

File Extension Base Crypto-Ransomware Vaccine - FEBRAV Project

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Abstract

Crypto-ransomware attacks have become one of the biggest cybersecurity threats to enterprises and government institutes. Traditional ransomware protection solutions have limited prevention techniques. This study focuses on file extensions to suggest a new ransomware vaccine solution for preventing ransomware encryption. Analysis and test results show that blurring file extensions dramatically reduces encrypted files on the system. Therefore, the implications of this study could be used for approaching ransomware prevention differently and developing new methods or tools.

Keywords: ransomware, malware, virus, vaccine, vaccination, file extension, encryption, file extension blurring.

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Introduction

The spread of ransomware is increasing, and traditional detection-based protection such as antivirus or anti-malware has become ineffective for preventing attacks. Many studies have been conducted by cybersecurity vendors in order to develop a new ransomware vaccine for combating ransomware infections. None of these vaccines, however, has proven to be effective against all types of crypto-ransomware. In most cases, traditional ransomware vaccines may only protect a target against current variants. Such vaccines are a good short-term solution; once they are released publicly, ransomware authors discover new techniques to quickly bypass them.

Bypassing is simple, as ransomware usually checks several points on the system before starting its encryption process. Traditional vaccines are targeting those points to change them in order to avoid encryption. Therefore, ransomware authors can easily adjust those checks for further attacks, so vaccines fail against other variants or different ransomware families.

However, this paper aims to provide a new vaccine approach for protecting systems against all crypto-ransomware by focusing on file extensions. File extensions are used for identifying file types on systems; therefore, almost all crypto-ransomware has an embedded list of file extensions for identifying its target for encryption. It is important to find a way to blur file extensions in order to prevent encryption. This paper explains how the file extension blurring technique works, how the system registry can be utilized for file extension management, and eventually how this technique can be used for future cybersecurity solution development.

1. Background

1.1 Crypto-Ransomware Attack Anatomy




Figure 1 - Crypto-Ransomware Attack Anatomy

1.1.1 Initial Compromise

The first step is to distribute the malware to potential victims. Users are either tricked or forced to download the malware or payload via a phishing email, an exploit kit, or a drive-by download and activate it. The malware then initiates the infection. (Vioreanu, 2021)




Figure 2 - Fake attachment phishing technique (Source: VedaSecure)

1.1.2 Infection

During the infection stage, new processes are being launched, and malware starts its infection process. Some processes might seem legitimate, but they run from strange locations in the file structure. The infected user will probably not notice much of what's going on.

1.1.3 Privilege Escalation and Persistence

In order to gain access to desired files and to make sure that malicious code stays on the victim's device, malware uses several techniques such as:

- Deleting shadow copies and propagating itself through the file system
- Modifying configuration files or registry keys for various rights

1.1.4 File Encryption

The ransomware starts to encrypt all files it discovers while it's scanning. Then, it uploads the newly encrypted versions and deletes the originals. The ransomware only encrypts specific file types, which are pre-defined within the ransomware.

| | | | |
|-------|--------------|-------|--------------|
| aLnk | db '.lnk',0 | | |
| | align 4 | | |
| aDoc | db '.doc',0 | | |
| | align 4 | aPpt | db '.ppt',0 |
| aDot | db '.dot',0 | | align 4 |
| | align 4 | aPps | db '.pps',0 |
| aDocx | db '.docx',0 | | align 4 |
| | align 4 | aPot | db '.pot',0 |
| aDocb | db '.docb',0 | | align 4 |
| | align 4 | aPpsx | db '.ppsx',0 |
| aDotx | db '.dotx',0 | | align 4 |
| | align 4 | aPptx | db '.pptx',0 |
| aDotb | db '.dotb',0 | | align 4 |
| | align 4 | aPosx | db '.posx',0 |
| aWkb | db '.wkb',0 | | align 4 |
| | align 4 | aPotx | db '.potx',0 |
| aXml | db '.xml',0 | | align 4 |
| | align 4 | aSldx | db '.sldx',0 |
| aXls | db '.xls',0 | | align 4 |
| | align 4 | aPdf | db '.pdf',0 |
| aXlsx | db '.xlsx',0 | | align 4 |
| | align 4 | aDb | db '.db',0 |
| aXlt | db '.xlt',0 | | align 4 |
| | align 4 | aSql | db '.sql',0 |
| aXltx | db '.xltx',0 | | align 10h |
| | align 4 | aCs | db '.cs',0 |
| aXlsb | db '.xlsb',0 | | align 4 |
| | align 4 | aTs | db '.ts',0 |
| aXlw | db '.xlw',0 | | align 4 |
| | align 4 | aJs | db '.js',0 |
| | | aPy | db '.py',0 |

Figure 3 - Embedded File Extension List of LockerGoga Ransomware (source: trendmicro.com)

1.1.5 Payday

When the encryption is finished, the victim receives instructions on how to recover their file. A common way to do this is to show a ransom note like “The contents of this machine are encrypted. Send us <enter currency here> or other crypto to get your files back.” (PHIPPS, 2022)



Figure 4 - WannaCry Desktop image and Wana Decrypt0r 2.0 (source: ANY.RUN)

1.2 Traditional Crypto-Ransomware Vaccines

Traditional vaccines have been used as a method for combatting the rise of ransomware and other malware for several years. (Burt, 2021)

1.2.1 How Traditional Vaccines Work

Traditional vaccines use infection markers to make systems look infected in order to avoid real infection from malware. (Constantin, 2016) Traditional malware vaccines are like medical vaccines, which apply inactive or weakened parts of viruses to a person in order to protect them but unlike medical vaccines, traditional malware vaccines do not improve the security response of the system.

There are several methods for creating traditional malware vaccines, such as causing errors in malware to crash or placing invalid data in specific places to crash malware. Those methods can trick ransomware into not encrypting files. (Hahn, 2022)

1.2.2 Limitation to Tradition Vaccines

Traditional malware vaccines have several limitations, which makes them unpopular and not user-friendly. (Hahn, 2022)

- Makes systems look infected, which leaves an anti-malware solution in a difficult situation for detection.
- Works only for a specific malware variant or family.

2. Methodology

2.1 New File Extension Definition in Windows Registry

2.1.1 Windows Registry




Figure 5 – Microsoft Windows Registry (Regedit App)

A central hierarchical database used in Windows 98, Windows CE, Windows NT, and Windows 2000 is used to store information that is necessary to configure the system for one or

more users, applications, and hardware devices. The registry contains information that Windows continually references during operation, such as profiles for each user, the applications installed on the computer, and the types of documents that each can create, property sheet settings for folders and application icons, what hardware exists on the system, and the ports that are being used. (Team, 2022)

2.1.2 Windows Registry – HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT

The HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT (HKCR) key contains file name extension associations and COM class registration information. The user-specific settings have priority over the default settings. For example, the default setting might specify a particular application to handle .doc files. But a user can override this setting by specifying a different application in the registry.

The *HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT* key provides a view of the registry that merges the information from these two sources *HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Classes* and *HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes*. (Registry, 2021)

2.1.3 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT – File Extension Definition Keys

In HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT (the first section of the Windows Registry), there are a list of keys used for defining file extensions. Those keys (file extensions) have default values that point to other keys in the same section, which is basically application launch mapping.




Figure 6 - File Extension Definition Key for Text File .txt and Its Default Value txtfile

2.1.4 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT – Application Launcher Keys

Another important key listed in HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT is the application launcher key. Those keys are used for defining commands in order to launch specific applications when a defined file is tried to open with its defined file extension.

For instance, the file extension definition for text files (.txt key) is pointing to the txtfile key, which has a defined command to open an application with the file.




Figure 7 - Application Launcher Key for txtfile which has defined notepad.exe command

2.1.5 How To Define New File Extension (Registry)

HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT can be used for defining a new file extension. In order to protect a personal file from ransomware attack, a new file extension can be defined in the registry.




Figure 8 – New Text File Extension Definition (.xyzt)

As it can be seen in *Figure 8*, a new extension is defined, and it is pointed to the notepad launcher. This definition can be used instead of “.txt”.

2.1.6 How To Use New File Extension (File System)

Defined new file extension can be easily used on the files. For instance, changing a known file extension to something randomly generated and defined in the registry will not cause any issues with daily file usage.




Figure 9 – A Text File with File Extension .xyzt - Opened with Notepad As Defined

Figure 9 shows that defining a new file extension in the Windows Registry and mapping its application launcher opens the file without any issue.

2.2 File Extension Vaccine Development

As crypto-ransomware finds specific files by looking at their file extension and attacking them to encrypt their content, it is very important to blur the file extension of the files without damaging file execution from an end-user perspective.

For instance, in order to protect text files on the system, the file extension can be changed from (.txt) to (.xyzt) to avoid encryption on text files.

To do this extension change on the registry and file system, requires proper vaccine development.

2.3 Vaccine Components

2.3.1 Inputs

It is very important to get specific input from a vaccine runner, such as:

- Extension list, as vaccine should focus only on provided file extension in order to avoid changes on OS system files.
- Directory, as the vaccine should only work in the provided directory and its subdirectories to avoid changes to OS system files.
- Additionally, vaccine can get action inputs such as “lock” or “unlock” for changing extensions or reverting changed extensions back.

2.3.2 Random Extension Generator

The random extension generator reads the provided file extensions list and generates random file extension for usage in the registry and in the file system.

2.3.3 Registry Modifier

Registry modifier is a set of operations for registry modification, such as:

- Create Key, which creates defined registry keys.
- Set Key Value, which sets values for created keys.
- Get Key, which reads the value of any keys.
- Delete Key, which deleted any keys.

2.3.4 File System Modifier

File system modifier modifies the extension of the files that are located in the provided directory.

2.3.5 Vaccine Process




Figure 10 – Vaccine Execution Processes

As it is shown in Figure 10, Vaccine has several processes for modifying system and reverting modification back.

1. **(1)** – Inputs where user provides to vaccine script/application.


```
python ex_bluring.py --action lock --extension ".zip|.rtf|.txt" --path C:\\Users\\REM\\Desktop\\Test
```

Figure 11 – Execution of Vaccine (shows provided inputs as action, extension and path)

2. (2) – The vaccine reads the provided extension list and generates random extensions and also keeps them as extension token

```
zip@.0A3uA7OZ|.rtf@.1Oze2GI6|.txt@.2e5F456
```

Figure 12 – Generated Extension (shows it as token form)

3. (3) – It reads extension token and changes the extension of files in the provided directory.






| | | | | |
|---|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------|
|  | pdf_file_format.pdf | PDF File | 8/22/2010 3:14 PM | 488 KB |
|  | png_file_format.png | PNG File | 3/26/2021 2:15 PM | 2 KB |
|  | rich_text_format.rtf | Rich Text Document | 9/24/2022 7:08 PM | 1 KB |
|  | text_file_format.txt | TXT File | 9/24/2022 7:10 PM | 0 KB |
|  | zip_file_format.zip | zip Archive | 9/24/2022 7:10 PM | 1 KB |

Figure 13 – Files and Their Extension in Provided Directory (Before Vaccine Execution)






| | | | | |
|---|---------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------|
|  | pdf_file_format.pdf | PDF File | 8/22/2010 3:14 PM | 488 KB |
|  | png_file_format.png | PNG File | 3/26/2021 2:15 PM | 2 KB |
|  | rich_text_format.1Oze2GI6 | Rich Text Document | 9/24/2022 7:08 PM | 1 KB |
|  | text_file_format.2e5F4560 | Notepad++ Docu... | 9/24/2022 7:10 PM | 0 KB |
|  | zip_file_format.0A3uA7OZ | zip Archive | 9/24/2022 7:10 PM | 1 KB |

Figure 14 – Files and Their Extension After Vaccine Execution (Provided directory)

4. (4) – Generated extension keys in registry, which helps OS to open appropriate application with the files that are vaccinated.




Figure 15 – Generated Extension Keys in Registry

5. (5) – After vaccine execution, the script/app stores extension token in the registry for future reverting back process; this token is also printed on the screen after execution so that the user can copy and secure it.




Figure 16 – Extension Token

6. (6) – Reverting all changes back by executing the vaccine script/app with similar parameters.

```
python ex_bluring.py --action unlock --path C:\\Users\\REM\\Desktop\\Test
```

Figure 17 – Reverting Extension Changes (parameters: action and path)

7. (7) – All modified extensions were reverted back.

| | | | |
|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------|
| pdf_file_format.pdf | PDF File | 8/22/2010 3:14 PM | 488 KB |
| png_file_format.png | PNG File | 3/26/2021 2:15 PM | 2 KB |
| rich_text_format.rtf | Rich Text Document | 9/24/2022 7:08 PM | 1 KB |
| text_file_format.txt | TXT File | 9/24/2022 7:10 PM | 0 KB |
| zip_file_format.zip | zip Archive | 9/24/2022 7:10 PM | 1 KB |

Figure 18 – Reverted File Extension (In Provided Directory)

8. (8) – Generated keys were deleted in the registry.




Figure 19 – Registry After Reverting Vaccine

3. Test

2.4 How To Test

In order to prove the effectiveness of the crypto-ransomware vaccine, it must be tested with real ransomware, and the testing methodology will be simple as creating certain files with proper content and certain file extensions in a specific directory. After preparing files, the vaccine will be applied. In order to show ransomware functionality, the test will have ransomware execution results with and without the vaccine.

2.5 Test

2.5.1 Preparation

As below table shows that there will be three different files in test directory. All tests will be done on a Windows 10 operating system, and the ransomware will be a variant of WannaCry.

| | |
|-------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Operating System | Windows 10 |
| Test Directory | C:\Users\<user>\Desktop\ptest |
| Text File | txt_file_format.txt |
| Rich Text File | rtf_file_format.pdf |
| Zip File | zip_file_format.zip |
| Ransomware | WannaCry |
| Ransomware MD5 | 84C82835A5D21BBCF75A61706D8AB549 |

As shown in Figure 20, three files (*rtf_file_format.rtf*, *text_file_format.txt* and *zip_file_format.zip*) have been created in defined directory (*C:\Users\<user>\Desktop\ptest*)




Figure 20 – Before Execution

Those three files have a specific content in order to see encryption, text files (rtf and txt) have “*This is a <rtf or text> file with this specific content!*” sentence, and the zip file just contains the copy of txt and rtf files.





Figure 21 – Before Execution (File Content) RTF, TXT and ZIP

2.5.2 Execution & Execution Result (without Vaccine)

In this execution, ransomware will be executed without any vaccination. The result can be seen in Figure 22.



| Name | Date modified | Type | Size |
|----------------------------|-------------------|------------|------|
| @Please_Read_Me@.txt | 9/28/2022 3:10 PM | TXT File | 1 KB |
| @WanaDecryptor@.exe | 9/28/2022 3:10 PM | Shortcut | 1 KB |
| rtf_file_format.rtf.WNCRY | 9/28/2022 2:48 PM | WNCRY File | 1 KB |
| text_file_format.txt.WNCRY | 9/28/2022 2:47 PM | WNCRY File | 1 KB |
| zip_file_format.zip.WNCRY | 9/28/2022 2:48 PM | WNCRY File | 1 KB |

Figure 22 – After Execution (No Vaccine)

The result shows that prepared files were encrypted, and even the extension of the executed ransomware “WNCRY” is shown. Note that two files were additionally created by the ransomware.


2.5.3 Execution & Execution Result (with Vaccine)

Firstly, defined file extensions will be vaccinated, these extensions are “.zip” and “.rtf” as shown in Figure 23. The developed Python script can be found in Appendix section below.

```
python ex_v.py --action lock --extension ".zip|.rtf" --path C:\\Users\\[redacted]\\Desktop\\vtest
.zip@.0i8Y7wTa|.rtf@.18wjHS8
```

Figure 23 – Locking/Vaccinating Files (Specific Directory and Specific Files)


After vaccination, only two files now have different “random” extension. To demonstrate infection in the folder, one text file (with the extension.txt) will be left without vaccine.



| Name | Date modified | Type | Size |
|--------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|------|
| rtf_file_format.18wjHS8a | 9/28/2022 3:48 PM | Rich Text Document | 1 KB |
| txt_file_format.txt | 9/28/2022 3:48 PM | TXT File | 1 KB |
| zip_file_format.0i8Y7wTa | 9/28/2022 3:48 PM | zip Archive | 1 KB |

Figure 24 – Right Before Ransomware Execution

After ransomware execution, as it can be seen in Figure 25 that already vaccinated files “.rtf” and “.zip” are not infected, at least the file extension seems has not been changed.



| Name | Date modified | Type | Size |
|---------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|------|
| @Please_Read_Me@.txt | 9/28/2022 3:58 PM | TXT File | 1 KB |
| @WanaDecryptor@.exe | 9/28/2022 3:58 PM | Shortcut | 1 KB |
| rtf_file_format.18wjHS8a | 9/28/2022 3:48 PM | Rich Text Document | 1 KB |
| txt_file_format.txt.WNCRY | 9/28/2022 3:48 PM | WNCRY File | 1 KB |
| zip_file_format.0i8Y7wTa | 9/28/2022 3:48 PM | zip Archive | 1 KB |

Figure 25 – After Ransomware Execution (Shown Vaccinated and Not Vaccinated Files)

If file contents are reviewed, the result is the same. it can be seen in Figure 26 that files without vaccine (.txt file in this case) has encrypted content.




Figure 26 – Content of RTF, TXT and ZIP Files (Shown that the content of txt file is encrypted)

4. Conclusion

As it can be seen from the result, this new vaccine method is effective and has a very high protection rate against crypto-ransomware attacks.

Without a doubt, there will be new methods from crypto-ransomware authors to bypass this new generic vaccine method, but in general, this research aims to show ways to approach this problem. As this method is just one window to look at this problem, there can be many developments or fixes over this prove of concept such as, securing extension token in a better way, instead of extension blurring, magic byte blurring can be used or random extension generation can be applied each time the OS boots up.

5. Appendices

----- Python Script Starts-----

```
import os
import random
import string
import winreg
import argparse

class RegManager():

    def __init__(self, unit, type_=winreg.REG_SZ):
        if unit == "HCR":
            self.root = winreg.HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT
        elif unit == "HCU":
            self.root = winreg.HKEY_CURRENT_USER
        elif unit == "HLM":
            self.root = winreg.HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE
        elif unit == "HU":
            self.root = winreg.HKEY_USERS
        elif unit == "HCC":
            self.root = winreg.HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG
```



```

else:
    pass
self.type_ = type_

def _is_key_exist(self, key):
    try:
        handle = winreg.ConnectRegistry(None, self.root)
        winreg.OpenKeyEx(handle, key, 0, winreg.KEY_ALL_ACCESS)
        winreg.CloseKey(handle)
        return True
    except FileNotFoundError:
        return False

def _open_key(self, key):
    if self._is_key_exist(key):
        handle = winreg.ConnectRegistry(None, self.root)
        return winreg.OpenKeyEx(handle, key, 0, winreg.KEY_ALL_ACCESS)
    else:
        return 1

def create_key(self, sub_key):
    if self._is_key_exist(sub_key):
        key_handle = self._open_key(sub_key)
    else:
        key_handle = winreg.CreateKeyEx(self.root, sub_key, 0, winreg.KEY_ALL_ACCESS)
    return key_handle

def set_key_value(self, sub_key, value):
    if self._is_key_exist(sub_key):
        winreg.SetValue(self.root, sub_key, self.type_, value)
    else:
        self.create_key(sub_key)
        winreg.SetValue(self.root, sub_key, self.type_, value)
    return 0

def set_subkey_value(self, key, value_name, value):
    if self._is_key_exist(key):
        winreg.SetValueEx(self._open_key(key), value_name, 0, self.type_, value)
    else:
        self.create_key(key)
        winreg.SetValueEx(self._open_key(key), value_name, 0, self.type_, value)
    return 0

def get_key(self, key, value_name):

```

```

if self._is_key_exist(key):
    raw_value = winreg.QueryValueEx(self._open_key(key), value_name)
    return raw_value[0]
else:
    return 1

def delete_key(self, sub_key):
    if self._is_key_exist(sub_key):
        winreg.DeleteKey(self.root, sub_key)
        return 0
    else:
        return 1

class ExtensionChanger():

    def __init__(self, path, ex_def):
        self.path = path
        self.ex_def = ex_def

    def set_new_extension(self):
        for root, subFolders, files in os.walk(self.path):
            for file in files:
                full_filename = os.path.join(root, file)
                fname = os.path.splitext(full_filename)[0]
                old_extension = os.path.splitext(full_filename)[1]
                for i in self.ex_def.split("|"):
                    if i.split("@")[0] == old_extension:
                        os.rename(full_filename, fname + i.split("@")[1])

    def set_old_extension(self):
        for root, subFolders, files in os.walk(self.path):
            for file in files:
                full_filename = os.path.join(root, file)
                fname = os.path.splitext(full_filename)[0]
                old_extension = os.path.splitext(full_filename)[1]
                for i in self.ex_def.split("|"):
                    if i.split("@")[1] == old_extension:
                        os.rename(full_filename, fname + i.split("@")[0])

class RandomStringGen():
    def __init__(self, length):
        self.length = length

    def get_random_string(self):

```

```
# abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789
letters = string.digits+string.ascii_letters+string.digits
result_str = ''.join(random.choice(letters) for i in range(self.length))
return result_str
```

```
class Manager():
```

```
    def __init__(self, dir, ext):
        self.directory = dir
        self.extension_list = ext
        self.ran_str = RandomStringGen(7)

    def start_change(self):
        change_keeper = str()
        # Extension changing
        for i in range(len(self.extension_list.split("|"))):
            change_keeper = change_keeper + self.extension_list.split("|")[i] + "@"
            new_ext = self.ran_str.get_random_string()
            change_keeper = change_keeper + "." + str(i) + new_ext + "|"
        change_keeper = change_keeper[:-1]
        ext_chgr = ExtensionChanger(self.directory, change_keeper)
        ext_chgr.set_new_extension()

        # Registry changing
        reg_man = RegManager("HCR")
        for i in change_keeper.split("|"):
            # Initially clean registry key any exists
            reg_man.delete_key("\\\\"+i.split("@")[1])

            try:
                # Get old extension set program
                used_app = reg_man.get_key("\\\\"+i.split("@")[0], "")
            except FileNotFoundError:
                pass

            # Create Key
            reg_man.create_key(i.split("@")[1])

            # Set default value
            reg_man.set_subkey_value("\\\\"+i.split("@")[1], "", used_app)

        reg_man.create_key("extension_log")
        reg_man.set_subkey_value("\\\\extension_log", "log", change_keeper)
```

```

print(change_keeper[:-1])
# .zip@.01y7E4z1|.exe@.1Z9F3Jk|.txt@.2THORC8P|.pdf@.3R6ZvH0x

def revert_change(self):
    # Read log
    reg_man = RegManager("HCR")
    extension_log = reg_man.get_key("\\extension_log", "log")
    # Change back
    ext_chgr = ExtensionChanger(self.directory, extension_log)
    ext_chgr.set_old_extension()

    for i in extension_log.split("|"):
        reg_man.delete_key("\\"+i.split("@")[1])

def runner(args):
    agent = Manager(args.path, args.extension)
    if args.action == 'lock':
        agent.start_change()
    elif args.action == 'unlock':
        agent.revert_change()
    else:
        print("ERROR - Something went wrong!")

def main():
    my_parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()

    my_parser.add_argument('--extension', type=str, help="Provide your file extension to secure: '--extension .zip|.pdf|.txt' (required only with [action lock])")

    my_parser.add_argument('--action', type=str, help="Provide your action over file(s): '--action lock/unlock' (required)")

    my_parser.add_argument('--path', type=str, help="Provide your full path: '--path C:\\Users\\<username>\\Desktop' (required)")

    args = my_parser.parse_args()

    runner(args)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()
----- Python Script Ends-----

```

6. References

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