Public Opinion on the Eurozone Fiscal Union: Evidence from Survey Experiments in Italy

Online Supplemental Material

# Correlates of Support for a Fiscal Union

## Survey Question and Information on the Operationalization of Correlates

The survey question is: “According to some, the recent crisis in some European countries was very deep due to the absence of a fiscal union, namely the European Union does not have sufficient resources, financed from taxes payed in by the citizens of all Eurozone countries, to be allocated for anti-crisis policies. Are you in favor or against the creation of a fiscal union among the countries of the Eurozone?”

For opponents of a fiscal union, the next question is: “If Italy was in need of European funds, because hit by a recession, thus benefiting from the funds payed in by other European taxpayers, would you still be against or would you change opinion about a fiscal union?”

For supporters of a fiscal union, the question is: “If another country of the Eurozone was in need of European funds, because hit by a recession, thus benefiting from the funds payed in by the Italian taxpayers, would you still be in favor or would you change opinion about a fiscal union?”

This probing alerts respondents to both distributive and insurance implications of the measure. As with most welfare programs, these features can hardly be separated. Figure S1 shows two overlaid histograms of these attitudes. Awareness about risks and redistributive implications increases overall opposition to a fiscal union by ten percentage points, but a majority (61 per cent) of respondents remains in favor of the measure, even after probing.

We are aware of two large cross-country surveys with a similar question. A Eurobarometer survey reports similar results: 58 percent of Italians (excluding undecided) are in favor of helping financially other EU countries facing severe economic and financial difficulties (European Commission, 2012: 57). The European Parliament Elections Study (Schmitt *et al.*, 2016) reports a much lower figure for Italy (32 percent).

If we consider those who do not know, Italians (53 percent in favor) are less supportive than Dutch (65 percent), Belgians (60 percent) and Germans (54 percent). The relevant figures from the European Parliament Elections Study are: Italy (30 percent in favor), the Netherlands (66 percent), Belgium (58 percent) and Germany (62 percent).

## FIGURE S1 Attitudes toward a Fiscal Union



Note: N = 3,118 (608 undecided), see the SM for the question wording.

For the employment status, the inactive category includes pensioners, housepersons, students, those in civil or military service and those unable to work. The unemployed category includes those actively seeking employment, on leave or receiving unemployment benefits. Lower income jobs include the legally defined categories of impiegato and operaio, as well as, among others, artisans, caregivers, sales agents, school teachers, personal assistants, book-keepers, office managers, manual workers and farmers. Higher income jobs include the legal categories of dirigente and quadro, as well as entrepreneurs, managers, tradespersons, professionals and professors. Well-off individuals with non-occupational income, such as rentiers, are included in this latter group. The legal categories of occupations are used in wage collective bargaining and indicate different wage scales.

Lastly, in order to determine if a region is a net contributor, we used the 2012 data from Istat (Italian Statistical Office, see <http://www.wikispesa.it/Residuo_Fiscale_Regioni>).

Figure S2 reports histograms for selected predictors. Table S1 lists descriptive statistics.

## FIGURE S2 Histograms of Selected Predictors



## TABLE S1 Descriptive Statistics

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Mean | Standard deviation | Minimum | Maximum |
| Support for fiscal union | 2.95 | 0.892 | 1 | 4 |
| Support for fiscal union (probed) | 2.84 | 0.929 | 1 | 4 |
| Inactive | 0.36 | 0.481 | 0 | 1 |
| Unemployed | 0.09 | 0.279 | 0 | 1 |
| Low Income Occupation | 0.36 | 0.480 | 0 | 1 |
| High Income Occupation | 0.19 | 0.393 | 0 | 1 |
| Family Income | 2.91 | 0.944 | 1 | 5 |
| Net Contributing Region | 0.57 | 0.495 | 0 | 1 |
| Left-Right Ideology | 5.62 | 3.033 | 1 | 11 |
| EU Membership: Bad | 0.19 | 0.395 | 0 | 1 |
| EU Membership: Neither | 0.27 | 0.441 | 0 | 1 |
| EU Membership: Good | 0.54 | 0.498 | 0 | 1 |
| European Identity | 2.73 | 0.836 | 1 | 4 |
| Italian vs. European Identity | 2.45 | 0.958 | 1 | 5 |
| Trustworthiness: EU | 2.18 | 0.825 | 1 | 4 |
| Trustworthiness: Italian Government | 2.06 | 0.839 | 1 | 4 |
| Trustworthiness: Greek Government | 1.91 | 0.821 | 1 | 4 |
| Trustworthiness: German Government | 2.34 | 0.934 | 1 | 4 |
| Trust in Greeks | 2.15 | 0.847 | 1 | 4 |
| Trust in Germans | 2.25 | 0.863 | 1 | 4 |
| Interpersonal Trust | 2.93 | 1.585 | 1 | 7 |
| Female | 0.43 | 0.495 | 0 | 1 |
| Education | 5.70 | 2.366 | 1 | 11 |
| Age | 52.01 | 15.968 | 21 | 88 |

Note: Based on models 1a and 2b of Table S3.

Table S2 reports the attitudes and the probability of switching by occupational status. The latter is computed as

where is the probability of switching from group to (say, from in favor to against), is the number of switchers from group to and is the number of respondents in group before probing.

## TABLE S2 Attitudes by Income Occupation and Probabilities of Switching Attitudes after Probing

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Attitudes by Income Occupation Category (Proportions) | | | |
|  | Strongly against | Somewhat against | Somewhat for | Strongly for |
|  | Before probing | | | |
| Inactive | 0.08 | 0.14 | 0.48 | 0.30 |
| Unemployed | 0.16 | 0.22 | 0.45 | 0.17 |
| Low income occupation | 0.11 | 0.21 | 0.44 | 0.24 |
| High income occupation | 0.09 | 0.19 | 0.43 | 0.29 |
|  | After probing | | | |
| Inactive | 0.11 | 0.23 | 0.37 | 0.29 |
| Unemployed | 0.23 | 0.28 | 0.34 | 0.15 |
| Low income occupation | 0.13 | 0.29 | 0.38 | 0.20 |
| High income occupation | 0.10 | 0.26 | 0.38 | 0.26 |
|  | Probabilities of Switching Attitudes toward a Fiscal Union after Probing | | | |
|  | From ‘in favor’ to ‘against’ | | From ‘against’ to ‘in favor’ | |
| Inactive | 0.26 | | 0.36 | |
| Unemployed | 0.44 | | 0.37 | |
| Low income occupation | 0.33 | | 0.40 | |
| High income occupation | 0.29 | | 0.49 | |

Table S3 reports the full model (summarized in Table 1 in the article).

A short note on education and gender: Works on preferences for redistribution generally find less educated and female individuals to be more supportive (Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Corneo and Grüner 2002). Table S3 instead shows female and younger participants to be more critical of a fiscal union, whereas education is uncorrelated. In a survey experiment on Spanish attitudes toward inter-regional redistribution, Balcells, Fernández-Albertos, and Kuo (2015) report similar findings.

## TABLE S3Predictors of Support for a Fiscal Union

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Not probed (1a) | Not probed (1b) | Probed (2a) | Probed (2b) |
| Inactive | 0.0650 | 0.0384 | 0.114\* | 0.0801 |
|  | (0.0472) | (0.0483) | (0.0498) | (0.0513) |
| Unemployed | 0.0107 | -0.0739 | 0.0120 | -0.0407 |
|  | (0.0778) | (0.0802) | (0.0815) | (0.0849) |
| High Income Occupation | -0.114\* | -0.156\*\* | -0.0155 | -0.0538 |
|  | (0.0531) | (0.0535) | (0.0576) | (0.0591) |
| Family Income | 0.0283 | 0.0307 | 0.0257 | 0.0290 |
|  | (0.0222) | (0.0221) | (0.0236) | (0.0238) |
| Net Contributing Region | 0.0444 | 0.0244 | 0.0646 | 0.0372 |
|  | (0.0365) | (0.0371) | (0.0393) | (0.0403) |
| Left-Right Ideology | -0.0202\*\* | -0.0166\* | -0.0266\*\* | -0.0253\*\* |
|  | (0.00721) | (0.00726) | (0.00738) | (0.00763) |
| EU Membership: Bad | -0.284\*\* | -0.286\*\* | -0.311\*\* | -0.318\*\* |
|  | (0.0646) | (0.0645) | (0.0643) | (0.0653) |
| EU Membership: Good | 0.313\*\* | 0.383\*\* | 0.250\*\* | 0.294\*\* |
|  | (0.0489) | (0.0493) | (0.0530) | (0.0532) |
| European Identity | 0.181\*\* |  | 0.197\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0298) |  | (0.0318) |  |
| Italian vs. European Identity |  | 0.103\*\* |  | 0.145\*\* |
|  |  | (0.0228) |  | (0.0252) |
| Trustworthiness: EU | 0.0204 | 0.0306 | -0.00130 | -0.00170 |
|  | (0.0316) | (0.0317) | (0.0351) | (0.0350) |
| Trustworthiness: Italian Government | 0.00774 | 0.0187 | 0.0379 | 0.0474 |
|  | (0.0265) | (0.0272) | (0.0281) | (0.0289) |
| Trustworthiness: Greek Government | 0.0298 | 0.0238 | 0.0680\* | 0.0534 |
|  | (0.0304) | (0.0312) | (0.0321) | (0.0328) |
| Trustworthiness: German Government | 0.0270 | 0.0346 | 0.00452 | 0.0142 |
|  | (0.0303) | (0.0309) | (0.0329) | (0.0339) |
| Trust in Greeks | -0.0184 | -0.0232 | -0.000108 | -0.00670 |
|  | (0.0306) | (0.0312) | (0.0325) | (0.0327) |
| Trust in Germans | 0.00672 | 0.00227 | 0.00446 | -0.00401 |
|  | (0.0314) | (0.0320) | (0.0347) | (0.0359) |
| Interpersonal Trust | -0.00282 | -0.000839 | 0.0259 | 0.0242 |
|  | (0.0127) | (0.0128) | (0.0135) | (0.0138) |
| Female | -0.301\*\* | -0.305\*\* | -0.230\*\* | -0.219\*\* |
|  | (0.0368) | (0.0376) | (0.0396) | (0.0405) |
| Education | 0.0140 | 0.0152 | 0.0118 | 0.0130 |
|  | (0.00894) | (0.00897) | (0.00941) | (0.00946) |
| Age | 0.00531\*\* | 0.00560\*\* | 0.00382\*\* | 0.00442\*\* |
|  | (0.00135) | (0.00137) | (0.00145) | (0.00150) |
| Constant | 1.968\*\* | 2.123\*\* | 1.733\*\* | 1.908\*\* |
|  | (0.159) | (0.154) | (0.165) | (0.165) |
| N | 1,845 | 1,757 | 1,845 | 1,757 |
| R-squared | 0.270 | 0.261 | 0.246 | 0.229 |

Notes: May 2015 survey question. Ordinary least squared coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*p < 0.01, \*p< 0.05. Reference categories: Low Income Occupation; EU Membership: Neither. Models 1a and 1b: original attitudes on fiscal union, models 2a and 2b: attitudes after pointing out insurance and distributive implications.

## Robustness Analysis

Tables S4a-d list several alternative model specifications, considering especially the possible collinearity among membership evaluation, identity and trustworthiness. Trust in the EU and trust in the Greek government lose significance once we consider the full model of Table 1/S3. The impact of the other variables (employment status/income - for models 1a and 1b -, ideology, membership evaluation and identity) is robust throughout.

## TABLE S4aRobustness Analysis of Model 1a of Table 1/S3

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Inactive | 0.0967\* |  |  |  |  | 0.0735 | 0.0703 | 0.0650 | 0.0613 |
|  | (0.0523) |  |  |  |  | (0.0516) | (0.0478) | (0.0485) | (0.0501) |
| Unemployed | -0.110 |  |  |  |  | -0.102 | -0.0362 | -0.0451 | -0.0804 |
|  | (0.0820) |  |  |  |  | (0.0794) | (0.0750) | (0.0787) | (0.0783) |
| High Income Occupation | -0.114\* |  |  |  |  | -0.111\* | -0.101\* | -0.120\*\* | -0.119\*\* |
|  | (0.0591) |  |  |  |  | (0.0582) | (0.0537) | (0.0547) | (0.0569) |
| Left-Right Ideology |  | -0.0629\*\*\* |  |  |  | -0.0618\*\*\* | -0.0244\*\*\* | -0.0361\*\*\* | -0.0487\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.00703) |  |  |  | (0.00703) | (0.00684) | (0.00694) | (0.00711) |
| EU Membership: Bad |  |  | -0.418\*\*\* |  |  |  | -0.389\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.0634) |  |  |  | (0.0638) |  |  |
| EU Membership: Good |  |  | 0.506\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.466\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.0436) |  |  |  | (0.0441) |  |  |
| European Identity |  |  |  | 0.380\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.342\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.0252) |  |  |  | (0.0262) |  |
| Trustworthiness: EU |  |  |  |  | 0.264\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.234\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.0266) |  |  |  | (0.0262) |
| Trustworthiness: Greek Government |  |  |  |  | 0.0499\*\* |  |  |  | 0.0111 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.0245) |  |  |  | (0.0248) |

## TABLE S4bRobustness Analysis of Model 1b of Table 1/S3

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Inactive | 0.0853 |  |  |  |  | 0.0640 | 0.0612 | 0.0254 | 0.0538 |
|  | (0.0526) |  |  |  |  | (0.0521) | (0.0485) | (0.0505) | (0.0507) |
| Unemployed | -0.160\* |  |  |  |  | -0.152\* | -0.0934 | -0.155\* | -0.137\* |
|  | (0.0863) |  |  |  |  | (0.0839) | (0.0780) | (0.0845) | (0.0820) |
| High Income Occupation | -0.150\*\* |  |  |  |  | -0.147\*\* | -0.133\*\* | -0.175\*\*\* | -0.152\*\*\* |
|  | (0.0595) |  |  |  |  | (0.0587) | (0.0541) | (0.0562) | (0.0573) |
| Left-Right Ideology |  | -0.0581\*\*\* |  |  |  | -0.0568\*\*\* | -0.0216\*\*\* | -0.0380\*\*\* | -0.0443\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.00725) |  |  |  | (0.00723) | (0.00700) | (0.00719) | (0.00729) |
| EU Membership: Bad |  |  | -0.365\*\*\* |  |  |  | -0.342\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.0650) |  |  |  | (0.0650) |  |  |
| EU Membership: Good |  |  | 0.521\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.483\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.0447) |  |  |  | (0.0454) |  |  |
| European Identity |  |  |  | 0.244\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.209\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.0233) |  |  |  | (0.0235) |  |
| Trustworthiness: EU |  |  |  |  | 0.255\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.229\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.0267) |  |  |  | (0.0264) |
| Trustworthiness: Greek Government |  |  |  |  | 0.0463\* |  |  |  | 0.0129 |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.0249) |  |  |  | (0.0252) |

## TABLE S4cRobustness Analysis of Model 2a of Table 1/S3

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Inactive | 0.148\*\*\* |  |  |  |  | 0.121\*\* | 0.119\*\* | 0.112\*\* | 0.110\*\* |
|  | (0.0563) |  |  |  |  | (0.0551) | (0.0510) | (0.0516) | (0.0531) |
| Unemployed | -0.121 |  |  |  |  | -0.113 | -0.0468 | -0.0541 | -0.0881 |
|  | (0.0865) |  |  |  |  | (0.0844) | (0.0814) | (0.0812) | (0.0815) |
| High Income Occupation | -0.00155 |  |  |  |  | 0.00181 | 0.0104 | -0.00723 | -0.00784 |
|  | (0.0615) |  |  |  |  | (0.0603) | (0.0578) | (0.0580) | (0.0595) |
| Left-Right Ideology |  | -0.0728\*\*\* |  |  |  | -0.0716\*\*\* | -0.0358\*\*\* | -0.0453\*\*\* | -0.0549\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.00723) |  |  |  | (0.00724) | (0.00720) | (0.00707) | (0.00723) |
| EU Membership: Bad |  |  | -0.471\*\*\* |  |  |  | -0.425\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.0637) |  |  |  | (0.0641) |  |  |
| EU Membership: Good |  |  | 0.464\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.409\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.0475) |  |  |  | (0.0484) |  |  |
| European Identity |  |  |  | 0.399\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.350\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.0261) |  |  |  | (0.0270) |  |
| Trustworthiness: EU |  |  |  |  | 0.261\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.227\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.0276) |  |  |  | (0.0274) |
| Trustworthiness: Greek Government |  |  |  |  | 0.115\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.0709\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.0255) |  |  |  | (0.0257) |

## TABLE S4dRobustness Analysis of Model 2b of Table 1/S3

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Inactive | 0.136\*\* |  |  |  |  | 0.111\*\* | 0.110\*\* | 0.0658 | 0.102\* |
|  | (0.0565) |  |  |  |  | (0.0554) | (0.0516) | (0.0542) | (0.0537) |
| Unemployed | -0.132 |  |  |  |  | -0.121 | -0.0643 | -0.125 | -0.104 |
|  | (0.0913) |  |  |  |  | (0.0889) | (0.0856) | (0.0853) | (0.0860) |
| High Income Occupation | -0.0309 |  |  |  |  | -0.0275 | -0.0147 | -0.0590 | -0.0316 |
|  | (0.0629) |  |  |  |  | (0.0618) | (0.0597) | (0.0595) | (0.0611) |
| Left-Right Ideology |  | -0.0699\*\*\* |  |  |  | -0.0686\*\*\* | -0.0362\*\*\* | -0.0469\*\*\* | -0.0537\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.00745) |  |  |  | (0.00746) | (0.00744) | (0.00744) | (0.00745) |
| EU Membership: Bad |  |  | -0.419\*\*\* |  |  |  | -0.380\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.0660) |  |  |  | (0.0662) |  |  |
| EU Membership: Good |  |  | 0.459\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.402\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.0488) |  |  |  | (0.0496) |  |  |
| European Identity |  |  |  | 0.287\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.242\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.0235) |  |  |  | (0.0242) |  |
| Trustworthiness: EU |  |  |  |  | 0.242\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.210\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.0280) |  |  |  | (0.0278) |
| Trustworthiness: Greek Government |  |  |  |  | 0.107\*\*\* |  |  |  | 0.0662\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (0.0260) |  |  |  | (0.0262) |

Notes: Sociodemographic control variables included: gender, level of education, age. For the number of observations, see Table 1/S3. May 2015 survey question. Ordinary least squared coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*p < 0.01, \*\*p< 0.05 \*p< 0.1. Reference categories: Low Income Occupation; EU Membership: Neither

## Extensions: Curvilinear Impact of Ideology and Social Mobility Prospects

Extreme left-wing voters may be less supportive of a fiscal union in light of their greater dissatisfaction with mainstream politics (e.g. Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit, 2014). Table S5 adds a quadratic term of ideology to the models in Table S3, while Figure S3 displays the predictive effects. Evidence of a curvilinear relation between ideology and support is weak. Respondents with extreme left views are slightly less supportive that left-wing respondents in models 1b and 2a, while there is no difference in models 1a and 2b. The effects plateau as we move to the extreme left.

## TABLE S5Predictors of Support for a Fiscal Union with Quadratic Ideological Correlate

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Not probed (1a) | Not probed (1b) | Probed (2a) | Probed (2b) |
| Inactive | 0.0625 | 0.0360 | 0.111\* | 0.0778 |
|  | (0.0472) | (0.0483) | (0.0499) | (0.0513) |
| Unemployed | 0.00842 | -0.0756 | 0.00877 | -0.0423 |
|  | (0.0774) | (0.0798) | (0.0811) | (0.0846) |
| High Income Occupation | -0.116\* | -0.158\*\* | -0.0182 | -0.0554 |
|  | (0.0531) | (0.0535) | (0.0576) | (0.0591) |
| Family Income | 0.0282 | 0.0300 | 0.0255 | 0.0283 |
|  | (0.0221) | (0.0220) | (0.0234) | (0.0237) |
| Net Contributing Region | 0.0469 | 0.0271 | 0.0682 | 0.0398 |
|  | (0.0366) | (0.0371) | (0.0393) | (0.0403) |
| Left-Right Ideology | 0.0206 | 0.0345 | 0.0306 | 0.0243 |
|  | (0.0267) | (0.0273) | (0.0280) | (0.0292) |
| Left-Right Ideology (squared) | -0.00345 | -0.00434 | -0.00483\* | -0.00421 |
|  | (0.00226) | (0.00232) | (0.00234) | (0.00245) |
| EU Membership: Bad | -0.276\*\* | -0.275\*\* | -0.300\*\* | -0.308\*\* |
|  | (0.0648) | (0.0646) | (0.0643) | (0.0653) |
| EU Membership: Good | 0.319\*\* | 0.391\*\* | 0.258\*\* | 0.301\*\* |
|  | (0.0489) | (0.0492) | (0.0530) | (0.0532) |
| European Identity | 0.180\*\* |  | 0.195\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0298) |  | (0.0317) |  |
| Italian vs. European Identity |  | 0.0995\*\* |  | 0.141\*\* |
|  |  | (0.0227) |  | (0.0252) |
| Trustworthiness: EU | 0.0192 | 0.0299 | -0.00296 | -0.00234 |
|  | (0.0315) | (0.0316) | (0.0350) | (0.0349) |
| Trustworthiness: Italian Government | 0.00120 | 0.0109 | 0.0287 | 0.0398 |
|  | (0.0265) | (0.0272) | (0.0282) | (0.0290) |
| Trustworthiness: Greek Government | 0.0361 | 0.0320 | 0.0768\* | 0.0613 |
|  | (0.0306) | (0.0314) | (0.0321) | (0.0329) |
| Trustworthiness: German Government | 0.0235 | 0.0308 | -0.000431 | 0.0105 |
|  | (0.0303) | (0.0309) | (0.0328) | (0.0339) |
| Trust in Greeks | -0.0183 | -0.0231 | -6.62e-05 | -0.00662 |
|  | (0.0306) | (0.0312) | (0.0324) | (0.0326) |
| Trust in Germans | 0.00747 | 0.00241 | 0.00552 | -0.00387 |
|  | (0.0313) | (0.0319) | (0.0346) | (0.0358) |
| Interpersonal Trust | -0.00331 | -0.00126 | 0.0252 | 0.0237 |
|  | (0.0127) | (0.0128) | (0.0135) | (0.0137) |
| Female | -0.301\*\* | -0.305\*\* | -0.230\*\* | -0.219\*\* |
|  | (0.0368) | (0.0376) | (0.0396) | (0.0405) |
| Education | 0.0137 | 0.0149 | 0.0114 | 0.0127 |
|  | (0.00891) | (0.00893) | (0.00937) | (0.00943) |
| Age | 0.00534\*\* | 0.00565\*\* | 0.00386\*\* | 0.00447\*\* |
|  | (0.00135) | (0.00137) | (0.00145) | (0.00150) |
| Constant | 1.891\*\* | 2.029\*\* | 1.625\*\* | 1.816\*\* |
|  | (0.165) | (0.162) | (0.171) | (0.174) |
| N | 1,845 | 1,757 | 1,845 | 1,757 |
| R-squared | 0.271 | 0.263 | 0.247 | 0.231 |

Notes: May 2015 survey question. Ordinary least squared coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*p < 0.01, \*p< 0.05. Reference categories: Low Income Occupation; EU Membership: Neither. Models 1a and 1b: original attitudes on fiscal union, models 2a and 2b: attitudes after pointing out insurance and distributive implications.

## FIGURE S3Predictive Effects on Fiscal Union Support with a Quadratic Ideological Correlate



Note: Predictive effects with 95% confidence intervals.

In an extension of the Meltzer-Richard model, individuals care about both current and future income (Benabou and Ok 2001). Therefore, low-income earners that expect upward mobility may be less supportive than individuals in the same income group who do not hold these expectations. Similarly, high-income earners that expect lower future income may be more supportive than similar individuals without these expectations - this second implication is not derived from Benabou and Ok (2001), but see Alesina and Giuliano (2011: 99).

To account for the impact of prospects of social mobility, we have added interactions between employment status and retrospective and prospective evaluations of family income. These evaluations account for past experience and future expectations. We find some weak evidence that, for inactive and high income respondents, favorable assessment of future family income decreases support for a fiscal union (results are available upon request).

# Conjoint Analyses

Tables S6 and S7 list the attributes and their values of the two conjoint analyses, while Table S8 illustrates examples of choice tasks.

## TABLE S6 First Conjoint Experiment: Attributes for Economic Policy Programs and Objectives

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Attributes | Values |
| Acceptable rate of unemployment | 13%  7%  3%  1% (full employment) |
| Acceptable rate of inflation | 0.5%  2%  5%  8% |
| National social services and taxation | Social services and taxation are adequate  Cut taxes, even at the cost of fewer social services  More social services, even at the cost of higher taxes |
| Euro | Keep the euro as the national currency  Replace the euro with a national currency |
| European oversight of government budget | Oversight is adequate  Less oversight  More oversight |
| European social services and taxation | Social services and taxation must remain national prerogatives  European social services and taxation, in addition to national ones  European social services and taxation, replacing national ones |

## TABLE S7 Second Conjoint Experiment: Attributes for Fiscal Unions

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Attributes | Values |
| Income tax rate | 1‰  3‰  5‰  10‰ |
| Tax type | Additional to national taxation  Alternate to national taxation |
| Spending destination | Health  Unemployment benefits  Education  Infrastructure  Not earmarked |
| Spending type | Additional to national expenditure  Alternate to national expenditure |
| Institution responsible for spending | European Commission  National Government |
| Institution responsible for auditing | European Court of Auditors  European Commission  Italian Court of Auditors |

## TABLE S8Examples of Choice Tasks

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Economic Policy Programs and Objectives Conjoint Experiment  *We list here below two pairs of different economic policy programs. For each pair, you must choose the program you prefer.*  *Between these two programs, which one do you prefer?* | | |
|  | **Program 1** | **Program 2** |
| **Acceptable unemployment rate** | 7% | 3% |
| **Acceptable inflation rate** | 2% | 2% |
| **National social services and taxation** | Social services and taxation are adequate | Cut taxes, even at the cost of fewer social services |
| **Euro** | Keep the euro as the national currency | Keep the euro as the national currency |
| **European oversight of government budget** | Less oversight | More oversight |
| **European social services and taxation** | European social services and taxation, in addition to national ones | European social services and taxation, replacing national ones |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |

|  |
| --- |
| Are you for or against these two programs?  Express your opinion on a scale ranging from "strongly against" to "strongly for" |
| Program 1: strongly against / somewhat against / somewhat for / strongly for |
| Program 2: strongly against / somewhat against / somewhat for / strongly for |

Note: This is an example of one task. Each respondent evaluates two of these comparisons, each displayed on a new screen

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Fiscal Union Conjoint Experiment  *We list here below two pairs of different fiscal union schemes. For each pair, you must choose the scheme you prefer.*  *Between these two schemes, which one do you prefer?* | | |
|  | **Scheme 1** | **Scheme 2** |
| **Tax rate** | 5‰ | 3‰ |
| **Tax type** | Alternate to national taxation | Additional to national taxation |
| **Spending destination** | Unemployment benefits | Infrastructure |
| **Spending type** | Additional to national expenditure | Additional to national expenditure |
| **Spending institution** | National Government | National Government |
| **Auditing institution** | European Court of Auditors | Italian Court of Auditors |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  |  |  |

|  |
| --- |
| Are you for or against these two schemes?  Express your opinion on a scale ranging from "strongly against" to "strongly for" |
| Scheme 1: strongly against / somewhat against / somewhat for / strongly for |
| Scheme 2: strongly against / somewhat against / somewhat for / strongly for |

Note: This is an example of one task. Each respondent evaluates two of these comparisons, each displayed on a new screen

## Analysis of Support for Fiscal Union from the Conjoint Analysis

We have collapsed the ratings of each fiscal union scheme used in the conjoint analysis into a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if a respondent is somewhat or strongly supportive of a scheme, and zero otherwise. Figure S4 displays the shares of schemes that were supported by each participant (see Figure 2 in Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit (2017) for a similarly produced illustration). Respondents support on average 52 per cent of the schemes. This figure is somewhat lower than the means of our survey and of the Eurobarometer survey (European Commission, 2012: 57). About 14 percent of respondents supports all four schemes, while approximately 45 percent supports two schemes. About 13 percent is fundamentally opposed to the policy. They oppose all four schemes.

## FIGURE S4 Share of Fiscal Union Schemes Supported by Respondent



## Analysis of AMCEs: Economic Policy Priorities and the Properties of a Fiscal Union

Figure S5 shows the average marginal component effects (AMCEs, see Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014) of each attribute value on the probability that participants choose a given economic policy program (left panel) and fiscal union scheme (right panel). In the left panel, the reference categories are the conditions at the time of the survey (13 per cent unemployment rate, 0.5 per cent inflation rate, no changes to taxation and spending and to budgetary oversight, euro as the national currency, no expansion of EU fiscal capacity).

## FIGURE S5 Effects of Attributes on the Probability of an Economic Policy Program and a Fiscal Union Scheme Being Chosen



Notes: AMCEs from model 1 in Tables S9 and S10. Dots indicate point estimates, while lines the 95 per cent confidence intervals. The reference categories are represented by dots with no confidence intervals.

Consider first our core attribute of interest at the bottom of the left panel in Figure S5. Economic policy programs that propose to expand EU fiscal capacity are opposed. Respondents want to keep these policies national. If a supranational policy is proposed in addition to the current national one, a program is 8.3 percentage points (se=1.10) less likely to be preferred. If it replaces current policies, it is 3 percentage points (se=1.10) less likely to be preferred. Additionality is also penalized over substitution (F-test *p*-value > 0.00).

These results must be read in context though. Respondents also consider the oversight the EU exercises over national budgets too intrusive,[[1]](#footnote-2) but leaving the Eurozone is clearly the most heavily penalized attribute of any program. A policy with such a measure is 15 percentage points (se= 0.96) less likely to be preferred over one that keeps the common currency. This clearly overruns concerns about oversight and expansion of fiscal capacity.

The only other significant issue that is at par with the euro is the unemployment objective. The top half of the left panel in Figure S5 shows that programs tolerating higher inflation or proposing a change in domestic taxation and spending are opposed, but these effects are smaller compared to the large rewards for lower unemployment. They indeed rival the euro effect: a program that foresees no improvement over the 13 per cent unemployment rate is as muchpenalized as one that advocates leaving the Eurozone (F-test *p*-value > 0.68).

The right hand panel of Figure S5 displays how features of a fiscal union affect the choice of a scheme. The reference categories are the most preferred ones: alternate tax rate of 1 per thousand, alternate spending on health, European Commission as the spending institution and European Court of Auditors as the auditing institution.

Tax rates and type exercise the largest substantive effects. Schemes with higher tax rates are less likely to be selected. A fiscal union with a 10 per thousand tax rate is 15.7 percentage points (se=1.28) less likely to be preferred over a scheme proposing only a 1 per thousand rate. The effect is clearly monotonic. Furthermore, an additive scheme is 14.9 percentage points (se=0.89) less likely to be chosen over an alternate one.

Health, unemployment benefits and education spending are preferred to infrastructural spending or no earmarking, however an alternate spending scheme is 4 percentage points (se=0.88) more likely to be chosen over an additive one. There is also a clear preference for the involvement of supranational organizations. A scheme where the European Commission is in charge of spending is 3.6 percentage points (se=0.91) more likely to be preferred over one where national governments are involved. Scrutiny by the European Court of Auditors is 2.2 and 6 percentage points (se=1.10 and 1.11) preferred over scrutiny by the Commission and the Italian Court of Auditors respectively. The Commission is preferred over the national court.

## Robustness Check: Dichotomous vs. Ordinal Response Variables

Table S9 reports the models on the effects of the attributes on the choice of economic policy programs. In model 1, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a program is chosen; in model 2, the dependent variable is the four-point assessment of a program. The unit of analysis is an economic policy program. Figure S5 is based on model 1. There is only a minor difference between model 1 and 2. The penalties for advocating tighter budgetary control and for proposing alternate taxation and services do not reach significance when the ordinal ranking is used as outcome variable.

## TABLE S9Effects of Attributes on the Choice of an Economic Policy Program

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 | 2 |  |
| Unemployment: 7% | 0.0924\*\* | 0.131\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0122) | (0.0190) |  |
| Unemployment: 3% | 0.156\*\* | 0.219\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0126) | (0.0198) |  |
| Unemployment: 1% | 0.153\*\* | 0.231\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0123) | (0.0197) |  |
| Inflation: 2% | -0.00974 | -0.00993 |  |
|  | (0.0126) | (0.0196) |  |
| Inflation: 5% | -0.0470\*\* | -0.0796\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0129) | (0.0193) |  |
| Inflation: 8% | -0.115\*\* | -0.136\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0127) | (0.0198) |  |
| Taxation and spending: Less | -0.0238\* | -0.0466\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0111) | (0.0171) |  |
| Taxation and spending: More | -0.0358\*\* | -0.0602\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0110) | (0.0165) |  |
| Euro: Ditch it | -0.150\*\* | -0.248\*\* |  |
|  | (0.00965) | (0.0164) |  |
| Budgetary control: Less | 0.0483\*\* | 0.0555\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0108) | (0.0171) |  |
| Budgetary control: More | -0.0259\* | -0.0265 | Notes: Ordinary least squared coefficients (average marginal components effects) with standard errors clustered on respondents in parentheses. \*\*p < 0.01, \*p< 0.05. Reference categories: Unemployment: 13% Inflation: 0.5%; Taxation and spending: Adequate; Euro: Keep it; Budgetary control: Adequate. |
|  | (0.0110) | (0.0167) |
| EU taxation and spending: Additional | -0.0828\*\* | -0.0859\*\* |
|  | (0.0110) | (0.0168) |
| EU taxation and spending: Alternate | -0.0299\*\* | -0.0102 |
|  | (0.0110) | (0.0166) |
| Constant | 0.569\*\* | 2.425\*\* |
|  | (0.0165) | (0.0259) |
| N | 12,104 | 12,104 |
| R-squared | 0.056 | 0.052 |

## FIGURE S6 Economic Policy Conjoint Analysis: Diagnostic Tests for Framing Effects



Notes: Tests for carryover effects in the first two panels from the left. Test of profile order effects in the second two panels. The reference categories are represented by dots with no confidence intervals.

Table S10 reports the models on the effects of the attributes on the choice of fiscal union schemes. In model 1, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a scheme is chosen; in model 2, the dependent variable is the four-point assessment of a scheme. The unit of analysis is a fiscal union scheme. Figure S5 is based on model 1. There are only minor differences between model 1 and 2: if the outcome variable is the ranking of schemes, respondents are indifferent between infrastructure and education expenditure; they weakly prefer unemployment benefits to education and infrastructure to no earmarking.

## TABLE S10Effects of Attributes on the Choice of an Fiscal Union Scheme

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 | 2 |  |
| Income tax rate: 3‰ | -0.0303\* | -0.0383\* |  |
|  | (0.0124) | (0.0184) |  |
| Income tax rate: 5‰ | -0.0822\*\* | -0.0781\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0127) | (0.0189) |  |
| Income tax rate: 10‰ | -0.157\*\* | -0.193\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0128) | (0.0197) |  |
| Tax type: Additional | -0.149\*\* | -0.230\*\* |  |
|  | (0.00889) | (0.0140) |  |
| Spending destination: Unemployment benefits | -0.00238 | 0.0197 | Notes: Ordinary least squared coefficients (average marginal components effects) with standard errors clustered on respondents in parentheses. \*\*p < 0.01, \*p< 0.05. Reference categories: Income tax rate: 1‰; Tax type: Alternate; Spending destination: Health; Spending type: Alternate; Spending institution: European Commission; Auditing institution: European Court of Auditors. |
|  | (0.0144) | (0.0218) |
| Spending destination: Education | -0.0227 | -0.0162 |
|  | (0.0140) | (0.0203) |
| Spending destination: Infrastructure | -0.0560\*\* | -0.0470\* |
|  | (0.0144) | (0.0216) |
| Spending destination: Not earmarked | -0.0570\*\* | -0.0862\*\* |
|  | (0.0146) | (0.0216) |
| Spending type: Additional | -0.0405\*\* | -0.0450\*\* |
|  | (0.00881) | (0.0131) |
| Spending institution: National Government | -0.0355\*\* | -0.0445\*\* |
|  | (0.00912) | (0.0136) |
| Auditing institution: European Commission | -0.0225\* | -0.0288 |
|  | (0.0110) | (0.0166) |
| Auditing institution: Italian Court of Auditors | -0.0597\*\* | -0.0938\*\* |
|  | (0.0111) | (0.0170) |
| Constant | 0.735\*\* | 2.779\*\* |
|  | (0.0157) | (0.0249) |
| N | 12,472 | 12,472 |
| R-squared | 0.043 | 0.039 |

## FIGURE S7 Fiscal Union Conjoint Analysis: Diagnostic Tests for Framing Effects



Notes: Tests for carryover effects in the first two panels from the left. Test of profile order effects in the second two panels. The reference categories are represented by dots with no confidence intervals.

## Further Analysis: Employment Status and Spending Destinations of a Fiscal Union

The different ranking of spending destinations across income groups is suggestive. High income and unemployed respondents differ more markedly from the other groups. The former prefer education over health,[[2]](#footnote-3) indicating that they may either benefit directly or assign positive externalities to this expenditure (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011: 100). Unemployed subjects prefer unemployment benefits over almost every other spending destination,[[3]](#footnote-4) compared to other participants. They also oppose no earmarking and infrastructural spending much more than high income respondents do, when compared to health spending (F-test *p*-values > 0.026 and > 0.030, respectively). These results resonate well with the expected economic benefits that income groups are likely to derive from each spending destination.

## Further Analysis: Ideology and Spending Destinations of a Fiscal Union

As expected, left-wing participants prioritize unemployment benefit expenditure over any other destination. This policy is preferred to health (F-test *p*-value > 0.000), education (*p* > 0.021), infrastructure (*p* > 0.000) and no earmarking (*p* > 0.009), compared to right-wing respondents.

In sum, unemployed and left-wing respondents prefer unemployment benefits over other destinations, whereas high income participants prefer education spending. The Five Presidents’ Report specifically refers to “investment projects” (Juncker *et al.*, 2015, p. 15). Unemployed subjects are more opposed to this destination (and to no earmarking) than high income respondents. So, this statement looks like an attempt to increase support among the likely net contributors of the scheme.

## TABLE S11 Interaction between Attributes of an Economic Policy Program and Employment Status

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 | 2 |  | 1 | 2 |  | 1 | 2 |
| Unemployment: 7% | 0.0836\*\* | 0.135\*\* | Unemployment: 3% × High income | 0.0417 | 0.0115 | Inflation: 5% × Low income | -0.00465 | -0.0145 |
|  | (0.0199) | (0.0323) |  | (0.0454) | (0.0705) |  | (0.0331) | (0.0491) |
| Unemployment: 3% | 0.131\*\* | 0.228\*\* | Unemployment: 1% × Unemployed | 0.0238 | 0.0979 | Inflation: 5% × High income | -0.00149 | -0.00172 |
|  | (0.0215) | (0.0322) |  | (0.0383) | (0.0644) |  | (0.0445) | (0.0681) |
| Unemployment: 1% | 0.148\*\* | 0.221\*\* | Unemployment: 1% × Low income | 0.0595 | 0.0478 | Inflation: 8% × Unemployed | -0.0254 | -0.00734 |
|  | (0.0198) | (0.0306) |  | (0.0317) | (0.0481) |  | (0.0401) | (0.0639) |
| Unemployed | -0.138\*\* | -0.138 | Unemployment: 1% × High income | -0.0433 | 0.0107 | Inflation: 8% × Low income | 0.00736 | -0.0166 |
|  | (0.0530) | (0.0837) |  | (0.0429) | (0.0706) |  | (0.0323) | (0.0495) |
| Low income | -0.158\*\* | -0.0117 | Inflation: 2% | -0.0280 | -0.00426 | Inflation: 8% × High income | -0.0123 | -0.0575 |
|  | (0.0421) | (0.0655) |  | (0.0208) | (0.0322) |  | (0.0424) | (0.0673) |
| High income | -0.0266 | 0.0125 | Inflation: 5% | -0.0480\* | -0.0935\*\* | Tax-spend: Less | -0.0482\*\* | -0.0346 |
|  | (0.0570) | (0.0900) |  | (0.0205) | (0.0313) |  | (0.0184) | (0.0282) |
| Unemployment: 7% × Unemployed | -0.00837 | 0.0277 | Inflation: 8% | -0.117\*\* | -0.124\*\* | Tax-spend: More | -0.0550\*\* | -0.0493 |
|  | (0.0389) | (0.0614) |  | (0.0209) | (0.0317) |  | (0.0181) | (0.0264) |
| Unemployment: 7% × Low income | 0.0505 | -0.0283 | Inflation: 2% × Unemployed | 0.0105 | 0.0535 | Tax-spend: Less × Unemployed | 0.0605 | -0.0103 |
|  | (0.0309) | (0.0478) |  | (0.0393) | (0.0620) |  | (0.0348) | (0.0562) |
| Unemployment: 7% × High income | -0.00373 | 0.0414 | Inflation: 2% × Low income | 0.0569 | 0.000630 | Tax-spend: Less × Low income | 0.0241 | -0.0333 |
|  | (0.0424) | (0.0647) |  | (0.0328) | (0.0509) |  | (0.0286) | (0.0424) |
| Unemployment: 3% × Unemployed | -0.00997 | 0.00933 | Inflation: 2% × High income | 0.0318 | -0.0977 | Tax-spend: Less × High income | 0.0792\* | 0.0129 |
|  | (0.0397) | (0.0642) |  | (0.0420) | (0.0665) |  | (0.0385) | (0.0573) |
| Unemployment: 3% × Low income | 0.0827\*\* | 0.00887 | Inflation: 5% × Unemployed | 0.0213 | 0.103 | Tax-spend: More × Unemployed | 0.0310 | 0.0292 |
|  | (0.0320) | (0.0483) |  | (0.0413) | (0.0612) |  | (0.0352) | (0.0510) |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Tax-spend: More × Low income | 0.0227 | -0.0260 | Budget control: More × Unemployed | 0.0501 | -0.0376 | Constant | 0.632\*\* | 2.439\*\* |
|  | (0.0279) | (0.0426) |  | (0.0368) | (0.0555) |  | (0.0269) | (0.0420) |
| Tax-spend: More × High income | 0.0705 | -0.0207 | Budget control: More × Low income | 0.0227 | -0.0391 | Observations | 10,588 | 10,588 |
|  | (0.0388) | (0.0577) |  | (0.0274) | (0.0429) | R-squared | 0.064 | 0.060 |
| Ditch euro | -0.184\*\* | -0.310\*\* | Budget control: More × High income | -0.0208 | -0.0361 | Notes: Ordinary least squared coefficients with standard errors clustered on respondents in parentheses. \*\*p < 0.01, \*p< 0.05. Reference categories: Unemployment: 13% Inflation: 0.5%; Taxation and spending: Adequate; Euro: Keep it; Budgetary control: Adequate. In model 1, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a program is chosen; in model 2, the dependent variable is the four-point assessment of a program. The unit of analysis is an economic policy program. | | |
|  | (0.0157) | (0.0257) |  | (0.0372) | (0.0578) |
| Ditch euro × Unemployed | 0.0959\*\* | 0.180\*\* | EU tax-spend: Additional | -0.0944\*\* | -0.0920\*\* |
|  | (0.0301) | (0.0540) |  | (0.0184) | (0.0277) |
| Ditch euro × Low income | 0.0647\*\* | 0.114\*\* | EU tax-spend: Alternate | -0.0407\* | -0.0139 |
|  | (0.0248) | (0.0417) |  | (0.0181) | (0.0275) |
| Ditch euro × High income | 0.0152 | 0.00699 | EU tax-spend: Additional × Unemployed | 0.0190 | 0.00968 |
|  | (0.0342) | (0.0564) |  | (0.0350) | (0.0520) |
| Budget control: Less | 0.0287 | 0.0450 | EU tax-spend: Additional × Low income | 0.0291 | 0.0359 |
|  | (0.0176) | (0.0272) |  | (0.0280) | (0.0427) |
| Budget control: More | -0.0305 | -0.00912 | EU tax-spend: Additional × High income | -0.0227 | -0.0641 |
|  | (0.0181) | (0.0269) |  | (0.0382) | (0.0570) |
| Budget control: Less × Unemployed | 0.0540 | -0.00391 | EU tax-spend: Alternate × Unemployed | 0.0404 | 0.00201 |
|  | (0.0356) | (0.0547) |  | (0.0356) | (0.0534) |
| Budget control: Less × Low income | 0.0589\* | -0.0155 | EU tax-spend: Alternate × Low income | 0.0396 | 0.0180 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0276) | (0.0438) |  | (0.0280) | (0.0419) |  |  |  |
| Budget control: Less × High income | -0.0166 | 0.0368 | EU tax-spend: Alternate × High income | -0.0405 | -0.0351 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0364) | (0.0595) |  | (0.0365) | (0.0584) |  |  |  |

## FIGURE S8 Effects of Program and Scheme Attributes on the Probability of Being Selected by Employment Status



Note: See Figure S5 for the reference categories.

## TABLE S12 Interaction between Attributes of a Fiscal Union Scheme and Employment Status

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 | 2 |  | 1 | 2 |  | 1 | 2 |
| Tax rate: 3‰ | -0.0231 | -0.00780 | Tax rate: 5‰ × Low income | -0.0320 | -0.0622 | Education | -0.0397 | -0.0493 |
|  | (0.0210) | (0.0312) |  | (0.0298) | (0.0442) |  | (0.0238) | (0.0335) |
| Tax rate: 5‰ | -0.0803\*\* | -0.0629\* | Tax rate: 5‰ × High income | 0.0995\*\* | 0.0570 | Infrastructure | -0.0469 | -0.0173 |
|  | (0.0213) | (0.0300) |  | (0.0384) | (0.0540) |  | (0.0249) | (0.0373) |
| Tax rate: 10‰ | -0.144\*\* | -0.127\*\* | Tax rate: 10‰ × Unemployed | -0.0444 | -0.0634 | Not earmarked | -0.0827\*\* | -0.155\*\* |
|  | (0.0219) | (0.0328) |  | (0.0438) | (0.0692) |  | (0.0253) | (0.0349) |
| Unemployed | 0.0591 | -0.0339 | Tax rate: 10‰ × Low income | -0.0616\* | -0.136\*\* | Unempl. benefits × Unemployed | 0.103\* | 0.117 |
|  | (0.0516) | (0.0866) |  | (0.0302) | (0.0456) |  | (0.0465) | (0.0751) |
| Low income | 0.0189 | -0.00383 | Tax rate: 10‰ × High income | 0.0792\* | -0.0338 | Unempl. benefits × Low income | 0.0119 | 0.0612 |
|  | (0.0372) | (0.0593) |  | (0.0383) | (0.0606) |  | (0.0343) | (0.0514) |
| High income | -0.142\*\* | -0.0491 | Tax type: Additional | -0.135\*\* | -0.247\*\* | Unempl. benefits × High income | 0.0293 | 0.00445 |
|  | (0.0487) | (0.0745) |  | (0.0154) | (0.0235) |  | (0.0446) | (0.0669) |
| Tax rate: 3‰ × Unemployed | -0.0576 | 0.00422 | Tax type: Additional × Unemployed | -0.0354 | -0.0252 | Education × Unemployed | -0.0164 | -0.0508 |
|  | (0.0425) | (0.0667) |  | (0.0305) | (0.0515) |  | (0.0463) | (0.0732) |
| Tax rate: 3‰ × Low income | -0.0293 | -0.0509 | Tax type: Additional × Low income | -0.0180 | 0.0490 | Education × Low income | 0.00791 | 0.0493 |
|  | (0.0293) | (0.0431) |  | (0.0210) | (0.0327) |  | (0.0329) | (0.0466) |
| Tax rate: 3‰ × High income | 0.0660 | -0.0588 | Tax type: Additional × High income | -0.0170 | 0.00472 | Education × High income | 0.0965\* | 0.0959 |
|  | (0.0370) | (0.0552) |  | (0.0271) | (0.0418) |  | (0.0445) | (0.0620) |
| Tax rate: 5‰ × Unemployed | -0.0558 | -0.00324 | Unemployment benefits | -0.0228 | -0.0240 | Infrastructure × Unemployed | -0.0771 | -0.256\*\* |
|  | (0.0444) | (0.0689) |  | (0.0252) | (0.0375) |  | (0.0461) | (0.0743) |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Infrastructure × Low income | -0.0156 | -0.0384 | Sp. inst.: Government × Unemployed | 0.0314 | 0.0115 | Constant | 0.745\*\* | 2.796\*\* |
|  | (0.0346) | (0.0509) |  | (0.0311) | (0.0488) |  | (0.0275) | (0.0431) |
| Infrastructure × High income | 0.0375 | 0.0731 | Sp. inst.: Government × Low income | -0.0470\* | -0.0260 | Observations | 12,320 | 12,320 |
|  | (0.0437) | (0.0635) |  | (0.0218) | (0.0320) | R-squared | 0.050 | 0.047 |
| No earmarked × Unemployed | -0.0318 | -0.00238 | Sp. inst.: Government × High income | -0.00637 | -0.0320 | Notes: Ordinary least squared coefficients with standard errors clustered on respondents in parentheses. \*\*p < 0.01, \*p< 0.05. Reference categories: Income tax rate: 1‰; Tax type: Alternate; Spending destination: Health; Spending type: Alternate; Spending institution: European Commission; Auditing institution: European Court of Auditors. In model 1, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a scheme is chosen; in model 2, the dependent variable is the four-point assessment of a scheme. The unit of analysis is a fiscal union scheme. | | |
|  | (0.0499) | (0.0763) |  | (0.0271) | (0.0406) |
| No earmarked × Low income | 0.0387 | 0.106\* | Auditing: Eu. Commission | -0.0633\*\* | -0.0469 |
|  | (0.0345) | (0.0501) |  | (0.0190) | (0.0286) |
| No earmarked × High income | 0.0948\* | 0.146\* | Auditing: It. Auditors Court | -0.0624\*\* | -0.103\*\* |
|  | (0.0449) | (0.0651) |  | (0.0189) | (0.0289) |
| Spending type: Additional | -0.0486\*\* | -0.0452\* | Auditing: Eu. Commission × Unemployed | 0.00102 | -0.0127 |
|  | (0.0153) | (0.0223) |  | (0.0375) | (0.0595) |
| Sp. type: Additional × Unemployed | -0.00780 | -0.0145 | Auditing: Eu. Commission × Low income | 0.0711\*\* | 0.0144 |
|  | (0.0298) | (0.0475) |  | (0.0260) | (0.0390) |
| Sp. type: Additional × Low income | 0.0145 | 0.0210 | Auditing: Eu. Commission × High income | 0.0757\* | 0.0981\* |
|  | (0.0209) | (0.0311) |  | (0.0333) | (0.0496) |
| Sp. type: Additional × High income | 0.0244 | -0.0356 | Auditing: It. Auditors Court × Unemployed | -0.0261 | 0.0159 |
|  | (0.0268) | (0.0384) |  | (0.0382) | (0.0598) |
| Spending inst.: Government | -0.0200 | -0.0324 | Auditing: It. Auditors Court × Low income | 0.0158 | 0.0277 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0159) | (0.0235) |  | (0.0263) | (0.0394) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | Auditing: It. Auditors Court × High income | 0.00515 | -0.0172 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (0.0331) | (0.0532) |  |  |  |

## TABLE S13 Interaction between Attributes of an Economic Policy Program and Ideology

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 | 2 |  | 1 | 2 |  | 1 | 2 |
| Unemployment: 7% | 0.104\*\* | 0.136\*\* | Inflation: 2% × Left-Right Ideology | -0.00583 | -0.0108 | Budget control: More | -0.0491 | -0.000263 |
|  | (0.0295) | (0.0463) |  | (0.00473) | (0.00776) |  | (0.0265) | (0.0411) |
| Unemployment: 3% | 0.188\*\* | 0.203\*\* | Inflation: 5% × Left-Right Ideology | -0.00931 | -0.00241 | Budget control: Less × Left-Right Ideology | 0.00734 | 0.0101 |
|  | (0.0294) | (0.0476) |  | (0.00490) | (0.00746) |  | (0.00408) | (0.00675) |
| Unemployment: 1% | 0.175\*\* | 0.169\*\* | Inflation: 8% × Left-Right Ideology | -0.000692 | -0.00353 | Budget control: More × Left-Right Ideology | 0.00407 | -0.00420 |
|  | (0.0292) | (0.0479) |  | (0.00487) | (0.00762) |  | (0.00419) | (0.00664) |
| Left-Right Ideology | -0.0168\*\* | -0.0378\*\* | Tax-spend: Less | -0.158\*\* | -0.213\*\* | EU tax-spend: Additional | -0.0659\* | -0.0823\* |
|  | (0.00626) | (0.0103) |  | (0.0266) | (0.0425) |  | (0.0260) | (0.0399) |
| Unemployment: 7% × Left-Right Ideology | -0.000738 | 0.00125 | Tax-spend: More | 0.0173 | 0.0541 | EU tax-spend: Alternate | -0.0155 | -0.0184 |
|  | (0.00468) | (0.00723) |  | (0.0258) | (0.0390) |  | (0.0259) | (0.0405) |
| Unemployment: 3% × Left-Right Ideology | -0.00510 | 0.00355 | Tax-spend: Less × Left-Right Ideology | 0.0229\*\* | 0.0264\*\* | EU tax-spend: Additional × Left-Right Ideology | -0.00467 | -0.00153 |
|  | (0.00475) | (0.00757) |  | (0.00414) | (0.00688) |  | (0.00412) | (0.00652) |
| Unemployment: 1% × Left-Right Ideology | -0.00443 | 0.0107 | Tax-spend: More × Left-Right Ideology | -0.00842\* | -0.0183\*\* | EU tax-spend: Alternate × Left-Right Ideology | -0.00472 | -0.00186 |
|  | (0.00474) | (0.00762) |  | (0.00405) | (0.00629) |  | (0.00418) | (0.00650) |
| Inflation: 2% | 0.0219 | 0.0300 | Ditch euro | -0.389\*\* | -0.767\*\* | Constant | 0.691\*\* | 2.693\*\* |
|  | (0.0297) | (0.0484) |  | (0.0223) | (0.0388) |  | (0.0393) | (0.0648) |
| Inflation: 5% | 0.0107 | -0.0829 | Ditch euro × Left-Right Ideology | 0.0351\*\* | 0.0787\*\* | Observations | 9,396 | 9,396 |
|  | (0.0304) | (0.0480) |  | (0.00359) | (0.00629) | R-squared | 0.087 | 0.102 |
| Inflation: 8% | -0.108\*\* | -0.139\*\* | Budget control: Less | -0.00326 | 0.00146 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0302) | (0.0475) |  | (0.0256) | (0.0410) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Note: See Table S11. | | | | | | | | |

## FIGURE S9 Effects of Selected Attributes on the Probability of Economic Program Being Selected by Ideology



Note: See Figure S5 for the reference categories.

## TABLE S14 Interaction between Attributes of a Fiscal Union Scheme and Ideology

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 | 2 |  | 1 | 2 |  | 1 | 2 |
| Tax rate: 3‰ | -0.0292 | -0.0239 | Education | 0.0318 | 0.0276 | Spend. inst.: Gov’t × Left-Right Ideology | 0.00750\* | 0.00530 |
|  | (0.0304) | (0.0435) |  | (0.0336) | (0.0489) |  | (0.00355) | (0.00529) |
| Tax rate: 5‰ | -0.0338 | -0.0215 | Infrastructure | -0.0410 | -0.0817 | Auditing: Eu. Commission | -0.0758\*\* | -0.0643 |
|  | (0.0301) | (0.0458) |  | (0.0346) | (0.0510) |  | (0.0266) | (0.0389) |
| Tax rate: 10‰ | -0.0809\*\* | -0.0700 | No earmarked | -0.0135 | -0.0858 | Auditing: It. Auditors Court | -0.160\*\* | -0.196\*\* |
|  | (0.0312) | (0.0476) |  | (0.0356) | (0.0513) |  | (0.0268) | (0.0403) |
| Left-Right Ideology | 0.00293 | -0.0193\* | Education × Left-Right Ideology | -0.0204\*\* | -0.0122 | Auditing:Eu.Commission × Left-Right Ideology | 0.00815\* | 0.00764 |
|  | (0.00603) | (0.00960) |  | (0.00542) | (0.00853) |  | (0.00402) | (0.00620) |
| Tax rate: 3‰ × Left-Right Ideology | 0.000709 | -0.00271 | Unemployment benefits × Left-Right Ideology | -0.00835 | -0.00624 | Auditing: It. Auditors Court × Left-Right Ideology | 0.0169\*\* | 0.0167\* |
|  | (0.00471) | (0.00701) |  | (0.00527) | (0.00799) |  | (0.00413) | (0.00651) |
| Tax rate: 5‰ × Left-Right Ideology | -0.00601 | -0.0107 | Infrastructure × Left-Right Ideology | 8.49e-05 | 0.00817 | Constant | 0.714\*\* | 2.916\*\* |
|  | (0.00480) | (0.00742) |  | (0.00538) | (0.00811) |  | (0.0380) | (0.0576) |
| Tax rate: 10‰ × Left-Right Ideology | -0.0112\* | -0.0222\*\* | No earmarked × Left-Right Ideology | -0.00620 | 0.00262 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.00486) | (0.00764) |  | (0.00550) | (0.00842) |  |  |  |
| Tax type: Additional | -0.174\*\* | -0.167\*\* | Spending type: Additional | 0.0184 | -0.0519 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0212) | (0.0330) |  | (0.0208) | (0.0311) |  |  |  |
| Tax type: Additional × Left-Right Ideology | 0.00259 | -0.0126\* | Spending type: Additional × Left-Right Ideology | -0.00853\*\* | 0.000776 | Observations | 9,692 | 9,692 |
|  | (0.00336) | (0.00546) |  | (0.00324) | (0.00504) | R-squared | 0.050 | 0.057 |
| Unemployment benefits | 0.106\*\* | 0.0823 | Spending inst.: Government | -0.0877\*\* | -0.0703\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0344) | (0.0521) |  | (0.0226) | (0.0332) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Note: See Table S12. | | | | | | | | |

## TABLE S15 Interaction between Attributes of an Economic Policy Program and Assessment of EU Membership

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 | 2 |  | 1 | 2 |  | 1 | 2 |
| Unemployment: 7% | 0.0879\*\* | 0.127\*\* | Inflation: 2% | -0.0255 | -0.00166 | Tax-spend: Less × Membership: Bad | 0.0396 | -0.00567 |
|  | (0.0223) | (0.0330) |  | (0.0221) | (0.0337) |  | (0.0328) | (0.0519) |
| Unemployment: 3% | 0.180\*\* | 0.239\*\* | Inflation: 5% | -0.0876\*\* | -0.0403 | Tax-spend: Less × Membership: Good | -0.0471 | -0.111\*\* |
|  | (0.0232) | (0.0334) |  | (0.0229) | (0.0328) |  | (0.0257) | (0.0381) |
| Unemployment: 1% | 0.189\*\* | 0.284\*\* | Inflation: 8% | -0.123\*\* | -0.110\*\* | Tax-spend: More × Membership: Bad | -0.0552 | -0.0981\* |
|  | (0.0220) | (0.0337) |  | (0.0225) | (0.0332) |  | (0.0326) | (0.0491) |
| Membership: Bad | -0.114\* | -0.215\*\* | Inflation: 2% × Membership: Bad | 0.0372 | 0.0137 | Tax-spend: More × Membership: Good | 0.0271 | 0.0603 |
|  | (0.0487) | (0.0771) |  | (0.0372) | (0.0565) |  | (0.0251) | (0.0364) |
| Membership: Good | 0.112\*\* | 0.239\*\* | Inflation: 2% × Membership: Good | 0.0201 | -0.0457 | Ditch euro | -0.0876\*\* | -0.0903\*\* |
|  | (0.0374) | (0.0560) |  | (0.0285) | (0.0436) |  | (0.0173) | (0.0253) |
| Unemployment: 7% × Membership: Bad | -0.0288 | -0.0151 | Inflation: 5% × Membership: Bad | 0.0466 | -0.0180 | Ditch euro × Membership: Bad | 0.283\*\* | 0.504\*\* |
|  | (0.0360) | (0.0546) |  | (0.0387) | (0.0547) |  | (0.0273) | (0.0440) |
| Unemployment: 7% × Membership: Good | 0.0219 | 0.0203 | Inflation: 5% × Membership: Good | 0.0734\* | -0.0842 | Ditch euro × Membership: Good | -0.257\*\* | -0.558\*\* |
|  | (0.0280) | (0.0428) |  | (0.0291) | (0.0429) |  | (0.0213) | (0.0333) |
| Unemployment: 3% × Membership: Bad | -0.104\*\* | -0.0471 | Inflation: 8% × Membership: Bad | 0.0355 | 0.000829 | Budget control: Less | 0.0762\*\* | 0.0637\* |
|  | (0.0375) | (0.0585) |  | (0.0387) | (0.0580) |  | (0.0196) | (0.0292) |
| Unemployment: 3% × Membership: Good | -0.0140 | -0.0121 | Inflation: 8% × Membership: Good | 0.00729 | -0.0778 | Budget control: More | -0.0297 | -0.0473 |
|  | (0.0290) | (0.0435) |  | (0.0287) | (0.0433) |  | (0.0194) | (0.0291) |
| Unemployment: 1% × Membership: Bad | -0.0589 | -0.0194 | Tax-spend: Less | -0.00908 | 0.00185 | Budget control: Less × Membership: Bad | -0.0473 | 0.0177 |
|  | (0.0358) | (0.0567) |  | (0.0204) | (0.0297) |  | (0.0324) | (0.0515) |
| Unemployment: 1% × Membership: Good | -0.0486 | -0.0720 | Tax-spend: More | -0.0380 | -0.0763\*\* | Budget control: Less × Membership: Good | -0.0610\* | -0.0462 |
|  | (0.0281) | (0.0438) |  | (0.0197) | (0.0286) |  | (0.0247) | (0.0374) |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Budget control: More × Membership: Bad | 0.000490 | 0.00960 | Observations | 11,388 | 11,388 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0328) | (0.0494) | R-squared | 0.106 | 0.139 |  |  |  |
| Budget control: More × Membership: Good | -0.0114 | 0.0204 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0247) | (0.0371) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| EU tax-spend: Additional | -0.120\*\* | -0.111\*\* |  | |  |  | | |
|  | (0.0189) | (0.0284) |  |  |  |
| EU tax-spend: Alternate | -0.0488\* | -0.0417 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0195) | (0.0284) |  |  |  |
| EU tax-spend: Additional × Membership: Bad | 0.0328 | -0.0736 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0327) | (0.0472) |  |  |  |
| EU tax-spend: Additional × Membership: Good | 0.0539\* | 0.0634 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0246) | (0.0373) |  |  |  |
| EU tax-spend: Alternate × Membership: Bad | -0.0101 | -0.0421 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0322) | (0.0476) |  |  |  |
| EU tax-spend: Alternate × Membership: Good | 0.0393 | 0.0828\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0250) | (0.0370) |  |  |  |
| Constant | 0.548\*\* | 2.364\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0289) | (0.0425) |  |  |  |
| Note: See Table S11. | |  |  |  |  |  | | |

## TABLE S16 Interaction between Attributes of a Fiscal Union Scheme and Assessment of EU Membership

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 | 2 |  | 1 | 2 |  | 1 | 2 |
| Tax rate: 3‰ | -0.0306 | -0.0329 | Tax rate: 10‰ × Membership: Good | 0.0745\* | 0.0876 | Education × Membership: Bad | -0.0335 | -0.0308 |
|  | (0.0235) | (0.0348) |  | (0.0302) | (0.0447) |  | (0.0403) | (0.0589) |
| Tax rate: 5‰ | -0.113\*\* | -0.141\*\* | Tax type: Additional | -0.146\*\* | -0.218\*\* | Education × Membership: Good | 0.0522 | 0.0785 |
|  | (0.0236) | (0.0337) |  | (0.0166) | (0.0249) |  | (0.0338) | (0.0453) |
| Tax rate: 10‰ | -0.202\*\* | -0.233\*\* | Tax type: Additional × Membership: Bad | -0.000858 | -0.0468 | Infrastructure × Membership: Bad | 0.0156 | -0.0280 |
|  | (0.0234) | (0.0352) |  | (0.0252) | (0.0409) |  | (0.0412) | (0.0624) |
| Membership: Bad | 0.0143 | -0.240\*\* | Tax type: Additional × Membership: Good | -0.0122 | -0.0134 | Infrastructure × Membership: Good | 0.0717\* | 0.0743 |
|  | (0.0450) | (0.0731) |  | (0.0213) | (0.0320) |  | (0.0344) | (0.0487) |
| Membership: Good | 0.0283 | 0.121\* | Unemployment benefits | 0.0354 | 0.0163 | No earmarked × Membership: Bad | -0.0248 | -0.0198 |
|  | (0.0376) | (0.0589) |  | (0.0262) | (0.0397) |  | (0.0415) | (0.0638) |
| Tax rate: 3‰ × Membership: Bad | -0.00171 | -0.0335 | Education | -0.0472 | -0.0414 | No earmarked × Membership: Good | 0.0326 | 0.0248 |
|  | (0.0358) | (0.0543) |  | (0.0268) | (0.0347) |  | (0.0351) | (0.0487) |
| Tax rate: 3‰ × Membership: Good | 0.00535 | -0.00210 | Infrastructure | -0.0962\*\* | -0.0747\* | Spending type: Additional | -0.0201 | -0.0307 |
|  | (0.0297) | (0.0432) |  | (0.0270) | (0.0378) |  | (0.0167) | (0.0239) |
| Tax rate: 5‰ × Membership: Bad | 0.0417 | 0.0314 | Not earmarked | -0.0691\* | -0.0979\*\* | Sp. type: Additional × Membership: Bad | -0.0684\*\* | -0.00349 |
|  | (0.0366) | (0.0536) |  | (0.0274) | (0.0379) |  | (0.0250) | (0.0386) |
| Tax rate: 5‰ × Membership: Good | 0.0556 | 0.110\* | Unempl. benefits × Membership: Bad | -0.0720 | 0.0108 | Sp. type: Additional × Membership: Good | -0.00993 | -0.0263 |
|  | (0.0303) | (0.0431) |  | (0.0405) | (0.0649) |  | (0.0212) | (0.0302) |
| Tax rate: 10‰ × Membership: Bad | 0.0561 | -0.0178 | Unempl. benefits × Membership: Good | -0.0562 | 3.05e-05 | Spending inst.: Government | -0.0230 | -0.0341 |
|  | (0.0361) | (0.0573) |  | (0.0341) | (0.0500) |  | (0.0169) | (0.0245) |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Sp. inst.: Government × Membership: Bad | 0.0541\* | 0.0479 | Observations | 11,800 | 11,800 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0262) | (0.0396) | R-squared | 0.053 | 0.083 |  |  |  |
| Sp. inst.: Government × Membership: Good | -0.0599\*\* | -0.0529 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0217) | (0.0312) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Auditing: Eu. Commission | -0.0196 | -0.0535 |  |  |  |  | | |
|  | (0.0204) | (0.0300) |  |  |  |
| Auditing: It. Auditors Court | -0.00322 | -0.0706\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0204) | (0.0313) |  |  |  |
| Auditing: Eu. Comm. × Membership: Bad | -0.00333 | 0.0445 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0311) | (0.0483) |  |  |  |
| Auditing: Eu. Comm. × Membership: Good | -0.00878 | 0.0254 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0262) | (0.0382) |  |  |  |
| Auditing: It. Auditors Court × Membership: Bad | -0.0131 | 0.0274 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0318) | (0.0486) |  |  |  |
| Auditing: It. Audit. Court × Membership: Good | -0.115\*\* | -0.0759 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0263) | (0.0395) |  |  |  |
| Constant | 0.725\*\* | 2.787\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0296) | (0.0479) |  |  |  |
| Note: See Table S12. | |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## FIGURE S10 Effects of Program and Scheme Attributes on the Probability of Being Selected by Assessment of EU Membership



Note: See Figure S5 for the reference categories.

## TABLE S17 Interaction between Attributes of an Economic Policy Program and European Identity

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 | 2 |  | 1 | 2 |  | 1 | 2 |
| Unemployment: 7% | 0.104\*\* | 0.127\*\* | Inflation: 2% × European Identity | 0.000582 | -0.00938 | Budget control: More | -0.0247 | -0.0139 |
|  | (0.0231) | (0.0368) |  | (0.00399) | (0.00632) |  | (0.0206) | (0.0328) |
| Unemployment: 3% | 0.183\*\* | 0.210\*\* | Inflation: 5% × European Identity | -0.000179 | -0.00152 | Budget control: Less × European Identity | 0.00577 | 0.0133\* |
|  | (0.0231) | (0.0373) |  | (0.00400) | (0.00614) |  | (0.00343) | (0.00565) |
| Unemployment: 1% | 0.167\*\* | 0.233\*\* | Inflation: 8% × European Identity | 0.00337 | -0.00625 | Budget control: More × European Identity | -0.000505 | -0.00211 |
|  | (0.0227) | (0.0379) |  | (0.00402) | (0.00651) |  | (0.00350) | (0.00548) |
| European Identity | -0.0105\* | -0.0149 | Tax-spend: Less | -0.0470\* | -0.0665\* | EU tax-spend: Additional | -0.0458\* | -0.0393 |
|  | (0.00506) | (0.00837) |  | (0.0205) | (0.0334) |  | (0.0207) | (0.0329) |
| Unemployment: 7% × European Identity | -0.00187 | 0.00105 | Tax-spend: More | -0.00264 | -0.00840 | EU tax-spend: Alternate | 0.0346 | 0.0766\* |
|  | (0.00380) | (0.00609) |  | (0.0202) | (0.0311) |  | (0.0202) | (0.0323) |
| Unemployment: 3% × European Identity | -0.00533 | 0.00299 | Tax-spend: Less × European Identity | 0.00439 | 0.00199 | EU tax-spend: Additional × European Identity | -0.00820\* | -0.0110\* |
|  | (0.00395) | (0.00639) |  | (0.00345) | (0.00563) |  | (0.00347) | (0.00540) |
| Unemployment: 1% × European Identity | -0.00164 | 0.00169 | Tax-spend: More × European Identity | -0.00673\* | -0.0115\* | EU tax-spend: Alternate × European Identity | -0.0126\*\* | -0.0173\*\* |
|  | (0.00386) | (0.00639) |  | (0.00342) | (0.00532) |  | (0.00342) | (0.00530) |
| Inflation: 2% | -0.00712 | 0.0412 | Ditch euro | -0.336\*\* | -0.643\*\* | Constant | 0.624\*\* | 2.505\*\* |
|  | (0.0233) | (0.0376) |  | (0.0174) | (0.0322) |  | (0.0304) | (0.0497) |
| Inflation: 5% | -0.0421 | -0.0755\* | Ditch euro × European Identity | 0.0361\*\* | 0.0769\*\* | Observations | 11,404 | 11,404 |
|  | (0.0235) | (0.0372) |  | (0.00297) | (0.00529) | R-squared | 0.075 | 0.090 |
| Inflation: 8% | -0.133\*\* | -0.122\*\* | Budget control: Less | 0.0150 | -0.00537 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0233) | (0.0382) |  | (0.0196) | (0.0327) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Note: See Table S11. | | | | | | | | |

## TABLE S18 Interaction between Attributes of a Fiscal Union Scheme and European Identity

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 | 2 |  | 1 | 2 |  | 1 | 2 |
| Tax rate: 3‰ | -0.0712 | -0.0375 | Education | 0.0543 | -0.0681 | Spend. inst.: Gov’t × European Identity | 0.0384\*\* | -0.0328\*\* |
|  | (0.0377) | (0.0335) |  | (0.0426) | (0.0366) |  | (0.0109) | (0.00969) |
| Tax rate: 5‰ | -0.0754 | -0.136\*\* | Infrastructure | 0.0312 | -0.0731 | Auditing: Eu. Commission | 0.0416 | -0.0499 |
|  | (0.0390) | (0.0345) |  | (0.0431) | (0.0386) |  | (0.0334) | (0.0298) |
| Tax rate: 10‰ | -0.135\*\* | -0.266\*\* | No earmarked | -0.0251 | -0.0308 | Auditing: It. Auditors Court | -0.136\*\* | -0.00411 |
|  | (0.0382) | (0.0343) |  | (0.0449) | (0.0380) |  | (0.0338) | (0.0301) |
| European Identity | -0.00881 | -0.00106 | Education × European Identity | 0.00582 | -0.0280 | Auditing:Eu.Commission × European Identity | -0.0274\* | 0.0108 |
|  | (0.0192) | (0.0172) |  | (0.0169) | (0.0149) |  | (0.0133) | (0.0118) |
| Tax rate: 3‰ × European Identity | 0.0163 | 0.00355 | Unemployment benefits × European Identity | -0.0329\* | 0.0192 | Auditing: It. Audit. Court × European Identity | 0.0319\* | -0.0228 |
|  | (0.0147) | (0.0136) |  | (0.0167) | (0.0146) |  | (0.0134) | (0.0120) |
| Tax rate: 5‰ × European Identity | -0.00277 | 0.0264 | Infrastructure × European Identity | -0.0345\* | 0.00972 | Constant | 0.761\*\* | 0.731\*\* |
|  | (0.0153) | (0.0138) |  | (0.0172) | (0.0151) |  | (0.0488) | (0.0431) |
| Tax rate: 10‰ × European Identity | -0.0113 | 0.0473\*\* | No earmarked × European Identity | -0.0125 | -0.00848 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0151) | (0.0136) |  | (0.0175) | (0.0152) |  |  |  |
| Tax type: Additional | -0.189\*\* | -0.110\*\* | Spending type: Additional | -0.0145 | -0.0913\*\* |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0270) | (0.0241) |  | (0.0265) | (0.0240) |  |  |  |
| Tax type: Additional × European Identity | 0.0149 | -0.0178 | Spending type: Additional × European Identity | -0.0109 | 0.0238\* | Observations | 11,988 | 11,200 |
|  | (0.0107) | (0.00957) |  | (0.0104) | (0.00939) | R-squared | 0.049 | 0.049 |
| Unemployment benefits | -0.0161 | 0.0675 | Spending inst.: Government | -0.130\*\* | 0.0419 |  |  |  |
|  | (0.0435) | (0.0373) |  | (0.0276) | (0.0245) |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Notes: Ordinary least squared coefficients with standard errors clustered on respondents in parentheses. \*\*p < 0.01, \*p< 0.05. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a scheme is chosen. In model 1, we used the measure of identity employed in models 1a and 2a of Table 1, in model 2, the measure in models 1b and 2b of Table 1. See Table S12 for the reference categories. | | | | | | | | |

## Further Analysis: European Identity and Conjoint Analyses

Figure S11 displays selected marginal effects derived from models with interactions between measures of European identity and features of economic policy programs (left column) and of fiscal union schemes (right column).[[4]](#footnote-5)

In line with H4, respondents who perceive EU membership weakening their cultural identity sanction more severely any expansion of EU fiscal capacity (and approve leaving the Eurozone, but there is no significant interaction between identity and budgetary oversight). But, contrary to this expectation, participants who feel less European are neither less willing to contribute nor more opposed to additional taxation and spending. We find significant interactions with the willingness to contribute only if we use the measure, employed in models 1b and 2b of Table 1, which assumes mutually exclusivity between Italian and European identity. Respondents with stronger national identity punish more severely schemes with higher tax rates, additional spending and taxation.

Finally, further corroborating H4, stronger European identity leads to opposition to schemes involving national institutions (see right column of Figure S11).

## FIGURE S11 Effects of Selected Attributes on the Probability of Economic Program or Fiscal Scheme Being Selected by Identity



Note: See Figure S5 for the reference categories. Clockwise from top left panel F-test *p*-values greater than: 0.0000; 0.000; 0.0388; 0.0170; 0.018; 0.000. The Commission is also preferred to the national court of auditors by respondents with strong European identity (F-test *p*-value > 0.000).

## TABLE S19 Interaction between Attributes of a Fiscal Union Scheme and Trust

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 | 2 | 3 |  | 1 | 2 | 3 |  | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Tax rate: 3‰ | -0.0485 | -0.0308 | -0.0926\*\* | Tax type: Additional × Trust | 0.00351 | 0.0154 | 0.0109 | Spending type: Additional × Trust | 0.00323 | 0.0280\* | 0.00760 |
|  | (0.0248) | (0.0345) | (0.0320) |  | (0.00570) | (0.0111) | (0.0117) |  | (0.00560) | (0.0109) | (0.0114) |
| Tax rate: 5‰ | -0.127\*\* | -0.0601 | -0.191\*\* | Unemployment benefits | -0.0323 | 0.0196 | -0.0696 | Spending inst.: Government | -0.0483\* | 0.0203 | -0.0417 |
|  | (0.0262) | (0.0354) | (0.0327) |  | (0.0295) | (0.0398) | (0.0376) |  | (0.0187) | (0.0248) | (0.0243) |
| Tax rate: 10‰ | -0.227\*\* | -0.222\*\* | -0.251\*\* | Education | -0.0928\*\* | -0.0534 | -0.0582 | Spend. inst.: Gov’t × Trust | 0.00462 | -0.0264\* | 0.00188 |
|  | (0.0265) | (0.0353) | (0.0331) |  | (0.0279) | (0.0381) | (0.0365) |  | (0.00574) | (0.0109) | (0.0119) |
| Interpersonal Trust | -0.0314\*\* |  |  | Infrastructure | -0.0844\*\* | -0.0418 | -0.0717 | Auditing: Eu. Commission | -0.0251 | -0.0128 | -0.0441 |
|  | (0.0101) |  |  |  | (0.0296) | (0.0407) | (0.0375) |  | (0.0223) | (0.0300) | (0.0291) |
| Trustworthiness: EU |  | -0.00398 |  | No earmarked | -0.130\*\* | -0.0712 | -0.0710 | Auditing: It. Auditors Court | -0.0663\*\* | -0.00613 | -0.0234 |
|  |  | (0.0197) |  |  | (0.0297) | (0.0396) | (0.0379) |  | (0.0226) | (0.0307) | (0.0288) |
| Trustworthiness: Greek Gov’t |  |  | -0.0581\*\* | Education × Trust | 0.0105 | -0.0116 | 0.0320 | Auditing: Eu. Commission × Trust | 0.000539 | -0.00598 | 0.00875 |
|  |  |  | (0.0200) |  | (0.00918) | (0.0179) | (0.0183) |  | (0.00681) | (0.0135) | (0.0142) |
| Tax rate: 3‰ × Trust | 0.00612 | 7.13e-07 | 0.0327\* | Unemployment benefits × Trust | 0.0242\*\* | 0.0151 | 0.0169 | Auditing: It. Audit. Court × Trust | 0.00161 | -0.0262 | -0.0220 |
|  | (0.00774) | (0.0157) | (0.0160) |  | (0.00878) | (0.0171) | (0.0181) |  | (0.00698) | (0.0137) | (0.0143) |
| Tax rate: 5‰ × Trust | 0.0152 | -0.00859 | 0.0621\*\* | Infrastructure × Trust | 0.00975 | -0.00483 | 0.00808 | Constant | 0.828\*\* | 0.744\*\* | 0.853\*\* |
|  | (0.00811) | (0.0159) | (0.0161) |  | (0.00913) | (0.0181) | (0.0184) |  | (0.0324) | (0.0442) | (0.0408) |
| Tax rate: 10‰ × Trust | 0.0238\*\* | 0.0317\* | 0.0509\*\* | No earmarked × Trust | 0.0254\*\* | 0.00676 | 0.00648 |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.00822) | (0.0159) | (0.0167) |  | (0.00920) | (0.0178) | (0.0192) | Observations | 12,272 | 12,056 | 11,292 |
| Tax type: Additional | -0.159\*\* | -0.183\*\* | -0.177\*\* | Spending type: Additional | -0.0501\*\* | -0.0989\*\* | -0.0555\* | R-squared | 0.046 | 0.046 | 0.048 |
|  | (0.0186) | (0.0248) | (0.0238) |  | (0.0179) | (0.0248) | (0.0231) |  |  |  |  |
| Notes: Ordinary least squared coefficients with standard errors clustered on respondents in parentheses. \*\*p < 0.01, \*p< 0.05. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a scheme is chosen. See Table S12 for the reference categories. | | | | | | | | | | | |

## FIGURE S12 Effects of Selected Fiscal Union Tax Rates on the Probability of Being Selected by Interpersonal Trust



Notes: Marginal effects of interactions between selected tax rates and interpersonal trust, with 95% confidence intervals. The reference category is the 1‰ tax rate. F-test *p*-values greater than: 0.061 (left panel); 0.004 (right panel)

## TABLE S20 Full Models (Economic Policy)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1 | 2 |  | 1 | 2 |  | 1 | 2 |
| Unemployment: 7% | 0.0622 | 0.0872\* | Unemployment: 3% × High income | 0.0393 | 0.0281 | Inflation: 5% × Low income | -0.00743 | -0.00495 |
|  | (0.0475) | (0.0391) |  | (0.0475) | (0.0490) |  | (0.0362) | (0.0365) |
| Unemployment: 3% | 0.184\*\* | 0.168\*\* | Unemployment: 1% × Unemployed | 0.0560 | 0.0604 | Inflation: 5% × High income | -0.0197 | -0.00399 |
|  | (0.0481) | (0.0398) |  | (0.0439) | (0.0449) |  | (0.0465) | (0.0470) |
| Unemployment: 1% | 0.200\*\* | 0.159\*\* | Unemployment: 1% × Low income | 0.0697\* | 0.0745\* | Inflation: 8% × Unemployed | -0.00111 | -0.00282 |
|  | (0.0454) | (0.0379) |  | (0.0354) | (0.0353) |  | (0.0482) | (0.0485) |
| Unemployed | -0.0959 | -0.120 | Unemployment: 1% × High income | -0.0205 | -0.0225 | Inflation: 8% × Low income | 0.0550 | 0.0538 |
|  | (0.0632) | (0.0642) |  | (0.0453) | (0.0453) |  | (0.0359) | (0.0358) |
| Low income | -0.156\*\* | -0.170\*\* | Inflation: 2% | -0.0285 | 0.0254 | Inflation: 8% × High income | -0.0167 | -0.0197 |
|  | (0.0471) | (0.0467) |  | (0.0453) | (0.0393) |  | (0.0447) | (0.0450) |
| High income | -0.0107 | -0.0228 | Inflation: 5% | -0.0479 | 0.0205 | Tax-spend: Less | -0.171\*\* | -0.176\*\* |
|  | (0.0631) | (0.0634) |  | (0.0473) | (0.0398) |  | (0.0419) | (0.0349) |
| Unemployment: 7% × Unemployed | -0.0325 | -0.0535 | Inflation: 8% | -0.117\* | -0.107\*\* | Tax-spend: More | -0.0244 | 0.0131 |
|  | (0.0459) | (0.0478) |  | (0.0474) | (0.0405) |  | (0.0415) | (0.0334) |
| Unemployment: 7% × Low income | 0.0552 | 0.0696\* | Inflation: 2% × Unemployed | 0.0358 | 0.0439 | Tax-spend: Less × Unemployed | 0.0339 | 0.0327 |
|  | (0.0344) | (0.0345) |  | (0.0458) | (0.0466) |  | (0.0406) | (0.0411) |
| Unemployment: 7% × High income | -0.0386 | -0.0277 | Inflation: 2% × Low income | 0.0391 | 0.0480 | Tax-spend: Less × Low income | 0.0401 | 0.0326 |
|  | (0.0445) | (0.0446) |  | (0.0361) | (0.0363) |  | (0.0320) | (0.0316) |
| Unemployment: 3% × Unemployed | 0.00606 | -0.000488 | Inflation: 2% × High income | 0.0318 | 0.0265 | Tax-spend: Less × High income | 0.0663 | 0.0843\* |
|  | (0.0456) | (0.0472) |  | (0.0440) | (0.0440) |  | (0.0410) | (0.0408) |
| Unemployment: 3% × Low income | 0.0798\* | 0.0912\* | Inflation: 5% × Unemployed | 0.0325 | 0.0348 | Tax-spend: More × Unemployed | 0.0212 | 0.0199 |
|  | (0.0354) | (0.0355) |  | (0.0477) | (0.0493) |  | (0.0412) | (0.0412) |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Tax-spend: More × Low income | 0.0363 | 0.0379 | Budget control: More × Unemployed | 0.0306 | 0.0485 | Left-Right Ideology | -0.00717 | -0.0137 |
|  | (0.0318) | (0.0316) |  | (0.0435) | (0.0443) |  | (0.00745) | (0.00697) |
| Tax-spend: More × High income | 0.0723 | 0.0949\* | Budget control: More × Low income | 0.0258 | 0.0256 | Unemployment: 7% × Left-Right Ideology | 0.00460 | 0.00219 |
|  | (0.0414) | (0.0422) |  | (0.0301) | (0.0303) |  | (0.00542) | (0.00527) |
| Ditch euro | -0.238\*\* | -0.519\*\* | Budget control: More × High income | -0.00418 | 0.00184 | Unemployment: 3% × Left-Right Ideology | -0.00265 | -0.00297 |
|  | (0.0347) | (0.0280) |  | (0.0405) | (0.0413) |  | (0.00572) | (0.00538) |
| Ditch euro × Unemployed | 0.0257 | 0.0789\* | EU tax-spend: Additional | -0.135\*\* | -0.0368 | Unemployment: 1% × Left-Right Ideology | -0.00392 | -0.00456 |
|  | (0.0331) | (0.0353) |  | (0.0411) | (0.0350) |  | (0.00547) | (0.00519) |
| Ditch euro × Low income | 0.0212 | 0.0318 | EU tax-spend: Alternate | -0.0900\* | 0.0276 | Inflation: 2% × Left-Right Ideology | -0.00789 | -0.00742 |
|  | (0.0261) | (0.0270) |  | (0.0406) | (0.0342) |  | (0.00548) | (0.00532) |
| Ditch euro × High income | -0.00835 | -0.00379 | EU tax-spend: Additional × Unemployed | 0.0271 | 0.0167 | Inflation: 5% × Left-Right Ideology | -0.0114\* | -0.0125\* |
|  | (0.0337) | (0.0348) |  | (0.0401) | (0.0411) |  | (0.00562) | (0.00545) |
| Budget control: Less | 0.0375 | -0.0538 | EU tax-spend: Additional × Low income | 0.0205 | 0.0247 | Inflation: 8% × Left-Right Ideology | -0.00507 | -0.00387 |
|  | (0.0416) | (0.0330) |  | (0.0315) | (0.0315) |  | (0.00563) | (0.00547) |
| Budget control: More | -0.0406 | -0.0654 | EU tax-spend: Additional × High income | -0.0316 | -0.0428 | Tax-spend: Less × Left-Right Ideology | 0.0216\*\* | 0.0239\*\* |
|  | (0.0406) | (0.0343) |  | (0.0409) | (0.0412) |  | (0.00485) | (0.00472) |
| Budget control: Less × Unemployed | 0.0266 | 0.0296 | EU tax-spend: Alternate × Unemployed | 0.0310 | 0.0293 | Tax-spend: More × Left-Right Ideology | -0.00617 | -0.00830 |
|  | (0.0409) | (0.0413) |  | (0.0415) | (0.0424) |  | (0.00479) | (0.00458) |
| Budget control: Less × Low income | 0.0606 | 0.0620\* | EU tax-spend: Alternate × Low income | 0.0310 | 0.0412 | Ditch euro × Left-Right Ideology | 0.0156\*\* | 0.0274\*\* |
|  | (0.0310) | (0.0307) |  | (0.0313) | (0.0316) |  | (0.00412) | (0.00408) |
| Budget control: Less × High income | 0.0102 | 0.0126 | EU tax-spend: Alternate × High income | -0.0575 | -0.0653 | Budget control: Less × Left-Right Ideology | 0.00307 | 0.00341 |
|  | (0.0385) | (0.0394) |  | (0.0409) | (0.0402) |  | (0.00478) | (0.00465) |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Budget control: More × Left-Right Ideology | 0.00128 | 0.00295 | Inflation: 2% × Membership: Bad / E.I. | 0.0829 | -0.00184 | Ditch euro × Membership: Good | -0.196\*\* |  |
|  | (0.00480) | (0.00461) |  | (0.0476) | (0.00492) |  | (0.0264) |  |
| EU tax-spend: Additional × Left-Right Ideology | -0.00299 | -0.00194 | Inflation: 2% × Membership: Good | 0.0554 |  | Budget control: Less × Membership: Bad / E.I. | -0.0527 | 0.0107\* |
|  | (0.00490) | (0.00469) |  | (0.0347) |  |  | (0.0420) | (0.00422) |
| EU tax-spend: Alternate × Left-Right Ideology | 0.000696 | 0.00152 | Inflation: 5% × Membership: Bad / E.I. | 0.111\* | 0.000624 | Budget control: Less × Membership: Good | -0.0603 |  |
|  | (0.00480) | (0.00471) |  | (0.0508) | (0.00491) |  | (0.0309) |  |
| Membership: Bad / European Identity (E.I.) | -0.152\* | -0.00712 | Inflation: 5% × Membership: Good | 0.0910\*\* |  | Budget control: More × Membership: Bad / E.I. | 0.0114 | 0.00359 |
|  | (0.0646) | (0.00622) |  | (0.0350) |  |  | (0.0422) | (0.00427) |
| Membership: Good | 0.0443 |  | Inflation: 8% × Membership: Bad / E.I. | 0.0555 | -0.000192 | Budget control: More × Membership: Good | -0.0128 |  |
|  | (0.0461) |  |  | (0.0490) | (0.00489) |  | (0.0305) |  |
| Unemployment: 7% × Membership: Bad / E.I. | -0.0502 | -0.000615 | Inflation: 8% × Membership: Good | 0.0165 |  | EU tax-spend: Additional × Membership: Bad / E.I. | 0.0375 | -0.0113\*\* |
|  | (0.0457) | (0.00466) |  | (0.0351) |  |  | (0.0421) | (0.00434) |
| Unemployment: 7% × Membership: Good | 0.0343 |  | Tax-spend: Less × Membership: Bad / E.I. | 0.0313 | -0.00118 | EU tax-spend: Additional × Membership: Good | 0.0713\* |  |
|  | (0.0354) |  |  | (0.0411) | (0.00425) |  | (0.0307) |  |
| Unemployment: 3% × Membership: Bad / E.I. | -0.114\* | -0.00433 | Tax-spend: Less × Membership: Good | -0.00494 |  | EU tax-spend: Alternate × Membership: Bad / E.I. | 0.00953 | -0.0169\*\* |
|  | (0.0481) | (0.00482) |  | (0.0317) |  |  | (0.0407) | (0.00427) |
| Unemployment: 3% × Membership: Good | -0.0368 |  | Tax-spend: More × Membership: Bad / E.I. | -0.0474 | -0.00399 | EU tax-spend: Alternate × Membership: Good | 0.0702\* |  |
|  | (0.0363) |  |  | (0.0422) | (0.00428) |  | (0.0313) |  |
| Unemployment: 1% × Membership: Bad / E.I. | -0.0780 | 0.000246 | Tax-spend: More × Membership: Good | 0.0323 |  | Constant | 0.698\*\* | 0.767\*\* |
|  | (0.0454) | (0.00464) |  | (0.0317) |  |  | (0.0610) | (0.0514) |
| Unemployment: 1% × Membership: Good | -0.0636 |  | Ditch euro × Membership: Bad / E.I. | 0.307\*\* | 0.0313\*\* | Observations | 8,012 | 8,104 |
|  | (0.0348) |  |  | (0.0349) | (0.00370) | R-squared | 0.133 | 0.110 |

Notes: Ordinary least squared coefficients with standard errors clustered on respondents in parentheses. \*\*p < 0.01, \*p< 0.05. Reference categories: Unemployment: 13% Inflation: 0.5%; Taxation and spending: Adequate; Euro: Keep it; Budgetary control: Adequate. Model 1 includes the assessment of EU membership. Model 2 includes European identity (E.I.). The unit of analysis is an economic policy program.

Table S21 reports the models with the full set of interactions. Results hold to a large extent, especially considering that the identity, assessment and trustworthiness variables are fairly correlated. The interaction between trustworthiness and additional spending is the most robust.

## TABLE S21 Full Models (Fiscal Union)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Tax rate: 3‰ | -0.128 | -0.116 | -0.0577 | -0.0979 | -0.0624 | 0.00197 |
|  | (0.0673) | (0.0724) | (0.0619) | (0.0844) | (0.0684) | (0.0622) |
| Tax rate: 5‰ | -0.188\*\* | -0.198\*\* | -0.173\*\* | 0.00843 | -0.0527 | 0.00931 |
|  | (0.0678) | (0.0709) | (0.0617) | (0.0823) | (0.0665) | (0.0603) |
| Tax rate: 10‰ | -0.161\* | -0.274\*\* | -0.176\*\* | -0.197\* | -0.270\*\* | -0.178\*\* |
|  | (0.0666) | (0.0711) | (0.0627) | (0.0805) | (0.0683) | (0.0619) |
| Trustworthiness | -0.0378 | -0.0381 | -0.0343 | -0.00824 | 0.00299 | -0.0171 |
|  | (0.0231) | (0.0239) | (0.0234) | (0.0251) | (0.0247) | (0.0252) |
| Tax rate: 3‰ × Trustworthiness | 0.0239 | 0.0220 | 0.0179 | 0.00759 | -0.0131 | -0.00795 |
|  | (0.0185) | (0.0190) | (0.0188) | (0.0205) | (0.0201) | (0.0206) |
| Tax rate: 5‰ × Trustworthiness | 0.0496\*\* | 0.0480\* | 0.0481\* | -0.0207 | -0.0313 | -0.0296 |
|  | (0.0186) | (0.0193) | (0.0187) | (0.0204) | (0.0202) | (0.0206) |
| Tax rate: 10‰ × Trustworthiness | 0.0394\* | 0.0237 | 0.0364 | 0.0355 | 0.00566 | 0.0344 |
|  | (0.0191) | (0.0197) | (0.0191) | (0.0203) | (0.0199) | (0.0203) |
| Tax type: Additional | -0.235\*\* | -0.157\*\* | -0.208\*\* | -0.252\*\* | -0.146\*\* | -0.197\*\* |
|  | (0.0484) | (0.0512) | (0.0447) | (0.0573) | (0.0500) | (0.0439) |
| Tax type: Additional × Trustworthiness | 0.0275\* | 0.0265 | 0.0261 | 0.0240 | 0.0278\* | 0.0249 |
|  | (0.0137) | (0.0143) | (0.0137) | (0.0141) | (0.0141) | (0.0145) |
| Unemployment benefits | 0.00298 | 0.172\* | 0.112 | 0.120 | 0.216\*\* | 0.191\*\* |
|  | (0.0776) | (0.0823) | (0.0739) | (0.0914) | (0.0789) | (0.0705) |
| Education | 0.0554 | 0.0213 | 0.000831 | 0.0428 | -0.00506 | 0.0197 |
|  | (0.0731) | (0.0784) | (0.0700) | (0.0878) | (0.0750) | (0.0685) |
| Infrastructure | 0.0640 | -0.0319 | -0.0432 | 0.165 | -0.00438 | 0.000208 |
|  | (0.0730) | (0.0827) | (0.0731) | (0.0894) | (0.0808) | (0.0719) |
| No earmarked | 0.0193 | 0.0562 | 0.0382 | -0.0118 | 0.0321 | 0.00159 |
|  | (0.0759) | (0.0818) | (0.0720) | (0.0936) | (0.0778) | (0.0706) |
| Unemployment benefits × Trustworthiness | 0.0173 | 0.0214 | 0.0196 | -0.0170 | -0.0122 | -0.0138 |
|  | (0.0215) | (0.0221) | (0.0215) | (0.0226) | (0.0226) | (0.0232) |
| Education × Trustworthiness | -0.00479 | -0.00104 | -0.00198 | 0.00265 | 0.00858 | -0.00763 |
|  | (0.0207) | (0.0217) | (0.0209) | (0.0216) | (0.0218) | (0.0225) |
| Infrastructure × Trustworthiness | -0.0124 | 0.00229 | -0.00726 | -0.0385 | -0.0183 | -0.0203 |
|  | (0.0211) | (0.0222) | (0.0213) | (0.0227) | (0.0233) | (0.0230) |
| No earmarked × Trustworthiness | -0.0205 | -0.00704 | -0.0182 | -0.00117 | 0.00337 | -0.00983 |
|  | (0.0220) | (0.0229) | (0.0222) | (0.0227) | (0.0227) | (0.0230) |
| Spending type: Additional | 0.0217 | -0.0182 | 0.0391 | -0.100 | -0.0753 | -0.0426 |
|  | (0.0467) | (0.0509) | (0.0457) | (0.0569) | (0.0490) | (0.0439) |
| Spending type: Additional × Trustworthiness | -0.0101 | -0.0139 | -0.0101 | 0.0302\* | 0.0215 | 0.0293\* |
|  | (0.0135) | (0.0141) | (0.0136) | (0.0139) | (0.0137) | (0.0140) |
| Spending inst.: Government | -0.161\*\* | -0.0606 | -0.0866 | -0.117\* | -0.0108 | -0.0698 |
|  | (0.0493) | (0.0533) | (0.0462) | (0.0591) | (0.0497) | (0.0441) |
| Spending inst.: Government × Trustworthiness | 0.0128 | 0.0153 | 0.0137 | -0.00100 | -0.00657 | 0.0122 |
|  | (0.0138) | (0.0142) | (0.0138) | (0.0140) | (0.0137) | (0.0142) |
| Auditing: Eu. Commission | -0.0416 | -0.180\*\* | -0.125\* | 0.0487 | -0.149\* | -0.0952 |
|  | (0.0574) | (0.0637) | (0.0559) | (0.0692) | (0.0615) | (0.0547) |
| Auditing: It. Auditors Court | -0.197\*\* | -0.105 | -0.0842 | -0.223\*\* | -0.102 | -0.115\* |
|  | (0.0600) | (0.0645) | (0.0558) | (0.0719) | (0.0607) | (0.0540) |
| Auditing: Eu. Commission × Trustworthiness | 0.00218 | -0.00201 | 0.000455 | -0.0273 | -0.0166 | -0.0133 |
|  | (0.0165) | (0.0171) | (0.0165) | (0.0169) | (0.0168) | (0.0173) |
| Auditing: It. Auditors Court × Trustworthiness | -0.0133 | -0.0139 | -0.0163 | -0.00579 | -0.00952 | 0.00358 |
|  | (0.0168) | (0.0172) | (0.0168) | (0.0177) | (0.0173) | (0.0176) |
| Left-Right Ideology | 0.00146 | -0.00246 | 0.00318 | 0.00339 | -0.000548 | 0.00521 |
|  | (0.00672) | (0.00694) | (0.00696) | (0.00652) | (0.00683) | (0.00668) |
| Tax rate: 3‰ × Left-Right Ideology | 0.00359 | 0.00661 | 0.00468 | 0.000858 | 0.00454 | 0.00228 |
|  | (0.00520) | (0.00544) | (0.00541) | (0.00505) | (0.00527) | (0.00516) |
| Tax rate: 5‰ × Left-Right Ideology | -0.000630 | 0.00337 | 0.00153 | -0.00579 | -0.00171 | -0.00318 |
|  | (0.00532) | (0.00546) | (0.00546) | (0.00511) | (0.00528) | (0.00522) |
| Tax rate: 10‰ × Left-Right Ideology | -0.00953 | -0.00243 | -0.00869 | -0.00945 | -0.00123 | -0.00821 |
|  | (0.00534) | (0.00547) | (0.00547) | (0.00516) | (0.00530) | (0.00524) |
| Tax type: Additional × Left-Right Ideology | 0.00245 | 0.00164 | 0.00195 | 0.00208 | 0.00152 | 0.00138 |
|  | (0.00373) | (0.00389) | (0.00379) | (0.00363) | (0.00382) | (0.00367) |
| Unemployment benefits × Left-Right Ideology | -0.0197\*\* | -0.0217\*\* | -0.0210\*\* | -0.0219\*\* | -0.0229\*\* | -0.0226\*\* |
|  | (0.00603) | (0.00620) | (0.00627) | (0.00580) | (0.00601) | (0.00594) |
| Education × Left-Right Ideology | -0.00935 | -0.0107 | -0.00879 | -0.00819 | -0.00924 | -0.00811 |
|  | (0.00578) | (0.00599) | (0.00605) | (0.00563) | (0.00585) | (0.00582) |
| Infrastructure × Left-Right Ideology | -0.000295 | -0.00106 | -0.00279 | 0.000456 | -0.000149 | -0.00178 |
|  | (0.00609) | (0.00619) | (0.00627) | (0.00592) | (0.00609) | (0.00604) |
| No earmarked × Left-Right Ideology | -0.00880 | -0.00891 | -0.00851 | -0.00735 | -0.00793 | -0.00606 |
|  | (0.00616) | (0.00637) | (0.00633) | (0.00590) | (0.00615) | (0.00601) |
| Spending type: Additional × Left-Right Ideology | -0.00980\*\* | -0.00923\* | -0.00902\* | -0.00860\* | -0.00804\* | -0.00783\* |
|  | (0.00365) | (0.00379) | (0.00377) | (0.00348) | (0.00365) | (0.00357) |
| Spending inst.: Government × Left-Right Ideology | 0.00781\* | 0.00910\* | 0.00546 | 0.00653 | 0.00696 | 0.00346 |
|  | (0.00396) | (0.00412) | (0.00408) | (0.00380) | (0.00397) | (0.00389) |
| Auditing: Eu. Commission × Left-Right Ideology | 0.00957\* | 0.0111\* | 0.00835 | 0.00866\* | 0.0100\* | 0.00776 |
|  | (0.00451) | (0.00467) | (0.00468) | (0.00436) | (0.00456) | (0.00447) |
| Auditing: It. Auditors Court × Left-Right Ideology | 0.0149\*\* | 0.0157\*\* | 0.0134\*\* | 0.0157\*\* | 0.0154\*\* | 0.0135\*\* |
|  | (0.00469) | (0.00487) | (0.00483) | (0.00452) | (0.00471) | (0.00458) |
| Unemployed | 0.0130 | -0.0245 | 0.0170 | 0.00486 | -0.0162 | 0.0269 |
|  | (0.0649) | (0.0695) | (0.0665) | (0.0648) | (0.0697) | (0.0661) |
| Low income | 0.0258 | 0.0173 | 0.0376 | 0.0225 | 0.0117 | 0.0319 |
|  | (0.0424) | (0.0434) | (0.0427) | (0.0422) | (0.0431) | (0.0425) |
| High income | -0.166\*\* | -0.189\*\* | -0.164\*\* | -0.169\*\* | -0.189\*\* | -0.161\*\* |
|  | (0.0551) | (0.0571) | (0.0549) | (0.0549) | (0.0569) | (0.0547) |
| Tax rate: 3‰ × Unemployed | -0.0250 | -0.0260 | -0.0144 | -0.00234 | -0.00999 | 0.00344 |
|  | (0.0535) | (0.0574) | (0.0553) | (0.0532) | (0.0571) | (0.0551) |
| Tax rate: 3‰ × Low income | -0.0591 | -0.0594 | -0.0685\* | -0.0525 | -0.0525 | -0.0608 |
|  | (0.0340) | (0.0350) | (0.0346) | (0.0337) | (0.0345) | (0.0341) |
| Tax rate: 3‰ × High income | 0.0828\* | 0.0900\* | 0.0795 | 0.0982\* | 0.102\* | 0.0938\* |
|  | (0.0422) | (0.0432) | (0.0424) | (0.0415) | (0.0424) | (0.0415) |
| Tax rate: 5‰ × Unemployed | -0.0509 | -0.0271 | -0.0214 | -0.0487 | -0.0249 | -0.0263 |
|  | (0.0569) | (0.0611) | (0.0587) | (0.0557) | (0.0607) | (0.0575) |
| Tax rate: 5‰ × Low income | -0.0627 | -0.0515 | -0.0531 | -0.0644 | -0.0462 | -0.0515 |
|  | (0.0346) | (0.0357) | (0.0349) | (0.0340) | (0.0351) | (0.0343) |
| Tax rate: 5‰ × High income | 0.0846\* | 0.0728 | 0.0904\* | 0.0857\* | 0.0762 | 0.0900\* |
|  | (0.0429) | (0.0441) | (0.0427) | (0.0423) | (0.0433) | (0.0422) |
| Tax rate: 10‰ × Unemployed | -0.0286 | 0.00318 | -0.0300 | -0.0169 | 0.00348 | -0.0311 |
|  | (0.0561) | (0.0587) | (0.0585) | (0.0556) | (0.0592) | (0.0576) |
| Tax rate: 10‰ × Low income | -0.0645 | -0.0606 | -0.0680 | -0.0691\* | -0.0610 | -0.0732\* |
|  | (0.0350) | (0.0359) | (0.0352) | (0.0347) | (0.0354) | (0.0347) |
| Tax rate: 10‰ × High income | 0.0657 | 0.0572 | 0.0654 | 0.0689 | 0.0580 | 0.0641 |
|  | (0.0435) | (0.0441) | (0.0432) | (0.0429) | (0.0434) | (0.0425) |
| Tax type: Additional × Unemployed | -0.0519 | -0.0590 | -0.0599 | -0.0458 | -0.0525 | -0.0523 |
|  | (0.0392) | (0.0423) | (0.0394) | (0.0384) | (0.0418) | (0.0386) |
| Tax type: Additional × Low income | -0.0212 | -0.0237 | -0.0315 | -0.0249 | -0.0253 | -0.0329 |
|  | (0.0247) | (0.0254) | (0.0248) | (0.0244) | (0.0250) | (0.0244) |
| Tax type: Additional × High income | -0.0120 | -0.00643 | -0.0169 | -0.0107 | -0.00642 | -0.0199 |
|  | (0.0306) | (0.0312) | (0.0303) | (0.0300) | (0.0306) | (0.0297) |
| Unemployment benefits × Unemployed | 0.119\* | 0.144\* | 0.134\* | 0.128\* | 0.143\* | 0.128\* |
|  | (0.0562) | (0.0581) | (0.0573) | (0.0552) | (0.0573) | (0.0563) |
| Unemployment benefits × Low income | 0.0189 | 0.00599 | 0.0168 | 0.0239 | 0.00998 | 0.0174 |
|  | (0.0397) | (0.0406) | (0.0402) | (0.0388) | (0.0396) | (0.0392) |
| Unemployment benefits × High income | 0.0473 | 0.0771 | 0.0565 | 0.0465 | 0.0714 | 0.0514 |
|  | (0.0496) | (0.0514) | (0.0497) | (0.0487) | (0.0504) | (0.0486) |
| Education × Unemployed | -0.0211 | 0.00829 | -0.0132 | -0.0242 | -0.00934 | -0.00829 |
|  | (0.0569) | (0.0631) | (0.0573) | (0.0558) | (0.0623) | (0.0563) |
| Education × Low income | 0.0241 | 0.0182 | 0.0231 | 0.0180 | 0.0108 | 0.0203 |
|  | (0.0377) | (0.0386) | (0.0383) | (0.0372) | (0.0381) | (0.0376) |
| Education × High income | 0.130\*\* | 0.133\*\* | 0.129\*\* | 0.130\*\* | 0.129\* | 0.131\*\* |
|  | (0.0499) | (0.0511) | (0.0497) | (0.0495) | (0.0505) | (0.0493) |
| Infrastructure × Unemployed | -0.0843 | -0.0417 | -0.0819 | -0.0987 | -0.0595 | -0.0953 |
|  | (0.0566) | (0.0621) | (0.0587) | (0.0561) | (0.0619) | (0.0582) |
| Infrastructure × Low income | 0.00597 | -0.000617 | 0.00515 | 0.00158 | -0.00644 | 0.00236 |
|  | (0.0399) | (0.0410) | (0.0404) | (0.0392) | (0.0402) | (0.0396) |
| Infrastructure × High income | 0.0620 | 0.0612 | 0.0598 | 0.0425 | 0.0353 | 0.0348 |
|  | (0.0491) | (0.0511) | (0.0491) | (0.0489) | (0.0506) | (0.0487) |
| No earmarked × Unemployed | -0.0854 | -0.0381 | -0.0601 | -0.108 | -0.0699 | -0.0863 |
|  | (0.0631) | (0.0668) | (0.0645) | (0.0602) | (0.0641) | (0.0612) |
| No earmarked × Low income | 0.0212 | 0.0254 | 0.0171 | 0.0280 | 0.0306 | 0.0246 |
|  | (0.0395) | (0.0404) | (0.0399) | (0.0387) | (0.0396) | (0.0390) |
| No earmarked × High income | 0.0861 | 0.105\* | 0.0880 | 0.0814 | 0.0984 | 0.0852 |
|  | (0.0502) | (0.0511) | (0.0500) | (0.0494) | (0.0502) | (0.0492) |
| Spending type: Additional × Unemployed | 0.0177 | 0.0464 | 0.0146 | 0.0216 | 0.0445 | 0.0192 |
|  | (0.0371) | (0.0398) | (0.0383) | (0.0360) | (0.0389) | (0.0369) |
| Spending type: Additional × Low income | 0.0294 | 0.0434 | 0.0248 | 0.0255 | 0.0386 | 0.0206 |
|  | (0.0246) | (0.0251) | (0.0248) | (0.0239) | (0.0244) | (0.0240) |
| Spending type: Additional × High income | 0.0205 | 0.0235 | 0.0136 | 0.0218 | 0.0275 | 0.0146 |
|  | (0.0304) | (0.0312) | (0.0307) | (0.0298) | (0.0305) | (0.0299) |
| Spending inst.: Government × Unemployed | 0.0608 | 0.0505 | 0.0572 | 0.0540 | 0.0457 | 0.0465 |
|  | (0.0404) | (0.0431) | (0.0405) | (0.0399) | (0.0428) | (0.0402) |
| Spending inst.: Government × Low income | -0.0520\* | -0.0450 | -0.0469 | -0.0466 | -0.0399 | -0.0393 |
|  | (0.0256) | (0.0264) | (0.0259) | (0.0251) | (0.0258) | (0.0253) |
| Spending inst.: Government × High income | -0.00748 | 0.000667 | 0.00325 | -0.0101 | -0.00323 | 0.00404 |
|  | (0.0302) | (0.0307) | (0.0302) | (0.0298) | (0.0302) | (0.0297) |
| Auditing: Eu. Commission × Unemployed | 0.0263 | -0.00981 | -0.00108 | 0.0224 | -0.0176 | -0.0162 |
|  | (0.0483) | (0.0517) | (0.0495) | (0.0474) | (0.0508) | (0.0484) |
| Auditing: Eu. Commission × Low income | 0.0599\* | 0.0577 | 0.0499 | 0.0702\* | 0.0670\* | 0.0585\* |
|  | (0.0298) | (0.0306) | (0.0301) | (0.0293) | (0.0300) | (0.0295) |
| Auditing: Eu. Commission × High income | 0.0739\* | 0.0791\* | 0.0665 | 0.0771\* | 0.0880\* | 0.0697 |
|  | (0.0372) | (0.0379) | (0.0372) | (0.0367) | (0.0374) | (0.0368) |
| Auditing: It. Auditors Court × Unemployed | 0.0125 | 0.00731 | -0.0192 | 0.0154 | 0.0101 | -0.0222 |
|  | (0.0490) | (0.0508) | (0.0490) | (0.0484) | (0.0501) | (0.0487) |
| Auditing: It. Auditors Court × Low income | 0.0280 | 0.0279 | 0.0202 | 0.0269 | 0.0280 | 0.0192 |
|  | (0.0312) | (0.0318) | (0.0315) | (0.0307) | (0.0312) | (0.0309) |
| Auditing: It. Auditors Court × High income | 0.0449 | 0.0579 | 0.0318 | 0.0461 | 0.0607 | 0.0322 |
|  | (0.0373) | (0.0378) | (0.0371) | (0.0370) | (0.0373) | (0.0365) |
| Identity | -0.0197 | 0.0140 |  | -0.0201 | 0.00525 |  |
|  | (0.0231) | (0.0211) |  | (0.0251) | (0.0219) |  |
| Tax rate: 3‰ × Identity | 0.0212 | 0.00688 |  | 0.0241 | 0.0167 |  |
|  | (0.0181) | (0.0169) |  | (0.0198) | (0.0173) |  |
| Tax rate: 5‰ × Identity | 0.0199 | 0.0128 |  | 0.00775 | 0.0301 |  |
|  | (0.0187) | (0.0170) |  | (0.0204) | (0.0176) |  |
| Tax rate: 10‰ × Identity | 0.00550 | 0.0463\*\* |  | 0.0185 | 0.0547\*\* |  |
|  | (0.0187) | (0.0169) |  | (0.0200) | (0.0176) |  |
| Tax type: Additional × Identity | 0.00939 | -0.0208 |  | 0.0180 | -0.0296\* |  |
|  | (0.0134) | (0.0121) |  | (0.0143) | (0.0124) |  |
| Unemployment benefits × Identity | 0.0132 | -0.0545\*\* |  | 0.000802 | -0.0395\* |  |
|  | (0.0208) | (0.0185) |  | (0.0222) | (0.0191) |  |
| Education × Identity | -0.0170 | -0.00302 |  | -0.0184 | -0.00123 |  |
|  | (0.0203) | (0.0181) |  | (0.0214) | (0.0186) |  |
| Infrastructure × Identity | -0.0359 | -0.00562 |  | -0.0493\* | 0.00512 |  |
|  | (0.0211) | (0.0188) |  | (0.0221) | (0.0194) |  |
| No earmarked × Identity | 0.00207 | -0.0268 |  | -0.00168 | -0.0252 |  |
|  | (0.0209) | (0.0187) |  | (0.0225) | (0.0195) |  |
| Spending type: Additional × Identity | 0.00146 | 0.0174 |  | 0.0148 | 0.00851 |  |
|  | (0.0129) | (0.0119) |  | (0.0138) | (0.0121) |  |
| Spending inst.: Government × Identity | 0.0270\* | -0.0211 |  | 0.0230 | -0.0185 |  |
|  | (0.0133) | (0.0120) |  | (0.0146) | (0.0125) |  |
| Auditing: Eu. Commission × Identity | -0.0381\* | 0.0230 |  | -0.0479\*\* | 0.0263 |  |
|  | (0.0160) | (0.0149) |  | (0.0171) | (0.0154) |  |
| Auditing: It. Auditors Court × Identity | 0.0223 | -0.0171 |  | 0.0260 | -0.0199 |  |
|  | (0.0165) | (0.0152) |  | (0.0178) | (0.0158) |  |
| Membership: Bad |  |  | -0.00411 |  |  | 0.00128 |
|  |  |  | (0.0540) |  |  | (0.0551) |
| Membership: Good |  |  | 0.0419 |  |  | 0.0650 |
|  |  |  | (0.0446) |  |  | (0.0458) |
| Tax rate: 3‰ × Membership: Bad |  |  | -0.0333 |  |  | -0.0469 |
|  |  |  | (0.0446) |  |  | (0.0449) |
| Tax rate: 3‰ × Membership: Good |  |  | -0.0124 |  |  | -0.0121 |
|  |  |  | (0.0352) |  |  | (0.0364) |
| Tax rate: 5‰ × Membership: Bad |  |  | 0.0126 |  |  | -0.00862 |
|  |  |  | (0.0444) |  |  | (0.0448) |
| Tax rate: 5‰ × Membership: Good |  |  | 0.0275 |  |  | 0.0365 |
|  |  |  | (0.0357) |  |  | (0.0368) |
| Tax rate: 10‰ × Membership: Bad |  |  | 0.0317 |  |  | 0.0489 |
|  |  |  | (0.0441) |  |  | (0.0442) |
| Tax rate: 10‰ × Membership: Good |  |  | 0.0433 |  |  | 0.0260 |
|  |  |  | (0.0362) |  |  | (0.0369) |
| Tax type: Additional × Membership: Bad |  |  | 0.0223 |  |  | 0.0212 |
|  |  |  | (0.0311) |  |  | (0.0312) |
| Tax type: Additional × Membership: Good |  |  | 0.00186 |  |  | -0.0207 |
|  |  |  | (0.0253) |  |  | (0.0261) |
| Unemployment benefits × Membership: Bad |  |  | -0.0964 |  |  | -0.109\* |
|  |  |  | (0.0492) |  |  | (0.0493) |
| Unemployment benefits × Membership: Good |  |  | -0.111\*\* |  |  | -0.0931\* |
|  |  |  | (0.0401) |  |  | (0.0415) |
| Education × Membership: Bad |  |  | -0.0309 |  |  | -0.0474 |
|  |  |  | (0.0480) |  |  | (0.0483) |
| Education × Membership: Good |  |  | 0.0244 |  |  | 0.0181 |
|  |  |  | (0.0404) |  |  | (0.0417) |
| Infrastructure × Membership: Bad |  |  | 0.0305 |  |  | 0.00767 |
|  |  |  | (0.0496) |  |  | (0.0496) |
| Infrastructure × Membership: Good |  |  | 0.0416 |  |  | 0.0377 |
|  |  |  | (0.0408) |  |  | (0.0416) |
| No earmarked × Membership: Bad |  |  | -0.0502 |  |  | -0.0470 |
|  |  |  | (0.0495) |  |  | (0.0495) |
| No earmarked × Membership: Good |  |  | -0.0175 |  |  | 0.00581 |
|  |  |  | (0.0410) |  |  | (0.0416) |
| Spending type: Additional × Membership: Bad |  |  | -0.0312 |  |  | -0.0227 |
|  |  |  | (0.0309) |  |  | (0.0306) |
| Spending type: Additional × Membership: Good |  |  | -0.0194 |  |  | -0.0344 |
|  |  |  | (0.0255) |  |  | (0.0258) |
| Spending inst.: Government × Membership: Bad |  |  | 0.0711\* |  |  | 0.0681\* |
|  |  |  | (0.0318) |  |  | (0.0320) |
| Spending inst.: Government × Membership: Good |  |  | -0.0333 |  |  | -0.0465 |
|  |  |  | (0.0260) |  |  | (0.0270) |
| Auditing: Eu. Commission × Membership: Bad |  |  | -0.00134 |  |  | 0.00940 |
|  |  |  | (0.0380) |  |  | (0.0382) |
| Auditing: Eu. Commission × Membership: Good |  |  | 0.0228 |  |  | 0.0297 |
|  |  |  | (0.0313) |  |  | (0.0320) |
| Auditing: It. Auditors Court × Membership: Bad |  |  | 0.00185 |  |  | 0.00842 |
|  |  |  | (0.0399) |  |  | (0.0397) |
| Auditing: It. Auditors Court × Membership: Good |  |  | -0.0770\* |  |  | -0.0928\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.0317) |  |  | (0.0322) |
| Constant | 0.863\*\* | 0.814\*\* | 0.775\*\* | 0.796\*\* | 0.740\*\* | 0.718\*\* |
|  | (0.0822) | (0.0914) | (0.0804) | (0.103) | (0.0897) | (0.0793) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 9,000 | 8,532 | 8,876 | 9,328 | 8,876 | 9,248 |
| R-squared | 0.064 | 0.063 | 0.066 | 0.065 | 0.063 | 0.066 |
| Notes: Ordinary least squared coefficients with standard errors clustered on respondents in parentheses. \*\*p < 0.01, \*p< 0.05. Reference categories: Income tax rate: 1‰; Tax type: Alternate; Spending destination: Health; Spending type: Alternate; Spending institution: European Commission; Auditing institution: European Court of Auditors. Models 1 to 3: trustworthiness of Greek Government. Models 4 to 6: trustworthiness of EU. Models 1 and 3: European identity. Models 2 and 4: Italian vs. European identity. The unit of analysis is a fiscal union scheme. | | | | | | |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

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1. Proposing looser control is 4.8 percentage points (se=1.08) more likely to be preferred over keeping the status quo. Advocating tighter rules is 2.6 percentage points (se=1.10) less likely to be preferred. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. The conditional AMCEs for “education” differ significantly from the AMCEs in the inactive (F-test *p*-value > 0.030), unemployed (*p* > 0.039) and low income (*p* > 0.044) subsamples. No earmarking is also preferred to health spending compared to inactive respondents (*p* > 0.035). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. Eleven of the twelve F-tests are significant. Unemployed and high income respondents do not differ only with regard to the choice between unemployment benefits and health. The results are available up request. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. In the economic policy case, the measure of identity is a ten-point scale of agreement with the statement that EU membership leads a loss of cultural identity. In the fiscal union case, it is the measure employed in models 1a and 2a of Table 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)