Here is the assurance case for the BlueROV2 system in a hierarchical tree format using dashes (-) to denote different levels.

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- G1: Hazards for BlueROV2 system addressed in accordance with ALARP principle. (undeveloped)

- S1: Argument by risk reduction/elimination of each hazard.

- G2: No intolerable risks present in the system.

- C1: Definition of "intolerable".

- S2: Argue that risk posed by any remaining hazards is negligible. (undeveloped)

- S3: Argue that no other risks have been identified. (undeveloped)

- G3: Risk from hazard has been reduced as low as reasonably practicable.

- C2: Assigned severity class is {Hazard.Severity}.

- S4: Apply ReSonAte to estimate level of risk from hazard condition.

- A1: Function {Function} required by BTD is available.

- G4: Model BTD accurately describes possible propagation of hazard.

- G6: Possible hazard propagation paths correctly captured in BTD. (undeveloped)

- G7: Barriers in the BTD correctly describe their respective control action including any required system functions. (undeveloped)

- G8: All non-negligible threats have been identified. (undeveloped)

- G5: Quantitative risk estimates are accurate and below acceptable threshold.

- G9: State probability distribution used for risk estimation is an accurate representation of expected system states. (undeveloped)

- G10: Estimated probability of consequence is below allowable threshold for severity class.

- Sn1: Estimated risk level is below 10^-3 per hour.

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The instantiated assurance case for the BlueROV2 system is derived from the given assurance case pattern by filling in the placeholders with the relevant domain information. The hierarchical structure demonstrates the relationship between goals, strategies, contexts, assumptions, and solutions.