**“And Her Heart Fluttered”:
The Psychopathology of Desire in the *Argonautika***

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Frontispiece: Medea contemplating the death of her children, from the House of the Dioscuri: Pompeii, Museo Archeologico Nazionale, Naples. Gurd (1974), fig. 2.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the way that Apollonios constructs Medea's psyche and body in response to contemporary medical and philosophical influences in order to portray realistically the way that *erōs* manifests itself in Medea as both sickness and mental illness. Apollonios delves into Medea's psyche and exposes how it functions in moments of intense desire, pain, indecision and introspection while under the powerful sways of *erōs*. Medea's *erōs* manifests as erratic and dangerous behaviour and crippling indecision, the analysis of which is done in light of Chrusippos' discussion of Euripides' Medea's *akrasia*. Apollonios draws from Euripides' version to depict Medea in a different stage of her life, making a similar life-altering decision: whether or not to help Jason and betray her family or stay at home and watch him die. Apollonios makes the audience sympathize with Medea by showing her as a victim of destructive *erōs* and by exhibiting her emotional suffering. He heightens the degree that the internal is depicted and the very fact that he *does* internalize Medea shows an interest in *her* side of the story. It humanizes her to see her motivations, her fears, her desires and her moral dilemmas. Apollonios twists the image of Medea that an audience may expect to see by focusing, in Book 3 at least, almost entirely on her maidenhood and her struggle between exercising maidenly shame and giving in to the temptation of Jason. Apollonios makes the audience understand and sympathize with Medea by delving into the workings of her psyche and explaining her pleasure and pain, and most importantly, explaining *why* she cannot act rationally. *erōs* also manifests itself inside Medea and in turn this is expressed in Medea's outward appearance as medical symptoms, like those of fever. In addition, by incorporating contemporary medical discoveries like the nervous system Apollonios is able to utilize the new conceptions of sense-perception to realistically show the way that destructive emotions manifest themselves as perceivable physical pain. Apollonios draws on philosophical and medical influences to heighten the realism of Medea's physical and psychological pain and pleasure while simultaneously providing a forceful warning of the destructiveness of *erōs*' nature.

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INTRODUCTION

In this thesis, I look at the way that Apollonios constructs Medea's psyche and body in response to contemporary medical and philosophical influences in order to portray realistically the way that *erōs* manifests itself in Medea as both sickness and mental illness.¹ Apollonios does this to heighten the realism of Medea's physical and psychological pain and pleasure while simultaneously providing a forceful warning of the destructiveness of *erōs*' nature. Apollonios delves into Medea's psyche and exposes how it functions in moments of intense desire, pain, indecision and introspection. It is these moments, when time stands still and Apollonios gives his audience a snapshot of *how erōs* is manifesting inside Medea and what the effects of this are, that are of interest to this thesis. Apollonios successfully creates these moments of realism through drawing on and adapting medical and philosophical texts in his descriptions. This symbiosis of medicine and poetry creates astounding realism and he provides psychologically and physically real models of anguish that are universally relatable to both an ancient and modern audience. In Book 3 of the *Argonautika* the topic of desire saturates the plot and even though the extent to which Apollonios discusses *erōs* and used medical and philosophical terminology is unprecedented, his antecedents are important to consider as understanding them will allow the reader to better understand the scope of Apollonios' innovations.

Apollonios builds his Medea on the foundations that other authors have already laid and to view the *Argonautika* in the light of them, highlights the innovations he makes. The invocation to Eratō at the start of Book 3 signifies a change in focus towards the topic of erotic love. In the Hellenistic Period, the muses which in the Classical period granted the poet a direct vision to help actualize the myth in his production were now embodied in the numerous scrolls (including philosophic and medical) housed in the library of Alexandria to which Apollonios had unprecedented access.² So, Apollonios' muses are the countless works available to him and it is through the utilization of them that he constructs his own vision of love. Apollonios'

¹ In this thesis, my preferred translation for *psukhē* is 'mind' or 'psyche' rather than 'soul' because in the Hellenistic Period psyche performed mental functions. In doing this I follow Graver (2007) 23: 'the Greek word psyche refers in physical terms to the entire stretch of *pneuma* present in a human, it is commonly used in a more restricted way - to refer to that centralized portion of *pneuma* which is responsible for what we would call the psychological functions'. In my transliteration of Greek to English I try to represent the Greek truthfully, however on occasion convention prevails.

² González (2000) 284.

innovations are best viewed in light of these earlier treatments of *erōs* from which he gained inspiration. Firstly, the archaic poets understood the emotional and physical hold that desire can have on a person, and it is in their works where we see the mixed nature of *Erōs*' power.³ Sappho herself coined the oxymoron *pikros-glukos* 'bitter-sweet' to describe the dichotomy that *erōs* embodies. On the one hand it is irresistible, and the gratification of it feels great, but on the other hand, *erōs* is painful and destructive and the lasting effects deadly. Sappho also used vocabulary with a medical flavour to bring a heightened realism to her moments of love-frustrated pain (fr. 1). Apollonios heightens this *pikros-glukos* dichotomy by describing in great detail Medea's painful and pleasurable sensations realistically according to contemporary models. In addition, he places an emphasis on the psychological pain that *Erōs*, as the child of Aphrodite and Ares, causes, as he incites both desire and strife – two very destructive things.⁴ In tragedy, the depiction of *pathē* (passions) only becomes more negative and depictions like Euripides' *Medea* provide powerful warnings to society about the dangers of *pathē*, especially in women. Philosophically, *erōs* as a *pathos* comes to inhibit rationality and even decision-making. In advancing the theories of Plato and Aristotle, in the Hellenistic Period the Stoics, the largest and most influential school of the period,⁵ were the most strongly adverse to the passions (desire and anger being the primary two) and believed that they ultimately caused strife in one's personal life. Apollonios too, in his descriptions of desire in the *Argonautika* makes strife a consequence of people acting irrationally upon their desires. Apollonios' work seems the culmination of the evolution of *erōs* in literature as well as the evolution of *erōs* in philosophy and medicine and thus represents a unique Alexandrian perspective. His depiction of *erōs* is truly unique in comparison to previous productions through the interior focalization and realism that he creates in portraying Medea's *pathos* as it affects her psyche and body. Through exposing the terrifying effects of this he vilifies his *oulos erōs* (destructive desire) to the extreme.

Apollonios introduces *Erōs* in his anthropomorphic god-form to show him to be desirous, malicious and power-hungry. *Erōs*' role as god is to represent the destructive nature of *erōs* in the cosmos and this destructive nature, which is then transferred into

³ For example, Anacreon's *Erōs* steps over heads and hits someone with a ball (fr. 358); Calame (1999) 15; Cyrino (1996) 371.

⁴ cf. 4.1165-7: 'Never do we tribes of suffering mortals tread with whole foot upon the path of delight; there is always some bitter grief to accompany our joys.' Hunter (1993) 106; Zanker (2004) 19.

⁵ Long (1974) 107.

Medea's heart, takes up residence to manifest as the cause of Medea's erratic behaviour and bodily sickness. He is first introduced at 3.114ff after Aphrodite, at the appeal of Hera and Athena, supplicates him to bewitch Medea to make her fall in love with Jason.⁶ He is called mad (μάργος) and rejoices in his ill-gotten victory over Ganymede (3.119-20).⁷ His madness, greed, impudence and shamelessness (3.93) are transferred to Medea.⁸ Aphrodite is able to persuade Erōs to shoot Medea with his bolt of love through bribery, offering him the golden ball⁹ which Zeus was given when he was a child. It is through the description of this ball that Erōs' cosmic significance is revealed (3.129-144). For the ball is constructed along the lines of the astronomer Aratus' (c. 315-240 BC) cosmic sphere,¹⁰ and as such it represents the universe and the mortal realm. The fact that the universe is a coveted toy (μείλιον) for the malevolent boy is a frightful image indeed. This ball was Zeus' plaything as a child, and in visual arts when Zeus is depicted with a ball it symbolizes his power over the universe.¹¹ Accordingly, Erōs' association with the ball here, transfers to him some kind of cosmic role. To find Erōs in a cosmic role we must go to Empedocles (a poet-philosopher 490-430 BC).¹² Apollonios draws on Empedocles' model of the cosmos and the relationship that exists in it between the cosmic forces of love (φιλότης) and strife (νεῖκος) and appropriates the qualities of *philotēs* to his *erōs*.¹³ Interestingly, Apollonios presents an Empedoclean cosmos through the lens of Aristotle's criticisms: Aristotle amends Empedocles' theory, and states that *instead of* under the forces of increasing *neikos* in

⁶ Aphrodite touches her son's jaw which is both a natural motherly gesture and a gesture of supplication (Arg 3.128). See Vergil's parallel scene where he calls Aphrodite a *supplex* (Aen 1.666); Hunter (1989) 111.

⁷ cf. Alcman 58.

⁸ Calame (1999) 15.

⁹ For Erōs playing with a ball see Anacreon 5; for later passage see Meleager, AP 5.214. Erōs and Cupid are also represented playing with a ball in art, where the ball symbolises their universal power (cf. LIMC III 1.914, 987; Eur, *Hipp* 126-81); Hunter (1989) 113.

¹⁰ Globes were a common apparatus in the ancient world associated with astronomers, and these became so common that the authors of the introductions of didactic astronomical works assumed that their reader had one at hand. Apollonios clearly draws on Aratus' work, and the verbal echoes of the two passages are poignant. See Pendergraft (1991) 97-100 and Hunter (1989) 114.

¹¹ This ball was given to Zeus by his nurse Adrasteia who represents the inevitability of fate which her name also denotes. This is transferred to *erōs*, in the form of the inevitability of his presence in people's lives; Pendergraft (1991) 96. Kyriakou says that the ball/cosmos symbolizes the complete surrender of the cosmic elements to *philotēs* and by means of the sympathy between cosmic and human level. It also foreshadows that Medea will eventually surrender to the love it causes; Kyriakou (1994) 316.

¹² Erōs also has a cosmic role in Orphic writings and rites and his cosmic role evokes the Φιλότης in the cosmos of Empedocles and Lucretius' Venus, which emphasise the role of love as a guiding force in the universe, and its importance as a force of attraction, fertility and life; Pendergraft (1991) 101. It is this image which Apollonios so greatly disturbs.

¹³ The 'cosmogony-theogony' that Orpheus sings in Book 1 before the expedition takes off (1.498-511) resembles the cosmos of Empedocles. In this song, out of *philotēs* which encompasses everything comes a νεῖκος ὁλοόν (destructive strife) (1.498); Kyriakou (1994) 309.

the cosmos, it is under the forces of increasing *philotēs* in the cosmos that destructive things on earth happen.¹⁴ One of the consequences of this *philotēs* is the generational violence which it engenders. This generational violence is confirmed in Book 4, when Medea helps to kill her brother Absurtos in order to escape with Jason safely.¹⁵ Apollonios addresses Erōs:

Σχέτλι' Ἔρωσ, μέγα πῆμα, μέγα στύγος ἀνθρώποισιν,
ἐκ σέθεν οὐλόμεναί τ' ἔριδες στοναχαί τε γόοι τε,
ἄλγεά τ' ἄλλ' ἐπὶ τοῖσιν ἀπείρονα τετρήχασιν·
δυσμενέων ἐπὶ παισὶ κορύσσειο δαῖμον ἀερθεῖς
οἷος Μηδείῃ στυγερὴν φρεσὶν ἔμβαλες ἄτην. (4.445-49)

*Wretched Erōs, great curse, greatly hated by men,
from you came deadly strifes and grieving and troubles,
and countless other pains you swirl up on top of these.
Rear up, daimōn, against the children of my enemies
just as you did when you threw hateful ate into Medea's mind.*¹⁶

Here Apollonios blames Erōs for Absurtos' death more so even than he blames Medea and Jason.¹⁷ Such an emotional outburst from a narrator is uncharacteristic of Apollonios and is representative of his own feelings about Erōs.¹⁸ Here, the narrator, recognizing the overwhelmingly destructive power of Erōs, reflects Jason and Medea's interest in self-preservation which they exercise in sacrificing Absurtos, and tries to deflect the forces of Erōs onto others.¹⁹ In doing this he shows the universality and inevitability of *pathē*. The author's reprimand of *erōs* is reminiscent of a Stoic's desire to be *apathēs* (without passions) because *pathē* lead us away from virtue and are thus dangerous to both individuals and to society. In fact, Apollonios' address to Erōs is rewritten from Aratus' *Phaenomena*. *Phaenomena* 15 calls Zeus a 'great wonder, a great advantage to humanity' (Χαῖρε, πάτερ, μέγα θαῦμα, μέγ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὄνειαρ) and

¹⁴ *De Caelo* 280a11ff; Kyriakou (1994) 310.

¹⁵ Another consequence of the dominance of *philotēs* in the cosmos according to Empedocles is the birth of monstrous, disfigured human-animal creatures (fr. 52, 140). In Book 4 Kirke does not turn her lovers into pigs or lions or wolves, as in Homer (*Od* 10. 212-213, 238), but into monsters, born from primeval slime, that combine both human and animal features (4.672ff); Kyriakou (1994) 309.

¹⁶ All translations of the *Argonautika* are mine, unless stated otherwise. The edition I am using is *Apollonios of Rhodes: Argonautika Book III*, Hunter (ed. & comm.) (1989). cf. 4.1165 which is another example of the ambiguity of *erōs* in the Hellenistic Period; Zanker (2004) 19. cf. Jason refused to let Atalanta join the voyage because he is aware of the dangers of love (1.769-73).

¹⁷ Dyck (1989) 461.

¹⁸ Hunter (1993) 117.

¹⁹ In addition it is an *apopompē* which is a prayer that an ill-doing spirit will do harm to someone else instead of oneself; Byre (1996) 10-11.

Apollonios reworks this for his very negative admonition of Erōs²⁰ to contrast the order and stability that Zeus brings to the cosmos directly with the strife and discord that Erōs brings. Erōs, as an anthropomorphic symbol of the *pathos* desire, uses the subduing force of this emotion over humankind and manifests as psychological and physical pain in people and ultimately the dissolution of the values of society. Apollonios' Erōs deserves no veneration; he is destructive, delights in the suffering of others and covets the ball/cosmos to be merely his plaything. The lives of the people who inhabit it are meaningless and subject to his every whim. *Pathē* permeate life and harm it on both the cosmic and the biological plane. As a consequence of *philotēs* Medea is transformed from a happy, pious girl and obedient daughter into a cold-blooded murderess of her brother, and later (as is known to the audience because of the mythic tradition) her own children.²¹ The tragedy of Medea's mythic tradition allows Apollonios to foreshadow the longevity of the destructiveness of giving way to *pathē*. Medea acts this way because *erōs* has manifested itself in her and it has altered and affected her psychic make-up so much that she acts passionately and temperamentally. *erōs* as *pathos* pushes people and drives them beyond their limits, destroying the normal bounds of friendship and family.²²

It is under this negative light which Apollonios creates, that we must view love, lust and desire in the *Argonautika*. Apollonios presents the effects of desire by making the anthropomorphised, cosmic Erōs manifest in Medea as the *pathos* which exhibits itself as impassioned irrational behaviour and physical sickness. This thesis analyses these effects and the cause that Apollonios presents for their manifestation. Apollonios uses Erōs' attack on Medea to facilitate the entrance of Erōs to the biological plane in order that he may proceed with his investigation into Medea's nosology. The transformation of Cupid to gadfly and then to archer, whose arrow penetrates the skin, is the means by which Erōs manifests in Medea as physical and mental illness.²³ Erōs, in acting like a

²⁰ Mori (2005) 227.

²¹ Kyriakou (1994) 315.

²² Mori (2000) 77. Apollonios provides his audience with just such an example in the Lemnians' society, as the very fabric of their moral and judicial systems are destroyed by the *erōs* that the goddess sends (1.609ff).

²³ Erōs manifests itself as disease and madness which the image of the gadfly implies. The application of the concept of a gadfly to Erōs can be seen as early as Simonides (fr. 541. 6-11) and the image remains popular in the Hellenistic period. cf. Euripides, *Hippolytus* 1298-1303; Plato, *Phaedrus* 240c6-240d4; Theocritus, *Syrinx* 13-20; Adaeus, *Anthologica Palatina* 7. 51. 1-3; Callimachus, *Hecale* fr. 301. The incorporation of Erōs as a winged figure also allows for Apollonios to effortlessly transition him into a winged gadfly and then into the physical manifestation of disease in Medea. The gadfly traditionally brings pestilence and madness to humans through its sting. The implication of the gadfly would have

gadfly takes on its associations of causing madness and fever. In this aetiological role in mental disease and sickness, Erōs acts as a daemonic force,²⁴ disrupting human life arbitrarily and unexpectedly and without any regard for human suffering. Apollonios is the only author to incorporate both the gadfly and the winged archer image in Erōs' description and the effect is piercing and results in an emphasis on the psychological instability, physical disease and hopelessness of the situation that Medea will find herself in:²⁵

Τόφρα δ' Ἔρωσ πολιοῖο δι' ἡέρος ἵξεν ἄφαντος,
 τετρηχώς, οἷόν τε νέαις ἐπὶ φορβάσιν οἷστρος
 τέλλεται, ὃν τε μύωπα βοῶν κλείουσι νομῆες.
 ὄκα δ' ὑπὸ φλιὴν προδόμῳ ἔνι τόξῳ τανύσσας
 ἰοδόκης ἀβλήτα πολύστονον ἐξέλετ' ἰόν.
 ἐκ δ' ὃ γε καρπαλίμοισι λαθὼν ποσὶν οὐδὸν ἄμειπεν
 ὀξέα δενδύλων· αὐτῷ δ' ὑπὸ βαιὸς ἐλυσθείς
 Αἰσονίδῃ, γλυφίδας μέσσηι ἐνικάτθετο νευρῇ,
 ἰθὺς δ' ἀμφοτέρησι διασχόμενος παλάμησιν
 ἦκ' ἐπὶ Μηδείῃ. τὴν δ' ἀμφασίῃ λάβε θυμόν·
 αὐτὸς δ' ὑπορόφοιο παλιμπετὲς ἐκ μεγάροιο
 καρχαλόων ἦξε· βέλος δ' ἐνεδαίετο κούρηι
 νέρθεν ὑπὸ κραδίῃ φλογὶ εἴκελον. ἀντία δ' αἰεὶ
 βάλλεν ἐπ' Αἰσονίδην ἀμαρύγματα, καὶ οἱ ἄηντο
 στηθέων ἐκ πυκινὰ καμάτωι φρένες, οὐδέ τιν' ἄλλην
 μῆστιν ἔχεν, γλυκερὴ δὲ κατεῖβετο θυμὸν ἀνίη·

been more than clear to an ancient audience as it brought pestilence and disease to ancient communities, and in literature it had clear links to the incitement of insanity; metaphorically, οἷστρος is a sting that drives people mad (*Il* 22.297-301). The gadfly attacks heifers in the springtime and its victims flee in a mad panic. Hera famously transformed Zeus' lover Io into a heifer and caused a gadfly to endlessly bother her, pursuing her relentlessly as she wandered helpless from land to land (Aeschylus, *Suppliants* 299-301, Ps.Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound* 577-582). The mention of the gadfly recalls Herakles and his erotic-driven anguish when Hylas is stolen by the nymph (1.1265-9). In the recollection of Herakles' experiences, the audience is prepared for a similar effect to happen in Medea. Apollonios reverses the gadfly image however, as here the gadfly stings the one who will become the lover, not the one who is the beloved, like Io; Matone (1999) 55. Erōs as gadfly not only brings sickness and insanity, but he incites dangerous and powerful desire in his victim, this makes him more dangerous. The victim will become the active pursuer of love. For a discussion on how Medea shows dominance in her pursuit of Jason through gestures see Ojennus (2006).

²⁴ On pottery *daimones* were depicted as attacking their victims from above or behind, usually winged. *Daimones* are associated with sudden and mysterious 'incursions of divinity into the observable order, especially those which bring about good or ill fortune': a *daimōn* is temperamental and potentially malevolent. In Archaic Greek culture the appearance of afflictions like disease, powerful emotions and erratic or negative mental states were thought to be because of some kind of divine intrusion, like a *daimōn*. This is because these phenomena were otherwise unexplainable (e.g., epileptic seizures were still thought in the Classical period to be a divine affliction; Hippocrates, *Morb. Sacr* 7. 17-18, 13). The early philosophers' contribution to the discussion slowly turned the interest into explaining disease in terms of natural internal causation (like the imbalance of internal fire, *pneuma*, and the humors) rather than because of divine interference; Holmes (2010) 46-53.

²⁵ Erōs appears as an archer in 5th century vase painting and in tragedy, e.g. Euripides, *Hippolytus* 530ff.

ὥς δὲ γυνὴ μαλερῶι περὶ κάρφεα χεύετο δαλῶι
χερνῆτις, τῇ περ ταλασῆια ἔργα μέμηλεν,
ὥς κεν ὑπωρόφιον νύκτωρ σέλας ἐντύναιτο,
ἄγχι μάλ' ἐζομένη· τὸδ' ἀθέσφατον ἐξὸλίγοιο
δαλοῦ ἀνεγρόμενον σὺν κάρφεα πάντ' ἀμαθύνει·
τοῖος ὑπὸ κραδίηι εἰλυμένος αἶθετο λάθρηι
οὔλος ἔρως· ἀπαλὰς δὲ μετετρωπᾶτο παρειάς
ἐς χλόον, ἄλλοτ' ἔρευθος, ἀκηδείηισι νόοιο. (3. 275-298)

*Meanwhile Erōs flew unseen through the bright air,
moving busily like the gadfly which attacks young heifers
and which herdsmen call 'myops'. He quickly arrived at the
foot of the doorpost to the chamber and having strung his bow,
he selected from his quiver a new grief bringing arrow.
From there, he swiftly crossed the threshold, unseen, peering
sharply around. He crouched down low by Jason, fitted
the arrow-notch to the bowstring, and stretching the bow far back in his
two hands, he shot straight at Medea. Speechlessness seized her psyche.
And Erōs, rejoicing with a mocking laugh, darted back out of the high-
roofed palace; but his arrow burned deep in the girl's heart
like a flame. Medea kept casting bright-glances sideways at Jason,
and her heart fluttered out of her chest in her love-sickness. She thought
of nothing else, and her heart flooded with sweet anguish.
As when a woman heaps up twigs around a raging brand,
a poor woman whose livelihood is spinning,
so that she can have light in her house at night,
crouches near the fire. A fierce flame conflagrates from a small one,
and the raging fire consumes all the kindling together.
Just like this destructive erōs crouched unseen, blazing in
Medea's heart. At one moment her cheeks drain pale, at another they
flush red, the control of her mind now gone.*

Apollonios uses the image of Erōs as archer to emphasise the asymmetry in the relationship between hunter and prey,²⁶ god and mortal,²⁷ *pathos* and victim, and to draw parallels with the Homeric world of martial action. Apollonios models much of Erōs' descent on Pandaros' passage in the *Iliad* (Il 4.116-26). He transfers martial language to the language of love because in Book 3 of the *Argonautika* it is *erōs*, not war which is the main theme. Erōs poses all the danger of a warrior, and the effects of love are just as painful as battlefield wounds. Love is strife and strife causes physical

²⁶ The arrow that threatens Menelaus is also likened to a fly, however the goddess swats it easily away and it poses none of the overwhelming power over its target that Erōs' arrow does. Medea is utterly helpless against the god's attack; she does not even see it coming.

²⁷ Pandarus too, is used as a pawn by the other gods; Lennox (1980) 65.

pain.²⁸ Apollonios uses the arrow as the physical object to complete the transformation on the narrative level from the ‘seen’ to the ‘felt’ in order to describe this pain and the feelings associated with it.²⁹ It is through the arrow’s penetration of the skin that *erōs* metaphorically transfers to Medea where it is seen through its physical effects, not its physical presence as archer. Apollonios draws on Homer for this idea as Apollo in Book 1 of the *Iliad* brings pestilence with his arrows. His presence is not known from the noise he makes or from his appearance before the camp, nor even by the arrows that he shoots, but by the disease that ensues.³⁰ At lines 16.792ff he uses his arrows once again, this time against Patroklos to stun him and make him vulnerable to the Trojan onslaught. Apollo’s attack does not draw blood, as an arrow is wont to do but results in an internal interruption. He penetrates the barrier between what Holmes calls the ‘seen’ and enters the realm of the ‘felt’. This passage is the earliest one to suggest that human beings have another barrier, different to the boundary of skin that can be transgressed.³¹ It became the job of later philosophers to understand exactly what this boundary was and how it worked. The arrow serves, both in Homer and in Apollonios, as a marker to demonstrate the line between the hidden god and the victim and also to track the relationship between the cause and effect.³²

In order for Apollonios to translate his action from the physical to the emotional plane *Erōs* must attack Medea silently, unseen and unexpectedly, like an archer.³³ *Erōs*, like an archer, approaches Medea secretly and unobserved (*λαθών*) which is the way that gods approach mortals.³⁴ However, this is not that way that immortals engage mortals, simply because of the asymmetry of the positioning; it is not a fair fight.³⁵ Nor is Medea’s battle with her *pathos* a fair fight in this respect. Through the intrusion of

²⁸ *Erōs*’ passage is also a reworking of *Iliad* 1.382ff where Apollo brings the plague upon the Greek armies and Apollonios, through the archer image once again emphasises the sickness that *Erōs* will create in Medea.

²⁹ The arrow takes the place of *Erōs*’ traditional means of overcoming his victims which is through his gaze. cf. Pindar, *Pyth* 10.59ff; Ibycus fr. 287; Calame (1999) 20.

³⁰ Holmes (2010) 49.

³¹ Holmes (2010) 42.

³² Generally in epic, warfare is face-to-face, there is a mutual seeing of one-another, an exchange of words, and sometimes of weapons. The archer was often considered cowardly, as he attacked from an unseen vantage point. The ideal of engaging in face-to-face combat is further emphasized by the fact that warriors accrued shame if they received a wound in the back, as it was a sign of flight e.g. *Il* 13.184, 17.305; Holmes (2010) 49-50.

³³ Lennox (1980) 68.

³⁴ cf. *λαθών Il* 15.540-42.

³⁵ cf. *Il* 15.540-42, 7.242-4, 13.352, 16.184; *Od* 4.92. The archer’s superiority of vision is also often stressed and the victim is left glancing around frantically for the attacker, as Medea indeed does (cf. *Il* 13.649; Holmes (2010) 50).

the arrow *Erōs* transforms conceptually into the emotion *erōs*.³⁶ *Erōs* now burns deep in Medea's heart unseen (λάθρη). This signifies the transition from the physical 'seen' realm to the emotional 'felt'. Apollonios is henceforth uninterested in the anthropomorphic figure of *Erōs*, only his abstract state 'desire' and the effects it has.³⁷ The path of the arrow also represents the movement from the divine to the human plane, as thereafter Medea's anguish is almost entirely dealt with on a human psychological level.³⁸ This is further signified by the fact that desire is usually referred to in the plural, *Erōtes* rather than *erōs*, which implies the emotion rather than the figure.³⁹ Apollonios incorporates both the epic tradition of divine intervention as the cause of mortal disease and madness, and medical and philosophical leanings toward natural causation in his construction of Medea's nosology to create a symbiosis of old and new. After *Erōs*' intervention, all of Medea's sufferings are described in psychological terms, and the divine is disregarded. Apollonios uses medical concepts to explain *how* *erōs* disturbs Medea's psyche and physiological make-up to manifest as it does. This is in itself a departure from Homeric tendencies, as he focuses on the who, what and why, not the how.⁴⁰ The lyric poets, like Apollonios had a huge interest in the effects of emotions, and one of Apollonios' innovations is that he adds the discussion of *how* they interact with Medea to produce those effects. He delves into the internal realm, the realm of the unseen and the unknowable in order to explain, along medical and philosophical terms, the effects of love. This highlights his place in history and reflects the importance the ancients placed on symptomology in identifying cause from effect, not effect from cause.

This thesis also focuses on effects of Medea's desire and the causes behind *how* they manifests. Chapter One discusses Medea's psychopathology, which is the study of the *pathē* and how they affect the psyche. It discusses the way the *erōs* as a *pathos* manifests in Medea and affects her psychology. Apollonios constructs his Medea's very psyche according to a Stoic model and in accordance with this her *pathos* acts as a Stoic *pathos* when interacting with her psyche. *Erōs* affects Medea's very ability to function mentally, it impedes her ability to receive and process information, and to make rational decisions. Apollonios uses this framework for his exposition of Medea's

³⁶ Hunter (1989) 131.

³⁷ Beye (1982) 127.

³⁸ Lennox (1980) 47.

³⁹ Beye (1982) 127.

⁴⁰ Holmes (2010) 44.

love-induced indecision as well as engaging in the philosophical discussion of *akrasia*. Erōs compromises Medea's very psycho-somatic make-up by creating disturbances in her overall pneumatic tension and goading Medea into an already established disposition: weak-will. This weak-will causes her to act in the opposite way that she should and assent to be with Jason, betray her family and homeland and eventually help to kill her brother.

Chapter Two discusses Medea's patho-physiology, which is the study of disease and how it alters the human body (*phusis*). In particular, this chapter looks at how the *pathos* manifests in Medea's body as a physical symptom indicative of an internal problem. This chapter also explores contemporary means by which people tried to understand causes from their effects, such as physiognomy and pulse theory and looks at Apollonios' incorporation of these methods to provide his own diagnosis for Medea's *pathos*. Apollonios follows medical and philosophical thought in attributing Medea's bodily and mental diseases as arising from internal imbalance such as excess of internal fire. This internal fire creates Medea's most prevalent physiological symptom; fever, which manifests externally as, for example, a blush on the cheeks. In response to the importance placed on symptoms and physical expressions as illustrative of some internal characteristics, Apollonios also places a focus on Medea's facial expressions, and in particular her eyes. In doing this he demonstrates an interest in Hellenistic aesthetics and also in the quasi-medical field of physiognomy which aimed at understanding internal characteristics from external ones in order to foretell a person's disposition. This chapter also discusses *how* physiologically, the distress and pain that the *pathos* causes is able to manifest itself as perceivable bodily pain. Apollonios, in order to make Medea's emotional suffering manifest as real somatic pain draws on contemporary discussions of the nervous system and philosophic debates on the *hēgemonikon* (governing part of the psyche) and its relationship with the body as the locus of emotions and sense-perception.

Apollonios uses symptomology as a means to physically show manifest Medea's internal physical and psychological turmoil. Apollonios both shows the physical symptoms of Medea's disease, the 'seen' and also affords his audience a glimpse into the internal unseen, the 'felt'. He uses his position as omniscient narrator to reveal the internal cause for the external symptom or expression. In doing this he blends the poeticism and emotion of his poetry with the impersonality and

informativity of diagnosis. Just as the internal is the causation of the external, Apollonios often retards the most prolific symptoms until the end of the narrative passage, showing the ultimate manifestation of the illness, the symptom that identifies the sickness to the other characters and the evidence that indicates an internal problem has seized the victim's mind and body. The external symptom is often stressed at the commencement of the description, which is resonant with the importance that the ancients placed on symptomology in identifying cause from effect, not effect from cause.

CHAPTER I: PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

This chapter focuses on the psychology of Medea and in particular, how her psychological anguish is modelled on contemporary philosophic models. The Hellenistic Period exhibited an increase in an interest in psychology which can be seen in philosophy and medicine and even art and literature. Apollonios investigates Medea's psyche and describes *how* it is affected by her *pathos* and realistically portrays and admonishes against the destructiveness of desire as it manifests in Medea's body as crippling indecision.

Medea's emotionally charged manic behaviour, when she is at one moment restless and sporadic and the next lethargic and moody, at one moment loyal and pious and at another moment treacherous and shameless is most definitely not considered normal behaviour to the Greeks. It was this kind of behaviour, especially when exhibited by females that was considered incredibly harmful to families and society. This is the type of Medea that Euripides manufactures, one that is so impulsive, so impassioned and so reckless and vengeful that she has the gall to manipulate men, plot against and kill royalty, and murder her own sons. Apollonios draws from this version to depict Medea in a different stage of her life, making a similar life-altering decision: whether or not to go with Jason and betray her family or stay at home and watch him die. The audience comes to this romance with the knowledge in their minds that the end result is worse than unsuccessful.⁴¹ We know that Medea and Jason break up, we know she kills the children, and some may know that she will marry Aegeus after all of this. But, we must not forget that in Apollonios' narrative, none of this has happened yet and Medea is, for all Apollonios lets us know, an innocent young virgin. We are told that she is good with *pharmaka* but we do not yet know the extent of the sinister power she yields.⁴² The powerful *pathos* that comes over her is so strong and she is too young and weak willed to overpower, and it is this that makes the audience sympathize with Medea.⁴³ Apollonios makes the audience understand and sympathize with Medea by delving into the workings of her psyche and explaining her pleasure and pain, and explaining why she cannot act rationally. In constructing this along contemporary philosophical and medical models Apollonios brings to this depiction an unprecedented realism to Medea's suffering.

⁴¹ cf. Broeniman (1989).

⁴² Some of the drugs that Medea has are helpful, and some destructive (3.802-4).

⁴³ Papadopoulou (1997) 653.

Firstly, in response to contemporary philosophic belief, Medea's psyche is unified, and her *hēgemonikon* (ruling faculty) receives, interprets and decides on information and is also the locus of emotions. Disruptions in pneumatic tension of the psyche disrupt its ability to perform functions properly. Pneumatic tension is the system of *pneuma* 'breath/ air' that flows through the entire body and is the mechanism behind physical and psychic functioning, as I will discuss shortly. When this pneumatic tension is disrupted it causes weak-will, and weak-will makes a person who may already be naturally susceptible to the *pathos* even weaker in their resolve. It makes them ignore right reason and they instead decide on the very thing they know will cause the most destruction. However, Apollonios acknowledges that in Medea this decision is the result of a long internal struggle which is made harder by the degree to which she clings to each value. This indecision that arises with the inception of *pathē* was depicted by Euripides in his *Medea* and was also a topic of interest for Chrusippos (c. 280-207 BC). For it seems that the very aspects of Euripides' treatment of Medea; her lack of psychological control, her decision-making process, her unique self-consciousness and the articulateness of her sub-consciousness, in response to her *pathos*, that attracted Chrusippos, are, in response, the very same aspects of Medea's experience that Apollonios accentuates, develops and draws attention to. This chapter focuses in particular on how *erōs* as a *pathos* affects Medea's psyche, and how these effects manifest as emotional, irrational behaviour.

This chapter looks at how Apollonios redefines the very nature and construction of Medea's psyche according to philosophic models. He recreates Medea's psyche along Stoic lines in particular, to demonstrate the disease-like destruction that desire as a *pathos* effects upon a psyche, in accordance with the Stoics' general admonition of the *pathē*.⁴⁴ He also recreates Medea along Stoic lines to demonstrate one model of how a *pathos* seems to take over a body with respect to its ability to make decisions that are in accordance with 'right reason'.⁴⁵ He was, therefore also writing a didactic poem of sorts, which his predecessor Chrusippos, and the other early Stoics would have

⁴⁴ For a discussion of the presence of Stoicism in Alexandria see Fisch (1937).

⁴⁵ The Stoics deem actions that are in accordance with right reason to be morally acceptable. This is deemed 'right reason' as opposed to just 'reason' because the impulse and judgement are themselves rational. 'An impulse 'disobedient to reason' cannot be blocking the reasoning that leads to action; it is the reasoning that leads to action. It must then, be disobedient to reason in a normative sense – "right reason" the reasoning that should have been followed.' Annas (1992) 105. Diogenes Laertius gives examples of acts that are in accordance to right reason that include honouring parents, brothers and native land (*Lives* 7.107-8); Long (1974) 190. Gill says these actions are not rational because they are not what a wise-man would do (1996) 228.

lauded. For, the Stoics were undoubtedly the philosophical school (especially in the Hellenistic Period) with the most interest in poetry, and uniquely, they praised the power of poetry as a useful and morally good tool for society. In this they deviated from other thinkers like Plato and the Epicureans. The Stoics believed in particular in the power that poetry has in its capacity to represent something in nature truthfully.⁴⁶ They therefore used poetry, Homer especially, along with arguments of common usage to prove some of their more controversial points. They even used poetry to prove psychopathological arguments in their dialogue with physicians. Moreover, they were interested in psychology and the way that the psyche was affected by *pathē* in its ability to make decisions. They provided a model construction of the mind and discussed why and how we make decisions when affected by emotions and the effect of those decisions. Apollonios constructs his Medea in accordance with Chrusippos' model of the sympathetic relationship between body and psyche and how *pathē* affect this.

Apollonios in particular seems to have been influenced by the Stoics, and discusses his Medea within the confines of their discussion of *pathē* and their effects on the psyche. The *Argonautika* is the first substantial treatment of both the physical and mental effects that love and other *pathē* have on their victims. The depiction of these effects of desire, in particular, in the *Argonautika* is intense, destructive and out-of-control. As a result, desire, in the *Argonautika* brings only brief happiness, but leaves lasting destruction in the form of severed familial ties and compromised values. He describes the bitter aspect of the *pikros-glukos* relationship that *pathē* create as not only momentary bouts of physical pain but also lasting emotional pain into the future which come as a result of a series of bad decisions made by impassioned minds. If Apollonios was looking for a contemporary model for his own description of emotions, then the largest, and most appropriate model available to him, was the Stoic one.⁴⁷ This is because for the Stoics the worst affliction was a *pathos* (passion). *Pathē* are commonly translated as 'emotions', and constitute a range of emotions including desire, fear, pain, pleasure, dejection, joy and so on. *Pathē* were considered, to the Stoics, inherently bad because they lead us away from virtue⁴⁸ and this is why the ideal state for the

⁴⁶ Kyriakou (1997) 271.

⁴⁷ In normal Greek usage *pathē* are neither inherently good nor bad, this is determined by how they are handled. However, the Stoics thought that *pathē* were inherently bad; Annas (1992) 103.

⁴⁸ They cause us to become attached to values we deem to be desirable and cause us not to give moral value the supremacy it demands; Annas (1992) 115.

Stoic-wise man was to be *apathēs* (without *pathē*).⁴⁹ The Stoics, although pessimistic towards the effect of passions in our lives, were nonetheless the sect who most extensively discussed them, and the psychology and physiology they affect. This chapter discusses how Apollonios in particular adapts the Stoic concept of a *pathos* to his *erōs* to show realistically the destructiveness of *erōs* by making it manifest itself in Medea as realistic mental illness, and poor moral choices.

The philosophers were able to realistically discuss the effect that desire has on the mind in physiological terms because they had begun to be considered akin to physicians. The concept of ‘philosopher as physician’ is marked by the dominance that the thought of philosophers such as Empedocles, Pythagoras and Alcmaeon began to have in the discussion about psychic and medical issues. This trend continued into the Hellenistic Period as Aristotle, the Stoics and the Epicureans for example had more sway over the population than physicians such as Herophilus and Erasistratos.⁵⁰ This was in part because philosophers had already established themselves as vital and reliable sources of medical insight. They also legitimized their discipline along medical lines by likening ailments of the psyche to ailments of the body. The soul was now considered to be corporeal (at least by the two largest philosophical schools of the time, the Epicureans and the Stoics) and became discussed as such.⁵¹ Mental diseases were considered directly analogous with somatic diseases and both could and had to be cured and the treatment of the former was the philosopher’s job. Antiphon (5th century BC) for example, ‘founded an art to cure griefs, analogous to that which among doctors serves as a basis for the treatment of disease’ (Plutarch, *Lives* 10.833c2). They entered the realm of treatment when they aimed at healing these psychic ailments. However, they did this not through therapeutics or dietetics or unguents, but through philosophy and ethics. Democritus says ‘medicine heals diseases of the body, wisdom frees the psyche from passions (*pathē*)’ (fr. 31). In his later writings, Plato discusses mental defectiveness as a sickness in the psyche⁵² which usually exhibits itself as erratic or impassioned behaviour which must be cured. Theoretically, once the treatment of knowledge had been exercised, proof that the therapy had worked was when the

⁴⁹ To the Stoics, the state of *apatheia* was defined as the state of not acting in accordance with any *pathē*, not as the state of not having any *pathē* present, as these are inevitable and attack even the wise-man.

⁵⁰ Lloyd (2003) 211.

⁵¹ The concept of the corporeality of the psyche is further discussed in Chapter Two.

⁵² Gill (1985) 321.

rational faculty had taken back full control of the person.⁵³ The philosophers treated the psychological manifestations of the *pathos* as doctors would treat illness they wanted to treat therapeutically, but to do so they had to explain how the *pathos* was interacting with the psyche.

In addition to the negative effects that emotions have on behaviours, the philosophers also wanted to investigate the processes that our ‘minds’ go through when receiving, interpreting and acting on information that we use in order to make decisions. In the Hellenistic Period the philosophical aim was to understand the soul, which in this period had all of its faculties in one location; reasoned, spirited and desiderative existed in the heart and chest area and it is this model which is the basis for the origin of our modern understanding of ‘mind’.⁵⁴ Long says ‘The Stoic’s conception of the mind or ‘governing part’ of the unified soul (*hēgemonikon*) centralizes and coordinates psychic life to an extent that is without parallel in the rest of Greek philosophy. This ‘mind’ constitutes not only the perceiving, feeling, thinking and wanting of human beings but all that they do, as intentional agents’.⁵⁵ The theory of a unified psyche remained the dominant idea from this point on, and we can trace the synonymy of soul and mind in the very evolution of the word ‘psyche’ which became the root for such mental words as psychology, psychiatry, psychotic and psychedelic. Apollonios uses the traditional poetic terms *thumos* (heart/spirit), *psukhē* (psyche), *kardia* (heart), and *phrenes* (mind) as virtually indistinguishable elements of the psyche.⁵⁶ In fact I posit that the variations in these terms come mainly from considerations of meter, not because of any variation in meaning. They all reside in the

⁵³ Even though they acknowledged that to be in the constant state of this was incredibly difficult to achieve, and was the state of the wise-man; Lloyd (2003) 211.

⁵⁴ Both the Stoics and Epicureans, the largest and most influential philosophical schools in the Hellenistic Period argued that the psyche was unified, as did Aristotle’s pupils, the Peripatetics. The theory of a partite soul was still held by neo-Platonists even in the 2nd century AD, the most famous example being Galen.

⁵⁵ Long (2008) 572.

⁵⁶ In both Archaic poetry and Euripides, *thumos* can be virtually equated with *erōs* or anger, but also, it is a general term used to describe a force (e.g. courage) that directs the self to action; Foley (1989) 69-70. For a further discussion of the meaning of *thumos* in Greek literature see Padel (1992) 27-30. In the *Argonautika*, *thumos* usually acts passively, not assertively and aggressively like in Euripides’ *Medea*. When the forces compelling Medea are described they are shame, fear and desire; not *thumos*. *Thumos* acts less like an emotion (anger) and more like psyche itself. The *thumos* does not represent the aggressive *pathos* itself; rather, it is actually depicted as being affected by the aggressive *pathos*: ‘as many things as the *Erotes* stir up in her *thumos* to care about’ (πολλὰ δὲ θυμῷ / ὄρμαιν’ ὅσσα τ’ ἔρωτες ἐποτρύνουσι μέλεσθαι 3.451-2). Apollonios’ usage of *thumos* is comparable to its use in Stoic doctrine, for they also place *thumos* in the chest, and like the heart, it is connected with cognition, the will and emotions. To the Stoics, *thumos* is synonymous with psyche ‘drinking the life-destroying drugs’ (πασσαμένη ραιστήρια φάρμακα θυμοῦ 3.785-790, 724).

chest, can be affected by winds and liquids,⁵⁷ are affected by emotions, act like a mind responding to external stimuli, and all represent Medea's 'rationality' 'or prudence' as well as her combating desires. There is no element in the body that Medea has that is not linked back to her heart and in fact some Stoics actually thought the *hēgemonikon* was in the *pneuma* around the heart.⁵⁸ One of these interests in the *hēgemonikon* was an interest in the physiology (the physical way that it functions) of the *hēgemonikon* and the mechanism behind the *hēgemonikon* functioning was *pneuma*. *Pneuma* literally 'breath' was a concept that by the Hellenistic Period was in every philosopher and physician's theories to explain psychic and bodily processes.⁵⁹ These processes can find their parallel with Apollonios' pneumatic terminology.

The way that these psychic faculties are shown manifest by Apollonios is through his physicalization of the psyche. To the Stoics, the psyche was *pneuma*,⁶⁰ and if we accept that Medea is constructed along a Stoic model, then it can be recognized that the movements and affections of her psyche are exhibited as *pneuma* as well. *Pathē* affect the psyche by disrupting its very nature, its pneumatic tension (the steady tension [*tonos*] of *pneuma* that flows throughout the body) which constitutes its ability to act rationally.⁶¹ *Pneuma* is responsible for many psychic functions, including perception and sensation. Sense-perception (*aisthesis*), for example, is said to be the *pneuma* extending from the *hēgemonikon* to the limbs, the apprehension of the perception through them, and also the make-up of the sense organs themselves.⁶² Annas explains this as 'the *hēgemonikon* centralizes the senses and other functions, like an octopus whose tentacles are extensions of *pneuma* to the senses, or a spider sitting in the middle of its web, sensitive to every change (Calcid, *In Tim* 220). What happens in the sense

⁵⁷ For a discussion and examples of emotions depicted metaphorically as winds in Greek literature see Padel (1992) 88-98.

⁵⁸ Mansfeld (1989) 319.

⁵⁹ For an in depth analysis see Lloyd (2007).

⁶⁰ *Pneuma* is the very make-up of a person. *Pneuma* is responsible for the form of the body (muscles and sinews) and for psychological attributes. These rely on an appropriate *tonos* of *pneuma*; Long (1996) 233. The kind of life depends on the degree of this tension (*SVF* ii 714-16); Long (1974) 171. The free flow of *pneuma* within the body is also crucial because any impediment in it results in disease; Boylan (2007) 211.

⁶¹ Fire and air are the 'active' elements which work together upon the two 'passive' elements, earth and water. But these are also opposed to each other as hot element to cold element and outward moving force to inward moving force. The combination of the two is the *tonos*, produced by the opposed forces; Graver (2007) 19. The fire aspect of fire-*pneuma* as working in Medea through the fire similes of *erōs*, the conflagration of which manifest as fever will be discussed in Chapter Two.

⁶² Annas (1992) 71.

organ is transmitted to the *hēgemonikon* and recorded there.’⁶³ The *hēgemonikon* is the locus for sight, hearing, touch, taste, smell, and also voice and reproduction⁶⁴ and all of these are mechanized by *pneuma*. To the Stoics, the very psyche *is pneuma*⁶⁵ and as a *pathos* is an upset (*ptoia*) in the psyche’s pneumatic tension, it disrupts the mind’s ability to function.⁶⁶ Because of the corporeality of the psyche during this period, the idea of *tonos* was conceived along somatic lines: just as the body has good or bad tension, so too does the soul have good or bad pneumatic tension. In the body, tension takes the form of fitness and taut muscles, enabling the body to perform what is needed. In the soul, it takes the form of firmness of character; like an under-exercised body unable to perform physical tasks which it should be capable of, the soul with the poor tension (*atonos*) will respond weakly when it should be responding firmly.⁶⁷ This ‘responding’ refers to the strength with which the person tries to act in disobedience of their *pathos* and follow right reason. The state of one’s overall pneumatic tension affects not only what one perceives but how one reacts and makes decisions.⁶⁸ Chrusippos used the example of Menelaus, when confronting Helen at Troy, determined to kill her but then feebly giving in because he felt overcome by her beauty, as an example of weak pneumatic tension (Galen, *De Placitis* IV 6.1-11).⁶⁹ The result of seeing Helen was his assenting to the impulse to embrace her, which made him fail to act as he had resolved as right. Emotional behaviour is thus considered, on the

⁶³ Annas (1992) 62.

⁶⁴ Annas (1992) 61.

⁶⁵ For a very good discussion on this see Webb (1982) 29.

⁶⁶ Annas (1992) 45, cf. Galen, *De Placitis* 3.1.9-15.

⁶⁷ Annas (1992) 106.

⁶⁸ An affected pneumatic tension also affects the psyche’s very ability to interpret the impression; Annas (1992) 83. An impression appears externally and makes an imprint in the *hēgemonikon* that represents an impulse to do something and is conceived physiologically as a sort of motion of the mind (*pneuma*) that arises in response to a modification of the mind from an external impression (cf. 3.638). Brennan invites us to define not only belief and knowledge, but desire, fear and all of the other emotions as impressions; Brennan (2005) 61. Medea’s inception of desire is external and also targets the heart (3.275-87), where impressions are located (Sext. Emp., *Against the Professors* 7.231; Diog. Laert., *Lives* 7.159; Aetius, 4.5.6; Galen, *De Foetuum* 4.698). Cleanthes envisioned how an impression worked as akin to a wax seal, leaving an imprint in the mind, which Brennan invites us to imagine as a mental picture, of for example someone’s face; Brennan (2005) 53. cf. 3.455-8 where every aspect of Jason’s physique are imprinted in Medea’s mind and dance before her eyes, enticing her; cf. Chariton, *Callirhoe*. 2.4.3, 6.7.1 disc. in Will (1962). An impression can be deceptive and cause the assent to it to be a false belief, this was why the Stoics warned of them. Epictetus addressing Euripides’ Medea says, ‘Do not be carried away by the intensity of an impression; but say, ‘wait a moment for me, impression; let me see who you are and what you are about and let me test you... do not let it lead you on by depicting the consequences. Otherwise it will take possession of you and take you wherever it wants to. What you should do rather is oppose it to a fair and noble impression and discard this sordid one’ (*Diss* 11.13.24-6; cf. Diog. Laert., *Lives* 7.46-47).

⁶⁹ All translations of *On The Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* are from De Lacy (ed., trans. & comm.) (2005) *Galen: On The Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato Volumes I-III*.

whole, as a result of a structural weakness in the psyche.⁷⁰ The state of the psyche allowing the passion to have its way (not the possession of the *pathos* itself) is a weakness; the person is mentally flabby and should shape up by improving their reason.⁷¹ Reason was considered the *pneuma* that is extended through the body at a higher level of tension than the other soul-*pneuma*.⁷² Apollonios is able to show the invisible disruption of the reason- *pneuma* in Medea's mind by in response, physicalizing its motions as winds.

By the time that we find Apollonios writing in, *pneuma* was the standard explanation for the vital and psychic functioning of the body from almost every influential philosophical school.⁷³ The idea of *pneuma* as a facilitating element in the body would have been so ingrained in an ancient audience that I think it would be almost impossible, especially for the learned audience, not to associate the 'winds' and 'breezes' that buffet or occur within Medea as *pneuma* in some form. 'Her mind fluttered out of her chest in her love-sickness' (καί οἱ ἄηντο στηθέων ἐκ πυκινῶν καμάτων φρένες 3.228-89). Hunter identifies this as the moment when *erōs* takes away Medea's judgement.⁷⁴ When we view the mentions of the *thumos*, the *phrenes*, and the heart and so on, when buffeted with wind, or when they soar, or flutter or whirl, as moving in response to being affected by disturbances and imbalances in the pneumatic tension:⁷⁵ 'her heart fluttered within her with joy' (τῆς δ' ἔντοσθεν ἀνέπτατο χάρματι θυμός 3.724).⁷⁶ This word that the Stoics use to describe the upset that the *pathos* makes (*ptoia*) literally means a terror or fright, or when metaphorically used means a flutter like a disruption of air. This is the same cognate with the verb *ptoeo* 'to fly, flutter' which is what the *thumos*, *phrenes*, *nous* and psyche do. After Medea's meeting with Jason, 'her mind soared high in the clouds' (ψυχὴ γὰρ νεφέεσσι μεταχρονίη

⁷⁰ Graver (2007) 71. *Pneuma* is both nothing more than a mixture of air and fire, but it also possesses a remarkable abilities to endow the person with sense-perception and voluntary motion; Graver, 19.

⁷¹ Annas (1992) 106.

⁷² Annas (1992) 67-8.

⁷³ Frixione (2012) 506. The Stoics differentiated between vital *pneuma* (the *pneuma* responsible for doing base bodily functions, like digestion and circulation) from psychic *pneuma* which was the *pneuma* which was endowed with some ability to partake in the psychological processes of the body. Chrusippos thought that the left ventricle of the heart contained psychic *pneuma* because it was the location of the *hēgemonikon* whereas Erasistratos thought vital *pneuma* was in the heart and psychic *pneuma* was in the brain's ventricles which was then transmitted to the nerves; Cambiano (1999) 601.

⁷⁴ The word order of καμάτων (love-sickness) between noun and adjective makes this clear, cf. 4.1018; Hes, *Theog* 122; *Il* 14.217, 294; *h. Aphr* 38; Hunter (1989) 130.

⁷⁵ cf. 3.688, 3.610-15, 3.1009, 3.1131.

⁷⁶ Tieleman (1996) 241.

πεπότητα 3.1150).⁷⁷ Thus Apollonios exhibits to the audience the affections of Medea's mind, as it is buffeted and blown, as it flutters and flies, as metaphorical descriptions of the 'upsets' which Medea's *pathos* inflicts. These breezes disrupt Medea's inner balance and thus hinder her capacity to reason. A strong pneumatic tension indicates a healthy soul, just as physical health in the body is signified by bodily strength and tension. Through the buffeting and fluttering of the psychic organs Medea's struggle with weak will and reason, and the onslaught of the passions are exhibited to the audience. As a result of the fact that the psyche was now thought to be corporeal, the mechanisms behind its functioning were discussed in more physical ways and mechanical systems like the one that *pneuma* operates in were applied to the system which the *hēgemonikon* used to govern the body. It was this system's integrity that constituted an agent's ability to make decisions, and if this system was disturbed the agent made bad moral decisions, and these bad moral decisions were disparaged by the philosophers.

In the Hellenistic period a large focus of philosophical discourse was on ethics. In ancient philosophy, ethics referred to a kind of didactic philosophy which aimed at instructing and guiding people how best to live every part of their own life. According to the Stoics' teachings, the ideal state was one of *apatheia*, however, because this goal was only attainable for the wise man, in response they asked *how* we should cope with these emotions when they do inevitably come upon us in order to better be prepared for next time. This is because to the Stoics *pathē* are inevitable; they are as inevitable as fate. *Pathos* is literally an affliction, and its very nature is intrusive and disturbing. *Pathē* are of course very difficult to repulse, but some people have natural advantages and some, have some serious natural *disadvantages*. Fools, barbarians and lovers, for example are more likely to act in accordance with the *wrong* thing to do because they are weak-willed (*De Placitis* III 6-7, III 18-19). Being weak-willed meant that you had a tendency towards acting against 'right reason', and what causes this tendency is the result of the *pathos* affecting the very *pneumatic* tension of the soul.⁷⁸ Medea is a barbarian, and a lover, so to start with she is less well-equipped than others (to begin

⁷⁷ For a discussion of how the mind 'flies' in Greek literature in response to emotions including anger, fear and desire see Padel (1992) 97.

⁷⁸ It was also characteristic of the fool to change his mind a lot and this was because of his unsatisfactory make-up (cf. Sext. Emp., *Adv. Math* 7.434); Arthur (1983) 76.

with) in handling her *pathē*.⁷⁹ In addition to this, Medea is inexperienced at this point in the experiences of love. Posidonius says that ‘those who are unused (to a thing) are more greatly affected in situations of fear, distress, desire and pleasure; and the more vicious (*kakoteroi*) are quickly seized by their affections’ (*De Placitis* IV 5.34). Reason is a power that we can improve by experience, and the only way we are able to improve our other powers is by improving our reason first.⁸⁰ The strength of Medea’s *pathos* and its influence over her psyche and the strength with which she holds to her values makes her decision-making process very difficult and it is this indecision which results that Apollonios exhibits in a way that makes the audience sympathize with her experience.

Apollonios depicts his Medea as a person going through having to make a very tough moral decision and ultimately as a person so affected by love that she makes the wrong decision. Medea’s very moral fibre is compromised by *erōs* and it is through references to medical and philosophical ideas that Apollonios conveys how it came about that her psyche was *so* affected that she betrayed her family and homeland.

Apollonios was inspired by one particular aspect of Medea’s earlier exposition, her moment of indecision. This focus on the inner hidden mechanisms of the mind and in particular on psychological examinations of famous characters was sparked by innovative works such as Euripides’ *Medea*. One particular scene of psychological indecision in this tragedy influenced not only Apollonios, but also philosophers like Chrusippos and Plato and artists like Timomachos. No doubt the Stoics’ interest in the psychology of poetic characters was in part caused by the intense psychological treatment of characters like Euripides’ *Medea*. In his *Medea* she is shown in the midst of deciding whether to exact the most punitive revenge possible against Jason by destroying his children, or to let her children live and save herself the same personal loss.⁸¹ Chrusippos, in his investigation of the psychological effects of *pathē*, paid much

⁷⁹She is a barbarian, a woman, and inexperienced in youth. Aristotle describes *akratēs* affected by weak-will as young, trusting and naive (Aristotle, *NE* 7.14, 1154b10, cf. *NE* 1147a7); Charles (2011) 190. Galen attributes Euripides’ Medea’s weak-will to a consequence of being ‘uneducated and uncivilized’ (*De Placitis* III 7.13-14) and also says that in barbarians, anger is stronger than reason (*De Placitis* III.1.5).

⁸⁰ Annas (1992) 66-7.

⁸¹ Pindar’s treatment of this decision for young Medea lacks any opposing force to subdue Medea’s pursuits as she does not have a father who would punish her if she crossed him. Apollonios however, includes the presence of Medea’s father Aietes, and emphasises his wrathfulness to make Medea’s decision much harder, as if she helps Jason, both she and Jason will be punished. Apollonios includes Medea’s fear of her father’s wrath as one of the main driving emotions in Medea’s decision making, and

attention to Euripides' *Medea* and discussed her psychological make-up along the lines of his own theories on psychopathology. It is this model which Apollonios adapts to portray his own Medea in her moment of indecision. Euripides' Medea's deliberation scene was so famous for its glimpse into a moment of psychological indecision that it also became a popular scene in the art world. The composition of Timomachos' Medea showed 'a pause, a moment of radical suspense, sword in hand, [as] Medea watched her children and struggled with her intention to slaughter them in revenge for Jason's betrayal'.⁸² The idea that this singular moment of internal psychological indecision could be captured in a snap shot attests to the Hellenistic aesthetic desire for realism. Ancient viewers also noticed and admired the psychological tension in this painting and discussed it throughout antiquity.⁸³ This painting was so highly regarded that Caesar himself bought the painting (along with one of Ajax) for 80,000 talents (Pliny, *NH* 7.126). Unfortunately, the original was destroyed in a fire in 80AD but two surviving paintings from Herculaneum and Pompeii which are believed to have been inspired by Timomachos' *Medea* can be used for insight into what the Hellenistic idea of psychological indecision looked like when manifest as a facial expression. It was arguably this kind of realism to which Apollonios aspired in his writing.

it is this element of danger that adds drama, suspense and gravity to Medea's decision (cf. Pindar, *Pyth* 4; Euripides, *Medea* 434); Papadopoulou (1997) 658.

⁸² Gurd (2007) 309.

⁸³ cf. *API* 135, 136, 138, 139, 140; Ovid, *Tristia* 2.526; Plutarch, *Moralia* 18a; Pliny, *NH* 35.145.

Figure 1: Fragmentary fresco of Medea from Herculaneum: Museo Archeologico Nazionale, Naples. Gurd (2007) 310.

The tension created in Medea's indecision scenes is heightened by the ambiguity created around her own character and behaviours.⁸⁴ As narrator, Apollonios plays with the audience's perception and expectations of Medea to keep them in suspense as to how she will act, and he obscures and highlights some of her tendencies at different times to emphasise her multifaceted character and the disastrous effects of *erōs*.⁸⁵ We alter whether we think she is an inherently good girl turned bad only by betrayal, or whether she was always a bad girl. Medea is traditionally a very dangerous woman, a murderess, a manipulator and a powerful sorceress. Undoubtedly her most violent and terrifying depiction is actualized by Euripides and she provides a terrifying warning of the dangers of uncurbed women. She is the sorceress *par excellence*; the daughter of Aietes son of Helios, niece of the infamous Kirke, a priestess of Hekate, and a resident of Colchis to the east of Greece which bore associations with magic and

⁸⁴ Byre (1996) 4.

⁸⁵ Apollonios also recasts the couple as Nausikaa and Odysseus who provide a better model of how the courtship process occurs in the civilized world. For parallels and discussions see Clauss (1997).

sorcery.⁸⁶ Despite all of these negative aspects of Medea's character that are surely in the audience's mind, Apollonios makes the audience sympathize with Medea and he does this by showing her as a victim of destructive love and by exhibiting her emotional suffering.⁸⁷ He heightens the degree that the internal is depicted and the very fact that he *does* internalize Medea shows an interest in *her* side of the story. It humanizes her to see her motivations, her fears, her desires and her moral dilemmas.⁸⁸ Apollonios twists the image of Medea that an audience may expect to see by focusing, in Book 3 at least, almost entirely on her maidenhood and her struggle between exercising maidenly shame and giving in to the temptation of Jason. Many scholars have criticized the psychological unity of Medea as a character because she so drastically changes in the fourth book. In Book 3 Apollonios avoids discussing Medea's sorceress side, she is identified as a priestess of Hekate, and indeed she has the ability to use powerful drugs, but she uses her powers to help Jason, not harm anyone. The term for 'drugs' which Apollonios uses is *pharmaka* which in isolation is ambiguous; it can mean both drugs that heal and drugs that harm. Apollonios keeps her sorceress side and her maidenly side almost completely separate until Book 4 when the sorceress side of Medea is quickly revealed. She becomes angry, her eyes blaze with fire, she wishes to burn down the Argonauts' ship and she threatens people (4.15ff). Her conversation with the moon also reveals to the audience the true extent of her acquaintance with dark magic: she prevents the moon from shining at night so she can work (4.57ff), and hunt for poisonous roots and corpses (4.50, 4.385ff). Her power as a sorceress is further emphasised through the progression of the book as she is able to defeat both the dragon that guards the Golden Fleece and Talos, through using magic. While in the past it has been argued that the disjunction between Medea's two sides – maiden and sorceress - makes Medea's psychological character and her changes of mind inconsistent and unbelievable, other scholars tend to argue the exact opposite.⁸⁹ She is complicated and multifaceted like a real person and real people are not consistent.⁹⁰ While Apollonios keeps Medea's witchcraft and love life separate he simultaneously forces the audience to accept the premise that her personality contains

⁸⁶ Hanson (1965) 55.

⁸⁷ Mori (2000) 94.

⁸⁸ Papadopoulou (1997) 650.

⁸⁹ cf. Wilson (2001); Dyck (1989); Phinney, Jr. (1967); Beye (1982).

⁹⁰ Wilson (2001) 227.

both ‘integrated halves’⁹¹ at the same time, and it is this revelation/concealment of these characteristics which keeps the psychological vacillation realistic.⁹²

In Medea’s indecision scenes Apollonios shows the audience the very physiological make-up of Medea’s dilemma. He reveals the nature of her *pathē* and the judgements she is torn between, and provides us with a model of how Medea makes the decision, as well as how the *pathē* impede her from making the ‘right’ decision. Although Medea does ultimately make the ‘wrong’ decision, and chooses to help Jason and her betray her family, Apollonios uses her process as a teaching tool and reveals why and how we can be affected in our capacity to reason correctly when under the influence of *pathē*. While Medea is not the Stoic success story of how to deal with *pathē*,⁹³ her portrayal is real, and the process of how she made the wrong decision is validated through discussion. She is often criticized for being impulsive, irrational, and too strong-minded with no consideration for the consequences, but I think these readings neglect to look at the intense indecision and hesitation that Medea goes through and the pain that this causes her. It also fails to acknowledge how the ancients would have viewed Medea as being medically compromised by her *pathē* in her ability to make this decision and behave properly as Apollonios alludes to. Instead, it focuses on Medea as a two-dimensional character, and fails to recognize her motivations and her limitations. It does not acknowledge any of the subtlety in Medea’s psychology, nor any reasons for the flaws in her reasoning. Medea’s character is multifaceted and the reason why her moments of indecision are so tense is that she is so firmly rooted in each value: desire for Jason and fear of reproach for her act of treason. In Medea’s decision scene she oscillates between assenting to her desire and helping Jason, and assenting to her fear and not helping him. While the duplicity and contention between

⁹¹ Dyck (1989) 456.

⁹² For a convincing argument in favour of this see Phinney, Jr. (1967) 334; Phinney, Jr. provides a chart to visualize the relationship of this reveal/concealment of Medea’s maiden and sorceress elements. He concludes that Book 4 inverts the characterization (sorceress element is now dominant) but nevertheless the two main elements remain the same, therefore her change of character in Book 4 should not be considered inconsistent behaviour, but previously dormant behaviour now expressing itself more obviously.

⁹³ Though time does not permit me much time to discuss this, the mention of Medea in terms of a Stoic model asks the question of how Jason also fits into this analysis. I agree with the views Williams (1996), Mori (2005) that Jason should be viewed as a regular man, representative of the average man (this is in response to the Hellenistic interest in the individual) attempting to develop himself in journey towards becoming something analogous to the Stoic sage. Some of the arguments are; the presence of the epithet *amēchanos* declines dramatically as the journey proceeds as Jason, through experiences, improves his knowledge to know next time how better to handle the situation, this includes his increasing disinterest in the opposite sex. Jason’s apparent callous indifference towards Medea (with one exception at 3.1077-8) is representative of his development to becoming closer to the state of *apatheia*. Also see Jackson (1992).

two concepts is clear in this scene, if we read closely we can see that Apollonios applies a Chrusippean model of a unified psyche to Medea, not a partite one, to emphasise Medea's agency and to display the way that *pathē* affect the psyche as perceived in the Hellenistic Period, rather than the Classical:

ἐξομένη δῆπαιτα δοάσσατο, φώνησέν τε·
 “Δειλὴ ἐγώ, νῦν ἔνθα κακῶν ἢ ἔνθα γένωμαι;
 πάντῃ μοι φρένες εἰσὶν ἀμήχανοι, οὐδέ τις ἀλκή
 πῆματος, ἀλλ' αὐτῶς φλέγει ἔμπεδον. ὥς ὄφελόν γε
 Ἀρτέμιδος κραιπνοῖσι πάρος βελέεσσι δαμῆναι,
 πρὶν τόν γ' εἰσιδέειν, πρὶν Ἀχαΐδα γαῖαν ἰκέσθαι
 Χαλκιόπης υἱᾶς· τοὺς μὲν θεὸς ἢ τις Ἑρινὺς
 ἄμμι πολυκλαύτους δεῦρ' ἤγαγε κεῖθεν ἀνίας.
 φθείσθω ἀεθλεύων, εἴ οἱ κατὰ νειὸν ὀλέσθαι
 μοῖρα πέλει· πῶς γάρ κεν ἐμοὺς λελάθοιμι τοκῆας
 φάρμακα μησαμένη; ποῖον δ' ἐπὶ μῦθον ἐνίσψω;
 τίς δὲ δόλος, τίς μῆτις ἐπὶ κλοπος ἔσσειτ' ἀρωγῆς;
 ἢ μιν ἄνευθ' ἐτάρων προσπτύξομαι οἶον ἰοῦσα;
 δύσμορος· οὐ μὲν ἔολπα καταφθιμένοιο περ ἔμψης
 λωφήσειν ἀχέων· τότε δ' ἂν κακὸν ἄμμι πέλοιτο
 κεῖνος, ὅτε ζωῆς ἀπαμείρεται. ἐρρέτω αἰδώς,
 ἐρρέτω ἀγλαΐη· ὁ δ' ἐμῇ ἰότητι σαωθεῖς
 ἀσκηθῆς, ἵνα οἱ θυμῷ φίλον, ἔνθα νέοιτο·
 αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν αὐτῆμαρ, ὅτ' ἐξανύσειεν ἄεθλον,
 τεθναίνην, ἢ λαιμὸν ἀναρτήσασα μελάθρῳ
 ἢ καὶ πασσαμένη ραιστήρια φάρμακα θυμοῦ.
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥς φθιμένῃ μοι ἐπιλλίξουσιν ὀπίσσω
 κερτομίας. τηλοῦ δὲ πόλις περὶ πᾶσα βοήσει
 πότμον ἐμόν· καὶ κέν με διὰ στόματος φορέουσai
 Κολχίδες ἄλλυδις ἄλλαι ἀεικέα μωμήσονται·
 ‘ἢ τις κηδομένη τόσον ἀνέρος ἄλλοδαποῖο
 κάθθανεν, ἢ τις δῶμα καὶ οὖς ἤισχυνε τοκῆας,
 μαργοσύνην εἷξασα.’ Τί δ' οὐκ ἐμόν ἔσσεται αἴσχος;
 ὦ μοι ἐμῆς ἄτης. ἢ τ' ἂν πολὺ κέρδιον εἴη
 τῇδ' αὐτῇ ἐν νυκτὶ λιπεῖν βίον ἐν θαλάμοισι,
 πότμῳ ἀνωίστῳ κάκ' ἐλέγχεα πάντα φυγοῦσαν,
 πρὶν τάδε λωβήεντα καὶ οὐκ ὀνομαστὰ τελέεσαι.” (3.770-801)

*And so sitting, full of doubt she said:*⁹⁴

‘Which of these miseries am I to choose?’

⁹⁴ Apollonios experiments with many variations of this word δοάσσατο (innovating Homer's meanings, cf. *Il* 14.23; *Od* 24.239) to emphasise the presence of deliberation (3.770, 3.818-19, 3.954-55); Garson (1972) 1.

*My mind is utterly at a loss, nor is there any
cure for this pain, for it burns ceaselessly, always the same. Would
it have been better if earlier I were killed by the arrows of Artemis
before I saw him, before Chalkiope's sons reached the
Achaian land. Some god or Fury brought them from there
to cause me much weeping and anguish.
Let him die in the contest, if it is his fate to die on
that plane. How could I devise to help with my drugs
without my parents noticing! What could I say?
What trick, what crafty scheme can help them?
Shall I meet him alone, away from his comrades?
Oh I am unlucky! Nor do I expect that even his death will
bring relief from this anguish; that is when he will bring
me pain, when he no longer lives! Away with shame!
Away with good reputation! He will be saved by my desire
and may go off, unscathed, wherever he wants to go.
But I, on that same day, when the contest has been completed,
may I find death, either hanging my throat on a beam,
or by drinking drugs that destroy life.
But even after I am dead, hereafter they will reproach
me with their glances. Far off the whole city will shout
of my fate, and wherever they go, the Colchian women
will speak of me accuse me of shameful acts;
'she who cared so much for some foreign man,
that she died, she who dishonoured her home and her parents,
in yielding to her lust.' Of what disgrace will I not be accused?
Oh alas for my mad folly! Much better would it be to
end my life here, on this very night, in this room,
in an unexpected death, escaping all the bitter reproaches
before doing these outrageous and unspeakable things.'*

In this passage the impediment to Medea's happiness is her inability to make a decision according to right reason because of the combating emotions she feels. These two main emotions are desire and fear: desire for Jason, to save his life and to become his wife, and fear of the repercussions she might suffer for betraying her family. The genus of Stoic *pathē* comprises desire (*epithumia*), fear (*phobos*), pain (*lupē*) and pleasure (*hēdonē*), but desire and fear are primary.⁹⁵ Apollonios focuses in the Medea passages on her desire and fear, and the pain and pleasure they bring her. In line with Stoic thought, she feels both pain and pleasure as subsequent, or supplementary

⁹⁵ Annas (1992) 104; for a more comprehensive list see Stob, *Ecl* 2.90.19-91.9. Cairns states that *aidōs* is also included as a *pathos* (1993) 411.

emotions in response to her desire and fear. In Stoic doctrine, desire is directed toward apparent good, and fear is directed at apparent evil.⁹⁶ Pleasure and pain supervene on these sometimes: pleasure when we get what we are desiring or escape what we fear, and pain when we fail to get what we were desiring, or happen upon what we were fearing.⁹⁷ It is this intense pleasure (the *glukos*) which Medea feels when she gratifies her desire for Jason that is a major driving force behind her actions. It is because of this indecision and the tug-of-war between acting in accordance with reason and acting in accordance with a desire that this monologue recalls Euripides' *Medea* so strongly.

The background before which we must view Apollonios' treatment of Medea's passion and indecision is Euripides' *Medea*. Euripides' *Medea* was produced in 431 BC and depicted a hateful, powerful sorceress version of Medea as a woman dealing with her husband's rejection by killing their own two children and poisoning his new bride. The most powerful scene in that play is where Medea is deliberating whether to kill her children or not. This internal debate is animated as a push-and-pull between two controlling parts of her partite soul, anger (*thumos*) and reason (*bouleumata*). Medea's agency in the decision-making is reduced and she is overpowered and subject to the outcome of their battle.⁹⁸ Because of the feeling of being out of control of your own actions that such affection caused, this kind of state was a very frightful and dangerous concept for the philosophers, and should be cured. These few lines sparked great discussion in the philosophical community about *akrasia* (lack of control):

καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά,
 θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων,
 ὅσπερ μεγίστων αἴτιος κακῶν βροτοῖς. (*Medea* 1078-80)

*And although I see the evils which I am about to do,
 My anger (thumos) overpowers my rational plans to save the children,⁹⁹
 just as it is the blame of the greatest evils in me*

Medea acts in a state of *akrasia* because she is no longer feels in control of her own decisions and cannot act in accordance with reason. Instead, her emotion, her anger, her desire for revenge governs her and forces her to act in disobedience to right reason. Euripides' *Medea* was most likely constructed along Platonic lines and in fact

⁹⁶ Annas (1992) 105.

⁹⁷ Stob, *Ecl* 2.88.8-89.3

⁹⁸ The *thumos* is the agent; Gill (1996) 224.

⁹⁹ 'rational plans to save the children' is Foley's translation of these lines; (1989) 67.

the concept of *akrasia* was first discussed by Plato in his *Protagoras* where Socrates talks with Protagoras about the strength of knowledge. Plato says:

*Come, my good Protagoras, uncover some more of your thoughts: how are you in regard to knowledge? Do you share the view that most people take of this, or have you some other? The opinion generally held of knowledge is something of this sort—that it is no strong or guiding or governing thing; it is not regarded as anything of that kind, but people think that, while a man often has knowledge in him, he is not governed by it, but by something else—now by passion, now by pleasure, now by pain, at times by love, and often by fear; their feeling about knowledge is just what they have about a slave, that it may be dragged about by any other force. Now do you agree with this view of it, or do you consider that knowledge is something noble and able to govern man, and that whoever learns what is good and what is bad will never be swayed by anything to act otherwise than as knowledge bids, and that intelligence is a sufficient succour for mankind? (Plato, *Protagoras* 352b1ff)*

The hypothesis is that ordinarily, if a person exercises his knowledge and recognizes the right thing to do, he does it, but when the opposite happens, if a person recognizes the right thing to do, and acts contrary to it and in accordance instead with some kind of passion, then this can be viewed as *akrasia*, because how can anyone be fit to make decisions if they are not governed by knowledge. The right thing to do, ‘in accordance with reason’ would be not to kill her children and do harm to Jason and herself. The fact that Medea here seems to acknowledge that she knows what ‘evils’ (*kaka*) she is about to commit yet decides to commit them anyway, shows that she has now become *akratic*; she is ‘out of control’. Chrusippos said ‘a person not only rejects reason in desires, but also makes the supposition that he should ‘cleave’ to the thing even if it is not beneficial. (*De Placitis* IV 5.29-43).¹⁰⁰ This element of *akrasia* seems very important, as the person shows that they are ‘out of control’ by simultaneously knowing they should not do something, but then doing it anyway.¹⁰¹ This is because the *pathos* affects their ability to reason and do the right thing. However, Platonic and Stoic views regarding exactly *how* the *pathos* affects the person’s ability to reason are described very differently.

In Platonic *akratic* episodes, some internal factor such as *anger* (*thumos*) or reason (*logismos*) is said to take over and directs the person to bring about an action that is

¹⁰⁰ cf. *De Placitis* IV 6.27.

¹⁰¹ Joyce states ‘an agent, Medea, is *akratic* if and only if she freely, knowingly and intentionally performs an action Φ while judging that a similar action Ψ is the better thing to do’ (1995) 335.

different to what the person had previously recognized as best to do, yet an action which pursues the desire which the person is happy to gratify.¹⁰² Ethically, the ideal state is obviously for every man to be ruled and governed by knowledge and reason. However, when a person becomes governed by *pathē* they make him ignore his knowledge and reason. *Pathē*, however, cause a person to get carried away, and forget about their ‘reason’ side. Medea too, ignores reasonable plans and commits to killing her children in Euripides, and decides to betray her family in Apollonios, for ‘she no longer considered her rational plans (*boulē*)’ (3.818-19). These people are referred to as *akratēs* because they seem out of control. The philosophers educated how employing reason and knowledge are therapeutic and help cure mental defectiveness. Euripides’ Medea, in her lack of following reason indeed seems to have a lack of self-control, in fact she is taken *over* by her internal elements, anger and reason. It is exactly this interest in the loss of control over reasoning that attracted the early Stoic philosopher Chrusippos to the case of Medea, as he wanted to show why and how she was *akratic* because of her *pathos*. He however, did not discuss this as a push-and-pull relationship like the one Euripides presents. Apollonios responds to this portrayal of *pathē* and also Chrusippos’ criticisms of it in his construction of his Medea’s psychopathological experience.

Chrusippos’ discussion of the psyche and of the effects that *pathē* have on a person are recorded mainly in Galen’s work *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* and are as a result, tainted by Galen’s anti-Stoic polemic. Galen does, however, also engage passionately in the debate about Medea’s *akrasia* and provides an example of applying the theory of a tri-partite psyche to Euripides’ Medea. Galen’s main issue of contention with Chrusippos is regarding the nature of the *psukhē*: more specifically whether it is unified or tripartite in nature. Galen does not see Euripides’ Medea’s psyche as unified, but rather tri-partite, and as a result, in his reading parts of the psyche (anger and reason) have a battle and the winner takes control over Medea’s agency and actions:

She knew what an unholy and terrible thing she was doing when she set out to kill her children and therefore she hesitated... then anger dragged her again to the children by force, like some disobedient horse that has overpowered the charioteer; then reason in turn drew her back and led her away, then anger again exerted an opposite pull, and then again reason. Consequently, being

¹⁰² Rickert (1987) 94.

repeatedly driven up and down by the two of them, when she has yielded to anger, she utters these famous lines. (De Placitis III 3.14)

Galen sees the movement of the psyche during the decision scene as a violent push and pull between reason and anger that occurs between two of the elements within Medea. He views it in terms of a partite theory of the psyche; reason, desire and anger (*thumos*) were different parts of the psyche and possessed different faculties, and existed in spatially different areas of the body.¹⁰³ As separate entities, they seem to battle with one another inside the psyche.¹⁰⁴ This reading, one of a divided psyche, being engaged in a tug-of-war, is the reading taken up by some modern scholars also. Snell sees Euripides' Medea's monologue as a 'deliberative contribution to the late fifth century debate about the capacity of reason to control emotion.'¹⁰⁵ He sees Medea's monologue as an attestation to Plato's theory of the tri-partite soul.

On the other side of the coin, however, there is another way to interpret these lines of Euripides' Medea's monologue which is more in line with a Hellenistic Chrusippean model of the psyche and it is this model which Apollonios seems to follow. Chrusippos does not see Euripides' Medea's changes of mind as a result of being pushed and pulled by two internal elements that comprise her, but as a result of one unified psyche, oscillating between two different decisions. Knox argues that the only person who can pose an obstacle to Medea's plans is *Medea* herself, and in this reading he credits more power to Medea's agency. She pleads with herself, and changes her mind again and again, but her *thumos* overrules. The agents in conflict are not two distinct elements in Medea's psyche, but Medea *herself* is somehow involved with both sides of the dispute, she is not dragged away by a disobedient horse.¹⁰⁶ Chrusippos was interested in how a *pathos* can co-exist with, and overcome the awareness that the person has that the passion is based on a false judgement.¹⁰⁷ In response to contemporary philosophic thought Apollonios' Medea's psyche seems to be unified, the heart centralized, and her decision scenes mirror that of a Stoic account of decision

¹⁰³ Gill (1996) 231-34.

¹⁰⁴ cf. Galen, *De Placitis* III 7.13-14. Conflicts are able to arise between reason and desire, *thumos* and desire, and while *thumos* is a natural ally of reason it can also take the side of desire when 'corrupted' (cf. Plato, *Rep* 440e4-7, 441a2-3); Kerford (1981) 146. Graver describes the combat as 'The Platonic *thumos* seems to have the capacity to make judgements, since it has a way to disagree with the decisions of the reasoning part. Meanwhile, reason has motivations as well as theoretical understanding, and even appetite is able to identify objects and choose a course of action in relation to them' (2007) 75.

¹⁰⁵ Gill (1983) 137; Snell (1964) 52.

¹⁰⁶ Foley agrees that Euripides' Medea has more agency than the Galen approach allows; (1989) 64.

¹⁰⁷ Gill (1996) 230.

making, not one like that depicted in Euripides where one part supervenes and dominates the other. In Apollonios' Medea's monologue, desire and fear are not competing with one another, they are not pulling and pushing Medea's mind to this judgement now that. Instead, Medea engages in a stream of conscious narrative, where the expression of each emotion and idea articulates itself sequentially. Medea even initiates the monologue with a proclamation that *she* is the one who has to choose what to do: 'Alas, which of these miseries am I to choose? My mind is utterly at a loss' (3.771-2). Medea too exhorts to herself 'let him woe!' 'let him die!' yet then changes her mind to proclaim 'away with shame!' 'away with reputation!' (3.378ff) yet the last thing she says before she ultimately chooses to help Jason is, 'It would be much better to end my life here in my room on this very night in a death without explanation, and in doing so escape reproaches, than to do these dreadful, unspeakable things' (3.789-81). The Stoics tried to disprove the Platonic explanation that this indecision was a feeling of 'tug-of-war'. Instead they argued that these changes of mind are actually a successive series of very fast changes of mind in its entirety.¹⁰⁸ Apparent conflict of *pathē* and reason are according to the Stoics, the unitary mind's oscillation between pro and contra judgements.¹⁰⁹ This model of oscillation is further explained by Plutarch as, 'Emotion is no different from reason nor is there dissension and strife between two things, but the turning of one reason in both direction; this escapes our notice because of the swiftness and speed of the shift' (Plutarch, *Vir. Mor* 446ff). In fact Gill says of Chrusippos' picture of Medea that 'he likely would have seen Medea as more actively involved in either side in turn, and each side acting as a complete self, with 'reason' and 'emotions' of different kinds in play on each side.'¹¹⁰ This concept of unified psyche, which alternates between wanting to act in accordance with reason, and then passion, aligns with Chrusippos' analysis of Euripides' Medea's monologue.

In opposition to Galen's explanation of the horse overcoming the charioteer to explain how a person may not act in accordance with reason, Chrusippos uses this analogy:

When a man walks in accordance with a conation, the motion of his legs is not excessive but in some way commensurate with the conation, so that he may stop when he wishes, or change his pace. But when persons run in

¹⁰⁸ Knuuttila & Sihvola (1998) 5.

¹⁰⁹ Long (2008) 581-2.

¹¹⁰ Gill (1983) 142.

accordance with a conation, this sort of thing no longer happens. The moment they set out to do so. I think that something similar to these (movements of the legs) happens also in conations because of an excess beyond the rational measure, so that when a man exercises the conation he is not obedient to reason; and whereas the excess in running is termed contrary to the conation, the excess in conations is termed contrary to reason. For the proper measure of natural conation is that which is conformable to reason and which goes only so far as reason thinks right. Therefore when excess arises in this respect and under these conditions, it is said to be an excessive conation and an unnatural movement of the soul. (De Placitis IV 2.14-18)

In Chrusippos' model, the process of running originates because of someone's deliberate choice, but once they are running, they are unable to 'stop on a dime' as a walker would be able to as he has gained his own momentum. This picture suggests that a person may be conscious of his *pathos* (as he is conscious of his legs moving) as Medea is, but that this 'movement' of the psyche may no longer express his/ her deliberate choice. There is an implication of intentionality in saying that someone disobeys or rejects reason, and in order for the action of disobedience or rejection to be intentional, one has to be conscious of what they are rejecting, i.e. they know what they *should not* do. This is one of the crucial qualifications of *akrasia*.¹¹¹

What is the result of this? Why does it matter? Apollonios' Medea is given more control over her own agency and she is made more responsible. In addition, the exposition of her process of decision-making also forces the audience to sympathise with her, as we watch her go through emotional turmoil which because of the alluring temptation of desire forces her to compromise her very moral integrity. While Medea is more responsible for her actions in Chrusippos' model,¹¹² Chrusippos seems to actually vilify her less.¹¹³ In Plato's theory of the tri-partite soul, the two elements that were not 'reason' were considered irrational. Plato tried to distance himself from these and

¹¹¹ Aristotle differentiated between two kinds of *akrasia*: impetuosity and weakness. The latter, having deliberated do not stand by what they have deliberated because of a passion, the former are lead by a passion because they have not deliberated (*N.E* 1150b19-22, 1151a1-5, 1152a18-19); Charles (2011) 189. In addition to this, although they fail to stand by the result of what they had previously deliberated, Charles states that there is no reason to believe that their reasoning has been forgotten; (2011) 193.

¹¹² The Stoics judged that ultimately any deviance from acting in accordance with universal reason results from a failure on the agent's part to exercise rationality; Kerford (1981) 156. The individual is thus responsible for himself and his feelings; Lloyd (2003) 209.

¹¹³ For a discussion of Medea's own views on her responsibility see Papadopoulou (1997) 659.

considered the spirited and desiderative impulses as bestial and ‘lower’.¹¹⁴ While Euripides’ Medea is controlled by her irrational and bestial impulses, Apollonios’ Medea chooses to act in accordance *with* these impulses because *her* ability as agent to reason has been compromised by her *pathē*. In Chrusippos’ model, the psyche is undivided and as a result, we are indissolubly identified with our emotions and their expressions. They are not considered to have come about completely unintentionally. The Stoics insist that emotions involve the whole psyche, and are expressed in its activities; they are not produced by a subordinate and potentially alien part within us, and Annas explains this as follows: ‘Our emotions and feelings, turbulent and dysfunctional though they can be, cannot be ascribed to an irrational part over which the agent only has indirect control’.¹¹⁵ Medea is not a beast to Chrusippos, she is out of control like the runner in his model of *akrasia*, afflicted by an excessive passion. Her state is not one of complete irrationality, where she ceases to function as a human, it is of rejection or disobedience to reason whether acting upon the passion is still what she wants to do or not, like the running legs, she no longer has control to stop it. There is a divide between the individual as he is at the moment and as he might be, if he exercised his full potentiality of human reasoning. At any one moment, the person functions as a whole, even if his functioning is a sort of malfunctioning.¹¹⁶

And if we were to apply Chrusippos’ running man analogy to Apollonios’ Medea we could predict the outcome of the decision-making process. Just as a person running is carried away by an impulse and cannot obediently change his pace the moment they want to, so too Medea, being carried away by her passion could not obediently change her pace the moment she wanted to. She must be with Jason, and to be with him she travels down the path she has recognised as wrong and must not go down. Her *pathos* has compromised the control she has over her decision-making, and her ability to reason properly has left her and ‘she could not think of anything other than Jason’ (3.289-90).¹¹⁷ The thought of Jason controls Medea’s existence and the pursuit of his approval and love compromises her own fundamental values. At the end of her monologue Medea is resolved to help Jason and even though she is still

¹¹⁴ Annas (1992) 116.

¹¹⁵ Annas (1992) 115-16.

¹¹⁶ Gill (1983) 140.

¹¹⁷ In this moment, Medea is devoid of her good senses, her *phrenes* have left her. *Erōs* in literature is absent from the psychic organs (*nous*, *phrenes*) because of its ability to impair rationality and decision making; Calame (1999) 19.

ecstatically moving ahead with her plans, she simultaneously recognizes that it is wrong to do so (3.1130-3, 3.1159-62). And it is the conviction with which Medea holds these values that makes the decision which she must go through all the more painful and impassioned. It is also because of the conviction with which she holds these values that makes her all the more sympathetic.¹¹⁸

Thus I have shown how Apollonios constructs Medea's psyche according to philosophical constructions to realistically provide a model of how a *pathos* affects a psyche in its ability to make decisions and act in accordance with reason. Apollonios thus shows how ultimately *erōs* manifests as dangerous emotions while simultaneously warning the audience of the moral dissonance that *erōs* creates in society. Apollonios follows Chrusippos' model of how a *pathos* sways a person to act in accordance with that desire and the resistance that the person employs to oppose this. Chrusippos' opinion is hugely important, because it provides an account of how a *pathos* affects the psyche, and its ability to act in accordance with reason was conceived in the Hellenistic Period. It pinpoints a moment in time, when some philosophers started to think of the psyche as unified, and the interaction between passions and the psyche became not one where passion resides inside us, in the *thumos*, and can rise and battle 'reason', another element of our psyche, but where the psyche is endowed with reason and oscillates between acting in accordance with that reason, and acting in accordance with the passion which infiltrates from outside us.¹¹⁹ In following this, Apollonios describes Medea's mind as unified, which provides an updated realistic model of decision making where the *hēgemonikon* oscillates between decisions. This struggle represents Medea's indecision. This is shown in part through *erōs*' manifestation as upsets in the psyche's pneumatic tension, the upset of which weakens her mind's resolve and will and heightens the struggle and sympathy of her indecision. Apollonios constructs his Medea along contemporary philosophical models to realistically portray her psyche's interaction with *pathē*. He also provides a model to explain to his learned audience the medical and psychological limitations that the manifestation of a *pathos* puts on a person's very ability to function.

My next chapter focuses on the physiopathology of Medea; the ways that *erōs* manifests itself physically in Medea's body. I discuss how *erōs* causes in Medea

¹¹⁸ Gill (1983) 140.

¹¹⁹ Reason is not separable from the human psyche and is involved in all its activities; Annas (1992) 67-8.

external symptoms that convey her illness. In this, *erōs* becomes physicalized and treated in accordance with the medical symptoms it produces. In the *Argonautika*, *erōs* manifests itself as internal heat which inflames to produce symptoms of fever. *Erōs* exhibits itself as redness on Medea's cheeks, movement in her eyes and as an erratic impassioned pulse. Apollonios also manifests *erōs* as somatic pain, which is the ultimate physical manifestation of emotional pain. He does this through constructing Medea along medical and philosophical terms and references contemporary advancements in anatomy, such as those concerning the nervous system, to heighten the realism of her sensations.

In doing so, Apollonios constructs the manifestation of *erōs* along medical and philosophical lines and as a result he creates a symbiosis of poetic and scientific realism.

CHAPTER II: PHYSIO-PATHOLOGY

This chapter looks at the pathology of Medea's body as it is affected by 'love-sickness'. I focus on the ways that the *pathos*, acting as a sickness, interacts with the internal balance of the body to produce physical symptoms of the illness. In this way, *pathē* become medicalized, as they are exhibited as physical sickness, which physicians can interpret to find the nature of the *pathos*. This physicalization of love is possible because of the corporeality of the psyche and also because of the interest in finding cause from effect. As will be exhibited in this chapter, Medea frequently suffers symptoms associated with fever, such as blushing, misty eyes, rapid movements and an erratic pulse. The cause of these symptoms should be considered an excess of her internal heat, aggravated by the *pathos* which results in fever. Apollonios merges the symbolism of fire being associated with the sensation of love with the medical aetiology of her disease as a fever to create realism in her experience of love-sickness. This realism is heightened by Apollonios' description of *erōs*' manifestation as physical pain. By incorporating contemporary medical discoveries like the nervous system Apollonios is able to utilize the new conceptions of sense-perception to realistically show the way that destructive emotions manifest themselves as perceivable physical pain.

This chapter looks at how the *pathos erōs* manifests itself inside Medea and in turn how this is expressed on Medea's outward appearance as a medical symptom. Apollonios uses the image of the arrow to transfer *erōs* from the physical plane into the emotional plane to manifest in Medea's chest as a fire blazing. This fire is representative of the concept of 'internal fire'. The increase of this causes Medea's symptoms which are traditionally associated with fever.¹²⁰ The first example of this manifestation in Medea's outward appearance is the simple appearance of her blush which occurs at *erōs*' inception:

αὐτὸς δ' ὑπορόφοιο παλιμπετὲς ἐκ μεγάροιο
καρχαλόων ἦιξε· βέλος δ' ἐνεδαίετο κούρηι
νέρθεν ὑπὸ κραδίῃ φλογὶ εἵκελον. ἀντία δ' αἰεὶ
βάλλεν ἐπ' Αἰσονίδην ἀμαρύγματα, καὶ οἱ ἄηντο
στηθέων ἐκ πυκινὰ καμάτωι φρένες, οὐδέ τιν' ἄλλην
μῆστιν ἔχεν, γλυκερὶ δὲ κατεῖβετο θυμὸν ἀνίη·
ὥς δὲ γυνὴ μαλερῶι περὶ κάρφεα χεύετο δαλῶι

¹²⁰ Fever is the oldest and best known manifestation of disease, for a discussion see Atkins (1985) 339.

χερνῆτις, τῇ περ ταλασῆια ἔργα μέμηλεν,
 ὥς κεν ὑπωρόφιον νύκτωρ σέλας ἐντύναιτο,
 ἄγχι μάλ' ἐζομένη· τὸδ' ἀθέσφατον ἐξὸλίγιοιο
 δαλοῦ ἀνεγρόμενον σὺν κάρφεα πάντ' ἀμαθύνει·
 τοῖος ὑπὸ κραδίῃ εἰλυμένος αἶθετο λάθρηι
 οὔλος ἔρωσ· ἀπαλὰς δὲ μετετροπᾶτο παρειάς
 ἐς χλόον, ἄλλοτ' ἔρευθος, ἀκηδείηισι νόοιο. (Arg 3. 285-298)

And Erōs, rejoicing with a mocking laugh, darted back out of the high-roofed palace. But his arrow burned deep in the girl's heart like a flame. Medea kept casting bright-glances sideways at Jason, and her heart fluttered out of her chest in her love-sickness. She thought of nothing else, and her heart flooded with sweet anguish. As when a woman heaps up twigs around a raging brand, a poor woman whose livelihood is spinning, so that she can have light in her house at night, crouches near the fire. A fierce flame conflagrates from a small one, and the raging fire consumes all the kindling together. Just like this destructive erōs crouched unseen, blazing in Medea's heart. At one moment her cheeks drain pale, at another they flush red, the control of her mind now gone.

In this passage the blush is the final external symptom that Apollonios offers to the audience and this represents the importance that the study of symptomology had in the ancient world, as the symptoms of the body were really the only clue to the physician as to the nature of the patient's illness.¹²¹ This is because there were strict taboos regarding cutting into dead bodies¹²² and to compensate for the limitations of this, the philosophers and physicians developed the field of physiognomy, which dictates that from external characteristics we theoretically are able to gain insight into both medical and psychological characteristics. The physiognomists also sometimes attempt to provide a cause for them and attribute them to internal imbalances, like internal heat. Physiognomy is a useful tool when studying the *Argonautika* because Apollonios places an emphasis on the face, eyes, expression and symptoms of his characters within the narrative, and these external symptoms that characters display are the only clue to the other characters in the *Argonautika* about their psychological and medical states.¹²³ These symptoms can be understood when read in addition to the

¹²¹ Percy (1992) 601.

¹²² Longrigg (1998) 457.

¹²³ Chalkiope recognises that Medea is affected by a *nousos* (3.676) and Jason recognises her as suffering from an *atē* (3.973).

insights that Apollonios gives his audience through glimpses into the unseen, internal cause of this external symptom. The *most* common external symptoms is the change in the colour of the cheeks and the frequency of this symptom and its prominence of place in important psychopathological scenes warrants investigation as to what exactly this means to the physiognomist and how Apollonios manipulates this.

In the *Argonautika* the blush implicates anger, desire, loss of innocence, bashfulness, abandonment of maidenly shame and foreshadows murder, which is the ultimate consequence of Medea's desire. In the *Argonautika* red often signifies an irreversible change in the person's character in ways that usually have serious moral consequences;¹²⁴ this is because it represents the presence of a *pathos* which provokes erratic behaviour.

In a time when the understanding of physical symptomology was lacking, the change of one's skin colour was a clear indication to the physician and the other characters that something was wrong internally. The question is then, how is Medea's change of cheek colour described in medical and philosophical writings? What are its causes and what exactly do the colours mean to a physician who has drawn on years of cultural opinions? For an insight into this we must delve into the field of physiognomy, the study of what insight physical characteristics can offer for the study of mental and behavioural characteristics. Their investigations include: 'movements, gestures of the body, colour, characteristic facial expression, the growth of the hair, the smoothness of the skin, the voice, condition of the flesh, the parts of the body, and the build of the body as a whole. (*Physiognomica* 806a23-806b3) It is these same things that Apollonios focuses on to provide insight to the psychology of his characters.

Physiognomy is a pseudo-science and always bore a close relationship to medicine and this is probably the reason that philosophers and physicians saw its use in their attempt to understand a man's condition when it was not transparent.¹²⁵ In Förster's catalogue of the *loci physiognomici* the emergence of physiognomy becomes evident, as little to no evidence of it can be found in the works of Homer, Aeschylus and Sophocles, and only insignificant traces in Aristophanes, Euripides, Thucydides, Herodotus and other Attic orators.¹²⁶ Physiognomics as a field of study seems to have

¹²⁴ Pavlock (1990) 29.

¹²⁵ Armstrong (1958) 52.

¹²⁶ cited in Evans (1969) 6.

existed in Greece as early as during the time of Pericles. Zopyrus claimed to be proficient in physiognomy, and Galen attributed Hippocrates who was also working in this time period as the inventor of physiognomy.¹²⁷ Plato also shows a fair amount of interest in physiognomy and has a few observations to add, and another of Socrates' pupils, the philosopher Anisthenes wrote a treatise on it (Diog. Laert., *Lives* 6.16).¹²⁸ There existed two different types of physiognomists, the seers (*metopôskopoi*) and the physicians. It is not until Aristotle that we see the first systematic treatment of physiognomy, and he elaborates on many tenets that appear already accepted in his *Analytica Priora*, *De Anima*, *Historia Animalium*, *De Partibus Animalium*, *De Generatione Animalium*, and most devotedly in the *Physiognomica* attributed to Pseudo-Aristotle. Physiognomy after this time flourished in popularity, and its greatest peak in popularity can be seen in the 3rd century BC which is largely due to its popularity in Stoic and Peripatetic thought.¹²⁹ Loxus the physiognomist is dated to the 3rd century BC,¹³⁰ and the Stoics Zeno and Posidonius in particular seem to have advanced physiognomics and used it with practical applications. The early Stoics included a proficiency in physiognomy as one of the characteristics of a wise-man (Diog. Laert., *Lives* 7.173).¹³¹ Galen himself in his foray into physiognomics follows Stoic sources.¹³² A reflection of this rise in popularity can be seen in the increased interest in characterization and personality that litters the literature of the Hellenistic Period,¹³³ and the importance that the eyes, skin and facial expressions had in depicting characterization. The expanse and legitimacy of this profession and medical school of thought can be seen in an epigram by Theocritus (3rd century BC), which attests to the professional status of the physiognomist Eusthenes).¹³⁴ The persistence of the physiognomy can be seen into the 4th century AD in an anonymous text which also discusses the ideas of predecessors like Polemus and Psuedo-Aristotle.¹³⁵ Apollonios' incorporation of physiognomic references shows his inclusion in the contemporary

¹²⁷ Evans (1969) 5-6. Physiognomy has its origins in Babylonia, but the emphasis was on predicting the vicissitudes of a man's life; Armstrong (1958) 52.

¹²⁸ Evans (1969) 6.

¹²⁹ The most important technical handbooks are: Pseudo-Aristotle's *Physiognomica* (3rd century BC); Polemo Rhetor of Laodicea's *De Physiognomica* (2nd century AD); Adamantus the Sophist's *Physiognomica* (4th century AD); and an anonymous Latin handbook *De Physiognomica* (4th century AD).

¹³⁰ Armstrong (1958) 53.

¹³¹ Tsouna (1998) 185.

¹³² Evans (1969) 26.

¹³³ Evans (1969) 10.

¹³⁴ Evans (1969) 10.

¹³⁵ Evans (1969) 10.

discussion of characterization, a trend which remained consistent. Seneca was also interested in physiognomics, and it proves most evident that Euripides' Medea's cheeks never change in colour, but both Apollonios' and Seneca's Medeas do.¹³⁶

The account for the rise in physiognomics in the Hellenistic period, especially among the Stoics, is in part due to the contemporary trend of thought that the soul was corporeal. This belief entailed that the soul's affections manifestly became the affections of the body, and vice versa.¹³⁷ Pseudo-Aristotle himself hints at this:¹³⁸

Soul and body, as it seems to me, are affected sympathetically by one and other: on the one hand, an alteration of the state of the soul produces an alteration in the form of the body, and contrariwise an alteration in bodily form produces an alteration in the state of soul. Grief and joy, to take an instance, are states of the soul, and everyone knows that grief involves a gloomy and joy a cheerful countenance. Now if it were the case that the external expression persisted after the soul had got rid of these emotions, we might still say that soul and body are in sympathy, but their sympathetic changes would not be entirely concomitant. As a matter of fact, however, it is obvious that every modification of the one involves a modification of the other. The best instance of this is to be found in manic insanity. (Physiognomica 808b11-808b26)¹³⁹

It is through this corporeality that emotion is able to manifest somatically in the form of, for example, a blush. In addition, Aristotle established the main use of physiognomics which is its use in determining the cause of the disease from the effect, rather than effect from cause. Apollonios uses this same principle in his employment of describing physical manifestations of *erōs* and provides the medical cause of the blush: an increase in internal heat. External symptoms are thus used as indicators of the psychological and physiological disturbances that occur unseen and their analysis can help determine a diagnosis.

The skin is obviously an ideal indicator of any internal change because it changes colour. The rapid and continual switch between red and white on Medea's

¹³⁶ Evans (1969) 62.

¹³⁷ The Stoics notion of the corporeality of the soul came about from a denial that anything can exist which is not a body or a state of body; Long (1996) 227. Since the soul interacts the body the soul must be corporeal. For a detailed discussion on the structure of thought see Hankinson (1998) 239-241. The body was thought to be mixed 'through and through' (*krasis di' holoon*) which Alexander of Aphrodisias explains as 'for none of the soul lacks a share in the body which possesses the soul' (Alex. Aphr. *Mixt* 11.473); Long (1996) 231.

¹³⁸ cf. *Physiognomica* 805a1-805a17. Although Pseudo-Aristotle did not mean that the psyche *must* be corporeal because of this, although the Stoics did.

¹³⁹ Translations of Aristotle are taken from Barnes (ed.) (1991) *Complete Works (Aristotle)*.

cheeks reveals to the audience the fluctuations of Medea's physical and psychological anguish. The colour for white (*khloōn*) which Apollonios uses has a medical flavour¹⁴⁰ and is immediately evocative of Sappho 31 where a similar word is used to convey Sappho's anguish on her skin. *Khlōros* here indicates a pale, sickly green that comes on at love's frustration:

ἑκαδε μ' ἰδρὼς ψυχρὸς κακχέεται τρόμος δὲ
 παῖσαν ἄγρει, χλωροτέρα δὲ ποίας
 ἔμμι, τεθνάκην δ' ὀλίγω 'πιδεύης
 φαίνομ' ἔμ' αὖται (Sappho. fr. 31. 13-16)

*Sweat runs down, a shiver shakes
 me deep, I feel paler than grass,
 As close to death as that, and green,
 is how I seem.*

Sappho's *pathos* here manifests itself physically as the sickly colour on her skin. This manifestation is the 'seen' but the 'felt' i.e., what her psyche is going through, remains concealed from those around her. It is because of this concealment of the internal that Aristotle developed medical theories behind what was causing the manifestation in order to better understand the cause of them. This is the last stanza of her poem, and reveals the climax of Sappho's mental and physical anguish. This climax can be seen as the final externalization of her *pathos*, the ultimate manifestation of her desires into the 'seen'. This is the moment when her internal anguish can be seen by those around her and she can no longer conceal her bodily alterations that *erōs* affects. Apollonios too, often follows this model of retarding the external physical symptom until the climax of the psychopathological description (3.298) to emphasise the climactic effect of the *pathos* taking over Medea's body. He also is fond of using the colour of the cheeks in particular to represent the physical expression of *pathē*'s disruption in the body.

Firstly, paleness in the *Argonautika*, more than anything else, seems to signify fear. In Book 2 Jason and his comrades have the 'paleness of fear' come over their cheeks (2.1210) and later, at the thought of impending death on the desert island, in fear, the comrades' 'hearts grew cold and the colour drained from their cheeks' (4.1280). Apollonios thus associates paleness mainly with fear as well as a reference to

¹⁴⁰ Hunter (1989) 131.

paleeness from a sickness such as the one that Sappho suffers. Pseudo-Aristotle also states that paleeness is a result of ‘terror and cowardice, as is seen in women.’ (*Physiognomica* 812a12-812a26). The Stoic Cleanthes explains this in relation to the sympathetic connection of mind and body when it comes in particular to the skin:¹⁴¹

When the body is sick or hurt, the soul suffers with it, and conversely the body with the soul. For when the soul feels shame the body blushes, and when the soul feels fear, the body blanches. Therefore the soul is corporeal. (Nerresius, 545-548)¹⁴²

Apollonios thus blends the poetic tradition of associating paleeness with frustrated desire and the medical tradition that it is a sign of fear. Here, Apollonios is implying that Medea is both desirous of Jason, and also fearful of her future decision which her desire will force. She knows that her father is violent and vengeful and so choosing Jason becomes interwoven with the possibility that she will get caught by her father. This alternation between feeling desire and fear is then showed physically on her face. Redness of skin signifies bashfulness, irascibility, impudence, desire and is a sign of a rogue (*panourgos*) who is prone to outbursts of passion.¹⁴³

First, observe how redness incites and indicates sexual delight and joy: ‘Medea’s heart within her leapt for joy, her beautiful face grew flushed, and a mist descended all over her in the warmth of her delight’ (3.724-6). Redness is first seen when Jason appears to the Lemnian women like the star Hesperos, his ‘red (*ereuthos*) brilliance bewitches their eyes through the dark air’ (1.777-8) and closely followed after this the *ereuthos* manifests itself on Hypsipyle’s cheeks.¹⁴⁴ The colour represents the inception of Hypsipyle’s desire, and foreshadows the similar reaction that Medea will have to manic behaviours.

This redness (*ereuthos*), in consequence, usually indicates the future abandonment of maidenly shame. It thus represents sexual desire and holds

¹⁴¹ Long (1996) 236 uses this quote as an example of Cleanthes’ argument of *sympatheia*. Aristotle also noticed the way that *pathē* are ‘inseparable from the physical matter of animals’ (Aristotle, *De Anima* 1.1403b17) but he does not conclude that because of this the psyche *must* be body, but the Stoics do.

¹⁴² Evans (1969) 82.

¹⁴³ All of these behaviours (perhaps with the exception of bashfulness), are negative, and not the personality traits that a virtuous man would aim to have. These find their parallels in physiognomy and retain their negative connotations. In fact, according to Pseudo-Aristotle, the wise-man most likely would have a pale pink or tawny complexion (*Physiognomica* 806b4-806b5).

¹⁴⁴ cf. *Arg* 1.230-33 where the nymph’s cheeks flush red in her lust for Hylas.

connotations of the Lemnians' sexual aggression ¹⁴⁵ which does in fact manifest in Medea. However, the blush also, as Cleanthes points out, represents bashfulness. It simultaneously represents the feeling of desire and the embarrassment of having that feeling at the same time. This bashfulness however, is short-lived and *ereuthos* indicates the abandonment of maidenly shame in the pursuit of desire. Apollonios describes Hypsipyle as having 'coy reserve' (1.785) but she quickly abandons this reserve and sense of shame to address Jason. Redness both instigates the desire, and is also a physical manifestation of it. The 'shameless' Erōs also blushes red. Therefore, it is a symbol completely entwined with desire, but also represents the combative relationship between desire and shame, and ultimately how desire will, in most people, conquer.

Apollonios uses the blush in a similar way to describe Medea's conflict between desire and her sense of *aidōs*. When Chalkiope questioned Medea as to what was wrong Medea's cheeks 'grew red and for a long time maidenly shame held her back' (3.681-2). *Ereuthos* is employed whenever Medea begins to lose the battle with the social value *aidōs*,¹⁴⁶ and just as Hypsipyle acted in accordance with desire, rather than shame, Medea too will do the same. Instead of speaking the truth to her sister she 'speaks with cunning, for the bold *Erotes* buffeted hard against her' (3.686-7) in order to advance her plans to help Jason. Her blush signifies the familiar sign of bashfulness, but also indicates the subsequent abandonment of said bashfulness. Pseudo-Aristotle himself describes one of the meanings of redness in this way, 'a face that reddens easily marks a bashful man, for blushing is an expression of bashfulness' (*Physiognomica* 812a27-812b13). After Medea is first struck by Erōs' arrow and we see her subsequent blush, she pulls her veil sideways to stare at Jason (3.445-46). Medea's veil is an important symbol of her modesty, and over the course of the poem its employment, as well as that of *ereuthos* can be used to track Medea's moral degradation.¹⁴⁷ Jason too, when he abandons shame, exhibits a similar symptom; 'At one moment they stared coyly at the ground, and at the next they cast glances at each other, and smiling with desire, their faces lit up' (3.1022-4). This is carried further as when Jason comes upon the golden fleece in Book 4, and he finally obtains the object of his desire, he again is

¹⁴⁵ Pavlock (1990) 30.

¹⁴⁶ Pavlock (1990) 30.

¹⁴⁷ Pavlock (1990) 31. cf. 1.759-762 where Jason's cloak depicts the giant Tityos attempting to rape Leto as pulls aside her veil, which serves as a symbol of the compromise of her maidenly shame; Rose (1985) 35.

depicted with flame-like blush over his cheeks, ‘as when a girl catches in her dress the gleam of the full moon hanging high over her bedroom under the roof, and her heart is delighted at the sight of the lovely radiance; just so did Jason rejoice as he lifted the great fleece in his hands, and over his face and forehead the sparkle of the wool threw a blush like flame’ (4.167-73).¹⁴⁸ This moment recalls not only the image of the Lemnians, but Medea as well, and thus shows the potential/ inevitable results that such powerful lust and desire can produce.¹⁴⁹ This is ultimately actualized in the shameful murder of Absyrtos where red is again employed to signify desire’s effects.

The poignancy of the symbolism of red in the murder scene is somewhat foreshadowed by Apollonios’ fondness for the contrast of red against white. For Apollonios is known for being particularly fond of the colour red especially against a white background¹⁵⁰ and this is probably influenced by advances in painting aesthetics in Hellenistic painting.¹⁵¹ Pliny states, ‘Eventually painting developed different characteristics and exhibited light and shade, while contrast of colours (*differentia colorum*) intensified those colours reciprocally’ (Pliny, *H.N* 35.29). Apollonios expresses this most vividly in two particular scenes: the inception of Medea’s desire and the murder of Absyrtos when Medea’s silver veil is stained red by Absyrtos’ blood. In this moment the red that represents the ultimate destruction that Medea’s desire has caused becomes permanent, ‘And at last hero breathing out his life caught up in both hands the dark blood as it welled from the wound, and he dyed red his sister’s silvery veil and robe as she shrank away’ (3.471-74). This image recalls the first time we saw this colour contrast: when Medea is first struck by Erōs’ arrow, and her cheeks blush between redness and pallor; the inception of Medea’s desire. ‘At one moment her cheeks drain pale, at another they flush red, the control of her mind now gone.’ (3.297-8). Here Apollonios shows the cause of the later effect.

The veil which was the symbol of Medea’s propriety and maidenly shame is now permanently stained with the reminder and pollution of her brother’s murder. This second instance of stark contrast of *ereuthos* on white signifies the consequence of the first inception of desire. Her moral degradation is also enhanced by her lack of

¹⁴⁸ cf. 4.125-6. Knight discusses the sexual imagery here and how the wedding dress in moonlight foreshadows the bad future marriage; (1991) 250; Bremer (1987) 423.

¹⁴⁹ cf. 4.1143.

¹⁵⁰ Phinney Jr. (1967) 146.

¹⁵¹ Phinney Jr. (1967) 147.

deliberation over her brother's murder.¹⁵² Thus we can see how Apollonios traces Medea's moral degradation through the colour red. What is interesting is that through physiognomic references Apollonios employs physiognomy's main function: predicting future behaviours.¹⁵³ Thus, according to physiognomy, Medea's redness foretells her impassioned behaviour. Pseudo-Aristotle says: 'Impudence is signified by small, bright, wide-open eyes, with heavy bloodshot lids slightly bulging; high shoulder-blades; a carriage of the body not erect, but crouched slightly forwards; quickness of movement; a reddish hue over the body; with a sanguine complexion, a round face, and high chest' (*Physiognomica* 807b29-808a2). The redness on Medea too, is not just localized to her cheeks, but it covers her whole body 'all over' (ἅμυδις) at one point (3.725).¹⁵⁴ The redness on Medea's cheeks foreshadows her impudence and betrayal of her family and it foreshadows her as a rogue as, 'too ruddy a hue marks a rogue (*panourgos*), as in the case of the fox' (*Physiognomica* 812a12-812a26).

In addition to impudence and desire, in physiognomic thought, the most frequent characteristic of redness on one's body is a proneness to irascibility and passion: "Men of fierce temper bear themselves erect, are broad about the ribs and move with an easy gait; their bodies are of a reddish hue (*epipurros*)' (*Physiognomica* 808a20-808a23).¹⁵⁵ Thus the redness of Medea's cheeks also foreshadows her anger that she exhibits in Book 4, but more drastically, outside the limits of the *Argonautika*, in the plot of Euripides' *Medea*.

This overwhelmingly prevalent idea that redness of skin indicates anger and irascibility pervaded medical and philosophical thought into the Hellenistic period and persisted for a long time thereafter. This is largely in part due to the role given to the concept of internal heat in creating restlessness and impassioned behaviour. Pseudo-Aristotle describes the importance of this concept of internal heat and how it influences mind and body thus:

A red hue indicates hastiness, for all parts of the body on being heated by movement turn red. A flaming skin, however, indicates mania for it results from

¹⁵² Holmberg (1998) 154.

¹⁵³ Tsouna (1998) 184.

¹⁵⁴ Hunter (1989) 175; cf. 3.1012.

¹⁵⁵ cf. *Physiognomica* 808a33-808a33, 812a27-812b13.

*an overheated body, and extreme bodily heat is likely to mean mania. Pathos brings this on. (Physiognomica 812a12-812a26)*¹⁵⁶

Apollonios himself presents an increase of internal heat as the cause for Medea's red skin in lines 3.285-98. Erōs' manifestation in Medea is first expressed as fire burning beneath her heart, then as a blush upon her face. Apollonios here uses the simile of the wool-worker and the burning brand to represent the destructive power that *erōs* has over Medea. He emphasises the fire and shows it in full blaze to mimic the extremeness of the manic behaviour it causes. The redder the skin, the hotter the internal heat. The most severe characteristic of red skin is mania, as Aristotle says:

*There are solid earthy fibres in the thick blood which produce a passionate temperament and make it liable to outbursts of passions. For example passion (ὀργή) produces heat, and solids which are heated give off more heat. Fibres are solid, and when inside the blood, cause it to boil up, if fits of passion come on. Thus bulls and boars are liable to fits of passion because their blood is fibrous. (Aristotle, De Partibus Animalum 2.2 648a)*¹⁵⁷

The presence of the image of love 'burning' is, of course evocative of Sappho. However, Apollonios in adapting Sappho's image of burning love exaggerates it to the extreme. It is not a gentle flame that creeps beneath her skin (χρῶι πῦρ ὑπαδεδρόμηκεν fr. 31.10), it is an all-consuming fire that rages and it quickly and easily devours the twigs which represent Medea and consumes her very heart. Campbell posits that Medea is the wool-weaver, nourishing her own desire; however, he seems to have in mind the image of Dido, rather than Medea (*Aeneid* 4.1-2, 66-67).¹⁵⁸ As Matone notes, the wool-weaver is reminiscent of Aphrodite who is likened to a wool-weaver (*Iliad* 3.386-87).¹⁵⁹ It can be metaphorically seen then that love is stoking the flame, perhaps blowing on it, as *erōs* often blows and buffets Medea with its breezes. The fire is shown in full conflagration, devouring the passive victim Medea to show the heightened destructiveness of *erōs* in this poem. In fact, the image of fire in the form of

¹⁵⁶ Galen too ascribed to the idea of internal heat and its effect on the mental condition: 'If very much heat dominates, straightaway there is bitter anger, and madness and rashness' (*Ars Medica* 10).

¹⁵⁷ See also Galen, *Anim. Mor. Corp. Temp* 4.796; *De Placitis* III 1.30-33; *Part. Anim* 24.650b.

¹⁵⁸ Campbell (1983) 28.

¹⁵⁹ Matone (1999) 68 discusses how this is also reminiscent of the wool-working woman in *Iliad* 12.433-435: 'But they held even, as the scales of a careful working-woman/ who holds the balance and draws up the wool in it on both sides/ making them equal, in order that she win a pitiful wage for her children:/ thus their battle and war-waging was stretched equally on each side.' The woman weighing wool on scales evokes the image of Erōs determining fate with his golden ball. The tenor of the Homeric simile is the constant fighting on two battle lines and this foreshadows the constant internal battle that Medea faces.

an ember lying beneath ashes waiting to ignite as a symbol of love also occurs elsewhere in Hellenistic poetry.¹⁶⁰ However, Apollonios inflates this image, as instead of playing with the suspense of the ember's conflagration it is shown as a fire blazing in full force, raging within Medea.¹⁶¹ He shows the frightening potential of the *pathē* when in full blaze. In this simile, Apollonios also equates *Erōs* with strife, as he evokes another passage from the *Iliad* where strife quickly increases from nothing (as paralleled with the fire in Medea's heart ἀθέσφατον ἐξὸ λῆγιοιο):¹⁶²

...and Hatred (Eris) raging without cease,
the sister comrade of Ares the man-slayer,
who rears her head, tiny at first, but then
her head reaches heaven while she walks on earth.
She then tossed contention in the midst of both sides, equally,
going through the multitude, increasing the groaning of men. (*Iliad* 4.440-445)

Apollonios appropriates this image of strife to *erōs* as fire to foretell the overwhelming strife that *erōs* will cause in Medea's life. The extreme heat of the flame is a representation and cause for the manic behaviour that she will exhibit. As Pseudo-Aristotle says, this extreme internal heat causes mania, which Medea exhibits as symptoms of eros. To the informed reader, this flame (symbolic of increased internal heat) and flaming red cheeks foreshadows the manic behaviour that the audience is in suspense of for the whole poem; the angry, vengeful, hateful and cruel Medea that Euripides portrays. The image of this flame and the destruction it wreaks on its victims is also applied to Jason and the manifestation of it as a flush on Jason's cheeks also marks the beginning of his 'moral degradation' because soon after he proposes the most disapproved plan: to kill Absyrtos. In the moment when the fleece casts its light (*ereuthetai*) on Jason's face the flush is 'like a flame' (*phlogi eikelon*) (4.173). This recalls the only other time this exact phrase *phlogi eikelon* appears in the poem which is to describe how the arrow burned in Medea's heart.¹⁶³ Just as Medea soon exhibits questionable behaviour, so too does Jason. Just as the fire burns in Medea to create mania, so too does this happen in Jason.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁰ cf. Callimachus, *Epigrams* 44. 1-2; Homer, *Od* 5.488-491.

¹⁶¹ Matone (1999) 72.

¹⁶² Matone (1999) 73.

¹⁶³ The fleece also 'shone like Zeus' lightning' (4.185) which recalls the bolt that strikes Medea.

¹⁶⁴ Rose remarks that Jason will henceforth lose his innocence and when he returns to the ship he holds onto the fleece fearing that a god or man may take it (4.181-82), he keeps it hidden from his companions and tries to hide it (4.184) which foreshadows his jealousy and selfishness. At 4.180 he bears parallels

Apollonios uses physiognomy's original function: to predict what kind of behaviour people might exhibit. The subtleties behind what a red face means physiognomically and probably culturally give a pseudo-medical hint to the audience as to what kind of person Medea *will* become. It indicates what kind of behaviour she has the propensity to exhibit. The lack of differentiation physically between the different types of blush and whether they are an indication of desire, anger, fear or joy is very much in line with the Stoic concept of the *pathē*, as they were not generally differentiated in the symptoms they create. The focus was more on the way that a *pathos* affects the psyche and body. In this way, the red blush which Medea exhibits on her cheeks becomes not only a symbol of her desire for Jason but also a symbol of her future anger, and in general her susceptibility to passions in general, and her consequent ease at being overwhelmed by them.

Apollonios' focus on the blush, which is such a delicate expression, betrays his interest in facial expression to convey psychology and character. Eyes in particular were of interest in revealing character and Apollonios also includes a focus on the eyes and their role in revealing Medea's character and psychological states. Timomachos' *Medea*, for example was lauded for the detail of her eyes and their conveyance of indecision: 'This is the sketch of Medea. Observe how she raises one eye to anger, and softens the other towards sympathy for her children' (*API* 143).¹⁶⁵ Aristotle assigns much importance to the eyes and discusses their role in physiognomy in revealing the character of a person to the world. In the *Argonautika* too, Medea's eyes convey her internal psychological turmoil.

Every moment the plot turns Apollonios shows the reaction on someone's face, delving into the characters' psyche and revealing, albeit often subtly, their psychological state.¹⁶⁶ This is most frequently achieved through description of eyes and their movement. In the *Argonautika* the eyes can convey desire, anger, modesty and shame, boldness, sexual deviancy, anxiousness and internal contemplation. It is through allusions to physiognomy that Apollonios is able to depict such recognizable emotions. A common description of the eyes in the *Argonautika* is that they are 'fixed on the ground' which reveals internal psychological indecision. Pseudo-Aristotle describes the

with Argos (1.325) and Herakles which foreshadows his abandonment of the diplomatic code. Rose (1985) 39.

¹⁶⁵ Gurd (1974) 316.

¹⁶⁶ Evans (1969) 62.

role of the eyes in revealing internal character as: ‘A slow movement of the eyes which allows a tinge of white to show all the time, so that they look stationary, indicates a reflective character; for when the mind is absorbed in reflection, our eyes also are motionless’ (*Physiognomica* 813a30). Stationary eyes are considered a manifestation of the indecision. Athena and Hera both fix their eyes on the ground while they ponder what to do (3.22) and Jason does the same thing when thinking about how to respond to Aietes’ anger (3.422), as does Medea when she is anxiously worrying about Jason’s fate (3.1063). In these moments in addition to the fixed eyes there is usually a verbal indication of indecision and contemplation, such as *amēchanos*.¹⁶⁷ When the eyes are fixed on the ground Apollonios provides the audience with a visual image of that person’s indecision.¹⁶⁸

In reverse, the opposite of this transfixion is the eyes’ inability to keep still. Rapid moving eyes in the *Argonautika* indicate Medea’s anxiousness, anticipation and lust for the object of her desire.¹⁶⁹ When Medea is waiting for Jason, Apollonios says:

Οὐδ' ἄρα Μηδείης θυμὸς τράπετ' ἄλλα νοῆσαι,
 μελομένης περ ὅμως. πᾶσαι δέ οἱ, ἦν τιν' ἀθύροι
 μολπήν, οὐκ ἐπὶ δηρὸν ἐφήνδανεν ἐπιάσθαι,
 ἀλλὰ μεταλλήγεσκεν ἀμήχανος· οὐδέ ποτ' ὅσσε
 ἀμφιτόλων μεθ' ὅμιλον ἔχ' ἀτρέμας, ἐς δὲ κελεύθους
 τηλόσε παπταίνεσκε παρακλίνουσα παρειάς. (3.947-53)

*Medea was unable to keep concentration,
 and whatever games she played, none gave her
 pleasure or kept her amused for long,
 but she kept stopping, confused. Nor could she
 keep her eyes fixed on her group of maidservants, but she would
 constantly turn her cheek sideways and with a searching glance peers into the
 distance along the path.*

Pseudo-Aristotle says: ‘Mobile eyes signify keenness and rapacity, as in hawks’ (*Physiognomica* 813a20). Hippocrates also notices that rapid movements of the pupils occurs in patients suffering from delirium, which often leads to madness (Hippocrates,

¹⁶⁷ *Amēchanos* is often translated as ‘helplessness’ but in these instances, it reflects a moment of psychological indecision and hesitation to act. It complements intense internal deliberation and concentration (cf. 2.681, 3.423, 3.951, 4.136). It is also commonly found with speechlessness (*aphasia*) and physical paralysis.

¹⁶⁸ See the Herculaneum and the Pompeii *Medeas*.

¹⁶⁹ The alliteration of 3.953 emphasises the speed and emotional charge of Medea’s glances; Hunter (1989) 201.

Prognostics 7). Medea exhibits a similar madness and pursues Jason. The rapidity of Medea's eyes and her keenness for Jason is also mimicked in Medea's body language (3.649-53), in her moments of indecision (3.771) and in her rapid heart-beat (3.658). Restlessness is also described by Pseudo-Aristotle as 'lethargic movements are a sign of a soft character, rapid movements of a passionate person (*enthermon*)' (*Physiognomica* 806b25-806b26). This restlessness is inherently caused by an increase in internal heat. In addition, Pseudo-Aristotle says that men with 'dry tissues' and people who have red skin are not 'persistent' and cannot linger on one idea for a long period of time. Instead, they rapidly move onto something new. This is because the redness is caused by blood flowing rapidly within a limited space, which produces heat (*Physiognomica* 813b6-813b35).¹⁷⁰ Here the link between internal fever, redness and rapacity is made clear by Pseudo-Aristotle, and the inclusion of all of these symptoms in Medea's symptomology proves that her restlessness and her quick movements are a result of the fever burning inside her. The rapidity of Medea's eye movements represent her longing for Jason, and to portray this same psychological insight Apollonios employs the side-ways glance.

Medea also shows her lust for Jason when she tried to sneak a peek to the side to get a glimpse of her beloved. This side-ways glance signifies Medea's longing and the subsequent abandonment of her shame. When she first sees Jason Medea throws glances at him (αἰεὶ βάλλεν ἐπ' Αἰσονίδην ἀμαρύγματα 3.287)¹⁷¹ and when Medea first dares to inspect Jason in the hall she 'kept her eyes on him, looking sideways (λοξά) behind her shining veil' (3.445) and when she is waiting for Jason's arrival to their meeting, she likewise casts long side-ways glances (παπταίνεσκε παρακλίνουσα) to the road in search of him.¹⁷² Pseudo-Aristotle says of this, 'Sidelong leering (ἐγκλιδόν) glances are held to be characteristic of a fop (*kinaidos*)' (*Physiognomica* 813a25). The main characteristic of a 'fop' is effeminacy and sexual lewdness, and in this way, we may view the sideways glance as a gaze that signifies both Medea's sexual appetite, and the impropriety of it. 'Hypsipyle 'turns her eyes aside (ἐγκλιδόν) in her attempt to show maidenly shame (1.774) but addresses Jason anyway. Medea, when flattered

¹⁷⁰ Evans (1969) 10.

¹⁷¹ cf. Sappho, fr. 16.17-18.

¹⁷² Ojennus argues this scene and the ones surrounding it are littered with marriage imagery, symbolizing Medea's full commitment to Jason at this point; (2006) 269; Nishimura-Jensen (2009) 16.

looks aside (ἐγκλιδόν) in a moment of sexual desire (3.1008).¹⁷³ Looking straight into another person's eyes shows boldness, and for Medea it shows that she has abandoned her shame, for, 'once again Medea addressed him face to face with mournful words, and took his right hand, for shame had left her eyes (ἀπ' ὀφθαλμοῦς λίπεν αἰδώς 3.1068).¹⁷⁴ So we can see how the moments of the eyes can reveal psychological states.

In following this, avoiding someone's eyes is a sign of modesty, shame and guilt. 'Shameless' Erōs himself only shows his shame in his eyes, 'shameless though he is, for you he will show at least a little shame in his eyes' (3.92-3).¹⁷⁵ Medea and Jason too show shame and shyness in their eyes: 'At one moment they both stared coyly (αἰδόμενοι) at the ground, at the next they cast glances at each other, smiling with desire, their faces lit up' (3.1022-4) and in her moments of guilt, Medea covers her eyes: when she is fleeing (4.45-6), and when she avoids seeing the murder and blood of her brother (4.465-70). After this both Jason and Medea avoid looking into people's eyes as sign of guilt and this is most notably seen when they do not raise their eyes to meet Kirke (4.697-9). However, at the same time, when Medea and Jason *do* look at each other in the eyes, an incredible joy comes over them, and they share a tender gaze. This too according to Pseudo-Aristotle is a sign of a 'fop' because: 'an upward roll of the eyes under the upper lids with a tender gaze and drooping eyelids, and in general all tender melting glances; we argue partly from congruity, partly from the fact that these looks are common in women' (*Physiognomica* 813a25). As well as to reveal psychological expressions, eyes are an indicator of Medea's internal heat. Apollonios uses the eyes to intensify this romantic ecstasy and heightens Medea's sensation through medical allusions. When she is in the full thrall of desire, Medea's blush is accompanied with a mist that descends over her eyes. The misty eye first happens when Chalkiope asks Medea to help Jason so that her sons will be saved, and then again when Jason appears before Medea at their private meeting. The effects of Jason's appearance (he is here likened to Sirius and bewitches Medea's eyes) incites an exaggerated and violent

¹⁷³ Garson (1972) 2. These two are identical half-lines: ἡ δ' ἐγκλιδὸν ὅσσε βαλοῦσα. Another moment where we see the sideways glance is when Medea is talking about fearing 'the casting eyes of mockery' (4.389). ἐπιλλίζω means both 'look askance' and 'mock', and although in this instance the meaning is clearly mock, in a moment of reversal the one who did cast sideways glances in lust, is now the passive agent, being looked at, and judged for that very sexual impropriety.

¹⁷⁴ cf. 4.1315, 2.680.

¹⁷⁵ cf. Theocr. 27.70.

physiological reaction that Apollonios himself likens to a sickness, one of the symptoms of which is misty eyes:

αὐτὰρ ὃ γ' οὐ μετὰ δηρὸν ἐελδομένηι ἐφάνθη,
ὕψος' ἀναθροισκῶν ἅ τε Σείριος Ὠκεανοῖο,
ὃς δ' ἦτοι καλὸς μὲν ἀρίζηλός τ' ἐσιδέσθαι
ἀντέλλει, μήλοισι δ' ἐν ἄσπετον ἦκεν οἰζύν·
ὥς ἄρα τῇ καλὸς μὲν ἐπήλυθεν εἰσοράασθαι
Αἰσονίδης, κάματον δὲ δυσίμερον ὥρσε φανθεῖς.
ἐκ δ' ἄρα οἱ κραδίη στηθέων πέσεν, ὄμματα δ' αὖτως
ἦχλυσαν, θερμὸν δὲ παρηίδας εἴλεν ἔρευθος·
γούνατα δ' οὔτ' ὀπίσω οὔτε προπάροιθεν ἀεῖραι
ἔσθενεν, ἀλλ' ὑπένερθε πάγῃ πόδας. (3.956-65)

*Soon, however, Jason appeared to her as she longed for him,
just like Sirius leaping high from Ocean,
which rises brilliant and clear to see, but to flocks it brings terrible misery.
Just so did the son of Aison approach her, brilliant to behold,
but his appearance roused the sickening torment of desire.
Her heart dropped out of her chest, her eyes grew misty,
and a hot flush seized her cheeks;
she was not able to move her legs either forward or back,
but her feet were planted firm beneath her.*

This mist evokes both the mist that accompanies a warrior's death in the *Iliad* (5.696, 16.344), and the mist that accompanies lovers' eyes in Archilochus (fr. 103). Apollonios melds the misty eyes in the *Argonautika* to make them both a sign of sexual ecstasy and of painful disease-like death. He uses these tropes to help demonstrate the heightened *pikros-glukos* nature of his love's sensation. The only other time in the *Argonautika* when mist descends over someone's eyes is when Mopsos dies painfully from a snake bite: 'Already beneath his skin his limb-relaxing sleep sank in, and a thick mist descended over his eyes; very soon his heavy limbs collapsed to the ground, and he grew cold beyond remedy' (4.1524-27). This passage very much evokes the earlier image of Medea, and obvious similarities can be drawn; the mist over the eyes, the heaviness of the body and the lack of control over the limbs.¹⁷⁶ Mopsos however, is cold. Medea burns hot. Both the flush on her cheeks and her misty eyes are a sign of increased internal heat, and are symptoms of her fever.¹⁷⁷ The Hippocratic author of

¹⁷⁶ Temporary paralysis is a common symptom of love, Hunter (1989) 203. cf. *Od* 14.463-64; Theocr. 2.110; *HE* 3214-17; Anacr. fr. 376 where Erōs, like wine has the ability to invade the mind and 'muddle the limbs.' Cyrino (1996) 372.

¹⁷⁷ cf. Hippocrates, *Aphorisms* 7.74; *On Injuries of the Head* 11; *Prognostics* 24 (occurs twice in this section).

Epidemics links misty eyes with fever, paralysis and mania (Hippocrates, *Epidemics* 1.2.6.1). Although Medea is clearly ecstatic in her joy, the bitterness of her desire cannot be dismissed and these symptoms reveal to the audience (and to Jason) that Medea is sick with fever and may exhibit manic behaviour. In response to this, Jason treads very lightly; he flatters Medea and eventually promises to marry her in trade for her help.¹⁷⁸ Just as the blush foretells that Medea will be susceptible to being passionate and manic, and the likening of *erōs* to a gadfly foretells insanity and disease, so too does the appearance of Sirius the Dog Star foretell Medea's bodily fever-like disease.

Apollonios compares Jason to the Dog Star and transfers to him all the associations of Sirius, the effects of which manifest in Medea as fever-like illness. Aratus says that Sirius' brightness dominates the constellation of the Canis Major (Aratus, *Phaenomena* 326-7) and Sirius' intense brightness is indeed its most noticeable feature in all ancient literature that discusses it. However, in Aratus' *Phaenomena* we see for the first time the addition of constellation myths surrounding Sirius. Aratus tells us that the Dog Star 'draws forth, as if guiding it, the constellation of the Argo' (Aratus, *Phaenomena* 603-4).¹⁷⁹ Jason's repeated likeness to Sirius can be viewed as a further assertion of his position as rightful leader of the Argonauts.¹⁸⁰ It is also by Apollonios' lifetime that the 'Golden Fleece' is considered a constellation (Eratosthenes, *Katasterismoi* 19).¹⁸¹ The prevalence of the *Argonautika* myth in the constellations of this period provides evidence for its continued popularity and cosmological importance. Through constellation mythologies we see the myth played out in the cosmos, and when Apollonios likens Jason to his cosmological counterpart, Sirius the Dog Star, he brings all of its associations with it like fever and disease. How the Dog Star effects the human world is being played out inside Medea as the manifestation of her desire.

¹⁷⁸ This is in line with Jason's preference of persuasion over violence (cf. 3.84, 3.183-85), for a discussion of this see Goldhill (1991) 303-5; Holmberg (1998) 137-154; Danielewicz argues that in showing this Apollonios uses an acrostic in lines 3.1008-11 to spell out ὦναιο 'you have profited' emphasises Jason's skill at flattery; (2005) 331-2.

¹⁷⁹ cf. Cicero, *Aratea* 388-89.

¹⁸⁰ Stover (2003) 135.

¹⁸¹ Noegel (2004) 132.

Figure 2: Star chart based on Aratus' *Phaenomena*, from A. W. Mair and G. R. Mair, trans., Callimachus' Hymns and Epigrams, Lycophron, and Aratus, Loeb Classical Library, 129 (1921; rev. ed. 1955; reprint, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1989).

The most pertinent reason that Jason is likened to Sirius the Dog Star is the effect that he has on the women in the *Argonautika*. Homer first uses the image of Sirius to represent martial prowess and when he applies it to both Diomedes and Achilles he uses it to enhance their *aristeia*, and to highlight their power to cut down their foes (*Iliad* 5.4-8; 22.25-35)¹⁸² just as Sirius ravages flocks and crops. This was already an established thought because Sirius rises at the end of July and marks the onset of the hottest days of the year. Homer says, 'It is the brightest star, but it is an evil sign and brings great fever upon wretched mortals' (*Iliad* 22.25-35). It is Hesiod

¹⁸² cf. Sirius used to display martial prowess 3.1269ff; *Aeneid* 10.270-75; Valerius Flaccus, *Argonautika* 6.607-8. See Goldhill (1991) 306-7 for discussion.

who first associates Sirius with sexual mania, when he states it is the period when women are the most ‘wanton’ (Hesiod, *Works and Days* 586). The negative effects that Sirius has on people gains medical credibility in the works of Hippocrates, as he states, ‘One must also guard against the risings of stars, especially the Dog Star, then of Arcturus, and also of the setting of the Pleiades. For it is especially at these times that disease comes to a crisis’ (Hippocrates, *Airs Waters Places* XI.10).¹⁸³ This Hippocratic author associates Sirius with the climax of disease, and so when Jason is likened to the Dog Star it signifies disastrous ruin for Medea, both sexually and medically.¹⁸⁴

Sirius the Dog Star literally incites in Medea a fever: her symptoms of misty eyes, blush and paralysis reflect this. Another way that Medea’s fever and excitement as a result of her *pathos* manifests in Medea’s body is through her palpitating pulse. Apollonios, in incorporating a reference to the contemporary advances on pulse theory adds realism to Medea’s symptomology. This reference appears in the passage just before Medea’s final monologue about her indecision and her erratic heart-beat reflects this:

πυκνὰ δέ οἱ κραδίη στηθέων ἔντοσθεν ἔθυιεν,
 ἡελίου ὥς τις τε δόμοις ἐνὶ πάλλεται αἶγλη,
 ὕδατος ἐξανιούσα τὸ δὴ νέον ἡ ἐ λέβητι
 ἡέ που ἐν γαυλῶι κέχυται, ἡ δ' ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθα
 ὠκείῃ στροφάλιγγι τινάσσεται αἰσσοῦσα
 ὥς δὲ καὶ ἐν στήθεσσι κέαρ ἐλελίζετο κούρης. (3.755-760)

*Often her heart fluttered wildly in her chest.
 As when in a house, a sunbeam dances which is
 reflected off water that has just been poured into a bowl
 or a bucket, and darts this way and that
 as it is shaken in a rapid swirl.
 Just so did the young girl’s heart whirl in her breast.*

This allusion to a fast pulse conveys to the audience Apollonios’ knowledge of contemporary medical advances on the pulse and the advances in the knowledge of its sympathetic relationship with *pathē*. A fast erratic pulse became representative medically of both fever and also a psychological *pathos*.

¹⁸³ cf. Hesiod, *Works and Days* 417; Manilus, *Astronomica* 1.398-404.

¹⁸⁴ cf. He appears to the Lemnian women like a star. Hunter says this is Hesperos, the evening star which is associated with love and marriage; (1989) 202. cf. Catullus 62; Seneca, *Medea* 56ff.

Apollonios shows Medea with an erratic pulse *because* he draws on the works of Herophilos, who connected an erratic pulse to an increase in internal heat as a symptom of fever, as Marcellinus (1st century AD physician) attests:

What Herophilos' position concerning the pulse of those suffering from fever is: Herophilos gave the opinion that a person has a fever whenever his pulse becomes more frequent, bigger, and stronger [and is] accompanied by a high internal temperature. So, if the pulse loses its strength and magnitude, [it is] because the fever is getting [some] relief. The frequency of the pulse-beats, on the other hand, not only first arises when the fevers begin, but then also continues to linger up to the complete remission of the fever – thus Herophilos. There is a story that Herophilos had such confidence in the frequency of the pulse, using it as a reliable diagnostic sign, that he constructed a water-clock capable of containing a specified amount for the natural pulses of each age. And, upon entering to visit a patient, he would set up his water-clock and feel the pulse of the person suffering from a fever. By as much as the movements of the pulse exceeded the number that is natural for filling up the water-clock, by that much he declared the [patient's] pulse too frequent – that is, that [the patient] had either more or less of a fever. (Marcellinus, De Pulsibus 11)

Herophilos here draws a clear link between the strength of the internal heat with fever and the degree that the pulse deviates from its usual state.¹⁸⁵ In the *Argonautika*, the fluttering of the heart is most certainly evocative of a fast beating pulse.¹⁸⁶ Apollonios continues this image into the simile by making the ray of light also symbolize Medea's heart and her atypical pulse, restless movements and indecision.¹⁸⁷ The ray of light is described as being reflected on water just stirred, which creates a sporadic dispersal of light, the image of which represents the sporadic beat of Medea's pulse. Apollonios is very fond of painting an image of reflected light, which is quite un-Homeric, and this is most likely due to this kind of imagery emerging in Hellenistic painting.¹⁸⁸ The question is, why does Apollonios choose this image in particular to convey the heart-beat? The ray of light is an appropriate model for Medea's psyche because it is discussed as such in philosophy. The comparison of the atoms of the soul to dust particles seen floating in sunlight is an idea that persists through philosophic

¹⁸⁵ Atkins (1985) 339.

¹⁸⁶ Zanker (2004) 63.

¹⁸⁷ Hunter (1989) 179. This image is recreated at *Aenied* 8.18-25. Democritus too, equates soul with nous. (Aristotle, *De Anima* 404a25-30)

¹⁸⁸ Phinney Jr. (1967) 147. cf 1.1280-82; 4.167-71. Phinney Jr. Also discusses a trend of popular paintings in the Hellenistic period where reflection of light is admired, especially a painting of a boy blowing on a fire and the light thrown on the boy's face by Antiphilus; (1967) 147. See also Zanker (2004) 61ff. for a discussion on this trend.

thought¹⁸⁹ and the first occurrence can be seen in Aristotle's *De Anima* where he speaks of Democritus' theory: 'soul is a sort of fire or hot substance; his 'forms' or atoms are infinite in number; those which are spherical he calls fire and soul, and compares them to the motes in the air which we see in shafts of light coming through windows' (Aristotle, *De Anima* 404a1-5).¹⁹⁰ The Stoics considered the soul to be made up of *pneuma* and fire¹⁹¹ and to them, a ray of light (αἴγλη) was seen to be a 'kindling of a sudden fire' (Diog. Laert., *Lives* 7.81). Thus the ray of light flickering around the room as a reflection of the water is both a representation of Medea's restless and perturbed psyche, and of the fire that ceaselessly burns in Medea's heart causing her fever and in response, an increased pulse.

The first person to write extensively about the significance of the pulse was Praxagoras of Cos (c. 340 BC) who influenced Herophilos, Erasistratos and Chrusippos. Praxagoras was the first to distinguish between arteries and veins and held that while arteries contained *pneuma*, veins contained blood.¹⁹² With regards to the pulse, he postulated that it was the movement of *pneuma* through the arteries that caused pulsation. He had tried to prove through experiments that the *pneuma* was thought to be propelled throughout the body independent of any other organ (*De Placitis* VIII 702).¹⁹³ In a strange automaton like fashion, pulsation was thought to occur independently of the heart and Praxagoras did not differentiate it from any other arterial movements and considered it muscular (Galen, *De Pulsuum Differentiis* 4.2).¹⁹⁴ Herophilos advancing on his tutor's ideas, assigned the heart as the mechanism behind pulsation (*De Placitis* VIII 703). However it was Erasistratos who first correctly identified the heart as acting like a pump pushing the *pneuma* through the arteries. He likens the heart's pumping to the image of bellows.¹⁹⁵ The fact that Medea's heart has such a prominent role in the representation of her pulsation implies that Apollonios was aware of this and incorporated it into his description. As the first to realise that the heart controlled pulsation, Herophilos identified the variation in pulsation as a physiological

¹⁸⁹ cf. Lucretius 2. 112-24; Epictetus 3.3.30-2; Dio Chrys. 21.14. The image of water rippling is used by the Stoics to explain hearing, 'We hear because the air between the speaker and the hearer is struck in a spherical manner; and is then agitated in waves, resembling the circular eddies which one sees in a cistern when a stone is dropped into it.' (Diog. Laert., *Lives* 7.158).

¹⁹⁰ Heraclitus also conceived the soul as fire (*Vorsokr.* 22b36); cf. Solmsen (1957) 119.

¹⁹¹ cf. Galen, *On the History of the Soul* 4.

¹⁹² Longrigg (1988) 467.

¹⁹³ Longrigg (1988) 469.

¹⁹⁴ Longrigg (1993) 203.

¹⁹⁵ Longrigg (1988) 479. Bellows were also used in therapeutics to distend an obstructed cavity; Gundert (1992) 462.

reaction to emotional and physical distress, and therefore tried to utilize its potential for diagnosis and therapy. Deviances in the pulse correlated to internal deviances. He created a system to catalogue the different pulses and their meanings focusing on size, strength, rate and rhythm (*De Placitis* VIII 592).¹⁹⁶ His system employed musical terminology¹⁹⁷ to describe the different types of rhythm. He devised metaphorical terms derived from the supposed resemblance to the gait of certain animals such as ‘capering’ (*dorkadizon*, i.e., like a gazelle, *De Placitis* VIII 556), ‘crawling’ (*myrmekizon*, i.e., like an ant, *De Placitis* IX 453) and others, which remained in use for centuries.¹⁹⁸ He organized a way to name the different kinds of pulses, and a way for them to be easily recognisable by creating a system of pulse analysis based around metrical feet; spondee, troche, and pyrrhic. He also assigned a typical type of pulse to the different ages and if the pulse diverged from its normal state, it was a clear indication that something was wrong within the body, and Herophilos identified three main types of abnormal pulse the ‘pararrythmic’, ‘heterorrhythmic’, and ‘ekrhythmic’. Of these, the first indicates merely a slight divergence from normality, the second a greater and the third the greatest (*De Placitis* IX 471).¹⁹⁹ As with most physiological functions, deviating from its regular state is representative of something wrong. This is why Herophilos in particular tried to understand and measure it, because he thought it would reveal something otherwise invisible. He invented a *klepsydra* that he took with him on visits to patients which was supposed to measure and catalogue his patients’ pulses in order that he better understand the nature of their illness. The very fact that the ray of light representative of Medea’s pulse is being measured in some way by water (which is absent in Democritus’ description) is evocative of Herophilos’ use of the *klepsydra* in his pulse diagnosis.

The physiological effects that fever as well as *pathē* have on the pulse is demonstrated by Erasistratos through his treatment of Antiochus. At around the same time as Herophilos’ foray into pulse theory, Erasistratos is said to have employed similar techniques in perhaps the most famous and repeated example of the power of

¹⁹⁶ cf. Archigenes apud Galen, *De Pulsuum Differentiis* 2.6

¹⁹⁷ This is thought to be derived from Aristoxenus of Tarentum (Galen, *De Placitis* IX.463); Longrigg (1988) 470. cf. Rufus Ephesius, *Synopsis De Pulsibus* 4.

¹⁹⁸ cf. Galen, *De Pulsuum Differentiis* 1.28; Marcellinus, *De Pulsibus* 31.

¹⁹⁹ Some further light is thrown upon those terms by the pseudo-Galenic treatise *Definitiones Medicae* XIX.409. Its author, citing Bacchius and Zeno, two medical disciples of Herophilos, here distinguishes the ‘pararhythmic’ pulse as one which does not possess the rhythm characteristic of the age of the patient, the ‘heterorrhythmic’ as possessing the rhythm of another age, and the ‘ekrhythmic’ as possessing a rhythm which does not correspond to any age.’ Longrigg (1988) 470.

physicians' diagnosis and prognosis. Erasistratos treated the ill Antiochus, son of King Seleucus, who was suffering from a mystery ailment which proved to be frustrated love for his mother in law, Stratonice.²⁰⁰ Erasistratos determines this diagnosis through analysing the symptoms that he exhibits, including the pulse. The widespread retelling of this story shows the popularity of pulse theory and fever analysis in diagnosis and prognosis, even though the *klepsydra* does not seem to have persisted as a measuring tool.²⁰¹ The revolutionary status of Herophilos' pulse theory advancements are described by Galen as 'inaugurating a new era' in medicine and the fact that Erasistratos' proved that he could diagnose psychological love-sickness from it attests to its remarkability in revealing hidden causes.²⁰² Plutarch in his *Life of Demetrius* tells the story as such:

Antiochus was distressed and for a time he struggled to conceal his passion. But at last he decided that his malady was incurable, his desires sinful and his reason too weak to resist them: he therefore determined to make his escape from life and to destroy himself gradually by neglecting his body and refusing all nourishment, under the pretext that he was suffering from disease. Erasistratos, his physician, found no difficulty in diagnosing his condition, namely that he was in love, but it was less easy to discover with whom. He made a habit of spending day after day in the young prince's room, and when any particularly good looking girl or young man entered, he would study his patient's face minutely and watch those parts and movements of the body which nature has formed as to reflect and share the emotions of the soul. Sure enough, when anybody else came in, Antiochus remained unmoved, but whenever Stratonice visited him, as she often did either alone or with Seleucus, all the symptoms which Sappho describes immediately showed themselves: his voice faltered, his skin began to flush, his eye became languid, a sudden sweat broke out on his skin, his heart began to beat violently and irregularly, and finally as if his soul was overpowered by his passions, he would sink into a state of helplessness, prostration and pallor.' (Plutarch, *Vita Demetrii* 38. 2907a)

Erasistratos here used not only the pulse, but other established manifestations of fever to diagnose Antiochus. Erasistratos proves interested in the very physical signs that physiognomy is interested in: voice, skin colour, eyes. In addition to this, the rapid heart-beat is included as a symptom of a *pathos*. The similarities between Antiochus' love-sickness and Medea's are poignant and apparent. The *pathos* affects the body because of the psycho-somatic relationship between body and psyche: the affections of

²⁰⁰ Longrigg (1993) 182.

²⁰¹ Longrigg (1993) 205.

²⁰² Longrigg (1993) 203.

the psyche become the affections of the body because the soul is corporeal. This demonstrates the medicalization of love in the Hellenistic period, and how physical symptomology was being used to interpret unusual psychological behaviour. An example of this is the fact that the Stoics equated a *pathos* with a *nosema* ‘disease’. A *nosema* to the Stoics was considered both a sickness of the psyche and of the body, as was a *pathos*.²⁰³ The *psukhē* and body are irrepealably sympathetically connected. Apollonios builds on this idea in his *Medea* as her increased pulse is the physical manifestation of her *erōs*-induced psychological turmoil.

The image of the fire raging in Medea’s chest is evocative of internal heat and also shows parallels with how Erasistratos constructed the relationship of fire-*pneuma* in the heart. Hippocrates also discusses the image of the heart and fire: ‘Thus cold *pneuma* must be constantly drawn inward by the hottest parts of the body—i.e., the heart and associated large vessels—just as it is pulled up by a flame or by burning wood (Hippocrates, *Fleshes* 6).²⁰⁴ Thus we see that the image of burning wood is used as an analogy to the functioning of the heart in medical literature. Erasistratos describes the actions of the heart as thus and makes the heart the pump behind the pulse: ‘material does not rush in spontaneously, as into some inanimate vessel, but the heart itself, dilating like a coppersmith’s bellows, draws the material in, filling the diastole.’²⁰⁵ Just as bellows nourish a fire and incite the sudden conflagration, so too does *erōs* tend the fire that rages in Medea’s heart.²⁰⁶ Apollonios later explicitly brings up the image of bellows and fire to provide a parallel of Medea’s heart as a furnace and to demonstrate how destructive *erōs* is:

ὥς δ' ὅτ' ἐνὶ τρητοῖσιν ἐύρρινοι χοάνοισι
 φῦσαι χαλκίων ὅτ' ἐ μὲν τ' ἀναμαρμαίρουσι
 πῦρ ὀλοὸν πιμπρᾶσαι, ὅτ' αὖ λήγουσιν ἀντμῆς,
 δεινὸς δ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ πέλεται βρόμος, ὅππότε' αἴζηι
 νειόθεν· ὥς ἄρα τώγε θοὴν φλόγα φυσιώντες
 ἐκ στομάτων ὁμάδεν, τὸν δ' ἄμφεπε δῆϊον αἶθος

²⁰³ Inwood & Gerson (2008) 207.

²⁰⁴ Frixione (2012) 54. Other mentions of burning wood in medical thought: *Regimen* explains that water ‘is consumed to nourish the fire which assails it;’ Hippocrates, *Regimen* 1, 3; While *Fleshes* states: ‘we know that the nourishment of hot is cold;’ Hippocrates, *Fleshes* 6; similarly, according to *Breaths*, ‘wind [pneuma] is food for fire;’ Hippocrates, *Breaths* 3; and *Nature of the Child* concurs in that ‘the heat in the [burning] wood draws in cold air...to nourish itself;’ Hippocrates, *Nature of the Child* 12.

²⁰⁵ Longrigg (1993) 206. The image of ‘blowing’ in the heart, like Erasistratos’ image of the bellows is also seen in Stoic thought: impressions arise in us as if vaporized from the heart and as if they were pushing out against someone and were blowing into the face and hands (Galen, *De Placitis* III 1.22-25).

²⁰⁶ For the image of *erōs* as a blacksmith, see Anacreon, fr. 413.

βάλλον ἅ τε στεροπή· κούρης δέ ἐ φάρμακ' ἔρυτο. (3.1299-1305)

*As when the tough leather bellows of the blacksmiths
penetrate the pierced furnaces and cause sparks to leap
out whenever they stoke the destructive fire, but then rest from
their blowing and the fire crackles fiercely as it leaps up
from below; just so was the noise as fiery flame flashed out from
the bulls' mouths, and the blaze enveloped Jason,
striking him like a lightning bolt; but Medea's drugs protected him.*

Here many verbal echoes can be seen: bellows stoke the deadly fire. The fire is here destructive (ὄλοον as at 3.297 οὔλος ἔρω), and it is shown in full blaze (αἶθος as at 3.296 αἶθετο). The locus of the conflagration is also specifically identified. The fire in the furnace leaps fiercely up from below (νειόθεν) which Hunter explains is where the bellows would be applied.²⁰⁷ Likewise, the fire in Medea's chest burns beneath (νέρθεν ὑπό) Medea's heart like a flame (3.286-7).²⁰⁸ The image of the destructiveness of this fire being inflicted on people through the form of a bolt is also recalled as the fire from the bull's mouth is also likened to a bolt, a thunderbolt. However Jason, unlike Medea has protection from it. The fire through its verbal echoes to *erōs* bears with it the associations of *erōs*. The fire that burns (πιμπρᾶσαι) has a medical flavour meaning 'fever', which is what *erōs* incites in Medea.²⁰⁸ Apollonios thus equates the destructive fire which *erōs* nourishes inside Medea's heart with the destructive fire that bellows nourish in a furnace, alluding to Erasistratos' description of the heart and the relationship with fire and fever.

Medea's *pathos* manifests itself in Medea's body as physical symptoms of fever, the analysis of which reveals to the physician that a *pathos* exists. Through the medicalization of *erōs*' physical manifestations, *pathē* could be identified not only through erratic mental behaviour but through physical signs. In addition to Apollonios showing *erōs* manifest as fever, blushes, eye movements and increased pulse-rate, Apollonios also shows *erōs* manifesting itself as pure physical pain. In describing Medea's physical somatic pain realistically, Apollonios constructs Medea's experience by incorporating the latest discoveries in explaining somatic sensation: the nervous system. It is through Apollonios' description of the nervous system at work in Medea's

²⁰⁷ Hunter (1989) 243.

²⁰⁸ The fire also leaps *aisso* (αἶσσι) just as *Erōs* does at 3.286. Apollonios uses this verb for fiery imagery. The ray of light also darts (*aissousa*) around the room (3.759) which represent Medea's fevered pulse-rate.

body that he is able to, for the first time, describe the emotional suffering that affects the heart, as the traditional seat of emotion, as manifesting itself somatically in a physiologically accurate way. As a result, he can create a fusion of traditional poetic, with contemporary, scientific, realism. In this passage Apollonios investigates the relationship that the heart has, as the locus of emotions, with the nervous system which transfers somatic sensation around the body. This investigation reveals Apollonios' engagement in the contemporary dialogue about the physiology, anatomy and hegemony of the body. With the inclusion of the nervous system the audience is invited to examine the physiology that Apollonios applies to Medea, and how his description compares with those of physicians and philosophers.

Apollonios incorporates the most recent and innovative ideas on somatic pain and sensation to provide a realistic model of how Medea's *pathos* interacts with the *psukhē* in its psychosomatic relationship with the body. The climax of Medea's emotional pain becoming manifest as physical pain is when she gets her severe headache because of her mental anguish:

δάκρυ δ' ἀπ' ὀφθαλμῶν ἐλέωι ῥέεν· ἔνδοθι δ' αἰεὶ
 τεῖρ' ὀδύνη, σμύχουσα διὰ χροὸς ἀμφί τ' ἀραιᾶς
 ἵνας καὶ κεφαλῆς ὑπὸ νεῖατον ἰνίον ἄχρις,
 ἔνθ' ἀλεγεινότατον δύνει ἄχος, ὅππότε' ἀνίας
 ἀκάματοι πραπίδεςσιν ἐνισκίμπωσιν Ἔρωτες. (3.761-65)

*Tears were flowing from her eyes in pity, and pain was
 always wearing her away inside, burning through her skin, around her fine
 nerves and even as far as the lowest base of the occiput from under her head,
 where, the most unbearable pain sinks in, whenever
 the untiring Erotes should hurl sorrows into her heart.*

The superlatives in lines 3.751-65 νεῖατον (deepest) and ἀλεγεινότατον (most painful) help demonstrate that this passage is the climax, the pinnacle of Medea's ongoing emotional pain. It also suggests that the area around the occipital bone, as the epicentre of the nervous system, is centre of the real somatic pain. The pain slowly hones in on the most sensitive spot, making its way from larger areas to smaller,²⁰⁹ it makes its way through the skin, then the nerves, then to the occipital bone and the heart

²⁰⁹ Hunter (1989) 180.

is the impetus for this pain transfer. The *Erotes* fire emotional pain upon (ἐνισκίμψωσιν 3.765) Medea's heart, and the very word that Apollonios uses evokes the arrow which Aphrodite begs Erōs to fire (ἐνισκίμψης 3.153) at Medea which also has the heart as the target.²¹⁰

It is clear that both the brain and the heart play a very important role in the psychopathology of Medea's desire and anguish. And it is evident that Apollonios adopts the contemporary discovery of the nervous system to explain somatic sensation and pain, but ultimately follows Chrusippos' model that the heart is the *hēgemonikon* and receives the emotion, and the somatic pain comes in response to the emotional pain in the *hēgemonikon*. Chrusippos, in granting the validity of the discovery of the nervous system argues that it does not prove that the brain is the *hēgemonikon* as Herophilos and Erasistratos think. In fact, he argues that even though the brain is the source of the nerves, the stimuli come from the heart as the seat of intellect and the locus of emotions.²¹¹ Indeed this is the model that Apollonios follows, for the pain travels through the nervous system 'whenever the untiring *Erotes* should hurl sorrows into her heart'. Apollonios retards the mention of the heart as the locus of emotions until the last line of the verse to add forceful emphasis to its role as the impetus of the whole process of somatic sensation.

This dialogue centres on the discovery of the nervous system which was occurring in Alexandria. Hellenistic Alexandria provided a unique environment which enabled significant scientific and intellectual progresses to occur. The patronage and encouragement of the Ptolemies to create an intellectual environment, through which they could show off their wealth and establish Alexandria as a centre of culture and scholarship funded the research of physicians such as Herophilos (and most likely Erasistratos)²¹² and also financed the city's museum and library, which in turn acted as research facilities and intellectual forums.²¹³ Apollonios, as Chief Librarian was in the midst of this intellectual research and had access to countless texts ranging across all genres.²¹⁴ Alexandria was a centre of medicine and in the forefront of the development

²¹⁰ Hunter (1989) 180.

²¹¹ Tielman (1996) 195.

²¹² Longrigg (1988) 473.

²¹³ Other notable people invited to work in Alexandria were Philetas, Eratosthenes, Archimedes, Straton of Lampascus; see Luce (1988) 25.

²¹⁴ There is already evidence that Apollonios' contemporary Callimachus was influenced by the gynaecological and ophthalmological writings of Herophilos; Most (1981) 193.

of understandings of anatomy, due in most to the dissection and vivisection of humans performed by Herophilos and Erasistratos.²¹⁵ Von Staden puts forward the theory that Alexandria was an unparalleled setting for the evolution of medicine, for a few reasons:²¹⁶

The unusual combination of ambitious Macedonian patrons of science (i.e. the Ptolemies), eager scientists like Herophilus, a new city in which traditional values at first were not considered intrinsically superior, and a cosmopolitan intelligentsia committed not only to literary and political, but also to scientific frontiersmanship, apparently made it possible to overcome traditional inhibitions against opening the human body.

Prior to this, the only dissections that occurred in the Greek world were performed on animals, and even this practice was relatively new, as it is thought to have started at the Lyceum under Aristotle.²¹⁷ The limitations of comparative animal dissection however involve the substitution of animal anatomy and physiology onto humans, which does not always prove very accurate.²¹⁸ Human dissection and vivisection not only occurred in Alexandria by Herophilos, and probably Erasistratos,²¹⁹ but was actually sanctioned by the state, as prisoners were provided for the experiments.²²⁰ Longrigg suggests that because of the taboo nature of human dissection and vivisection they would have been more likely to have taken place within a relatively closed intellectual society, like that of the Museum, rather than in an *iatreion* in the city.²²¹ The environment was anomalous and only lasted perhaps 50 years, and no other human vivisections and no other dissections, outside of Alexandria, are known to have been performed until the early 14th century AD by Mondino Dei Luicci. Galen, who worked in Alexandria only a few hundred years after Herophilos, gained most of his anatomical knowledge from his dissections on the Barbary ape and

²¹⁵ Longrigg (1988) 457. These dissections were in part perhaps influenced by contemporary ideas about the corporeality of the soul and life after death. Chrusippos, in his argument for corporeality of the soul argues ‘Death is separation of soul from body; but nothing incorporeal is separated from body; for an incorporeal does not even make contact with a body but the soul both makes contact with, and is separated from, the body; therefore the soul is a body.’ (Nemesius, *SVF* 11.790); Long (1996) 236.

²¹⁶ Von Staden (1989) 141-2.

²¹⁷ Longrigg (1993) 184.

²¹⁸ Edelstein (1967) 295.

²¹⁹ Longrigg (1993) 183.

²²⁰ For the best discussion of this see Edelstein (1967) 247-302; he convincingly argues that dissection first occurred in Alexandria under Herophilos and then remained only in Alexandria practiced by the practitioners in the academies for medical teaching. cf. Von Staden (1989).

²²¹ Longrigg (1993) 179.

the Rhesus monkey.²²² Longrigg posits that the reason for the short-lived life of this practice is in part due to the negative rather than positive attention the practice ultimately received.²²³ Nevertheless, the lasting result was the discovery of the nervous system which Apollonios refers to in order to show Medea's feelings of pain as physically real.

The discovery of the nervous system should be viewed as a result of physicians and philosophers' attempts to understand the experience of bodily sensation; i.e., how it is that we feel pain and pleasure somatically, especially when in response to emotions? It also should be viewed in light of their attempts to understand voluntary and involuntary somatic movement. Both of these are tied to the *hēgemonikon* as it interpreted emotional pain and facilitated its manifestation as physical pain through the nervous system. The *hēgemonikon* received and interpreted impulses and delivered the message to the body to move.

Praxagoras of Cos, Herophilos' tutor and Chrusippos' main influence, addressed the question of how voluntary movement worked. He posited that voluntary movement was transmitted from the heart (as the *hēgemonikon*) through arteries which contained psychic *pneuma* to the rest of the body.²²⁴ Praxagoras here employed the term *neuron* to describe the final part of the artery through which the motions were transmitted, and this is presumably because it resembled a sinew.²²⁵ Just as *pneuma* is realized as the mechanism behind the psyche, the psyche uses this mechanism to interact with body. The driving instrument behind all of the motions of the soul was considered to be *pneuma*, which rose in popularity between the time of Aristotle and Herophilos and was generally considered by both physicians and philosophers to be the instrument of the soul and the means through which it participated in sense-perception.²²⁶ Aristotle was the first to consider *aesthēsis* 'sense-perception' as a function of the *hēgemonikon* and the Stoics also adapted this view.²²⁷

²²² When he was away from Alexandria he had to rely on animal dissections, however Edelstein argues that when Galen did visit Alexandria he had access to human dissections; Edelstein (1967) 292.

²²³ Longrigg (1993)

²²⁴ Aristotle also credits *pneuma* for voluntary motions in his *De Motu Animalium*; for discussion see Cambiano (1999) 600.

²²⁵ Longrigg (1993) 192.

²²⁶ Tielman (1996) 171.

²²⁷ Webb (1982) 27.

Herophilos, when he discovered the nervous system transferred to it the attribution of bodily movement *and* sense-perception. Herophilos, advancing on the work of his tutor, distinguished between the motor and sensory nerves. Both Erasistratos and Herophilos credited the nerves with the capability of voluntary motion and sensation (they called them *aisthētika neura*). Through dissections however, Herophilos determined that the *hēgemonikon* was the brain as the nervous system stemmed from it (Erasistratos agrees). In doing this Herophilos proved Aristotle's theory that the processes occurred in one and the same organ, although Aristotle thought this happened in the heart and denied the brain *any* role in sense-perception. The discovery of a nervous system was ground-breaking for the Greeks' understanding of human biology. This discovery would have revolutionised the Greeks' perspective on pain and feeling, as they now knew there was this net-like system of nerves that stretched throughout the body which were responsible for producing the sensations we feel.

I have already stated how Medea's soul in the *Argonautika* is unified and located in the region of the heart. How then, does Apollonios manage to incorporate the nervous system whose existence seems to disprove the heart's hegemony according to its discoverers? Apollonios follows Chrusippos' more traditional view which still incorporates the new discovery but within the confines of maintaining that the heart is the *hēgemonikon*. The passage with the headache illustrates that the emotional suffering that affects the heart, as the seat of the psyche, is then transformed into physically 'real' pain that has its origins at the base of the head, the origin of the nervous system which carries movement and sensation to the whole body. In doing this he also hints at the views of people like Herophilos and Erasistratos by highlighting the importance that the brain plays in somatic sensation, and hinting at the possible hegemony of the brain. Ultimately however, Apollonios follows Chrusippos' model, one where the heart is *hēgemonikon* and acts as the stimulus for the physical pain.

The emphasis that Apollonios places on the area of the base of the brain and its role in this system of sense-perception acknowledges contemporary medical views that the *hēgemonikon* resides there. Although the dominant trend in philosophical thought throughout the Classical and Hellenistic Period was that the controlling seat of the psyche was the heart, the argument for the brain's hegemony remained strong. The debate between whether the heart or the head was the organ with the capacity for

consciousness, sensation and knowledge was debated by physicians, philosophers and scientists ceaselessly even up to the Renaissance. A line of people that included Aristotle, Praxagoras, Zeno, Chrusippos and the Stoics attributed these faculties to the heart. And indeed, poetically and culturally speaking, the heart was traditionally this seat. Alcmaeon, the Pythagoreans, Hippocrates, Plato, Herophilos, Erasistratos and later, Galen, on the other hand, prescribed to the theory that the brain possessed these faculties. In Galen's treatise *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* this issue takes pride of place, which attests to its topicality even in his era.²²⁸ The primacy of the heart's role in decision-making, emotion, sensation and reaction are evidenced continually throughout the *Argonautika* and are concentrated in Book 3. This cardio-centricity is due to many influences. Apollonios' primary model for the physiology of mind and body is Chrusippos' – and Chrusippos was a strong advocate for the cardio-centric model and used poetry as evidence.

Chrusippos quotes Homer and the tragedians extensively, using their language and ways of describing and explaining emotion as fountains of truth. This is one of the striking similarities between Apollonios and Chrusippos as their influences and interests are so similar that it is not unreasonable to assume that Apollonios would have seen in Chrusippos a relatable interest in epic, lyric, tragedy and philosophy. Also, the poetic tradition is one of cardio-centricity, as was the general public opinion.²²⁹ It would be a great shift, perhaps a somewhat unintelligible one, if Apollonios were to associate emotions with the brain, for even Herophilos and Erasistratos, whose discovery of the nervous system was the most compelling evidence up to that point in antiquity in favour of an enkephalo-centric model of body and psyche never said anything specifically about its role in emotions.²³⁰ Even Galen discussed emotions as affecting the heart and conceded that this is because the heart departs most from its natural state when affected by passions (i.e. an increased pulse; *De Placitis* III 5.43-44).²³¹ One of Galen's main criticisms of Chrusippos was his ineptitude to take up Herophilos and Erasistratos' advancements, and, in the face of 'undeniable' evidence not only retain cardio-centricity but argue for it by using what he considers quite unscientific reasoning. Although his criticisms are perhaps a bit harsh as the Stoic

²²⁸ Tielman (1996) xxiii.

²²⁹ See Tielman (1996) 169ff.

²³⁰ Although Tielman finds this likely (1996) 169.

²³¹ Tielman (1969) 169.

system of sense-perception was fairly analogous with a nervous system already; the Stoic psyche was categorized as having eight parts; the five senses, reproduction and the *hēgemonikon*,²³² and Long argues that the psyche's involvement in these operations emphasised its diffusion through the body and the multiplicity of the functions it was in control of. The faculties that Plato deemed composite in a psyche are all unified in the *hēgemonikon*, and the other parts are purely instruments of its activity and enable movement and sense-perception.²³³ This model bears close enough resemblance to a nervous system that the slight alteration of Chrusippos' own model to incorporate the new discovery does not in fact really compromise the integrity of his own system: he is able to alter it only slightly to make his model, one where the heart as *hēgemonikon* registers emotional pain and delivers this to the body through a nervous-system like structure as somatic sensation.²³⁴ In addition, because the heart was the recognized locus of emotions his determination that the heart was the *hēgemonikon* was the more believable argument when it came to understanding the psychosomatic relationship of emotional pain. Chrusippos relies heavily on etymology, folklore and poetic tradition for endorsing cardio-centricity.²³⁵ For example, he discusses the etymology of *kardia*, and says that it is derived from *kratia* which denotes its supreme power over the body (*De Placitis* III 5.28). He also argues that because we nod our head downwards when we say *ego* that we look in the direction of where our mind and *hēgemonikon* is (*De Placitis* III 5.25). Chrusippos also argues that 'speech passes through the windpipe. If it were passing from the brain, it would not pass through the windpipe. Speech passes through the same region as discourse. Discourse passes from the mind. Therefore, the mind is not the brain' (*De Placitis* II 5.7-8).²³⁶ Chrusippos argues in favour of this tradition and says that most men perceive emotion to be in the heart, because that is where it is felt (*De Placitis* III 5.2-5).²³⁷ In particular, he identifies the feeling of love as arising in the heart (*De Placitis* II 7.10-12), and Medea seems to have this self-

²³² cf. Heirocles, *Col* 7.5.10; Sen, *Ep* 14.8.

²³³ Long (1996) 242.

²³⁴ Graver believes that with a better working knowledge of the nervous system a Stoic should have no problem in transferring to the brain the role that Chrusippos gave to the heart; Graver (2007) 23.

²³⁵ See De Lacy (2005) 177-187. See also Padel (1996) 18 for examples of the heart acting as the centre of impulse, as a mind, and its movements in Greek literature; for examples of the roles of the *thumos*, *phrēn* and *prapides* see 20-30.

²³⁶ cf. *De Placitis* II 5.27-60; Diog. Laert., *Lives* II. 5.57-60; parallel in the *Argonautika* 3.681-7.

²³⁷ For a discussion on how passion is described as felt in the heart in Greek literature see Padel (1996) 19.

awareness when she diagnoses her own pain as being in her heart (3.644).²³⁸ This appeal to general conviction was used as a trump card of sorts.²³⁹

Although Apollonios ultimately models Medea on Chrusippos' model, he does hint at other contemporary views through his reference to the occiput (*inion*). It is important to note that even among those who held the view that the brain was the *hēgemonikon* there was disagreement as to *where* exactly in the brain this existed.²⁴⁰ It was Aristotle who first differentiated the cerebrum, the larger frontal part of the brain, from the cerebellum, the smaller section at the back, and the differentiation between the two was crucial in later anatomical research on the brain, as different physicians located the *hēgemonikon* in different anatomical locations of the brain; 'concerning the command centre, Plato and Democritus locate it in the entire head; Strato in the space between the eyebrows; Erasistratos in the area of the meninx of the brain which he calls 'on the skull'; and Herophilos in the ventricle of the brain which is also its base (*basis*)' (Galen, *De Historia Philosophia* 28). Apollonios was aware of the contemporary medical works of Herophilos who assigned control of the body to the fourth ventricle in the cerebellum, which directly correlates with the locus of the occiput (*inion*). The term '*basis*' which Herophilos uses for base of the brain, seems synonymous with the location of the *inion* 'occiput'. Herophilos states that 'all the nerves of the body grow either from the cerebellum or from the spinal marrow' (Galen, *De Usu Partium* 8.11). This finds parallels in how the *ines* branch out from the *inion*, and in highlighting the *inion* as the epicentre of somatic sensation Apollonios hints at Herophilos' theory that the *hēgemonikon* was in this area, not the heart.²⁴¹

²³⁸ An important tenet to the Stoics is that humans have an innate ability to understand themselves and their own condition. Chrusippos says 'the first thing appropriate to every animal from the moment of birth is its own constitution and the consciousness of this' (Diog. Laert., *Lives* 7.85); cf. Hierocles, *Col* 44-53; Long (1996) 236. In addition, it is through *pneuma* that humans are able to continuously perceive themselves (Hierocles, *Col* 4.38-53); cf. Medea says, 'my heart is buffeted around by worry for your children' (περί μοι παίδων σέο θυμὸς ἄηται 3.688).

²³⁹ Tielman (1996) 168.

²⁴⁰ Chrusippos modestly admits that anatomy seems to have largely failed in the endeavour of exposing where the *hēgemonikon* resides for its real location eludes everybody: 'Thus the place seems to elude us, since we have either a clear perception (of it), as we had with the others, nor sure signs from which the matter might be inferred; otherwise disagreement among physicians and philosopher would not have grown so great' (Galen, *De Placitis* III 1.9-15). This is why he resorts to other, less scientific means of argumentation; he is no anatomist and admits to it.

²⁴¹ Both *inion* and *ines* are derived from the Greek word *is*, which means strength or force. The close proximity of these words, in fact they exist in the same line, emphasises the great strength and dynamism that exists in the localised area of the base of the head. Apollonios' clever wordplay (it is almost a form of *polyptoton*) here enables him to convey the debated dynamism of this area.

Apollonios discusses the exact nature of the relationship between the head, the heart and the nerves in this headache passage to show his interest in the contemporary discussion and heighten the realism of the pain that spreads across Medea's body and centres in her head. The references to Herophilos' theory that the *hēgemonikon* resides in the brain may tempt us to say that Apollonios himself prescribed to an encephalo-centric model of the body and soul. However, this idea is thwarted by the undeniable primacy of the heart's role in Medea as the organ that feels and reacts to the emotion, and in this passage it is the stimulus for the emotional pain travelling through the nervous system to manifest as physical pain. The pain that Medea feels occurs 'whenever the tireless *Erotes* should hurl sorrows upon her heart'. The heart is the first point of contact and it is the primary locus of emotions. Apollonios' incorporation of contemporary models in his description of Medea's pain enables him to physically show Medea's emotional anguish manifest realistically as somatic pain.

CONCLUSION

As this thesis has discussed, Apollonios constructs Medea's psyche and body in response to contemporary medical and philosophical influences in order to portray more realistically than anyone before him the way that *erōs* manifests itself in Medea as symptoms of both mental illness and physical sickness. Apollonios does this to heighten the realism of Medea's physical and psychological pain and pleasure while simultaneously providing a forceful warning of the destructiveness of *erōs*. Apollonios realistically portrays the enticing romantic delight of the *glukos*, while simultaneously magnifying the *pikros* aspect of desire to the extreme. The extent of this amplification is better understood having discerned Apollonios' allusions to contemporary theories on sense-perception and pain. His detailed treatment of Medea's internal workings represents how the *pathos* manifests and alters the psyche on the biological level. Apollonios is able to transfer the destructive and terrifying attributes of Erōs into Medea's very psyche where it disrupts her internal balances of *pneuma* and fire to manifest as equally terrifying behaviour and debilitating sickness through the image of Eros as archer firing the bolt into Medea's heart. Eros acts as a *daimōn*, providing a traditional explanation of divine intervention for disease and manic behaviour. The gadfly also bears associations of disease and mental illness which are able to manifest in Medea through the bolt, which transfers *erōs* and all his attributions to Medea's psyche. This is the set-up which Apollonios provides to henceforth explain Medea's symptomology along more scientific lines of natural causation. Apollonios thus blends traditional views of divine causation that resonate in epic poetry with contemporary medical and philosophical views of natural causation to provide a construction of Medea which very much represents the current conceptions of a psychological make-up and its affections and expressions. Apollonios represents an example of the Hellenistic scholar's interest in characterization and psychology. His depiction of Medea's psychological turmoil and indecision is sometimes criticised as inconsistent and unbelievable, because her demeanour and characterization so drastically changes at the beginning of Book 4. however, this reading fails to recognise the premise that Medea's personality contains both her virginal and sorceress sides as integrated halves at the same time, and it is this reveal/ concealment of these characteristics which keeps the psychological vacillation of Medea's decision making realistic. This indecisiveness heightens the tension of the decision-making process as it keeps the audience in

suspense as to what Medea will choose to do, *even though* we already know that she will choose Jason. Apollonios uses Medea's behaviour to allude to her dormant sinister tendencies like her passionate, angry and murderous nature, her ability to manipulate men and her sinister sorceress' *pharmaka*. However, this decision is made all the harder by the strength with which Medea clings to her values, and this exposition of a young, inexperienced Medea having to choose between two life-altering decisions is truly one which evokes sympathy in the audience for her, yet also casts unforgettable recollections of Euripides' Medea in the future making an equally life-altering decision and suggests that as in that situation, so in this one too, Medea will be overcome by her need to gratify her desire and act against right reason in order to pursue Jason.

Apollonios on several occasions, at significant moments, tactfully hints at the future developments in the myth-of Medea and foretells that Medea will ultimately be a survivor, valuing self-preservation and self-gratification more than familial ties. This is because her *pathos* affects her psyche's very ability to act in accordance with right reason. The Stoics deem right reason to be the kind of actions which a wise-man is wont to do, and include for example, acts of loyalty to one's parents, brothers and homeland. It is this very conundrum, whereby a person is able to be aware of the thing which is best to do and which is according to reason, yet still act in opposition to this which the philosophers discussed as *akrasia*. Both Euripides' Medea and Apollonios' Medea acknowledge that to act in accordance with their passion is wrong and will lead to terrifying consequences (*kaka*), and in an attempt to stand by this deliberation admonish themselves against the object of desire, yet still happily and ecstatically pursue it, while simultaneously recognizing that this is wrong. This was, to the philosophers, a type of mental illness that needed to be cured by therapeutics, however instead of unguents and dietetics they prescribed philosophy, ethics and knowledge. The employment of knowledge, for example, alleviates the pathos. This concept was conceived within somatic terminology, as the psyche was now considered to be corporeal and the mind's affections were acknowledged to be able to manifest physically as both erratic behaviour and physical sickness. The physicalization of the soul was described in terms of pneumatic *tonos* and flow. A *pathos* is literally an upset (*ptoia*) in the pneumatic tension of the psyche, and the degree of tautness of this tension correlates to the person's mental strength and resolve to act in accordance with reason. *Pathē* disrupt this and compromise the psyche's ability to receive, interpret and act on

information rationally, because they enhance in them weak-will. Some people, unfortunately, already naturally have weak-will like barbarians, lovers and fools. It is in this way that through the utilization of contemporary theories Apollonios is able to reveal to a modern audience the degree to which an ancient audience would have considered his Medea as medically compromised by her *pathē*, and thus more sympathetic. Chrusippos and Apollonios are both interested in *how* it came about that Medea was so affected by her *pathos* that she betrayed her family and homeland. According to Chrusippos' model, the psyche is unified and represents what we could call a 'mind' and as a unified whole, the *hēgemonikon* is endowed with the Platonic faculties, oscillates between acting in accordance with reason and in accordance with the *pathos*. To him it was not two elements of Medea's psyche that rise to battle one another for governance of the body, but the person as a whole involved fully in the decision making, sequentially expressing ideas, and it is this which represents the swift vacillation that Chrusippos describes. As a result of a unified psyche, the agent has more responsibility over his actions. Although the lover is granted more agency and is thus held more morally accountable for his actions, the lover must nevertheless be judged in light of his medical limitations.

Just as Medea's psyche is disturbed by the inception of *erōs*, which manifests as manic behaviour and immobilizing indecision, so too does the disruption of Medea's psyche manifest physically. Eros as a *pathos* interacts with the balance of internal heat to create fever, the symptoms of which include flushes on the skin, rapid movements of the eyes and body, and a palpitating heart. The *pathos* is able to manifest physically because of the corporealization of the psyche, whereby it is completely diffused throughout the body and its effects manifest also as affections of the body, and vice versa. Because of this, *pathē* became medicalized and were able to be diagnosed and prescribed treatment. This sympathetic relationship between mind and body had been recognized earlier and advanced on in the pseudo-science physiognomy, which held the tenet that from outward physical characteristics we are able to gain valuable insight into the psychological characteristics that are otherwise unperceivable. The physiognomists were in particular interested in what the skin, voice, eyes, gait and expressions had to reveal about internal psychological activity. Apollonios magnifies the treatment of these characteristics and their importance in expressing characterization. According to physiognomy, for example, the blush signifies desire, anger, impudence and the

abandonment of shame, for it also marks the beginning of decisions that have serious moral consequences. Medea's combating feelings of desire and fear are expressed through the alternating blush and pallor that comes upon her cheeks. In addition, Apollonios accentuates the focus on the eyes, and their movements are representative of the psyche's activity. The eyes signify desire, anger, modesty, boldness and contemplation. When the eyes are stationary they reflect indecision, when moving rapidly they reflect restlessness, and when they are cast sideways in an attempt to catch a glimpse of the beloved they reflect sexual voracity. A major function of physiognomy was to predict what kind of behaviour people are most likely to exhibit, and Apollonios uses this function to associate Medea's blushes, for instance, with a tendency for impassioned behaviour, and Apollonios once again toys with the audience's image of Medea. Another function of physiognomy was to explain the cause behind the effects, as there were restrictions on entering the body and external symptomology was the only means to interpret the internal unseen 'felt'. The blush is thus, also a symptom of fever, the cause of which is increased internal heat, stoked by the breezes of the *Erotes*. The fire that burns in Medea's heart is shown raging in full blaze, and according to Aristotle, the hotter the fever the hotter the flush and in consequence, the more manic the behaviour. In addition, Medea also exhibits symptoms of fever in her eyes, as when a mist descends over them in her moments of pure ecstatic delight, Apollonios evokes imagery of fever and death to oppose the *pikros* with the *glukos*. It is the presence of Jason which reignites this fever and his associations with Sirius also enable his fever-like wantonness to manifest in Medea as well. The effect of Medea's *pathos* is also seen in an accelerated pulse, also another symptom of her fever. Through reference to Medea's palpitating pulse Apollonios engages in the contemporary discussion on the circulatory system. Herophilos and Erasistratos both employed pulse analysis to diagnose and treat fever and the presence of *pathē* and the account of Antiochus' illness which Erasistratos famously diagnoses bears striking similarities to Medea's symptomology. In addition, Apollonios heightens the realism of his construction of Medea's heart by alluding to Erasistratos' revolutionary discovery of the heart's pumping role in pulsation. And lastly, this thesis looked at how Apollonios allowed Medea's emotional anguish to manifest as real perceivable somatic pain through his incorporation of the nervous system. He engages in the contemporary dialogue of sense-perception and the location of the *hēgemonikon*, and while he seems to subscribe to Chrusippos' more traditional model where the heart is *hēgemonikon*, he also

acknowledges the role of the base of the brain in the functioning of the newly discovered nervous system. The heart, as locus of the *hēgemonikon* and where emotions are felt, interpreted and judged upon, is the stimulus behind the transfer of emotional pain to physical pain which diffuses through the body by means of the nervous system. In a remarkable effort he describes *how* it can be that we feel physical pain because of our emotions.

Apollonios thus presents on the whole a very pessimistic portrayal of the experience of love. He parallels the destructive cosmic Eros who wants the cosmos as his play thing with the destructive *pathē* that affect all people and are as inevitable as fate itself. These *pathē* incite emotional and physical illness and strife. Apollonios heightens the *pikros* element of *erōs* to provide a forceful warning of its consequences in alignment with Stoic ethical philosophy, yet also acknowledges the *glukos* element which is undeniably present in the experience of love, and the sweetness of this feeling is what makes *pathē* so incredibly irresistible.

This thesis is important because it provides a unique perspective on Medea's *pathos*, and as a result, her erratic behaviours. Although these behaviours serve as a terrifying warning to the dangers of *pathē* Apollonios provides to his modern audience insight into how his ancient audience would have viewed Medea's erratic behaviour as a consequence of her medical limitations. In this way, Apollonios sympathizes with Medea more so than any of his antecedents. This represents a Hellenistic focus on the affections of the everyday person, and thus, how an ordinary person copes with them.

This thesis begins to track the popularity of medically and philosophically held tenets and the social response to these beliefs, through the appearances of them in contemporary literature. This is very effective when looking at the intertextuality between the arts and science in the ancient world. The appropriation of contemporary material in order to heighten the realism of his text is typical of a progressive Alexandrian scholar, and through Apollonios' utilization of them he provides insight into his perspective on psychological issues such as *akrasia*. Through studying how Medea is constructed physiologically and psychologically and the ethical expectations that are put upon her, we are better able to interpret how Medea's character functions in the poem as a whole. This type of investigation, I believe, could also provide insight into other texts that deal with similar psychopathological themes.

Because of limitations regarding space, I was unable to discuss everything I would have liked to in this thesis. As a result I believe there are many areas of research which are still to be done in relation to this thesis. For example, Medea is also undoubtedly affected by liquids in the descriptions of her desire, and in this Apollonios enters the scientific realm of humoral psychology, i.e. the way that internal flux and imbalance of the humors affects psychological behaviour and induces states like melancholy. In addition, a further investigation into Apollonios' role as physician when clinically depicting and diagnosing Medea in relation to the Stoic concept of a 'spectator' is also warranted to further elucidate Apollonios' incorporation of Stoic psychopathology in his depiction of Medea.

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