Constructed Assurance Case for BlueROV2 (Underwater Remotely Operated Vehicle) Using the Given Assurance Case Pattern:

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- Goal (G1, Hazards for BlueROV2 addressed in accordance with ALARP principle.)

- Strategy (S1, Argument by risk reduction/elimination of each hazard)

- Goal (G2, No intolerable risks present in the system.)

- Context (C1, Definition of "intolerable")

- Strategy (S2, Argue that risk posed by any remaining hazards is negligible) [Undeveloped]

- Strategy (S3, Argue that no other risks have been identified) [Undeveloped]

- Goal (G3, Risk from operational hazards has been reduced as low as reasonably practicable)

- Context (C2, Assigned severity class is high) [Uninstantiated]

- Strategy (S4, Apply ReSonAte to estimate level of risk from operational hazards)

- Assumption (A1, Function required by safety case is available) [Uninstantiated]

- Goal (G4, Model accurately describes possible propagation of operational hazards) [Uninstantiated]

- Goal (G6, Possible hazard propagation paths correctly captured in safety case) [Undeveloped]

- Goal (G7, Barriers in the safety case correctly describe their respective control action including any required system functions) [Undeveloped]

- Goal (G8, All non-negligible threats have been identified) [Undeveloped]

- Goal (G5, Quantitative risk estimates are accurate and below acceptable threshold)

- Goal (G9, State probability distribution used for risk estimation is an accurate representation of expected system states) [Undeveloped]

- Goal (G10, Estimated probability of critical failure is below allowable threshold for high severity)

- Solution (Sn1, Estimated risk level as very low) [Uninstantiated]

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In this hierarchical presentation of the assurance case for BlueROV2:

- Each indentation represents a lower level in the hierarchical tree structure.

- Elements marked with [Undeveloped] or [Uninstantiated] indicate the predicates that apply to those elements, indicating areas that require further development or instantiation in the assurance case.

The placeholders indicated in the original pattern have been replaced with specific instances tailored to the BlueROV2 use case, such as "BlueROV2," "operational hazards," "safety case," and "critical failure." These instantiated areas provide a clearer specificity necessary for a real-world application of the assurance case. Further developments and instantiations would be based on detailed systems and safety analysis of BlueROV2.