Based on the predicate rules and patterns provided, the specific assurance case instantiation for the BlueROV2 underwater remotely operated vehicle (ROV) is constructed. This follows the provided tree structure format:

- `G1: Hazards for BlueROV2 addressed in accordance with ALARP principle.`

- `S1: Argument by risk reduction/elimination of each hazard for BlueROV2`

- `G2: No intolerable risks present in the BlueROV2 system.`

- `C1: Definition of "intolerable" risks in underwater operations`

- `S2: Argue that risk posed by any remaining hazards in BlueROV2 is negligible (undeveloped)`

- `S3: Argue that no other risks have been identified in BlueROV2 operations (undeveloped)`

- `G3: Risk from electrical short-circuit has been reduced as low as reasonably practicable in the BlueROV2.`

- `C2: Assigned severity class is high due to proximity to water (uninstantiated)`

- `S4: Apply ReSonAte to estimate level of risk from hazard condition electrical short-circuit in BlueROV2`

- `A1: Function automatic circuit breaker required by BTD to handle an electrical short-circuit is available (uninstantiated)`

- `G4: Model BTD accurately describes possible propagation of hazard electrical short-circuit in BlueROV2 (uninstantiated)`

- `G6: Possible hazard propagation paths correctly captured in BTD (undeveloped)`

- `G7: Barriers in the BTD correctly describe their respective control actions including any required system functions (undeveloped)`

- `G8: All non-negligible electrical threats have been identified in BlueROV2 (undeveloped)`

- `G5: Quantitative risk estimates for electrical hazards are accurate and below acceptable threshold in the BlueROV2 system.`

- `G9: State probability distribution used for risk estimation is an accurate representation of expected system states in BlueROV2 (undeveloped)`

- `G10: Estimated probability of severe damage from electric shock is below allowable threshold for severity class in BlueROV2 (uninstantiated)`

- `Sn1: Estimated risk level 0.02% from electric shock (uninstantiated)`

This hierarchical representation maps out how the specific GSN elements fit together to form a structured argument regarding the treatment and management of hazards in the BlueROV2, specifically focusing on the electrical short-circuit hazard as an example. The tree illustrates nested Goals, Strategies, Contexts, Assumptions, and Solutions, providing a clear path from high-level safety claims down to specific solutions and burden of proof evidence. The 'undeveloped' and 'uninstantiated' tags indicate areas where further development or instantiation with actual data or validation is necessary to fully support the argument.