Annotation for Transparent Inquiry

University of Cincinnati, July 24, 2018

Sebastian Karcher
QDR, Syracuse University

Quantitative Research: Matrix Data



	X	condition	global_warming	human_induced	support_cap	smallercar	ce_ppl	ce_er	partyid	ideology
1	1	5	0.33	-0.33	0.33	-0.67	0.33	0.33	0.67	-0.67
2	2	3	-1.00	-0.67	-0.67	-0.67	-0.33	0.00	-0.67	0.00
3	3	4	0.67	1.00	0.33	0.67	-0.33	-1.00	1.00	1.00
4	4	1	0.67	1.00	0.00	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.00	0.00
5	5	1	1.00	1.00	-0.33	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.67	0.00
6	6	4	0.67	0.67	1.00	-0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	-0.33
7	7	5	0.33	0.67	0.67	0.00	0.33	0.67	1.00	0.67
8	8	2	-0.33	0.00	0.00	0.67	0.67	0.00	0.00	0.00
9	9	3	1.00	1.00	0.67	0.33	-0.67	-0.33	0.00	0.00
10	10	3	0.33	0.67	0.00	-0.67	0.33	0.33	0.67	0.00
11	11	1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	-1.00	-1.00
12	12	2	0.67	0.33	0.00	0.33	0.67	0.33	0.33	-0.67
13	13	2	0.67	1.00	1.00	0.67	0.67	0.67	1.00	0.67
14	14	4	0.67	0.67	0.00	0.33	0.00	-0.33	0.67	0.67
15	15	2	0.33	0.67	0.67	0.33	0.33	0.67	1.00	0.00
16	16	5	0.33	-0.67	0.33	-0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.00
17	17	4	0.67	0.67	0.00	0.33	0.00	0.00	0.67	0.33
18	18	2	1.00	0.33	1.00	-0.33	0.33	0.33	-0.67	0.67
19	19	4	0.33	0.67	0.67	-0.33	0.33	0.33	0.67	0.67



Table 2. Treatment Effects (Experiment 1)

	Perceived Personal Influence	Expected Reciprocity	Believe Global Warming is Happening	Believe Global Warming is Human Induced	Support Cap on Carbon Emissions	Willingness to Take Personal Action
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Intercept	0.38**	0.23**	0.37**	0.25**	0.28**	0.20**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Pro Descriptive (D)	-0.04	0.02	0.05	-0.03	-0.06	-0.02
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Pro Descriptive + Injunctive (D+I)	-0.08	0.07	0.09	0.06	-0.02	-0.05
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Con D	-0.18**	-0.06	-0.06	-0.05	-0.16**	-0.17**
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Con D+I	-0.10	0.11*	0.03	-0.06	-0.08	-0.06
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
PartyID	0.21**	0.21**	0.28**	0.31**	0.21**	0.13*
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)
PartyID * Pro D	-0.05	-0.04	-0.10	-0.04	-0.05	0.04
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
PartyID * Pro D+I	-0.10	-0.12	-0.06	-0.13	-0.14	0.04
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.11)
PartyID * Con D	-0.10	-0.19**	0.00	-0.10	0.03	0.11
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
PartyID * Con D+I	-0.13	-0.21**	0.01	-0.15	0.01	0.04
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.11)
SER	.48	.47	.52	.53	.51	.54
n	612	612	612	611	612	612

*p<.10, **p<.05, one-tailed test
Note: D = Descriptive, I = Injunctive. Cell entries are unstandardized linear regression coefficients with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Baseline is the control condition. Party identification is coded with seven categories from Republican (-1) to Independent (0) to Democrat (+1). SER is the Standard Error of the Regression (Beck, 2010).

While we expected norms promoting action to influence both beliefs (Hypothesis 1a) and behavioral intentions (Hypothesis 2a), we find little support our hypotheses. Table 2 reports regression results with indicators for each treatment condition (relative to a control condition), including a control for party identification. Looking at the rows for the Pro Norm conditions, we do not see any effect on any outcome. Indeed for several outcomes (perceived personal influence and support for a carbon emissions tax), we find effects in the opposite direction of our

Toby Bolsen, Thomas J. Leeper, and Matthew Shapiro. 2014. "Doing What Others Do: Norms, Science, and Collective Action on Global Warming." *American Politics Research* 42(1): 65–89.

Qualitative Research: Granular Data



Analysis

Analysis

Analysis

Analysis

DANILOV'S DEFENSIVE PLAN OF 1910

The Russian war plan of 1910 was more defensive and more oriented toward Germany than any other Russian plan made between 1880 and 1914. General Danilov, the principal draftsman of the plan, allocated 53 divisions to the German front and 19 to the Austrian front. His deployments abandoned Warsaw, the forward fortresses, the Narew River barrier, and indeed most of Poland. Forces deployed against Germany and Austria were to advance after completing their concentration, if circumstances permitted. Rail and road improvements were, however, planned with strictly defensive operations in mind. The abandoned forward zones were to be stripped of all supplies.[1]

Danilov gave two reasons for concentrating forces far from the frontier and primarily against Germany. One was Russian military weakness after the Russo-Japanese War, including the continuing lag in the speed of Russian deployments, and the other, the possibility of a large-scale German attack against Russia and the uncertainty of adequate French support.

The Russo-Japanese War and its attendant political and economic difficulties had a ruinous effect on the Russian army. Matériel stocks were drawn down and not replaced because of Russia's financial crisis, which lasted almost until 1910. Official targets for the stockpiling of equipment and supplies would not even be approached until 1913 or 1914.[2] Between 1906 and 1908 as many as one-third of Russia's soldiers were used for internal security duties, which sapped morale and interfered with training.[3] Moreover, Russia's defeats in Manchuria had called into question the fitness of existing military doctrines, organizational forms, and commanders. The first few years after the war were spent debating the doctrinal and institutional implications of the defeat. Significant reform and reorganization were delayed until 1908 and 1910, when funding was increased and policymaking powers were concentrated in the hands of the war minister.[4]

Russian military figures warned at several times during this period that the army's devastated condition made the use of force dangerous [end of 166] against even Turkey, not to mention Austria or Germany.[5] Such was the state of disorganization even as late as 1909 and 1910 that it would have been "utterly impossible to make war," according to General A. Brusilov, who commanded the Russian Eighth Army. In Brusilov's high-priority corps in the Warsaw military district, supplies were barely sufficient even for peacetime requirements, and the transport service was in chaos.[6]

The Traditional Way

front. His deployments abandoned Warsaw, the forward fortresses, the Narew River barrier, and indeed most of Poland. Forces deployed against Germany and Austria were to advance after completing their concentration, if circumstances permitted. Rail and road improvements were, however, planned with strictly defensive operations in mind. The abandoned forward zones were to be stripped of all supplies.[1]

Notes to Chapter 7

1. A. M. Zaionchkovskii, *Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine* (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 140, 183–230, 301. In addition to the forces deployed on the main fronts, eight divisions were designated to protect the coasts near St. Petersburg from Swedish or German sea-borne attack and six divisions were assigned to observe the Rumanian border. The westernmost force in Danilov's scheme was the Second Army, deployed from Bielostok to Brest-Litovsk. Of the forces deployed north of the Pripiat marsh barrier (i.e., those blocking the path of a German attack toward St. Petersburg and Moscow), the 32 divisions of the First and Second armies formed the first line of defense with the 21 divisions of the Fourth and Fifth armies deployed behind them.

A First Attempt: Active Citation

morality."[9]

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[9] These quotations are taken from a speech Kennedy gave in Lynn, Massachusetts; the latter portion of the speech was taken directly from a radio speech on Russia, which as Dallek notes, Kennedy used repeatedly toward the end of the 1946 campaign. John F. Kennedy (hereafter JFK), Speech to Professional & Business Women, October 21, 1946; and Radio Speech on Russia, both in PPP-HF, Box 94, JFKL; see also Dallek 2003, 133.

a) JFK, Speech to Professional and Business Women, October 21, 1946, Pre-presidential Papers-House Files, Box 94, JFK Library.

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b) JFK, Radio Speech on Russia, Pre-presidential Papers-House Files, Box 94, JFK Library.

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Annotation for Transparent Inquiry (ATI)

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Conditioning of Policy Decision on Action

Prior to the Mujib-Heath meeting on 8 January 1972, only two states, India and Bhutan, had recognized the state of Bangladesh, and no states had done so since the end of the fighting and the ceasefire declaration on 17 December 1971.[88] There were four categories of reasons given to British officials for why recognition of Bangladesh might be a problem.[89] One was that recognition might negatively affect the state's relations with Pakistan, and for some states, like Portugal and Hungary, this was their only stated concern. However, many states conditioned their recognition decision on an action related to Indian troop withdrawal and gave three different types of reasons for doing so. States also differed in the extent of troop withdrawal they required before recognition. See Table 2 for a full list of states, their stated reason for conditioning recognition on withdrawal (if any can be identified), and what recognition was conditioned on (whether actual withdrawal or a proxy).

The first type of reason, opposition to condoning or legitimizing aggression, is labeled as "Non-aggression." A good example comes from Mexican Foreign Minister Emilio Óscar Rabasa who reported that the Mexican president had decided not to recognize Bangladesh because, "since the Mexicans, like many Latin Americans, refuse to condone territorial aggrandizement as a result of war, they would prefer to wait on the withdrawal of Indian troops as the sign of true independence."[90]

This statement also appeals to "true independence." Self-determination is another important value expressed by the Mexican representative and is the second type of reason commonly appealed to as justifying recognition as Bangladesh. For

88. See Figure 2.
89. A frequent concern was that states had to recognize in a group, or on the same day as multiple other states. However, even allowing for minor coordination problems, this in and of itself cannot explain the

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QDR Apr 18

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> *they would prefer to wait on the withdrawal of Indian troops as the sign of trueindependence."*

Annotation for Transparent Inquiry (ATI) QDR

Analytic Note: This is a confidential telegram from UK Ambassador to Mexico Sir Peter Hope to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of 26 January, 1972, from folder 37/1020 of the FCO Archives held at the National Archives at Kew, UK. This excerpt shows that the Mexican Foreign Minister, Emilio Oscar Rabasa, gave as a reason for the Mexican President's decision not to recognize Bangladesh, that they did not want to condone territorial aggrandizement as a result of war until Indian troops had been withdrawn. The telegram also indicates that this reason and another reason, i.e. that Mujib's assumption of several cabinet portfolios cast doubt on the fact that his government had been elected by the people, were the only two reasons cited by the Mexican government.

Source Excerpt: Rabasa said that, since the Mexicans, like many Latin Americans, refuse to condone territorial aggrandizement as a result of war, they would prefer to wait on the withdrawal of Indian troops as the sign of true independence.

Data Source: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=2529

Full Citation: Sir Peter Hope, UK Ambassador to Mexico, a confidential telegram from Hope to the Foreign and Commonwealth

More

ATI: Data repository

Data for: Making the real: Rhetorical adduction and the Bangladesh Liberation War Version 1.0

O'Mahoney, Joseph. 2018. "Data for: Making the real: Rhetorical adduction and the Bangladesh Liberation War". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6M2H9VQ. QDR Main Collection. V1

Cite Data Project

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Description

This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry (ATI) data project.

The annotated article can be viewed on the publisher's website.

The overarching empirical research question of the paper is "why did states recognize Bangladesh as a state?" and, more specifically, "why did (most of) the international community first condemn and then accept Bangladesh as a state?". The goal of the empirical section of the paper was to do theory-building process-tracing of the decisions to recognize Bangladesh, that is, to build a theoretical explanation from the empirical evidence of a particular case, and then inferring that an analytically general mechanism exists.

Data generation

After immersing myself in the secondary literature and the archival material that I had collected for the prior doctoral project, I had an idea for a skeleton causal mechanism, i.e. that the withdrawal of Indian troops from Bangladesh had somehow changed the status of recognition, i.e. legitimated recognition. In order to assess this idea, I then consulted some theory from international relations, psychology, sociology, and cognitive science, on how decisions are made and how arguments work, in order to hypothesize a causal mechanism. This causal mechanism, elucidated in the paper, was rhetorical adduction; basically that states try to win arguments (thus changing the behavior of relatively uncommitted audiences relative to some policy) by linking some empirical state of affairs with their argument and then bringing that empirical state of affairs about. In this Bangladesh case, this meant that some actors argued that although India's invasion and occupation of East Pakistan made recognition of Bangladesh problematic, the withdrawal of Indian troops from Bangladesh would dismiss or undercut the critique. At this point, I formulated some observable implications of this idea, such as that if this is what had actually been going on, the states making the argument (e.g. Bangladesh and India) would have to actually have made the argument, and states would have explicitly conditioned their recognition policy decision on the withdrawal of Indian troops. In order to find out whether there was any evidence for these observable implications, I consulted three main types of evidence; 1) public statements by state representatives in the press and at the UN (using the UN verbatim meeting records), 2) UK political and diplomatic archives and 3) US political and diplomatic archives. As it happens, the UK was heavily involved in discussions surrounding recognition and the US was not (US President Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger were more concerned with other issues, like supporting West Pakistan and also organizing the historic visit to the People's Republic of China), so that almost all of the relevant evidence came from UK archives. A clear limitation of this sampling frame is that it relies on 3rd party evaluations of internal deliberations of most of the states involved. This is less of a problem than it might otherwise be because there seems little reason to explicitly condition recognition on troop withdrawal in private and secret/confidential bilateral communication with the UK if it is irrelevant to internal deliberations. If there had been some clear self-interest in misrepresenting, in this type of communication, then it would affect the plausibility of the causal claims. I collected most of the documents used in the paper from the National Archives at Kew in the UK during two visits, one in January 2011 and another in July 2013. The first visit was to collect data for my doctoral dissertation, which was a prior, separate project from this paper. While I was finishing the Bangladesh case for my dissertation, I began to have another idea about the material. That is, I started to think that a slightly different type of conceptual/theoretical argument was relevant to a different empirical aspect of the Bangladesh case. However, as I had not had that in mind when initially collecting archival documents, I arranged a second visit to search for more information more directly relevant to this second puzzle. The documents primarily come from a series of folders from the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices' archives and the Premiers' Archives that I found via two methods. First, I used the citations in Musson 2008 to identify potentially important or relevant material and then made a list of all the folders that that material was contained in. Second, I performed keyword searches for recognition and Bangladesh in the National Archives database search engine. While I was in the archives, I made copies of almost every single document in the folders that I had previously identified. I excluded documents that were obvious duplicates or that had no readable text.

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ATI examples: Historical research

Annotation

QDR Apr 18

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> *after the Indian troop presence in Bangladesh was pre-sented to them as an issue and a barrier to recognition.*

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Analytic Note: This is a confidential telegram from UK Ambassador to Turkey Sir Roderick Sarell to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (and others) of 25 January, from folder 37/1020 of the FCO Archives held at the National Archives at Kew, UK. This excerpt shows that the Turkish Foreign Minister both cited the presence of Indian troops as a barrier to recognition and also indicates that this linkage was not immediately apparent and was dependent upon it being made.

Source Excerpt: I spoke as instructed to the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and later to the Foreign Minister after lunch today. 2. They had both had a long meeting with Bhutto the previous evening…The Turks had clearly been impressed by Bhutto's argument that the continued presence of the Indian Army in Bangladesh was incompatible with Mujibur Rahman's claim to effective control, which might he maintained crumble within a week or two of the Army's evacuation.
… Bayulken [Turkish Foreign Minister] also made a good deal of play with Bhutto's arguments about the continued presence of Indian troops.

Data Source: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=2527

Source document



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COPENHAGEN, KABUL, UKMIS NEW YORK, STACKHOLM, TUNIS, AMMAN.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 145 TO ISLAMABAD: RECOGNITION OF BANGLADESH.

1. I SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND LATER TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER AFTER LUNCH TODAY.
2. THEY HAD BOTH HAD A LONG MEETING WITH BHUTTO THE PREVIOUS EVENING AND TOLD ME THAT, AS A RESULT OF THOSE DISCUSSIONS AND HIS PREVIOUS MEETING IN TEHRAN, THE TURKISH AND IRANIAN GOVERNMENTS, WHILE MAKING CLEAR TO HIM THAT AN INDEPENDENT BANGLADESH WAS NOW A FACT, HAD ACCEPTED HIS STRONG PLEA FOR MORE TIME IN WHICH TO NEGOTIATE FRESH LINKS, SUCH AS A CUSTOMS UNION, WITH BANGLADESH. THE TURKS HAD CLEARLY BEEN IMPRESSED BY BHUTTO'S ARGUMENT THAT THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF THE INDIAN ARMY IN BANGLADESH WAS INCOMPATIBLE WITH MUJIBUR RAHMAN'S CLAIM TO EFFECTIVE CONTROL, WHICH MIGHT HE MAINTAINED CRUMBLE WITHIN A WEEK OR TWO OF THE ARMY'S EVACUATION. BE THAT AS IT MAY, THE TURKISH AND IRANIAN GOVERNMENTS HAVE BOTH UNDERTAKEN TO MAKE NO MOVE TO RECOGNITION EXCEPT IN CONCERT WITH THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT. (COMPARE TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE IN MIPT).

Publication

ately apparent. For example, U… ck Sarell reported that the senior members of the Turkish … shment had agreed to not recognize Bangladesh only after the Indian troop p… ce in Bangladesh was presented to them as an issue and a barrier to recognition.[78] Similarly, the Sri Lankan

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ATI Example: Excerpt, translation, and analysis

Source excerpt

Source Excerpt: نمونهاش همین مذاکرات هستهای و برجام است که امروز مسئولین دستگاه دیپلماسی خود ما و همان کسانی که در این مذاکرات از اوّل تا آخر حضور داشتند، همینها دارند میگویند آمریکا نقض عهد کرده است، آمریکا زیر ظاهر آرام و زبان چرب و نرم مسئولانش و وزیر خارجهاش و دیگران، از پشت دارد تخریب میکند، مانع ارتباطات اقتصادی کشور با کشورهای دیگر دنیا است؛ این را مسئولین خود برجام دارند میگویند. این حرفی است که بنده البتّه از یک سال پیش و یکسالونیم پیش، مرتّب تکرار کردم که به آمریکاییها نمیشود اعتماد کرد - بعضیها سختشان بود قبول کنند - امّا امروز خود مسئولین ما میگویند. همین هفتهی گذشته، مسئولین محترم مذاکره کنندهیما با طرفهایشان در اروپا جلسه داشتند؛ همین حرفها را مسئولین ما به آنها گفتند و آنها جواب نداشتن. ... شش ماه هم از امضای برجام میگذرد، هیچ تأثیر محسوس و ملموسی هم در وضع معیشت مردم به وجود نیامده است؛ درحالیکه خب، برجام اصلاً برای برداشتن تحریمها بود؛ برای اینکه تحریمهای ظالمانه برداشته بشود. مگر غیر از این است؟ خب برداشته نشده؟ ...بنده سال گذشته در سخنرانی عمومی ... گفتم برجام و این مذاکرات هستهای، برای ما یک نمونه خواهد بود؛ ببینیم آمریکاییها چهکار میکنند؛ اینها که حالا با زبان چرب و نرم میآیند، گاهی نامه مینویسند... خیلی خب ببینیم در عمل چهکار میکنند. حالا معلوم شد در عمل چهکار میکنند! در ظاهر وعده میدهند، با زبان چرب و نرم حرف میزنند امّا در عمل توطئه میکنند، تخریب میکنند، مانع از پیشرفت کارها میشوند؛ این شد آمریکا؛ این شد تجربه. حالا آمریکاییها میگویند بیایید دربارهی مسائل منطقه با شما صحبت کنیم! خب، این تجربه به ما میگوید این کار برای ما سمّ مهلک است.

Translation

Source Excerpt Translation: An example [of U.S. untrustworthiness] lies in the nuclear negotiations and the JCPOA. Today, our own diplomats and the very people who were present in the negotiations from start to end, these very people are saying that the United States has violated the deal. America, under its calm surface and the nice words of its officials and its Secretary of State and others, is damaging [the JCPOA]. They pose an obstacle to [Iran's] economic relations with other countries. This is what those responsible for the JCPOA are saying themselves. But that America cannot be trusted is what I had said repeatedly from a year ago and a year and a half ago. Some would hardly accept it. But today our own officials say this. This past week, our honorable negotiators had a meeting with their European counterparts. Our negotiators said the same thing and [the Europeans] did not have an answer.

Analysis

Analytic Note: Since the JCPOA's implementation process started in January 2016, the regime's leadership has become more divided on what course of action will best ensure economic rejuvenation for the country. The debate has brought out key lessons from the war, including how the country should balance self-reliance and much-needed economic exchange with the world community and how it should deal with enduring distrust of foreign powers. While moderates and reformists largely continue to see economic interdependence as the right way forward, others have instead emphasized self-reliance. In particular, Khamenei has used his public appearances and televised remarks a number of times since the end of the talks to tell his base that he was right in advocating for caution when dealing with the United States in particular, whose leaders, Khamenei argues, cannot be trusted. Khamenei has repeated this sentiment multiple times since the JCPOA was signed. The following excerpt from July 2016, a year after the conclusion of the JCPOA and six months into its implementation, captures Khamenei's distrust of the United States, what he views as European complicity in obstructing Iranian economic recovery, and belief that the JCPOA will not translate into prosperity for the nation.

Publication

would find other excuses to stymie Iran's p[illegible]lite and popular support for the deal in Iran ebbed following the JCPOA's official Imp[illegible]entation Day on January 16, 2016, as economic recovery was slow to materialize and Khamenei distanced himself from the deal and from the moderate president, Hassan Rouhani, who delivered it.[5]

Example: audio in linguistics

Documentation (list of excerpts)

3. Ambi#Syl

Extract 3a: /t/

Jock: Eh the packet of Woodbines would've cost I think six pence halfpenny. They were a **little** green packet with five cigiis.

Extract 3b: glottal replacement

Adam: I go to middens, I collect old **bottles** and things like that.

Publication table

Table 3. Linguistic context by syllabic position and following phonetic environment

Syllabic position	Following phonetic environment	Example	Description
Coda	pause	*I like that.*	Coda#Pause
	vowel	*I like that example.*	Coda#Vowel
Ambi	syllabic consonant	*bottle, bitten*[7]	Ambi#Sy
	vowel	*pretty, computer*	Ambi#V
Onset	vowel	*sometimes, nineteen*	Onset

Data source (audio)

[redacted]

QDR

QUALITATIVE DATA REPOSITORY

[redacted]

Link: http://bit.do/ati-audio

Annotations under the hood: JSON (1)


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{
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  "group": "bR7GAVK2",
  "target": [
    {
      "source": "https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00286",
      "selector": [
        {
          "conformsTo": "https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3236",
          "type": "FragmentSelector",
          "value": "articleContent"
        },
        {
          "exact": "the event in modern Iranian history whose significance and impact rival that of the revolution i
          "prefix": "ve failed to adequately examine ",
          "type": "TextQuoteSelector",
          "suffix": " Neglect of such a momentous eve"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
```

Annotations under the hood: JSON (2)


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    "json": "https://hypothes.is/api/annotations/4b6CXHo_Eei6M6d7VblmUw",
    "html": "https://hypothes.is/a/4b6CXHo_Eei6M6d7VblmUw",
    "incontext": "https://hyp.is/4b6CXHo_Eei6M6d7VblmUw/www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00286"
  },
  "tags": [],
  "text": "<a href=\"https://qdr.syr.edu/guidance/ati\">\n<img src=\"https://qdr.syr.edu/drupal_data/public/ati_bann
  and long-lasting effects on a nation's subsequent foreign or military policy." \n\n**Source excerpt:** We show, Wa
  society; they are episodes where the future of the entire country is on the line. Those who fight in these wars ar
  what it means to be a patriot, or a 'good citizen,' and help set the boundaries for political discourse for years
  Foreign Policy, September 21, 2017.",
  "created": "2018-06-27T19:25:42.289665+00:00",
  "uri": "https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00286",
  "flagged": false,
  "user_info": {
    "display_name": "Qualitative Data Repository"
  },
  "moderation": {
```

Standard Compliant

Web Annotation Data Model

W3C Recommendation 23 February 2017

This version:
https://www.w3.org/TR/2017/REC-annotation-model-20170223/

Latest published version:
https://www.w3.org/TR/annotation-model/

Latest editor's draft:
http://w3c.github.io/web-annotation/

Implementation report:
https://w3c.github.io/test-results/annotation-model/all.html

Previous version:
https://www.w3.org/TR/2017/PR-annotation-model-20170117/

Editors:

Robert Sanderson, J. Paul Getty Trust, rsanderson@getty.edu,
Paolo Ciccarese, Massachusetts General Hospital, paolo.ciccarese@gmail.com
Benjamin Young, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., byoung@bigbluehat.com

Repository:

Open Source & Non-Profit

h

build passing | codecov 96% | IRC #hypothes.is | license BSD | python 2.7

h is the web app that serves most of the https://hypothes.is/ website, including the web annotations API at https://hypothes.is/api/. The Hypothesis client is a browser-based annotator that is a client for h's API.

Development

See the Contributor's guide for instructions on setting up a development environment and contributing to h.

Community

Join us on Slack (request an invite or log in once you've created an account) or in #hypothes.is on freenode for discussion.

If you'd like to contribute to the project, you should also subscribe to the development mailing list and read our Contributor's guide. Then consider getting started on one of the issues that are ready for work.

Please note that this project is released with a Contributor Code of Conduct. By participating in this project you agree to abide by its terms.

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Evaluating ATI: The ATI Initiative

- 2 Phases; currently beginning of 2nd
- 1st phase: Annotating recently published articles
- Collaborated closely with Cambridge University Press to test technology, workflows, and solicit articles
- Projects available at qdr.org/ati/ati-models
- 2nd phase: Annotating during writing process
- Every paper paired with reviewer, pre- and post review
- Authors keep logbook & fill out survey
- Very preliminary results

Evaluating ATI

- Average time spent per project: ~20hs





Evaluating ATI

- Relatively poor match between reviewer expectation and annotations
- Widely differing number of annotations (6-80/article)
- Widely differing usage of annotations, some disagreement
- Concern about incentives
- Interest in clearer typology of annotations
  - Existing work on annotation/citation ontologies

ATI Challenge

- 2nd Phase of pilots
- Solicited proposals for (paid) annotation & workshop
- 80 submissions across disciplines & continents, though skewed towards political science
- About to announce 18 selected projects, workshop in November