REPORT on the draft Council decision on the putting into effect of the remaining provisions of the Schengen *acquis* relating to the Schengen Information System in the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania

28.5.2018 - (15820/1/2017 – C8‑0017/2018 – 2018/0802(CNS)) - \*

Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs  
Rapporteur: Monica Macovei

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

**A. Background**

1. According to the first subparagraph of Article 4(2) of the Act of Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania, the provisions of the Schengen *acquis,*other than those listed in Annex II to that Act, to which the Republic of Bulgaria (‘Bulgaria’) and Romania shall adhere upon accession, are to apply in Bulgaria and Romania pursuant to a Council decision to that effect, after verification that the necessary conditions for the application of all parts of the Schengen *acquis*have been met.

2. On9 June 2011, the Council concluded, in accordance with the applicable Schengen evaluation procedures, that the conditions in all the areas of the Schengen *acquis*relating to air borders, land borders, police cooperation, data protection, the SIS, sea borders and visas had been fulfilled by Bulgaria and Romania.

3. However, despite repeated calls from the European Parliament for these countries to join the Schengen area, the Council has yet to take the final decision, which is dependent of a unanimous vote by all Schengen Member States.

4. The provisions of the Schengen *acquis*relating to the Schengen Information System (‘SIS’) started to apply to Bulgaria and Romania from 15 October 2010[[1]](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0192_EN.html#_part2_def1), with the exception of the obligation to refuse entry into or stay on its territory to third country nationals for whom an alert has been issued by another Member State and the obligation to refrain from issuing SIS alerts and entering additional information on third country nationals for the purposes of refusing entry or stay (the ‘remaining restrictions’).

5. The present draft Council Decision aims to lift the remaining restrictions concerning the use of SIS by Bulgaria and Romania. The checks performed by Bulgaria and Romania at their external borders and in their territory should become more effective by issuing SIS alerts for the purposes of refusing entry or stay and by executing such alerts introduced by other Member States, in particular if such alerts are based on a threat to public policy or public security or national security.

**B. Position of the rapporteur**

The rapporteur recalls that in June 2011 the European Parliament gave its approval for Bulgaria and Romania to join the Schengen area, stating in a legislative resolution that Bulgaria and Romania where ready to join the Schengen border check-free area.

Since 2011, the European Parliament has made reiterated calls for the enlargement of the Schengen area to these two countries and has counted with the support of the European Commission, requesting the Council to take the final decision allowing for the lifting of checks at internal borders for Bulgaria and Romania.

In October 2017, the Council adopted Decision (EU) 2017/1908[[2]](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0192_EN.html#_part2_def2) putting into effect certain provisions of the Schengen *acquis* relating to the Visa Information System (‘VIS’) in Bulgaria and Romania. This would allow Bulgaria and Romania to access the VIS data for consultation purposes, thereby increasing the level of security in the Schengen area and facilitating tethe fight against serious crime and terrorism. The European Parliament endorsed the draft Council’s Decision.

Bulgaria and Romania play a key role in surveillance - related operations in the Black Sea, as well as on the Danube River, both strategic corridors open to naval international traffic and subject to border vulnerabilities.

Bulgaria and Romania share borders with Turkey, Moldova, Ukraine, Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, securing significant buffer zones for entry into the Schengen area.

Romania has been, for many years in a row, a main contributor to the logistical operations of the European Boarder and Coast Guard Agency.

In view of all above-mentioned elements, the current Council Decision aiming at lifting the remaining restrictions concerning the use of SIS by Bulgaria and Romania is a welcomed development for the participation of these two countries in the Schengen *acquis.* It will increase the level of security in the Schengen area and make the fight against serious crime and terrorism more effective.

By eliminating all restrictions to the use of SIS, Romania and Bulgaria would be able to ensure the same level of protection of the Union external borders as other Schengen member states.

The rapporteur recommends that Parliament endorse the draft Council’s text without amendments to encourage the Member States to proceed speedily with the adoption of the Decision.

<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0192_EN.html#_section2>

EPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of the Schengen Information System for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals

10.11.2017 - (COM(2016)0881 – C8‑0532/2016 – 2016/0407(COD)) - \*\*\*I

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The use of the Schengen Information System for information sharing on return decisions is another small but crucial step in a series of Union measures with the aim of improving the effectiveness of the return of illegally staying third-country nationals. Improving the effectiveness of the Union return policy is crucial in order to maintain public trust in the Union migration and asylum policy.

The rapporteur would like to stress that the Union return policy at the moment is far from effective. In 2015, the number of irregular migrants ordered to leave the European Union amounted to 533,395, while the total return rate was around 42%. Moreover, if return to Western Balkans is disregarded, the European Union return rate drops further to 27%.

This proposal will set up for the first time a Union-wide system for sharing information between Member States on return decisions and will therefore allow for monitoring whether third-country nationals subject to those decisions have left the territory of the Member States and implementation of Union wide return decisions, which should thereby increase the effectiveness of Union return policies.

The rapporteur is of the opinion that also for this Commission proposal on the use of the Schengen Information System on return, the Member States should use the infrastructure that is already there and is working well for the exchange of supplementary information. Therefore, the SIRENE Bureaux should be the authority responsible for the efficient and swift exchange of supplementary information in connection to alerts on return between Member States.

<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2017-0348_EN.html#_section2>

Romania's accession to the Schengen area

7.2.2018

[Answer in writing](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-000776-ASW_EN.html)

Question for written answer E-000776-18  
to the Commission  
Rule 130  
Răzvan Popa (S&D)

Romania has met the criteria for accession to the Schengen area since 2011. On 13 September 2017, in his State of the Union speech, President Juncker said that the necessary steps should be taken for Romania to join the Schengen areas as soon as possible. This has still not happened, in spite of repeated attempts by the Romanian Ministry of European Affairs to place the subject on the agenda of the Justice and Home Affairs Council. The Romanian Government has tried to add this item to the Council’s agenda 15 times, and each time it was withdrawn.

1. Taking into account that the Romanian Government has requested that the subject be placed on the agenda 15 times, what is the Commission’s position on the delay in the vote on Romania’s accession to the Schengen area within the Justice and Home Affairs Council?

2. What is the Commission’s position and what conclusions have been reached concerning the preparation and monitoring of Romania’s accession to the Schengen area?

REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of the Schengen Information System for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals

10.11.2017 - (COM(2016)0881 – C8‑0532/2016 – 2016/0407(COD)) - \*\*\*I

Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs  
Rapporteur: Jeroen Lenaers

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

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<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2017-0348_EN.html#_section2>

Situation at the border between Russia and the Schengen area

20.1.2016

[Answer in writing](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2016-000420-ASW_EN.html)

Question for written answer E-000420-16  
to the Commission  
Rule 130  
Paavo Väyrynen (ALDE)

In recent weeks, many asylum-seekers have entered the Schengen area from Russia via Norway and Finland. Dozens of different nationalities are represented. The bulk of these people had previously spent long periods in Russia, which is a safe country.

Criminal activity is associated with the organisation of immigration. People seeking to make their way to Finland have been sold substandard cars. Large fees have been charged for organising travel.

The northern route is dangerous during the cold winter season. Recently, a man who was apparently an Indian national froze to death on his way to Finland when his car broke down.

The European Union should be in contact with the Russian authorities to slow this migration.

Is the Commission aware of the increase in immigration into the Schengen area via the northern route? Is the Commission prepared for the possibility that the situation may deteriorate? Has the Commission contacted the Russian authorities, or will it do so, in order to get this migration under control?

Schengen Borders Code

10.4.2019

[Answer in writing](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-2019-001753-ASW_EN.html)

Question for written answer P-001753-19  
to the Commission  
Rule 130  
Anna Záborská (PPE)

Since the migration crisis in 2015, the Austrian authorities have continued to exercise regular police checks of buses and passenger cars crossing the Austrian-Slovak border. These checks take place within 20 kilometres of the land border with Slovakia and are equivalent to border checks as they do not reflect actual threats and are systemic in their nature. By continuing to perform these checks, the Austrian authorities are violating the Schengen Borders Code and undermining European citizens’ trust in their fundamental freedoms.

1. Is the Commission aware that frequent and regular police checks in border areas are being used by some Member States as a way of reintroducing border controls which are prohibited by the Schengen Borders Code, as confirmed by European Court of Justice case law?

2. Will the Commission verify the concern that the measures adopted by the Government of Austria have an effect equivalent to border checks?

3. Given the importance of freedom of movement for European citizens, what steps will the Commission take to ensure that Member States do not violate the Schengen*acquis*by introducing arbitrary police measures intended as a substitute for border checks?

Exit and entry checks in and out of the Schengen area

18.8.2017

[Answer in writing](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-2017-005214-ASW_EN.html)

Question for written answer P-005214-17  
to the Commission  
Rule 130  
Jill Seymour (EFDD)

With the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2017/458 by some Member States during the peak time of travel, when holidaymakers are attempting to reach their destinations in order to satisfy their desire to start their annual holiday, it has become apparent that the new enhanced security checks have caused unnecessary delays.

In light of the recent terror attacks in London, Paris, Brussels and Nice, and in other cities and towns in the EU, it is essential to ensure that all law-abiding citizens and subjects of the Member States can go about their daily business without the fear of death or injury.

In view of recitals 8, 10 and 11 and Article 1(2a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/458:

* 1.In light of the problems that have arisen with regard to the implementation of the regulation, will the Commission bring forward its evaluation of the implementation and consequences before 8 April 2019? If not, why not?
* 2.In respect of Article 1(2a), what risk assessments, if any, where undertaken by Spain, France and Belgium?
* 3.Why where there not enough resources in place when Member States implemented this regulation during a peak travel season? Given that there was clearly an impact on the flow of traffic, why did the Member States not implement Article 1(2a)?

REPORT on the full application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in Bulgaria and Romania: abolition of checks at internal land, sea and air borders

* 9.11.2018 - (2018/2092(INI))
* Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs  
  Rapporteur: Sergei Stanishev
* EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
* **I. BACKGROUND**
* In 2007, pursuant to Article 4(2) of their 2005 Act of Accession to the European Union, Bulgaria and Romania adopted the Schengen *acquis*. Certain provisions, including the abolition of checks at internal borders, were to apply in Bulgaria and Romania only pursuant to a Council decision to that effect after verification that the necessary conditions have been met. On 9 June 2011, the Council concluded, in accordance with the applicable Schengen evaluation procedures, that the conditions in all the areas of the Schengen *acquis* relating to Air Borders, Land Borders, Police Cooperation, Data Protection, the Schengen Information System, Sea Borders and Visas had been fulfilled by Bulgaria and Romania. However, the entering into effect of the provisions related to the abolition of checks at internal land, sea and air borders continues to be awaiting a final decision of the Council, where a positive unanimous decision must be taken by all current Schengen Member States.
* At the time of the drafting of this report, Bulgaria and Romania apply the Schengen *acquis* only partially and checks are therefore still carried out at the borders with these two Member States. Since 2011, the Council has confirmed on multiple occasions its commitment to make any further decision on the basis of a ‘two-step’ approach – abolition of checks at internal sea and air borders only, followed by the abolition of checks at internal land borders on an unspecified date with a separate legal act.
* The aim of this report is to confirm the Parliament’s position that the Council must a take a decision without further delay on the accession of Bulgaria and Romania as fully-fledged members of the Schengen area. Your Rapporteur believes that this House should stand firmly by the principle that following the successful completion of the Schengen evaluation process in all areas by an acceding country, the Council, after consulting the Parliament, should take an immediate decision to abolish checks at internal land, sea and air borders with a single legal act.
* **II. TIMELINE**
* Following the issuance of their declarations of readiness in 2007 and 2008, Bulgaria and Romania underwent a detailed and in-depth Schengen evaluation to determine their preparedness for the application of all parts of the Schengen *acquis* (Data Protection, the SIS, Air Borders, Land Borders, Sea Borders, Police Cooperation and Visas). On 29 September 2010, the Council published a draft decision for the full application of the Schengen *acquis*, including the abolition of checks at internal land, sea and air borders, subject to the definitive fulfilment of the necessary conditions*.*Following the opinion and approval of the European Parliament of 8 June 2011 (as part of a consultation procedure) the Justice and Home Affairs Council confirmed in its conclusions of 9 and 10 June 2011 that the Schengen evaluation process for Bulgaria and Romania has been completed successfully in all areas of the Schengen *acquis*. However, the Council failed to take a decision on the basis of the legal text consulted with the Parliament and postponed the matter until September 2011.
* As a result of the lack of unanimity in the Council, in September 2011 the then-Polish Presidency put forward a compromise proposal for a ‘two-step’ approach. This proposal was submitted as a draft Council decision to the Committee of the Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States to the European Union (Coreper). Even though the draft Council decision represented a significant departure from the text approved by the Parliament, the Council failed to consult the Parliament again as requested in its legislative resolution of 8 June 2011.
* The proposal for a ‘two-step’ approach on the abolition of checks at internal borders for Bulgaria and Romania has since been discussed on multiple occasions by the Justice and Home Affairs Council and has also been referred to in public statements by Heads of (Schengen) EU Member States.
* **III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PARTIAL APPLICATION OF THE SCHENGEN *ACQUIS*BY THE TWO MEMBER STATES**
* Your Rapporteur believes that there are direct negative consequences stemming from the ongoing deferral of the full accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the Schengen area for the two Member States, but also for the Union as a whole.
* Free movement is a core principle of the EU and the ability to move within the Union without facing border checks at internal borders is one of its most successful and tangible achievements. It has strengthened the citizens’ sense of belonging to a common entity of shared freedom, peace and prosperity. By contrast, the failure to extend this achievement to all European citizens fuels EU skepticism, foments a feeling of injustice and erodes the popularity of the EU, ultimately undermining public support for common European actions.
* The free movement in the Schengen area has also resulted in significant economic benefits for participating Member States by facilitating the integration of cross-border trade. The study ‘The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs aspects’, commissioned by the Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), draws key conclusions on the negative economic impact of cross border control between the Member States. The costs linked with the reintroduction of border control in the Schengen area are estimated to range between €0.05 billion and €20 billion in one-off costs and between €2 billion and €4 billion in annual operating costs. While there are multiple obstacles to quantifying the exact economic implications for Bulgaria and Romania, your Rapporteur believes that the provided data serves as an indication for the significant economic and social losses for the two countries as a result of the continued deadlock in the Council.
* In the public discourse, the enlargement of the Schengen area is often linked to other Union policies, such as the reform of the Common European Asylum System or the ongoing efforts towards an effective Security Union. Your Rapporteur firmly believes that free movement of citizens should not suffer from deficiencies in or be subjected to other Union policies. Providing for the Union’s security requires common action and not fragmentation, while preserving the right balance between freedoms and security. To this end, efforts must be made towards building a coordinated, robust and inclusive legal framework, where all Member States are on equal footing.
* The ongoing deferral of Bulgaria and Romania’s accession to the Schengen area, however, is a step in the opposite direction. It creates the need for distinguishing between Members States applying the Schengen *acquis*in full and Member States applying the Schengen *acquis*partially in the EU legislation, as well as the necessity for specific measures to avoid gaps and prevent possible deficiencies. The proposal for partial accession of Bulgaria and Romania is a further step towards the legal codification of the *de facto*co-existence of a Schengen area with free movement and a Schengen area without (or partial) free movement.
* In what could be considered a final step before lifting the internal border control for Bulgaria and Romania, both countries were granted passive access to the Visa Information System (VIS) in 2017. At the time of the drafting of this report, there is an ongoing procedure for enabling the full application of the provisions of the Schengen *acquis*related to the Schengen Information System (SIS). The criteria for the implementation of these legislative acts has been fulfilled back in 2011. However, these Council proposals were put forward not as a result of commitments taken on behalf of the EU, but rather as part of the ongoing preparation for the EU-wide implementation of the Entry/Exit System, expected to be operational by 2020. Your Rapporteur believes that following these decisions, Bulgaria and Romania will have all responsibilities and obligations of fully-fledged Members of the Schengen area, thus contributing to the security of all Schengen Member States, but Union citizens would still not enjoy the benefit of free movement to and from these countries.
* **IV. RAPPORTEUR’S CONCLUSIONS**
* Your Rapporteur believes that the proposal for a ‘two-step’ approach for Bulgaria and Romania’s accession to the Schengen area not only lacks any legally sound justification, but also poses a number of risks, such as introducing new conditionalities to further delay the abolition of checks at internal land borders, prolonging the significant economic burden for the two Member States which results from maintaining checks at land borders, as well as setting the ground for potential information gaps and legislative deficiencies between Schengen Member States and non-Schengen Member States in the future.
* Splitting the Council decision into two legal acts (one for the abolition of checks at air and sea borders, and another one – for land borders) would also legally codify the current double standard in the Schengen area, where Bulgaria and Romania have all obligations and responsibilities of fully-fledged Schengen members, but do not enjoy the benefit of free movement.
* Therefore, your Rapporteur is of the opinion that the European Parliament should stand firmly by the model established in previous enlargements of the Schengen area, where the full application of the provisions of the Schengen *acquis*, including abolition of checks at internal air, sea and land borders, has been carried out through a single legal act following the fulfilment of the necessary criteria. Any other decision would set a precedent leading to negative political, economic and social consequences not only for Bulgaria and Romania, but for the Union as a whole, as well as negatively affecting other future enlargements of the Schengen area.

<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0365_EN.html#_section2>

REPORT on the draft Council decision on the putting into effect of the remaining provisions of the Schengen *acquis* relating to the Schengen Information System in the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania

28.5.2018 - (15820/1/2017 – C8‑0017/2018 – 2018/0802(CNS)) - \*

Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs  
Rapporteur: Monica Macovei

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

**A. Background**

1. According to the first subparagraph of Article 4(2) of the Act of Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania, the provisions of the Schengen *acquis,*other than those listed in Annex II to that Act, to which the Republic of Bulgaria (‘Bulgaria’) and Romania shall adhere upon accession, are to apply in Bulgaria and Romania pursuant to a Council decision to that effect, after verification that the necessary conditions for the application of all parts of the Schengen *acquis*have been met.

2. On9 June 2011, the Council concluded, in accordance with the applicable Schengen evaluation procedures, that the conditions in all the areas of the Schengen *acquis*relating to air borders, land borders, police cooperation, data protection, the SIS, sea borders and visas had been fulfilled by Bulgaria and Romania.

3. However, despite repeated calls from the European Parliament for these countries to join the Schengen area, the Council has yet to take the final decision, which is dependent of a unanimous vote by all Schengen Member States.

4. The provisions of the Schengen *acquis*relating to the Schengen Information System (‘SIS’) started to apply to Bulgaria and Romania from 15 October 2010[[1]](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0192_EN.html#_part2_def1), with the exception of the obligation to refuse entry into or stay on its territory to third country nationals for whom an alert has been issued by another Member State and the obligation to refrain from issuing SIS alerts and entering additional information on third country nationals for the purposes of refusing entry or stay (the ‘remaining restrictions’).

5. The present draft Council Decision aims to lift the remaining restrictions concerning the use of SIS by Bulgaria and Romania. The checks performed by Bulgaria and Romania at their external borders and in their territory should become more effective by issuing SIS alerts for the purposes of refusing entry or stay and by executing such alerts introduced by other Member States, in particular if such alerts are based on a threat to public policy or public security or national security.

**B. Position of the rapporteur**

The rapporteur recalls that in June 2011 the European Parliament gave its approval for Bulgaria and Romania to join the Schengen area, stating in a legislative resolution that Bulgaria and Romania where ready to join the Schengen border check-free area.

Since 2011, the European Parliament has made reiterated calls for the enlargement of the Schengen area to these two countries and has counted with the support of the European Commission, requesting the Council to take the final decision allowing for the lifting of checks at internal borders for Bulgaria and Romania.

In October 2017, the Council adopted Decision (EU) 2017/1908[[2]](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0192_EN.html#_part2_def2) putting into effect certain provisions of the Schengen *acquis* relating to the Visa Information System (‘VIS’) in Bulgaria and Romania. This would allow Bulgaria and Romania to access the VIS data for consultation purposes, thereby increasing the level of security in the Schengen area and facilitating tethe fight against serious crime and terrorism. The European Parliament endorsed the draft Council’s Decision.

Bulgaria and Romania play a key role in surveillance - related operations in the Black Sea, as well as on the Danube River, both strategic corridors open to naval international traffic and subject to border vulnerabilities.

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Romania has been, for many years in a row, a main contributor to the logistical operations of the European Boarder and Coast Guard Agency.

In view of all above-mentioned elements, the current Council Decision aiming at lifting the remaining restrictions concerning the use of SIS by Bulgaria and Romania is a welcomed development for the participation of these two countries in the Schengen *acquis.* It will increase the level of security in the Schengen area and make the fight against serious crime and terrorism more effective.

By eliminating all restrictions to the use of SIS, Romania and Bulgaria would be able to ensure the same level of protection of the Union external borders as other Schengen member states.

The rapporteur recommends that Parliament endorse the draft Council’s text without amendments to encourage the Member States to proceed speedily with the adoption of the Decision.

REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of border checks, amending Regulation (EU) No 515/2014 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006

10.11.2017 - (COM(2016)0882 – C8‑0533/2017 – 2016/0408(COD)) - \*\*\*I

Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs  
Rapporteur: Carlos Coelho

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

**Background**

The current Schengen Information System II (‘SIS II’) legal framework although agreed by 2006/2007 only became applicable on 9 April 2013 when the SIS II system was ready.

Following these hugely deplorable delays, accompanied by an investment eight times bigger than anticipated, the SIS II has, however, developed into a European success story. As the evaluation report of the Commission and the SIS II statistics show, the number of alerts and hits have been constantly increasing.

However, there is still much room for improvement by Member States. The assessment accompanying the current proposals and the evaluations and recommendations on the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism sometimes point to serious issues regarding the non- or wrong implementation of the SIS II legal framework. These range from data quality problems, lack of training of end-users to insufficient information on alerts and delays of the SIRENE bureaux following-up a hit. This is particularly worrisome regarding terrorism.

SIS is regularly subject to evaluation and these new proposals, along with the amendments in this draft, are a reflection of this. However, the rapporteur calls on the Member States to swiftly implement all recommendations that have been addressed to them and to take all measures to fully exploit the functionalities offered by SIS II according to its legal framework without delay.

**Position of the rapporteur on the new proposals**

The rapporteur welcomes the Commission’s proposals, as they further strengthen the SIS, underlining its truly European nature, maintaining its main characteristics and addressing some of the shortcomings at national level.

Still, the rapporteur considers that further improvements can be made and presents in this draft report a series of amendments to this end. The amendments can be grouped under the following main headings:

Architecture

The rapporteur is fully aware of the fact that structurally the system has to be reinforced to enable it to cope with ever more data inserted, in particular biometric data, new search functionalities and more users. It is clear that as the key European law enforcement and borders large-scale IT system it has to be reliably available to end-users at any time. The rapporteur doubts, however, that the solution proposed by the Commission, that is to oblige all Member States to have a national copy, is the right way to go. Parliament has always been sceptical of national, and also of technical copies, mainly due to the inherent risks for data protection and security. Nonetheless, Parliament, as a compromise, accepted - and accepts still - that those Member States that do want to have national copies can have them. What it cannot accept is to impose that obligation to those that do not. Following the agreement on the SIS II legal framework much effort was made, and money spent, to have a properly functioning central system. The rapporteur firmly believes that further efforts should be made in order to ensure the uninterrupted availability of the system at this level. The rapporteur is proposing, therefore, a series of amendments which seek to further enhance the availability and capacity of the central system to end-users. In particular, CS-SIS should contain a further copy and a backup system should be in simultaneous active operation all the time. In the same spirit, consideration should be given to increase SIS reliability and security by duplicating all key elements of the architecture, including the communication infrastructure. Finally, eu-LISA should become the sole actor responsible for the communication infrastructure.

Access to the system

The Commission proposes to provide for enhanced access possibilities for a series of European agencies. While the rapporteur agrees with these proposals, he nevertheless has tabled a series of amendments which seek to define in a more precise way, with reference to the existing mandates of the respective agencies, the circumstances under which SIS data may be accessed. He also proposes to increase the safeguards in this respect, be it in terms of prior training, logging and oversight.

The rapporteur firmly believes in the added value of the system and recognises the need to address the new security challenges. Namely, ensuring access to all relevant national competent authorities. This access should, however, be conditional on all legal provisions on data protection being applicable to these authorities and on the possibility for the supervisory authorities to verify the correct application of the legal provisions, including through the Schengen evaluation mechanism.

Data Security

Given the nature of the data contained in the SIS, data security has to be a key objective. The rapporteur recognises that much effort is made by eu-LISA and Member States in this regard. Nevertheless, the case of the hacking into the SIS via an external service provider in Denmark should be a reminder to increase efforts in this regard. The rapporteur welcomes the new provisions on security incidents proposed by the Commission. He proposes some amendments on this provision especially regarding the cooperation between the different institutional actors and the Member States. He also suggests, having the Danish case in mind, that Member States and eu-LISA should closely monitor the activities of contractors. Finally, a few further requirements regarding data security are added in line with other large-scale IT systems.

Data Protection

Data protection for SIS is complex due to its dual nature as an immigration and law enforcement database. In addition, its different users at European level and national level are subject to a wide range of legal provisions. All efforts have to be made, however, to provide for appropriate safeguards which are also robust enough to stand the test of everyday use. Achieving this is as crucial for the integrity and legitimacy of the system as are its successes. A series of amendments are therefore proposed which mainly aim to clarify which the applicable rules are. In addition, a number of provisions are strengthened and brought further in line with EU Data Protection framework.

Alerts for the purpose of refusing entry

The rapporteur welcomes the proposal of the Commission regarding the consultation procedure which is to be used to avoid that the very same third country national is subject to a refusal of entry alert and at the same time holds a document of a Member State granting him or her a right to stay. The rapporteur supports all efforts to improve cooperation between Member States. Cooperation is the key to make the Schengen area work as an area without internal borders.

The rapporteur deplores, however, that the Commission has not made any effort in trying to harmonise the criteria which are to be applied for the insertion of an alert for the purpose of refusing entry to the Schengen area. Parliament has, in the past, called for greater harmonisation when the SIS II legal framework was negotiated. As a compromise the following review clause was inserted:

*“The Commission shall review the application of this Article three years after the date referred to in Article 55(2). On the basis of that review, the Commission shall, using its right of initiative in accordance with the Treaty, make the necessary proposals to modify the provisions of this Article to achieve a greater level of harmonisation of the criteria for entering alerts.”*

Unfortunately, the Commission’s sole proposal in in this regard was to propose to suppress this paragraph.

The rapporteur therefore proposes some amendments which aim for greater harmonisation. Finally, he also suggest that persons convicted of terrorism should be inserted for the purpose of refusing entry.

Entry into force of the new provisions

The Schengen area currently has been put in a difficult situation. Terrorism and migration have led to the prolonged internal border controls, posing new challenges that need to be addressed quickly. The rapporteur therefore considers that SIS is key for this purpose today and can deliver solutions. The proposals should therefore be adopted as swiftly as possible, as we are upgrading the biggest, best implemented and most used centralised European information system and thus delivering concrete and immediate solutions to problems affecting European citizens. The rapporteur therefore proposes that the new legal framework should become applicable one year after the entry into force. A fixed deadline should be inserted to avoid long delays was the case with the SIS II legal framework.

<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2017-0347_EN.html#_section2>

REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of the Schengen Information System for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals

10.11.2017 - (COM(2016)0881 – C8‑0532/2016 – 2016/0407(COD)) - \*\*\*I

Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs  
Rapporteur: Jeroen Lenaers

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The use of the Schengen Information System for information sharing on return decisions is another small but crucial step in a series of Union measures with the aim of improving the effectiveness of the return of illegally staying third-country nationals. Improving the effectiveness of the Union return policy is crucial in order to maintain public trust in the Union migration and asylum policy.

The rapporteur would like to stress that the Union return policy at the moment is far from effective. In 2015, the number of irregular migrants ordered to leave the European Union amounted to 533,395, while the total return rate was around 42%. Moreover, if return to Western Balkans is disregarded, the European Union return rate drops further to 27%.

This proposal will set up for the first time a Union-wide system for sharing information between Member States on return decisions and will therefore allow for monitoring whether third-country nationals subject to those decisions have left the territory of the Member States and implementation of Union wide return decisions, which should thereby increase the effectiveness of Union return policies.

The rapporteur is of the opinion that also for this Commission proposal on the use of the Schengen Information System on return, the Member States should use the infrastructure that is already there and is working well for the exchange of supplementary information. Therefore, the SIRENE Bureaux should be the authority responsible for the efficient and swift exchange of supplementary information in connection to alerts on return between Member States.

<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2017-0348_EN.html#_section2>

Schengen acquis provisions relating to the Visa Information System in Bulgaria and Romania (A8-0286/2017 - Agustín Díaz de Mera García Consuegra)

04-10-2017

I welcome the positive vote in the European Parliament, which paves the way for a Council decision allowing the enforcement of certain provisions of the Schengen acquis in Romania and Bulgaria. For Romania, this has an immediate practical value, as it gives to national authorities the possibility to consult the Schengen visa information data, in order to take better decisions on national visa applications and work towards a coordinated approach with the other Schengen countries.  
More importantly, this is yet another confirmation of the fact that Romania belongs in Schengen. The vote today in the European Parliament confirms what the European Commission had been saying since 2009 and was reiterated by President Juncker on 13 September 2017 in his State of the Union Address – that Romania fulfils all the conditions to join Schengen and should be allowed to do so immediately.

Application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System in Croatia (A8-0073/2017 - Nuno Melo) RO

05-04-2017

Deși anumite dispoziții ale acquis-ului Schengen sunt aplicabile în Croația de la data aderării, o serie de alte dispoziții se vor aplica doar în temeiul unei decizii a Consiliului, după verificarea îndeplinirii unor condiții tehnice și juridice necesare pentru prelucrarea datelor SIS.  
În conformitate cu Actul de aderare a Croației la Uniunea Europeană din 2011, dispozițiile cuprinse în acest act se aplică doar în temeiul unei decizii a Consiliului, după consultarea Parlamentului și după verificarea prin intermediul mecanismului de evaluare Schengen a îndeplinirii condițiilor prevăzute pentru aplicarea tuturor părților acquis-ului, inclusiv aplicarea efectivă a tuturor normelor Schengen în conformitate cu standardele comune convenite și cu principiile fundamentale.  
Așadar, adoptarea unei decizii de către Consiliu a fost condiționată de îndeplinirea de către Croația a unor măsuri tehnice și juridice necesare pentru a prelucra datele SIS și a face schimb de informații suplimentare. În acest sens, în Croația a fost organizată o evaluare Schengen.  
În urma verificărilor desfășurate, s-a constatat că toate aceste condiții au fost îndeplinite și s-a propus autorizarea Croației de a introduce alerte și date suplimentare în SIS, de a utiliza datele SIS și de a face schimb de informații suplimentare.

EU-Norway Agreement on supplementary rules in relation to the instrument for financial support for external borders and visa (A8-0174/2017 - Tomáš Zdechovský) FR

16-05-2017

J’ai voté abstention sur ce texte qui prévoit que les pays associés à la mise en œuvre, à l’application et au développement de « l’acquis de Schengen » devraient participer financièrement à l’instrument de soutien financier. Il s’agit ici de la Norvège à qui on demande en substance de payer une contribution financière pour sa participation. Même si nous sommes opposés à Schengen, nous pouvons difficilement voter contre le fait que les Norvégiens paient leur part.

Application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System in Croatia (A8-0073/2017 - Nuno Melo) FR

05-04-2017

Ce texte a pour objectif d’appliquer en Croatie les dispositions de l’acquis de Schengen relatives au système d’information Schengen (SIS) qui ne sont pas encore appliquées. Ce projet constitue la première étape de la levée des contrôles aux frontières intérieures de l’Union vers la Croatie.  
Profondément opposé au système de Schengen tel qu’il existe, j’ai voté contre ce texte. Au lieu d’élargir Schengen, il faut rendre aux États membres leur souveraineté sur leurs frontières !

Schengen acquis provisions relating to the Visa Information System in Bulgaria and Romania (A8-0286/2017 - Agustín Díaz de Mera García Consuegra) RO

04-10-2017

Libera circulație este unul dintre cele mai mari succese ale Uniunii Europene, care trebuie să devina o realitate pentru toți cetățenii europeni, inclusiv pentru cei din România și Bulgaria. Votul de astăzi privind accesul la Sistemul de informații privind vizele reprezintă un pas important în procesul de aderare al României și Bulgariei la spațiul Schengen. Este un mesaj clar că aceste țări întrunesc toate condițiile și trebuie să devină, fără întârziere, membre cu drepturi depline în spațiul de liberă circulație Schengen.  
Această poziție este susținută și de Comisia Europeană prin discursul Președintelui Jean-Claude Juncker privind Starea Uniunii și prin adoptarea de curând a pachetului pentru un spațiu Schengen mai puternic. Am toată convingerea că decizia Consiliului nu se va lăsa mult așteptată și va fi una favorabilă.

Responsibility of the State of first arrival for considering asylum applications, and exclusion from the Schengen area of countries which fail to control the Schengen external borders

3.12.2015

[Answer in writing](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-2015-015381-ASW_EN.html)

Question for written answer P-015381-15  
to the Commission  
Rule 130  
Jussi Halla-aho (ECR)

By the beginning of November, 800 000 people had illegally entered the EU, most of them arriving by sea in Greece and Italy. The vast majority of these illegal immigrants entered EU territory to seek international protection. Greece and Italy have by no means registered all of the illegal immigrants as required by the Eurodac Regulation. Those countries have also failed to comply with Article 13 of the Dublin Convention, which stipulates that applications for asylum submitted by illegal immigrants must be considered by the State of first arrival, and they have failed to comply with their obligation to control the external borders effectively, as required by Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code. As a result, hundreds of thousands of people have moved on, mainly from Greece, to the EU country of their choice to seek asylum, imposing a disproportionate burden on the reception systems of countries in Northern Europe.

The Dublin III Regulation should be revised so that, if asylum-seekers refuse to submit applications in the Member States of arrival, the right to international protection lapses. Moreover, an amendment to the same Regulation should exclude the possibility that moving from one State to another within EU territory could result in a different State’s becoming responsible for considering an asylum application, with responsibility being transferred from the State of arrival to some other State. Infringement of the Schengen Borders Code in relation to control of the external borders should in future lead to a State’s being excluded from the Schengen area. In order to make this possible, an appropriate amendment should be made to the Schengen Borders Code. Border controls should also be fully reinstated inside the Schengen area until such time as control of the EU’s external borders functions properly.

Will the Commission propose amendments to the Dublin III Regulation to ensure that in all instances the State responsible for considering an asylum application is the EU Member State of first arrival of a person seeking international protection, and will the Commission recommend that the Schengen Borders Code be amended so as to exclude from the Schengen area countries which neglect control of the external borders of that area?

Establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System in the field of border checks (A8-0347/2017 - Carlos Coelho)

24-10-2018

I voted in favour of this draft regulation on the establishment and use of the new and improved SIS or Schengen Information System. This report on borders checks makes up part of the update that will enhance the system and make it better applicable in the field. As the SIS is the biggest and most widely used database system for security and border checks in Europe its function and implementation is of fundamental importance.  
The new SIS should allow for better cooperation between Member States when it comes to security and allow for a much more comprehensive approach when it comes to border checks, with the necessary information more easily reaching the personnel in the field.

Establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (A8-0349/2017 - Carlos Coelho)

24-10-2018

I voted in favour of this draft regulation on the establishment and use of the new and improved SIS or Schengen Information System. This report on police and judicial cooperation makes up part of the update that will enhance the system and make it better applicable in the field. As the SIS is the biggest and most widely used database system for security and border checks in Europe its function and implementation is of fundamental importance.  
This new and updated version of SIS should allow for better cooperation between Member States when it comes to fighting and preventing crime. An important aspect of this is that Europol now also will be given access to the system, and that new alerts have been established regarding persons connected to serious crimes and terrorism. Including an obligation on National authorities to share all relevant information and data when it comes to terrorist acts and attacks with their counterparts in other Member States.

Use of the Schengen Information System for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals (A8-0348/2017 - Jeroen Lenaers)

24-10-2018

I voted in favour of this draft regulation on the establishment and use of the new and improved SIS or Schengen Information System. This report on the return of illegally staying third country nationals makes up part of the update that will enhance the system and make it better applicable in the field. As the SIS is the biggest and most widely used database system for security and border checks in Europe its function and implementation is of fundamental importance.  
Currently third country nationals obliged to return can often avoid this by going to another Member State due to the lack of cross-border cooperation. This update should make return policies more effective and enforce return decisions in all Members States. It is fundamental that this loophole is closed rapidly and that this new update is implemented in full.

Improving the Schengen filing system in order to better fight terrorism

14.7.2017

[Answer in writing](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2017-004865-ASW_EN.html)

Question for written answer E-004865-17  
to the Commission  
Rule 130  
Alain Cadec (PPE)

The Schengen Information System (SIS), which entered into force in 1995, is now considered one of the best instruments for coordinating efforts between police and the judiciary in the EU, with 64 million alerts concerning persons and objects issued in 2015.

The SIS must now adapt to the new challenges of the fight against terrorism. A 2015 eu-LISA report pointed out that use of the SIS filing system to issue alerts on people varies considerably from country to country. Moreover, the information available is sometimes insufficient or too brief.

What steps is the Commission taking to harmonise the use of the SIS filing system by police services and the judiciary in the Member States?

Is risk of terrorism clearly mentioned among the criteria for inclusion in the SIS filing system?

Visas between EU/Schengen area and Russia

12.7.2018

[Answer in writing](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-003880-ASW_EN.html)

Question for written answer E-003880-18  
to the Commission  
Rule 130  
Morten Messerschmidt (ECR)

The inquirer has been informed that there is a mismatch when issuing visas between the EU and Russia. Allegedly, Russian citizens (private individuals) receive visas which are valid for 5 years in the Schengen area, while EU citizens must apply for a visa to visit Russia for each individual trip.

Can the Commission say whether this arrangement is regulated via an EU/Russian agreement?

If so, can the Commission say why the agreement contains this asymmetry?

Does the Commission intend to change so that equal rules exist between the two parties?

Schengen acquis provisions relating to the Visa Information System in Bulgaria and Romania (A8-0286/2017 - Agustín Díaz de Mera García Consuegra) RO

04-10-2017

Am votat pentru acest proiect de rezoluție care aprobă decizia Consiliului de a permite României și Bulgariei să aibă acces la datele din Sistemul de informații privind vizele (VIS). În acest fel, până la eliminarea controalelor la frontiere și participarea deplină a României la acquis-ul Schengen, autoritățile competente din România vor putea consulta datele înscrise în VIS, ceea ce va fi util în procesul de acordare a vizelor la nivel național. În același timp, accesul la VIS va contribui la prevenirea fraudelor în materie de vize Schengen, la facilitarea controalelor la punctele de trecere a frontierei și la identificarea persoanelor care ar putea să nu îndeplinească condițiile de intrare sau de ședere pe teritoriul României.  
Desigur, accesul României la acest sistem nu înlocuiește apartenența la Schengen, dar țara noastră trebuie să aibă o atitudine proactivă și să continue să militeze pentru ca cele patru libertăți din Tratatul de la Maastricht, să se aplice ca atare tuturor statelor membre.

Maltese authorities' visa issuing policy and risk to the Schengen Area

10.11.2015

[Answer in writing](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-2015-014567-ASW_EN.html)

Question for written answer P-014567-15  
to the Commission  
Rule 130  
Elisabeth Morin-Chartier (PPE)

A judicial inquiry is under way in Malta into improprieties on the part of the Maltese authorities in issuing residence permits to Libyan nationals. There has been large-scale fraud, apparently, also involving the forging of official documents.

The Maltese press recently reported on a similar case involving Algerian nationals who had obtained Maltese visas in order to travel to other Schengen Area countries without spending more than a few hours in Malta. The Schengen Area, to which I am deeply committed, will be undermined and considerably weakened if there have been irregularities on the part of the Maltese authorities.

At a time when efforts are being made to strengthen the Schengen Area's external borders and migration and security continue to be two of the European public's main concerns, can the Commission give thought to launching an inquiry so as to determine whether Maltese practices comply with Schengen rules?

Can the Commission also make an appraisal as to whether the Maltese authorities' visa issuing practices raise domestic security concerns?

Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders (A8-0356/2018 - Tanja Fajon) PT

04-04-2019

O espaço Schengen é uma das maiores realizações da integração europeia, que implica não só a livre circulação de pessoas, mas também de bens e serviços, e que acarretou vantagens significativas para os cidadãos europeus e a economia. Graças a Schengen, o continente europeu, dividido e dilacerado pela guerra no passado, voltou a estar unido.  
Apesar do espaço de livre circulação nunca ter sido tão frágil como atualmente, devido aos desafios com que a União tem sido confrontada nos últimos anos, não é nada que não consigamos enfrentar se estivermos unidos. Devido a uma enorme falta de confiança mútua, infelizmente, vários Estados-Membros reintroduziram controlos nas fronteiras internas nos últimos anos, pondo em risco o futuro processo de integração política da União, bem como as nossas economias.  
A suspensão de Schengen e o restabelecimento de controlos permanentes nas fronteiras constituiria um grave atentado às quatro liberdades fundamentais e teria um impacto económico fortemente negativo. As estimativas mostram que os custos de não-Schengen se situariam entre os 5 mil milhões e os 18 mil milhões de euros por ano, em função da região, do sector e dos canais comerciais alternativos. Trata-se de um preço que nem a União nem nenhum dos seus Estados-Membros pode comportar. Por conseguinte, há que preservar Schengen! Votei favoravelmente.

Schengen European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS)

18.1.2019

[Answer in writing](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2019-000251-ASW_EN.html)

Question for written answer E-000251-19  
to the Commission  
Rule 130  
John Stuart Agnew (ENF)

The EU currently has ‘no visa’ agreements with 61 countries around the world. Does the Commission agree that in introducing the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS), it risks retaliation from other countries, by being removed from their ‘no visa’ lists? Does the Commission also agree, in view of the relatively low statistical risk of terrorist activity, that the inconvenience of ETIAS outweighs any security benefit to be gained, as ‘home grown’ terrorism historically poses more of a risk?

Security at Schengen area borders

10.12.2015

[Answer in writing](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2015-015647-ASW_EN.html)

Question for written answer E-015647-15  
to the Commission  
Rule 130  
Mike Hookem (EFDD)

Given that the Dublin Agreement prohibits countries from refusing asylum claims if they have been granted by another Member State, and given that the vast majority, if not all, of the migrants trying to make their way illegally into the UK are using increasingly desperate and violent measures, including threatening lorry drivers with violence, what does the Commission propose to do to alleviate the situation, and will it rule out any changes to both the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Agreement?

Application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System in Croatia (A8-0073/2017 - Nuno Melo) FR

05-04-2017

Le système d’information Schengen II (SIS II) a pour objet de permettre aux États membres de l’espace Schengen de mettre en place une politique commune de contrôle des entrées au sein de cet espace et, ainsi, de faciliter la libre circulation de leurs ressortissants tout en préservant l’ordre et la sécurité publics.  
L’évaluation réalisée en 2016 par la Commission a démontré que la Croatie avait la capacité politique, juridique et technique pour intégrer progressivement cet espace, le pays disposant désormais d’un niveau satisfaisant de protection des données.  
La Croatie pourra ainsi exploiter le SIS pour permettre une meilleure coopération policière avec les États membres et les pays associés, dans la recherche des personnes poursuivies pour activités criminelles, des personnes disparues, et d’objets disparus comme des voitures ou des documents volés.

Establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System in the field of border checks (A8-0347/2017 - Carlos Coelho) HU

24-10-2018

Az EP ezúttal is az európai polgárok érdekét tartja szem előtt, amikor fellép egyes tagállamok gyakorlatával szemben, amelyek rendkívül helyzet – adott esetben a menekültválság – okán, sőt ürügyén indokolatlan szigorításokat, határellenőrzéseket vezetnek be a Schengeni rendszer alkalmazása során. A tapasztalatok viszont azt igazolják, hogy ezekkel az ideiglenesnek hirdetett, de sokszor jogtalanul és értelmetlenül hosszúra nyúló ellenőrzésekkel még egyetlen terroristát sem sikerült megállítani, miközben a lakosság számára okozott kényelmetlenség és félelemérzet ismét csak az EU-ellenes demagógia malmára hajtja a vizet.  
Ismert tény, hogy a szabad mozgást, a határok átjárhatóságát az európai választópolgárok az integráció egyik legnagyobb és a leginkább polgárbarát vívmányaként tartják számon. Az EU nagyrészt ebből táplálkozó egyértelmű lakossági támogatottságát különösen a mostani kényes politikai helyzetben nem szabadna kockára tenni, amikor Európa-szerte erősödik a nacionalista, populista EU- és idegenellenes erők hangja. Európai demokrataként számomra tehát a humánum, a politikai célszerűség és a józan ész egyaránt a polgárok szabad mozgásának védelmét, az itt javasolt új szabályok támogatását indokolta.

Implementation of the remaining provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System in Bulgaria and Romania (A8-0192/2018 - Monica Macovei) HU

13-06-2018

Támogattam a határozatot, mert természetesnek, a hatékony uniós határvédelemhez, jogsegélyhez és bűnüldözéshez elengedhetetlennek tartom, hogy ez a két ország maradéktalanul rendelkezzen minden schengeni eszközzel, így a SIS információs bázishoz való hozzáféréssel is.  
A vízuminformációs rendszerhez való hozzáférés korábbi biztosítása után ezzel a két tagállam hatóságai gyakorlatilag a schengeni együttműködésből fakadó minden konkrét kötelezettségnek eleget tesznek. Ennek ellenére - számomra elfogadhatatlan politikai okokból - egyes tagállamok a teljes jogú schengeni tagságukat változatlanul akadályozzák. Bulgáriának és Romániának földrajzi helyzetükből adódóan kulcsszerepe lehet a nemzetközi terrorizmus és a határon átnyúló bűnözés elleni uniós együttműködésben is, ám ma ennek gyakorlati érvényesülését Schengen-tagságuk halogatása akadályozza.  
A helyzet abszurditását jelzi, hogy miközben a román és a bolgár idegenrendészet már minden schengeni követelményt teljesít, más, teljes jogú tagállamok szinte korlátok nélkül, ellenőrizetlenül engedhetnek be gyanús hátterű, harmadik országbeli személyeket, az ún. letelepedési kötvények és arany vízumok révén, amivel az egész Unió biztonságát veszélyeztetik.

Annual Report on the functioning of the Schengen area (A8-0160/2018 - Carlos Coelho) HU

30-05-2018

Szavazatommal támogattam a 2015-ös menekültválság nyomán felállított Schengen-figyelő parlamenti különbizottság megállapításait összegző EP-jelentés elfogadását, mert nagyra értékelem, hogy a jelentéstevő a számos hiányosság feltárásával és egy sor intézkedés sürgetésével együtt is határozottan kiáll a schengeni rendszer fenntartása, értékeinek megőrzése mellett. Megítélésem szerint a schengeni térség az európai integráció egyik legfontosabb, az európai polgárok számára kézzelfogható előnyöket jelentő vívmánya, amely a jelentésben jelzett irányokban továbbfejlesztett, megerősített formájában fontos szerepet játszhat a menekült- és migrációs hullám további, közös európai szintű kezelésében is. Ez a jelentés az Európai Parlament konstruktív hozzájárulása ahhoz a vitához, amelyben néhány tagállam – elsősorban a magyarországi Orbán-kormány – a Tanácsban obstrukciókkal, vétókkal, az idegenellenesség szításával próbálja akadályozni a közös EU-megoldás kialakítását.

Schengen visas: ensuring that Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty are respected

27.11.2014

[Answer in writing](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2014-009949-ASW_EN.html)

Question for written answer E-009949-14  
to the Commission  
Rule 130  
Anna Elżbieta Fotyga (ECR) , Marek Jurek (ECR)

Following its illegal annexation of the Ukrainian Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Russia took a number of steps to bind the occupied territory as closely as possible to Russia. One of the key moves was to grant Russian citizenship to inhabitants of Crimea and to issue them with Russian passports. The passports, issued in special offices, are identical to those issued in Russia. Given that the EU and its Member States do not recognise Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and continue to regard the republic as an integral part of Ukraine, Schengen visas for inhabitants of Crimea should be issued only in EU offices in Ukraine.

1. Is the Commission checking to ensure that Schengen visas are being issued in accordance with the principle of Ukraine's territorial integrity? 2. Are Schengen visas being issued to inhabitants of Crimea by accredited consular offices outside Ukraine, and are Russian passports issued to inhabitants of the Ukrainian Autonomous Republic of Crimea being accepted?

Establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (A8-0349/2017 - Carlos Coelho) PL

24-10-2018

W głosowaniu poparłem sprawozdanie dotyczące użytkowania Systemu Informacyjnego Schengen w dziedzinie współpracy policyjnej i współpracy wymiarów sprawiedliwości w sprawach karnych. Uważam bowiem, że proponowane rozwiązania prawne poprawią bezpieczeństwo w Unii Europejskiej przez ożywienie współpracy pomiędzy służbami państw członkowskich. Wśród różnych problemów trzeba bowiem zaznaczyć, że występują trudności w identyfikacji nielegalnych migrantów, co osłabia skuteczność walki z przestępczością. Zintegrowana baza danych będzie także wielce pomocna w pracy straży granicznych i przybrzeżnych. Podstawowym celem w walce z przestępcami musi być skuteczność w ich identyfikacji, ściganiu i karaniu. Nie może być tak, że osoba ukarana uchyla się od ponoszenia odpowiedzialności, uciekając do innego państwa członkowskiego. W moim przekonaniu proponowane rozporządzenie, poprzez usprawnienie systemów informatycznych i poszerzenie baz danych o przestępcach, jest krokiem w dobrym kierunku. Dlatego jeszcze raz opowiadam się za przyjęciem niniejszego wniosku.

Annual Report on the functioning of the Schengen area (A8-0160/2018 - Carlos Coelho) PL

30-05-2018

Głosowałem za przyjęciem sprawozdania rocznego w sprawie funkcjonowania strefy Schengen, ponieważ jest ona bez wątpienia jednym z największych osiągnięć Unii Europejskiej umożliwiającym swobodny przepływ osób, bez kontroli na granicach wewnętrznych. Jej sprawne funkcjonowanie ma zasadniczy wpływ nie tylko na stabilność wspólnego rynku i wzrost gospodarczy, ale przyczynia się także do poprawy jakości życia obywateli Unii Europejskiej. W ostatnim czasie, stabilność strefy Schengen została zachwiana w związku z kryzysem migracyjnym i tragicznymi zdarzeniami o podłożu terrorystycznym. Dlatego uważam, że bardzo ważnym krokiem na drodze do przywrócenia normalnego funkcjonowania strefy Schengen jest z pewnością utworzenie – na bazie Frontexu – Europejskiej Agencji Straży Granicznej i Przybrzeżnej, a ponadto zmiany przewidziane w kodeksie granicznym Schengen. Obecnie, instytucje UE wraz z państwami członkowskimi powinny dołożyć wszelkich starań, by w możliwie krótkim czasie znieść kontrole na granicach wewnętrznych, które skutkują kosztami gospodarczymi dla całej UE i powodują poważne szkody na jednolitym rynku.

Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders (A8-0356/2018 - Tanja Fajon) DE

29-11-2018

Wir haben mit der Zustimmung zum Bericht Fajon einen wichtigen Schritt zum Erhalt und zur Modernisierung des Schengener Grenzkodex getan. Die Wiedereinführung von Kontrollen an den Binnengrenzen durch einige Länder kann und darf kein Dauerzustand sein. Es braucht einen effektiveren Schutz der Außengrenzen und den politischen Willen, den Schengen-Raum zu sichern und zu erhalten. Der Schengener Grenzkodex und die damit verbundene Reisefreiheit sind die tragenden Säulen einer bürgernahen EU.

European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) (A8-0322/2017 - Kinga Gál) DE

05-07-2018

Mit der Abstimmung haben wir die Einführung eines EU-weiten Reiseinformations- und -genehmigungssystems (ETIAS) bestätigt. Es geht um eine Vorabüberprüfung von Reisenden in den Schengen-Raum, die keiner Visumspflicht unterliegen. Wir Liberale haben dabei wichtige Erfolge beim Schutz der Persönlichkeitsrechte und beim Datenschutz erzielt: Die anfallenden Daten des EU-weiten Einreise-Genehmigungssystems werden nur noch maximal drei Jahre gespeichert, der Rat hatte fünf Jahre festschreiben wollen. Sensible Gesundheitsdaten und berufliche Situation werden nur noch als Kategorien und nicht spezifisch abgefragt. Zwischenstopps an europäischen Flughäfen werden auch nicht mehr erfasst. Auch wurde durchgesetzt, dass Ermittlungsbehörden keinen Blankoscheck beim Zugriff auf die erhobenen Daten erhalten und bei Verdacht auf Sicherheitsrisiken zuvor das EES abgleichen müssen. Eine Vorabkontrolle zur Einreise in die EU ist eine notwendige Maßnahme, wenn wir das visumsfreie Reisen weiterhin ermöglichen und ausbauen wollen. Denn Visumsbefreiungen schaffen erst die Voraussetzungen für internationale Geschäftsbeziehungen, kulturelle Begegnungen und wissenschaftlichen Austausch.

Internal border controls between Schengen Member States

22.11.2017

[Answer in writing](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2017-007171-ASW_EN.html)

Question for written answer E-007171-17  
to the Commission  
Rule 130  
Eleftherios Synadinos (NI)

Germany has announced its decision to reintroduce internal border controls, in accordance with Article 25 of the Schengen Borders Code, for reasons of ‘internal security and public policy’. However, according to the German press, this is a political reaction geared at appealing to voters. These border controls also apply to flights exclusively from Greece, though, according to the Commission, ‘the impact on free movement will be small’.[[1]](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2017-007171_EN.html#def1)

‘Secondary movements’ within the Union and illegal immigration from Turkey to Greece are still an issue, and the main illegal immigration and refugee route through the Balkans now passes through Bulgaria.

This year, approximately 1 000 individuals without a Schengen visa arrived at German airports. No further data per country is available. Nothing indicates that the appropriate controls were not carried out at Greek airports. In the first ten days of November, the Greek authorities arrested approximately 1 800 individuals before they boarded international flights.[[2]](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2017-007171_EN.html#def2)

The German Government states that the controls focus on individuals whose ‘facial characteristics may indicate that they are immigrants or refugees’.

In view of this, the Commission is asked:

* —Are there data available regarding the number of individuals moving illegally between Schengen Member States by air?
* —Is the Commission considering reintroducing systematic internal border controls?
* —Do the aforementioned controls raise issues of racial discrimination?

Residence of third-country nationals in EU/Schengen Member States following expiration of long-term residence permits

22.1.2015

[Answer in writing](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2015-000886-ASW_EN.html)

Question for written answer E-000886-15  
to the Commission  
Rule 130  
Pavel Svoboda (PPE)

We submitted a question (No [E-007775/2014](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2014-007775_EN.html)) concerning residence of third-country nationals who are not required to hold a visa in EU/Schengen Member States and whose long‐term residence permits have expired, but who wish to continue residing in an EU/Schengen Member State pursuant to the rules on short‐term stays.

The purpose of our question was to gain the Commission's opinion on whether it is possible, under current legislation, for this third‐country national to leave the territory of the Member State in which he/she had previously resided, since the relevant provisions link entitlement to short‐term stays with ‘entry’ into the territory.

We feel that the response provided by the Commission fails to answer this question. In its response, the Commission states that ‘before the expiration of the residence permit the person should request the prolongation/extension of stay from the Member State that issued the permit’. In the case of, for instance, an American student whose long‐term residence for the purposes of study has just expired, he/she would be unable to apply for a prolongation of his/her long‐term residence, since:

* 1.that person no longer holds any title that would entitle him/her to apply for long‐term residence, and
* 2.that person does not intend to remain for longer than three months in the EU/Schengen Area.

Therefore, is it possible for that person to remain without interruption in the same EU/Schengen Member State even after the expiration of his/her long‐term residence permit?

Reintroduction of controls in the Schengen area

17.11.2017

[Answer in writing](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2017-007102-ASW_EN.html)

Question for written answer E-007102-17  
to the Commission  
Rule 130  
Miltiadis Kyrkos (S&D)

Germany has requested the continued reintroduction of controls, not only at its land borders with Austria but also at airports for flights from Greece.

The Schengen area is one of the most important achievements in terms of European integration and directly affects the everyday life of European citizens. In addition, its member countries have begun to step up security in a number of ways, including exchanges of information in a bid to tackle organised cross-border crime, terrorism, etc. In view of this:

* 1.Does the Commission consider that Germany is justified in seeking the reintroduction of border controls at airports for flights from Greece alone, given that none of the perpetrators of terrorist attacks in any of the Member States entered directly from Greece?
* 2.Has Germany has submitted its reasons for the proposed reintroduction of controls, including all relevant data detailing events that constitute a serious threat to its public policy or internal security, under Article 27 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399?
* 3.Have any weaknesses been detected along Greek external borders that might jeopardise the overall functioning of the Schengen area?

Exit and entry checks in and out of the Schengen area

18.8.2017

[Answer in writing](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-2017-005214-ASW_EN.html)

Question for written answer P-005214-17  
to the Commission  
Rule 130  
Jill Seymour (EFDD)

With the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2017/458 by some Member States during the peak time of travel, when holidaymakers are attempting to reach their destinations in order to satisfy their desire to start their annual holiday, it has become apparent that the new enhanced security checks have caused unnecessary delays.

In light of the recent terror attacks in London, Paris, Brussels and Nice, and in other cities and towns in the EU, it is essential to ensure that all law-abiding citizens and subjects of the Member States can go about their daily business without the fear of death or injury.

In view of recitals 8, 10 and 11 and Article 1(2a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/458:

* 1.In light of the problems that have arisen with regard to the implementation of the regulation, will the Commission bring forward its evaluation of the implementation and consequences before 8 April 2019? If not, why not?
* 2.In respect of Article 1(2a), what risk assessments, if any, where undertaken by Spain, France and Belgium?
* 3.Why where there not enough resources in place when Member States implemented this regulation during a peak travel season? Given that there was clearly an impact on the flow of traffic, why did the Member States not implement Article 1(2a)?

Spain steps up without due cause national checks on coaches coming from Catalonia (Schengen area)

20.3.2019

[Answer in writing](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2019-001423-ASW_EN.html)

Question for written answer E-001423-19  
to the Commission  
Rule 130  
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

On 16 March 2019, 520 coaches[[1]](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2019-001423_EN.html#def1) travelled from Barcelona to Madrid carrying people attending the ‘La autodeterminación no es delito’ [Self-determination is not a crime] demonstration held at six in the evening that day in Madrid. Organisers say 120 000 people took part in this calm and public-spirited demonstration which took place without any incidents.

Passengers reported that the coaches were subjected to a number of checks by the Guardia Civil during the trip[[2]](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2019-001423_EN.html#def2), for instance at Bujaraloz and the motorway tolls at Pina de Ebro.

Documents had to be shown, suitcases were searched and drivers required to show the contract for their vehicle’s hire.

In the European Union, people have the right to move around freely, and the terrorism threat level in Spain was no higher than normal on 16 March.

1. Does the Commission believe all these checks, which were not random ones, are justified within the Schengen area?

2. Does the Commission know whether there was a threat to public safety or law and order in Spain that day that would justify stepping up checks on coaches from Catalonia in this way?

3. Could the Commission say in what situations Member States may or should step up checks on the EU’s highways?

European Border and Coast Guard (A8-0076/2019 - Roberta Metsola) DE

17-04-2019

Durch den Ausbau von Frontex im Jahr 2016 wurde die Europäische Agentur für Grenz- und Küstenwache (EBCG) in ihrer heutigen Form geschaffen. Das neue Mandat dieser Agentur sollte den verstärkten Herausforderungen beim Schutz der EU-Außengrenzen insbesondere seit der 2015 ausgebrochenen, von Staaten wie Deutschland mitverschuldeten Migrationskrise Rechnung tragen. Da nach wie vor der Schutz der Schengen-Außengrenze nicht gewährleistet ist, beabsichtigt diese neue Verordnung eine weitere Aufstockung von Frontex auf eine ständige Reserve von 10 000 Grenzbeamten bis zum Jahr 2027. Diese ständige Reserve soll die EU-Mitgliedstaaten bei Grenzkontrollen, Rückführungsaufgaben sowie beim Kampf gegen grenzüberschreitende Kriminalität unterstützen. Zudem sollen das ständige Personal bei Frontex von derzeit einigen hundert auf 3000 bis ins Jahr 2025 aufgestockt und das europäische Grenzüberwachungssystem EUROSUR in das neue Mandat mit einbezogen werden. Mit dem neuen Mandat belaufen sich die Kosten für Frontex bis 2027 auf rund 12,5 Mrd. EUR. Zwar kann das neue Mandat die Migrationskrise alleine nicht lösen. Zudem wäre es sinnvoll, wenn Rückführungen Nicht-Schutzbedürftiger von einem Drittstaat in einen anderen ermöglicht werden könnten, was diese Verordnung nicht vorsieht. Dennoch begrüße ich die Ausweitung des Mandates für Frontex als wichtigen Baustein zur Wiedererlangung von Kontrolle an den Schengen-Außengrenzen und stimme diesem Bericht daher zu.

Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders (A8-0356/2018 - Tanja Fajon) DE

04-04-2019

Seit Ausbruch der Migrationskrise im August 2015 wurde in der Europäischen Union zunehmend von der Möglichkeit Gebrauch gemacht, die Kontrollen an den Binnengrenzen vorübergehend wiedereinzuführen. Grund hierfür waren die Sekundärbewegungen von irregulären Migranten und die zunehmende Gefahr durch den grenzübergreifenden Terrorismus. Gemäß aktuellem Schengen-Besitzstand können Binnengrenzkontrollen für maximal sechs Monate wiedereingeführt werden, mit der Möglichkeit einer dreimaligen Verlängerung für den jeweils gleichen Zeitraum. Die Kommission unterbreitete im September 2017 einen neuen Verordnungsentwurf, der die Flexibilität für die Mitgliedstaaten bei der Wiedereinführung von Binnengrenzkontrollen durch Fristverlängerungen und Erleichterungen bei der Beantragung von Verlängerungen erhöhen sollte. Waren hier Verbesserungen im Vergleich zur heute gültigen Regelung in Sicht, schlug das Europäische Parlament in seiner Mehrheit den entgegengesetzten Weg ein. In der ersten Lesung bekundete es am 29. November 2018, die zeitlich begrenzte Wiedereinführung von Grenzkontrollen an Binnengrenzen noch mehr einzuschränken als bisher und im Regelfall nicht mehr als zwei Monate zu erlauben. Dies ist völlig inakzeptabel und gefährdet in noch höherem Maße als bisher die innere Sicherheit einzelner Mitgliedstaaten. Nach zwei erfolglos verlaufenen interinstitutionellen Verhandlungen soll nun wieder der Schlusstext der ersten Lesung als vorläufiger Standpunkt des Europäischen Parlaments bekräftigt werden. Was falsch war, bleibt falsch, weshalb ich auch jetzt diesen Parlamentsbericht ablehne.

Objection pursuant to Rule 105(3): Instrument for financial support for external borders and visa (B8-0215/2019) DE

27-03-2019

Der 2014 geschaffene Fonds für innere Sicherheit im Bereich Außengrenzen und Visa soll den Schutz der Außengrenzen verbessern sowie die Zahl illegaler Einreisen verringern. Zudem soll er der EU ermöglichen, rasch und wirksam auf sicherheitsbezogene Krisen, die das Funktionieren des Schengen-Systems gefährden, zu reagieren. Im vorliegenden Fall geht es allerdings nicht um den Fonds als solchen, sondern um die Frage, ob ein AMIF ergänzender delegierter Rechtsakt der Kommission vom Europäischen Parlament genehmigt werden soll oder nicht. Der zuständige LIBE-Ausschuss plädiert dabei für eine Ablehnung, da er das im delegierten Rechtsakt enthaltene Konzept der so genannten kontrollierten Zentren in Frage stellt. Die Errichtung von kontrollierten Zentren wurde – nicht zuletzt ausgelöst durch den damaligen Koalitionsstreit der Bundesregierung – vom Europäischen Rat auf dessen Sitzung vom 28./29. Juni 2018 in den so genannten Schlussfolgerungen festgeschrieben. Demzufolge soll durch die freiwillige Einrichtung von kontrollierten Zentren in einzelnen EU-Mitgliedstaaten eine rasche und gesicherte Abfertigung ermöglicht werden, die zwischen irregulären Migranten, die rückgeführt werden, und schutzwürdigen Personen unterscheidet. Auch wenn das Konzept der kontrollierten Zentren bislang in der Praxis nicht umgesetzt wurde, so gibt es keinen Grund, dieses grundsätzlich in Frage zu stellen. Entsprechend wende ich mich gegen das vorgeschlagene Veto des LIBE-Ausschusses.

Application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System in Croatia (A8-0073/2017 - Nuno Melo) FR

05-04-2017

Le système d’information Schengen II (SIS II) a pour objet de permettre aux États membres de l’espace Schengen de mettre en place une politique commune de contrôle des entrées au sein de cet espace et, ainsi, de faciliter la libre circulation de leurs ressortissants tout en préservant l’ordre et la sécurité publics.  
L’évaluation réalisée en 2016 par la Commission a démontré que la Croatie avait la capacité politique, juridique et technique pour intégrer progressivement cet espace, le pays disposant désormais d’un niveau satisfaisant de protection des données.  
La Croatie pourra ainsi exploiter le SIS pour permettre une meilleure coopération policière avec les États membres et les pays associés, dans la recherche des personnes poursuivies pour activités criminelles, des personnes disparues, et d’objets disparus comme des voitures ou des documents volés.

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on blocking the accession of Croatia to the Schengen Area

24.1.2017

pursuant to Rule 133 of the Rules of Procedure  
  
Steeve Briois

B8-0129/2017

Motion for a European Parliament resolution on blocking the accession of Croatia to the Schengen Area

*The European Parliament*,

–  having regard to Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System,

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders,

–  having regard to Rule 133 of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the Commission is preparing to propose to the Council the inclusion of Croatia in the Schengen Information System (SIS), bringing it a step closer to full membership to the Schengen Area;

B.  whereas the principle of free movement of persons within the Schengen Area is facilitating penetration of Europe by jihadists from the Middle East;

C.  whereas a most illegal immigrants favour the Balkan route for the purpose of entering an EU Member State, Croatia being one stage of their journey;

1.  Calls for the accession of Croatia to the Schengen Area to be blocked;

2.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission and the Member States.

Annual Report on the functioning of the Schengen area (A8-0160/2018 - Carlos Coelho) NL

30-05-2018

De VVD is een groot voorstander van een goed functionerende Schengenzone, maar hiertoe dienen de buitengrenzen van Schengen en van de EU effectief te worden bewaakt om illegale migratie in te dammen. Dit is thans niet het geval. Derhalve wil de VVD de mogelijkheid openhouden dat lidstaten in geval van acute migratiecrises (tijdelijke) grenscontroles kunnen invoeren. Omdat dit onvoldoende in het verslag naar voren komt, heeft de VVD zich bij de eindstemming onthouden.

Illegal passport controls carried out by the Belgian authorities within the Schengen area on passengers arriving by air from Greece

6.12.2017

[Answer in writing](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-2017-007516-ASW_EN.html)

Question for written answer P-007516-17  
to the Commission  
Rule 130  
Notis Marias (ECR)

On Monday, 4 December 2017, passengers on Aegean Airlines Flight 622 from Athens to Brussels were officially informed immediately after landing that the Belgian authorities would be checking their passports.

Immediately after the passengers had left the aircraft, the Belgian authorities, in the form of persons in civilian clothing wearing distinctive red armbands, checked their passports within the Schengen area of Zaventem airport in Brussels.

This unlawful act by the Belgian authorities comes in the wake of similar illegal actions by the German authorities, which are systematically carrying out passport controls on passengers arriving on flights from Greece. Thus, after the German authorities introduced ‘quarantine’ measures for Greeks and other air passengers arriving in Germany from Greece, the Belgian authorities are now introducing their own ‘quarantine’ measures.

Since it is forbidden to carry out any passport controls within the Schengen area on passengers of flights who have legally boarded an aircraft which has departed from another Schengen country and in view of the abovementioned unlawful act by the Belgian authorities, can the Commission say:

* —What measures does it intend to take against the Belgian authorities to prevail upon them henceforth to stop carrying out illegal passport controls of this kind on air passengers from Greece within the Schengen area?

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on ending the Schengen system

29.3.2016

pursuant to Rule 133 of the Rules of Procedure  
  
Edouard Ferrand, Matteo Salvini, Mara Bizzotto

B8-0457/2016

Motion for a European Parliament resolution on ending the Schengen system

*The European Parliament*,

–  having regard to Rule 133 of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas, in the wake of the bombings in Brussels on 22 March, Europe can be said to be at the mercy of Islamist terrorism, organised by what is essentially a fifth column within Europe's borders;

B.  whereas the threat of terrorism has grown hugely since the massive influx of refugees to Europe, which include a large number of Jihadists;

C.  whereas the EU is committed, under Article 3(2) of the Treaty on European Union (EU Treaty), to offering its citizens 'an area of freedom, security and justice [...] and the prevention and combating of crime';

1.  Calls on the Council immediately to cease its policy of accepting refugees indiscriminately;

2.  Calls on the Council to abolish the Schengen system and ensure the re-establishment of national borders as a result.

<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-8-2016-0457_EN.html>

Establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System in the field of border checks (A8-0347/2017 - Carlos Coelho) ES

24-10-2018

El nuevo Sistema de Información de Schengen (SIS) es el paso correcto para garantizar que los delincuentes y las personas que permanecen ilegalmente en la Unión Europea sean localizados en el menor tiempo posible. Este sistema de intercambio de información facilitará la vida a los oficiales de policía, guardias de fronteras y autoridades nacionales, pero al mismo tiempo hará la vida mucho más difícil para aquellos que representan una amenaza para la seguridad de los ciudadanos.  
Porque estoy preocupado por las necesidades de la sociedad actual, así como por la gran preocupación de los ciudadanos europeos por la seguridad y la migración, mi voto es favorable al nuevo SIS.

Establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (A8-0349/2017 - Carlos Coelho) ES

24-10-2018

El nuevo Sistema de Información de Schengen (SIS) es el paso correcto para garantizar que los delincuentes y las personas que permanecen ilegalmente en la Unión Europea sean localizados en el menor tiempo posible. En concreto, el nuevo SIS facilitará las actuaciones de usuarios clave en el ámbito de la cooperación policial y judicial en la UE, como Europol, Eurojust y la Agencia Europea de la Guardia de Fronteras y Costas.  
Porque estoy preocupado por las necesidades de la sociedad actual, incluida la alta preocupación de los ciudadanos europeos por la seguridad y la migración, mi voto es favorable al nuevo SIS en el área de la cooperación policial y judicial en materia penal.

Annual Report on the functioning of the Schengen area (A8-0160/2018 - Carlos Coelho) IT

30-05-2018

La creazione dello spazio Schengen, rappresenta una delle conquiste principali dell'Unione europea. Una conquista raggiunta grazie alla volontà politica e alla fiducia reciproca tra gli Stati membri, ma anche grazie a misure di compensazione, come il rafforzamento dello scambio di informazioni tramite la creazione del sistema d'informazione Schengen (SIS) e l'istituzione di un meccanismo di valutazione, per verificare l'applicazione dell'acquis di Schengen da parte degli Stati membri. Con questa risoluzione difendiamo lo spazio Schengen e condanniamo senza mezzi termini la continua reintroduzione dei controlli alle frontiere interne da parte di molti Stati membri. Controlli che noi riteniamo non siano conformi alle norme esistenti, in quanto alla loro estensione, necessità o proporzionalità, risultando pertanto illeciti. Molti Stati membri hanno addirittura modificato la base giuridica per la reintroduzione dei controlli per prorogarli oltre il periodo massimo possibile. Senza peraltro fornire giustificazioni sufficienti per tali controlli, né informazioni sufficienti sui risultati, ostacolando quindi l'analisi da parte della Commissione e il controllo esercitato dal Parlamento. Mettere a rischio lo spazio Schengen avrà delle conseguenze politiche, economiche e sociali dannose, non solo al principio della libera circolazione ma anche alla prosperità dei cittadini europei.

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on ending the Schengen system

25.10.2016

pursuant to Rule 133 of the Rules of Procedure  
  
Edouard Ferrand

B8-1213/2016

Motion for a European Parliament resolution on ending the Schengen system

*The European Parliament*,

–  having regard to Rule 133 of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas on 25 October 2016 the Commission submitted a recommendation with a view to prolonging by three further months the proportionate controls reintroduced – in accordance with the Council’s recommendation of 12 May – at certain internal borders within the Schengen area (Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway);

B.  whereas the Commission acknowledged that all the security conditions defined in the ‘Back to Schengen’ Roadmap allowing for a return to a normally functioning Schengen area were not yet fulfilled, as the system had been profoundly shaken in recent months by the size of the challenge presented by the biggest refugee crisis since the end of the Second World War;

1.  Regards this as an admission of the inability of the European authorities to cope with the unprecedented influx of refugees fleeing the various conflicts afflicting Africa and Asia, and illegal economic migrants;

2.  Calls on the Commission to admit the failure of its policy in this field and to end the Schengen system, reintroducing border controls permanently.

REPORT on the draft Council decision on the putting into effect of certain provisions of the Schengen *acquis* relating to the Visa Information System in the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania

27.9.2017 - (10161/2017 – C8‑0224/2017 – 2017/0808(CNS)) - \*

Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs  
Rapporteur: Agustín Díaz de Mera García Consuegra

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The proposed Council Decision aims to grant Bulgaria and Romania passive access to the Visa Information System (VIS) and, in accordance with the agreement reached by the co-legislators on a draft Regulation establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES), it is a precondition for the application of the EES to those Member States. Therefore, the rapporteur recommends that Parliament endorse the draft Council’s text without amendments so as to encourage the Member States to proceed speedily with the adoption of the Decision.

<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2017-0286_EN.html#_section2>

Listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, as regards the UK's withdrawal from the EU (A8-0047/2019 - Sergei Stanishev) ES

04-04-2019

La presente propuesta pretende incluir al Reino Unido en el Anexo II del Reglamento (CE) n.º 539/2001, es decir, en la lista de terceros países cuyos nacionales están exentos del requisito de visado, en lo que respecta a los nacionales británicos. Esto significaría que los ciudadanos del Reino Unido no necesitarían un visado para viajar durante estancias de corta duración, hasta 90 días, en cualquier período de 180 días en el espacio Schengen. Este régimen se aplicaría a partir del 30 de marzo de 2019. Sin embargo, si se llega a un acuerdo, se aplicará a partir del final del período de transición, como se indica en el acuerdo de salida entre la Unión Europea y el Reino Unido. La propuesta está sujeta a la condición de que el Reino Unido conceda condiciones recíprocas y no discriminatorias a los nacionales de los Estados miembros de la Unión. Aplicando el principio de reciprocidad y asegurando condiciones equilibradas para todos los ciudadanos de la Unión Europea respecto a los británicos, he votado a favor de la propuesta.

Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders (A8-0356/2018 - Tanja Fajon) ES

04-04-2019

El objetivo de esta propuesta consiste en modificar el Código de fronteras Schengen para garantizar que los plazos aplicables a la reintroducción temporal de controles fronterizos dentro de la Unión permitan a los Estados miembros responder a amenazas graves para la seguridad conjunta o las políticas públicas. Al mismo tiempo, esta propuesta aspira a que se mejoren las garantías procesales para asegurar que tales decisiones se toman sobre la base de evaluaciones de riesgo y en cooperación con los Estados miembros interesados. Comprometido con la seguridad interior de la Unión, apuesto con mi voto por esta propuesta.

Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders (A8-0356/2018 - Tanja Fajon) FR

04-04-2019

L'espace Schengen est un des principaux acquis de la construction européenne pour les citoyens européens. Il est le symbole de la libre circulation mais il est aussi devenu le symbole de l'échec des gouvernements européens à se montrer solidaires. Cela fait maintenant près de quatre ans que certains États membres mettent en cause l’espace Schengen et ont rétabli des contrôles à leurs frontières intérieures pour des raisons liées aux mouvements migratoires ou à la sécurité.  
Dans l’état actuel des choses, la Commission n’a pas les moyens de sanctionner les États qui ne respectent pas les règles. Elle a proposé un nouveau cadre qui revient pour l’essentiel à normaliser les manquements graves au cadre juridique actuel par les États membres.  
Le Parlement européen, s’est prononcé contre cette tentative de normalisation et pour un renforcement des procédures permettant le rétablissement de ces contrôles et la limitation de leurs durées de réintroduction.  
Les négociations interinstitutionnelles ont échoué. Le Conseil n’étant même plus capable de maintenir la position prise par les États en juin 2018. Par ce vote, le Parlement européen a confirmé sa position initiale. La libre circulation au sein de l’espace Schengen est fondamentale.  
Je vote pour une seconde fois en sa faveur.

REPORT on the full application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in Bulgaria and Romania: abolition of checks at internal land, sea and air borders

9.11.2018 - (2018/2092(INI))

Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs  
Rapporteur: Sergei Stanishev

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

**I. BACKGROUND**

In 2007, pursuant to Article 4(2) of their 2005 Act of Accession to the European Union, Bulgaria and Romania adopted the Schengen *acquis*. Certain provisions, including the abolition of checks at internal borders, were to apply in Bulgaria and Romania only pursuant to a Council decision to that effect after verification that the necessary conditions have been met. On 9 June 2011, the Council concluded, in accordance with the applicable Schengen evaluation procedures, that the conditions in all the areas of the Schengen *acquis* relating to Air Borders, Land Borders, Police Cooperation, Data Protection, the Schengen Information System, Sea Borders and Visas had been fulfilled by Bulgaria and Romania. However, the entering into effect of the provisions related to the abolition of checks at internal land, sea and air borders continues to be awaiting a final decision of the Council, where a positive unanimous decision must be taken by all current Schengen Member States.

At the time of the drafting of this report, Bulgaria and Romania apply the Schengen *acquis* only partially and checks are therefore still carried out at the borders with these two Member States. Since 2011, the Council has confirmed on multiple occasions its commitment to make any further decision on the basis of a ‘two-step’ approach – abolition of checks at internal sea and air borders only, followed by the abolition of checks at internal land borders on an unspecified date with a separate legal act.

The aim of this report is to confirm the Parliament’s position that the Council must a take a decision without further delay on the accession of Bulgaria and Romania as fully-fledged members of the Schengen area. Your Rapporteur believes that this House should stand firmly by the principle that following the successful completion of the Schengen evaluation process in all areas by an acceding country, the Council, after consulting the Parliament, should take an immediate decision to abolish checks at internal land, sea and air borders with a single legal act.

**II. TIMELINE**

Following the issuance of their declarations of readiness in 2007 and 2008, Bulgaria and Romania underwent a detailed and in-depth Schengen evaluation to determine their preparedness for the application of all parts of the Schengen *acquis* (Data Protection, the SIS, Air Borders, Land Borders, Sea Borders, Police Cooperation and Visas). On 29 September 2010, the Council published a draft decision for the full application of the Schengen *acquis*, including the abolition of checks at internal land, sea and air borders, subject to the definitive fulfilment of the necessary conditions*.*Following the opinion and approval of the European Parliament of 8 June 2011 (as part of a consultation procedure) the Justice and Home Affairs Council confirmed in its conclusions of 9 and 10 June 2011 that the Schengen evaluation process for Bulgaria and Romania has been completed successfully in all areas of the Schengen *acquis*. However, the Council failed to take a decision on the basis of the legal text consulted with the Parliament and postponed the matter until September 2011.

As a result of the lack of unanimity in the Council, in September 2011 the then-Polish Presidency put forward a compromise proposal for a ‘two-step’ approach. This proposal was submitted as a draft Council decision to the Committee of the Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States to the European Union (Coreper). Even though the draft Council decision represented a significant departure from the text approved by the Parliament, the Council failed to consult the Parliament again as requested in its legislative resolution of 8 June 2011.

The proposal for a ‘two-step’ approach on the abolition of checks at internal borders for Bulgaria and Romania has since been discussed on multiple occasions by the Justice and Home Affairs Council and has also been referred to in public statements by Heads of (Schengen) EU Member States.

**III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PARTIAL APPLICATION OF THE SCHENGEN *ACQUIS*BY THE TWO MEMBER STATES**

Your Rapporteur believes that there are direct negative consequences stemming from the ongoing deferral of the full accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the Schengen area for the two Member States, but also for the Union as a whole.

Free movement is a core principle of the EU and the ability to move within the Union without facing border checks at internal borders is one of its most successful and tangible achievements. It has strengthened the citizens’ sense of belonging to a common entity of shared freedom, peace and prosperity. By contrast, the failure to extend this achievement to all European citizens fuels EU skepticism, foments a feeling of injustice and erodes the popularity of the EU, ultimately undermining public support for common European actions.

The free movement in the Schengen area has also resulted in significant economic benefits for participating Member States by facilitating the integration of cross-border trade. The study ‘The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs aspects’, commissioned by the Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), draws key conclusions on the negative economic impact of cross border control between the Member States. The costs linked with the reintroduction of border control in the Schengen area are estimated to range between €0.05 billion and €20 billion in one-off costs and between €2 billion and €4 billion in annual operating costs. While there are multiple obstacles to quantifying the exact economic implications for Bulgaria and Romania, your Rapporteur believes that the provided data serves as an indication for the significant economic and social losses for the two countries as a result of the continued deadlock in the Council.

In the public discourse, the enlargement of the Schengen area is often linked to other Union policies, such as the reform of the Common European Asylum System or the ongoing efforts towards an effective Security Union. Your Rapporteur firmly believes that free movement of citizens should not suffer from deficiencies in or be subjected to other Union policies. Providing for the Union’s security requires common action and not fragmentation, while preserving the right balance between freedoms and security. To this end, efforts must be made towards building a coordinated, robust and inclusive legal framework, where all Member States are on equal footing.

The ongoing deferral of Bulgaria and Romania’s accession to the Schengen area, however, is a step in the opposite direction. It creates the need for distinguishing between Members States applying the Schengen *acquis*in full and Member States applying the Schengen *acquis*partially in the EU legislation, as well as the necessity for specific measures to avoid gaps and prevent possible deficiencies. The proposal for partial accession of Bulgaria and Romania is a further step towards the legal codification of the *de facto*co-existence of a Schengen area with free movement and a Schengen area without (or partial) free movement.

In what could be considered a final step before lifting the internal border control for Bulgaria and Romania, both countries were granted passive access to the Visa Information System (VIS) in 2017. At the time of the drafting of this report, there is an ongoing procedure for enabling the full application of the provisions of the Schengen *acquis*related to the Schengen Information System (SIS). The criteria for the implementation of these legislative acts has been fulfilled back in 2011. However, these Council proposals were put forward not as a result of commitments taken on behalf of the EU, but rather as part of the ongoing preparation for the EU-wide implementation of the Entry/Exit System, expected to be operational by 2020. Your Rapporteur believes that following these decisions, Bulgaria and Romania will have all responsibilities and obligations of fully-fledged Members of the Schengen area, thus contributing to the security of all Schengen Member States, but Union citizens would still not enjoy the benefit of free movement to and from these countries.

**IV. RAPPORTEUR’S CONCLUSIONS**

Your Rapporteur believes that the proposal for a ‘two-step’ approach for Bulgaria and Romania’s accession to the Schengen area not only lacks any legally sound justification, but also poses a number of risks, such as introducing new conditionalities to further delay the abolition of checks at internal land borders, prolonging the significant economic burden for the two Member States which results from maintaining checks at land borders, as well as setting the ground for potential information gaps and legislative deficiencies between Schengen Member States and non-Schengen Member States in the future.

Splitting the Council decision into two legal acts (one for the abolition of checks at air and sea borders, and another one – for land borders) would also legally codify the current double standard in the Schengen area, where Bulgaria and Romania have all obligations and responsibilities of fully-fledged Schengen members, but do not enjoy the benefit of free movement.

Therefore, your Rapporteur is of the opinion that the European Parliament should stand firmly by the model established in previous enlargements of the Schengen area, where the full application of the provisions of the Schengen *acquis*, including abolition of checks at internal air, sea and land borders, has been carried out through a single legal act following the fulfilment of the necessary criteria. Any other decision would set a precedent leading to negative political, economic and social consequences not only for Bulgaria and Romania, but for the Union as a whole, as well as negatively affecting other future enlargements of the Schengen area.

<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0365_EN.html#_section2>

REPORT on the draft Council decision on the putting into effect of the remaining provisions of the Schengen *acquis* relating to the Schengen Information System in the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania

28.5.2018 - (15820/1/2017 – C8‑0017/2018 – 2018/0802(CNS)) - \*

Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs  
Rapporteur: Monica Macovei

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

**A. Background**

1. According to the first subparagraph of Article 4(2) of the Act of Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania, the provisions of the Schengen *acquis,*other than those listed in Annex II to that Act, to which the Republic of Bulgaria (‘Bulgaria’) and Romania shall adhere upon accession, are to apply in Bulgaria and Romania pursuant to a Council decision to that effect, after verification that the necessary conditions for the application of all parts of the Schengen *acquis*have been met.

2. On9 June 2011, the Council concluded, in accordance with the applicable Schengen evaluation procedures, that the conditions in all the areas of the Schengen *acquis*relating to air borders, land borders, police cooperation, data protection, the SIS, sea borders and visas had been fulfilled by Bulgaria and Romania.

3. However, despite repeated calls from the European Parliament for these countries to join the Schengen area, the Council has yet to take the final decision, which is dependent of a unanimous vote by all Schengen Member States.

4. The provisions of the Schengen *acquis*relating to the Schengen Information System (‘SIS’) started to apply to Bulgaria and Romania from 15 October 2010[[1]](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0192_EN.html#_part2_def1), with the exception of the obligation to refuse entry into or stay on its territory to third country nationals for whom an alert has been issued by another Member State and the obligation to refrain from issuing SIS alerts and entering additional information on third country nationals for the purposes of refusing entry or stay (the ‘remaining restrictions’).

5. The present draft Council Decision aims to lift the remaining restrictions concerning the use of SIS by Bulgaria and Romania. The checks performed by Bulgaria and Romania at their external borders and in their territory should become more effective by issuing SIS alerts for the purposes of refusing entry or stay and by executing such alerts introduced by other Member States, in particular if such alerts are based on a threat to public policy or public security or national security.

**B. Position of the rapporteur**

The rapporteur recalls that in June 2011 the European Parliament gave its approval for Bulgaria and Romania to join the Schengen area, stating in a legislative resolution that Bulgaria and Romania where ready to join the Schengen border check-free area.

Since 2011, the European Parliament has made reiterated calls for the enlargement of the Schengen area to these two countries and has counted with the support of the European Commission, requesting the Council to take the final decision allowing for the lifting of checks at internal borders for Bulgaria and Romania.

In October 2017, the Council adopted Decision (EU) 2017/1908[[2]](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0192_EN.html#_part2_def2) putting into effect certain provisions of the Schengen *acquis* relating to the Visa Information System (‘VIS’) in Bulgaria and Romania. This would allow Bulgaria and Romania to access the VIS data for consultation purposes, thereby increasing the level of security in the Schengen area and facilitating tethe fight against serious crime and terrorism. The European Parliament endorsed the draft Council’s Decision.

Bulgaria and Romania play a key role in surveillance - related operations in the Black Sea, as well as on the Danube River, both strategic corridors open to naval international traffic and subject to border vulnerabilities.

Bulgaria and Romania share borders with Turkey, Moldova, Ukraine, Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, securing significant buffer zones for entry into the Schengen area.

Romania has been, for many years in a row, a main contributor to the logistical operations of the European Boarder and Coast Guard Agency.

In view of all above-mentioned elements, the current Council Decision aiming at lifting the remaining restrictions concerning the use of SIS by Bulgaria and Romania is a welcomed development for the participation of these two countries in the Schengen *acquis.* It will increase the level of security in the Schengen area and make the fight against serious crime and terrorism more effective.

By eliminating all restrictions to the use of SIS, Romania and Bulgaria would be able to ensure the same level of protection of the Union external borders as other Schengen member states.

The rapporteur recommends that Parliament endorse the draft Council’s text without amendments to encourage the Member States to proceed speedily with the adoption of the Decision.

<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0192_EN.html#_section2>

Implementation of the remaining provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System in Bulgaria and Romania (A8-0192/2018 - Monica Macovei) BG

13-06-2018

Днес за пореден път на дневен ред е приемането на България и Румъния в Шенгенското пространство. Днес за пореден път Европейският парламент изразява ясната позиция, че двете държави са изпълнили всички технически критерии за членство и са напълно готови за присъединяване. Въпреки многократните призиви отправени от Европейския парламент от 2011 г. насам, Съветът настойчиво продължава да ни блокира пътя. При все това, България е външна граница на Съюза. Това поставя под въпрос сигурността на всички европейски граждани.  
Напоследък често говорим за двойни стандарти. Говорим и за Европа на две скорости. За съжаление истината е, че Европа отдавна си е на две скорости. Един от основополагащите принципи на ЕС – за свободното движение на хора, не важи за българските граждани. На моите съграждани не им се предлага и еднакво качество храни. Предложението за поетапното ни приемане в Шенген само с въздушните и морските ни граници може спокойно да се тълкува по същия начин – като поредния двоен стандарт.  
Вместо да се бори срещу тези поредни двойни стандарти, прилагани към нашата страна и нейните граждани, българското правителство сметна, че европредседателството не е подходящ момент за отстояване на националните ни интереси. Това са отново пропуснати възможности за България.

European Border and Coast Guard (A8-0076/2019 - Roberta Metsola) DE

18-04-2019

Durch den Ausbau von Frontex im Jahr 2016 wurde die Europäische Agentur für die Grenz- und Küstenwache (EBCG) in ihrer heutigen Form geschaffen. Das neue Mandat dieser Agentur sollte den verstärkten Herausforderungen beim Schutz der EU-Außengrenzen insbesondere seit der 2015 ausgebrochenen, von Staaten wie Deutschland mitverschuldeten Migrationskrise Rechnung tragen. Da nach wie vor der Schutz der Schengen-Außengrenze nicht gewährleistet ist, beabsichtigt diese neue Verordnung eine weitere Aufstockung von Frontex auf eine ständige Reserve von 10 000 Grenzbeamten bis zum Jahr 2027. Diese ständige Reserve soll die EU-Mitgliedstaaten bei Grenzkontrollen, Rückführungsaufgaben sowie beim Kampf gegen grenzüberschreitende Kriminalität unterstützen. Zudem sollen das ständige Personal bei Frontex von derzeit einigen hundert auf 3 000 bis ins Jahr 2025 aufgestockt und das europäische Grenzüberwachungssystem EUROSUR in das neue Mandat mit einbezogen werden. Mit dem neuen Mandat belaufen sich die Kosten für Frontex bis 2027 auf rund 12,5 Mrd. EUR. Zwar kann das neue Mandat die Migrationskrise alleine nicht lösen. Zudem wäre es sinnvoll, wenn Rückführungen nicht Schutzbedürftiger von einem Drittstaat in einen anderen ermöglicht werden könnten, was diese Verordnung nicht vorsieht. Dennoch begrüße ich die Ausweitung des Mandates für Frontex als wichtigen Baustein zur Wiedererlangung von Kontrolle an den Schengen-Außengrenzen und stimme diesem Bericht daher zu.

European Border and Coast Guard (A8-0076/2019 - Roberta Metsola) DE

17-04-2019

Durch den Ausbau von Frontex im Jahr 2016 wurde die Europäische Agentur für Grenz- und Küstenwache (EBCG) in ihrer heutigen Form geschaffen. Das neue Mandat dieser Agentur sollte den verstärkten Herausforderungen beim Schutz der EU-Außengrenzen insbesondere seit der 2015 ausgebrochenen, von Staaten wie Deutschland mitverschuldeten Migrationskrise Rechnung tragen. Da nach wie vor der Schutz der Schengen-Außengrenze nicht gewährleistet ist, beabsichtigt diese neue Verordnung eine weitere Aufstockung von Frontex auf eine ständige Reserve von 10 000 Grenzbeamten bis zum Jahr 2027. Diese ständige Reserve soll die EU-Mitgliedstaaten bei Grenzkontrollen, Rückführungsaufgaben sowie beim Kampf gegen grenzüberschreitende Kriminalität unterstützen. Zudem sollen das ständige Personal bei Frontex von derzeit einigen hundert auf 3000 bis ins Jahr 2025 aufgestockt und das europäische Grenzüberwachungssystem EUROSUR in das neue Mandat mit einbezogen werden. Mit dem neuen Mandat belaufen sich die Kosten für Frontex bis 2027 auf rund 12,5 Mrd. EUR. Zwar kann das neue Mandat die Migrationskrise alleine nicht lösen. Zudem wäre es sinnvoll, wenn Rückführungen Nicht-Schutzbedürftiger von einem Drittstaat in einen anderen ermöglicht werden könnten, was diese Verordnung nicht vorsieht. Dennoch begrüße ich die Ausweitung des Mandates für Frontex als wichtigen Baustein zur Wiedererlangung von Kontrolle an den Schengen-Außengrenzen und stimme diesem Bericht daher zu.

Implementation of the remaining provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System in Bulgaria and Romania (A8-0192/2018 - Monica Macovei) BG

13-06-2018

Днес за пореден път на дневен ред е приемането на България и Румъния в Шенгенското пространство. Днес за пореден път Европейският парламент изразява ясната позиция, че двете държави са изпълнили всички технически критерии за членство и са напълно готови за присъединяване. Въпреки многократните призиви отправени от Европейския парламент от 2011 г. насам, Съветът настойчиво продължава да ни блокира пътя. При все това, България е външна граница на Съюза. Това поставя под въпрос сигурността на всички европейски граждани.  
Напоследък често говорим за двойни стандарти. Говорим и за Европа на две скорости. За съжаление истината е, че Европа отдавна си е на две скорости. Един от основополагащите принципи на ЕС – за свободното движение на хора, не важи за българските граждани. На моите съграждани не им се предлага и еднакво качество храни. Предложението за поетапното ни приемане в Шенген само с въздушните и морските ни граници може спокойно да се тълкува по същия начин – като поредния двоен стандарт.  
Вместо да се бори срещу тези поредни двойни стандарти, прилагани към нашата страна и нейните граждани, българското правителство сметна, че европредседателството не е подходящ момент за отстояване на националните ни интереси. Това са отново пропуснати възможности за България.

EU-Norway Agreement on supplementary rules in relation to the instrument for financial support for external borders and visa (A8-0174/2017 - Tomáš Zdechovský) FR

16-05-2017

Je me suis abstenue sur l’accord UE-Norvège établissant des règles complémentaires relatives à l’instrument de soutien financier dans le domaine des frontières extérieures et des visas. La Norvège est un pays tiers associé à la zone Schengen. On demande en substance à la Norvège de payer une contribution financière pour sa participation à « l’acquis » de Schengen, participation qu’au demeurant elle a volontairement choisie. Même si je suis opposée à Schengen, je peux difficilement voter contre le fait que les Norvégiens paient leur part.

Implementation of the remaining provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the Schengen Information System in Bulgaria and Romania (A8-0192/2018 - Monica Macovei) BG

13-06-2018

Уважаеми г-н Председател,  
Готовността за присъединяването на България и Румъния още от 2011 г. бе удостоверена и многократно изтъквана от Европейския парламент и Комисията. Двете страни осигуряват успешно граничната сигурност на Европейския съюз, а усилията ни бяха и допълнително подкрепени с разширяването на правомощия на Европейската агенция за гранична и брегова охрана.  
Безспорно, докладът за привеждане в действие на оставащите разпоредби от правото на Шенген, свързани с употребата на ШИС, е стъпка напред спрямо ефективността на граничните проверки. При все това, само приемането на България и Румъния в Шенген би допринесло за пълното подобряване на оперативната съвместимост на системите в областта на граничната сигурност и достигане на тяхната пълна ефективност.  
Ето защо подкрепям настоящия доклад, но отново настоявам, че Съветът трябва неотложно да предприеме нужните действия по приемането на България и Румъния в Шенген.

Schengen acquis provisions relating to the Visa Information System in Bulgaria and Romania (A8-0286/2017 - Agustín Díaz de Mera García Consuegra) BG

04-10-2017

Подкрепям доклада относно привеждането в действие на разпоредби, свързани с Визовата информационна система в Република България и в Румъния, тъй като той предвижда предоставянето поне на пасивен достъп за консултиране на данните във ВИС, улеснявайки осъществяваните проверки по външните граници на двете държави и подпомагайки идентифицирането на лица, които не отговарят на изискванията за влизане или престой в държавите – членки на ЕС.  
Казвайки това, подчертавам, че докладът е стъпка в правилната посока за постигането на повече сигурност по външните граници на Европа, но техническите проблеми, породени от непълното участие на България и Румъния в Шенгенското пространство, продължават да стоят на дневен ред. България и Румъния изпълняват задълженията си по опазване на европейските граници, изпълнили са изискванията за прием в Шенген и поемат тежестта по въвеждането на всички изисквания, стандарти и системи за сигурност, и е правно обосновано Съветът незабавно да вземе решение за приемането на двете страни.

European Border and Coast Guard (A8-0076/2019 - Roberta Metsola) DE

17-04-2019

Durch den Ausbau von Frontex im Jahr 2016 wurde die Europäische Agentur für Grenz- und Küstenwache (EBCG) in ihrer heutigen Form geschaffen. Das neue Mandat dieser Agentur sollte den verstärkten Herausforderungen beim Schutz der EU-Außengrenzen insbesondere seit der 2015 ausgebrochenen, von Staaten wie Deutschland mitverschuldeten Migrationskrise Rechnung tragen. Da nach wie vor der Schutz der Schengen-Außengrenze nicht gewährleistet ist, beabsichtigt diese neue Verordnung eine weitere Aufstockung von Frontex auf eine ständige Reserve von 10 000 Grenzbeamten bis zum Jahr 2027. Diese ständige Reserve soll die EU-Mitgliedstaaten bei Grenzkontrollen, Rückführungsaufgaben sowie beim Kampf gegen grenzüberschreitende Kriminalität unterstützen. Zudem sollen das ständige Personal bei Frontex von derzeit einigen hundert auf 3000 bis ins Jahr 2025 aufgestockt und das europäische Grenzüberwachungssystem EUROSUR in das neue Mandat mit einbezogen werden. Mit dem neuen Mandat belaufen sich die Kosten für Frontex bis 2027 auf rund 12,5 Mrd. EUR. Zwar kann das neue Mandat die Migrationskrise alleine nicht lösen. Zudem wäre es sinnvoll, wenn Rückführungen Nicht-Schutzbedürftiger von einem Drittstaat in einen anderen ermöglicht werden könnten, was diese Verordnung nicht vorsieht. Dennoch begrüße ich die Ausweitung des Mandates für Frontex als wichtigen Baustein zur Wiedererlangung von Kontrolle an den Schengen-Außengrenzen und stimme diesem Bericht daher zu.

REPORT on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area

3.5.2018 - (2017/2256(INI))

Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs  
Rapporteur: Carlos Coelho

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The Schengen area is one of the greatest achievements of the European Union.

It is an essential part of the European project and the most appreciated and recognized by European citizens.

In the last reform of the Schengen Governance, and after severe negotiations, the European Parliament saw its scrutiny powers enhanced and more in line with the European framework. Although it remains founded in the sovereign competence of Member States to control their borders, in 2013 Schengen became more European.

On 5 September 2016 the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) decided to set up a Working Group on Schengen Scrutiny dedicated to the reviewing and scrutinising the specific results of the Schengen evaluations of different fields. The Working Group has proven to be invaluable in enhancing the level of cooperation and dialogue between the Commission and the Parliament, but above all, it has clearly improved the overall understanding of the Members as regards to the current State of Schengen.

On the 13 March 2017 the LIBE Committee Coordinators agreed to launch this annual Report on the Functioning of the Schengen area. This report is the result of the meticulous work of the Working Group on Schengen Scrutiny and the vital contributions of the Shadow Rapporteurs. During the past year the Working Group has delved itself into the details of the respective fields of the Schengen evaluation by examining the different evaluation reports and Council conclusions and by exchanging views with the Commission on specific issues.

After the establishment of the LIBE Working group on Schengen Scrutiny, this report hopes to be another important step in consolidating the active role of Parliament in representing citizens. It was not long ago when Member States treated this area as a secretive, exclusive and unaccountable domain, despite the huge impact of Schengen on peoples’ lives.

The past three years have been quite daunting, with Schengen being under enormous pressure. Not because of its structure and governance, but due to failures in parts of the *acquis*, such as the external borders, and in strongly linked areas, such as the Common European Asylum System.

Times of incertitude and perils require of this European Parliament an even more active role in protecting Schengen and defending the rights of citizens.

In an area of free movement, external borders become common borders and today we share over 50.000 kilometres of those. This means, a security problem in one Member State or its external border potentially affects all. That is why Schengen has a set of compensating measures, an *acquis*, upon which mutual trust is based and an area of Freedom, Security and Justice to emerge.

Nevertheless, the mechanisms put in place to safeguard the area of free movement have come under enormous stress during recent times. For the first-time article 29 of the Schengen Borders Code has been activated, founded on serious deficiencies of a Member State. Member States have announced changes in their laws to allow internal border controls based on an influx of illegal migrants. Others gave in on the easy rhetoric of blaming free movement, while at the same time just pretending to have internal border controls. Political discourse is using Schengen as an easy justification for security issues. Reintroduction of internal border controls must not become a normalized status quo.

Moreover, Member States have not been implementing the *acquis* properly, with problems across most fields of evaluations and Member States. The purpose of this report is precisely to highlight the major shortcomings encountered in the implementation of the Schengen *acquis*. It also brings forward the progress made and points out the actions that European Institutions and Member States should take in the future. The report details the core findings from the different fields of the Schengen evaluation mechanism and the Vulnerability Assessment methodology which the European Parliament has deemed to be unacceptable and in need of further actions.

In recent years, Parliament has recognized that reality has changed too. That there are new challenges, diffuse threats and unforeseeable phenomena, all of which require more cooperation, better information and European solidarity. Your rapporteur believes that the new measures approved by this house in the field of security, from information systems to amending the Schengen Borders code, are expression of such approach. Despite frail implementation by Member States being more often than desired. Regarding Asylum, Parliament is also acting with the urgency the situation requires and - here again - Member States fail to deliver.

Almost two years ago, the Commission presented a roadmap to bring back Schengen. Parliament and Council endorsed this Communication. Two years after, the normal functioning of Schengen is far from being seen.

Parliament remains strongly committed to look for all the possible solutions that will provide swift and reasonable outcome for the situation and for all EU citizens. It is crucial that the European Union enforces these rules in a manner that guarantees the functioning of Schengen.

Your rapporteur believes this house should stand firmly by the European Commission and remind vehemently to Member States that they are the key holders to bring Schengen back.

Your rapporteur firmly believes Schengen is part of the solution and not part of the problem. If Schengen perishes, the Europe of citizens that we have today will vanish.

<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0160_EN.html#_section2>

European Border and Coast Guard (A8-0076/2019 - Roberta Metsola) DE

17-04-2019

Durch den Ausbau von Frontex im Jahr 2016 wurde die Europäische Agentur für Grenz- und Küstenwache (EBCG) in ihrer heutigen Form geschaffen. Das neue Mandat dieser Agentur sollte den verstärkten Herausforderungen beim Schutz der EU-Außengrenzen insbesondere seit der 2015 ausgebrochenen, von Staaten wie Deutschland mitverschuldeten Migrationskrise Rechnung tragen. Da nach wie vor der Schutz der Schengen-Außengrenze nicht gewährleistet ist, beabsichtigt diese neue Verordnung eine weitere Aufstockung von Frontex auf eine ständige Reserve von 10 000 Grenzbeamten bis zum Jahr 2027. Diese ständige Reserve soll die EU-Mitgliedstaaten bei Grenzkontrollen, Rückführungsaufgaben sowie beim Kampf gegen grenzüberschreitende Kriminalität unterstützen. Zudem sollen das ständige Personal bei Frontex von derzeit einigen hundert auf 3000 bis ins Jahr 2025 aufgestockt und das europäische Grenzüberwachungssystem EUROSUR in das neue Mandat mit einbezogen werden. Mit dem neuen Mandat belaufen sich die Kosten für Frontex bis 2027 auf rund 12,5 Mrd. EUR. Zwar kann das neue Mandat die Migrationskrise alleine nicht lösen. Zudem wäre es sinnvoll, wenn Rückführungen Nicht-Schutzbedürftiger von einem Drittstaat in einen anderen ermöglicht werden könnten, was diese Verordnung nicht vorsieht. Dennoch begrüße ich die Ausweitung des Mandates für Frontex als wichtigen Baustein zur Wiedererlangung von Kontrolle an den Schengen-Außengrenzen und stimme diesem Bericht daher zu.

Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders (A8-0356/2018 - Tanja Fajon) DE

04-04-2019

Seit Ausbruch der Migrationskrise im August 2015 wurde in der Europäischen Union zunehmend von der Möglichkeit Gebrauch gemacht, die Kontrollen an den Binnengrenzen vorübergehend wiedereinzuführen. Grund hierfür waren die Sekundärbewegungen von irregulären Migranten und die zunehmende Gefahr durch den grenzübergreifenden Terrorismus. Gemäß aktuellem Schengen-Besitzstand können Binnengrenzkontrollen für maximal sechs Monate wiedereingeführt werden, mit der Möglichkeit einer dreimaligen Verlängerung für den jeweils gleichen Zeitraum. Die Kommission unterbreitete im September 2017 einen neuen Verordnungsentwurf, der die Flexibilität für die Mitgliedstaaten bei der Wiedereinführung von Binnengrenzkontrollen durch Fristverlängerungen und Erleichterungen bei der Beantragung von Verlängerungen erhöhen sollte. Waren hier Verbesserungen im Vergleich zur heute gültigen Regelung in Sicht, schlug das Europäische Parlament in seiner Mehrheit den entgegengesetzten Weg ein. In der ersten Lesung bekundete es am 29. November 2018, die zeitlich begrenzte Wiedereinführung von Grenzkontrollen an Binnengrenzen noch mehr einzuschränken als bisher und im Regelfall nicht mehr als zwei Monate zu erlauben. Dies ist völlig inakzeptabel und gefährdet in noch höherem Maße als bisher die innere Sicherheit einzelner Mitgliedstaaten. Nach zwei erfolglos verlaufenen interinstitutionellen Verhandlungen soll nun wieder der Schlusstext der ersten Lesung als vorläufiger Standpunkt des Europäischen Parlaments bekräftigt werden. Was falsch war, bleibt falsch, weshalb ich auch jetzt diesen Parlamentsbericht ablehne.

Objection pursuant to Rule 105(3): Instrument for financial support for external borders and visa (B8-0215/2019) DE

27-03-2019

Der 2014 geschaffene Fonds für innere Sicherheit im Bereich Außengrenzen und Visa soll den Schutz der Außengrenzen verbessern sowie die Zahl illegaler Einreisen verringern. Zudem soll er der EU ermöglichen, rasch und wirksam auf sicherheitsbezogene Krisen, die das Funktionieren des Schengen-Systems gefährden, zu reagieren. Im vorliegenden Fall geht es allerdings nicht um den Fonds als solchen, sondern um die Frage, ob ein AMIF ergänzender delegierter Rechtsakt der Kommission vom Europäischen Parlament genehmigt werden soll oder nicht. Der zuständige LIBE-Ausschuss plädiert dabei für eine Ablehnung, da er das im delegierten Rechtsakt enthaltene Konzept der so genannten kontrollierten Zentren in Frage stellt. Die Errichtung von kontrollierten Zentren wurde – nicht zuletzt ausgelöst durch den damaligen Koalitionsstreit der Bundesregierung – vom Europäischen Rat auf dessen Sitzung vom 28./29. Juni 2018 in den so genannten Schlussfolgerungen festgeschrieben. Demzufolge soll durch die freiwillige Einrichtung von kontrollierten Zentren in einzelnen EU-Mitgliedstaaten eine rasche und gesicherte Abfertigung ermöglicht werden, die zwischen irregulären Migranten, die rückgeführt werden, und schutzwürdigen Personen unterscheidet. Auch wenn das Konzept der kontrollierten Zentren bislang in der Praxis nicht umgesetzt wurde, so gibt es keinen Grund, dieses grundsätzlich in Frage zu stellen. Entsprechend wende ich mich gegen das vorgeschlagene Veto des LIBE-Ausschusses.

Reinforcement of checks against relevant databases at external borders (A8-0218/2016 - Monica Macovei) FR

16-02-2017

J’ai soutenu ce rapport, qui demande que soient effectués des contrôles d’identité renforcés aux frontières de l’espace Schengen et de l’Union Européenne. Ces contrôles sont actuellement menés uniquement auprès des non-citoyens de l’Union Européenne, et ce à la seule entrée de l’espace Schengen. Ce rapport préconise que les contrôles soient désormais réalisés de manière systématique auprès de tout voyageur qui franchirait les limites de l’espace Schengen ou les frontières de l’Union, qu’elles soient terrestres, maritimes ou aériennes. Cette mesure est absolument indispensable pour la lutte contre le terrorisme, qui constitue l’une des priorités du PPE.  
Les contrôles effectués s’appuieraient non seulement sur les bases de données actuellement employées, mais aussi sur toute autre base de données qui pourrait s’avérer pertinente en la matière. Sont notamment visés les systèmes d’information Europol et Schengen. La consultation d’un ensemble étendu de bases de données permettrait d’améliorer grandement l’efficacité de l’identification, de la détection et du suivi des personnes surveillées.

European Border and Coast Guard (A8-0076/2019 - Roberta Metsola) DE

18-04-2019

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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on repealing the Schengen agreements

23.7.2015

pursuant to Rule 133 of the Rules of Procedure  
  
Sylvie Goddyn, Steeve Briois, Marine Le Pen, Nicolas Bay, Florian Philippot, Marie-Christine Boutonnet, Gilles Lebreton, Edouard Ferrand, Sophie Montel, Dominique Bilde

B8‑0740/2015

Motion for a European Parliament resolution on repealing the Schengen agreements

*The European Parliament*,

–       having regard to the Schengen agreements signed on 13 June 1985,

–       having regard to Rule 133 of its Rules of Procedure,

A.     whereas 13 June 2015 marked the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Schengen agreements, and whereas those agreements do away with border controls within the Schengen area and thus make freedom of movement a reality;

B.     whereas the number of states in the Schengen area has increased from 5 to 26 in 30 years;

C.     whereas European states do not have the same economic and social interests, nor do they face the same financial, budgetary and security constraints;

D.     whereas 1.25 billion journeys are made within the Schengen area each year;

E.     whereas the Schengen area makes it possible for illegal immigrants and potential terrorists to move around freely;

F.     whereas freedom of movement is leaving states and their citizens at the mercy of criminal organisations and networks of traffickers in arms, people and illegal substances;

1.      Calls for the Schengen agreements to be repealed and for national borders to be reintroduced;

2.      Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council and the Member States.

<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-8-2015-0740_EN.html>

Establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System in the field of border checks (A8-0347/2017 - Carlos Coelho) HU

24-10-2018

Az EP ezúttal is az európai polgárok érdekét tartja szem előtt, amikor fellép egyes tagállamok gyakorlatával szemben, amelyek rendkívül helyzet – adott esetben a menekültválság – okán, sőt ürügyén indokolatlan szigorításokat, határellenőrzéseket vezetnek be a Schengeni rendszer alkalmazása során. A tapasztalatok viszont azt igazolják, hogy ezekkel az ideiglenesnek hirdetett, de sokszor jogtalanul és értelmetlenül hosszúra nyúló ellenőrzésekkel még egyetlen terroristát sem sikerült megállítani, miközben a lakosság számára okozott kényelmetlenség és félelemérzet ismét csak az EU-ellenes demagógia malmára hajtja a vizet.  
Ismert tény, hogy a szabad mozgást, a határok átjárhatóságát az európai választópolgárok az integráció egyik legnagyobb és a leginkább polgárbarát vívmányaként tartják számon. Az EU nagyrészt ebből táplálkozó egyértelmű lakossági támogatottságát különösen a mostani kényes politikai helyzetben nem szabadna kockára tenni, amikor Európa-szerte erősödik a nacionalista, populista EU- és idegenellenes erők hangja. Európai demokrataként számomra tehát a humánum, a politikai célszerűség és a józan ész egyaránt a polgárok szabad mozgásának védelmét, az itt javasolt új szabályok támogatását indokolta.

Listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, as regards the UK's withdrawal from the EU (A8-0047/2019 - Sergei Stanishev) ES

04-04-2019

La presente propuesta pretende incluir al Reino Unido en el Anexo II del Reglamento (CE) n.º 539/2001, es decir, en la lista de terceros países cuyos nacionales están exentos del requisito de visado, en lo que respecta a los nacionales británicos. Esto significaría que los ciudadanos del Reino Unido no necesitarían un visado para viajar durante estancias de corta duración, hasta 90 días, en cualquier período de 180 días en el espacio Schengen. Este régimen se aplicaría a partir del 30 de marzo de 2019. Sin embargo, si se llega a un acuerdo, se aplicará a partir del final del período de transición, como se indica en el acuerdo de salida entre la Unión Europea y el Reino Unido. La propuesta está sujeta a la condición de que el Reino Unido conceda condiciones recíprocas y no discriminatorias a los nacionales de los Estados miembros de la Unión. Aplicando el principio de reciprocidad y asegurando condiciones equilibradas para todos los ciudadanos de la Unión Europea respecto a los británicos, he votado a favor de la propuesta.

EU-Barbados Agreement on the short-stay visa waiver (A8-0301/2018 - Emilian Pavel) RO

23-10-2018

Am votat în favoarea recomandării privind exonerarea de obligația de a deține viză de scurta ședere, deoarece acest acord de modificare a acordului privind exonerarea de obligația de a deține viză de scurtă ședere reprezintă simultan punctul culminant al aprofundării relațiilor  
dintre Uniunea Europeană și Barbados, acesta asigurând coerența juridică, precum și armonizarea între statele membre, prin aderarea la noua definiție a conceptului de scurtă ședere, așa cum este prevăzută de modificarea Codului frontierelor Schengen, care oferă și o interpretare mai clară a acestui concept.

European Border and Coast Guard (A8-0076/2019 - Roberta Metsola)

18-04-2019

I voted in favour of the resolution on the European Border and Coast Guard. Two years ago, Frontex was expanded to become the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) Agency that it is today. The Agency’s new mandate and increased resources are a clear and strong response to the challenges faced at the EU’s external borders as a result of the migration crisis, but also relate to the difficulty in encouraging greater solidarity among Member States.  
The EBCG proposal addresses the need to ensure proper control of the Schengen external borders as a precondition to managing migration effectively, to ensure a high level of security within the system while safeguarding free movement of persons within the Union. The necessary operational support has to be provided to ensure that EU solidarity is effectively delivered whenever it is needed.  
I support the rapporteur that this will enhance solidarity between the Member States, reinforce integration regarding border management and contribute to preventing crisis situations at the external borders. The proposal responds to the weaknesses identified due to insufficient contributions of border guards and technical equipment by Member States and hence the lack of flexibility in redeployment by the Agency.

Full application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in Bulgaria and Romania (A8-0365/2018 - Sergei Stanishev) SV

11-12-2018

Vi värnar Schengensamarbetet och möjligheten för alla medlemsstater att delta i detta, så även Rumänien och Bulgarien. Men samarbetet bygger på att rättsstatens regler respekteras fullt ut när vi tillämpar dessa regler gemensamt. Liksom EU-kommissionen konstaterade så sent som i november i sin utredning kring landets Schengeninträde, brister Rumänien i åtgärder rörande antikorruption och för att säkra ett självständigt rättsväsende. Dessa brister måste åtgärdas innan ett Schengeninträde kan bli aktuellt.

Protocol to the EU-Denmark Agreement on the criteria and mechanisms for establishing the State responsible for examining a request for asylum and 'Eurodac' (A8-0196/2019 - Ignazio Corrao) IT

17-04-2019

L'ETIAS andrà a colmare il vuoto informativo sui viaggiatori esenti dall'obbligo di visto al momento dell'attraversamento delle frontiere esterne; determinerà l'ammissibilità dei cittadini di paesi terzi esenti da tale obbligo prima che si rechino nello spazio Schengen e stabilirà se il loro viaggio rappresenta un rischio per la sicurezza, un rischio di immigrazione irregolare o un alto rischio epidemico; darà inoltre ai viaggiatori la sicurezza di poter attraversare le frontiere senza ostacoli. Se necessario, l'autorizzazione ai viaggi ETIAS potrà essere negata dalle unità nazionali ETIAS. La valutazione dei rischi di cui sopra implicherà il trattamento automatizzato dei dati personali forniti nelle domande di autorizzazione ai viaggi.  
Il regolamento ETIAS stabilisce che tali dati vengano confrontati con quelli contenuti nelle cartelle, nei fascicoli o nelle segnalazioni registrate nei sistemi di informazione o nelle banche dati dell'UE (sistema centrale ETIAS, sistema d'informazione Schengen (SIS), sistema di informazione visti (VIS), sistema di ingressi/uscite (EES) o Eurodac), nei dati Europol o nelle banche dati Interpol (banca dati Interpol sui documenti di viaggio rubati o smarriti (SLTD) o banca dati Interpol sui documenti di viaggio associati a segnalazioni (TDAWN).

European Border and Coast Guard (A8-0076/2019 - Roberta Metsola)

18-04-2019

I have voted in favour of the report, because ensuring that the EU’s external borders are managed effectively is a priority. Secure external borders are vital to ensuring genuine free movement in the Schengen area. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency has an important role to play in supporting and helping coordinate Member States’ work in that regard.

European Border and Coast Guard (A8-0076/2019 - Roberta Metsola) FR

17-04-2019

L'UE, afin de répondre aux inquiétudes des peuples quant aux vagues d'immigration massive auxquelles nous sommes amenés à faire face, entend proposer une réponse financière par le renforcement de Frontex, sans que pour autant ne soit envisagé une refonte globale du cadre juridique existant. En effet, il ne faut pas oublier que le Parlement a adopté récemment le régime de visa humanitaire et que l'UE appelle à une immigration économique pour combler les déficits de main-d'œuvre dans nombre d'États membres. En d'autres termes, l'Europe entend ici donner une carotte à la veille des élections afin d'éviter un parlement composé d'un tiers d'eurosceptiques le 26 mai prochain, tout en maintenant incontrôlées les frontières et en ne changeant, voire en aggravant, le régime d'immigration de l'espace Schengen. Je vote contre.

Use of the Schengen Information System for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals (A8-0348/2017 - Jeroen Lenaers) CS

24-10-2018

Řada států střední Evropy se domnívala, že schengenský systém, do kterého vstupují a kvůli kterému několik let připravovaly technické podmínky pro výměnu údajů, jim zajistí dvě důležité věci. Věřily ve volný pohyb občanů daného státu uvnitř schengenského prostoru a ochranu vnější hranice. Bohužel naprosté zhroucení systému v poledních 10 letech ukázalo, že v dosavadním pojetí systém nefunguje. Složitý název zprávy má zahrnovat inovovaný Schengen, který na podporu informačního systému využívá v jednotlivých státech rozptýlená střediska centrály SIRENE a je provozován Agenturou pro provozní řízení rozsáhlých informačních systémů v prostory svobody, bezpečnosti a práva. Tento název se skrývá pod zkratkou EU-LISA. Agentura má ve skutečnosti zajistit nepřetržitou dostupnost SIS. Protože SIS obsahuje pouze elementární údaje o osobách, je ve vybraných případech doplňován poměrně rozsáhlým spektrem údajů uložených v centrále SIRENE. Slabým místem dosavadní aplikace SIS byla rychlost posouzení žádosti o azyl, absolutní prostupnost vnější hranice EU a dále absence uzavřených readmisních dohod na straně jedné a špatná vymahatelnost těch uzavřených dohod pak na straně druhé. Z těchto důvodů se domnívám, že je třeba navrhované změny SIS podpořit.

Schengen acquis provisions relating to the Visa Information System in Bulgaria and Romania (A8-0286/2017 - Agustín Díaz de Mera García Consuegra) LV

04-10-2017

Balsoju par Bulgārijas un Rumānijas pievienošanos Vīzu informācijas sistēmai (VIS). Tā kā abas valstis vēl nav pievienojušās Šengenas zonai, tad ir saprotams, ka pieeja pagaidām ir limitēta, ļaujot apskatīt sistēmā iekļautos datus, bez iespējas tos labot. Uzskatu, ka šis ir būtisks solis gan Bulgārijas un Rumānijas ceļā uz Šengenas zonu, gan ceļā uz to iekļaušanu paredzētajā ES ieceļošanas/izceļošanas sistēmā. Pateicoties tam, ka Bulgārijai un Rumānijai būs pieeja informācijai par izsniegtajām vīzām iebraukšanai ES un Šengenas zonā, abas valstis varēs veiksmīgāk reģistrēt informāciju ES ieceļošanas/izceļošanas sistēmā, tādejādi uzlabojot migrācijas kontroli un drošību visā ES.

EU-Iceland Agreement on supplementary rules for external borders and visas for 2014-2020 (A8-0196/2018 - Anders Primdahl Vistisen) FR

13-06-2018

L’Union européenne peut-elle être considérée comme un État? Le sera-t-elle un jour? Ces questions d’importance primordiale méritent une réponse, mais cette dernière n’est inscrite nulle part explicitement. Cependant, nos acquis, eux, sont inscrits noir sur blanc dans nos traités. Parmi eux, l’espace Schengen. Si nous tenons à obtenir une réponse sur le statut étatique ou non de l’UE, il faudra bien que cette réponse soit crédible. Mais comment rester crédible si nos acquis sont bel et bien écrits, mais seulement partiellement en application?  
C’est dans ce cadre que je soutiens le présent accord entre l’UE et l’Islande. Bien que l’Islande ne fasse pas partie de l’UE en tant qu’état membre, elle fait partie de l’espace Schengen, dont le principe est d’abolir les frontières intérieures, en maintenant les frontières extérieures. Alors, je suis d’accord pour que les normes européennes des frontières extérieures s’appliquent également en Islande, cela paraît logique. J’espère, tout comme le collègue Vistisen, que nous aurons ainsi un système de frontières extérieures uniforme et pratique, tout en maintenant un niveau de contrôle élevé mais efficace.

Objection pursuant to Rule 105(3): Instrument for financial support for external borders and visa (B8-0215/2019) DE

27-03-2019

Der 2014 geschaffene Fonds für innere Sicherheit im Bereich Außengrenzen und Visa soll den Schutz der Außengrenzen verbessern sowie die Zahl illegaler Einreisen verringern. Zudem soll er der EU ermöglichen, rasch und wirksam auf sicherheitsbezogene Krisen, die das Funktionieren des Schengen-Systems gefährden, zu reagieren. Im vorliegenden Fall geht es allerdings nicht um den Fonds als solchen, sondern um die Frage, ob ein AMIF ergänzender delegierter Rechtsakt der Kommission vom Europäischen Parlament genehmigt werden soll oder nicht. Der zuständige LIBE-Ausschuss plädiert dabei für eine Ablehnung, da er das im delegierten Rechtsakt enthaltene Konzept der so genannten kontrollierten Zentren in Frage stellt. Die Errichtung von kontrollierten Zentren wurde – nicht zuletzt ausgelöst durch den damaligen Koalitionsstreit der Bundesregierung – vom Europäischen Rat auf dessen Sitzung vom 28./29. Juni 2018 in den so genannten Schlussfolgerungen festgeschrieben. Demzufolge soll durch die freiwillige Einrichtung von kontrollierten Zentren in einzelnen EU-Mitgliedstaaten eine rasche und gesicherte Abfertigung ermöglicht werden, die zwischen irregulären Migranten, die rückgeführt werden, und schutzwürdigen Personen unterscheidet. Auch wenn das Konzept der kontrollierten Zentren bislang in der Praxis nicht umgesetzt wurde, so gibt es keinen Grund, dieses grundsätzlich in Frage zu stellen. Entsprechend wende ich mich gegen das vorgeschlagene Veto des LIBE-Ausschusses.

Differentiated integration (A8-0402/2018 - Pascal Durand) DE

17-01-2019

Das Europäische Parlament bezieht mit diesem Entschließungsantrag eine Position zu Konzepten der „differenzierten Integration“, also einem Europa der verschiedenen Geschwindigkeiten. Es wird festgestellt, dass es differenzierte Integration gibt und es nicht um das „Für und Wider“ gehen solle. In den einzelnen Paragrafen wird dann aber festgestellt, dass differenzierte Integration immer nur temporär sein sollte, eine begrenzte Anzahl von Politiken betreffen sollte, dass sie generell als „zweite Wahl“ zu betrachten sei, und dass das „gemeinschaftliche Vorgehen“ die beste Lösung für das Funktionieren der Union sei.  
Diese Aussagen belegen, dass das Parlament mit diesem Entschließungsantrag die differenzierte Integration möglichst weit begrenzen und abschaffen will. Wichtige Politikbereiche, die hiervon betroffen wären, sind z. B. das Euro-System oder die Schengen-Regelungen.  
Als Vehikel für diese Politik setzt man auf eine vermehrte Anwendung der sogenannten Passerelle-Klausel nach Artikel 48 (7) AEUV. Einige Länder sollen mit der „verstärkten Zusammenarbeit“ vorangehen und neue Politiken einführen, die dann per Passerelle auf die gesamte EU übertragen werden sollen. Man erhofft sich so eine Ausschaltung des Europäischen Rates.  
Das Parlament fordert ganz klar, den Weg in einen in allen Politikbereichen gleichgeschalteten europäischen Zentralstaat zu gehen. Diese Konzeption lehne ich klar ab und habe deshalb gegen den Antrag gestimmt.

Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders (A8-0356/2018 - Tanja Fajon) FR

04-04-2019

Depuis 2015, que ce soit la conséquence des terribles attentats qui ont frappé notamment la France ou celle de l’arrivée de millions de réfugiés, ou prétendus tels, sur le territoire européen, certains États membres ont rétabli les contrôles à leurs frontières avec d’autres États membres.  
La législation actuelle ne leur permet de le faire que pour une période maximale de deux ans, mais il est clair que cette limite a été dépassée, et à bon droit, pour faire face à ces menaces. La proposition de la Commission vise à étendre à cinq ans cette période maximale, dans un louable souci de prendre en compte la réalité et dans le but moins louable de faire croire que Schengen est encore viable.  
À rebours du bon sens, en revanche, Mme Fajon propose de limiter à un an la période maximale, d’en durcir la mise en œuvre et d’en donner le contrôle à la Commission. Pour elle, malgré ses aberrations et ses conséquences désastreuses, Schengen doit être maintenu à tout prix, y compris au prix de la sécurité des citoyens européens et de l’encouragement à encore plus d’immigration illégale.  
J’ai voté contre.

Reinforcement of checks against relevant databases at external borders (A8-0218/2016 - Monica Macovei) FR

16-02-2017

La Commission propose une modification du règlement établissant un code communautaire relatif au régime de franchissement des frontières par les personnes (code frontières Schengen) en vue d'accroître la sécurité dans l'espace sans contrôle aux frontières intérieures. La proposition introduit des contrôles systématiques obligatoires des bases de données sur tous les types de frontières extérieures (frontières terrestres, maritimes et aériennes) pour tous ceux qui entrent et sortent, c'est-à-dire les ressortissants de pays tiers, les citoyens de l'UE et les personnes bénéficiant du droit de libre circulation au sein de l'espace Schengen. Jusqu'à présent, pour la première catégorie, le contrôle était uniquement effectué à l'entrée et pour les deux autres, les contrôles n'étaient que «minimaux» (c'est-à-dire qu'ils consistaient en une vérification de l'identité exacte du voyageur et de la validité de son document de voyage). Au final il n'y a aucune preuve de la nécessité, de l'efficacité et de la proportionnalité des dispositions du présent règlement. Au contraire, c'est une mesure massivement invasive qui traite tous les voyageurs «de bonne foi» comme des suspects et criminels potentiels. Je vote CONTRE ce texte

REPORT on the draft Council decision on the putting into effect of certain provisions of the Schengen *acquis* relating to the Visa Information System in the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania

27.9.2017 - (10161/2017 – C8‑0224/2017 – 2017/0808(CNS)) - \*

Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs  
Rapporteur: Agustín Díaz de Mera García Consuegra

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The proposed Council Decision aims to grant Bulgaria and Romania passive access to the Visa Information System (VIS) and, in accordance with the agreement reached by the co-legislators on a draft Regulation establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES), it is a precondition for the application of the EES to those Member States. Therefore, the rapporteur recommends that Parliament endorse the draft Council’s text without amendments so as to encourage the Member States to proceed speedily with the adoption of the Decision.

<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2017-0286_EN.html#_section2>

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on ending the Schengen system

25.10.2016

pursuant to Rule 133 of the Rules of Procedure  
  
Edouard Ferrand

B8-1213/2016

Motion for a European Parliament resolution on ending the Schengen system

*The European Parliament*,

–  having regard to Rule 133 of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas on 25 October 2016 the Commission submitted a recommendation with a view to prolonging by three further months the proportionate controls reintroduced – in accordance with the Council’s recommendation of 12 May – at certain internal borders within the Schengen area (Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway);

B.  whereas the Commission acknowledged that all the security conditions defined in the ‘Back to Schengen’ Roadmap allowing for a return to a normally functioning Schengen area were not yet fulfilled, as the system had been profoundly shaken in recent months by the size of the challenge presented by the biggest refugee crisis since the end of the Second World War;

1.  Regards this as an admission of the inability of the European authorities to cope with the unprecedented influx of refugees fleeing the various conflicts afflicting Africa and Asia, and illegal economic migrants;

2.  Calls on the Commission to admit the failure of its policy in this field and to end the Schengen system, reintroducing border controls permanently.

<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-8-2016-1213_EN.html>

Annual Report on the functioning of the Schengen area (A8-0160/2018 - Carlos Coelho) HU

30-05-2018

Elfogadtam a jelentést, és ezalkalommal is hangsúlyoztam, hogy véget kell vetni a már zaklatásig fajuló, hosszadalmas ellenőrzéseket a határokon és a reptereken az unión belül. A schengeni szabályok reformjáért felelős európai néppárti árnyékjelentéstevőként a szabad mozgás különös jelentőséggel bír számomra. A hosszadalmas ellenőrzés többek között a határokon átnyúló kereskedelem és a munkaerő szabad áramlásának összeomlásához vezethet, ahogy azt Svédország és Dánia között láthattuk.

European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) (A8-0322/2017 - Kinga Gál) PT

05-07-2018

Em abril de 2016, a Comissão propôs a criação do ETIAS. Neste sentido, este sistema permitirá avaliar se um nacional de país terceiro isento da obrigação de visto que pretende viajar para o espaço Schengen pode representar um possível risco de migração irregular, de segurança ou de saúde pública antes de o indivíduo chegar à fronteira externa num ponto de passagem da fronteira, o que contribui para uma maior segurança do espaço Schengen e, por conseguinte, o número de recusas na fronteira irá ser reduzido.  
Neste contexto, são feitas algumas alterações para evitar problemas de execução, por exemplo, qual o Estado-Membro responsável pela avaliação de um pedido ETIA, ainda as transportadoras que fazem o transporte terrestre de grupos por autocarro não devem ser abrangidas pela categoria de transportadoras com obrigações ao abrigo do presente regulamento.  
Além disso, os Estados-Membros deveriam estabelecer pontos centrais de acesso específicos, onde as condições de acesso das autoridades de aplicação da lei estão satisfeitas em vez das unidades nacionais do ETIAS que executam estas tarefas, envolvendo uma terceira autoridade. Por fim, deve existir uma segurança e proteção dos dados pessoais, como também deve existir uma fiscalização clara e rigorosa.

Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders (A8-0356/2018 - Tanja Fajon)

29-11-2018

. ‒ UKIP MEPs voted against this legislative report. UKIP firmly believes in the sovereign right of all nations to control their borders. UKIP MEPs are, however, extremely disappointed that amendments to this report have drastically reduced the length of time for which Schengen states can introduce temporary border controls, as this report reduces the capacity for Member States to control their own borders.

Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders (A8-0356/2018 - Tanja Fajon) HU

04-04-2019

Az egyes tagállamok által 2015 óta fenntartott, már-már intézményesített határellenőrzések teljes mértékben szembe mennek az Európai Unió alapvető szabadságjogaival és aláássák a schengeni megállapodás érvényesülését. Ezek az állandósult belső határellenőrzések veszélyeztetik a magyar polgárok számára az EU legkézelfoghatóbb vívmányát, a szabad mozgáshoz való joguk gyakorlását. Emellett komoly kihatással lehet az áruk, a szolgáltatások és a tőke szabad áramlására is, amelyek pénzügyi hatásai negatívan befolyásolhatják az EU gazdasági növekedését. Véleményünk szerint az Unió külső határait kell megvédeni minden eszközzel, nem a belső határnélküliséget megszüntetni.  
Az első olvasatos szöveg összhangban van a magyar kormány álláspontjával, miszerint el kell kerülni a nem valós indokok alapján állandósított belső határellenőrzések visszaállítását. Továbbá garanciákat kell beépíteni, hogy a belső határellenőrzést politikai céllal ne tarthassák fenn, ezért a FIDESZ néppárti delegáció tagjaként szavazatommal támogattam az első olvasatos álláspont elfogadását.

EU-Norway Agreement on supplementary rules in relation to the instrument for financial support for external borders and visa (A8-0174/2017 - Tomáš Zdechovský) CS

16-05-2017

Podpořil jsem dnes udělení souhlasu ze strany Evropského parlamentu s návrhem rozhodnutí Rady o udělení souhlasu s dohodou mezi EU a Norskem, která umožní začlenění Norska do mechanismu Fondu pro vnitřní bezpečnost, konkrétně do části týkající se hranic a víz. Norsko jako země přidružená k provádění schengenského acquis tak bude přispívat do Fondu vnitřní bezpečnosti a Evropská komise bude moci dohlížet na realizaci programů financovaných z tohoto fondu v Norsku. Tato užší spolupráce je příspěvkem k dalšímu posílení bezpečnosti v schengenském prostoru, jelikož napomáhá řádnému provádění schengenských předpisů v oblasti víz a ochrany vnějších hranic.

Agreement on Operational and Strategic Cooperation between Denmark and Europol (A8-0164/2017 - Agustín Díaz de Mera García Consuegra) CS

27-04-2017

Podpořil jsem udělení souhlasu Evropského parlamentu s Dohodou o operativní a strategické spolupráci mezi Dánskem a Europolem. Uzavřít tuto dohodu je nutné s ohledem na to, že Dánsko se neúčastní unijní spolupráce v této oblasti a ve chvíli, kdy vstoupí v platnost nové nařízení o Europolu, nebude se toto nařízení na Dánsko vztahovat a vztah mezi Dánskem a Europolem je proto třeba znovu založit de iure . Jen tak lze zajistit, aby dosavadní spolupráce mezi Dánskem a Europolem mohla pokračovat. Tato spolupráce dále přispěje ke schopnosti Evropské unie bojovat proti terorismu a organizovanému zločinu. Je možno dodat, že spolupráce mezi Europolem a Dánskem je podmíněna členstvím Dánska v EU, ve Schengenu a uznáním jurisdikce Evropského soudního dvora.

Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders (A8-0356/2018 - Tanja Fajon) HU

04-04-2019

Az egyes tagállamok által 2015 óta fenntartott, már-már intézményesített határellenőrzések teljes mértékben szembe mennek az Európai Unió alapvető szabadságjogaival és aláássák a schengeni megállapodás érvényesülését. Ezek az állandósult belső határellenőrzések veszélyeztetik a magyar polgárok számára az EU legkézelfoghatóbb vívmányát, a szabad mozgáshoz való joguk gyakorlását. Emellett komoly kihatással lehet az áruk, a szolgáltatások és a tőke szabad áramlására is, amelyek pénzügyi hatásai negatívan befolyásolhatják az EU gazdasági növekedését. Véleményünk szerint az Unió külső határait kell megvédeni minden eszközzel, nem a belső határnélküliséget megszüntetni.  
Az első olvasatos szöveg összhangban van a magyar kormány álláspontjával, miszerint el kell kerülni a nem valós indokok alapján állandósított belső határellenőrzések visszaállítását. Továbbá garanciákat kell beépíteni, hogy a belső határellenőrzést politikai céllal ne tarthassák fenn, ezért a FIDESZ néppárti delegáció tagjaként szavazatommal támogattam az első olvasatos álláspont elfogadását.

Implementation of the Treaty provisions concerning enhanced cooperation (A8-0038/2019 - Alain Lamassoure) HU

12-02-2019

A megerősített együttműködés jogintézményét a Lisszaboni Szerződés vezette be, de már azelőtt is sok példa volt az ilyen logika mentén létrejött mechanizmusokra, gondoljunk csak a schengeni övezetre vagy az eurózónára. Az EU tagállamai számának növekedésével arra kell számítani, hogy egyre több területen állhat elő az a helyzet, hogy a tagállamok nem mindegyike szeretné elmélyítené az együttműködést bizonyos területeken. Ez már korábban is előfordult, hiszen sem a schengeni övezetben, sem az eurózónában nem vesz részt az összes régi tagállam. Ezért a jövőben megnövekedhet a megerősített együttműködések száma és kiterjedtsége, ami egy teljesen jó megoldás arra, ha bizonyos területen az egyhangúság követelménye miatt nem sikerül előrehaladni. Sőt, azokon a területeken is el lehet gondolkodni az alkalmazásán, ahol minősített többséggel át lehetne vinni egy döntést. Az EU ugyanis csak úgy fejlődhet harmonikusan az összes tagállama megelégedésére, ha figyelembe veszi a tagállamok eltérő megközelítését és nem bélyegzi Európa-ellenesnek azokat a országokat, amelyek egy-egy kérdéseben nem követik a tagállamok többségét.

Establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System in the field of border checks (A8-0347/2017 - Carlos Coelho) NL

24-10-2018

Met meer dan 80 miljoen signalisaties en 40 000 grensoverschrijdende arrestaties sinds 2013 is het Schengeninformatiesysteem de belangrijkste databank voor politie- en justitiesamenwerking in Europa. Een reeks aanpassingen, waarover vandaag een akkoord werd bereikt, moet de informatiedeling naar een hoger niveau tillen en de mazen in het net verder sluiten voor terroristen en criminelen.  
Vingerafdruk- en gezichtsherkenning moeten in alle lidstaten uitgerold worden om grenswachters effectiever te helpen controleren wie de Europese buitengrenzen overschrijdt en valse identiteiten te onderscheppen.  
De nationale politie- en justitiediensten moeten voortaan ook verplicht elke aan terrorisme gekoppelde zaak in de databank signaleren, en Europol krijgt toegang tot alle signalisaties, om mogelijke contacten in andere lidstaten proactief op te sporen en terreurnetwerken sneller op te rollen.  
Voortaan wordt ook elk inreisverbod en uitwijzingsbevel voor migranten automatisch met de 28 EU-lidstaten gedeeld om transmigratie een halt toe te roepen. Vandaag is het nog te gemakkelijk om een uitwijzingsbevel te omzeilen door de grens over te gaan naar de volgende lidstaat.

Visa Code (A8-0434/2018 - Juan Fernando López Aguilar) FR

17-04-2019

J’ai voté en faveur de cet accord interinstitutionnel relatif au code des visas. Entré en vigueur le 5 avril 2010, ce code est un élément central de la politique commune de visas: il fixe des procédures et conditions harmonisées de traitement des demandes de visa et de délivrance des visas. La révision de ce code vise à faciliter les déplacements des voyageurs en règle et à simplifier le cadre juridique de la procédure de visa, tout en préservant la sécurité aux frontières extérieures et en garantissant le bon fonctionnement de l’espace Schengen. Le code des visas régit le traitement des demandes de visas de court séjour pour les ressortissants de pays tiers dont les pays ne sont pas exemptés de l’obligation de visa, soit 90 jours sur 180 jours. C’est un instrument essentiel pour le tourisme et les milieux économiques.

European Border and Coast Guard (A8-0076/2019 - Roberta Metsola)

18-04-2019

I voted in favour of the resolution on the European Border and Coast Guard. Two years ago, Frontex was expanded to become the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) Agency that it is today. The Agency’s new mandate and increased resources are a clear and strong response to the challenges faced at the EU’s external borders as a result of the migration crisis, but also relate to the difficulty in encouraging greater solidarity among Member States.  
The EBCG proposal addresses the need to ensure proper control of the Schengen external borders as a precondition to managing migration effectively, to ensure a high level of security within the system while safeguarding free movement of persons within the Union. The necessary operational support has to be provided to ensure that EU solidarity is effectively delivered whenever it is needed.  
I support the rapporteur that this will enhance solidarity between the Member States, reinforce integration regarding border management and contribute to preventing crisis situations at the external borders. The proposal responds to the weaknesses identified due to insufficient contributions of border guards and technical equipment by Member States and hence the lack of flexibility in redeployment by the Agency.

Eurojust-Denmark Agreement on judicial cooperation in criminal matters (A8-0192/2019 - Claude Moraes) IT

18-04-2019

Ho votato a favore del progetto di decisione di esecuzione del Consiglio che approva la conclusione, da parte di Eurojust, dell'accordo di cooperazione giudiziaria penale tra Eurojust e il Regno di Danimarca. L'accordo di cooperazione giudiziaria penale tra Eurojust e il Regno di Danimarca, è necessario a seguito della "lisbonizzazione" di Eurojust. Il regolamento si applicherà a decorrere dal 19 dicembre 2019. Alla luce dello status speciale assunto dalla Danimarca nell'ambito della giustizia penale a seguito del trattato di Lisbona, questo Stato non partecipa al nuovo regolamento e non è da esso vincolato,. Tuttavia, ha manifestato il desiderio di continuare a partecipare alle attività di Eurojust. A tal fine è necessaria la conclusione di un accordo di cooperazione tra i due soggetti, così da fornire alla Danimarca, uno status intermedio tra quello di Stato membro e quello di paese terzo. Sono favorevole alla proposta, in quanto ritengo necessario garantire la prosecuzione della partecipazione della Danimarca alla struttura di Eurojust, allo spazio Schengen, a diversi strumenti dell'ex Terzo pilastro e al finanziamento di Eurojust.  
Infine, a mio parere, è vitale garantire la preservazione del settore GAI comune dell'UE e l'applicazione delle prerogative del GEPD e della Corte di giustizia.

Differentiated integration (A8-0402/2018 - Pascal Durand) DE

17-01-2019

Das Europäische Parlament bezieht mit diesem Entschließungsantrag eine Position zu Konzepten der „differenzierten Integration“, also einem Europa der verschiedenen Geschwindigkeiten. Es wird festgestellt, dass es differenzierte Integration gibt und es nicht um das „Für und Wider“ gehen solle. In den einzelnen Paragraphen wird dann aber festgestellt, dass differenzierte Integration immer nur temporär sein sollte, eine begrenzte Anzahl von Politiken betreffen sollte, dass sie generell als „zweite Wahl“ zu betrachten sei, und dass das „gemeinschaftliche Vorgehen“ die beste Lösung für das Funktionieren der Union sei.  
Diese Aussagen belegen, dass das Parlament mit diesem Entschließungsantrag die differenzierte Integration möglichst weit begrenzen und abschaffen will. Wichtige Politikbereiche, die hiervon betroffen wären, sind z. B. das Euro-System oder die Schengen-Regelungen.  
Als Vehikel für diese Politik setzt man auf eine vermehrte Anwendung der sogenannten Passerelle-Klausel nach Artikel 48 (7) AEUV. Einige Länder sollen mit der „verstärkten Zusammenarbeit“ vorangehen und neue Politiken einführen, die dann per Passerelle auf die gesamte EU übertragen werden sollen. Man erhofft sich so eine Ausschaltung des Europäischen Rates.  
Das Parlament fordert ganz klar, den Weg in einen in allen Politikbereichen gleichgeschalteten europäischen Zentralstaat zu gehen. Diese Konzeption lehne ich klar ab und habe deshalb gegen den Antrag gestimmt.

Strengthening the security of identity cards and of residence documents issued to Union citizens (A8-0436/2018 - Gérard Deprez) IT

04-04-2019

Nel corso di questa sessione Plenaria il Parlamento si è espresso in merito ad una proposta legislativa che intende rafforzare la sicurezza delle carte d'identità rilasciati ai cittadini dell'Unione e ai loro familiari.  
La proposta, che interessa anche i titoli di soggiorno, ha come scopo principale quello di ridurre la diffusione e l'uso di documenti fraudolenti che potrebbero essere utilizzati da criminali o terroristi per entrare nell'Unione da paesi terzi. Attualmente nell'UE esistono 86 diversi tipi di carte d'identità, e questo quadro frammentato, se inserito nel contesto della libera circolazione garantita dal sistema Schengen, fa sì che la criminalità organizzata, come anche reti terroristiche, ne possano approfittare per le loro attività.  
Una situazione rischiosa, come sottolineato dalla Commissione europea già nel 2016 nella sua comunicazione per rafforzare un migliore scambio di informazioni nella lotta al terrorismo e frontiere esterne più solide.  
Il collega Deprez si è occupato di redigere la posizione del Parlamento, che ha ribadito la necessità di stabilire norme chiare in merito al periodo di validità di questi documenti, e per la quale espresso voto favorevole.

Use of the Schengen Information System for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals (A8-0348/2017 - Jeroen Lenaers) BG

24-10-2018

На последната пленарна сесия в Страсбург подкрепих предложението да се използва информационната система на Шенген за екстрадирането на нелегално пребиваващи граждани на трети държави. Употребата на тази информационна система ще наложи безпрецедентна и прецизна комуникационна мрежа между държавите членки, която ще синхронизира техните решения по екстрадиране на граждани на трети държави. От огромна важност е да се увеличи процентът на успешно завърнали се в държавите си емигранти, защото в момента тази политика на Съюза не е ефективна. По данни за 2015 г., от над 530 000 незаконно пребиваващи емигранти, едва 42% са напуснали територията на Съюза.  
За мен е ключово да бъде постигнато споразумение по въпроса за нелегалното пребиваване и екстрадиране на емигранти, които не са граждани на ЕС. Трябва да бъде гарантирана по-голяма ефективност при употребата на новата информационна система, за да се запази публичното доверие в разрешаването на тези актуални проблеми.

Interoperability between EU information systems in the field of borders and visa (A8-0347/2018 - Jeroen Lenaers) FR

16-04-2019

J’ai voté aujourd’hui en faveur de ce rapport sur un cadre pour l’interopérabilité des systèmes d’information de l’Union Européenne (frontières et visas). Ce rapport permet aux pays européens de centraliser des informations clés sur la sécurité, l’immigration et la gestion des frontières. Un système de recherche unique regroupera ces informations afin que les différents agents de contrôle aux frontières (police aux frontières et douaniers) aient accès à une seule et même base de données. Plusieurs systèmes d’informations seront ainsi reliés entre eux tels que ETIAS (le système européen d’information et d’autorisation concernant les voyages), le système européen d’information sur les casiers judiciaires des ressortissants de pays tiers condamnés ou encore le Système d’information Schengen. Une meilleure interopérabilité entre ces différents systèmes permettra de soutenir le travail des États membres dans la gestion des frontières et d’assurer une plus grande protection des citoyens face au risque criminel et terroristes.

Schengen acquis provisions relating to the Visa Information System in Bulgaria and Romania (A8-0286/2017 - Agustín Díaz de Mera García Consuegra) IT

04-10-2017

Ho votato a favore della proposta del Consiglio che mira a concedere alla Bulgaria e alla Romania un accesso passivo al sistema di informazione visti (VIS). Ciò, conformemente all'accordo raggiunto dai colegislatori su un progetto di regolamento che istituisce un sistema di ingressi/uscite (EES), rappresenta una condizione preliminare per l'applicazione dell'EES a tali Stati membri.  
Approvo il progetto di testo del Consiglio senza modifiche e credo che gli Stati membri debbano procedere rapidamente all'adozione di tale decisione. Sostengo inoltre il fatto che il Parlamento inviti il Consiglio ad informarlo qualora intenda discostarsi dal testo approvato dal PE e che chieda ad esso di consultarlo nuovamente qualora intenda modificarne sostanzialmente il testo approvato.

Visa Code (A8-0434/2018 - Juan Fernando López Aguilar) IT

17-04-2019

Ho votato a favore dell'aggiornamento del codice dei visti dell'UE che si applica agli Stati membri di Schengen. Il Codice contiene una serie di nuove disposizioni tra cui l'introduzione di un legame tra facilitazione dei visti e cooperazione in materia di riammissione, ovvero un meccanismo per utilizzare la politica dei visti per incoraggiare i paesi terzi a cooperare nel settore della riammissione; la possibilità per i consolati degli Stati membri di rappresentare un altro Stato membro e infine la previsione di una tassa base per il visto fissata a € 80 con riduzioni previste per diverse fasce d'età o altre categorie di viaggiatori.

Schengen Borders Code

10.4.2019

[Answer in writing](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-2019-001753-ASW_EN.html)

Question for written answer P-001753-19  
to the Commission  
Rule 130  
Anna Záborská (PPE)

Since the migration crisis in 2015, the Austrian authorities have continued to exercise regular police checks of buses and passenger cars crossing the Austrian-Slovak border. These checks take place within 20 kilometres of the land border with Slovakia and are equivalent to border checks as they do not reflect actual threats and are systemic in their nature. By continuing to perform these checks, the Austrian authorities are violating the Schengen Borders Code and undermining European citizens’ trust in their fundamental freedoms.

1. Is the Commission aware that frequent and regular police checks in border areas are being used by some Member States as a way of reintroducing border controls which are prohibited by the Schengen Borders Code, as confirmed by European Court of Justice case law?

2. Will the Commission verify the concern that the measures adopted by the Government of Austria have an effect equivalent to border checks?

3. Given the importance of freedom of movement for European citizens, what steps will the Commission take to ensure that Member States do not violate the Schengen*acquis*by introducing arbitrary police measures intended as a substitute for border checks?

Annual Report on the functioning of the Schengen area (A8-0160/2018 - Carlos Coelho) HU

30-05-2018

Mit ér az olyan halászháló, amely a vizet megfogja, de a halakat átereszti, avagy mit ér a bűnözőket segítő és a tisztességeseket szankcionáló rendszer? Mit ér az olyan külső határellenőrzés, amely a saját polgárok mozgását precízen nyilvántartja, de amely mellett az ismeretlen idegenek akadálytalanul besétálhatnak? És mit ér az olyan jelentés, amely a meglévő hatalmas hiányosságokat némi maszatolással elintézi? Vajmi keveset és egyáltalán nem támogatható egyik sem. A hatalmas befektetéssel létrehozott és fenntartott Schengeni Rendszer gyakorlatilag megbukott. Százezrek jöttek be úgy az EU-ba, hogy az illetékeseknek fogalmuk sincs a személyazonosságukról, életkorukról, állampolgárságukról, sőt az általuk korábban esetleg elkövetett súlyos, akár háborús bűncselekményekről sem. Olyan százezrek is, akik több biztonságos országon is áthaladtak, sok esetben nem valódi menekültek, csak gazdasági migránsok.  
Mostanában kezdenek már kipotyogni a csontvázak a németországi szekrényekből, döbbenetes visszaélések Brémában és másutt is. Amint a FRONTEX-ről is kiderült, hogy csak migráns-taxi, úgy az egész határőrizeti rendszer is elégtelenre vizsgázott.

Eurojust-Denmark Agreement on judicial cooperation in criminal matters (A8-0192/2019 - Claude Moraes) IT

18-04-2019

Ho votato a favore del progetto di decisione di esecuzione del Consiglio che approva la conclusione, da parte di Eurojust, dell'accordo di cooperazione giudiziaria penale tra Eurojust e il Regno di Danimarca. L'accordo di cooperazione giudiziaria penale tra Eurojust e il Regno di Danimarca, è necessario a seguito della "lisbonizzazione" di Eurojust. Il regolamento si applicherà a decorrere dal 19 dicembre 2019. Alla luce dello status speciale assunto dalla Danimarca nell'ambito della giustizia penale a seguito del trattato di Lisbona, questo Stato non partecipa al nuovo regolamento e non è da esso vincolato,. Tuttavia, ha manifestato il desiderio di continuare a partecipare alle attività di Eurojust. A tal fine è necessaria la conclusione di un accordo di cooperazione tra i due soggetti, così da fornire alla Danimarca, uno status intermedio tra quello di Stato membro e quello di paese terzo. Sono favorevole alla proposta, in quanto ritengo necessario garantire la prosecuzione della partecipazione della Danimarca alla struttura di Eurojust, allo spazio Schengen, a diversi strumenti dell'ex Terzo pilastro e al finanziamento di Eurojust.  
Infine, a mio parere, è vitale garantire la preservazione del settore GAI comune dell'UE e l'applicazione delle prerogative del GEPD e della Corte di giustizia.

OPINION on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of the Schengen Information System for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals

26-07-2017 AFET\_AD(2017)605921 PE605.921v02-00 AFET

[PDF (471 KB)](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/AFET-AD-605921_EN.pdf)[DOC (129 KB)](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/AFET-AD-605921_EN.docx)

Hilde VAUTMANS