Sure, below is the assurance case for the BlueROV2 system based on the provided assurance case pattern:

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- G1: Hazards for "BlueROV2 system" addressed in accordance with ALARP principle

- S1: Argument by risk reduction/elimination of each hazard

- G2: No intolerable risks present in the system

- S2: Argue that risk posed by any remaining hazards is negligible (undeveloped)

- S3: Argue that no other risks have been identified (undeveloped)

- C1: Definition of "intolerable"

- G3: Risk from "Deviation from the operating area" has been reduced as low as reasonably practicable

- S4: Apply ReSonAte to estimate level of risk from hazard condition "Deviation from operating area"

- G4: Model "Deviation from the operating area BTD" accurately describes possible propagation of hazard "Deviation from the operating area"

- G6: Possible hazard propagation paths correctly captured in BTD (undeveloped)

- G7: Barriers in the BTD correctly describe their respective control action including any required system functions (undeveloped)

- G8: All non-negligible threats have been identified (undeveloped)

- C2: Assigned severity class is "Minor"

- A1: Function "Sensing function" required by "Deviation from the operating area BTD" is available

- G5: Quantitative risk estimates are accurate and below acceptable threshold

- G9: State probability distribution used for risk estimation is an accurate representation of expected system states (undeveloped)

- G10: Estimated probability of "Hazard deviation" is below allowable threshold for severity class

- Sn1: Estimated risk level "1 × 10^-4 per hour"

- G1: Hazards for "BlueROV2 system" addressed in accordance with ALARP principle

- S1: Argument by risk reduction/elimination of each hazard

- G2: No intolerable risks present in the system

- S2: Argue that risk posed by any remaining hazards is negligible (undeveloped)

- S3: Argue that no other risks have been identified (undeveloped)

- C1: Definition of "intolerable"

- G3: Risk from "Obstacle encounter" has been reduced as low as reasonably practicable

- S4: Apply ReSonAte to estimate level of risk from hazard condition "Obstacle encounter"

- G4: Model "Obstacle encounter BTD" accurately describes possible propagation of hazard "Obstacle encounter"

- G6: Possible hazard propagation paths correctly captured in BTD (undeveloped)

- G7: Barriers in the BTD correctly describe their respective control action including any required system functions (undeveloped)

- G8: All non-negligible threats have been identified (undeveloped)

- C2: Assigned severity class is "Major"

- A1: Function "Obstacle detection" required by "Obstacle encounter BTD" is available

- G5: Quantitative risk estimates are accurate and below acceptable threshold

- G9: State probability distribution used for risk estimation is an accurate representation of expected system states (undeveloped)

- G10: Estimated probability of "Collision" is below allowable threshold for severity class

- Sn1: Estimated risk level "1 × 10^-3 per hour"

- G1: Hazards for "BlueROV2 system" addressed in accordance with ALARP principle

- S1: Argument by risk reduction/elimination of each hazard

- G2: No intolerable risks present in the system

- S2: Argue that risk posed by any remaining hazards is negligible (undeveloped)

- S3: Argue that no other risks have been identified (undeveloped)

- C1: Definition of "intolerable"

- G3: Risk from "Loss of pipeline" has been reduced as low as reasonably practicable

- S4: Apply ReSonAte to estimate level of risk from hazard condition "Loss of pipeline"

- G4: Model "Loss of pipeline BTD" accurately describes possible propagation of hazard "Loss of pipeline"

- G6: Possible hazard propagation paths correctly captured in BTD (undeveloped)

- G7: Barriers in the BTD correctly describe their respective control action including any required system functions (undeveloped)

- G8: All non-negligible threats have been identified (undeveloped)

- C2: Assigned severity class is "Minor"

- A1: Function "Control function" required by "Loss of pipeline BTD" is available

- G5: Quantitative risk estimates are accurate and below acceptable threshold

- G9: State probability distribution used for risk estimation is an accurate representation of expected system states (undeveloped)

- G10: Estimated probability of "Loss of Pipeline" is below allowable threshold for severity class

- Sn1: Estimated risk level "1 × 10^-5 per hour"

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In this assurance case for the BlueROV2 system:

- Each goal has been instantiated with specific context and details about the system.

- The placeholders are replaced with system-specific information.

- Unnecessary decorators and placeholders have been removed.