Here's the assurance case for the BlueROV2 system, depicted in a hierarchical tree format using dashes to denote different levels.

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- Goal (G1, Hazards for the BlueROV2 system addressed in accordance with ALARP principle.)

- Strategy (S1, Argument by risk reduction/elimination of each hazard)

- Goal (G2, No intolerable risks present in the system.)

- Context (C1, Definition of "intolerable")

- Strategy (S2, Argue that risk posed by any remaining hazards is negligible) (Undeveloped)

- Strategy (S3, Argue that no other risks have been identified) (Undeveloped)

- Goal (G3, Risk from obstacle encounter has been reduced as low as reasonably practicable)

- Context (C2, Assigned severity class is Major)

- Strategy (S4, Apply ReSonAte to estimate level of risk from hazard condition obstacle encounter)

- Assumption (A1, Function Obstacle Detection required by Obstacle encounter BTD is available)

- Goal (G4, Model Obstacle encounter BTD accurately describes possible propagation of hazard obstacle encounter)

- Goal (G6, Possible hazard propagation paths correctly captured in BTD) (Undeveloped)

- Goal (G7, Barriers in the BTD correctly describe their respective control action including any required system functions) (Undeveloped)

- Goal (G8, All non-negligible threats have been identified) (Undeveloped)

- Goal (G5, Quantitative risk estimates are accurate and below acceptable threshold)

- Goal (G9, State probability distribution used for risk estimation is an accurate representation of expected system states) (Undeveloped)

- Goal (G10, Estimated probability of collision is below allowable threshold for severity class)

- Solution (Sn1, Estimated risk level 10^-3 per hour)

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This assurance case reflects the specific elements related to the BlueROV2 system, including its identified hazards, severity levels, and risk estimates.