of 'security/terrorism', 'public services', 'corruption/violation', 'national unity/political dialogue', election fraud', 'federalism', and 'supporting electoral slate' by mainly relying on 'film report reporter unseen' format. Furat channel came second in most of the topics cited above except for 'democracy' in which it showed more emphasis than the other channels by mostly using 'film report reporter unseen' format. On the other hand, Iraqia TV showed more attention in terms of the number of stories to 'IHEC' and 'other' topics by mainly employing 'package' format, but Baghdad TV devoted more time to 'other' topic than the other channels, clustering around 'live interview' format.

Coverage of 'Horse-race' Issue

To answer one of the research questions, this coding frame revealed whether or not the channels presented the horse-race issue in their coverage of the 2010 general

election. First, it is important to note that there were few stories aired by Baghdad and Furat channels in which the anchorperson or reporter mentioned that the channels' political sponsor got more popular approval by the people than the other slates but without presenting any figures or pieces of evidence. With a total of six stories, only two channels referred to poll surveys dealing with the public's voting preferences and the expected sequence of political parties running in the elections. Out of 221 stories aired by Furat channel during the period of study, 5 stories referred to a horse-race issue (see Table 7.12 below). All the stories aired claim that INA was ahead of the other political blocs in the polls. Twice, Maliki's slate was said to come second, whereas Allawi's bloc was twice reported to come third.

Interestingly, Baghdad TV aired one story that contained references to two poll surveys, both of which do not mention IAF. The report stressed that the polls were false because they were biased and politicised. Ironically, Allawi's slate was shown to be ahead of the other blocs in the two polls, which was truly what happened in the election. Maliki and Hakim's slates alternated between the second and third positions in the polls, which also proved to be true later (see Table 7.12 below). In brief, the Iraqi channels tackled in this study did not seem to pay much attention to horse-race issues except for Furat TV, even though it aired very few relevant stories.

Table 7.12 No. of stories featuring horse-race issue and the parties' sequence on Furat and Baghdad Channels

Candidates' Slates	Furat TV No. of Stories and Sequence	Baghdad TV No. of Stories and Sequence
Maliki	2 (sequence 2)	1 (sequence 2) 1 (sequence 3)
Allawi	2 (sequence 3)	2 (sequence 1)
Hakim	5 (sequence 1)	1 (sequence 2) 1 (sequence 3)
Sadr	0	0
Talabani	0	0
Samarai	0	0
Others	2 (sequence 4)	0

Conclusion

In conclusion, the four channels aired topics with different degrees of attention by using various format types, number of stories, and time allotments. These vital aspects shed light on the way each channel viewed the importance of the topics it covered. The preferred or dominant story format used in covering each topic was selected by choosing the largest number of stories and highest time allotted to each topic in every channel. This method was followed in order to reach sound results on the amount of emphasis laid by each channel to the different issues tackled. In general, Baghdad TV showed more emphasis in covering the election and the different topics investigated in this study. Furat TV came second to be followed by Iraqia channel. On the other hand, Hurria TV showed the lowest amount of interest in covering the election and the different topics.

In terms of the stories featuring narrative references to political candidates, film/image of the candidates, and interview with the candidates, Baghdad TV was once more far ahead of the other channels. It was followed by Furat TV and then Hurria channel, while Iraqia TV was not directly involved in the promotion of political candidates. As expected, the channels tackled in this study showed obvious bias toward their own respective sponsors. They simply negated the existence of other political factions and preferred to air favorable views of the parties that support them.

The above findings give us a clear indication about the [non-]application of the principles of good journalism especially neutrality and impartiality. As stated in Chapter Five, TV channels must be more aware and cautious in covering topics and candidates because they all signed a pledge to remain objective and balanced in their coverage of the election. Yet, the findings show that the four channels were only concerned about presenting their own agenda and conveying favourable ideas about their candidates/sponsors rather than pursuing truth or criticising their own parties. This was expected because the Iraqi media after 2003 did not witness a real radical and positive change that would enable them to transcend old media practices and partisan allegiances.

What was not expected was the low number of stories featuring horse-race issues. It seemed that the channels preferred to present the candidates' programmes more than predict what might happen on the Election Day. Furat TV was more interested in airing horse-race issues than the other channels. The results cited above largely corresponded with the findings in Chapter Six. In the following chapter, a closer look is taken into all

the stories by examining the four channels' tendency in presenting the topics and candidates.

Chapter Eight

Sub-Story-Level Results

Introduction

The last level of content analysis in this study was the investigation of the four TV channels' tendencies in covering the topics and candidates. Tendency here refers to the way each topic or candidate was presented, be it in a neutral, positive, or negative manner. In order to reach sound results on this aspect of the study, the author classified the most common words or expressions that normally accompany any reference to the topics or candidates based on reading, personal experience, and the outcomes of the pilot study. Hence, the author counted these neutral, positive, or negative words in order to determine in the end the four channels' way of depicting the topics or candidates.

The second part of this coding frame is centred on examining the way each channel covered the candidates. First, an investigation into the candidates' spatial relationship was made which has a great influence on the viewers' perception of these candidates. Second, this level of analysis allowed the author to understand the amount of attention and emphasis given by each channel toward the candidates shown by the use of camera angles and close-ups.

Whether related to topic or candidate, one can investigate balance on TV news when the numerical sum of positive and negative references is computed, forming a scale of which the point in the middle becomes the neutral point. This is especially useful in comparing the news stories aired by more than two TV channels (McQuail 1992, p. 227). Many studies followed this procedure such as comparing between CBS and NBC's coverage of the Vietnam War (Russo, 1971), or assessing the way the German media covered the 1973 oil crisis (Kepplinger and Roth, 1979). Further, Janet Murphy (1998) studied political bias in the 1996 US election campaign by analysing the production techniques like audio-visuals, nonverbal messages, and other indications in news stories. The researcher concluded that Bill Clinton was covered in a 'mostly neutral' manner, while Bob Dole's presentation was mostly unfavourable in terms of the amount of negative coverage. In this study, a similar method was used to measure balance and point

out the patterns of representation on four Iraqi channels that depicted different topics and candidates.

On the other hand, in order to understand how the channels presented news, it is important to compare the news stories with the reality around, as Kuypers (2002, p. 18) and McQuail (1992, p. 207) suggested. Hence, the researcher frequently cited examples taken from the ground in order to compare them with the way the channels presented the topics.

Before starting the discussion on the channels' coverage of topics and candidates, it is important to point out some limitations observed in conducting this level of analysis. First, most of the channels tried to avoid any direct reference to other political blocs especially if it carried negative connotations. For example, Iraqia TV started its 24th February newscast with an editorial speech that made an indirect reference to the former Iraqi Prime Minister, Ayad Allawi's previous public statement that mentioned the re-appearance of unidentified corpses in Baghdad's morgue. Allawi who was the strongest opponent to Maliki's slate, made a statement that coincided with the election campaign, but it was meant to suggest that the security situation worsened and reached a level similar to what Iraqis witnessed during the civil war era especially in 2006. The story lasted 63 seconds with a newsreader only and was followed later with another story that lasted 190 seconds tackling the same issue. Iraqia TV accused the people behind making up and disseminating such a claim to be from the Baath party, a term that has very negative connotation amongst many Iraqis. However, the author could not assign any negative attributes to Allawi and his followers because there was no direct reference to the candidate.

Further, Hakim's Furat TV followed the same procedure in its coverage of the Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri Maliki's abuse of power in promoting his slate during the election campaign. For example, story code 82,262 mentioned the decision of employing 20,000 former Iraqi officers as political propaganda, but no reference was made to Maliki who took that decision. Also, there were several reports on a slate whose candidates conspired to buy peoples' votes by either giving them cash money, offering presents, or promising them lands and jobs. In all the reports aired, Maliki's slate was not mentioned but only implied (stories aired on the 28th February (sequence 10), 1st March (sequence

12), 2nd March (sequence 19), 3rd March (sequence 9), 4th of March (sequence 16), and 7th March (sequence 11)). It is important to note here that all the stories aired by Furat TV in which Maliki was indirectly mentioned were packages denoting the importance given by the channel to such reports.

The other limitation of the coding frame was the absence of investigating the subtitle that presented short news items. Further, there was no examination of the effect of images on the message conveyed. To give an example, Furat TV aired several stories on its INA candidates and used to show their images along Ayatollah Ali Sistani though the latter refrained from supporting any slate in order to maintain his independence. The implied message was that INA candidates were supported or approved by Sistani which was not the case.

Topic Level Analysis

The first part of the discussion is focused on the discussion of the neutral/positive/negative attributes of each topic. Each topic attributes are calculated and compared with other channels. The raw data is presented in Tables 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3 together with Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney tests (for detailed Kruskal-Wallis results, please see Tables 2, 3, 3 in Appendix VII and for detailed Mann-Whitney results, please see Tables 8, 9, 10 in Appendix VII).

1. 'Political Differences'

With the first topic and as with the rest of other topics, neutral tone refers to reporting the topic without siding with or against it. Whereas the positive attributes refer to the efforts, hopes, and aspirations to overcome any differences among the political parties. On the other hand, the negative tone entails division, discord, and disagreement among the parties.

In Chart 55, Appendix VI, the neutral and positive references to 'political differences' were somehow similar as there were few discrepancies; however, there were greater differences with negative references to this topic. Furat TV came first with 222 references followed by Baghdad TV with 129 ones. As mentioned in Chapter Six, it seems that Iraqia and Hurria TV did not want to highlight the political differences like the other two channels despite the gloomy reality on the ground. This is partly due to the fact that Iraqia TV is run by the government, whereas Hurria channel is closely linked to it.

This, however, does not mean that the two channels were subjective in their coverage of this topic since the highest number of references centred around the negative attributes.

2. 'Security/Terrorism'

In relation to the topic of security/terrorism, the neutral attributes denote reporting the facts on the ground without deletions or additions. In addition, there should be no unwarranted praise of the government's effort to establish security or unsubstantiated criticism against other parties or officials. As for the positive tone, it refers to the flattering and/or pointless applause given to the security forces or the government in restoring peace and order. This could surely be seen as one way of giving credit to the government in terms of its alleged success in achieving remarkable security gains.

Finally, negative attributes entail that there is an unnecessary or overstated amount of criticism against the government, security forces, or the army. It could be related to some unproven or unconfirmed accusations or claims that are meant to discredit the government and its ability to protect the Iraqi people. Indeed, Iraqia TV showed imbalance and subjectivity in reporting this topic. Unlike the reality on the ground, the highest number of references to security/terrorism was centred on the positive attributes to be followed by the neutral references. As for the negative references made by this channel, they constituted about 9.5% of the total number of references to this topic (see Chart 56, Appendix VI).

A similar feature was found in the coverage of Furat and Hurria channels which mostly mentioned positive references to this topic. This is probably due to the fact that Iraqi security forces are mostly made up of members from Hakim's military Badr Brigade and Talabani's Kurdish Peshmerga. On the other hand, the Sunni Baghdad TV mostly referred to security/terrorism in a negative manner that made up about 55.6% of the total number of references to this topic which marked a major gap in differences in relation to the other channels. This is probably related to the fact that Iraqi Sunnis are underrepresented in the security forces and are the most persecuted segment in the society in terms of subjection to random arrests, interrogation, and detention (see Chapter Two for more details).

3. 'Democracy'

As for the topic of democracy, it is a relatively a new concept in Iraq since it was not really practiced during Saddam Hussein's rule. The US administration tried to disseminate it to the public though it was rarely applied by all the parties concerned. However, democracy is always linked to new Iraq along with the freedom of speech, and the ethnic and religious diversity in the composition of the government. In this study, the negative attributes of democracy are related to the lack of its practice or its abuse by some political parties.

As for the positive tone, it denotes praise of the new democracy that Iraq allegedly enjoys. In Chart 57, Appendix VI, the positive references to this topic can give us a good indication of the nature of the four channels. In the first place, Iraqia TV came first with the most positive references to be followed by Furat and Hurria channels. Baghdad TV came last with the fewest number of positive references. The fact that Iraqia TV never made any negative reference to this topic and that 92.1% of the total number of references were centred on its positive features suggests that Iraqia TV presented a one-sided view of reality. This is because the channel ignored the presence of other negative aspects of this topic that are abundantly seen in everyday life in Iraq.

4. 'Public Services'

As mentioned in the previous chapters, the topic of 'public services' is of a great concern to many Iraqis due to their great shortages. After about seven years since the US-led coalition invaded the country in 2003, Iraq regressed and became one of the worst countries in the region in terms of education, heath care, and the rapid spread of illiteracy. Public services include the provision of water and sewage services, electricity, education, child care…etc. It also involves assisting Iraqis working in other sectors like agriculture and industry. In terms of the negative feature, it refers to the lack or intentional negligence by the government to provide public services to the people. On the other hand, positive attributes mean that there is some kind of applause for the government or some political parties for their efforts to provide these services.

Chart 58, Appendix VI shows that Baghdad TV was the most critical channel though it aired the largest number of positive references on this topic, too. This is followed by Furat TV and then Hurria channel, although the two channels focused on presenting the positive references more than the negative ones. On the other hand, Iraqia TV did not seem to be interested in reporting on this topic despite the fact that Iraqis were preoccupied by it. Except for Baghdad TV, the other three channels did not cover this topic objectively as the facts publicly known gave us a completely different picture.

5. 'Corruption/Violation'

The fourth topic is 'corruption/violation'. Indeed, Iraq is still regarded as one of the most corrupt countries in the world (Transparency International 2010). Here, the positive attributes related to this topic refer to the successful efforts to combat or counter corruption in the country. In other words, there is some kind of praise to the government or the political parties concerned in stopping corruption. As for the negative features, they are related to the critical and harsh views that depict corruption with some kind of emotionalism. Baghdad TV came first once more in the number of negative references to corruption to be followed by Furat TV and then Hurria channel. Interestingly, the same sequence was found in the positive references to this topic with a greater gap separating Baghdad TV from the others. This was not expected; however, the focus of Baghdad TV was not on praising the government but rather on airing how its IAF's candidates would restore transparency and combat corruption if they got elected. On the other hand, Iraqia TV did not give this topic enough attention and mainly concentrated on reporting it in a neutral manner. Again, this aspect of Iraqia TV coverage proved that it was not balanced in reporting on corruption (see Chart 59, Appendix VI).

6. 'National Unity/Political Dialogue'

National unity/political dialogue remained an important topic because Iraq went though a civil war following the 2006 bombing of the Samara Shiite shrine. After 2008, Iraqi TV channels generally tried to avoid any kind of direct confrontation and criticism of ethnic or religious groups in the country in order to calm down the already tense situation. This was mainly due to the channels' adherence to the CMC's media regulations. The negative references to national unity/political dialogue denote the failure to establish a dialogue between conflicting parties. On the other hand, the positive

attributes are related to showing the successful fruits of political dialogue and/or praising the national unity enjoyed by Iraqis in general and the political parties in particular. We can see in Chart 60, Appendix VI that there is a concentration on the positive references to this topic. One might expect that Iraqia TV would come first as it always presented positive news on the progress in the country; however, Baghdad TV was ahead. This was probably done to avoid any kind of accusations that the Sunni IAF slate had narrow sectarian orientations. In the end, more Iraqis might become convinced to vote for IAF's candidates. The same argument could be applied to Furat and Hurria channels that had also a concentration around positive references.

7. 'Election Fraud'

The seventh topic is election fraud. During the election campaign, many observers specifically shown by Furat TV noted that election fraud might take place because of several factors including Maliki's alleged monopoly of IHEC and the suspicions that accompanied the political allegiances of its members. This was understandable because Iraq witnessed a great deal of corrupt officials and many doubts were voiced during the 2005 general elections. Positive references to election fraud denote that there were successful efforts to counter or stop it. As for the negative attributes, they mainly referred to the alleged presence of fraud or an attempt to forge the election results. Interestingly, one would have expected Baghdad TV to air more negative references that the other channels, but it was Furat TV that did so. The latter came first with the highest number of negative references which were all focused on the way Maliki's slate monopolised the state's powers for political propaganda. Though Maliki was rarely mentioned, the reports aired on Furat channel were very critical, carrying suggestions that Maliki's bloc would win in devious ways. As expected, Iraqia and Hurria channels mostly focused on the positive side of election fraud, by presenting a mostly transparent electoral process (see Chart 61, Appendix VI).

8. 'Federalism'

The other topic is federalism. As explained in the previous chapters, federalism is a thorny subject because it entails a separatist tendency which is rejected by the majority of Iraqi Arabs. The total number of references to this topic was modest in comparison to the number of references to other topics. Surprisingly, Baghdad TV aired the highest

number of positive references to this topic though one would expect the Kurdish Hurria channel to do so. However, the only negative references to federalism were aired by Baghdad TV. In fact, the negative references were used by some candidates as a powerful promotional tool to convince potential voters that they would fight against any attempt to divide Iraq (see Chart 62, Appendix VI).

9. 'Supporting Electoral Slate'

Probably the most relevant topic to our study is 'supporting electoral late' because it shows the amount of attention and the dominant tone used in covering this topic. The negative references denote some kind of criticism against the slate that sponsors the channel, whereas the positive features mean some kind of praise for or compliment to the same political slate. As expected, Iraqia TV refrained from supporting any slate; however, there was an indication that it supported Maliki. First, there were some negative references aired on Maliki's competitor, Allawi, and his candidate slates. In fact, Iraqia TV never criticised any other slate. Also, Maliki was shown almost daily using 'package', 'voice-over' or 'voice-over-sound-on-tape' either to inaugurate a new construction project and other public service facilities such as stories (Iraqia TV, 2nd of March, sequence 14, package, 204 seconds), and (Iraqia TV, 3rd of March, sequence 18, package, 189 seconds) or to follow up on security matters. Almost always, he was praised for his achievements especially on security matters such as inking the Iraqi-US agreement to withdraw US forces by the end of 2011. Certainly, airing such footage has a priming effect on the viewers. As a reminder, priming denotes that media channels have a later influence on the viewers that is related to an earlier exposure to news (Bryant and Zilmann 2002, p. 97). In other words, many TV viewers might become convinced to vote for Maliki on the Election Day after repeatedly seeing him in such positive scenes.

Other Iraqi politicians like the President and his two deputies were neither given the same time nor frequency to appear in this manner though they also performed similar activities. To give few examples, Maliki was shown on the 22nd February urging Iraqis to vote (26 seconds) in which 'voice-over' was used; however, no other Iraqi politician was given this opportunity. Then, on the 6th March, 2010 which was the media silence day, Iraqia TV aired two stories (voice-over) to urge Iraqis to vote. The first story (sequence

5) showed Maliki who was given 69 seconds, whereas the second story (sequence 6) presented Samarai who talked for 37 seconds only.

As explained in the previous chapters, Baghdad TV came first with the largest number of stories and highest time allotted to 'supporting electoral slate'. This surely corresponded with the positive references to 'supporting the electoral slate' as shown in Chart 63, Appendix VI. Furat TV came second with a slight gap separating the two channels. Finally, Hurria TV came third with the lowest number of positive references. On the other hand, there were few negative references which echoed some kind of criticism against representatives of the political blocs that sponsor the channels. Normally, the stories would mention the 'false' accusations to be followed by intensely fierce defense.

10. 'IHEC'

The tenth topic is centred on the Iraqi High Electoral Commission. Most of the references were concentrated on the neutral side especially by Iraqia TV which was expected. It is because this channel is the official one that is responsible for conveying information about the election process to all Iraqis in a timely manner. But what was not expected was the way Furat TV depicted IHEC. There were many accusations of fraud and that IHEC's decisions were biased and politicised. Furat TV publicly voiced its frustration against IHEC and even refrained from making any reference to it for two consecutive days (1st and 2nd March 2010) (see Chart 64, Appendix VI).

11. 'Other'

Finally, the last issue is centred on 'other' topics. As mentioned before, most of the 'other' topics were related to urging Iraqis to vote in the election. Iraqia TV in particular advocated airing most of these calls because it was in the government's interest to have a high turnout. As for Furat TV, it scored the highest number of positive references; almost all the calls for participation in the election came from Shiite religious leaders which was an indirect way of political promotion by insinuating that INA was supported by those leaders. Baghdad TV followed the same technique used by Furat channel but to a lesser extent since Sunnis unlike Shiite do not have a unified religious leadership to follow (see Chart 65, Appendix VI).

In brief, the different attributes given to the topics tackled in this study suggest that each TV channel presented its own version of reality which it found more suitable for its audience. In order to have a deeper look into the differences among the channels in covering the different topics, Kruskal-Wallis tests were computed on the neutral, positive, and negative attributes of each topic across the four channels. The results revealed that few topics showed significant differences among the four channels as shown below in Tables 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3. The highest degree of statistically significant differences was generally centred on the topics' negative attributes (six topics) to be followed by the positive references (five topics) and finally the neutral ones (four topics). The topics of 'public services' and 'IHEC' in particular showed significant differences along three different attributes, whereas the topics of 'election fraud' (neutral and negative) and 'corruption/violation' (positive and negative) showed significant differences along two attributes.

Magnitude of Inter-Channel Differences

As stated in Chapter Six, Kruskal-Wallis tests the hypothesis that all the variables in a group have similar or identical distributions. We can see in Table 1 in Appendix VII that when there is no significant difference among the channels in connection to their coverage of topics, we find very similar or close mean ranks along the four channels. However, the mean rank of each topic might differ from one channel to another if there is a significant difference. For example, the average mean of the topic of 'IHEC' with neutral attributes was 430.4. Hence, we can notice that Iraqia TV which has a mean rank of 488.8 and Furat TV 394.2 both deviated from the average mean rank as they carried extreme figure on both sides.

Neutral Attributes

The advantage of following the Kruskal-Wallis statistical test is to see which channel deviated the most from the average mean ranks which was usually above 427. For example, the average mean ranks of the topic of 'public services' is 428.5. In Table 2, Appendix VII, we can see that Baghdad TV was the only channel that deviated from this mean which meant that this channel was the main contributor towards the emergent significant difference in its coverage of neutral topics (compare these assumptions with the raw data in Table 8.1 below). In general, there were eight topics with neutral

attributes that showed significant difference in their coverage by the four channels. Based on the Chi-square coefficients produced by the Kruskal-Wallis analyses, we can arrange the above topics starting with the highest degree of difference: (1) 'other', (2) 'IHEC', (3) 'public services', (4) 'election fraud', (5) 'supporting electoral slate', (6) 'security/terrorism', (7) 'democracy', and (8) 'national unity/political dialogue' (see Table 8.1 below).

As for pair-wise comparisons of the channels, we can see in Table 8.1 that the four channels showed agreement in their coverage of neutral topics in three topics only. Yet, we cannot see an overwhelming unique agreement between two channels in Table 8.1 below since they relatively varied in the way they covered the topics. Surprisingly, the highest degree of agreement was between Baghdad and Hurria channels with eight topics that did not have any significant difference. On the other hand, the lowest degree of agreement was between Iraqia and Furat channels and Furat and Baghdad channels with five topics each which were not significantly different (for more details, please see Table 8 in Appendix VII).

Table 8.1 Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney Tests: Neutral Topics Ranking

	Iraqia TV No. of References	Furat TV No. of References	Baghdad TV No. of References	Hurria TV No. of References	Chi-square	Asymp. Sig.
Political differences	14^a	19^a	12^a	13^a	1.35	$p < .717$
Security/terrorism	79^a	7^b	48^a	55^a	10.53	$*p < .015$
Democracy	7^a	5^a	0^b	0^b	7.79	$**p < .051$
Public services	0^a	0^a	28^b	0^a	29.63	$***p < .000$
Corruption/violation	5^a	0^a	2^a	6^a	2.57	$p < .463$
National unity/political dialogue	13^a	0^b	12^a	2^a (Furat)	7.31	$****p < .063$
Election fraud	51^a	21^b	31^b	3^c (Furat)	16.69	$*****p < .001$
Federalism	0^a	0^a	0^a	8^a	3.26	$p < .353$
Supporting electoral slate	0^a	0^a	29^b	27^b	11.93	$******p < .008$
IHEC	442^a	152^b	284^b	174^c (Baghdad)	32.31	$*******p < .000$
Others	265^a	49^b	138^c	187^d	50.87	$********p < .000$

Note: Scores that share the same superscript are not significantly different at the p < 0.05 level. In few cases, the channel that does not share a significant difference with another is written between brackets though the superscript is different.

*p < .015 (security/terrorism: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
**p < .051 (democracy: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)

***p < .000 (Public services: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
****p < .063 (national unity/political dialogue: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
*****p < .001 (Election fraud: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
******p < .008 (supporting electoral slate: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
*******p < .000 (IHEC: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
********p < .000 (Other: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)

Positive Attributes

Based on Table 8.2 below, all the topics with positive attributes had significant differences except for the topic of 'election fraud'. But what was expected was that the topic of 'supporting electoral slates' on the positive scale would show the highest degree of differences among the four channels especially given that Iraqia TV did not cover it. The topic scored a Chi-square of 185.9 on the positive attributes because the three channels (Baghdad, Furat, and Hurria) promoted their own political slates in a zealous manner. In Table 3, Appendix VII we can see that the average mean of the four channels in relation to this topic is 423.1. We can see the great deviations from mean since Iraqia TV scored a mean rank of 290.5 which was due to its decision not to directly promote any slate, while Baghdad TV came with a mean rank of 532.2 due to its continuous efforts to promote its candidates. These two mean ranks were the extreme figures and caused this topic to have a significant difference. According to the Chi-square results, we can arrange the topics starting with the highest degree of difference: (1)) 'supporting electoral slate', (2) 'public services', (3) 'IHEC', (4) 'democracy', (5) 'corruption/violation', (6) 'national unity/political dialogue', (7) 'political differences', (8) 'security/terrorism', (9) 'federalism', (10) 'other'.

In relation to Mann-Whitney test, we can see in Table 8.2 below that the highest degree of agreement with regard to pair-wise comparison was between Furat and Baghdad channels with eight topics that did not have any significant difference, whereas the highest degree of disagreement was between Iraqia and Baghdad channels with two topics only that shared no significant difference. These results are expected because Furat and Baghdad channels shared similar editorial policies in supporting their respective slates, whereas Iraqia and Baghdad channels stood at opposite points as mentioned before (for more details, please see Table 9 in Appendix VII).

Table 8.2 Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney Tests: Positive Topics Ranking

	Iraqia TV No. of References	Furat TV No. of References	Baghdad TV No. of References	Hurria TV No. of References	Chi-square	Asymp. Sig.
Political differences	0[a]	21[b]	3[b]	26[c] (Furat)	9.66	*p < 0.022
Security/terrorism	166[a]	93[b]	141[a]	111[a]	9.11	**p < 0.028
Democracy	82[a]	56[a]	11[b]	41[a]	15.50	***p < 0.001
Public services	0[a]	132[b]	145[b]	46[c] (Furat)	28.53	****p < 0.000
Corruption/violation	1[a]	11[a]	48[b]	3[a]	13.31	*****p < 0.004
National unity/political dialogue	25[a]	70[b]	80[b]	23[a]	11.03	******p < 0.012
Election fraud	42[a]	51[a]	49[a]	61[a]	1.80	p < 0.615
Federalism	0[a]	2[a]	31[b] (Furat)	13[b]	8.93	*******p < 0.030
Supporting electoral slate	0[a]	1039[b]	1172[b]	377[d]	185.91	********p < 0.000
IHEC	65[a]	61[b]	26[b]	8[b]	17.03	*********p < 0.001
Others	400[a]	503[a]	372[b] (Furat)	342[a] (Baghdad)	7.34	**********p < 0.062

Note: Scores that share the same superscript are not significantly different at the p < 0.05 level. In few cases, the channel that does not share a significant difference with another is written between brackets though the superscript is different.

*p < .022 (political differences: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
**p < .028 (security/terrorism: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
***p < .001 (democracy: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
****p < .000 (Public services: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
*****p < .004 (corruption/violation: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
******p < .012 (national unity/political dialogue: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
*******p < .030 (federalism: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
********p < .000 (supporting electoral slate: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
*********p < .001 (IHEC: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
********p < .062 (Other: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)

Negative Attributes

There are seven topics with negative attributes that had significant differences, but the highest degree of significant difference among the four channels was related to the topic of 'election fraud' (see Table 8.3 below and Table 4 in Appendix VII). The topic was followed by 'election fraud' then 'security/terrorism' and 'public services' on the negative attributes. These three topics were very controversial and were employed by Baghdad and Furat channels in particular to promote their slates and discredit Maliki's government. The other topics are arranged in the following order depending on the degree of difference: (4) 'political differences', (5) 'corruption/violation', (6) 'IHEC', and (7) 'democracy'. In terms of the average mean rank, it was 427.7. As Iraqi TV attempted to ignore this aspect of the topic of 'election fraud', its mean rank reached 396.35, whereas Furat TV that strongly advocated the cause of revealing fraud carried out by Maliki's slate scored 485.6. The other raw data that was used in Chart 61, Appendix VI can give a complementary idea of the way this topic was covered by the four channels.

As for the pair-wise comparisons of channels, the highest degree of agreement was between Iraqia and Hurria channels with ten topics that did not show any significant difference. This is expected because the two channels are closely affiliated with the Iraqi government. As for the highest degree of disagreement, it was between Iraqia and Baghdad channels and Furat and Baghdad channels with four topics each that had no significant difference (for more details, please see Table 10 in Appendix VII).

Table 8.3 Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney Tests: Negative Topics Ranking

	Iraqia TV No. of References	Furat TV No. of References	Baghdad TV No. of References	Hurria TV No. of References	Chi-square	Asymp. Sig.
Political differences	41[a]	222[b]	129[b]	36[a]	26.20	*p < 0.000
Security/terrorism	26[a]	69[a]	237[b]	62[a]	60.01	**p < 0.000

Democracy	0^a	18^b	4^a (Furat)	4^a	8.70	***p < 0.034
Public services	9^a	88^b	181^c	24^a	53.93	****p < 0.000
Corruption/violation	3^a	27^a	44^b	13^a	20.20	*****p < 0.000
National unity/political dialogue	0^a	0^a	16^b	1^a (Baghdad)	5.34	p < 0.149
Election fraud	23^a	417^b	127^c	46^a	63.75	******p < 0.000
Federalism	0^a	0^a	7^b	0^a	5.33	p < 0.149
Supporting electoral slate	0^a	2^a	3^a	3^a	0.94	p < 0.816
IHEC	2^a	97^b	11^a	18^c (Baghdad)	16.30	*******p < 0.001
Others	59^a	190^a	8^a	108^a	1.47	p < 0.689

Note: Scores that share the same superscript are not significantly different at the p < 0.05 level. In few cases, the channel that does not share a significant difference with another is written between brackets though the superscript is different.

*p < 0.000 (Political differences: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
**p < 0.000 (Security/terrorism: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
***p < 0.034 (democracy: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
***p < 0.000 (Public services: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
****p < 0.000 (Corruption/violation: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
*****p < 0.000 (Election fraud: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
******p < 0.001 (IHEC: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)

In brief, the four channels had significant differences with topics having positive attributes more than the neutral and negative ones. Ten topics on the positive scale were significantly different compared with eight topics on the neutral scale and seven topics on the negative scale. In other words, the four channels had fewer differences and higher agreements in relation to their coverage of topics with negative attributes.

It is also important here to note the highest degrees of agreement among the four channels along the three attributes. In the first place came the topic of 'supporting electoral slate' on the negative side with a Chi-square of p < 0.816 which was mainly due to the channels' avoidance of waging propaganda attacks against other candidates/slates. In terms of the mean, the average mean ranks is 428.9725 which also shows the least deviation from the mean among the four channels, scoring as follows: Iraqia TV 427.50, Furat TV 429.43, Baghdad TV 429.33, and Hurria TV 429.63. This topic was followed by 'political differences' on neutral attributes. The third highest degree of agreement was the topic of 'other' on the negative side. As mentioned earlier, the 'other' topic was

mainly related to urging Iraqis to vote, and all the channels tackled in this study highly encouraged people to participate in the general election.

Candidates' Attributes

The second major results' output of this level of coding is the understanding of the candidates' scores along three scales: neutral, positive, and negative. Based on the calculation of the neural/positive/negative words, adjectives, and expressions, the author evaluated the tone associated with the candidates' presentation. As mentioned previously, Iraqia TV refrained from covering the activities of political candidates; however, there was a slight concentration on Allawi and his slate. Five negative references were made in comparison to three neutral ones. The Iraqi President Talabani and the Parliament speaker, Samarai both received one neutral reference. Though Maliki was mentioned on a daily basis and mostly in a positive way, he was always presented as the Prime Minister.

As for Furat TV, the concentration of references was naturally on Hakim's slate with 124 positive attributes. This was expected; however, ten negative references to Maliki's slate were not expected from the channel which was largely due to the fact that Maliki decided to withdraw from the Shiite alliance that was formed in 2005 in order to present himself as a unifier of Iraqis whether be Sunnis or Shiites. Hence, Maliki tried his best to include Sunni figures in his slate like the senior members of the Awakening Council of Anbar. Indeed, this move angered Hakim and his bloc that seemed to take a somehow antagonistic attitude toward Maliki and his slate. Other references made by Furat TV included nine positive ones on Sadr and his bloc because the two groups formed an alliance, as mentioned earlier. Finally, there were few other neutral references made (eight for Hakim and six for Sadr).

The third channel investigated was Baghdad TV. There were few negative references to political blocs especially twenty ones concentrated on others who were either unknown or unnamed. As for the positive attributes, we find the largest number of positive references among the four channels was 639 ones for Samarai's bloc and 8 ones for other slates. In fact, Baghdad TV scored the largest number of stories, highest time allotment, and highest number of references to its IAF's candidates. Finally, there were seven neutral references to Samarai's bloc.

The last channel investigated was Hurria TV. In terms of the positive references, there were 38 ones on Talabani's slate, seven for Allawi's bloc, and four for Hakim's slate. As mentioned earlier, the Kurds did not focus on Talabani and his slate because there were investing in other Kurdish-language channels. As for the positive references to other blocs, it seems that the channel had in mind the idea of future alliances with other slates without which the Kurds could not form a majority in the Parliament. There were few negative references, too. The highest number of such references was centred on Talanabi's slate (10 ones), Maliki's slate (6 ones), and Allawi's bloc (3 ones). Finally, neutral attributes were given to Talabani (12 ones), while Sadr and Samarai got one reference each.

Magnitude of Inter-Channel Differences

In order to examine the details of the differences in covering the candidates among the four channels and between pair-wise channels, further Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney Tests were computed (see Tables 8.4, 8.5, and 8.6 below and Tables 5, 6, 7 in Appendix VII). In terms of the neutral attributes, there was only one significant difference in the coverage of Talabani and his slate which was due to Hurria TV's high number of neutral references to its sponsor. As expected, the highest degree of significant differences was centred on the positive terms and in particular the slates of Allawi, Hakim, Samarai, and Talabani.

As for the rest of candidates, there were no differences in the way there were covered by the four channels. However, the highest degree of significant difference was found in Samarai's slate due to the high number of positive references made by Baghdad TV to its sponsor. Hakim's slate came second, and Talabani's slate came third, while Allawi came in the end. Noteworthy, there were no significant differences among the four channels in the negative references to the different candidates. This was probably due to the channels' tendency to avoid criticism of other candidates in order to abide by CMC's regulations, as stated above.

In relation to the pair-wise comparisons of channels, the highest degree of agreement in terms of the neutral attributes was between Iraqia and Baghdad channels with all the seven candidates/slates having no significant differences (for detailed results,

please see Tables 11, 12, 13 in Appendix VII). This was not expected due to the different nature of the two channels.

As for the lowest degree of agreement, it was between Furat and Hurria channels with only five candidates/slates that had no significant difference. In relation to the positive attributes, the channels did not have unique or excessive disagreements or agreements amongst them. For example, Iraqia and Baghdad channels on the one hand and Iraqia and Hurria channels on the other hand had six candidates/slates each with no significant differences, whereas Furat and Baghdad channels on the one hand and Furat and Hurria channels on the other hand had four candidates/slates each with no significant difference. Finally, all the four channels had no significant differences in terms of covering the negative attributes of candidates/slates corresponding with the Kruskal-Wallis cited above.

Table 8.4 Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney Tests: Ranking of Candidates' Neutral Attributes

	Iraqia TV No. of References	Furat TV No. of References	Baghdad TV No. of References	Hurria TV No. of References	Chi-square	Asymp. Sig.
Maliki	0^a	0^a	1^a	0^a	2.66	$p < 0.447$
Allawi	3^a	0^a	0^a	0^a	3.26	$p < 0.353$
Hakim	0^a	8^a	1^a	0^a	3.41	$p < 0.333$
Sadr	0^a	6^b	0^a	1^a	5.82	$p < 0.121$
Talabani	1^a	0^a	0^a	12^b	18.83	$*p < 0.000$
Samarai	1^a	0^a	7^a	1^a	1.07	$p < 0.786$
Others	0^a	0^a	0^a	0^a	0.00	$p < 1.000$

Note: Scores that share the same superscript are not significantly different at the $p < 0.05$ level.

*$p < 0.000$ (Talabani: There are significant differences in covering this candidate/slate among the channels)

Table 8.5 Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney Tests: Ranking of Candidates' Positive Attributes

	Iraqia TV No. of References	Furat TV No. of References	Baghdad TV No. of References	Hurria TV No. of References	Chi-square	Asymp. Sig.
Maliki	0^a	0^a	0^a	0^a	0.00	$p < 1.000$
Allawi	0^a	0^a	0^a	7^a	6.54	$*p < 0.088$
Hakim	0^a	124^b	0^a	4^a	63.36	$**p < 0.000$
Sadr	0^a	9^b	0^a	0^a	5.76	$p < 0.124$

Talabani	0[a]	0[a]	0[a]	38[b]	19.70	***p < 0.000
Samarai	0[a]	0[a]	639[b]	0[a]	326.67	****p < 0.000
Others	0[a]	0[a]	8[a]	0[a]	2.66	p < 0.447

Note: Scores that share the same superscript are not significantly different at the p < 0.05 level.

**p < 0.088 (Allawi: There are significant differences in covering this candidate/slate among the channels)
**p < 0.000 (Hakim: There are significant differences in covering this candidate/slate among the channels)
***p < 0.000 (Talabani: There are significant differences in covering this candidate/slate among the channels)
****p < 0.000 ((Samarai: There are significant differences in covering this candidate/slate among the channels)

Table 8.6 Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney Tests: Ranking of Candidates' Negative Attributes

	Iraqia TV No. of References	Furat TV No. of References	Baghdad TV No. of References	Hurria TV No. of References	Chi-square	Asymp. Sig.
Maliki	0[a]	10[a]	0[a]	6[a]	3.98	p < 0.264
Allawi	5[a]	0[a]	0[a]	3[a]	4.11	p < 0.250
Hakim	0[a]	0[a]	0[a]	0[a]	0.00	p < 1.000
Sadr	0[a]	0[a]	0[a]	0[a]	0.00	p < 1.000
Talabani	0[a]	0[a]	0[a]	10[a]	3.26	p < 0.353
Samarai	0[a]	0[a]	0[a]	0[a]	0.00	p < 1.000
Others	0[a]	0[a]	25[a]	0[a]	5.33	p < 0.149

Note: Scores that share the same superscript are not significantly different at the p < 0.05 level.

Other Production Techniques

A further important aspect of this level of analysis was the investigation of the production techniques used by the four TV channels in their efforts to influence the viewers by making them pay more attention to the candidate(s) shown. The first section in this type of examination is the presence/absence of political contenders in the news stories. This is a very important indication on whether the channels are balanced enough to present two conflicting or opposing views within the same story. With all the talk on the new media freedom in Iraq and the claims that Iraqi channels are objective and balanced in their coverage, we find the exact opposite in the results cited below. Iraqia TV, for instance, did not show many candidates except for four ones without introducing any contenders. Also, Furat TV aired a total of 126 stories without contenders, whereas Baghdad TV aired (157 stories) and Hurria TV (39 stories) and had two interviews each with political contenders who were from small political parties. Indeed, the tiny amount of attention given to contenders reveals that these channels have ignored other political

candidates by regarding them as almost non-existent. Indeed, this aspect of the channels' coverage shows clear imbalance and subjectivity.

On the other hand, we find that these channels aired many stories showing interviews with political affiliates who almost always praised and expressed their allegiance to the concerned parties. As expected, the highest number of interviews with political affiliates was aired by Baghdad TV with more than 153 interviews. The last item coded in this section mentioned '5 affiliates or more' because the news story might contain interviews with more than five affiliates which actually occurred in very few cases. In the second rank came Furat TV with more than 132 interviews and then Hurria TV with 45 interviews. Finally, Iraqia TV aired 5 interviews with political affiliates from different parties.

Candidates' Spatial Relationship

A further aspect related to production technique was the candidate's spatial relationship with others. As mentioned in Chapter Five, Murphy (1998) classified the spatial relationship of the candidate with others into five categories following the study of Patterson and McClure (1976): candidate shown alone, touching distance to audience, speaking distance, public distance, further or unable to determine (1998, pp. 35-6). Just like the discussion on the 'visual weight', there is a strong link between the way the candidate is shown on screen and the effect on the viewer. For example, there is more influence on the viewer if the candidate is shown in touching or speaking distance to the audience. This study added 'candidate shown with others' which carries similar weight to the previous two techniques since the candidate is not always shown speaking to the audience. On the other hand, public distance is assigned when the candidate appears on stage that is above the level of the audience. This technique is less intimate and has a lesser influence on the viewer because the candidate is made to look isolated from the people around. The same argument is applied to a candidate 'shown alone'.

In Table 8.8 below, we find that the highest number of stories showing one to three candidates in 'speaking distance', 'touching distance' and 'shown with others' was aired by Baghdad TV. As stated above, these production techniques have been identified as having specific influences on viewers. Furat TV came first with the number of stories showing the first candidate in public distance in relation to others. In fact, this technique

was forced upon the channel because there were always large numbers of people showing up in public gatherings that were organised by Hakim's slate during the election campaign. Finally, Baghdad TV came first in the number of stories that showed candidates alone to be followed by Furat TV and then Hurria channel. In brief, Baghdad showed more emphasis on its candidates than the other channels which was clear by the way it presented them.

Table 8.8 Number of Types of Candidates' Spatial Relationship with others among the Four Channels

		Iraqia	Furat	Baghdad	Hurria
Candidates 1	1. Shown alone	4	43	107	21
	2. Shown with others	1	31	45	19
	3. Touching distance to audience	0	10	21	0
	4. Speaking distance	0	2	22	0
	5. Public distance	0	65	36	5
	6. Further or unable to determine	0	0	0	0
Candidates 2	1. Shown alone	1	12	30	5
	2. Shown with others	1	0	7	2
	3. Touching distance to audience	0	0	3	0
	4. Speaking distance	0	0	4	0
	5. Public distance	0	1	14	0
	6. Further or unable to determine	0	0	0	0
Candidates 3	1. Shown alone	0	5	17	4
	2. Shown with others	0	0	4	1
	3. Touching distance to audience	0	0	2	0
	4. Speaking distance	0	0	1	0
	5. Public distance	0	0	6	0
	6. Further or unable to determine	0	0	0	0

Finally, a Kruskal-Wallis test was computed to understand the significant differences among the four channels. The results showed that the channels had significant

differences in relation to all the positions of the first and second candidates' spatial relationship with others except for 'further or unable to determine'. As for the third candidate, the significant differences were only centred on 'shown alone', 'shown with others', and 'public distance'.

Camera Angles

The final phase of analysis in this coding frame was related to the camera angles used when a candidate(s) is shown. As stated in Chapter Five, Kepplinger (1982, 1983) investigated how some camera angles used in filming candidates can influence TV viewers' impressions of those candidates. The results of that study showed that the positive effect of the camera angle is achieved when the camera is held at an eye level. This is probably due to the viewer's feeling of being equal with and close to the candidate. As for bottom angle, it has a negative impact on the viewer but it is meant to show power and authority. In addition, Graber examined how camera angles can influence the manner by which the audience comprehend the message; for example, 'audiences are likely to pay more attention to close-ups and identified elements' (2001, p. 197). Grabe and Bucy confirm that:

> when candidates are portrayed in close-up shots that promote emotional involvement and establish social proximity between televised subjects and viewers….By minimizing the psychological distance between viewing audiences and actors on the political stage, television prompts viewers to regard candidates in personal terms, fostering familiarity and trust' (2009, p. 153).

In other words, there is more 'visual weight' with the camera's close-up and eye-level positions which add more importance to the candidate.

As expected, we find in Table 8.8 below that Baghdad TV showed more emphasis on its IAF's candidates by showing them more than did the other channels in close-up and eye-level angles. This was not only confined to the first candidates but also to the second and third candidates when available. In the second rank came Furat TV which was followed by Hurria channel.

Table 8.9 Camera Angles

		Iraqia	Furat	Baghdad	Hurria
Candidates 1	1. Eye level	5	117	153	41
	2. Full top view	0	1	1	0
	3. Bottom view	0	0	3	0
	4. Close-up	0	98	130	27
Candidates 2	1. Eye level	2	13	44	7
	2. Full top view	0	0	0	0
	3. Bottom view	0	0	2	0
	4. Close-up	1	13	34	5
Candidates 3	1. Eye level	0	5	25	5
	2. Full top view	0	0	0	0
	3. Bottom view	0	0	1	0
	4. Close-up	0	5	21	4

A Kruskal-Wallis test was computed to see the significant differences among the four channels in relation to the camera angles. It appears that there were seven significant differences as follows: Candidate 1. Eye leve; Candidate 1. Bottom view; Candidate 2. Eye level; Candidate 3. Eye level; Candidates 1, 2, & 3. Close-up. We can see that most of the significant differences were centred around the close-up camera position which denotes the differences among the four channels in this production technique aspect (for more details, see Table 14, Appendix VII).

In relation to the pair-wise comparisons for the channels' use of camera angles, the Mann-Whitney tests showed that the eye level view and close-up had significant differences for the three candidates and among all the channels. There were few exceptions to this rule which are as follows: Iraqia and Hurria channels did not have a significant difference in the close-up camera for the second candidate. Also, Furat and

Hurria channels did not have significant differences in relation to the eye level view for the second and third candidates. Finally, Furat and Baghdad channels had significant differences in relation to the eye level view for the three candidates like the other pair-wise comparisons, and there was also a significant difference in the bottom view for the first candidate (For more details, see Table 15, Appendix VII). In brief, the two channels that differed the most in the use of camera angles were Furat and Baghdad. This was expected because of the fierce competition between the two channels in promoting their candidates. On the other hand, the least amount of differences was between Furat and Hurria channels, suggesting that the two TV stations followed somehow similar production techniques.

To sum up, Baghdad TV was more fervent in its emphasis on the importance of its candidates than the other channels in all the production levels. The channel scored more stories and used more 'favourable' techniques that the others in terms of the number of political affiliates interviewed, its candidates' spatial relationship with others, and camera angles (eye-level view and close-up). Based on the same criteria, Furat TV came in the second rank in relation to the attention given to its candidates, while Hurria channel came third. As for Iraqia TV, the main emphasis was on the topics aired rather than political candidates.

Conclusion

Based on the data reported above, we can conclude that all the TV channels examined in this study showed some kind of imbalance and subjectivity in either covering the topics or the candidates. Balance is measured by counting the negative and positive references to topics/candidates, and what we observed was that all the channels, except in few cases, tended to either align with the positive or negative sides. In order to answer one of the research questions in this study: 'How did these channels present issues in the election campaign? Which issues were made prominent?, we need to discuss whether the channels discussed above presented the election news in a certain direction.

In this study, Iraqia TV presented the election news in a certain direction that mostly showed the positive side and completely ignored negative events or issues. Except for the topic of 'political differences' which was mildly presented in a negative manner, the channel presented the topics of 'security/terrorism', 'democracy', 'national

unity/political dialogue', and 'other' in a positive way by highlighting the achievements of the Iraqi government.. In some cases, the channel ignored or downplayed the importance of certain issues that irked Iraqis such as 'public services', 'election fraud', which mostly had a neutral tone, and 'federalism'. Based on what is discussed above, Iraqia TV was not balanced in its coverage of the election because it intended to follow the Iraqi government's policy of showing the bright side and ignoring the reality on the ground. Hence, the channel deviated from its mandate to remain independent from the state's policy.

Also, Iraqia TV emphasised the issue of participating in the elections and downsized the topic of security/terrorism in order to project an ideal image that it seeks to create among the audience. All the other channels aired news stories that encouraged Iraqis to vote. Though there are no Iraqi audience studies that can be referred to, the 2010 general election witnessed a high turnout despite the security concerns. Media outlets must have had a role in this high turnout especially in the Sunni areas as Iraqis mainly get their news from television as stated in Chapter One. IHEC mentioned that 11, 526,412 Iraqis voted in 2010 out of 18,892,000 registered voters.

The second channel discussed was Furat TV which differed from Iraqia TV in presenting some topics especially 'political differences', 'corruption/violation' and 'election fraud' which had extremely negative tones in order to discredit Maliki's government. What was implied and directly stated in 'supporting electoral slates' was that the channel set its candidates above the other ones in terms of their alleged sincerity and faithfulness to building Iraq and serving its people. As Furat TV belongs to Hakim's slate which had a high representation in the government, it was not surprsing to find that it the topics of 'security/terrorism', 'democracy', 'public services', 'national unity/political dialogue', and 'other' which mainly called on Iraqis to vote in the election were presented in a positive manner. Also, Furat TV highlighted the topics of 'election fraud' and 'corruption/violation' to discredit Maliki's government and convince more voters to vote for Hakim's slate rather than Maliki's group. The 2010 election results revealed that Maliki failed to win the majority; instead, Allawi's Iraqiya slate won 91 seats in the Parliament. Different television channels must have contributed to Maliki's loss since he was attacked by many opponent sides.

Baghdad TV, on the other hand, was the only channel that presented the news in a way that significantly differed from the rest of the channels. This was mainly due to the nature of the channel's Sunni sponsors who seemed to feel that they needed to overstate the shortcomings of Maliki's government and stressed that its candidates would be better alternatives. Certainly, the production techniques used such as the candidates' spatial relationship with others and the camera angles over-emphasised the importance of IAF's candidates. The channel presented the topics of 'political differences', 'security/terrorism', 'public services', 'election fraud', and 'other' in an extremely negative tone. Surprisingly, the topics of 'federalism', 'corruption/violation', and 'democracy' were presented in a positive way, though the channel was expected to project dominant negative attributes to them. However, the channel's intention was to stress that its candidates would be the right choice for Iraqi voters in order to establish a democratic state in which corruption and calls for federalism are strongly dealt with. Contrary to the desire of Baghdad TV, Samarai's slate suffered a great blow during the 2010 elections. In the December 2005 elections, the Iraqi Islamic Party that was affiliated within the Iraqi Accord Front had 44 seats in the Parliament, yet the Party ended up with six seats only in the 2010 election. Hence, Baghdad TV's efforts to promote its slate and polish the image of its candidates by its continuous coverage and exaggerated emphasis went in vain.

Finally, Hurria TV presented the news in a way that showed its close link to the Iraqi government which is due to the nature of the channel's sponsor. Similar to Iraqi TV, Hurria channel presented the topics of 'security/terrorism', 'democracy', 'public services', national unity/political dialogue', 'election fraud', federalism', and 'other' in a positive way. Only the topics of 'political differences' and 'corruption/violation' were slightly presented in a negative way. In other words, Hurria TV was on the extreme positive position, while Baghdad channel came on the opposite negative side. Similar to Baghdad TV, Hurria channel failed in winning voters in central and southern Iraq since the Kurdish bloc won most of their seats in Kurdistan. Contrary to the Kurdish official expectations, Kurds greatly lost in Baghdad where millions or hundreds of thousands were believed to reside. In a statement that testifies to the presence of Kurds in Baghdad and reflects the kind of ethnic division that characterise modern day Iraq, Muhammed

Amin Daloyee, head of KDP branch in Baghdad, once stated: 'If you say half of Baghdad are Kurds yet you don't get their votes in the elections, we should then say they are all traitors' (Saadi and Ahmed 2011). It seems that Hurria TV did not have much influence on those Kurds.

As for the candidates' spatial relationship with others, the author followed Patterson and McClure (1976) and Murphy (1998) and found that Baghdad TV showed more emphasis in presenting its candidates than the other channels especially in showing them in touching or speaking distance to audience. Furat TV followed Baghdad in the presentational significance it gave to its candidates.

Finally, the study tackled the effect of camera angles on TV viewers. Indeed, the use of certain camera angles has very important effects on the viewers. Audience-based research found out that camera angles can affect the perception of viewers toward the candidates (Grabe 1996; Kepplinger 1982; Detenber et al. 1998; Kepplinger and Donsbach 1986). Following Kepplinger (1982 and 1983), the author regarded the eye level as positive, top and bottom levels as negative except that the bottom view denoted power. As for the camera distance, the close-up has positive effect unlike the other shots like the long and medium ones (Berger 1981; Graber 2001; Bucy and Grabe 2007). The study concluded that Baghdad TV came first in the emphasis it showed in presenting its candidates. Furat TV came second to be followed by Hurria channel. The Mann-Whitney tests showed that Furat and Baghdad channels used different production techniques more than the other channels, while Furat and Hurria channels were the least different.

In brief, all the four channels presented the news story topics in ways that generally reflected the policies of the channels' sponsors. The analysis cited above reflects the partisan nature of these channels and their mostly one-sided outlook by which they viewed the issues and candidates investigated in this study. All the channels except for Iraqia TV gave generous attention to their political candidates whether in the verbal narratives, still images, films, the production techniques, spatial relationships with audience, and the use of camera angles. In the following chapter, the conclusion of this study is presented that sums up the key research findings.

Chapter Nine

Conclusion

This study investigated the evening newscasts of Iraqia, Furat, Hurria, and Baghdad channels for the fourteen days that preceded the 7th of March, 2010 Iraqi general election. The prime time of viewing TV in Iraq is usually at night due to security concerns. The same prime time is true of most other countries where there are no such security concerns. The main newscast of Iraqia TV is aired at 8:00 pm, while Baghdad and Furat channels are aired at 9:00 pm. As for Hurria TV, the main newscast is broadcasts at 10:00 pm.

This research analysed the (non)-application of the principles of good journalism, patterns of representation, and horse-race issues by the content analysis of the news output of these satellite TV channels. The study attempted to answer the following research questions:

4. To what extent did Iraqia, Furat, Hurria, and Baghdad TV channels apply the principles of good journalism in their election campaign coverage? How did they differ?

5. How did these channels present issues during the election campaign? Which issues were made prominent?

6. Did these channels focus on the coverage of candidates' characteristics or horse-race aspect of the General Election?

This study followed a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the newscasts. Three levels of analysis were used: (1) the programme level (2) the story level (3) and candidate/topic level (sub-story). Each level had a separate coding frame to measure relevant variables. The first coding frame, programme level, basically measured the following: number of stories in each newscast, election-related number of stories of different topic-types throughout the newscast, time allotted to the newscast as a whole, the duration of newscast time devoted to stories for each topic type, and the number of stories that featured different format types throughout the newscast. Besides, the story level coding frame measured the following: the story's sequence in relation to the

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newcast as a whole, the story's topic in relation to the election, the duration of the story presented, whether the story featured any references to 'horse-race' issues, and whether the story featured any narrative references to/ film reports or images of/ interviews with representatives of listed political parties. Finally, the candidate/topic (sub-story) level coding frame measured the following: the stories' topic(s) score of terms from narratives signaling neutral/positive/negative, the candidate's score of terms from narratives signaling neutral/positive/negative, the candidate(s) spatial relationship with others, and the camera angle when the candidate(s) was shown.

Since Iraqi journalists and news organisations are expected to be aware of the principles of good journalism, one expects the TV channels investigated in this study to follow these principles especially during election campaigns. All the local news organisations operating in Iraq must observe these principles because they signed a pledge to do so, and almost all of them claim to be objective and accurate in reporting the news.

Generally speaking, previous studies on the elections in the Arab world followed basic measures that usually calculated the time and length of stories related to different candidates/parties (El Fegiery, 2006; UNESCO 2008; AWGMM, 2007, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b 2010c, and 2011). Yet this study combined many other variables to reach better results and more comprehensive outcomes such as investigating patterns of representation, news formats, production techniques, candidates' spatial relationship with others, and the use of camera in connection to the candidates. Hence, this study represents a step forward from previous studies on Arab election in terms of being multi-dimensional rather than unidirectional, and is among the first ones of its kind on Iraqi election.

The Principles of Good Journalism

In this study, the first research question enquired: To what extent did Iraqia, Furat, Hurria, and Baghdad TV channels apply the principles of good journalism in their election campaign coverage? Further supplemental questions asked, how did they differ and which issues were made prominent?

The principles of good journalism like objectivity and impartiality are the main elements this study is concerned with. The author traced the (non)-application of these

principles throughout his research. In relation to objectivity, it is usually associated with newsrooms practices in which journalists produce news. Generally, it refers to 'giving a full and accurate account of events being reported which reflects as closely as possible the true facts of a matter. Thus, the facts of the matter can be independently verified and shown to be true' (Gunter 1997, 9). The verification of facts can be done by referring to the events taking place, figures, and statistics released or accepted by neutral bodies. Also, objective reporting means that journalists must maintain balance and fairness by devoting equal time to the different sides (Everette and Merrill 1996).

As for impartiality, Westerståhl (1983) states that journalists must keep their distance when they report the news and must avoid taking sides in any issue. Though it is a difficult task, journalists are expected to perform their job in the highest professional manner to ensure that the public are both informed and educated correctly.

Further, news values play an important role in directing journalists toward the selection of stories and later reporting these stories in the proper order. The 'intrinsic' news values associated with newsworthiness are: impact; timeliness; prominence; proximity; audience; oddity; celebrity; conflict; sensational; and magnitude (Ryan and O'Donnell 2001, 49-52; Harrison 2006, 137). These are the basic elements that journalists should look for. Unfortunately, some reporters avoid following the principles of good journalism which normally lead to biased reporting.

In this context, bias is usually linked to the following traits: unbalanced selection of presentation, partiality, attitude that hinders fair or balanced reporting, one-sidedness, sensational and personal preferences to one side, favouritism that deforms the facts, and irrational assessment (Sloan and Mackay 2007, 6). In his analysis of the news output of the BBC and his observation of the way its journalists worked, Schlesinger stressed that there were indications that the coverage of the conflict in Northern Ireland was biased despite the fact that the BBC journalists tried to be objective (1987, 12). Among the benefits of this study is that it gives an indication about the need to have external observers who can detect shortcomings and wrong journalistic practices without being directly involved in the work of the news organisation.

The results of the programme level of analysis showed that the four channels covered the election in a one-sided and partial way because they only presented their own

viewpoints while they excluded other opposing voices. Based on the number of stories, time allotment, and type of news formats, the author concluded that Baghdad TV came in the first place in covering the election and promoting its political sponsor to be followed by Furat channel. In the third place Iraqia channel came, while Hurria TV came last since it showed the least amount of interest in promoting its party and covering the election. This is mainly due to the fact that the Kurdish party that sponsors the channel had other media outlets broadcasting in the Kurdish language that targeted Kurds rather than Arabs. These findings are expected because the channels investigated in this study are mostly partisan whose aim is to promote their sponsors. Also, the state-run Iraqia TV differed from other official channels in the Arab world in the sense that it did not directly promote the ruling party during the general election. Yet, there were indications that Iraqia channel favoured Maliki's party.

In terms of the issues/topics covered, Iraqia channel covered all the topics except for 'federalism' and 'supporting electoral slate'. This channel highlighted the topic of 'IHEC' in the number of stories and time allotment and 'other' in the time allotment. As for the Kurdish Hurria TV, it paid the least kind of attention to promoting its sponsors in connection to the number of stories, airtime, and news formats. In fact, this channel was similar to Iraqia TV in covering some topics such as 'IHEC' and 'other' since both are closely affiliated to the Iraqi government. Hurria TV focused on the topic of 'federalism' more than the other channels because Kurds advocated this kind of political system more than all the other ethnic groups in Iraq.

On the other hand, Furat TV showed a great emphasis in covering the topics of 'political difference', 'democracy', 'election fraud', and 'security/terrorism'. As for Baghdad TV, it came first in the emphasis it showed in covering the topics of 'security/terrorism' (in terms of the number of stories), 'public services', 'corruption/violation', 'national unity/political dialogue', 'federalism', 'supporting electoral slate', and 'other' (in terms of time allotment).

Turning to the story level, the results showed that the four channels did not abide by the principles of good journalism, too. At this level of analysis, the preferred or dominant story format used in covering each topic was selected by choosing the largest number of stories and highest time allotted to each topic. The author concluded that

Baghdad TV paid more attention to the coverage of the election and its preferred topics, while Furat TV came second. It was followed by Iraqia channel, whereas Hurria TV came the fourth one in its emphasis on the election and the topics it covered.

Finally, the candidate/topic level of analysis also showed bias and imbalance exercised by the four channels. Here, balance is calculated by counting the positive and negative references to the candidates and topics. Except in few cases, all the four channels either covered the candidates/topics in positive or negative ways depending on the channels' background and ideology. In relation to the candidates' coverage, there was little criticism which is somehow similar to other studies on the election in the Arab world. We find in these studies that there is a clear avoidance to criticise politicians and their parties probably to keep away from troubles (see AWGMM's reports).

In relation to the stories featuring narrative references to political candidates, film/image of the candidates, and interview with the candidates, Baghdad TV came first and was followed by Furat channel and then Hurria TV. On the other hand, Iraqia channel did not directly promote any candidate though it indirectly favoured Maliki. The results above showed that these channels were subjective and partial in their coverage. Equal air time was not given to other parties even if they were not opposing the channels' sponsors. Indeed, these channels were only pre-occupied with projecting their own agenda by following the 'party logic' instead of the 'media logic'. This is similar to other media channels in many parts of the Arab world that are characterised by their evolving democracies (See for example AWGMM's different reports).

Patterns of Representation on Iraqi TV

The second research question asked: How did these channels present issues during the election campaign? The author concluded that all the channels investigated in this study presented the general election in a manner that suited their own sponsors' background and political belief. Mazzoleni (1987) asserted that journalists and news organisations shape news values and the news stories presented to the audience.

Based on the analysis of the data collected, Iraqia TV presented many story topics in a mostly positive way and ignored the negative side. For example, this channel presented the story topics of 'democracy', 'national unity/political dialogue', and 'other' positively by emphasising the Iraqi government's accomplishments. On the other hand,

Iraqia TV ignored other story topics that were important for Iraqis like 'public services' and 'election fraud' because it wanted to show the bright side of the reality, while it also downsized the importance of 'federalism' topic that creates a great deal of controversy among Iraqis. Also, the channel highlighted the topic of election participation more than the others, while it neglected the issue of security/terrorism. This is part of the state-run TV station's agenda to urge Iraqis to vote in order to make the electoral process succeed and to show that Iraq is a secure and safe country due to the 'sincere' efforts of the government and its Prime Minister.

Despite the fact that there are no published audience-based studies on the Iraqi audience perception of the election and the issues that accompanied this event, it was known that the 2010 general election had a considerably high turnout. This is partly due to the disappointment Iraqis felt toward the crippled political process and possibly because of the influence of television which is the favourite media outlet in Iraq.

In terms of Furat TV, it emphasised the issues of 'election fraud', 'corruption/violation' and 'political differences' and presented them in a negative manner in order to present Maliki and his followers as corrupt people who cannot unite Iraqis. In this way, the channel aims at persuading potential voters to vote for other slates. The channel presented the story topic of 'supporting electoral slates' in an extreme favourable way by showing the 'achievements' of its candidates and highlighting their 'integrity'. Other story topics were covered in a positive manner like 'security/terrorism', 'democracy', 'public services', 'national unity/political dialogue', and 'other' since Hakim's party played an instrumental role in the Iraqi government as many of its figures occupied important posts, so it was important to highlight some of their achievements. In relation Hakim's party that runs Furat TV, its slate won 70 seats in the Parliament out of 325 ones, yet most of these seats were won by Sadr movement that scored 39 seats. In other words, Furat TV did not seem to have influenced as many people as the channel had initially expected.

Baghdad TV stood on the opposite side of the other channels mainly because it is run by a Sunni party whose members seek more powers and influence in the government. IAF's candidates were shown as the best choice for Iraqi voters; this was clearly manifested in the news formats and production techniques used such as the candidates'

spatial relationship with others and the camera angles. Baghdad TV covered the story topics of 'political differences', 'security/terrorism', 'public services', 'election fraud', and 'other' in a highly negative manner. Interestingly, more election coverage and emphasis on candidates do not always mean that the channel's sponsor is going to have more voters. Despite the tireless efforts of Baghdad TV to promote its candidates, Samarai's party lost in the 2010 elections by securing six Parliament seats only.

Finally, Hurria TV was similar to Iraqia channel in the way news stories were presented. The channel presented the topics of 'security/terrorism', 'democracy', 'public services', 'national unity/political dialogue', 'election fraud', 'federalism', and 'other' in a positive manner. On the other hand, the story topics of 'political differences' and 'corruption/violation' were somehow presented negatively. Hurria TV did not seem to have achieved its aims by convincing Arabs or other Kurds who speak Arabic to vote for the Kurdish Alliance since the main Kurdish parties won 7 Parliament seats only in the provinces that are not geographically linked to Iraqi Kurdistan. In total, the Kurdish Alliance won 43 seats.

On the other hand, we find that Baghdad and Furat channels emphasised some topics that are appealing to the audience such as 'public services' and 'corruption/violation' in order to maximize the influence on the viewers.

Throughout the presentation of topics, we can see that the channels investigated here followed the advocacy model since they echoed the views of their sponsors. Though the media coverage is different, Donsbach reached similar conclusions about the coverage of the German Bundestag Election of 1994. The author found that the news framed the political process by analysing 18 German media channels that mostly supported certain political parties (1997).

When journalists endorse the ideology of some parties without any kind of questioning, they become 'agenda senders' instead of being 'agenda setters' (Semetko and Canel 1997). Indeed, the ideology held by journalists plays a major role in presenting biased news since they are driven to 'select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation' (Entman 1993, p. 52). In other words, the Iraqi journalists working for

the different channels investigated in this study generally reflect the ideology of the parties that sponsor their TV channels. This probably explains why the majority of these journalists are selected based on their ethnic or sectarian backgrounds as there is a minimal chance that they will conflict with the channels' editorial policies.

Candidates' Spatial Relationship with Others

The author relied on Patterson and McClure (1976) and Murphy (1998) with regard to the analysis and interpretation of candidates' spatial relationship with others. Touching or speaking distance to audience was regarded as positive unlike the other positions. Indeed, there is a connection between the way a candidate is presented on TV and his/her impact on the viewer. The candidate's touching or speaking distance to the audience is believed to be more significant than the other positions because the candidate is close to the audience.

In this regard, Baghdad TV aired the highest number of stories showing candidates 'alone', in 'speaking distance', 'touching distance' and 'shown with others', while Furat TV was ahead of the other channels in the number of stories that presented the first candidate in 'public distance'. The total sum of the positive scores revealed that Baghdad TV came first in the attention it paid to its candidates and was followed by Furat TV and then Hurria channel.

Camera Angles

In relation to the effect of camera angles on TV viewers, the author followed Kepplinger (1982, 1983) studies. The eye level is regarded as positive since it gives the impression that the candidate is equal to the viewer. The top and bottom views are considered negative. The bottom view though suggests power. As for the camera distance, close-up camera is regarded as positive, whereas the long and medium ones are neutral (Grabe and Bucy 2009). Indeed, certain camera angles can have an impact on TV viewers. Graber emphasises that 'audiences are likely to pay more attention to close-ups and identified elements' (2001, p. 197) since they can easily see the details and probably identify with the person(s) shown. Also, Berger stressed that the close-up position has a positive effect on the viewers just like shooting the head-and-shoulders. On the other hand, a medium shot showing the candidate from the waist up has a neutral impact, while a long shot presenting the candidate as a whole has a negative influence (1981).

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Based on the positive scores that are based on the camera's close-up and eye-level positions, the author concluded that Baghdad TV paid more attention to its candidates than the other channels. Furat channel came in the second place and was followed by Hurria TV. The pair-wise comparisons showed that the eye level view and close-up positions had significant differences among all the channels.

To sum up, Iraqia, Furat, Baghdad, and Hurria channels presented the story topics and candidates in certain ways that echoed the agenda and beliefs of the channels' sponsors. This is done by the selection and omission of information on some issue/candidates and the exaggerated emphasis on covering their preferred story topics and political candidates, except for Iraqia TV that was not directly involved in promoting political candidates. Unfortunately, Iraqia TV did not abide by its mandate to remain impartial and independent from the government and Prime Minister's office. It is noteworthy to mention here that Baghdad TV, which generally presented most story topics in a negative manner, was closer to Furat TV since both were overtly partisan, while Hurria TV, which stood at the opposite side of Baghdad TV, was closer to Iraqia channel in covering the election news. This study reached the above results by analysing the channels' news formats like the use of verbal narratives, still images, and films as well as investigating the production techniques like the candidates' spatial relationships with audience and the use of camera angles.

Horse-Race Issue

Finally, the third research question asked: Did these channels focus on the coverage of candidates' characteristics or horse-race aspect of the General Election? The horse-race aspect is very important because it makes some candidates look viable. According to Bartels, voters usually choose a candidate who is more viable than others, and (s)he consequently looks more positive (1988). This is related to the priming impact of TV news (Iyengar 1992). Hence, television viewers tend to recall the viable candidates who have been heavily covered in the news and regard them as more influential than the other candidates.

In relation to this study, the horse-race issue was measured based on the number of references to poll surveys that referred to the competing parties and their alleged popularity. The author concluded that the channels were not very interested in presenting

this issue except for Furat TV that made only five references to this issue. This fact suggests the channels' sponsors were not very concerned with the horse-race coverage and its impact on Iraqi viewers who usually suspect official figures. This lack of interest was probably due to the heritage of Saddam Hussein' rule. In the 2002 referendum, the government announced that Hussein won over 99 of the votes in which over 11 million Iraqis participated (BBC News 2002). In other words, the channels studied here focused on the candidates' characteristics more than the horse-race aspect of the election.

Contributions to Knowledge

This study is one of the first ones that offers an in-depth analysis of the 2010 Iraqi elections. Despite the fact that many studies were published on Arab elections, there are very few ones that are focused on the Iraqi elections which analysed media channels broadcasting in Arabic. Besides, the available few studies are mostly limited to basic quantitative analysis, whereas the qualitative side is rather tackled in a simple and sometimes superficial manner.

In relation to theory of objectivity, this research has shown that CMC's assertion of applying the universal principles of good journalism in Iraq is too ideal simply because these principles are impossible to be applied in the current political climate of Iraq which is in a state of an emerging democracy. In fact, Iraq's case is similar to many other countries around the world especially in Latin America, post-communist Russia, and Eastern Europe which witnessed a political transition toward democratic rule. One has to take into account the burden of the past Baathist legacy, lack of proper independent training and funding, and the increasing polarisation of the Iraqi society. The Iraqi media is still marginalised by politicians like other countries that witnessed a political transition.

Similar to the case of post-communist Eastern European countries and Russia where a kind of advocacy journalism is practiced, Iraqi journalists' ideological beliefs overwhelmed the way they covered the election; hence, this research reached results that are voiced by other media scholars on the influence of ideology and nature of political system on media freedom and objectivity (Oates 2006, Jakubowicz, 2001; Bagdikian, 1983; Miller, 2000; Gans 2004; Gauthier, 1993; Garyantes and Murphy 2010). Like Russia and Eastern Europe, Iraq is still confined to the authoritarian past but to a more intense degree. In Latin America where journalism of opinion is viewed as the norm, the

media plays a vital role in the society. Waisbord (2000) stressed that the press in Latin America enjoys a great deal of respect especially that watchdog journalism has 'contributed to the quality of South American democracies' (p. 246). Unfortunately, the Iraqi media has not reached this level yet since the political elite control the state and the media; as a result, many media outlets and practitioners must succumb to political pressure and become agenda senders instead of agenda setters in order to survive. Some scholars predicted that Iraq's media which inherited old-fashioned practices might witness a regression into the authoritarian media model if there are no serious changes to media performance (Kim, 2007; Kim and Hama-Saeed, 2008, p. 592). This prediction might prove to be true if the nature of the political system in Iraq does not allow real democratic practices to function wherein journalists are encouraged and empowered by the state itself to speak freely without censorship or the fear of punishment.

In terms of the research contribution to election studies, this study offered an in-depth understanding into the way Iraqi journalists and editors covered issues and political candidates during the 2010 election. In particular, the study manifested how the basic principles of journalism like objectivity and balance that are clearly stipulated in CMC's code of ethics are intentionally ignored in order to support a political slate or group. Despite all the discussion on media democracy and political freedom in the new Iraq, this research showed that the media is heavily suffering from political control and advocacy. In other words, there was no clear change from Iraq before 2003 since media practices have generally remained the same. This is also relevant to Iraqia TV which was originally established to be independent from the state; the results of this study indicated that the channel was not balanced in its coverage of the elections.

Recommendations for Further Research

This study is limited to four Iraqi television channels, and is mainly focused on analysing the newscasts related to election news. Also, the period covered is limited to the fourteen days that led up to the Election Day.

In terms of expanding this study, further research can be conducted to analyse the non-verbal language shown on TV such as candidates' gestures, postures, and eye contact (Hellweg and Phillips 1981). In relation to the production techniques, more studies can be

done to explore the audience reaction shots, screen placement, composition, and timing that have an influence on TV viewers (McCain et al. 1977; Tiemens, 1970; Tiemens 1978). Also, the 2010 election coverage can be compared with the upcoming 2014 election covered by the same four channels investigated in this study. In this way, the researcher(s) will be able to understand if any kind of positive development occurred in these channels and the nature of issues that will become more/less prominent in 2014. Also, comparisons can be made between the coverage of the 2010 Iraqi election and other Arab TV channels covering other elections in other countries to see the differences and similarities in terms the production techniques and news formats used. Another research angle can be explored by investigating the same four channels aired during normal days. Random samples of their newscasts can be recorded to be systematically analysed and discussed. The researcher(s) can then understand how these channels present the news at times that do not fall within the period of election campaigns.

Further studies can be conducted to explore the application of the principles of good journalism, framing, and agenda-setting role by independent Iraqi channels that are not directly affiliated with political parties such as Baghdadia, Asharqiya, or Diyar channels. Indeed, there are tens of such channels that air via Nilesat and target Iraqi audience inside and outside the country. Such studies can be done at any time without the need to have election campaigns. Also, similar studies can be conducted to understand the way other partisan channels cover the news such as Maliki's Afaq TV, Mutlaq's Babyliah channel, or the Muslim Scholars Association's Rafidain TV. In other words, there are plenty of research opportunities that can be undertaken to fully understand the new Iraqi media and their varied rhetoric.

More importantly, participant observation research needs to be conducted to further understand the media ethics and practices followed by Iraqi journalists. The results of such studies can support the evidence collected from the content analysis of the programmes aired by the TV channels. Also, audience-based studies in Iraq are lacking due to security concerns that usually lead to high research costs; they can give researchers good indications on audience media preferences and the issues that preoccupy them. The findings can assist media experts in understanding the agenda-setting role of the media channels after being carefully analysed.

Unfortunately, the results of this study suggest that the Iraqi TV channels discussed here did not abide by the principles of good journalism such as objectivity, balance, and impartiality. Further, each channel seemed to be targeting its own sect or ethnic group as if other minorities did not exist. Though they claimed to be impartial and objective, the results showed that they were far from these objectives due to their partisan or religious affiliations. These channels were rather reserved in showing the negative attributes of other candidates/slates because they either feared retribution, libel suits, or breaking possible political alliances in the near future especially during the formation of the Parliament. This situation is similar to what Europe went through in the decades that preceded the 1980s. Semetko et al. (1991) described it as a *sacerdotal* editorial approach that heavily relied on conservative official policies or the 'party logic'.

To improve the Iraqi media, the Iraqi Media Network (IMN) with its affiliate media outlets like Iraqia TV must become truly impartial and independent from the government; IMN was aligned with the ruling entity since its establishment in 2003. Also, a stronger and more transparent role for the Iraqi Communication and Media Commission (CMC) is urgently needed. CMC, which regularly monitors all the media outlets, posted only three monitoring reports in 2010 in which it sounded as a defender of the government and its Prime Minister instead of questioning everyone. Sadly, it blindly follows Maliki's orders in closing down TV stations just because they opposed the PM's policies. Indeed, CMC must be a separate entity that answers no one but the Iraqi Parliament and the public. Also, the Iraqi Media Center which is run by Maliki's media advisor must either be truly independent from the PM's grip or be dissolved because it is functioning as a propaganda tool for Maliki. Finally, pluralistic media outlets are surely needed in Iraq, but they must not be allowed to regard other sects or ethnic minorities as foreign to Iraq's mosaic of religious and ethnic groups. This will ensure that media channels will not be responsible for politically, socially, or culturally dividing the country.

Finally, throughout the newscasts the author investigated, there were rare investigative reports that questioned the government and the powerful ruling parties. Despite the new political change and the new talk on spreading and applying democracy, Iraqi journalists are generally reluctant to point out the shortcoming of their government or armed militias with whom they might share an ideological belief. Yet with the

emergence of popular revolutions in the Arab world and in Iraq in particular, the near future might witness more freedoms and better media channels that can freely point out shortcomings and hold the government and its officials accountable for what they did.

Appendix I

Media Regulations Stipulated in No. (111),
Penal Code 1969

Paragraph 225 - Any person who publicly insults the President or his representative is punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 7 years or by detention.

Paragraph 226 - Any person who publicly insults the National Assembly or the government or the courts or the armed forces or any other constitutional body or the public authorities or official or semiofficial agencies or departments is punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 7 years or detention or a fine.

Paragraph 227 - Any person who publicly insults a foreign state or any international organisation having an office in Iraq or that country's Head of State or its representative in Iraq or its flag or national emblem when it is displayed in accordance with Iraqi law, is punishable by a period of detention not exceeding 2 years plus a fine not exceeding 200 dinars. Legal proceedings may only be brought in respect of this offence by written permission from the Minister of Justice.

Paragraph 433 - (1) Defamation is the imputation to another in public of a particular matter which if true, would expose such person to punishment or cause him to be scorned by society. Any person who defames another is punishable by detention plus a fine or by one of those penalties. If such defamation is published in a newspaper or publication or other press medium it is considered an aggravating circumstance.
(2) Such person is not permitted to establish the proof of his imputation unless that imputation is directed at a public official or agent or public deputy or he is carrying out an act in the public interest or if such imputation is connected with the office or employment of the aggrieved person but if he establishes the proof of all imputations made, then there is no offence.

Paragraph 434 - Insult is the imputation to another of something dishonourable or disrespectful or the hurting of his feelings even though it does not include an imputation to him of a particular matter. Any person who insults another is punishable by a period of detention not exceeding 1 year plus a fine not exceeding 100 dinars or by one of those penalties. If such insult is published in a newspaper or publication or medium it is considered an aggravating circumstance.

Paragraph 435 - If the defamation or insult is directed at the victim in private or during a telephone conversation or if it is sent to the victim in writing or communicated to him by other means, the penalty will be a period of detention not exceeding 6 months plus a fine not exceeding 50 dinars or by one of those penalties.

Paragraph 436 - (1) It is not an offence if a complainant or his representative defames or insults the other party orally or in writing while defending his rights before a court, investigating. authority or other body as long as it is within the necessary limits of his defence.

(2) There is no penalty for any person who has defamed or insulted another while in a state of anger following an unjust assault on him by such other person.

Paragraph 437 - Any person who by reason of his office, profession, trade or the field of nature of his work is privy to confidential information and who discloses such information in circumstances other than those prescribed by law or uses it to his. advantage or to another's advantage is punishable by a period of detention not exceeding 2 years plus a fine not exceeding 200 dinars or by one of those penalties. However, there is no penalty if he has been authorised to make such disclosure or if, by such disclosure, he intends to report a felony or misdemeanour or prevent the commission of such offence.

Paragraph 438 - The following persons are punishable by a period of detention not exceeding 1 year plus a fine not exceeding 100 dinars or by one of those penalties:

(1) Any person who publishes in any way a picture, remark or information in respect of the private or family life of another, even though such information is true and such publication causes him offence.

(2) Any person other than those mentioned in Paragraph 328 who is privy to information contained in a letter, telex or telephone conversation and he discloses such information to a person other than for whom it is intended and such disclosure causes harm to another.

Appendix II

Inventory of Iraqi Satellite Channels

This list is compiled by the author of this work; it contains a description of the present and some old Iraqi satellite channels that appeared after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Though most of them are partisan in nature, almost all of them claim that they address all Iraqi groups and ethnicities and present neutral, objective, and credible news and non-sectarian programmes. Also, many channels are digitally streaming online. This list does not include the terrestrial TV stations which are believed to be more than the satellite channels. According to Arab Advisors Group (AAG), more than half the terrestrial channels in the Arab world are based in Iraq, Palestine and Egypt, and they are mostly controlled by the respective governments (AAG, 2011).

Except for few political advertisements in Arabic, Kurdish channels air their news and programmes in Kurdish language. The only exception is probably Kurdistan TV that sometimes shows a news subtitle in Arabic. Most of the channels listed below intend to type the Kurdish language in Latin instead of Arabic as one way of asserting their national identity and cultural independence from the Arabs. These channels include: Kanal 4; Gelî Kurdistan; Zagros; Jamawar Kurdistan; Hawler (Sama Mosul); Korek; Kurdistan; Kurdsat; ROJ, Kurd MMC, and ViN.

1. **Afak TV:** It is run by the Shiite Daawa Party which is led by the Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki and airs programmes and news in favour of the Iraqi government's efforts to establish national unity and fight terrorism. Its slogan is 'the distinguished media message'.
   http://www.afaqtv.com/

2. **Al-Ahad TV**: The channel is pro-Shiite and follows Sadr movement who are represented by the Shiite Ayatollah, Kadhim Al-Hairi. It is against the practices of the former government of Saddam Hussein and is anti-occupational, too. It shows, for instance, the news of the pro-Iranian Asa'aib Ahlul Haq, the Mahdi Army splinter group who later kidnapped and executed several British employees working for a telecommunication company. The channel is mentioned in several Shiite websites and blogs, stressing that Muqtada al-Sadr does not sponsor it. It airs from Lebanon, and it shows many Iranian-produced series on Islam that are dubbed into Arabic. It is not clear who supports it, but the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah could be one source of funding for the channel. In general, it can be regarded as the most extreme Iraqi Shiite channel. Its slogans are: 'One pledge…one homeland' and 'Commitment and Vow'.
   http://www.alahadtv.com/

3. **Ahul Bayt TV**: It is a Shiite channel that airs its programmes in English, Arabic, and Urdu. It is based in London and is run by the Shiite cleric Mahdi Al-Mudarissi who lives in Karbala, Iraq. Its slogan is: 'The Holy Household for Every Household', which refers to the Household of the Prophet Mohammed. Some of the presenters are Shiites from Iraq, Yemen, and other Arab countries. The channel gets other financial support from well off Shiites living in the Arab Gulf, Europe, and northern America.
http://www.ahlulbayt.tv/

4. **Al-Babelyia TV:** The channel was firstly based in Cairo and then moved to Jordan. The channel's website mentions that it is independent from any political party or foreign government, and its progrmmes are neutral because it is loyal to Iraq alone. However, it is clearly supported by Salih Al-Mutlak, an Iraqi Sunni MP, because it periodically shows his speeches. According to its website, the channel's aim is to 'address the human being by advocating a civil and balanced rhetoric. It is a channel for all Iraqis and its policy is to point out the positive aspects and criticise the negative ones no matter who has committed mistakes. Our weapon is dialogue'. However, its website is no more functioning.
http://www.albabelyia.com/

5. **Al-Diyar TV:** The channel is based in Baghdad and is run by Omar Al-Yassiri, the son of the famous Iraqi cinema director and media expert, Faisal Al-Yassiri. It tries to remain independent and balanced and has become popular by producing programmes that concern the general public. The most distinguished figure show is Falah Azzawi who always criticises the lack of public services and sides with ordinary Iraqis in his show 'Amongst the People' (Parker & Salman 2010). It is partly funded by the Saudi media company, ART (Arab Radio and Television). Its slogan is an 'Arab satellite channel with an Iraqi falvour'.
http://www.aldiyarsat.net/

6. **Al Etejah TV:** The programmes of the channel are mostly related to Iraq's news, and they generally show pro-government attitudes and with a Shiite orientation. It is not clear who supports this channel, but it airs from Lebanon and it occasionally refers to the news of the pro-Iranian Hezbollah Brigades which are allegedly close to the Lebanese Hezbollah. In one of CMC's reports, the channel was described as 'professional as it follows the media regulations' despite the fact that it airs some of the activities of Shiite armed militias such as 'League of the Righteous', the 'Promised Day Brigades', 'Hezbollah's Units in Iraq' (CMC 2010c, 35). The report does not criticise the channel as it clearly sides with al-Maliki's Shiite-run government that supports al-Sadr movement.
http://www.aletejahtv.org/

7. **Al-Fayhaa TV:** The channel first started broadcasting in July 25, 2004 and was originally located in Dubai but moved to Sulymaniah in northern Iraq after the expiry of its license in the UAE. It became a controversial channel from the beginning because of its pro-Shiite programmes. When the UAE diplomat, Naji Al-Naimi, was kidnapped in Baghdad in 2006, the kidnappers demanded that the UAE government must stop this channel from transmission. The channel mainly focuses on the plights of Shiite during Saddam's rule and always brings up the issue of Iraqi detainees held by Saudi Arabia in Rafah Camp since the 1991 Gulf War. It usually airs programmes and shows that focus on the shortcomings of Arab leaders. Its slogan is 'freedom of opinion and the responsibility of the stance'.
   http://www.alfayhaa.tv/

8. **Al-Furat Satellite TV**: It is established by the Shiite Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). It first started broadcasting from Iran during Saddam Hussein's rule as a propaganda tool to reveal the reality of the former regime in Iraq. After the US-led invasion, it moved its main office to Iraq. On its website, it is described as an 'edifice of truthful and committed media'. Its slogan is a 'channel of balance and originality' which is concerned with the 'athletic, political, and social religious cultural and economic affairs of the Iraqi people'. The channel states that it addresses 'the Iraqi people with all their ethnic and religious groups and sects as well as the Arab and Muslim people'. See chapter two for more information on this channel.
   http://www.alforattv.net/

9. **Al-Ghadeer TV:** It is a Shiite channel that is run by ISCI's armed militia, Badr Organisation which is currently led by of Hadi al-Amiri. Most of its programmes are Shiite-oriented sermons and seminars. On its website, it is mentioned that it was the first Iraqi television to broadcast terrestrially after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. Four years later, it began broadcasting via satellite. It also states that it is an 'Iraqi, Arabic, and Islamic channel that aims at spreading the noble principles and values and consolidating the concept of unity among Muslims. It also attempts to encourage dialogue, clemency, and communication between cultures'.
   http://www.alghadeertv.com/

10. **Al-Hadhara TV:** This is a relatively new apolitical channel that airs on Nilesat. From its name (Civilization), it aims at broadcasting programmes that highlight the historical, cultural, and artistic achievements of Iraq.

11. **Al-Hadath TV:** The channel is based in Cairo and is run by Abdullattif Humaim, the head of the Iraqi group of Intellectuals and Scientists. It started broadcasting in October 28, 2009. On its website, the channel's manager, Mohammed A. Humaim, claims that the channel has a 'committed national, Arabic, and Islamic orientation…, and it does not belong to any side except what it believes to be a moderate trend that is closer to reality and farther from extremism'.
http://www.alhadathtv.com/

12. **Al-Hurria TV:** It is a Kurdish channel led by the PUK that is headed by the Iraqi president, Jalal Talabani. It was first established as a terrestrial channel and started broadcasting on the 17th of April 2003. On the 1st of December 2005, it was upgraded to a satellite channel and only started regular broadcasting on the 1st of February 2006 for 24 hours a day. Its programmes, which are pro-government, are broadcast in Arabic. According to its website, the channel advocates a balanced, logical, and reasonable rhetoric. It seeks to present objective news before breaking news 'amidst the sectarian media Iraq suffered from'. The aim of the channel is to disseminate the concepts of liberty, democracy, and lenience. Its motto is 'Boldness, Reliability, and Tolerance'.
www.alhurriatv.com/

13. **Al-Iraqia Economic TV**: This is a channel that is based in Jordan. Its programmes are exclusively devoted to business news in an attempt to open up opportunities for investors to work in Iraq. It clearly receives support from the Iraqi government especially in terms of receiving money in return to the government advertisements the channels airs.

14. **Al-Lafeta TV and Al-Arabi TV**: The channel which is also called 'Saddam Hussein Satellite Channel' started broadcasting for few days during Eid holiday to commorate the execution of Saddam Hussein. It aired footages of Iraq's former president and popular songs, but the channel agiated many people in Iraq. It called for resisting the US occupation of Iraq and organising a revolution to change the political system. Its website stated that its aim is to protect the rights of the Arabs and Muslims around the world. The channel was allegedly managed by an Algerian citizen and used to broadcast from an undisclosed location to protect its staff. Due to tremendous pressures from the Iraqi government, it stopped transmission, but it claimed that it would resume broadcasting after fixing some technical issues.
www.allafeta-tv.net/

15. **Al-Mansour TV:** The channel is based in Lebanon and is very critical of the Iraqi government, and it has a clear Baathist nostalgia for the former government of Saddam Hussein. For example, it shows on its subtitle news that mentions 'Saddam International Airport' instead of the post- 2003 name 'Baghdad

International Airport'. It is managed by the former Iraqi Ambassador to Jordan, Sabah Yaseen. The channel stopped transmission on Nilesat, presumably due to pressures from the US and Iraqi governments on Egypt. It is not clear who supports this channel, but it follows the rhetoric of an Iraqi Baathist website that has the same name (http://www.almansore.com/index.php). Noteworthy, Al-Mansour which means victorious in Arabic was one of Saddam Hussein's epithets. Even the channel's website has remained under construction for a very long time.
http://www.almansourtv.net/

16. **Al-Masar TV & Al-Masar One TV:** These two channels are supported by the Shiite Dawa Party- Iraq Organisation that is led by Abdul Karim al-'Anizi. They are managed by Ayssa al-Furaiji who advocates the idea of 'responsible Shiite media'. Their slogan is 'The Message of Committed Arab Media'. The programmes are religious with a moderate rhetoric. Recently, Al-Masar One TV channel was launched to complement the programmes aired on Al-Masar TV.
http://www.almasartv.com/?cat=3

17. **Al-Mashriq TV**: The channel is supported by the Sunni Sheikh Ghandi al-Kastinzani who owns a newspaper with a similar name. The channel was based in Amman, Jordan, but it only aired for few months since the station could not secure enough profit to continue.

18. **Al-Mowsellya TV:** It was established in 2006. The channel airs from Mosul city and is managed and run by Ghazi Faisal. It appears to be supported by Mosul City Council. Its programmes are mainly related to the events happening in Mosul that has a Sunni majority. Its slogan is: 'Iraqi in Origin; its source is Mosul'.
http://www.almowselya.com/

19. **Al-Mutahida TV** (United Media TV): The channel mostly airs entertainment programmes and songs and is supported by the United Media Network.

20. **Al-Anbar TV:** It is based in Anbar governorate and is supported by Anbar Government Council. Its programmes focus on the political developments in the country, and it highlights the cultural and economic events and concerns of this Sunni governorate.

21. **Al Qethara TV:** It is called the 'channel of Iraqi Tunes' and is devoted to Iraqi music and art taken from the different regions of Iraq. It airs from Jordan.
http://www.alqiethara.tv/

22. **Al-Rafiden TV**: The channel is based in Egypt and is supported by the Sunni Muslim Scholars Association, headed by Harith Al-Dhari. It was launched on April 10, 2006. It had an office in Baghdad, but it was lately closed down because of the different attacks it suffered, according to the channel. Since the Muslim Scholars Association is closely aligned to the Muslim Brothers movement, there is a possible source of funding for he channel that comes from the Sunni Egyptian Muslim Brothers. The channel focuses on the plight of Sunnis in Iraq and is very critical of the Shiite dominated Iraqi government and its policies. According to its website, the channel's aim is to 'call for the departure of the occupier' and emphasises 'Iraqis' and Iraq's unity' and 'despises the occupation and its cultural and political leftovers'. Its slogan is "Because we are a civilization'.
http://www.alrafidain.tv/

23. **Al-Rasheed TV:** It is an independent TV. On its website, it states that the channel follows an approach characterised by 'variety and balance'. It does not 'pass judgments but presents events as they are'. The channel's slogan is to be 'devoid of any sectarian and ethnic influences'. Most of what is aired is Arabic series and documentaries, and the most famous programme that it broadcasts is 'Comedy Star' that presents Iraqis competing to become comedians.
http://www.alrasheedmedia.com/

24. **Al-Salam TV:** The channel is based in Khadimiah in Baghdad and is supported by the moderate Shiite cleric, Hussein Ismael Al-Sadr. According to the channel's website, it follows a 'moderate political and religious rhetoric' and it 'produces different programmes focusing on children, politics, religious, cultural, and social issues'. The channel is regarded as the most moderate Shiite TV due to the policy followed by its founder. It slogan is 'Our message is peace'. Salam in Arabic means peace, too.
http://www.tvalsalam.tv/

25. **al-Shams TV**: This is a new Iraqi channel on Nilesat, but it has not started actual transmission. It is not clear who supports the channel especially that there is no official website available. Its general director is Maki Awad, the famous Iraqi actor.

26. **Al-Sharqiya TV**: It is one of the most popular Iraqi TV channels. Based on Saudi funding, the channel started broadcasting from Iraq in 2004 then moved to Dubai after having security problems with the Iraqi government. It is regarded by many as the most popular TV channel mainly due to its reality TV shows (Wong 2005) and other series that harshly crticise Iraqi officials and the current situation such

as 'Night Wolves', 'Love and War', and 'An Owned Chair'. The channel is known to favour Ayad Allawi. See chapter two for more information on this channel. www.alsharqiya.com/

27. **Al-Taakhi TV**: It is a Kurdish channel supported by the KDP that is led by Masud Barazani. It started broadcasting on the same frequency of Zagros TV on Hotbird for few on August, 1 2005, and some of its programmes were in Arabic. It stopped transmission after about a couple of years. The KDP has a famous Arabic newspaper under the same name.

28. **Arrai TV:** The channel is based in Syria and is directed by the Sunni Misha'an Al-Jubouri who previously owned the controversial Al-Zawraa channel. Arrai tries to imitate Al-Zawraa but to a lesser extent by showing subtitles that document most of the activities of the Iraqi insurgent groups. Al-Jubouri claims that the new channel is not his own because it is owned by his Syrian wife and that he is only managing it. The channel has generated a great deal of controversy because of its anti-government stances and its support for armed struggle against the US-led forces in Iraq. In a confidential US cable leaked by Wikileaks, the US government pressured Syria to 'stop broadcasts from Damascus of Ba'thist-backed satellite channels glorifying terrorism and violence, but had not seen any action' (Department of State, 2009). This is a clear reference to Arrai TV channel.

29. **Ashur TV**: It is supported by the Christian Assyrian Democratic Party and airs its programmers in Syriac and Arabic. It broadcasts from California, USA and focuses on themes related to Iraqi Christians. Its website is not functioning at the moment.
http://www.ashurtv.org/

30. **Azzawra' TV:** It is a controversial channel supported by Misha'an Al-Jubouri that first aired from Iraq and then moved to Egypt. It was closed due to pressures from the American and Iraqi governments on the Egyptian authorities because the channel encouraged insurgency and continued broadcasting footage of insurgent groups. See chapter two for more information on this channel.

31. **Baghdad TV**: The channel airs from Baghdad and is supported by the Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party which is part of the political group, the Accord Front. Its programmes are mostly devoted to covering the issue of Sunni plight in the new government. See chapter two for more information on this channel.
http://www.baghdadch.tv/

32. **Baghdadia TV:** Its motto is 'The eye of Iraq on the world, and the world's eye on Iraq'. It is owned by the Iraqi businessman, Uon Hussein Al-Khashluq, and it

started broadcasting on 12 September 2005 from Cairo, Egypt. On its website, the channel claims to be against sectarianism, favouritsim, and calls for unity, freedom, and democracy. It became very famous after one of its correspondents, Muntadar Al-Zaidi, threw his shoes at the US president George Bush during a pres conference held in Baghdad in 2009. The channel faces tremendous pressures from official bodies because they do not give it the chance to air their advertisements, hoping to change its national policy. In one American report, the channel was labeled in the category of channels opposing the US presence in Iraq, and its staff were regarded as 'one of the biggest sources of erroneous stories. But when presented with clarifying information, they would typically choose not to provide a retraction or this alternative point of view (Cioppa 2009, 37). It has produced several interesting and famous series and reality shows like 'Put Him in Bucca' which created a great deal of controversy locally and internationally, making CMC revokes the channel's license and orders the closure of its offices in Iraq on September 7, 2010 because it breached the media laws. After restoring its license, the channel was permanently closed during the attack on Our Lady of Salvation Church in Baghdad on October 31, 2010. Al-Maliki's government was infuriated by the channel's decision to air the demands of a number of kidnappers from al-Qaeda group who took civilian hostages inside the church.
http://www.albaghdadia.com/

33. **Biladi TV:** It is a Shiite TV channel. According to its website, it 'reflects the pulse of the Iraqi street without siding with any group or sect in the society'. It further states that it 'speaks on behalf of the Iraqi people, and it is the voice of all Iraqis from various origins'. The channel describes itself as a 'national, political, and news channel that airs up-to-date news'. However, the channel usually focuses on issues relevant to the Shiites of Iraq. The channel airs Iranian-produced series dubbed into Arabic tackling Islamic history. It is run by the Shiite leader of the National Reformation Movement and former Prime Minister and former leader of Da'awa Party, Ibrahim Al-Jaafri.
http://www.beladitv.net/

34. **Dijla TV:** The channel was established in 2008 and was supported by Diyala Governorate Council. The channel was secular and used to air cultural programmes and shows and had a moderate rhetoric. However, it stopped transmission in January 2010 few months after facing financial difficulties since the funding it got from the Council ceased in mid 2009.

35. **Iraqyia TV or Iraqia TV:** This is the official television channel in Iraq that is hoped to be a public broadcasting station that is part of the Iraqi Media Network (IMN). It broadcasts in three languages: Arabic, Kurdish, and English. There are other channels linked to IMN: Iraqia Sport TV, Alforqan TV (religious programmes), Iraqia Education TV (programmes targeting students), and Iraqia Antikhabia (elections). The latter started broadcasting advertisements for political

parties in 2009 in preparation for the 2010 elections, but it stopped transmission after the end of the elections. There was Ittyaf Iraqia TV which broadcasts programmes in Kurdish, Turkomen and other languages spoken in Iraq, but the channel stopped due to IMN decision to reduce its budget in 2009. See chapter two for detailed information on this channel.
www.imn.iq

36. **Ishtar Broadcasting Cooperation TV:** It airs from Erbil city in Iraqi Kurdistan in three languages: Arabic, Syriac, and Kurdish. It started broadcasting in 2005. The channel emphasises the legal, cultural, political, and historical rights of Iraqi Christians. According to its website, it 'gives sufficient importance to our Chaldean Syriac Assyrian people whose civilization and national identity were marginalised and obliterated for long decades'. The current head of the channel is the Canadian Iraqi, George Mansour, who worked in the beginning in the official Iraqia TV.
http://www.ishtartv.com/

37. **Itv (Iraq Television):** This is a new channel, but it is not clear who funds it. It is managed by the pro-government Kurdish media figure, Ismael Zayer, who is also the editor-in-chief of *al-Sabah al-Jadeed* newspaper. According to its website, ITV 'aims to inform the Arab sphere and in particular Iraqis as citizen, consumers, employees and entrepreneurs. It provides a varied package of programs for all age groups, men and women, with a special focus on culture'. The channel is available on Nilesat, but there is no transmission. Also, its website is not functioning at the moment.
http://www.itv-iraq.com/

38. **Karbala TV:** It is a Shiite channel devoted to airing the Shiite sermons and festivities of Karbala city. It was established on October 1, 2008 and started experimental transmission on August 22, 2009. It is supported by the Shiite Religious Endowment and is based in Karbala.
http://www.karbala-tv.net/

39. **Salah El-Din TV:** It airs from the Sunni Salahdeen governorate and focuses on the events of this governorate. It is supported by Salahdeen City Council. It was temporarily closed down for airing footage of Iraqis mourning the death of Saddam Hussein whose hometown, Tikrit, is located in the same governorate.
http://www.salahdintv.net/

40. **Sumeria TV**: It is a well-respected and famous channel broadcasting from Beirut, Lebanon that was firstly established in September 2004. Owned by Iraqi

businessmen, it employs about 700 people, and it tries to show an objective account of the events taking place in Iraq. It has become famous after airing the popular 2005 show 'Iraq Star' which shows talented Iraqi singers competing to win (Hammond 2005). It also produced several famous Iraqi TV series that were aired during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. According to its website, the channel follows a moderate policy that involves all the sects and groups of the Iraqi society as the only way for peaceful co-existence. It slogan 'We Promote life' which reflects its policy.
http://www.alsumaria.tv/

41. **Suroyo TV**: It is a Christian channel that is based in Sweden. It first started broadcasting in 2004 and its programmes are aired in five languages: Syriac, Assyrian, Arabic, English, Turkish, and Swedish. The channel aims at addressing the Christians living in the Middle East region especially Iraq, Syria, and Turkey though its transmission reaches other Christian who immigrated to Europe and America.

42. **Turkmen TV**: It is a Turkomen TV that airs in Turkomen and Arabic languages and is obviously supported by Turkey. The channel uses Latin words instead of Arabic just like modern Turkish language. Most of the programmes focus on the issue of Kirkuk and it favours the Turkomen and their culture by emphasising their rights and concerns. It slogan is 'Irak'in Aydinlik Yüzü'.
http://www.turkmenelitv.com/tv/

Appendix III

The Code Book

The code book is written to test the coding frames designed to analyse the election news stories. There are three coding frames relating to three distinct levels of analysis: programme level, story-level attributes, and sub-story features.

1. **Coding Date:** The date on which coding took place……………..

2. **Coder's Name:** Please write down your first name. ………………..

Coding Frame (1)
Programme Level

1. **Newscast Code No.**: This code is given by the coders. It is done by relying on channel's code number and date of transmission. For instance, Al-Iraqia channel broadcasts a newscast on 2nd of March 2010, the code becomes (1.23) and so on. A separate list of all named news broadcasts each with its own numerical code is compiled. That code number can be entered here, by referring to the programme checklist.

2. **Newscast Duration:** It is the duration of the whole newscast in seconds.

3. **Please circle the channel's code number:** 1. Al-Iraqia 2. Al-Furat   3.   Baghdad 4. Al-Hurria

4. **Date of Transmission:** It refers to the date of broadcasting the newscast. This is usually mentioned either in the beginning of the newscast by the anchor or in the news bar. If it is not there, the principal investigator can assist you since he has the exact dates of all the newscasts.

5. **Total number of stories in the newscast that are related to the election**: How many stories were presented in the newscast analysed?

6. **What is the number of stories of different topic-types throughout the newscast that are related to the election?**

    Topic-types

1.Political differences Code (1)   0   -   No. of stories: …….

2.Security/terrorism   Code (2)   0   -   No. of stories: …….

3.Democracy   Code (3)   0   -   No. of stories: …….

4.Public services   Code (4)   0   -   No. of stories: …….

5. Corruption/violation   Code (5) 0   -   No. of stories: …….

6. National unity/political dialogue   Code (6) 0   -   No. of stories:
    …….

7.Election fraud   Code (7)   0   -   No. of stories: …….

8. Federalism Code (8)   0   -   No. of stories: …….

9. Supporting Electoral Slate Code (9) 0   -   No. of stories: …….

10.   IHEC   Code (10) 0   -   No. of stories: ………..

11.   Other Code (11)   0   -   No. of stories: …….

The coder needs to determine the absence/presence (0-1) of the codes above throughout the newscast. The same rule applies to the measures below.

7.   What is duration of newscast time devoted to stories for each topic type?

Code (1)   0   -   1   Time: Seconds……………….

Code (2)   0   -   1   Time: Seconds……………….

Code (3)   0   -   1   Time: Seconds………………

Code (4)   0   -   1   Time: Seconds………………

Code (5)   0   -   1   Time: Seconds……………….

Code (6)   0   -   1   Time: Seconds……………….

Code (7)   0   -   1   Time: Seconds……………….

Code (8)   0   -   1   Time: Seconds……………….

Code (9)   0   -   1   Time: Seconds……………….

Code (10)   0   -   1   Time: Seconds……………….

Code (11)   0   -   1   Time: Seconds……………….

8. What is the number of stories that feature different format types throughout the newscast?

1. Newsreader (Talking Head)   Code (1)   0   -
          No. of stories: ……

2. Voice-over   Code (2)   0   -   No. of stories: ………….

3. Voice-over-sound-on-tape (VO/SOT)   Code (3)0   -
          No. of stories: ……
4. Recorded Interview   Code (4)   0   -   No. of stories: ……
5. Live interview Code (5)   0   -   No. of stories: ……

6. Package   Code (6)   0   -   No. of stories: ……
7. Film report (reporter unseen) Code (8)   0   -   No. of stories…….
8. In-studio interview Code (9) 0   -   No. of stories……..

The coder needs to determine the absence/presence (0-1) of the news story format partly following Grabe and Bucy's classification (2009). (1) The newsreader (talking head) where the anchor(s) is(are) shown alone; (2) voice-over where a still or moving picture of the candidate/scene is shown while the anchor reads the news; (3) voice-over-sound-on-tape (VO/SOT) story consists of a voice-over read by the anchor with accompanying visual material which includes a sound bite; (4) a recorded interview is known when the TV station mentions 'Repeated' or there is 'Live' text; (5) live interview is done on air; (6) a package is a news story in which the anchor reads an introduction to be followed by a recorded and edited report done by a correspondent; (7) a film report is presented to cover an event or story wherein the reporter is not seen; (8) in-studio interview is when a political candidate or expert is interviewed inside a studio.

Coding Frame (2)
Story-Level Attributes

1. What is the story's unique code number?

The coder depends on the following to assign a code for each story: The channel's code number, date of transmission, and the story's sequence in the newscast. Let us say, the coder is analysing the third story of the newscast broadcast by al-Hurria channel on the 27th of February, 2010. The story's code becomes (3.4.272).

2. What is the channel code number on which the story appeared?

3. What is the newscast code number?

4. What is the duration of the story presented?

Time: Seconds……………….

5. Circle the story's sequence in relation to the newscast as a whole.

1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7.   8.   9.   10.   11.
        12.   13.   14.   15.   16.   17.

6. What is the story's topic in relation to the election? Please choose the code(s) only……..

Topic-types

    1. Political differences   Code (1)   0   -   1
    2. Security/terrorism   Code (2)   0   -   1
    3. Democracy   Code (3)   0   -   1
    4. Public services   Code (4)   0   -   1
    5. Corruption/violation   Code (5)   0   -   1
    6. National unity/ Political dialogue   Code (6)   0   -1
    7. Election fraud   Code (7)   0   -   1
    8. Federalism   Code (8)   0   -   1
    9. Supporting Electoral Slate   Code (9)   0   -   1
    10. IHEC   Code (10)   0   -   1
    11. Other   Code   (11)   0   -   1

The coder needs to select a story topic which is usually the dominant focus of the news item. There might be more than one topic in a news item though. The topic of 'Political differences' is centred on the discussion of discord among political parties competing in the election. 'Security/terrorism' is a popular topic because it deals with the current reality on the ground. It is a broad topic which includes the coverage of security incidents such as bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, arrests…etc. Democracy is a topic that is usually linked to the election process. Here, the coder needs to observe if the discussion is on the democratic progress/achievement in the country. The topic of 'public services' is another popular one because it is related to the peoples' daily preoccupations. The lack or provision of water, electricity, petrol, and gas is within this category. Though rarely mentioned, corruption is one of the topics that is vital in Iraq since it paralyses the backbone of the economy. If there are references in the news item to corruption in the public or private sector, the coder needs to point it out. As for national unity/political dialogue, it deals with the issue of joining the different parties and alliances to form a

government of national unity which has been the slogan of Maliki's government. Election fraud deals with the idea that a certain party/state/side attempted to change or did change the election results for its own interest. Federalism is a favourite topic for some political parties. The focus is on this new political system that empowers the provinces. Again, the coder needs to point out if there are any references to this topic. Supporting electoral slate is a very common topic during election because it deals with a news story that is focused on showing the positive side of voting for a particular political party. The Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) is another topic that is usually tackled during election times because it deals with their statements and activities in preparation for the elections. Finally, there might be other topics not listed above, the coder needs to write the new one(s).

7. **What did the story contain?**

   1. Newsreader (Talking Head)   Code (1)   0   -   1
   2. voice-over   Code (2)   0   -   1
   3. Voice-over-sound-on-tape (VO/SOT)   Code (3)   0   -   1
   4. Recorded Interview   Code (4)   0   -   1
   5. Live interview   Code (5)   0   -   1
   6. Package   Code (6)   0   -   1
   7. Film report (reporter unseen)   Code (9)   0   -   1
   8. In-studio interview   Code (10)   0   -   1

8. **Has the story featured any narrative references to representatives of listed political parties?**

List of political parties' representatives

1. Nouri al-Maliki (Ali Adeeb, deputy), Dawa Party, **State of Law slate,** Code (1)
            0   -   1

2. Ayad Alawi (Tariq al-Hashimi, Atheel al-Nujaifi, Rafia' al-Eissawi, representatives), **al-Iraqiya slate,** Code (2)   0   -   1

3. Ammar al-Hakim (Adel Abdul Mahdi, Baqr Jabbir Solagh, Jalal al-Deen al-Sagheer, representatives), Islamic Supreme Council, **Iraqi National Alliance slate,** Code (3)   0   -   1

4. Muqtada Sadr (Hazim Al-'Araji, Bahaa' Al-'Araji, 'Aqeel Abid Hussein, Salih Al-'Aqeeli…etc. representatives) Sadr movement, **Iraqi National Alliance slate,** Code (4)   0   -   1

5. Jalal Talabani & Masud Barazani (Barham Salih, Fu'ad Ma'sum, representatives), **Kurdish Alliance slate**, Code (5)   0   -   1

6. Ayad al-Samaraei (Mahmood al-Mashhadani, Salman al-Jumaili, Rashid al-Azzawi, representatives), Iraqi Islamic Party**, Iraqi Accord Front,** Code (6)

        0   -   1

7. Others…., please specify………., Code (7) 0   -   1

9. Has the story featured any film report or images of representatives of listed political parties?

Code (1)	0	-	1
Code (2)	0	-	1
Code (3)	0	-	1
Code (4)	0	-	1
Code (5)	0	-	1
Code (6)	0	-	1
Code (7)	0	-	1

10. Has the story featured any interview with members of listed political parties?

Code (1)	0	-	1
Code (2)	0	-	1
Code (3)	0	-	1
Code (4)	0	-	1
Code (5)	0	-	1
Code (6)	0	-	1
Code (7)	0	-	1

11. Has the story featured any references to 'horse-race' issues?

Horse-race issue   0   -   1

The news story might be focused on depicting a horse-race coverage in the sense that the viewers are informed about the polls results that suggest who is ahead in the election campaign.

12. If the news story features a reference to a 'horse-race' issue, please circle the sequence of candidate(s)/party mentioned to be ahead in the polls/surveys.

1. Code (1)	0	-	Candidate/Party Code …….
2.Code (2)	0	-	Candidate/Party Code …….
3.Code (3)	0	-	Candidate/Party Code …….
4.Code (4), please specify………	0	-	Candidate/Party Code …….

The coder needs to examine if the news story mentions poll results. The coder needs to write down the code number of a candidate/party that is mentioned to be ahead in these polls.

Coding Frame (3)
Topic and Candidate Level

1. **What is the unique candidate code number?**

The coder can use the candidate's surname or first name if his surname is not known.

2. **What is the newscast code number?** ....

3. **What is the channel code number?** ....

4. **What is the story code number?** ....

5. **What is the newscast duration that is related to the election?** Seconds.........

6. **What is the story duration? Seconds.........**

7. **What is the story's topic(s)?**

   Code Number(s)...............

1.	Political dialogue/differences	Code (1)	0	-	1
2.	Security/terrorism	Code (2)	0	-	1
3.	Democracy	Code (3)	0	-	1
4.	Public services	Code (4)	0	-	1
5.	Corruption/violation	Code (5)	0	-	1
6.	National unity	Code (6)	0	-	1
7.	Election fraud	Code (7)	0	-	1
8.	Federalism	Code (8)	0	-	1
9.	Supporting electoral slate	Code (9)	0	-	1
10.	IHEC	Code (10)	0	-	1
11.	Other. Please specify............	Code (11)	0	-	1

8. What is the story's topic(s) score of terms from narrative signaling 'neutral'?

    1. Code (1)   0   -   Neutral Score No…………….

    2. Code (2)   0   -   Neutral Score No…………….

    3. Code (3)   0   -   Neutral Score No…………….

    4. Code (4)   0   -   Neutral Score No…………….

    5. Code (5)   0   -   Neutral Score No…………….

    6. Code (6)   0   -   Neutral Score No…………….

    7. Code (7)   0   -   Neutral Score No…………….

    8. Code (8)   0   -   Neutral Score No…………….

    9. Code (9)   0   -   Neutral Score No…………….

    10. Code (10)   0   -   Neutral Score No…………….

    11. Code (11)   0   -   Neutral Score No…………….

List of terms/expressions

Issue(s)	Negative	Positive	Neutral
1, 6, & 8	Discord	Unity	Discussions
1, 6, & 8	Conflict	Agreement	Normal process
1, 6, & 8	Disagreement	Harmony	Political process
1, 6, & 8	Feud	Understanding	Meetings
2 & 4	Deterioration	Improvement	Relative Peace
2	Violence	Peace	Relative Calmness
2	Escalation	Settlement	-----
2	Aggression	Reconciliation	Compromise
2	Hostility	Concord	----
2	Terrorists	Mujahideen	Insurgents
2	Antagonism	Friendliness	----
2	Baathist	Pro-Iraqi/ New Iraqi	----
4	Careless	Responsibility	----
3	Dictatorship	Pluralism	Political System
3	Autocracy	Democracy	National Government
5 & 7	Bribery	Transparency	Political System

5 & 7	Corruption	Clarity	---
5 & 7	Fraud	Openness	---
All	Regress	Progress	No change
Other… Please Specify			

The coder must to observe the verbal language in particular since it carries most of the meaning. (S)he needs to examine the nouns, adjectives, and adverbs used in relation to the topic/issue discussed (see the chart above on positive/negative/neutral expressions). In Arabic just like in English, there are positive/negative/neutral words which denote the way an issue is portrayed. For example, if the issue discussed in the news story is security, the coder needs to see how the source/expert/side is approaching it by carefully observing the words used. The statement might be positive in the sense that the security situation has improved due to the sincere efforts of the Iraqi government, or it might be neutral since the statement might only make a passing reference or present facts about the security situation without attributing any features to it. It is not required from the coder to pass judgments here since (s)he only needs to count the number of positive/negative/neutral attributes made on the issue discussed.

9. What is the story's topic score of terms from narrative signaling 'positive'?

1. Code (1)   0   -   Positive Score No…………….

2. Code (2)   0   -   Positive Score No…………….

3. Code (3)   0   -   Positive Score No…………….

4. Code (4)   0   -   Positive Score No…………….

5. Code (5)   0   -   Positive Score No…………….

6. Code (6)   0   -   Positive Score No…………….

7. Code (7)   0   -   Positive Score No…………….

8. Code (8)   0   -   Positive Score No…………….

9. Code (9)   0   -   Positive Score No…………….

10. Code (10)   0   -   Neutral Score No…………….

11. Code (11)   0   -   Neutral Score No…………….

10. What is the story's topic score of terms from narrative signaling 'negative'?

    1. Code (1)   0   -   Negative Score No…………….

    2. Code (2)   0   -   Negative Score No…………….

    3. Code (3)   0   -   Negative Score No…………….

    4. Code (4)   0   -   Negative Score No…………….

    5. Code (5)   0   -   Negative Score No…………….

    6. Code (6)   0   -   Negative Score No…………….

    7. Code (7)   0   -   Negative Score No…………….

    8. Code (8)   0   -   Negative Score No…………….

    9. Code (9)   0   -   Negative Score No…………….

    10. Code (10)   0   -   Neutral Score No…………….

    11. Code (11)   0   -   Neutral Score No…………….

11. Has the candidate been mentioned in the narrative?

  0. No   1. Yes

12. Is the candidate shown in film report?

  0. No   1. Yes

13. Is the candidate shown in studio interview?

  0. No   1. Yes

14. Has the news story described/discussed a candidate?

0. No (Proceed to question 18) 1. Yes (proceed to question 15)

Here, the news story might not deal with a candidate, so the coder can jump to question (19).

15. What is the candidate's score of terms from narrative signaling 'neutral'?

List of candidate/party terms or attributes (list the number only)

Negative	Positive	Neutral
Corrupt (1)	Transparent (2)	Politician (3)
Mean (4)	Honest (5)	Government worker (6)
Agent (7)	Nationalist (8)	Iraqi (9)
Fraudster (10)	Sincere (11)	Citizen (12)
Liar (13)	Straightforward (14)	Political Party (15)
Embezzlement (15)	Open (16)	----
Blackmail (17)	Forthright (18)	----
Theft (19)	Noble (20)	-----
Treachery ((21)	Trustworthy (22)	-----
Treason (23)	Reliable (24)	-----
Destructive (25)	Constructive (26)	----
Irresponsible (26)	Responsible/countable (27)	----
Baathist (28)	Pro-Iraqi (29)	----
Terrorist (30)	Peacemaker/ Peacekeeper (31)	----
Other…Please specify		

List of candidates and their parties and codes

1. Nouri al-Maliki (Ali Adeeb, deputy), Dawa Party, State of Law slate, Code (1) 0 - Neutrality Score No…………….

2. Ayad Alawi (Tariq al-Hashimi, Atheel al-Nujaifi, Rafia' al-Eissawi, representatives), al-Iraqiya slate, Code (2) 0 - Neutrality Score No…………….

3. Ammar al-Hakim (Adel Abdul Mahdi, Baqr Jabbir Solagh, Jalal al-Deen al-Sagheer, representatives), Islamic Supreme Council, Iraqi National Alliance slate, Code (3) 0 - Neutrality Score No…………….

4. Muqtada Sadr (Hazim Al-'Araji, Bahaa' Al-'Araji, 'Aqeel Abid Hussein, Salih Al-'Aqeeli…etc. representatives) Sadr movement, Iraqi National Alliance slate, Code (4) 0 - Neutrality Score No…………….

5. Jalal Talabani & Masud Barazani (Barham Salih, Fu'ad Ma'sum, representatives), Kurdish Alliance slate, Code (5) 0 - Neutrality Score No…………….

6. Ayad al-Samaraei (Mahmood al-Mashhadani, Salman al-Jumaili, Rashid al-Azzawi, representatives), Iraqi Islamic Party, Iraqi Accord Front, Code (6) 0 - Neutrality Score No…………….

7. Others…., please specify………., Code (7) 0 - Neutrality Score No…………….

16. What is the candidate's score of terms from narrative signaling 'positive'?
(please refer to the list of candidates/parties above)

    1. Code (1)   0   -   Positive Score No…………….

    2. Code (2)   0   -   Positive Score No…………….

    3. Code (3)   0   -   Positive Score No…………….

    4. Code (4)   0   -   Positive Score No…………….

    5. Code (5)   0   -   Positive Score No…………….

    6. Code (6)   0   -   Positive Score No…………….

    7. Code (7)   0   -   Positive Score No…………….

17. What is the candidate's score of terms from narrative signaling 'negative'?
(please refer to the list of candidates/parties above)

    1. Code (1)   0   -   Negative Score No…………….

    2. Code (2)   0   -   Negative Score No…………….

    3. Code (3)   0   -   Negative Score No…………….

    4. Code (4)   0   -   Negative Score No…………….

    5. Code (5)   0   -   Negative Score No…………….

    6. Code (6)   0   -   Negative Score No…………….

    7. Code (7)   0   -   Negative Score No…………….

18. Is a political candidate being shown on their own or alongside another contender?

1. No political contender interviewed	0	-	1
2. Party 1 contender interviewed	0	-	1
3. Party 2 contender interviewed	0	-	1
4. Party 3 contender interviewed	0	-	1
5. Party 4 contender interviewed	0	-	1
6. Party 5 contender interviewed	0	-	1

19. Is the political candidate being shown on their own or alongside another affiliate?

1. No political affiliate interviewed	0	-	1
2. Party 1 affiliate interviewed	0	-	1
3. Party 2 affiliate interviewed	0	-	1
4. Party 3 affiliate interviewed	0	-	1
5. Party 4 affiliate interviewed	0	-	1
6. Party 5 affiliate interviewed	0	-	1

20. If any, what is the candidate's spatial relationship with others?

Candidate (1)

1.	Shown alone	0	-	1
2.	Shown with others	0	-	1
3.	Touching distance to audience	0	-	1
4.	Speaking distance	0	-	1
5.	Public distance	0	-	1
6.	Further or unable to determine	0	-	1

Candidate (2), if available

7.	Shown alone	0	-	1
8.	Shown with others	0	-	1
9.	Touching distance to audience	0	-	1
10.	Speaking distance	0	-	1
11.	Public distance	0	-	1
12.	Further or unable to determine	0	-	1

Candidate (3), if available

13.	Shown alone	0	-	1
14.	Shown with others	0	-	1
15.	Touching distance to audience	0	-	1
16.	Speaking distance	0	-	1
17.	Public distance	0	-	1

18.   Further or unable to determine   0   -   1

The coder needs to circle the absence (No. 0) or presence (No. 1) of the items related to the candidate(s)' spatial relationship with others. Shown alone means the candidate is filmed alone with no one around him/her. Shown with others denotes that the candidate is accompanied by other supporters or affiliates. Touching distance refers to the candidate's position that is very close to the audience which denotes his/her proximity and attachment to the audience. As for speaking distance, it means that the candidate is a little bit away from the audience since there is some gap between him/her the others. Finally, public distance is when the candidate is on stage delivering a speech to the public.

21. What is the camera angle when the candidate(s) is shown?

Candidate (1)
        1. Eye level   0   -   1
        2. Full top view 0   -   1
        3. Bottom view 0   -   1

Candidate (2), if available

        1. Eye level   0   -   1
        2. Full top view 0   -   1
        3. Bottom view 0   -   1

Candidate (3) , if available
        1. Eye level   0   -   1
        2. Full top view   0   -   1
        3. Bottom view   0   -   1

The coder must point out the camera angle here. There are three positions only. Eye level means that the camera's angle is position in the same level of the eye, while full top level; means that the camera is higher than the candidate and the viewers can see the top of his/her head. Finally, bottom level refers to the camera whose angle is lower than the candidate and the viewers can see the candidate's shoes or lower limbs. The coder needs to circle the presence (No. 1) or absence (No. 0) of the relevant items.

8. In relation to the candidate(s), was the camera in close-up position?

Candidate (1)

    0. No   1. Yes

Candidate (2) , if available

0. No   1. Yes

Candidate (3) , if available

0. No   1. Yes

The coder needs to mention whether the camera zooms in when the candidate is shown. In other words, the camera shows details of the candidate's face and his reactions when he speaks or does some action.

Programme Level: Topics Distribution's Charts & Other Tables Based on Raw Data (from 22 February to 7 March)

Iraqia Channel:

Chart 1 No. of Stories of 'political differences' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 2 Time allotted to the topic of 'political differences' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 3 No. of Stories of 'security/terrorism' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 4 Time allotted to the topic of 'security/terrorism' (from 22 February to 7 March)

**Chart 5 No. of Stories of 'democracy' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)**

Chart 6 Time allotted to the topic of 'democracy' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 7 No. of Stories of 'public services' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 8 Time allotted to the topic of 'public services' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 9 No. of Stories of 'corruption/violation' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 10 Time allotted to the topic of 'corruption/violation' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 11 No. of Stories of 'national unity/political dialogue' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 12 Time allotted to the topic of 'national unity/political dialogue' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 13 No. of Stories of 'election fraud' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 14 Time allotted to the topic of 'election fraud' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 15 No. of Stories of 'IHEC' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 16 Time allotted to the topic of 'IHEC' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 17 No. of Stories of 'other' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 18 Time allotted to the topic of 'other' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Furat Channel:

Chart 19 No. of Stories of 'political differences' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

**Chart 20 Time allotted to the topic of 'political differences' (from 22 February to 7 March)**

Chart 21 No. of Stories of 'security/terrorism' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 22 Time allotted to the topic of 'security/terrorism' (from 22 February to 7 March)


Chart 23 No. of Stories of 'democracy' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)


**Chart 24 Time allotted to the topic of 'democracy' (from 22 February to 7 March)**

**Chart 25 No. of Stories of 'public services' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)**

**Chart 26 Time allotted to the topic of 'public services' (from 22 February to 7 March)**

**Chart 27 No. of Stories of 'corruption/violation' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)**

Chart 28 Time allotted to the topic of 'corruption/violation' (from 22 February to 7 March)


Chart 29 No. of Stories of 'national unity/political dialogue' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)


Chart 30 Time allotted to the topic of 'national unity/political dialogue' (from 22 February to 7 March)

**Chart 31 No. of Stories of 'election fraud' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)**

Furat - election fraud. No. of stories. Total: 61

22/2	23/2	24/2	25/2	26/2	27/2	28/2	1/3	2/3	3/3	4/3	5/3	6/3	7/3
3	3	6	4	6	6	4	2	4	5	7	3	6	2

Chart 32 Time allotted to the topic of 'election fraud' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Furat - election fraud. Time allotment. Total (12865)

22/2	23/2	24/2	25/2	26/2	27/2	28/2	1/3	2/3	3/3	4/3	5/3	6/3	7/3
313	579	1113	1168	1092	1094	828	220	877	914	1452	601	1141	1572

Chart 33 No. of Stories of 'federalism' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Furat - federalism. No. of stories. Total: 2

22/2	23/2	24/2	25/2	26/2	27/2	28/2	1/3	2/3	3/3	4/3	5/3	6/3	7/3
0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Chart 34 Time allotted to the topic of 'federalism' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 35 No. of Stories of 'supporting electoral slate' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

**Chart 36 Time allotted to the topic of 'supporting electoral slate' (from 22 February to 7 March)**

Chart 37 No. of Stories of 'IHEC' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

A bar chart showing the number of stories per day. Values by date:
22/2: 2, 23/2: 1, 24/2: 4, 25/2: 3, 26/2: 3, 27/2: 5, 28/2: 2, 1/3: 0, 2/3: 0, 3/3: 4, 4/3: 5, 5/3: 2, 6/3: 5, 7/3: 3

Legend: Furat-IHEC. No. of stories. Total: 39

Chart 38 Time allotted to the topic of 'IHEC' (from 22 February to 7 March)

A bar chart showing time allotment per day. Values by date:
22/2: 140, 23/2: 315, 24/2: 680, 25/2: 467, 26/2: 757, 27/2: 949, 28/2: 193, 1/3: 0, 2/3: 0, 3/3: 901, 4/3: 1076, 5/3: 535, 6/3: 883, 7/3: 1633

Legend: Furat-IHEC. Time allotment. Total (8529)

Chart 39 No. of Stories of 'other' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

A bar chart showing the number of stories per day. Values by date:
22/2: 0, 23/2: 2, 24/2: 5, 25/2: 1, 26/2: 9, 27/2: 5, 28/2: 11, 1/3: 5, 2/3: 3, 3/3: 7, 4/3: 7, 5/3: 3, 6/3: 12, 7/3: 11

Legend: Furat - Other. No. of stories. Total: 81

Chart 40 Time allotted to the topic of 'other' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Baghdad Channel:

Chart 41 No. of Stories of 'political differences' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 42 Time allotted to the topic of 'political differences' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 43 No. of Stories of 'security/terrorism' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 44 Time allotted to the topic of 'security/terrorism' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 45 No. of Stories of 'democracy' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 46 Time allotted to the topic of 'democracy' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Bar chart showing "Baghdad-democracy. Time allotment. Total (1684)" with values by date:
22/2: 0, 23/2: 0, 24/2: 413, 25/2: 128, 26/2: 154, 27/2: 0, 28/2: 0, 1/3: 0, 2/3: 153, 3/3: 8, 4/3: 249, 5/3: 0, 6/3: 426, 7/3: 163

Chart 47 No. of Stories of 'public services' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Bar chart showing "Baghdad - public services. No. of stories. Total: 65" with values by date:
22/2: 3, 23/2: 6, 24/2: 4, 25/2: 4, 26/2: 0, 27/2: 6, 28/2: 10, 1/3: 6, 2/3: 9, 3/3: 6, 4/3: 3, 5/3: 5, 6/3: 2, 7/3: 1

Chart 48 Time allotted to the topic of 'public services' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Bar chart showing "Baghdad-public services. Time allotment. Total (14153)" with values by date:
22/2: 956, 23/2: 1018, 24/2: 977, 25/2: 866, 26/2: 0, 27/2: 1228, 28/2: 1516, 1/3: 1815, 2/3: 1474, 3/3: 1575, 4/3: 654, 5/3: 1431, 6/3: 349, 7/3: 197

263

Chart 49 No. of Stories of 'corruption/violation' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 50 Time allotted to the topic of 'corruption/violation' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 51 No. of Stories of 'national unity/political dialogue' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 52 Time allotted to the topic of 'national unity/political dialogue' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 53 No. of Stories of 'election fraud' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 54 Time allotted to the topic of 'election fraud' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 55 No. of Stories of 'federalism' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

**Chart 56 Time allotted to the topic of 'federalism' (from 22 February to 7 March)**

Chart 57 No. of Stories of 'supporting electoral slate' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 58 Time allotted to the topic of 'supporting electoral slate' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 59 No. of Stories of 'IHEC' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

**Chart 60 Time allotted to the topic of 'IHEC' (from 22 February to 7 March)**

Chart 61 No. of Stories of 'other' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 62 Time allotted to the topic of 'other' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Hurria Channel:

Chart 63 No. of Stories of 'political differences' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 64 Time allotted to the topic of 'political differences' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 65 No. of Stories of 'security/terrorism' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 66 Time allotted to the topic of 'security/terrorism' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 67 No. of Stories of 'democracy' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 68 Time allotted to the topic of 'democracy' (from 22 February to 7 March)

**Chart 69 No. of Stories of 'public services' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)**

Chart 70 Time allotted to the topic of 'public services' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 71 No. of Stories of 'corruption/violation' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 72 Time allotted to the topic of 'corruption/violation' (from 22 February to 7 March)


Legend: Hurria-corruption / violation. Time allotment. Total (681)

Values by date: 22/2: 64, 23/2: 0, 24/2: 39, 25/2: 172, 26/2: 0, 27/2: 0, 28/2: 182, 1/3: 0, 2/3: 0, 3/3: 38, 4/3: 0, 5/3: 186, 6/3: 0, 7/3: 0

Chart 73 No. of Stories of 'national unity/political dialogue' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Legend: Hurria-national unity / political dialogue. No. of stories. Total: 13

Values by date: 22/2: 2, 23/2: 1, 24/2: 0, 25/2: 0, 26/2: 1, 27/2: 0, 28/2: 3, 1/3: 1, 2/3: 0, 3/3: 0, 4/3: 0, 5/3: 3, 6/3: 0, 7/3: 2

Chart 74 Time allotted to the topic of 'national unity/political dialogue' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Legend: Hurria- national unity / political dialogue. Time allotment. Total (1627)

Values by date: 22/2: 161, 23/2: 40, 24/2: 0, 25/2: 0, 26/2: 132, 27/2: 0, 28/2: 508, 1/3: 116, 2/3: 0, 3/3: 0, 4/3: 0, 5/3: 273, 6/3: 0, 7/3: 397

271

**Chart 75 No. of Stories of 'election fraud' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)**

Chart 76 Time allotted to the topic of 'election fraud' (from 22 February to 7 March)


**Chart 77 No. of Stories of 'federalism' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)**

Chart 78 Time allotted to the topic of 'federalism' (from 22 February to 7 March)


**Chart 79 No. of Stories of 'supporting electoral slate' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)**

Chart 80 Time allotted to the topic of 'supporting electoral slate' (from 22 February to 7 March)

## Chart 81 No. of Stories of 'IHEC' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 81 No. of Stories of 'IHEC' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 82 Time allotted to the topic of 'IHEC' (from 22 February to 7 March)


Chart 82 Time allotted to the topic of 'IHEC' (from 22 February to 7 March)

## Chart 83 No. of Stories of 'other' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)


Chart 83 No. of Stories of 'other' topic (from 22 February to 7 March)

## Chart 84 Time allotted to the topic of 'other' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Chart 84 Time allotted to the topic of 'other' (from 22 February to 7 March)

Table 1
Number of Topics and Their Time Allotment in Seconds

		Iraqia	Furat	Baghdad	Hurria	Total
1. Political differences	Number of stories	12	37	30	19	98
	Time allotment	1565	10343	8014	3396	23318
2. Security/terrorism	Number of stories	59	41	87	48	235
	Time allotment	7019	8114	18196	4754	38083
3. Democracy	Number of stories	24	34	9	22	333
	Time allotment	3427	7679	1684	2834	15624
4. Public services	Number of stories	4	39	65	21	129
	Time allotment	729	9085	14153	2408	26375
5. Corruption/violation	Number of stories	3	6	27	8	44
	Time allotment	311	2937	6096	681	10025
6. National unity/ political dialogue	Number of stories	13	24	30	13	80
	Time allotment	1568	5688	7095	1627	15978
7. Election fraud	Number of stories	31	61	38	25	155
	Time allotment	5289	12865	8834	2398	29386
8. Federalism	Number of stories	0	2	7	7	16
	Time allotment	0	159	1873	548	2580
9. Supporting electoral slate	Number of stories	0	106	141	43	290
	Time allotment	0	19511	26598	4326	50435
10. Iraqi High Electoral Commission (IHEC)	Number of stories	78	39	46	50	213
	Time allotment	12422	8529	10157	4065	35173
11. other	Number of stories	115	81	88	103	387
	Time allotment	14842	12062	18186	8773	53863

Table 2 Kruskal-Wallis Test on Number of Story Topics Differences

	Iraqia TV Mean Rank	Furat TV Mean Rank	Baghdad TV Mean Rank	Hurria TV Mean Rank	Chi-square	Asymp. Sig.
Political differences	19.18	36.71	32.89	25.21	10.34	*p < 0.016
Security/terrorism	28.57	21.25	41.36	22.82	13.42	**p < 0.004
Democracy	29.32	35.39	19.86	29.43	6.95	***p < 0.074
Public services	12.93	33.25	42.71	25.11	26.36	****p < 0.000
Corruption/ violation	20.00	24.93	41.79	27.29	17.08	*****p < 0.001
National unity/political dialogue	23.29	30.93	37.14	22.64	7.97	******p < 0.047
Election fraud	23.93	41.36	27.57	21.14	13.02	*******p < 0.005
Federalism	22.50	26.21	32.64	32.64	7.77	********p < 0.051
Supporting electoral slate	11.00	35.96	41.61	25.43	30.23	*********p < 0.000
IHEC	38.04	24.18	23.93	27.86	7.02	**********p < 0.071
Others	31.96	25.71	24.61	31.71	2.40	p < 0.494

*p < 0.016 (Political differences: There is a significant difference among the channels in the number of stories covering this topic)

**p < 0.004 (Security/terrorism: There is a significant difference among the channels in the number of stories covering this topic)

***p < 0.074 (Democracy: There is a significant difference among the channels in the number of stories covering this topic)

****p < 0.000 (Public services: There is a significant difference among the channels in the number of stories covering this topic)

*****p < 0.001 (Corruption/ violation: There is a significant difference among the channels in the number of stories covering this topic)

******p < 0.047 (National unity/political dialogue: There is a significant difference among the channels in the number of stories covering this topic)

*******p < 0.005 (Election fraud: There is a significant difference among the channels in the number of stories covering this topic)

********p < 0.051 (Federalism: There is a significant difference among the channels in the number of stories covering this topic)

*********p < 0.000 (Supporting electoral slate: There is a significant difference among the channels in the number of stories covering this topic)

**********p < 0.071 (IHEC: There is a significant difference among the channels in the number of stories covering this topic)

Table 3 ANOVA Test on the Story Topics Difference in Their Time Allotment

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Political Differences	Between Groups	3,919,186.071	3	1,306,395.357	12.34	*p < 0.000
	Within Groups	5,506,207.857	52	105,888.613		
	Total	9,425,393.929	55			
Security/Terrorism	Between Groups	7,587,111.911	3	2,529,037.304	12.62	**p < 0.000
	Within Groups	10,421,244.929	52	200,408.556		
	Total	18,008,356.839	55			
Democracy	Between Groups	1,467,959.857	3	489,319.952	4.12	***p < 0.011
	Within Groups	6,173,708.143	52	118,725.157		
	Total	7,641,668.000	55			
Public services	Between Groups	8,233,170.196	3	2,744,390.065	16.75	****p < 0.000
	Within Groups	8,520,084.786	52	163,847.784		
	Total	16,753,254.982	55			
Corruption/ violation	Between Groups	1,515,893.625	3	505,297.875	5.75	*****p < 0.002
	Within Groups	4,573,167.357	52	87,945.526		
	Total	6,089,060.982	55			
National Unity/Political Dialogue	Between Groups	1,712,428.643	3	570,809.548	4.40	******p < 0.008
	Within Groups	6,743,547.571	52	129,683.607		
	Total	8,455,976.214	55			
Election Fraud	Between Groups	4,384,818.357	3	1,461,606.119	9.41	*******p < 0.000
	Within Groups	8,081,398.143	52	155,411.503		
	Total	12,466,216.500	55			
Federalism	Between Groups	154,972.429	3	51,657.476	3.98	********p < 0.013
	Within Groups	675,057.286	52	12,981.871		
	Total	830,029.714	55			
Supporting Electoral Slate	Between Groups	33,637,478.196	3	11,212,492.732	24.06	*********p < 0.000
	Within Groups	24,234,082.929	52	466,040.056		
	Total	57,871,561.125	55			
IHEC	Between Groups	2,675,272.625	3	891,757.542	4.26	**********p < 0.009
	Within Groups	10,876,513.929	52	209,163.729		
	Total	13,551,786.554	55			

Other	Between Groups	3,440,517.196	3	1,146,839.065	2.20	p < 0.100
	Within Groups	27,173,668.357	52	522,570.545		
	Total	30,614,185.554	55			

*p < 0.000 (Political differences: There is a significant difference among the channels in the time allotted to this topic)

**p < 0.000 (Security/terrorism: There is a significant difference among the channels in the time allotted to this topic)

***p < 0.011 (Democracy: There is a significant difference among the channels in the time allotted to this topic)

****p < 0.000 (Public services: There is a significant difference among the channels in the time allotted to this topic)

*****p < 0.002 (Corruption/ violation: There is a significant difference among the channels in the time allotted to this topic)

******p < 0.008 (National unity/political dialogue: There is a significant difference among the channels in the time allotted to this topic)

*******p < 0.000 (Election fraud: There is a significant difference among the channels in the time allotted to this topic)

********p < 0.013 (Federalism: There is a significant difference among the channels in the time allotted to this topic)

*********p < 0.000 (Supporting electoral slate: There is a significant difference among the channels in the time allotted to this topic)

**********p < 0.009 (IHEC: There is a significant difference among the channels in the time allotted to this topic)

Table 4 Mann-Whitney Test: Iraqia and Furat

	Mann-Whitney U	Wilcoxon W	Z	Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)]
Political Differences	40.00	145.00	-2.759	0.006	*p < 0.007
Security/Terrorism	68.50	173.50	-1.389	0.165	p < 0.178
Democracy	76.00	181.00	-1.031	0.303	p < 0.329
Public services	22.50	127.50	-3.673	0.000	**p < 0.000
Corruption/ violation	78.50	183.50	-1.184	0.236	p < 0.376
National Unity/Political Dialogue	68.50	173.50	-1.416	0.157	p < 0.178
Election Fraud	39.50	144.50	-2.718	0.007	***p < 0.006
Federalism	84.00	189.00	-1.441	0.150	p < 0.541
Supporting Electoral Slate	14.00	119.00	-4.293	0.000	****p < 0.000
IHEC	47.50	152.50	-2.347	0.019	*****p < 0.019
Other	77.00	182.00	-0.970	0.332	p < 0.352

*p < 0.006- p < 0.007 (Political Differences: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the number of stories aired and in relation to this topic)

**p < 0.000 - p < 0.000 (Public services: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the number of stories aired and in relation to this topic)

***p < 0.007- p < 0.006 (Election Fraud: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the number of stories aired and in relation to this topic)

****p < 0.000 - p <0.000 (supporting electoral slate: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the number of stories aired and in relation to this topic)

*****p < 0.019 - p < 0.019 (IHEC: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the number of stories aired and in relation to this topic)

Table 5 T-Test: Iraqia and Furat

	Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means					95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
	F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Political Differences	5.798	0.023	-5.657	26	*p < 0.000	-627.0000	110.83803	-854.83084	-399.16916
			-5.657	18.232	p < 0.000	-627.0000	110.83803	-859.64994	-394.35006
Security/Terrorism	1.520	0.229	-0.528	26	p < 0.602	-78.2143	148.13798	-382.71626	226.28769
			-0.528	20.477	p < 0.603	-78.2143	148.13798	-386.76385	230.33528
Democracy	11.036	0.003	-1.819	26	**p < 0.081	-303.7143	167.00924	-647.00670	39.57813
			-1.819	17.865	p < 0.086	-303.7143	167.00924	-654.77822	47.34964
Public services	20.227	0.000	-3.949	26	***p < 0.001	-596.8571	151.14642	-907.54306	-286.17122
			-3.949	14.316	p < 0.001	-596.8571	151.14642	-920.36397	-273.35032
Corruption/ violation	5.825	0.023	-1.536	26	p < 0.137	-187.5714	122.14355	-438.64110	63.49824
			-1.536	13.738	p < 0.147	-187.5714	122.14355	-450.01299	74.87014
National Unity/Political Dialogue	2.969	0.097	-1.795	26	****p < 0.084	-294.2857	163.92753	-631.24358	42.67215
			-1.795	14.100	p < 0.094	-294.2857	163.92753	-645.64190	57.07047
Election Fraud	0.023	0.880	-3.610	26	*****p < 0.001	-541.1429	149.92088	-849.30964	-232.97607
			-3.610	25.978	p < 0.001	-541.1429	149.92088	-849.32252	-232.96319

Federalism	10.402	0.003	-1.402	26	p < 0.173	-11.3571	8.09939	-28.00567	5.29139
			-1.402	13.000	p < 0.184	-11.3571	8.09939	-28.85481	6.14052
Supporting Electoral Slate	18.788	0.000	-6.543	26	****** p < 0.000	-1,393.6429	212.99519	-1,831.46074	-955.82497
			-6.543	13.000	p < 0.000	-1,393.6429	212.99519	-1,853.79099	-933.49472
IHEC	0.043	0.837	1.583	26	p < 0.125	278.0714	175.64630	-82.97471	639.11757
			1.583	26.000	p < 0.125	278.0714	175.64630	-82.97488	639.11774
Other	0.001	0.976	0.931	26	p < 0.361	198.5714	213.39579	-240.06991	637.21276
			0.931	25.996	p < 0.361	198.5714	213.39579	-240.07329	637.21614

*p < 0.000 - p < 0.000 (political differences: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)
**p < 0.081 - p < 0.086 (democracy: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)
***p < 0.001 - p < 0.001 (public services: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)
****p < 0.084 - p < 0.089 (national unity/political dialogue: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)
*****p < 0.001 - p < 0.001 (election fraud: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)
******p < 0.000 - p < 0.000 (supporting electoral slate: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

Table 6 Mann-Whitney Test: Iraqia and Baghdad

	Mann-Whitney U	Wilcoxon W	Z	Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)]
Political Differences	49.00	154.00	-2.363	0.018	*p < 0.024
Security/Terrorism	49.00	154.00	-2.268	0.023	**p < 0.024
Democracy	64.00	169.00	-1.649	0.099	p < 0.125
Public services	11.00	116.00	-4.174	0.000	***p < 0.000
Corruption/ violation	25.50	130.50	-3.594	0.000	****p < 0.000
National Unity/Political Dialogue	49.00	154.00	-2.314	0.021	*****p < 0.024
Election Fraud	81.50	186.50	-0.781	0.435	p < 0.454
Federalism	63.00	168.00	-2.412	0.016	******p < 0.114
Supporting Electoral Slate	21.00	126.00	-4.017	0.000	*******p < 0.000
IHEC	52.50	157.50	-2.114	0.034	********p < 0.035
Other	71.00	176.00	-1.244	0.213	p < 0.227

Table 7 T-Test: Iraqia and Baghdad

	Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means					95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
	F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Political Differences	4.751	0.039	-3.379	26	*p < 0.002	-460.6429	136.34003	-740.89380	-180.39192
			-3.379	16.315	p < 0.004	-460.6429	136.34003	-749.21857	-172.06714
Security/Terrorism	5.402	0.028	-4.472	26	**p < 0.000	-798.3571	178.53030	-1,165.33142	-431.38287
			-4.472	17.960	p < 0.000	-798.3571	178.53030	-1,173.49495	-423.21934
Democracy	3.677	0.066	1.585	26	p < 0.125	124.5000	78.52651	-36.91356	285.91356
			1.585	21.282	p < 0.128	124.5000	78.52651	-38.67336	287.67336
Public services	16.900	0.000	-6.309	26	***p < 0.000	-958.8571	151.98926	-1,271.27554	-646.43874
			-6.309	14.301	p < 0.000	-958.8571	151.98926	-1,284.19963	-633.51466
Corruption/violation	29.219	0.000	-4.086	26	****p < 0.000	-413.2143	101.13786	-621.10614	-205.32243
			-4.086	14.089	p < 0.001	-413.2143	101.13786	-630.00438	-196.42419
National Unity/Political Dialogue	9.013	0.006	-4.094	26	*****p < 0.000	-394.7857	96.42250	-592.98500	-196.58643
			-4.094	16.402	p < 0.001	-394.7857	96.42250	-598.78628	-190.78515

Election Fraud	1.382	0.250	-1.440	26	******p < 0.062	-253.2143	175.80400	-614.58458	108.15601
			-1.440	24.454	p < 0.062	-253.2143	175.80400	-615.70003	109.27146
Federalism	33.013	0.000	-2.326	26	*******p < 0.028	-133.7857	57.52841	-252.03706	-15.53437
			-2.326	13.000	p < 0.037	-133.7857	57.52841	-258.06830	-9.50313
Supporting Electoral Slate	22.113	0.000	-6.552	26	********p < 0.000	-1,899.8571	289.95035	-2,495.85863	-1,303.85566
			-6.552	13.000	p < 0.000	-1,899.8571	289.95035	-2,526.25680	-1,273.45749
IHEC	1.266	0.271	0.799	26	p < 0.431	161.7857	202.42028	-254.29513	577.86655
			0.799	24.477	p < 0.432	161.7857	202.42028	-255.55868	579.13011
Other	10.140	0.004	-0.696	26	p < 0.493	-238.8571	343.38741	-944.70006	466.98578
			-0.696	18.967	p < 0.495	-238.8571	343.38741	-957.66047	479.94618

*p < 0.002 - p < 0.004 (political differences: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

**p < 0.000 - p < 0.000 (security/terrorism: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

***p < 0.000 - p < 0.000 (public services: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

****p < 0.000 - p < 0.001 (corruption/ violation: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

*****p < 0.000 - p < 0.001 (national unity/political dialogue: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

*****p < 0.062- p < 0.062 (election fraud: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

******p < 0.028 - p < 0.037 (federalism: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

*******p < 0.000 - p < 0.000 (supporting electoral slate: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

Table 8 Mann-Whitney Test: Iraqia and Hurria

	Mann-Whitney U	Wilcoxon W	Z	Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)]
Political Differences	74.50	179.50	-1.131	0.258	p < 0.285
Security/Terrorism	77.50	182.50	-0.959	0.338	p < 0.352
Democracy	97.50	202.50	-0.024	0.981	p < 0.982
Public services	42.50	147.50	-2.796	0.005	*p < 0.009
Corruption/ violation	71.00	176.00	-1.564	0.118	p < 0.227
National Unity/Political Dialogue	92.50	197.50	-0.269	0.788	p < 0.804
Election Fraud	87.00	192.00	-0.517	0.605	p < 0.635
Federalism	63.00	168.00	-2.412	0.016	**p < 0.114
Supporting Electoral Slate	14.00	119.00	-4.284	0.000	***p < 0.000

IHEC	60.50	165.50	-1.737	0.082	****p < 0.085
Other	97.50	202.50	-0.023	0.982	p < 0.982

*p < 0.005 - p < 0.009 (public services: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the number of stories aired and in relation to this topic)

**p < 0.016 - p < 0.016 - p < 0.114 (federalism: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the number of stories aired and in relation to this topic)

***p < 0.000 - p < 0.000 (supporting electoral slate: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the number of stories aired and in relation to this topic)

****p < 0.082 - p < 0.085 (IHEC: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the number of stories aired and in relation to this topic)

Table 9 T-Test: Iraqi and Hurria

	Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means					95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
	F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Political Differences	0.142	0.710	-0.983	26	p < 0.335	-59.3571	60.38467	-183.47960	64.76532
			-0.983	25.270	p < 0.335	-59.3571	60.38467	-183.65437	64.94009
Security/Terrorism	0.049	0.827	1.368	26	p < 0.183	161.7857	118.27786	-81.33791	404.90934
			1.368	24.516	p < 0.184	161.7857	118.27786	-82.05608	405.62751
Democracy	0.104	0.750	0.448	26	p < 0.658	42.3571	94.51419	-151.91957	236.63385
			0.448	25.994	p < 0.658	42.3571	94.51419	-151.92179	236.63608
Public services	1.315	0.262	-2.163	26	*p < 0.040	-119.9286	55.44619	-233.89984	-5.95730
			-2.163	24.082	p < 0.041	-119.9286	55.44619	-234.34334	-5.51380
Corruption/ violation	0.971	0.333	-0.932	26	p < 0.360	-26.4286	28.34555	-84.69368	31.83654
			-0.932	25.983	p < 0.360	-26.4286	28.34555	-84.69555	31.83841
National Unity/Political Dialogue	0.440	0.513	-0.076	26	p < 0.940	-4.2143	55.38836	-118.06668	109.63811
			-0.076	24.011	p < 0.940	-4.2143	55.38836	-118.52741	110.09884
Election Fraud	5.894	0.022	1.736	26	p < 0.194	206.5000	118.97426	-38.05510	451.05510
			1.736	18.539	p < 0.199	206.5000	118.97426	-42.93613	455.93613
Federalism	18.200	0.000	-2.142	26	**p < 0.042	-39.1429	18.27532	-76.70832	-1.57739
			-2.142	13.000	p < 0.052	-39.1429	18.27532	-78.62429	0.33858

Supporting Electoral Slate	48.063	0.000	-5.069	26	***p < 0.000	-309.0000	60.96017	-434.30543	-183.69457
			-5.069	13.000	p < 0.000	-309.0000	60.96017	-440.69645	-177.30355
IHEC	5.183	0.031	4.366	26	****p < 0.000	596.9286	136.70852	315.92018	877.93696
			4.366	18.352	p < 0.000	596.9286	136.70852	310.10935	883.74779
Other	2.750	0.109	2.425	26	*****p < 0.023	433.5000	178.78480	66.00258	800.99742
			2.425	21.741	p < 0.024	433.5000	178.78480	62.46703	804.53297

*p < 0.040- p < 0.041 (public services: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)
**p < 0.042 - p < 0.052 (federalism: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)
***p < 0.000 - p < 0.000 (supporting electoral slate: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)
****p < 0.000 - p < 0.000 (IHEC: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)
*****p < 0.023 - p < 0.024 (other: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

Table 10 Mann-Whitney Test: Furat and Baghdad

	Mann-Whitney U	Wilcoxon W	Z	Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)]
Political Differences	81.50	186.50	-0.782	0.434	p < 0.454
Security/Terrorism	30.50	135.50	-3.132	0.002	*p < 0.001
Democracy	46.00	151.00	-2.478	0.013	**p < 0.016
Public services	53.50	158.50	-2.065	0.039	***p < 0.039
Corruption/ violation	37.50	142.50	-2.940	0.003	****p < 0.004
National Unity/Political Dialogue	73.00	178.00	-1.175	0.240	p < 0.265
Election Fraud	43.00	148.00	-2.571	0.010	*****p < 0.011
Federalism	75.00	180.00	-1.396	0.163	p < 0.306
Supporting Electoral Slate	50.50	155.50	-2.198	0.028	******p < 0.027
IHEC	94.00	199.00	-0.186	0.853	p < 0.874
Other	90.50	195.50	-0.346	0.729	p < 0.734

*p < 0.002 - p < 0.001 (security/terrorism: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the number of stories aired and in relation to this topic)
**p < 0.013 - p < 0.016 (Democracy: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the number of stories aired and in relation to this topic)
***p < 0.039 - p < 0.039 (public services: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the number of stories aired and in relation to this topic)
****p < 0.003 - p < 0.004 (corruption/ violation: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the number of stories aired and in relation to this topic)
*****p < 0.010 - p < 0.011 (election fraud: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the number of stories aired and in relation to this topic)
******p < 0.028 - p < 0.027 (supporting electoral slate: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the number of stories aired and in relation to this topic)

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Table 11 T-Test: Furat and Baghdad

	Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means					95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
	F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Political Differences	0.159	0.693	1.020	26	p < 0.317	166.3571	163.11830	-168.93733	501.65162
			1.020	24.618	p < 0.318	166.3571	163.11830	-169.85561	502.56990
Security/Terrorism	0.937	0.342	-3.462	26	*p < 0.002	-720.1429	208.01427	-1,147.72231	-292.56341
			-3.462	24.700	p < 0.002	-720.1429	208.01427	-1,148.82057	-291.46515
Democracy	21.225	0.000	2.709	26	**p < 0.012	428.2143	158.07764	103.28104	753.14753
			2.709	14.807	p < 0.016	428.2143	158.07764	90.89729	765.53128
Public services	0.007	0.934	-1.731	26	***p < 0.095	-362.0000	209.13960	-791.89261	67.89261
			-1.731	25.999	p < 0.095	-362.0000	209.13960	-791.89332	67.89332
Corruption/ violation	0.167	0.686	-1.447	26	p < 0.160	-225.6429	155.96097	-546.22521	94.93950
			-1.447	25.068	p < 0.160	-225.6429	155.96097	-546.80633	95.52062
National Unity/Political Dialogue	0.219	0.644	-0.545	26	p < 0.590	-100.5000	184.34910	-479.43499	278.43499
			-0.545	20.514	p < 0.592	-100.5000	184.34910	-484.42893	283.42893
Election Fraud	1.737	0.199	1.656	26	p < 0.110	287.9286	173.92071	-69.57056	645.42770
			1.656	24.126	p < 0.111	287.9286	173.92071	-70.92709	646.78423
Federalism	25.123	0.000	-2.107	26	****p < 0.045	-122.4286	58.09577	-241.84614	-3.01101
			-2.107	13.515	p < 0.054	-122.4286	58.09577	-247.45227	2.59513
Supporting Electoral Slate	1.152	0.293	-1.407	26	p < 0.171	-506.2143	359.77515	-1,245.74270	233.31413
			-1.407	23.866	p < 0.172	-506.2143	359.77515	-1,248.97422	236.54565

IHEC	0.964	0.335	-0.574	26	p < 0.571	-116.2857	202.66190	-532.86321	300.29179
			-0.574	24.511	p < 0.571	-116.2857	202.66190	-534.09817	301.52674
Other	10.397	0.003	-1.277	26	p < 0.213	-437.4286	342.55199	-1,141.55427	-266.69713
			-1.277	18.834	p < 0.217	-437.4286	342.55199	-1,154.82491	-279.96777

*p < 0.002 - p < 0.002 (Security/terrorism: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

**p < 0.012 - p < 0.016 (Democracy: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

***p < 0.095 - p < 0.095 (Public services: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

****p < 0.045 - p < 0.054 (Federalism: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

Table 12 Mann-Whitney Test: Furat and Hurria

	Mann-Whitney U	Wilcoxon W	Z	Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)]
Political Differences	57.50	162.50	-1.901	0.057	*p < 0.062
Security/Terrorism	93.50	198.50	-0.211	0.833	p < 0.839
Democracy	75.50	180.50	-1.054	0.292	p < 0.306
Public services	62.50	167.50	-1.668	0.095	p < 0.104
Corruption/ violation	89.00	194.00	-0.477	0.634	p < 0.701
National Unity/Political Dialogue	68.50	173.50	-1.410	0.158	p < 0.178
Election Fraud	31.50	136.50	-3.091	0.002	**p < 0.001
Federalism	75.00	180.00	-1.396	0.163	p < 0.306
Supporting Electoral Slate	30.00	135.00	-3.143	0.002	***p < 0.001
IHEC	84.00	189.00	-0.651	0.515	p < 0.541
Other	72.50	177.50	-1.179	0.238	p < 0.246

*p < 0.057 - p < 0.062 (political differences: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the number of stories aired and in relation to this topic)

**p < 0.002 - p < 0.001 (election fraud: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the number of stories aired and in relation to this topic)

***p < 0.002 - p < 0.001 (supporting electoral slate: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the number of stories aired and in relation to this topic)

Table 13 T-Test: Furat and Hurria

	Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
	F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference		Lower	Upper
Political Differences	7.413	0.011	5.256	26	*p < 0.000	567.6429	108.00595		345.63344	789.65228
			5.256	16.791	p < 0.000	567.6429	108.00595		339.55430	795.73142
Security/Terrorism	0.863	0.362	1.506	26	p < 0.144	240.0000	159.33148		-87.51055	567.51055
			1.506	23.675	p < 0.145	240.0000	159.33148		-89.08294	569.08294
Democracy	11.838	0.002	2.077	26	**p < 0.048	346.0714	166.59850		3.62331	688.51955
			2.077	17.728	p < 0.053	346.0714	166.59850		-4.32441	696.46727
Public services	15.391	0.001	3.097	26	***p < 0.005	476.9286	153.98999		160.39761	793.45953
			3.097	15.338	p < 0.007	476.9286	153.98999		149.33511	804.52203
Corruption/ violation	4.936	0.035	1.320	26	p < 0.198	161.1429	122.05911		-89.75324	412.03895
			1.320	13.701	p < 0.208	161.1429	122.05911		-101.18487	423.47058
National Unity/Political Dialogue	2.389	0.134	1.741	26	p < 0.093	290.0714	166.59880		-52.37731	632.52017
			1.741	14.981	p < 0.102	290.0714	166.59880		-65.06548	645.20833
Election Fraud	5.011	0.034	6.436	26	****p < 0.000	747.6429	116.17332		508.84518	986.44054
			6.436	18.838	p < 0.000	747.6429	116.17332		504.34804	990.93767
Federalism	5.422	0.028	-1.390	26	p < 0.176	-27.7857	19.98969		-68.87510	13.30367
			-1.390	17.917	p < 0.182	-27.7857	19.98969		-69.79642	14.22499
Supporting Electoral Slate	8.082	0.009	4.896	26	*****p < 0.000	1,084.6429	221.54705		629.24638	1,540.03934
			4.896	15.116	p < 0.000	1,084.6429	221.54705		612.74069	1,556.54502

IHEC	7.535	0.011	2.326	26	******p < 0.028	318.8571	137.06603	37.11388	600.60040
			2.326	18.321	p < 0.032	318.8571	137.06603	31.25382	606.46046
Other	2.702	0.112	1.326	26	p < 0.196	234.9286	177.17494	-129.25973	599.11688
			1.326	21.904	p < 0.199	234.9286	177.17494	-132.60281	602.45995

*p < 0.000- p < 0.000 (political differences: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

*p < 0.048- p < 0.053 (democracy: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

***p < 0.005- p < 0.007 (public services: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

****p < 0.000 - p < 0.000 (election fraud: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

*****p < 0.000 - p < 0.000 (supporting electoral slate: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

******p < 0.028 - p < 0.032 (IHEC: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

Table 14 Mann-Whitney Test: Baghdad and Hurria

	Mann-Whitney U	Wilcoxon W	Z	Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed Sig.)]
Political Differences	69.00	174.00	-1.377	0.169	p < 0.194
Security/Terrorism	34.50	139.50	-2.935	0.003	*p < 0.002
Democracy	63.00	168.00	-1.694	0.090	p < 0.114
Public services	30.50	135.50	-3.136	0.002	**p < 0.001
Corruption/ violation	45.00	150.00	-2.556	0.011	***p < 0.014
National Unity/Political Dialogue	51.00	156.00	-2.238	0.025	****p < 0.031
Election Fraud	72.50	177.50	-1.194	0.232	p < 0.246
Federalism	98.00	203.00	0.000	1.000	p < 1.000
Supporting Electoral Slate	39.00	144.00	-2.723	0.006	*****p < 0.006
IHEC	83.50	188.50	-0.674	0.500	p < 0.511
Other	78.00	183.00	-0.926	0.355	p < 0.376

*p < 0.003 - p < 0.002 (security/terrorism: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the number of stories aired and in relation to this topic)

**p < 0.002 - p < 0.001 (public services: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the number of stories aired and in relation to this topic)

***p < 0.011 - p < 0.014 (corruption/violation: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the number of stories aired and in relation to this topic)

****p < 0.025 - p < 0.031 (national unity/political dialogue: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the number of stories aired and in relation to this topic)

*****p < 0.006 - p < 0.006 (supporting electoral slate: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the number of stories aired and in relation to this topic)

Table 15 T-Test: Baghdad and Hurria

	Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
								95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
	F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Political Differences	5.633	0.025	2.994	26	*p < 0.006	401.2857	134.04783	125.74646	676.82497
			2.994	15.371	p < 0.009	401.2857	134.04783	116.16888	686.40255
Security/Terrorism	3.764	0.063	5.109	26	**p < 0.000	960.1429	187.92213	573.86339	1,346.42233
			5.109	20.693	p < 0.000	960.1429	187.92213	568.98447	1,351.30124
Democracy	1.869	0.183	-1.058	26	p < 0.300	-82.1429	77.64912	-241.75291	77.46720
			-1.058	21.478	p < 0.302	-82.1429	77.64912	-243.40444	79.11873
Public services	12.813	0.001	5.419	26	***p < 0.000	838.9286	154.81735	520.69695	1,157.16019
			5.419	15.311	p < 0.000	838.9286	154.81735	509.52613	1,168.33101
Corruption/ violation	26.828	0.000	3.828	26	****p < 0.001	386.7857	101.03586	179.10353	594.46790
			3.828	14.035	p < 0.002	386.7857	101.03586	170.13610	603.43533
National Unity/Political Dialogue	5.836	0.023	3.871	26	*****p < 0.001	390.5714	100.89709	183.17448	597.96838
			3.871	18.917	p < 0.001	390.5714	100.89709	179.32850	601.81436
Election Fraud	12.830	0.001	3.105	26	******p < 0.005	459.7143	148.07774	155.33614	764.09243
			3.105	16.417	p < 0.007	459.7143	148.07774	146.45081	772.97776
Federalism	14.631	0.001	1.568	26	p < 0.129	94.6429	60.36146	-29.43190	218.71762
			1.568	15.597	p < 0.137	94.6429	60.36146	-33.58669	222.87240

Supporting Electoral Slate	12.619	0.001	5.369	26	*******p < 0.000	1,590.8571	296.28930	981.82576	2,199.88852
			5.369	14.147	p < 0.000	1,590.8571	296.28930	955.99880	2,225.71548
IHEC	11.622	0.002	2.559	26	********p < 0.017	435.1429	170.02777	85.64576	784.63995
			2.559	16.309	p < 0.021	435.1429	170.02777	75.25444	795.03128
Other	21.337	0.000	2.087	26	*********p < 0.047	672.3571	322.13057	10.20827	1,334.50602
			2.087	15.420	p < 0.054	672.3571	322.13057	-12.62115	1,357.33543

*p < 0.006 - p < 0.009 (political differences: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

**p < 0.000 - p < 0.000 (security/terrorism: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

***p < 0.000 - p < 0.000 (public services: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

****p < 0.001 - p < 0.002 (corruption/violation: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

*****p < 0.001 - p < 0.001 (national unity/political dialogue: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

******p < 0.005 - p < 0.007 (election fraud: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

*******p < 0.000 - p < 0.000 (supporting electoral slate: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

********p < 0.017 - p < 0.021 (IHEC: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

*********p < 0.047 - p < 0.054 (other: There is a significant difference between the two channels in terms of the time allotment)

Appendix V

Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories & Time Allotment on Each Channel (Based on Raw Data)

Iraqia TV:

Chart 1 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'political differences'


Chart 2 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'political differences'

**Chart 3 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'security/terrorism'**

Chart 4 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'security/terrorism'

Chart 5 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'democracy'

**Chart 6 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'democracy'**

**Chart 7 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'public services'**

Chart 8 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'public services'

Chart 9 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'corruption/violation'

Chart 10 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'corruption/violation'

Chart 11 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'national unity/political dialogue'

Chart 12 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'national unity/political dialogue'


Chart 13 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'election fraud'


Chart 14 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'election fraud'

Chart 15 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'IHEC'

Chart 16 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'IHEC'


Chart 17 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'other'

Chart 18 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'other'

Chart data (Iraqia, other. Time allotment.):

| Format	Value
newsreader	
voice-over	1163
voice-over-sound-on-tape	752
recorded interview	
live interview	4074
package	7863
film report (reporter unseen)	435
in-studio interview	718

Furat TV:

Chart 19 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'political differences'

Chart 20 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'political differences'

Chart 21 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'security/terrorism'

Chart 22 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'security/terrorism'

Chart 23 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'democracy'

Chart 24 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'democracy'

Chart 25 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'public services'


**Chart 26 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'public services'**

Chart 27 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'corruption/violation'

Chart 28 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'corruption/violation'


Chart 29 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'national unity/political dialogue'


Chart 30 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'national unity/political dialogue'

Chart 31 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'election fraud'


Chart 32 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'election fraud'

Chart 33 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'federalism'

Chart 34 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'federalism'

Chart 35 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'supporting electoral slate'

Chart 36 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'supporting electoral slate'

Chart 37 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'IHEC'

**Chart 38 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'IHEC'**

Chart 39 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'other'

Chart 40 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'other'

Baghdad TV:

Chart 41 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'political differences'

Chart 42 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'political differences'

Chart 43 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'security/terrorism'

Chart 44 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'security/terrorism'

Chart 45 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'democracy'


**Chart 46 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'democracy'**

Chart 47 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'public services'

Chart 48 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'public services'

Chart 49 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'corruption/violation'

Chart 50 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'corruption/violation'

Chart 51 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'national unity/political dialogue'

Chart 52 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'national unity/political dialogue'

Chart 53 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'election fraud'

Chart 54 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'election fraud'

Chart 55 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'federalism'

Chart 56 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'federalism'

Chart 57 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'supporting electoral slate'

Chart 58 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'supporting electoral slate'

Chart 59 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'IHEC'

Chart 60 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'IHEC'

**Chart 61 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'other'**

Chart 62 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'other'

Hurria TV:

Chart 63 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'political differences'


**Chart 64 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'political differences'**

Chart 65 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'security/terrorism'

**Chart 66 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'security/terrorism'**

Chart 67 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'democracy'

**Chart 68 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'democracy'**

Chart 69 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'public services'

Chart 70 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'public services'

Chart 71 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'corruption/violation'

Chart 72 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'corruption/violation'

Chart 73 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'national unity/political dialogue'

Chart 74 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'national unity/political dialogue'

Chart 75 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'election fraud'

**Chart 76 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'election fraud'**

**Chart 77 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'federalism'**

Chart 78 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'federalism'

Chart 79 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'supporting electoral slate'

Chart 80 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'supporting electoral slate'

**Chart 81 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'IHEC'**

Chart 82 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'IHEC'

**Chart 83 Story Formats Distribution Based on Number of Stories on the Topic of 'other'**

Chart 84 Story Formats Distribution Based on Time Alloted to the Topic of 'other'

Chart 85 Number of stories by the four channels featuring narrative references to political candidates

Chart 86 No. of stories by the four channels featuring film/image of political candidates

Chart 87 No. of stories by the four channels featuring interviews with political candidates

Table 1 Kruskal-Wallis Test: Channels' ranks featuring narrative references to political candidates

	Iraqia TV Mean Rank	Furat TV Mean Rank	Baghdad TV Mean Rank	Hurria TV Mean Rank	Chi-square	Asymp. Sig.
Maliki	428.63	428.44	428.33	430.76	0.78	p < 0.855
Allawi	432.53	424.00	424.00	436.79	12.30	*p < 0.006
Hakim	367.50	600.17	369.33	371.76	386.20	**p < 0.000
Sadr	426.50	436.19	426.50	426.50	14.46	***p < 0.002
Talabani	413.63	411.50	411.50	483.99	110.33	****p < 0.000
Samarai	348.13	346.00	646.32	348.13	529.52	*****p < 0.000
Others	425.50	425.50	434.66	429.76	8.58	******p < 0.035

*p < 0.006 (Allawi: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)
**p < 0.000 (Hakim: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)
***p < 0.002 (Sadr: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)
****p < 0.000 (Talabani: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)
*****p < 0.000 (Samarai: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)
******p < 0.000 (Other: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)

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Table 2 Mann-Whitney Tests: No. of stories featuring narrative references to political candidates

1.Iraqia and Furat

	Maliki	Alawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	22200.500	21768.500	10150.500	21708.000	22100.000	22100.000	22210.500
Wilcoxon W	46731.500	46299.500	30451.500	42009.000	46631.000	46631.000	46741.500
Z	-.067	-2.105	-12.335	-2.143	-1.049	-1.049	.000
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.946	.035	.000	.032	.294	.294	1.000

2.Iraqia and Baghdad

	Maliki	Alawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	23500.500	23049.000	23416.500	23517.000	23400.000	7152.000	23014.500
Wilcoxon W	50995.500	50544.000	43717.500	51012.000	50895.000	27453.000	43315.500
Z	-.108	-2.165	-.927	.000	-1.079	-14.896	-2.082
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.914	.030	.354	1.000	.281	.000	.037

3.Iraqia and Hurria

	Maliki	Alawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	20100.000	19999.500	19999.500	20200.500	16883.500	20200.500	19999.500
Wilcoxon W	40401.000	40300.500	40300.500	40501.500	37184.500	40501.500	40300.500
Z	-.579	-.640	-1.416	.000	-5.831	.000	-1.416
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.563	.522	.157	1.000	.000	1.000	.157

4.Furat and Baghdad

	Maliki	Alawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	25850.500	25857.000	11927.500	25272.000	25857.000	7735.000	25304.500
Wilcoxon W	53345.500	53352.000	39422.500	52767.000	53352.000	32266.000	49835.500
Z	-.040	.000	-12.984	-2.311	.000	-15.545	-2.183
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.968	1.000	.000	.021	1.000	.000	.029

5.Furat and Hurria

	Maliki	Alawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	22090.000	21547.500	10371.500	21708.000	18453.500	22100.000	21989.500
Wilcoxon W	46621.000	46078.500	30672.500	42009.000	42984.500	46631.000	46520.500
Z	-.662	-2.584	-12.049	-2.143	-6.368	-1.049	-1.485
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.508	.010	.000	.032	.000	.294	.138

6.Baghdad and Hurria

	Maliki	Alawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	23383.500	22815.000	23383.500	23517.000	19539.000	7152.000	23248.500
Wilcoxon W	50878.500	50310.000	50878.500	43818.000	47034.000	27453.000	43549.500
Z	-.712	-2.658	-.712	.000	-6.545	-14.896	-.942
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.476	.008	.476	1.000	.000	.000	.346

Table 3 Kruskal-Wallis Test: Channels' ranks featuring film/image of political candidates

	Iraqia TV Mean Rank	Furat TV Mean Rank	Baghdad TV Mean Rank	Hurria TV Mean Rank	Chi-square	Asymp. Sig.
Maliki	429.63	427.50	429.33	429.63	1.07	p < 0.785
Allawi	429.76	425.50	427.33	434.03	5.75	p < 0.125
Hakim	370.50	591.54	372.33	374.76	363.12	*p < 0.000
Sadr	427.00	434.76	427.00	427.00	11.55	**p < 0.009
Talabani	414.13	412.00	412.00	482.35	106.81	***p < 0.000
Samarai	350.13	348.00	640.99	350.13	513.36	****p < 0.000
Others	426.50	426.50	431.99	430.76	5.03	p < 0.170

*p < 0.000 (Hakim: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)

**p < 0.000 (Sadr: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)

***p < 0.000 (Talabani: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)

****p < 0.000 (Samarai: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)

Table 4 Mann-Whitney Tests: No. of stories featuring film/image of political candidates

1.Iraqia and Furat

	Maliki	Alawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	22100.000	21989.500	10753.500	21808.500	22100.000	22100.000	22210.500
Wilcoxon W	46631.000	46520.500	31054.500	42109.500	46631.000	46631.000	46741.500
Z	-1.049	-1.485	-11.905	-1.914	-1.049	-1.049	.000
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.294	.138	.000	.056	.294	.294	1.000

2.Iraqia and Baghdad

	Maliki	Alawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	23500.500	23383.500	23416.500	23517.000	23400.000	7554.000	23215.500
Wilcoxon W	50995.500	50878.500	43717.500	51012.000	50895.000	27855.000	43516.500
Z	-.108	-.712	-.927	.000	-1.079	-14.601	-1.609
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.914	.476	.354	1.000	.281	.000	.108

3.Iraqia and Hurria

	Maliki	Alawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	20200.500	19999.500	19999.500	20200.500	16984.500	20200.500	19999.500
Wilcoxon W	40501.500	40300.500	40300.500	40501.500	37285.500	40501.500	40300.500
Z	.000	-.822	-1.416	.000	-5.729	.000	-1.416
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	1.000	.411	.157	1.000	.000	1.000	.157

4.Furat and Baghdad

	Maliki	Alawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	25746.500	25746.500	12629.500	25389.000	25857.000	8177.000	25525.500
Wilcoxon W	50277.500	50277.500	40124.500	52884.000	53352.000	32708.000	50056.500
Z	-.972	-.972	-12.536	-2.065	.000	-15.250	-1.687
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.331	.331	.000	.039	1.000	.000	.092

5.Furat and Hurria

	Maliki	Alawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	22100.000	21768.500	10974.500	21808.500	18564.000	22100.000	21989.500
Wilcoxon W	46631.000	46299.500	31275.500	42109.500	43095.000	46631.000	46520.500
Z	-1.049	-2.105	-11.612	-1.914	-6.266	-1.049	-1.485
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.294	.035	.000	.056	.000	.294	.138

6.Baghdad and Hurria

|	Maliki	Alawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	23500.500	23149.500	23383.500	23517.000	19656.000	7554.000	23449.500
Wilcoxon W	50995.500	50644.500	50878.500	43818.000	47151.000	27855.000	43750.500
Z	-.108	-1.523	-.712	.000	-6.440	-14.601	-.280
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.914	.128	.476	1.000	.000	.000	.780

Table 5 Kruskal-Wallis Test: Channels' ranks featuring interviews with political candidates

	Iraqia TV Mean Rank	Furat TV Mean Rank	Baghdad TV Mean Rank	Hurria TV Mean Rank	Chi-square	Asymp. Sig.
Maliki	429.00	429.00	429.00	429.00	0.00	p < 1.000
Allawi	429.00	429.00	429.00	429.00	0.00	p < 1.000
Hakim	407.50	488.93	407.50	409.63	122.18	*p < 0.000
Sadr	429.00	429.00	429.00	429.00	0.00	p < 1.000
Talabani	421.00	421.00	421.00	455.11	53.15	**p < 0.000
Samarai	366.00	366.00	596.73	366.00	392.83	***p < 0.000
Others	427.00	427.00	430.66	431.26	3.94	p < 0.268

*p < 0.000 (Hakim: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)

**p < 0.000 (Talabani: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)

***p < 0.000 (Samarai: There is significant difference among the four channels in the way this slate was covered)

Table 6 Mann-Whitney Tests: No. of stories featuring interviews with political candidates

1.Iraqia and Furat

	Maliki	Alawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	22210.500	22210.500	17989.500	22210.500	22210.500	22210.500	22210.500
Wilcoxon W	46741.500	46741.500	38290.500	46741.500	46741.500	46741.500	46741.500
Z	.000	.000	-6.505	.000	.000	.000	.000
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	1.000	1.000	.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000

2.Iraqia and Baghdad

	Maliki	Alawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	23517.000	23517.000	23517.000	23517.000	23517.000	10854.000	23316.000
Wilcoxon W	51012.000	51012.000	51012.000	51012.000	51012.000	31155.000	43617.000
Z	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	-12.329	-1.312
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	.000	.189

3.Iraqia and Hurria

	Maliki	Alawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	20200.500	20200.500	20100.000	20200.500	18592.500	20200.500	19999.500
Wilcoxon W	40501.500	40501.500	40401.000	40501.500	38893.500	40501.500	40300.500
Z	.000	.000	-1.000	.000	-4.077	.000	-1.416
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	1.000	1.000	.317	1.000	.000	1.000	.157

4.Furat and Baghdad

	Maliki	Alawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	25857.000	25857.000	20943.000	25857.000	25857.000	11934.000	25636.000
Wilcoxon W	53352.000	53352.000	48438.000	53352.000	53352.000	36465.000	50167.000
Z	.000	.000	-6.992	.000	.000	-12.815	-1.376
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	1.000	1.000	.000	1.000	1.000	.000	.169

5.Furat and Hurria

	Maliki	Alawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	22210.500	22210.500	18100.000	22210.500	20442.500	22210.500	21989.500
Wilcoxon W	42511.500	42511.500	38401.000	42511.500	44973.500	42511.500	46520.500
Z	.000	.000	-6.269	.000	-4.271	.000	-1.485
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	1.000	1.000	.000	1.000	.000	1.000	.138

6.Baghdad and Hurria

	Maliki	Alawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	23517.000	23517.000	23400.000	23517.000	21645.000	10854.000	23484.000
Wilcoxon W	43818.000	43818.000	50895.000	43818.000	49140.000	31155.000	50979.000
Z	.000	.000	-1.079	.000	-4.392	-12.329	-.153
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	1.000	1.000	.281	1.000	.000	.000	.879

Appendix VI

Sub-Story Level: Topics and Candidates Analysis

Iraqia TV

Chart 1

Legend: Iraqia, narrative references to political differences, code (1)

	Neutral	Positive	Negative
	14	0	41

Chart 2

Legend: Iraqia, narrative references to security/terrorism, code (2)

	Neutral	Positive	Negative
	79	166	26

Chart 3

Legend: Iraqia, narrative references to democracy, code (3)

	Neutral	Positive	Negative
	7	82	0

Chart 4

	Neutral	Positive	Negative
Iraqia, narrative references to public services, code (4)	0	0	9

Chart 5

	Neutral	Positive	Negative
Iraqia, narrative references to corruption, code (5)	5	1	3

Chart 6

	Neutral	Positive	Negative
Iraqia, narrative references to national unity/political dialogue, code (6)	13	25	0

329

Chart 7

Iraqia, narrative references to election fraud, code (7)

- Neutral: 51
- Positive: 42
- Negative: 23

Chart 8

Iraqia, narrative references to IHEC, code (10)

- Neutral: 442
- Positive: 65
- Negative: 2

Chart 9

Iraqia, narrative references to other, code (11)

- Neutral: 265
- Positive: 400
- Negative: 59

Furat TV

Chart 10

Legend: Furat, narrative references to political differences, code (1)

Neutral: 19
Positive: 21
Negative: 222

Chart 11

Legend: Furat, narrative references to security/terrorism, code (2)

Neutral: 7
Positive: 93
Negative: 69

Chart 12

Legend: Furat, narrative references to democracy, code (3)

Neutral: 5
Positive: 56
Negative: 18

Chart 13

Furat, narrative references to public services, code (4)

	Neutral	Positive	Negative
	0	132	88

Chart 14

Furat, narrative references to corruption, code (5)

	Neutral	Positive	Negative
	0	11	27

Chart 15

Furat, narrative references to national unity/political dialogue, code (6)

	Neutral	Positive	Negative
	0	70	0

Chart 16

Furat, narrative references to election fraud, code (7)

- Neutral: 21
- Positive: 51
- Negative: 417

Chart 17

Furat, narrative references to federalism, code (8)

- Neutral: 0
- Positive: 2
- Negative: 0

Chart 18

Furat, narrative references to supporting electoral slate, code (9)

- Neutral: 0
- Positive: 1039
- Negative: 2

Chart 19

Neutral: 152
Positive: 61
Negative: 97

Legend: Furat, narrative references to IHEC, code (10)

Chart 20

Neutral: 49
Positive: 503
Negative: 190

Legend: Furat, narrative references to other, code (11)

Baghdad TV

Chart 21

Baghdad, narrative references to political differences, code (1)

- Neutral: 12
- Positive: 3
- Negative: 129

Chart 22

Baghdad, narrative references to security/terrorism, code (2)

- Neutral: 48
- Positive: 141
- Negative: 237

Chart 23

Baghdad, narrative references to democracy, code (3)

- Neutral: 0
- Positive: 11
- Negative: 4

Chart 24

Baghdad, narrative references to public services, code (4)

	Neutral	Positive	Negative
	28	145	181

Chart 25

Baghdad, narrative references to corruption, code (5)

	Neutral	Positive	Negative
	2	48	44

Chart 26

Baghdad, narrative references to national unity/political

	Neutral	Positive	Negative
	12	80	16

Chart 27

Baghdad, narrative references to election fraud, code (7)

	Neutral	Positive	Negative
	31	49	127

Chart 28

Baghdad, narrative references to federalism, code (8)

	Neutral	Positive	Negative
	0	31	7

Chart 29

Baghdad, narrative references to supporting electoral slate,

	Neutral	Positive	Negative
	29	1172	3

337

Chart 30

Baghdad, narrative references to IHEC, code (10)

	Neutral	Positive	Negative
	284	26	11

Chart 31

Baghdad, narrative references to other, code (11)

	Neutral	Positive	Negative
	138	372	8

Hurria TV

Chart 32

Neutral	Positive	Negative	
13	26	36	Hurria, narrative references to political differences, code (1)

Chart 33

Neutral	Positive	Negative	
55	111	62	Hurria, narrative references to security/terrorism, code (2)

Chart 34

Neutral	Positive	Negative	
0	41	4	Hurria, narrative references to democracy, code (3)

Chart 35

Chart legend: Hurria, narrative references to public services, code (4)

Values: Neutral 0, Positive 46, Negative 24

Chart 36

Chart legend: Hurria, narrative references to corruption, code (5)

Values: Neutral 6, Positive 3, Negative 13

Chart 37

Chart legend: Hurria, narrative references to national unity/political dialogue, code (6)

Values: Neutral 2, Positive 23, Negative 1

340

Chart 38

Values: Neutral 3, Positive 61, Negative 46

Legend: Hurria, narrative references to election fraud, code (7)

Chart 39

Values: Neutral 8, Positive 13, Negative 0

Legend: Hurria, narrative references to federalism, code (8)

Chart 40

Values: Neutral 27, Positive 377, Negative 3

Legend: Hurria, narrative references to supporting electoral slate, code (9)

Chart 41

Hurria, narrative references to IHEC, code (10)

Chart 42

Hurria, narrative references to other, code (11)

Candidates' Score of Terms

Chart 43 Iraqia TV, candidates' score of terms

Chart 44 Furat TV, candidates' score of terms

Chart 45 Baghdad TV, candidates' score of terms

Chart 46 Hurria TV, candidates' score of terms

A 3D bar chart showing candidates' scores of terms with the following data:

Candidate	Positive	Negative	Neutral
Maliki		6	
Allawi	7	3	
Hakim	4		
Sadr			1
Talabani	38	10	12
Samarai			1
Others			

Appendix VII

Tables on the Magnitude of Inter-Channel Differences

Table 1 Average Mean Ranks of Topics

	Average Mean Rank (Neutral)	Average Mean Rank (Positive)	Average Mean Rank (Negative)
Political differences	429.07	429.10	427.89
Security/terrorism	429.39	429.49	427.04
Democracy	429.09	429.71	428.86
Public services	428.54	427.80	427.08
Corruption/violation	429.09	428.58	428.38
National unity/political dialogue	429.05	428.14	428.91
Election fraud	429.15	429.25	427.72
Federalism	429.03	428.95	428.92
Supporting electoral slate	428.95	423.15	428.97
IHEC	430.39	429.41	428.89
Others	430.91	429.98	428.77

Table 2 Kruskal-Wallis Test: Neutral Topics Ranks Ranking

	Iraqia TV Mean Rank	Furat TV Mean Rank	Baghdad TV Mean Rank	Hurria TV Mean Rank	Chi-square	Asymp. Sig.
Political differences	426.93	428.31	427.82	433.2	1.35	p < .717
Security/terrorism	442.72	414.18	428.63	432.01	10.53	*p < .015
Democracy	434.03	431.31	425.5	425.5	7.79	**p < .051
Public services	423.5	423.5	443.64	423.5	29.63	***p < .000
Corruption/violation	430.77	426.5	428.33	430.76	2.57	p < .463
National unity/political dialogue	435.3	422.5	431.69	426.71	7.31	****p < .063
Election fraud	446.88	424.69	427.91	417.12	16.69	*****p < .001
Federalism	428.5	428.5	428.5	430.63	3.26	p < .353
Supporting electoral slate	423	423	434	435.78	11.93	******p < .008
IHEC	488.82	394.24	416.27	422.22	32.31	*******p < .000
Others	482.54	384.26	409.54	447.3	50.87	********p < .000

*p < .015 (security/terrorism: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
**p < .051 (democracy: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
***p < .000 (Public services: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
****p < .063 (national unity/political dialogue: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
*****p < .001 (Election fraud: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
******p < .008 (supporting electoral slate: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
*******p < .000 (IHEC: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
********p < .000 (Other: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)

Table 3 Kruskal-Wallis Test: Positive Topics Ranking

	Iraqia TV Mean Rank	Furat TV Mean Rank	Baghdad TV Mean Rank	Hurria TV Mean Rank	Chi-square	Asymp. Sig.
Political differences	423	428.87	426.62	437.91	9.66	*p < 0.022
Security/terrorism	448.52	403.19	432.79	433.45	9.11	**p < 0.028
Democracy	435.83	444.27	402.46	436.28	15.50	***p < 0.001
Public services	394	441.41	450.76	425.01	28.53	****p < 0.000
Corruption/violation	421.6	425.33	441.57	425.8	13.31	*****p < 0.004
National unity/political dialogue	412.15	437.93	444.59	417.88	11.03	******p < 0.012
Election fraud	427.99	430.88	421.85	436.27	1.80	p < 0.615
Federalism	421.5	425.33	432.55	436.4	8.93	*******p < 0.030
Supporting electoral slate	290.5	494.12	532.23	375.73	185.91	********p < 0.000
IHEC	451.8	424.63	421.77	419.42	17.03	*********p < 0.001
Others	457.93	424.71	407.63	429.66	7.34	**********p < 0.062

*p < .022 (political differences: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
**p < .028 (security/terrorism: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
***p < .001 (democracy: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
****p < .000 (Public services: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
*****p < .004 (corruption/violation: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
******p < .012 (national unity/political dialogue: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
*******p < .030 (federalism: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
********p < .000 (supporting electoral slate: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
*********p < .001 (IHEC: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)

Table 4 Kruskal-Wallis Test: Negative Topics Ranking

	Iraqia TV Mean Rank	Furat TV Mean Rank	Baghdad TV Mean Rank	Hurria TV Mean Rank	Chi-square	Asymp. Sig.
Political differences	409.47	459.46	437.53	405.11	26.20	*p < 0.000
Security/terrorism	400.24	408.93	489.06	409.91	60.01	**p < 0.000
Democracy	424.50	436.14	428.15	426.64	8.70	***p < 0.034
Public services	397.77	432.27	473.95	404.31	53.93	****p < 0.000
Corruption/violation	419.19	422.83	447.92	423.56	20.20	*****p < 0.000
National unity/political dialogue	427.00	427.00	432.50	429.12	5.34	p < 0.149
Election fraud	396.35	485.63	425.96	402.92	63.75	******p < 0.000
Federalism	428.00	428.00	431.66	428.00	5.33	p < 0.149
Supporting electoral slate	427.50	429.43	429.33	429.63	0.94	p < 0.816
IHEC	419.09	444.31	422.48	429.67	16.30	*******p < 0.001
Others	420.17	433.20	432.13	429.56	1.47	p < 0.689

*p < 0.000 (Political differences: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
**p < 0.000 (Security/terrorism: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
***p < 0.034 (democracy: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
***p < 0.000 (Public services: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
****p < 0.000 (Corruption/violation: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
*****p < 0.000 (Election fraud: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)
******p < 0.001 (IHEC: There are significant differences in covering this topic among the channels)

Table 5 Kruskal-Wallis Test: Ranking of Candidates' Neutral Attributes

	Iraqia TV Mean Rank	Furat TV Mean Rank	Baghdad TV Mean Rank	Hurria TV Mean Rank	Chi-square	Asymp. Sig.
Maliki	428.50	428.50	430.33	428.50	2.66	p < 0.447
Allawi	430.63	428.50	428.50	428.50	3.26	p < 0.353
Hakim	427.50	431.38	429.33	427.50	3.41	p < 0.333
Sadr	427.00	432.82	427.00	429.13	5.82	p < 0.121
Talabani	427.12	425.00	425.00	439.93	18.83	*p < 0.000
Samarai	429.63	427.50	429.34	429.63	1.07	p < 0.786

Others	429.00	429.00	429.00	429.00	0.00	p < 1.000

*p < 0.000 (Talabani: There are significant differences in covering this candidate/slate among the channels)

Table 6 Kruskal-Wallis Test: Ranking of Candidates' Positive Attributes

	Iraqia TV Mean Rank	Furat TV Mean Rank	Baghdad TV Mean Rank	Hurria TV Mean Rank	Chi-square	Asymp. Sig.
Maliki	429.00	429.00	429.00	429.00	0.00	p < 1.000
Allawi	428.00	428.00	428.00	432.26	6.54	*p < 0.088
Hakim	417.00	461.60	417.00	419.12	63.36	**p < 0.000
Sadr	428.00	431.88	428.00	428.00	5.76	p < 0.124
Talabani	426.00	426.00	426.00	438.79	19.70	***p < 0.000
Samarai	375.00	375.00	572.77	375.00	326.67	****p < 0.000
Others	428.50	428.50	430.33	428.50	2.66	p < 0.447

  **p < 0.088 (Allawi: There are significant differences in covering this candidate/slate among the channels)
  **p < 0.000 (Hakim: There are significant differences in covering this candidate/slate among the channels)
***p < 0.000 (Talabani: There are significant differences in covering this candidate/slate among the channels)
****p < 0.000 ((Samarai: There are significant differences in covering this candidate/slate among the channels)

Table 7 Kruskal-Wallis Test: Ranking of Candidates' Negative Attributes

	Iraqia TV Mean Rank	Furat TV Mean Rank	Baghdad TV Mean Rank	Hurria TV Mean Rank	Chi-square	Asymp. Sig.
Maliki	427.50	429.44	427.50	431.76	3.98	p < 0.264
Allawi	431.76	427.50	427.50	429.63	4.11	p < 0.250
Hakim	429.00	429.00	429.00	429.00	0.00	p < 1.000
Sadr	429.00	429.00	429.00	429.00	0.00	p < 1.000
Talabani	428.50	428.50	428.50	430.63	3.26	p < 0.353
Samarai	429.00	429.00	429.00	429.00	0.00	p < 1.000
Others	428.00	428.00	431.66	428.00	5.33	p < 0.149

Table 8 Mann-Whitney Tests: Neutral Topic Scores

1. Iraqia-Furat

	Political Differences	Security/ terrorism	Democracy	Public Services	Corruption	National unity/ Political dialogue	Election fraud	Federalism	Supporting electoral slate	IHEC	Other
Mann-Whitney U	22139.500	20731.000	22069.500	22210.500	21989.500	21547.500	21058.000	22210.500	22210.500	17337.000	17088.500
Wilcoxon W	42440.500	45262.000	46600.500	46741.500	46520.500	46078.500	45589.000	46741.500	46741.500	41868.000	41619.500
Z	-.256	-3.291	-.509	.000	-1.485	-2.584	-2.502	.000	.000	-5.206	-6.560
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.798	.001	.611	1.000	.138	.010	.012	1.000	1.000	.000	.000

2. Iraqia-Baghdad

	Political Differences	Security/ terrorism	Democracy	Public Services	Corruption	National unity/ Political dialogue	Election fraud	Federalism	Supporting electoral slate	IHEC	Other
Mann-Whitney U	23468.000	22743.000	23049.000	22411.500	23383.000	23320.000	22482.500	23517.000	22914.000	19634.500	19535.500
Wilcoxon W	43769.000	50238.000	50544.000	42712.500	50878.000	50815.000	49977.500	51012.000	43215.000	47129.500	47030.500
Z	-.172	-1.416	-2.165	-3.110	-.715	-.554	-2.084	.000	-2.283	-3.853	-4.555
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.863	.157	.030	.002	.475	.579	.037	1.000	.022	.000	.000

3. Iraqia-Hurria

	Political Differences	Security/ terrorism	Democracy	Public Services	Corruption	National unity/ Political dialogue	Election fraud	Federalism	Supporting electoral slate	IHEC	Other

Mann-Whitney U	19905.000	19697.000	19798.500	20200.500	20200.500	19793.500	18793.500	20100.000	19597.500	16932.500	18541.500
Wilcoxon W	40206.000	39998.000	40099.500	40501.500	40501.500	40094.500	39094.500	40401.000	39898.500	37233.500	38842.500
Z	-.990	-.996	-2.008	.000	.000	-1.444	-3.567	-1.000	-2.465	-3.540	-1.928
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.322	.319	.045	1.000	1.000	.149	.000	.317	.014	.000	.054

4. Furat-Baghdad

	Political Differences	Security/ terrorism	Democracy	Public Services	Corruption	National unity/ Political dialogue	Election fraud	Federalism	Supporting electoral slate	IHEC	Other
Mann-Whitney U	25827.500	24983.000	25506.000	24641.500	25746.500	25304.500	25664.500	25857.000	25194.000	24581.500	24364.000
Wilcoxon W	53322.500	49514.000	53001.000	49172.500	50277.500	49835.500	50195.500	53352.000	49725.000	49112.500	48895.000
Z	-.092	-2.084	-1.786	-3.259	-.972	-2.183	-.495	.000	-2.394	-1.416	-2.403
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.926	.037	.074	.001	.331	.029	.621	1.000	.017	.157	.016

5. Furat-Hurria

	Political Differences	Security/ terrorism	Democracy	Public Services	Corruption	National unity/ Political dialogue	Election fraud	Federalism	Supporting electoral slate	IHEC	Other
Mann-Whitney U	21958.500	21288.000	21909.000	22210.500	21989.500	21989.500	21818.500	22100.000	21547.500	20677.000	18938.500
Wilcoxon W	46489.500	45819.000	42210.000	42511.500	46520.500	46520.500	42119.500	46631.000	46078.500	45208.000	43469.500
Z	-.764	-2.376	-1.656	.000	-1.485	-1.485	-1.528	-1.049	-2.584	-1.849	-4.788
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.445	.017	.098	1.000	.138	.138	.127	.294	.010	.064	.000

6. Baghdad-Hurria

	Political Differences	Security/ terrorism	Democracy	Public Services	Corruption	National unity/ Political dialogue	Election fraud	Federalism	Supporting electoral slate	IHEC	Other
Mann-Whitney U	23221.000	23331.500	23517.000	22411.500	23383.500	23243.500	22929.000	23400.000	23420.000	23145.500	21451.500
Wilcoxon W	50716.000	50826.500	43818.000	42712.500	50878.500	43544.500	43230.000	50895.000	50915.000	50640.500	48946.500
Z	-.872	-.374	.000	-3.110	-.712	-.960	-1.933	-1.079	-.262	-.409	-2.617
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.383	.709	1.000	.002	.476	.337	.053	.281	.794	.683	.009

Table 9 Mann-Whitney Tests: Positive Topic Scores

1. Iraqia-Furat

	Political Differences	Security/ terrorism	Democracy	Public Services	Corruption	National unity/ Political dialogue	Election fraud	Federalism	Supporting electoral slate	IHEC	Other
Mann-Whitney U	21909.000	19928.500	21804.500	19798.500	22018.000	20884.000	22060.000	22009.500	11859.000	20813.000	20577.500
Wilcoxon W	42210.000	44459.500	42105.500	40099.500	42319.000	41185.000	42361.000	42310.500	32160.000	45344.000	45108.500
Z	-1.656	-2.942	-.583	-4.802	-.917	-2.310	-.258	-1.350	-10.978	-2.589	-1.609
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.098	.003	.560	.000	.359	.021	.796	.177	.000	.010	.108

2. Iraqia-Baghdad

	Political Differences	Security/ terrorism	Democracy	Public Services	Corruption	National unity/ Political dialogue	Election fraud	Federalism	Supporting electoral slate	IHEC	Other
Mann-Whitney U	23316.000	22621.000	21726.500	20401.500	22423.000	21744.500	23181.000	22914.000	10050.000	21869.000	20740.500
Wilcoxon W	43617.000	50116.000	49221.500	40702.500	42724.000	42045.500	50676.000	43215.000	30351.000	49364.000	48235.500

	Political Differences	Security/terrorism	Democracy	Public Services	Corruption	National unity/Political dialogue	Election fraud	Federalism	Supporting electoral slate	IHEC	Other
Z	-1.312	-1.005	-3.220	-5.344	-2.837	-2.803	-.594	-2.283	-12.601	-3.015	-2.667
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.189	.315	.001	.000	.005	.005	.552	.022	.000	.003	.008

3. Iraqia-Hurria

	Political Differences	Security/terrorism	Democracy	Public Services	Corruption	National unity/Political dialogue	Election fraud	Federalism	Supporting electoral slate	IHEC	Other
Mann-Whitney U	19497.000	19455.500	20188.500	18693.000	19999.500	19913.500	19811.000	19497.000	16180.500	18662.500	18794.500
Wilcoxon W	39798.000	39756.500	40489.500	38994.000	40300.500	40214.500	40112.000	39798.000	36481.500	38963.500	39095.500
Z	-2.666	-.932	-.019	-3.942	-1.004	-.639	-.693	-2.666	-6.644	-3.155	-1.453
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.008	.352	.985	.000	.315	.523	.488	.008	.000	.002	.146

4. Furat-Baghdad

	Political Differences	Security/terrorism	Democracy	Public Services	Corruption	National unity/Political dialogue	Election fraud	Federalism	Supporting electoral slate	IHEC	Other
Mann-Whitney U	25724.000	24050.000	23321.000	25332.000	24878.500	25466.000	25313.500	25423.000	23827.000	25688.000	24888.000
Wilcoxon W	53219.000	48581.000	50816.000	49863.000	49409.500	49997.000	52808.500	49954.000	48358.000	53183.000	52383.000
Z	-.525	-2.147	-3.916	-.662	-2.257	-.509	-.875	-1.360	-1.536	-.390	-.930
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.599	.032	.000	.508	.024	.611	.382	.174	.124	.697	.352

5. Furat-Hurria

	Political Differences	Security/ terrorism	Democracy	Public Services	Corruption	National unity/ Political dialogue	Election fraud	Federalism	Supporting electoral slate	IHEC	Other
Mann-Whitney U	21748.000	20595.000	21778.000	21354.000	22185.000	21172.000	21932.000	21633.000	16140.500	21947.500	21927.000
Wilcoxon W	46279.000	45126.000	42079.000	41655.000	46716.000	41473.000	46463.000	46164.000	36441.500	42248.500	46458.000
Z	-1.403	-2.157	-.616	-1.362	-.099	-1.735	-.454	-1.844	-5.754	-.702	-.291
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.161	.031	.538	.173	.921	.083	.650	.065	.000	.483	.771

6. Baghdad-Hurria

	Political Differences	Security/ terrorism	Democracy	Public Services	Corruption	National unity/ Political dialogue	Election fraud	Federalism	Supporting electoral slate	IHEC	Other
Mann-Whitney U	22892.500	23493.000	21634.000	22065.000	22647.000	22033.500	22723.500	23310.000	14859.000	23392.500	22261.000
Wilcoxon W	50387.500	50988.000	49129.000	42366.000	42948.000	42334.500	50218.500	50805.000	35160.000	43693.500	49756.000
Z	-1.938	-.028	-3.332	-2.081	-2.105	-2.264	-1.322	-.537	-7.482	-.336	-1.259
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.053	.978	.001	.037	.035	.024	.186	.591	.000	.737	.208

Table 10 Mann-Whitney Tests: Negative Topic Scores

1. Iraqia-Furat

	Political Differences	Security/ terrorism	Democracy	Public Services	Corruption	National unity/ Political dialogue	Election fraud	Federalism	Supporting electoral slate	IHEC	Other
Mann-Whitney U	19632.500	21789.500	21607.500	20422.500	22026.500	22210.500	17593.000	22210.500	22110.000	20908.500	21550.000
Wilcoxon W	39933.500	42090.500	41908.500	40723.500	42327.500	46741.500	37894.000	46741.500	42411.000	41209.500	41851.000
Z	-3.808	-.793	-2.350	-3.560	-.717	.000	-6.259	.000	-.954	-3.244	-1.104
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.428	.019	.000	.473	1.000	.000	1.000	.340	.001	.270

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2. Iraqia-Baghdad

	Political Differences	Security/ terrorism	Democracy	Public Services	Corruption	National unity/ Political dialogue	Election fraud	Federalism	Supporting electoral slate	IHEC	Other
Mann-Whitney U	21962.500	18592.500	23316.000	19330.500	21932.500	23215.50	21878.500	23316.000	23416.500	23331.500	22845.000
Wilcoxon W	42263.500	38893.500	43617.000	39631.500	42233.500	43516.50	42179.500	43617.000	43717.500	43632.500	43146.000
Z	-2.458	-5.822	-1.312	-5.888	-3.340	-1.609	-2.997	-1.312	-.927	-.858	-1.063
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.014	.000	.189	.000	.001	.108	.003	.189	.354	.391	.288

3. Iraqia-Hurria

	Political Differences	Security/ terrorism	Democracy	Public Services	Corruption	National unity/ Political dialogue	Election fraud	Federalism	Supporting electoral slate	IHEC	Other
Mann-Whitney U	19994.000	19765.500	20100.000	19897.000	19997.500	20100.000	19893.500	20200.500	20100.000	19696.000	19758.500
Wilcoxon W	40295.000	40066.500	40401.000	40198.000	40298.500	40401.000	40194.500	40501.500	40401.000	39997.000	40059.500
Z	-.495	-.876	-1.000	-1.017	-.830	-1.000	-.860	.000	-1.000	-1.912	-.808
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.621	.381	.317	.309	.407	.317	.390	1.000	.317	.056	.419

4. Furat-Baghdad

	Political Differences	Security/ terrorism	Democracy	Public Services	Corruption	National unity/ Political dialogue	Election fraud	Federalism	Supporting electoral slate	IHEC	Other
Mann-Whitney U	24494.500	21049.000	25373.500	23344.000	24348.500	25525.500	22234.000	25636.000	25851.000	24542.500	25783.500
Wilcoxon W	51989.500	45580.000	52868.500	47875.000	48879.500	50056.500	49729.000	50167.000	53346.000	52037.500	53278.500
Z	-1.619	-5.252	-1.515	-2.927	-2.895	-1.687	-4.045	-1.376	-.037	-2.854	-.102
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.105	.000	.130	.003	.004	.092	.000	.169	.970	.004	.919

5. Furat-Hurria

	Political Differences	Security/ terrorism	Democracy	Public Services	Corruption	National unity/ Political dialogue	Election fraud	Federalism	Supporting electoral slate	IHEC	Other
Mann-Whitney U	19418.500	22162.000	21719.500	20763.500	22172.500	22100.000	17935.500	22210.500	22200.000	21443.500	22016.000
Wilcoxon W	39719.500	46693.000	42020.500	41064.500	46703.500	46631.000	38236.500	42511.500	46731.000	41744.500	42317.000
Z	-4.207	-.086	-1.774	-2.726	-.129	-1.049	-5.667	.000	-.071	-1.665	-.309
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.932	.076	.006	.898	.294	.000	1.000	.944	.096	.757

6. Baghdad-Hurria

	Political Differences	Security/ terrorism	Democracy	Public Services	Corruption	National unity/ Political dialogue	Election fraud	Federalism	Supporting electoral slate	IHEC	Other
Mann-Whitney U	21714.000	19195.500	23434.000	19697.500	22183.500	23331.000	22243.500	23316.000	23500.500	23119.500	23382.500
Wilcoxon W	42015.000	39496.500	43735.000	39998.500	42484.500	43632.000	42544.500	43617.000	50995.500	50614.500	43683.500
Z	-2.924	-4.997	-.443	-5.230	-2.687	-.861	-2.218	-1.312	-.108	-1.233	-.203
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.003	.000	.658	.000	.007	.389	.027	.189	.914	.217	.839

Table 11 Mann-Whitney Tests: Neutral Candidates' Scores

1. Iraqia-Furat

	Maliki	Allawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	22210.500	22100.000	22009.500	21909.000	22100.000	22100.000	22210.500
Wilcoxon W	46741.500	46631.000	42310.500	42210.000	46631.000	46631.000	46741.500
Z	.000	-1.049	-1.350	-1.656	-1.049	-1.049	.000
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	1.000	.294	.177	.098	.294	.294	1.000

2. Iraqia-Baghdad

	Maliki	Allawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	23416.500	23400.000	23416.500	23517.000	23400.000	23501.000	23517.000
Wilcoxon W	43717.500	50895.000	43717.500	51012.000	50895.000	50996.000	51012.000
Z	-.927	-1.079	-.927	.000	-1.079	-.104	.000
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.354	.281	.354	1.000	.281	.917	1.000

3. Iraqia-Hurria

	Maliki	Allawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	20200.500	20100.000	20200.500	20100.000	19595.500	20200.500	20200.500
Wilcoxon W	40501.500	40401.000	40501.500	40401.000	39896.500	40501.500	40501.500
Z	.000	-1.000	.000	-1.000	-2.147	.000	.000
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	1.000	.317	1.000	.317	.032	1.000	1.000

4. Furat-Baghdad

	Maliki	Allawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	25746.500	25857.000	25732.500	25506.000	25857.000	25746.500	25857.000
Wilcoxon W	50277.500	53352.000	53227.500	53001.000	53352.000	50277.500	53352.000
Z	-.972	.000	-.634	-1.786	.000	-.972	.000
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.331	1.000	.526	.074	1.000	.331	1.000

5. Furat-Hurria

	Maliki	Allawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	22210.500	22210.500	22009.500	22018.500	21437.000	22100.000	22210.500
Wilcoxon W	42511.500	42511.500	42310.500	42319.500	45968.000	46631.000	42511.500
Z	.000	.000	-1.350	-.914	-2.794	-1.049	.000
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	1.000	1.000	.177	.361	.005	.294	1.000

6. Baghdad-Hurria

	Maliki	Allawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	23416.500	23517.000	23416.500	23400.000	22698.000	23501.000	23517.000
Wilcoxon W	43717.500	43818.000	43717.500	50895.000	50193.000	50996.000	43818.000
Z	-.927	.000	-.927	-1.079	-2.875	-.104	.000

| Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) | .354 | 1.000 | .354 | .281 | .004 | .917 | 1.000 |

Table 12 Mann-Whitney Tests: Positive Candidates' Scores

1. Iraqia-Furat

	Maliki	Allawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	22210.500	22210.500	19899.000	22009.500	22210.500	22210.500	22210.500
Wilcoxon W	46741.500	46741.500	40200.000	42310.500	46741.500	46741.500	46741.500
Z	.000	.000	-4.696	-1.350	.000	.000	.000
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	1.000	1.000	.000	.177	1.000	1.000	1.000

2. Iraqia-Baghdad

	Maliki	Allawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	23517.000	23517.000	23517.000	23517.000	23517.000	12663.000	23416.500
Wilcoxon W	51012.000	51012.000	51012.000	51012.000	51012.000	32964.000	43717.500
Z	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	-10.950	-.927
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	.000	.354

3. Iraqia-Hurria

	Maliki	Allawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	20200.500	19999.500	20100.000	20200.500	19597.500	20200.500	20200.500
Wilcoxon W	40501.500	40300.500	40401.000	40501.500	39898.500	40501.500	40501.500
Z	.000	-1.416	-1.000	.000	-2.465	.000	.000
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	1.000	.157	.317	1.000	.014	1.000	1.000

4. Furat-Baghdad

	Maliki	Allawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	25857.000	25857.000	23166.000	25623.000	25857.000	13923.000	25746.500
Wilcoxon W	53352.000	53352.000	50661.000	53118.000	53352.000	38454.000	50277.500
Z	.000	.000	-5.057	-1.457	.000	-11.415	-.972
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	1.000	1.000	.000	.145	1.000	.000	.331

5. Furat-Hurria

	Maliki	Allawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	22210.500	21989.500	20008.000	22009.500	21547.500	22210.500	22210.500
Wilcoxon W	42511.500	46520.500	40309.000	42310.500	46078.500	42511.500	42511.500
Z	.000	-1.485	-4.385	-1.350	-2.584	.000	.000
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	1.000	.138	.000	.177	.010	1.000	1.000

6. Baghdad-Hurria

	Maliki	Allawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	23517.000	23283.000	23400.000	23517.000	22815.000	12663.000	23416.500
Wilcoxon W	43818.000	50778.000	50895.000	43818.000	50310.000	32964.000	43717.500
Z	.000	-1.528	-1.079	.000	-2.658	-10.950	-.927
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	1.000	.127	.281	1.000	.008	.000	.354

Table 13 Mann-Whitney Tests: Negative Candidates' Scores

1. Iraqia-Furat

	Maliki	Allawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	23517.000	23283.000	23517.000	23517.000	23517.000	23517.000	23316.000
Wilcoxon W	51012.000	50778.000	51012.000	51012.000	51012.000	51012.000	43617.000
Z	.000	-1.528	.000	.000	.000	.000	-1.312
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	1.000	.127	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	.189

2. Iraqia-Baghdad

	Maliki	Allawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	22110.000	21989.500	22210.500	22210.500	22210.500	22210.500	22210.500
Wilcoxon W	42411.000	46520.500	46741.500	46741.500	46741.500	46741.500	46741.500
Z	-.954	-1.485	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.340	.138	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000

3. Iraqia-Hurria

	Maliki	Allawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	19999.500	20100.500	20200.500	20200.500	20100.000	20200.500	20200.500
Wilcoxon W	40300.500	40401.500	40501.500	40501.500	40401.000	40501.500	40501.500
Z	-1.416	-.576	.000	.000	-1.000	.000	.000
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.157	.565	1.000	1.000	.317	1.000	1.000

4. Furat-Baghdad

	Maliki	Allawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	25740.000	25857.000	25857.000	25857.000	25857.000	25857.000	25636.000
Wilcoxon W	53235.000	53352.000	53352.000	53352.000	53352.000	53352.000	50167.000
Z	-1.029	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	-1.376
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.303	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	.169

5. Furat-Hurria

	Maliki	Allawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	22091.000	22100.000	22210.500	22210.500	22100.000	22210.500	22210.500
Wilcoxon W	46622.000	46631.000	42511.500	42511.500	46631.000	42511.500	42511.500
Z	-.656	-1.049	.000	.000	-1.049	.000	.000
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.512	.294	1.000	1.000	.294	1.000	1.000

6. Baghdad-Hurria

	Maliki	Allawi	Hakim	Sadr	Talabani	Samarai	Others
Mann-Whitney U	23283.000	23400.000	23517.000	23517.000	23400.000	23517.000	23316.000
Wilcoxon W	50778.000	50895.000	43818.000	43818.000	50895.000	43818.000	43617.000
Z	-1.528	-1.079	.000	.000	-1.079	.000	-1.312
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.127	.281	1.000	1.000	.281	1.000	.189

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