To create a security case for ACAS Xu (Airborne Collision Avoidance System Xu) from the provided security case pattern, we will instantiate the security case with specific details unique to ACAS Xu. Below is a representation of the instantiated security case in hierarchical tree format:

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- G0: ACAS Xu satisfies security requirements

- C0: Description of ACAS Xu

- C1: Security Requirements (SR) are requirements about protecting the ACAS Xu from malicious entities

- J0: The argumentation is based on satisfaction of Security Requirements (SRs)

- A0: System SRs for ACAS Xu are complete, adequate, and consistent

- S0: Argue through asset protection and secure development requirements

- G1: ACAS Xu satisfies the asset protection requirements

- A1: Asset inventory for ACAS Xu is established

- S1: Argue through the different stages of the system development life cycle

- G3: Asset protection requirements are met during the architecture design phase of ACAS Xu

- C2: Description of the ACAS Xu architecture

- S2: Argue through deriving security threats from SRs

- G5: ACAS Xu architecture is protected against identified security threats (STs)

- A2: All relevant threats to ACAS Xu have been identified

- S3: Argue over each security threat

- G0.X: ACAS Xu architecture is protected against STX (undeveloped, uninstantiated)

- G6: ACAS Xu architecture is validated (undeveloped, uninstantiated)

- C3: Description of ACAS Xu architecture model

- A3: ACAS Xu architecture model is well defined in formal method (uninstantiated)

- G4: Asset protection requirements are met during other phases (undeveloped)

- G2: ACAS Xu satisfies secure development requirements (undeveloped, uninstantiated)

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Explanation of the hierarchical representation:

- Each "Goal (G)" is listed with a description specific to ACAS Xu.

- Contexts (C), Justifications (J), and Assumptions (A) provide additional information and clarifications relevant to the goals and strategies.

- Strategies (S) detail the argumentative methods used to support the higher-level goals, indicating the logical connections.

- "SupportedBy" relationships indicate which strategies support which goals at different levels, creating a hierarchy.

- "IncontextOf" relationships associate goals and strategies with contexts, justifications, or assumptions to further explicate the reasoning or background.

- Placeholders have been replaced with specifics like "ACAS Xu," "security threats," and "architecture," refining the generic pattern to a concrete, applicable case.

- Some goals have been marked as undeveloped or uninstantiated, which indicates areas in the case needing further development or specifications.

This tree structure vividly illustrates how various elements are interlinked in an assurance/security case, providing a roadmap for understanding, meeting, or defending the security requirements of ACAS Xu.