

The Politics of Trade-offs: Studying the Dynamics of Welfare State Reform with Conjoint Experiments

Silja Häusermann*, Thomas Kurer[†], Denise Traber[‡]

*Department of Political Science, University of Zurich; silja.haeusermann@ipz.uzh.ch.

[†]Department of Political Science, University of Zurich; kurer@ipz.uzh.ch.

[‡]Department of Political Science, University of Lucerne; denise.traber@unilu.ch.

Supplementary Information

A Conjoint pairwise comparison - screenshot of the online survey

Figure 1: Conjoint pairwise comparison - screenshot of the online survey

	Reformpaket 1	Reformpaket 2
Eintrittschwelle in Pensionskasse	Unverändert: keine Ausweitung des Zugangs zu Renten aus Pensionskassen.	Erweiterter Zugang zu Renten aus Pensionskassen für Personen mit tieferem Einkommen und Teilzeitbeschäftigte.
Witwenrente	Wird schrittweise abgeschafft.	Keine Kürzung.
Mehreinnahmen für die AHV	Erhöhung der Mehrwertsteuer um maximal 1.5 Prozentpunkte.	Erhöhung der Mehrwertsteuer um maximal 3 Prozentpunkte.
Umwandlungssatz Pensionskasse	Senkung. Ausgleich durch höheres Altersguthaben.	Senkung. Ausgleich durch höheres Altersguthaben.
Flexibles Rentenalter	Wie bisher: Frühpensionierung möglich, jedoch mit gekürzter Rente.	Frühpensionierung möglich. Neu: finanzielle Abfederung für Personen mit tiefem Einkommen.
Rentenalter	Schrittweise Erhöhung auf 67 Jahre für Männer und Frauen.	Bleibt stabil: 64 für Frauen, 65 für Männer.

Falls Sie noch einmal nachlesen möchten, worum es bei den Reformelementen geht, klicken Sie bitte [hier](#). Um zurück zur Umfrage zu gelangen, können Sie einfach oben wieder in den gewünschten Tab klicken.

Welches Reformpaket bevorzugen Sie?

- Reformpaket 1 Reformpaket 2

Wenn Sie über **Reformpaket 1** abstimmen müssten, würden Sie der Reform zustimmen oder sie ablehnen?

- sicher zustimmen eher zustimmen eher ablehnen sicher ablehnen weiss nicht / keine Antwort

Wenn Sie über **Reformpaket 2** abstimmen müssten, würden Sie der Reform zustimmen oder sie ablehnen?

- sicher zustimmen eher zustimmen eher ablehnen sicher ablehnen weiss nicht / keine Antwort

B Expenditures

Table 1: Expenditures for different reform elements

Reform element	Levels	Change in expenditures	Source of the Estimate
Pension cutbacks 2nd pillar	1: status quo	0	
	2: Cutbacks. Balanced with higher contribution payments	-1406 mn/year	BBI 2014
	3: Cutbacks. No balancing	-4116 mn/year	BBI 2014
Cutbacks in widows' pensions	1: status quo	0	
	2: Restriction of eligibility	-359 mn/year	BBI 2014
	3: Stepwise abolishment	-960 mn/year	BSV 2016
Increase in age of retirement	1: status quo	0	
	2: 65 for men and women	-1114 mn/year	BBI 2014
	3: Stepwise increase for both men & women to 67	-4700 mn/year	BBI 2014
Subsidies for early retirement	1: status quo	0	
	2: Subsidies for lower-income earners	+390 mn/year	BBI 2014
Extended elibility 2nd pillar	1: status quo	0	
	2: Extend access for people with lower incomes and part-time workers	+400 mn/year	BBI 2014
Increased revenues (VAT)	1: status quo	0	
	2: Increase by max. 1.5 pp	0 (revenue increase of 3600 mn/year)	BSV 2014
	3: Increase by max. 3 pp	0 (revenue increase of 7200 mn/year)	BSV 2014

Sources:

BBI 2014: Botschaft zur Reform der Altersvorsorge 2020 vom 19. November 2014 (Official bill proposal by the Federal Government to the Parliament), Bundesblatt, reference number 14.088.

<https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/bundesrecht/bundesblatt.html>.

BSV 2016: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen. Schweizerische Sozialversicherungsstatistik 2016 (Official social insurance statistics of 2016). Bern.

www.bsv.admin.ch/bsv/de/home/sozialversicherungen/ueberblick/grsv/statistik.html.


BSV 2014: Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen. Zusammenfassung der Vernehmlassungsergebnisse (Synthesis of the consultation procedure), Bern.

<https://www.bsv.admin.ch/bsv/de/home/sozialversicherungen/ahv/reformen-revisionen/altersvorsorge2020/dokumentation.html>

C Robustness checks I

First and second pair only


Figure 2: Effects of reform elements on support for the pension reform package, only first two conjoint comparisons



Note: Findings based on a sub-sample of hypothetical packages that includes only the first two (out of five) conjoint comparisons. $N = 7492$ packages.

Excluding packages with only status quo on all retrenchment elements

Figure 3: Effects of reform elements on support for the pension reform package, only packages with cutbacks on at least one of the retrenchment-elements



Note: Findings based on a sub-sample of hypothetical packages that includes only those hypothetical packages that contain cutbacks (i.e. not status quo) on at least one of the 3 retrenchment reform elements. Of 18730 packages, 683 contained status quo on all three retrenchment-elements.

D Robustness checks II: Controls

Table 2: Full models, control for education

	Model 1	Model 2 Control variables
(Intercept)	0.620 [0.590; 0.649]	0.621 [0.591; 0.650]
Conversion_Ratecutbacks - balancing	-0.046 [-0.067; -0.025]	-0.045 [-0.066; -0.024]
Conversion_Ratecutbacks - no balancing	-0.094 [-0.115; -0.073]	-0.094 [-0.115; -0.072]
Widows_PensionsRestriction	-0.042 [-0.065; -0.020]	-0.042 [-0.065; -0.019]
Widows_PensionsAbolishment	-0.155 [-0.177; -0.133]	-0.155 [-0.177; -0.133]
Retirement_Age65 men&women	0.075 [0.054; 0.096]	0.075 [0.054; 0.096]
Retirement_Age67 men&women	-0.085 [-0.109; -0.060]	-0.084 [-0.108; -0.059]
Early_RetirementTargeted subsidies	0.012 [-0.009; 0.033]	0.012 [-0.009; 0.033]
Early_RetirementSubsidies for all	-0.003 [-0.024; 0.017]	-0.004 [-0.024; 0.017]
Eligibility_2nd_PillarExtend for low-income/part-time	0.045 [0.028; 0.062]	0.045 [0.028; 0.061]
VATincrease max. 1.5%	0.008 [-0.014; 0.030]	0.008 [-0.014; 0.030]
VATincrease max. 3%	-0.095 [-0.117; -0.072]	-0.095 [-0.117; -0.073]
High education		-0.004 [-0.008; 0.000]
Deviance	4441.562	4422.415
Dispersion	0.237	0.237
Num. obs.	18730	18660

Table 3: Models low and high income, control for ideology, age, gender

	Model 1	Model 2 Control variables
(Intercept)	0.665 [0.621; 0.708]	0.669 [0.623; 0.714]
Conversion_Ratecutbacks - balancing	-0.045 [-0.076; -0.015]	-0.045 [-0.076; -0.015]
Conversion_Ratecutbacks - no balancing	-0.113 [-0.145; -0.082]	-0.113 [-0.145; -0.082]
Widows_PensionsRestriction	-0.060 [-0.094; -0.025]	-0.060 [-0.095; -0.026]
Widows_PensionsAbolishment	-0.173 [-0.206; -0.140]	-0.173 [-0.206; -0.140]
Retirement_Age65 men&women	0.057 [0.025; 0.088]	0.057 [0.025; 0.088]
Retirement_Age67 men&women	-0.114 [-0.150; -0.078]	-0.114 [-0.150; -0.078]
Early_RetirementTargeted subsidies	0.003 [-0.029; 0.034]	0.003 [-0.028; 0.035]
Early_RetirementSubsidies for all	-0.014 [-0.042; 0.015]	-0.013 [-0.042; 0.015]
Eligibility_2nd_PillarExtend for low-income/part-time	0.038 [0.014; 0.063]	0.039 [0.014; 0.063]
VATincrease max. 1.5%	0.009 [-0.024; 0.041]	0.009 [-0.024; 0.042]
VATincrease max. 3%	-0.103 [-0.136; -0.071]	-0.103 [-0.136; -0.071]
Low income	-0.053 [-0.144; 0.038]	-0.052 [-0.143; 0.039]
Conversion_Ratecutbacks - balancing: low income	-0.029 [-0.098; 0.041]	-0.028 [-0.098; 0.041]
Conversion_Ratecutbacks - no balancing: low income	0.024 [-0.043; 0.091]	0.024 [-0.044; 0.091]
Widows_PensionsRestriction: low income	0.003 [-0.070; 0.076]	0.004 [-0.070; 0.077]
Widows_PensionsAbolishment: low income	-0.023 [-0.089; 0.042]	-0.023 [-0.089; 0.043]
Retirement_Age65 men&women: low income	0.019 [-0.053; 0.090]	0.019 [-0.053; 0.090]
Retirement_Age67 men&women: low income	0.007 [-0.075; 0.089]	0.007 [-0.075; 0.089]
Early_RetirementTargeted subsidies: low income	0.054 [-0.010; 0.118]	0.053 [-0.011; 0.117]
Early_RetirementSubsidies for all: low income	0.046 [-0.021; 0.113]	0.046 [-0.021; 0.113]
Eligibility_2nd_PillarExtend for low-income/part-time: low income	0.043 [-0.012; 0.098]	0.043 [-0.012; 0.098]
VATincrease max. 1.5%: low income	-0.011 [-0.084; 0.062]	-0.011 [-0.084; 0.062]
VATincrease max. 3%: low income	0.009 [-0.065; 0.083]	0.009 [-0.066; 0.083]
Ideology: left		-0.001 [-0.011; 0.009]
Ideology: moderate right		-0.001 [-0.011; 0.009]
Ideology: other		-0.006 [-0.015; 0.003]
Age		-0.000 [-0.000; 0.000]
Female		-0.004 [-0.010; 0.002]
Deviance	2253.421	2253.319
Dispersion	0.234	0.234
Num. obs.	9640	9640

Table 4: Models gender, control for ideology, age, income

	Model 1	Model 2 Control variables
(Intercept)	0.666 [0.618; 0.714]	0.662 [0.608; 0.717]
Conversion_Ratecutbacks - balancing	-0.077 [-0.115; -0.039]	-0.076 [-0.115; -0.036]
Conversion_Ratecutbacks - no balancing	-0.119 [-0.158; -0.080]	-0.128 [-0.169; -0.087]
Widows_PensionsRestriction	-0.025 [-0.065; 0.015]	-0.032 [-0.075; 0.011]
Widows_PensionsAbolishment	-0.149 [-0.188; -0.110]	-0.151 [-0.192; -0.109]
Retirement_Age65 men&women	0.091 [0.056; 0.127]	0.095 [0.057; 0.134]
Retirement_Age67 men&women	-0.085 [-0.127; -0.043]	-0.080 [-0.125; -0.034]
Early_RetirementTargeted subsidies	0.002 [-0.035; 0.040]	0.001 [-0.038; 0.040]
Early_RetirementSubsidies for all	-0.013 [-0.048; 0.023]	-0.013 [-0.051; 0.024]
Eligibility_2nd_PillarExtend for low-income/part-time	0.019 [-0.009; 0.047]	0.026 [-0.004; 0.057]
VATincrease max. 1.5%	-0.008 [-0.047; 0.031]	0.002 [-0.039; 0.044]
VATincrease max. 3%	-0.136 [-0.175; -0.097]	-0.123 [-0.165; -0.080]
Female	-0.017 [-0.087; 0.052]	-0.008 [-0.084; 0.068]
Conversion_Ratecutbacks - balancing: female	0.046 [-0.005; 0.097]	0.049 [-0.006; 0.105]
Conversion_Ratecutbacks - no balancing: female	0.041 [-0.011; 0.093]	0.039 [-0.016; 0.095]
Widows_PensionsRestriction: female	-0.053 [-0.108; 0.002]	-0.054 [-0.114; 0.007]
Widows_PensionsAbolishment: female	-0.050 [-0.102; 0.002]	-0.052 [-0.109; 0.005]
Retirement_Age65 men&women: female	-0.068 [-0.119; -0.017]	-0.066 [-0.122; -0.010]
Retirement_Age67 men&women: female	-0.062 [-0.120; -0.004]	-0.065 [-0.129; -0.001]
Early_RetirementTargeted subsidies: female	0.027 [-0.024; 0.077]	0.026 [-0.029; 0.081]
Early_RetirementSubsidies for all: female	0.037 [-0.011; 0.085]	0.019 [-0.033; 0.071]
Eligibility_2nd_PillarExtend for low-income/part-time: female	0.043 [0.002; 0.083]	0.040 [-0.003; 0.084]
VATincrease max. 1.5%: female	0.003 [-0.050; 0.056]	0.007 [-0.051; 0.066]
VATincrease max. 3%: female	0.050 [-0.004; 0.104]	0.042 [-0.017; 0.100]
Ideology: left		-0.001 [-0.011; 0.008]
Ideology: moderate right		-0.002 [-0.012; 0.009]
Ideology: other		-0.007 [-0.016; 0.002]
Age		-0.000 [-0.000; 0.000]
Low income		0.003 [-0.005; 0.010]
Deviance	2676.822	2249.158
Dispersion	0.234	0.233
Num. obs.	11450	9640

Table 5: Models party affiliation

	Model 1	Model 2 Control variables
(Intercept)	0.582 [0.520; 0.644]	0.557 [0.490; 0.624]
Conversion_Ratecutbacks - balancing	-0.046 [-0.091; -0.002]	-0.040 [-0.088; 0.008]
Conversion_Ratecutbacks - no balancing	-0.053 [-0.099; -0.006]	-0.054 [-0.104; -0.005]
Widows_PensionsRestriction	-0.026 [-0.075; 0.023]	-0.019 [-0.074; 0.035]
Widows_PensionsAbolishment	-0.130 [-0.177; -0.083]	-0.125 [-0.177; -0.073]
Retirement_Age65 men&women	0.101 [0.056; 0.146]	0.110 [0.062; 0.159]
Retirement_Age67 men&women	-0.003 [-0.054; 0.048]	0.013 [-0.041; 0.067]
Early_RetirementTargeted subsidies	-0.019 [-0.066; 0.029]	-0.029 [-0.082; 0.024]
Early_RetirementSubsidies for all	-0.037 [-0.083; 0.008]	-0.039 [-0.089; 0.011]
Eligibility_2nd_PillarExtend for low-income/part-time	0.015 [-0.018; 0.048]	0.021 [-0.015; 0.057]
VATincrease max. 1.5%	0.015 [-0.038; 0.067]	0.033 [-0.023; 0.088]
VATincrease max. 3%	-0.065 [-0.115; -0.015]	-0.055 [-0.111; -0.000]
ideolfarright	0.140 [0.041; 0.240]	0.156 [0.047; 0.264]
ideolleft	-0.024 [-0.108; 0.060]	-0.016 [-0.106; 0.074]
Conversion_Ratecutbacks - balancing:ideolfarright	-0.016 [-0.088; 0.056]	-0.020 [-0.097; 0.058]
Conversion_Ratecutbacks - no balancing:ideolfarright	-0.045 [-0.118; 0.029]	-0.050 [-0.127; 0.028]
Conversion_Ratecutbacks - balancing:ideolleft	0.002 [-0.060; 0.064]	-0.006 [-0.072; 0.060]
Conversion_Ratecutbacks - no balancing:ideolleft	-0.064 [-0.127; -0.001]	-0.066 [-0.132; 0.001]
Widows_PensionsRestriction:ideolfarright	-0.070 [-0.151; 0.011]	-0.078 [-0.166; 0.010]
Widows_PensionsAbolishment:ideolfarright	-0.026 [-0.103; 0.051]	-0.029 [-0.114; 0.055]
Widows_PensionsRestriction:ideolleft	0.011 [-0.053; 0.076]	0.004 [-0.066; 0.074]
Widows_PensionsAbolishment:ideolleft	-0.022 [-0.086; 0.041]	-0.028 [-0.097; 0.041]

Table 6: Models party affiliation,cont.

	Model 1	Model 2 Control variables
Retirement_Age65 men&women:ideofarright	-0.054 [-0.128; 0.021]	-0.046 [-0.126; 0.034]
Retirement_Age67 men&women:ideofarright	-0.084 [-0.168; 0.000]	-0.103 [-0.195; -0.011]
Retirement_Age65 men&women:ideolleft	-0.037 [-0.097; 0.022]	-0.043 [-0.106; 0.021]
Retirement_Age67 men&women:ideolleft	-0.132 [-0.202; -0.063]	-0.137 [-0.210; -0.063]
Early_RetirementTargeted subsidies:ideofarright	-0.016 [-0.089; 0.057]	-0.020 [-0.100; 0.060]
Early_RetirementSubsidies for all:ideofarright	0.060 [-0.009; 0.128]	0.051 [-0.022; 0.125]
Early_RetirementTargeted subsidies:ideolleft	0.092 [0.031; 0.154]	0.107 [0.040; 0.174]
Early_RetirementSubsidies for all:ideolleft	0.046 [-0.015; 0.107]	0.052 [-0.014; 0.117]
Eligibility_2nd_PillarExtend for low-income/part-time:ideofarright	-0.022 [-0.078; 0.034]	-0.020 [-0.081; 0.040]
Eligibility_2nd_PillarExtend for low-income/part-time:ideolleft	0.072 [0.024; 0.120]	0.072 [0.020; 0.123]
VATincrease max. 1.5%:ideofarright	-0.035 [-0.118; 0.047]	-0.037 [-0.126; 0.051]
VATincrease max. 3%:ideofarright	-0.093 [-0.171; -0.016]	-0.099 [-0.183; -0.014]
VATincrease max. 1.5%:ideolleft	0.037 [-0.029; 0.103]	0.024 [-0.046; 0.094]
VATincrease max. 3%:ideolleft	0.025 [-0.040; 0.089]	0.027 [-0.043; 0.097]
female1		-0.002 [-0.008; 0.005]
age		0.000 [-0.000; 0.000]
inclow		0.001 [-0.006; 0.009]
Deviance	2571.839	2258.026
Dispersion	0.237	0.235
Num. obs.	10870	9620

E Robustness checks III: 2nd survey in 2016

E.1 Survey information

The survey was conducted in the French-, Italian- and German speaking parts of Switzerland between April and August 2016 (after a pre-test in February 2016) and implemented by the survey company LINK. It contains 1947 fully completed interviews. The sampling strategy differed considerably from the first survey: while recruitment was done via CATI based on the national telephone register for the first survey, we relied on the national official register for this second survey. Respondents were recruited via postal letter in which they were given a personalized login for completing the survey. Respondents were – if needed – reminded three times (via letter twice and a third time – if a phone number was available in the national official register – via telephone). Our sampling strategy was based on quota for the region, age and gender, drawn from the national census. Our overall response rate was 42%.

E.2 Specification of reform elements and levels of the conjoint design, 2nd survey in 2016

Table 7: Reform elements that are being discussed (values) (2nd survey, 2016)

Reform elements	Levels		Goal of the reform elements
Pension cutbacks 2nd pillar	1: status quo	No cuts (6.8% conversion rate)	Retrenchment
	2: government proposal	Cutbacks to 6%. Balance the lowering of pension levels by having people contribute more.	
	3: beyond gvt	Cutbacks to 6% No balancing.	
Cutbacks in widows' pensions	1: status quo	All widows below 64 are eligible for benefits	Retrenchment
	2: government proposal	Only widows with children <16 years should be eligible	
	3: beyond gvt	Stepwise abolishment of widows' pensions	
Increase in age of retirement	1: status quo	64 for women, 65 for men	Retrenchment
	2: government proposal	Increase for women by 1 year: 65 for both	
	3: beyond gvt	Stepwise increase for both men & women to 67	
Increase in the level of basic pensions	1: status quo	No increase in the level of basic pensions	Compensation: targeting
	2: government proposal	Increase by 70 CHF/month. In return: increase of contribution-payments by 0.3 percentage points	
	3: beyond gvt	Increase by 70 CHF/month	
Extended eligibility 2nd pillar	1: status quo	No change. Only people earning >24'000 CHF/year are eligible	Compensation: recalibration
	2: government proposal	Extended access for part-time workers	
	3: beyond gvt	Extended access for people with lower incomes and part-time workers	
Increased revenues (VAT)	1: status quo	No increase in VAT	Compensation: increased revenues
	2: government proposal	Increase of VAT by max. 1 percentage points	
	3: beyond gvt	Increase of VAT by max. 2 percentage points	

E.3 Results conjoint analysis 2nd survey, 2016

Figure 4: Effects of reform elements on support for the pension reform package, pooled




Figure 5: Effects of reform elements on support for the pension reform package, by income




Figure 6: Effects of reform elements on support for the pension reform package, by gender





Figure 7: Effects of reform elements on support for the pension reform package, by party



F Robustness checks IV: Sophistication

To check whether the results differ between unsophisticated and sophisticated voters, we performed several tests. Sophistication was measured by tertiary education ($= 1$) vs. no tertiary education (sophistication $= 0$).

F.1 Split-sample test

Since the distribution of the sophistication variable is highly skewed (sophisticated $= 622$, unsophisticated $= 1244$), we draw repeated random samples and compare the average of computed correlation measures. More precisely, we use the following procedure:

Step A, unsophisticated voters:

1. Select random sample of 500 respondents
2. Select first split of packages (e.g. conjoint reform package comparisons 1-3)
3. Estimate AMCEs
4. Select second split of packages (e.g. conjoint reform package comparisons 4-5)
5. Estimate AMCEs
6. Calculate correlation between AMCE-estimates of split 1 and split 2 and save correlation
7. Repeat this procedure with 1000 random samples, each time saving correlation between AMCE estimates
8. Calculate mean of 1000 correlation measures

Step B, sophisticated voters:

Repeat 1-8, calculate mean correlation.

Step C, compare correlation between AMCEs:

Table 8: Correlations between AMCEs, sophisticated and unsophisticated respondents

Splits	Full sample	Sophisticated full sample N=622	Unsophisticated full sample N=1244	Sophisticated mean AMCE correlations of 1000 random samples of N=500	Unsophisticated mean AMCE correlations of 1000 random samples of N=500
(1,2) : (3,4,5)	0.96	0.89	0.96	0.87	0.89
(1,2,3) : (4,5)	0.95	0.82	0.97	0.80	0.91
(1,2) : (4,5)	0.94	0.85	0.96	0.83	0.88

F.2 Coherence between conjoint and direct questions

A very broad array of questions in our survey allows for an alternative way to examine potentially varying levels of comprehension among respondents. Beyond their choice of a reform package in the conjoint experiment, respondents were also asked about their attitudes towards several of the reform components in standard, uni-dimensional survey questions (Likert scale). For a total of three levels belonging to three different reform elements in the conjoint setting, we have sufficiently similar direct questions asked later in the survey (increase in retirement age, pension cutbacks second pillar, increase in VAT). We exploit this duplication to compare average within-respondent coherence between the group of sophisticated and unsophisticated respondents.

Step A: Individual attitudes in conjoint

Separate linear probability models are used to calculate respondent-specific estimates of the effect of the three specific values of interest (increase in retirement age to 67, pension cutbacks second pillar without compensation, increase in VAT by max. 3%) on choosing the displayed reform package or not. Given the small sample size per respondent (N=10), this obviously results in imprecise estimates. However, the point estimate nevertheless gives an indication regarding a respondent’s stance towards the specific reform component. The resulting coefficients are subsequently classified into quartiles in order to a) match the coding of the direct question and b) avoid over-interpretation of imprecise estimates.

Step B: Individual attitudes in direct questions

The answer category to the direct questions asking about the same reform components ranges from 1 to 4 and is recoded to match the direction of the equivalent items in the conjoint setting.

Step C: Compare level of within-respondent coherence between groups

Two different measures are used to compare coherence levels between the sophisticated and unsophisticated group of respondents. First of all, Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficient tests the association between the paired sample. An asymptotic confidence interval is given based on Fisher’s Z transform. As an alternative, Krippendorff’s alpha, a measure of coder reliability, is adapted to the purpose of comparing coherence between groups. The main interest is in the difference between groups. The absolute level of Krippendorff’s alpha in this application is not particularly informative as the measure only evaluates whether ratings in both questions types (conjoint and direct) are identical (e.g. 4 and 4) and does not reward similarity (e.g. 3 and 4 as opposed to 1 and 4). Bootstrapping (2000 iterations) provides confidence intervals for the given probabilities.

The following table presents mean values and confidence intervals of both measures of comparison resulting from 1000 repeated random samples of each group (N=500) to avoid differences in the measures based on unequal group size.

Table 9: Coherence between conjoint and direct questions

Sample	Estimate	95% CI
Pearson’s r		
full	0.463	0.422 - 0.502
sophisticated	0.482	0.442 - 0.520
unsophisticated	0.450	0.409 - 0.490
Krippendorff’s alpha		
full	0.174	0.238 - 0.110
sophisticated	0.195	0.260 - 0.130
unsophisticated	0.161	0.226 - 0.097

Irrespective of the trusted indicator, as one would expect, coherence is slightly higher among respondents with tertiary education but the measures of coherence do not differ in statistically significant terms.