Based on the provided assurance case pattern, I have instantiated the placeholders with concrete details from the BlueROV2 system domain information. Below is the hierarchical tree representation for the derived assurance case using dashes (-) to denote different levels:

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- G1: Hazards for BlueROV2 system addressed in accordance with ALARP principle.

- S1: Argument by risk reduction/elimination of each hazard

- G2: No intolerable risks present in the system.

- C1: Definition of "intolerable"

- (Undeveloped) S2: Argue that risk posed by any remaining hazards is negligible

- (Undeveloped) S3: Argue that no other risks have been identified

- G3: Risk from Deviation from the operating area has been reduced as low as reasonably practicable

- C2: Assigned severity class is Minor

- S4: Apply ReSonAte to estimate level of risk from hazard condition Deviation from the operating area

- A1: Function Avoidance Maneuver required by BTD is available

- G4: Model BTD accurately describes possible propagation of hazard Deviation from the operating area

- (Undeveloped) G6: Possible hazard propagation paths correctly captured in BTD

- (Undeveloped) G7: Barriers in the BTD correctly describe their respective control action including any required system functions

- (Undeveloped) G8: All non-negligible threats have been identified

- G5: Quantitative risk estimates are accurate and below acceptable threshold

- (Undeveloped) G9: State probability distribution used for risk estimation is an accurate representation of expected system states

- G10: Estimated probability of collision is below allowable threshold for severity class

- Sn1: Estimated risk level 10^-3 per hour

- G3: Risk from Obstacle encounter has been reduced as low as reasonably practicable

- C2: Assigned severity class is Major

- S4: Apply ReSonAte to estimate level of risk from hazard condition Obstacle encounter

- A1: Function Emergency Stop required by BTD is available

- G4: Model BTD accurately describes possible propagation of hazard Obstacle encounter

- (Undeveloped) G6: Possible hazard propagation paths correctly captured in BTD

- (Undeveloped) G7: Barriers in the BTD correctly describe their respective control action including any required system functions

- (Undeveloped) G8: All non-negligible threats have been identified

- G5: Quantitative risk estimates are accurate and below acceptable threshold

- (Undeveloped) G9: State probability distribution used for risk estimation is an accurate representation of expected system states

- G10: Estimated probability of collision is below allowable threshold for severity class

- Sn1: Estimated risk level 10^-3 per hour

- G3: Risk from Loss of pipeline has been reduced as low as reasonably practicable

- C2: Assigned severity class is Minor

- S4: Apply ReSonAte to estimate level of risk from hazard condition Loss of pipeline

- A1: Function Avoidance Maneuver required by BTD is available

- G4: Model BTD accurately describes possible propagation of hazard Loss of pipeline

- (Undeveloped) G6: Possible hazard propagation paths correctly captured in BTD

- (Undeveloped) G7: Barriers in the BTD correctly describe their respective control action including any required system functions

- (Undeveloped) G8: All non-negligible threats have been identified

- G5: Quantitative risk estimates are accurate and below acceptable threshold

- (Undeveloped) G9: State probability distribution used for risk estimation is an accurate representation of expected system states

- G10: Estimated probability of collision is below allowable threshold for severity class

- Sn1: Estimated risk level 10^-3 per hour

```

In the representation above:

- Undeveloped elements are marked accordingly.

- The context (C2) and assumption (A1) elements are instantiated as required.

- Multiplicities and choices have been handled with appropriate instantiations for the specific hazards identified for BlueROV2 system: "Deviation from the operating area," "Obstacle encounter," and "Loss of pipeline."

By following these steps, we've created a structured assurance case specifically for the BlueROV2 system, ensuring all placeholders are replaced with relevant contextual information and ensuring the completeness and coherence of the assurance argument.