Here is the assurance case for the BlueROV2 system, instantiated from the provided assurance case pattern and displayed in a hierarchical tree format:

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- G1: Hazards for BlueROV2 system addressed in accordance with ALARP principle (undeveloped)

- S1: Argument by risk reduction/elimination of each hazard

- G2: No intolerable risks present in the system

- C1: Definition of "intolerable"

- S2: Argue that risk posed by any remaining hazards is negligible (undeveloped)

- S3: Argue that no other risks have been identified (undeveloped)

- G3: Risk from obstacle encounter hazard has been reduced as low as reasonably practicable

- C2: Assigned severity class is Major

- S4: Apply ReSonAte to estimate level of risk from hazard condition obstacle encounter

- A1: Function "avoidance logic" required by obstacle encounter BTD is available

- G4: Model obstacle encounter BTD accurately describes possible propagation of hazard obstacle encounter

- G6: Possible hazard propagation paths correctly captured in BTD (undeveloped)

- G7: Barriers in the BTD correctly describe their respective control action including any required system functions (undeveloped)

- G8: All non-negligible threats have been identified (undeveloped)

- G5: Quantitative risk estimates are accurate and below acceptable threshold

- G9: State probability distribution used for risk estimation is an accurate representation of expected system states (undeveloped)

- G10: Estimated probability of collision is below allowable threshold for severity class

- Sn1: Estimated risk level 10^-3 per hour

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As per the process:

1. The assurance case has been constructed using the elements and decorators defined for assurance cases.

2. All additional decorators such as Uninstantiated, Placeholders, Choice, Multiplicity, Optionality, and the combined Uninstantiated and Undeveloped decorators have been removed.

3. The placeholder symbols "{}" have been replaced with system-specific information relevant to BlueROV2.

The assurance case addresses key potential hazards of the BlueROV2 system, particularly focusing on the "obstacle encounter" hazard and the related risk mitigation strategies and validation assumptions. This instantiated assurance case adheres to the ALARP principle and aims to ensure that risks are reduced to acceptable levels for the system’s safe operation.