MICROENTERPRISE IN CONSERVATION AREAS: DO STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT MODELS FIT IN A NON-TRADITIONAL CONTEXT?

by

Norman S. Wright
Zayed University

Jeff Caneen
and
Andrew Gomez
Brigham Young University Hawaii

David W. Hart
Brigham Young University Utah

Australia New Zealand Academy of Management
Rockhampton, Australia
December 6-9, 2006

The strategic management literature is rich with models that assist managers in deciding which industries to enter or exit and the strategic tactics to apply to be successful in those industries. While the efficacy of these models in understanding industry profitability and in guiding managerial thinking about its competition is well established, studies have largely focused on traditional industries operating in economically developed nations. Examples come from the commercial airplane industry (Chow et al, 1997), the electric appliance industry (Wolfe and Asch, 1992), the retail grocery industry (1992), and the lodging industry (Brewton, 1987), among others. The applicability of these models in non-traditional business settings, however, is less clear.

This paper examines one such context, indigenous tourism businesses in and around conservation areas in less developed countries. The conservation area context varies significantly from those of most strategy models in that the indigenous businesses tend to be microenterprises (fewer than six employees in the service sector or sixteen employees in the manufacturing sector (Sanchez, 1998; Otero and Rhyne, 1994)). Firms operating in this sphere are also distinguished by a strong tendency to develop business strategies in collaboration with government or non-governmental organization (NGO) partners. Two key approaches to strategy form the basis of this investigation with one approach being explored in greater detail through a conservation area case study.

The first approach to be explored encourages the managers of a business to think in terms of *core competencies* (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). Core competencies are those very few things that any company does that are its greatest strengths. In order to be considered a core competency, a strength must have three characteristics. First, it makes a valued contribution to the customer. Second, it is difficult for competitors to imitate. Third, it is fungible. That is, it gives the firm an advantage in a variety of markets.

The relevance of this approach to indigenous microenterprise in conservation zones is, however, limited. The core competency approach suggests that a firm has sufficient access to critical resources to leverage core competencies into differing lines of business. Yet, as several authors have noted, microentrepreneurs typically lack a wide variety of resources needed to leverage core competencies including access to capital, business skills, and other structural and socioeconomic conditions that they cannot overcome (Haynes, et al., 2000; Gulli, 1998). As a result, the core competency model seems to hold little value for the study of indigenous tourism businesses in or around conservation areas.

A second strategy model, however, holds greater promise. It moves away from the firm level approach of Prahalad and Hamel and, instead, focuses on an industry level analysis (Porter, 1979). Porter's model indicates that the way to profitability is to find a good industry, establish a position within the industry, and use or erect barriers to entry to keep other firms from diluting profit margins. This approach may prove particularly useful as indigenous microentrepreneurs frequently engage in a search for underserved market niches in which they can make a profit. Porter's model could help such indigenous entrepreneurs and their angel donors to identify such segments and determine their profitability. A brief review of the model is, therefore, helpful prior to considering its application in a specific conservation zone context.

In his seminal work in the field, Porter described how the ability of a firm to achieve economic success is influenced by outside forces. These include potential competitors who have not yet entered the industry, the buyers of the industry's products or services, the suppliers to the industry, substitute products or services that meet similar needs for the consumer, and the other firms within the industry. His model is demonstrated graphically in Appendix I.

In this model, each of the forces seeks to capture as much profit as possible from a series of transactions. That is, the five forces effectively compete to maximize their own share of the industry's value chain (Porter, 1985). If these forces are strong, meaning that they compete hardily for the value of the transaction, then the industry is likely to demonstrate low profit levels. If forces are weak, the opposite outcome holds.

In considering the applicability of this model to microenterprises in or around conservation zones, it is helpful to examine each of these forces in greater detail.

Threat of New Entrants

The threat of potential entrants is determined by a number of factors. For example, are there significant economies of scale that would make entrance more difficult? Are distribution channels tied up? Do customers exhibit significant brand loyalty? Do government policies exist that facilitate or hinder entrance? Are profit levels high suggesting that outside firms will be interested in entering? Is there sophisticated technological know-how required to enter the industry? Do learning curve effects exist?

Bargaining Power of Suppliers

Similarly, a number of factors determine who will fare better in a negotiation between suppliers and firms in the industry as they seek long or short term supply contracts. In general, suppliers are seen to have strength when no good substitutes exist for their product and other competitors cannot match the price or quality of the supplier. Additionally, suppliers are seen as being in a strong bargaining position when the product or service supplied is essential to the quality or success of the buying firm’s output. Also, if purchasing firms can switch easily and at a low cost between suppliers, supplier power is limited. Finally, if no credible threat of backward integration (producing the supplied product instead of purchasing it) exists, purchasing firms are seen as having less power in the bargaining process.

Bargaining Power of Buyers

As one might imagine, the bargaining power of buyers is, in many ways, the reverse side of the supplier transaction. Low switching costs for the buyers enhances buyer power. Also, if buyers can make the product or service themselves at a low cost, their power in transaction negotiations is strengthened.

In addition to these factors, some other influences also come into play. If, for example, a buyer purchases a large percentage of one's output, that buyer is likely to receive quantity discounts and preferential treatment. It is always difficult to return to the head office and announce that you just lost the McDonald's account. Also, a market that has relatively few buyers tends to favor buyers as alternatives for lost accounts are more difficult to find.

Substitute Products

Three major factors seem to dictate the competitive strength of substitute products. First, how close of a match is the substitute in terms of quality and performance to the product or service produced by an industry. Athletic footwear may provide an adequate substitute for casual footwear in many cases but trying to find a good substitute for kidney dialysis may prove more difficult.

Further, substitutes that meet or beat a product on price are, ceteris paribus, more attractive than substitutes that represent a significant price differential. Also, low switching costs tend to make substitutes a more competitive force than substitute products that impose significant switching costs.

Rivalry Among Competing Firms

Porter indicated that the force with the greatest impact on industry profitability was the intensity of rivalry among competing firms (1980). Industries with intense rivalry tend to be less profitable while those with lesser rivalry experience higher profits.

Several factors influence the level of rivalry within an industry. Industries facing a decrease or a slow down in demand tend to experience greater levels of competition as do industries with low switching costs. Similarly, rivalry is stronger when exit barriers are high or when strong companies outside of the industry acquire weak firms within the industry. Additionally, certain industries such as those with high fixed costs may tempt competitors to use price cuts to increase sales. Such moves also increase the intensity of rivalry. Finally, industries composed of larger numbers of competitors with similar capabilities create a focus on the execution of similar strategies which also leads to heated rivalry and pushes margins lower.

Having established Porter's model, the remainder of this paper examines the applicability of this model to the infrequently studied context of indigenous tourism businesses in and around conservation zones in developing country. This is done by examining a specific case study of the Damara people who live within the boundaries of the Tsiseb Conservancy in Namibia. Specifically, it examines the case of indigenous tourism businesses within and around the Conservancy.

Tsiseb Conservancy Context

In the 1970s and 1980s, primarily white commercial farmers in Namibia were benefiting from tourists and hunters visiting their private lands. In 1996, Namibia's majority black population pushed the government to pass a law allowing for publicly managed conservancies that would be run by local communities. Because of government support for conservancies, Namibia has become a model for promoting community-based natural resources management.

The Tsiseb Conservancy was established in 2001. Prior to its establishment as a conservancy area, the region had housed a successful tin mine in the township of Uis. The miners came not only from the local area but also from other parts of Namibia. As world tin prices declined over the years, the owners closed the mine leaving the area economically destitute. Many workers left the Tsiseb area to look for work while others from the region returned to a more subsistence style of living.

The 2,000 people who live in the Tsiseb Conservancy share their home with significant populations of desert elephants, black rhino, leopard, cheetah, mountain zebra, kudu, oryx, ostrich, springbok, steenbok, jackal, and klipspringer. The area also features the famous Branberg Mountain as well as the White Lady rock paintings site. The Conservancy is managed by a committee of sixteen members and an executive committee of six people. A manager, two technical assistants, ten game guards, an office clerk, and a cleaner are employed. The Conservancy is located some 200 kilometers from Namibia's capital city of Windhoek and is on a popular route to Namibia's primary tourist attraction, Etosha National Park.

In 2001, with the help of the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and other support agencies, the manager set about to meet the dual goals of the Conservancy – protecting the natural resources while helping Conservancy members attain a higher standard of living. With initial funding coming from national and international organizations, he was able to establish a basic office staff as well as hire game guards to protect the wildlife of the Conservancy. Under the watchful care of these capable employees, animal populations in the area began to grow, drawing more tourists to the area.

With the conservation infrastructure in place, the manager was able to spend more of his time promoting better livelihoods within the Conservancy by supporting locally owned businesses as well as founding ventures in which the Conservancy holds an equity stake. Among those enterprises with a direct tie to the Conservancy are an information center, the Daureb Mountain Guides, trophy hunting, own-use hunting, and the White Lady Lodge and campsite.

The information center consists of a building in the main town of Uis that hosts the administrative offices of the Tsiseb Conservancy. The center was built with a grant from the European Union with the Conservancy taking out a loan for the purchase of the land. In addition to administrative offices, the center is host to a coffee shop, the Daureb Craft Center, and internet café, and the booking office of the Daureb Mountain Guides. In total, these businesses provide employment for eight individuals as well as paying rent to the Conservancy.

In addition to revenues from the information center, the Conservancy garners significant earnings from trophy hunting. With the growth of animal populations within its 8,083 square kilometers, hunting animals such as springbok and ostrich for food has again become possible without putting in danger conservation goals. In 2004, hunting generated revenues of 133,000

Namibian dollars ($22,000 US dollars) for the Conservancy. In addition, wages were paid to trained Conservancy members who were paid to serve as trackers, skinners, and camp managers. Kills in 2004 included 600 springbok, 40 ostriches, and 40 oryx.

Perhaps the Conservancy's most profitable venture to date is the joint venture with a white Namibian business man. In 2000, this entrepreneur and the Tsiseb Conservancy entered negotiations for the takeover of an existing campsite and the exclusive right to build and operate a tourism lodge at the base of the Branberg Mountain. An agreement was reached stipulating that the entrepreneur would pay the Conservancy 250,000 Namibian dollars (roughly $42,000 US dollars) per year for the rights to operate the only lodge in the Conservancy and the existing Ugab Campground (associated with that lodge for a period of 20 years). Beyond a certain revenue level (unreached as of 2005), additional royalty payments would be made to the Conservancy. Additionally, the owner would be obligated to hire local workers. At the end of the lease, the lodge and campground including all buildings and equipment would be turned over to the Conservancy.

While there was some initial opposition to this agreement by some of the Conservancy' s partners, the deal was signed in 2000. With the agreement in place, the owner began construction in 2002. In 2004, the lodge, chalets, fixed-tent campsites, and other campsites began operations.

While construction of new units continues, the White Lady Lodge currently boasts 23 chalets. Each chalet has either two or three beds as well as a bathroom with a shower. During the high season, May to October, these rooms rent for 950 Namibian dollars double occupancy and 550 Namibian dollars single occupancy. The price includes both breakfast and dinner. During the low season a room may be had for as low as 400 Namibian dollars including breakfast for a double.

While the chalets provide the most luxurious accommodations, there are also six fixed-tent campsites. Each tent sits on a cement slab and includes bathing and toilet facilities. Finally, the Ugab Campground has multiple campsites which can accommodate up to 200 people at a time. Campsites cost 200 Namibian dollars per night but do not include meals.

In addition to the sleeping accommodations, the lodge features several other income generating ventures. Primary among these is a first class restaurant where meals featuring domestic and wild meats are provided. Adjacent to the restaurant is a well stocked-bar providing alcoholic beverages including various Namibian beers as well as non-alcoholic drinks. There also exists a kiosk that operates during the busy camping season selling drinks, food, and other camping supplies. Beyond food, beverage, and lodging, The White Lady Lodge operates guided game drives and other tours to see the local attractions including the Petrified Forest, Organ Pipes, and Brandberg Mountain.

In addition to the economic activities undertaken under the direction of the Conservancy management, private individuals also own and operate a variety of small enterprises in the town of Uis. These include two bed and breakfast operations, a grocery store, a restaurant, one gas station and garage, and numerous residents trying to sell souvenirs (mostly semiprecious stones) to tourists. Additional private businesses operate in other populated areas but are mostly along the lines of very small general stores and souvenir shops.

Tourism

Tourism is a unique industry in that the place is the product. Competition and competitive strategy necessarily takes place at two levels. The Tsiseb Conservancy District competes for tourists with other destinations within Namibia and throughout sub-Saharan Africa. At a macro level, even destinations in Asia, Australia, and in North and South America compete for the same adventure-seeking tourist. Individual firms operate independently and in competition with one another within each competing destination. On the one hand, all firms recognize that the destination must compete successfully for the industry to thrive at the local level, thereby encouraging cooperation and collaboration among them. On the other hand, firms compete with one another to capture the tourist revenues that are successfully attracted to the destination. Firms operating within tourism destinations are at once collaborative and competitive (Buhalis, 2000).

This is illustrated by the tourism purchase process model in which the tourist makes vacation decisions in an ever more specific sequence of: first deciding to take a vacation, to deciding on a destination type, to deciding on a specific destination, to deciding on transportation and accommodation obligations, to choosing on-site entertainment and souvenirs, etc. (Jeng, 1997).

This dual-level, competitive structure that is so fundamental to the tourism industry creates a greater level of strategic collaboration than can be found in most other industries. Collaboration in tourism destination management is a necessity for competitive survival (Bennett,1999). Back in the 1980s Teye (1988) noted the need for greater regional cooperation in enhancing the competitiveness of African tourism destinations.

Applying the Porter Model to the Tsiseb Conservancy Context

With this background, we can begin to explore the usefulness of the Porter model in understanding business opportunities and strategies within this context. By considering each force within the model a clearer picture of its applicability is formed.

Threat of New Entrants

While the threat of new entrants varies by the type of business pursued, several generic observations can be made about tourism business in the Tsiseb Conservancy. First, building and managing tourist lodges such as the White Lady Lodge is beyond the financial capabilities of Conservancy residents. Even small bed and breakfast operations are not possible for people who earn roughly $100 per month in well-paid employment. An additional barrier to entry for such business is the fact that the Conservancy controls the land outside of Uis and is, by charter, to use that land for conservation purposes as well as the economic development of local, indigenous peoples. Similarly, the Conservancy controls all hunting within its boundaries, establishing a government-backed monopoly in this highly profitable sector. These should lead to higher than normal returns for companies who are successful in entering the lodging/safari part of the tourism industry.

In other sectors, the threat of new entrants is significantly higher. In the souvenir and stone selling business, for example, barriers to entry are practically zero. Start up costs are very low (stones can be found for free and crafts made from low cost materials). Brand loyalty in such industries is almost non-existent as most tourists are unlikely to return to the area frequently. Distribution channels are a bit trickier. The White Lady Lodge, for example, largely controls the sale of souvenirs to its guests but there currently exists room for additional suppliers. The same might be said of other potential businesses which would seek to provide entertainment to Lodge guests through evening shows, cultural presentations, game drives/hikes, etc…

Overall, entry into the accommodation portion of the market is difficult outside of Uis due to government regulation but relatively easy inside of Uis for those with the minimal capital required. On the other hand, indigenous entrepreneurs are likely to be excluded from both markets due to the relatively high start up costs. Indigenous entrepreneurs can more easily enter the souvenir and entertainment markets if they can manage distribution channels. These channels center on the White Lady Lodge and the two bed and breakfast establishments for cultural shows and animal viewing as well as the Conservancy management for hunting and archeological tours.

At the destination level, new entrants would consist of other conservation areas in Africa as well as nature and wildlife preserves around the world. All would have similar access to government and NGO funding. Barriers to entry for public-sector organizations are comparatively low. In addition, tourism destinations follow a fashion-like life cycle (Butler, 1980) that encourages new entrants to take the place of destinations that are in a stage of decline. The tourism landscape is littered with destinations that once were fashionable but have been supplanted in the affections of travelers by trendier locales. This is no less true of “Eco-tourism” destinations like the Tsiseb Conservancy District than it is for mass tourism resort destinations (Butler, 1990).

In many respects the purpose of the Conservancy District is to regulate and limit the threat of new entrants for existing or favored indigenous firms operating within the District. On the other hand, the Conservancy District itself is exposed to significant threat from new entrants to the conservation / wildlife destination market.

It appears that a study of new entrants provides keen insights to both policy makers and business people in this context.

Bargaining Power of Suppliers

In most tourism related activities within the Conservancy, indigenous peoples are unlikely to rely on suppliers as the activities are largely service oriented. An indigenous entrepreneur seeking to provide a cultural show at the White Lady Lodge would depend mostly on local labor for the show. As such ventures would likely be established as cooperative ventures, the issue of labor supply would be a non-issue. In an alternative formulation of the same activity, an owner might hire local labor for the show. Given high unemployment rates in the area the suppliers of labor would certainly be in a weak negotiating position unless the person had significant hard to replicate skills in dancing, singing, or story telling.

In the case of souvenirs, supplies include such things as cloth, sticks, and semiprecious stones which can largely be found for free in nature or bought from a number of different sellers.

The one case in which suppliers may have some power is in foodstuffs. Given the somewhat remote location of the Conservancy and its small population, there are only a few suppliers of foodstuffs to the restaurants and lodges. As a result food costs are higher than they would be in more populated areas such as the capital, Windhoek.

Overall, studying the bargaining power of suppliers yields limited insights into the strategic operations on indigenous businesses in this context due to the service nature of these businesses.

Bargaining Power of Buyers

Tourists travel independently or in organized tour groups. Individual travelers have low bargaining power because they each buy very little of a given lodge's service. Tour groups on the other hand have significant bargaining power and in non-traditional "eco-tourism" destinations like the Tsiseb Conservancy District they often account for 60-80% of the business (Higgins, 1996). Tour companies generally control the tourist and can add or delete a destination from their itineraries at will. Switching costs are therefore low though local alternatives are limited, and there are few good substitutes for a night's sleep in a bed.

Within the other sectors of the tourism industry, individual buyers may be more powerful. Given the larger number or potential number of suppliers of souvenirs, there are few buyers each day for any entrepreneur. As a result, these buyers have great power to haggle over price and demand discounts. This would not be true of cultural shows, game drives, archeological tours, and hunting where monopoly positions have been or are likely to be established.

Studying buyer power suggests several potential strategies for enhanced business success in the Tsiseb Conservancy. These might include promotional strategies as well as collusive strategies meant to increase the price of souvenirs and maintain lodging prices at an acceptable level.

Substitute Products

The power of substitute products again varies by the sector of the tourism industry under investigation. There are very few good substitutes for a comfortable bed for a tired tourist.

While camping is a possibility, many tourists to Namibia do not come prepared to camp. Additionally camping concessions within the Tsiseb Conservancy are limited by the Conservancy management. Further, the aggressive nature of the desert elephants that roam through the Conservancy as well as the presence of leopards and other animals make camping a less attractive alternative for most tourists. As a result, the power of substitutes is a weak force in the accommodation sector.

The souvenir sector of the tourism industry presents a very different picture. Many tourists enjoy taking home a souvenir from an exotic location such as Namibia. On the other hand, for many tourists photographs may fulfill a similar need to have some kind of tangible record of their visit to the Tsiseb Conservancy. Further, wood carvings from Etosha National Park, Windhoek, Kenya, or even Dubai's Global Village may provide a good substitute for a souvenir bought in the Tsiseb Conservancy. For souvenirs then, substitutes are probably a strong force.

Finally, substitutes for hunting, game drives, cultural shows, and archeological tours probably have few good substitutes within the Conservancy. Each of these activities fulfills a need of occupying tourists' leisure time with entertainment. The reality for most guests to the Conservancy is that beyond these activities there is not much entertainment to be had. There are no malls, no movie theaters, no opera house, no sporting events, and no bowling alley. The most important substitute is the isolated beauty of nature. Additionally, tourists can engage in self-drive game tours though with limited accessibility to off-road locations. As a result, most visitors to the area are very much willing to purchase tours to the White Lady and other tours tied to the natural and cultural resources of the area.

Again, a study of substitutes yields important information for those seeking to increase livelihoods among the people of the Tsiseb Conservancy. It suggests the need for additional leisure activities such as cultural shows and the need to differentiate the local souvenir trade.

Rivalry Among Competing Firms

Rivalry within the accommodation sector has the potential to be high due to the high fixed component of this industry. Balancing this effect, however, is the growth trend in tourists visiting the Tsiseb Conservancy due to changes in tour itineraries in Namibia. Additionally, strategy differentiation between the two Uis competitors and the White Lady Lodge diminishes rivalry. Particularly during the high season, then, rivalry among competing firms is low. That rivalry does heat up during the off season with heavy discounts being offered.

Given the monopoly position granted to the Conservancy in tours, rivalry is also weak in this part of the tourism industry. While game drives could feasibly be provided by a variety of suppliers that has not happened to date. Additionally, two groups are currently planning to provide cultural entertainment suggesting this is an area in which rivalry might heat up. To date, however, there is very little rivalry in the area of tours.

By contrast, rivalry in the area of souvenirs is extreme. Given the low cost of entry, souvenir sellers gather around every customer exiting the restaurant or gas station with offers of discounted merchandise. Negotiation on price is the rule as most competitors follow a similar strategy. Non-indigenous vendors typically display their souvenirs in the restaurant or lodges providing a less stressful opportunity for tourists to buy carvings, dolls, stones, and so forth. Overall, however, the level of rivalry in souvenirs is very high.

As mentioned previously, rivalry between competing destinations is relatively intense as many undeveloped rural areas develop similar public-sector organizations to draw income to indigenous groups.

While Porter's model may provide important insight into the operation of indigenous tourism businesses in the Tsiseb Conservancy, the role of government in granting monopolies or oligopolies plays a key role in any industry analysis. This factor would seem to necessitate greater attention as one shifts attention to the conservation area context.

Conclusions

An investigation of the Tsiseb Conservancy case indicates that traditional business strategy models are of mixed importance to this alternative context. The core competency model put forth by Prahalad and Hamel (1990) provides limited value in analyzing potential business moves due to the small size of the indigenous business opportunities available. While one could make the argument that “nativeness” provides indigenous entrepreneurs with a competitive advantage in providing cultural shows, archeology tours, crafts, and game drives. Unfortunately, the status of being native is one that is easily replicated by other residents of the Conservancy and does not, therefore, constitute a core competency.

Porter’s Five Forces model (1979), on the other hand holds out greater promise with some caveats. We found that four out of Porter’s five forces are directly applicable to a study of indigenous tourism business activities within the Tsiseb Conservancies. Only the bargaining power of supplies seems to hold limited value. Additionally, however, the role of the Conservancy management in limiting competition would probably be underemphasized when using Porter’s model. While capturing this effect under the categories of *threat of new entrants* and *rivalry* may be somewhat effective, the importance of this factor suggests a minor reformulation of the model to highlight the government’s role as found in Appendix II.

While a single case study cannot provide a definitive answer to the research question of this study, it does provide some insights for the applicability of strategic models within an alternative context. The next step in this research agenda is to refine this initial hypothesized model through an exploration of other developing country conservation zones. In so doing, it is expected that the authors will be able to refine the model as well as articulate how that model might be used by indigenous entrepreneurs as well as conservation area decision makers.

Bennett, O. 1999. “Destination Marketing Into the Next Century,” *Journal of Vacation Marketing*, v. 6, no. 1, pp. 48-54.

Brewton, Charles. 1987. “A Model for Analyzing the Lodging Industry,” *Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly*, v. 28, no.2, pp. 10-12.

Buhalis, D. 2000. “Marketing the Competitive Destination of the Future,” *Tourism Management*, v. 21, no. 1, pp. 97-116.

Butler, R.W. 1980. “The Concept of a Tourist Area Life Cycle of Evolution: Implications for Managers of Resources,” *Canadian Geographer*, v. 24, no. 1, pp. 5-12.

Butler, R.W. 1990. “Alternative Tourism: Pious Hope or Trojan Horse,” *Journal of Travel Research*, v. 28, pp. 40-45.

Chow, Irene, Neil Holbert, Lane Kelley, and Julie Yu. 1997. *Business Strategy: An Asia-Pacific Focus*. Singapore: Prentice Hall, chapter 2.

Duke, Robert. 1992. “Structural Changes in the UK Grocery Retail Market,” *British Food Journal*, v. 94, no.2, pp. 18-23.

Gulli, Hege. 1998. *Microfinance and Poverty: Questioning the Conventional Wisdom*. Washington DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

Haynes, C. Beth, Kristie K. Seawright, and William C. Giauque. 2000. “Moving Microenterprises Beyond a Subsistence Plateau,” *Journal of Microfinance*, v. 2, no. 2, pp. 135-152.

Higgins, B. 1996. “The Global Structure of the Nature Tourism Industry: Ecotourists, Tour Operators, and Local Businesses,” *Journal of Travel Research*, v. 35, no. 2, pp. 11-18.

Jeng, J. 1997. “Facets of the Complex Trip Decision Making Process,” *28th Annual Travel and Tourism Research Assoc. Annual Conference Proceedings*. Norfolk, VA

Otero, M., and E. Rhyne. 1994. *The New World of Microenterprise Finance: Building Healthy Financial Institutions for the Poor*. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.

Porter, Michael E. 1980. *Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors*. New York: Free Press, chapter 1.

Porter, Michael E. 1979. "How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy," H*arvard Business Review* 57, no. 2, pp. 137-45.

Prahalad, C. K., and Gary Hamel. 1990. "The Core Competence of the Corporation," *Harvard Business Review*, v. 68, no. 3, pp. 79-93.

Sanchez, S. M. 1998. *The Participation of Mexican Microenterprises in Credit Markets: Gender Differences*. Working paper. Washington DC: World Bank.

Teye, V.B. 1998. "Prospects for Regional Tourism Cooperation in Africa," *Tourism Mangement*, v. 9, no. 3, pp. 221-234.

Thompson, Arthur A. and A. J. Strickland III. 1998. *Strategic Management: Concept and Cases*, 10th ed., Boston: Irwin McGraw Hill, chapters 2 and 9.

Wolfe, Brian S. and David Asch. 1992. "Retailers Squeeze Electric Appliance Manufacturers," *Long Range Planning*, v. 25, n.6, pp. 102-109.

Appendix I
Porter's Five Forces Model (1979)



Appendix II
Revised Competitive Forces Model for Indigenous Tourism Businesses in Developing Country Conservation Zones