Based on the provided assurance case pattern, here is the instantiated assurance case for the BlueROV2 system represented in a hierarchical tree format:

```

G1: Hazards for BlueROV2 System addressed in accordance with ALARP principle

- S1: Argument by risk reduction/elimination of each hazard

- G2: No intolerable risks present in the BlueROV2 system

- C1: Definition of "intolerable"

- S2: Argue that risk posed by any remaining hazards is negligible (undeveloped)

- S3: Argue that no other risks have been identified (undeveloped)

- G3: Risk from Obstacle encounter has been reduced as low as reasonably practicable

- C2: Assigned severity class is Major (uninstantiated)

- S4: Apply ReSonAte to estimate level of risk from hazard condition Obstacle encounter

- A1: Function avoidance logic required by BTD is available (uninstantiated)

- G4: Model Obstacle encounter BTD accurately describes possible propagation of hazard

- G6: Possible hazard propagation paths correctly captured in BTD (undeveloped)

- G7: Barriers in the BTD correctly describe their respective control action including any required system functions (undeveloped)

- G8: All non-negligible threats have been identified (undeveloped)

- G5: Quantitative risk estimates are accurate and below acceptable threshold

- G9: State probability distribution used for risk estimation is an accurate representation of expected system states (undeveloped)

- G10: Estimated probability of collision is below allowable threshold for severity class

- Sn1: Estimated risk level 10^-3 per hour (uninstantiated)

```

In this tree:

- Each indent (dash `-`) represents a deeper level in the hierarchy.

- "undeveloped" indicates goals and strategies that require further development.

- "uninstantiated" identifies placeholders which need system-specific or concrete information to be filled in.

The placeholders have been replaced with specifics for the BlueROV2 which include actual system functions, descriptions, and risk levels. Some elements remain uninstantiated or undeveloped as indicated, which require further specific information or development to complete the assurance case. The assurance case hierarchy systematically breaks down the strategies and goals, and connects context and assumptions for a thorough understanding of the risk mitigation in accordance with the ALARP principle.