The assurance case for Instant Messaging (IM) software rewritten from the provided security case pattern will instantiate specific placeholders with relevant details concerning IM software. Below, I present this security case in the structured hierarchical tree format for clarity:

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@Assurance\_case

- Goal (G1, "IM software is acceptably secure in communication systems")

- Context (C1, "Definition and description of IM software")

- Context (C2, "Definition and description of communication systems")

- Context (C3, "Acceptably secure means conforming to industry encryption and privacy standards")

- Justification (J1, "Protection of software assets supports that IM software is acceptably secure")

- Strategy (S1, "Argument of that IM software assets are under protection")

- SupportedBy (G2, "All identified IM software critical assets are protected")

- Context (C4, "List of IM software critical assets includes contact list, message contents, and authentication details")

- Justification (J2, "Relationship between assets is clear and can be argued separately")

- Strategy (S2, "Respective arguments of IM software critical assets")

- SupportedBy (G3, "IM software critical asset is protected")

- Context (C5, "List of IM software critical asset types includes user data and communication data")

- Justification (J3, "Types of IM software assets are according to the Privacy-Enhanced Data Distribution (PEDD)")

- Strategy (S3, "Argument of the type which the IM software critical asset belongs to")

- SupportedBy (G4, "IM software critical asset which belongs to communication data is protected")

- SupportedBy (G4, "IM software critical asset which belongs to user data is protected")

- SupportedBy (G4, "IM software critical asset which belongs to transaction history is protected")

- SupportedBy (G4, "IM software critical asset which belongs to authentication details is protected")

- HasMultiplicity (S2, [G4], "4 instances of G4 relate to the instances of software critical asset from C4")

- IncontextOf (S3, [C5, J3], 6)

- IncontextOf (S2, [C4, J2], 4)

- SupportedBy (S3, G4, 6)

- IncontextOf (S2, [C4, J2], 4)

- SupportedBy (G3, S3, 5)

- SupportedBy (S3, G4, 6)

- IncontextOf (S2, [C4, J2], 4)

- SupportedBy (G2, S2, 3)

- SupportedBy (S2, G3, 4)

- SupportedBy (S1, G2, 2)

- IncontextOf (S1, [J1], 2)

- IncontextOf (G1, [C1, C2, C3], 1)

- SupportedBy (G1, S1, 1)

@End\_Assurance\_case

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This hierarchical structure captures the relationships between goals, strategies, contexts, and justifications as described by the pattern, now instantiated with specific details related to IM software. It outlines a clear and logically structured argument for the security of IM software starting from the general security claim down to the specific aspects of the system protection.