To create the assurance case for Instant Messaging (IM) software using the security case pattern provided, the placeholders will be replaced with IM software-specific information as required by the pattern.

Here is the instantiation of the generic assurance case pattern specifically tailored for the IM software:

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- Goal (G1, "IM software is acceptably secure in a communication system")

- Context (C1, "Definition and description of IM software")

- Context (C2, "Definition and description of the communication system")

- Context (C3, "Definition of what constitutes being 'acceptably secure'")

- Strategy (S1, "Argument that IM software assets are under protection")

- Justification (J1, "Protection of IM software assets supports that the software is acceptably secure")

- Goal (G2, "All identified IM software critical assets are protected")

- Context (C4, "List of IM software critical assets")

- Strategy (S2, "Respective arguments of IM software critical assets")

- Justification (J2, "Relationship between assets is clear and can be argued separately")

- Goal (G3, "IM software critical asset is protected")

- Strategy (S3, "Argument of the type which the IM software critical asset belongs to")

- Context (C5, "List of IM software critical asset types in Privacy, Encryption, Data Integrity, Device Compatibility (PEDD)")

- Justification (J3, "Types of IM software assets are according to PEDD")

- Goal (G4, "IM software critical asset which belongs to privacy type is protected")

- Goal (G4, "IM software critical asset which belongs to encryption type is protected")

- Goal (G4, "IM software critical asset which belongs to data integrity type is protected")

- Goal (G4, "IM software critical asset which belongs to device compatibility type is protected")

```

In this tree:

- Each level of nesting is marked by a dash “-” representing depth within the tree structure.

- Placeholders such as `{software}`, `{system}`, and `{acceptably secure}` have been replaced with specific terms like "IM software", "communication system", and definitions of being "acceptably secure".

- Contexts provide definitions and descriptions necessary for understanding the scope and boundaries of the GSN elements.

- The strategies outline the methodological approach of the arguments supporting the higher-level goals.

- Justifications are employed to clarify and support the strategies or relationships portrayed.

This tree format effectively outlines the structure and argumentation flow of the security case for IM software, according to the predicates and assumptions provided.