MONASH University

The South African heterotopia: Whiteness and the postcolonial struggle for recognition beyond Apartheid

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Abstract

The focus of this study is on the politics of recognition in post-Apartheid South Africa with specific reference to whiteness and affluence. The study proposes a *white politics of acknowledgment* (*pace* Markell) with the aim to form a philosophical interpretation and critique of the *life-world of suburban whiteness*. The main hypothesis is that *South Africa is a postcolonial heterotopia* due to the continued proliferation of economic apartheid, epitomised by the two worlds of white suburbia and black township. The study charts the way in which the dialectic of colonial times and Apartheid has become a postcolonial heterotopia beyond Apartheid.

The **introduction** situates the study within the wider discourse on recognition. An account of the *failure of mutual recognition* in Hegel is discussed, which sketches the conditions of self-consciousness in this failure. This account gives a phenomenological explanation regarding the cognitive roots of racism and violence. I sketch a model regarding *Hegel's theory of consciousness* to help with an understanding of how self-recognition, misrecognition and mutual recognition (which Hegel also provides) are linked to different forms of consciousness.

Chapter one looks at Fanon's reinterpretation of Hegel's master-slave dialectic within the colonial context: The dialectic is re-inscribed along *racial* lines with a *white* master (colonist) and *black* slave (native). Recognition for the black slave is only possible through violence and not dialogue as their humanity is rendered *invisible* because the measure for humanity is whiteness. The result of the racial dialectic is the insulation and accompanying *invisibility of whiteness* (i.e. apartheid), which leads white and black to live in two vastly different realities within the same place.

Chapter two concerns the gaping economic divide between the 'rich white' and the 'black poor'. The claim is made that *heterotopia is characteristic of post-Apartheid South Africa*, reinterpreting and expanding Foucault's concept with a *broader, postcolonial concept* that refers to the *racialization of place and space*. A case study of white suburbia through a series of phenomenological descriptions shows how heterotopia brings across the idea of the radically different, and ethically precarious, co-existing realities of white and black.

Chapter three shows how the economic advancement of whites despite their declining political power becomes clear in the case of so-called *rugbymentality*. Many (but not all) Afrikaners find compensation for their loss of political power and a sense of empowerment in rugby. *Rugby is a heterotopia for Afrikaners*, a way of either insulating themselves from the realities of post-Apartheid South Africa, or an attempt to be recognised by others through excellence in the sport.

Chapter four argues that there is a gradual shift in society from race to class, hence the invisibility of whiteness flows into an *invisibility of richness* (affluence). New money is shifting the dynamic of power relations from race to class, leading to the *invisibility of the poor* as a form of misrecognition. The structures that privileged whites during Apartheid, are now in the process of becoming structures that privilege the rich, both white and black. This situation should not lead whites to be silent in public discourse (*contra* Vice) but should rather motivate an *attitude of care* in their social engagements.

The **conclusion** returns to the question of *mutual recognition* and how it is problematised by the persistence of a *colonial mentality* that undergirds *economic apartheid*. This underlines the centrality of economic recognition as the dominant form of recognition post-Apartheid. This problematic is highlighted through a Fanonian reading of Honneth's influential theory of mutual recognition that imagines a *postcolonial theory of recognition*. This theory shows how mutual recognition is problematised within South Africa by various Fanonian forms of violence (physical, structural and psychological) and by the lack of Honneth's preconditions concerning universal access to cultural education and economic security.

Declaration

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at any university or equivalent institution and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

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
Print Name: Charles Mathurin Villet

Date: 31 August 2018

Thesis including published works declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at any university or equivalent institution and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

This thesis includes *four* original articles published in peer reviewed journals. The core theme of the thesis is *white identity and the struggle for recognition in post-Apartheid South Africa*. The ideas, development and writing up of all the papers in the thesis were the principal responsibility of myself, the student, working within the School of Social Sciences under the supervision of *Prof Anna-Mart van Wyk and Dr Paul Muldoon*.

In the case of *chapters one, two, three and four*, my contribution to the work involved the following:

Thesis Chapter	Publication Title	Status *(published, in press, accepted or returned for revision, submitted)*	Nature and % of student contribution
1	Hegel and Fanon on the Question of Mutual Recognition: A Comparative Analysis	Published	100%. Concept and writing
2	South Africa as Postcolonial Heterotopia: The Racialized Experience of Place and Space	Published	100%. Concept and writing
3	Loftus as Afrikaner Heterotopia: The Life World of Rugbymentality	Published	100%. Concept and writing
4	The Invisibility of Richness: A Critique of Vice's 'Strange Place'	Published	100%. Concept and writing

I have not renumbered sections of submitted or published papers in order to generate a consistent presentation within the thesis.

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
Date: 31 August 2018

The undersigned hereby certify that the above declaration correctly reflects the nature and extent of the student's contributions to this work.

Main Supervisor signature: ███████   **Date:** 26 September 2018

Acknowledgements

Table of Contents

This is a thesis by publication that includes four published journal articles, thus four chapters that are framed by an introduction (minimum 15 000 words) and conclusion (minimum 10 000 words):

- The journal information for each chapter is indicated here after the title of the chapter.

- Chapters one to four include two sets of page numbers: The page numbers that appear in the journal articles are included following the requirement of the Faculty of Arts to submit articles in their published format without any alterations. The second page number indicates the continuous number for the full thesis document. The page numbers here are for the full document.

- The introduction and conclusion do not include second page numbers. The same applies to the consolidated bibliography.

- Chapters one and three do not include section numbers in their published format but they are numbered here for ease of use.

Publication: Villet C. 2011. "Hegel and Fanon on the Question of Mutual Recognition: A Comparative Analysis," *Journal of Pan-African Studies*, 4 (7): 39-51 (ISSN-1: 1942-6569).

Abstract

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References

Publication: Villet, C. 2018. "South Africa as postcolonial heterotopia: The racialised experience of place and space", *Foucault Studies*, 24: 12-33 (ISSN-1: 1832-5203).

Abstract

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Publication: Villet, C. 2012. "Loftus as Afrikaner heterotopia: The life world of rugbymentality", *Image and Text: A Journal for Design*, 19 (Special Issue: Vryheidspark and other governmonumentalities): 64-79 (ISSN-1: 1020-1497).

Abstract

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3. Rugbymentality and the heterotopia of Loftus
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5. The symbolic meanings of Loftus
6. Loftus as space of exotic tradition
7. Loftus as museum and monument
8. Concluding remarks: Loftus as mirror

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References

Publication: Villet, C. 2012. "The invisibility of richness: A critique of Vice's 'strange place'", South African Journal of Philosophy, 31 (4): 703-716 (ISSN-1: 0258-0136).

Abstract

Introduction (not numbered in the article)

1. South Africa as strange place

    1.1   The invisibility of whiteness in this strange place

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    2.2   Why whites should have a political voice

    2.3   The way forward for whites

References

Introduction and Framing of Publications
The South African heterotopia: Whiteness beyond Apartheid

This study will look at the politics of recognition regarding the socio-economic situation beyond Apartheid in South Africa, specifically on the power relations centred around whiteness and affluence. The aim is to form a philosophical interpretation and critique of the *life-world of suburban whiteness*. The main hypothesis is that *South Africa is a postcolonial heterotopia* due to the continued proliferation of economic apartheid, epitomised by the two worlds of white suburbia and black township. *De jure* Apartheid might have come to an end but *de facto* apartheid endures: The former political masters have successfully pursued economic affluence as compensation for their political marginalisation. This has established the continued economic privilege of whiteness whilst blackness in general is *misrecognised* as being synonymous with poverty and crime. There is a gradual shift in society from race to class as the main factor in recognition but significant in this development is that affluence seems to be an extension of whitely ways of being. The general outcome of this study will be a rough sketch of contemporary forms of whiteness: Deliberate and casual racism, economic affluence, suburban victimhood, sporting excellence and reconciliation.

The goal is to come to an understanding of the main form that white identity has taken in post-Apartheid South Africa, namely that of economic affluence. This identity goes hand in hand with the end of institutionalised Apartheid, but the continuation of forms of economic apartheid that cuts across race and class. The thesis will work on two levels: Firstly, it will theoretically look at the problem of misrecognition as it figures within the wider discourse on recognition, specifically in the work of Hegel, but also in the works of Fanon and Axel Honneth as it relates to the issue of mutual recognition. The problem of misrecognition (and alienated self-consciousness) is the wider framework within which the situation in South Africa, as the second level of study, will be sketched in a number of investigations regarding whiteness beyond Apartheid. This second level of study will incorporate and combine the ideas of the Hegelian dialectic and the Foucauldian heterotopia (this combination with its tensions and differences is discussed in section five).

The general overarching thread running through this thesis will be as follows: Hegel introduces the struggle for recognition with the master-slave dialectic, which is an account of misrecognition, i.e. the failure of mutual recognition. Fanon's work highlights how the dialectic

during colonialism took place in racial terms with a white master and black slave. The dialectic was clearly the relation that persisted in South Africa before and during Apartheid. The focus of this study is on the persistence of the dialectic beyond Apartheid, with the focus on the former masters of Apartheid. The situation of whites has changed, but they still wield a certain form of mastery, especially in the economic sphere, although their political power has diminished. This means that *institutional* Apartheid (with a capital A) has ended, but in a way apartheid *as a segregated structuring of society* has not. For this reason, I assert that the dialectic has taken on the form of a postcolonial (Foucauldian) heterotopia because power relations have become more complicated and messy within the postcolonial context of post-Apartheid South Africa. The dialectic concerns two worlds: that of master and slave, existing side by side. The heterotopia, on the other hand, concerns the simultaneous presence of utopia and dystopia in the same place. The two segregated worlds of white and black has given way to the clash in everyday life of these worlds that happens in the form of the racialized experience of place and space. In short, the First and Third Worlds collide in the postcolonial heterotopia in the same place and people's experience depends on their situatedness in terms of class and race. This heterotopia maps onto Foucault's idea but twists and extends the different principles of the heterotopia, especially as it concerns the aspects of crisis and deviance as well as normal and abnormal, which he considered to be mutually exclusive. The postcolonial heterotopia contains these aspects of Foucault's heterotopia but also combines and contorts them in surprising ways (this will also be elaborated in section five).

The situation of whites in post-Apartheid South Africa has taken on a peculiar dynamic in that they are still economic masters but, in a sense, political slaves. They thus have an identity of a kind of dual master-slave, so to speak, with the emphasis on the economic sphere where they are still masters. The dialectic relation that takes on the form of the heterotopia thus has to do with the way in which contradictions take hold and exist side by side. The contradiction in this respect is that someone can be a master and a slave at the same time; a contradiction that profoundly influences the white (racial) experience of post-Apartheid South Africa.

Before I begin this introduction in earnest, first a word of explanation regarding the combination of thinkers in this thesis, namely Hegel, Foucault, Fanon and Honneth. This combination is one that might seem like a strange fit in a certain sense, but I will show how they together provide the tools for a better understanding of the post-Apartheid situation. The significance of Hegel for this project is his master-slave relation as starting point, which we find in the early stages of the line

(or pathway) of the dialectic. The dialectic for Hegel is a progressive movement towards the crucial process (but also moment) of *Aufhebung* (English: sublation), which involves the development and attainment of a higher viewpoint where there is a merger or reconciliation between oppositions. *Aufhebung* as it relates to the master-slave relation concerns the achievement of mutual recognition, which Hegel does not fully develop in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Honneth identifies the tools in Hegel's earlier works (in his Jena-lectures and specifically the *Philosophy of Spirit*) for mutual recognition (and thus *Aufhebung*), and develops the conditions that Hegel implicitly identifies for the structures of mutual recognition. Honneth in a way revises the failure of mutual recognition in Hegel (as found in the *Phenomenology*) in asserting that the conditions for mutual recognition can be found in his earlier works. Fanon, like Honneth, also strives for *Aufhebung* in his work and dialectic of experience (as identified by Sekyi-Out, 1996). He considers Hegel's master-slave dialectic in light of colonialism, and his work also proves to have interesting overlaps with Honneth's theory as it concerns the structures of mutual recognition and misrecognition (in other words violence). These links between Hegel, Fanon and Honneth are explored in the introduction, chapter one and the conclusion.

The chapters in-between are concerned with the contextualisation of these issues as it relates to post-Apartheid South Africa, with the focus on white identity. This is done because I share Amy Allen's concern that Honneth's normative critical theory framed by the notion of historical progress is problematic, as it concerns the postcolonial. She asserts that this notion, even in a modest form, "stands in the way of an openness to postcolonial difference and an inclusiveness of postcolonial others" (Allen, 2016: 121). She argues that critical theory will be better framed by "a thoroughgoing metanormative contextualism" and a "critical genealogical problematization" (ibid.) that can be found in the work (and critical theory) of Foucault (and Adorno). I follow Allen's example in turning to Foucault (in chapters two and three) to provide some context to the questions that I'm asking on recognition within South Africa in a critical and genealogical analysis of white identity (that extends to chapter four). This contextualisation is taken further in the conclusion with a Fanonian reading of Honneth in order to see what we can then gain in a normative sense from Honneth's theory of mutual recognition from within the postcolonial. My project thus begins and ends within the Hegelian paradigm but makes use of other sources of critical theory (Fanon and Foucault) to bring the study full circle and demonstrate how the dialectic is becoming a postcolonial heterotopia.

This introduction will set the stage then for this thesis regarding the development of the dialectic into a postcolonial heterotopia. Section one will set out the rationale for this study. Section two will outline the research questions that guide the study. Section three will give a brief synopsis (roadmap) for each chapter (including the introduction and conclusion, both lengthy chapters as required to frame and theoretically root this thesis by publication). Section four will show how the study is theoretically framed on one level by the discourse on recognition, a debate that has become prominent since the late 20th-century. Section five will look at the second level of the theoretical framework in terms of the key concepts of dialectic and heterotopia, providing an argument for why and how these two concepts can be combined and indeed that they need to be combined for this study to gain an understanding of white identity and recognition in post-Apartheid South Africa. Section six will state the position and vantage point of this study, namely a politics of acknowledgement. This will clarify why whiteness and the self is at issue in this study since the focus of the politics of recognition is usually on the other. Section seven will give a lengthy account at the theoretical background for Hegel's account of the failure of mutual recognition.

1.   Framing of publications

This is a thesis by publication and as such, the requirement is that both the introduction (with a minimum of 15 000 words) and conclusion (with a minimum of 10 000 words) frame the publications in locating the argument that runs throughout as well as to highlight the different shared themes found in the publications. This section will therefore focus on doing this from the onset, although the whole introduction sets out to frame the four publications within the study.

The nature of the Fanonian colonial dialectic as a reworking of Hegel's dialectic and the phenomenon of mutual recognition is explored in chapter one. This will be prefigured by a fairly lengthy discussion of Hegel's notions of self-consciousness and recognition in the introduction in order to frame the place of recognition within Hegel's work. The argument is that this dialectic becomes a postcolonial heterotopia. Chapters two and three ('SA' and 'Loftus' as heterotopia) look in-depth at the heterotopia, and these two chapters together with chapter four (on the invisibility of whiteness/richness) adopt a focus on the socio-economic situation of whites. These chapters develop two important parts of the thesis thread that had a more specific focus than just that of the dialectic discussed in the first chapter.

The first part puts the spotlight on whites and how their identity has developed in post-Apartheid South Africa, with an eye on figuring out how they should relate to those who were formerly oppressed during Apartheid. This is a three step process that looks at suburban whiteness and how it still represents various forms of objectifying the black other in the so-called laager of suburbia (chapter two); then how this laager is not the only way to respond to the realities of South Africa beyond Apartheid, as reconciliation is also an option (chapter three); and finally that a recognition is necessary of the double invisibility of whiteness and affluence that whites enjoy, which also then requires a careful engagement with those who do not enjoy these privileges (chapter four).

The second part demonstrates how significant economic recognition has become in post-Apartheid South Africa and how this recognition includes most whites but has also been extended to anyone who is economically affluent. This relates to the way in which suburban whiteness is an identity anchored in economic advancement, but also in the way that the rising black middle class has taken on some (but not all) of the privileges that whites enjoy due to their situation of economic well-being. The final chapter is at pains to demonstrate that the issue of privilege and invisibility (regarding one's own situation of affluence) is not limited to whites only although it is of relevance to most whites because of their systemic and generational affluence.

These two threads will be developed to illustrate the dynamic of misrecognition in post-Apartheid South Africa but also to highlight three problems that beset struggles for recognition and the ideal of mutual recognition. The first problem is an unbalanced approach to considering the matter of recognition only from the standpoint of the other, i.e. those who are being misrecognised and searching for the proper recognition. Markell (2003: 5-7) and Presbey (2003: 539) highlight this problem and the importance of also putting the spotlight on the self and the various ways in which the self is complicit in the misrecognition of others. There should therefore be some sort of acknowledgement of the situation and circumstances of the self (*pace* Markell) as an important precondition for the possibility of mutual recognition. This complicity can take various forms but the idea of whiteness as heterotopia and the heterotopian experience of South Africa by whites (explored in chapters two and three) provides one way of exploring this acknowledgement on a deep phenomenological level.

The second problem regarding struggles for recognition is the continued presence and mutation of different forms of violence within post-Apartheid South Africa. The utopian idea of the

Rainbow Nation that dominated the birth of democracy in South Africa led to perceptions that the violence that characterised Apartheid should come to an end. Old and new forms of violence persist in the country: High levels of crime, racism, xenophobia, relationships of service/servitude and domination, an increasingly authoritarian state through securitisation and gangsterism, police militarisation, protest movements as well as the graphic language of violence in public discourse. Violence is a clear and definite obstacle to mutual recognition and cognisance needs to be taken of the way in which it impacts struggles for recognition, although it must be added that violence in itself is also an instance of the struggle for recognition by those who are misrecognised and/or oppressed.

The third problem that besets struggles for recognition beyond Apartheid is that of economic redistribution. The gulf between rich and poor in South Africa has widened to such an extent that it has now been regarded as the most unequal society in the world for nearly a decade. The black middle class has grown considerably but the main problem is that the majority of blacks still live in some form of poverty. This is a definite consequence of the Apartheid system that actively oppressed blacks in various sectors of society, but at the same it must be said that the current government has not done enough to alleviate poverty in the country. In following the neo-liberal economic model after the compromise between the last Apartheid government and the African National Congress (ANC), the focus has been on the growth of the middle class and on transferring various institutions to that middle class. Continued protests by the poor in violent altercations with the state have demonstrated that economic redistribution must be factored in when we look at struggles for recognition.

The problematic that is sketched here is distinctly Fanonian and it speaks to the problems that he anticipated and already witnessed early on in the postcolony. Fanon makes a point of this when he speaks about what happens in the postcolony. He asserts that decolonisation in many cases simply comes down to "the transfer into native hands of those unfair advantages which are the legacy of the colonial period" (1967: 122). This thesis will be at pains to demonstrate how these unfair advantages in the South African context becomes a complex equation. The country's colonizers did not return to Europe but remained and became settlers (much like the case in the US and Australia). This is quite a singular situation on the African continent, where other colonists left during the period of decolonisation that took place in the two decades after the Second World War. The manner in which they established themselves and resisted decolonisation was through the system of Apartheid and the unfair advantages that it afforded whites. The

transition of power in 1994 saw this system and its unfair advantages becoming the domain of the new post-Apartheid government. There are many spaces in society that have been desegregated but other spaces have remained racialized. The economic sphere might arguably have become the most racialised of all. This is a sphere that is highly contested by whites because this is where their power is concentrated. Their say in the political institutions is negligible but they still have considerable economic power, in part because of the generational privileges afforded by Apartheid and entrenched by the 1994 compromise.

At the same time, the old Apartheid system was opened up in an economic sense (but also otherwise) to include those who were not previously included or advantaged by the system. This led to a situation in which the invisibility of whiteness has developed into the so-called invisibility of richness (affluence), where the privileges afforded by the system are extended to those who have the economic means. This has led to a situation where affluence becomes a kind of extension of whiteness and provides access to the old system for blacks in new forms. Fanon's famous description of the colonial situation with regards to affluence was that "you are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich" (1967: 31) and this description still holds true in South Africa. In the first sense, whites are still rich because of their whiteness and the privileges it affords them through generational networks.

There is a second sense in which the dynamic has changed beyond Apartheid, in a way in that can be summed up as follows: You are white because you are rich even if you are not white. So it is a case of being white *enough* because you are rich. This provides blacks with the license to enter white spaces under the condition that they have the economic means to do so. This then is a way in which the economic sphere is racialised but at the same time, access to economic privilege is closely linked to governmental and institutional links and affiliations (which have been transferred to the ANC). In this way, government and institutions further racialise the economic sphere through legislation and policies such as affirmative action and black economic empowerment (BEE) in order to extend the system's economic privileges. This situation has seen the rapid growth of the black middle class but also acutely racialised the economic sphere to such an extent that forms of reverse discrimination can be identified. The dilemma here is how to right the injustices of the past against a black majority, whilst not allowing resentment to foment against the white (but affluent) minority.

This situation, as one could imagine, is rife with the possibility of various forms of economic and institutional violence. This is the situation of the postcolony, although I want to add that it would be better for us to talk about the postcolonial as a global phenomenon instead of something that is limited only to certain geographic locations. In other words, we live in a postcolonial world where the questions and problems of postcoloniality do not only impact the former colonies in the so-called Global South, but also those countries that spearheaded colonialism. Trumpism and Brexit has shown how these questions and issues have taken root in the US and Europe in the showdown between postcolonial cosmopolitanism and neo-colonial traditionalism. This is why certain issues highlighted in this thesis also speaks to other contexts and situations, although its findings are specific to that of the South African context.

The development of a postcolonial theory of recognition incorporating Honneth and Fanon will be the end goal of this study. A philosophical understanding of Hegel's master-slave dialectic is necessary to conceptualise such a theory and the form that the dialectic has taken in post-Apartheid South Africa, i.e. a postcolonial heterotopia. The thesis will thus begin with Hegel and then return to Hegelian thought in the final part of this thesis. This is necessary because the dialectic as heterotopia in post-Apartheid South Africa poses serious problems regarding the question of mutual recognition. Hegel's account of recognition in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (which also appears in the *Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Mind*) shows how mutual recognition fails in the master-slave dialectic, but Fanon provides some ideas on how to address the failure (this is discussed at the end of chapter one). It is exactly this failure that Honneth addresses with his model of mutual recognition based on Hegel's earlier Jena writings on recognition.

2.   Research questions: A guide to this study

This study will be both descriptive and normative: Descriptive in the sense that is an analysis of the dialectic and postcolonial heterotopia in South Africa in order to come to a philosophical understanding of whiteness in post-Apartheid South Africa. The study is normative in the sense that it provides some recommendations towards the end of the study regarding the attitude with which whites should approach the victims of past and current discrimination due to the societal structures formed by Apartheid (in chapters four and the conclusion). The postcolonial theory of recognition provided in the conclusion, although descriptive in its analysis, will also have a normative application if taken further in future studies (especially with regards to the addition of an economic component of recognition). This study will further reinterpret Hegel (via Fanon),

Foucault and Honneth (again via Fanon) from within the postcolonial context. Foucault and Honneth's work will especially be challenged against the background of post-Apartheid South Africa (much in the way that Fanon did with Hegel's work).

As this is a thesis by publication, the framing of the publications within the overall project is crucial. The research questions serve a key function in terms of connecting the chapters, holding the overall thread of the argument together as well as providing consistency and coherence to the project.

The research questions guiding this study will be as follows, with an overarching question that will be relevant throughout, and then a specific question guiding each of the chapters:

- *Overarching question:* What is the place and role of whiteness in the general politics of recognition within post-Apartheid South Africa?
- *Introduction:* What takes place in self-consciousness that leads to misrecognition and hence racism?
- *Chapter 1:* How does misrecognition lead to violence within the colonial dialectic, and what are the conditions for mutual recognition in light of this situation?
- *Chapter 2:* What is the nature of the dialectic in post-Apartheid South Africa as it relates to white identity?
- *Chapter 3:* How has the South African heterotopia impacted Afrikaner identity?
- *Chapter 4:* How should whites respond to the realities of South Africa and their situation beyond Apartheid?
- *Conclusion:* How is mutual recognition problematised in post-Apartheid South Africa?

The spadework for the theoretical framework of this thesis will be done in the introduction. This flows into the first chapter where the relation between master and slave will be discussed as it transitions from the work of Hegel to that of Fanon within the colonial context. The scene will then be theoretically set for the rest of the study (chapters two to four), where the dialectic's development and transition into the postcolonial heterotopia will be the main thread. The end point of the thesis will be the conceptualisation of a post-Apartheid (and postcolonial) theory of recognition, and each of the chapters work towards that goal in wrestling with the problematic of the dialectic and postcolonial heterotopia where economic recognition has become the form of social domination.

3.   Roadmap to the study

The roadmap for the study and synopsis for each of the chapters will be as follows:

Introduction: An overview of the discourse on recognition will be provided and then an explanation of why the focus of this study is on whiteness and the self. This will be followed by an account of the failure of mutual recognition in Hegel. This account sketches the conditions of self-consciousness in this failure, i.e. alienated self-consciousness. A phenomenological understanding is necessary of how and why this failure of mutual recognition takes place, because this account also gives a phenomenological explanation regarding the cognitive roots of racism and violence. At the end of this chapter, I will sketch a model regarding Hegel's theory of consciousness. The hope is that this model could help with an understanding of how self-recognition, misrecognition and mutual recognition is linked to different forms of consciousness.

Chapter one: Frantz Fanon's reinterpretation of Hegel's master-slave dialectic within the colonial context will be analysed: The insight is the dialectic being re-inscribed along *racial* lines with a *white* master (colonist) and *black* slave (native). Recognition for the black slave is only possible through violence and not dialogue as their humanity is rendered *invisible* because the measure for humanity is whiteness, which itself is rendered *invisible* to whites due to the privileges it affords them. This relation of oppression is characterised by Fanon's description of black identity as being determined from the outside by society's white standard. White privilege is the luxury to determine your identity from within, an existential fact invisible to yourself but not to others. The result of the racial dialectic is the insulation and accompanying *invisibility of whiteness* (i.e. apartheid), which leads white and black to live in two vastly different realities within the same place.

Chapter two: The gaping economic divide between rich white and the black poor in contemporary South Africa leads them to have a fundamentally different experience of place and space to such an extent that one could say that they are living in two different countries. The Foucauldian concept of heterotopia brings across the idea of radically different, and ethically precarious, co-existing realities. The claim is made that *heterotopia is characteristic of post-Apartheid South Africa*, i.e. where heterotopia is usually the exception in society, instead it is the norm in South Africa. This claim reinterprets and expands Foucault's concept with a *broader,*

postcolonial concept: Heterotopia here refers to the *racialization of place and space*, and hence to otherness and difference as a primary characteristic of heterotopia.

The ubiquity of heterotopia post-Apartheid is evident in the life-worlds of white suburbia and the black township. A case study is undertaken of white suburbia through a series of phenomenological descriptions in contemporary South Africa with heterotopia as heuristic tool. This demonstrates how Foucault's notion of the heterotopia is relevant but also too narrow when related to the postcolonial context. An *expanded* notion of the term as denoting a *racialized experience of space and place* is necessary in coming to terms with the strangeness of post-Apartheid South Africa, where contradiction and otherness is the norm rather than the exception. The postcolonial heterotopia can be seen to function as a contemporary South African continuation of the Fanonian dialectic between master and slave, namely the "messy dialectic" between white and black.

Chapter three: The economic advancement of whites despite their declining political power becomes clear in the case of so-called *rugbymentality* (my term). Many (but not all) Afrikaners find compensation for their loss of political power and a sense of empowerment in rugby, a sport and commercial phenomenon with a local public face that is a mixture of Afrikaans tradition, South African nationalism and Americanised consumer culture. *Rugby is a heterotopia for Afrikaners* (personified by the metaphor of Loftus, the rugby stadium in Pretoria), a way of either insulating themselves from the realities of post-Apartheid South Africa, or an attempt to be recognised by others through excellence in the sport. Their obsession with rugby follows from the political regression of Africa's last white tribe and the Springbok is a national symbol that they consider to be their own.

Chapter four: The invisibility of whiteness has seen some significant developments in light of the growth of the black middle class and hence flows into an *invisibility of richness* (affluence), which extends beyond mere whiteness. New money is shifting the dynamic of power relations from race to class, leading to the *invisibility of the poor* as a form of misrecognition. The structures that privileged whites during Apartheid are in the process of becoming structures that privilege the rich, both white and black. Whiteness and affluence are thus two sides of the same coin. This implies though that most whites are still privileged because they are rich whilst the poor are mostly black and a majority of blacks still live in poverty. This also then calls not for

silence (as Samantha Vice recommends) but rather engaged humility from whites in order for them to acknowledge the generational and structural privilege of white affluence.

Conclusion: The culmination of the thesis returns to the question of mutual recognition, which theoretically frames the study of the dialectic becoming postcolonial heterotopia. This chapter will firstly frame the publications and bring together the general thread regarding the economic problematic that runs through each of them. This problematic shows that the economic preconditions for mutual recognition are greatly problematised in post-Apartheid South Africa through the continuation of economic apartheid. There is a persistence of a so-called colonial mentality that continues in an economic form post-Apartheid. This colonial mentality, which is alluded to in each chapter of this thesis, concerns isolated white domains and whitely ways of being that concerns not only whites but also anyone that lives in affluence. In short, it underlines the problematic centrality of economic recognition as the most dominant form of recognition post-Apartheid. This problematic will then be highlighted through a discussion of Axel Honneth's influential theory of mutual recognition in light of the persistence of violence and economic misrecognition beyond Apartheid. This will be done through a Fanonian reading of Honneth's theory in order to imagine a *postcolonial theory of recognition* that helps with an understanding of how mutual recognition is problematised within South Africa beyond Apartheid.

4.   Theoretical framework (first level of study): The discourse on recognition

The discourse on recognition has become prominent towards the end of the twentieth century, although its roots can be found during the Enlightenment in the works of Rousseau, Herder and Kant (Taylor, 1994: 29-30, 44). Although these thinkers are considered as the earliest proponents of recognition, the most famous treatment of the theme is found in Hegel's work. Many prominent thinkers have responded to Hegel's work, among them Nietzsche, Sartre, Levinas and Fanon. In our present time, one finds the discourse on recognition extended in the works of Charles Taylor (1994), Paul Ricoeur (2003) and most prominently in the work of Axel Honneth (1995). Any contemporary project looking at the discourse of recognition must take notice of Hegel's work, in which one finds the influential master-slave relation, as well as engaging with the analysis of the discourse provided by especially Taylor and Honneth (but also Markel). This study will begin with a critical discussion of sections of Hegel's work on self-consciousness, the backbone of his work on intersubjectivity and recognition, and situate itself in terms of Taylor's

"politics of recognition". However, a discussion of Hegel is simply the entry point to this study and its specific focus, which will deal with recognition within the postcolonial context. Therefore, various thinkers will further feature in the study, namely Fanon, Foucault and also Markell (in the introduction and conclusion).

Hegel's discussion of recognition is centred around his take on consciousness and cast into the well-known master-slave dialectic found in his work *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807). This master-slave dialectic is one of Hegel's most profound ideas and it underscores his primary attempt at conceptualizing and describing the process of recognition on the way to mutual recognition. In short, *proper* recognition is the *mutual* recognition of one conscious agent and a second conscious agent. The result of mutual recognition is mutual freedom, i.e. both self and other has the freedom to develop and attain meaningful self-consciousness. Hegel's fable of the relation between master and slave describes and explains a specific form of human relationships in which the domination of the other by the self is a central feature. The fable is used as a means to describe the struggle for recognition in the midst of an antagonistic situation, arising from the desire for domination over the other. Hegel provides a good beginning for an enquiry into mutual recognition when one takes into account the master-slave dialectic.

For Hegel, human relations always take place in a dialectic fashion, i.e. between two opposites that are dependent on each other for the meaning of both. In other words, opposites are required for the processes of the realization, preservation and fulfilment of persons to come about. In the case of human relations, the two opposites are self and other. For reasons of clarity and simplicity, the meanings I attach to the Hegelian self and other are as follows: *self* refers to the embodied self. This includes consciousness of self, which only I have exclusive access to. O*ther* refers to the embodied other. However, I have mediated access, instead of full access, to her consciousness of self. According to Hegel, there exists a struggle between self and other with the aim of affirming one's own self-consciousness. The consciousness of self is affirmed through recognition by an-other (1977: 178), i.e. one of the opposites finds itself fulfilled. This struggle resembles a fight for life and death (1977: 187). However, life and death here is used in a metaphorical sense, for the self "requires that the 'other' should remain alive. A corpse cannot provide 'recognition'" (Young, 2003: 64).

I take this self-other duality to be extrapolated from the individual to the level of group and class in the way that Hegel does, since this project very much concerns this move as it relates to white

identity and whiteness (in its relation to blackness). This duality in this sense involves an economic exchange, i.e. each side must somehow surrender something in order for the other to gain, but there is more at work here. As will be seen in this project, what is further involved is also an exchange in which identity and the life-world that comprises identity is problematised. This means that what is at issue is an economy of the self which is not left unchanged. This self-other duality is what Hegel has in mind when he looks at the master-slave dialectic.

Hegel makes use of the relation between master and slave to discuss one instance of intersubjectivity and how it relates to recognition. For Hegel, the terms of master and slave are more appropriate when self-consciousness is at issue. The master and slave is not a substitute in terms of life and death. It is rather the role of especially death in the struggle between master and slave that explains Hegel's use of the image of the master and slave. The master represents the victor in the struggle, namely the self. She stands in opposition to the slave because of the slave's fear of death represented by the threatening posture of the master (1977: 194). The master is the victor because she has come to be the subject of meaning, and therefore she is able to affix her own meaning. The result of this is a realization of self, constituting the master as a being-for-self (1977: 187, 190). The slave as the loser (namely the other) is the object of meaning, and therefore she is not able to affix her own meaning. Rather, she is dependent on the master for her meaning. Her meaning is determined and constructed by an-other, and therefore she is a being-for other. The realization of the master comes at the cost of the slave's sublation, i.e. she is consumed by the master and her meaning is derivative of the master's meaning.

What is the outcome of the master-slave relation? According to Hegel, there exists two possibilities: either mediation or conflict-ridden perpetuation. Hegel, according to Williams (1997: 55-56), provides two outcomes to the master-slave dialectic: on the one hand, one can move towards a synthesis of master and slave by means of the intermediacy of reason with the goal of attaining reciprocal, mutual recognition. In this respect, reason refers to dialogue aimed at finding a point of mediation with the other. Thus, reason provides an alternative to violence for both slave and master. On the other hand, one can simply perpetuate the dialectic by entering into conflict, which could turn violent (although various forms of violence can take place, not just actual physical violence). In the latter instance the struggle for life and death repeats itself, always with the result of constituting a master and a slave. As a consequence, there exists a tension within Hegel's dialectic between the possibilities of reciprocity (as it is gained through the intermediacy of reason) and the exclusion / rejection of the other by the self. Conflict as

opposition to the other, renders the other invisible. In the light of this, Williams (1997: 60) asserts that "master and slave represent a *deficient* realization of the process of recognition." This deficiency is straightforward and will become self-evident in a discussion of the master-slave relation (as will be seen in chapter one).

Fanon takes up Hegel's account of recognition and provides a deep and penetrating analysis of its manifestation within the colonial context in the processes of colonization and decolonization. Fanon appropriates the master-slave dialectic, but he does make a number of adjustments as Hegel's analysis is inadequate for a proper understanding of the colonial context. He reinterprets the struggle for recognition within the colonial context in terms of race, namely the relationship between white settler and black man, i.e. master and slave. Fanon brings to light the deficiencies of this model as an account of recognition, revealing it to be inadequate if one takes into account the intricacies found within the colonial context. These intricacies include the phenomena of racism and colonialism, both of which are also self-evidently deficient as a model for human relations. Fanon identifies violence as a key feature in relationships within the colonial context. In light of this, Fanon provides a general model with which to understand the phenomena of colonisation and decolonisation. Fanon's analysis adds an extra dimension to that of Hegel's recognition. For Hegel, conflict and the attempt to overthrow the power of the master is not always accompanied by unusual levels of violence. For Fanon, the overthrow of an oppressive form of rule in the colonies is always accompanied by various levels of violence. Fanon's story, of course, is not told in the form of a fable. He described his version of a concrete reality in the European colonies, although a good dose of rhetoric was added in certain respects. The explicit link between Hegel and Fanon is found in the penultimate chapter of Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952), but the image of the master and the slave permeates his work.

A constant theme in Fanon's work is the role of violence in the colonial and postcolonial contexts. Violence seems to be an inescapable and unavoidable feature of the postcolonial reality. For Fanon, violence has a double function because it can be a tool of subjection (that is to oppress or dominate) or as a tool of liberation (to free people from oppression). Violence as a tool of liberation could work in various ways but in its most extreme form, it could be a way of cleaning the slate clean, so to speak, which purifies society of the damaging effects of colonialism. The bleak impasse presented by violence is the reason behind the view on Fanon as a thinker of suspicion and conflict. This he is indeed, and there is no denying the strong and direct message he conveys in terms of the violence that transpired in the colonial context. However, in my opinion,

he is not simply a prophet or advocate of violence but someone who provided a descriptive account of what was transpiring in the colonial context within which he found himself. Fanon rather provides us with what I would call the Fanonian wager: If mutual recognition in a decolonising society is possible only through violence because a colonised society requires the cleansing function of violence, how is it possible to bring about mutual recognition non-violently? This is a tough question, and one that is also the problematic that one finds in post-Apartheid South Africa. This study is not at pains to answer the wager, but rather in fleshing out the problematic as it stands in South Africa.

Some of Fanon's forecasts in terms of decolonization did not realize, but many did and therefore he remains pertinent. In terms of the South African context, Fanon's words speaks to us most urgently. The aftermath of colonization is a messy and uncompromising process in which human lives are lost or seriously damaged. Violence still plagues great parts of Africa, be it in the guise of war, terrorism or crime. It is because of the context in which we find ourselves that, apart from the realism of Fanon's work, one should mine his work for some hope amidst the pessimism. There are a number of positive and empowering values that emerge from his work. Pithouse (2001 and 2003) argues that these values could be the basis for a new (and positive) postcolonial conception of humanism in the light of colonialism. Gibson (2003: 177) identifies a unique brand of humanism implicit in the works of Fanon. Central within this humanism is the notion of reciprocal recognition (ibid.: 180), which serves as a way to overcome the master-slave relation. This humanism also provides a positive description of humanity and what it is to be human. Therefore, an optimistic moment seems to possibly lurk within Fanon's sober and unnerving reading of Hegel's master and slave as it manifests in the colonial context. This optimistic moment will be discussed in chapter one, and revisited in the conclusion to this study.

4.1   The demand / need for recognition

The need for recognition, as mentioned above, increases in the light of widespread violence within a society. Taylor (1994: 25-26) refers to the need (or demand) for recognition as a vital human need. The reason for this is that recognition is inextricably linked to the modern-day notion of identity. This link underpins the necessity of recognition and implies that identity is partly shaped by recognition or misrecognition. Taylor defines identity as "a person's understanding of who they are [and] their fundamental characteristics as a human being" (ibid.). This means that my view on myself, firstly as the specific person that I am and secondly, as a

human being who engages with others, hinges on recognising others and being recognised myself. I am a person and a human being if I am recognised. If I am misrecognised, then my status as a person and human being comes into question, be it by myself or by others, or both. Therefore, misrecognition is a very problematic issue, for it can have grave consequences for a person's identity and therefore their sense of self. The problem of misrecognition will be addressed below, but for now I would like to remain with the issue of the demand for recognition as it pertains to Hegel and Fanon according to Taylor.

Taylor considers Hegel's treatment of recognition particularly influential. Hegel is pre-empted by Rousseau, who seeks what Taylor (ibid.: 47) refers to as "balanced [or complete] reciprocity" in which, ideally speaking, "everyone … depend on everyone else, but all [do] so equally". This complete and balanced reciprocity provides equality and a unity of purpose. Accordingly, I obey my self, but also take into account the general will (ibid.: 48), thus bringing about a mutual freedom between self and other, the result of which is social unity. The idea of a balanced reciprocity gives birth to the age of dignity (ibid..: 49) and opens up the way for Hegel's treatment of recognition. Therefore, within Hegel we find a politics of dignity (ibid.: 50), described by way of the master-slave dialectic. Taylor (ibid.) notes that "Hegel follows Rousseau in finding [reciprocal recognition] in a society with a common purpose." Hegel (1977: 110) describes reciprocal recognition as the situation or context in which there is an "I that is [a] We and [a] We that is [an] I". This points to the socially mediated nature of recognition and the fact that mutual recognition can only come about in intersubjective relations. As a consequence, for Hegel, the need for recognition is fundamental to human flourishing. One needs to be recognized in order to be human. This need for recognition is represented by the presence and existence of consciousness. In terms of the relation between consciousness and recognition, two important things must be noted: firstly, "each consciousness seeks recognition in another" consciousness (Taylor, 1994: 50), thus constituting the need. Secondly, the need for recognition by consciousness "is not a sign of a lack of virtue" (ibid.) but rather a vital human need.

From the above one can deduce that the need for recognition is not a weakness, but rather it is this need that makes us human. Also, as a consequence, to recognise, i.e. recognising the other, is the *humane* thing to do. This does not transpire in the relation between master and slave, which represents an example of recognition won in the face of a hierarchy of honor that exists, i.e. there is a winner and a loser. However, even though the master wins out, the recognition she receives is a lesser recognition, because it is a recognition she receives from the losers (ibid.). This

recognition is not as valuable as the master perceives it to be, and she is not really a free, self-supporting subject. Ultimately, there exists only one successful and favourable solution to the master-slave relation, namely mutual recognition. Taylor (1994: 50) affirms this when stating, "the struggle for recognition can find only one satisfactory solution, and that is a regime of reciprocal recognition among equals".

The issue of recognition in Hegel is of key importance and something that requires universal acknowledgment (Taylor, 1994: 36). This acknowledgment takes place on two levels, namely an intimate level (i.e. personal relations) and a social level (i.e. political relations). On the *intimate level*, the emphasis is on the formation of identity, which hinges on one's contact with significant others (*Ibid*). It is on this level that one develops an authentic (true and real) identity. This formation of (original) identity urgently requires the need for recognition. As a consequence, one's identity is vulnerable to the presence, or lack of, "recognition given or withheld by significant others" (*Ibid*). Therefore, relationships are the key location of self-discovery and self-affirmation. From the point of view of the self, there exists a need for the self to be recognized by others. From the point of view of the other, there exists a need for the other to be recognised by the self. If both parties partake in recognising *and* are willing to be recognised, then one finds mutual recognition taking hold. On the *social level*, one finds the politics of equal recognition, which has to do with the requirements that need to be in place in order to constitute a society where mutual recognition can take place, in other words the formation of a group identity. These requirements are based on "the understanding that identities are formed in open dialogue" with others (*Ibid*). On this level, the requirements are motivated by two ideas: firstly, withholding recognition is a form of oppression, and secondly, misrecognition constitutes an injustice (*Ibid*). Therefore, one needs to have a look at the conditions in which recognition fail, and from there formulate the conditions necessary for mutual recognition. Here, Taylor provides a revision of Hegel to show where recognition could go when we begin from that position of inequality, for in Hegel that starting point of the inequality of recognition is what drives the dialectic. An important movement in the dialectic is from the individual to the social, and hence from individual difference to finding a shared identity as part of a group (which is also a move that Honneth makes, as will be seen in the conclusion).

According to Taylor (1994: 65), Fanon in *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961) reveals the intricacies of recognition within the colonial context, and the turn towards violence in the struggle for recognition. The crucial motivation behind the Fanonian application of recognition is

the notion that recognition forges identity, the basis of which is the tendency of dominant groups "to entrench their hegemony by inculcating an image of inferiority in the subjugated" (Taylor, 1994: 66). In short, the master creates the slave, but also upholds her own self-image and identity by (mis)recognition of the slave as other. The struggle for the slave's freedom must "pass through a revision of these images" (*Ibid*). Taylor considers the Fanonian application of recognition as central to a major transition that took place in terms of the discourse on recognition. This transition consists of four insights (ibid.: 64): firstly, we are fundamentally formed by recognition. Our identity is crucially rooted in recognition. Secondly, in the light of this fundamental formation, the demand for recognition becomes explicit, i.e. it becomes a political ideal that we should strive for. Therefore, we should seek out the conditions in which mutual recognition can be successful. Thirdly, misrecognition is always couched or camouflaged as actual recognition. Therefore, misrecognition is a lack of recognition masquerading as mutual recognition, i.e. a phoney recognition. In the fourth place, misrecognition represents a harm that constitutes a form of inequality, exploitation and injustice. This means that misrecognition represents a transgression of humanity. From this, one can gather that misrecognition is a deeply problematic (possible) outcome of the struggle for recognition, and it disrupts the possibility of mutual recognition.

4.2   *The problem of (phoney) misrecognition*

Misrecognition is a problem lurking in the shadows when the possibility of mutual recognition is explored. Misrecognition can very well also be at the root of the turn to violence in the pursuit of recognition. Therefore, a brief discussion of misrecognition is in order, for misrecognition problematises mutual recognition in either denying the possibility of mutual recognition or otherwise camouflaging itself as mutual recognition, i.e. phoney recognition.

Misrecognition can be defined as a "pretend act of respect given on the insistence of its supposed beneficiary" (Taylor, 1994: 70). Taylor (ibid.: 25-26) identifies five characteristics to misrecognition: firstly, it inflicts harm on the misrecognised. Secondly, it is form of oppression. Thirdly, misrecognition provides the other with "a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being". Fourthly, misrecognition reveals a lack of due respect. In the fifth place, misrecognition leads to self-hatred. This self-hatred is the consequence of an image and identity that is forced onto the slave / other by the master / self. The slave comes to believe that the false, distorted and reduced mode of being afforded to him is his identity, and this is cause for an intense self-loathing.

Among other things it is this sense of self-loathing that is studied by Fanon. At the root of this self-loathing is the idea that non-recognition (which is what misrecognition comes down to, i.e. a lack of recognition that grants the other freedom) brings shame to the slave / other (ibid.: 50). This shame is internalised in the Fanonian slave, and as a consequence one finds a growing sense of resentment in the slave (i.e. the colonised) towards the master (i.e. the coloniser). The colonised want to purge themselves of their self-deprecating image (ibid.: 65), and in so doing, they turn to violence as the means to attain this aim. Fanon (1982: 220) asserts that even if the (white) master attempts to counter the violence by providing the (black) slave with freedom, violence will still transpire. The reason for this is that the freedom granted to the slave is a phoney freedom and a misrecognition of the other, because the master still provided it in the capacity of being a master, and the slave did not win this freedom by his own accord (ibid.: 221). Therefore, the outcome of misrecognition, in the colonial context, is mostly violence (although this is not always the outcome of misrecognition *per se*).

It is particularly important to take note that misrecognition can camouflage itself as actual recognition. Misrecognition can thus also be thought of as a phoney recognition. This is a term used by Williams (1997: 64) in his treatment of Hegel's master-slave dialectic. It will be worthwhile to include the extract in which Williams mentions this kind of recognition, which will shed more light on misrecognition (emphasis added):

> Since the slave is unessential, merely an extension of the master, recognition by the slave does not count even for the master. The slave is not genuinely other, it is only the "master's other." *Mastery represents a vain attempt to coerce recognition*, that is, reduce mediation by other to self-mediation. Mastery succeeds merely in reducing the other to a slave, only to discover that *coerced recognition is both phony and worthless. Phony recognition is the truth of mastery.* Thus we find a reversal: mastery, as sheer self-affirmation, turns out to be self-subverting and brings about the opposite of what is intended. Mastery ends in failure, a dead end that can only be maintained by force.

According to Williams, recognition within the relation between master and slave only seems like recognition, but is something quite different. In fact, this "recognition", i.e. phoney recognition, is aimed at a perpetual affirmation of the master / self through the slave (as caricature of the other). This means that the master finds an inverted mirror image of herself affirmed in the slave, who is simply a derivative of the negation of the master, i.e. the slave is everything that the master does not want to be. In so doing, the slave is negated and the master simply finds recognition of the

self by negation of the other, who is not recognised as other, but is merely considered as not-self. This means that the other is not recognised and remains invisible, unknown to the master. It also means that the master-slave relation is characterised by a one-sided recognition, of the master by the master herself. This seems odd. However, it would make sense if thought of in the following manner: the master creates the slave as a negation of the slave's own image. The slave then recognises the master, but this simply provides a mirror in which the master can measure her own mastery over an-other. The slave's recognition of the master is simply an extension of the master's recognition of the self, i.e. the self-mediation that Williams is referring to. Therefore, the slave's recognition is phoney and worthless because it is not recognition by a genuine other. Rather, the recognition of the master comes from a "phoney other", fabricated and constructed from the negation of the image of the master by the master herself. The result of this process, of the *exclusive* self-affirmation of the master, is a failure of recognition because mediation with the other does not transpire. Instead, one finds mastery aimed at maintaining the master-slave relation by way of forced coercion which, in its most extreme form, could result in a reversion to violence.

Therefore, as Williams asserts, the truth of mastery is phoney recognition, which is a one-sided recognition. For Williams (1997: 60), it is this movement into only one direction that makes the master-slave relation deficient, the problem being that "one party [the slave / other] recognizes the other but is not recognized in turn, and the other [the master / self] is recognized but does not recognize." Fanon (1967a: 217) also identifies one-sided recognition as deficient:

> [I]f I prevent the accomplishment of movement into two directions, I keep the other within himself. Ultimately, I deprive him even of this being-for-itself. […] Action from one side only would be useless, because what is to happen can only be brought about by means of both."

It seems clear that both Williams and Fanon identifies the master-slave relation as a deficient form of recognition and their reason for this is much the same. Phoney recognition, it seems, resembles a truce between self and other at the expense of the other. The self remains the dominant party, recognised as such, whilst the other is misrecognised, thankful simply because she is alive beyond prior conflict. This truce is held in place by way of force and coercion, which could turn into violence, although not necessarily so. However, what is important in this respect is that the possibility of violence exists, and therefore the problem of phoney recognition pre-

empts the problem of violence. Phoney recognition is at the root of violence. Phoney recognition dressed up as actual recognition is a dangerous problem, for it simply perpetuates the master-slave under the pretension that it does *not* perpetuate this relation. Thus, phoney recognition is a subtle but effective way of remoulding old relations. However, the dangerous possibility of violence still remains, as the situation in the postcolonial context has revealed.

4.3   The problem of violence in the postcolony

As mentioned above, violence mostly is the outcome of misrecognition in the colonial context. A troublesome persistence of violence exists in South Africa beyond Apartheid. The reasons for this situation are complex, multifarious and the result of influences both internal and external. Fanon provides a complex yet diffuse analysis of the course of violence during colonialism and decolonisation. Jinadu (1986: 44-50) attempts to order this analysis by way of providing three types of violence that Fanon identifies in colonialism and postcolonialism. The first type of violence is physical, i.e. somatic injury inflicted on human beings. In its most radical form, this type of violence results in the killing of an individual. Thus, here we are talking about violence *per se*. The second type of violence is structural, in the sense that violence serves as a condition for social injustice, which is kept in place by necessary institutions. An example of such violence was that of the Apartheid system. The third type of violence is psychological, i.e. injury or harm done to the human psyche. Here cultural imperialism has a role to play in the guise of propaganda, indoctrination, brainwashing and threats. Fanon provides discussions of each of these types of violence in *Studies in a Dying Colonialism* (1959) and *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961), whilst also providing insights into psychological violence in *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952). What is most significant to the identification of these three types of violence is the relation each has to the other, as they are interconnected: physical violence in early colonialism results in the pacification of 'natives' by settlers, resulting in the constitution of institutions to ensure the superiority of the settlers, i.e. structural violence. The superiority of the settlers becomes the measure of the 'natives', who develops an inferiority complex as a consequence, i.e. psychological violence. Ultimately, the 'natives' both rid themselves of this inferiority complex and acquire the superiority of the settlers by a return to physical violence, leading to decolonisation.

Decolonisation could be considered as the beginning of the postcolonial situation. As one moves deeper into this situation, the application of Fanon's theory and work becomes more speculative

and also frighteningly prophetic. In terms of the postcolonial situation, Fanon was indeed a prophet of suspicion, being suspicious of the so-called social change brought about by decolonisation. Although the master of old (the white settler) leaves / abandons the colony, or at the very least hands the power of governance over to the slave of old, the model of the master-slave remains within relations in the postcolonial context. Fanon (1967b: 60) asserts that the same dialectic is kept in place by the native government and its opposition and the "atmosphere of violence, having coloured all the colonial phase, continues to dominate national life." Mbembe (2001) follows this line of thought and provides an interesting analysis of violence in what he refers to as the 'postcolony'. "Public violence", "lordship" and "coercion" is the order of the day in the postcolony (ibid.: 84-85). Phoney recognition dressed up as social change is prevalent in the postcolony. Change has occurred because power has changed hands, but the relations of old are simply remoulded amongst the natives themselves. Violence remains as a daily constant, be it in the guise of crime, domestic violence, warfare, tyranny or genocide. It is this current situation of violence as a regular and general phenomenon in the postcolonial context that is troublesome. Mutual recognition is highly elusive in light of the persistence of violence, especially in the more intimate day-to-day relations between people.

4.4   *Violence and mutual recognition*

The awareness of the dangers of misrecognition brings more urgency to the search for mutual recognition. Taylor reveals well how our multicultural global village necessitates finding an alternative to (phoney) misrecognition. The alternative to misrecognition, according to Taylor (1994: 72), would be the presumption that all cultures are of equal worth (which, in other words, provides us with his version of mutual recognition). In the view of Taylor, this presumption can be grounded either in religion or in humanity. It is in terms of the latter that my project is situated, and the route that Fanon probably follows when he searches for a new kind of humanism. Taylor (ibid.) motivates the grounding of the presumption in humanity by saying that it is reasonable to claim that a meaningful culture should be admired and respected, even if we don't agree with much of it. Actually, it would be arrogant not to allow for this presumption (ibid.: 73). The reason that Taylor provides for this is that a culture provides a horizon of meaning for a large number of human beings. It has stood the test of time and provides people with a "sense of the good, the holy, the admirable" (ibid.: 72).

The presumption of equal worth requires one to come to three insights: firstly, one should have a "willingness to be open to comparative cultural study of the kind that must displace our [cultural] horizons in the resulting fusions" (ibid.) of our own culture with that of an-other. The result of this is the insight that one's own cultural standard is but one among many others, all of them equally worthy of respect and value. Secondly, there must be "an admission that we are very far away from that ultimate horizon from which the relative worth of different cultures might be evident" (ibid.). In the third place, one should avoid "peremptory and inauthentic judgments of equal worth" (ibid.). These insights can bring one to the presumption of equal worth, which could serve as the starting point from which to view other cultures, i.e. it is an approach from which to embark on the study of the other (ibid.: 72). This presumption has a normative side to it because a deeply moral issue is at work here: we are limited, finite beings that have only a limited part to play in the story of humanity (ibid.: 73). Therefore, to disregard or disrespect a culture is an act of arrogance in which our place in history is not understood. Arrogance in this respect comes down to being a moral failing.

Taylor's presumption of equal worth (and thus mutual recognition) is clearly problematised by the situation in post-Apartheid South Africa in terms of each of the three insights, both negatively and positively. This means that it is a space where each of these insights remain problematic but also that it is a space that contains the conditions for the possibility of these insights. In other words, displacing our cultural horizons, recognizing the worth of other cultures, and avoiding an inauthentic recognition regarding the equal worth of other cultures (inauthentic because it is based in pre-judgments about another culture, such as patronising stereotypes and/or caricatures) could become possible. But exactly what these insights try to avoid might also happen, and hence disrespect and disregard as well as arrogance displaces any possibility of equal worth. In the latter case, we are then dealing with forms of violence where cultures come into conflict with each other. This perpetuates misrecognition and makes mutual recognition more problematic.

I take what Taylor says to be important for this study in two respects: Firstly, that comparative cultural study provides us with important normative work that requires our attention. My project aims to do this although the focus is on the cultural study of a group with whom I am most certainly associated, and hence not with another cultural group. Secondly, I take his assertion regarding pre-emptory and inauthentic judgements of equal worth very serious and my study is at pains to take into account Markell's assertion that this happens even when we think that we are recognising the other in an authentic way. This is also how so-called phoney recognition takes

place. I therefore take on the normative work that Taylor suggests but not exactly in the way that he suggests. This will be spelled out in section six regarding the position and focus of my research as being that of the self instead of the other.

The overall theoretical framework of this study, however, requires elaboration with the regards to the second level of study. As mentioned above, the space of post-Apartheid South Africa problematises the presumption of equal worth (and hence mutual recognition) but also contains the conditions to make it possible. The first level of my study, as spelled out above, concerns human relations with regards to the politics of recognition, but this picture needs to be filled out by the second level of study, which looks at the role of space and place as it regards the politics of recognition (and hence misrecognition and mutual recognition). This is where the concept of the heterotopia comes into play, and in the next section I will explain how this concept relates to the dialectic (as the important concept on the first level of study).

5.   Theoretical framework (second level of study): Dialectic and heterotopia

This thesis asserts that the master-slave dialectic that manifested as a settler-native dialectic during colonialism and Apartheid in South Africa has become a postcolonial heterotopia beyond Apartheid. The reader might find the combination and link in this project between the dialectic and heterotopia to be surprising or even problematic since they are two theoretical concepts that do not ordinarily belong together. I will explain why I choose this "odd couple" for the second level of study in this thesis.

This thesis aims to philosophically tell the story that begins during colonialism and runs through Apartheid and now in the present with all its contractions. This story, in my view requires the right theoretical tools provided by the dialectic and the heterotopia. The key difference between these two concepts is that the dialectic, in terms of the master and slave, is about a type of human relation whilst the heterotopia concerns a relation between spaces and places. Combining the two, or rather incorporating them together in the same study, helps to demonstrate the intersection between the two concepts as well as to show how the heterotopia becomes a type of racialized experience within the postcolony.

The Hegelian dialectic is a diachronic concept that sees history as moving along a straight line in the direction of progression. The dialectic tends to focus on how contradictions and conflict

between two opposing sides ultimately attempt to reconcile or merge with each other to a higher viewpoint (he called this *Aufhebung*, which translates in English to sublation). Foucault's heterotopia, on the other hand, is a synchronic concept that has as its focus a specific epoch or historical moment (or episteme for Foucault as it concerns the form of knowledge that is dominant at such a moment), and how there are places and spaces that exist simultaneously in contradiction next to each other. These two concepts are therefore in tension, in a way regarding progressive (dialectic) and regressive (heterotopian) elements in society, and they would indeed not easily be spoken of in the same breath.

The main reason for linking these two concepts in my project is a simple insight: The heterotopia concerns a tension between the place or space of the heterotopia and the opposing reality of society that it reflects, deflects or contradicts. The contradictions that this entail means that there is a tension and even conflict in the relation that the heterotopia has to society, which means that there is an absence of some form of mutual representation of each side in this relation. This absence is what misrecognition is about, and this mutual representation of each side is one of the aims of mutual recognition. This means that in a society where heterotopia is the norm (as discussed in chapter two), in other words that the society is heterotopian in nature, one finds a proliferation of these contradictions and tensions. This leads to a proliferation of misrecognition and the question regarding mutual recognition becomes even more urgent. This is the situation and question that stands front and centre in this project, as it concerns the postcolonial context of South Africa as heterotopia. The postcolonial is of course a situation or a place that follows from the colonial, and which retains some aspects of the colonial whilst on the other hand moving into new directions in dealing with its former colonial structure.

Foucault himself considered colonies to be generally heterotopian. What he says about their role in society is significant and provides a starting point on how postcolonies might retain some of the elements of a heterotopia (1986: 27):

> [Heterotopias] have a function in relation to all space that remains. … their role is to create a space that is other, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as ours is messy, ill constructed and jumbled. … [This] type would be the heterotopia, not of illusion but of compensation, and I wonder if certain colonies have not functioned somewhat in this manner. In certain cases, they have played, on the level of the general organization of terrestrial space, the role of heterotopias. I am thinking, for example, of

the first wave of colonization in the seventeenth century, of the Puritan societies that the English had founded in America and that were absolutely perfect other places.

I take my cue here from Foucault to find out what has become of the colonial heterotopia beyond (formal) decolonisation, so to speak. The former colonies were heterotopias in relation to the colonial empires that controlled them. This is a significant assertion because these colonies *in toto* were heterotopia, in other words a whole area or region became a heterotopia after colonisation (by force or through conflict). The question that this project poses is whether the consequent nation-states that were formed from those colonies after decolonisation remained to be heterotopias or at the very least retained certain heterotopian aspects. The provocative and controversial claim of this project is that in Apartheid South Africa, these aspects continued and proliferated (it was after all a society formed by racial segregation), and this process continues in post-Apartheid South Africa to such an extent that the country *in toto* could be viewed to still be a heterotopia but more significantly, a postcolonial heterotopia.

This postcolonial heterotopia is different though from Foucault's heterotopia, although it definitely retains and crucially combines various aspects of the original heterotopia, as well as containing various classic types of heterotopia within itself. For instance, in the sense that Foucault (1986: 24-25) sees heterotopias of crisis and heterotopias of deviance to be mutually exclusive because the former is mainly pre-modern and the latter modern, they are somehow combined in a new form within the postcolonial heterotopia. He nevertheless mentions that there might be a "borderline between the heterotopia of crisis and the heterotopia of deviance" (for instance, in the case of retirement homes) where one might find an overlap between these two forms of heterotopia, and this is where I see the postcolonial heterotopia to be situated.

Seen in this light, the postcolonial heterotopia could be seen as a "bad place" but this is only partly true. What can be said about the postcolonial heterotopia that makes it problematic, and which differentiates it from the Foucauldian heterotopia in general, is that it contains elements that are somehow opposed in the Foucauldian heterotopia's relation to society itself. In Foucault's words above, the perfect / meticulous / well-arranged and the messy / ill-constructed / jumbled combines within the postcolonial heterotopia, hence my assertion regarding the simultaneous presence of utopia and dystopia in the postcolonial heterotopia The postcolonial heterotopia as it is sketched in this thesis describes a place or space that is morally precarious, a

place that contains the characteristics of exclusion (and also segregation) as well as a lack of integration and coherence (and hence contradictions).

The way in which Foucault highlights colonies as generally heterotopian means that Apartheid South Africa probably contained various heterotopian elements that were continuous with its history as a British and Dutch colony. This simultaneously happened as the stark dialectic between black and white of colonial times continued with Apartheid's institutionalised segregation and brutal oppression of those who were not white. Apartheid and post-Apartheid South Africa therefore seems to me to be at a kind of intersection between the dialectic and heterotopia, along a continuum of becoming more heterotopian as we move further away from colonialism (but nevertheless various aspects of the dialectic remain).

This project will however show that there are interesting theoretical spaces at the edges (or intersection) of these two concepts that can help us to understand the shift from Apartheid to post-Apartheid South Africa. This shift involves what at base is the point of each of these concepts, i.e. the dialectic as diachronic idea and the heterotopia as a synchronic idea. In other words, the thesis is asserting that there is a shift beyond Apartheid in the character of society from the diachronic to the synchronic. A straight line of progression (as seen from a modern colonial perspective) has given way to a contested space of contradictions where both progression and regression has become characteristic of post-Apartheid society.

To put this in another way, Apartheid put forward a single historical narrative that gives a Eurocentric story of progression and racial segregation that was seen by its architects as morally necessary (they even saw Apartheid as their moral duty). This was prefigured by a colonial narrative of oppression and domination that also carried the moral veneer of necessity and duty (what was called the White Man's Burden). This was the dialectic seen as a straight line of progression, which has been splintered and ruptured into a contested space of contradictions beyond Apartheid. This is not to say that this only happened beyond Apartheid. In a way, Apartheid itself was both an attempt to institutionalise this single historical narrative and a process according to which the single historical narrative as a straight line of progression gradually broke down into a contested space of contradictions. This is the dialectic becoming a heterotopia and this project seeks to investigate this process in the present beyond Apartheid, highlighting the disjunctures and continuities between Apartheid and post-Apartheid South Africa by focusing on whiteness and economic affluence.

The idea of universal knowledge that Apartheid preached has broken down and requires of us to contextually investigate the present and its localities, and therefore the move from the dialectic to the heterotopia (i.e. the global to the local, and the general to the specific) is theoretically fruitful. There are no doubt tensions and differences between Hegel's dialectic and Foucault's heterotopia. This thesis aims to reinterpret the heterotopia in the same way that Fanon reinterpreted the dialectic, and to map the potentially creative space between these tensions and differences within the context of post-Apartheid South Africa.

The dialectic's straight line of progression becoming a contested heterotopian space of contradictions has greatly problematised identity as such in South Africa. My thesis is that South Africa is a postcolonial heterotopia, and so this heterotopian space can be inhabited by white or black and others. As my focus I have chosen whiteness and white identity, but the focus could also have been otherwise with equally fruitful results. The dialectic becoming postcolonial heterotopia is exactly about the tensions and contradictions that exists between the life-worlds of white and black in post-Apartheid South Africa, but also about the reconciliatory possibilities at the edges of these concepts where they intersect. One such possibility is mutual recognition that attempts to deal with these tensions and contradictions and how they represent forms of misrecognition.

My project has normative work as its end goal (*contra* Foucault) that views misrecognition as a dominant element found at this intersection. This normative aspect will be to conceptualise a theory of postcolonial recognition that considers the morally precarious space of the dialectic becoming heterotopia, a space that is dominated by economic inequality, violence and a colonial mentality that pervades South African society. The turn in the conclusion to a Fanonian rereading of Honneth's reinterpretation of Hegel's theory of recognition (based on the dialectic) will aim to extend the theoretical space between the Hegelian dialectic and Foucauldian heterotopia, both of which are stretched and contorted in the postcolony. This interesting and creative space is where I would like to situate and develop my postcolonial theory of recognition, as I require all of these thinkers and their theories to come to an understanding of the present in post-Apartheid South Africa: Hegel's theory of recognition, Fanon's colonial reinterpretation of Hegel's master-slave dialectic, my postcolonial reinterpretation of Foucault's heterotopia, and then a Fanonian take on Honneth's theory of mutual recognition. I see both the dialectic and the heterotopia as two

influential factors beyond Apartheid and require these thinkers to articulate this theoretical picture and demonstrate the moral problematic that they pose at their intersection in the present.

This normative end to my study is in step with Taylor's assertion that the study of the other should be an essential part of one's inquiry into human relations (1994: 70). The politics of recognition and the search for mutual recognition requires a turn to the other, to see how the other is misrepresented and hence mistreated by the self, in order to come to the right representation of the other in an existential and political sense. However, the focus of this study is not on the other but rather on the (white) self. This might seem like an odd way and point of entry in approaching the politics of recognition in post-Apartheid South Africa. At this juncture, before we arrive at a discussion of the primary theoretical problematic at issue in the study, the position of this study will be clarified in looking at the reasons that motivate a study of the self rather than the other.

6.   The politics of acknowledgement: Why whiteness? Why the self?

A legitimate question that can be raised regarding this thesis is why, then, is whiteness and white identity the focus of study. The study is framed by the politics of recognition, which usually focuses on the injustice suffered by the other and how to redress the situation through mutual recognition. To focus on whites, would be to focus on those who perpetrated the injustices of Apartheid and who continue to benefit from the structural privileges left behind by that system. There is, however, much to be learnt from their current situation and place in South Africa in terms of their reaction to the end of Apartheid. I'm white myself and in a way, this study is self-examination about my own situation of whiteness and being white in post-Apartheid South Africa.

My personal journey through this process of self-examination and self-critique serves as kind of history of the self in the Foucauldian sense. This is not done from a sense of hubris or an attitude of being holier than thou, so to speak, and the aim is not to be self-righteous but rather to acknowledge the parameters of whiteness from my point of view. My philosophical attitude is rather one of staying true to the self, i.e. to be honest and truthful in looking at my situation, and not to purport to know the other (to whiteness) or to speak on their behalf. The findings of my study articulate a certain situatedness and place that might shed light on whiteness beyond Apartheid. I do not claim that it encapsulates whiteness as it is in its entirety, but rather that it provides certain insights about whiteness right here and right now in South Africa. This position

takes its cue from Patchen Markell's politics of acknowledgement, which succinctly articulates why a focus on the self can benefit a study on the politics of recognition in South Africa.

Markell's book entitled *Bound by Recognition* (2003) provides a critique of the politics of recognition on a very basic and simple but crucial point: The focus of recognition is always on the misrecognised other and their situation that has been impacted by discrimination and oppression, but not so much on the role of the self and how their circumstances has impacted those who find themselves at the receiving end of systemic injustice. In other words, the focus is far more on the victims and how they should be recognised whilst the situation / position and role of the perpetrators becomes either a moot point or is insufficiently articulated. Markel asks a number of key questions in this regard, especially in terms of how we attempt to deal with the problem of misrecognition. He words his concern with the politics of recognition as follows (2003: 4-5):

> [T]he crucial questions to be asked about the politics of recognition concern its presuppositions about the nature and sources of injustice in relations of identity and difference. Is "misrecognition" best understood as the failure to see and/or respect the identity of the other? Or does the characterization of the problem mislead us about the structure of this sort of injustice, and, consequently, about what it would mean to overcome it? … [I]njustice in relations of identity and difference is not simply a matter of improper recognition in the conventional sense – that is, of the proliferation of false or demeaning images of various people and groups. To be sure, this is one important and widespread symptom of injustice, although it is not a necessary one.

Markell's questions points to a problematic regarding recognition and might be worded as follows: If misrecognition is seen as the failure to see and/or respect the identity of the other, then it means that there must be some real identity that must be correctly recognised. Markell points out that this might mislead us then about the structure of the injustice involved. The issue here is that the correctly recognised identity, as an alternative to the misrecognized identity, might still be one that is enforced as an exertion of power over others. This is when, as Markell (ibid.: 5) points out, "affirmative images of others could be consistent with, or serve as vehicles of, injustice". Markell says that the desire and motivation behind misrecognition, i.e. the desires and motivation *of the self* that is not "*about* others" (ibid., his emphasis), is often ignored. The focus is thus always on the way that misrecognition impacts the other and how this can be remedied through the correct recognition of their identity, but the role of the self is seen as secondary to the

remedy. This means that "the politics of recognition is a matter of how much or what kind of recognition *we* – speaking in the voice of universality, for the larger society – ought to extend to *them*" (ibid.: 6, his emphasis).

Markell provides an original insight in terms of the politics of recognition, namely that we should take care with how we go about in our consideration of identity and differences, whether they be improper (false or demeaning) or affirmative (and hence seen as positive). His position takes this care further with his "politics of acknowledgement", which he summarises as follows (ibid.: 7):

> Following up on the thought that the source of relations of subordination lies not in the failure to recognize the identity of the other, but in the failure to acknowledge one's own basic situation and circumstances, I call this alternative a politics of *acknowledgment* rather than a politics of recognition. In this picture, democratic justice does not require that all people be known and respected as who they really are. It requires, instead, that no one be reduced to any characterization of his or her identity for the sake of someone else's achievement of a sense of sovereignty or invulnerability, regardless of whether that characterization is negative or positive, hateful or friendly (for, as we shall see, positive images can be instruments of subordination, too). It demands that each of us bear our share of the burden and risk involved in the uncertainty, open-ended, sometimes maddeningly and sometimes joyously surprising activity of living and interacting with other people.

Markel provides a number of important insights here: Firstly, he emphasises the importance of the acknowledgement of one's complicity in a situation of injustice simply by being honest about one's own situation and circumstances, and especially in an honest admission about how this situation and circumstances impacts one's interaction with others and their situation. Secondly, there is a communal aspect to this as Markell says that this acknowledgement means that one shares the burden of injustice within a society whilst there is also a risk involved because one's interaction with others is not attached to a certain or specific characterisation of them. In the third place, it is important to note that there is no sufficient reason to reduce another to a characterisation (thus a caricature, stereotype or type) of their identity, whether it is done for the sake of one's own sense of power or for the sake of their empowerment. Negative or positive characterisations can have the same effect as instruments of subordination, and thus of control and power over others. An apt description of this situation where the fixing of the other actually

says more about the self than the other is provided by Nicholson (1996: 10 & 15) in imagining what the other might say to the self:

> Let my presence make you aware of the limitations of what you have so far judged to be true and of worth. … See how you presume that you know who I am. You have defined me without really knowing me, and the definition you create tells me more about you, your desires and your presumptions, than it does about me.

Markell shifts the focus involved in the politics of recognition away from what could be an imbalanced burden on, or even obsession with, the other and their identity. The focus instead comes to be on the self, in terms of their desires and motivations, and how this impacts the self's interaction with others. This does not mean that the role and place of the other is not taken into account but that the primary focus is on the self. Markell (ibid.: 35) elaborates that the focus on the self provides a change of direction that is analogous to the shift "from a conception of injustice that focuses on its significance for those who suffer it, to one that focuses on its meaning for those who commit it", and clarifies it as follows (ibid.):

> [A]lthough the presence or absence of acknowledgment may have important implications for others, the direct object of acknowledgment is not the other, as in the case of recognition; it is, instead, something about the self. But this, on its own, is not enough: it is equally important to make clear that acknowledgment is not fundamentally the acknowledgment of one's own identity.

The above position that Markell sketches gives a solid articulation regarding the position from which my own study is conducted and why the focus is on whites beyond Apartheid: As a white man myself, who grew up during the final decade of Apartheid but entered adulthood in post-Apartheid South Africa, I see it as my prerogative to explore and acknowledge the basic situation and circumstances of whites, the group who was complicit in the injustices of Apartheid and the group with whom I feel a close affinity. My position is both critical and sympathetic: As will be seen throughout my study, I am critical of a continuing trend among a great portion of whites to insulate themselves from the realities of post-Apartheid South Africa, i.e. to perpetuate Apartheid in a privatised and informal manner. At the same time, I am sympathetic to the fact that the end of Apartheid has brought about a crisis of white identity; that Apartheid, much like Nazism in the case of German identity, was in the end detrimental to the sense of self that whites could have exactly because it rendered their relation to the black and coloured other problematic or even

impossible; and that there is also a large contingent of whites who attempt outreach, reconciliation and mutual recognition with those who suffered under Apartheid.

My exploration of the white situation will commence in chapter two on the postcolonial heterotopia, and how the suburbs have become an insulated laager of sorts. In chapter three on the Afrikaner heterotopia, I will explore a specific kind of identity that many (but not all) Afrikaners have taken on in reply to their loss of political power. As I identify as an Afrikaner, this is an identity that I find worth exploring because of my proximity to this community. Although Markell asserts that acknowledgement is not fundamentally about identity, it has a role to play. In chapter four, I explore the complicity of whites in post-Apartheid South Africa as it regards current injustices in terms of rich and poor. This complicity is however not limited only to affluent whites but to anyone who lives in affluence in the country, thus also to the black elite.

This study therefore concerns the relation between self and other, but the analysis of this relation begins with the self and keeps to that focus for the duration of the study until mutual recognition is investigated in the conclusion. Following the politics of acknowledgement, a study of this nature requires that the self be analysed first internally (i.e. what transpires in her consciousness), and from there one could have an idea of why a certain type of relationship to the other exists. Also, one could work out the possible conditions (i.e. states of consciousness in self) that are required for alternate outcomes to the existing one. In other words, how should consciousness be transformed or altered to bring about a new type of relationship between self and other?

This, then, is the point of departure for my study and the answers to these questions can be found in the work of Hegel (in whose work we find the first clear analysis of recognition): I will scrutinize what dynamic is at work in the relationship between master and slave (self and other) in terms of one of the outcomes of this relation, namely misrecognition. In this respect one will have to find out what transpires in the consciousness of the self that leads to misrecognition. Further, one will have to work out what the conditions might be for such consciousness to move from the misappropriation of the other (leading to violence) to entering in a relation of mutual recognition with the other. In order to address these issues, I will now turn to the work of Hegel that prefigures the discussion of the master and slave (lord and bondsman) and which is at pains to dissect the workings of self-consciousness as it relates to recognition. The master-slave dialectic will then be discussed in chapter one as it relates to the colonial context.

7.   The Hegelian failure of mutual recognition

The point of Hegel's account of the master and slave in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is to show that intersubjectivity is crucial for self-consciousness and the struggle for recognition. The *struggle* for recognition is a struggle exactly because of this intersubjectivity, i.e. it takes place between two or more parties that want to assert their own freedom. This is not to say that the formation of self-consciousness is completely dependent on intersubjectivity, but that a deepening and fulfilment of self-consciousness is possible only through intersubjective recognition. Intersubjective recognition provides self-consciousness with the possibilities of self-transcendence and self-development. These possibilities lie in the dynamic movement that can develop in coming to a better knowledge of the self through intersubjective contact with others. However, if these possibilities are lacking, then self-consciousness is truncated and this is very much the case for the Hegelian slave.

One finds the most famous assertion of the crucial role of intersubjectivity in the first sentence of the discussion on the master and slave (Hegel, 1977: 111): "Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged." At closer inspection, Hegel does not assert that intersubjectivity is needed to become self-conscious, but that self-consciousness is *mediated* by recognition of itself by an-other. Therefore, intersubjectivity is already found in the master-slave relation as is the recognition of the *phenomenon* of the other. Hegel (1977: 184) asserts that through the mediation of the other, both the master and slave "*recognize* themselves as *mutually recognizing* one another." However, this mutual recognition on a phenomenal-sensory level does not necessarily translate into the mutual recognition of the humanity of an-other or of an-other as a person. I say this because Hegel (1977: 185) further asserts that the "pure Notion of recognition" will at first "exhibit the side of the inequality of the two," resulting in two extremes (i.e. master and slave) that are opposed to each other "one being only *recognized*, the other only *recognizing*." This inequality leads to one-sided recognition, what Taylor (1994: 25-26) calls misrecognition or what Williams (1997: 64) calls phoney recognition.

This exercise of misrecognition takes place in distinguishing the other as an object, which can be contrasted with the exercise of mutual recognition in distinguishing the other as a subject. The result of misrecognition is alienated self-consciousness, i.e. a truncated self-consciousness that does not give meaning to its own life-world. The crux of the matter becomes clear: in basic,

concrete intersubjective engagement, mutual recognition is possible, but this does not necessarily translate into a conceptual-discursive recognition of the humanity of an-other or of an-other as a person. The deepening of self-consciousness cannot be without contact with an-other; yet this deepening can be short-changed if this mutual recognition does not continue on an epistemological-conceptual level, i.e. the level of understanding (this move from concrete recognition to conceptual-discursive recognition is important to take into account when we look at Honneth's model in the conclusion). The notion of recognition is undermined by the inequality that forms on an epistemological-conceptual level between master and slave.

Full recognition should be between persons-as-persons and it should arrive at a full self-appreciation, which is bound up with the appreciation of others. In other words, if others are not appreciated as persons able to converse intelligently and responsibly, then one falls short of full self-appreciation. The denial of the humanity of the other is also a denial of the full appreciation of the humanity of self. Hegel's master-slave dialectic therefore provides, in my mind, a good example of what is simply one-sided recognition. What is important to consider here is that Hegel's master-slave dialectic does not operate only on the level of the individual; it is actually at pains to show that this one-sided recognition is embedded in societal structures that enforces the dialectic. These societal structures only become apparent as the struggle for recognition proceeds towards the *Aufhebung* (sublation) of the dialectic. The relation of mastery and subjugation is therefore rather a starting point for the dialectic, which has the potential to progress on the social and political levels. The question of this progress is what keeps Hegel scholars awake at night, as Hegel provides the tools with which to develop the potential of the dialectic on those levels.

This is very much the primary work of my study: Firstly, to follow Hegel's analysis of the dialectic on an individual level and then secondly, to chart how progress can be made from the starting point of mastery and subjugation. The first task permeates the case studies of this project, looking at the tension that exists at these levels but then also to look at how progress in terms of recognition can take place. This second task is Honneth's concern and as his theory of mutual recognition has become so influential in how it sets out with that task, I return to his work in the conclusion (more on this in section 6.3).

I interpret Hegel's dialectic and especially the master-slave relation from a postcolonial perspective, hence a position that considers conflict and violence as a socio-political reality, but also attempt to find a bridge out of this situation (or at least, to understand the problematic of

mutual recognition in this context). This position on the dialectic is well-articulated by Sekyi-Otu (1996: 28-29) in his seminal book on *Fanon's Dialectic of Experience*:

> Hegel's dialectic is not fundamentally and specifically *political*. We need not share that indiscriminate suspicion of all talk of dialectic – "'Dialectic' is a way of evading the always open and hazardous reality of conflict by reducing it to a Hegelian skeleton" – that leads Foucault to prefer the discourse of war and battle as the true model of the "history that bears and determines us." We need only note that absent from Hegel's version of dialectical movement is that strong sense of the political, understood as the relations of power and conflict, subjugation and resistance, which function as the *defining conditions* of problems of truth and meaning.

Here Sekyo-Otu is pointing to a crucial point for my study, namely that the dialectic as it appears in Hegel's work does not concern only the political and that it does not have to function necessarily as a model for the political. In a sense, the social and political only takes form further down the line of the dialectic from self-consciousness, which has to go through a number of crucial developments (explained below in this section). Sekyi-Out points to the doubts that some thinkers (like Foucault) have of the dialectic as a way to bypass conflict (or violence for that matter). This leads thinkers like Foucault (or Hobbes) to view violence as the model that is more suited to the reality of human relations. What they are suspicious about, of course, is the movement of the dialectic through *Aufhebung* to more progressive forms for human relations. This interpretation of the dialectic is rooted in a view of the dialectic that is found in the work of a host of thinkers: Marx (1844), Nietzsche (1887), Sartre (1945), Kojève (1947) and Hyppolite (1946), among others. Kojeve goes so far as considering the master-slave relation as the core achievement of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. This view considers conflict and antagonism as the end point, rather than a transitional stage, in the dialectic (although perhaps not for Marx).

I follow Sekyi-Out in viewing the master-slave relation as one point on the line of the dialectic that moves towards *Aufhebung* and more progressive forms that are not necessarily as explicitly political than the war-battle view. Sekyi-Otu says what is significant here is that although Hegel's dialectical movement is most certainly connected to this view of the political as a violent process, it need not necessarily define the political or the defining conditions for problems regarding truth and meaning. This is an important observation from Sekyi-Otu that encapsulates the spirit of my own study, namely that the dialectic is to be found beyond the political in our social realities and

that there is more to the dialectic than the confrontational and antagonistic relations that are emphasised in the above interpretation that views *Aufhebung* as a Hegelian mirage.

Sekyi-Otu (1996: 26) further provides a characterisation and contextualisation of the dialectic within the colonial and postcolonial based on Fanon's work that demonstrates how the dialectic moves forward in a progressive manner. My discussion and analysis of the Hegelian failure of mutual recognition must be seen, and indeed read, against the background of this Fanonian dialectic of experience:

> Fanon follows Hegel in describing the procession of order of things and configurations of consciousness as a "pathway" … I too will go along with Hegel and call Fanon's account of the movement a *dialectic* of experience. Dialectic because it narrates the generation of relations infinitely more complex than the "mass relationship" or "simplifying" logic of the colonizer-colonized opposition. Dialectic because it testifies to the dissolution of the "the two metaphysics" of absolute difference to which colonizer and colonized alike subscribe. And dialectic because this movement of experience consists, according to Fanon, in a "progressive enlightening of consciousness" occasioned by the appearance or resuscitation of realities hidden from the inaugural purview of the colonial subject. In the process, structures, figures and relations initially presented as the defining characteristics of social reality, hence as the ultimate terms of political and moral discourse, are shown – after the manner of Hegel – to be the misleading products of "immediate knowledge": they are shown to be "abstract and too immediate" in the identities, oppositions and unities they are held to exhibit.

This revision of the Hegelian dialectic by Sekyi-Otu emphasizes the non-rational element in the dialectic. Significant here for my project is the sketch of the dialectic as a pathway (a line) along which the order of things and various forms of consciousness move. This is however not just a pathway of ideas but also of experience, and it does follow Hegel in seeing the dialectic as a pathway of progress, in other words the movement towards *Aufhebung*. Sekyi-Otu's sketch shows that the dialectic encapsulates the various complexities of human relations and especially the dynamics of colonisation, hence it does not try to oversimplify the logic that underpins oppression. The dialectic also points the way towards overcoming what is perceived to be a radical difference rooted in the incommensurate realities of the colonizer and colonized. This leads us to what Fanon calls a "progressive enlightening of consciousness" in which one sees a new postcolonial reality arising, one that can be discovered by the colonizer and the colonized

alike. The accepted social reality and status quo, so to speak, as the source of politico-moral discourse is questioned and indeed shown to be untenable. This is when the need and indeed the desire towards *Aufhebung* becomes most urgent and in a sense inevitable.

Sekyi-Otu's (post)colonial sketch of the dialectic very much emphasises this dynamic and non-rational movement of the dialectic. I would contend that this movement requires the possibility of mutual recognition and that it indeed comes to a standstill without that possibility. This is the failure of Hegelian mutual recognition but at the same time, he provides us with the conditions that can make it possible. Honneth takes his cue from this moment of possibility in Hegel in his seminal work on mutual recognition, and instead of approaching the master-slave as standard for the struggle for recognition, looks towards Hegel's earlier works from which he distils a theory of mutual recognition that indeed can bring us to the *Aufhebung* beyond misrecognition. I am just making this note to emphasize why I will turn to Honneth in the conclusion, as he also shares in Fanon's belief in the movement towards *Aufhebung* (they will also be combined in a postcolonial reading of Honneth's theory).

I will now look at the manner in which Hegelian recognition forms and develops, from the interplay between subject and object (i.e. self and other, concept and phenomenon) that gives way to the problem of alienated self-consciousness, to the possible conditions for mutual recognition and how the failure of mutual recognition could possibly be addressed.

7.1   *Hegelian recognition and the interplay between subject and object*

The core of Hegel's master-slave dialectic is the constitution of the subject-object relation in terms of the provision of meaning by the subject (i.e. the master) onto the object (i.e. the slave). The dynamic of the interplay between subject and object is highlighted well by Hegel's master-slave dialectic: The subject is the individual who can assert its own identity and form the meaning of that identity (and hence of the world). The object is an individual who cannot do this as they've been *subjected to* someone on whom this identity and meaning is dependent. Meaning is thus formed through a conceptual grasp by the subject of the object as phenomenon, and Hegel provides a description of this process. Therefore, the relation between phenomenon and concept is an important one to take into account because it plays a big role with regards to the problems that are encountered in the failure of mutual recognition. The relation between phenomenon and concept appears to be at the heart of Hegel's analysis of self-consciousness and more importantly,

at the heart of his notion of recognition. Hegel's analysis seems to be of phenomenological import, but its equation of the concept with the phenomenon it relates with, is problematic in the ethical sense. This is a problematic tendency or habit that plagues the emergence of self-consciousness in general, i.e. he is thus giving us a descriptive and not a normative account of the process. This tendency or habit becomes apparent when one has a look at Hegel's account of the moment of the emergence of self-consciousness in the *Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Spirit* (1971: 164-165):

> …consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object. The ego in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it – it has itself. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness. … Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a consequence of the former, all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine; and thus in it I am aware of me. The formula of self-consciousness if I = I: – abstract freedom, pure 'Ideality'.

Here Hegel seems to draw a distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness, saying that self-consciousness is the continuation (or logical progression) of consciousness. The passing of consciousness into self-consciousness seems inevitable and it heralds a couple of significant moments: firstly, self-consciousness brings about a relationship of mutual dependence between the subject and object (i.e. self and other), at this point at the level of phenomena. Secondly, self-consciousness comes to objectify itself as a subject (the self) that can interact with other objects in the world. These moments represent the passage from consciousness into self-consciousness. At this point the role of ideas (concepts) becomes important because it is part of the attempt by self-consciousness to assert the certainty or truth of its ideas of the world, and of course the other.

In light of the above it seems that (human) self-consciousness represents the location where the aspects of phenomenon and concept intersect, in other words the relation between phenomenon and concept is constituted by self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is able to have a simple cognitive awareness of an-other object, but this does not provide explicit knowledge of the object. No doubt, the object does engage the intellect of self-consciousness, which opens the door to conceptual thinking. In order to do this, self-consciousness moves to more progressive levels and inevitably ends up at a recognition of the world and others in terms of conceptual aspects. It seems therefore that progressive self-consciousness is consciousness in its mode of knowing, that self-consciousness is the epistemological dimension of consciousness. Therefore, self-

consciousness, manifest as the embodied self, is the manner in which consciousness asserts or searches for the truth of itself and then fixes this truth through a conceptual formation of the world. The movement of relating concepts to phenomena is crucial for the deepening of self-consciousness, but so too is the presence of the other (as object). Hegel makes this clear in the above passage when he states: "the object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine; and thus in it I am aware of me." "The object is my idea", and therefore ideas (as a conceptual understanding of the world) have a pivotal role to play in terms of self-consciousness, hence one lives in a world of ideas.

One could say that within the Hegelian paradigm, the movement of relating concepts to phenomena is unavoidable for the deepening of self-consciousness. In fact, this movement is also crucial for self-consciousness to engage intersubjectively. The reason for this is that explicit knowledge of self and other requires this movement. Dien Winfield (2006: 778) words this requirement well when he states: "preverbal intersubjectivity in which nondiscursive self-consciousness resides can hardly involve self-knowledge or knowledge of others." It seems therefore that the movement of relating concepts to phenomena is a necessary step for the deepening of self-consciousness in order for itself to become an object of attention to itself. For Hegel, this movement and deepening of self-consciousness takes place in intersubjective engagement.

At this point it would be helpful to bring the above discussion together by distinguishing two important aspects of Hegelian recognition in intersubjective engagement. The deepening of self-consciousness through intersubjective recognition within the Hegelian paradigm requires these two important aspects, which seems to be present alongside each other in the interaction with other subjects, i.e. these are two aspects of the same experience. These two important aspects are:

1. A basic and immediate recognition of the other, which is a recognition of the actual existence of the concrete other, i.e. *intersubjective recognition in its phenomenal aspect*.
2. A reflective recognition of the other, which is formed in conceptual reflection by self-consciousness on the concrete other, which opens up to *discursive recognition* or *recognition in its conceptual aspect*.

The relation between phenomenon and concept requires some elaboration in order to come to an understanding of the nature of Hegelian recognition as well as the problems inherent to it, which lies in the relation between phenomenon and concept. There is an explicit notion of the world being consumed by self-consciousness in the projection of meaning onto the field of the given due to the primacy of concepts. This relation encompasses alienated self-consciousness and, as I assert below, opens the door to racist thinking and violence, which Hegel did not consider.

The phenomenal aspect of Hegelian recognition is the result of the embodied nature of self-consciousness. Therefore, the interaction with the other requires an embodied awareness of the other. Recognition on the level of intersubjectivity involves this embodied contact with an-other human being, in which event forms a basic but rudimentary distinction between oneself and an-other. Within the Hegelian paradigm a basic recognition by an-other is required for the deepening of self-consciousness. This provides the phenomenal aspect of intersubjective recognition, which seems to be self-explanatory in the sense that it simply just happens and is formed in an immediate fashion. However, this is simply a one-sided recognition, because all it provides is an awareness that the other is there in my presence whilst I distinguish myself as separate from the other. This simple awareness does not provide knowledge of myself or of the other, for which one requires the movement to the conceptual aspect of recognition. This phenomenal aspect is an aspect of consciousness in general, i.e. the basic awareness of phenomena. Once consciousness has become self-consciousness, this phenomenal aspect functions as the element common to both because of its non-discursive nature. Hegel's phrase "bare existence" (1949: 233) is of relevance here, referring to a recognition of existing phenomena as such. In this respect, the word 'phenomenal' refers to the experience of phenomena in the world, meaning that the world is known through the senses *as one (but not the only) aspect of experience.*

The phenomenal aspect of Hegelian recognition, as mentioned above, in the first place concerns what Hegel (1971: 165) refers to as immediate self-consciousness. In the second place, it crucially informs and influences the formation of concepts, which for Hegel represents the emergence of self-consciousness from consciousness. This emergence takes form prior to human intersubjectivity but deepens within intersubjective engagement. What is at stake in immediate self-consciousness is an intelligent understanding of one's existence. The phenomenal aspect of recognition is the initial experience of self-consciousness, which represents a form of intersubjectivity that does not require thought or speech (Dien Winfield 2006: 773). Following

Dien Winfield, the formation of immediate self-consciousness consists of two significant moments:

1. The moment in which the other (as the object) is considered as *similar* to, and *indistinguishable* from, the self (as the subject), i.e. recognition as simple awareness and consumption;
2. The moment of realising the crucial distinction of *difference* between self / subject and other / object, thus constituting a relation between self and other, i.e. recognition as differentiation.

The first moment is characterized by a simple awareness of an object (the other) that is external to the self. The moment when self-consciousness takes hold is a moment in which the embodied self becomes aware of an object. Self-consciousness emerges from consciousness in this awareness of the object. In this moment, consciousness becomes self-consciousness, although it remains as a simple, felt, animalistic awareness of the presence of the other. The foundation of this awareness is desire or appetite (Hegel, 1971: 167). This is a crucial observation about the main spring of self-consciousness, namely that it begins in desire. The role of desire in the formation of self-consciousness cannot be understated because it is by way of desire that the self is drawn to an object. Desire is what drives the will to master and possess the object (and so actually to repel the object) but it is also through desire that *Aufhebung* or sublation can be accomplished, which carries with it the conditions which are necessary for the self to reconcile with the object, in other words the possibility of mutual recognition. Kojève (1969: 40) provides a compact description of the role of desire in asserting that both self-consciousness and (mutual) recognition begins in desire (emphases are his own):

> Action that is destined to satisfy an animal Desire, which is directed toward a given, existing *thing*, never succeeds in realizing a *human*, self-*conscious* I. Desire is human – or, more exactly, "humanizing," "anthropogenetic – only provided that it is directed toward an-other Desire and an *other* Desire (for the thing). To be *human*, man must not act for the sake of subjugating a *thing*, but for the sake of subjugating another *Desire* (for the thing). The man who desires a thing humanly acts not so much to possess the *thing* as to make another *recognize* his *right* – as will be said later – to that thing, to make another recognize him as the *owner* of the thing. And he does this – in the final analysis – in order to make the other recognize his *superiority* over the other. It is only Desire or such a

> *Recognition* (*Anerkennung*), it is only Action that flows from such a Desire, that creates, realizes, and reveals a *human*, non-biological I.

Kojève gives a crucial insight here: The process of self-consciousness and recognition, indeed the process of homonization, is possible only through desire and it is desire that characterizes the movement of the dialectic as it moves along its line of progress. The human trait is not to subjugate (i.e. to control and overcome) simple things as objects but indeed to control and exert power over another Desire in a two-fold way, namely for an-other Desire (i.e. another human being) and also the desires of this human being. This is done by forcing an-other human being to recognize the right of the self (the I) to be the one who holds power and is in control; in other words, as the one whose social reality is the accepted state of society. This is done in order to assert the superiority of the self through a recognition of this superiority, which begins in desire but, as will be seen in chapter one, also leads to a proliferation of desire by the subjugated.

At this point, we are dealing with something basic and rudimentary that is positioned at the start of the dialectic. Immediate self-consciousness has as its aim simply an intentional desire / appetite for the object (Dien Winfield, 2006: 770). It seems to me that this is desire in its most basic form, because, following Dien Winfield (ibid.: 771), the aim is the consumption of the object. The object's function to self-consciousness in this respect is simply to be a means of satisfaction, thus making it an object of gratification. At this point, self-consciousness is negative because it affirms a basic awareness of the object through the negation and absorption of the object (ibid.: 772). This form of self-consciousness is further negative because its recognition of an-other human being is not much different from the recognition of other objects in general. Therefore, recognition of an-other human is reduced to recognition of an object, i.e. everything in the field of the given is objectified (or reified). As a consequence, this recognition is simply an exercise in objectification, and comes down to being nothing more than basic awareness. The awareness of self in the first moment of self-consciousness thus arises from the objectification of the other. This objectification can involve the "literal devouring of the object" (ibid.: 772) (for instance violence or murder), or "some lesser alteration".

This lesser alteration brings us to the second significant moment in the formation of immediate self-consciousness, which is summarised well by the three irreducible premises in Hegel's *Phenomenology* that Kojève (1969: 39-40) identifies: Firstly, "the elementary possibility of *revelation* of Being by Speech", which serves as a conceptual expression of the primary

objectification of the other (which I would suggest to be the main spring of racism). Secondly, "*Action* that destroys or negates given Being (Action that arises from and because of Desire)", in other words the conceptual objectification of the other is taken further (and in fact acts as a kind of desire) through manifest actions that subjugate the other to this conceptual understanding (thus, I would suggest, violence of some sort). Thirdly, "the existence of *several* Desires that can desire one another mutually, each of which wants to negate, to assimilate, to make its own, to subjugate, the other Desire as Desire". This sets the scene for the master-slave relation, where this drama plays out with a winner and a loser, which leads to the further development of self-consciousness. Kojève (1969: 40-41) however mentions something crucial, namely that self-consciousness and humans would remain stuck with desire if the right to be recognised is exclusive only to one side, and that "Man can be fully realized and revealed – that is definitively *satisfied* – only by realizing a universal Recognition". This hints at the possibility of mutual recognition (which will be discussed below in section 6.3) but Kojève continues by saying that due to this multiplicity of Desires, the struggle for recognition at first in the beginning can be nothing but the life and death struggle between different Desires (i.e. master and slave).

This second moment for Hegel comes with the realization of the crucial distinction of difference between self / subject and other / object, thus constituting a relation between self and other. Intersubjectively, this distinction can lead to positive self-consciousness if it fulfils a number of requirements. Firstly, the explicit realization that an object is actually an-other self-consciousness (ibid.: 774), i.e. an-other subject who can form their own identity and meaning. Secondly, the awareness of the embodied differences between self and other. The reason for this is that objects of awareness need to be observed before the differences can be asserted through the mediation of concepts. This means that the moment when self-consciousness distinguishes itself as distinct from an-other takes place in concrete and everyday contact between human beings. Given that both have a sense of self-consciousness, then "each consciousness has the same structure" (ibid.) in acknowledging the embodied nature of differences. Therefore, both share in the exercise of differentiation in which the difference between self and other is asserted. In a sense, this represents a very basic form of reciprocal (or mutual) recognition, but it simply concerns a felt distinction between self and other. Therefore, this felt sense of differentiation is simply a minimal mutual recognition of differences (reflected by the attitudes that say "you're okay and I'm okay" or "let's agree to disagree"). This minimal recognition is fleeting and basic in being an issue of simple perception and observation, but could be taken further by intelligent, reasonable and personal interaction, i.e. through dialogue.

This minimal mutual recognition finds itself with a strange paradox, as worded by Hegel (1971: 170): "In that other as ego I behold myself, and yet also an immediately existing object, another ego absolutely independent of me and opposed to me." In other words, I am aware of myself through the presence of the other, and yet because of its independence, the other can oppose me in the assertion of my subjectivity (for my own identity and meaning). The significance of the presence and independence of the other is the paradox: I can assert my subjectivity only through the presence of the other, but she can assert her subjectivity by virtue of her independence of my subjectivity, i.e. she requires my presence but not my subjectivity. The result of this is that "either self-consciousness [has] the impulse to *show* itself as a free self, and to exist as such for the other:– the process of recognition" (ibid.), i.e. each self-consciousness wants to be recognized as a free being. However, Hegel (ibid.: 171-172) asserts that this process "is a battle" and "a life and death struggle". Recognition in its phenomenal aspect as differentiation (the second moment of immediate self-consciousness) can end with much the same end product as that of recognition as awareness (the first moment).

The struggle for the recognition of the freedom of self happens at the expense of the freedom of the other. For the self to be free, the other must become a thing, i.e. the other must be objectified (and thus consumed). This is the end product of recognition as awareness. Self-consciousness, having gone through the experience of the similiarities and differences it shares with an-other, ultimately returned to itself. However, recognition as differentiation does not arrive at the literal consumption of the object. Rather, it introduces the notion of relationality with the dialectic of mastery and subjugation (master and slave). Accordingly, the struggle for recognition stops short of the literal consumption of the other, i.e. the other is not killed in the process. Nevertheless, the result of the struggle is the objectification of the other, i.e. a return to the self. In this respect, Hegel (1971: 173) asserts that "the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality. While the one combatant prefers life, retains his single self-consciousness, but surrenders his claim for recognition, the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recognized by the former as his superior." The fight for recognition ends with a one-sided recognition as the other forfeits recognition, its life spared in return.

In the end, the notions of mastery and subjugation become a blueprint for the social and political life of humans. In the words of Hegel (ibid.), we see "in the battle for recognition and the subjugation under master … on their phenomenal side, the emergence of man's social life and the

commencement of political union." These notions came to be confirmed in the work of Fanon as the *literal* reality of human relations in colonialism. What is significant is that self-consciousness and its recognition (of self and other) consists in moments that will be further reinforced in a conceptual form *as racism*. So, if an-other as object escapes death, violence can still be exercised against them through various means. This does not mean that the dialectic operates identically at every level. The interaction between individuals is not something that can simply be extrapolated to the collective. The process in the abstract (as I am sketching it here in a somewhat de-historicised fashion) concerns the process of increasing tension between opposites, but there are different dynamics on the social and political levels that can be progressive in attempting to overcome these tensions.

7.2   The problem of alienated self-consciousness

Hegel's account of the master-slave dialectic provides a descriptive rather than a normative model for human relations. When one finds the dynamics of this manifesting itself in society (which was what Hegel was describing, i.e. a state of affairs in society) then it becomes a serious problem because it is the main spring of various forms of prejudice and oppression. In this respect, Hegel provided an account similar to that of Machiavelli (in *The Prince*) and Hobbes (in *Leviathan*) by putting conflict and strife central in human relations, or rather as a starting point for human relations. These accounts are successful as descriptions of human societies but leave us with the normative task to conceptualise some kind of solution to deal with this state of affairs. This solution will have to address the impasse that the dialectic brings about. This impasse seems to be rooted deeply within the notion of Hegelian consciousness as illustrated above. However, one must be fair to Hegel and acknowledge the fact that he is providing a descriptive account, and he provides some ideas about a way forward in dealing with the master-slave relation. This account reveals the dynamics of a problematic type of human relation. The problem with this form of intersubjectivity following from Hegelian consciousness originate in two assumptions within his work:

1. That "[f]or Hegel, all human behaviour in the material world, and hence all human history, is rooted in a prior state of [human] consciousness", i.e. on the level of ideas (a point made by Fukuyama, 1989).
2. The integral role that intersubjective recognition plays in the emergence of self-consciousness.

These assumptions carry an important rationale, i.e. to seriously consider what Hegel has to say in terms of the master-slave dialectic (including its underlying assumptions) and the kind of consciousness that is involved, revealing how it provides an explanation of sorts for the presence of racism and violence in human relations. That does not mean that I accept Hegel's assumptions as categorical elements of human relations, but for the sake of the process and line of thinking of this project, it is necessary to take its conclusions seriously. Hegel motivates the first assumption through an instance of the second assumption that he provides, namely the master-slave dialectic. Through this example he reveals that the "realm of consciousness in the long run necessarily becomes manifest in the material world, indeed creates the material world in its own image" (ibid.). In other words, the state of human consciousness (and its ideas of the world) will lead to a certain type of worldly reality. When it concerns intersubjectivity, it stands to reason that the state of human consciousness (and the ideas it generates) will have a profound effect on human relations.

Taking the above assumptions into account, one could point to a critical problem regarding the account of the master-slave. The reaction of the master to the slave (and *vice versa*) brings about a consciousness that holds ideas, i.e. concepts, as primary. Therefore, the slave will be connected to an idea that the master has in his consciousness. This means that the slave's idea of himself is not of his own making. The nature of the self-consciousness that emerges in the slave (but also in that of the master) involves a relation of alienation (this was the focus of Marx's reinterpretation of Hegel) and involves the development of *alienated self-consciousness*. This kind of self-consciousness has to do with two key problems:

1. The negation, absence or denial of humanity within self-consciousness where it concerns relations with others, for instance in the case of race.
2. The ideas generated as a consequence of this negation / absence / denial, which are attached to the racial other and leads specifically to misrecognition.

Hegel charts the development of this kind of self-consciousness and this development is of crucial importance to the sketch of mutual recognition that will follow below. The importance of his account when it regards a discussion of race and an explanation for racism is affirmed by Gibson (2003: 30) when he says that "Fanon's introduction of race into the master/slave dialectic is a profound though largely overlooked original contribution developed in the context of the

postwar 'Hegel' in France." This original contribution needs also to be considered when looking at the issue of mutual recognition and Honneth's influential model of mutual recognition (considered in the conclusion), revealing how Fanon pointed to the role of racism and violence in the struggle for recognition (an issue neglected by Hegel).

7.3   The possibility of mutual recognition

Hegel put some thought into the possibility of mutual recognition in what Williams (1997: 59) refers to as Hegel's "syllogism of recognition". This (rather complicated) syllogism reveals where the master-slave dialectic becomes a failure of mutual recognition (1977: 112):

> In this movement [of two self-consciousnesses] we see repeated the process which presented itself as the play of Forces, but repeated now in consciousness. What in that process was *for us*, is true here of the extremes themselves. The middle term is self-consciousness which splits into the extremes; and each extreme is thus exchanging of its own determinateness and an absolute transition into the opposite. Although, as consciousness, it does indeed come *out of itself*, yet, though out of itself, it is at the same time kept back within itself, is *for itself*, and the self outside of it is for *it*. It is aware that it at once is, and is not, another consciousness, and equally that this other is *for itself* only when it supercedes itself as being for itself, and is for itself only in the being-for-self of the other. Each is for the other the middle term, through which each mediates itself with itself and unites with itself; and each is for itself, and for the other, an immediate being on its own account, which at the same time is such only through this mediation. They *recognize* themselves as *mutually recognizing* one another.

In this complicated but important passage, Hegel asserts that the exchange between two self-consciousnesses follows the same route as the rudimentary interplay between subject and object, i.e. between concept and phenomenon. This passage is significant because it asserts that mutual recognition is possible if only as an ideal. Hegel calls the above the "pure Notion of recognition", i.e. the pure concept of recognition. This means that mutual recognition is possible in theory but as Hegel's master-slave dialectic reveals in reality, intersubjectivity hinges on strife and conflict instead of reciprocity in mutual recognition. Based on the above "syllogism of recognition", self-consciousness itself seems to carry the potential for the mutual recognition of an-other. However, the fulfilment of this potential hinges on three important aspects that need to be present in self-consciousness:

1. *Self-transcendence*, a term used by Williams (1997: 59) in his discussion of the above passage to describe the movement between two self-consciousnesses. This aspect points to the significance of self-consciousness as an attempt to reach out to an-other self-consciousness. In this movement of reaching out, one grants oneself the chance to move beyond prejudice and preconceived notions. This results in a transcendence of the self and an openness to an-other.

2. *Mediation* is necessary because for "each is the mediating term for the other, through which each mediates itself with itself and coincides with itself" (Hegel, 1977: 112). This means that mediation requires a sense of community between two persons, i.e. one seeks a common ground on which to meet the other (e.g. the humanity of self and other).

3. *Reciprocity* is required to ensure that the recognition attained is not one-sided (i.e. misrecognition masquerading as recognition). This reciprocity implies that one must observe oneself as recognizing an-other whilst the other does the same. The result of this is a mutual freedom in which self-agency is gained.

Williams (1997: 59) asserts, quite significantly, that only through mutual recognition can one gain a full sense of self. He seems to be implying here that anything short of mutual recognition provides one with an inadequate sense of self, in other words a self that is not fully developed. Williams has the following to say in light of Hegel's "syllogism of recognition":

> …each term [i.e. each self-consciousness] is both extreme and mean. Each self must serve as mediator for the other, while receiving in turn mediation – that is, recognition – from the other. Only through such reciprocal action can the self "return" to itself out of its "othered" state, by gaining itself in the other's recognition. Yet this syllogism contains a paradox: Recognition is both needed and yet cannot be coerced. If it is coerced, the resulting recognition is phony and inauthentic, as Hegel's analysis of mastery shows. Affirmative self-recognition in the other cannot be coerced; it must be freely proffered by the other, who in turn must be allowed to be.

Self-consciousness is significant because it represents the potential for the mutual recognition of an-other (as mentioned above). However, a tension exists within self-consciousness itself because of the interplay between subject and object. Self-consciousness can follow the route of extremity, in which case it objectifies an-other as wholly different from itself whilst at the same time forcing

its own identity onto an-other. That means that an-other must recognize the identity of its other as master whilst accepting the identity that is forced onto itself as slave. For Hegel (1977: 112), this is an unequal recognition of opposition in which one self-consciousness (namely the master) is being *recognized* whilst the other (namely the slave) is simply *recognizing*. This is the phony and inauthentic recognition that Williams refers to; recognition that is forced or coerced from one side by the other. On the other hand, self-consciousness can follow the route of mediation with a fusion of its own interests and that of an-other. In this case, self-consciousness realizes the subjectivity and agency of an-other, which ironically strengthens its own subjectivity and agency. This opens the door to mutual recognition and the important move away from implementing the subject-object relation in human relations. Instead, one has a true sense of intersubjectivity, i.e. mutual subjectivity. Mutual subjectivity implies that the identity of self-consciousness is of its own making, and not forced onto itself by the agency of an-other.

This is how so-called *Aufhebung* (English: sublation) happens, i.e. to reach a higher viewpoint that combines both parties whilst leaving behind the former situation and progressing further along the line of the dialectic. What is the significance of *Aufhebung* for my study? This study is a movement towards the possibility of mutual recognition that shows how the structures of mutual recognition is problematised within the postcolonial context of post-Apartheid South Africa. This in itself represents a movement further down the historical path of the dialectic, whilst also exploring the possibilities of mutual recognition in the context of the postcolonial form that the dialectic has taken. In fact, what I hope to show with my study is that the dialectic in this context becomes heterotopia. In other words, heterotopia represents *Aufhebung* in the postcolonial context. However, the postcolonial heterotopia is not necessarily progressive and can either be derivative of the dialectic or be the dialectic in a decomposed form. In this way, the heterotopia poses the same problems to the possibility of mutual recognition than the dialectic, and so the turn to Honneth's theory of mutual recognition in the conclusion attempts to show that *Aufhebung* could be situated at a more progressive point in the movement of the dialectic within the postcolonial context.

7.4   *Addressing the failure of mutual recognition*

Phony and inauthentic recognition (i.e. misrecognition) is clearly a case of the subject-object relation characteristic of conceptualist thinking that becomes manifest in human relations. Williams (1997: 69) rightly asserts that Hegel explores the negative dimensions of recognition,

i.e. refusal, coercion and deception. He alludes to the possibility of mutual recognition. However, the account of the master-slave dialectic as it appears in the *Phenomenology* provides the description of a specific shape of consciousness that is subversive and destructive (ibid.). It is a problematic version of intersubjectivity because "the fundamental distinction between concept and its determinate appearance-instantiations" are blurred instead of being retained (ibid.:73). Williams points out that this problematic is central to the dialectic and that "Hegel himself tends to blur this distinction somewhat because he discusses recognition as if master/slave were an integral aspect of it, rather than a contingent, deficient exemplification of [the] possibilities [of recognition]". Hegel's categorical discussion of the master-slave seems to leave him open to criticism and Williams makes a note of the fact that Hegel does redeem himself in the *Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit* (published in 1830). In this work, Hegel "maintains that recognition does not necessarily involve conflict and opposition" (ibid.: 74). In the case of the master and slave, recognition is stunted because strife and opposition is characteristic of the relation.

What is clear, is that Hegel did not adequately consider the role of violence and racism within the master-slave dialectic. The role of especially racism seems to be discounted. He might not dismiss race as having a role in the dialectic, but the role of race is ambiguous within Hegel's account simply because he does not use explicit racial terms when he speaks about the master and the slave. Hegel does speak of the life-and-death struggle that takes place before the identities of the master and slave are formed, and after which the master is the one that conceptually determines the other. He does speak of the conceptual inversion that takes place in the self-consciousness of the slave, attained through the rigors of labour. However, Hegel did not fully think through the implications of the dynamics of each of these moments in the dialectic. Therefore, one must look at the dynamic that is identified as problematic within the dialectic, namely the blurred distinction between concept and phenomenon. The role of conceptual thinking on the phenomena that it describes must be considered, and the primacy that Hegel affords to concepts bars him from fully realizing the consequences of the master-slave dialectic.

With an eye on addressing the failure of mutual recognition in the conclusion with developing a postcolonial theory of recognition, I think it is important to make three possible suggestions regarding Hegel's text. These three suggestions are not necessarily original but might provide the crux of the problematic found within Hegel's account of the master and slave. The three

suggestions also constitute a rationale from my side for a certain perspective on the master-slave dialectic:

1. As a starting point, following Williams (1997: 60), one could view the master-slave dialectic as a *deficient* realization of the process of recognition because it "is a determinate instance of recognition that is unequal: one party recognizes the other but is not recognized in turn, and the other is recognized but does not recognize". However, Williams (ibid.: 73) asserts that the master-slave dialectic is simply "a contingent, deficient exemplification of [the] possibilities [of recognition]."

2. Assuming this to be the case, one must then ask what is constituted by this deficient realization of recognition. Here I suggest that it constitutes the type of self-consciousness that undergirds racism and violence. In this respect I follow Fanon's example in approaching the master-slave dialectic as an account of the development of *alienated self-consciousness*, i.e. self-consciousness which is characterized by racism and expressed through violence (although not exclusively so).

3. Accepting the first two suggestions, one must then ask where the problem lies in Hegel's account of self-consciousness, which brings about alienation and consequently racism and violence. In my view, it has to do with the relation between two important aspects within the Hegelian paradigm, namely phenomenon and concept. This relation proves to be problematic when it concerns intersubjective recognition and the relations between persons, i.e. when it specifically concerns the phenomenon of race and how it is related through racist concepts. Hegel did not take full cognizance of the threat of racism and violence in terms of the relation between master and slave.

These suggestions must be seen in light of the dialectical process: The master-slave dialectic is an unequal relation by definition, with subjugation and domination standing central in the dynamic of this relation. There is thus no other form for this relation to take, unless there is a movement away from the relation towards a progressive form further along the line in the dialectic. What needs to be emphasised is that this progression is carried by the slave because s/he is the one who is subordinate and in a worse-off situation, so to speak. There is no reason for the master to make this move. The world or social reality of this relation becomes the making of the slave (as will be seen in chapter one) as s/he is the one performing the labour or work of making things, which also contributes to a sense of self-consciousness. Through slavery, the slaves develop

consciousness as a group or class that then begins to move towards a demand for recognition. This class consciousness does not extrapolate from the individual but develops from the collective into a reality, and it is a movement that does not take place in the master. This movement towards recognition for the slave moves through alienated self-consciousness (as discussed in 6.2), and actually has to make this movement in all its various forms (stoic, sceptic, unhappy, etc.) in order to arrive at a point where self-consciousness can demand mutual recognition (to rid itself of racism and violence as effects of the master-slave relation).

In terms of the above suggestions the central assertion is that Hegel's account of the master-slave dialectic and the self-consciousness constituted by it could be viewed as an account of the emergence of misrecognition. Racism and violence are concrete consequences of the interplay between master and slave as it manifests in reality. The process with regards to recognition and how it develops from self-recognition to one-sided recognition and then mutual recognition can be sketched in the following table:

Table 1: Recognition and Hegel's theory of consciousness

	Type of recognition:	Cognitive process:	Level of consciousness:
Interaction with the world (field of the given)	Self-recognition	Distinguish object (world, reality)	Consciousness (of bare existence)
		Distinguish subject and object (self and other)	Deepening of consciousness (as self-awareness)
Intersubjectivity (interaction with persons)	Misrecognition (One-sided)	Distinguish other as an object	Alienated self-consciousness (racism, violence)
	Mutual Recognition	Distinguish other as subject	Self-consciousness (receptivity to the other)

To bring it all together: Self-consciousness distinguishes and identifies objects in the world and this level of consciousness can be termed bare existence. There is then a deepening of consciousness as self-awareness where the self is distinguished as distinct from the world, and so we find the split that takes place between the self as subject and the world (or other) as object. Misrecognition as one-sided recognition is basically a continuation of object-centred recognition in human relations where the other person is simply distinguished as an object. This leads to

relations of racism and violence and alienated self-consciousness, i.e. a relation where the self dominates the other to such an extent that they are alienated from each other whilst the other also feels themselves to be alienated from the world around themselves because their sense of freedom is controlled by someone else. Ideal interaction with others, where issues of racism and violence are addressed, would be some form of mutual recognition where the other is distinguished as a subject (i.e. a free person who can form their own identity). In this relation, one also finds the ideal conditions for self-knowledge for both self and other. The master-slave dialectic is an instance of misrecognition, what Williams calls "phoney recognition", but it is not the only form that recognition can take. Markell (2003: 119) provides a succinct summary of the place of the dialectic:

> Hegel's account of master and slave, though it does have *resonances* with Greek and Roman slavery, modern colonial slavery, and relations of personal domination in medieval Europe, is best understood as a parable that illustrates certain general features of social domination, and not as a single concrete form.

This then is the cue for this study, to use Hegel as the starting point (in the introduction and chapter one) regarding the general features of social domination (i.e. the dialectic), and then to study the concrete form that it has taken in post-Apartheid South Africa (i.e. the postcolonial heterotopia). The transition and transformation of the dialectic to the heterotopia beyond Apartheid is the key thread that runs through this study, and with that the demonstration of the economic sphere as the locus of recognition in contemporary South Africa. This form of recognition, i.e. economic recognition, will be shown to be a form of misrecognition in the way that it regards social domination.

CHAPTER ONE

Hegel and Fanon on the Question of Mutual Recognition: A Comparative Analysis

by

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Abstract

In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel provides his exposition of the master-slave dialectic as an account of both the emergence of self-consciousness and the need for recognition. Hegel's line of thought came to play an important role in Fanon's critique of Western colonialism. Whilst the hand of Hegel can be seen throughout Fanon's oevre, in a chapter of *Black Skin, White Masks* Fanon pays particular interest to the specific relevance of the master-slave dialectic for colonial societies. The focus of Fanon's critique is on the role of race and violence. Violence complicates, and adds urgency, to the need for recognition. I would like to contend that an optimistic moment lurks in Fanon's work, which is articulated in a characterization of humanity which could serve as a point of entry into mutual recognition.

Introduction

Frantz Fanon's work was written in a context both similar and different to our own. We have seen an end to colonialism but its effects are still around, as is the unequal relationship between the West and its former colonies. The persistence of violence and racism in some of these former colonies in Africa means that Fanon still carries much relevance. Revisiting Fanon does not only result in a reassessment of his work but also of our own context. This paper will attempt to look at a specific passage within Fanon's work on Hegel's master-slave dialectic. The significance of this passage lies in Fanon's attempt to demonstrate why Hegel's dialectic is relevant to the colonial context. This passage is important because it provides some clues that could help us in addressing the problem of mutual recognition in light of violence and racism.

Hegel's master-slave dialectic serves as one of his most profound ideas and it has left a lasting legacy. The master-slave dialectic underscores Hegel's primary attempt at conceptualizing and describing the process of recognition on the way to mutual recognition. In short, *proper* recognition is the *mutual* recognition of one conscious agent and a second conscious agent.

Mutual recognition allows both self and the Other to have freedom and agency in the development and attainment of their own self-consciousness, in other words a cognitive awareness of the self and its relation to the Other (and also the world).[1] Hegel's master-slave dialectic describes a specific form of human relations in which domination has a central role to play. This domination is at the heart of the need for recognition in the midst of a life and death struggle. The master-slave dialectic was taken up by Fanon in his critique of Western colonialism. According to Fanon the dialectic is relevant to human relations in the colonies but he adjusts the dialectic with a focus on the role of race and violence. I agree that Fanon's version of the dialectic problematises mutual recognition but want to contend that mutual recognition still remains possible. This article sets out to articulate an optimistic moment that seems to lurk in Fanon's work where engagement with the Other (one's fellow human being), rooted in the notion of reciprocity, rests on a characterization of humanity that could possibly serve as a point of entry into mutual recognition.

Hegel's Recognition: Master and Slave

Hegel provides the master-slave dialectic in his work *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807).[2] This dialectic represents a fable of sorts in that it reflects Hegel's ideas on the course of history up to his time, but also the conflict contemporary to his time that existed between the French (master) and German (slave) cultures in the early nineteenth century in his native Prussia. The dialectic takes the form of an analysis of the working of self-consciousness and demonstrates how the self can only become conscious of itself by the presence of, and recognition of itself by, an-other (PhS, p. 113). However, this process of self-consciousness takes place at the expense of the Other. The moment in which the self becomes conscious of itself, declaring itself as an 'I', the Other is negated and destroyed as an-other (PhS, p. 109). This is a perplexing notion. This negation and destruction of the Other is the result of it becoming a mirror image of the self (PhS, p. 111). This mirror image is the self's attempt at overcoming the Other in order to become certain of itself as the primary and essential being in this world (PhS, p. 111). Both self and the Other engage in this process of self-consciousness and the result is an always unequal relationship of strict opposition. In short, the process is thus: declaring oneself as 'I' is a reaction to becoming conscious of one's self through the presence of an-other. Declaring oneself as 'I' is important, because it avoids consideration of the self as a *thing* (PhS, p. 115) or object amongst other objects. However, in order to do this one must see the Other as a *thing* or object, and in so doing, negate and annihilate the Other as a self that exists for itself.

To demonstrate the working of the process of self-consciousness Hegel incorporates the metaphor of the relationship between master and slave (in his vocabulary, lord and bondsman). The master "is a consciousness existing *for itself* which is mediated with itself through another consciousness" (PhS, p. 115). Once this mediation has transpired, the master becomes a being-for-*self*.

The master becomes conscious of self only by virtue of the presence of an-other. This other is the slave, who "is the dependent consciousness whose essential nature is simply to live or to be for another" (PhS, p. 115), which means that he is a being-for-*other*. The slave is inextricably linked to *thinghood* (PhS, p. 115), and cannot break free from being considered a thing by the master. The master, on the other hand, ironically, desires the thing that is the slave. Why this desire? According to Singer (2001, p. 76), in the Hegelian sense, "[t]o desire something is to wish to possess it and thus not to destroy it altogether – but also to transform it into something that is yours, and thus to strip it of its foreignness." The master desires the thing that is the slave in as much as the thing can be possessed, namely by defining what the thing is. Defining the thing that is the Other satisfies the desire of the master by virtue of representing an act of making the Other the same as the self. The Other nourishes the desire of the self to make the world its own. The master seizes power over the thing because he is the one who decides what the thing is (PhS, p. 115). What is the nature of the thing, according to the master? The answer to this is quite simple: "it is something merely negative" (PhS, p. 115).

The relation between master and slave has an ironic effect: "the lord [master] achieves his recognition through another consciousness" (PhS, p. 116) (the slave), and in so doing becomes dependent on the thing for his own self-consciousness (PhS, p. 117). The chains of the slave become that of the master as well. As a consequence, there exists no manner of freedom, only mutual enslavement to the *thing*. The slave is dependent on his thinghood and thus on his definition as thing by the master (PhS, p. 115). This dependence of the slave is held in place by servitude, in other words a fearful consciousness in which one's whole being is seized with dread (PhS, p. 117): the slave fears annihilation (in other words death) by the master. The slave sets aside his own self-consciousness, in so doing negating himself, by providing servitude to the master in an attempt to rid himself of this fear (PhS, pp. 116, 117). The price the slave pays for keeping alive is servitude, which satisfies the desire the master has for possession of the Other. The slave, negating himself, does to himself the same thing that the master does to the slave. This negation, at first, draws back into itself and he makes his own "negativity an object and transform[s his] alienation into independent self-consciousness" (Oliver, 2004, p. 5). This transformation is brought about through the act of labour (or work), which finds expression in an object created by the slave. This created object serves an important function: the slave recognizes a representation of himself in the object, and consequently the object serves as a motivation for the slave to bring about his own liberation. In short, the slave's labour sets him free. Through his newly acquired independent self-consciousness the slave becomes aware of what he really is (PhS, p. 118). His fear, at first muted and also turned inward, is externalized onto the master (PhS, pp. 118-119), and the master is seen as the object of his (the slave's) fear (PhS, p. 117). The independent consciousness of the slave represents a spirit of resistance and rebellion against the master. Through this rebellion the slave comes to see himself as existing on his own accord by negating the object of his fear, namely the master (PhS, p. 118). As a consequence, the master becomes other to the slave, which also heralds the slave's entry into subjecthood.

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The slave still fears the master, but overcomes this fear by seeing the master as an object and therefore a *thing*. The thing has been seized as the possession of the slave through his rebellion, and its nature is now his own making. What is the nature of the thing, according to the slave? The answer to this is quite ironic, for the shape of the thing is now a mirror image of the slave himself (PhS, p. 118), namely an object that needs to be mastered, negated and annihilated. Liberman (1999, p. 272) words this moment well when he says, "each subject objectifies the Other, i.e. each subject produces an object."

The distinction between object and subject is an important one to take into account because it plays a big role in identifying the differences between Hegelian and Fanonian slavery (discussed in the next section). Following Lonergan (1992, p. 446) one can distinguish two elements in the Hegelian dialectic that is crucial for this distinction, namely the primacy of concepts and the integral role of sublation. Firstly, in short, concepts are primary because of its provision of meaning to objects, which results in the grasp of objects. In this respect the grasp of an object facilitates the move into being a subject. Secondly, this movement into subjecthood means that the object becomes sublated, meaning that it is consumed by the subject. In so doing, the object becomes dependent on the subject for its own nourishment and as a result its meaning hinges on that of the subject. The term object, then, refers to a self-consciousness that is not able to affix its own meaning and in so doing bring itself to realization. The object's meaning is determined and constructed by an-other, and therefore it is a being-for-other. Therefore, a subject, in contrast, refers to a self-consciousness that is able to affix its own meaning, bringing about a realization of self, which means that he is a being-for-self. The subject's realization comes at the cost of the object, which is sublated in the process whilst its meaning is derived from the subject and must also be acceptable to the subject. Hegel's treatment of recognition ends with the slave turning the tables on the master by way of considering the master as an object, but this only happens after the slave regards himself as an object that needs to be transformed into a subject.

Fanon's Recognition: White Master and Black Slave

Frantz Fanon provides a specific analysis of the theme of recognition in the work *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952) and reinterprets Hegel in the colonial context in terms of race, namely the relationship between the white settler and Black man, in other words master and slave.[3] He picks up where Hegel left off, stating that "man is human only to the extent to which he tries to impose his existence on another man in order to be recognised by him" (BSWM, p. 216). This presents a number of positive and negative things to be said about recognition: positively, it seems that the desire or need for one to be recognised is a simple human attribute, which means that it is human to want to be recognised.[4] Both positively and negatively, one is only human if recognised as such. Negatively, Fanon seems to suggest that the extent of the imposition of one's existence on an-other becomes the measure of humanity, in other words one can only be human if one ensures that one imposes oneself on an-other successfully.

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It must be clear that from the onset the concept of humanity is now problematised, but it is also qualified as the bond between self and the Other. This is clear when Fanon (BSWM, p. 217) says, "it is on that other being, on recognition by that other being, that his [man's] own human worth and reality depend. It is that other being in whom the meaning of life is condensed." Thus, I am only human if an-other recognises me as human. My humanity is inextricably intertwined with the Other, even though it seems that (Hegelian) humanity can only come about in the consumption of the Other because of the need or desire for recognition (Williams, 1997, p. 49). This need or desire is expressed in an "open conflict between black and white" (BSWM, p. 217) within the colonial context. The situation is such that the white settler regards the Black man as a slave (BSWM, p. 214) because he does not measure up to the standard of whiteness. In so doing the white settler asserts himself as the master. Therefore the Black slave mirrors everything that is bad to the white master, namely the negative characteristics of humanity. What are the negative characteristics of humanity, in the eyes of the white man, in the Black man? The white man considers Black men as "machine-animal-men" (BSWM, p. 220): they are partly human, partly animal, completely thing and object, and is there solely to perform labour (BSWM, p. 220).

Where there is, at least, some form of reciprocity in Hegel, Fanon points to a major departure in the colonial context with regards to the white master and Black slave (BSWM, p. 220-21). The white master finds the Black slave laughable and is not seeking recognition from the slave. Rather, the white master simply wants the Black slave to perform labour for him. However, the Black slave finds no liberation in his work (as the Hegelian slave does), and does not get embroiled in objectifying the master. He does not come to regard the white master as an object because he never turns his own negativity (a result of his negation and objectification by the master) into an object in the first place (Oliver, 2004, p. 5). This is a necessary step on the way to subjectivity, and the Black slave never makes this move. Instead, he wants to be *like* the white master and he is fixated with becoming a subject. This situation makes him less independent than the Hegelian slave because he always considers the subjectivity of the master, and never his own. The result of this is a paradox in which the Black slave finds himself: he wants to be recognised as a subject, but the master will not provide such recognition because in his consideration the slave is not human but part of nature and therefore an animal. Serequeberhan (1994, p. 46) points out that in the Hegelian sense, nature is equated with objecthood. Therefore, the white colonial master's attitude rests exactly on a Hegelian presupposition concerning humanity. Human (or spiritual) existence is equated with self-conscious freedom (Serequeberhan, 1994, p. 139), in other words subjecthood, which is on a higher level than that of the unfree and naturally determined, namely the nonhuman. The master initially found himself on this level, but elevated himself to become human when he became conscious of himself, therefore forsaking his natural existence. This, according to Serequeberhan, is the most significant moment of Hegel's master-slave dialectic, and it is a moment that the Hegelian slave can also partake in. This moment transpires when the Hegelian slave becomes a subject in his own consideration when he regards the master as an object.

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Fanon's Black slave never reaches this moment, but remains stuck within a fixation with the identity of the white master. The Hegelian slave turns away from the master and turns towards the object (BSWM, p. 220), therefore he considers the master as an object and in so doing asserts his own subjectivity. The Black slave, on the other hand, turns towards the master and abandons the object (BSWM, p. 220), therefore he considers the master's subjectivity as something he wants himself. The Hegelian slave attains subjectivity although he did not pursue it whilst the Black slave pursues subjectivity, but finds it unattainable. In the final analysis, the Hegelian slave both disallows definition of itself by the object (namely the master) and being considered as an object as such and in so doing takes hold of its own meaning. The Hegelian slave knows how to form an independent self-consciousness and his situation even becomes so radical that the master becomes dependent on the slave to uphold his own self-consciousness. Fanon's Black slave is not so fortunate and remains in an unfavourable situation. He does not create himself (BSWM, p. 220) and is dependent on the master for his own self-consciousness. Within this situation, at bottom, as Fanon puts it so succcintly, "[i]t is always a question of the subject; one never even thinks of the object" (BSWM, p. 212). The Black slave wants to be recognised as a subject, and never wants to be regarded as an object. The Black slave wants to be the "centre of attention", wants to be *the* subject. However, in the gaze of the white master the Black slave always fulfills the role of an object in four ways: firstly, the slave is an instrument against which the master measures his own superiority. Secondly, the slave enables the master to realize his subjective security. Thirdly, the slave helps the master in defining himself and the world. Fourthly and crucially, the slave is denied his individuality and liberty (BSWM, p. 212).

The Move into Conflict and Violence

The situation between the white master and Black slave becomes even more radical and bleak. The Black slave's desire for subjectivity is by no means exhausted, despite the odds staked up against him. He is "a man crucified. The environment has shaped him, has horribly drawn and quartered him … [he has] an indisputable complex of dependence on the [white master]" (BSWM, p. 216). The Black slave cannot simply remain in the place that has been assigned to him, for he seeks to make an end to this (BSWM, p. 216). For Fanon this can only happen through conflict and violence. According to Fanon "human reality in-itself-for-itself can be achieved only through conflict and through the risk that conflict implies" (BSWM, p. 218). Conflict, it seems, is a central feature in human reality if one is to be transformed from being an object to being a subject, thus facilitating the entry into self-consciousness. Fanon continues by saying, "self-consciousness accepts the risk of its life, and consequently it threatens the Other in his physical being" (BSWM, p. 218), implying, it seems to me, that the pursuit of subjectivity by the Black slave threatens the master's life. The desire for subjectivity, for the Black slave, represents three things: firstly, he wants to make himself recognized (BSWM, p. 217) by virtue of his own agency and he wants to assign meaning to himself as he pleases. Secondly, he wants to be considered as one that can desire, and is not devoid of the ability to transform himself.

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Thirdly, he does not want to be considered a mere thing. Fanon looks to Hegel for a clear articulation of the Black slave's desire for subjectivity: "It is solely by risking life that freedom is obtained; only thus it is tried and proved that the essential nature of self-consciousness is not *bare existence*, is not the merely immediate form in which it at first makes its appearance, is not its mere absorption in the expanse of life" (PhM, p. 233). For Hegel freedom exists only because one is prepared to take the ultimate risk to obtain it. Freedom is therefore essentially negative because it is not something that it is my *right* to have. Freedom is gained only beyond struggle, thus it something to be *earned*. This freedom is characterized by the ability to assign meaning to oneself. The reason for this is that self-consciousness is not bare existence (being-in-itself) but rather "pure self-existence, being-for-self" (PhM, p. 233). To recapitulate, in my view, being-for-self refers to the individual that has agency in terms of assigning meaning to one's self. The freedom and agency that is involved in being-for-self is not granted to the Black slave, or rather, *he does not grant himself this freedom and agency*. According to Fanon this is the case because recognition without struggle does take place as the white master, one day, without conflict, "said to the Negro, 'From now on you are free'" (BSWM, p. 219). Here the white master's words seem contradictory as its tone seems normative in a sense, commanding the Black slave to accept that he is now free because he has the same rights as the master. However, this is an empty recognition as "the former slave wants to make himself recognized" (BSWM, p. 217) and be in control of how this transpires. Thus, he wants to be in control of the "what" in himself that is recognized, namely the image and identity conveyed to the master of old and also to himself. And yet, the desire to be like the white master persists.

The situation of the Fanonian slave-object is described well by Hegel (PhM, p. 233): "The individual who has not staked his life, may, no doubt, be recognized as a *person*, but he has not attained the truth of his recognition as an independent self consciousness." This is indeed an interesting point in my view, and it throws some light on the idea of personhood, at least in the Hegelian sense. Personhood can be gained without struggle, but this does not necessarily imply that one has gained freedom or agency in being able to provide oneself with meaning. It seems then that personhood does not imply mutual agency and freedom. It is rather a question of what kind of personhood one gains: is it a personhood of equality following on the master's decision to forsake his hold on the slave, meaning that he simply does not oppress the slave anymore and the slave has the *same* rights as the master; or is it a personhood of superiority that was preceded by a violent struggle after which the slave has rights that are *superior* to that of the master. This problematises personhood, for equal rights seem to be a fair trade but also seem to be no more than a simple truce with violence simmering just under the surface. In Fanon's view, the Black slave will only be satisfied if the dialectic is inverted, and the means to do this is violence. The values of the white master are simply inherited and exercised by the slave and not transformed, transcended or overcome in order to reach values that are authentically the slave's own. This leaves one at a rather bleak juncture. Is there any hope in coming to terms with the colonial situation between the white master and Black slave? Is it at all possible to make the move from violence to mutual recognition on an intersubjective level? I think that such a move could be possible if one turns to Fanon's characterization of humanity, which could serve as a point of entry into mutual recognition.

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Fanon's Characterization of Humanity

Fanon, in my view, provides three helpful suggestions in the direction of mutual recognition that forms his characterization of humanity: firstly, the importance of acknowledging differences among people; secondly, the integral role of action as it relates to the formation of subjectivity; and thirdly, the basic values of humanity.

The Acknowledgment of Difference

Fanon reveals that the affirmation of differences between Black and white is important. This does not mean that there are *only* differences between Black and white, but if differences are stamped out then forgetfulness creeps in of both colonialism's atrocities and the history of race and racism it embodies. How is this forgetfulness a problem? According to Fanon the white man, addressing the Black man as 'brother', attempts to convince the Black man that there are in fact no differences between black and white (BSWM, p. 221). However, this is not done for reasons of brotherhood. The origin of this address, says Fanon, is much rather an indifference from the white man for the differences between himself and that of the (former) Black slave (BSWM, p. 221). More importantly, it is also done from a simple paternalistic curiosity that the white man has in the Black man (BSWM, p. 221), meaning that he has an interest in the Black man as far as the former slave can be of economic and political assistance to the white man's aspirations in this respect. Under the surface of the rhetoric according to which the white man proclaims black and white to be equal, there are ulterior motives. Fanon would have it that this is not actually an assertion of equality, but rather of sameness. It is an assertion serving in the name of economic and political functionality and expediency, seeking to ascertain the gain that the Other can provide in this respect. Fanon opposes this motivation and asserts, "yet the Negro *knows* that there is a difference. He *wants* it" (BSWM, p. 221). The acknowledgement, maybe even the celebration of difference, is key to the formation of self-consciousness. The acknowledgment of the role and impact of race in society is an issue that should not simply be skirted over. It could be said that a forgetfulness of race can even result in a forgetfulness, or misappropriation, of being in the sense that people cannot properly develop a self-consciousness in the Fanonian sense. Difference, according to Fanon, is affirmed in what he calls the maintenance of alterity by the Black man (BSWM, p. 222), which means that the self affirms itself as fundamentally different in certain respects to the Other. However, Fanon calls this an "[a]lterity of rupture, of conflict, of battle" (BSWM, p. 222), once again alluding to the violence that waits on the horizon. In my view, at bottom this is a reference to the self's resistance to its objectification. One can never fully be sure of one's own subjectivity under the gaze of the Other, as Fanon asserts, "[the black slave is] [u]nable ever to be sure whether the white man considers him consciousness in-itself-for-itself" (BSWM, p. 222). This uncertainty motivates a call to action by the self, a motivation that moves one to assert one's subjectivity by affirming difference instead of seeking *only* sameness in self and the Other.

Action and Subjectivity

For Fanon, action is integral to the formation of subjective self-consciousness. In no uncertain terms Fanon states, "[t]he former slave needs a challenge to his humanity, he wants a conflict, a riot" (BSWM, p. 221). The former slave is rendered active by the challenges from the outside to his desire for subjectivity. He asserts his subjectivity by virtue of this challenge, in reaction to the objectification of himself by the white man. The importance of action as central to Fanon's idea of subjectivity is, however, a notion that problematises and even undermines recognition. In this respect Chari (2004, p. 118) notes that the recognition model fails to provide the conditions for the realization of the agency of the colonized subject, something that action does provide. Therefore, action seems to transcend the aims of recognition. Although I concur with Chari that action helps in the provision of agency, I feel that recognition is left problematised but not necessarily undermined or left behind as something that had to be transcended. In my view, action and recognition could (and should) co-exist as a means of attaining one's subjectivity. This I say because it seems to me that only once intelligent thought has transpired can Fanonian action take place. According to Fanon, "[t]o educate man is to be *actional*, preserving in all his relations his respect for basic values that constitute a human world, is the prime task of him who, having taken thought, prepares to act" (BSWM, p. 222). Fanon is very clear about the significance and utter importance of action in coming to terms with the end of oppression. However, before one can enter *humane* action, one needs to put thought into what one considers to be basic values that constitute the human world. These basic values, in my view, could serve as point of entry into mutual recognition, conferring subjectivity on both self and the Other.

The Basic Values of Humanity

Fanon provides his selection of values that motivates action from people, those values that people pursue, even risking death in the process. He puts it forward as follows, "man is a *yes*. I will never stop reiterating that. *Yes* to life. *Yes* to love. *Yes* to generosity" (BSWM, p. 222). These values constitute the backbone of humanity and also mutual recognition: recognition of life, love and generosity in one's fellow human being and in oneself. It serves only as a starting point of entry for constituting humanity as it properly facilitates mutual recognition and mutual subjectivity. These values also serve both as the motivation towards action, and as the successful result of action, which implies that action should bring about a human society based on these values. Fanon considers action to be superior to reaction when he says, "[m]an's behaviour is not only reactional. And there is always resentment in reaction" (BSWM, p. 222). Here Fanon follows Nietzsche in telling us that human behaviour must be actional and that freedom is to be found in practice. This once again reiterates the point that action must follow on the conceptualization of values that are worth pursuing. The worth of these values depends on whether they affirm the value of humanity as the "supreme good" (BSWM, p. 218). Therefore, one must grant others life, love and generosity as revealed in practice and demonstrated in daily life, in the daily interaction with the Other.

Nevertheless, I want to suggest that reaction is not necessarily always a negative thing. Action in this case can also be a reaction against something, namely against transgressions of humanity. These transgressions are conceptualized by Fanon when he says, "man is also a *no*. *No* to scorn of man. *No* to degradation of man. *No* to exploitation of man. *No* to the butchery of what is most human in man: freedom" (BSWM, p. 222). Humans are defined by their desire for life, love and generosity, but also by their desire both for freedom and a mutual subjectivity in which agency is afforded both to self and the Other for the provision of meaning to one's own life. This freedom is both a value and a practice, and transgressions against it almost certainly result in a violation of human life. Therefore one's action, in favour of mutual subjectivity, must at the same time be a reaction against scorn, degradation and exploitation aimed at human life. These transgressions (against the Other) also represent saying no to one's *own* humanity and inevitably results in the subversion of one's own subjectivity. Self and the Other is inextricably dependent on a simple and basic, but mutually beneficial, conceptualization of humanity. Fanon provides the starting point for such a conceptualization and in that I find the optimistic moment in Fanon's (unnerving) reading of Hegel, namely a point of entry into mutual recognition.

Reciprocity as Key to Mutual Recognition

Fanon considers reciprocity to be a key element in Hegel's recognition. In fact, he considers absolute reciprocity to be the foundation of the Hegelian dialectic (BSWM, p. 217). Recognition that is one-sided cannot work since, as Fanon asserts, "action from one side only would be useless, because what is to happen can only be brought about by means of both" (BSWM, p. 217). The search for an authentic identity, and meaning to life, can only be fulfilled in mutual recognition. The starting point to mutual recognition is the move from objecthood to subjecthood. This is a need that is intergral to the constitution of a healthy and functional human society. To use Fanon's words (with liberty), each one of us "is an isolated, sterile, salient atom with sharply defined rights of passage, each one of [us] *is*. Each one of [us] wants to *be*, to *emerge*" (BSWM, p. 212). It could be said that one primitively begins as an *is*, in other words a being-in-itself, but one wants to *be* and emerge into being recognized. One does not want to be considered as an object (being-for-other), but wants to emerge as a subject (being-for-self), which importantly will bring one's self-consciousness into being. This is done, on a primitive level, with the corroboration of the Other (BSWM, p. 313). The Other must be present to bring about the transition from being-for-other to being-for-self. However, the Other requires the same, namely the presence of oneself, to reach the same result and as a consequence a society of comparison is formed (BSWM, p. 213). This environment of comparison perpetuates the cycle of recognition, reinforcing identities and knowledge, and bringing about a race of people that all share a certain sameness. Fanon describes this society of comparison as follows:

> As soon as I desire I am asking to be considered. I am not merely here-and-now, sealed into thingness. I am for somewhere else and for something else. I demand that notice be taken of my negating activity insofar as I pursue something other than life; insofar as I do battle for the creation of a human world – that is, of a world of reciprocal recognitions. (BSWM, p. 218)

At the root of the need for recognition is a simple conviction that the self has about itself, namely that the self is not a mere thing, not to be considered as an object. This refusal to be objectified drives the desire for subjectivity. This desire opens up the possibility of independence, freedom, agency and personhood. This desire also represents the move "beyond life toward a supreme good that is the transformation of subjective certainty of my own worth into a universally valid objective truth" (BSWM, p. 218). The search for such truth, for a supreme good beyond life, represents the creation of the human world in which one seeks reciprocal recognitions by recognizing that which is human in an-other.

To recapitulate, mutual recognition leads to a realization of the value of my own life and the transcendence thereof in realizing the value of the life of an-other. This realization brings me to view my own value, but also that of the Other I so desperately need, as "a primal value without reference to life" (BSWM, p. 217), in other words a value that transcends both of us and requires affirmation in our actions aimed at each other. This is the basis for the notion of reciprocal recognitions, namely the infinite value of human life. This infinity includes my own life and that of the Other. With this simple but profound idea Fanon leaves us with a simple task, namely to affirm the infinite value of human life in our daily interaction with one another.

Conclusion

The attempt in this paper was to show that an optimistic moment lurks in Fanon's sober and unnerving reading of Hegel's master and slave as it manifests in the colonial context. This is not to discount or deny the strong and direct message Fanon conveys in terms of the violence that transpired in the colonial context. Violence still plagues great parts of Africa, be it in the guise of war, terrorism or crime. In terms of our own context Fanon's words on decolonisation (especially in *The Wretched of the Earth*) speaks to us most urguently and there is no denying its truth in reality. The aftermath of colonisation is a messy and uncompromising process in which human lives are lost or seriously damaged. It is because of the troubling persistence of violence in the postcolony that one should mine Fanon's work for some hope amidst the stark realities of our times. There are a number of positive and empowering values that emerge from his work. In this paper I focused on his ideas regarding the pitfalls and possibilities of mutual recognition, which reveals a positive description of humanity.

These ideas are basic, but strong in its simplicity because it is based in the concrete reality of Fanon's own life experience. Philosophy is about ideas interacting with concrete reality, making a difference in everyday life and uplifting human life. This is where Fanon takes us: he provides the values underpinning the infinite value of human life, and it is up to us to make use of these values to affirm this infinity and recognise it in our fellow human beings.

Notes

[1] For reasons of clarity the meanings I attach to the Hegelian self and the Other are as follows: *self* refers to the embodied self. This includes consciousness of self, which only I have exclusive access to. *The Other* refers to the embodied Other. However, I rather have a mediated access, instead of full access, to her consciousness of self.

[2] Cited as PhS (Miller translation) or PhM (Baille translation).

[3] Cited as BSWM.

[4] I will, at certain points in the discussion, make use of the term 'human' as I regard *sole* reference to the term 'man' as sexist. However, I will make some of use of the term 'man' for reasons of clarity of style in order to remain connected to Fanon's vocabulary and avert a confusion of terms. The same applies to the pronoun 'he', which I will use throughout.

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CHAPTER TWO

Foucault Studies

South Africa as postcolonial heterotopia: The racialized experience of place and space

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ABSTRACT: This essay claims that heterotopia is characteristic of post-Apartheid South Africa, i.e. where heterotopia is usually the exception in society, it is the norm in South Africa. This claim reinterprets and expands Foucault's concept: heterotopia here refers to the racialization of place and space, and hence to otherness and difference as primary. The ubiquity of heterotopia post-Apartheid is evident in the life-worlds of white suburbia and the black township. A case study is undertaken of white suburbia through a series of phenomenological descriptions of contemporary South Africa using heterotopia as a heuristic tool. This study demonstrates how Foucault's notion of heterotopia is relevant but also too narrow when related to the postcolonial context. An expanded notion of the term as denoting a racialized experience of space and place is necessary for the purposes of coming to terms with the strangeness of post-Apartheid South Africa, where contradiction and otherness are the norm rather than the exception.

Keywords: Apartheid, Foucault, heterotopia, postcolonialism, South Africa, whiteness

1. Introduction

In this essay, I both draw upon and expand Foucault's notion of heterotopia. On the one hand, I show that conditions within contemporary South Africa can be characterized in terms of the six principles of heterotopia Foucault delineates in his essay, *Of Other Spaces*. On the other hand, my analysis of white suburbia shows that the South-African postcolonial context calls for an expansion of heterotopia as not merely *a specific place* or a *type of space* within society, but in phenomenological terms – in terms, that is, of people's experiences of and within place and space. My essay thus focuses not only on "the relational 'difference' [of the heterotopia] … from the ordinary"[1] spatial constructs of society, but also on the experience of alterity and otherness it effects.[2] Lefebvre argues that

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[1]   Peter Johnson, "History of the Concept of Heterotopia" (revised), *Heterotopia Studies* (website), http://www.heterotopiastudies.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Brief-History-of-the-Concept-of-Heterotopia-word-dec-2016-pdf.pdf (2016), 6.

[2]   This has also motivated my use of the Miskowiec translation in "Of Other Spaces" (1986) instead of Hurley's translation in "Different Spaces" (1998). The

heterotopias concern "mutually repellant spaces;"[3] the *postcolonial heterotopia* as I conceive of it concerns the way in which contradictions arise within the same space through the attempt to keep the (repelling, racialized) other at bay.

This notion of a *heterotopian experience* follows the Foucauldian metaphor of the ship as heterotopia,[4] the heterotopia as a movement through space[5] – in this case the movement through the heterotopia that is South Africa. The key about *South Africa as heterotopia* (with an eye on the case study I undertake below) is that the daily experience of place by many whites is located in an actual place that is the (mostly white) suburbs, a place that contrasts sharply with the actual place of the (mostly black) townships. The important thing to keep in mind regarding the white heterotopian experience is that it is a rupture of the *black* order of things by virtue of its dominance and normalization, i.e. so-called white normativity. Despite the end of Apartheid, which was a rupture of the *white* order of things, whiteness as the norm lives on in the suburbs as a place of retreat for whites who no longer dominate politically. Within this context, whites experience blackness as a rupture in the normalized *white suburban* order of things. [6]

Colonialism and Apartheid shaped the heterotopian realities of contemporary South Africa. As a colony, South Africa can be seen to have been a heterotopia in relation to the "motherland" (i.e. the Netherlands and/or Great Britain), where heterotopia in this colonial sense carries the meaning, as I shall discuss below, of a space where the normal and accepted logic and rules of a society are suspended, such that things that can be done in the heterotopia which are not allowed or accepted in "decent society." The colony, as an outpost and heterotopia of the colonial powers, was a place where violence, genocide and various inhuman practices were sanctioned. Until the Second World War, when the Holocaust and Nazism brought these practices into their own backyards, such practices – specifically as part of an organized system of oppression, discrimination, and dehumanization – were mostly absent in the countries that undertook European colonial endeavours.

Heterotopia manifests differently within Apartheid and post-Apartheid South Africa. The current façade of fences and walls one finds surrounding suburban areas are

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emphasis on otherness in the former translation is more relevant to my suggestion of the *postcolonial heterotopia*.

[3]   Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1991 [1974]), 366.

[4]   OS, 27.

[5]   Thomas L. Dumm, *Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom* (Walnut Creek, California: AltaMira Press, 2000), 42.

[6]   Angahrad E. Beckett, Paul Bagguley and Tom Campbell, "Foucault, social movements and heterotopic horizons: rupturing the order of things," *Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest* 20 (2016), 4.

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superior even to what one might find at the actual borders of the country. This heterotopia shift is indicative of the privatization of a new Apartheid apparatus of security that ensures the insulation of suburbia from most of the socio-economic realities beyond. A phenomenology of white suburbia in post-Apartheid South Africa thus frames suburbia as a socio-economic extension of the metaphorical *laager*. The *laager* was a battle formation used by the *Voortrekkers*, the Dutch-speaking Boers who migrated out of the British controlled Cape Colony through the Great Trek during the mid-nineteenth century into the interior of modern-day South Africa. When they were attacked, the *Voortrekkers* would draw their ox wagons into a circle to form a protective barrier and would then engage the battle with firearms from within. This practice of *laertrek*, (i.e. to draw up a circle of wagons and hide inside the *laager*) became a metaphor for the insulated Apartheid state, where there was an emphasis on the various borders of the country: the national border (Afrikaans: *Die Grens*) that had to be safeguarded by the defense force from various "dangers," including communism and terrorism; the administrative borders of the so-called black homelands (*bantustans*) established by the Apartheid government; and the borders of the black townships on the fringes of urban areas that were patrolled by the police force.[7] As a *laager*, white suburbia can be seen to function as a contemporary South African continuation of the Fanonian dialectic between master and slave – a more intricate experience of mastery and slavery, namely the "messy' dialectic"[8] between white and black.

As I will show in what follows, within a postcolonial context, and within contemporary South Africa more specifically, heterotopia paradoxically becomes the norm, a place or space where people find themselves, something which shapes their experience, on a regular and even daily basis. Despite its prevalence, this space or place remains a heterotopia because it is defined by its otherness in relation to other spaces, places, and experiences. There exists a kind of counteraction between places, spaces, and experiences which function, as Foucault highlights in his essay, as mirrors for one another. The notion of a postcolonial heterotopia in this sense thus follows the idea of Hetherington that "heterotopia are places of Otherness", i.e. Otherness "as different to norms within or between cultures *in excessive of* or *incongruous to* the normative standards of a socio-cultural or historical position."[9] That the ordering of space within South Africa produced by

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[7]   This is a general account of the *laager* and its link to Apartheid South Africa. For a number of good historical accounts about whites during Apartheid, see: Jamie Miller, *An African Volk* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Herman Giliomee, *The Afrikaners,* 2nd ed. (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2009); Gerald L'ange, *The White Africans* (South Africa: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2005); Allister Sparks, *The Mind of South Africa* (London: Mandarin, 1991).

[8]   Robyn Marasco, *The Highway of Despair: Critical Theory after Hegel* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 148.

[9]   Derek Hook and Michele Vrdoljak, "Gated communities, heterotopia and 'rights' of privilege: a 'heterotopology' of the South African security-park," *Geoforum* 33 (2002), 210. Their emphasis.

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colonialism and Apartheid remains post-Apartheid is apparent in current relations between white suburbia and the poor black townships: otherness shapes these spaces and, hence, experiences of and within them. Through exploring this spatial ordering and its effects, my analysis will thus elucidate how an expanded, phenomenological and postcolonial sense of heterotopia is closely linked to what Soja identifies as "the spatialization of history [in Foucault's interpretation of space], the making of history entwined with the social production of space, the structuring of a historical geography."[10] In short, we are dealing here with contrasting, and ethically precarious, co-existing realities.

2. Foucault's notion of heterotopia

Heterotopia has a small place in Foucault's *oeuvre*, limited to the essays *Of Other Spaces* and *Different Spaces*[11] and the preface to *The Order of Things*.[12] At the same time, heterotopia does reflect "Foucault's wider questioning of the complexity of resisting power relations."[13] According to Beckett et al, heterotopia must be construed in terms of Foucault's work in *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, which focus on the process of subjectivation and how it is framed by an ordering of things formed through the normalising rationalities of government. Foucault viewed heterotopia as a possibility for, or making possible of, a type of rupture or form of resistance "in this *order of things.*"[14] This notion of heterotopia as a rupture of prevailing modes of thought and existence should be kept in mind when thinking about whiteness, as I will shortly illustrate.

Heterotopia and its six principles are discussed in *Of Other Spaces*.[15] In that text, Foucault offers two possible meanings of the concept. First, it could be a space (such as a brothel) where the normal and accepted logic and rules of a society are suspended. In other words, things can be done in a heterotopia that are not allowed or accepted in "decent society." Secondly, heterotopia can be defined as a designated space within or outside of society (such as a religious colony) that functions as a kind of mirror to the state of affairs

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[10]   Edward W. Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (London: Verso, 1989), 18.

[11]   Michel Foucault, "Different Spaces," translated by Robert Hurley, in *Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954 – 1984, Volume 2: Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology*, ed. James Faubion (London, Penguin: 1998 [1967]), 175-185.

[12]   Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things* (London: Routledge, 1989 [1966]).

[13]   Peter Johnson, "Unravelling Foucault's Different Spaces," *History of the Human Sciences* 19.4 (2006), 86.

[14]   Beckett, Bagguley and Campbell, 4. Their emphasis.

[15]   Michel Foucault, "Of Other Spaces," translated by J. Miscowiec, *Diacritics* 26.1 (1986 [1967]): 22-27. Reference to Foucault's text will further be denoted with the abbreviation OS.

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within society, be it as a mirror of perfection or imperfection.[16] The point is that heterotopias consist of strong contradictions, and more specifically contradictions between what society should be like and what society actually is.

The *first* principle of heterotopia, which makes it so significant for Foucault, is that heterotopias are found in all cultures or human societies, although their forms and types vary from one context to the next. Nevertheless, Foucault identifies two main categories.[17] The *heterotopia of crisis* is a space where "there are privileged or sacred or forbidden places, reserved for individuals who are, in relation to society and the human environment in which they live, in a state of crisis."[18] Foucault's examples here include adolescents, menstruating or pregnant women, and the elderly (for whom the crises of declining health and death are likely to be more acutely felt). Foucault associates heterotopias of crisis with primitive societies, although the idea of an individual in crisis who needs to be placed somewhere apart from society remains in modern societies. Examples here include boarding schools or military service for young men, both focusing on normalizing and or rehabilitating young men.[19] Second, the *heterotopia of deviance* is a space "where individuals whose behavior is deviant in relation to the required mean or norm are placed."[20] Here Foucault has in mind psychiatric hospitals, retirement homes for the elderly (where they can deviate from the productive norm of work to permanently rest), and prisons. The heterotopia of deviance is slowly displacing that of crisis due to the development of modern and administrative-bureaucratic notions of normativity and discipline.

The *second* principle concerns the multiple functions that space and place have with respect to the passage of time. Foucault says that

> a society, as its history unfolds, can make an existing heterotopia function in a very different fashion… each has a precise and determined function within society and the same heterotopia can, according to the synchrony of the culture in which it occurs, have one function or another.[21]

An instance here would be cemeteries, which acquire different meanings in societies where there is a move away from a religious to an atheistic viewpoint. This second principle could in a sense be said to undercut the first because the meaning of crisis and deviance, and of those who are deemed to be deviant or in crisis, can change within a society as history unfolds and old epistemes recede whilst new ones become dominant.

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[16] OS, 24 & 27.

[17] OS, 24.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] OS, 25.

16

The *third* principle addresses a heterotopia's capacity to juxtapose "in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible."[22] An example here would be a theatre or suburban garden, where aspects from various disparate places around the world are brought together in one space.

The *fourth* principle links heterotopia to slices in time, where it "begins to function at full capacity when men arrive at a sort of absolute break with their traditional time."[23] Foucault refers to a slice in time encompassing an absolute break with traditional time as a "heterochrony." As the signal of the constitution of a heterotopia, a heterochrony suspends normal, linear time.[24] This kind of suspension happens in a cemetery, where time is actually interrupted and replaced by death, or in museums and monuments where time is displaced in favour of a kind of timelessness.

The *fifth* principle encompasses "a system of opening and closing that both isolates [it] and makes [it] penetrable."[25] This means that a heterotopian site is not freely accessible to everyone, i.e. it is not a public space *per se*. The reason for this is that entry into such a space is either compulsory, (e.g. in barracks or prisons), or subject to rites and purification, (i.e. certain forms of rules, etiquette and behaviour, such as in a Moslem hammam or a Scandinavian sauna).[26]

The *sixth* principle of heterotopia "is that [it has] a relation to all the space that remains,"[27] i.e. it stands in contradistinction to the rest of society. On the one hand, it creates an imaginary space that exposes the illusions of every *real* space in society. On the other hand, its role can be the creation of a space that is radically other to the communal space of daily life. Pertinent examples here would be the two extremes of religious colonies (such as those established by Christians in the so-called New World) and brothels as both, in their respective ways, reflect the apparent best and worst ideals of society.[28]

Heterotopia for Foucault thus refers to certain places or spaces within or outside of society (a place being a specific location, space referring to various locations of a certain type) that have two distinct but not mutually exclusive functions. First, people can go to a heterotopia and do something there that would otherwise be seen as unacceptable in society; in this case the heterotopia is a space of transgression where processes of normalisation are suspended. Second, it can be quite the opposite and instead function as a place where society's processes of normalisation are dominant. In this case, it becomes a place where people are rehabilitated or moulded in society's image. What binds the two

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[22]   Ibid.

[23]   OS, 26.

[24]   Ibid.

[25]   OS, 26.

[26]   Ibid.

[27]   OS, 27.

[28]   Ibid.

functions together is that heterotopia is a place or space where people go to be isolated from society in order to transgress or normalise. It functions as either a mirror for society's ideals or as an inverse mirror for society's other, for what is considered to be immoral or indecent in society. The mirror can also link up with certain utopian ideas (e.g., a perfect society) and the inverse mirror with certain dystopian ideas (e.g., the disintegration of society) that undermines and unsettles utopia.[29]

I will now turn to white suburbia, one of various locations in South Africa that can be seen as a heterotopia. The rest of the essay will examine and analyze white suburbia across South Africa, thereby expanding the scope of the heterotopia beyond that which Foucault envisioned. What will become apparent is the way in which this expanded (postcolonial) sense is closely linked to what Soja identifies as "the spatialization of history [in Foucault's interpretation of space], the making of history entwined with the social production of space, the structuring of a historical geography."[30] The ordering of space within South Africa was historically produced by Apartheid; post-Apartheid, this ordering has continued in ways that constitute both suburbia and the township as the heterotopia of the other.

3. A phenomenology of suburban whiteness in the South African heterotopia

The definition of heterotopia as "the way in which radically different social spaces can come into connection with one another" aptly describes both the life-world of white suburbia in South Africa and its contact with the world outside its boundaries.[31] In what follows, I will examine the phenomenon of white suburbia using Foucault's principles of heterotopia as a grid through which to interpret both whiteness and the relation between suburban whites and the black poor. The analysis of white suburbia in terms of heterotopia reveals it, specifically, as a simultaneously insular and porous space characterized by contradictory realities and relationships (i.e., to the black other) that unsettle normative whiteness.[32]

3.1 Crisis and deviance in the white suburbs

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[29]   Johnson, 82.

[30]   Soja, 18.

[31]   Tony Schirato, Geoff Danaher, and Jen Webb, *Understanding Foucault*, 2nd ed. (London: Allen and Unwin, 2012), xxi.

[32]   I'm deeply indebted to Hook and Vrdoljak's study regarding the South African security-park as heterotopia. Their study is still a consideration of heterotopia in the more narrow sense as pockets of space inside or outside of society (with the focus on the security-park of Dainfern on the outskirts of Johannesburg). See: Derek Hook and Michele Vrdoljak, "Gated communities, heterotopia and 'rights' of privilege: a 'heterotopology' of the South African security-park," *Geoforum* 33 (2002), 195-219.

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I suggest that, depending on their location, not only whiteness but blackness as well can function as heterotopias of both crisis and deviance (first principle). The heterotopia of crisis is characterized by a problematization of the body, with race and poverty both marking crisis in South Africa. Race has to do with the bodily physiology of whites and blacks (the brute fact of being born white or black) and being attached to its mere appearance in the Fanonian sense,[33] although it does not involve a transitional stage for the body as is the case for Foucault but rather a permanent bodily feature of fact.[34] Race is a marker of crisis in South Africa because of the persistence of racism, which views the race of another as an "abnormality" of some sort. Steeped in history, race has a way of problematizing the identity of both black and white persons in the country. While the changing context of post-Apartheid South Africa has thus provoked a crisis of (both Afrikaner[35] and English-speaking) white identity for quite some time, race has become an acute marker of crisis for whites due to the history of racism they themselves have perpetuated in the country. This situation of crisis can be understood in terms of *solastalgia*, where people begin to develop forms of depression and mental illness when there is a change in their environment.[36] According to Albrecht (who coined the term), *solastalgia* "exists when there is a recognition that the beloved place in which one resides is under assault … *solastalgia* is a form of homesickness one experiences when one is still at home."[37] In a socio-political sense, the condition develops when a change in their environment leads people to *perceive* themselves as victims of their situation, and therefore to feel homesick for the past within the context of their own places of dwelling.

Poverty, on the other hand, is a clear marker of crisis for black South Africans. The poor person's bodily condition is precarious, being characterized by hunger and ill-health, which leads them to be excluded from certain spaces in society. Poor, mostly black people are placed in areas isolated from the rich and especially the white suburbs. This remnant of Apartheid, now becoming a capitalist phenomenon, is still a significant factor in terms of the dwelling space of the black poor.

In what sense is South Africa a heterotopia of deviance? Ironically, despite the fact that a substantial part (if not a majority) of the country's population is impoverished, in South Africa poverty is casually considered to be deviant by many suburban whites.

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[33]   Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, translated by Charles Lam Markmann (London: Pluto Press, 2008 [1952]), 87.

[34]   The transitional stage of the body here refers to the differently embodied subjects placed within heterotopias of crisis or deviance as discussed by Foucault, such as adolescents, pregnant women, people with illness and the elderly and in some cases, criminals or the mentally ill (although in their case, it can also become a permanent stage).

[35]   See: Charles Villet, "Loftus as Afrikaner heterotopia: The life world of rugbymentality," *Image and Text*, 19 (2012), 64-79.

[36]   Glenn Albrecht, "Solastalgia," *Alternatives Journal* 32, 4/5 (2006), 34-36.

[37]   Ibid, 35.

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Beggars (mostly black) are found at almost every traffic light and street corner. The black poor can still be said to be "placed" in townships, informal settlements and squatter camps away from suburban whites, although this now happens due to existential demands, social sanction, and the capitalist economic ordering of society rather than explicit governmental decisions and control, as was the case during Apartheid. The black poor do venture out to white suburbia, often as menial workers, security guards or as beggars. Here one can think of a suburban white stopping at a traffic light and finding a beggar, sometimes kneeling in front of the car, asking for money or food. In some cases, the motorist might look upon the beggar with guilt, in other cases with disgust, thinking of this poor person as abnormal and lazy. There are some suburban whites who find the black poor to be abhorrent and they do not appreciate the invasion of their space, be it public or private. This interpretation of poverty by (some but not all) suburban whites is grossly insensitive and ignorant.

3.2 White existential insecurity and angst

Heterotopia through the heterochrony (a slice of time) has to do with an absolute break with traditional time (fourth principle).[38] One instance of such a temporal break is the loss of life, or a moment in which the loss of life is a possibility. In South Africa, unnatural and violent loss of life is a regular occurrence. Violent crime in the country, be it murder, assault, or rape, takes place on a daily basis, especially in poorer areas. Deaths on the roads are endemic; thousands die every year as a consequence of reckless driving and drunken pedestrians not adhering to the rules of the road.

The possible daily loss of life leads to a heterotopian experience for suburban whites because this daily danger is *surreal*, lending itself to the proliferation of fearful ideas and emotions (whether founded or unfounded). Daily life consists of obstacles, fears, tribulations, and psychosis as a direct consequence of the (perceived) ubiquity of crime. This situation is intensified when an individual has experienced a situation (a slice of time, hence a heterochrony) in which s/he faced the possibility of death but escaped it somehow. An individual could have been, for example, the victim of a successful or even a botched car hijacking, house break-in, armed robbery, or motor vehicle accident. While such a situation would constitute a surreal experience for all South Africans, for suburban whites it manifests specifically as an experience of a daily life filled with threats and alien others that cannot be trusted. The dwelling space of suburban whites is problematized and thrown into crisis because it can be dangerously invaded by "them." Suburban whites can afford to erect defenses against these "invasions", such as electrified fences, house alarms, and private security guards patrolling the suburbs, but the black poor cannot. There is an ambiguity apparent in the security whites receive from the men that patrol their streets because most of these guards are black; hence they come from the very group that is criminalized by the white gaze. These guards are viewed by some with suspicion as

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[38]   OS, 26.

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"criminals in uniform" (as is also the case with the police, who are also mostly black); alternatively, a distinction is made between "good blacks" (security guards and menial workers) and "bad blacks" (criminals and beggars). Whether the perception of whites is the former or the latter, the presence of black security guards heightens the climate of fear in white suburbia. In South Africa the persistence of violent crime leads suburban whites (but also the black poor) to experience anxiety and stress, which is in part why Altbeker speaks of "a country at war with itself."[39]

The most significant development in response to this situation where threats to individual life are experienced as both ever-present and imminent is the privatization of security services. I argue that this development has effectively led to the privatization of the Apartheid apparatus, with the line of security now in the suburbs instead of the various borders of the country. Within what Hook refers to as "privatized governance," the emphasis of responsibility shifts from citizens to taxpayers.[40] Mbembe uses the terminology of "privatization of political sovereignty" to describe the resulting special relationship that emerges between government and business.[41] The statistics tell an interesting tale in this regard: The cost of the private security industry in the country stands at around R60 billion and it employs 487,000 people.[42] What is significant about this number of security officers is that the former South African Defence Force, apart from around 75,000 full-time personnel, had just over half a million citizen-force personnel.[43] In a sense, what used to be half a million white men on stand-by for a crisis situation, has now become half a million private security officers (mostly black) who patrol the suburbs and stand guard in various public spaces to combat high levels of crime.

3.3 White homes as space of anxiety and fear

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[39] Antony Altbeker, *A Country at War with Itself: South Africa's Crisis of Crime* (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishing, 2009).

[40] Derek Hook, *Foucault, Psychology and the Analytics of Power* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 191-192.

[41] Achille Mbembe, *On the Postcolony* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), 78.

[42] Anine Kriegler and Mark Shaw, *A Citizen's Guide to Crime Trends in South Africa* (Johannesburg and Cape Town: Johnathan Ball Publishers, 2016), 4.

[43] Noel Stott, "From the SADF to the SANDF: Safeguarding South Africa for a better life for all?," *Violence and Transition Series*, Vol. 7, (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2002),
https://www.sa-soldier.com/data/09-SADF-links/UsedPDFs/fromsadftosandf.pdf.

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The juxtaposition of incompatible spaces (third principle)[44] manifests in two ways in South Africa: first, in terms of the heterotopian and incompatible experience of the same space by suburban whites and the black poor and, second, in terms of the paradoxical experience that both groups have of their own dwelling spaces due to the stark contrast between immense wealth and utter poverty within the same city limits, and sometimes even within a stone's throw of each other. These contrasting experiences serve to show how the living space of the suburban white is a heterotopia to the black poor, and *vice versa*. In other words, if the black poor find themselves in the privileged space of the suburban white, their experience of that space is heterotopian. White suburbia is so different from the living space of the black poor that its rules and decorum are incompatible and alien. Likewise, if suburban whites find themselves in the underprivileged space of the black poor, the same heterotopian experience of incompatibility applies with regard to the lifestyle and rules of conduct. In this case many suburban whites, locals and tourists alike, will only enter a township as part of a "township tour" that involves driving through and gawking at the otherness of race and poverty. The incompatible meanings attached to the space of the other reveal the juxtapostion of space in South Africa, with the space of the black poor representing something radically other (and even exotic) for suburban whites across South Africa.

Suburban whites and the black poor also have conflicting experiences with respect to their own respective dwelling spaces. The space of the suburban white is simultaneously a home, a safe haven from the black poor "other," and a place that is in danger of being 'invaded' or violated by that other (i.e. by the vagrant or criminal). Hook and Vrjoldak identify "crime-fear" as a significant factor in terms of the development of the securitized environment of white suburbia, which in turn represents a spatial answer to a social problem or crisis (in this case, crime).[45] Actual instances of, for example, armed robberies produce a general mindset of white suburban hypersecurity characterized by the perception that the whole of life is being threatened.[46] A significant and problematic issue in this case is that of farm murders, the regularity of which has led to claims of white genocide.[47] Real numbers reveal these claims as mere hyperbole; nonetheless, invoking the

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[44]   OS, 25.

[45]   Hook and Vrdoljak, 211.

[46]   The idea of *solastalgia* is here again of relevance, as people view their homes as being under assault.

[47]   See: Nickolaus Bauer, "Red October: The Plight of Whites in the New South," *ENCA*, October 10, 2013, http://www.enca.com/south-africa/red-october-plight-whites-new-south-africa.

Also: "Allow all white South Africans the right to return to Europe," accessed February 8, 2016, https://www.change.org/p/european-commission-allow-all-white-south-africans-the-right-to-return-to-europe.

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notion of genocide reveals the mentality of suburban whites, who perceive themselves as being under attack and besieged in the midst of a black South Africa. To make these points is not, however, to diminish the problematic status of farm murders, some of which resemble hate crimes; more worrisome, others involve torture.[48] This brings to mind the tactics used by the security police during Apartheid, which might be an instance that demonstrates how certain forms of violence and violent practices from a colonial society remains in a decolonizing or postcolonial society.

The view of farm murders as genocide is a way for the white middle class to make the problem their own. This leads to the internalization of farm murders but also white poverty by suburban whites as the main factors in their perceived victimisation in post-Apartheid South Africa (even though they are not poor or brutalized in most cases), which further fuels the *solastalgia* they experience in seeing themselves as victims of the system. This mindset leads many suburban whites to reduce the black poor to the irritating vagrant and dangerous criminal, and the common humanity of the "man on the street" is erased. White suburban space needs to be protected and secured in order to deal with this irritation and danger. The space of suburban whiteness thus becomes both home and a strange space of confinement and captivity. The black poor also experience their dwelling space in this paradoxical way; however, the paradox of confinement and captivity manifests very differently within white and black spaces. For the wealthy white this notion is motivated by keeping the other at bay by way of security measures; for the black poor this notion is motivated exactly by their poverty and the lack of security measures that it brings about. Terreblanche[49] notes that the rich (and therefore most whites) are mostly victims of property crime whereas the poor (mostly black and mostly female) are at risk of personal crime.[50]

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[48]   Statistics show that in the period from 1990 to April 2015, there were 3,494 farm attacks and 1,737 murders. See: Lloyd Phillips, "Farm murder figures – TAU SA," *Farmer's Weekly*, April 28, 2015, http://www.farmersweekly.co.za/agri-news/south-africa/farm-murder-figures-tau-sa/.

This means though that the murder rate for farm murders can be as high as 132 per 100,000. The current national murder rate in South Africa is 33 per 100,000, or 49 murders per day (statistics for 2014/15). See: Greg Nicolson, "Farm attacks: If only the issue were just black and white," *Daily Maverick*, August 25, 2015, https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-08-25-farm-attacks-if-only-the-issue-were-just-black-and-white/#.WKQdm9J96Hs. Also see: *South Africa Survey 2016*, edited by Frans Cronje and John Kane-Berman (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations), 748-749 (about national murder rate).

[49]   Sampie Terreblanche, *A History of Inequality in South Africa, 1652 – 2002* (Scottsville: University of Natal Press, 2002), 401.

[50]   Violence against (especially black and coloured) women and children is the darker side of post-Apartheid South Africa and the rate of sexual assault is high. The current rate of sexual assault is 99 per 100,000 or 147 offences per day (statistics for 2014/15). See: *South Africa Survey 2016*, 748-749.

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3.4 Restricted accessibility to white spaces

The heterotopia as a system of opening/closing and isolation/penetration (fifth principle)[51] further elucidates interesting juxtapositions of suburban white and poor black spaces within South Africa. For the suburban white, access to the township space of the black poor is possible but undesirable due to its lack of infrastructure and the threat (real or perceived) it poses to the white visitor. Therefore, the space of the black poor is fully accessible to themselves, but access is restricted and even undesirable to the suburban white. The inverse is true regarding the space of the suburban white. That space is accessible to the black poor, but only in a restricted manner and by means of the submissive role of a menial worker, the service role of a security guard (who does not have the quite the same authority of the police) or worse, beggar or thief. Moreover, in certain residential areas, and depending on context and time, colour functions as a signifier of access, with only whites being welcome in certain areas, and only blacks being welcome in others. In many pockets of the city, in other words, this remnant of Apartheid endures.

Perhaps the most readily apparent example of the heterotopian mechanism of restricted access are the boomgates found in affluent neighbourhoods around the country, which literally open and close to visitors and residents, and isolate the neighbourhoods from the criminal "other." So-called gated communities, townhouse complexes, or security-parks (basically a small town with extended security features that is insulated from the rest of society) are exemplary in this regard. Hook and Vjoldak's study again emphasizes how these types of residential areas are heterotopias: the restricted access is much like the "influx control" of Apartheid South Africa where black citizens had their movement limited by various measures, such as "signing registers, requiring the permission of empowered parties, [and] possessing the correct 'documents' to obtain right of access."[52] The difference in this case is that the new forms of regulation are not based only on race but also on class, thereby adding a "liberal politics of admission."[53]

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[51]   OS, 26.
[52]   Hook and Vjoldak, 212.
[53]   Ibid.

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3.5 The white functions of space

The multiple functions of heterotopia both historically and in the present (second principle)[54] have direct relevance to the way in which public and private space within South Africa functions differently for different people, depending on their race and/or economic status. Specifically, heterotopia concerns "the highly significant distinction between *dominated* and *appropriated* spaces."[55] The spaces in South Africa that are dominated and appropriated by whites have become highly private and commercial, whilst predominantly black public spaces are administered by the government. The idea of whiteness has consequently changed because of the mirror that society provides: In Apartheid South Africa, whites saw fewer blacks, and definitely fewer beggars, than they do now. Moreover, in the past socio-economic problems were hidden from view due to a militarized police that ensured no wide scale rupture of white spaces. In a sense, the heterotopia has remained the same post-Apartheid, but its borders have closed in on whites, limiting them to suburbia. The insular bubble of the white Apartheid state has now given way to the punctured bubble of suburbia.[56] The socio-economic problems of the country now stare whites in the face on a daily basis out in the street, so to speak, and, although this does not mean that they necessarily identify with them, exposure to these problems produces a different notion of whiteness. Also, the public and cultural space of white and black, but also of rich and poor, has become a heterotopia to the other, i.e. it seems exotic, foreign and like something from another continent.

A significant phenomenon in this regard is that of so-called domestic workers (mostly black or coloured) cleaning the houses of the middle class (mostly white but also black) and tending their gardens. In other words, the homes of suburban whites are the workplace of their domestic workers. This is a huge source of (sometimes informal) employment and income for the black poor, but the relationship between suburban whites and their domestic workers often takes on an ambivalent power dynamic which poses obvious moral problems. Domestic workers in colonial times were servants, and in the present, many still take on the role of a servant in certain cases.

These multiple and changing functions of public and private space are almost certainly the outcome of the massive inequality found in the country. Where suburban whites live on properties that range from large to massive, the black poor may find themselves squeezed into a room or shack with a number of other people. White suburbia in its many insulated forms is thus a kind of disqualification of the exterior because it makes "the problematics and vulnerabilities of 'other' external and surrounding spaces" overt[57] simply through the dynamic that exists between suburban white and black poor.

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[54]   OS, 25.

[55]   Lefebvre, 164.

[56]   I am indebted to Paul Muldoon for this insight.

[57]   Hook and Vrdoljak, 215.

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The dynamic at work could perhaps be described as follows: Within the dwelling space of the black poor (in the township, informal settlement or squatter camp), private space practically disappears because of poverty; while suburban whites have an expansive notion of private space, for the black poor this notion is alien or non-existent. This separation leads to the moralisation of non-moral issues, namely decorum and etiquette. Some suburban whites, for example, view the black poor as engaging in improper behavior in public. These perceptions become especially engrained within racial relations between white and black: Whites would say that "it is simply the way they are" (an anecdote I hear frequently). The tendency to essentialise the black poor from the outside is strong[58] and the socio-economic root of the different notions of private space is not acknowledged. In sum, "[o]therness is established through a relationship of difference with other sites, such that their presence either provides an unsettling of spatial and social relations or an alternative representation of spatial and social relations."[59]

3.6 White suburbia's other: The heterotopian mirror of the black township
Foucault concludes that the significance of the heterotopia "is that [it has] a relation to all the space that remains,"[60] i.e. it stands in contradistinction to the rest of society (sixth principle). This principle of contradistinction exemplifies the relation between white suburbia and its other, the ubiquitous townships, otherized as "the location" during Apartheid, where the inhabitants are almost exclusively black. The township/location is situated on the outskirts of urban areas (towns and cities); farthest away from white suburbia; and usually near or adjacent to a highway, train tracks or an industrial area, which are simultaneously physical markers of division and buffers between the two areas. Here the word location itself is already ambivalent because it speaks of a certain place (i.e., a specific town or city), but on the other hand it refers to any given location where "they" (blacks) live and are located. As a result of Apartheid urban planning, the location is also usually "messy, ill-constructed and jumbled"[61] in relation to the space of the town itself.

Tabensky provides significant insight about the dynamic concerning the relation between the white space ("settler village") and the black space ("location") of Grahamstown (a university town in the Eastern Cape) observing that "at one level, the two parts … may as well be thought of as two different towns existing at great geographical distance from one another (except, in the first instance, for the presence of cheap labour and

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[58]   Fanon elaborates on this tendency to essentialise in chapter five of *Black Skin, White Masks* entitled "The Fact of Blackness."

[59]   Kevin Hetherington, *The Badlands of Modernity: Heterotopia and Social Ordering* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 8.

[60]   OS, 27.

[61]   Ibid. Foucault's words in describing the space of daily life that is contrasted by the heterotopia, hence the description of the township as an inverse mirror below.

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beggars roaming the white spaces)."[62] Although the public and residential spaces still reflect the Apartheid order, both are now also highly influenced by the capitalist ordering of space: middle class blacks move into suburbs that are predominantly white (i.e. the former white areas of the Apartheid era), but one would be hard pressed to find more than a handful of poor whites moving into the townships.

The township/location thus provides an instance of the heterotopia in the narrow and typical sense, i.e. as a pocket of society that says something about society at large. The impoverished and chaotic ordering of the location/township represents an inverse mirror to white suburbia's organized and wealthy space. The township/location, as white suburbia's other, exposes the paradox of that which is considered perfect and ideal in post-Apartheid society, namely white normativity. Whiteness is the measure of perfection and the ideal to strive for; it is not seen as the actual source of society's problems by whites but rather as the solution to the problem. Here whiteness is in a way both invisible and visible to whites: invisible because whiteness is uncritically seen as the measure of the state of society, but also visible because what the mirror reflects back to whites is blackness. The mirror exposes whiteness as the problem, but ironically this insight remains invisible to many whites. In this respect Vice provides a succinct and deep insight when she says that "[w]hile one's whiteness might still constitute the unacknowledged norm … that one is white rather than black is always present to oneself and others, barring an impressive feat of self-deception."[63] The problem is that this self-deception is pervasive amongst suburban whites, and therefore perhaps not as impressive as Vice might think. Hook and Vrodoljak says to the contrary that

> [r]ather than indications of an inequitable system, these contradictions [in society] are taken up as exactly the measures necessitated by an unfavourable socio-political system, a tactic by which socio-political accountability is deferred and historical privilege is consolidated in the face of profound inequality.[64]

The economic Apartheid that exists post-Apartheid,[65] safeguarding the economic privilege of the majority of whites and keeping in place the impoverishment and subsequent social subjugation of the majority of blacks, is camouflaged by painting whites as victims of the current political regime. This renders black victimhood invisible whilst revealing continuity

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[62]   Pedro Tabensky, "The Oppressor's Pathology," *Theoria*, 57 (2010): 96.

[63]   Samantha Vice, "How Do I Live in This Strange Place?," *Journal of Social Philosophy* 41.3 (2010): 326.

[64]   Hook and Vrdoljak, 214.

[65]   See: Peter S. Goodman, "End of Apartheid in South Africa? Not in Economic Terms", *New York Times*, 24 October, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/business/south-africa-economy-apartheid.html?smid=fb-share.

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with Apartheid South Africa in the acceptance of whiteness and whitely ways as the norm by which to measure the state of South African society.[66]

4. Concluding remarks: The heterotopian experience of whites, their nervous condition of white victimhood, and the Euro-African Thirdspace

I would like to conclude with three remarks about the place of white suburban heterotopia in contemporary South Africa that can provide avenues for further research regarding the heterotopian experience and the Euro-African fabric of South African society.

The first insight is a stronger and more expansive version of the claim that suburban whiteness functions as a specific kind of heterotopian experience in South Africa. This would be the claim that whiteness (e.g. suburban whiteness) will always lead to a heterotopian experience when it encounters that which is not white, especially in the postcolonial context but also where immigrants and refugees are encountered by the white gaze in the European and American context. For instance, the nationalist and xenophobic undertones of Donald Trump's ascendancy to the U.S. Presidency point to a heterotopian experience by many U.S. whites. Trump's insistence on building The Wall on the Mexican border speaks to the "common man" by making America sound like a yard in the neighbourhood, very much like the white suburbs in South Africa, that needs not only to be fenced off, but which also requires a large physical edifice that can keep any purported dangers from Mexico at bay.

What also characterizes Trumpism is the phenomenon of *solastalgia*, where people view themselves as victims and hence become homesick or nostalgic for the past in light of a changing environment at home. To recap, Albrecht says that *solastalgia* "exists when there is a recognition that the beloved place in which one resides is under assault."[67] The American context seems to also be characterized by *solastagia*, with the perception of many whites that their beloved place is under existential threat. Trump's slogan of "Make America Great Again" is a prime example of a politician who ran a campaign of *solastalgia* that targeted so-called white victimhood, convincing the white middle class that they are victims because of cultural and political changes in America. These changes allegedly endanger white, suburban values and hence there is the need to "take back America." Trump's mention of so-called "American carnage" in his inaugural address[68] fits squarely into this narrative of victimhood and forms the imaginary basis for what can be

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[66] See: Savo Heleta, "White privilege and hypocrisy in South Africa", *Africa is a Country*, 6 November, 2016, http://africasacountry.com/2017/11/white-privilege-and-hypocrisy-in-south-africa/.

[67] Albrecht, 35.

[68] Donald Trump, "Inaugural address: Trump's full speech," accessed February 8, 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/20/politics/trump-inaugural-address/ (transcript and video).

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characterized as an *American laager* that is made secure by The Wall and attempts at a Muslim ban.

The second insight is a claim that I would make about this heterotopian experience by whites, namely that it constitutes a kind of "nervous condition" they have in relation to their situation in post-Apartheid South Africa. Fanon used this term to describe both the socio-political and the socio-psychological situation of natives in colonial and decolonising societies. These nervous conditions of the natives were maintained by the settlers during colonial times as the natives developed an inferiority complex in the course of their violent oppression.[69] South Africa is a country that has gone through various waves of decolonisation: Apartheid itself was a nationalist attempt by Afrikaners to free themselves from the yolk of British rule. This was done at the expense of the black population, who were oppressed and excluded in a highly racist society where Antjie Krog also identified nervous conditions among working class Afrikaners during Apartheid.[70]

My claim is that the wave of decolonisation following Apartheid by blacks from the yolk of white rule has kept these nervous conditions in place, albeit in different forms. One of these forms is the nervous condition that I would refer to as so-called "white victimhood", which can be identified in the various phenomenological descriptions of life in suburbia. This is probably only one of a variety of nervous conditions for white and black due to their heterotopian experiences in South Africa. I would contend that the nervous condition identified by Krog among whites has shifted from the working class to the middle class, which has taken on the plight and challenges (such as poverty and farm murders) of the working class as their own. What is interesting about this white nervous condition is that it inverts (or subverts) the idea that whiteness holds power and domination, claiming instead that whites are actually victims of the post-Apartheid situation. This could be a hybrid of actual lived experiences and/or constructed beliefs, but it could also be a kind of tactic or strategy. "White victimhood" ultimately masks the continued reality of white economic mastery and the privileges attached to whiteness beyond Apartheid.[71]

The third insight is that heterotopian experience of South Africa reveals an inverse mirror for both Europe and Africa, representing "the crisis of European Man," to make use

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[69]   Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, translated by Constance Farrington (London: Penguin Books, 1967 [1961]), 17.

[70]   Antjie Krog, "…between the nose and the mouth. Perhaps more towards the eyes," in *Some Afrikaners revisited*, by David Goldblatt (Roggebaai: Umuzi, 2007), 32.

[71]   I explore this form of victimhood in South Africa and its link to Donald Trump elsewhere in an online article. See: Charles Villet, "Donald Trump, white victimhood and the South African far-right," *The Conversation Africa*, 23 February, 2017, https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-white-victimhood-and-the-south-african-far-right-73400.

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of Lewis Gordon's phrase,[72] and turns the gaze of criticism on European Man but also his extensions of affluence and consumerism. This reversal of the critical gaze shows how European Man is problematised within South Africa because of the injustices of poverty and racism which continue in the country beyond Apartheid as a consequence of industrialization and globalisation. The mirror further reflects modern "African Man," who is also in crisis because of the way he is radically objectified. This mix of European and African spaces and ideas constitutes what one could call the Euro-African fabric of society (to borrow from the Comaroffs' phrase regarding Euro-America[73]). The problem of the Euro-African is represented by the complexities of human relations as it manifests and is fractured by heterotopian experience, i.e. the racialised experience of space by white and black.

Whites who come from Europe have told me that they were never as aware of their whiteness until they spent time in South Africa, but blacks from elsewhere in Africa tell me the same thing about an awareness of their blackness. This situation might not be unique to South Africa but finds its clearest expression within the country's stark division between white and black as well as rich and poor, which also sees the entrenchment of new forms of oppression. In the end, the country is also a mirror to the rest of the world about the vast inequities and injustices of globalisation. Where these inequities and injustices are found in places that are continents apart, in South Africa they are found in the same country, which is why there really is a tale of two countries to be told. The country is representative of the so-called Thirdspace that Soja and Bhaba talks about, in this case a Euro-African Thirdspace.[74] Therefore, it is crucial to follow the course of South Africa beyond Apartheid as it could give some clues as to the direction of world history and new forms of Apartheid in the 21st century. In short, the future of the next century will not be utopian or dystopian but rather a combination of both. The heterotopia could be the reality of a brave new world in the coming century.[75]

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[72]   Lewis R. Gordon, *Fanon and the Crisis of European Man: An Essay on Philosophy and the Human Sciences (*New York: Routledge, 1995).

[73]   John Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, *Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-America is Evolving Toward Africa* (Boulder, Colorado and London: Paradigm, 2012).

[74]   Richard Peet, *Modern Geographical Thought* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1998), 225.

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CHAPTER THREE

Loftus as Afrikaner heterotopia: The life world of rugbymentality[1]

Charles Villet

Abstract

The aim of this article is to explore the nature of contemporary Afrikaner identity philosophically through the *topos* of Loftus and the game, the spectacle, and the experience of rugby. I suggest that Loftus Versfeld stadium in Pretoria is a heterotopia for many Afrikaners. The concept of heterotopia, as suggested by Foucault, represents a place where the ideas of utopia and dystopia exist alongside each other. An analysis of Loftus as heterotopia offers a number of novel insights about the place (both physical and mental) that the stadium represents. Loftus acts as a mirror to the lifeworld of Afrikaners, termed here as so-called 'rugbymentality': Loftus reveals that Afrikaners have moved economically beyond apartheid, but that their political voice has become almost insignificant. Loftus represents the expression of this economic advancement with simultaneous political regression. The result is an invented tradition and postcolonial nostalgia that reveal what it means to be an Afrikaner. Loftus and rugbymentality function as the attempt by Afrikaners either to insulate themselves (*laertrek*) from post-apartheid South Africa, or to become part of the cultural mosaic of South Africa, which could both be expressed through achieving excellence in rugby.

Key words: Afrikaners; Blue Bulls; Foucault; heterotopia; Loftus Versfeld Stadium; rugby

Introduction

Pretoria has been at the centre of governmentality in South Africa during the apartheid era and after. The privilege of this governmentality has shifted from Afrikanerdom to the current ANC-government. The spaces within which Afrikaners have power changed since 1994 and they have been disenfranchised within the political sphere but still remain an economically affluent group. Many sites of significance for Afrikanerdom remain in Pretoria and are found virtually within the shadow of the Union Building where the government resides: *Affies* (the famous secondary schools for boys and girls), *Tukkies* (the University of Pretoria) and the Loftus Versfeld rugby stadium with the Pretoria East Dutch Reformed Church (*Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk*) just across the road. This is probably the most significant Afrikaner neighbourhood in the country. Here one finds in close proximity three of the 'encircling influences' identified by Jansen (2009:70-79), which facilitate the transmission of knowledge across Afrikaner generations, namely school, church and rugby. The role of rugby as a source of knowledge for the identity of Afrikaners is what is at issue in this article, and one of the most prominent rugby symbols in the country is Loftus.

Loftus (Figure 1) is a landmark in Pretoria and a monument to rugby and Afrikanerdom. It might only have been a coincidence, but the establishment of the Northern

Figure 1: Loftus, archive photo, 1991 (Gallo Images)

Transvaal Rugby Union (now the Blue Bulls Company) in 1938 took place in the same year that the centenary of the Great Trek was celebrated with much fanfare by Afrikaners across the whole country.[2] Loftus came to be the home of the so-called Blue Bulls right from the start, albeit in different reincarnations as each of the pavilions were rebuilt over the years. In a sense it is one of few contemporary public spaces where Afrikaners are still in power. The symbols of the Blue Bulls and the Springboks are an integral part of the daily life of many Afrikaners and their culture. The Bulls and the Boks bring to mind the image of big, burly Afrikaner men (Figure 2) who are not to be messed with.[3] These rugby players have become prime role models for many Afrikaners. According to Grundlingh (1995c:118), rugby has contributed to the 'common consciousness' of Afrikaners since the early days of apartheid. Rugby plays a central role in the knowledge and history of self that Afrikaners develop as a group, what Gaffney

and Bale (2004:35) call the 'construction of collective history'. Loftus is a stadium where this takes place and the lifeworld of Loftus provides Afrikaners with a sense of belonging to a group. One could (following Gaffney & Bale 2004:34-35) even say that Loftus is almost a 'sacred place' that carries a sense of 'religiosity' for some Afrikaners and that a visit to Loftus is a kind of 'pilgrimage' for fans. Many sport stadia across the globe carry these meanings in the lives of fans because sport is the culture of the masses – although there are interesting variations in intensity and character (Black & Nauright 1998:1).

In this article I turn to the 'intensity' of rugby in the lives of Afrikaners because it carries more weight in their culture than simply being the proverbial opium of the masses. The main concern in this article is to look at the spectators of Loftus and conceptualise an attitude of so-called 'rugbymentality'. This mentality

provides a certain experience for many Afrikaners of their life world. This article will investigate rugbymentality through the Foucauldian lens of 'heterotopia', which would help to put into perspective the significance of rugby and Loftus in the lives of Afrikaners.

What is rugbymentality?

The idea of 'rugbymentality' brings to mind Foucault's idea of *governmentality*. For Foucault (2002a:219-220), the idea of governmentality has to do with a complex form of power which could be more broadly understood as power of an administrative and bureaucratic kind which is exercised through the government. This form of power concerns the control of three important aspects: A target population, the key knowledge of political economy, and apparatuses of security. Afrikaners had control of each of these aspects during the apartheid era: The target population of black South Africans, the key knowledge of Christian nationalism as guiding principle for governance, and the apparatuses of the police and the armed forces keeping the target population in place. Governmentality was thus the privilege of Afrikaners to wield, but there has been an obvious shift for Afrikaners away from governmentality after apartheid. The question is: through what form of knowledge or mentality do they now assert their knowledge? My answer would be that at a substantial proportion of Afrikaners form their identities through so-called rugbymentality. Rugby and arts festivals are the two encircling influences that, according to Jansen (2009:73-75, 77-78), have probably grown most in importance in the post-apartheid era as forms of knowledge that help Afrikaners to forge identities.

'Rugbymentality' is obviously a play on words – on 'governmentality'. This play is quite deliberate because it demonstrates a shift in the position of power that Afri-

kaners experienced, from the space of the government during apartheid to the narrow place of the rugby field in the twenty-first century. Their say in the civil service has become negligible (Giliomee 2009:701), but on the rugby field, they are still in power. For example, in the group of thirty players that were chosen to represent South Africa at the 2011 World Cup, nineteen were white and Afrikaans-speaking. That constituted almost two-thirds of the team, even though Afrikaners only make up 6 per cent of the population of the country (Giliomee 2009:700).[4] Rugby is an integral and central aspect in the cultural landscape of Afrikaners and the numbers simply serve to demonstrate how important rugby is in their cultural-associational lives.

Rugbymentality concerns the relation of many Afrikaners towards their country; whether they feel pride in this respect or not depends heavily on the success of their rugby teams. The general function of sport around the globe as a source of national pride and nationalism is exemplified in Afrikaner society (Booth 1999:182). At this point, an important qualification needs to be made in order to be fair to the wider array of identities available to Afrikaners. Rugbymentality as conceptualised here concerns a well-known public image of Afrikaners that appears on television every Saturday. This public image is representative of a large portion of Afrikaners, but not all of them. The point is that many do subscribe to this image and Loftus is the symbolic focus of this group. Rugbymentality refers to the role and function of rugby in the cultural lives of the Afrikaner public.

Who are these Afrikaners? I would argue that they are a mixture of two groups within Afrikaner ranks during apartheid identified by Krog (2007:30-32), namely the rising middle class and the passive followers of ideology and institution: They are affluent undiscerning consumers whose life world has been largely depoliticised in

the pursuit of economic goals (Rossouw 2007:90). They are also driven by an unconscious desire to escape the post-apartheid 'nervous condition' (a term used by Fanon 1967:17) that is the crisis of Afrikaner identity. This article analyses the form that this consumerism takes in the Afrikaner guise beyond apartheid, centred on Loftus and rugby.

Rugbymentality and the heterotopia of Loftus

In the text entitled 'Of other spaces', Michel Foucault (1986:22-27) elaborates on the idea of heterotopia. This strange notion carries two meanings: Firstly, heterotopia could be a space where the normal and accepted logic and rules of a society are allowed to be suspended. In other words, things can be done in heterotopia that are not allowed or accepted in 'decent society'. Secondly, the heterotopia can be defined as a designated space within or outside of society that functions as a kind of mirror to the state of affairs within society, be it as a mirror of perfection or imperfection (Foucault 1986:24, 27). In this way, heterotopia consists of contradictory spaces that are either (or both) utopian or dystopian in kind. The point is that heterotopia consists of strong contradictions between what society should, or should not, be like and what society is actually like.

Why rely on the Foucauldian concept of heterotopia in looking at Loftus? Certain other concepts could also be quite helpful, such as the anthropological concept of 'liminality' or the more generalised idea of 'nostalgia'; indeed, the idea of the heterotopia relates to both. Liminality refers to 'in-between situations and conditions that are characterized by the dislocation of established structures, the reversal of hierarchies, and uncertainty regarding the continuity of tradition and future outcomes' (Horvath *et al* 2009:3-4). As will be

seen, heterotopia carries a similar meaning and demonstrates each of these aspects in some way. However, heterotopia is different in one important aspect which exactly concerns the function of nostalgia: heterotopia reveals how the disruption caused by liminality in each of the above ways is countered by nostalgia itself. In other words, the disruption caused by societal change in post-apartheid South Africa to Afrikaner identity is countered by Afrikaners in turning to cultural nostalgia in a number of ways. Viewing Loftus as heterotopia will bring this dynamic to the fore. Heterotopia is a kind of heuristic device through which one can come to understand the power dynamics within a specific context, in this case the postcolonial context of South Africa and the ways in which it influences Afrikaner identity.

The main advantage of using the concept of heterotopia is that it brings to light the intricate dynamics involved in societal and identity formation. Current Afrikaner identity is constructed partly on the basis of what Foucault calls 'pastoral power'. This kind of power is distributed in a more diffuse manner in society although it is still attached to institutions of some sort, for example Christianity and the Church, but also the state (Foucault 2002b:333-334). Pastoral power provides the opportunity for individual identity formation through the appropriation of knowledge which is disseminated in society by institutions (in the strict or loose sense of the word). There is an ambivalence involved here, what Foucault (2002b:336) calls a 'double bind' which involves 'the simultaneous individualization and totalization of modern power structures'. The problem is to explain how we actively and freely form our identities (within bounds) by way of the knowledge at our disposal without passively subjecting ourselves to these institutions (Foucault 2002b:336). The discussion of rugbymentality aims to demonstrate how pastoral power is at work in both ways in the lives of

Figure 2: **Bulls players training in the gym (Gallo Images)**

Afrikaners through the 'institution' of Loftus, whether in an active manner (i.e., creatively) or passively, where their identities are simply formed by outside influences.

As with all kinds of mentalities, there is a physical space that is symbolically representative of rugbymentality, namely the Loftus Versfeld Stadium in Pretoria. Loftus is the prime symbol of rugbymentality and probably *the place* in the country that most visibly represents the public image of Afrikaner-identity in post-apartheid South Africa. Jansen (2009:73-74) provides an apt description of the significance of the stadium for Afrikaners:

When one enters the almost all-white, almost all-Afrikaans rugby stadium called *Loftus Versfeld*, it becomes immediately clear that this game is much more than rugby. It is an event of tremendous social and cultural significance for the Afrikaner. It is, of course, at base a sport, and so the normal travails and joys of losing and winning are the same as with sports everywhere. But there is something more, for this is the sport in which power, nationalism and masculinity are projected and entrenched in Afrikanerdom.

Jansen points to the link between rugby and the self-image of Afrikaners and the weight that the sport carries in their culture. Loftus, and the rugbymentality that it engenders, function as an important mirror to

Afrikaners. Loftus represents a complex postcolonial invented tradition that reveals what it means to be an Afrikaner. Certain kinds of games (i.e., types of sport) attract a specific kind of audience and these 'games discipline instincts and institutionalize them' (Callois in Esposito 1995:114). If we regard rugby from this vantage point, then an analysis of Loftus as an institution of rugby will tell us a lot about how this game shapes, and is shaped by, Afrikaner identity and culture.

Loftus Versfeld rugby stadium itself is the *place* that represents Afrikaner identity – that is, an actual geographic site – but also a *space* that can tell us about Afrikaners. Space concerns the multiple symbolic meanings and experiences of a place, which can be diffuse and differ from the perspective of one individual to the next. Loftus is both the physical place that it is, and the mental and experiental space that it represents, namely rugbymentality. Heterotopia concerns this relation between place and space. In the discussion of Loftus (as physical space) and rugbymentality (as mental space), creative use will be made of the principles of heterotopia outlined by Foucault.

Loftus as a space of crisis and deviance

Foucault (1986:24) asserts that all cultures and societies consist of either (or both) of two types of heterotopia, namely a heterotopia of crisis and a heterotopia of deviance. *Heterotopia of crisis* is a space where 'there are privileged or sacred or forbidden places, reserved for individuals who are, in relation to society and the human environment in which they live, in a state of crisis' (Foucault 1986:24). *Heterotopia of deviance* is a space 'where individuals whose behavior is deviant in relation to the required mean or norm are placed' (Foucault 1986:25).

In what sense is Loftus a *heterotopia of crisis*? I would suggest that the shift from the Union Building to Loftus as the symbol of Afrikanerdom is a symbolic demonstration of an identity that has been in crisis for quite some time. Afrikaners are still in the process of rethinking their identity, which was inextricably bound up with apartheid. Krog (2009:126) describes the disruption caused by the end of this social and political order:

> Afrikaners found their way of life forcefully splintered by a gradually self-asserting black majority, and the majority of Afrikaans-speakers turned out to not be white and started claiming the majority space in their language. So Afrikaners, who have so easily appropriated the land and the continent, found themselves in a new kind of post-colonial dynamic and are still reeling and deeply resentful about the incoherence of their lives.

The end of apartheid threw the identity of Afrikaners into turmoil and turned their world upside down: Apartheid was an attempt by Afrikaners to create a 'coherent' society although it was already 'incoherent' as African cultures were disrupted by colonialism. Afrikaners simply lived in a 'completely closed coherent world' (Krog 2009:126), which was itself disrupted and exposed with the end of apartheid. The collapse of Afrikaner nationalism left a massive symbolic gap (Rossouw 2007:90) and rugby has helped to deal with this situation. Rugby has become an integral part of the identity of many and represents a link to an otherwise disgraced past. The continuity that rugby represents between the past and the present provides a rich source of heroes for Afrikaners (Figure 3), heroes that are untainted by their political past. These heroes are not admired only by Afrikaners, but also by the general South African public. The expression of power by Afrikaners takes place on the rugby field despite the political disenfranchisement off the field. This expression is quite effective, for the reverence

Figure 3: Three heroes of the Bulls and the Springboks (Gallo Images)

for the Springboks is second only to the All Blacks, famous for the Haka war cry (a Maori challenge to battle) that they perform before every match. For Afrikaners in the latter half of the twentieth century, the rivalry with New Zealand significantly took the place of the British, because of the dominance of international rugby by the All Blacks (Black & Nauright 1998:77).

The importance of rugby in the lives of Afrikaners is not limited to the present: Rugby began to displace traditional forms of culture (*volksfeeste*) in the 1970s during a time when South African sport teams in general were boycotted as a result of political sanctions (Grundlingh 1995b:100-101). The boycott of South African rugby teams during apartheid made a deep impression on Afrikaners in terms of the isolation that they felt from the rest of the world. This mixture of rugby and politics did not end with apartheid. There is still a strong political side to rugby; surrounding the

sport are also debates about the role of Afrikaners in the country, for instance the debate about the Springbok and the question as to whether this symbol should disappear owing to its association with apartheid. The Springbok has proven to be a symbol that Afrikaners fight to keep within the public domain. The Springbok is symbolic of their identity crisis and the battle for the Springbok is also one of the battles for the identity of Afrikaners and the last bit of public power that they have. Rugby represents a significant expression of public power for Afrikaners and it has filled the vacuum left in the wake of the disappearance of the myths of apartheid, providing new myths that offer themselves to mediating the identity of Afrikaners. This might sound like an overstatement of the importance of rugby but some go as far as saying that 'the demise of the Springbok could draw a line under the once dominant influence of Africa's last white tribe' (Evans 2008). Issues of identity, community and myth are often intertwined

with sport (Foster 2010:254). The myth of rugby contributes to the reinvention of Afrikaner identity.

In what sense is Loftus a *heterotopia of deviance*? I would argue that the deviance of Loftus lies with the violent nature of rugby, which neatly ties in with the metaphor of sport as war. Sport could be considered as a substitute for war; World Cups in sport attest to this function of sport, where one finds an 'orgy of chauvinism and mime-show of war between nations' (Coetzee (2001:351), in his description of the 1995 World Cup in South Africa). The 'sports field and battlefield are linked as locations for the demonstration of legitimate patriotic aggression' (Mangan 2006), and the aggression on the rugby field no doubt fulfils this role. The violence on the field is the focus of the spectator and usually remains on the field, although it can sometimes spill over into the stands if some become a bit '*warm onder die kraag'* (hot under the collar).

This role is not openly fulfilled by the players on the field but, from a psychoanalytic point of view, it is the role that they fulfil in the eyes of many spectators. Rugby provides Afrikaners with a kind of psychological compensation for their political problems off the field. The languishing political voice of Afrikaners is canalised into the sport and their rugby heroes project an image of power back to them, thus providing Afrikaners with a sense of empowerment (what Grundlingh (1995c:118) calls their 'ethnic self-esteem') despite a low political self-esteem. It represents a kind of catharsis for Afrikaners, where success on the rugby field can compensate for their political woes. This helps rugby fans 'to regulate potentially harmful emotions' (Lambert 2010:219) and find the opportunity to vent their political frustrations in a 'healthy' (albeit subconscious) manner. This can be done at Loftus in a manner 'that could not be expressed in other social contexts without a degree of embarrassment or offence' (Lambert 2010: 223). The key here is that the rugby stadium (namely Loftus) provides a space for this psychological function, and a place where a certain type of aggression and behaviour is legitimate. This reveals an important function of heterotopia as a space within or outside of society where the accepted logic and rules of society are allowed to be suspended. In other words, things can be done in heterotopia (namely Loftus) that are not otherwise allowed or accepted in 'decent society', for example open patriotic aggression, public drunkenness and its related misconduct.

The symbolic meanings of Loftus

According to Foucault (1986:25), 'a society, as its history unfolds, can make an existing heterotopia function in a very different fashion'; 'each heterotopia has a precise and determined function within society and the same heterotopia can, according to the synchrony of the culture in which it occurs, have one function or another.' In this respect, Loftus is a heterotopia because the stadium itself, although seen as a symbol of Afrikanerdom, also carries other functions apart from Afrikanerdom or rugby. The stadium has been used for the purposes of soccer during the 2010 World Cup and is also home to the soccer team of Mamelodi Sundowns. In the former instance, the stadium interestingly became a space where people from all around the world congregated to watch soccer matches. The stadium was also used for some of the religious gatherings that Angus Buchan recently organised around the country, which filled stadiums (and Loftus) up to the brim. In this instance, the majority of Buchan's audience were probably Afrikaners, but they came to Loftus for religious reasons. This reveals the importance of both rugby and Christianity in the lives of Afrikaners. To complete the list of its functions, the stadium has also been a venue for rock concerts over the years.

Figure 4: A horned Bulls *bakkie* with the Orlando Stadium in the background (Gallo Images)

Rugby has another significant role in the lives of Afrikaners: Sometimes it does provide a way for them to reach out to other population groups, or at least to share in a sense of what it means to be South African in the midst of the national glory provided by the Boks or Bulls winning a big competition. The most distinct examples of these are the two World Cups, with President Mandela (in 1995) and President Mbeki (in 2007) visibly present when the Boks lifted the trophy. In May 2010, the Bulls played the semi-final and final matches of the Super 14 competition in Orlando Stadium (Figure 4) because Loftus Versfeld had already been handed over to FIFA for the Soccer World Cup.[5] President Zuma was present at the final in which the Bulls beat the Capetonian Stormers, their compatriots and archrivals, and the event displaced the heterotopia of Loftus to Soweto. These events were fleeting but incisive symbolic events which revealed that some Afrikaners aligned themselves with a sense of a broader national identity.

Loftus as space of exotic tradition

Heterotopia concerns the notion of *incompatible spaces*, that is, the capacity to juxtapose 'in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible' (Foucault 1986:25). Loftus is a heterotopia in this sense: within its off-field culture one finds a strange mixture of the traditional and the 'exotic'. The traditional can be seen in the integral role that Afrikaans music plays at Loftus: The song *Liefling* (Beloved) by Gé Korsten once dominated the music played at the stadium and Steve Hofmeyr's *Die Bloubul* (The Blue Bull) is considered the 'national song' (*nasionale lied*) of the Blue Bulls (Van der Berg & Burger 2008:148). The exotic can be seen in the strong element of Texan culture resonating in the entertainment surrounding the rugby field. The metaphor of the Bulls make Pretoria seem like Dallas: The horns, the offroad 4x4 *bakkies*

(Figure 4), the *braais* (barbeques) covered with all manner of meat and the open demonstration of Christian faith in interviews with the players after the match. The dancing girls, the Bulls Babes (Figure 5), at one point wore cowgirl outfits and matching cowboy hats. This last example demonstrates how the role of women remains subordinate to that of men: The women provide entertainment next to the field and a furtive sexual distraction to the display of aggression on the field, where the men in charge are the 'male actors who create and sustain the nation by military and constitutional or political struggles [now rugby struggles] from which women by definition are excluded' (Gaitskell *et al* in Grundlingh 1995c:126). Rugby reinforces gender relations in Afrikaans society (Gaitskell *et al* in Grundlingh 1995c:126), whether through tradition or through the exotic.

The reason for the 'American exotic' is probably twofold: Firstly, an affinity that Afrikaners feel towards the frontier mentality and nostalgia of the American mid-West; and secondly, the advent of professionalism in 1995 and the accompanying commercialisation (and thus Americanisation) of rugby (which had already been underway since the mid-1980s, according to Grundlingh 1995a:19). Sport teams have become brands within the consumerist culture and the Bulls brand is sold as a mixture of the traditional (Afrikaans) and the exotic (American). The traditional element in the Bulls brand sets it apart from most sport brands in the world and makes it part of a smaller group of brands whose fans invest some kind of regional or nationalist sentiments in the team. Other examples are Bayern Munich and FC Barcelona: many Bavarians and Catalonians have the same secessionist sentiments harboured by some Afrikaners, aspiring to separate themselves from the nation-state and to form their own homeland (*volkstaat*). The ideal of the *volkstaat* (such as the picture painted by Roodt (2006:378-385)) gestures toward a

Figure 5: The Bulls Babes in their 'full' regalia (Gallo Images)

future heterotopia that would exist in the midst of a dystopian South African society.

Loftus as museum and monument

Heterotopia is frequently linked to slices in time, where 'the heterotopia begins to function at full capacity when men arrive at a sort of absolute break with their traditional time' (Foucault 1986:26). Loftus is a heterotopia because time seems to stand still there. This gives it the feel of a (noisy) museum or a monument; at Loftus, one is in the same space where so many past events of glory took place *in memoriam* (in this sense, many rugby and sports stadia could be considered heterotopic). Figure 1 shows an archive photo of this 'museum' taken during the Currie Cup final in 1991. The stadium has remained much the same, although

Figure 6: Bulls fans in the traditional blue jerseys and horned hats (Gallo Images)

the Eastern pavilion (from which the photo is taken) has since been rebuilt with the addition of an upper deck.[6]) Afrikaners have a 'historical experience' (see Gaffney & Bale 2004:34) at a stadium event when they watch rugby at Loftus. The stadium provides Afrikaners with a sense of historical continuity, a connection to memorable events in the past that can be celebrated even though they took place in the time of apartheid. The architecture of Loftus as stadium can be read as a historical text where 'the collective energies, dreams and aspirations of large segments of the [Afrikaner] population are posited and deposited in the stadium' (Gaffney & Bale 2004:35).

Loftus as rugby stadium becomes a kind of parallel reality during the rugby match: during the 80 minutes of

the game (the slice of time that Foucault refers to), reality fades as the spectators escape into the parallel reality. In the slice of time that is the rugby match, it is not only the rugby stadium where this experience is felt. Rugby (and most sport) lends itself to the medium and format of television. Indeed, spectators watching the match at the stadium constitute a small proportion of those who watch it on television. The match can be watched live on television, whether it is played in the same city or halfway around the world. A recording of the game can be watched again and again on television (or on a computer or cellular phone screen). The slice of time that is the rugby match (or highlights thereof) becomes an iconic event on television, whether in real time or *in memoriam*. If it were not for television, then sport (and rugby) would not exert the attraction

that it enjoys in modern culture (and for that matter in Afrikaans culture).

Concluding remarks: Loftus as mirror

I would like to bring this paper to a close in relating Loftus to the final principles of Foucault's heterotopia. Heterotopia, with its 'relation to all the space that remains' (Foucault 1986:27), serves as a kind of mirror exposing different contradictions within society. On the one hand, heterotopia creates an imaginary space that exposes the illusions of every *real* space in society (Foucault 1986:27). On the other hand, the role of heterotopia can be the creation of a space radically other to the communal space of daily life. What insights do Loftus and rugbymentality offer when viewed as a mirror, but also as imaginary space, of Afrikaners?

The first insight concerns specific ideological shifts. The consumerist nature of current Afrikaner culture expressed through 'rugbymentality' confirms the shift in the ideology of Afrikaners that Rossouw (2007:89-90) identifies: From the ideology of republicanism in the nineteenth century (that motivated the *Great Trek* and the Anglo-Boer War), to the ideology of nationalism in the twentieth century (which formed the bedrock of apartheid), and now (since the 1970s) the ideology of consumerist capitalism. Economic ideals now take precedence over political ideals in the lives of Afrikaners (Rossouw 2007:3). The integral function of rugby within Afrikaner culture is no coincidence. Rugby, like any sport, is part and parcel of the development of modern culture since the Industrial Revolution. Rugby has been present in all three of the above phases since it was imported here from the British Isles in the late nineteenth century. One can imagine that for Afrikaners at that time, beating the English

at their own game provided a way of dealing with the scars wrought by English domination; much of this sentiment was carried over into the twentieth century, when rugby 'matches against the British Lions were significant opportunities for Afrikaners to teach *die Engelse* [the English] a lesson' (Black & Nauright 1998:77).

The second insight concerns the manner in which Loftus as heterotopia can either open or close the world of Afrikaners to others and also open or close the world to Afrikaners themselves. Heterotopia encompasses 'a system of opening and closing that both isolates [it] and makes [it] penetrable' (Foucault 1986:26). This means that the heterotopic site can at the same time be freely accessible to everyone (in theory) but also inaccessible to some. This relates to *Loftus as exclusive and inclusive space*: Loftus as place and brand is accessible to anyone and everyone (Figure 6 shows fans of different groups). Becoming a Bulls fan is simple because in essence anyone could be a Bull and yet, being an Afrikaner is a far more complex and exclusive affair. As a cultural symbol Loftus is part of an attempt by some Afrikaners to retroactively insulate (*laertrek*) themselves from the social and political realities of South Africa, whilst others see Loftus inclusively, as a way to become part of the cultural mosaic of the country.

Rugbymentality can function as a form of *self-imposed exclusion* for some Afrikaners. Rugbymentality reveals an interesting variation on the Foucauldian heterotopia: heterotopia is not just a physical place but also a specific *experience* of the world. In other words, rugbymentality leads many Afrikaners to experience the places that they daily inhabit in ways different from those of their fellow citizens, whether black or poor. The disempowerment of Afrikaners within the political sphere and the social realities of post-Apartheid South Africa have led to a sense of alienation, and rugbymentality

is a way of dealing with this. Loftus provides a physical space within which this mentality, and a sense of power, can be expressed. The rugby match at Loftus provides many Afrikaners with a kind of festival which is 'confined to the limits of a reality of which it is a negation' (Bataille 1991:215-216). The game is an escape from a reality they would like to deny and yet the game overflows into reality, whilst reality also has a direct impact on the game itself.

Rugbymentality can also function as *the struggle for inclusion* on the part of Afrikaners. The struggle of the Springboks to win the World Cup and be the best in the world is more significant than being just a sporting pursuit. The status of the Springboks as world champions 'demonstrate[s] that the Afrikaner could beat the best the world could offer' (Grundlingh 1995c: 118). The success of the South African team at the world championship acts as kind of mirror to Afrikaners and demonstrates to them how worthy their contribution is to the country. If the Springboks are the world champions, then Afrikaners share in the pride of being South African. This pursuit is therefore also the struggle of Afrikaners for their own recognition as politically and culturally relevant within the wider South African community. Loftus can be a way for Afrikaners to reinvent themselves as citizens of post-apartheid South Africa making an important and essential contribution to South African society and rethinking what it means to be an Afrikaner. It is after all significant that Afrikaners call themselves Afrika(ners); with the emergence of this name came the realisation that they belong to Africa and live according to its rhythm (Krog 2009:123). In a sense they did not fully become a 'tribe' of Africa because of their role in the institutionalisation of apartheid which, in common parlance, is considered a form of colonialism. Only beyond apartheid can they envisage themselves as the white tribe of Africa with the claim of belonging to this place that is South Africa.

Notes

1   A word of thanks to fellow participants for their advice and feedback on an earlier version of this article that was presented at the Walkshop on 'Vryheidspark and other Governmonumentalities' at the University of South Africa (UNISA) in Pretoria in September 2011. I further owe a number of ideas to fellow participants at a research seminar that I also presented at UNISA, this time at the Department of Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology in April 2012. A number of ideas in this article were also inspired by conversations with Pieter Duvenage and Sampie Terreblanche. I found their thoughts and comments to be insightful and of great help. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for valuable feedback that helped to make this article substantially stronger. I also thank Gallo Images for their kind permission to reproduce the images in this publication.

2   The Northern Transvaal Rugby Union broke away from the Johannesburg-based Transvaal Rugby Football Union with its establishment in 1938 (see Van Den Berg & Burger 2008:11-13). During the period after South Africa became a Union within the British Commonwealth in 1910 through the apartheid era until the mid-1990s, most rugby unions in South Africa were named in some way after the four provinces of the country, Transvaal being one of them. At the end of 1994 after the first free general elections, the country was re-divided into nine provinces. The rugby unions of Northern Transvaal and Transvaal both fell in the new province of Gauteng, which mainly consists of the greater metropolitan areas of Pretoria and Johannesburg. Both unions opted to move away from renaming themselves after the province and instead chose the more brand friendly names of the Blue Bulls and Golden Lions respectively.

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3   This does not discount the fact that, according to a recent BMI survey, the majority of Bulls supporters are apparently black (see McGregor 2011:159). In an interview Barend van Graan, the current CEO of the Blue Bulls Company, explained that one must take into account that the mostly white spectators seen at the stadium represent only a small fraction of the greater fan base watching matches on television. Although a much higher proportion of white people are rugby fans, the majority black population means that even a small proportion of black fans at some point start to outnumber the white fans.

4   According to Gilliomee (2009:xiii), there were around 2.6 million people identifying as Afrikaners in South Africa in 1980. The current estimate is that there are around 3 million people identifying as Afrikaners in South Africa (www.unpo.org), hence 6per cent of an estimated population of around 50 million, and even as many as 600 000 residing elsewhere in the world (official figures for the diaspora are hard to ascertain; figures given here are derived from the Wikipedia entry on 'Afrikaners'). These figures apply if one views Afrikaners as ethnically white, that is, the exclusive definition of Afrikaners, which makes them part of the greater 'white' population of around 4.6 million (SA Survey 2010/12:1). If one follows the inclusive definition, that is Afrikaners as first language Afrikaans speakers, the figure would be considerably higher – amounting to probably at least twice, if not thrice, the figure given above for ethnically 'white' Afrikaners. The inclusive figure includes the majority of the Coloured population, of almost 4.5 million (SA Survey 2010/12:1), and numerous black Afrikaans speakers. Both of these definitions of Afrikaners are problematic for different reasons: The exclusive definition is a racist definition, whilst the inclusive

definition could lead to an oversight of the socio-economic problems that beset certain Coloured and African communities in grouping them together with their affluent white Afrikaans-speaking counterparts.

5   The Super Rugby competition (formerly Super 10, Super 12 and Super 14) is an international competition in which 5 regional teams each from South Africa, New Zealand and Australia compete from February to August. The competition has been running since 1993 and could be compared to the UEFA Champions League (in soccer) or the Heineken Cup (in rugby) in Europe. The Bulls have recently won three Super 14 titles in 2007, 2009 and 2010.

6   The Currie Cup is the national provincial rugby competition in South Africa. The competition has been running since 1889 and the Blue Bulls (formerly Northern Transvaal until 1996) have won the Cup 23 times, most recently in 2009. Only one team, the Bulls' archrivals Western Province from Cape Town, has won more titles with 31 wins (supersport.com). Bulls supporters will be quick to point out that 17 of these titles were won before the Northern Transvaal Rugby Union was established in 1938. During the Apartheid years especially, this rivalry between Northern Transvaal and Western Province replaced competitive international rugby. The resulting isolation led to a deep-seated provincialism that still exists today.

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CHAPTER FOUR

The invisibility of richness: A critique of Vice's 'strange place'[1]

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Abstract

This article builds on Samantha Vice's argument on the problem of whiteness in contemporary South Africa. I will explore the thesis of invisibility regarding whiteness and argue for its relevance to the rich *per se*. This thesis demonstrates how white privilege and affluence, despite being glaringly visible in a concrete sense, is rendered invisible together with the mostly black poverty by which it is contrasted. The invisibility of whiteness translates and flows into the so-called 'invisibility of richness', which involves anyone who is economically affluent in this country and has the same effect of rendering poverty invisible. The massive and ever-growing divide between rich and poor means that both have *fundamentally incommensurate* experiences of life in this country, which is why post-apartheid South Africa is such a strange place to live in for *all* of its inhabitants. In the latter part of the article, a suggestion will be made about what the appropriate response to the injustices of this strange place might look like for whites.

Introduction

This article is a sympathetic critique of Samantha Vice's analysis of whiteness in South Africa and the argument is that the 'thesis of invisibility' (2010: 325) concerns not only whiteness but also the economically affluent in this country. I will further attempt to demonstrate how the thesis of invisibility regarding whiteness and richness lies at the heart of South Africa as a strange place. This argument will proceed in two parts: The first part will be an analysis of South Africa as a strange place by way of unpacking the 'thesis of invisibility' regarding both whiteness and richness. The sec-

ond part will aim to provide an answer to the question, what should whites do in this strange place? A suggestion will be made about what the appropriate response to the injustices of this strange place might look like for whites.

The 'thesis of invisibility' lies at the root of what is so problematic about present-day South Africa for Vice, namely that 'it is still a visibly divided and suspicious country' (323) (and here the recent events in Marikana and its aftermath demonstrates this statement). The remnants of apartheid are still present and the dynamic in society between privileged and underprivileged is reinforced by the country's socio-economic conditions. Vice says that whites lose sight of their privileged socio-economic status as well as the conditions that help to sustain their position. Whites cannot see what their privilege entails and the widespread socio-economic problems in the country remain invisible to them. We can therefore speak of a so-called 'invisibility of whiteness'.

I follow Vice in saying that the phenomenon according to which privilege is rendered invisible extends to the rich. The notion of a so-called 'invisibility of richness' might seem counter-intuitive because economic affluence is most visible in a concrete sense. However, the 'invisibility of richness' describes the way in which the privilege attached to affluence is rendered invisible to the rich themselves. This means that the affluence that the rich enjoys is taken to be self-evident, to just be the 'way things are' (a phrase used by Vice (2010: 324) in relation to whiteness), i.e. taken for granted to the degree that everything that affluence entails becomes invisible. The reality underlying the contrast between affluence and poverty, namely how it comes to be and how it is maintained, is rendered invisible to the rich.

The hope is that this article will highlight the intersection between the debates on race and class, and why the debate on whiteness must take cognisance of the growing economic class divide in the country. Although whiteness is overwhelmingly linked to affluence and blackness to poverty, one must take note of the massive chasm that has opened up between the black rich and poor, and also between the white rich and poor.

1. South Africa as a strange place

Samantha Vice's article ('How Do I Live In This Strange Place?') analyses the problem of being white in post-apartheid South Africa (2010: 323-342). The article received a fair amount of attention and debate in the Afrikaans and English printed media in 2011, both in support and critique. The public reaction to ideas found within the article, which was read in a second-hand fashion in the newspapers through articles of Eusebius McKaizer (2011a) and Anton Van Niekerk (2011), was emotionally highly-charged and culminated in the assault upon Professor van Niekerk, Chair of the Philosophy Department, in his office at the University of Stellenbosch on 14 July 2011 by a member of the Afrikaans right-wing group *Volksraad Verkiesing Kommissie* (National Assembly Election Commission). Van Niekerk had written an opinion piece a week earlier in an Afrikaans newspaper in which he cautioned whites against romanticising apartheid and he supported some (but not all) of Vice's ideas, especially with regards to white responsibility (*skuld*) for certain injustices in the country. The response to the article showed that Vice's argument hit a nerve, as she rightly pointed out in her response to the furore that broke out (2011a: 28).[2]

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2   See the Mail & Guardian webpage for the Whiteness Debate, where Vice's response and a range of reactions to her article can be found: http://mg.co.za/tag/whiteness-debate.

Vice says that whiteness constitutes a problem in South Africa because of the privileged position that whites still enjoy in the country (Vice, 2010: 325). This privilege is problematic for a number of reasons: Firstly, it is an unearned privilege inherited from previous generations, a privilege gained through the oppression of non-whites during apartheid. Secondly, this privilege continues in face of widespread poverty in the country (323). The great majority of the poor in the country is black, and whites find the black face of poverty around many a street corner and traffic light. Thirdly and crucially, the 'invisibility of whiteness' (325) renders white privilege unremarkable to whites themselves and makes them unaware of their position of affluence in society. The problem of whiteness[3] and the privileges it carries poses inconvenient questions to whites and concerns the fundamental issue of the collective guilt and shame that all whites (both Afrikaans and English) feel, or at least *should* feel according to Vice, in South Africa. Vice recommends that whites need to retreat from the political sphere, enacting a kind of '*political* silence' (337), and engage in a private and self-reflective project (339)[4] in which the focus must be to work on the damage that was done by apartheid to the moral selves of whites.[5]

I will proceed by engaging in conversation with Vice's argument in focusing on the 'thesis of invisibility': The notion of the 'invisibility of whiteness' will be discussed, as will be the extension of this notion to the so-called 'invisibility of richness'. This invisibility is at the root of the strangeness of this place and it demands shame and guilt from not only whites but also the rich in general. For the purposes of the argument, I will remain with the simple distinction that Vice makes between white and black. This distinction in itself is problematic, especially within the South African context because it could hide the fact that there is a richness of ethnic and cultural diversity in South Africa by simply dividing people into the hegemonic groupings of black and white. However, this might exactly be one of the insights of the 'thesis of invisibility' in Vice's article, namely that whites too easily reduce the richness of this diversity as it concerns non-whites to the blanket term of 'blacks' (the inverse is also applicable). The aim and importance of Vice's distinction is also to show that in general

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3   For another account on the problem of being white in South Africa, see Krog's *Begging to be Black* (2009). Krog's personal account is interesting because it expresses the 'intense connection to the land' (Vice, 2010: 342) that many Afrikaners feel, but also the nostalgia they sometimes experience for Europe.

4   Kerner (2007) highlights a similar trend regarding Critical Whiteness Studies in Germany, a theory which claims that 'the hegemonic whiteness of Germany is not seen and problematized by most white Germans'. Kerner points out that, significantly, 'this has lead to the call for self-reflective practices, for the creation of a white self-understanding on the part of white Germans, especially of their – or should I say: our – acknowledgment that being considered white in Germany comes with a lot of privileges'. Kerner does however caution against thinking that such a private project alone would be enough to deal with racism or power asymmetries, for the systemic and epistemic dimensions attached to racism also requires attention in the attempt to deal with the hegemony of whiteness. Critical Whiteness Studies returns race to the liberal public discourse, where it is mostly abolished, but for Kerner it does not successfully deal with white hegemony more than to simply make it apparent and visible.

5   Vice (2010: 325) asserts that 'both the oppressed and oppressors are morally damaged' in different ways. This is the point of Fanon's work in *The Wretched of the Earth* (1967), namely to show that oppression damages both parties. In this respect, Lötter (1997: 36) says that 'apartheid did major moral harm to white people, a harm that seriously affected the core of their humanity'. See Tabensky (2010) for an insightful discussion of the moral harm done to the oppressor by his own actions. Also see Hurst (2011) for a discussion of the reciprocal shame of the oppressor and oppressed, and the role that forgiveness plays regarding issues of shame.

there are definite differences in the experience of this country between white and black, regardless of other sub-categories there might be.

1.1. The invisibility of whiteness in this strange place

Vice describes South Africa as 'a strange and morally tangled place to live in' (2010: 323) and at the heart of this strangeness lies the so-called 'invisibility of whiteness'. The moral problematic of this place poses a basic question to whites: Should you feel shame for being white and therefore privileged? Vice feels that whites encounter this question on a daily basis and she provides a succinct picture of this place in the opening paragraph of her article:

> …[O]ur equally famous history of stupefying injustice and inhumanity feels still with us: its effects press around us every day, in the visible poverty, the crime that has affected everyone, the child beggars on the pavements, the *de facto* racial segregation of living spaces, in who is serving whom in restaurants and shops and in homes.

Vice refers to certain daily encounters that whites in general might have with blacks. What is interesting here is that the main quality of this strangeness is its utter visibility: Poverty is something that is most visible in a concrete sense as the injustice of the hardship that the poor experiences are clear for all to see (although I will shortly argue that this is often not the case); the fear of violence in the guise of crime accompanies daily life; blacks in many situations still remain servants to whites at home, in shops and restaurants. Vice is referring to instances here where the state of affairs is actually quite visible for all to see. Her argument in this respect is quite simple: This place is rife with moral confusion, whether it leads one to feel guilt or shame or not, and that makes for a strange existential experience in the day to day lives of South Africans. Vice's point is that the real life world of blacks is hidden from whites because of the roles that they occupy in the life world of whites: They are seen as the helpful domestic worker that cleans up the house, the irritating beggar that asks for money at the traffic light, the vagrant that comes to your front gate (not door, due to secured properties) to ask for some food, or the criminal that might violently break into your house.

  Two insights arise from Vice's picture of this strange place: Firstly, that the reality of the life world of blacks is rendered invisible despite the clear visibility of the roles they fulfill. Secondly, that the privilege that whites enjoy due to these black roles itself is rendered invisible to whites despite being very visible to blacks, hence the 'invisibility of whiteness'. I would argue for a third insight based on Vice's picture of this strange place, namely that it is not just a picture of the relationship between white and black but also of the relationship between rich and poor. In other words, of how both the life world of the poor and the privilege that the rich enjoys is rendered invisible. This insight brings us to the thesis of the 'invisibility of richness', which will be discussed in the next section. However, the 'invisibility of whiteness' first needs to be unpacked before the consequent 'invisibility of richness' can be understood.

  Vice offers a strongly normative claim when she asserts that 'whites *ought* to see themselves as a problem' (2010: 337). She says this exactly because the problem of their being white in South Africa is hidden from whites. In fact, the problem *is* exactly that so much of reality is hidden from them, be it consciously or unconsiously. How does this happen? Vice turns to the work of Paul Taylor to demonstrate how exactly this phenomenon takes place. Taylor provides an interesting definition of whiteness as 'a social location of structural privilege in the right kind of racialized society' (2004:

229). This social location leads whites to see themselves and their perspectives as the centre of society (2004: 230), and as simply being 'the way things are' (Vice, 2010: 324). As a consequence, the structural advantages attached to being white becomes hidden from view and hence invisible. Reality is thus hidden from the normalizing gaze of whites.

Vice's article highlights a variation on the invisibility of whiteness that is found in South Africa, where a strange tension seems to exist between the invisibility and visibility of whites.[6] Whiteness is still the measure of perfection and the ideal to strive for in South African society but Vice does say that 'at least some aspects of whiteness are highly visible and explicitly acknowledged' in the country (2010: 335). This means that whiteness is both invisible and visible to whites: Invisible because whiteness is uncritically seen as the measure of the state of society but also visible because what society reflects back to whites is blackness, i.e. whiteness is clearly seen in contrast to blackness. For whites, the measure that is whiteness is not seen as the problem but rather as the solution to all that is wrong with society. However, society exposes whiteness as the actual problem but this insight remains unacknowledged by whites. Therefore, although the problem in South African society (for whites) seems to be blackness, whiteness is definitely problematized. In this respect Vice (2010: 326) provides a succinct and deep insight when she says that '[w]hile one's whiteness might still constitute the unacknowledged norm, as the invisibility thesis claims, *that one* is white rather than black is always present to oneself and others, barring an impressive feat of self-deception'. This is a deep insight from Vice but the problem is that this self-deception is pervasive and therefore perhaps not as impressive as she might think.

1.2. The invisibility of richness in this strange place

I will discuss the crux of the so-called 'invisibility of richness' in this section, arguing that much of the strangeness of this place is due in part to this phenomenon. The role of economic inequalities seems to be somewhat underestimated by Vice, although this has more to do with her focus on whiteness than being a deliberate oversight. She does assert that 'materially nothing much has changed for anyone, black or white' (2010: 332). In a sense this is true because most whites are rich and most blacks are poor. In another sense, for some much has changed: A good portion of whites have become filthy rich, even more so than during apartheid, whilst others have actually become dirt poor. In the same breath, a good portion of blacks have become rich and also filthy rich but they still remain a vast minority to those blacks living in poverty.

Poverty is a phenomenon which is easily overlooked by the rich and an aspect that makes South Africa so morally problematic to live in. According to recent studies the divide between rich and poor in the country has become the deepest in the world (Bhorat *et al*, 2009: 8), having overtaken Brazil in the last decade and still growing.[7] The difference between rich and poor is especially disproportionate in terms of their material wealth and this makes for a strange encounter between rich and poor on a daily basis. This contact is strange because it is experienced in fundamentally different ways by both rich and poor. These encounters consist of existential angst, and the

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6   Thanks to Ina Kerner for providing this insight.
7   The results of this study are based on statistics regarding the Gini co-efficient for South Africa being the highest in the world at 0.72. The figure for Africans is 0.61, for Coloureds 0.59, for Asians 0.56 and for Whites it is 0.51 (Bhorat *et al*, 2009: 8). The Gini co-efficient is a measure of income inequality. It can vary from 0 (complete equality) to 1 (complete inequality). A figure of 0.5 and higher is considered as a sign of economic injustice.

shame or guilt experienced by some in the West due to the knowledge that their own wealth exists at the expense of global poverty is a daily experience for the rich in South Africa: The poor are found on their daily routes to work, to home, to school and so on.

Rich and poor have *fundamentally incommensurate* experiences of life in this country, which is why post-apartheid South Africa is such a strange place to live in for *all* of its inhabitants. In a way, rich and poor inhabit a different country. Two things are significant to this situation: Firstly, the country in which the rich live is quite visible to the poor because of its overwhelming material contrast to the life world of the poor. Secondly, the country in which the poor live is invisible to the rich because the life world of the rich is taken for granted as the norm. The rich do not realise that poverty and not affluence is actually the norm and in this way, the problem of poverty is *mostly* hidden from view. For an example of these two different life worlds, think of an affluent urban family going on holiday in any given rural area in the country, passing by an informal settlement of shacks on the way to a luxurious resort in a wildlife park. The rich family would probably not see the shacks for what they represent, namely a desperate life of poverty and survival, which stands in contrast to the recreational experience of the family in the 'wilderness' away from the city. In fact, they probably see the shacks as being exotic and even quant in a way. The experience of the same place here is vastly different for rich and poor. The poor cannot escape the brute facts of this strange place but for the rich its strangeness can somehow simply remain awkward and inconvenient (and sometimes even quant) for the unsympathetic, or tiresome and shameful for the sympathetic. The interpretation of poverty by the rich (both white and black) can sometimes be grossly insensitive and ignorant, as two personal anecdotes demonstrate just how 'invisible' poverty can be to the rich:

The first anecdote is similar to the above example of a drive through a rural area by the rich. A white (and clearly racist) travel companion comments on an informal settlement passed by, saying 'just look at the way that they live'. Here one sees the perspective that being poor can be reduced to a choice to live in poverty, whilst also saying that essentially all blacks choose to live in poverty and filth. This is a clear instance of the 'invisibility of whiteness' and this person is completely oblivious to the socio-economic structures and conditions that lead people to live in poverty whilst providing him with a privileged position of wealth.

The second anecdote concerns a remark made by a young black man that owns a business dealing in used cars. In his opinion, people who live in poverty are simply lazy to work themselves out of poverty. This also implies that the poor simply remain in poverty because of a choice they made not to work hard. This is a clear instance of the 'invisibility of richness' and again it reveals an attitude oblivious to both the real problems that lead to poverty and the privilege that comes with wealth, whilst also generalising what is actually relevant to people that live in wealth.

The persistence of the ever-growing divide between rich and poor echoes the insight of Fanon that the societal dynamic 'which governed colonial society is preserved intact during the period of decolonization' (1967: 39). The fall of apartheid has broken down some divisions and forms of injustice in South Africa. However, the division between rich and poor has not only remained but has been reinforced and grown even larger. Gibson refers to this division as 'the new reality of the nation' (2011: 111) and rightly points to the divide between the haves and the have-nots as the main driver of fear in the country (2011: 134). The presence of this fear (in the minds of both rich

and poor) makes for a surreal experience of everyday life for rich and poor because their realities are so different, hence the strange place in which they live. This growing divide between rich and poor is an issue that complicates the debate surrounding white privilege as current injustices are not only caused by whiteness.

By now it must be clear that the so-called invisibility of whiteness is linked in crucial ways to richness. The invisibility of whiteness clearly flows into the so-called 'invisibility of richness' - where the privilege of affluence is invisible to oneself. Whites make up a large portion of the rich (hence the problem of whiteness) but the rich also includes a good portion of blacks. Statistics show that the black middle class in 2007 already numbered as many as six million and the black upper class around two million (Terreblanche as quoted by IRIN Africa, 2007).[8] This is a rather significant amount but at the same time it must be noted that this represents only 20% of the black population (IRIN Africa, 2007) whilst most whites (around 99% or 87%) are situated in those classes (SA Survey 2009/10: 268-269 and Solidarity, 2010).[9] Nevertheless, the issue of the shame and guilt of whites is perhaps a bit more complicated. Simply put, it can be said that if you are white then you are rich, but if you are rich then you are not necessarily white.[10] A simple look around in peak hour traffic in Johannesburg will reveal that many of those sitting in luxury sedans are not white. On the other hand, a simple visit to public and private hospitals reveals that there is still a massive difference in the medical care that blacks and whites receive.[11] The same can be said regarding the state of the schools where whites and blacks receive their education.[12] Whites are still disproportionately represented among the wealthy and the beggars on street corners are almost exclusively black.[13] However, the point here is that the focus should perhaps be slightly augmented to include not only whites, but also the rich *per se*. In this respect I follow De Kock (2011: 31), who articulates this insight well:

> [C]apitalist accumulation and greed can longer be attributed to whiteness so simply or to a white neo-liberal capitalist project alone. This is not to minimise the fact that enormous wealth continues to be marshalled from within the ranks of whiteness in South Africa and elsewhere. But the binary of whiteness as a consolidated bloc versus the poor others has become less stark and is now increasingly inaccurate. … [E]ven in South Africa, the rapid "colouration" of this

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8 Terreblanche says that 'the gap between the [roughly] 8 million rich blacks and the 20 to 25 million poor blacks has become dangerously big. … The fact that [about] 20 percent of blacks have become rich, and even very rich, while 60 percent of blacks remain poor and have to live in deteriorating socio-economic conditions, is a deplorable and dangerous state of affairs' (IRIN Africa, 2007).

9 Blacks top LSM-groups one (lowest) through eight and Whites categories nine and ten (highest) (SA Survey, 2010/11: 305-306).

10 Current statistics show that around 19.9 million people in South Africa live in relative poverty (40% of the total population of 50.6 million): 18.5 million Africans, 1.2 million Coloureds, 139 000 Asians and 37 000 whites (SA Survey, 2010/11: 310-311; rounded-off estimates). This means that around 46% of the black population of 40.2 million lives in poverty whilst only about 1% of the white population of 4.6 million does (SA Survey, 2010/11: 10). Solidarity's figure for poor whites is 600 000 (2010).

11 One requires private medical aid coverage to be treated in a private hospital in South Africa and whilst 71% of whites have this coverage, only 10% of Africans, 22% of Coloureds and 47% of Asians have coverage (SA Survey, 2009/10: 574).

12 My focus remains on the critical issues of poverty and crime due to the contraints of space, for much and also be said about the crisis of education and the HIV/AIDS-pandemic in the country.

13 Almost 2.5 million people in South Africa (5% of the population) live below the breadline on less than $2 a day: (SA Survey, 2010/11: 308): 93% of them are African, 6% are Coloured and the percentages for Whites and Asians are negligble (SA Survey 2009/10: 270).

hegemony, this unequal accumulation in the midst of want and poverty, is such
that its whiteness must necessarily now come into question as a useful category.

The point here is that whiteness still carries a lot of power, but that it is not the only
'colour', so to speak, to do so. This is true on a global scale with the rise of China and
India (and others), where massive wealth is accumulated in the midst of ever more
poverty in much the same way as in South Africa. In many cases the 'poor others' are
still non-white, but an increasing number of non-whites are also becoming rich and
even super-rich. De Kock (2011: 31) says further that the inner core of consumer capi-
talism is becoming less white in the 21ˢᵗ century and the growth of capitalism in the
world is becoming less of an extension of whiteness than was the case in the previous
century. Here I have one reservation about an issue that vexes me, namely whether af-
fluence is an extension of whiteness, i.e. whether whitely habits are perpetuated by the
rich irrespective of their colour. In other words, do the newly rich take on whitely hab-
its and ways when they become rich? What can be said, or so I would argue, is that the
rich at least seem to take on habits that are similar to whitely habits in the sense that it
renders privilege invisible, or in another way renders poverty and injustice invisible to
the privileged.

In this respect, a clue to furthering the argument might lie in Vice's words when she
says that '[t]here is nothing about one's particular self that makes one deserve special
treatment and that ease of moving about the world that comes with being white' (2010:
329). It is no secret that a white skin holds many advantages but the same can defi-
nitely be said of being rich: The rich most certainly move around with more ease than
the poor, both publicly and politically, but also in an existential sense. For instance,
the rich have the means to secure themselves against crime whilst the poor do not.
Terreblanche (2002: 401) notes pertinently that the rich are mostly victims of property
crime whereas the poor (mostly black and mostly female) are at risk of personal crime,
exactly because they cannot secure themselves.

The habits of the rich seems to work in the same way than that of whites and, to
make use of Vice's words, 'their characters and modes of interaction with the world
just will be constituted in ways that are morally damaging' (2010: 326). This means
that the current privilege of being rich in South Africa leads to some inconvenient
questions regarding shame or guilt that the rich should feel about the injustice of pov-
erty in the country.

1.3. Shame and guilt in this strange place
Vice raises an important issue in looking at the shame that should be experienced in
this strange place. The crucial question is: Why or how can one live in this place with-
out experiencing shame? Vice (2010: 328) asserts that it is probably more appropriate
for whites to experience shame than guilt in South Africa. Following Vice (328-329),
shame concerns a reaction to who one *is* or what one has *become*, namely the identity
that one occupies. Guilt, on the other hand, concerns a reaction to something that one
has done, thus a reaction to some immoral action that one has enacted. Vice asserts
that shame 'seems an appropriate response to the recognition of one's unavoidable
privilege' and for whites this means experiencing shame because they live in a country
'that accomodates [them] at the expense of others' (329) due to unjust benefits.

Vice rightly asks this uncomfortable question of whites, but I would argue that it is
not only limited to whites. As one reads through Vice's paper, many of the instances
of shame and guilt that she speaks of certainly also apply to the rich, whether white or

black, although it must be noted that it carries a different register in whites and en-
riched blacks (as will shortly be discussed). The following passage from Vice's article
regarding shame demonstrates this point:

> [S]hame seems an appropriate response to the recognition of one's unavoidable
> privilege. For white privilege does not attach merely to what one does or how
> one benefits, but, more fundamentally, to who one is. And one does not wish to
> be a person whose welfare is dependent on harm to others. One does not wish
> to be a person with vicious traits that are helping, however passively, to sustain
> privilege and oppression. (2010: 329)

The salient point that Vice is highlighting is that one experiences shame in the moment
that one's damaging habits and ways of being in the world, once invisible, now be-
comes visible to oneself. This invisibility is simply caused by the position of privilege
that one inhabits but it becomes visible with the knowledge that this privilege is de-
pendent upon some kind of injustice done to others. Therefore, a number of things be-
come apparent to oneself: Firstly, the former invisibility of one's habits and ways; sec-
ondly, the privilege and harm to others that these habits and ways carry; and thirdly,
the injustice of the situation as such. In a way, Janz points to this moment and intersec-
tion of race and class in noting that 'shame is based in visibility' and 'the visibility is
racial visibility, but it is also class visibility' (2011: 464). In this context, shame takes
form in the moment that privilege becomes apparent as the root of injustice. The class
visibility Janz speaks of is the old class visibility of apartheid, relevant to whites only,
but that class visibility is shifting. The moment of shame is certainly as relevant to the
newly rich as it is to whites. The welfare of the rich happens to the detriment of the
poor, although in a different way than the welfare of whites did during apartheid.

Here one finds a crucial distinction between shame, i.e. the insight that my welfare
does harm to others, and guilt, where I simply feel overwhelmed at the injustice at-
tached to my position of privilege. These emotions of shame and guilt, for instance,
arise when one stops at a traffic light and sees a beggar on the street corner. The emo-
tions experienced by an affluent white or black person when a black beggar kneels in
front of the car at a traffic light surely must be similar in certain respects: Similar be-
cause the experienced emotions are (or *should* be) guilt and shame. However, in draw-
ing the comparison between the experience of shame and guilt in whites and enriched
blacks, it must be noted that one should not conflate these experiences with each other.
There is a different register to the experience of shame and guilt with regards to these
two groups:

The shame or guilt that whites experience is due to the realisation that historically
their privilege arose from systematic oppression and so their privilege to a large extent
can be seen as unearned. A white person might therefore experience these emotions in
feeling that their affluence is the consequence of *past* injustices and systemic oppres-
sion. A white person might ask questions such as: Should I feel shame for being afflu-
ent because of my skin colour? Should I feel shame that I profited from previous
race-based legislation that advanced my current affluent situation?

The shame or guilt that the enriched black experiences is due to the realisation that,
despite societal revolution, their privilege arose from a system that does not favour the
worst-off but rather allows for vast economic inequalities. A black person might there-
fore experience these emotions in feeling that it is the consequence of *current* injus-
tices, and might ask questions such as: Should I feel guilty for being lucky where other

blacks have been unlucky in becoming affluent? Should I feel shame that I profited from current race-based legislation that advanced me as a black person although this black beggar in front of me clearly will never profit from the same legislation?

Difficult questions will be posed to the rich because the issue at hand is that of people's affluent situation being a consequence of their colour or race and *the rich, both white and black, profit in this sense from their skin colour*. In short, the rich profit either from past or from current race-based legislation in the country. However, it must be noted that the experience of shame by blacks should not lead to the relinquishment of white shame, which could so easily happen. This can be seen in the way that even the idea that enriched blacks *should* experience shame where they do not, leads to the feeling that white shame is therefore now at an end. This would result in an abdication of responsibility for past oppression and current injustices.

Here one could raise a serious objection against the claim that all rich blacks have become rich because of race-based legislation, namely Affirmative Action and Black Economic Empowerment. This is a valid objection but this same objection can be raised against a wholesale claim that all whites gained from apartheid. The point is that privilege develops in a society where race-based legislation is present, and this is cause for some form of shame by those who could *possibly* be advantaged if their group's advantage is to the detriment of others, i.e. the passive role in privilege and oppression highlighted by Vice (2010: 329). This could be the case for either rich whites (based in the past) or rich blacks (based in the present). The crucial question for Vice is how whites should atone for their privilege inherited from apartheid, which will now be discussed.

2. What should whites do in this strange place?
The basic question at this juncture in history is: what should whites do? Vice recommends a kind of 'political silence' to whites, a silence that I argue might hold some danger. This notion of political silence will be scrutinized, after which it will be argued that it is actually imperative that whites do have a political voice. A suggestion will be made as to what this political voice could look like and how whites could proceed in expressing this political voice.

2.1. The question of political silence
The suggestion regarding a kind of silence in the political sphere is where my argument diverges most from Vice, or at least so it would seem at first glance. She says the following in this regard:

> The relevant kind of silence is therefore a *political* silence, silence in the political realm, rather than a professional silence or the stifling of all conversation with others, in which race or privilege, for instance, is the topic. For once again, shame, regret, or guilt would be the expected responses to knowledge of one's whiteliness and insidious connection to injustice. This knowledge seems to recommend silence in the political realm as the morally decent policy: One would remain silent to prevent one's whitely perspective from causing further distortion in the political and public contexts, where whiteness is most problematic and charged. Thought of in these terms, silence is a response to the inevitability of going wrong and an expression of humility. (2010: 337)

Vice is asserting here that knowledge of one's whiteliness is key and that one must take cognisance of its connection to injustice. This is a relevant insight about the ne-

cessity of a form of self-knowledge that whites need to develop and incorporate into their view of this country, and many, if not most, live in a quiet denial of the connection between white affluence and injustice. Vice's recommendation further seems to come down to a self-imposed lack of participation in the political sphere for whites, but she admitted that she might have stated this point too bluntly. She qualified this political silence in her response to discussions of her article in a special issue of the *South African Journal of Philosophy*, writing the following:

> My essay never advocates that white people not exercise their civil and political rights – to vote, to stand for public office, to join governmental and non-governmental organisations. … If the political relevance of inner work is recognised, such a requirement would mean that politically *relevant* activity is not sufficient for adequate moral engagement with injustice. … One way to lessen this disagreement is to conceive of another space, between the political and the private … [namely] that of 'civil society' … [which] refers to the wide variety of non-governmental organisations and engagement that provide meaning and value for those participating in them. … I accept, as McKaizer presses, that a lack of engagement with others in this space can be detrimental to both whites and blacks. … My suspicion of political engagement on the part of white South Africans does not extend to participation in civil society, then, though the same care and sensitivity should guide our interactions in all domains. (2011b: 511)

Here Vice says that what she had in mind was not literally political silence but rather a *careful* approach to politics where white privilege is acknowledged. Further, engagement in the political sphere is not enough to deal with injustice. Therefore, whites need to participate within civil society, if carefully so, in order to build awareness of the injustices in this country and how they come about. Vice's concern is that white gripes about problems (e.g. corruption, lack of services, the paychecks of politicians, inefficiency, etc.) in the country still takes place from behind a so-called veil of whiteness (my term), and that these gripes (in private and publicly) reinforce the idea of whites as self-righteous and arrogant (2011b: 512). The problem here is that these gripes could lead to a kind of romanticising of apartheid, a concern that Van Niekerk (2011) also raised in his opinion piece in the Afrikaans newspapers *Beeld* and *Die Burger*. The impression this forms is that the above problems never existed during apartheid and also that these problems do not stem from the effects of apartheid (Vice, 2011b: 512), which comes down to an ignorance or denial of the injustices, both present and past, that was caused by apartheid.

2.2. Why whites should have a political voice
Vice and Van Niekerk's concern about the demonisation of post-apartheid South Africa and the romanticising of apartheid by whites is a crucial motivation for political modesty. If one does not admit to the injustices of this place, then one cannot morally provide any kind of valid political or social commentary and criticism. This awareness and acknowledgement of injustice will probably find better expression within civil society, where the daily experiences of people come into play as a measure of themselves because civil society has to do with a regular engagement with fellow citizens. That said, I do think that there are a number of reasons which makes *vocal but restrained* political protest on the part of whites relevant within the political sphere:

 Firstly, the problem of crime in this country puts certain existential demands on *everyone*, white and black as well as rich and poor, which cannot be ignored. One cannot

expect people to remain unconcerned in face of violent crime.[14] The persistence of violent crime in post-apartheid South Africa is problematic. Despite the fairly peaceful transition of the 1990's, the violent psychic energy left by apartheid has not been exorcised. This usually happens in the case of a civil war or violent decolonization, where the oppressed find in violence a kind of purification that rids them of the past (*pace* Fanon, 1967: 74 & Gibson 2003: 118). As this has not happened in South Africa, the need for this purification is still strong and finds its expression in, amongst other things, violent crime. When crime gains a racial flavour, it takes the form of hate crimes in which one finds the same methods of torture that were employed by the security police during apartheid. The regular occurrence of these crimes warrants some form of reaction that makes a political voice essential for whites.

Secondly, history can so easily repeat itself with the former oppressed deciding to become oppressors themselves. This is what happened to Afrikaners, who were oppressed by the English in the 19th century and then themselves came to oppress blacks (Jackson, 2011b: 16).[15] This attempt to compensate for the concrete and psychological inferiority that oppression leaves behind could so easily take hold in such a climate of political silence. The main task for both white and black in this country should be an attempt to overcome this historical cycle. To remain politically passive could simply invert and repeat the political landscape of apartheid where one party is not allowed to talk. Following Kostopoulos (2012: 311), this could also lead to a kind of 'submissiveness' where one finds white fear driving the attempt to appease black authority in order to safeguard their privileged economic position.

Thirdly, the political impotence of whites has led some to already be silent, but instead they do so with an arrogance and lack of remorse for the injustices of this strange place. This arrogant and remorseless silence (similar to the 'renewed white pride' that Kostopoulos (2012: 311) mentions) is what leads Boitumelo Senokoane (in Jackson, 2011a: 3) to say, 'White man, you are on your own'. This inversion of Biko's famous saying ('Black man, you are on your own' (2004: 108)) is meant to critique the way in which many whites insulate themselves from the social and political realities of South Africa. The main problem with this silence is that it could foster fundamentalist ideas and according to Thomashausen (in Jackson, 2011b: 4) there is the danger that young Afrikaner men who feel politically isolated could turn to violence in expressing their political impotence (in much the same way that Anders Behring Breivik did in Norway). The possibility of fundamentalist violence in a multicultural, transitional society like South Africa is quite real and dangerous. A political voice and political participation is key to preventing such a fundamentalism from developing.[16]

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14 The statistics for crime in the country is the darker side of post-apartheid South Africa and the figures for rape and murder is among the highest in the world for a country where there is no state of war: Women and children suffer greatly in terms of sexual assault, with the current rate in the country at 132.4 per 100 000 (SA Survey 2010/11: 719), or 181 offences per day. The current murder rate in South Africa is 31.9 per 100 000 (ibid), or 44 murders per day. According to a recent study, South Africa is the only country in the world where the murder rate is higher than the road accident fatality rate and the country has 'the worst road accident death and the second worst murder figures when compared to 31 countries for road fatalities and over 190 countries for murder' (SAIRR, 2012).

15 Antjie Krog (1994) reckons that the total lack of acknowledgment by the British of the atrocities perpetrated by themselves in the concentration camps during the Anglo Boer War (1899-1902) in a way motivated the mythical pathology of Afrikaners to secure themselves against any threat. See Duvenage (1999: 11-12) for a discussion of this argument.

16 See Villet (2011) for a succint argument regarding the dangers of political silence within the South African context.

2.3. The way forward for whites

I would like to conclude the article with a suggestion about the appropriate attitude that whites could adopt with regards to their position of privilege. The appropriate attitude for whites to adopt would probably be similar to the one suggested by McKaizer (2011b: 460-61), Van Niekerk (2011: 13) and Vice's requalified position (2011b), namely that whites take cognisance of the invisibility of both their position of privilege (i.e. their whiteness and richness) but that they nevertheless engage with others in the political and public sphere. What is key for Van Niekerk and Vice as it concerns this attitude is *humility*, but this word carries some religious overtones that could be morally problematic because of its connection to the notion of subservience. I would rather suggest that what is key to this attitude is *care*: McKaizer makes use of this word when he says that whites should take a stand against continued white privilege in taking 'practical care in mitigating against the continued, systemic benefits of whiteness' (2011b: 461). Vice also makes use of this word in her original article in asserting that a careful attitude from whites would reflect 'a recognition of the moral complexities and potential for mistakes' within the racially charged space of South Africa (2012: 334). The word also appears in the requalification of her position on white political silence, where she says that whites should take care when they politically engage with others in civil society (2011b: 511). Kerner (2007) makes use of this word when she speaks about the care that should be taken in considering racial categories, 'especially by people who are categorized as white' (she writes from within the German context).[17] Kerner says that racial categories, despite being social constructions, still have a naturalizing effect (Fanon argued for much the same point) and because of the dominance of whiteness, one should be careful in employing race if you are white. Whites in South Africa do not always take care in considering that their sense of reality is not necessarily truthful and that it is a reflection of their own ignorance about injustice and their blindness about the privilege of being white. An awareness of this ignorance and blindness (which is the invisibility of whiteness) is essential for whites to develop a more nuanced and truthful picture of their social reality.

With this appropriate attitude whites could help to unmask racism and contribute to reconciliation in the country without pontificating from behind a so-called veil of whiteness. This contribution is crucial because our democracy is still in its adolescence, and at a precarious juncture with regards to race relations and the direction that political discourse has taken. It is important that a contribution be made to the public sphere by minority groups because after all, ours is, in essence, a nation made up of minorities. The public sphere should allow for the richness of diversity that accommodates the voice of minorities, something quite rare in current political discourse where this richness is drowned out by the rhetoric of nationalism, racialism and economic agendas. The voice of minorities should be heard and heeded, and they could be black,

17 Kerner (2007) provides an interesting critique of whiteness in Germany, saying that the growing presence of immigrants has interestingly brought into question what it means to be German. The German man on the street (my phrase) tends to think that to be German means that one should be white and this is reinforced by way of the racist exclusion of immigrants, who are seen to be lower on the social hierarchy. Kerner critiques this problematic German conception, pointing out that it is caused by actual institutionalised racism that privileges whiteness. The consequence is the unjust treatment of immigrants because 'racism often functions by attempts to de-legitimize people who are not considered white as far as their status as proper German citizens and as members of the German state go'.

white, rich or poor.

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Conclusion and Framing of Publications
The dialectic becoming postcolonial heterotopia:
A postcolonial theory of recognition

> Two minds, two worlds, one country: … where people occupy the same space but live in different time frames so that they do not see each other and perceive different realities. Though only a few miles separate their living areas, though they spend much of their working days together, the black South African world is as distant from the white world as Outer Mongolia; its mind a closed book to all but a handful of whites who keep contact with it.
>
> Allister Sparks, *The Mind of South Africa* (1991: xvii)

This conclusion, serving as the final chapter of this thesis by publication, will attempt to bring the study to a close in theorising how the problem of whiteness, and by extension the problem of affluence, poses such a challenge to mutual recognition in post-Apartheid South Africa. This will be contextualized in looking at the ideal form that recognition can take, namely that of mutual recognition, and how it applies to post-Apartheid South Africa. Mutual recognition is the attempt to address questions of social domination and power, thus the dynamic inherent to the dialectic. The focus will thus be on looking at how mutual recognition is an attempt to address the Hegelian dialectic (and misrecognition) and how it is undermined by the persistence of white economic privilege (and by extension the economic privilege of affluence as such) in post-Apartheid South Africa. In short, mutual recognition is problematized and I want to investigate one aspect that feeds this problem within the postcolonial context of post-Apartheid South Africa. This return to the issue of recognition, outlined in the introduction and chapter one, will serve to show how the promise of mutual recognition in the work of Hegel has been envisioned whilst at the same time providing a postcolonial take on mutual recognition.

The aim of this chapter will thus be to develop a postcolonial theory of recognition. Such a theory would have to take into account the problematic of economic inequality, which is a constant in post-Apartheid South Africa, in order to demonstrate this problematic and provide an explanation for the frustration of mutual recognition. The starting point and motivation for such a theory will be the well-known theory of mutual recognition provided by Axel Honneth. His theory sketches the general outline of the structure of relations of mutual recognition with the focus on three forms of recognition, namely love, rights and solidarity. I suggest a Fanonian reading of this

theory which will point to links with Fanon's own clues about mutual recognition, in the process developing an amended theory that takes into account the postcolonial problematic. Honneth himself also makes a few key statements about the economic conditions necessary for mutual recognition, economic conditions that are absent within the South African situation. This is important to point out and will extend the Fanonian reading of his theory to demonstrate one aspect of the frustration of mutual recognition within the South African context.

Before this postcolonial theory of recognition is developed, the conclusion will first bring together the different aspects of this study on whiteness beyond Apartheid. Section one will frame the publication chapters in two steps: Firstly, outlining economic apartheid and how it relates to the politics of recognition. Secondly, outlining the problem of whiteness as the persistence of a colonial mentality (alluded to in each of the publication chapters) that underlines economic apartheid.

The rest of the chapter will then outline the postcolonial theory of recognition with the focus on the links and overlaps between Honneth's theory and Fanon's work. Section two will provide a Fanonian reading of Honneth's theory of recognition that will help to contextualise the problem of mutual recognition in South Africa. Section three will take this Fanonian reading further by explicitly connecting his work on violence to Honneth's theory regarding violations (Honneth calls it forms of disrespect) that leads to misrecognition and closes off the possibility of mutual recognition. Section four will look at how Honneth himself sees problems for his theory in terms of the economic sphere. Sections two, three and four together constitute the postcolonial theory of recognition.

The conclusion (and thesis) will end in section five with an important caveat to mutual recognition in returning to Markell's "politics of acknowledgement" that illuminates a problematic gap in theories of recognition, namely the situation of the self, that is brought about by a focus on injustices perpetrated against the other. This caveat, I will argue, is crucial in the South African context with regards to the situation of whites in explaining why mutual recognition is problematized and why mutual recognition remains an ethico-political task for whites beyond Apartheid. I suggest that Markell's politics could give some form to the attitude of care, outlined at the end of chapter four, that whites should adopt beyond Apartheid.

1.   Framing of publications: The dialectic becoming postcolonial heterotopia

The focus of this project has been on white identity beyond Apartheid and a central thread running through the study has been how the master-slave dialectic has taken the form of a postcolonial heterotopia in South Africa. The argument is of course that the European colonies in Africa and elsewhere were heterotopias of a certain type, where the colonists and settlers could act and behave in ways that would be unacceptable back home. The dialectic and heterotopia are thus two sides of the same coin, but its form depends on the context's contingencies and state of affairs. The consideration of the dialectic is in line with Markell's assertion that the master-slave relation has resonances with the colonial context (2003: 119), but also that it is not the only form in which recognition can develop. In the same way, heterotopia resonates within the postcolonial context as a certain context within which misrecognition takes form.

There are a number of arguments from each of the chapters that are part of a general thread running through the study: The introduction raised the problem regarding the failure of recognition and a possible way forward in addressing this failure. At the end of chapter one, we see Fanon providing clues towards mutual recognition in light of the form that the master-slave dialectic takes during colonialism. Chapters two and three demonstrates how, as the dialectic becomes a postcolonial heterotopia, we continue to see the failure of recognition in the way that whites insulate themselves within post-Apartheid South Africa. The other side of this insulation, as outlined at the end of chapter three, is the attempt at inclusion and being recognized by others as politically and culturally relevant within the country. The conclusion to chapter four outlined an attitude of care (engaged humility) that would be the appropriate place from which whites might approach those in the citizen body who have been the victims of oppression, discrimination and racism. Accompanying this general thread that runs through each of these chapters is the nagging feeling that there is a persistence of the colonial mentality, which is mainly of an economic nature, that comes with whiteness in isolated but fairly specific places (the concern of the case studies at issue in this thesis).

The general thread of these arguments running through the thesis will now be brought together and conceptualized in two steps: Firstly, in forming a picture of economic apartheid and how it relates to recognition; and secondly, in explicitly articulating the so-called colonial mentality that persists beyond Apartheid.

1.1 *Economic apartheid and recognition*

The struggle for recognition (Hegel's *Kampf um Anerkennung*) was apparent during Apartheid, exemplified by the anti-Apartheid Struggle that was waged by various organisations such as the African National Congress, who came to power in 1994. The new democratic regime has entrenched human rights and equality in the Constitution and Bill of Rights. The end of Apartheid and the birth of a new democratic South Africa is seen by many as a historical rupture that should have brought various forms of domination, oppression, injustice and violence to an end. What is apparent in my project is that this is not the case and that there are various continuities between Apartheid and post-Apartheid South Africa. Massive economic inequalities are not only a constant but have deepened beyond Apartheid, whilst resurgent forms of racism and violence have also remained. This problematizes attempts at mutual recognition despite processes of reconciliation.

This situation, where democracy, a liberal constitution and human rights are all in place and yet injustice prevails, is encapsulated by the words of Terence Cave that begins the chapter on recognition in Markell's *Bound to Recognition* (2003: 39):

> Recognition is par excellence the vehicle of nostalgia. It invests in securities, moral, legal, social, political; it parades before us the ghosts of all we ever wanted and always failed quite to grasp and hold.

The point here is simple: Recognition can promise us all sorts of things in the legal, social and political spheres, but these promises can remain unfulfilled if the important preconditions for recognition are not in place. Presbey notes the concern of James Ingram that "recognition without economic change will be experienced as bogus" (2003: 554) and that any recognition without instrumental or procedural changes might simply be seen as mere "tokens" (ibid.). Within the South African context, it must be clear that the Constitution and Bill of Rights provides people with various types of recognition in theory, but that these do not become a practical reality in the lives of many (if not the majority). The main thread running through this thesis has been that the most dominant form of recognition in post-Apartheid South Africa is that of economic recognition and with that, the dominance of economic misrecognition. Presbey (following Nixon) notes that "[g]ranting political rights in South Africa without attempting to correct deep and long-standing discriminatory practices in the economy will lead to continued economic apartheid" (ibid.). In this sense, Apartheid in certain forms ended in the 1990's but it has continued in the

form of economic apartheid. The explicit dialectic between master and slave, nakedly manifest during colonialism and politically manifest during Apartheid, has become more implicit in an economic form. In this thesis, I have explored and identified it as the so-called postcolonial heterotopia that has a different dynamic than the dialectic but nevertheless involves power relations of domination and subjugation.

The epigraph from Allister Sparks' *The Mind of South Africa* at the start of this conclusion expresses an integral aspect of the postcolonial heterotopia, namely the different life-worlds inhabited by white and black but also rich and poor by extension. The relevance of the epigraph, written towards the end of Apartheid, still speaks to us today and could just as well have been written more than two decades after the end of Apartheid. It still stands as a description of the different countries, so to speak, within which white and black as well as rich and poor find themselves. This postcolonial heterotopia concerns the massive gulf that exists between rich (most whites and the black elite) and the (mostly black) poor in terms of their material wealth. Their different life-worlds present us with a morally precarious situation between two co-existing realities. This situation is what led Samantha Vice (2010: 323) to say that "South Africa is a strange and morally tangled place to live in": Rich and poor (and hence the majority of whites and the majority of blacks) live in this place and encounter each other on a daily basis. This contact is strange because it is experienced in fundamentally different ways by both, and the strangeness is emphasized by the racial dynamics concerning perceptions around whiteness as the default for affluence and blackness as the default for poverty. These experiences are accompanied in large part by widespread existential guilt or angst as consequence to this daily contact that rich and poor, hence also white and black, have in this place. This is why Gibson (2011: 111) speaks of the "dialectic between rich and poor as the new reality and main driver of fear in South Africa", which is a continuation of the master-slave dialectic. This is a dialectic different to that of colonialism or formal Apartheid (although similar in certain respects) because of the dominant role that economic recognition plays, a role that places it prior to any other form of recognition.

This dialectic of economic recognition is characteristic of the dialectic that has become a postcolonial heterotopia: The master-slave relation of colonialism was institutionalised during Apartheid but despite the dismantling of Apartheid's political structures, the principle of apartheid has remained and grown in an economic sense through the logic of the racialised capitalism that existed during Apartheid. There is thus a continuity with Apartheid South Africa where society is divided and separated by economic lines and privileges. This leads to a society

that is "divided into compartments", much like the colonial world described by Fanon (1967: 29), and these compartments carries a certain continuity with Apartheid South Africa. In this sense, the words of Allister Sparks (1991: xvii) written during the last days of Apartheid are still relevant.

Sparks provides an apt description of the dialectic that has become a postcolonial heterotopia and although formal institutional Apartheid has come an end, there is a sense for a large portion of the population living in poverty that, as Fanon (1967: 52) said, "nothing has changed, everything goes on as before." To an extent, it is literally a case of business as usual. Political power has shifted but business in the neoliberal capitalist sense of the word has continued unabated as South Africa's market was opened to the world in the 1990's and South Africans also gained access to the globalising markets of the world. This is of course the kind of situation where people speak about neocolonialism, as globalisation sets up a situation where the markets of formerly colonized countries (the so-called Third World of developing countries) are now wide-open for investment and the inflow of consumer goods without the baggage of a racist past. The rub of the matter is that they still find themselves in a situation of some form of exploitation or a power relation that supplants master and slave either with rich and poor, or with investor and consumer. Underlining this neocolonialism is the persistence of the colonial mentality, now given some recent "legitimacy" by Trumpism and its xenophobic undertones as well as camouflaged racism, which was at issue in each of the chapters of this thesis. This neocolonial moment and situation in South Africa started in 1994 when formal Apartheid came to an end but continued in the form of economic apartheid (Harvey in Presbey, 2003: 556):

> The negotiated settlement, which culminated in the 1994 elections, left many questions of our struggle unresolved. The capitalist economy, responsible for the exploitation of the African masses, was left untouched. The marriage between non-racial democracy and the capitalist system, which puts profit before people, was bound to pose fundamental problems for our transformation, simply because apartheid was underpinned by capitalism and did not stand on its own as a system of racial oppression. Apartheid and capitalism worked hand in glove. All the changes to the law of the country could not wipe away the legacy of deep-rooted racism and ethnicity in our country, which is why today it is still so prevalent.

There is a connection between apartheid and capitalism, and the economic system that has remained and continue beyond Apartheid has preserved a number of aspects inherent to

apartheid. Changes on an institutional level that eradicated formal racism has created the impression that apartheid has now come to an end. However, various struggles beyond Apartheid shows that this is not the case and it ultimately lives on in an economic form through a system of racialized capitalism. This racialised capitalism is based on the racial categories of Apartheid (white / European, black/African, Coloured and Indian/Asian), and it discriminates in targeting both black and white as racial capital. Racialised capitalism discriminates in various ways in treating racial bodies as a function of capitalism itself and a type of economic discrimination takes hold within this situation. The outcome for the rich though is as follows: You are rich because you are white, and you are rich because you are black. The rich as such profits from racialised capitalism. This is a paradoxical outcome, but the rub of the matter is that you become rich by virtue of your skin colour, whether white or black.

A legitimate question that could be asked here in light of racialized capitalism is whether there is an economic system, be it capitalist or otherwise, that would be a realistic alternative. There have for instance been calls in South Africa from, amongst others, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) for the nationalisation of mines and for land redistribution without compensation. These issues are political dynamite and tainted by the way that it played out in places like Venezuela (concerning nationalisation) and Zimbabwe (concerning land redistribution). The ANC, who has been slow in implementing the process of land redistribution, has recently taken this issue further under President Cyril Ramaphosa in 2018, by suggesting that the Constitution be amended to allow for land redistribution without compensation. The question posed by these political moves therefore, however practical or impractical (and even opportunistic) they might be, is what equal economic recognition might look like in concrete terms.

I realise that this is a rather crucial question and one that is left unanswered in this study. My study in this conclusion is concerned with the way in which misrecognition and especially economic misrecognition (in other words, violence and poverty) problematises mutual recognition, which is working towards the postcolonial theory of recognition that will be conceptualised below. The omission of exploring this question in my study is simple and personal: I have not quite arrived at a point in my research to say that I can confidently answer this question. My sense is that in terms of my work on recognition, a turn to the work of Nancy Fraser on redistribution might provide some recommendations in this regard. A Marxist critique could also perform the same task, although Marxism reduces social dynamics to class and does not include race as a significant marker (in the same way that Hegel does not explicitly consider

race). My study situates itself before this question and sees it as the logical next step in further research that follows from the study. Suffice it to say, I am not ready yet to explore this until some questions around the problematic of mutual recognition in the postcolonial context have been explored.

The situation of the dialectic that has become a postcolonial heterotopia is sketched here as a racialized capitalism that treats all bodies, but especially black bodies, as "there" to be exploited. This cause and root of this situation, discussed in each of the chapters in this thesis, has been alluded to but not been made explicit. The attitude underpinning the situation, i.e. the economic structures of this racist capitalism, needs to be fleshed out and critiqued. This attitude begins with the problem of whiteness and encompasses what I will here term as a so-called colonial mentality.

1.2   *Whiteness and the colonial mentality of affluence*

The conditions for this so-called colonial mentality were explored in the introduction, i.e. misrecognition and the failure of mutual recognition. This colonial mentality (in its earliest and basest form) and the relationship between master and slave was at issue in chapter one as Fanon analysed it within the colonial context itself. The life-worlds of white and black were separated and isolated from each other through the dialectic and this dynamic continued through Apartheid, which literally means to separate and keep apart. The dialectic during Apartheid was institutionally formalised but it was a messy dialectic due to its racialized nature and high levels of violence. The formal institutions that kept Apartheid together were dismantled but the messy dialectic has persisted beyond Apartheid, largely in racial manner but also in an economic sense between rich and poor. Chapter two showed the form that the dialectic has taken on in post-Apartheid South Africa, namely the postcolonial heterotopia. The gated suburb and community has become a late capitalist form of the laager for whites, with various privatized forms of neo-Apartheid mechanisms that has developed beyond Apartheid (which keeps in place this colonial mentality). The focus though for most (but not all) whites has shifted from political to economic ideals and aspirations. Chapter three explored this situation through the metaphorical prism of rugby, looking at how a consumerist life-world has supplanted the old Apartheid life-world. This new life-world is a heterotopia, where whites could either insulate themselves or attempt to engage with others who share that same life-world.

Chapter four emphasized this crucial point regarding the colonial mentality: Whites are increasingly affluent in the wake of institutional Apartheid and their economic privileges remained as part of the deal struck between the last Apartheid government and the ANC. Political power and the institutions of government were transferred to the ANC, and hence to the black elite, whilst economic power has very much remained a white domain. However, in the two plus decades since the end of Apartheid, there has been a gradual but significant shift of various economic structures and privileges in the country being extended to the black elite and the black middle class. This situation is accompanied by the persistence of growing economic inequality and a massive gap between rich and poor, with the majority of the black population still living in poverty. The point is that the privileges and invisibility of whiteness has extended to the black elite and middle class, meaning that some but not all in that group could be culpable for the economic injustices that exist in the country. In short, the colonial mentality that exists in the economic domain concerns both whites and the black elite.

There are thus two sides to this colonial mentality as I sketch it: This mentality begins with the outlook of mastery and colonisation that has historically accompanied whiteness, expressed within whitely ways of being in South Africa, but it now extends to the black elite as the invisibility of whiteness flows into the invisibility of richness (affluence). In short, the colonial mentality (as it concerns the aims of this study) is now the mentality taken up by the rich in general, i.e. most whites and the black elite, be it explicitly or implicitly. This mentality is not exactly the same in white and black, but the point made in this study in chapter four is that there is a gradual shift from race to class as a marker of discrimination, which means that both white and black can be driven by this colonial mentality by virtue of their affluence.

This claim regarding a shift from race to class is significant and indeed controversial. The emphasis here is on "gradual shift", meaning that we are at a point on a line of development and most definitely still in an early stage of that development. What this implies is that we find ourselves at an intersection between race and class, but that race still very much has a dominant role to play in the foreseeable future regarding the issue of economic privilege and its role in misrecognition. The generational privilege that whites enjoy with regards to their affluence is definitely not erased by this intersection. I would also not argue for supplanting race with class, but I would argue that both needs to be taken into account because of developments in post-Apartheid South Africa since 1994. This claim does not attempt to bunch all middle class or upper middle class blacks into that group, in the same way that I would probably also not bunch

all whites under the same group either as it regards privilege or culpability for Apartheid. This is not an all or nothing argument, but rather one that asks for nuance as it relates to these issues and questions. I would not claim that everyone with economic success, be it white or black, are perpetrators of inequality. The way in which their privilege is structured might contribute to the conditions for economic inequality, depending on where they are situated in society.

What I am concerned with here as it regards the intersection between race and class is the way that the post-Apartheid regime has developed. There is a close relationship between government and the business sector, which has led to the development of what could be a type of political-economic privilege for those in the elite that find themselves privy to this relationship. Such a privilege also existed during Apartheid between government and the business sector, and in a way it has continued beyond Apartheid although the privileged group has been expanded beyond the initial grouping of whites. This privilege is one that could possibly be explained in Marxist terms (regarding the bourgeois and proletariat) but this is too reductive and does not have enough nuance for a situation where race has a dominant role to play.

My sense is that Fanon (who makes use of certain elements of Marx's theory) and Foucault provides more appropriate theoretical tools with which to understand this dynamic that has developed beyond Apartheid. I made use of Foucault in this study to understand the dynamic that has developed beyond Apartheid for the majority of whites. In answer to some questions on this intersection between race and class, the analysis of recognition and violence from a Fanonian perspective in the latter parts of this conclusion will provide some insights (in section 3). Suffice it to say, this intersection concerns a continuation of a kind of colonial mentality. What this intersection highlights, is the dominant role of economic recognition and how this problematises mutual recognition (this will also be discussed below in section 4 regarding the economic challenge to mutual recognition).

I would just briefly like to outline this colonial mentality in terms of its prevalence amongst whites and the black elite. The basis of economic apartheid and misrecognition begins with the problem of whiteness and the failure of proper self-recognition, which I here term as the so-called colonial mentality. This thesis has been at pains to provide a picture of this problem and to highlight the failure of self-recognition in taking up a white politics of acknowledgement as the starting point of this thesis (as outlined in the introduction). The colonial mentality can briefly be summed up as following the logic of apartheid, namely through the tactic or function of

compartmentalisation (mentioned in the previous section) that insulates whiteness from its other, whilst also *subjugating* the other. The aim of the colonial mentality is *mastery*, i.e. to be in control of a specific socio-economic or socio-political situation, in order to be the master of the other and the situation. This mentality was far more explicit during colonialism and institutionalized Apartheid but has persisted in post-Apartheid South Africa in the guise of economic apartheid, where black bodies continue to be regarded as a resource for exploitation (this point is relevant to whites and the black elite). In short, the essence of this mentality lies in the thought that black lives don't matter. In this sense, whites, having remained affluent in the main, are still part of the problem but it has extended to the rich in general.

The idea that there is a persistence of a colonial mentality might be jarring to many ears, as much as talk of economic apartheid and the idea that apartheid did not quite come to an end would be. Presbey (2003: 554) highlights this point though in terms of the Fanonian insight that a certain status quo continues even beyond decolonization, when (quoting Nixon) she says that white South Africans thought that "once the old personnel have changed their minds, little else needs change, least of all the institutions of power." What is interesting about this, after over two decades that has gone by since the end of formal Apartheid, is that certain institutions of power have changed, at least on a state and governmental level. In an economic sense, the situation is more complex because the end of Apartheid has economically been very good for whites. The significant thing is that a change of mind might've been the most difficult thing of all.

The colonial mentality as outlined here has remained, whether in the narrow economic sense or more broadly in the way that whites relate themselves to post-Apartheid South Africa. The idea that "little else needs change" means that, in an economic sense at least, "nothing has changed, everything goes on as before" (to quote Fanon (1967: 52) again). The point is that as long as the economy is healthy, and the middle class grows, then social progress is made and Apartheid disappears in the rear view mirror. This thesis has been at pains to demonstrate that this is not the case. The dilemma of economic apartheid has remained and in the two decades beyond Apartheid, has simply grown as a problem that has the potential of derailing the post-Apartheid project of rebuilding society. This economic dilemma as it is rooted in the problem of whiteness was already envisioned just after the end of formal Apartheid (Nixon, 1994: 211):

Historically, South Africa was singled out as a uniquely offensive society not because of its discriminations, state brutality, injustices, or unequal opportunities, but because it enshrined racism in law. It has thus been all too easy in the early 90s to misconstrue the attenuation of legalized racism as the end of apartheid. If that perception prevails, once the laws have gone, South Africa will slide from the news and join the ranks of the myriad more or less anonymously unjust societies. Without economic redress and swift institutional transformations which require international support and investment, privilege and dereliction will remain distributed almost entirely along racial lines. If we permit that to happen, the future will hold out little more than flag-independence from apartheid, which will continue to govern the society from the past.

In a way, South Africa has simply joined the ranks of other unjust societies around the world where economic injustice and inequality exist. Many consider Apartheid to be a done deal because its laws have disappeared and the institutions in society have changed hands. This is however not the case because the problem of economic apartheid remains. The conditions and structures for this problem were constructed during Apartheid, but they continue beyond Apartheid to confer privilege on most of the white population. This is, however, where the situation has become more complex. Distribution along racial lines has remained as it concerns whites living in affluence, but these lines are also becoming class lines.

The Apartheid structures of economic privilege have been extended to an ever-growing black middle class. In other words, those who are privileged by the structures of economic apartheid are not only whites as the system has opened up to also include the black elite. This is a significant development that has taken place in the second decade beyond Apartheid. The amount of middle class and rich blacks has grown and overtook their white counterparts during that second decade, if only in numbers and not as a percentage of the total black population (Tereblanche, 2007). This situation has continued and deepened but it is not as simple as considering more black people to now have a better life. The current situation beyond Apartheid as it concerns the black middle class was already envisioned by Fanon (1967: 122), who puts it as follows:

Yet the national middle class constantly demands the nationalization of the economy and of trading sectors. This is because, from their point of view, nationalization does not mean placing the whole economy at the service of the native and deciding to satisfy the needs of the nation. For them, nationalization does not mean governing the state with regard to the new social relations whose growth it has been decided to encourage. To them,

nationalization quite simply means the transfer into native hands of those unfair advantages which are a legacy of the colonial period.

The point here is simple if related to the South African context: The unfair advantages of Apartheid have been extended to the black elite, but it does not benefit all those who suffered during Apartheid (or necessarily the whole of the black middle class) and even happens to their detriment. Debates on issues such as nationalisation of mines and land expropriation are simply done in service of the transfer of economic privilege to the black middle class (this is not to say that these proposals are not valid in terms of economic redistribution, but that they serve the black elite's interests in the same way that certain debates on farm murders serve the interests of the white middle class). The state, as the national structures of governance, ensures that this transfer of privilege goes to a select group and not the whole population. The transfer to the black middle class of certain unfair advantages is constitutive of this process but the situation has deepened during the second decade beyond formal Apartheid. The state capture that has characterised the tenure of President Jacob Zuma during the second decade beyond Apartheid has seen a radical case of unfair advantages for a very narrow select group of politicians and business men. This corrupt situation has changed the culpability and complicity regarding continuing economic injustices in the country. The blame falls now on the shoulders of both the white and black middle class connected to the black governmental elite for the role that they play in perpetuating this situation.

This claim regarding the extension of apartheid privilege to the black elite is also one that needs to be qualified (like the claim regarding the shift from race to class). This claim does not imply that all black success can be reduced to the outcome of unfair privilege gained due to racial affiliation. There are those who have no doubt found success despite finding themselves in a system that is still unjust and in which whites still have a disproportionate majority as it regards property ownership and inter-generational wealth. Those in the black middle and upper middle class are not necessarily there because of connections to government. The black elite here refers to those who find themselves in this upwardly mobile group because they have somehow benefitted from government corruption or nepotism. There are thus those who have excelled through hard work and creativity, but others who have gained an unfair advantage through an affiliation with the so-called governmental elite with whom they are aligned. This is a tricky distinction to make though regarding the black elite, but it concerns a type of corrupt relation between the middle class and business sector with government that is similar in certain respects

to that same relation during Apartheid (and hence continues the dynamic of racialized capitalism). This relation was expressed during Apartheid through the Afrikaans saying "baantjies vir boeties", directly translated to something like giving the inside lane to your brothers (who are in on the deal). This privileged relationship subsists despite the change of government post-Apartheid.

The South African situation, the dialectic that has become a postcolonial heterotopia, is thus not entirely unique but there are certain aspects that have remained unique beyond Apartheid. The overt nature of its racialised capitalism, which privileges the rich that are both white and black, has kept economic apartheid in place. There are a number of formerly colonised countries where massive economic inequality also has a strong racial dynamic, so in that sense South Africa gives a view into what happens after decolonization where political power, but also access for the elite to the economy, shifts to the formerly colonized. There is one sense in which the South African situation is unique in Africa: Whereas most of the colonies in Africa saw the departure of the majority of their settler populations, which then saw their occupied spaces as national entities taken up by the "native elite" (as described by Fanon in *The Wretched of the Earth*), in South Africa (and to some lesser extent other countries in Southern Africa) the settler population has remained in great numbers. The settler population in South Africa made the colony their homeland in much the way that settlers did in the Americas, Australia and so on. But the difference is that they are a minority, albeit a wealthy minority that erected a racist system to keep the black majority at bay. The situation beyond Apartheid has seen the black elite occupy many of the positions of power that whites held during Apartheid and colonialism, but as the former settler population remained and are still around, there is a quite a diversion from the situation where the native elite simply filled the void left behind by the former colonisers.

The South African situation can be summed up as follows (and here I put on my Hobbesian hat for the sake of understanding the *real politik* of the situation): The black elite has taken control of government after the negotiated settlement of the early 1990's, and to a fair extent they have also made in-roads into the economy with a sizeable and growing black middle class. However, this middle class has become embroiled in competition with the white middle class for various spheres within the economy. This is an economic continuation of the political struggles that existed during Apartheid, in spite of massive poverty that still exists in the lives of most blacks. The current debate that has developed in early 2018 regarding land expropriation without compensation is an exact example of this competition, which takes place between the different

middle classes. The competition involves the rich, both white and black, whilst amid this economic tussle the majority of the black population that is poor are left behind and "is discerned only as a distinct mass" (Fanon, 1967: 34). This competition is what the colonial mentality is about, to be in control and command of the economic sphere at the expense of those living in poverty. In this sense, the rich, both white and black, are complicit in the economic injustices of post-Apartheid South Africa that sees a great majority of the black population living in poverty.

This colonial mentality that prevails beyond Apartheid in an economic form, I would argue, lies at the heart of many socio-economic and socio-political problems in South Africa. There are various answers to this problem but they all seem to miss the mark in a way: For some whites on the right, there is a nostalgia for the Apartheid era and the sentiment is that whites simply need to be in control of government again for the situation to be rectified. For many blacks and some whites on the left, there is a nostalgia for some sort of communist solution to the problem, where nationalization of various aspects of the economy will rectify the situation. These answers, I think, buys into the idea that one side (either white or black) is to blame and it does not take into account that this is a tussle between the white and black middle classes that makes both complicit in this colonial mentality.

What seems to be clear to me though is that this economic situation and the colonial mentality that underlines it poses great challenges to the question of mutual recognition in the country. What this picture regarding the frustration of mutual recognition (i.e. misrecognition) looks like, is an implicit line running throughout this thesis. The situation as sketched above is a Hobbesian problem, so to speak, that requires a Hegelian counterweight that can provide some normative content to this descriptive account. This is where the contemporary theory of Axel Honneth will be of great help as a guide to what mutual recognition ideally looks like and how the economic problem impacts various aspects of this ideal.

2.   A postcolonial theory of recognition: Honneth's theory of mutual recognition (via Fanon)

My turn to Honneth's theory to better understand the South African situation takes its cue from Gail Presbey's study that makes this link. Her study (published in 2003) was conducted during the first decade beyond Apartheid in relating Thabo Mbeki's idea of an African Rennaisance to Honneth's theory. My study, spanning the second decade beyond Apartheid, is focused on the

problem of economic apartheid and the colonial mentality in which that problem is rooted. However, Presbey highlights the economic problem (as seen in the previous section) and she also makes a mention of the benefit of Honneth's theory to understand the South African situation:

> Honneth's account of the moral motivation of struggle for recognition (with its concomitant struggle for economic justice) is a more accurate account of the struggle against apartheid in South Africa than a Marxist or purely egoist economic interpretation would be. Indeed, Sartre and Fanon as well understood the importance of recognition in struggles against racism and colonialism.

This then, is why I turn to Axel Honneth's influential theory of mutual recognition, which I will do by way of a Fanonian entrance and reading of his theory. Honneth's theory is not based though on Hegel's work in the *Phenomenology*, but rather in his earlier Jena-writings (*System of Ethical Life*, *First Philosophy of Spirit* and *Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit*). Axel Honneth, like Robert Williams (discussed in the introduction), provides convincing arguments in favour of a theory of mutual recognition to be found in Hegel's earlier Jena-writings. Honneth, who finds himself within the third generation of the Frankfurt School, is well-known for his theory because of the full picture, a kind of model, which he sketches for mutual recognition. The interesting thing about his seminal work *The Struggle for Recognition* (according to Anderson in the Translator's Introduction) is that it does not discuss Hegel's master-slave dialectic. The reason for this according to Anderson is that "Honneth concludes that the earlier and later Jena writings [the *Phenomenology* being part of the later writings] negate each other, without Hegel ever being able to effect their *Aufhebung* (sublation). Honneth might not be attempting this sublation himself but he is at pains to demonstrate that Hegel provides the tools for mutual recognition in his earlier Jena-writings whereas it is absent in the latter writings that included the *Phenomenology*" (Honneth, 1995: xx).

Honneth's theory of mutual recognition provides a phenomenologically oriented typology of three patterns of recognition: Love, rights and solidarity (1995: 93). His three-part systematic structure is based on differentiations in the work of other philosophers, who distinguish different forms of recognition in separate spheres of the reproduction of society. He finds this to be quite significant in terms of the way that we also need to think about recognition (Honneth: 94):

> One of the things that speaks in favour of the systematic structure inherent in these different three-part divisions is the astonishing manner in which these differentiations are reflected in a number of other social philosophers … [b]ut no matter how extensive such a list of historical interconnections among theories might be, it could hardly do more than demonstrate that a division of social life into three spheres of interaction has a high degree of plausibility. It is evidently quite natural to distinguish forms of social integration according to whether they occur via emotional bonds, the granting of rights, or a shared orientation to values.

Honneth (ibid.) mentions a number of the social philosophers who conceptualise a three-part division and identify different forms of recognition in separate spheres of the reproduction of society: Hegel differentiates between family, civil society and the State; Scheler between life-community, society and community of persons; Plessner between primary bonds, commerce with society and the community of shared aims; and Mead between primary relationships to concrete others, legal relations and the sphere of work. The common thread that can be drawn here is three spheres that concern familial and friendly relations, institutional relations, and identifying group relations. Honneth builds on Hegel's work to refine these spheres to relations of love, rights and solidarity and how recognition functions in terms of each of these relations.

There also seems to be a Fanonian overlap in this respect, to bring us back to the end of chapter one regarding Fanon's take on Hegel. Fanon provides an outline of what mutual recognition might look like in face of the levels of violence that he observed within the colonial and decolonising context. The key to him is that mutual recognition must in some way affirm the infinite value of humanity. He provides three aspects in this regard:

Firstly, the *acknowledgement of difference* (1986: 221-22). This is meant to provide an awareness that despite the shared values regarding our own humanity (such as rights) and the values that constitute this humanity as well as the actions that violate this humanity (what is called crimes against humanity), there are cultural, ethnic and racial differences that constitute our identities. The key for Fanon was that we don't focus only on differences or only on shared values (and disavow any differences). An exclusive focus on differences leads easily to oppression and discrimination exactly with the motivation of the differences as a sign of inferiority. An exclusive focus on shared values can easily lead to a tendency to avoid or deny any differences with the consequence that a culture or group are forced to conform to some form of normativity, or that previous crimes against a cultural or racial group is disavowed in the name of equality. The latter

was a very real fear of Fanon (1986: 220-21) as pointed out in chapter one, where whites would give blacks freedom and declare everyone to be equal in exchange for past crimes to be forgiven and forgotten.

Secondly, Fanon (1986: 222) emphasises that *action* should be a key component of the formation of our identities. He cautions against lip service to the acknowledgement of differences and/or shared values, which simply become empty pronouncements if they are not acted upon to transform society. The key here is *humane action* that is revealed in our daily interaction with others: In other words, action that shows humanity in how we treat others; action that treats others with respect based exactly on the experience of our shared humanity; but also treating others with respect regarding the differences that arise from the contingencies of different contexts.

Thirdly, Fanon (1986: 222) urges us to focus on the *basic values of humanity*. To recap and revisit his words from the penultimate chapter of *Black Skin, White Masks*, he says that "man is a *yes*. I will never stop reiterating that. *Yes* to life. *Yes* to love. *Yes* to generosity … but man is also a *no*. *No* to scorn of man. *No* to degradation of man. *No* to exploitation of man. *No* to the butchery of what is most human in man: freedom" (1986: 222). Fanon (1986: 217-18) asserts the primal value of humanity in terms of an affirmation of the basic values that he lists here (as the supreme good) but also that which endangers humanity. Humanity (or man, in Fanon's vocabulary) is made up of certain values and the transgression of these must be fought: The basic value of life or livelihood and humane life, threatened by actual violence. The values of love and generosity, which gives us the opportunity to share in the experience of humanity but also the ability to put ourselves in the shoes of those other to ourselves. These values are rooted in our freedom to give meaning to our life-world and form our own identities, but this freedom is violated through scorn, degradation and exploitation in human relations.

Fanon thus provides three basic aspects to mutual recognition: Acknowledgement of differences, humane action and the basic values or experience of humanity. I suggest that these aspects overlap with the three patterns of recognition (love, rights and solidarity) identified by Honneth in Hegel's early Jena writings, specifically with the three spheres of interaction regarding emotional bonds, granting of rights and a shared orientation to values (1995: 93). This is an important overlap to identify because it provides an opportunity to fill out the outline for mutual recognition provided by Fanon. As will be seen in the next section, there is also an important

overlap between Fanon's ideas on violence and Honneth's ideas on disrespect. We can now use the links to fill out a picture of mutual recognition following Honneth's very complete theory that also provides an alternative to the master-slave dialectic in terms of the culmination of the struggle for recognition.

Honneth provides his theory of mutual recognition in the fifth chapter of *The Struggle for Recognition* entitled *Patterns of Intersubjective Recognition: Love, Rights, and Solidarity*. He refers to his three-part division of mutual recognition as "the structure of relations of recognition" (1995: 129), centred around the three forms of love/friendship, rights and solidarity. His theory is based in "the idea that the young Hegel outlined in his Jena writings with such brilliant rudimentariness … [in order to] make it the guiding thread of a social theory with normative content". He further says that "[t]he intention of this is to explain processes of social change by referring to the normative demands that are, structurally speaking, internal to the relationship of mutual recognition" (1995: 92). Taken together, the three patterns of recognition of love, rights, and solidarity constitute the necessary aspects for mutual recognition. Honneth sees each of these patterns as an expansion (different stages) of mutual recognition along the "species-historical process of individuation" (ibid.: 93) according to which love is involved with homonisation (thus the first experience of humanity), rights as recent historical development involving modern societies and solidarity as an extension of rights into various societal spheres. Love involves relations with specific others close to you, rights with a generalised other, and solidarity combines the two in a sense by relating oneself to those with whom you share a certain group identity. Love therefore has to do with interpersonal recognition, rights with legal and structural recognition, and solidarity with personal recognition via identity or group.

I would like to suggest here that there are specific links and overlaps between Honneth and Fanon, which can help to give us an idea of the picture of mutual recognition that Fanon might've had in mind: Love/friendship resembles humane action, rights refers to the basic and shared values of humanity, and solidarity has to with fleshing out differences regarding our identities. Honneth provides a neat model (at the end of the chapter on intersubjective recognition) for his picture of mutual recognition (1995: 129) which I will use to unpack the three patterns of recognition inherent to his theory of mutual recognition. This model is important to keep in mind in the sections still to follow on violence and inequality:

Table 2: Honneth's theory of recognition

Mode of recognition	emotional support	cognitive respect	social esteem
Dimension of personality	needs and emotions	moral responsibility	traits and abilities
Forms of recognition	primary relationships (love, friendship)	legal relations (rights)	community of value (solidarity)
Developmental potential	—	generalization, de-formalization	individualization, equalization
Practical relation-to-self	basic self-confidence	self-respect	self-esteem
Forms of disrespect	abuse and rape	denial of rights, exclusion	denigration, insult
Threatened component of personality	physical integrity	social integrity	'honour', dignity

Honneth's theory provides a breakdown of not only mutual recognition but also of recognition as a process, both personal and historical, that can be identified in society. Honneth begins in rooting the process in a mode of recognition that is some vital need (to use Charles Taylor's words) in the person and also has to do with the formation of personal identity. This recognition is focused on a specific dimension of personality in the person that is formed through a form of recognition (i.e. recognition gives form to the person) and which holds a developmental potential for personhood. The main contribution of a form of recognition is that it assists a person's practical relation-to-self. Honneth significantly also points out the dangers to recognition, in other words forms of misrecognition that stunt or damage the vital need required for the developmental potential and practical relation-to-self. Honneth refers to these as forms of disrespect which threaten a component of the person's personality (here we find the other overlap between Honneth and Fanon, which will be discussed further below).

2.1 *Emotional support: The primary relationships of love and friendship*

The first form of recognition that appears in Honneth's theory is that of the *primary relationships of love and friendship* (refer to figure). This is recognition in the mode of emotional support, hence the focus on both love and friendship. Love in this regard does not refer to intimate relationships as such (although that is also relevant) but also to relations between the parent (mother) and child as well as friendship (1996: 95). The dimension of personality that is the focus

of this recognition is that of needs and emotions, namely the needs and emotions of the child, friend, lover or spouse and so on. Honneth does not qualify the developmental potential of this form of recognition simply because it does not take place in the formalised manner as is the case with rights and solidarity. Nevertheless, the simple satisfaction of the needs and emotions of a child lays the groundwork for development potential at this primary level. The lack of any attention will obviously have far-reaching consequences for the development potential of the child and future adult. The same can be said for intimate relationships and friendships, which will also be affected if needs and emotions are neglected. The practical relation-to-self that takes hold is that of basic self-confidence, very much a prerequisite for various relationship types. In this regard, the forms of disrespect that Honneth identifies are that of abuse and rape which threatens the physical integrity of the person. Therefore, what is at issue here in terms of misrecognition is actual physical violence and the somatic violation of someone's physical (bodily) integrity. Violence on this primary level is the most basic form of misrecognition but also the type of misrecognition that can be total in its damage if someone is assaulted or killed.

Honneth (1996: 96) notes that Hegel formulates love as "being oneself in another" and that Hegel considers love as the first stage of reciprocal recognition in which subjects "confirm each other with regard to the concrete nature of their needs" and "so recognize each other as needy creatures" (1995: 95). Honneth considers love to be a form of recognition because of "the specific way in which it makes the success of affectional bonds dependent on the capacity, acquired in early childhood, to strike a balance between symbiosis and self-assertion" (1995: 98). This is the key aspect regarding this form of recognition and the development that it kickstarts in the child to have healthy and constructive relationships later on life. Honneth also notes that recognition at this early stage provides the first scene of various processes of recognition that are repeated later in life if they develop in an ideal manner:

1. Recognition, as "the capacity for cognitive differentiation", between oneself and the environment (ibid.: 100).
2. Recognition of the freedom of others as independent persons, which the child experiences in learning that her mother is a distinct person (ibid.: 98).
3. The establishment of boundaries within relationships (ibid.: 105).
4. A process of disillusionment because others (in this case the mother) will not always be at one's disposal (ibid.: 100).

5. Acceptance of others as entities in their own right (ibid.: 100-101).

6. Recognition of the unique value of others and one's unique value to them (ibid.: 104).

As can be seen, love is the primary source or level of recognition. As the basis of recognition, it puts into place the requirements for development in the individual but at the same time, injury on this level can have far-reaching consequences later on in life. Honneth (ibid: 107) says as much when he asserts that "the fundamental level of emotional confidence – not only in the experience of needs and feelings but also in their expression – which the intersubjective experience of love helps to bring about, constitutes the psychological precondition for the development of all further attitudes of self-respect."

2.2   Cognitive respect: Legal relations and rights

The second form of recognition in Honneth's theory is that of *rights* as it is entrenched through legal relations (refer again to figure). This is recognition in the mode of cognitive respect, in other words the (cognitive) recognition of humanity in others and the values that accompany respect of humanity. The dimension of personality involved here is that of moral responsibility and developing the person to put oneself in the shoes of others, so to speak, namely to take on "the perspective of the 'generalised other'" (ibid.: 108) and hence to generalise the way in which one treats others. This should still take place in everyday contact and although it is a form of normative behaviour, it does not necessarily happen in a formal manner (hence it is deformalized) but nevertheless prescribed by formal institutions within society (government and civil society) and it becomes generalized in this way. The practical relation-with-self that takes hold is self-respect, in other words respect for one's own humanity but *by proxy* also the humanity of others. The forms of disrespect that threatens the person's self-respect is the denial of rights (and hence the denial of someone's humanity) but also exclusion from being regarding by certain institutions as someone who deserves rights and humane treatment. In this respect, this form of disrespect threatens the social integrity of the person as someone who is excluded from certain spheres in society and treated in an inhumane manner due to their identity.

Honneth (ibid.: 108) sees rights as "the particular form of reciprocity found in legal recognition [that] can emerge only in the course of a historical development". This means that rights are not a form of recognition that arises as spontaneously as is the case with love. This is also then why Hegel saw that "this type of universal respect is not conceived as an affective attitude but rather

only as a purely cognitive accomplishment of comprehension" (ibid.: 110), hence the result of a process of moral learning focused on the general values that constitute humanity, regardless of the cultural and ethnic differences that there may be. This should lead to a certain form of freedom and equality between persons. This type of "legal recognition" (ibid.: 111) is enforced by formal institutions but embodied in everyday contact between persons. In this regard, Honneth (ibid.: 112-113) says something quite significant about legal recognition:

> In legal recognition, two operations of consciousness flow together, so to speak, since, on the one hand, it presupposes moral knowledge of the legal obligations that we must keep vis-à-vis autonomous persons, while, on the other hand, it is only an empirical interpretation of the situation that can inform us whether, in the case of a given concrete other, we are dealing with an entity possessed of the quality that makes these obligations applicable.

The key here regards the "given concrete other", that is the embodied person who is encountered in everyday interactions, and how they are cognitively understood to be human and to be treated humanely in line with our legal obligations enshrined in rights. This person may be someone specific I know or just a stranger in general, but all rights apply to them equally. They key here is that legal recognition works on two levels: An institutional level with regards to the source of the legal obligations and moral knowledge, but also on an intersubjective level with regards to the situation of concrete interaction with an other in which the recognition of the quality that confers these obligations arises. The empirical interpretation of this situation refers to the above mentioned cognitive nature of this form of recognition. This recognition as an "accomplishment of comprehension" reflects how it is an actual accomplishment to shed the prejudices accompanying forms of discrimination such as racism and sexism.

Honneth (ibid.: 115) notes that there are three types of rights, namely civil rights that guarantees the liberty of individuals, political rights that guarantees individual participation, and social rights guaranteeing basic welfare. Civil rights are "negative rights that protect a person's life, liberty, and property from unauthorized state interference" (ibid.). Political rights are "positive rights guaranteeing a person the opportunity to participate in processes of public will-formation" (ibid.). Social rights are also "positive rights that ensure a person's fair share in the distribution of basic goods" (ibid.). What these rights have in common is "a general principle of equality" and the requirement of a legal order that does not allow any exceptions of privileges (ibid.) except those based on the rights themselves. This legal order needs to be attuned to the differences that exist

between the situations of individuals and the opportunity they have for realising the freedoms afforded by rights, whilst the legal relations between persons must nevertheless be universal by including those who might have been previously excluded or disadvantaged (ibid.: 118).

The significance of rights is that it has been a historical development that has gradually expanded in society to include "an ever increasing number of members of society" (ibid). Honneth notes that Hegel (and Mead) were both convinced that the "struggle for recognition" continues within the legal sphere, which is a development we see as rights are introduced into a society. The outcome of this struggle is ultimately for all members within a society to view others as morally responsible persons (ibid.), i.e. to be universally recognised as someone who has rights and who can also recognise others as having the same rights, and hence as someone who is deserving of treatment that is humane and respectful.

2.3   *Social esteem: Community of value and solidarity*

The third form of recognition in Honneth's theory is that of a *solidarity* as it is found through a community of value (refer again to figure). This is recognition in the mode of social esteem, and so what matters is the worth that persons see in identities and ways of life found in society. The dimension of personality involved here are the traits and abilities that individuals have, in other words their identity and their way of life. This includes the values and goals that root their livelihood and also what they do for a living. The practical relation-to-self involved here is that of self-esteem, thus respect for oneself, which is based on the esteem that one receives from society. This means that one's own identity and way of life is valued according to the significance that society sees in the identity and way of life as it is based in a certain worldview. The forms of disrespect that Honneth identifies here are denigration and insult, in this case the consideration of certain identities or ways of life as less important or even as inferior. In this respect, these forms of disrespect threaten the sense of 'honour' attached to a person's place and status within society, which translates into a loss of dignity with regards to their identity and livelihood.

Honneth (ibid.: 121) says that solidarity, although related to legal recognition, stands apart from rights in the sense that it has to do with "the forms of social regard in which subjects are recognised according to the socially defined worth of their concrete characteristics." What is important to take into account here is that whereas rights concern the status of sameness and hence shared similarities between persons, solidarity with a community of value concerns the

differences between people, and more specifically groups of people with regards to identity and ways of life (or life-worlds). Honneth (ibid.: 122) says that the focus of modern law is on "universal features of human subjects" whilst the focus of social esteem is on "characteristic differences between human subjects" and further that social esteem is directed "at the particular qualities that characterise people in their personal difference." This does not mean though that differences are positive at face value but rather that respect for differences is an outcome of the "struggle for recognition." The necessary respect for this form of recognition would be mutual esteem that would support 'ethical life', a term used by Hegel himself (ibid.: 121). Honneth (ibid.) describes this mutuality as follows:

> For self and other can mutually esteem each other as individualised persons only on the condition that they share an orientation to those values and goals that indicate to each other the significance or contribution of their qualities for the life of the other.

The identity and way of life of a person is therefore respected because it demonstrates some kind of significance or contribution to the lives of other people and especially to "the realisation of societal goals" (ibid.). This has a normative ring to it and Honneth (ibid.: 122) says as much in viewing this as "a particularly demanding type of value-community." This value-community involves the cultural self-understanding of a society (ibid.) and therefore it does not involve the "biographically individuated subject but rather those of a culturally typified status group" (ibid.: 123). This means that individuals are therefore esteemed in the way in which they take on an identity associated with a cultural group and hence take on the characteristics and traits of that cultural group. A cultural group in this sense can be loosely or specifically defined on a continuum, e.g. South African, white or Afrikaner, etc.

What this means is that although social esteem applies "to those traits and abilities with regard to which members of society differ from one another" (ibid.: 125), members still align themselves with a cultural group based on the values they share with others within that group and hence for a certain sense of sameness that exists within the group itself. The field of social esteem is a contested field (ibid.) exactly because different groups, consisting of individuals who share in the cultural values and life-world of the group, compete for esteem from other groups. In this context, an individual enters this contested field of cultural groupings as someone who has been formed by a "particular life-history" who has interactions, exchanges and conflicts with the different collectivities.

The important thing for Honneth (ibid.: 125-26) to take into account in this regard, as is the case with rights, is that social esteem has evolved historically. The older forms of honour as "standing or prestige" were attached to a "status group or estate, thus one's societal class in the former instance or one's place in society by virtue of bloodline, property and family association in the latter instance. The historical development in this respect is that the function and meaning of honour has shifted in regarding the worth of a person, with its universalisation into "dignity" and its privatisation into "integrity" (ibid.: 126). Dignity is something that has come to be considered as a given when humanity is involved, whilst integrity to a large extent has a taken on a moral meaning. Standing and prestige has left behind its legal and moral connotations and now it "only signifies the degree of social recognition the individual earns for his or her form of self-realisation by thus contributing, to a certain extent, to the practical realisation of society's abstractly defined goals" (ibid).

The outcome of this historical development is ambivalent. On the one hand, "because it is no longer to be determined in advance which ways of leading one's life are considered ethically admissible, social esteem begins to be oriented not towards collective traits [such as family, bloodline, estate, clan] but towards the capacities developed in the course of his or her life" (ibid.). This means that individual achievements receive recognition as such, whilst a "general value-horizon" (ibid.: 126) opens up regarding "differing forms of personal self-realisation" (ibid.) that leads to a form of "value pluralism" (ibid.). On the other hand, recognition is still subject to terms that are class and gender-specific (and here Honneth omits race, a crucial aspect within the South African context) and esteem remains a group-based issue. "A feeling of group-pride or collective honour" (ibid.: 128) remains significant because the accomplishments of an individual still relates to a collective that considers these accomplishments to be worthy. This is of course where the sense of solidarity comes from, the solidarity one feels with a social group or collective by whom one is recognised and with whom one associates. However, Honneth clearly views the most important development (and achievement) in this respect to be the ability of individuals to view their own accomplishments as valuable and worthy. This provides a feeling of self-worth, i.e. self-esteem (ibid.: 129).

Due to the ambivalence between individual and group recognition, the field of social esteem is always in a state of constant contestation and cultural conflict (ibid.: 126). At the heart of this contestation and conflict is what Honneth calls "a need for a secondary interpretive practice"

(ibid.), i.e. a subjective process of cultural evaluation according to which the worth of a culture is determined within a specific historical context. Honneth says that this practice itself is part of "an on-going cultural conflict" (ibid.). This conflict is exactly the reason why there is an expansion regarding the different identities and ways of life that are recognised as making a valuable contribution to society, as it is part of a historical process that advances to include ever more cultural life-worlds. There is thus an "opening of societal value" and of "ideas for differing forms of self-realisation" (ibid.: 125), thus an ever-expanding spectrum of identities and opportunities for individuals to form their identities and seek out solidarity with groups centred around these identities.

2.4   Disrespect and the denial of recognition

Honneth brings together his discussion of mutual recognition in the chapter following the one on love, rights and solidarity (chapter six entitled Personal Identity and Disrespect: The Violation of the Body, the Denial of Rights, and the Denigration of Ways of Life). In this chapter, he looks at the forms of disrespect that does violence to personal identity: The violation of the body, the denial of rights, and the denigration of ways of life. Honneth (ibid.: 131) says that each of these "forms of disrespect" is a "denial of recognition" against persons that injures "the positive understanding of themselves." Disrespect is a key term for Honneth (ibid.) referring to the "specific vulnerability of humans resulting from the internal interdependence of individualisation and recognition". Honneth (ibid.: 132) makes it clear though that the injury caused by disrespect involves varying degrees of harm, so one term would not suffice and therefore one needs to distinguish between these harms. He says the following regarding this distinction (ibid.):

> But even just the fact that we have been able to identify systematic gradations for the complementary concept of 'recognition' points to the existence of internal differences between individual forms of disrespect. If it is the case that the experience of disrespect signals the withholding or withdrawing of recognition, then the same distinctions would have to be found within the field of negative phenomena as was met with in the field of positive phenomena. In this sense, the distinctions between three patterns of recognition gives us a theoretical key with which to separate out just as many kinds of disrespect.

Honneth is pointing here towards a similar three-part division regarding disrespect than the one he sets up for mutual recognition (refer to figure 2). This division demonstrates the different aspects of disrespect and also shows the different forms of recognition are problematised and

importantly, how mutual recognition is problematised if one or all three forms of disrespect are present. Disrespect as "the withholding or withdrawing of recognition" means that it leads to an absence of recognition and the empty space is filled by various forms of insult and injury. What is of key importance here for Honneth (ibid.) is to answer a question that Hegel could not answer, namely how disrespect can motivate people to turn to resistance and conflict. In other words, how does disrespect motivate the struggle for recognition? He attempts to answer this in analysing the three forms of disrespect: Abuse and rape (problematising love and friendship), denial of rights (problematising rights), and denigration and insult (problematising solidarity).

The first form of disrespect is the most basic but also most visceral form because it threatens the physical integrity of a person. This then is violence as we know it, for instance in the forms of physical injury that leads others to suffer physical pain. The disrespect that is *abuse and rape* is also the only form of disrespect that is not historically contingent and linked to processes of historical change (ibid.: 133) but rather to basic human relations on the level of primary relationships as it relates to the relationship between parent and child. Honneth (ibid.) says that "[t]he forms of practical maltreatment in which a person is forcibly deprived of any opportunity freely to dispose over his or her own body represent the most fundamental sort of personal degradation", hence this form of disrespect is the most destructive (in case of torture, rape or murder). This destruction for Honneth (ibid.) is found in the practical relation-to-self that one has because a threat to one's physical integrity is accompanied by a shattering "feeling of being defencelessly at the mercy of another subject". This does lasting damage to the basic confidence learned and acquired through love, leading to shame and humiliation as well as "the loss of trust in oneself and the world" (ibid.: 132-33). The end result is "a dramatic breakdown in one's trust in the reliability of the social world and hence by a collapse in one's own basic self-confidence" (ibid.: 133).

The second form of disrespect that threatens the social integrity of a person is the denial of rights, which impacts the moral self-respect of a person. Honneth (ibid.) says that denial of rights "refers to those forms of personal disrespect to which an individual is subjected by being structurally excluded from the possession of certain rights within a society". This results in a person "not being accorded the same degree of moral responsibility as other members of society" (ibid.) and being incapable of making correct moral judgments (or being allowed to make those judgments), hence they are socially ostracised. This exclusion leads people to miss out on the "cognitive regard for the status of moral responsibility that had to be so painstakingly acquired in the

interactive processes of socialisation" (ibid.: 134). This form of disrespect is contingent to historical processes and developments, which means that it can become negligible depending on the development of legal relations within a specific historical phase. This historical aspect also means that "the semantic content of what counts as a morally responsible agent" (ibid.), and hence that which counts as rights and also the denial of rights, also depends on the specific historical phase within a society.

The third form of disrespect threatens the dignity or 'honour' of a person in the form of the "denigration of individual or collective ways of life" (ibid.). This impacts the solidarity that individuals or groups might have, also with consequences to the value that society sees in their way of life. This comes in the form of the devaluation of a group's way of life according to a hierarchy of values within society, which finds individual expression in the form of insult. Honneth (ibid.) provides a striking description of the far-reaching impact of this form of disrespect:

> If this hierarchy of values is so constituted as to downgrade individual forms of life and manners of belief as inferior or deficient, then it robs the subjects in question of every opportunity to attribute social value to their own abilities. For those engaged in them, the result of the evaluative degradation of certain patterns of self-realisation is that they cannot relate to their mode of life as something of positive significance within their community.

Here Honneth is talking about the way in which ways of life, e.g. cultural groups, ethnic traditions, are viewed as inferior, in other words uncivilised, uncultured, immoral, etc. This leads to a loss of personal self-esteem for those people who belong to the culture because their way of life is not deemed to be of value to society and worse, even eradicated by the society within which they live. This removes the possibility in the life of an individual to gain social approval by way of group solidarity, an important means through which self-realisation can take place (ibid.). Denigration of ways of life is also a historically contingent form of disrespect and is therefore linked to a process of historical change (ibid.), which also means that certain forms of disrespect can disappear in time as ways of life are accepted as valuable within society. Two things are important here with regards to reaching such a historical moment: Firstly, the institutional entrenchment of the acceptance of ways of life and their value for society. Secondly, and

following on institutional entrenchment, self-esteem becomes a case of the evaluation of "individual abilities instead of collective traits" (ibid.).

The experience of disrespect leads to personal after-effects that are described in various metaphors (ibid.: 135) such as "psychological death" (in the case of torture or rape), "social death" (in the case of denial of rights), or "scars and injuries" (in the case of cultural denigration), demonstrating that these forms of disrespect has a direct socio-somatic impact on the individual. Honneth says that "the negative emotional reactions accompanying the experience of disrespect could represent precisely the affective motivational basis in which the struggled-for recognition is anchored" (ibid.). This is a significant point in terms of how misrecognition is a motivational factor for the continued struggle for recognition, and that the presence of these forms of disrespect in a society means that mutual recognition is problematised or inadequate at a given historical juncture. Honneth continues to expand on this point by defending a crucial thesis (ibid.: 135-136), which is an important connection with the work of Fanon:

> Neither in Hegel nor in Mead did we find any indication as to how experiencing social disrespect can motivate a subject to enter a practical struggle or conflict. There was, as it were, a missing psychological link that would lead from mere suffering to action by cognitively informing the person in question of his or her social situation. I would defend the thesis that this function can be performed by negative emotional reactions, such as being ashamed or enraged or indignant. These comprise the psychological symptoms on the basis of which one can come to realise that one is being illegitimately denied social recognition. … Hence the experience of disrespect is always accompanied by affective sensations that are, in principle, capable of revealing to individuals the fact that certain forms of recognition are being withheld from them.

Honneth turns to Dewey to demonstrate his thesis regarding the "motivational impetus for a struggle for recognition" that motivates active conduct and a praxis that opens up political resistance" (ibid.: 138). This conduct and praxis is made possible by the realisation of the denial of recognition, what Honneth also calls the "opportunity for moral insights inherent in these negative emotions, as their cognitive content" (ibid.). This is the missing psychological link that Honneth refers to above, namely the link from disrespect (i.e. misrecognition) to moral and political action. Honneth says though that crucial to this link are the right conditions within society for political action (ibid.: 138-39):

> Empirically, whether the cognitive potential inherent in feeling hurt or ashamed becomes a moral-political conviction depends above all on how the affected subject's cultural-political environment is constructed: only if the means of articulation of a social movement are available can the experience of disrespect become a source of motivation for acts of political resistance. The developmental logic of such collective movements can, however, only be discovered via an analysis that attempts to explain social struggles on the basis of the dynamics of moral experiences.

There are two issues to point out here: Firstly, that the conditions within a society must be such that it is possible for people to develop a moral-political conviction based on the awareness of the impact that disrespect has on their lives. Secondly, that the formation of social movements is a necessity for the possibility of any kind of political action and resistance. What does this mean? In short, that there must be some inclination towards (or possibility of) democracy or rights within the society in question if the affects or emotions associated with the experience of disrespect (shame, rage, indignation) are to find expression as acts of political resistance. For instance, Apartheid South Africa had neither but there was an understanding of what democracy and rights could achieve and this is what motivated the Struggle. South Africa beyond Apartheid is a democratic state with rights enshrined in the democracy but the struggle for recognition is still on-going through various political and social movements. The recent calls for decolonisation shows that this process did not finish when Apartheid came to an end.

There are two further points that are crucial going forward in terms of looking at the problematisation of mutual recognition within the South African context. I aim to take Honneth's points further in the postcolonial context but with a somewhat different point of entry. Firstly, Honneth refers to a "developmental logic of collective movements" that requires analysis. In the following two sections I will look at factors that problematise this developmental logic, namely violence and poverty. In this respect, the work of Fanon provides the necessary theoretical grid through which to analyse this problematic as he gives us a description of Honneth's disrespect in the colonial and decolonising context. Secondly, Honneth refers to the "cognitive potential" that follows from shame to become a "moral-political conviction". In the final section, following on the discussions regarding violence and poverty, I want to conclude with an argument that this cognitive potential and the subsequent conviction is necessary not only for those who suffered disrespect but also for those who perpetrated disrespect (i.e. whites in South Africa beyond Apartheid). Such a cognitive potential would of course be different as it is based more in shame and guilt than actual hurt or injury.

Here I follow Markell (2003), who argues that the focus of the politics of recognition should be on both parties and not only on victims of misrecognition. The perpetrators of misrecognition should give an acknowledgement of how their own social situation contributes to injustice. I argue that this acknowledgement is a necessity for the possibility of mutual recognition, an acknowledgement of white but also rich complicity in terms of various forms of Honneth's disrespect that can found within the South Africa context. This cognitive potential as acknowledgement would then be part of the ethico-political task that this conclusion to the study outlines, i.e. a task with normative content aiming at mutual recognition. This will attend to the weakness that Markell identifies in the struggle for recognition, namely to only focus on the victim of harm and not the perpetrator. Honneth also realises this when he pre-empts the above passage by saying that "the weakness of this foothold of morality within social reality is shown by the fact that, in these affective reactions, the injustice of disrespect does not inevitably *have to* reveal itself but merely *can*" (ibid.: 135). The importance of the acknowledgement by perpetrators in past and current complicity regarding disrespect is a crucial element that allows for this move from *can* to *have to* without which mutual recognition is left truncated. This issue regarding acknowledgement will be fleshed out in the final section of the conclusion after the extension of the theory of recognition within the postcolonial context.

3.   **A postcolonial theory of recognition: Violence and the non-rational challenge to mutual recognition**

An important observation needs to be made at this juncture before I discuss the extension of the proposed postcolonial theory of recognition. Honneth's theory of recognition as it is linked to Fanon's version of recognition above gives us a strictly rational picture of recognition. In other words, it describes recognition as founded on deliberate actions and a framework that will help us out of the situation of radical misrecognition. This is not the only means by which to face and take on radical misrecognition and Honneth also recognises this in his discussion about forms of disrespect (as pointed out above). There are non-rational elements that are part of the process in overcoming misrecognition. In this respect, Fanon clearly recognized the inherent violence that accompanies the colonial system and the decolonial process. In my view, Fanon did not favour violence for the sake of violence, but he saw few alternatives in the cases where the systemic violence of colonialism is not acknowledged. Violence provides the oppressed and colonised with a means of overcoming their inferior status in society. In this sense, violence serves as an

intermediate stage where the old system is undone, which clears the way for the conditions that could make rational recognition a possibility. This is a key qualification to be made because the question on violence stands quite central in the postcolony on the back of a history of colonial violence and this is also the case in South Africa (where Apartheid was built on a system of violence that persists in other forms post-Apartheid). Honneth further provides a place in his theory that is occupied by violent practices (the forms of disrespect) although he looks at violence as violation rather than violence as resistance. This aspect of his theory as it regards violations of the various elements of mutual recognition nevertheless provides more links and overlaps with Fanon's work.

What can be gathered from Honneth's theory of mutual recognition is that forms of disrespect (i.e. misrecognition) threatens mutual recognition in various ways: Abuse and rape in primary relationships threatens the physical integrity of a person in violating their due emotional support; denial of rights and exclusion threatens the social integrity of a person in violating due cognitive respect; denigration and insult threatens the honour and dignity of a person in violating due social esteem. These forms of disrespect compromise various components of the self, namely basic self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem. The important consideration in this regard is that within Honneth's schema, the three modes of recognition contribute to mutual recognition and a violation of one of these modes problematises mutual recognition.

This, then, is the point of entry for looking at the colonial and decolonising situation, also as it relates to South Africa. The forms of disrespect that Honneth identifies are each a form of violence within different levels of society, i.e. a personal level (abuse and rape), an institutional level (denial of rights and exclusion), and a social / psychological level (denigration and insult). Violence, as a transgression committed against the humanity of a fellow human being, is an inescapable truth within the colonial and postcolonial context. Fanon saw colonialism but also decolonisation as violent phenomena, in a normative sense but also as a description of how these processes work. Colonialism is the attempt to gain mastery over another and decolonisation is the attempt by the colonised to undo that mastery, which almost inevitably takes place through violent means of some sort. The problem is that the postcolonial situation is one of perpetual or episodic decolonisation and hence violence is an inescapable reality in this respect. Ongoing violence implies the perpetuation of misrecognition and hence various obstacles problematize mutual recognition within the postcolonial context.

In this respect, on a theoretical level, the work of Fanon is informative for a constructive understanding of this situation. Fanon's work incorporates an analysis of violence in the colonial context but also within a context of decolonisation, a process that he saw as inevitably violent. Fanon's outline of violence will be informative here for two reasons:

Firstly, his work was done within a colonial context that carries striking similarities with South Africa. *Black Skin, White Masks* still reflected on his native Martinique in the Caribbean, but the rest of his work focused on the resistance and revolution taking place in Algeria. The former French colony had the largest white population (around one million) in Africa outside of South Africa (three million at the time) before they were evacuated in 1962 as the revolution came to an end with Algeria's independence. The revolution in Algeria was one of total war and not a peaceful transition. The situation in South Africa in the 1980's was volatile and bordered on civil war in the early 1990's but it never came to that. That said, the country has been in a postcolonial phase since 1994 and levels of violence have remained high whilst the need for decolonisation demonstrates why violence has remained as a mark of social life. The persistence of violence and narrative of decolonisation is therefore a link with that which happened in Algeria and Fanon's work on violence carries a certain manner of relevance for the South African situation (which has already been demonstrated by a whole body of scholarship in the country that enlists Fanon's work to make sense of the post-Apartheid situation).

Secondly, there is the link between Fanon's work and that of Honneth suggested by this study (and established above). The link between the structures of mutual recognition in three and different modes seems quite obvious: Fanon's humane action overlaps with Honneth's emotional support as the foundation of the primary relationships of love and friendship; Fanon's basic and shared values of humanity overlaps with Honneth's cognitive respect as the foundation of the legal relations established by rights; and Fanon's acknowledgement of differences overlaps with Honneth's social esteem as the foundation for a community of value where solidarity is formed.

This overlap extends further in terms of the different forms of disrespect that Honneth qualifies for each form of recognition, i.e. abuse and rape as disrespect of love/friendship; denial of rights and exclusion as disrespect of rights; and denigration and insult as disrespect of solidarity. The threatened component with abuse and rape is physical integrity; with denial of rights and exclusion it is social integrity that is threatened; and with denigration and insult it is one's honour and dignity that is at issue. I would suggest that these threats and components overlap with the

different forms of violence that is identified by Jinadu (2003) in the work of Fanon: Abuse and rape (physical integrity) with physical violence; denial of rights and exclusion (social integrity) with structural violence, and denigration and insult with psychological violence. These forms of violence provide an explanation and fuller understanding of the ways in which mutual recognition is problematised within the postcolonial context.

Adele Jinadu provides a "three-fold categorisation of violence" in his book *Fanon: In Search of the African Revolution* (2003: 44-52). Fanon himself did not necessarily analyse the colonial situation explicitly by distinguishing these forms of violence although he did sometimes make use of these terms or similiar concepts in other words. Jinadu's argument is thus his own regarding these forms of violence, although the grid of analysis that he provides is based on Fanon's work. The important thing to take into account here is the continuation of these forms of violence within the context of post-Apartheid South Africa.

The first form of violence is *physical*, i.e. "somatic injury inflicted on human beings". In its most radical form this form of violence results in the murder of an individual (ibid.: 44-45) but it can also include assault and rape. Thus, here we are talking about violence *per se*. Fanon (1967: 31) says that this form of violence is where colonialism started when "the foreigner who came from another country imposed his rule by means of guns and machines". This form of violence *puts into place* the Manichean relation between coloniser and colonised (ibid.: 46), i.e. the dialectic between master and slave as white settler and black native.

The second form of violence is *structural*, in the sense that violence serves as a condition for social injustice, which is kept in place by necessary institutions (ibid.: 46) and which aims to *keep in place* the Manichean dialectic between settler and native. Jinadu (ibid.) says that "the abject poverty of the colonised is in stark contrast to the superfluity of the coloniser", which speaks to the former and current situation in South Africa as it regards the relation between white and black but also rich and poor. A good example of such violence would thus be that of the Apartheid-system and Fanon also says as much (1967: 29):

> The colonial world is a world divided into compartments. It is probably unnecessary to recall the existence of native quarters and European quarters, of schools for natives and schools for Europeans: in the same way we need not recall apartheid in South Africa.

What this form of violence does is to divide society into the different worlds inhabited by the conquered natives and the European settlers by way of institutions that keep these worlds separate. These institutions could make use of physical violence in order to uphold this separation and more often than not this is the case.

The third form of violence is *psychological*, i.e. injury or harm done to the human psyche. Here cultural imperialism, once in place through the various institutions, has a role to play in the guise of propaganda, indoctrination, brainwashing and threats (Jinadu, 2003: 47-48). The aim of psychological violence is quite significant in the way that it changes the perspective and life-world of the native (ibid.):

> This psychological violence represents the attempt, conscious or unconscious, by the coloniser to create alienated colonised individuals who reject indigenous values and institutions because they are deceived or brainwashed into believing that those values and institutions are inferior to those of the coloniser.

This form of violence is the cause of the inferiority complex that Fanon analyses in *Black Skin, White Masks*. This leads the colonised's attempt to be as white as possible as he or she "apes the language and social mannerisms of the coloniser" (ibid.: 48), hence the "white masks" that Fanon speaks about. Here one could also think about the way in which whitely ways of being (and the invisibility of whiteness) extends to rich ways of being (and the invisibility of affluence).

The different forms of violence are interconnected and contribute to a cycle of violence (following a loose interpretation of Jinadu): Physical violence in early colonialism results in the pacification of 'natives' by settlers (*ibid*.: 45). Once the natives have been pacified, institutions are established to ensure the superiority of the settlers through structural violence. This can be done through various institutions, systems and ideologies, such as apartheid. In this situation, one finds the development of violent resistance by the colonised natives in response to their oppression. In reaction to this resistance (such as The Struggle against Apartheid), one finds systemic reinforcement by the colonising settlers and hence the continuation of physical violence in various forms. This cycle of violence can be summed up as follows in the figure below:

Figure 1: The cycle of violence in the colonial and postcolonial context

The institutions and systems of violence focus on keeping the natives "in their place" and do so through the active oppression and intimidation of the natives, i.e. psychological violence in various guises. The underlying assumption of these institutions and systems is the superiority of the settlers (ibid.: 49), which is actively enforced by these institutions and systems by way of indoctrination, threats and brain washing. The natives develop an inferiority complex as a consequence of psychological violence, which becomes the location of settler racism and alienation as well as resentment for the native. Ultimately, the 'natives' both rid themselves of this inferiority complex and acquire the superiority of the settlers by a return to physical violence through revolution or protest, leading to decolonization. The problematic regarding the reversion to physical violence is that there could simply be an inversion of power relations, where the slave of old becomes the new master and hence the dialectic continues as before with a master and slave (which also means that *Aufhebung* of the dialectic does not take place).

Jinadu's analysis of violence in the work of Fanon can be summarised in the figure below (the figure is my summation of Jinadu's analysis). Important to note here is that these forms of violence overlap with each other exactly because of the above-mentioned cycle of violence. Note further how each form of violence, also in terms of the examples provided, is misrecognition of a

certain sort and how it corresponds with the forms of disrespect that Honneth identifies. The full picture will be sketched shortly.

Table 3: Fanon's three-fold categorization of violence (Jinadu, 2003)

Form of violence	physical	structural	psychological
Content of violence	actual violence: somatic injury inflicted on human beings	necessary institutions	indoctrination, brain washing
Aim of violence	somatic injury inflicted on human beings	condition for social injustice	injury or harm done to the human psyche
Result of violence	pacification of natives	superiority of settlers	inferiority complex of natives
Example	*assault, murder, rape*	*apartheid state and institutions*	*propaganda, verbal threats*

It seems to me that in the postcolonial space one will find that (Fanonian) violence in each of these three guises is still prevalent. The situation in post-Apartheid South Africa, preceded by decades of oppression and violence exercised by the Apartheid regime, includes each of these forms of violence. The system of organised and *de jure* Apartheid came to an end with the first democratic elections in 1994. The political mastery of whites was undone but this did not mean that the process of decolonisation has come to an end. Various socio-economic challenges remain, many of which has just become more acute beyond Apartheid. The current situation in South Africa demonstrates the Fanonian dynamic according to which violence does not disappear from the colonial to the decolonising context but rather remains, taking on new and old forms.

The levels of crime in the country since the end of Apartheid are well-known, both in terms of petty and violent crime. Chapters two and four regarding suburban whiteness and affluence made mention of how black on white crime has become the focus of public discussion, but the crime affects all people in country and the hardest hit are the black poor who cannot afford any form of sophisticated defence against criminal activity. Suburban crime (house break-ins and vehicle hijacking) are also endemic as are farm attacks that involve grievous harm and murder. Suburban crime is however only a part of the problem as the township reality of the black poor sees violence being a daily reality or at least a daily possibility for most.

This situation is even more problematic if one views the full landscape of violence in the country. Racism on various levels and in various sectors of society remains a systemic problem, whether it

be explicit or casual white racism, new forms of reverse racism that still keep the racial categories of Apartheid in place, as well as xenophobia on an institutional and communal level. The xenophobic outbursts over the past decade demonstrates this new form of racism that targets the nationality of individuals but where the outbursts simply brought the problem to the public eye, it remains a daily reality for many foreign nationals who reside in townships, work in corporate environments and deal with the government bureaucracy.

The problem of institutional violence, which is very much the form of violence that Apartheid exercised, remains as a systemic problem that has grown in prominence, giving way to new forms of apartheid whilst keeping certain old forms in place. Relationships of technical servitude and labour domination remain in place, between white and black but also between rich and poor. Chapter two, which regards South Africa as a postcolonial heterotopia, was at pains to demonstrate this dynamic. On an institutional level, growing state securitisation during President Jacob Zuma's tenure of nine years has led to police militarisation. This has led to forms of political gangsterism: Intimidation of the political opposition and media, corruption on various levels of government and violent reactions to protest movements against the government (exemplified by the violence that characterised the Fees Must Fall movement over the last three years). These protest movements do not only involve governmental violence but also violence from the movements themselves and service delivery protests, continuous post-Apartheid, more often than not involve violence. The power dynamic in this regard is asymmetrical as these movements face a militarised police and government rhetoric that proclaims itself as aligned with the plight of the poor, but then follows neoliberal policies that simply lead to a greater divide between rich and poor. In the last place, a language of violence pervades public discourse as it relates to various protest movements, political parties and action groups as well as certain sectors within government itself.

The problematic of violence demonstrates the continuity that exists in South African society between Apartheid and the new dispensation since 1994. As previously mentioned, there is a view that 1994 is a disjuncture or rupture that wipes the slate clean, leading to a change in the levels of violence and racism that characterised Apartheid. This was the view that accompanied the idea of the Rainbow Nation, but the reality in the two decades beyond 1994 has simply seen a continuation of various forms of violence and racism. This study has been at pains to investigate why this is the case and how this situation problematises mutual recognition.

The struggle for mutual recognition in post-Apartheid South Africa is ongoing and the end of Apartheid with democratic elections of 1994, although a very significant historical event, was simply the start of the next chapter of decolonisation. Forms of *de facto* apartheid is making this ideal difficult and, at worse, even impossible to attain. The picture by which mutual recognition is problematised can be summarised in the figure below (overleaf) by joining the links between Honneth's theory of mutual recognition and Fanon's analysis of violence (via Jinadu's three-fold categorisation), which provides a picture of the problematic that violence poses to mutual recognition. The examples and results of violence are amended to the current South African context.

Table 4: A postcolonial theory of recognition (Honneth and Fanon)

HONNETH **Mode of recognition**	(humane action) emotional support	(basic and shared values of humanity) cognitive respect	(differences) social esteem
Dimension of personality	needs and emotions	moral responsibility	traits and abilities
Forms of recognition	primary relationships (love, friendship)	legal relations (rights)	community of value (solidarity)
Developmental potential	—	generalization, de-formalization	individualization, equalization
Practical relation-to-self	basic self-confidence	self-respect	self-esteem
Forms of disrespect	abuse and rape	denial of rights, exclusion	denigration, insult
Threatened component of personality	physical integrity	social integrity	'honour', dignity
JINADU ON FANON **Form of violence**	physical	structural	psychological
Content of violence	actual violence: somatic injury inflicted on human beings	necessary institutions	indoctrination, brain washing
Aim of violence	somatic injury inflicted on human beings	condition for social injustice	injury or harm done to the human psyche
Result of violence	pacification of protest / actual criminal activity	monopoly of government and corporate institutions	nervous conditions of rich and poor, white and black
Examples	assault, murder, rape	kleptocratic state and captured institutions	propaganda (fake news), institutional threats

This picture already gives us a good idea about the way according to which mutual recognition is problematised in its various forms within the postcolonial context with reference to post-Apartheid South Africa, especially as it regards the rationale behind various forms of violence. Physical violence results in the pacification of protest or actual criminal activity. Structural violence results in the monopoly of governmental and corporate institutions, such as a kleptocratic state and captured intuitions (both state and private). Psychological violence results in the nervous conditions of both white and black as well as rich and poor, which is motivated by so-called fake news and institutional threats. The picture this provides, is one where mutual recognition is frustrated, short-changed or simply impossible.

This situation is amplified, and indeed also caused to a large extent, by the great economic inequality that characterises South African society and leads many to live in some manner of poverty. Whereas Honneth provides an explicit discussion of violence (regarding the forms of disrespect) in his theory of recognition, he provides more of a piecemeal discussion regarding economic issues and its impact on recognition. There are however several important insights that can be taken from what he has to say, to which I now turn in order to fill out the whole picture for my proposed theory of postcolonial recognition.

4.   A postcolonial theory of recognition: The economic challenge to mutual recognition

In this section, I would like to argue that Honneth's theory of mutual recognition does not provide the whole picture regarding the different forms of recognition or disrespect (and thus violence). Honneth does not provide a mode of recognition that seems crucial to the South African and postcolonial context, namely that of the economic sphere. He does, however, give pointers in that direction and admit that economic equality is a prerequisite for persons to have certain rights at all and also especially for relations of social esteem to develop. Presbey highlights the fact that Honneth (1995: 127, 165-7) makes a solid mention of the importance of the economic sphere (2003: 549):

> As Honneth noted, struggles can be set off when an implicit economic consensus is
> violated, for people feel that they have been denied social recognition and worth. Insofar
> as many people's economic expectations have not yet been met by the new government,
> we should not be surprised if occasions for struggle continue.

Honneth puts it as follows towards the end of his chapter on the structures of recognition in *The Struggle for Recognition* (1995: 127):

> Since, beyond [the permanent struggle for social esteem], relations of social esteem are, as Georg Simmel already saw, indirectly coupled with patterns of income distribution, economic confrontations are also constitutive for this form of struggle for recognition.

This is an important admission from Honneth, one that resonates with the debate that he's had with Nancy Fraser regarding questions of redistribution and recognition (see Fraser and Honneth, 2003). Honneth might see recognition as being primary to redistribution, but he does consider the economic sphere to be significant to the struggle for recognition. In this case, he says that relations of self-esteem are also economic in nature as it relates to the struggle for recognition in this form. In other words, the struggle for recognition also involves the struggle for economic distribution and hence economic equality (or at least access to economic stability). The words regarding "patterns of income distribution" and "economic confrontations" speak deeply to the South African context, the world's most unequal society as it regards the gulf between rich and poor. Honneth points out though that economic confrontations are not the only prerequisite, but so is education. He has the following to say in this regard (ibid.: 116-17):

> The goal of this struggle [for universal mandatory education] was to provide not the child but the future adult with the measure of cultural education required for the equal exercise of citizens' rights. Once this point had been reached, the insight was not far away that political rights would have to remain a merely formal concession to the mass of the population as long as the possibility for actively taking advantage of them was not guaranteed by a certain social standard of living and degree of economic security. During the twentieth century, what then emerged from such demands for equality, at least in those Western countries that have followed a welfare state course, was a new class of social welfare rights, which are supposed to assure every citizen the possibility of asserting all his or her other rights-claims.

There are a few important things to note in this passage (which Honneth bases on his analysis of T.H. Marshall's classification of rights): Firstly, cultural education (which I understand to refer to a general education that serves to provide a cultural knowledge rather than to enculturate, although it could also mean the more problematic function of the latter case) provides citizens as future adults with the preconditions for the exercise of rights. In other words, cultural education

provides the conditions for the development of the cognitive abilities that facilitates an understanding of the exercise of rights and helps to develop the cognitive respect that is one of the modes of recognition in Honneth's theory. Secondly, these rights were extended to all citizens in the absence of economic security exactly to provide them with some form of institutional security and safeguards because their social standard of living does not provide this. Thirdly, Honneth notes then that the rise of welfare state, most notably in Western Europe, provided a new class of rights that safeguards the social welfare of its citizens, i.e. to ensure a certain minimum of economic security.

If one takes into account the above three insights, then it becomes clear that the process in South Africa, evolving as it has in the wake of Apartheid, presents a number of problems. Rights have no doubt been extended to all citizens because of the attempt to correct the injustices of Apartheid, but exactly also because such a great part of the population has no economic security and live in poverty. The situation is problematised in this sense by the absence of sufficient cultural education and social welfare in the lives of those who live in poverty. Illiteracy and poverty poses a massive problem in South Africa not just with regards to people's ability to exercise their rights but also for them to have these rights at all. This problem goes both ways because their own status as right-holders diminishes but so does their own cognitive ability to recognize others as right-holders. In the absence of proper or at least sufficient cultural education and economic security, the struggle for recognition is shortchanged in terms of rights and social esteem (solidarity) as two of Honneth's modes of recognition. The absence or insufficiency of these conditions will however have an obvious negative impact on the remaining initial (and non-institutional) mode of recognition that is love and friendship. Honneth gives an indication of this as he further frames the conditions for mutual recognition (ibid.: 117):

> [I]n order to be involved as morally responsible persons, individuals need not only legal protection from interference in their sphere of liberty, but also the legally assured opportunity for participation in the public process of will-formation, an opportunity that they can only actually take advantage of, however, if they also have a certain social standard of living. Thus, during the last few centuries, the enrichment of the legal status of the individual citizen was accompanied by the successive expansion of the core constellation of capacities that constitutively characterize a human being as a person. In particular, the characteristics that put a subject in a position to act autonomously on the basis of rational insight have since come to include a minimum of cultural education and economic security.

Honneth points out that "a certain standard of living" is required for people to be able to actively participate in the process that safeguards their rights. The South African situation shows how persons are excluded from this process if their standard of living is poor whilst affluence provides access to this process. This is exactly what Honneth says, that a certain social standard of living is essential for persons to take advantage of the rights to which they are entitled. In other words, they have rights on paper but in practice, their standard of living can impede the right to be accessible at all. Honneth further reiterates that there must be a minimum of cultural education and economic security. In fact, these provide the core capacities and characteristics for personhood. This personhood is thus also something that someone will lack without this core, following this line of thinking. The lack of being regarded as a person, i.e. someone who lacks a certain standard of living that precludes cultural education and economic security, is something that almost certainly must impact the primary relationships of love and friendship. In other words, the upbringing of a child will be negatively impacted in the absence of these conditions. Economic security together with cultural education are therefore key factors in bringing about this minimum for personhood and is therefore necessary conditions for the different modes of recognition that together constitutes mutual recognition.

The significance of what Honneth says in these quoted passages is that education and economic security are crucial factors that impact on the conditions for mutual recognition. The absence of either or both can potentially problematise mutual recognition, and in South Africa we see a clear-cut case study where the lack of education and economic security leads not simply to problematizing mutual recognition but also to the proliferation of forms of misrecognition. Honneth's own admission of the importance then of economic security and cultural education, to my mind, makes it necessary to rethink his theory of mutual recognition. In this respect, it seems to me that it would be possible to theorise that cultural education and economic security could be a form of recognition that precedes the other modes of recognition based on what Honneth himself says in this regard. The suggestion of such a preceding form of recognition carries some significance for the South African context and, following Honneth, would concern cultural education and economic security.

This preceding form of recognition as suggested here might present an addition to Honneth's theory of mutual recognition, namely a mode that is characterized by human living conditions and a certain standard of living. This preceding form of recognition points to a number of

important insights regarding Honneth's model and the post-Apartheid South African situation: Firstly, the South African context highlights how the different forms of recognition (love, rights and solidarity) are interrelated and a violation of one form of recognition flows into misrecognition of the other forms. In other words, a violation of any form of recognition impacts the other forms of recognition and problematizes mutual recognition. The point of a preceding form of recognition serves to show the importance of economic preconditions but at the same time, also to simply demonstrate that the violation of one form of recognition impacts the other forms of recognition. The cannot be separated or quarantined from each other. Secondly, mutual recognition in South Africa fails because these economic preconditions of civil equality are missing. Thirdly, mutual recognition in South Africa further fails because of the persistence of a colonial mentality, beginning with whiteness but extending to the black elite, that focuses on economic recognition as the dominant form of recognition. Fourthly, the South African situation also demonstrates the Fanonian insight (and worry) that dismantling the colonial political structures is not enough if the colonial mentality lingers. The colonial mentality of old considered black lives to not matter, and now beyond Apartheid it has taken on an economic form according to which poor lives don't matter.

The development of the outline for a suggested form of recognition regarding economic security and the accompanying cultural education can be explored in future research, as I am simply highlighting the necessity here of the economic preconditions for mutual recognition. In this regard, an engagement with Nancy Fraser's work might assist in this respect but due to the constraints of space and the more narrow focus of this study, it will be better left to a future study. What I hope this suggestion brings to the fore, is the problematic foundation from which the search for mutual recognition is launched in South Africa. The stark socio-economic realities of the country imply that the struggle for recognition is an ongoing process and more importantly, that mutual recognition remains an ethico-political task within the post-Apartheid landscape.

5.   A concluding caveat: Whiteness and the politics of acknowledgement

This study has meandered through various problematics as it concerns whiteness in post-Apartheid South Africa. The introduction theoretically framed the study in earnest by looking at the Hegelian failure of recognition, i.e misrecognition, which constitutes the cognitive conditions for racism and violence. Chapter one took this further in Fanon's analysis of the Hegelian master-slave dialectic and the form that it took in the colonial context. The colonial dialectic results in a

violent society where mutual recognition becomes impossible. Chapter two suggests that this dialectic is in the process of becoming a postcolonial heterotopia within the South African context in looking at a case study of suburban whiteness, claiming that the laager of the Apartheid state has given way to a suburban laager that exists behind fences and gates. Chapter three took this case study further in looking at the role of rugby (both literal and metaphorical) in Afrikaner society and their reaction to the end of Apartheid. Their main communal focus has moved from political ideals to economic ideals characterized by a consumerist life-world. Chapter four brought the case study to an end in a critical response to the idea that whites should remain silent as it concerns socio-political issues and debates in the country exactly because of their dominant socio-economic position. The crucial point made in this chapter is that there is a gradual shift from race to class as it regards economic privilege, but that this shift sees affluence as an extension of whiteness. The conclusion summarized and theorised the general thread of the study, namely economic apartheid and the so-called colonial mentality that persisted beyond Apartheid. The study then came full circle with a return to the Hegelian theoretical framework with a Fanonian reading of Honneth's theory of mutual recognition. The suggested postcolonial theory of recognition developed in the conclusion aims to address the Hegelian failure of mutual recognition outlined in the introduction, whilst also elaborating on the role of economic misrecognition and the suggestion of preceding form of recognition that concerns cultural education and economic security. This theory also seeks to explain the persistence in post-Apartheid South Africa of a colonial mentality that is economic in nature.

The study has brought to the fore how whiteness is problematized in post-Apartheid South Africa but at the same time, how post-Apartheid South Africa itself is problematized by the dynamic that whiteness brings to the dialectic that is becoming a postcolonial heterotopia in the country. In light of this and with the focus on white identity in this study, the question that returns time and again is how they should respond to their situation of being white in this place, especially in light of the colonial mentality of affluence. There seems to be an existential "uneasiness" (a term used by Gabriel Marcel) about being white in South Africa, whether this uneasiness has to do with feeling that you are part of the problem or that your environment is problematic. The previous chapter finished off with a recommendation that instead of silence, the way forward for whites in terms of their interaction with those who suffered (and still suffer) due to Apartheid would be an attitude of *care*. I would like to briefly elaborate the recommendation about this attitude of care in relation to the issue of recognition. I see this attitude as part and parcel of the ethico-political task of mutual recognition in post-Apartheid South Africa but would recommend that it implies that

we should also take care in how we conduct the politics of recognition itself within South Africa. Here I'm going to return to the work of Patchen Markell, who provides an insight about recognition that seems to me to be crucial to the South African context.

The problem at hand, to summarise it again, is this: I think that it is important that whites take on the burden for their complicity in terms of injustices in the country. The simple fact that they still find themselves ever-more affluent in the midst of a sea of black poverty, points to structures within a society that still very much work in their favour. These structures might not be strictly institutional as it relates to the state but in the private sector and their own communal networks, there are structures that very much favours their chances of having a good life where these networks and structures are absent in most black communities. This, however, is only a part of the burden at hand. During the tenure of President Jacob Zuma, the hold of mainly black networks of patronage over government and the rise of the black middle class has seen the development of a new kind of complicity that also needs to be acknowledged as it regards the massive divide between rich and poor in the country. There also exists a relationship then between government and the private sector that works to each other's benefit but at the expense of a better life for the poor majority. This situation means that neither just whites, or just the black elite must shoulder the burden for injustices in the country. This tends to happen though in the public discourse, where some whites will abdicate any responsibility for current injustices and simply blame it on the current black elite due to endemic corruption on government level, whereas some in the black elite will deny any responsibility for current injustices and simply blame it on Apartheid and the white privilege engendered by that system. Both sides are to blame, and both should acknowledge how their situation provides complicity in current injustices. As long as we remain in that blame game, then progress regarding current injustices will simply remain in a state of inertia.

What this acknowledgement entails can be explored in a future study, taking into account what Markell says about the politics of acknowledgement (which does not render the politics of recognition moot, but rather critically serves to highlight methodological and practical problems inherent in recognition). The mention of Markell in this concluding caveat to my thesis simply serves to show why the white situation was at issue in my study, and why this focus on the self is important to take into account with regards to politics of recognition in South Africa. For this reason, the theoretical framework sketched of misrecognition in the introduction and mutual

recognition in the conclusion as well as in chapter one was complimented by various explorations of the white self in chapters two to four.

A future study of a politics of acknowledgement in South Africa, which I see as an extension of the attitude of care outlined at the end of chapter four, could take into account the four aspects of acknowledgement as outlined by Markell in his book and work out how it would be relevant to the South African context. Very briefly, Markell (ibid.: 38) sketches it as follows, outlining four features to acknowledgement:

> So acknowledgment is in the first instance self- rather than other-directed; its object is not one's own identity but one's own ontological condition of circumstances, particularly one's own finitude; this finitude is to be understood as a matter of one's practical limits in the face of an unpredictable and contingent future, not as a matter of the impossibility or injustice of knowing others; and finally, acknowledgment involves coming to terms with, rather than vainly attempting to overcome, the risk of conflict, hostility, misunderstanding, opacity, and alienation that characterizes life among others.

Markell's outline (which he then explores at length in his book) provides an important critique of the politics of recognition. Acknowledgement is not to replace recognition completely, but serves to correct the imbalanced focus on the other in order to include a critical focus on the role of the self in terms of injustice in society. This focus is not about identity *per se*, although it is an important component, but rather about one's own existential situation. Closer inspection of this situation will bring into focus the limits that the situation places on one's actions, i.e. what is possible and impossible for one to do, and the impact of one's situation on others. These limits are caused by an unknowable future within a context and placed with specific conditions that are framed by the here and now. These limits do not imply that the other is unknowable, but rather that the other could surprise us with who they might turn out to be, whilst it does not imply that we commit an injustice in forming knowledge of others although it should be on their own terms. In the last place, one must realise that interaction with others will involve various antagonisms but instead of rendering conflict moot, one should rather inspect why the conflict exists and accept it as part and parcel of our interaction with others within various situational scenarios.

What becomes clear from the above is that the focus on the self through the politics of acknowledgement aims to clarify the relation to the other with an emphasis on the importance of interaction with the other, which goes some way towards filling out this conclusion's explanation

of the problem of mutual recognition in South Africa. We can heed the cautionary words that Markell provides about the change of direction to focus on the self: Acknowledgement must not be a retreat into the self or a refusal to engage with others because of the fear that they can either not be known or the fear that they will be dominated (ibid.: 36). This results in a kind abdication (ibid.) to take up the burden of one's responsibility for the self's part in certain injustices in society. This retreat and consequent abdication, it would seem to me, could happen either through the choice by some whites to insulate themselves from post-Apartheid South Africa through new forms of apartheid, or otherwise through the problematic silence and refusal to criticise (and even to romanticise) black complicity in injustices. Insulation or silence therefore ironically has the same outcome, either through a complete lack of acknowledgement or otherwise through a kind of acknowledgment that incapacitates the self. The situation of the self and interaction with the other is compromised, whilst recognition of who they (and we) are becomes a problem, whether rooted in injustice (discrimination and oppression) or in the solution to injustice (to recognise them as they really are).

This thesis considered the different features of acknowledgement and Markell's caution in an indirect fashion as it explored white identity and the white situation, but a way forward in terms of what this white politics of acknowledgement would look like leaves room for future study, where the problematic of complicity as sketched above should be taken into account. An exclusive focus on the complicity of only whites or only the black elite will not suffice, as the role of both needs to be considered in the ever-evolving socio-economic and socio-political landscape of post-Apartheid South Africa. A study of this kind will also pay heed to Fanon's fear about the master-slave dialectic simply reproducing itself beyond decolonisation. My study has been at pains to attend to this Fanonian worry in showing how the dialect has remained but that it has taken on new forms, most notably that of the postcolonial heterotopia. The ongoing task of mutual recognition in South Africa requires that we come to an understanding of the postcolonial heterotopia, as a contemporary form of the dialectic, but also that we come to an understanding of our own situation and role in this place. This understanding might not be comforting or easy for it requires a great sense of honesty and can pose deep existential questions, even existential crisis, about oneself. The upside would be self-knowledge that is authentic and closer to the realities of the postcolonial heterotopia that is South Africa.

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