



# MONASH University

**Measuring support for extremism and violent extremism in Indonesia:**

**The role of existential anxiety**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The issue of extremism and violent extremism in Indonesia first came to public attention following the 2002 Bali bombings terrorist attacks. The emergence of ISIS has renewed this threat facing Indonesia. These issues are tied into the country's history, and a perceived existential battle between the state and a minority of Muslims who believed that Indonesia should have always been ruled under Islamic law. Despite this prolonged threat, concern from the community, government, and academics, there is a paucity of empirical research on this problem. Instead the extant literature has been largely descriptive and involving historical analysis. Accordingly, there is a clear need for empirical research that seeks to identify the underlying processes by which someone comes to support extremism and violent extremism in Indonesia. This thesis examines the relationship between existential anxiety-related constructs (death reminders, death anxiety, search for meaning in life, alienation, loneliness, sense of control) and support for extremism and violent extremism in Indonesians.

Study One utilised Terror Management Theory (TMT) as a theoretical framework to examine whether reminders of death can increase support for extremism and violent extremism in Indonesian students studying in Australia ( $N = 118$ ). The results showed that when controlling for sense of alienation, Muslim students who were randomly assigned to the mortality salience (MS) condition (a death reminder) had significantly higher support for extremist beliefs, but not violent extremist action, than Muslim students in the control condition and non-Muslim students in either condition.

In Study Two, mortality salience and norm priming was used within a random sample of young Indonesians living in Indonesia ( $N = 204$ ). Participants were randomised to receive either a topic relevant norm where participants were informed that there was considerable social support for extremism and violent extremism. The control norms simply portrayed wide social support for nutritious eating habits of growing children. The results showed that there was no significant effect of MS or norm manipulation, and no interaction effect between the two on support for extremism or violent extremism.

Study Three examined the relationship between several existential anxiety-related constructs (death anxiety, search for meaning in life, loneliness, sense of control) and support for extremism and violent extremism. Specifically, study three examined whether this relationship was mediated by either political efficacy (internal and regime based political efficacy) and/or religious orientation (extrinsic religiosity and intrinsic religiosity). The results showed that search for meaning was both directly linked to support for extremism and violent extremism, and indirectly linked to support for extremism with extrinsic religiosity as a mediator. The results also showed that loneliness was indirectly linked to support for violent extremism with internal political efficacy as a mediator, and that lack of control was indirectly linked to support for violent extremism with internal and regime-based political efficacy as a mediator.

The results of this thesis suggest that existential anxiety-related constructs are linked to support for extremism and violent extremism. Although this research has limitations and larger scale work is certainly required, the results in this thesis have implications for understanding and countering radicalisation into extremism and violent extremism in Indonesia. Specifically, the results of the studies suggest that interventions based on raising



sense of meaning, sense of control, reducing loneliness, increasing political efficacy may be useful in reducing support for violent extremism and/or extremist violence.

## DECLARATION

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at any university or equivalent institution and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Signature: .....



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Date: 10 November 2017 .....

## PUBLICATIONS DURING ENROLMENT

- Bliuc, A.-M., Best, D., Iqbal, M., & Upton, K. (2017). Building addiction recovery capital through online participation in a recovery community. *Social Science & Medicine*, 193, 110–117. <http://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.09.050>
- Best, D., Bliuc, A.-M., Iqbal, M., Upton, K., & Hodgkins, S. (2017). Mapping social identity change in online networks of addiction recovery. *Addiction Research & Theory*, 1–11. <http://doi.org/10.1080/16066359.2017.1347258>
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## **CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION**

Violent extremism is unfortunately an ever-present concern for the Indonesian population. On the morning of 14 January 2016, a lone suicide bomber detonated explosives at a Starbucks coffee shop in central Jakarta, Indonesia. This was followed by two other attackers who opened fire at civilians in the same area. Shortly after, two different attackers on a single motorbike rode towards and opened fire at a nearby police station before detonating their bomb vests. By the end of this coordinated attack, seven people had been killed, five of whom were the attackers themselves, and a further 19 people were injured. It is believed that the attackers acted under the instructions of an Indonesian national by the name of Bahrin Naim, who had travelled to the Middle East and joined the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also referred to as ISIL, Islamic State, or IS). This attack was the latest in Indonesia's struggle against extremism and violent extremism (Kapoor & Whiteside, 2016; Spiller et al., 2016).

### **Defining extremism and violent extremism**

The term violent extremism originated in 2005 when the Bush administration re-branded its Global War on Terror (GWOT) into the Struggle Against Violent Extremism (SAVE, Schmid, 2013). What has previously been labelled and discussed as terrorism has since been superseded by the new label of violent extremism, and terrorist acts are now seen to be part of the repertoire of violent extremist individuals or groups. For the purposes of this thesis, extremism will be understood as the adoption of "political ideas that are diametrically opposed to a society's core values, [in the form] of racial or religious supremacy, or



ideologies that deny basic human rights or democratic principles” (Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013, p. 365). Violent extremism will be understood as the adoption of “methods by which actors seek to realize any political aim, namely by ‘show[ing] disregard for the life, liberty, and human rights of others’” (Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013, p. 365). Operationally, in this thesis I adopt a simple understanding where extremism refers to ideas, views, and beliefs, while violent extremism refers to violent acts and behaviours carried out based on said beliefs. Here it is important to emphasise the distinction between extremist beliefs and violent extremist action, as it is something that can have policy implications. Some countries, such as Britain, focus their efforts in preventing violent-extremist acts and have even partnered with non-violent extremists as part of their strategy against violent extremism (Schmid, 2013). Other countries, such as Indonesia, see extremist beliefs itself as the primary problem to tackle (IPAC, 2014a; Neumann, 2013; Schmid, 2013).

### **Contextualising Extremism and Violent Extremism in Indonesia**

Despite being the largest democratic Muslim-majority country where the majority of its population is seen to practice a moderate form of Islam (van Bruinessen, 2013), Indonesia has not been immune from extremism and violent extremism. Indonesia’s struggle against violent extremism first came to global attention with the 2002 Bali bombings that claimed 202 lives, but was preceded by a less known series of attacks on churches throughout the country on 24 December, 2000. The 2002 bombings was followed by other major attacks such as that on the Marriot hotel in 2003, the Australian Embassy in 2004, a second bombing attack in Bali in 2005, the JW Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotels in 2009 (ICG, 2003, 2005a, 2009c; Koschade, 2006), and the aforementioned attacks in Jakarta in 2016 (Kapoor & Whiteside, 2016; Spiller et al., 2016). Though Indonesia has had numerous policing

successes against violent extremist groups (Allard & Kapoor, 2016; Zenn, 2011), the 2016 Jakarta attacks highlighted that it continues to be a problem. Moreover, it is believed that more than 500 Indonesians have travelled to the Middle East to join ISIS and that there is strong support for ISIS within a minority of Indonesian Muslims (S. Jones, 2015b). While these developments are relatively recent, the issue of extremism and violent extremism in Indonesia is deeply linked to the nation's history. Specifically, it is tied to how the state and a minority of Muslims who wish to see the country be ruled under a narrow and hard-line interpretation of Islamic law came to see each other as existential threat.

### ***Islam as a unifying worldview***

Islam was thought to have arrived in Indonesia around the 11<sup>th</sup> century, primarily through traders and merchants (Kroef, 1958; Ricklefs, 2006). Prior to the arrival of Islam, there was no unifying feature between the islands that constitute modern Indonesia. Instead the archipelago consisted of various independently organised societies, each with unique cultures, languages, ethnic groups, and political systems (Lev, 1972). The islands of Java, Sumatra and Bali, for example, went through several different Hindu and Buddhist kingdoms before the arrival of Islam (Ricklefs, 2001). It was not until the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> century that Indonesia had predominantly converted into Islam, a process that incorporated pre-Islamic rituals and beliefs such as mysticism, animism, as well as Hindu and Buddhist practices and beliefs (Eliraz, 2004a). The spread of Islam did not result in the creation of an outright union across the archipelago, but it did provide a set of unifying worldviews that allowed the islands' inhabitants to think beyond local terms (Lev, 1972). This unifying worldview however, would not go uncontested.

### ***The fight for independence and the Pancasila***

Fearing that Islam would become a rallying point for an independence movement, the Dutch colonial powers that ruled over the archipelago between the 1800s to the mid-1900s did much to suppress it (Eliraz, 2004a; Kapiten, 2007; Ricklefs, 2001). This however, did not stop political movements based on Islam from forming, such as Sarekat Islam (SI, Islamic Association), who called for an independent self-governing Indonesian state based on a combination of Islamic and Marxist principles (Effendy, 2003). Sarekat Islam is perhaps one of the first examples of an Islamist movement in Indonesia. Islamism and Islamists sees Islam as more of a political ideology than just a religion and thus wishes to shape society under Islam, though not necessarily always under a narrow and strict interpretation of Islamic law (Roy, 2001). Sarekat Islam would eventually fall apart, giving birth to two opposing factions formed around the two main worldviews championed by the movement. The Islamist camp, led by Mohammad Natsir, wanted an independent Indonesia based on Islam, whilst the Nationalist camp, led by Sukarno, championed Marxist principles and thus saw a less central role for religion (Effendy, 2003). This debate over how much of a role Islam would play in governing Indonesia is central to the acts of violent extremism seen in contemporary Indonesia.

In trying to formulate a compromise acceptable to both camps, Sukarno had proposed the *Pancasila* (Five Principles), a national ideology that tried to balance the role of religion and nationalism. In their original order they were: 1) Indonesian nationality; 2) Internationalism/humanism; 3) Deliberative consensus; 4) Social welfare; and 5) Belief in God. (Bruinessen, 2002; Effendy, 2003; G. M. Kahin, 2003). The Islamist faction however believed that Islam should play a more central role in the new country. To placate them, a

deal known as the Jakarta Charter was made to amend the last principle to read as the “belief in one God, with the obligation to carry out Islamic Shari’a (law) for its adherents”, and that only a Muslim may be elected president or vice-president (Effendy, 2003, pp. 31–32).

This compromise angered non-Muslim majority areas who reportedly threatened to leave the new Republic unless it was revoked (Effendy, 2003; Ricklefs, 2001). Thus, on 18 August 1945, one day after the declaration of independence, the Jakarta Charter was nullified. However as another compromise, “belief in God” would be placed first within the *Pancasila*, and that it would be amended to read as “Belief in *one* God” (emphasis added, Barton, 2005, p. 32). While many in the Islamist camp saw this as an acceptable compromise, some would see this as an act of betrayal by the nationalist camp (Ramage, 1995).

### ***Post-independence***

Following Indonesian independence, the two political factions managed to momentarily coexist and cooperated in governing the country. However, as time progressed they once again found themselves on opposing sides, much of which had to do with Sukarno’s increasingly left-leaning politics (Bruinessen, 2002). This conflict came to a head when Masyumi, one of the more prominent Islamic political parties of the era, was ordered to dissolve itself as a political party in 1960 due to the leadership’s involvement in US-backed rebellions against Sukarno. Many of its leaders, including Natsir, were imprisoned (Bruinessen, 2002, p. 122).

Sukarno’s tenure as President saw continuous turmoil in the form of ongoing economic crisis and violent regional rebellions such as those perpetrated by groups such as

Darul Islam, (Ricklefs, 2001; Solahudin, 2013). The Darul Islam rebellions started when Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo's established the *Negara Islam Indonesia* (NII, Islamic State of Indonesia) in 1949, along with his declaration that territory under his control would be known as the "Abode of Islam" or Darul Islam (ICG, 2002a, pp. 3–4). Soon after regional rebellions in South Sulawesi, led by Kahar Muzakar, and in Aceh, led by Daud Beureueh, had joined the Darul Islam rebellions. However, it is important to note that the Darul Islam rebellions were not purely driven by religious beliefs but more out of a common disdain towards the newly established Indonesian government whom they felt had marginalised or maligned their group in some way. For Kartosuwirjo, it was because he believed that the Indonesian government had given too many concessions in negotiating with the Dutch who had tried to recolonise Indonesia; for Muzakar it was because his guerrilla unit was not given a place in the new national Army; and for Beureueh it was because Aceh's autonomic status was rescinded by Sukarno, relegating the region to being a mere province in Sumatra (Solahudin, 2013, Chapter 1). This rebellion however, was not able to sustain itself and effectively ended with the capture and execution of Kartosuwirjo in 1962 (Solahudin, 2013, Chapter 1).

### ***The rise of Suharto***

Sukarno was eventually overthrown by General Suharto in 1965, who despite having taken advantage of Muslim groups and networks in his coup, continued to suppress them. One example of this is the barring of prominent Muslim politicians, such as Natsir, from re-entering politics once released from prison. Suharto also introduced the *Asas Tunggal* (Sole Basis) policy, which forced all public organisations to adopt the Pancasila as its only ideological basis. Protests were mounted by some Muslim groups who did not accept the

implementation of *Asas Tunggal*, which eventually led to the riots of 1984 that resulted in the death of hundreds of civilians at hands of the Indonesian military (ICG, 2002a; A. R. Kahin, 2012; Ricklefs, 2001).

Coinciding with Suharto's ascendance in the political realm was the rise of a Chinese and Christian business class. In trying to resolve the economic crisis he inherited from Sukarno, Suharto appointed a board of Western-educated technocrats as economic advisors. They implemented an economic strategy that they believed would bring in much needed economic assistance from the West, that in turn would create a trickle-down effect from certain targeted industries (e.g. manufacturing) into all sectors of society (Ricklefs, 2001). While the monetary assistance came, it never trickled down and instead coalesced around the predominantly Chinese and Christian business tycoons who obtained and controlled the nation's wealth, often through corruption, collusion, and nepotism involving government officials (Jahroni, 2008). The dominance of these tycoons came at the marginalisation of Muslim merchants and helped create and reinforce a very negative view of the Chinese and Christian minority in Indonesia that some hard-line Muslim viewed as cooperating with the supposed anti-Islam government (Sidel, 2007, Chapter 3). For some hard-line Islamists, Suharto continued the oppressive stance towards political Islam and turned the Pancasila into an anti-Islam symbol in the process. This further entrenched him, and by extension the Indonesian government, as an existential enemy.

### ***Post-Suharto and the rise of extremist and violent extremist groups***

Suharto fell from power in May 1998 amid the Southeast Asian economic crisis. The post-Suharto era saw the public rise of several extremist and violent extremist groups, many

of whom had been quietly developing during Suharto's rule. One example of such a group is Jemaah Islamiyah, whose members were responsible for the series of bombings between 2000 to 2009 outlined above (Solahudin, 2013). The founders of Jemaah Islamiyah were at one point involved with the Darul Islam rebellions that fought against Sukarno, which also led to their imprisonment by the Suharto regime (Barton, 2005; Solahudin, 2013). Another example of such a group would be the FPI (Front Pembela Islam, Islamic Defenders Front), who claim to be protecting Muslims from the supposed immorality and heresy that they perceive is plaguing Indonesia (Colombijn, 2001). While the FPI do not engage in acts of terrorism, their actions have also resulted in the deaths of civilians, such as the death of members of the Ahmadiyah sect in 2015 during a brutal mob attack (HRW, 2011). Then there is Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), an organisation that wishes to establish an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia through non-violent means while also eschewing party politics and electoral democracy. First becoming active in Indonesia in the early 1980s, HTI are known for running seminars and organising demonstrations and rallies calling for the implementation of shari'a law (Fealy & Borgu, 2005).

In recent years, there also seems to be an increase in intolerance towards minorities in Indonesia. The 2014 presidential elections were rife with anti-Shia sentiment with many hardliners claiming that one nominee, Joko Widodo (commonly referred to as Jokowi), would appoint a Shia Muslim as Minister for Religious Affairs. Opponents of Jokowi claimed that this will destroy the Muslim community in Indonesia (Bollier, 2014; Harfenist, 2014). In 2014, the *Aliansi Nasional Anti Syiah* (ANNAS, National Anti-Shia Alliance) was inaugurated, declaring that they will take any steps necessary to stop the spread of Shi'ism in Indonesia. Another mandate of ANNAS was to demand that the government ban Shi'ism and revoke all government issued licences tied to the Shia community (IPAC, 2016). Another

example of this seeming rise of intolerance concerns former governor of Jakarta Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (commonly referred to as Ahok). Ahok was accused of blasphemy when a campaign speech and its transcript was edited to make it seem like he insulted the Qur'an. In response to Ahok's speech, a series of rallies were staged in November and December 2016, spearheaded by the FPI and involved other groups such as HTI, the Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI, Islamic Mujahideen Assembly), and the Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI, Islamic Student Association) (Batu, 2017; Ismail, 2016). Ahok has since been found guilty and sentenced to two years in prison (Lamb, 2016, 2017).


### **A review of the literature on extremism and violent extremism in Indonesia**

The ever-evolving situation in Indonesia highlights the need for continued research in this area, especially on why people come to support such groups. However, it is important to first review the extant literature to gain an understanding of what research has already been conducted and what is already known about the issue. This review of the literature will focus on journal articles, books, book chapters, as well as reports that have been published on the issue of extremism and violent extremism in Indonesia.

The first review was conducted in February 2014 on the following terrorism focused peer-reviewed academic journals: *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, and *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*. This was updated with an expanded literature search on the Scopus, PsycINFO, and ProQuest online research databases. Within each database the following keyword combinations were used: "indonesia\* and terroris\*", "indonesia\* and extremis\*", "indonesia and extremis\*", and "indonesia\* and radical\*", and "indonesia\* and fundamentalis\*". Literature not relevant to the thesis, such as




**Figure 1.1 Number of publications by type of publication**



health-focused articles or those not sufficiently focused on Indonesia, were excluded from the literature review. This left a total of 106 articles. In addition to these results several books and reports were added to the literature review resulting in a total of 155 works (see Appendix A, Table 1). These works were then categorised as either group focused or contextually focused, and whether they are inferential, or descriptive in nature. Group focused works are literature that primarily discuss a specific group or number of groups and how they evolve, operate, or are linked together. Contextually focused works are those that primarily discuss the wider social, political, and/or religious situation within Indonesia that drive support or involvement in extremism and violent extremism in Indonesia. Descriptive works are literature that primarily describe the matters relating to extremism and violent extremism, such as how groups evolve and operate. Inferential works on the other hand are pieces of literature that make inferences about factors linked to support for extremism and

violent extremism. Within the final literature list, there were 95 journal articles, 14 books, 10 book chapters, and 34 reports (see Figure 1.1).

**Figure 1.2 Number of publications by year**



### ***Literature released prior to 2002 Bali Bombing***


While the majority of the literature (98%, see Figure 1.2) were published after the 2002 Bali bombings, several were published prior to this attacks and was predominantly descriptive in nature. These articles talked about the issue of terrorism within the context of the Cold War (Chalk, 1998), the Acehese separatist movement (Chalk, 1998), or ethnic or communal violence (Chalk, 1998; ICG, 2001). Other articles, touch on the periphery of groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah, discussing the history of political Islam in Indonesia (Bruinessen, 2002; ICG, 2001), while also linking them to international groups such as Al-

Qaeda (ICG, 2002a), but never outright discussing them as a clandestine violent extremist organisation.

### ***Literature focusing on the societal context***

Following the 2002 Bali bombings the literature remained predominantly descriptive (see Figure 1.3), some of which covered the wider context in Indonesia and Southeast Asia. These works covered the ramifications of the Bali bombings and the Indonesian government's subsequent reaction (ICG, 2002b), the challenge of violent extremist groups within the wider social, religious, and political context of Indonesia and its surrounding countries (Sidel, 2007; Singh, 2004), as well as international links and how extremist ideas and movements originating in the Middle East eventually found its way to Indonesia (Abuza, 2003b; Eliraz, 2004a).

**Figure 1.3 Number of publications by year and category**



### ***Literature focusing on operational aspects of Violent Extremist Groups***

Another common area covered by the literature focuses on operational aspects of groups such as JI, which looks at how attacks were planned and carried out (ICG, 2002c, 2003), or how organisations such as JI structures itself (Pavlova, 2007). A number of articles focus on the Internet and how it is utilised by extremist and violent extremist groups in Indonesia and how they help spread their messaging and propaganda (Hui, 2010; Lim, 2005), show solidarity with Muslims in conflict areas (Hui, 2010), as well as distribute war and bomb-making manuals (Hui, 2010).

### ***Literature focusing on social networks of extremist and violent extremist groups***

Another area widely covered by the literature are the social networks surrounding groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah. These articles cover how links with other groups such as Darul Islam allows them to cross-recruit (ICG, 2005a) and carry out attacks (Koschade, 2006). Other articles focuses on the networks created through education, and kinship as perpetrators of attacks are often linked through family or have at one point attended the same religious boarding school (Abuza, 2006; Magouirk, 2008; Magouirk, Atran, & Sageman, 2008; S. Osman, 2010).

### ***Literature focusing on historical development of extremist and violent extremist groups***

Another common area covered by the literature was the historical evolution of Extremist groups such as JI. These works covered how the evolution of JI was related to the

greater socio-political context of Indonesia (Barton, 2005), as well as prior movements rooted in Indonesia's history (Fealy & Borgu, 2005; Solahudin, 2011, 2013). As the years proceeded, the focus of the literature took the form of how groups such as JI have continued to evolve and adapt to the changing landscape (S. Jones, 2005; Oak, 2010), and how internal rifts threatened to splinter JI (Ismail & Ungerer, 2009; S. Jones, 2005; Oak, 2010). One article discusses the threats posed by new groups such as Mujahideen Indonesia Timur (MIT, East Indonesian Mujahideen) who at the time were targeting the police and urging others to target them as well (S. Jones & Solahudin, 2014).

### ***Literature focusing on disengagement and de-radicalisation***

Another area discussed within the literature are works that examine disengagement and deradicalisation within an Indonesian context. A number of these articles focused on operational challenges posed by the prison system (ICG, 2007a; Ungerer, 2011), while one article takes a broader approach and evaluates the *Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme* (BNPT, National Agency for Combating Terrorism), concluding that there is room for improvement, that the different government agencies under its umbrella needs to be positioned to play to their strengths, and that better coordination is needed between government and civil society organisations in their efforts in fighting against extremism and violent extremism (IPAC, 2014a).

### ***Literature focusing on radicalisation towards involvement with or support of extremist beliefs and violent extremist action***

One final area of research in the Indonesian context is research focusing on radicalisation to extremism and violent extremism. Radicalisation is often used to describe the process through which people come to support or become involved in extremism and violent extremism. One series of articles, based on semi-structured interviews and descriptive in nature, found that that follower-leader dynamics played an important role in the radicalisation of individuals involved in the 2002 Bali bombings. That is leaders of terrorist organisations play a pivotal role in guiding and nurturing people in supporting extremism and violent extremism (Milla, Faturochman, & Ancok, 2013). Social bonds were also the focus of King, Noor, and Taylor's article (2011), which found that "family members were found to agree with their kin's involvement in the violent activities of JI, and perceived their community as being supportive. Agreement with their relative's involvement in JI was predicted by anti-Western sentiment, not support for violent jihad"

Religious and political aspects were also covered within this subset of the Indonesian literature. One article found that a perception of conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims, the need to apply Sharia (Islamic law), the deprivation of Indonesian Muslims, and a belief that the Indonesian government often sides with non-Muslims over the Muslims, have also contributed to why some people join or support extremism and violent extremism (Putra & Sukabdi, 2013). In another article, using data from the 2007 PEW survey, Fair and Shepherd (2006) found that the biggest predictors of support for terrorism in Indonesia are greater support of religious leaders playing a role in politics and a perception that Muslims are under threat.

In their article, Muluk and Sumaktoyo (2010), found that a desire for simple cognitive structures, a latent variable made up of support for Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA),

Dogmatism, and desire for certainty, was linked to intratextual fundamentalism, a belief in the absolute truth of one's religious texts. Building on this, Muluk, Sumaktoyo, and Ruth (2013) also found that belief in violent jihad mediated the relationship between intratextual fundamentalism, perceptions of unfair treatment, religious practice, and support of sacred violence. Conversely Putra and Sukabdi (2014) found that a belief in the ability to establish Islam peacefully moderated the relationship between fundamentalism and support for acts of terrorism, such that people with high belief of establishing Islam peacefully had lower levels of support for terrorism.

Shafiq and Sinno (2010) found that, in addition to higher education being linked to lower levels of support for acts of suicide bombings against civilians, they also found that political dissatisfaction was linked to higher levels of support for suicide bombings targeting Westerners. Berger (2014) found that within Indonesia, support for attacks against US military targets is linked to US foreign policy and hostility towards the Muslim world. On the other hand, support for attacks against US civilians was linked to negative views of US culture as well as disapproval of the domestic political situation in Indonesia. Similarly, LaFree and Morris (2012) found that people who have more favourable views of American citizens and culture have lower levels of support for attacks against America. LaFree and Morris (2012) also found that favourable views of the domestic governmental system is linked to lower levels of support for violent groups that attack America.

One final area explored by the extant literature focuses on existential anxiety. In his dissertation, Hairgrove (2011) found that cognitive openings are linked to support for extremism and violent extremism. Within Hairgrove's dissertation, cognitive openings were understood as times when an individual may be open to finding a new sense of meaning or

purpose in their life. These are similar to some of the factors discussed in Ramakrishna's Radical Pathways Framework (RPF, 2005a). The RPF is a conceptual model of violent extremist radicalization in Indonesia, built around the experiences of the 2002 Bali bombers. It argues that the process of radicalisation occurs when an individual's identity and culture collides with geopolitical, historical, and ideological factors that drives them to think that their group is under existential threat. Ramakrishna argues that it was this mixture that led the Bali bombers to carry out their attack (Ramakrishna, 2005a).

### **Theoretical framework and research direction**

As described above, much of the literature on extremism and violent extremism in Indonesia has been descriptive. While this has been useful in uncovering the history and operational aspects of violent extremist groups such as JI, the Indonesian nationals recently involved with ISIS are seemingly recruited from outside of JI or other known violent extremist groups (S. Jones, 2015b). Considering this shifting landscape, it is therefore important to empirically examine factors other than the historical development of violent extremism, and that further inferential work focusing on the process of radicalisation be carried out. As also described above, the history of the relationship between the Indonesian state and political Islam is one where each side has come to see the other as an existential threat. However, existential anxiety is a factor that has not been widely analysed within the extant academic literature and should be further explored.

While the Indonesian literature has not extensively focused on existential anxiety, it is often included within conceptual models of radicalisation that are common within the wider global literature. These models, similar to Ramakrishna's RPF, primarily focus on trying to



explain how a seemingly normal individual can support and adopt extremist views and even eventually carry out violent extremist acts themselves. Examples of these models include Randy Borum's (2003) four stage model of the terrorist mindset, Fathali Moghaddam's (2005) Staircase to Terrorism, Horgan and Taylor's (2006) model of terrorist involvement, Silber and Bhatt's (2007) jihadist model of radicalisation, McCauley & Moskalenko's (2008) pyramid model of radicalisation, and many others.

While these models acknowledge that there are multiple paths through which someone can become involved in violent extremism, there are often common elements across these different paths. One such commonality is that individuals often go through some form of an existential crisis, where they go through an event or condition that makes them question their worldview. Borum describes this as a "type of undesirable event or condition" where individuals perceive that "things are not as they should be" (Borum, 2003, pp. 7–8). In response to this, individuals will begin to move towards worldviews that can help them overcome their predicament and alleviate any anxiety they feel and by doing so they encounter other individuals who share and thus reinforce their worldview. Moghaddam, in his Staircase to Terrorism Model, talks about how individuals frustrated with their situation, will climb up a metaphorical staircase in search of a solution. For some this process could bring them into violent extremist groups who claim that their way of thinking is the only way to resolve their problems and society's problems (Moghaddam, 2005).

A criticism of such models is that they are built on retrospective analysis of known violent extremist and their actions and often do not utilise control groups (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). While they may provide useful insight to those already involved in such groups or movements, without the use of control groups any evidence provided is based upon a biased

sample. Therefore these models cannot fully verify whether the process described are indeed unique to people involved in extremism and violent extremism. Another common criticism of the above models is that they have not been empirically tested and validated (Borum, 2011). It has even been suggested that these models may not be amenable to such a process. For example, Moghaddam stated that his staircase to terrorism model was created with the intention to “provide a general framework within which to organize current psychological knowledge and to help direct future research and policy” and that “it is not intended as a formal model to be tested against alternatives” (Moghaddam, 2005, p. 162).

The social psychology literature has a substantial amount of research on existential anxiety as a driver of human behaviour (Koole, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2006). This includes constructs such as isolation or alienation (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; Pinel, Long, Landau, Alexander, & Pyszczynski, 2006), control (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000), meaning in life (Baumann & Kuhl, 2002; Davis & McKearney, 2003), and death anxiety (Jeff Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1990; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). Out of these constructs, death anxiety is perhaps one of the most studied, with much of the literature stemming out of the theoretical framework of Terror Management Theory (TMT).

### **Terror Management Theory: An Overview**

TMT was conceptualised by Jeff Greenberg, Tom Pyszczynski, and Sheldon Solomon. The authors were prompted by two questions: why do people have such a great need to feel good about themselves, and why do people have so much trouble getting along with those different from themselves (Cox & Arndt, 2008). Building on the works of cultural

anthropologist Ernest Becker (1962, 1973, 1975), Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon first outlined their theory in a paper titled ‘The causes and consequences of a need for self-esteem: A terror management theory’ (1986).

In his works, Becker synthesised different elements from various social science disciplines in an attempt to better explain human behaviour. One of the key insights that he gleaned from his efforts is that humans, who instinctively strive for self-preservation, are also inherently self-aware of the inevitability of their death. It is this awareness of these two contrasting realities that has the potential to create a subconscious sense of existential anxiety, a sense of terror within humans (Jeff Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1990; Rosenblatt et al., 1989).

TMT builds upon Becker’s work by proposing a two-part cultural anxiety buffer system that allows humans to overcome the above existential anxiety. The first part of this system is cultural worldviews, which are man-made symbolic constructions of reality that provides an individual’s life with a sense of order, stability, and permanence (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999). Examples of this include, but are not limited to, religion, ideologies, and nation states. These cultural worldviews not only imbue a sense of meaning, but also give individuals pathways through which they can transcend death and obtain immortality, thus tackling the initial existential anxiety (Jeff Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1990; Pyszczynski et al., 1999; Strachan et al., 2007). Such immortality can be obtained in two different forms. The first form of immortality is literal, in that individuals believe that they can continue to live on in some form of an afterlife. The second form of immortality is symbolic immortality, where individuals can live on through the children they conceive and raise, or by joining a community or group. In both examples the collective identity will

continue to live on even long after the individual have passed away (Pyszczynski et al., 1999).

The second part of TMT's cultural anxiety buffering system is self-esteem, or how individuals feel about themselves. TMT argues that high self-esteem is obtained when an individual believes in the validity of their worldview and when they have lived up to the standards of that worldview (Jeff Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1990; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). When an individual achieves this, it also means that they believe that they will obtain immortality, thus alleviating that terror of death (Pyszczynski et al., 1999).

However, these two components are quite fragile, caused primarily by their contradictory nature. On the one hand there is a diverse and perhaps competing range of worldviews, while on the other hand, continuous social consensus is needed to instil the confidence and belief needed in order for the individual to believe in the validity of their cultural worldview (Pyszczynski et al., 1999). To overcome this contradiction, TMT argues that individuals tend to gravitate towards others who share a similar worldview whilst moving away from those who threaten it (Pyszczynski et al., 1999; Rothschild, Abdollahi, & Pyszczynski, 2009), allowing them to strengthen their anxiety buffer system. It is through this that the continuous consensual validation needed for the anxiety buffer system to function effectively is achieved (Pyszczynski et al., 1999).

Emerging out of TMT's core framework are two main hypotheses. The first, the Mortality Salience (MS) hypothesis, argues that: "if a psychological structure provides protection against the fear of death, then reminding individuals of their mortality should

increase their reliance on that structure” (Friedman & Rholes, 2008, p. 37). The second hypothesis, the anxiety buffer hypothesis, argues that: “if a psychological structure protects against death-related anxiety, then bolstering that structure should *decrease* existential anxiety and, conversely, weakening the protective structure should *increase* such anxiety” (emphasis added, Friedman & Rholes, 2008, p. 37).

### **Terror Management Theory: A Review of Relevant Studies**

The above hypotheses have formed the basis of over 300 empirical studies that looked at the effects of thoughts of mortality on a range of different topics (see Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010). Some of these studies, such as those that looked at issues of religious fundamentalism and martyrdom, can be helpful in informing the research design and direction of the thesis, which will now be discussed.

#### ***TMT and religious fundamentalism***

A common area of focus within TMT research is religious fundamentalism. At perhaps the most basic level, Norenzayan and Hansen (2006) found that mortality salience increases religiosity as well as a stronger belief in God and divine intervention within an American sample (Study 1 & 2). This relationship held true even when the supernatural agency was presented in a culturally alien context (e.g. Buddhism and Shamanic beliefs). The authors found that even though participants were not more inclined to believe in Buddha, they also weren’t willing to deny his supernatural existence (Study 3). This was also true for Shamanic beliefs, but only within religious individuals and not within non-religious individuals (Study 4).

A series of articles primarily authored by Mike Friedman also looked at the issue of fundamentalism through the lens of TMT. In one paper Friedman and Rholes (2007) looked at whether or not contemplating inconsistencies within religious text can have an effect on death awareness within those who identify as religious fundamentalists. They found that only those who are high on the religious fundamentalism scale had increased death awareness when presented with material that challenged religious texts. In a second paper, Friedman and Rholes (2008) analysed the effects of MS on the need for worldview defences within those who identify as religious fundamentalists. They hypothesized that high fundamentalists would engage in less worldview defence as their fundamentalism serves as a buffer for the potential anxiety brought about by MS, which was confirmed by their findings. In further analysis they found that high fundamentalists were more positive and accepting of their death compared to those who were low fundamentalists. Further exploring these results, Friedman (2008) looked at the relationship between thoughts of mortality and linguistic choices within those who are religiously fundamentalists. He found that high fundamentalists not only used more positive words when writing of their death, but also used less cognitive complexity, and were more future and socially oriented. In a fourth paper Friedman and Rholes (2009) analysed the links between death awareness, religious fundamentalism and self-construal. They found that those whose identity is dependent on their relationship to their social network (interdependent self-construal) and scored low on the religious fundamentalism scale, had reduced death awareness.

Building on some of Friedman's findings, Zukerman et. al. (2016) found that in their sample of Jewish Israeli students, those who identified as secular and were exposed to a greater number of acts of terrorism more were more likely to question their religiosity than

those who identified as being religious. Meanwhile, Rothschild et. al. (2009) approached religious fundamentalism from a different angle, and looked at whether or not death awareness can have an effect on hostility towards an out-group. They found that when primed with compassionate values found within religious beliefs that came from an authoritative source, respondents who were given the MS manipulation and are high fundamentalists were less likely to support aggressive military intervention against an out-group.

### ***TMT and the impact of terrorism on the general population***

The majority of studies conducted using TMT have not looked at whether or not existential fear can increase support for violent extremism, but have instead focused on the impact of terrorism on the wider population. For example, Nehami Baum (2010) analysed the impact of terrorist attacks during the Second Intifada on Israeli-Arab social workers. While the research showed that there was pervasive tension and anxiety following the attacks, individuals who had close relationships with Jewish co-workers did not feel anxious or excluded following a terror attack. They also found that relationships became more distant in those that lacked warmth, while those with warm and friendly relationships reported higher alertness and discomfort after an attack. Moreover, Hall et. al. (2009) also looked at an Israeli population experiencing the Second Intifada, and found individuals who experienced positive changes and growth experiences following a terrorist attack also reported greater PTSD and greater negative attitudes towards out-groups.

Routledge et. al (2010) took a slightly different approach and utilized terrorism salience instead of the standard mortality salience as a manipulation. They analysed if this manipulation had an effect on adopting the Euro on a British sample, and the attitudes

towards non-traditional ways of celebrating Thanksgiving on an American sample. This research found that terrorism salience increased anti-Euro adoption support and decreased favorability of non-traditional celebrations of Thanksgiving.

Yum and Schenck-Hamlin (2005) examined proximal and distal defence reactions of college students two weeks after the 9/11 attacks. Their findings showed that students' immediate defence mechanisms were one of shock and disbelief. In contrast their delayed response to the attacks constituted more altruistic, pro-social behaviour, as well as searching for meaning in their lives. For some, the delayed reaction to the 9/11 attacks also saw them make bigoted remarks towards Arab Americans. Curtis Dunkel (2002) also utilized TMT to analyse a post-9/11 America, focusing on the effects of anxiety on identity change. He found that mortality salience can increase identity exploration scores within those who were already exploring their identities (Dunkel, 2002, Study 1). He also found that terrorism salience can increase anxiety within those who are still exploring their identities but also produce higher levels of identity commitment. Dunkel attributed this to the need for greater cohesion in a time of crisis such as that in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks (Dunkel, 2002, Study 2). Stein, Steinley, and Cropanzano (2011) on the other hand examined whether the 9/11 attacks, posited as a very explicit reminder of death, had an effect on the sentencing of individuals committing morally severe crimes (e.g. kidnapping, sexual assault, and murder) by the U.S. Federal Judiciary. They found that there was indeed an increase in the severity of punishment following the 9/11 attacks.

Das et. al. (2009) analysed if news reports on terrorism can increase prejudice against out-groups. Their first two studies were comprised of a non-Muslim sample with Arab immigrants as the out-group. Their third study was comprised of Muslims who were given



Europeans as the out-group, and non-Muslims who were again given Arab immigrants as the out-group. Across studies they found that terrorism salience increased thoughts of death, which in turn also increased prejudice against out-groups. Building on the findings of Das et. al. (2009), Kastenmüller et. al. (Kastenmüller & Greitemeyer, 2011) found that the increase of prejudice against the outgroup was because the terrorism threat increased death related thoughts, which in turn increases prejudice against both Muslims and immigrants.

Using the standard MS manipulation, Sánchez and García analysed the effect of death reminders on people's perceptions of terrorists themselves. Specifically, they analysed the effect of mortality salience on how political liberals and conservatives dehumanized terrorists. Their results suggest that when reminded of their deaths, liberals dehumanize terrorists less while conservatives dehumanized terrorists more (Sánchez & García, 2016).

Finally, Landau et. al. (2004) looked at the effects of mortality salience and reminders of 9/11 to study the levels of support for George W. Bush. They found that MS increased support for Bush and his counter-terrorism policies (Study 1), and that subliminal reminders of 9/11 increased thoughts of death (Study 2). Landau et. al. found that reminders of death and terrorist attacks similarly increase support for Bush, but that this was more pronounced for conservatives in the MS condition (Study 3). Finally, they also found that MS increased support for Bush but decreased support for John Kerry in the then upcoming 2004 American presidential election (Study 4). Luke & Hartwig (2014) on the other hand, looked at a specific counter-terrorism policy enacted during the Bush administration: torture. Within their study, they analysed the effects of mortality salience on people's perception on the effectiveness and acceptance of various interrogation techniques, such as incentivising, manipulating, causing

discomfort, and torturing detainees. Their results found that mortality salience significantly increased the acceptance of torture but not any of the other techniques (Luke et al., 2014).

### ***TMT and violent extremism***

In terms of studies that utilized TMT that specifically looks at the issue of violent extremism, a 2006 study conducted by Pyszczynski et. al. (2006) is perhaps one of the first. Using TMT as their theoretical framework, the authors conducted two experimental surveys. The first survey looked at whether MS would have an effect on support for martyrdom attacks against US targets among Iranian college students. Students who were in the MS condition were more supportive of martyrdom attacks against the US than students in the control condition. Abdollahi et. al. (2010) also tested the effect of MS in Iranian students on support for martyrdom attacks against the United States. This study also considered the influence of perceived social norms. The study found that respondents within the MS condition were more likely to support martyrdom attacks when they were under the perception that this was a widely-held norm within the general Iranian population.

### **Research Direction**

There are conceptual overlaps between TMT and many of the theories of radicalization mentioned above. Many of the theories of radicalization emphasizes the role of existential anxiety as a key factor in an individual's radicalization; TMT studies death and the awareness of our own mortality, one of the biggest potential triggers of existential anxiety. Many theories of radicalisation posit that after going through an existential crisis individuals may turn to extremist worldviews and in doing so affiliate themselves with other like-minded

individuals; TMT argues that individuals utilize cultural worldviews to defend themselves from death anxiety, and that they boost their self-esteem through social connections with others who share their worldview. Furthermore, the historical relationship between the state and a minority of Indonesian Muslims holding extremists beliefs evolved to one where each side saw the other as an existential threat.

Therefore, this thesis will utilise TMT as a theoretical framework to examine existential anxiety-related constructs as an early antecedent of support for extremism and violent extremism. Specifically, it will examine whether Mortality Salience can increase support for extremism and violent extremism within Indonesia. This thesis does not intend to test the entire radicalisation process, but will instead be limited to testing the factors that may drive people to support extremism and violent extremism.


## **CHAPTER TWO – GENERAL METHODOLOGY AND MEASURES**

The research for this thesis will extensively utilise the standard designs, measures, and manipulations of TMT studies. For expediency, the structure, measures, and manipulations will be outlined within this chapter and any differences will be outlined within the methods section of each individual study. Any additional manipulations and measures will also be outlined within the methods section of each individual study. The measures and manipulations presented within this chapter will be in English; for the Indonesian translation please refer to the Appendix.

### **Design of TMT studies**

A typical TMT study will randomize participants into one of two conditions. The first condition is the mortality salience (MS) condition where participants are reminded of their mortality. The second condition is the control condition where participants are asked to think about a non-death related event. In most TMT studies, participants in the control condition are reminded about pain related to sharp and unexpected toothaches. Following the manipulation, participants are given delay/filler tasks which are designed to allow thoughts of death to recede into their subconscious. These tasks often take the form of word search quizzes, reading tasks, as well as completing the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) scale. Following the delay/filler tasks, participants are then given the manipulation check, to determine whether the manipulation had the desired effect. The manipulation check can take the form of a word fragment completion task known as a Death Thought Accessibility (DTA) check, or the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). Finally, the participants are given the dependent variables.

**Figure 2.1 Typical structure of TMT study**



### **Mortality Salience manipulation**

Studies reported in this thesis utilised the standard TMT mortality salience manipulation, translated into Indonesian. Participants in the Mortality Salience condition received the following instructions:

**Please briefly think about the moment of your death.**

**Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you.**

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**Please describe, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you physically die and once you are physically dead.**

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Participants in the control condition received the following instructions:

**Please briefly think about getting an intense, unexpected toothache.**

**Please briefly describe the emotions that an unexpected toothache arouses in you.**

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**Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you when you get an unexpected toothache.**

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## **Delay tasks**

Studies reported in this thesis utilised two different delay tasks. The first is an Indonesian word search quiz (Figure 2.2 for Study One and Figure 2.3 for Study Two). The word search in Study One contained the following Indonesian words (translation in brackets): buku (book), meja (table), kertas (paper), rumput (grass), komputer (computer), telefon (telephone), kereta (train), sekolah (school), minuman (drink), sutradara (director), kucing

(cat), kue (cake), botol (bottle), gambar (picture), pensil (pencil), tidur (sleep), tikus (mouse), serigala (wolf), and foto (photo).

**Figure 2.2 Indonesian word search used in Study One**



The word search in Study Two contained the following Indonesian words (translation in brackets): Meja (table), kertas (paper), rumput (grass), komputer (computer), telepon (telephone), kereta (train), sekolah (school), minuman (drink), sutradara (director), aktor (actor), kue (cake), botol (bottle), gambar (picture), foto (photo), rangkuman (summary), gunting (scissors), kotak (box), kancing (button), celana (pants), komisi (commission), persen (per cent), twitter, kipas (fan), sepatu (shoe), roda (wheel). Participants were asked to spend no more than 5 minutes on the quiz and were provided with a timer above the word search

(Figure 2.3) so that they can keep track of how much time they have spent. Participants were not made aware of how many words can be found within the word search quiz.

**Figure 2.3 Indonesian word search used in Study Two**



The second filler task utilised by studies reported in this thesis is the PANAS scale. The 10-item scale utilised for this thesis presented the participants with the following words: upset, hostile, alert, ashamed, inspired, nervous, determined, attentive, afraid, active. They were then asked to rate the extent to which they were feeling each affective word at the moment of completing the measure even if they have felt differently at different times.



## **Manipulation check**

A typical manipulation check within a standard TMT experiment takes the form of a DTA check. Within a DTA check participants are given a number of word fragments, some of which can be completed as a death related word or a non-death related word. For example, the word fragment “C O F F \_ \_” can be completed as either COFFIN or COFFEE. Theoretically, if the manipulation was successful participants in the mortality salience condition will complete more death-related words than participants in the control condition.

### ***Creating an Indonesian DTA check***

As the studies reported in this thesis specifically targets an Indonesian population and would thus be delivered in Indonesian, it was necessary to create an Indonesian DTA check. Since the DTA check was first used by Greenberg et. al. in 1994 (J Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994), it has been since been utilised in studies conducted throughout the world and in many different languages (Hayes, Schimel, Arndt, & Faucher, 2010). This indicates that the concept is cross-cultural and could potentially work in Indonesia. While there is no prescribed method for translating and developing a robust and reliable DTA check, a recent review of the DTA literature indicated that the frequency of occurrence of possible words that can be completed from each stem should be taken into account (Steinman & Updegraff, 2015).

In developing the Indonesia DTA check there were three important problems to consider. The first is the possibility that a death word presented by a word fragment has a far higher frequency than that of any non-death word alternative. This this raises the possibility of respondents in both MS and control conditions to complete the stem with a death word.

The second is that the non-death word is far more frequent than the death word, and thus perhaps limiting the DTA check's ability to detect the priming effect of the MS manipulation. The third and final problem is the number of both death and non-death related different words that is possible given from any given word fragment. Ideally, word fragments can only be completed as either one death related word or one non-death related word, with the non-death related word being less than two times more frequent than the non-death related word. The following steps were taken to create the Indonesian DTA check.

Using the death words found in Hayes et al. (2010) as a starting point for translation, a total of 62 unique Indonesian words or phrases was generated. After eliminating phrases of two words or longer, and single words shorter than 4 characters, the total was reduced to 38 potential words (Table 2.1). The shortest word consists of 4 characters, whilst the longest are 11 characters long. Each word from this list was then run through a Python script. Python is an object-oriented computer language used for general purpose programming. This particular Python script, called Wordlist (Pellegrini, 2014. Available from <https://github.com/rexos/wordlist>), generated all the possible unique word fragments with two letters removed. A four-letter word resulted in 6 unique fragments, whilst an 11-letter word resulted in 55 unique fragments (Figure 2.4). In total, 1054 different word fragments were generated from the 38 death words.

These word fragments then passed through the Wordlist Python script, which generated all the different ways that each word fragment can be filled with letters from the alphabet, yielding a total of 676 word tokens for each word fragment. The resulting list was then cross checked with a dictionary word list containing 60,404 words or phrases taken from the website *Kamus Besar* (Great Dictionary, 'Kamus Besar', 2014). This site sources its

**Table 2.1 Indonesian death-related words**

<b>Indonesian Death Word</b>	<b>English Translation</b>	<b>Number of Indonesian word fragments</b>
Kaku	Stiff	6
Mati	Dead	6
Kubur	Bury	10
Makam	Grave	10
Mayat	Corpse	10
Nisan	Headstone	10
Tewas	Dead	10
Wafat	Passed away	10
Kanker	Cancer	15
Korban	Victim	15
Tulang	Bone	15
Bangkai	Carcass	21
Jenazah	Corpse	21
Kuburan	Grave	21
Melayat	Funeral	21
Sekarat	Dying	21
Almarhum	The deceased	28
Belatung	Maggot	28
Kematian	Death	28
Kerangka	Skeleton	28
Membunuh	Killing	28
Mengubur	Burying	28
Pembunuh	Killer	28
Tempayak	Maggot	28
Terkubur	Buried	28
Berkabung	Mourn	36
Kebusukan	Rotten	36
Meninggal	Passed away	36
Pemakaman	Funeral	36
Tengkorak	Skull	36
Almarhumah	The deceased	45
Pembunuhan	Killing	45
Pembusukan	Rotting	45
Penguburan	Burial	45
Membusukkan	Rotting	55
Pengorbanan	Sacrifice	55
Pengurbanan	Sacrifice	55
Perkabungan	Mourning	55



The remaining results were then compared to a frequency count of Indonesian words. In the past such data was obtained through counting the frequency of words appearing in the national newspaper *Kompas*. This was first conducted in 1996 (Muhadjir, Nazief, Adriani, Mangkudilaga, & Lauder, 1996) and once again in 2012 (Lanin, Geovedi, & Soegijoko, 2013). Unfortunately the 1996 word frequency list may be somewhat out-dated, while the 2012 list have only provided an incomplete frequency list of the top 10,000 words, thus precipitating the need to generate a new frequency count.

To generate this new list, a technique known as ‘web scraping’ was utilized. Simply put, web scraping is a data mining technique that allows users to systematically capture web based content. This includes data visible on the web (such as a text present on a website), page as well as meta-data about the web page found in its Hyper Text Markup Language (HTML) code. To generate an initial list of links to scrape, I first performed a Google site search which constricted search results to articles published on Kompas within a certain date range. For example, inputting “site:http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/01/\*” into the Google search bar resulted in all articles published in the month of January 2013 within the national news section of Kompas. This method was repeated for all news sections (national news, regional news, metropolitan news, international news, sports news, science news, education news, economic news, soccer news, technology news, entertainment news, automotive news, health news, women’s news, property news, travel), for all articles published in calendar year 2013. This resulted in over 92,000 links (Table 2.2).

**Table 2.2 Articles per section of Kompas**

<b>Section</b>	<b>Sub-Total</b>
National (National)	6,795
Regional (Regional)	6,659
Megapolitan (Metro)	7,273
Internasional (International)	7,038
Olahraga (Sports)	6,373
Sains (Science)	3,213
Edukasi (Education)	3,631
Ekonomi (Economy)	7,091
Bola (Soccer)	6,931
Tekno (Techonolgy)	5,777
Entertainment (Entertainment)	5,217
Otomotif (Automotive)	5,215
Health (Health)	4,925
Female (Female)	5,859
Properti (Property)	4,153
Travel Travel	6,044
<b>Total</b>	<b>92,194</b>

These links were then inputted into a scraping software called OutWit Hub, which was then tasked to scrape the title and body text found in all links that were fed into the program (see Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6 for example). Once the web scraping was complete the results were then processed by another program called AntConc (Anthony, 2014. Available from <http://www.laurenceanthony.net/>), a free program that automatically processes the corpus text. AntConc found 195,000 unique words and calculated their frequencies within the corpus.

**Figure 2.5 Webscrapping example.**

```

928      <!-- read title-->
929      <h1 class="read__title">JK: Partai Golkar Tak Sedemokratis Dulu</h1>
930    </div>

```

An OutwitHub script was trained to classify text between “<h1 class=“read\_\_title”>” and “</h1>” as title text.

**Figure 2.6 Webscrapping example.**

```

1001      <div class="read__content">
1002
1003    <br /><strong>JAKARTA, KOMPAS.com</strong>&nbsp;&mdash; Politisi Senior Partai Golkar Jusuf
Kalla (JK) menyindir partainya saat menjadi pembicara dalam Rapat Kerja Nasional (Rakernas)
Partai Nasdem, di Jakarta, Senin (2/12/2013). Dia menilai, Partai Golkar saat ini sudah tidak
demokratis lagi.</p><p>Hal tersebut disampaikan Kalla kepada Ketua Bapilu Nasdem, Ferry
Mursyidan Baldan, yang juga mantan politisi Golkar. "Saya rasa partai ini beda dengan partai
kita dulu ya, Pak Feri. Partai kita sekarang sudah tidak bebas bicara," kata Kalla di depan
ribuan kader Partai Nasdem.</p><p>Kalla menilai, kader Partai Nasdem beruntung karena atmosfer
demokrasi masih bisa mereka rasakan. Hal tersebut, lanjut Kalla, harus dimanfaatkan oleh mereka
untuk unjuk gigi semaksimal mungkin. </p><p>"Di sini kader seluruh Indonesia bisa berbicara.
Berbeda dengan partai kita dulu, tidak sedemokratis daripada Nasdem ini," lanjut dia. </p><!--
(ads.parallax) --><p>Namun, Kalla mengaku tak menyalahkan apa yang terjadi dalam Partai Golkar.
Menurutnya, setiap partai mempunyai cara masing-masing dalam bersikap dan bergerak. "Tapi itu
adalah cara mereka. Cara partai memang masing-masing berbeda. Pada akhirnya nanti rakyatlah yang
memilih mana partai yang caranya lebih baik," pungkas Kalla. </p><p>Kalla kembali memuji Partai
Nasdem sebagai partai demokratis saat salah seorang kader memintanya untuk menjadi calon
presiden dari Partai Nasdem. Seusai berpidato selama 30 menit, dibuka sesi tanya jawab.
</p><p>"Jika Pak Jusuf Kalla diusung Nasdem jadi calon presiden, siap tidak?" tanya seorang
kader. </p><p>"Terima kasih. Ini artinya Nasdem terbuka dan harmoni, tidak lagi terbelah dengan
asal-usul tapi pada kemampuan seseorang," jawab Kalla.</p>
1004    </div>

```

An OutwitHub script was trained to classify text between “<div class=“read\_\_content”>” and “</div>” as body text.

With this new data, the following criteria was applied to seek out potential word fragments to be used in an Indonesian DTA check: 1) that the death word is the second most frequent word in the stem, 2) that the top non-death word alternative is no more than twice as frequent, 3) that it is only possible to complete one death related word and one non-death related word from the word fragment. From this, the top ten word stems were obtained. Three of these word fragments were excluded as the death words were deemed to be too infrequent as they occurred less than 1000 times within the corpus. From the remaining fragments six were selected to be utilised (see Table 2.2). These six stems were then inserted among 19 other word fragments that were randomly chosen (see Table 2.3).

**Table 2.3 Indonesian DTA check**

<b>Word Stem</b>	<b>Most Frequent Indonesian Death Word</b>	<b>Most Frequent Indonesian Non-Death Word</b>	<b>Death related to non-death related frequency difference</b>
_ E W A _ *	Tewas (Dead)	Lewat (Passed by)	1.26
T A _ _ M A N	NA	Tanaman (Plant)	NA
M A _ _ K	NA	Masak (Cook)	NA
_ _ J I N G	NA	Anjing (Dog)	NA
T _ _ A N G *	Tulang (Bone)	Terang (Bright)	1.32
B U N _ _	NA	Bunga (Flower)	NA
R _ _ A	NA	Raja (King)	NA
_ _ T U	NA	Ratu (Queen)	NA
K U R _ _	NA	Kursi (Chair)	NA
P _ _ P E N	NA	Pulpen (Pen)	NA
K U _ I _ G	NA	Kuping (Ear)	NA
M _ _ A T *	Mayat (Corpse)	Minat (Intent)	1.36
G O R E N _ _ N	NA	Gorengan (Fried foods)	NA
M _ _ A	NA	Meja (Table)	NA
P E M A _ A _ A N *	Pemakaman (Burial)	Pemasaran (To market)	1.40
_ O B I _	NA	Mobil (Car)	NA
P I _ I _ G	NA	Piring (Plate)	NA
_ O _ I	NA	Topi (Cap)	NA
M E N I N G _ A _ *	Meninggal (Passed away)	Meningkat (Rising)	1.41
K E _ _ A S	NA	Kertas (Paper)	NA
_ _ M P U T E R	NA	Komputer (Computer)	NA
_ _ T I *	Mati (Die)	Hati (Heart)	1.62
J _ N D _ L A	NA	Jendela (Window)	NA
H _ _ A N	NA	Hewan (Animal)	NA
S _ _ E D A	NA	Sepeda (Bike)	NA

\* Word fragments that can be completed as either a death or non-death related word


### **Measures of support for extremism and violent extremism**

Paramount to the design of the dependent variables measuring support for extremism and violent extremism was that they are relevant to Indonesia's Muslim identity. Thus, this measure specifically assessed intergroup conflict that is salient within contemporary



Indonesian society. Participants were given seven statements supposedly representing the views of an Indonesian student peer but was in fact bogus statements designed to portray a student who supports extremism and violent extremism. Four statements were designed to assess participants' stance towards extremist views (extremism, statements 1 and 2) and violent extremist action (violent extremism, statements 3 and 4). In order to clearly delineate between extreme views vs. extreme violent actions, an important distinction in terrorism research, specific references to violence was made in statements 3 and 4. Each statement presented to participants as supposedly real samples of a questionnaire completed by a fellow student. To this end, to increase the believability of the statements the student responses was handwritten (Figure 2.7).

**Figure 2.7 Sample of Indonesian handwritten DV statement**



The design of the items drew from the definitions of extremism and violent extremism outlined in Chapter 1, and thus measures participants' stance towards democratic principles and religious supremacy. Participants were asked to rate their personal agreement with each student statement on a seven-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).

Statement 1:

**How do you feel about Indonesia's transition to democracy?**

I think its bad. It has made Indonesia a weak nation, and the only way we can be strong again is if the country was run under sharia law.

Statement 2:

**A former Religious Affairs Minister once claimed that religious minorities deserve to be disbanded. How do you feel about his statement?**

I remember what he said, it was about the Ahmadiyah. I agree with him. They claim to be part of Islam but they're not. Instead they teach, practice, and spread their heretical beliefs.

Statement 3:

**Are violent attacks on religious minorities ever justified?**

Yes. They have been warned repeatedly that they need to come to the true path of Islam, but they did not listen and continue to spread their heretical beliefs and practices.

Statement 4:

**Are violent attacks on government branches and institutions ever justified?**

Sometimes violence is necessary against government institutions such as the police, especially when it is part of a government that is acting on behalf of Western interests.

In addition to the above items that specifically measured extremism and violent extremism, a number of items were created to allow us to utilise a cover of conducting research looking at general social and political issues in Indonesia. These items are:

Filler 1:

**Do you think enough is being done to fight corruption in Indonesia?**

No, I think more needs to be done. There is still widespread corruption in places such as the National Police and in the People's Representative Council.

Filler 2:

**How do you feel about Indonesia's economic trajectory after Suharto's resignation?**

Nothing has really changed. The majority of the people are still very poor, and it's always the same type of people that are taking advantage of the rest of us.

Filler 3:

**Do you think that the education system in Indonesia is adequately preparing Indonesia's youth?**

No. I think that there is far too much attention on the hard sciences and not enough time spent is on subjects that will strengthen the faith of today's youth.

Participants were asked to rate their personal agreement with each student statement on a seven-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The DV and filler statements were presented in the following order: filler 1, statement 1, filler 2, statement 2, filler 3, statement 3, statement 4.

**CHAPTER THREE – STUDY ONE:  
MORTALITY SALIENCE AS EARLY ANTECEDENTS  
OF SUPPORT FOR EXTREMISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM  
WITHIN AN INDONESIAN STUDENT COHORT STUDYING IN AUSTRALIA**

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As discussed in Chapter 1, extremism (extremist views) and violent extremism (violent extremist action) in Indonesia came to public attention after the 2002 Bali bombings that killed 202 people, most of whom came from Indonesia and Australia. There is international concern regarding the increasing number of youths from America, Europe, Australia, and Indonesia who have travelled to the Middle East to fight for violent extremist groups such as ISIS (Stern & Berger, 2015). Within Indonesia, violent extremism came to the forefront of public attention after the 2002 Bali bombings which resulted in the deaths of 202 civilians, the majority of which were Indonesian and Australian citizens (Solahudin, 2013). Though political parties advocating the adoption of Sharia have consistently been rejected within Indonesia (Barton, 2005), religious minorities such as the Ahmadiyah continue to encounter prosecution by both fringe extremist groups and segments of the Indonesian government (Burhani, 2014). Furthermore, it is currently estimated that more than 200 Indonesians have travelled to Iraq and Syria to join ISIS (S. Jones, 2015a), most of whom are university students studying domestically or abroad and are seemingly alienated from those around them (Sanliurfa, 2015). As noted by previous research, the adjustment period when studying abroad can be especially alienating and challenging for international students as they may initially lack a sense of belonging and identity in their adoptive country (Cemalcilar & Falbo, 2008; Lefdahl-Davis & Perrone-McGovern, 2015; Sawir, Marginson, Deumert, Nyland, & Ramia, 2008). Furthermore, it has been suggested that social alienation (a lack of

connectedness with others around them) play an important role in driving recruitment into groups such as ISIS (Eric Schmitt, 2014; J. Horgan, 2008; Sanliurfa, 2015). There is a particular fear within authorities that Indonesians recruited into terrorist groups overseas will conduct violent attacks when they return home (S. Jones, 2015a).

Thus far there have been few studies within a young Indonesian population examining the antecedents of extremism and violent extremism (Liu, 2013). Experiments utilising Terror Management Theory (TMT) in Muslim youths in Iran have found that mortality salience (MS) can increase support for martyrdom (i.e. violent extremism; Abdollahi et al., 2010; Pyszczynski et al., 2006). This work builds on research that examines the effects of MS on support for violent action and aggression within American and Israeli populations (Hirschberger & Ein-Dor, 2006; Hirschberger, Pyszczynski, & Ein-Dor, 2009; Lieberman, Solomon, Greenberg, & McGregor, 1999). According to TMT, reminders of death can create a sense of anxiety within individuals, which can be overcome through a two-pronged buffer system based on one's cultural worldviews and self-esteem. When humans are reminded of their death they subconsciously suppress their anxiety by grasping tightly to and bolstering their cultural worldviews (e.g. norms, standards, ideology, identity, and affiliation). By strongly believing and living up to their group's cultural worldviews, they increase their self-esteem, which reduces anxiety (Rosenblatt et al., 1989).

Prior research has shown that cultural context can affect how participants defend their cultural worldview (Kashima, Beatson, Kaufmann, Branchflower, & Marques, 2014). To this end the present study utilises statements that touch on salient cultural, political, and religious issues within Indonesia. Additionally, I address potential limitations in previous research involving the measurement of support for violent extremism. In earlier work, Pyszczynski et.

al. (2006) assessed support for violent extremism using statements that contained elements describing both violent actions and non-violent views. This makes it difficult to establish whether participants in the MS condition were more supportive of the use of extremist violence rather than just being more supportive of extremist views, an important distinction highlighted by terrorism researchers (Busher & Macklin, 2014; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009; Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013). Accordingly, terrorism researchers define extremism (extremist views) as ‘political ideas that are diametrically opposed to a society’s core values’, while violent extremism (violent extremist action) is the ‘methods by which actors seek to realize any political aim, namely by ‘show[ing] disregard for the life, liberty, and human rights of others’’ (Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013, p. 365).

The present study tests whether reminders of death (MS) increase support for extremist and/or violent extremist statements within young Muslim Indonesians. I hypothesised that evoking MS would result in greater support for extremism and violent extremism in young Indonesian Muslim students, but not non-Muslims students.


## **Methods**

### ***Participants***

One hundred and eighteen young Indonesians studying at Australian universities participated in the experiment. There were 68 females (58%) and 50 males (42%) in the sample. The mean age of the participants was 23.7 (SD=3.36, range 18 to 29 years). Sixty three of the participants identified as Muslim (53%) and 55 identified as non-Muslim (47%).

Of those who identified as non-Muslim, 27 were Christian, 17 were Catholic, 7 were Buddhist, and 4 identified as 'Other'.

**Figure 3.1 Outline of Study One**



## ***Measures***

Along with demographic details (i.e., religion, gender, age, education level), measures of alienation, death thought accessibility (DTA), and agreement with extremism and violent extremism were taken. Participants were also asked whether they saw themselves as conservative or progressive in terms of their social and political orientation (1=very conservative, 7=very progressive); and about the importance of religion in their day-to-day life on seven-point scales (1=not at all important, 7=very important).

*Alienation.* To control for alienation, participants were presented with the Jessor and Jessor (1977) alienation scale. This 15-item questionnaire measures general alienation according to the meaningfulness of daily roles and a perception of interpersonal isolation from others around them.

*Experimental manipulation.* To evoke MS, participants were given the standard MS manipulation (Rosenblatt et al., 1989): ‘Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you’, and ‘Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you physically die and once you are physically dead’. Participants in the control condition answered questions about dental pain. As a distractor and delay, participants were given two task: the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) scale (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and a word search task.

*Manipulation check.* To ensure the manipulation was successful, I conducted a DTA check using an Indonesian word stem completion task. Of the 25 words stems used, the following six can be completed as either a death or non-death related word: \_ E W A \_ (tewas, killed),



T \_ \_ A N G (tulang, bone), M \_ \_ A T (mayat, corpse), P E M A \_ A \_ A N (pemakaman, burial), M E N I N G \_ A \_ (meninggal, died), \_ \_ T I (mati, dead).

*Support for extreme views and violent extremist action.* Participants were given seven statements, three of which were unrelated filler items designed to maintain the cover story of the study. The remaining four items were specifically designed to assess participants' support for extremist views (extremism; two items), and support for violent extremist action (violent extremism; two items) against religious groups and government bodies within Indonesia. I also ensured the items were relevant to Indonesia's Muslim national identity, with each statement presented to participants as supposedly real samples of a questionnaire completed by a fellow Indonesian Muslim student (see statements below). Participants were asked to rate their agreement with each student statement on a seven-point scale (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree).

Statements assessing support for extremist views:

Statement 1: Question: How do you feel about Indonesia's transition to democracy?

Student response: I think it's bad. It has made Indonesia a weak nation, and the only way we can be strong again is if the country was run under sharia law.

Statement 2: Question: A former Religious Affairs Minister once claimed that

religious minorities deserve to be disbanded. How do you feel about his statement?

Student response: I remember what he said, it was about the Ahmadiyah. I agree with him. They claim to be part of Islam but they're not. Instead they teach, practice, and spread their heretical beliefs.

Statements assessing support for violent extremist action:

Statement 1: Question: Are violent attacks on religious minorities ever justified?

Student response: Yes. They have been warned repeatedly that they need to come to the true path of Islam, but they did not listen and continue to spread their heretical beliefs and practices.

Statement 2: Question: Are violent attacks on government branches and institutions ever justified? Student response: Sometimes violence is necessary against government institutions such as the police, especially when it is part of a government that is acting on behalf of Western interests.

### ***Procedure***

Recruitment was conducted through flyers placed at various university campuses in Melbourne, Australia, along with online advertisement through various Indonesian student organisations throughout Australia. These advertisements incentivised potential participants via the possibility of winning either a \$100 gift card to a local supermarket chain or an iPad mini, and directed them to an online questionnaire hosted by Qualtrics.com. All written instructions and materials were presented in Indonesian (double translated back and forth). Participants were told that the survey was about young Indonesians' opinions on a variety of social, political, and behavioural issues, and that their identity would remain anonymous. No mention was made to religion or Muslim identity. After obtaining consent, participants answered the experimental survey containing the measures outlined above. Demographic questions and alienation scale were completed before the experimental manipulation, delay

and distractor tasks, and manipulation check. Respondents were then asked to indicate their agreement with the extremist and violent extremism statements.

### ***Statistical Analysis***

ANOVAs were used to assess significant mean differences in DTA scores between participants in the MS and control conditions. To assess mean differences between conditions (MS: death, control; and religious groups: Muslim, non-Muslim), on support for extremism and violent extremism, I conducted ANCOVA's while controlling for alienation. Planned contrasts were conducted to assess the *a priori* hypothesis that only Muslim participants in the MS condition would report higher levels of support for extremism and violent extremism than participants in other conditions.

## **Results**

### ***Preliminary analysis and manipulation check***

Confirming the effect of the MS manipulation, ANOVAs showed that there was a significant difference in DTA score,  $F(1, 117) = 5.10, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .04$ , between the MS (mean = 2.17, SD = 1.30) and control (mean = 1.67, SD = 1.13). To assess for the reliability of the extremist views and violent the extremist action measures, correlations between individual items and their respective composite measures were calculated. Items assessing support for extreme views and violent extremist actions were strongly associated with their respective composite measures ( $r_s > .85, p_s < .001$ ), but less so with the opposing composite

**Table 3.1 Participant characteristics and DV scores for each experimental condition in Study One**

	<b>Muslims</b>		<b>Non-Muslims</b>		<b>Total, N = 118</b>
	<b>MS, N = 36</b>	<b>Control, N = 27</b>	<b>MS, N = 22</b>	<b>Control, N = 33</b>	
Age	23.67 (3.47)	24.96 (3.30)	23.55 (3.45)	22.76 (3.04)	23.69 (3.36)
Gender	1.61 (0.49)	1.63 (0.49)	1.55 (0.51)	1.52 (0.51)	1.58 (0.50)
Education level	2.61 (1.08)	2.81 (0.96)	2.55 (0.96)	2.45 (1.00)	2.60 (1.01)
Social/political orientation	5.11 (1.43)	4.93 (1.38)	5.05 (1.33)	5.24 (0.87)	5.09 (1.25)
Religiosity	5.58 (1.56)	5.33 (1.59)	5.68 (1.81)	5.03 (1.57)	5.39 (1.62)
Alienation	2.81 (0.66)	2.84 (0.52)	2.68 (0.66)	2.82 (0.63)	2.80 (0.62)
Support for extremism	3.52 (1.57) <sup>a</sup>	2.60 (1.59) <sup>b</sup>	2.08 (1.12) <sup>b</sup>	2.21 (1.19) <sup>b</sup>	2.67 (1.50)
Support for violent extremism	2.54 (1.48)	2.19 (1.54)	2.05 (1.47)	2.39 (1.47)	2.33 (1.48)

Note: Within rows, mean scores with different superscript letters are significantly different at  $p < .05$ . MS = mortality salience.

measures ( $r_s < .54$ ,  $p_s < .001$ ). The composite scales assessing support for extreme views and support for extremist actions were significantly correlated,  $r = .57$ ,  $p < .001$ . There was a significant positive correlation between alienation and extremist views,  $r = .23$ ,  $p < .05$ , as well as alienation and violent extremist action,  $r = .27$ ,  $p < .01$ , justifying its inclusion as a covariate in ANCOVAs. No other independent variable or manipulation was significantly associated with the dependent variables.

### *Effect of MS*

ANCOVAs revealed a significant main effect of the MS manipulation,  $F(3, 113) = 4.33$ ,  $p < .05$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .04$ , on support for extremist views. Those in the MS condition reported higher levels of support for the extremist statements than those in the control condition (Table 3.1). There was also a significant main effect for religious group,  $F(3, 113) = 13.37$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .10$ , with Muslims reporting higher levels of support for the extremist statements than non-Muslims (Table 3.1). The interaction between MS and religious group approached traditional levels of significance,  $F(3, 113) = 2.95$ ,  $p = .089$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .03$ . Planned contrasts revealed that Muslims in the MS condition reported significantly higher level of support for the extremist statements than Muslims in the control condition,  $t(114) = 2.69$ ,  $p < .01$ ,  $d = .61$ , non-Muslims in the MS condition,  $t(114) = 3.83$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 1.03$ , and non-Muslims in the control condition,  $t(114) = 4.34$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 1.05$ .

ANCOVAs revealed no significant main effect of for either the MS manipulation,  $F(3, 113) = .05$ ,  $p = .83$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .0004$ , or religious group,  $F(3, 113) = .13$ ,  $p = .72$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .001$ , on support for the violent extremist statements. The interaction between MS and religious group was also not significant,  $F(3, 113) = 1.35$ ,  $p = .25$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .01$ .

## Discussion

The present study examined whether reminders of death (MS) can increase support for extremism and violent extremism within young Indonesian Muslims. Consistent with our hypothesis I found that young Muslim Indonesians in the MS condition displayed greater agreement with extremism. However, whilst Muslims within the MS condition reported, on average, higher support for violent extremist action, the differences between conditions were not statistically significant.

The results lend some support to previous work in young Muslims (Pyszczynski et al., 2006). However, Pyszczynski et al. (2006) did not distinguish between support for extremist views and support for violent extremist actions, an important distinction called for by terrorism researchers (Busher & Macklin, 2014; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). Though the results of this study provide support for calls to distinguish between extreme views and violent actions, there are some limitations to the measures used here. While I only found a significant effect for MS on support for extreme views, the measure of support for extreme views was correlated with support for violent extremist action. Although it may be difficult to completely disentangle different facets of extremism, there is a need in the field for measures that distinguish between extreme views and violent actions.

I also found that the effect of MS on support for extremism is only present in Indonesian Muslims. The absence of any effect in non-Muslim participants is interesting. While not our primary question, one might have expected that there would be significantly less support for extremism and violent extremism following MS within non-Muslim participants. This was not the case.

Overall, the study suggests that while death reminders may influence people's support for extreme views, they do not appear to lead to greater support for violent action. An important question that arises from this study is whether the expression of support for individuals with extremist views could influence such individuals to take violent action. This has not to our knowledge been examined in Muslim populations. There are also a number of other factors that future research may address, such as whether Indonesian students studying domestically are more prone towards supporting extremism and violent extremism than those studying in "Western" countries. Future research may also analyse the effect of MS on items that utilises provoked forms of violence, which has been found to be more successful in prior research (Hirschberger et al., 2009).

## **CHAPTER FOUR – STUDY TWO: MORTALITY SALIENCE AND NORM PRIMING AS EARLY ANTECEDENTS OF SUPPORT FOR EXTREMISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM WITHIN A DOMESTIC INDONESIAN POPULATION**

The results of Study One suggests that while Mortality Salience (MS) increased support for extremism within Muslim respondents, it did not increase support for violent extremism. To try and increase support for violent extremism, Study Two will utilise norm priming in addition to the MS priming used in Study One. As argued by TMT, individuals try to suppress thoughts of death by committing to cultural worldviews that in turn provides them with pathways to immortality. However, there are multiple, sometimes competing or contradictory worldviews to which an individual can commit themselves to in times of existential anxiety (Jeff Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1990; Rosenblatt et al., 1989). Furthermore, TMT argues that the validity of a worldview is contingent on social consensus, that a group of people believe in the worldview and thus giving it credibility. Previous TMT studies have utilised norm priming to portray that a particular worldview has social consensus behind it. One paper reported that priming respondents with both MS and a pacifist worldview increased support to more pacifist responses to a nuclear threat (Jonas et al., 2008 Study 2). Conversely, priming respondents with death thoughts and conservative/high security norms increased their willingness to recommend harsher bonds for criminals (Jonas et al., 2008 Study 3). Perhaps more relevant to this research, studies conducted in Iran have shown that under MS, young Muslims primed with an aggressive social norm are more accepting of martyrdom attacks against the US, than those primed with no norms or those primed with peaceful norms (Abdollahi et al., 2010).




Study Two examines whether norm manipulation will increase the effect of the MS manipulation on support for extremism and violent extremism. To achieve this, I utilised a second experimental manipulation where participants are primed with one of two norms. The first norm (topical) infers that the majority of Indonesians are sympathetic to extremist beliefs and thoughts, while the second norm (control) infers the importance placed by the majority of an international cohort of parents on the nutrition of a growing child. Following procedures set out in Abdollahi et al., (2010), the norm manipulation were introduced after the MS manipulation as a way to provide participants with a worldview to protect themselves against the existential anxiety evoked by the MS manipulation. I hypothesised that respondents in the MS condition who received the topical norms will have higher levels of support for extremism and violent extremism, than those in other conditions.

## **Methods**

### ***Participants***

Two hundred and four young Indonesians participated in the experiment. There were 101 females (49 per cent) and 103 males (51 per cent) in the sample. The mean age of the participants was 21.65 ( $SD = 1.97$ , range 18 to 24 years). As the MS manipulation in Study 1 only had an effect on Muslim participants, participation in Study 2 was limited to those who identified themselves as Muslim. Fifty-six per cent of the participants had only completed high school, while 10 per cent had obtained a Diploma, and 34 per cent had finished a Bachelor's degree. The majority of the participants identified as being politically progressive (54 per cent), while 25 per cent identified as being more conservative, and 20 per cent

**Figure 4.1 Outline of Study Two**



identified as being moderate. The majority of the participant identified as being religious (74 per cent), while 7 per cent identified as being not very religious.

### ***Measures***

Participants were asked a similar set of demographic questions as in Study One (i.e. age, gender, education level, ethnicity, and religion). Participants were asked whether they see themselves as politically progressive or conservative (1 = very conservative, 7 = very progressive), and whether they see themselves as socially progressive or conservative (1 = very conservative, 7 = very progressive). The measure of religiosity was also modified into two separate items. The first item asks whether they consider themselves to be a religious person (1 = not at all religious, 7 = very religious), while the second item asks how important religion is to them on a daily basis (1 = not at all important, 7 = extremely important). Participants were then given measures of alienation, DTA, agreement with vignettes, and agreement with extremism and violent extremism.

*Extremism and Violent Extremism.* Participants were given seven statements similar to those utilised in Study One, which was first outlined in Chapter Two. Three filler items were used to maintain the cover story of the study, and are exactly the same as those used in Study One. Four of the items were used to assess participants' stance towards extremism (statements 1 and 2) and violent extremism (statements 3 and 4). While the broad themes of the statements remained the same, (i.e. extremism and violent extremism directed towards religious minorities and the Indonesian government), the specific details were altered. Within Study Two, the minority sect in question was no longer Ahmadiyah but was instead Shia Muslims, who had been increasingly discriminated against in the wake of the 2014 Indonesian

presidential elections. Participants were asked to rate their agreement with each student statement on a seven-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).

*MS Experimental Manipulation.* To evoke MS, participants were given the same set of questions (Rosenblatt et al., 1989) used in Study One, which was outlined in Chapter Two. The PANAS scale (Watson et al., 1988) and a word search task were again utilised as distractor and delay tasks. The Indonesian DTA check was once again used in Study Two as a manipulation check.

*Experimental Norm Priming.* To prime participants with the belief that the majority of Indonesian Muslims are sympathetic to extremist beliefs and thoughts, they were given two short statements that are topically relevant to the dependent variables (DVs). Participants were asked to rate how much they think each statement is representative of their own beliefs on an eight-point scale (1 = not at all, 8 = very much). Participants in the control condition were given a different set of statements that were designed to be topically neutral to the DVs. Again, the participants were asked to rate how much they think each statement is representative of their own beliefs on an eight-point scale (1 = not at all, 8 = very much).

Statements assessing support for the topical norm:

Statement 1: A recent national poll of Indonesian Muslims showed that 74% of the respondents believe that Indonesia has become too Western, and that this has led to an increase of corruption, heresy, and sin within the country.

Statement 2: Many of the respondents also believe that Indonesia should return to its roots of being a Muslim nation.

Statements assessing support for the control norm:

Statement 1: Results from a recent international study has shown that 74% of the respondents believe that a balanced and nutritious diet is important for a child's development.

Statement 2: Many of the respondents also believe that it is important for parents to have easy access to information on the type of foods that will allow for a balanced diet.

### ***Procedure***

Recruitment was conducted through Qualtrics' panel management service that directed members to an online questionnaire hosted by Qualtrics. All written instructions and materials were presented in Indonesian (double translated back and forth) and participants completed the questionnaire individually. Participants were told that the survey is on opinions of young Indonesians on a variety of social and political issues, and that their identity would remain anonymous. After obtaining their consent, participants answered the experimental survey containing the measures outlined above. Demographic questions were completed before the MS experimental manipulation, delay and distractor tasks, and manipulation check. This was followed by the experimental norm priming. Respondents were then asked to indicate their agreement with the extremist and violent extremism statements. Finally, the

respondents were debriefed and informed of the true nature of the study. Data collection took place in between late July and early August 2015.

### ***Statistical Analysis***

ANOVAs were used to assess significant mean differences in DTA scores between participants in the MS and control conditions. ANOVAs were also used to assess significant mean differences in norm agreement between MS and control condition. Two-way ANOVAs were conducted to assess mean differences between conditions (MS: death, control; and norm manipulation: topical, control) on support for extremism and violent extremism.

## **Results**

### ***Preliminary analysis and manipulation check***

Confirming the effect of the MS manipulation, ANOVAs showed that there was a significant difference in DTA score,  $F(1, 202) = 7.98, p < .01, \eta_p^2 = .04$ , between the MS,  $M = 2.06, SD = .83$ , and control,  $M = 1.71, SD = .95$ . One-way ANOVAs showed that there was no significant difference between MS and Control condition on the level of agreement with both topical norm one,  $F(1, 95) = .85, p = .36, \eta_p^2 = .008$ , and topical norm two,  $F(1, 95) = .02, p = .90, \eta_p^2 = .0001$ . There was also no significant difference between MS and Control condition on the level of agreement with control norm one,  $F(1, 107) = 3.01, p = .09, \eta_p^2 = .03$ , and control norm two,  $F(1, 107) = .48, p = .49, \eta_p^2 = .005$ . This indicates that MS did not increase participants' agreement with either the topical or control norm statements.

**Table 4. 1 Participant characteristics and DV scores for each experimental condition in Study Two**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>Topical statements</b>		<b>Control statements</b>		<b>Total, <i>n</i>=204</b>
	<b>MS, <i>N</i> = 46</b>	<b>Control, <i>N</i> = 50</b>	<b>MS, <i>N</i> = 56</b>	<b>Control, <i>N</i> = 52</b>	
Age	21.13 (2.00)	22.02 (1.91)	21.70 (1.93)	21.58 (2.01)	21.62 (1.97)
Education Level	1.74 (1.08)	1.94 (0.93)	1.91 (1.10)	1.71 (0.91)	1.83 (1.01)
Political Orientation	4.48 (1.46)	4.26 (1.74)	4.48 (1.82)	4.75 (1.43)	4.50 (1.62)
Religiosity	5.61 (1.08)	5.28 (1.34)	5.09 (1.15)	5.31 (1.18)	5.31 (1.20)
Support for Extremist Statements	5.24 (1.29)	5.20 (1.27)	5.34 (1.27)	5.38 (1.44)	5.29 (1.31)
Support for Violent Extremist Statements	4.54 (1.74)	4.73 (1.58)	4.82 (1.58)	4.82 (1.80)	4.74 (1.67)

To assess for the reliability of the measures, correlations between items assessing support for extremist views and violent extremist action and their respective composite measures were calculated. Items assessing support for extremist views and violent extremist action were strongly associated with their respective composite measure,  $r_s > .79$ ,  $p_s < .001$ , but less so with the opposing composite measure,  $r_s < .44$ ,  $p_s < .001$ . The composite scales assessing support for extreme views and support for extremist actions were significantly correlated,  $r = .48$ ,  $p < .001$ . No other independent variable or manipulation was significantly associated with the dependent variables.

### *Effect of MS and Norms Manipulation*

Two-way ANOVAs revealed that there was no significant main effect of the MS manipulation,  $F(2, 201) = .0001$ ,  $p = .99$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .0000004$ , and no significant main effect for norm priming manipulation,  $F(2, 201) = .55$ ,  $p = .46$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .003$ , on agreement with extremism. There was also no significant interaction between MS and norm priming manipulation,  $F(2, 201) = .05$ ,  $p = .84$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .0002$ . Similarly, two-way ANOVAs found no significant main effect of the MS manipulation,  $F(2, 201) = .11$ ,  $p = .73$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .0008$ , and no significant main effect for norm priming manipulation,  $F(2, 201) = .60$ ,  $p = .44$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .003$ , on support for violent extremism. There was also no significant interaction between MS and norm priming,  $F(2, 201) = .16$ ,  $p = .69$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .0008$ .

## **Discussion**

Study Two examined whether norm priming can enhance the effects of MS on support for extremism and violent extremism within young Indonesian Muslims. I



hypothesised that participants in the MS condition who received the topical norms would show greater levels of support for extremism and violent extremism. However, this was not the case as there was no significant difference between any of the four conditions.

These results goes against the findings of previous research such as that conducted by Abdollahi et. al. (2010), which found that MS and norm priming significantly increased support for violent extremist acts such as martyrdom. Within their study, participants in the MS condition who received an aggressive social norm (i.e. that 75% of the Iranian population support martyrdom attacks) reported higher levels of support of martyrdom attacks than those in the MS condition who received no normative information, peaceful norm priming, as well as those in the control conditions.

There are several possible reasons the results of Study Two does not align with that of Abdollahi et. al. One such reason could be the way in which the experiments were designed. In their Iranian study, Abdollahi et. al. presented participants with an item that assess support for martyrdom operations after they were randomly given different social consensus information regarding said operations. In other words, the dependant variable directly assessed the manipulation, and perhaps should be seen more as a manipulation check rather than a dependent variable in its own right.

Another possibility is that participants in Indonesia did not find the norm manipulation realistic, in that 74 per cent of the Indonesian population supporting Sharia is too high. However, previous surveys found that 72 per cent of the Indonesian population favours implementing Sharia as law of the land (PEW, 2013). Another survey found that 91 per cent of the Indonesian population thinks that there would be benefits of implementing

Sharia (ISEAS, 2017). This same survey found that the large support for sharia is due to the belief that it will safeguard society against moral decay (ISEAS, 2017).

Another potential reason why the norms manipulation did not work is that it was not introduced at a point where it would have an effect on the participants. Following the procedure set out in Abdollahi et. al. (2010), the norms manipulation was placed after the MS manipulation as this would theoretically provide individuals with a widely-held worldview that would help protect them against the existential anxiety activated by the MS manipulation. However, an alternative interpretation of TMT is that the MS manipulation would strengthen already held or salient worldviews rather than making individuals seek out new stronger worldviews. Therefore, future research can test if placing the norms manipulation before the MS manipulation, will have had a stronger effect on the participants and increase their support for extremism and violent extremism.

The results of the two studies also suggests that there is a higher acceptance of extreme beliefs and actions by Muslims in Indonesia than those residing overseas in Australia. In Study One the average rate of support for extremism is either at or below the neutral response within the scale, while the average rate in Study Two was above the neutral response across all four conditions. Similarly, support for violent extremism in Study One is well below the neutral response within the scale, support for violent extremism fell at the neutral response in Study Two. This suggests that while Indonesian Muslims may not necessarily support violent extremist attacks, it also indicates that they do not outright reject it, however the random, non-representative sample in both Study One and Study Two limits the generalisability of these findings.

Taken together, the results of Study One and Study Two indicate that mortality salience may not be a potent factor in driving people to support extremism and violent extremism. In Study One mortality salience only had an effect when controlling for sense of alienation, and in Study Two it had no effects whatsoever. This suggests that other existential anxiety-related constructs should be further explored.

## **CHAPTER FIVE – STUDY THREE: EXISTENTIAL, RELIGIOUS, AND POLITICAL FACTORS AS EARLY ANTECEDENTS OF SUPPORT FOR EXTREMISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM**

The results of Study One and Study Two suggests that the role of Mortality Salience (MS) as an antecedent of support for extremism and violent extremism may not be as strong as indicated by the previous literature (e.g. Abdollahi et al., 2010; Pyszczynski et al., 2006; Pyszczynski, Rothschild, & Abdollahi, 2008). The results of Study One also suggests that other existential anxiety-related constructs, such as alienation, may be a better predictor for both extremism and violent extremism. Study Three will expand on the findings of Study One and Two by incorporating other constructs of existential anxiety discussed in Chapter One (e.g. lack of control, loneliness, search for meaning, and general death anxiety). Study Three will also incorporate other factors put forward in the literature review in Chapter One as potential mediators between existential anxiety and support for extremism and violent extremism. Specifically, the mediating factors proposed and analysed in Study Three are religious orientation and political efficacy.

### **Existential Anxiety**

On top of death reminders analysed in Studies One and Two, there are several other existential anxiety-related constructs that can also contribute to an individual's sense of existential unease. Sense of loneliness (related to sense of alienation) is one example of this and has been found to be related to social anxiety, external locus of control, depression (Moore & Schultz, 1983), impaired cognitive performance, and a range of other outcomes including cardiovascular health risks (Caspi, Harrington, Moffitt, Milne, & Poulton, 2006). Many theories of radicalisation emphasises the importance of the social processes involved

when an individual joins a violent extremist groups, as it brings them into contact with people who share a similar worldview (Moghaddam, 2005; Sageman, 2004).

Another construct that can effect an individual's existential anxiety is a sense of control, which could also be understood as a sense of freedom, autonomy, or agency. Research into sense of control has found that it is related to physical and mental well-being (Skinner, 1996). Some theoretical models of radicalisation posit that the act of joining a violent extremist group is about gaining autonomy over a situation in which the individual had no control over (Moghaddam, 2005).

Sense of meaning is another important construct of existential anxiety (Proulx & Heine, 2006). Previous research has shown that a sense of meaning can vary between age groups, with younger individuals more likely to be searching for meaning while older individuals tend to possess greater sense of meaning (Michael F. Steger, Oishi, & Kashdan, 2009). Many theoretical models of radicalisation argue that people join violent extremist groups because it imbues a sense of meaning or purpose into their lives (Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman, & Orehek, 2009; Wiktorowicz, 2005)

## **Religious orientation**

After the 9/11 attacks, religion became a focal point when discussing the issue of terrorism with much of research and public discourse primarily focused on Islamist terrorism (Silke, 2009). However, it has also been argued that Islamist groups such as Al-Qaeda or Jemaah Islamiyah co-opt a narrow and extreme interpretation of religion to achieve political aims (Sedgwick, 2004). The utilisation of religion for non-religious goals is an idea captured


within the concept of religious orientation, which argues that there are two different reasons for why people are religious. Those who use religion in an instrumental or utilitarian manner are considered to have an extrinsic orientation, while those who are religious because they are living out their beliefs are considered to have an intrinsic orientation (Allport & Ross, 1967). While there have been very few studies that look at the relationship between religious orientation with extremism and violent extremism, there are numerous studies that have looked at similar issues. For example, higher extrinsic religiosity scores are linked to negative outgroup attitudes and actions such as ethnocentrism, racial conservatism, and symbolic racism (Donahue, 1985). Conversely, higher intrinsic religiosity scores were related to lower prejudice against minorities (Donahue, 1985).

### **Political efficacy**

In terms of political factors, acts of extremism and violent extremism have long been described as a tool utilised by individuals or groups who have limited access and influence to the political arena (Crenshaw, 2008); something that is explored within the notion of political efficacy. In this study political efficacy is operationalised as two separate components: internal and external political efficacy. Whereas internal political efficacy relates to an individual's own beliefs about their ability to understand and participate in politics, external political efficacy examines the responsiveness of governments towards its citizens (Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 1990). Research has shown that non-normative political action such as participation in violent demonstrations and participation in groups aiming to overthrow the government is linked to lower political efficacy and lower support of the government (Finkel, 1987).

The present study examines whether search for meaning, lack of control, loneliness, and death anxiety are linked to support for extremism and violent extremism in Indonesia. It will examine whether there is a direct relationship between the above existential anxiety-


**Figure 5.1 Simplified model of direct path**



**Figure 5.2 Simplified model of indirect path through both political efficacy and religious orientation**



**Figure 5.3 Simplified model of indirect path through either political efficacy or religious orientation**



related constructs and support for extremism and violent extremism (Figure 5.1), whether this relationship is mediated through both political efficacy and religious orientation (Figure 5.2), or whether this whether this relationship is mediated through political efficacy and religious orientation separately (Figure 5.3). Although this study is exploratory in nature and thus no firm hypothesis will be offered, I expected the existential anxiety-related constructs to be positively linked to support for extremism and violent extremism. I also expected that

extrinsic religiosity to be positively linked to support for extremism and violent extremism, while intrinsic religiosity to be negatively linked to support for extremism and violent extremism. Finally, I also expected that both regime-based efficacy and internal efficacy to be negatively linked to support for extremism and violent extremism.

## **Methods**

### ***Participants***

Two hundred and ten young Indonesian participated in the study. There were 105 females (50%) and 105 males (50%) in the sample. The mean age of the participants was 21.47 ( $SD = 1.88$ , range 18 to 24 years). All participants identified themselves as Muslim. Sixty one percent of the participants have only completed high school, while 12% have completed a bachelor's degree and 26% have completed a master's degree. The majority of the participants identified as being politically progressive (54%), while only 13% identifier as being more politically conservative.

### ***Measures***

Participants were asked to answer demographic questions: age, gender (male = 1, female = 0), education level, and political orientation, along with measures of existential anxiety related constructs (control, meaning, loneliness, death anxiety), religious orientation (extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity), political efficacy (internal efficacy, regime based efficacy), and support for extremism and violent extremism. Participants were also asked to denote their social and political orientation, each on a five-point scale (1 = very conservative,



5 = very progressive). They were also asked to indicate how religious they view themselves to be (1 = not at all religious, 5 = very religious).

### Existential anxiety.

*Lack of control.* To assess lack of control, participants completed the Sense of Control measure (Lachman & Weaver, 1998), which contains 12 items divided into two subscales. The first subscale, Personal Mastery, contains four items and measures the extent to which one is capable in carrying out their life goals. The second subscale, Perceived Constraints, contains eight items and assess the extent to which an individual believes that there are obstacles outside of their control that stops them from achieving their goal. For the purposes of this study, participants were only given the Perceived Constraints subscale. Participants were asked to rate how much they agreed with each statement, where 1 = strongly disagree, and 5 = strongly agree. Examples of questions asked in the Perceived Constraints subscale include “What happens in my life is often beyond my control” and “I often feel helpless in dealing with the problems of life”. Reliability analysis of the Perceived Constraints subscale returned an acceptable Cronbach’s  $\alpha = .84$ .

*Search for meaning.* Search for meaning was assessed through the Meaning in Life Questionnaire (M. F. Steger, Frazier, Oishi, & Kaler, 2006), which is divided into two subscales: Search for Meaning and Presence of Meaning, each containing 5 items. This study only utilised the Search for Meaning subscale. Participants were asked to rate how much they agreed with each statement, where 1 = strongly disagree, and 5 = strongly agree. Examples of questions asked in the Search for Meaning subscale include “I am looking for something that makes my life feel meaningful” and “I am seeking a purpose or mission for my life”.

Reliability analysis of the Search for Meaning subscale returned an acceptable Cronbach’s  $\alpha$

= .85. Descriptive results showed that the search for meaning scores was skewed (skew = -1.03). To adjust for this skew and following procedures outlined in Tabachnick and Fidell (2014) tertile splits were calculated for Search for Meaning scores for the purposes of analysis.

*Sense of loneliness.* To assess sense of loneliness, participants were given the eight-item UCLA Loneliness Scale (ULS-8, Hays & DiMatteo, 1987), which measures the feeling of being cut off or separated from others. Participants were asked to rate how much they agreed with each statement, where 1 = strongly disagree, and 5 = strongly agree. Examples of questions asked in the ULS-8 include “I lack companionship” and “I feel isolated from others”. Reliability analysis of the ULS-8 returned an acceptable Cronbach’s  $\alpha = .87$ .

*Death anxiety.* Death anxiety was measured by the Collett-Lester Fear of Death Scale (Lester & Abadel-Khalek, 2003), a 28-item scale split across four subscales: Your Own Death, Your Own Dying, Death of Others, Dying of Others. For the purposes of this study, only the Your Own Death subscale was used, which looks at an individual’s fear of being dead. Participants were asked to rate how often they were made anxious by the aspects of death presented to them within the scale, where 1 = not all anxious, and 5 = extremely anxious. Examples of questions asked in the Your Own Death subscale include “The shortness of life” and “Never thinking or experiencing anything again”. Reliability analysis of the Your Own Death subscale returned an acceptable Cronbach’s  $\alpha = .83$ .

#### Religious orientation.

*Extrinsic religiosity.* Participants were given two scales that measured religious orientation. To measure extrinsic religiosity this study utilised the Muslim Extrinsic Cultural Religious

Orientation scale (ECROS, Ghorbani, Watson, Zarehi, & Shamohammadi, 2010), which assesses extrinsic religiosity across four factors: Family & Social Order, Disorder Avoidance, Peace and Justice, and Cultural Foundations. For the purposes of this study, items not directly relating to the social application of religion were removed. From the original 32 items, items number 6, 7, 10, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 28, 29, 30, and 31 remained (henceforth referred to as the ECROS-Social scale). Factor analysis revealed that the ECROS-Social scale loaded onto one factor and not four as originally reported with the full 32-item scale. Examples of questions asked in the ECROS scale include “My commitment to religion is based on the belief that religion is necessary if a society is to be moral” and “Underlying my faith is the belief that religion is essential to the moral development of the society”. Reliability analysis of the ECROS-Social scale returned an acceptable Cronbach’s  $\alpha = .87$ . Descriptive results showed that the Extrinsic Religiosity scores were skewed (skew = -1.06). To adjust for this skew tertile splits were calculated for Extrinsic Religiosity scores for the purposes of analysis.

*Intrinsic religiosity.* To measure intrinsic religiosity this study used the Muslim Experiential Religiousness scale (MER, Ghorbani, Watson, Geranmayepour, & Chen, 2014), a 15-item scale that assess spirituality along dimensions such as closeness to God. Examples of questions asked in the MER scale include “When I look deeply within myself, I understand that the experience of loving God is worth any effort in my life” and, “What has given me peace in all of my life difficulties is being in submission to God’s will”. Reliability analysis of the MER scale showed Cronbach’s  $\alpha = .94$ . Descriptive results showed that the Intrinsic Religiosity score was also skewed (skew = -1.54) and thus tertile splits was also calculated for Intrinsic Religiosity scores for the purposes of analysis.

*Political efficacy.*

*Internal political efficacy.* All measures relating to political efficacy was taken from the 1987 National Election Studies (NES) pilot study (Craig et al., 1990). The eight-item Internal Efficacy scale was used to measure an individual's belief of their ability to understand and participate effectively in politics. Examples of questions asked in the Internal Efficacy scale include "I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country" and "I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics". Reliability analysis returned an acceptable Cronbach's  $\alpha = .78$ .

*Regime-based political efficacy.* The 6-item Regime-Based External Efficacy scale was used to assesses the extent to which ordinary citizens believe that the rules and procedures of policy formation and implementation benefits and is accessible to the ordinary citizen (Craig et al., 1990). Examples of questions asked in the Regime-Based External Efficacy scale include "Voting is an effective way for people to have a say about what the government does" and "There are many legal ways for citizens to successfully influence what the government does". Reliability analysis returned a low Cronbach's  $\alpha = .38$ . To address the low reliability of the Regime-Based External Efficacy measure, a factor analysis was conducted, which suggested that the measure be split into two subscales labelled Regime-Based External Efficacy-A (items 2, 5, and 6, Cronbach's  $\alpha = .53$ ) and Regime-Based External Efficacy-B (items 1, 3, and 4, Cronbach's  $\alpha = .62$ ). This split occurred along the division of positively phrased items and negatively phrased items. For the purposes of this study Regime-Based External Efficacy-B was used as a measure for regime based political efficacy, as this contained the positively phrased items and had a marginally better reliability.

*Support for extreme views and violent extremist action.*

Participants were given eight statements designed to assess their support for extremist views (extremism; four items), and support for violent extremist action (violent extremism; four

items) against religious groups and government bodies within Indonesia. The design of the dependent variables drew from the definitions of extremism and violent extremism outlined in Chapter One, and thus measured participants' stance towards democratic principles and religious supremacy. I also ensured the items were relevant to Indonesia's Muslim national identity, with each statement presented to participants as supposedly real statements made by a fellow Indonesian Muslim. The measure of support for extremism and violent extremism used in Study Three expands on those used in Study One and Two as participants were now given four statements assessing their support for extremism and violent extremism against the Shia religious sect as well as the Indonesian government. Participants were asked to rate their personal agreement with each statement on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Reliability analysis returned an acceptable Cronbach's  $\alpha = .69$  for the extremism composite, while reliability analysis returned an acceptable Cronbach's  $\alpha = .72$  for the violent extremism composite.

Statements assessing support for extremist views:

Statement 1: Religious sects such as the Shiah are heretical and their followers are ultimately on the wrong path

Statement 2: The places of worship of the Shiah must be closed down as they help spread their heretical teachings

Statement 3: The current Indonesian government is not legitimate as it is based on man-made laws

Statement 4: The only way to remedy Indonesia's problems is to implement sharia law

Statements assessing support for violent extremist action:

Statement 5: The Shiah only have themselves to blame when they are physically attacked

Statement 6: The killing of Shias are justifiable, they have been warned to return to the true path but did not listen

Statement 7: Violence in overthrowing the government is justifiable, it is the only way that Allah's laws can be implemented in Indonesia

Statement 8: The killing of national police members is justifiable, they are the puppets of an illegitimate government

### ***Procedure***

Recruitment was conducted through Qualtrics' panel management service that directed members to an online questionnaire hosted by Qualtrics. All written instructions and materials were presented in Indonesian (double translated back and forth) and participants completed the questionnaire individually. Participants were told that the survey was designed to assess opinions of young Indonesians on a variety of social and political issues, that their identity would remain anonymous, and that they had the right to withdraw their participation at any point of the study. After obtaining their consent, participants answered an observational survey containing the measures outlined above. Demographic questions were presented first, followed by existential anxiety-related constructs, religious orientation, political attitudes, and measures of extremism and violent extremism. Finally, the respondents were debriefed. Data collection took place between 10 and 17 February 2016.

### ***Statistical analysis***

Descriptive statistics of demographic and background characteristics along with scores of the independent, mediating and dependent variables were calculated. ANOVAs were conducted to assess gender differences. Spearman correlations were calculated to determine relationships between all variables. Path analysis was conducted to test for direct relationships between constructs related to existential anxiety and support for extremism and violent extremism, and whether these relationships were mediated via political efficacy

and/or religious orientation. The path analysis simultaneously tested relationships between all independent, mediating, and dependent variables using the R statistical software. The adequacy of the structural model was tested using the chi-square goodness-of-fit test.

## Results

### *Preliminary analysis*

Table 5.1 displays descriptive statistics for all variables in Study Three. There were significant gender differences for search for meaning, internal efficacy, support for extremism, and support for violent extremism, with men reporting higher average scores than women in all variables except for search for meaning. Table 5.2 displays the correlations between all variables. Of the existential anxiety constructs, there was a significant positive correlation between search for meaning and extremism ( $r = .22, p < .01$ ) as well as search for meaning and violent extremism ( $r = .20, p < .01$ ). This indicates that the more the

**Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics of demographics, independent and dependent variables**

Variables	Male	Female	Total
Age	21.63 (1.93)	21.31 (1.84)	21.47 (1.88)
Education level	1.77 (.96)	1.56 (.84)	1.67 (.91)
Political orientation	3.70 (1.13)	3.58 (.93)	3.64 (1.03)
Religiosity	3.30 (1.00)	3.23 (.92)	3.27 (.96)
Control	2.11 (.81)	1.89 (.81)	4.34 (.65)
Loneliness	2.45 (.83)	2.49 (.79)	2.47 (.81)
Meaning	2.42 (.75) <sup>a</sup>	2.46 (.72) <sup>b</sup>	2.44 (.74)
Death	2.78 (1.10)	2.94 (.97)	2.86 (1.04)
Internal efficacy	3.29 (.75) <sup>a</sup>	3.02 (.78) <sup>b</sup>	3.16 (.78)
Regime based efficacy B	2.44 (1.02)	2.60 (.94)	2.52 (.98)
Extrinsic religiosity	2.10 (.84)	1.90 (.78)	4.62 (.49)
Intrinsic religiosity	2.09 (.81)	1.91 (.82)	4.30 (.56)
Support for extremism	3.77 (.80) <sup>a</sup>	3.50 (.78) <sup>b</sup>	3.64 (.80)
Support for violent extremism	2.85 (.93) <sup>a</sup>	2.45 (.90) <sup>b</sup>	2.65 (.93)

Note. Within rows, mean scores with different superscript letters are significantly different at  $p < .05$ .

**Table 5.2 Correlations between all variables in Study Three**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. Age	-														
2. Gender	.08	-													
3. Education level	.50***	.12	-												
4. Political orientation	.03	.06	-.09	-											
5. Religiosity	.06	.04	.16*	-.07	-										
6. Search for meaning	-.04	.14*	.00	.20**	.02	-									
7. Lack of control	-.05	-.03	-.06	-.16*	-.14*	-.10	-								
8. Loneliness	-.02	-.03	-.05	-.13	-.19**	-.02	.54***	-							
9. Death anxiety	-.08	-.08	-.10	-.04	-.17*	-.06	.25***	.32***	-						
10. Internal efficacy	-.01	.17*	.15*	.14*	.25***	.06	-.30***	-.31***	-.18**	-					
11. Regime based efficacy	-.05	-.08	-.05	-.01	.18*	-.06	-.19**	-.07	-.11	.15*	-				
12. Intrinsic religiosity	-.02	.13	.05	.15*	.15*	.31***	-.19**	-.14*	-.17*	.16*	-.02	-			
13. Extrinsic religiosity	.03	.10	.07	.16*	.25***	.26***	-.10	-.04	-.13	.12	-.07	.70***	-		
14. Extremism	.01	.17*	-.06	.07	.20**	.22**	-.06	.06	.07	.02	-.13	.24***	.27***	-	
15. Violent extremism	-.01	.21**	.02	.00	.05	.20**	.05	.04	-.04	-.13	-.26***	.19**	.19**	.58***	-

\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$



participants' are searching for a sense of meaning in their lives, the more they support extremism and violent extremism. While no other existential anxiety constructs correlated with either dependent variable, several were correlated with the proposed mediating variables. Lack of control was correlated negatively with support for regime based efficacy ( $r = -.30, p < .001$ ) internal efficacy ( $r = -.19, p < .01$ ), and intrinsic religiosity ( $r = -.19, p < .01$ ). Loneliness was correlated negatively with internal efficacy ( $r = -.14, p < .05$ ), while death anxiety was correlated negatively with intrinsic religiosity ( $r = -.18, p < .01$ ). Finally, search for meaning was correlated with both intrinsic ( $r = .31, p < .001$ ) and extrinsic religiosity ( $r = .26, p < .001$ ).

Of the proposed mediating variables, there was a significant negative correlation between regime-based efficacy and violent extremism ( $r = -.26, p < .001$ ). This suggests that the more participants believe that the government are responsive to the needs of their citizens, the less they support violent extremism. Finally, both measures of intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity were positively correlated with extremism (intrinsic:  $r = .24, p < .001$ , extrinsic:  $r = .27, p < .001$ ) and violent extremism (intrinsic:  $r = .19, p < .01$ , extrinsic:  $r = .19, p < .01$ ). This indicates that the higher the participant's religious orientation scores, the more they supported extremism and violent extremism. Of the demographic and background measures, gender was correlated with both extremism ( $r = .14, p < .05$ ) and violent extremism ( $r = .18, p < .01$ ), while religiosity was correlated with extremism ( $r = .22, p < .01$ ). This indicates that male participants had higher levels of support for extremism and violent extremism, and that as religiosity goes up, so too does support for extremism.


### *Path analysis*

The results of the path analysis with standardised regression coefficients are presented in Table 5.3, while for the sake of clarity, Figure 5.4 only display significant paths within the model. As there were significant gender differences in numerous independent, mediating, and dependent variables, it was controlled for within the model. Modification Indices suggested that support for extremism and violent extremism be allowed to correlate with each other and that the two extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity also be allowed to correlate with each other. Modification Indices also suggested that lack of control be allowed to correlate with loneliness, death anxiety, and search for meaning, and that loneliness be allowed to correlate with death anxiety.

The initial model (Model 1) had a good fit,  $X^2(4, N = 210) = 6.50, p = .20$ , CFI = .99, GFI = .99, RMSEA < .05. Figure 5.4 indicates that meaning had a direct effect on support for violent extremism ( $\beta = .14, p < .1$ ). Meaning also had a direct ( $\beta = .12, p < .1$ ) and indirect effect ( $\beta = .04, p < .1$ ) on support for extremism with extrinsic religiosity as the mediator. Lack of control on the other hand had an indirect effect on support for violent extremism with internal efficacy ( $\beta = .03, p < .1$ ) and regime-based efficacy ( $\beta = .05, p < .05$ ) as separate mediators. The  $R^2$  indicates that 17% of the variance in support for extremism and 15% of the variance in support for violent extremism is explained by this model.


Deleting non-significant relationships from the model (Model 2) also produced a good fit,  $X^2(21, N = 210) = 30.30, p < .1$ , CFI = .98, GFI = .97, RMSEA < .05. All relationships that were previously approaching traditional levels of significance became significant. Figure 5.5 indicates that search for meaning had a direct effect on support for violent extremism

**Figure 5.4 Significant paths in Model 1**



<sup>t</sup>  $p < .1$ , \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

**Figure 5.5 Significant paths in Model 2**



\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

**Table 5.3 Standardised regression coefficients for path analysis**

	<b>Model 1</b>		<b>Model 2</b>	
	<b><math>\beta</math></b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b><math>\beta</math></b>	<b>S.E.</b>
<b>Measurement Model</b>				
Violent Extremism <- Extrinsic Religiosity	.08	.10		
Violent Extremism <- Intrinsic Religiosity	.12	.10		
Violent Extremism <- Regime-Based Efficacy	-.20**	.06	-.15**	.05
Violent Extremism <- Internal Efficacy	-.20*	.08	-.17*	.07
Violent Extremism <- Lack of Control	.02	.09		
Violent Extremism <- Search for Meaning	.14 <sup>t</sup>	.08	.20**	.07
Violent Extremism <- Loneliness	.02	.10		
Violent Extremism <- Death Anxiety	-.05	.06		
Extremism <- Extrinsic Religiosity	.17 <sup>t</sup>	.09	.14*	.06
Extremism <- Intrinsic Religiosity	.07	.09		
Extremism <- Regime-Based Efficacy	-.09	.05		
Extremism <- Internal Efficacy	-.01	.07		
Extremism <- Lack of Control	-.12	.08		
Extremism <- Search for Meaning	.12 <sup>t</sup>	.07	.16*	.07
Extremism <- Loneliness	.11	.09		
Extremism <- Death Anxiety	.08	.05		
Extrinsic Religiosity <- Regime-Based Efficacy	-.07	.06		
Extrinsic Religiosity <- Internal Efficacy	.10	.08		
Extrinsic Religiosity <- Lack of Control	-.07	.08		
Extrinsic Religiosity <- Search for Meaning	.24***	.07	.26***	.07
Extrinsic Religiosity <- Loneliness	.06	.09		
Extrinsic Religiosity <- Death Anxiety	-.09	.06		
Intrinsic Religiosity <- Regime-Based Efficacy	-.03	.06		
Intrinsic Religiosity <- Internal Efficacy	.09	.07		
Intrinsic Religiosity <- Lack of Control	-.10	.08		
Intrinsic Religiosity <- Search for Meaning	.28***	.06	.30***	.07
Intrinsic Religiosity <- Loneliness	.03	.09		
Intrinsic Religiosity <- Death Anxiety	.08	.05		
Regime-Based Efficacy <- Lack of Control	-.26*	.10	-.24**	.08
Regime-Based Efficacy <- Search for Meaning	-.09	.08		
Regime-Based Efficacy <- Loneliness	.09	.11		
Regime-Based Efficacy <- Death Anxiety	-.09	.07		
Internal Efficacy <- Lack of Control	-.17*	.07	-.18*	.07
Internal Efficacy <- Search for Meaning	.02	.06		
Internal Efficacy <- Loneliness	-.20*	.08	-.22**	.08
Internal Efficacy <- Death Anxiety	-.05	.05		

<sup>t</sup>  $p < .1$ , \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

**Table 5.3 (Continued)**

	<b>Model 1</b>		<b>Model 2</b>	
	<b><math>\beta</math></b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b><math>\beta</math></b>	<b>S.E.</b>
<b>Variances</b>				
Violent Extremism	.72***	.07	.74***	.07
Extremism	.54***	.05	.57***	.06
Extrinsic Religiosity	.60***	.06	.62***	.04
Intrinsic Religiosity	.57***	.06	.59***	.04
Regime-Based Efficacy	.91***	.09	.92***	.08
Internal Efficacy	.51***	.05	.51***	.05
Lack of Control	.65***	.06	.65***	.06
Search for Meaning	.65***	.06	.65***	.03
Loneliness	.54***	.05	.54***	.05
Death Anxiety	1.07***	.11		
<b>Controls</b>				
Violent Extremism <- Gender	.35**	.12	.38**	.12
Extremism <- Gender	.20 <sup>t</sup>	.11	.20 <sup>t</sup>	.11
Extrinsic Religiosity <- Gender	.07	.11	.11	.11
Intrinsic Religiosity <- Gender	.10	.11	.14	.11
Regime-Based Efficacy <- Gender	-.16	.13	-.17	.13
Internal Efficacy <- Gender	.23*	.10	.24*	.10
Lack of Control <- Gender	-.04	.11	-.04	.11
Search for Meaning <- Gender	.23*	.11	.23*	.11
Loneliness <- Gender	.05	.10	-.05	.10
Death Anxiety <- Gender	.16	.14		
<b>Covariances</b>				
Violent Extremism ~ Extremism	.34***	.05	.35***	.05
Extrinsic Religiosity ~ Intrinsic Religiosity	.39***	.05	.40***	.05
Lack of Control ~ Loneliness	.32***	.06	.32***	.05
Lack of Control ~ Death Anxiety	.21***	.06		
Loneliness ~ Death Anxiety	.24***	.06		

<sup>t</sup>  $p < .1$ , \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$

( $\beta = .20, p < .01$ ). Search for Meaning also had a direct ( $\beta = .16, p < .05$ ) and indirect effect ( $\beta = .04, p < .05$ ) on support for extremism with extrinsic religiosity as the mediator. Lack of control on the other hand had an indirect effect on support for violent extremism with internal efficacy ( $\beta = .03, p < .05$ ) and regime-based efficacy ( $\beta = .04, p < .05$ ) as separate mediators. The  $R^2$  indicates that 12% of the variance in support for extremism and 8% of the variance in support for violent extremism is explained by this model.

## Discussion

Numerous theoretical models suggests that existential anxiety is an important driver of support for extremism and violent extremism (Borum, 2003; Moghaddam, 2005; Ramakrishna, 2005a; Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Wiktorowicz, 2005). These models however have not been widely empirically tested. This study aimed to examine whether various existential anxiety-related constructs (death anxiety, search for meaning, lack of control, and loneliness) had a direct effect on support for extremism and violent extremism, or if it was mediated through religious orientation and/or political efficacy. The results of this study suggest that search for meaning directly and indirectly effects support for extremism with extrinsic religiosity as a mediator, and that lack of control indirectly effects support for violent extremism with regime-based efficacy and internal efficacy as separate mediators. The results of this study also found no direct or indirect links between death anxiety and support for extremism and violent extremism. This further challenges the extant TMT literature, which have found that death reminders can push people to support acts of violent extremism such as martyrdom (Abdollahi et al., 2010; Pyszczynski et al., 2006). Though death anxiety as measured in this study is not the same as the death reminders manipulation used in typical

TMT studies, the results suggest that even general anxiety related to one's own death is also not related to support for extreme views and action.

Within the Indonesian context, loneliness was briefly mentioned within a broader examination of the role played by a group of *madrasah* (Islamic boarding school) affiliated with Jemaah Islamiyah (Magouirk, 2008). Prior research into the role of such *madrasah* suggests that they can provide the required environment to foster closely-knit social bonds and networks of lonely or alienated youths, as they away from their family and friends (Magouirk, 2008). While this issue of loneliness was mentioned in the article, it was not a factor that was then analysed in conjunction with the social network analysis that was carried out on the network formed by the Jemaah Islamiyah members. This may have been purely a limitation of the data used in the study, as the author was analysing historic biographical information that only had data related to their involvement in attacks, their affiliation to extremist *madrasah*, as well as basic demographic information (Magouirk, 2008). Data on how lonely these individuals felt was not available.

While lack of control and political efficacy has not been analysed specifically within an Indonesian context, there are similar factors that has been studied. For example, Muluk and Sumaktoyo (2010) suggested that the desire for simple cognitive structures is predictive of intratextual fundamentalism, which was defined as viewing religious text as central, infallible, and the only 'correct' text. This desire for simple cognitive structure was assessed through a latent variable that incorporated measures of religious fundamentalism, right wing authoritarianism, and dogmatism. While these latent variables arguably reflect a desire and need for a sense of control in one's life, it would be a stretch to argue that the measure of Intratextual Fundamentalism Scale (IFS) is similar to the measure of support for extremism



and violent extremism. The IFS only measures strong belief in a religion's text, and not how much they are against outgroup members based on that text (Williamson, Hood Jr, Ahmad, Sadiq, & Hill, 2010). Future research can therefore investigate whether religious fundamentalism, right wing authoritarianism, dogmatism, and intratextual fundamentalism mediates the relationship between sense of control and support for extremism and violent extremism.

Sense of political efficacy was perhaps also touched on by Putra and Sukabdi (2014), who reported that a belief in establishing Islam peacefully moderated the relationship between religious fundamentalism and support for acts of terrorism. They found that people with low belief in establishing Islam peacefully had higher levels of support for acts of terrorism. On the other hand, people who had high levels of belief in establishing Islam peacefully had lower levels of support for acts of terrorism. Such a belief is perhaps reflective of feelings of political efficacy, where high levels of belief in establishing Islam peacefully is reflective of high political efficacy and low levels of belief in establishing Islam peacefully is reflective of low political efficacy. However, it must be noted that belief in establishing Islam peacefully and support for acts for terrorism are potentially confounds and thus it should not be surprising that the two are linked. Future reach should address whether these two variables are indeed confounding and if a belief in establishing Islam peacefully is linked to political efficacy.

A search for or lack of meaning and how it relates to support for extremism and violent extremism is again something that has not been widely explored within an Indonesian context. In his thesis Hairgrove (2011) explored the role of cognitive openings, which can be understood as times when individuals are open to finding new meaning in their life

(Wiktorowicz, 2005). Within his thesis, Hairgrove found that such cognitive openings were common amongst individuals in extremist study circles and that it was predictive of individuals who would support violent extremist action. The results of this study supports Hairgrove's findings.

The relationship between extrinsic religiosity and support for extremism and violent extremism in Indonesia was touched on by Fair and Shepherd (2006). Analysing data from the 2002 Global Attitudes survey, Fair and Shepard (2006) suggested that respondents who believed that religious leaders should play a larger role in politics were more likely to support terrorism. However, unlike Fair and Shepherd's (2006) findings, Study Three only found a link between extrinsic religiosity and support for extremist beliefs. This difference could perhaps be due to the different measures used. Whereas Study Three used the Extrinsic Cultural Religious Orientation scale (ECROS), Fair and Shepherd's (2006) study utilised a single item measure of support for terrorism as well as a single measure that assess support for religious leaders playing a larger role in politics.

It must also be noted that the measure of extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity used within this study is not the standard measure of extrinsic religiosity developed by Allport and Ross (1967) nor the subsequent revised versions (e.g. Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989; Kirkpatrick, 1989). Instead this study utilised the Extrinsic Cultural Religious Orientation Scale (ECROS) as a measure for extrinsic religiosity and the Muslim Experiential Religiousness Scale (MERS) as a measure of intrinsic religiosity. The ECROS and MERS was chosen over the standard and revised ROS as they were designed with the Muslim population in mind. Moreover, the ECROS was designed to capture different aspects of extrinsic religiosity, namely social order, disaster avoidance, peace and justice, and cultural foundation. These

five aspects arguably better reflect the intertwined nature of politics and religion within the history of extremism and violent extremism in Indonesia than that offered by the traditional ROS scale. However, while the extrinsic religiosity subscale of the ROS is more about gaining social benefits through religion (e.g. “I go to church because it helps me to make friends”), several items within the ECROS reflect the desire to exert religious influence over society (e.g. “I am religious because religion is so important in preventing crime and other social disorders, and I want to contribute in this effort”). Therefore, the ECROS could be seen to share similar characteristics with measures of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), but of a religious nature.

Finally, it is important to note the difference in how religious orientation and political efficacy are linked to extremism and violent extremism. Within the path model, religious orientation, specifically extrinsic religiosity, is only linked to support for extremist beliefs and not to support for violent extremist action. Both internal and regime-based political efficacy on the other hand, are linked to support for violent extremism. This further supports arguments that acts of violent extremism, such as terrorism, are perhaps driven more by politics than religion (Sedgwick, 2004). However, it must also be noted that the overall variance explained by the regression models are relatively small low ( $< 20\%$ ). Future research should therefore build on the findings of the present study and explore other factors such as right wing authoritarianism, social dominance order, and perhaps even the standard religious orientation measure.

## **CHAPTER SIX – GENERAL DISCUSSION**

The aim of this thesis was to examine the role of existential anxiety and its associated psychosocial constructs as antecedents of support for extremism and violent extremism in young Indonesians. While violent extremist attacks within Indonesia have only occurred within the past two decades, they are part of a much longer history tied to Indonesia's relationship with Islam and how some violent extremists became engaged in an existential battle with the state. This is reflected in the extant literature, which has involved largely descriptive historical analyses, focusing on how known groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah evolve and operate. However, the landscape of violent extremism in Indonesia is changing, where individuals committing attacks or traveling overseas to join groups such as ISIS had no known connection to existing groups. This has made it more important to understand the underlying factors that drive people support extremism and violent extremism. Given the nature of the antagonistic relationship between the state and a minority cohort of hard-line Muslims, the Indonesian context is this particularly susceptible for research that examines existential threats as a potential antecedent towards support for extremism and violent extremism.

Many of the theoretical models that look at the process in which an individual may come to support or be involved with extremism and violent extremism share several features (e.g. Borum, 2003; Moghaddam, 2005; Ramakrishna, 2005a). One such commonality is that individuals often go through an existential crisis, where they question the world and their place in it. Another common feature is that in response to this existential crisis, individuals gravitate towards worldviews that can help resolve their crisis, and in doing so gravitate

towards people who share and reinforce those worldviews, and away from people who challenge it. However, these models of radicalisation has not been widely empirically tested.

This thesis employed Terror Management Theory (TMT) to analyse potential antecedents of extremism and violent extremism. TMT argues that humans protect themselves from the awareness of their own mortality by utilising cultural worldview defences to suppress any feelings of anxiety that may arise from their awareness of said mortality. Importantly for this thesis, the core tenets of TMT overlap with the common features of the various models of radicalisation. Specifically, both TMT and many of the models of radicalisation highlight existential anxiety as a driver of human behaviour, and both TMT and many of the models of radicalisation also discuss the role of worldviews and social interconnectedness as a way through which individuals can become involved with extremism and violent extremism. This thesis aimed to address the shortcomings of the Indonesia-focused literature by conducting studies utilising TMT to analyse whether existential anxiety is an early antecedent of extremism and violent extremism. Specifically, this thesis aimed to analyse whether mortality salience can increase support for extremism and violent extremism.

Study One tested whether individuals who were reminded of their death (MS condition) as opposed to those reminded of a toothache (control condition) were more likely to support extremism and violent extremism. The results of Study One indicated that when controlling for sense of alienation, Muslim students in the MS condition had significantly higher levels of support for extremism than Muslim students in the control condition, non-Muslim students in the MS condition, as well as non-Muslim students in the control condition. No other significant differences between these conditions were found, and there

were also no significant differences between these conditions in regards to support for violent extremism, even after controlling for alienation scores.

Study Two further tested the effects of mortality salience on support for extremism and violent extremism. Study Two was conducted on young Indonesians between the ages of 18-24, living in Indonesia. In addition to randomly presenting participants with either a death reminder or a toothache reminder, participants were also presented with a norm priming manipulation. This second manipulation presented participants with either two short statements depicting wide societal support for extremism and violent extremism, or two short control statements about the nutrition of growing children. The results of Study 2 indicated that neither the mortality salience nor norm priming manipulation had an effect on the levels of support for extremism and violent extremism.

The mixed results of Studies One and Two suggests that mortality salience may not be a particularly strong antecedent of support for extremism and violent extremism, and that other existential anxiety related construct be examined. Therefore, Study Three examined additional existential anxiety-related constructs such as loneliness, control, meaning, and death anxiety, along with political efficacy and religious orientation as potential mediators. The results of Study Three suggests that the more individuals searched for meaning, the stronger their sense of intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity, but that it is only a high sense of extrinsic religiosity that is in turn linked to support for extremist beliefs. Study Three also found that a high sense of lack of control was linked to low levels of both internal and regime-based political efficacy, and that high feelings of loneliness is linked to low levels of internal efficacy. Both a low sense of internal and regime-based efficacy is in turn linked to

high support for violent extremist action. Overall, Study Three suggests that support for acts of violent extremism is more about politics than religion.

### **Implications for understanding support for extremism and violent extremism**

This thesis contributes to the literature on understanding extremism and violent extremism in Indonesia by expanding the body of knowledge on the role of existential anxiety as early antecedents towards support for extremism and violent extremism. Prior research into extremism and violent extremism in Indonesia have not extensively looked at the possible early antecedents of extremism and violent extremism, and has been mostly descriptive and historical. However, in a context where individuals with no ties to known violent extremist groups are committing attacks and joining ISIS, it is important to understand what may motivate seemingly ordinary individuals to support or join violent extremist groups and/or commit violent extremist attacks. While not explicitly using the same concepts and measures used in prior research, the results reported within these studies builds on some of the findings provided by prior works conducted within an Indonesian and global context.

The results of this thesis suggest that the links between the existential anxiety-related constructs and support for extremism and violent extremism varies between the different constructs. For example, death reminders or general death anxiety was not very strongly linked to support for extremism and violent extremism. In Study One, death reminders only had a significant effect on support for extremism when controlling for levels of alienation and had no effect on support for violent extremism. In Study Two, death reminders had no significant effect on either support for extremism or violent extremism. Finally, in Study

Three, general death anxiety was not directly linked to either support for extremism and violent extremism and was also not indirectly linked to either support for extremism and violent extremism through religious or political factors. This goes against the literature on Terror Management Theory, which suggests that reminders of death are linked to support for acts of martyrdom (Abdollahi et al., 2010; Pyszczynski et al., 2006).

Other constructs related to existential anxiety on the other hand are indeed linked with support for extremism and violent extremism in Indonesia. These links however seem to be more indirect in nature as it is mediated through other factors. For example, high feelings of loneliness is linked to lower levels of political efficacy, which in turn is linked to higher support for violent extremism. While there has been no studies that specifically looked at the links between loneliness, political efficacy, and support for violent extremism, these results are similar to the findings of previous research that looked at the relationship between efficacy and loneliness more broadly. In one study of adolescent youths, feelings of loneliness was correlated to an external locus of control, suggesting that those who are more lonely more strongly believe that external forces have greater control over their lives (Moore & Schultz, 1983).

The results of Study One and Three also suggests that the role in which alienation or isolation plays as a possible antecedent towards extremism and violent extremism is dependent on the context. Whereas Study One recruited Indonesians living abroad, Study Three recruited Indonesians living domestically within Indonesia. While it is possible that the different results are caused by the different measures used, it is also plausible that it is due to the different geographic location of the two studies. In situations where individuals are more likely to feel a heightened sense of alienation (e.g. studying abroad), alienation may play a



stronger role as an early antecedent towards support for extremism and violent extremism. However, when individuals are in situations where feelings of alienation may not be as high, such feelings may not be linked to support for extremism and violent extremism.

Another existential anxiety-related construct that is indirectly linked to support for extremism and violent extremism is sense of control, which is mediated by not only internal political efficacy but also regime based political efficacy. Specifically, a higher sense of lack of control was linked to lower levels of both regime-based and internal political efficacy, which in turn is linked to higher levels of support for violent extremism. The relationship between sense of control and extremism and violent extremism, whether directly or indirectly, is one that has not been widely explored empirically. These findings are further supported by research in general political science outside of terrorism studies, which suggests that high political efficacy is linked to normative political action (Clarke & Acock, 1989; Finkel, 1987), while low political efficacy is linked to non-normative political action (Finkel, 1987). The finding that lack of control is linked to violent extremism through a low sense of political efficacy further supports the notion that acts of violent extremism are tools of those who perceive themselves to be powerless and weak in the political arena and see no other available course of action. For example, some have suggested that violent extremist action restores a sense of control for Palestinians who feel that they have been stripped of it (Moghaddam, 2005; Post, 2010). It is possible that lack of control and political efficacy perhaps measure a similar concept, but that political efficacy measures a lack of control specifically within the political domain. This suggests that support for extremism and violent extremism doesn't stem from a general sense of powerlessness, but a specific feeling of not being able to make an impact on the political arena.

Finally, sense of meaning was both directly and indirectly linked to support for extremism and violent extremism through extrinsic religiosity. Specifically, a higher search for meaning is linked to higher levels of support for extremism, as well as higher levels of extrinsic religiosity that is in turn linked to higher levels of support for extremism. Outside of Indonesia, sense of meaning has also been found to be related to extremism and violent extremism. Ali and Moss (2010), found that individuals can derive a sense of meaning through three different tenets. The first way in which individuals can find meaning is through their cause, while the second is through a self-affirmation of their own beliefs and the derogation of outgroup members, and third is a prescriptive ideology that can alleviate any uncertainty over the future. Such tenets may create a worldview that is receptive to violent extremism. Further exploring the theme of meaning, Ali et. al. (2017) argued that meaning in life is created through one of four conditions: a just and supportive community; unambiguous standards and duties; enduring values; and extensive capabilities and experiences. Ali et. al. (2017) further argued that when meaning in life is disrupted, individuals may be vulnerable to four biases that is intended to restore one of the four conditions, which in turn may make these individuals more susceptible to violent extremism. For example, when an individual finds themselves being pulled by two polarising sets of standards and duties, they will seek out ways to find closure and resolve this dilemma. Ali et. al. (2017) argues that this may lead these individuals to have contempt towards other communities and groups, which in turn could bring them to commit acts of extremism and violent extremism.

The direct link between search for meaning and extremism and violent extremism adds support to the theoretical and empirical works surrounding the theory of Quest for Significance, which argues that preventing significance loss (i.e. losing meaning in life) or obtaining significance gain (i.e. obtaining meaning in life) is a key driver of extremism and

violent extremism. This finding also adds support to the Meaning Maintenance Model (Proulx & Heine, 2006). This theory argues that individuals prefer to see the world as meaningful and predictable, and that when a meaning-providing framework is threatened, individuals may search for meaning from other sources. In the case of Study Three, participants who had high levels of search for meaning in turn had high levels of both intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity. Previous studies found that religion provided religious people with answers about their purpose or meaning in life (Ali & Moss, 2010).

### **Potential points of intervention in countering support for extremism and violent extremism in Indonesia**

The results reported within the thesis offer some potential points of intervention in fighting against extremism and violent extremism in Indonesia. For example, interventions could target isolated youths who may be susceptible to extremist viewpoints. Young students attending madrassah may be especially at risk of this as they are away from home and their support structures, perhaps for the first time. Such interventions may also be useful for young Indonesian students studying abroad, which Study One showed may be at heightened risk of supporting extremism and violent extremism. While there have been no reports of Indonesian students studying in Australia having directly gone to join ISIS, there are media reports of Indonesian students who have joined ISIS via Egypt, Turkey, Yemen and Pakistan (Anthony Bubalo, Jones, & Nuraniyah, 2016; S. Jones, 2015b). Furthermore it is believed that the first Indonesians who joined ISIS were already in the region on student visas (Soloway & Johnson, 2016).

Interventions designed to reduce loneliness generally adopt one of four strategies to reduce loneliness: improving social skills; enhancing social support; increasing opportunities for social interaction; and addressing deficits in social cognition (Masi, Chen, Hawkley, & Cacioppo, 2011). Such approaches may prove effective in reducing loneliness and in turn support for extremism and violent extremism, but this needs to be specifically assessed. On face value, students attending a *madrassah* or an overseas educational institution may better benefit from interventions that enhances social support and/or increases opportunities for social interaction. Take for example the situation described by Magrouirk (2008), where isolated *madrassah* students alleviate their sense of isolation by forming tight-knit bonds with others who may hold extremist viewpoints. In such situations, providing these individuals with the opportunity to meaningfully socialise and interact with those who hold different and diverse viewpoints may prove crucial (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). These students may also benefit from enhanced social support, such as how to better deal with being away from home for the first time. The issue of better social support might also be especially important for Indonesian students studying overseas. Being in a completely different country, with a different language (that they may not speak fluently), as well as different culture and customs may exponentially increase the effects of loneliness.

Programs targeting sense of meaning may also serve as another point of intervention. One area of prior research looked at the effect of meaning-making interventions for cancer patients. Diagnosis of cancer can be especially difficult to manage and can evoke existential anxiety where patients question the meaning of their life and how much control they actually have over their lives. Some interventions employ strategies around religion and spirituality as a way of overcoming these existential fears. Though the results seem to show that such approaches may be beneficial for people who are religious, their effectiveness needs to be

more rigorously tested (Cole & Pargament, 1999; M. Greenstein, 2000; Mindy Greenstein & Breitbart, 2000).

Other studies employed interventions where cancer patients are given individual counselling that taught them strategies through which they can retain a sense of control and meaning. This intervention improved sense of control, self-esteem, life satisfaction, while also reducing depression and sense of alienation (Linn, Linn, & Harris, 1982). A more recent study utilised ‘Lifeline’ exercises within individual counselling sessions. In this exercise, their cancer diagnosis are discussed within the context of their entire life, including how they have overcome prior challenges in an attempt to restore meaning and control over their lives. Patients who received this intervention reported higher levels of self-esteem, optimism, and self-efficacy than the control condition (Lee, Robin Cohen, Edgar, Laizner, & Gagnon, 2006). While these interventions have been designed to help with health-related conditions, they may also be applicable in countering extremism and violent extremism. Individuals who have been arrested for terrorism charges or youth who are seen to be vulnerable of supporting extremism and violent extremism may benefit from such individualised meaning-making interventions tailored to their context. However, further research needs to be conducted to see whether such meaning making interventions can have flow on effects for support for extremism and violent extremism.

Interventions could also seek to target sense of control and political efficacy. The results of the meaning-making interventions described above suggest that it may also increase sense of control. However, further research needs to be carried out to determine whether interventions designed to tackle a sense of meaning would also increase political efficacy and reduce support for extremism and violent extremism. Previous research that specifically

looked at increasing sense of control are often very targeted. For example, in trying to increase math skills, students who were asked to establish more short-term proximal goals (i.e. finish 6 pages a day) in completing a math assignment, reported higher levels of self-efficacy than those who were asked to establish more long-term distal goals (i.e. finish the booklet by the due date). Similarly, students in the proximal condition also reported higher levels of self-efficacy than those who were not asked to establish any goals in regards to the assignment (Bandura & Schunk, 1981). Similar results were found for reading comprehension (Schunk & Rice, 1989), as well as resolving a modified version of the classic Cannibals and Missionaries problem solving task (Stock & Cervone, 1990). One study that did look at increasing a general sense of control in the elderly (above 65 years old) found that interventions that aimed to increase reasoning (i.e. problem solving) and speed of processing had long-term effects on the participants' internal locus of control. Specifically, those who in either the reasoning or speed of processing conditions had significantly higher internal locus of control scores when compared to the control condition at the end of the 5-year study period (Wolinsky et al., 2009). Again, the approaches used in these areas could also inform any interventions targeting support for extremism and violent extremism.

Other research that seeks to address civic skills and knowledge may also be informative in designing interventions targeting support for extremism and violent extremism. Previous research suggests that civic education undertaken at a young age is related to higher levels of political efficacy (Torney-Purta, 2002; Torney-Purta et al., 2001). In a multi-country study that assessed the civic engagement and civic knowledge of 14-year-olds, results suggested that civic knowledge and skills along with feelings of political efficacy can emerge in children as young as 14 years-old (Torney-Purta, 2002; Torney-Purta et al., 2001). This study also suggests that the classroom can play a big role in the

development of civic knowledge and skills. Specifically, it suggests that classrooms provide students with an opportunity to practice their interpersonal skills when expressing their civic knowledge, skills that will be important for civic engagement later in life (Torney-Purta, 2002; Torney-Purta et al., 2001). Additionally, the study suggests that participating in student bodies such as the student council and generally collaborating with other students to help the functioning of the school can help students foster higher levels of political efficacy (Torney-Purta, 2002; Torney-Purta et al., 2001).

One final potential point of intervention to stem out of the results of this thesis are programs specifically targeting religious orientation. Future research can perhaps investigate whether solely increasing people's sense of intrinsic religiosity is enough to override any sense of extrinsic religiosity, or whether extrinsic religiosity needs to be specifically targeted. This however may prove to be a sensitive task, as some have made the argument that some Muslims does not see Islam as merely a religion that dictates your relationship to God but is an all-encompassing guide to how you should live your life, including how you should interact with society (Murken & Shah, 2002). For those who hold this interpretation, it stands to reason that intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity are two related factors. Therefore, any attempt to intervene should be careful to not be seen as efforts to deny Muslims to practice their faith as they see fit.

An additional challenge with interventions targeting religious orientation is that their effectiveness is unclear. One study, which tested whether intrinsic religiosity and religious priming decreased moral hypocrisy found that intrinsic religiosity led to moral congruence within the religious prime condition but not within the control condition (Carpenter & Marshall, 2009). However, another study which looked at the links between religious

priming, intrinsic religiosity and aggressive behaviour found that religious priming had no discernible impact on aggressive behaviour. Furthermore, while higher intrinsic religiosity is linked with lower levels of aggression the effect of religious priming on levels of intrinsic religiosity was not reported (Leach, Berman, & Eubanks, 2008). Further research needs to be conducted to determine what interventions can increase intrinsic religiosity and whether such interventions would also effect support for extremism and violent extremism.

### **Implications for efforts in countering extremism and violent extremism in Indonesia**

It is unclear whether the above points of intervention are incorporated within any government-led Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) initiatives in Indonesia. The emergence of CVE within the global context coincided with the Bush administration's rebranding of the Global War on Terror to the Struggle Against Violent Extremism. This change was also marked by a shift in the overall strategy away from just fighting terrorism with hard power (e.g. policing and intelligence) into one that incorporated preventative measures against violent extremism. CVE as a strategy is one that has been employed by countries such as the United States of America, England, Australia, Indonesia, and many others (IPAC, 2014a; Romaniuk, 2015; Schmid, 2013).

CVE initiatives in Indonesia initially took a very ad hoc approach, where police officers took what has been called a cultural interrogation approach, where they attempted to build trust by showing detainees that they too are practicing Muslims (John Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Sumpter, 2017). Detainees were also incentivised to engage with police officers by offers of better meals, health care, and more lenient sentences. While this approach created some success, with notable former extremists now arguing against campaigns of indiscriminate violence, an underfunded, overcrowded, and deeply corrupt



prison system has posed continuous challenges to such an approach (John Horgan & Braddock, 2010; ICG, 2007a; Sumpter, 2017).

Indonesia's CVE efforts took a more structured approach when in 2010, the *Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme* (BNPT, National Agency for Combating Terrorism) was established. On top of being tasked with coordinating prevention, protection and de-radicalisation efforts (i.e. CVE), the agency was also responsible for operations and enforcement, as well as establishing international cooperation. In 2013, BNPT published a national deradicalisation blue print, which outlined the agency's approach to CVE. BNPT's approach is one that sees ideology as the primary problem to tackle. However, as findings of research into deradicalisation suggest, approaches solely targeting ideology may be ineffective, as ideological commitment and/or support is often secondary to social and psychological factors (Sumpter, 2016, 2017). The results of this thesis support the notion that at the very least, support of violent extremism is perhaps driven by other factors such as existential anxiety. Therefore, BNPT may better tackle the issue of violent extremism if they address the underlying issues that lead to the support and or commitment of violent extremist ideologies, rather than the ideologies themselves.

Outside of the government led-efforts there are numerous NGO-led CVE initiatives. Within this space, Indonesia's two largest Muslim organisations, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, play important roles as their religious clerics can help inoculate the Indonesian public from extremism and violent extremism. This is achieved by the progressive Islamic values that are being preached and taught by the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama clerics. This however also has its shortcomings, as while progressive clerics may be an effective way to reach ordinary Indonesian Muslims, they are automatically seen as agents

of the government by individuals who have become involved with groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (Ramakrishna, 2014). On top of this, they are still addressing the ideologies, rather than the potential drivers behind why people embrace such ideologies.

Finally, there are also initiatives run by non-religious NGOs. One such example are programs run by Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP, Institute for International Peace Building) and its founder Noor Huda Ismail. YPP have been involved in numerous programs that primarily aim to help convicted terrorist reintegrate into wider society following their release. These programs aim to not only provide new social connections outside of their prior network but also constructive and meaningful employment (S. Osman, 2014). These two aspects of the program can perhaps help address two of the constructs related to existential anxiety analysed in study three: sense of loneliness and sense of meaning. Ismail, speaking of his first interaction with a terrorist detainee who would later join one of his programs, also spoke about the importance of empowering these individuals, making them feel that their life is still in their control (Ismail, 2014). Thus, such programs can perhaps also help address the lack of control that was also analysed in study three.

One issue facing such programs run by the YPP along with countless others within the CVE space, is their lack of evaluation (Borum & Horgan, 2010; Romaniuk, 2015). A recent systematic literature review found only eight cases of CVE evaluation, four of which utilised no control or comparison conditions (Beaghley et al., 2017). One way to remedy this problem is by incorporating evaluation methods into the design of the program so that optimal assessment through the use of randomised control trials as well as pre/post assessment can be done. This thesis can contribute to this need within the Indonesian context,

as the translated scales used throughout studies One to Three can also be used as evaluation tools in future interventions.

### **Implications for Terror Management Theory**

Despite the large and impressive body of work built on TMT, the theory is not without its critics, most of whom take issue with conceptual and theoretical components of TMT. The primary criticism has been TMT's sweeping claim of being able to explain all human behaviour. Critics feel that this overreaches what the theory is capable of, and that while there have been many different aspects of human behaviour that is seemingly explained by TMT, there is a great deal that has not been proven (Lerner, 1997; Muraven & Baumeister, 1997; Pelham, 1997; Proulx, 2003; Vallacher, 1997). One example is the case of suicide, which many have argued is antithetical to TMT's core argument that human behaviour is driven by the need to obtain immortality (Lerner, 1997; Pelham, 1997; Proulx, 2003). Some have also argued that there are multiple motivators of human behaviour and that death is but one of them, which is encapsulated by the Meaning Maintenance Model (MMM, Proulx & Heine, 2006). This theory argues that individuals prefer to see the world as meaningful and predictable, and that when a meaning-providing framework is threatened, individuals may strive to find meaning from other sources. In outlining their theoretical framework, the founders of MMM argue that their theory supersedes TMT, as death related existential anxiety is only one of four ways in which individuals can attain a sense of meaning: self-esteem, sense of closure, feeling of belonging, or symbolic immortality. The findings of this thesis perhaps point to the MMM being a more viable framework when looking at the early antecedents of support for extremism and violent extremism.

In addition to the findings that mostly go against the extant TMT literature, the work completed within this thesis highlighted the often inconsistent and unclear methodological procedures utilised in TMT studies. One example of this can be found in the use of the Death Thought Accessibility (DTA) check as a manipulation check. The DTA check was first introduced in 1994 as a way to distinguish between proximal and distal defences against mortality salience (J Greenberg et al., 1994). However, the DTA check has since become infrequently used as a manipulation check within TMT studies, with many studies instead using the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) as an alternative manipulation check. One argument put forwards against using the DTA check is that it may bring thoughts of death to the conscious level, and thus would activate proximal (conscious) rather than distal (subconscious) defences (Hayes et al., 2010). Another argument put forward was that using the DTA check could potentially contaminate participants in the control condition should they fill out a death related word within the DTA check (Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2015). However, neither of these two arguments have been empirically tested.

In instances where the DTA check is used, there is a noticeable lack of clear guidelines on how they should be used. For example, the number of word fragments that can be completed as either a death or non-death related range from two to 17 (Das et al., 2009; Dunkel, 2009; Hayes et al., 2010), and the number of words that can only be completed as non-death words also varies from zero to 28 (Das et al., 2009; Hayes et al., 2010; MacDorman, 2005). No firm explanation is given to explain this variability. Even the argument that death related words needs to be interspersed within non-death words and thus hiding the true intent of the measure is questionable. Some studies utilised DTA checks that consist entirely of words that can be completed as death words (Hayes et al., 2010).

While it is generally argued that longer delays will elicit greater DTA scores (Burke et al., 2010; Steinman & Updegraff, 2015), there is also a lack of clear guidelines on how long this delay should be and whether there is a minimum amount of time that should be allowed for the delay. This is a task that is made more complicated by the fact that delay times are often not reported within published articles. Similarly, while there is again evidence to suggest that more delay task will elicit greater DTA scores (Burke et al., 2010; Steinman & Updegraff, 2015), there are also no clear guidelines on how many different types of delay tasks should be used and whether some tasks are more effective than others.

Furthermore, in preparing the Indonesian version of the DTA check it became apparent that there were no clear guidelines on what steps need to be taken to ensure a robust and reliable measure was developed. This is true of the original DTA check first used by Greenberg et. al. (1994) as well as in the many DTA checks that has been translated into Hebrew (Mikulincer & Florian, 2000), German (Fritsche, Jonas, & Fankhänel, 2008), Dutch (Das et al., 2009; Rutjens, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2009), or Chinese (Zhou, Lei, Marley, & Chen, 2009; Zhou, Liu, Chen, & Yu, 2008).

Worryingly, examining the original DTA check revealed that when comparing the word frequencies of possible word completions from death word fragments, many death words are more frequent than their non-death counterpart. Take for example the word fragment “K I \_ \_ E D”, one of the words provided on the TMT resources website (Cox & Arndt, 2008) that according to Hayes et al.’s (2010) literature review of DTA studies has been used in at least 29 studies. According to data provided in the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), this particular word fragment can be completed as either the death-related word *Killed* or the non-death related words *Kicked*, *Kidded*, *Kinked*, *Kissed*, and

*Kitted*. On top of this, *Killed* has a word frequency of 51,452 within the COCA, which is 2858.44 times greater than *Kilted*, the least frequent non-death word possible from the fragment, and 7.44 times greater than *Kissed*, the most frequent non-death word possible from the fragment. This calls into question whether participant who complete the “K I \_ \_ E D” word fragment as *Killed* is due to the priming effect or if it is because the word is far more frequent than any of the non-death words possible from the word fragment. This concern was raised by Steinman & Updegraff (2015) who said “the frequency at which certain death- related words or concepts are commonly used may vary by language, which might affect priming sensitivity”, though it is something that has not been empirically explored.

The lack of clear guidelines on how the DTA should be used has perhaps led to the problematic state of the empirical evidence surrounding the DTA check. This is best surmised by Martin and van den Bos (2014, p. 59), who write that mortality salience “may increase, decrease, or have no effect on death thought accessibility, and these accessibility thoughts, in turn, may or may not relate to mortality salience effects.” Additionally, they also surmised that “[the] time between the mortality salience manipulation and the dependent defences measures may increase, decrease, or have no effect on death thought accessibility” (L. L. Martin & van den Bos, 2014, p. 59). In other words, there is no clear empirical evidence that mortality salience has the effect on DTA as argued by the proponents of TMT. Clearly there is room for clearer methodological guidelines in conducting TMT studies.

### **Future research direction**

Aside from the future research directions already mentioned within this chapter, there are several others that needs to be acknowledged. One example of this is related to the DTA

check utilised within the thesis. While the Indonesian DTA check was a reliable manipulation check for studies One and Two, there is still room for improvement. Unlike the COCA, which generated its corpus from a number of sources such as transcribed speech from TV and radio, literary fiction, academic texts, as well as newspapers ('Corpus of Contemporary American English', 2015), the Indonesian corpus used by this thesis was generated by only a single online source, the national newspaper *Kompas*. Although *Kompas* is arguably the paper of record in Indonesia, it would still limit the vocabulary of the Indonesian corpus to language used within formal news reporting and does not account for the numerous other sources which can influence language such as literary fiction, academic texts, or even forms of entertainment such as television, film, and music. On top of this, while the COCA dataset also includes parts of speech/grammatical tagging (e.g. nouns, verbs, adjectives, etc), as well as the frequency of the grammatical iteration of each word, the Indonesia corpus includes no such data. Expanding the sources as well as including grammatical tagging could perhaps improve the accuracy of future iterations of the DTA check.

Similarly, further work is perhaps required on the dependent variables used to measure support for extremism and violent extremism within the thesis. Specifically, future research should examine the construct validity of the measures and how reliable it is in measuring support for extremism and violent extremism. Future research can achieve this by perhaps analysing its concurrent validity with other measures such as the Activism and Radicalism Intention Scale (ARIS, Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009), and the Provioleence, Vile World, and Divine Power subscales within the Militant Extremism Scale (MES, Stankov, Saucier, & Knezević, 2010). Such research could also determine how much of the support for specific issues in Indonesia is reflected within the more general ARIS and MES measures.

Future research can also examine the role of social networks in how people come to support or even be involved with extremism and violent extremism. It has been argued that social networks play an important role in the radicalisation process as it is a conduit through which extremist ideas are passed or reinforced (S. Osman, 2010). Such research can perhaps utilise social network analysis in conjunction with some of the measures used in this thesis. For example, future research can perhaps recruit specifically from *madrasah* and examine whether how well connected a student is to their peers is correlated with measures of loneliness, religious orientation and political efficacy. Such an approach has been used to previously identify that loneliness mediated the relationship between isolation and depressive symptoms (Witvliet, Brendgen, Lier, Koot, & Vitaro, 2010).

Finally, future research could further explore the findings reported in this thesis and conduct experimental studies that attempt to manipulate and heighten participants' feelings of loneliness, lack of control, and lack of meaning. Future research can assess whether such manipulations would directly increase participant's level of support for extremism and violent extremism, or whether mediating factors need to be taken into account.

Despite these limitations, this thesis has contributed significantly to the understanding of why people come to support extremism and violent extremism. It has been able to provide empirical evidence of the links between numerous factors of existential anxiety and support for extremism and violent extremism, which has been largely missing from the literature. Additionally, this thesis was able to provide empirical evidence of how political efficacy and religious orientation are linked to support for extremism and violent extremism.



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## APPENDIX A

**Table 1**

<b>Author(s)</b>	<b>Language (English/Indonesian)</b>	<b>Group (Yes/No)</b>	<b>Context (Yes/No)</b>	<b>Inferential (Yes/No)</b>	<b>Descriptive (Yes/No)</b>
Abuza, 2003	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Abuza, 2003a	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Abuza, 2003b	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Abuza, 2004	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Abuza, 2006	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Abuza, 2007	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Abuza, 2009	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Acharya & Acharya, 2007	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Ad'ha Aljunied, 2012	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Al Qurtuby, 2013	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Barton, 2004	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Barton, 2005	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Berger, 2014	English	No	Yes	Yes	No
Blackwell, 2010	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Bräuchler, 2004	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Bruinessen, 2002	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Bubalo & Fealy, 2005	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Chalk & Ungerer, 2008	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Chalk, 1998	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Chalk, 2001	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Cotton, 2003	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Daniels, 2007	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Davulcu et al., 2010	English	No	Yes	No	Yes

**Table 1 (Continued)**

De Jong, 2012	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Eliraz, 2004a	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Eliraz, 2004b	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Emmers, 2009	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Fair & Shepherd, 2006	English	No	Yes	Yes	No
Fealy & Borgu, 2005	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Fealy, 2007	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Feillard & Madinier, 2011	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Fenton, 2014	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Formichi, 2014	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Hadiz, 2008	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Hadiz, 2013	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Hairgrove, 2011	English	No	Yes	Yes	No
Hamayotsu, 2014	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Hamilton-Hart, 2005	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Harb & Fischer, 2013	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Hasan, 2002	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Hasan, 2006	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Hassan, 2006	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Hassan, 2007	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Hastings, 2008	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Hefner, 2002	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Heiduk, 2012	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Hilmy, 2013	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Horgan & Braddock, 2010	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Hui, 2010	English	No	Yes	No	Yes

**Table 1 (Continued)**

Hwang, 2012	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Hwang, Panggabean, & Fauzi, 2013	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
ICG, 2001	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
ICG, 2002	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
ICG, 2002a	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
ICG, 2002b	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
ICG, 2003	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
ICG, 2004a	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
ICG, 2004b	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
ICG, 2005a	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
ICG, 2005b	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
ICG, 2006	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
ICG, 2007	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
ICG, 2007a	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
ICG, 2007b	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
ICG, 2008a	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
ICG, 2008b	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
ICG, 2009	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
ICG, 2009a	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
ICG, 2009b	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
ICG, 2010a	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
ICG, 2010b	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
ICG, 2011	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
ICG, 2012a	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
ICG, 2012b	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
IPAC, 2013a	English	No	Yes	No	Yes

**Table 1 (Continued)**

IPAC, 2013b	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
IPAC, 2014	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Ismail & Ungerer, 2009	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Jo, 2012	English	No	Yes	Yes	No
Juwana, 2009	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Juwana, 2012	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Khisbiyah, 2009	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Kilcullen, 2006	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
King, Noor, & Taylor, 2011	English	Yes	No	Yes	No
Kipp, 2004	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Kivimäki, 2007	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Koschade, 2006	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Kruglanski, 2013	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Kurlantzick, 2004	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Laffan, 2003	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
LaFree & Morris, 2012	English	No	Yes	Yes	No
Lim, 2005	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Lim, 2011	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Liu & Woodward, 2013	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
MacDonald & Lemco, 2002	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Magouirk & Atran, 2008	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Magouirk, 2008	English	Yes	No	Yes	No
Martin, 2011	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mazumder et al., 2013	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
McCauley & Scheckter, 2008	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Midlarsky, 2011	English	No	Yes	No	Yes

**Table 1 (Continued)**

Milla, Faturachman, & Ancok, 2013	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Ministry of Home Affairs, 2003	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Muhtadi, 2009	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Muluk & Sumaktoyo, 2010	English	No	Yes	Yes	No
Muluk, Sumaktoyo, & Ruth, 2013	English	No	Yes	Yes	No
Noor, 2007	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Oak, 2010	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Pavlova, 2007	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Petrigh, 2011	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Piggott, 2010	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Pizam, 2010	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Pusponegoro, 2003	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Putra & Sukabdi, 2013	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Putra & Sukabdi, 2014	English	No	Yes	Yes	No
Ramakrishna & Tan, 2003	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Ramakrishna, 2005	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Ramakrishna, 2005a	English	Yes	No	No	No
Ramakrishna, 2005b	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Realuyo, 2002	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
C. Jones, 2014	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
D. M. Jones, Smith, & Weeding, 2003	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
S. Jones, 2005	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
S. Jones, 2008	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
M. Osman & Nawab, 2010	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
S. Osman, 2014	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Searle, 2002	English	No	Yes	No	Yes

**Table 1 (Continued)**

Shafiq & Sinno, 2010	English	No	Yes	Yes	No
Sidel, 2007	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Singh, 2004	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sirozi, 2005	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sirozi, 2007	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Slama, 2011	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Solahudin, 2011	Indonesian	No	Yes	No	Yes
Solahudin, 2013	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Stark, 2008	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sukma, Ma'ruf, & Abdullah, 2011	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Swanström & Björnehed, 2004	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Talib et al., 2012	English	No	Yes	Yes	No
Tan, 2000	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Tan, 2003	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Tan, 2008	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Temby, 2010	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
Tumanggor, 2007	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Turner, 2007	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Ungerer, 2011	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
van Bruinessen, 2013	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Waluyo, 2007	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Ward, 2008	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Ward, 2009	English	Yes	No	No	Yes
White, Porter, & Mazerolle, 2013	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Wieinga, 2009	English	No	Yes	No	Yes
Woodward et al., 2013	English	Yes	No	No	Yes



## APPENDIX B

### Study One (English)

#### Explanatory Statement & Consent

Hi!

First of all, thank you for participating in this survey. We are particularly interested in the views of student of Indonesian citizenship between 18 and 29 years old.

The survey should take around 15 minutes to complete. At the end you'll automatically be entered into a draw to win one of five \$100 Coles gift cards! You'll be taken to the raffle page on the last page of the survey.

This study is completely anonymous and we will not be able to identify your answers from those of any other respondents. Data will be safely in a secure location in accordance with Monash University regulations. This survey is entirely voluntary and you have the option of stopping at any time. We are hoping to use the results of this study to inform government policy in Indonesia, and we will publish and communicate the results of this study widely to ensure that your views are shared.

Before going any further, we first would like to give you some background information on our research. We are interested in the opinion and attitudes of young Indonesian students on a range of social, behavioural (such as health and consumption) and political issues, belonging, and inclusion issues. We are doing this because the opinions of young Indonesians are rarely asked for and listened to, and therefore their views on a range of issues may not be appropriately represented. Accordingly, we ask you to be as honest as possible in your responses.

As compensation for your time and inconvenience, you will be entered into a draw to win one of five \$100 Coles gift cards at the end of the survey. You will also learn something about how this sort of research is conducted. You may or may not experience some level of discomfort in this study as we do ask some potentially challenging questions. However any discomfort experienced should not be greater than what you would normally encounter, because images and items that may appear in the questionnaire are not different from what one sees in media reporting.

If you have any questions about this survey or the research in general or would like to be informed of the aggregate research finding, please contact:

Muhammad Iqbal

Phone number: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Should you have any concerns about your feelings, or want any additional information or help, please see the following services and contact details below.

**BeyondBlue**, which provides information on depression, anxiety and related disorders

Website: <http://www.beyondblue.org.au/>  
[REDACTED]

Should you have any concerns or complaints about the conduct of the project, you are welcome to contact the

Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee

Email: [REDACTED]

Once again, thank you for your participation.

Muhammad Iqbal

### Demographic & Psychosocial Questions

Firstly, we'll just need to get some basic demographic and background information.

What is your age (in years)?

\_\_\_\_\_

What is your sex?

- ☐ Male  
☐ Female

What is your city or town of birth?

\_\_\_\_\_

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- ☐ Graduated from high school  
☐ Graduated from university (Diploma)  
☐ Graduated from university (Bachelors Degree)  
☐ Graduated from university (Masters Degree)  
☐ Graduated from university (PhD)  
☐

Other: \_\_\_\_\_

In terms of ethnicity, I identify myself as a...

(Example: Javanese, Chinese-Indonesian, Arab-Indonesian, etc. You may list two answers)

\_\_\_\_\_

In which years did you participate in a national election?

- ☐ 2004  
☐ 2009  
☐ 2014  
☐ Never

Would you describe yourself as conservative (upholding the status quo and established traditions) or progressive (leaning towards changing the status quo for the progress of society)?

Very conservative   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Very progressive

Religiously, I would identify myself as a:

- ☐ Muslim  
☐ Christian  
☐ Hindu  
☐ Buddhist  
☐ Other: \_\_\_\_\_

How important is religion to you on a daily basis?

Not at all important   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Very important

### Alienation Scale

This is a quick personality test that gauges your perception of yourself in a number of different situations. Please answer the following questions by indicating the strength of your agreement as fast as you can. The next page will provide a preliminary result of the test before it continues over the next couple of pages. More information about your personality will be given at the end of the questionnaire.

I sometimes feel that the people I know are not too friendly

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

Most of what I do during my day seems worthwhile and meaningful to me

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

I sometimes feel uncertain about who I really am

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

I feel that my family is not as close to me as I would like

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

When the people I know are having problems, it's my responsibility to try to help

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

I often wonder whether I'm becoming the kind of person I want to be

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

It's hard to know how to act most of the time since you can't tell what others expect

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

I often feel left out of things that others are doing

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

Nowadays you can't really count on other people when you have problems or need help

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

Most people don't seem to accept me when I'm just being myself

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

I often find it difficult to feel involved in the things I am doing

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

Hardly anyone I know is interested in how I really feel inside

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

I feel that I have a lot of similar hobbies with other people that I know

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

I often feel alone when I am with other people

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

If I really had my choice I'd live my life in a very different way than I do

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

**Mortality Salience Randomisation**

The next question may be challenging, but it is important to understand what you think of this...

**Mortality Salience Condition**

Please briefly think about the moment of your death.

Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you.

---

---

---

Please describe, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you physically die and once you are physically dead.

---

---

---

**Control Condition**

Please briefly think about getting an intense, unexpected toothache.

Please briefly describe the emotions that an unexpected toothache arouses in you.

---

---

---

Write down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you when you get an unexpected toothache.

---

---

---

**Delay 1: PANAS Scale**

Please read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Thinking about yourself and how you normally feel, to what extent do you generally feel:

Upset

Very often    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Not very often

Hostile

Very often    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Not very often

Alert

Very often    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Not very often

Ashamed

Very often    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Not very often

Inspired

Very often    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Not very often

Nervous

Very often    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Not very often

Determined

Very often    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Not very often

Attentive

Very often    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Not very often

Afraid

Very often    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Not very often

Active

Very often    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Not very often

### Delay 2: Word Search Task

Please find as many words as you can in the above puzzle and write them in the box below. You have five minutes to complete the task. This task assesses your language and visual processing capabilities, as we think this may be related to responding to complex issues.

M	E	J	A	I	N	I	K	U	C	I	N	G	E	M	B	A	K	A	U
X	U	E	K	D	C	N	S	C	R	P	M	Z	L	L	F	O	T	O	B
U	K	A	N	C	I	N	G	Y	O	A	E	U	H	K	Y	E	O	P	X
Z	C	K	Z	K	K	S	K	S	C	M	N	M	A	B	R	C	M	W	B
P	U	W	E	A	O	E	K	U	U	B	G	G	A	E	F	E	I	M	O
B	E	M	T	O	M	K	Y	T	K	R	U	K	K	A	M	S	N	E	T
I	E	R	X	N	I	O	N	R	U	U	R	O	G	U	V	E	U	L	O
S	J	E	S	Z	S	L	D	A	I	M	U	M	Q	U	M	J	M	I	L
W	C	K	I	I	I	A	W	D	J	P	L	P	I	B	X	A	A	B	X
B	E	Q	T	I	D	H	J	A	G	U	K	U	E	C	U	L	N	A	K
D	L	K	E	N	W	A	I	R	A	T	A	T	O	N	L	K	N	B	D
N	A	E	L	D	F	R	N	A	M	N	N	E	Z	Z	S	E	U	K	K
C	N	R	E	O	P	W	J	D	B	T	J	R	A	T	B	I	Q	A	O
T	A	T	F	N	C	I	E	R	A	T	W	I	T	T	E	R	L	N	T
P	T	A	O	E	K	S	W	T	R	N	V	Y	D	I	R	I	N	D	A
E	I	S	N	S	E	P	R	E	S	S	I	D	E	N	I	G	X	J	K
R	K	X	R	I	T	X	J	X	Q	J	I	D	A	K	X	F	U	G	J
S	U	U	B	A	A	G	U	N	T	I	N	G	N	R	T	I	D	U	R
E	S	I	E	F	L	T	H	I	M	G	G	A	T	E	R	B	A	D	I
N	M	E	T	J	A	D	I	X	S	E	R	I	G	A	L	A	N	X	F

### DTA Check

We are simply pre-testing this questionnaire for future studies. Please complete the following by filling letters in the blanks to create words. Please fill in the blanks with the first word that comes to mind into the text box next to the incomplete word. Some words may be plural.

\_ E W A \_ \_\_\_\_\_  
T A \_ \_ M A N \_\_\_\_\_  
M A \_ \_ K \_\_\_\_\_  
\_ \_ J I N G \_\_\_\_\_  
T \_ \_ A N G \_\_\_\_\_  
B U N \_ \_ \_\_\_\_\_  
R \_ \_ A \_\_\_\_\_  
\_ \_ T U \_\_\_\_\_  
K U R \_ \_ \_\_\_\_\_  
P \_ \_ P E N \_\_\_\_\_  
K U \_ I \_ G \_\_\_\_\_  
M \_ \_ A T \_\_\_\_\_  
G O R E N \_ \_ N \_\_\_\_\_  
M \_ \_ A \_\_\_\_\_  
P E M A \_ A \_ A N \_\_\_\_\_  
\_ O B I \_ \_\_\_\_\_  
P I \_ I \_ G \_\_\_\_\_  
\_ O \_ I \_\_\_\_\_  
M E N I N G \_ A \_ \_\_\_\_\_  
K E \_ \_ A S \_\_\_\_\_  
\_ \_ M P U T E R \_\_\_\_\_  
\_ \_ T I \_\_\_\_\_  
J \_ N D \_ L A \_\_\_\_\_  
H \_ \_ A N \_\_\_\_\_  
S \_ \_ E D A \_\_\_\_\_

### Dependent Variables Briefing

We would like to ask you your opinions on a few different and important social and political issues. Over the next two pages are sample responses from an interview with two Indonesian male students. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with their statements, and whether you think your friends, family and society in general will approve of their views. Some of this will seem like repetition, but they are all equally important. Please complete the opinion questionnaires on the following pages with your most natural response. Please follow the instructions provided and complete the questionnaires in the order they are presented. That is, do not skip around.

#### Filler 1

##### **Do you think enough is being done to fight corruption in Indonesia?**

No, I think more needs to be done. There is still widespread corruption in places such as the National Police and in the People's Representative Council.

How much do you agree with this student's view?

Not at all   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Extremely

#### DV 1

##### **How do you feel about Indonesia's transition to democracy?**

I think its bad. It has made Indonesia a weak nation, and the only way we can be strong again is if the country was run under sharia law.

How much do you agree with this student's view?

Not at all   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Extremely

#### Filler 2

##### **How do you feel about Indonesia's economic trajectory after Suharto's resignation?**

Nothing has really changed. The majority of the people are still very poor, and it's always the same type of people that are taking advantage of the rest of us.

How much do you agree with this student's view?

Not at all   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Extremely

#### DV 2

##### **A former Religious Affairs Minister once claimed that religious minorities deserve to be disbanded. How do you feel about his statement?**

I remember what he said, it was about the Ahmadiyah. I agree with him. They claim to be part of Islam but they're not. Instead they teach, practice, and spread their heretical beliefs.

How much do you agree with this student's view?

Not at all   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Extremely

#### Filler 3

##### **Do you think that the education system in Indonesia is adequately preparing Indonesia's youth?**

No. I think that there is far too much attention on the hard sciences and not enough time spent is on subjects that will strengthen the faith of today's youth.

How much do you agree with this student's view?

Not at all   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Extremely

#### DV 3

##### **Are violent attacks on religious minorities ever justified?**

Yes. They have been warned repeatedly that they need to come to the true path of Islam, but they did not listen and continue to spread their heretical beliefs and practices.

How much do you agree with this student's view?

Not at all   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Extremely



**DV 4**

**Are violent attacks on government branches and institutions ever justified?**

Sometimes violence is necessary against government institutions such as the police, especially when it is part of a government that is acting on behalf of Western interests.

How much do you agree with this student's view?

Not at all   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Extremely

### **Debrief**

Thank you for taking our survey. Your response and participation is very important to us.

Just to let you know, this study is looking whether thinking about uncomfortable thoughts and issues may change how we think about other related issues. For any information about the survey, please contact Muhammad at [miqbl@student.monash.edu](mailto:miqbl@student.monash.edu).

To go into the draw, please click the next button below, and you will be automatically redirected to the raffle page.

Thank you once again!

## Study One (Indonesian)

### Explanatory Statement & Consent

Halo!

Terima kasih atas partisipasi anda dalam survei ini. Kami ingin mendengar pendapat khususnya para mahasiswa dari Indonesia yang berumur 18 hingga 29 tahun.

Survei ini hanya memerlukan waktu sekitar 15 menit untuk diselesaikan. Pada akhir survei ini, Anda akan secara otomatis mengikuti undian untuk memenangkan satu dari lima voucher untuk Coles Supermarket senilai \$100. Anda akan mendapatkan hasil undian anda pada akhir survei ini.

Survei ini seluruhnya anonim, dan kami tidak akan bisa mengidentifikasi jawaban anda dari jawaban yang kami terima dari responden yang lain. Jawaban Anda akan disimpan di lokasi yang aman, sesuai dengan peraturan Monash University. Survei ini bersifat sukarela dan Anda memiliki pilihan untuk mengundurkan diri dari berpartisipasi lebih lanjut pada setiap tahap. Kami berharap untuk menggunakan hasil dari penelitian ini untuk menginformasikan kebijakan pemerintah di Indonesia, dan kami akan mempublikasikan dan mengumumkan hasil dari penelitian ini untuk memastikan bahwa opini Anda termasuk di dalamnya.

Sebelum melanjutkan lebih jauh, kami ingin memberikan Anda informasi latar belakang mengenai penelitian kami. Kami tertarik pada opini mahasiswa muda Indonesia yang tinggal Australia dalam beberapa bidang yang terkait dengan isu sosial, perilaku (seperti kesehatan dan kebiasaan konsumsi) politik, dan inklusi. Kami melakukan penelitian ini karena opini mahasiswa Indonesia muda tidak sering ditanya dan didengarkan, dan demikian mungkin tidak direpresentasikan dengan akurat. Oleh karena itu, kami meminta Anda untuk menjawab sejujur mungkin dalam tanggapan Anda.

Sebagai kompensasi untuk waktu Anda, Anda akan secara otomatis berpartisipasi dalam undian untuk memenangkan salah satu dari lima kartu hadiah senilai \$100. Anda juga akan mempelajari sesuatu mengenai bagaimana riset seperti ini dilakukan. Akan ada kemungkinan bahwa anda akan mengalami ketidaknyamanan karena survei ini akan meminta Anda untuk fokus pada pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang sulit dan menantang. Namun ketidaknyamanan yang mungkin akan Anda rasakan tidak akan lebih besar dari apa yang biasanya Anda rasakan pada kegiatan sehari-hari Anda. Ini dikarenakan gambar yang mungkin muncul dalam survey kami tidak berbeda dari apa yang terlihat dalam liputan dan pemberitaan di media sehari-hari.

Jika Anda memerlukan informasi lebih lanjut mengenai proyek ini, Anda dianjurkan untuk menghubungi:

**Muhammad Iqbal**

[REDACTED]

Jika Anda mempunyai kekhawatiran apapun mengenai perasaan Anda, atau ingin informasi atau bantuan lebih lanjut, mohon lihat pelayanan sebagai berikut dan rincian kontak yang bisa dihubungi di bawah ini.

**Beyondblue**

Penyedia jasa informasi tentang depresi, keresahan, dan segala yang berkaitan

Situs Web: <http://www.beyondblue.org.au/>

[REDACTED]

Jika Anda memiliki masalah atau keluhan tentang pelaksanaan penelitian ini, Anda bisa menghubungi:

**Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee**

Email: [REDACTED]

Sekali lagi, terima kasih atas partisipasi anda.

Muhammad Iqbal

### Demographic & Psychosocial Questions

Pertama-tama, kami perlu mendapatkan beberapa informasi demografis.

Berapa usia Anda (dalam tahun)?

\_\_\_\_\_

Apakah jenis kelamin Anda?

- ☐ Laki-laki
- ☐ Perempuan

Di kota manakah Anda lahir?

\_\_\_\_\_

Apa tingkat pendidikan tertinggi yang telah Anda selesaikan?

- ☐ Lulus SMA
- ☐ Lulus universitas (Diploma)
- ☐ Lulus universitas (S1)
- ☐ Lulus universitas (S2)
- ☐ Lulus universitas (S3)
- ☐ Lainnya: \_\_\_\_\_

Dalam aspek kelompok etnis, saya mengkategorikan diri saya sebagai bagian dari kelompok...  
(Contoh: Jawa, Tionghoa-Indonesia, Arab-Indonesia. Anda bisa mencantumkan sebanyak dua jawaban)

\_\_\_\_\_

Pada tahun berapakah Anda berpartisipasi dalam pemilihan umum presiden?

- ☐ 2004
- ☐ 2009
- ☐ 2014
- ☐ Tidak pernah

Apakah Anda mengkategorikan diri Anda sebagai seseorang yang konservatif (mempertahankan keadaan, kebiasaan, dan tradisi yg berlaku) atau progresif (berkeinginan untuk mengubah keadaan sekarang untuk kemajuan masyarakat)?

Sangat konservatif   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat progresif

Dalam aspek agama, saya mengkategorikan diri saya sebagai seorang penganut agama:

- ☐ Islam
- ☐ Kristen
- ☐ Hindu
- ☐ Buddha
- ☐ Lainnya: \_\_\_\_\_

Seberapa pentingkah agama dalam kehidupan sehari-hari anda?

Sangat penting   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat tidak penting

### Alienation Scale

Ini adalah sebuah tes kepribadian yang akan mengukur persepsi Anda terhadap diri Anda sendiri di dalam beberapa situasi yang berbeda. Mohon jawab pertanyaan-pertanyaan di bawah ini secepat-cepatnya. Mohon tunjukkan tingkatan persetujuan Anda dengan setiap pernyataan yang ada di bawah. Pada halaman berikutnya Anda akan diberikan hasil awal dari tes kepribadian ini. Hasil akhir dari tes ini akan diberikan ketika anda telah menyelesaikan survei ini.

Saya kadang-kadang merasa orang-orang yang saya kenal tidak terlalu ramah dengan saya  
 Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Saya merasa sebagian besar dari aktifitas sehari-hari saya berharga dan bermakna untuk saya  
 Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Kadang-kadang saya merasa ragu dan bimbang dengan identitas diri saya  
 Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Keluarga saya tidak seakrab dengan saya seperti yang saya inginkan  
 Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Ketika orang yang saya kenal sedang menghadapi masalah, adalah kewajiban saya untuk mencoba menolong  
 Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Saya sering bertanya-tanya apakah saya akan menjadi figur orang yang saya inginkan  
 Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Saya kesulitan untuk tahu bagaimana cara berperilaku yang tepat, karena tidak mudah untuk mengetahui ekspektasi orang-orang di sekitar saya  
 Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Saya sering kali merasa ditinggalkan dalam kegiatan orang-orang di sekitar saya  
 Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Pada masa sekarang ini, kita tidak bisa terlalu mengandalkan pertolongan orang lain ketika kita sedang menghadapi masalah  
 Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Sebagian besar orang sepertinya tidak menerima saya apa adanya  
 Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Saya sering merasa kesulitan untuk bersemangat dalam aktifitas-aktifitas yang saya jalankan  
 Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Tidak banyak orang yang peduli terhadap perasaan saya yang sebenarnya  
 Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Saya merasa hobi-hobi saya banyak yang mirip dengan sebagian besar orang yang saya kenal  
 Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Saya sering merasa kesepian dan sendiri ketika saya sedang berkumpul dengan orang lain  
 Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Jika saya punya pilihan, saya akan menjalani hidup saya dengan cara yang berbeda dengan sekarang  
 Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

### **Mortality Salience Randomisation**

Pertanyaan berikut ini berpotensi menantang, tapi sangatlah penting bagi kami untuk memahami apa yang Anda pikirkan tentang hal ini...

### **Mortality Salience Condition**

Mohon untuk berpikir secara singkat tentang saat kematian Anda

Mohon jelaskan secara singkat emosi yang dibangkitkan saat anda berpikir tentang saat kematian Anda

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Mohon jelaskan, secara terperinci mungkin, apa yang Anda duga akan terjadi kepada anda ketika Anda meninggal secara jasmaniah dan fisik Anda telah meninggal.

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### **Control Condition**

Mohon untuk berpikir secara singkat tentang saat Anda mendapatkan sakit gigi yang sangat tajam secara tiba-tiba.

Mohon jelaskan secara singkat emosi yang dibangkitkan saat Anda mendapatkan sakit gigi yang tajam secara tiba-tiba.

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Mohon jelaskan, secara terperinci mungkin, apa yang Anda duga akan terjadi kepada secara fisik, Anda ketika Anda mengalami sakit gigi yang tajam secara tiba-tiba.

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### Delay 1: PANAS Scale

Mohon untuk membaca setiap kata di kolom paling kiri, dan kemudian cantumkan jawaban yang menurut Anda paling tepat. Berpikir tentang diri Anda sendiri dan bagaimana Anda biasanya merasa, sejauh manakah Anda merasa:

Kesal

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Bermusuhan

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Waspada

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Malu

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Terinspirasi

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Gugup

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Tekun

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Penuh perhatian

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Takut

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Aktif

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

### Delay 2: Word Search Task

Mohon temukan kata-kata sebanyak mungkin dalam teka-teki di atas dan tulis di dalam kotak di bawah. Anda memiliki waktu lima menit untuk menyelesaikan teka-teki ini. Tugas ini menilai kemampuan pengolahan bahasa dan visual Anda, karena kami merasa ini dapat berhubungan dengan tanggapan Anda terhadap isu-isu yang kompleks.

M	E	J	A	I	N	I	K	U	C	I	N	G	E	M	B	A	K	A	U
X	U	E	K	D	C	N	S	C	R	P	M	Z	L	L	F	O	T	O	B
U	K	A	N	C	I	N	G	Y	O	A	E	U	H	K	Y	E	O	P	X
Z	C	K	Z	K	K	S	K	S	C	M	N	M	A	B	R	C	M	W	B
P	U	W	E	A	O	E	K	U	U	B	G	G	A	E	F	E	I	M	O
B	E	M	T	O	M	K	Y	T	K	R	U	K	K	A	M	S	N	E	T
I	E	R	X	N	I	O	N	R	U	U	R	O	G	U	V	E	U	L	O
S	J	E	S	Z	S	L	D	A	I	M	U	M	Q	U	M	J	M	I	L
W	C	K	I	I	I	A	W	D	J	P	L	P	I	B	X	A	A	B	X
B	E	Q	T	I	D	H	J	A	G	U	K	U	E	C	U	L	N	A	K
D	L	K	E	N	W	A	I	R	A	T	A	T	O	N	L	K	N	B	D
N	A	E	L	D	F	R	N	A	M	N	N	E	Z	Z	S	E	U	K	K
C	N	R	E	O	P	W	J	D	B	T	J	R	A	T	B	I	Q	A	O
T	A	T	F	N	C	I	E	R	A	T	W	I	T	T	E	R	L	N	T
P	T	A	O	E	K	S	W	T	R	N	V	Y	D	I	R	I	N	D	A
E	I	S	N	S	E	P	R	E	S	S	I	D	E	N	I	G	X	J	K
R	K	X	R	I	T	X	J	X	Q	J	I	D	A	K	X	F	U	G	J
S	U	U	B	A	A	G	U	N	T	I	N	G	N	R	T	I	D	U	R
E	S	I	E	F	L	T	H	I	M	G	G	A	T	E	R	B	A	D	I
N	M	E	T	J	A	D	I	X	S	E	R	I	G	A	L	A	N	X	F



### DTA Check

Kami hanya sekedar menguji daftar pertanyaan ini untuk survei di masa depan. Mohon lengkapi kata yang tidak lengkap di bawah ini untuk merancang sebuah kata utuh yang pertama terpikir oleh Anda. Mohon tulis kata tersebut di kotak di samping/bawah.

\_ E W A \_ \_\_\_\_\_  
T A \_ \_ M A N \_\_\_\_\_  
M A \_ \_ K \_\_\_\_\_  
\_ \_ J I N G \_\_\_\_\_  
T \_ \_ A N G \_\_\_\_\_  
B U N \_ \_ \_\_\_\_\_  
R \_ \_ A \_\_\_\_\_  
\_ \_ T U \_\_\_\_\_  
K U R \_ \_ \_\_\_\_\_  
P \_ \_ P E N \_\_\_\_\_  
K U \_ I \_ G \_\_\_\_\_  
M \_ \_ A T \_\_\_\_\_  
G O R E N \_ \_ N \_\_\_\_\_  
M \_ \_ A \_\_\_\_\_  
P E M A \_ A \_ A N \_\_\_\_\_  
\_ O B I \_ \_\_\_\_\_  
P I \_ I \_ G \_\_\_\_\_  
\_ O \_ I \_\_\_\_\_  
M E N I N G \_ A \_ \_\_\_\_\_  
K E \_ \_ A S \_\_\_\_\_  
\_ \_ M P U T E R \_\_\_\_\_  
\_ \_ T I \_\_\_\_\_  
J \_ N D \_ L A \_\_\_\_\_  
H \_ \_ A N \_\_\_\_\_  
S \_ \_ E D A \_\_\_\_\_

### Dependent Variables

Sekarang, kami ingin menanyakan opini Anda tentang beberapa isu sosial dan politik. Mohon melengkapi daftar pertanyaan di beberapa halaman berikut ini dengan jawaban Anda yang paling naluri. Di dua halaman berikut ini, Anda akan diberikan kutipan jawaban dari sebuah survei yang sebelumnya telah diselesaikan oleh dua orang mahasiswa dari Indonesia. Mohon tandai sebagaimana kuatnya Anda setuju atau tidak setuju dengan jawaban mereka. Tandai juga apabila menurut Anda keluarga Anda, teman-teman dekat Anda, dan masyarakat akan menyetujui sudut pandang mereka. Beberapa pertanyaan akan tampak seperti pertanyaan yang diulang, tetapi perlu dicatat bahwa semua pertanyaan tersebut sama pentingnya.

Mohon untuk mengikuti petunjuk yang telah diberikan dan selesaikan daftar pertanyaan ini sesuai urutan yang telah diberikan. Mohon untuk tidak menyelesaikan daftar pertanyaan secara tidak berurut.

### Filler 1

Menurut Anda, apakah upaya untuk memberantas korupsi sudah cukup?

Tidak. Menurut saya masih banyak yang bisa dilakukan. Korupsi masih merajalela, terutama di lembaga-lembaga seperti polisi dan MPR/DPR.

Seberapa banyak Anda setuju dengan sudut pandang mahasiswa ini?

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

### DV 1

Bagaimana perasaan Anda tentang transisi Indonesia ke dalam sistem demokrasi?

Menurut saya dampaknya buruk. Transisi ini telah membuat Indonesia menjadi negara yang lemah, dan satu-satunya cara untuk menjadi negara yang kuat adalah jika negara ini didasari hukum syariah.

Seberapa banyak Anda setuju dengan sudut pandang mahasiswa ini?

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

### Filler 2

Bagaimana perasaan Anda tentang perkembangan ekonomi Indonesia setelah resignasi Suharto?

Tidak banyak yang berubah.  
Mayoritas orang masih sangat miskin,  
dan selalu tipe orang yang sama  
yang mengeksploitasi kita semua.

Seberapa banyak Anda setuju dengan sudut pandang mahasiswa ini?

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

### DV 2

Seorang mantan Menteri Agama pernah menyatakan bahwa agama minoritas layak dibubarkan. Bagaimana perasaan Anda tentang pernyataan tersebut?

Saya ingat pernyataan itu, waktu itu  
beliau berbicara tentang tentang Ahmadiyah.  
Saya setuju dengan beliau. Mereka  
mengaku bagian dari Islam tapi sebenarnya  
tidak. Sebaliknya mereka malah mengajar,  
mempraktekkan, dan menyebarkan ~~keyakinan~~ keyakinan  
sesat mereka.

Seberapa banyak Anda setuju dengan sudut pandang mahasiswa ini?

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

### Filler 3

Menurut Anda, apakah sistem pendidikan di Indonesia mampu mempersiapkan generasi muda Indonesia?

Tidak. Menurut saya terlalu banyak  
perhatian yang diberikan kepada ilmu  
sains dan tidak cukup waktu yang  
diberikan kepada pelajaran yang akan  
memperkuat iman generasi muda  
sekarang.

Seberapa banyak Anda setuju dengan sudut pandang mahasiswa ini?

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

### DV 3

Apakah serangan kekerasan terhadap minoritas agama bisa dibenarkan?

Iya. Mereka telah ~~diperingat~~ diperingatkan berulang kali bahwa mereka ~~perlu~~ harus kembali ke jalan yang benar, tetapi mereka tidak menggubris dan terus mengebarkan keyakinan dan praktek sesat mereka.

Seberapa banyak Anda setuju dengan sudut pandang mahasiswa ini?

Sama sekali tidak   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

### DV 4

Apakah serangan kekerasan terhadap cabang-cabang dan lembaga pemerintah bisa dibenarkan?

Kadang-kadang kekerasan memang dibutuhkan untuk melawan lembaga pemerintahan, seperti polisi, terutama jika pemerintahnya adalah ~~pemerit~~ pemerintah yang bertindak demi kepentingan Barat.

Seberapa banyak Anda setuju dengan sudut pandang mahasiswa ini?

Sama sekali tidak   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

### **Debrief**

Terima kasih atas partisipasi Anda dalam survei ini. Jawaban dan partisipasi Anda sangatlah penting bagi kami.

Sekedar informasi, studi ini menganalisa apabila kita berpikir tentang pikiran dan isu-isu yang tidak nyaman akan dapat merubah bagaimana kita berpikir tentang isu-isu lain yang terkait. Untuk informasi lanjutan tentang survei ini, mohon menghubungi Iqbal di [miqb1@student.monash.edu](mailto:miqb1@student.monash.edu).

Untuk masuk undian untuk mengikuti undian, mohon tekan tombol “Next” Di bawah ini, dan Anda akan secara otomatis di bawa ke halaman undian.

Sekali lagi, terima kasih!

## APPENDIX C

### Study Two (English)

#### Welcoming page, Explanatory Statement, Consent

Hi!

First of all, thank you for participating in this survey. We are particularly interested in the views of young Indonesians (between 18 and 29 years old). The survey should take around 15 minutes to complete. Some of the questions in this survey may seem strange and repetitive, but they are vital as they measure important ways of thinking socially that may be relevant to your political views.

This study is completely anonymous and we do not collect any identifying information. Data will be safely in a secure location in accordance with Monash University ethics regulations. This survey is entirely voluntary and you have the option of stopping at any time. We are hoping to publish and communicate the results in academic outlets to ensure that your views are shared.

Before going any further, we first would like to give you some background information on our research. We are interested in the opinion and attitudes of young Indonesian students on a range of social, behavioural (such as health and consumption) and political issues, belonging, and inclusion issues. We are doing this because the opinions of young Indonesians are rarely asked for and listened to, and therefore their views on a range of issues may not be appropriately represented. Accordingly, we ask you to be as honest as possible in your responses.

It is unlikely that you will experience any level of discomfort, however we do ask some challenging questions. Any discomfort experienced should not be greater than what you would normally encounter, because images and items that may appear in the questionnaire are not different from what one sees in media reporting.

If you have any questions about this survey or the research in general or would like to be informed of the aggregate research finding, please contact:

**Muhammad Iqbal**

Phone number: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Should you have any concerns about your feelings, or want any additional information or help, please see the following services and contact details below.

**International Community Activity Center**, which provides confidential telephone counselling services to anyone who may need support in order to express their feelings and experiences

Website: <http://www.icacservices.org>

Phone number: +[REDACTED]

Should you have any concerns or complaints about the conduct of the project, you are welcome to contact:

**The Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee**

Email: [REDACTED]

Once again, thank you for your participation.

Muhammad Iqbal

**By continuing to the next page you are agreeing that you have read and understood the information above and agree to participate in the project, realising that you may withdraw at any stage by exiting the survey. This includes an agreement that research data provided by you during the project may be included in a thesis, presented at conferences and published in journals on the condition that neither your name nor any other identifying information is used.**

### Demographic & Background information

Firstly, we'll just need to get some basic demographic and background information.

What is your age (in years)?

\_\_\_\_\_

What is your gender?

- ☐ Male  
☐ Female  
☐ Other \_\_\_\_\_

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- ☐ Graduated from high school  
☐ Graduated from university (Diploma)  
☐ Graduated from university (Bachelors Degree)  
☐ Graduated from university (Masters Degree)  
☐ Graduated from university (PhD)  
Other \_\_\_\_\_

Politically and socially, would you describe yourself as conservative (upholding the status quo and established traditions) or progressive (leaning towards changing the status quo for the progress of society)?

Politically

Very conservative   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Very progressive

Socially

Very conservative   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Very progressive

Do you consider yourself to be a very religious person?

Not at all religious   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Very religious

How important is religion to you on a daily basis?

Not at all important   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Very important

**Mortality Salience Randomisation**

The next question may be challenging, but it is important to understand what you think of this...

**Mortality Salience Condition**

Please briefly think about the moment of your death.

Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you.

---

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---

Please describe, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you physically die and once you are physically dead.

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**Control Condition**

Please briefly think about getting an intense, unexpected toothache.

Please briefly describe the emotions that an unexpected toothache arouses in you.

---

---

---

Put down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you when you get an unexpected toothache.

---

---

---



### Delay 1: Word Search

Please find as many words as you can in the above puzzle and write them in the box below. You have five minutes to complete the task. This task assesses your language and visual processing capabilities, as we think this may be related to responding to complex issues.

P	N	A	D	N	A	D	I	S	R	E	P	I	L	O	T	O	B	X	P
K	G	R	N	V	D	S	W	E	A	T	E	R	E	K	X	A	Q	H	T
V	U	A	P	N	I	N	T	A	D	O	R	U	A	N	A	L	E	C	N
Q	M	B	M	M	S	U	A	K	O	E	H	I	M	G	G	A	Z	N	O
X	A	A	O	B	P	T	O	K	Y	H	V	A	L	A	T	E	K	L	F
Y	X	K	T	M	A	I	D	A	B	R	E	T	L	M	W	I	I	U	E
K	W	U	O	V	V	R	I	V	N	A	S	C	I	O	I	X	X	G	L
A	N	K	A	N	C	I	N	G	J	L	B	U	E	S	K	S	N	U	E
B	E	X	K	G	U	T	U	P	M	U	R	I	T	Y	X	E	T	N	T
M	S	N	B	N	T	K	S	B	I	K	N	E	L	R	M	M	S	T	E
E	R	N	A	A	Q	A	U	K	A	A	W	O	T	E	A	L	U	I	H
G	E	U	L	K	T	J	U	J	M	D	D	X	J	T	M	D	M	N	S
Y	P	F	X	R	L	E	J	U	U	I	I	A	A	M	I	A	A	G	B
C	M	Z	E	H	V	U	K	J	D	J	R	L	U	E	K	W	E	R	E
U	J	K	H	W	A	G	R	U	O	X	I	I	H	T	P	G	T	K	A
K	N	A	M	U	N	I	M	U	X	G	N	P	O	J	A	W	Y	I	S
U	H	H	H	A	F	O	T	O	G	F	D	R	K	A	E	P	F	P	E
I	L	P	R	E	S	S	I	D	E	N	A	H	G	D	Z	V	E	A	J
O	K	A	T	O	K	U	V	Y	X	F	E	Y	G	I	Z	V	D	S	A
A	Q	C	I	B	J	K	R	N	I	K	E	M	E	S	U	F	E	M	L

### Delay 2: PANAS Scale

Please read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Thinking about yourself RIGHT NOW and how you feel, to what extent do you feel:

Upset

Very often    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Not very often

Hostile

Very often    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Not very often

Alert

Very often    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Not very often

Ashamed

Very often    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Not very often

Inspired

Very often    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Not very often

Nervous

Very often    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Not very often

Determined

Very often    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Not very often

Attentive

Very often    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Not very often

Afraid

Very often    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Not very often

Active

Very often    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Not very often

### DTA Check

We are simply pre-testing this questionnaire for future studies. Please complete the following by filling letters in the blanks to create words. Please fill in the blanks with the first word that comes to mind into the text box next to the incomplete word. Some words may be plural.

\_ E W A \_ \_\_\_\_\_  
T A \_ \_ M A N \_\_\_\_\_  
M A \_ \_ K \_\_\_\_\_  
\_ \_ J I N G \_\_\_\_\_  
T \_ \_ A N G \_\_\_\_\_  
B U N \_ \_ \_\_\_\_\_  
R \_ \_ A \_\_\_\_\_  
\_ \_ T U \_\_\_\_\_  
K U R \_ \_ \_\_\_\_\_  
P \_ \_ P E N \_\_\_\_\_  
K U \_ I \_ G \_\_\_\_\_  
M \_ \_ A T \_\_\_\_\_  
G O R E N \_ \_ N \_\_\_\_\_  
M \_ \_ A \_\_\_\_\_  
P E M A \_ A \_ A N \_\_\_\_\_  
\_ O B I \_ \_\_\_\_\_  
P I \_ I \_ G \_\_\_\_\_  
\_ O \_ I \_\_\_\_\_  
M E N I N G \_ A \_ \_\_\_\_\_  
K E \_ \_ A S \_\_\_\_\_  
\_ \_ M P U T E R \_\_\_\_\_  
\_ \_ T I \_\_\_\_\_  
J \_ N D \_ L A \_\_\_\_\_  
H \_ \_ A N \_\_\_\_\_  
S \_ \_ E D A \_\_\_\_\_

### **Randomised Norm Statements Briefing**

The following questions ask you about your opinions on a few different and important social and political issues. First we would like to you to read an excerpt of findings from a recent national poll. Please indicate how much these findings reflect your own personal views.

Please complete the opinion questionnaires on the following pages with your most natural gut response. Please follow the instructions provided and complete the questionnaires in the order they are presented. That is, do not skip around.

### **Topical Norms**

A recent national poll of Indonesian Muslims showed that 74% of the respondents believe that Indonesia has become too Western, and that this has led to an increase of corruption, heresy, and sin within the country.

**Generally speaking, how much does this describe your own beliefs?**

Not at all   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Very much

Many of the respondents also believe that Indonesia should return to its roots of being a Muslim nation.

**Generally speaking, how much does this describe your own beliefs?**

Not at all   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Very much

### **Control Norms**

Results from a recent international study have shown that 74% of the respondents believe that a balanced and nutritious diet is important for a child's development.

**Generally speaking, how much does this describe your own beliefs?**

Not at all   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Very much

Many of the respondents also believe that it is important for parents to have easy access to information on the type of foods that will allow for a balanced diet.

**Generally speaking, how much does this describe your own beliefs?**

Not at all   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Very much

### DV Briefing

Now we will present you with sample responses from a follow-up interview conducted as part of the previous survey. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with their statements, and whether you think your friends and family will approve of their views.

Again, please complete the opinion questionnaires on the following pages with your most natural gut response. Please follow the instructions provided and complete the questionnaires in the order they are presented. That is, do not skip around.

### Filler 1

**Do you think enough is being done to fight corruption in Indonesia?**

No, I think more needs to be done, there is still widespread corruption in the government.

How much do you agree with this student's view?

Not at all   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Extremely

### DV 1

**How do you feel about Indonesia's transition to democracy?**

I think its bad. It has made Indonesia a weak nation and the only way we can be strong again is if the country was run under sharia law.

How much do you agree with this student's view?

Not at all   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Extremely

### Filler 2

**How do you feel about Indonesia's economic trajectory after Suharto's resignation?**

Nothing has really changed. The majority of the people are still very poor and it's always the same type of people that are taking advantage of the rest of us.

How much do you agree with this student's view?

Not at all   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Extremely

### DV 2

**How do you feel about the wave of anti-Shia sentiment that emerged in the past year?**

I agree with it. They claim to be part of Islam but they're not and yet they get to spread their heretical beliefs.

How much do you agree with this student's view?

Not at all   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Extremely

### Filler 3

**Do you think that the education system in Indonesia is adequately preparing Indonesia's youth?**

No, not enough time spent is on subjects that will strengthen the faith of today's youth.

How much do you agree with this student's view?

Not at all   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Extremely

### DV 3

**Are violent attacks on adherents of religious sects, such as the Syi'ah, ever justified?**

Yes. They have been warned repeatedly that they need to come to the true path of Islam but they did not listen and continue to spread their heretical beliefs and practices.

How much do you agree with this student's view?

Not at all   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Extremely

**DV 4**

**Are violent attacks on government branches and institutions ever justified?**

Yes, especially when our government is acting on behalf of Western interests and not its own citizens.

How much do you agree with this student's view?

Not at all   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Extremely

**De-brief**

Thank you for taking our survey. Your response and participation is very important to us.

This study is looking at whether thinking about uncomfortable thoughts and issues may change how we think about other political and social issues. This study also examined the impact of additional information on attitudes towards the above issues.

For any information about the survey, please contact Muhammad at [miqb1@student.monash.edu](mailto:miqb1@student.monash.edu).

Thank you once again!

## Study Two (Indonesian)

### Welcoming page, Explanatory Statement, Consent

Halo!

Pertama-tama, terima kasih atas partisipasi anda dalam survei ini. Kami sangat tertarik dengan opini pemuda Indonesia (antara umur 18 hingga 24 tahun).

Survei ini hanya memerlukan waktu 10 sampai 15 menit. Beberapa pertanyaan di survei ini mungkin nampak aneh dan berulang-ulang, namun semua pertanyaan sangatlah penting karena mereka mengukur cara berpikir sosial yang mungkin terkait dengan opini politik Anda.

Survei ini seluruhnya anonim dan kami tidak mengambil informasi yang bisa mengidentifikasi Anda. Data akan disimpan di lokasi yang aman, sesuai dengan peraturan etika Monash University. Partisipasi Anda dalam survei ini bersifat sukarela dan Anda mempunyai pilihan untuk mengundurkan diri dari survei ini kapan pun Anda mau. Kami berharap untuk mempublikasikan hasil dari survei ini dalam berbagai publikasi akademik untuk memastikan bahwa opini Anda tersebar.

Sebelum melanjutkan lebih jauh, kami ingin memberikan Anda informasi latar belakang mengenai penelitian kami. Kami tertarik pada opini pemuda Indonesia dalam beberapa bidang yang terkait dengan isu sosial, perilaku, dan politik. Kami melakukan penelitian ini karena opini pemuda Indonesia tidak sering ditanyakan dan didengarkan, dan demikian mungkin tidak direpresentasikan dengan akurat. Oleh karena itu, kami meminta Anda untuk menjawab sejujur mungkin dalam tanggapan Anda.

Kemungkinan untuk Anda mengalami ketidaknyamanan sangatlah kecil, namun kami memang akan menanyakan beberapa pertanyaan yang sulit dan menantang. Ketidaknyamanan yang mungkin akan Anda rasakan tidak akan lebih besar dari apa yang biasanya Anda rasakan pada kegiatan sehari-hari Anda. Ini dikarenakan gambar yang mungkin muncul dalam survei kami tidak berbeda dari apa yang terlihat dalam liputan dan pemberitaan di media sehari-hari.

Jika Anda memerlukan informasi lebih lanjut mengenai survei ini, Anda dianjurkan untuk menghubungi:

**Muhammad Iqbal**

Nomor telepon: [REDACTED]

Jika Anda mempunyai kekhawatiran apapun mengenai perasaan Anda, atau ingin informasi atau bantuan lebih lanjut, Anda bisa menghubungi layanan di bawah ini:

**International Community Activity Center**, penyedia jasa informasi tentang depresi, keresahan, dan segala yang berkaitan

Website: <http://www.icacservices.org>

Phone number: [REDACTED]

Jika Anda memiliki masalah atau keluhan tentang pelaksanaan penelitian ini, Anda bisa menghubungi:

**Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee**

Email: [REDACTED]

Sekali lagi, terima kasih atas partisipasi anda.

Iqbal

**Dengan melanjutkan ke halaman berikutnya, Anda menyetujui bahwa Anda telah membaca dan memahami informasi di atas dan bersedia untuk berpartisipasi di dalam survei ini, dengan pengetahuan bahwa Anda dapat mengundurkan diri kapanpun dengan keluar dari situs survei. Dengan melanjutkan ke halaman berikutnya, Anda juga menyetujui bahwa data penelitian yang Anda berikan melalui survei mungkin akan digunakan di dalam thesis, dipresentasikan dalam konferensi-konferensi dan diterbitkan dalam jurnal-jurnal dengan kondisi bahwa nama atau informasi yang dapat mengidentifikasi Anda tidak akan digunakan.**



### Demographic & Background information

Pertama-tama, kami perlu mendapatkan beberapa informasi demografis.

Berapa usia Anda (dalam tahun)?

\_\_\_\_\_

Apakah jenis kelamin Anda?

- ☐ Laki-laki
- ☐ Perempuan
- ☐ Lainnya \_\_\_\_\_

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- ☐ Lulus SMA
- ☐ Lulus universitas (Diploma)
- ☐ Lulus universitas (S1)
- ☐ Lulus universitas (S2)
- ☐ Lulus universitas (S3)
- ☐ Lainnya \_\_\_\_\_

Dalam segi politik dan sosial, apakah Anda mengkategorikan diri Anda sebagai seseorang yang konservatif (mempertahankan keadaan, kebiasaan, dan tradisi yg berlaku) atau progresif (berkeinginan untuk mengubah keadaan sekarang untuk kemajuan masyarakat)?

Dalam segi politik...

Sangat konservatif   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat progresif

Dalam segi sosial

Sangat konservatif   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat progresif

Apakah Anda merasa sebagai orang yang sangat beriman?

Sama sekali tidak beriman   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat beriman

Seberapa pentingkah agama dalam kehidupan sehari-hari anda?

Sama sekali tidak penting   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat penting

### **Mortality Salience Randomisation**

Pertanyaan berikut ini berpotensi menantang, tapi sangatlah penting bagi kami untuk memahami apa yang Anda pikirkan tentang hal ini...

### **Mortality Salience Condition**

Mohon untuk berpikir secara singkat tentang saat kematian Anda.

Mohon jelaskan secara singkat emosi yang bangkit saat Anda berpikir tentang saat kematian Anda.

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Mohon jelaskan, secara terperinci mungkin, apa yang Anda duga akan terjadi kepada anda ketika Anda meninggal secara jasmani, dan fisik Anda telah meninggal.

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### **Control Condition**

Mohon untuk berpikir secara singkat tentang saat Anda mendapatkan sakit gigi yang sangat tajam secara tiba-tiba.

Mohon jelaskan secara singkat emosi yang bangkit saat Anda mendapatkan sakit gigi yang tajam secara tiba-tiba.

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---

Mohon jelaskan, secara terperinci mungkin, apa yang Anda duga akan terjadi ketika Anda mengalami sakit gigi yang tajam secara tiba-tiba.

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### Delay 1: Word Search

Mohon temukan kata-kata sebanyak mungkin dalam teka-teki di atas dan tulis di dalam kotak di bawah. Anda memiliki waktu lima menit untuk menyelesaikan teka-teki ini. Tugas ini menilai kemampuan pengolahan bahasa dan visual Anda, karena kami merasa hal ini dapat berhubungan dengan tanggapan anda terhadap isu-isu yang kompleks.

P	N	A	D	N	A	D	I	S	R	E	P	I	L	O	T	O	B	X	P
K	G	R	N	V	D	S	W	E	A	T	E	R	E	K	X	A	Q	H	T
V	U	A	P	N	I	N	T	A	D	O	R	U	A	N	A	L	E	C	N
Q	M	B	M	M	S	U	A	K	O	E	H	I	M	G	G	A	Z	N	O
X	A	A	O	B	P	T	O	K	Y	H	V	A	L	A	T	E	K	L	F
Y	X	K	T	M	A	I	D	A	B	R	E	T	L	M	W	I	I	U	E
K	W	U	O	V	V	R	I	V	N	A	S	C	I	O	I	X	X	G	L
A	N	K	A	N	C	I	N	G	J	L	B	U	E	S	K	S	N	U	E
B	E	X	K	G	U	T	U	P	M	U	R	I	T	Y	X	E	T	N	T
M	S	N	B	N	T	K	S	B	I	K	N	E	L	R	M	M	S	T	E
E	R	N	A	A	Q	A	U	K	A	A	W	O	T	E	A	L	U	I	H
G	E	U	L	K	T	J	U	J	M	D	D	X	J	T	M	D	M	N	S
Y	P	F	X	R	L	E	J	U	U	I	I	A	A	M	I	A	A	G	B
C	M	Z	E	H	V	U	K	J	D	J	R	L	U	E	K	W	E	R	E
U	J	K	H	W	A	G	R	U	O	X	I	I	H	T	P	G	T	K	A
K	N	A	M	U	N	I	M	U	X	G	N	P	O	J	A	W	Y	I	S
U	H	H	H	A	F	O	T	O	G	F	D	R	K	A	E	P	F	P	E
I	L	P	R	E	S	S	I	D	E	N	A	H	G	D	Z	V	E	A	J
O	K	A	T	O	K	U	V	Y	X	F	E	Y	G	I	Z	V	D	S	A
A	Q	C	I	B	J	K	R	N	I	K	E	M	E	S	U	F	E	M	L

### Delay 2: PANAS Scale

Mohon untuk membaca setiap kata di kolom paling kiri, dan kemudian cantumkan jawaban yang menurut Anda paling tepat. Dengan memikirkan perasaan dan diri Anda sendiri PADA SAAT INI, sejauh manakah Anda merasa:

Kesal

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Bermusuhan

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Waspada

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Malu

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Terinspirasi

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Gugup

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Tekun

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Penuh perhatian

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Takut

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Aktif

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

### DTA Check

Kami hanya sekedar menguji daftar pertanyaan ini untuk survei di masa depan. Mohon lengkapi kata yang tidak lengkap di bawah ini untuk merancang sebuah kata utuh yang pertama terpikir oleh Anda. Mohon tulis kata tersebut di kotak yang tersedia.

\_ E W A \_ \_\_\_\_\_  
T A \_ \_ M A N \_\_\_\_\_  
M A \_ \_ K \_\_\_\_\_  
\_ \_ J I N G \_\_\_\_\_  
T \_ \_ A N G \_\_\_\_\_  
B U N \_ \_ \_\_\_\_\_  
R \_ \_ A \_\_\_\_\_  
\_ \_ T U \_\_\_\_\_  
K U R \_ \_ \_\_\_\_\_  
P \_ \_ P E N \_\_\_\_\_  
K U \_ I \_ G \_\_\_\_\_  
M \_ \_ A T \_\_\_\_\_  
G O R E N \_ \_ N \_\_\_\_\_  
M \_ \_ A \_\_\_\_\_  
P E M A \_ A \_ A N \_\_\_\_\_  
\_ O B I \_ \_\_\_\_\_  
P I \_ I \_ G \_\_\_\_\_  
\_ O \_ I \_\_\_\_\_  
M E N I N G \_ A \_ \_\_\_\_\_  
K E \_ \_ A S \_\_\_\_\_  
\_ \_ M P U T E R \_\_\_\_\_  
\_ \_ T I \_\_\_\_\_  
J \_ N D \_ L A \_\_\_\_\_  
H \_ \_ A N \_\_\_\_\_  
S \_ \_ E D A \_\_\_\_\_

### Randomised Norm Statements Briefing

Sekarang, kami ingin menanyakan opini Anda tentang beberapa isu sosial dan politik. Pertama-tama kami meminta Anda untuk membaca sebuah kutipan hasil dari sebuah survei nasional. Mohon tandai sebagaimana kuat kutipan ini mencerminkan pandangan Anda sendiri.

Mohon untuk menjawab sejujur mungkin berdasarkan hati nurani Anda. Mohon untuk menyelesaikan daftar pertanyaan ini sesuai urutan yang telah diberikan, dan tidak menjawabnya secara beracak.

### Topical Norms

Sebuah survei nasional yang menanyakan opini warga Muslim Indonesia menunjukkan bahwa 74% dari responden percaya bahwa Indonesia telah menjadi terlalu kebarat-baratan, dan ini telah menyebabkan peningkatan dalam korupsi, kesesatan, dan dosa.

Secara umum, seberapa banyak kutipan ini mencerminkan pandangan Anda sendiri?

Sama sekali tidak   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Sebagian besar dari responden ini juga percaya bahwa Indonesia harus kembali ke akarnya sebagai Negara Islam.

Secara umum, seberapa banyak kutipan ini mencerminkan pandangan Anda sendiri?

Sama sekali tidak   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

### Control Norms

Sebuah survei internasional menunjukkan bahwa 74% dari responden percaya bahwa pola makan yang seimbang dan penuh dengan nutrisi sangatlah penting bagi perkembangan anak-anak.

Secara umum, seberapa banyak kutipan ini mencerminkan pandangan Anda sendiri?

Sama sekali tidak   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Sebagian besar dari responden ini juga percaya bahwa sangatlah penting bagi orang tua untuk mempunyai akses yang mudah kepada informasi mengenai tipe-tipe makanan yang mendukung pola makan yang seimbang.

Secara umum, seberapa banyak kutipan ini mencerminkan pandangan Anda sendiri?

Sama sekali tidak   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

### DV Briefing

Sekarang kami akan menunjukkan beberapa contoh jawaban dari sebuah survei nasional. Mohon tandai sebagaimana kuatnya Anda setuju atau tidak setuju dengan jawaban mereka. Tandai juga apabila menurut Anda keluarga Anda dan teman-teman dekat Anda akan menyetujui sudut pandang mereka. Mohon untuk menjawab sejujur mungkin berdasarkan hati nurani Anda. Mohon untuk menyelesaikan daftar pertanyaan ini sesuai urutan yang telah diberikan, dan tidak menjawabnya secara beracak.

#### Filler 1

Menurut Anda, apakah upaya untuk memberantas korupsi sudah cukup?

Tidak. Masih banyak yang bisa dilakukan. Korupsi masih merajalela, terutama di lembaga-lembaga pemerintahan.

Seberapa banyak Anda setuju dengan sudut pandang mahasiswa ini?

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

#### DV 1

Bagaimana perasaan Anda tentang transisi Indonesia ke dalam sistem demokrasi?

Menurut saya dampaknya buruk. Transisi ini telah membuat Indonesia menjadi negara yang lemah, dan satu-satunya cara untuk menjadi negara yang kuat adalah jika negara ini didasari hukum syariat.

Seberapa banyak Anda setuju dengan sudut pandang mahasiswa ini?

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

#### Filler 2

Bagaimana perasaan Anda tentang perkembangan ekonomi Indonesia setelah turunnya Presiden Suharto?

Tidak banyak yang berubah. Mayoritas orang masih sangat miskin, dan selalu ~~tipis~~ tipe orang yang sama yang mengeksploitasi kita semua.

Seberapa banyak Anda setuju dengan sudut pandang mahasiswa ini?

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

## DV 2

Bagaimana perasaan Anda tentang sentimen anti-Syi'ah yang muncul kembali dalam setahun kebelakang ini?

Saya setuju dengan sentimen itu.  
Mereka mengaku bagian dari Islam  
tapi mereka sebenarnya tidak, dan  
mereka malah diperbolehkan untuk  
menyebarkan keyakinan sesat mereka.

Seberapa banyak Anda setuju dengan sudut pandang mahasiswa ini?

Sama sekali tidak ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Sangat

## Filler 3

Menurut Anda, apakah sistem pendidikan di Indonesia mampu mempersiapkan generasi muda Indonesia?

Tidak. Menurut saya terlalu banyak  
perhatian yang diberikan kepada ilmu  
sains dan tidak cukup waktu yang  
diberikan kepada pelajaran yang akan  
memperkuat iman ~~generasi~~ generasi  
muda sekarang.

Seberapa banyak Anda setuju dengan sudut pandang mahasiswa ini?

Sama sekali tidak ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Sangat

## DV 3

Apakah serangan kekerasan terhadap penganut sekte-sekte minoritas, seperti Syi'ah, bisa dibenarkan?

Iya. Mereka telah diperingatkan  
berkali-kali bahwa mereka harus  
kembali ke jalan yang benar,  
tetapi mereka tidak menggubris  
dan ~~terus~~ terus menyebarkan keyakinan  
dan praktek sesat mereka.

Seberapa banyak Anda setuju dengan sudut pandang mahasiswa ini?

Sama sekali tidak ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ Sangat



DV 4

Apakah serangan kekerasan terhadap cabang-cabang dan lembaga pemerintah bisa dibenarkan?

Iya. Terutama jika pemerintah kami  
berkehendak atas kepentingan Barat  
dan bukan warga negaranya sendiri.

Seberapa banyak Anda setuju dengan sudut pandang mahasiswa ini?

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

### **De-brief**

Terima kasih atas partisipasi Anda dalam survei ini. Jawaban dan partisipasi Anda sangatlah penting bagi kami.

Sekedar memberi tahu, studi ini menganalisa apakah berpikir tentang hal-hal yang tidak nyaman bisa merubah bagaimana kita berpikir tentang isu--isu lain yang terkait. Studi ini juga menganalisa dampak dari informasi tambahan terhadap pendapat kita tentang isu-isu tersebut.

Untuk informasi lanjutan tentang survei ini, mohon menghubungi Iqbal di [miqb1@student.monash.edu](mailto:miqb1@student.monash.edu).

Sekali lagi, terima kasih!

## APPENDIX D

### Study Three (English)

#### Welcoming page, Explanatory Statement, Consent

Hi!

First of all, thank you for participating in this survey. We are particularly interested in the views of young Indonesians (between 18 and 29 years old). The survey should take around 15 minutes to complete. Some of the questions in this survey may seem strange and repetitive, but they are vital as they measure important ways of thinking socially that may be relevant to your political views.

This study is completely anonymous and we do not collect any identifying information. Data will be safely in a secure location in accordance with Monash University ethics regulations. This survey is entirely voluntary and you have the option of stopping at any time. We are hoping to publish and communicate the results in academic outlets to ensure that your views are shared.

Before going any further, we first would like to give you some background information on our research. We are interested in the opinion and attitudes of young Indonesian students on a range of social, behavioural (such as health and consumption) and political issues, belonging, and inclusion issues. We are doing this because the opinions of young Indonesians are rarely asked for and listened to, and therefore their views on a range of issues may not be appropriately represented. Accordingly, we ask you to be as honest as possible in your responses.

It is unlikely that you will experience any level of discomfort, however we do ask some challenging questions. Any discomfort experienced should not be greater than what you would normally encounter, because images and items that may appear in the questionnaire are not different from what one sees in media reporting.

If you have any questions about this survey or the research in general or would like to be informed of the aggregate research finding, please contact:

**Muhammad Iqbal**

Phone number: [REDACTED]

Should you have any concerns about your feelings, or want any additional information or help, please see the following services and contact details below.

**International Community Activity Center**, which provides confidential telephone counselling services to anyone who may need support in order to express their feelings and experiences

Website: <http://www.icacservices.org>

Phone number: [REDACTED]

Should you have any concerns or complaints about the conduct of the project, you are welcome to contact:

**The Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee**

Email: [REDACTED]

Once again, thank you for your participation.

Muhammad Iqbal

**By continuing to the next page you are agreeing that you have read and understood the information above and agree to participate in the project, realising that you may withdraw at any stage by exiting the survey. This includes an agreement that research data provided by you during the project may be included in a thesis, presented at conferences and published in journals on the condition that neither your name nor any other identifying information is used.**

### Demographic & Background information

Firstly, we'll just need to get some basic demographic and background information.

Are you an Indonesian citizen?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

Are you currently living in Indonesia?

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

What is your religion?

- ☐ Islam
- ☐ Christianity
- ☐ Catholicism
- ☐ Hinduism
- ☐ Buddhism
- ☐ Other: \_\_\_\_\_

What is your age (in years)?

\_\_\_\_\_

What is your gender?

- ☐ Male
- ☐ Female
- ☐ Other \_\_\_\_\_

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- ☐ Graduated from high school
- ☐ Graduated from university (Diploma)
- ☐ Graduated from university (Bachelors Degree)
- ☐ Graduated from university (Masters Degree)
- ☐ Graduated from university (PhD)
- ☐ Other \_\_\_\_\_

Politically and socially, would you describe yourself as conservative (upholding the status quo and established traditions) or progressive (leaning towards changing the status quo for the progress of society)?

Politically

Very conservative   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Very progressive

Socially

Very conservative   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Very progressive

Do you consider yourself to be a very religious person?

Not at all religious   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Very religious

How important is religion to you on a daily basis?

Not at all important   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Very important

### **Lack of control**

Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the statements below. Please answer as honestly as you can using your gut responses.

There is little I can do to change many of the important things in my life

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

I often feel helpless in dealing with the problems of life

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

Other people determine most of what I can and cannot do

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

What happens in my life is often beyond my control

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

There are many things that interfere with what I want to do

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

I have little control over the things that happen to me

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

There is really no way I can solve some of the problems I have

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

Sometimes I feel that I am being pushed around in life

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

### **Search for meaning**

Please indicate how often you think about each of the statements below. Please answer as honestly as you can using your gut responses.

I am looking for something that makes my life feel meaningful

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

I am always looking to find my life's purpose

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

I am always searching for something that makes my life feel significant

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

I am seeking a purpose or mission for my life

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

I am searching for meaning in my life

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

### **Loneliness**

Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the statements below. Please answer as honestly as you can using your gut responses.

I lack companionship

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

There is no one I can turn to

Strongly disagree	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Strongly agree
I am an outgoing person						
Strongly disagree	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Strongly agree
I feel left out						
Strongly disagree	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Strongly agree
I feel isolated from others						
Strongly disagree	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Strongly agree
I can find companionship when I want it						
Strongly disagree	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Strongly agree
I am unhappy being so withdrawn						
Strongly disagree	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Strongly agree
People are around me but not with me						
Strongly disagree	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Strongly agree

### Death Anxiety

How disturbed or made anxious are you by the following aspects of death and dying? Read each item and answer it quickly. Don't spend too much time thinking about your response. We want your first impression of how you think right now. Circle the number that best represents your feeling.						
The total isolation of death						
Not at all anxious	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Extremely anxious
The shortness of life						
Not at all anxious	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Extremely anxious
Missing out on so much after you die						
Not at all anxious	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Extremely anxious
Dying young						
Not at all anxious	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Extremely anxious
How it will feel to be dead						
Not at all anxious	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Extremely anxious
Never thinking or experiencing anything again						
Not at all anxious	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Extremely anxious
The disintegration of your body after you die						
Not at all anxious	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Extremely anxious

### Extrinsic religiosity

Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the statements below. Please answer as honestly as you can using your gut responses.						
My commitment to religion is based on the belief that religion is necessary if a society is to be moral						
Strongly disagree	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Strongly agree
I am religious because religion is so important in preventing crime and other social disorders, and I want to contribute in this effort						
Strongly disagree	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	Strongly agree

In order to prevent and control criminal behaviour, society must support religion

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

I follow the teachings of my religion as a way to help solve social problems

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

Most of the problems of society result from the failure of people to be religious

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

From my point of view, religion is a gift from God to humanity that is designed to make the world a better place in which to live

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

My life is grounded in religion because without religion society becomes inhumane

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

If I were not religious, I would contribute to cultural processes that would weaken my society

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

My religious activities are motivated by a belief that religion helps prevent injustice in the world

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

The true purpose of my religion is to help create a more just world

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

Underlying my faith is the belief that religion is essential to the moral development of the society

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

If the people fail to be religious, a society cannot survive, and this largely explains why I am religious

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

A lack of religion produces many difficulties within a society, and this is an important reason why I am religious

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

I am religious because I know that the loss of religious life leads to the decline of civilization

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

#### **Extrinsic religiosity**

Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the statements below. Please answer as honestly as you can using your gut responses.

My commitment to religion is based on the belief that religion is necessary if a society is to be moral

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

I am religious because religion is so important in preventing crime and other social disorders, and I want to contribute in this effort

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

In order to prevent and control criminal behaviour, society must support religion

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

I follow the teachings of my religion as a way to help solve social problems

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

Most of the problems of society result from the failure of people to be religious

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

From my point of view, religion is a gift from God to humanity that is designed to make the world a better place in which to live

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

My life is grounded in religion because without religion society becomes inhumane

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

If I were not religious, I would contribute to cultural processes that would weaken my society

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

My religious activities are motivated by a belief that religion helps prevent injustice in the world

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

The true purpose of my religion is to help create a more just world

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

Underlying my faith is the belief that religion is essential to the moral development of the society

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

If the people fail to be religious, a society cannot survive, and this largely explains why I am religious

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

A lack of religion produces many difficulties within a society, and this is an important reason why I am religious

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

I am religious because I know that the loss of religious life leads to the decline of civilization

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

### **Intrinsic religiosity**

Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the statements below. Please answer as honestly as you can using your gut responses.

Experiences of submitting to God cause me to feel more vital and motivated.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

Sometimes, submission to God simultaneously creates within me a fear and a love of God.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

Submission to God has caused me to experience greatness and humility at the same time.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

What guides me to cope properly with life difficulties has been submission to God's will.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

I have understood how my passion to be closer to God has internally liberated me in contrast to the enslavement produced by the other passions in my life.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

When I look deeply within myself, I understand that the experience of loving God is worth any effort in my life.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree



My experience of God's presence in my life is important to experience love toward him.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

For me, the core of religious practices and ceremonies is that they help me achieve a close relationship with God.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

The experience of loving God produces a special enthusiasm within me.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

Intimate closeness to God is at the core of my efforts to be religious.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

Submitting to God gives me important insight into my inability in comparison to the greatness of God.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

Submitting to God is a lovely experience for me because I experience my finite nature in comparison to the greatness of God.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

What has given me peace in all of my life difficulties is being in submission to God's will.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

In my view, religious practices are a means for orienting my submission toward the infinity of God.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

Experiencing submission and closeness to God enhances my understanding of God.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

### **Internal political efficacy**

Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the statements below. Please answer as honestly as you can using your gut responses.

I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

Other people seem to have an easier time understanding complicated issues than I do.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

I often don't feel sure of myself when talking with other people about politics and government.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

I think that I am as well-informed about politics and government as most people.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

### **Regime-based political efficacy**

Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the statements below. Please answer as honestly as you can using your gut responses.

There are many legal ways for citizens to successfully influence what the government does.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

In this country, a few people have all the political power and the rest of us are not given any say about how the government runs things.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

Voting is an effective way for people to have a say about what the government does.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

Under our form of government, the people have the final say about how the country is run, no matter who is in office.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

If public officials are not interested in hearing what the people think, there is really no way to make them listen.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

People like me don't have any say about what the government does.

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

### **Support for extremism and violent extremism**

Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the statements below. Please answer as honestly as you can using your gut responses.

Religious sects such as the Shiah are heretical and their followers are ultimately on the wrong path

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

The places of worship of the Shiah must be closed down as they help spread their heretical teachings

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

The Shiah only have themselves to blame when they are physically attacked

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

The killing of Shias are justifiable, they have been warned to return to the true path but did not listen

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

The current Indonesian government is not legitimate as it is based on man-made laws

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

The only way to remedy Indonesia's problems is to implement sharia law

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

Violence in overthrowing the government is justifiable, it is the only way that Allah's laws can be implemented in Indonesia

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

The killing of Densus 88/national police members are justifiable, they are the puppets of an illegitimate government

Strongly disagree   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Strongly agree

### **De-brief**

Thank you for taking our survey. Your response and participation is very important to us.

Just to let you know, this study is looking whether thinking about uncomfortable thoughts and issues may change how we think about other related issues. For any information about the survey, please contact Muhammad at [miqb1@student.monash.edu](mailto:miqb1@student.monash.edu).

To go into the draw, please click the next button below, and you will be automatically redirected to the raffle page.

Thank you once again!

## Study Three (Indonesian)

### Welcoming page, Explanatory Statement, Consent

Halo!

Pertama-tama, terima kasih atas partisipasi Anda dalam survei ini. Kami sangat tertarik dengan opini pemuda Indonesia (antara umur 18 hingga 24 tahun). Survei ini hanya memerlukan waktu 15 sampai 20 menit. Beberapa pertanyaan di survei ini mungkin nampak aneh dan berulang-ulang, namun semua pertanyaan sangatlah penting karena mereka mengukur cara berpikir sosial yang mungkin terkait dengan opini politik Anda.

Survei ini seluruhnya anonim dan kami tidak mengambil informasi yang bisa mengidentifikasi Anda. Data akan disimpan di lokasi yang aman, sesuai dengan peraturan etika Monash University. Partisipasi Anda dalam survei ini bersifat sukarela dan Anda mempunyai pilihan untuk mengundurkan diri dari survei ini kapan pun Anda mau. Kami berharap untuk mempublikasikan hasil dari survei ini dalam berbagai publikasi akademik untuk memastikan bahwa opini Anda tersebar.

Sebelum melanjutkan lebih jauh, kami ingin memberikan Anda informasi latar belakang mengenai penelitian kami. Kami tertarik pada opini pemuda Indonesia dalam beberapa bidang yang terkait dengan isu sosial dan politik. Kami melakukan penelitian ini karena opini pemuda Indonesia tidak sering ditanyakan dan didengarkan, dan demikian mungkin tidak direpresentasikan dengan akurat. Oleh karena itu, kami meminta Anda untuk menjawab sejujur mungkin dalam tanggapan Anda.

Kemungkinan untuk Anda mengalami ketidaknyamanan sangatlah kecil, namun kami memang akan menanyakan beberapa pertanyaan yang sulit dan menantang. Ketidaknyamanan yang mungkin akan Anda rasakan tidak akan lebih besar dari apa yang biasanya Anda rasakan pada kegiatan sehari-hari Anda. Ini dikarenakan pertanyaan yang mungkin muncul dalam survei kami tidak berbeda dari apa yang terlihat dalam liputan dan pemberitaan di media sehari-hari.

Jika Anda memerlukan informasi lebih lanjut mengenai survei ini, Anda dianjurkan untuk menghubungi:

Muhammad Iqbal

Nomor telepon: [REDACTED]

Jika Anda mempunyai kekhawatiran apapun mengenai perasaan Anda, atau menginginkan informasi atau bantuan lebih lanjut, Anda bisa menghubungi layanan di bawah ini:

International Community Activity Center, penyedia jasa informasi tentang depresi, keresahan, dan segala yang berkaitan

Website: <http://www.icacservices.org>

Nomor telepon: [REDACTED]

Jika Anda memiliki masalah atau keluhan tentang pelaksanaan penelitian ini, Anda bisa menghubungi: Monash University Human Research Ethics Committee  
Email: [muhrec@monash.edu](mailto:muhrec@monash.edu)

Sekali lagi, terima kasih atas partisipasi anda.

Iqbal

**Dengan melanjutkan ke halaman berikutnya, Anda menyetujui bahwa Anda telah membaca dan memahami informasi di atas dan bersedia untuk berpartisipasi di dalam survei ini, dengan pengetahuan bahwa Anda dapat mengundurkan diri kapanpun dengan keluar dari halaman survei. Dengan melanjutkan ke halaman berikutnya, Anda juga menyetujui bahwa data penelitian yang Anda berikan melalui survei mungkin akan digunakan di dalam tesis, dipresentasikan dalam konferensi-konferensi akademik, dan diterbitkan dalam jurnal-jurnal akademik dengan kondisi bahwa nama atau informasi yang dapat mengidentifikasi Anda tidak akan digunakan.**

### Demographic & Background information

Pertama-tama, kami perlu mendapatkan beberapa informasi demografis.

Apakah Anda warga negara Indonesia?

- ☐ Iya  
☐ Tidak

Apakah Anda saat ini tinggal di Indonesia?

- ☐ Iya  
☐ Tidak

Apa agama Anda?

- ☐ Islam  
☐ Kristen  
☐ Katholik  
☐ Hindu  
☐ Buddha  
☐ Lainnya \_\_\_\_\_

Berapa usia Anda (dalam tahun)?

\_\_\_\_\_

Apa jenis kelamin Anda?

- ☐ Laki-laki  
☐ Perempuan  
☐ Lainnya \_\_\_\_\_

Apa tingkat pendidikan tertinggi yang telah Anda selesaikan?

- ☐ Lulus SMA  
☐ Lulus universitas (Diploma)  
☐ Lulus universitas (S1)  
☐ Lulus universitas (S2)  
☐ Lulus universitas (S3)  
☐ Lainnya \_\_\_\_\_

Dalam segi politik, apakah Anda mengkategorikan diri Anda sebagai seseorang yang konservatif (mempertahankan keadaan, kebiasaan, dan tradisi yg berlaku) atau progresif (berkeinginan untuk mengubah keadaan sekarang untuk kemajuan masyarakat)?

Sangat progresif   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat konservatif

Dalam segi sosial, apakah Anda mengkategorikan diri Anda sebagai seseorang yang konservatif (mempertahankan keadaan, kebiasaan, dan tradisi yg berlaku) atau progresif (berkeinginan untuk mengubah keadaan sekarang untuk kemajuan masyarakat)?

Sangat progresif   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat konservatif

Apakah Anda merasa sebagai orang yang sangat religius?

Sama sekali tidak   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Seberapa pentingkah agama dalam kehidupan sehari-hari Anda?

Sama sekali tidak penting   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat penting

### Lack of control

Mohon pilih jawaban yang menunjukkan seberapa kuatnya Anda setuju atau tidak setuju dengan setiap pernyataan di bawah. Mohon untuk menjawab dengan sejujur mungkin menurut hati nurani Anda.

Tidak banyak yang bisa saya lakukan untuk mengubah sebagian besar aspek penting dalam hidup saya

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Saya sering merasa tidak berdaya dalam menghadapi masalah hidup

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Orang lain menentukan sebagian besar dari apa yang saya bisa dan tidak bisa lakukan

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Apa yang terjadi dalam hidup saya di luar kendali saya

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Banyak hal yang mengganggu apa yang saya ingin lakukan

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Saya tidak mempunyai kendali atas hal-hal yang terjadi kepada saya

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Sungguh tidak ada cara untuk memecahkan beberapa masalah yang saya miliki

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Terkadang saya merasa saya dipaksa-paksa dan diatur dalam hidup

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

#### Search for meaning

Mohon pilih jawaban yang menunjukkan seberapa kuatnya Anda setuju atau tidak setuju dengan setiap pernyataan di bawah. Mohon untuk menjawab dengan sejujur mungkin menurut hati nurani Anda.

Saya mencari sesuatu yang membuat hidup saya lebih berarti

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Saya selalu mencari tujuan dari hidup saya

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Saya selalu mencari sesuatu yang membuat hidup saya terasa penting

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Saya sedang mencari tujuan atau misi untuk hidup saya

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Saya sedang mencari arti dalam hidup saya

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

#### Loneliness

Mohon pilih jawaban yang menunjukkan seberapa kuatnya Anda setuju atau tidak setuju dengan setiap pernyataan di bawah. Mohon untuk menjawab dengan sejujur mungkin menurut hati nurani Anda.

Saya kekurangan persahabatan

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Tidak ada orang yang bisa saya andalkan

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Saya adalah orang yang senang bersosialisasi

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Saya merasa ditinggalkan

Sangat tidak setuju    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Saya merasa terisolasi dari orang lain

Sangat tidak setuju    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Saya bisa mendapatkan persahabatan ketika saya menginginkannya

Sangat tidak setuju    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Saya tidak senang menjadi orang yang menyendiri

Sangat tidak setuju    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Orang-orang berada di sekitar saya tapi tidak bersama saya

Sangat tidak setuju    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

### Death Anxiety

Seberapa terganggu atau cemas Anda ketika berpikir tentang aspek kematian yang tercantum di bawah? Mohon untuk membaca setiap aspek dan menjawab secepat-cepatnya. Jangan terlalu lama berpikir tentang jawaban Anda. Kami menginginkan kesan pertama tentang bagaimana Anda berpikir pada saat ini. Mohon pilih jawaban yang paling mewakili perasaan Anda.

Isolasi total dalam kematian

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Betapa pendeknya hidup

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Ketinggalan banyak hal setelah saya Meninggal

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Mati muda

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Bagaimana rasanya mati

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Tidak akan bisa berpikir atau merasakan apapun lagi

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

Hancurnya tubuh setelah kematian

Sama sekali tidak    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat

### Extrinsic religiosity

Mohon pilih jawaban yang menunjukkan seberapa kuatnya Anda setuju atau tidak setuju dengan setiap pernyataan di bawah. Mohon untuk menjawab dengan sejujur mungkin menurut hati nurani Anda.

Komitmen saya kepada agama didasari oleh kepercayaan bahwa agama sangatlah penting untuk memastikan masyarakat yang bermoral

Sangat tidak setuju    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Saya adalah orang yang religius karena agama sangatlah penting dalam mencegah kejahatan dan kekacauan sosial lainnya, dan saya ingin berkontribusi dalam upaya ini

Sangat tidak setuju    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Untuk mencegah dan mengendalikan perilaku kriminal, masyarakat harus menyokong agama

Sangat tidak setuju    ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Saya mengikuti ajaran agama saya sebagai cara untuk membantu memecahkan masalah sosial  
Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Sebagian besar masalah yang dihadapi masyarakat berasal dari kegagalan orang-orang untuk menjadi manusia yang religious  
Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Dari sudut pandang saya, agama adalah sebuah karunia dari Allah kepada manusia yang bertujuan untuk membuat dunia ini menjadi tempat yang lebih baik untuk dihuni  
Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Hidup saya berdasarkan kepada agama, karena tanpa agama masyarakat akan menjadi tidak berperikemanusiaan  
Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Jika saya tidak religius, artinya saya berkontribusi kepada proses kultural yang akan melemahkan masyarakat  
Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Aktivitas agama saya termotivasi oleh kepercayaan bahwa agama membantu mencegah terjadinya ketidakadilan di dunia ini  
Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Tujuan sebenarnya dari agama saya adalah untuk membuat dunia yang lebih adil  
Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Dasar kepercayaan saya pada agama adalah keyakinan bahwa agama memiliki peran penting dalam perkembangan moral masyarakat  
Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Jika orang-orang tidak religius, maka masyarakat tidak akan bisa bertahan, dan karena inilah saya religious  
Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Ketiadaan agama akan menyebabkan aneka ragam kesulitan dalam masyarakat, dan karena inilah saya religious  
Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Saya adalah orang yang religius karena hilangnya kehidupan religius akan mengakibatkan merosotnya peradaban  
Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

#### **Intrinsic religiosity**

Mohon pilih jawaban yang menunjukkan seberapa kuatnya Anda setuju atau tidak setuju dengan setiap pernyataan di bawah. Mohon untuk menjawab dengan sejujur mungkin menurut hati nurani Anda.

Perasaan tunduk kepada Allah SWT membuat saya merasa lebih vital dan termotivasi  
Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Terkadang, tunduk kepada Allah SWT memberi saya perasaan takut dan sekaligus cinta kepada Allah SWT  
Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Tunduk kepada Allah SWT membuat saya merasakan kemegahan dan sekaligus kerendahan hati  
Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju



Yang membimbing saya dalam menghadapi tantangan hidup secara baik adalah kepasrahan kepada kehendak Allah SWT

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Saya telah mengerti bagaimana semangat saya untuk mendekatkan diri kepada Allah SWT telah membebaskan saya, berbeda dengan keinginan duniawi yang justru memperbudak saya

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Jika saya melihat secara mendalam pada diri saya, saya mengerti bahwa merasakan rasa cinta kepada Allah sesungguhnya setimpal dengan upaya apapun di dalam hidup saya

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Merasakan kehadiran Allah SWT dalam hidup saya adalah bagian yang penting untuk merasakan rasa cinta kepada-Nya

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Bagi saya, inti dari praktik-praktik keagamaan adalah bagaimana mereka membantu saya untuk mencapai hubungan yang dekat dengan Allah SWT

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Merasakan kasih cinta kepada Allah SWT memberi saya perasaan antusiasme yang special

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Kedekatan yang mendalam dengan Allah SWT adalah bagian yang inti dalam usaha saya untuk menjadi orang yang religious

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Tunduk kepada Allah SWT memberi saya pengertian yang penting terhadap ketidakmampuan saya dibandingkan dengan kebesaran-Nya

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Tunduk kepada Allah SWT adalah pengalaman yang indah bagi saya karena saya meraskan keterbatasan saya dibandingkan dengan kebesaran Allah SWT

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Yang memberi saya ketenangan dalam menghadapi tantangan hidup saya adalah kepasrahan kepada kehendak Allah SWT

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Dalam pandangan saya, praktik-praktik keagamaan adalah cara untuk mengarahkan pengabdian saya terhadap kemahaan Allah SWT

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Mengalami rasa tunduk dan kedekatan dengan Allah SWT menambah pengertian saya terhadap-Nya

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

#### **Internal political efficacy**

Mohon pilih jawaban yang menunjukkan seberapa kuatnya Anda setuju atau tidak setuju dengan setiap pernyataan di bawah. Mohon untuk menjawab dengan sejujur mungkin menurut hati nurani Anda.

Saya memandang diri saya sebagai seseorang yang mampu untuk berpartisipasi dalam politik

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Saya merasa diri saya mempunyai pemahaman yang cukup bagus mengenai isu-isu politik yang yang menghadapi Indonesia

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Orang lain sepertinya lebih mudah memahami isu-isu kompleks dibanding dengan saya

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Saya merasa saya sama mempunya dengan orang lain pada umumnya jika bekerja sebagai seorang pejabat

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Saya sering merasa kurang percaya diri ketika membahas isu-isu politik dan pemerintahan dengan orang lain

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Saya rasa pengetahuan saya tentang isu politik dan pemerintahan cukup baik dan sebanding dengan orang lain pada umumnya

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Kadang-kadang isu politik dan pemerintahan tampak sangat rumit hingga orang seperti saya tidak dapat mengerti apa yang sedang terjadi

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

#### **Regime based political efficacy**

Mohon pilih jawaban yang menunjukkan seberapa kuatnya Anda setuju atau tidak setuju dengan setiap pernyataan di bawah. Mohon untuk menjawab dengan sejujur mungkin menurut hati nurani Anda.

Banyak sekali cara yang sah secara hukum bagi masyarakat untuk mempengaruhi apa yang dilakukan oleh pemerintah

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Di negara ini, hanya sekumpulan kecil orang-orang yang memiliki kekuatan politik, sementara yang lainnya seperti kami tidak mempunyai suara atas bagaimana pemerintah bertindak

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Pemilu adalah cara yang efektif bagi masyarakat untuk mempengaruhi tindakan pemerintah

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Dalam sistem pemerintahan kami, masyarakatlah yang memutuskan bagaimana cara menjalankan negara ini, tanpa memperdulikan siapa yang menjadi presiden

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Jika para pejabat memang tidak memperdulikan opini masyarakat, maka tidak ada apa pun yang dapat dilakukan untuk membuat mereka mendengar suara kami

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Orang seperti saya tidak memiliki suara dalam apa yang dilakukan oleh pemerintah

Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

### Support for extremism and violent extremism

Mohon pilih jawaban yang menunjukkan seberapa kuatnya Anda setuju atau tidak setuju dengan setiap pernyataan di bawah. Mohon untuk menjawab dengan sejujur mungkin menurut hati nurani Anda.

Sekte-sekte agama seperti Syi'ah adalah aliran sesat dan pengikutnya berada di dalam jalan yang salah  
Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Tempat ibadah umat Syiah harus ditutup karena tempat-tempat ini membantu menyebarkan ajaran mereka yang sesat  
Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Umat Syi'ah tidak dapat menyalahkan siapa-siapa kecuali diri mereka sendiri jika mereka diserang secara fisik  
Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Pembunuhan pengikut Syi'ah dapat dibenarkan; mereka telah diperingatkan untuk kembali ke jalan yang benar tapi mereka tidak menggubris peringatan tersebut  
Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Pemerintahan Indonesia saat ini tidak sah karena didasarkan hukum manusia dan bukan hukum Allah  
Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju  
Satu-satunya cara untuk mengatasi masalah-masalah yang dihadapi negara Indonesia adalah dengan mengimplementasikan hukum Syariah  
Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Kekerasan dalam upaya untuk melewawan pemerintah Indonesia dapat dibenarkan; ini adalah satu-satunya cara agar hukum Allah dapat diterapkan  
Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

Pembunuhan anggota Polisi dapat dibenarkan; mereka adalah antek pemerintahan yang tidak sah  
Sangat tidak setuju   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   ☐   Sangat setuju

### De-brief

Terima kasih atas partisipasi Anda dalam survei ini. Jawaban dan partisipasi Anda sangatlah penting bagi kami.

Sekedar memberi tahu, studi ini menganalisa apakah berpikir tentang hal-hal yang tidak nyaman bisa merubah bagaimana kita berpikir tentang isu--isu lain yang terkait. Studi ini juga menganalisa dampak dari informasi tambahan terhadap pendapat kita tentang isu-isu tersebut.

Untuk informasi lanjutan tentang survei ini, mohon menghubungi Iqbal di [miqb1@student.monash.edu](mailto:miqb1@student.monash.edu).

Sekali lagi, terima kasih!

