Based on the provided assurance case pattern, here is the instantiated hierarchical GSN tree for the BlueROV2 system:

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- Goal (G1, "Hazards for BlueROV2 addressed in accordance with ALARP principle.") [Uninstantiated & Undeveloped]

- Strategy (S1, "Argument by risk reduction/elimination of each hazard")

- Goal (G2, "No intolerable risks present in the system.")

- Context (C1, "Definition of 'intolerable'")

- Strategy (S2, "Argue that risk posed by any remaining hazards is negligible") [Undeveloped]

- Strategy (S3, "Argue that no other risks have been identified") [Undeveloped]

- Goal (G3, "Risk from each identified hazard has been reduced as low as reasonably practicable") [Multiple instances for each hazard]

- Context (C2, "Assigned severity class is Minor/Major") [Uninstantiated]

- Strategy (S4, "Apply ReSonAte to estimate level of risk from hazard condition each identified hazard") [Uninstantiated]

- Assumption (A1, "Function required by each BTD is available") [Uninstantiated & Placeholder]

- Goal (G4, "Model each BTD accurately describes possible propagation of each hazard") [Uninstantiated]

- Goal (G6, "Possible hazard propagation paths correctly captured in each BTD") [Undeveloped]

- Goal (G7, "Barriers in each BTD correctly describe their respective control action including any required system functions") [Undeveloped]

- Goal (G8, "All non-negligible threats have been identified") [Undeveloped]

- Goal (G5, "Quantitative risk estimates are accurate and below acceptable threshold")

- Goal (G9, "State probability distribution used for risk estimation is an accurate representation of expected system states") [Undeveloped]

- Goal (G10, "Estimated probability of each consequence is below allowable threshold for severity class") [Uninstantiated]

- Solution (Sn1, "Estimated risk level 10^-3 per hour") [Uninstantiated & Placeholder]

```

In this assurance case tree:

- We have instantiated placeholders in the BlueROV2 system context to fill concrete system-specific information where it's defined or available.

- Specific hazardous scenarios linked to the BlueROV2 (e.g., Deviation from the operating area, Obstacle encounter, Loss of pipeline) are addressed through separate instances of `G3` and children to illustrate handling of multiple hazards.

- Decorators like `Uninstantiated` indicate where further instantiation is needed, `Undeveloped` indicates where arguments need further development.

- Contexts and assumptions necessary for certain goals and strategies have been specified, though some remain uninstantiated indicating a placeholder for future concrete data.

- Multiplicity indicates multiple instances relate to a certain part of the tree structure, representing handling of various hazards.

This assurance case covers all the aspects dictated by the pattern, contextualizing each element for the specific use case of the BlueROV2 system. This provides a structured approach to addressing risk and safety assurance, utilising evidence, assumptions, and strategic reasoning aligned with the system's specific requirements and hazards.