To create an assurance case for the BlueROV2 system based on the given assurance case pattern with placeholders and predicates, first, we need to instantiate the placeholders for Goal G1, Strategy S4, Context C2, Assumption A1, and Solution Sn1.

For this example, we'll assume:

- {A :: System}: BlueROV2 System

- {B :: Hazard}: Water leakage

- {S :: BTD}: Breakdown Tree Diagrams

- {R :: Hazard}: Low battery power

- {U :: Consequence}: System shutdown

- {C :: Hazard.Severity}: High

- {V :: attr:RiskEst}: '<5%'

- {T: Function}: Emergency power cutoff

We will also instantiate and develop the undeveloped elements.

Here's how the hierarchical tree structure of the instantiated assurance case for BlueROV2 would look:

```

- G1: Hazards for BlueROV2 System addressed in accordance with ALARP principle.

- S1: Argument by risk reduction/elimination of each hazard

- G2: No intolerable risks present in the system.

- C1: Definition of "intolerable"

- S2: Argue that risk posed by any remaining hazards is negligible

- S3: Argue that no other risks have been identified

- G3: Risk from water leakage has been reduced as low as reasonably practicable.

- C2: Assigned severity class is High

- S4: Apply ReSonAte to estimate level of risk from low battery power

- A1: Function Emergency power cutoff required by Breakdown Tree Diagrams is available

- G4: Model Breakdown Tree Diagrams accurately describe possible propagation of low battery power hazard

- G6: Possible hazard propagation paths correctly captured in BTD

- G7: Barriers in the BTD correctly describe their respective control action including any required system functions

- G8: All non-negligible threats have been identified

- G5: Quantitative risk estimates are accurate and below acceptable threshold

- G9: State probability distribution used for risk estimation is an accurate representation of expected system states

- G10: Estimated probability of system shutdown is below allowable threshold for severity class High

- Sn1: Estimated risk level '<5%'

```

This provides a structured tree-based visualization of the assurance case. Each goal is supported by strategies, and those strategies are in turn supported by subsidiary goals, assumptions, contexts, and solutions. The placeholders have been instantiated as per the high-risk operations and functions of the BlueROV2 system. Various assumptions, contexts, and supporting evidence have been provided where required. Note the structure includes only developed nodes for simplicity; additional nodes may need development based on detailed system analysis and risk assessment.