To create a security case for ACAS Xu using the given security case pattern, the placeholders would be filled and instantiated based on the domain information about ACAS Xu and specific goals associated with its security threats identified from the security requirements (SRs).

Following is the hierarchical tree representation for the instantiated assurance case:

```

- G0: ACAS Xu satisfies security requirements

- C0: ACAS Xu is a UAV collision avoidance system designed to enhance safety

- C1: Security requirements are about protecting the system from malicious entities

- J0: The argumentation is based on satisfaction of SRs

- A0: System SRS are complete, adequate, and consistent

- S0: Argue through asset protection and secure development requirements

- G1: ACAS Xu satisfies the asset protection requirements

- A1: Asset inventory is established

- S1: Argue through the different stages of the system development life cycle

- G3: Asset protection requirements are met during the architecture design phase

- C2: Describes the components, ports, and connectors of the ACAS Xu system

- S2: Argue through deriving security threats from SARs

- J1: Detection and mitigation of threats fulfill SRs

- G5: ACAS Xu architecture is protected against identified security threats (STs)

- A2: All relevant threats have been identified

- S3: Argue over each security threat

- G0.1: ACAS Xu architecture is protected against ST1: Tampering

- G0.2: ACAS Xu architecture is protected against ST2: Spoofing

- G0.3: ACAS Xu architecture is protected against ST3: Elevation of privileges

- G6: ACAS Xu architecture is validated (Undeveloped)

- C3: Description of ACAS Xu's architecture model

- A3: The architecture model of ACAS Xu is well defined in formal methods (Uninstantiated)

- G4: Asset protection requirements are met during other phases (Undeveloped)

- G2: ACAS Xu satisfies secure development requirements (UndevelopStantiated)

```

This tree shows how each goal, context, strategy, assumption, and justification is structured within the assurance case, reflecting their relationships and dependencies to argue that ACAS Xu satisfies security requirements. Each element, marked previously as uninstantiated or having placeholders, has been contextualized to fit ACAS Xu specific characteristics and the security requirements identified.