Neither a Conscript Army nor an All-Volunteer Force: Emerging Recruiting Models

This article develops an analytical model of force composition that combines the advantages of conscription with those of an all-volunteer force. Using Israel as a hypothesis-generating case study, it argues that mandatory military service has undergone changes centered on five key organizing principles: selective conscription, early discharges, elongated lengths of service, forms of voluntary service and differing pay-scales, and other material and non-material incentives for conscripts. These principles are “grafted” onto conscription creating a hybrid, “volunteer-ized” model. The utility of the theoretical model lies in explaining how these principles facilitate mobilizing a needed number or recruits, providing an adequate level of military expertise, as well as maintaining the legitimacy of the armed forces by meeting domestic social, economic, and political expectations about its composition and the use of personnel at its disposal. The system is adaptive and flexible, as shown through the comparisons throughout the paper.


Introduction
Most academic and military debates about the advantages and disadvantages of force composition (and hence recruitment and retention) posit a dichotomy between the ideal-types of conscription and all-volunteer models. We argue that a new model maximizing the benefits of the two systems-providing a necessary mass of force and specialized military professionals-has emerged in Israel. Moreover, a close scrutiny of other small-and medium-sized countries reveals similar, if limited, developments in the same direction. While some countries like Finland or South Korea have maintained conscription along classic lines, others as Denmark or Lithuania maintain parallel systems by decreasing the numbers of conscripts and strengthening their volunteer systems. In contrast, Israel has experimented with and adapted its model by "grafting" onto conscription a set of arrangements allowing it to enjoy many benefits of a fullyfledged voluntary force centered on military professionalism. While Israel's conscription has never been truly universal (and is becoming less so), for many groups, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) still embodies the ethos of a "People's Army." Moreover, the country preserves conscription (32 months for men, 24 months for women) despite evidence that volunteer forces are more cost-effective in terms of training and personnel (Arad, 2010).
Why, then, does Israel maintain conscription despite its inbuilt inequalities and costs? We contend that to meet its security challenges and corresponding personnel needs, a form of selective conscription has evolved that is centered on a multiplicity of organizational routes and roles involving different lengths of service, pecuniary and non-material rewards, professional development, promotion ladders, and prospects for civilian employment. Further, the design of this model represents an attempt to meet domestic social, economic, and political demands that have developed during the past four decades. This is an adaptive system since it allows the military to maintain its image of embodying the national ethos, adhering to economic constraints and addressing the multiple motivations of potential recruits while meeting the military demands of today's conflicts (see Krebs, 2005).
The IDF's force structure comprises conscripts, regulars, and reserves. Recent decades have witnessed considerable downsizing of the reserves (along with increasing material rewards for those remaining) (Levy, 2011;Catignani et al., 2021) coupled with a reform of the component of regulars (creating different contracts) (Safrai, 2019). No less significant are organizational transformations that have occurred in conscription, changes that are important since in Israel virtually all regulars and reservists (including officers), members of Israel's Internal Security Agency, the Mossad, and the police have served as conscripts.
Today's model of conscription is very different from the form it took until the 1980s since it is a hybrid structure combining elements of the ideal-types of professional and militia models (Cohen, 2010). Yet this form is neither an all-volunteer force nor a universal mandatory conscription one, nor is it one in which one segment of volunteers is juxtaposed next to a conscript-based one. Clearly there always were and still are mixes of the two ideal-types in any armed force composed of combinations of regulars, reserves, conscripts, civilians employed by the military, or external contractors. Moreover, during different historical periods militaries throughout the world have used some combination of conscription with other forms of service (as, for example, the UK or US). Historically however, the democracies have typically chosen between the key organizing principles of the ideal-types. Thus indeed, while the US continues to have a (somewhat neglected) selective service system that in theory could be used to conscript youths into the military, it has chosen to organize its force along the lines of a professional military.
Naming Israel's model as hybrid-as combining elements from both ideal-types-is nevertheless not enough since this term does not specify the organizing principles by which it is put together to adapt to changing operational and social changes. A fruitful metaphor for understanding this particular form of hybrid system is that of "grafting," since onto conscription have been implanted arrangements that become "organically" related to it and ongoing changes can be likened to "pruning" the limbs of a tree. This metaphor also sheds light on how conscription is a "live" model because the constant changes made to it enable it to adapt. In other words, the conscription model is historically emergent and was never fully designed and therefore did not develop unidirectionally to emerge fully coherent. Rather, it developed over decades incrementally and in a piecemeal fashion. But because the organizing principles have been in place for the past decades, it has been easy to attach (or detach) new practices and arrangements to it. To understand this system, one must take into account that human resources practices are never only internal organizational matters. They carry social meanings and resonate with wider beliefs and images about the composition of the armed forces and their actions. Accordingly, changes to the system of mandatory service result from alterations in armed conflicts and social transformations related to how militaries should be trained and deployed to use lethal force. Today's conscription system, then, is the culmination of adaptive responses by senior decision-makers to assure the legitimacy of the IDF and maintain its material and symbolic support.
Our aims are conceptual and integrative; conceptual in that we theorize the emergent model and its organizing principles, and integrative since we bring together findings from academic studies, publicly available data, and specialized reports. As we show in the conclusion, the importance of this study lies first in advancing studies of conscription globally; second, in developing a new model for analyzing the Israeli system; and third, formulating a way to apply it to other conscription systems.

Conscription Models
The large inter-power and global wars that took place since the 19 th century saw conscription arise as the dominant model (given the operational dictate for mass armies) (Lachmann, 2013). While historians and sociologists have studied conscription in the past (focusing on a variety of issues such as casualty aversion, democratic theory, or political control of the military), our focus is explicitly on the post-Cold War period marked by its abolition or preservation. Although many democracies ended mandatory military service and shifted to all-volunteer forces with the end of the Cold War, other countries decided to maintain it or renew it after elimination (for key examples see Ajangiz, 2002;Boene, 2009;Haltiner & Szvircsev Tresch, 2009). It is this process-the abolition of conscription-that has been explicitly theorized with the majority of studies published in this period seeing it as a result of four key developments (variables): (1) changed threat environments and a move to new missions based on multicountry cooperation and expeditionary forces, (2) pressures to reduce defense budgets and the rise of Neo-Liberal thinking, (3) technological developments necessitating long training for and investment in troops predicated on a force no longer necessitating large formations, and (4) social changes involving more individualistic (material and postmaterial) motivations and weakening links to the nation-state. Theoretically, then, their proposition involves four key drivers of change-threats and their perception, economic pressures, social change, and technological advances.
Yet some democracies decided to continue some form of conscription (e.g., Finland, Norway, Greece, or South Korea) or reinstated it (such as Sweden and Lithuania) (Mohadin, 2018). Unlike the above set of studies, it was somewhat surprising for us to find that there has actually been no sustained analysis or theoretical statement about keeping conscription or maintaining it (unlike the theorized move to an all-volunteer force). Rather, what appear are intimations or comments rather than full-blown attempts at explanation. Accordingly, maintaining or renewing conscription has been explained first by the fear that abolishing it will impair the ability to recruit soldiers of a sufficient level to staff advanced technical roles (Bieri, 2018;Tarabar & Hall, 2016). A second reason especially pertinent to smaller-and medium-sized countries is that compulsory recruitment is necessary to assure a force of a certain size (and unsurprisingly many democracies have found it difficult to meet recruitment goals after it was ended) (Jarvenpaa, 2016). Specifically, most of the Nordic and Baltic states see conscription as one measure to counter potential Russian threats by recruiting a minimal number of troops (Bieri, 2018). A third reason centers on discourses valuing the social role of conscription in an era of a loss of sense of citizenship and responsibility (hence countries like France or the UK are toying with introducing national service to counter social tensions) (Rosman & Elisheva, 2020). A fourth explanation is cultural (as in Switzerland, Finland, or Israel) where compulsory service is seen as embodying a national symbol and ethos (Bieri, 2018;Szvirczev Tresch, 2011).
In developing our theory of what we call maintenance-through-change of conscription we follow Weick (1989) (Ben-Ari & Eyal, 2014 who defines theory as an ordered set of assertions about a generic behavior or structure assumed to hold throughout a significantly broad range of specific instances. In regard to our case, we argue that to theorize the maintenance of conscription and its changed forms, it is useful to adopt the broad contours of how the move to all-volunteer forces were theorized, that is, utilizing the key variables delineated. We do so since this formulation has clarified the main drivers of change in recruitment models. But we further argue, that developments during the past two or so decades-that is the historical period following the decade that previous scholars wrote about-imply that the key drivers take on new forms. Accordingly, we link the four drivers of change charted out by the theory to force composition. Let us take each turn. First, the new threats evinced by Russia and China have meant that many countries have had to move to home defense-as is seen in the Nordic and Baltic states, and with South Korea, Taiwan, and Israel-this having been the case all along. Moreover, because conscripts were ideally seen as defenders of national territory and could only be sent abroad if they volunteered to do so, their importance has returned. Second, the adoption of a host of technological innovations in military activities has intensified amplifying the diversification of military occupational specialties requiring relatively high investments in long training (and subsequently longer terms of service to justify such investments). However, this development has emerged at the same time as the small-and medium-sized countries have recognized the need for a minimal mass of force for home defense. Third, the early post-Cold War demands to reduce defense budgets and the rise of Neo-Liberal thinking has continued unabated and are now expressed in demands that the armed forces not only use their resources at their disposal in efficient way with to greater openness to transparency and accountability. This point means that armed forces now have to constantly signal their openness to external monitoring and answerability to public demands. Fourth, during the past three decades not only has the shift to greater individualistic motivations strengthened, but the ascendance of post-material values has been accompanied by new demands that the armed forces address and reflect the new ideology of gender equality and social diversity. Indeed, the skill-sets now required in militaries make it even more necessary to take into account differences in educational levels and in the diverse aspirations and expectations that accompany them. Together, these developments mean that the armed forces of small-and medium-sized countries need forces comprised of a critical mass married to high-tech military technology that must adapt to pressures for economic efficiency and the demands of potential recruits in terms of motivations and new cultural ideologies.
Before going on to examine the Israeli case, let us clarify how our analysis goes beyond previous studies in one more key respect: we focus not only on mandatory military service as such, but on the actual organizational arrangements involved. Of course, there have always been various provisions centered on conscription-say different lengths of service for enlisted troops and NCOs or between support and combat soldiers. But to date, no scholar has systematically opened-up the "black-box" of conscription to suggest a fine-tuned analysis of the actual practices of conscription. This kind of analysis facilitates an exploration of how different arrangements answer different (often contradictory or complementary) operational needs and social and economic expectations. Along these lines, this is the first attempt to explain (within one model) the combination of operational demands and social changes that resulted in today's Israeli conscription model. Previous studies (Cohen, 1999(Cohen, , 2008 described how the relative weight of the IDF's three components changed so that the standing army (comprising regulars and conscripts) has taken pride of place; emphasized tensions between calls for an all-volunteer military and continuing mandatory service; identified the role contraction of the IDF brought about by a reduction of nationbuilding activities; or underscored the need for recruiting the middle-class to staff hightech roles. However, no one single investigation has brought all of these dimensions together.

The System-A Description and Principles
In Israel, out of a yearly cohort of 100,000 potential conscripts, only about 60,000 are obligated to serve. In recent years, the IDF recruits about 65% out of this potential, together with a few thousand volunteers (Bedouins, Israeli Arab Christians, Jews from abroad, Ultra-Orthodox Jews, and recruits who volunteer despite receiving a medical waiver) so that in practice, about 45,000 individuals are annually recruited (Malchi, 2021). Recruitment is based on five interlocking principles and arrangements which are "grafted" onto the core of conscription thus diversifying the terms of legally mandated military service.

Selective Recruitment
Potential draftees are selected before conscription. To begin, Israel's ultra-orthodox (Haredi) and Arab citizens are legally exempt although a slowly growing number of Haredim and even smaller number of Arab citizens do enter service. Also formally exempted are youngsters who have medical and mental health problems, all Druze women, and Jewish women declaring that they cannot serve for religious reasons. Accordingly, barely half of each cohort are actually drafted into the IDF (Cohen, 2010). In addition, one study showed that on average, of those obligated to serve by law, recruitment percentage for service was 75% in 1990 versus 65% in 2017 (Even & Hadad, 2019). Although one study found no major change in motivational levels during the same period (Rivnai Bahir & Avidar, 2017), this reduction can be explained by changes in the IDF's recruiting policy: by applying rigorous standards the IDF is able to exempt more candidates than in the past (reasons usually being physical or mental health conditions and criminal background). There is no shortage of willing recruits but thanks to conscription the IDF itself is able to choose whom to recruit and whom to discharge.

Early Discharges
A significant minority of soldiers receive early (honorable) discharges. In 2005, about 20% of conscripts did not complete their full term of conscription (Arad, 2010), but by 2015, the numbers grew to one in six men and one in 12 women with the main reason being mental difficulties (Bochbot, 2015). The relative ease of obtaining early discharge is due the IDF having a surfeit of personnel in its rear echelons, and hence, most individuals discharged belong to rear units where the surplus is most evident. Moreover, many of those discharged belong to families facing welfare problems and the IDF often places them in military bases near their homes so they are able to help their families by working during off-duty hours. Tiargan (2015) concluded that motivation for military service and significant service by young men and women whom the IDF regards as potential conscripts has not declined over the past two decades. At the same time, the percentage of teens who do not, from the IDF's perspective, have potential for military service may have increased primarily due to demographic developments, administrative decisions by the IDF, or legislation. Together selective, conscription and early discharge together are a mechanism for dealing with hidden unemployment in the military thus providing the system some flexibility.

Elongated Lengths of Service
Joined to conscription are large numbers of programs that lengthen time served and hence make troops available for deployment beyond formally stipulated conscription periods. These programs are designed to provide training in a plethora of specialized occupations in intelligence and telecommunications. They take place in military or civilian settings and train recruits in such subjects as Arabic and Farsi or computer and IT skills. While studying in civilian institutions (paid for by the IDF) potential recruits are not yet soldiers, but receive a small salary from the Ministry of Defense. The IDF also runs some technical high-schools and is involved in programs in civilian highschools that train future specialists. To join such programs, future conscripts must agree to lengthen their term of service for a few months or years. These additional periods of training are thus organically related the jobs conscripts take on. In addition, each year, about a thousand sponsored individuals study for undergraduate degrees mainly in the sciences, engineering, and social sciences. Their summers are devoted to basic training and NCOs and Officer courses, and they must commit, beyond conscription, to a further 3 years of service as short-term regulars.

Forms of Voluntary Service
A closely interlaced principle woven into conscription is that of volunteering since to enter some sought after roles and units, potential recruits must compete with other candidates. For instance, draftees must compete to be accepted to the elite infantry brigades and the special forces. Some top-tier special forces necessitate a commitment beyond conscription of a further salaried 3 years and can complete officer school and start a university degree. Volunteers for the commando brigade are required at least an additional 1-year term as salaried regulars. And, to volunteer and be accepted for training as naval commanders, submarine sailors, pilots, or air-crews, individuals must sign-on for a further number of years beyond conscription. Women who volunteer for positions requiring long training like border defense units, the artillery, dog handlers, or search and rescue teams are also obliged to sign-on to serve as long as their male colleagues.

Material and Non-Material Incentives
To motivate and acknowledge people in voluntary positions, the IDF offers incentives such as, different salaries for conscripts in combat, support and rear echelon roles and many units use milestones to award troops special berets, insignia, or certificates. For example, at the end of their first stage of training, infantry conscripts are awarded their units' shoulder patch while the completion of another stage affords them the right to wear distinctive berets. Additional combat postings entitle conscripts to display special pins and troops recognize these signs and treat each other accordingly. Indeed, the Hebrew term for combat soldier-Lochem (warrior)-still carries prestige in wider society thus cyber soldiers are called "cyber warriors" and members of search and rescue teams (in urban civilian centers) are also labeled "warriors." Further benefits include combat soldiers being allowed, after 21 months of service, to leave bases in civilian clothes and use public transportation in civilian clothes. Upon completion of their full term of service they are also eligible for funds for further education.
In 2017, to preserve the distinction of troops engaging in close combat versus those recently elevated to warrior status, the IDF developed five categories to designate different "classes" of soldiers. At the top, is the Front-Line Combat Soldier (Lochem Chod) (elite infantry, armor, combat engineering, and special units expected to engage the enemy directly). In the second tier, they are defined as a Combat Soldier (Lochem) (air defense and Home Front Defense Battalions who are exposed to fire). The third is comprised of Operational Combat Support roles (Tomech Lechima Mivtzai) (like logistics and technical personnel who perform their duties in areas of armed conflict). The fourth includes Combat Support postings (Tomech Lechima) who may enter conflict zones, and finally is the Rear Echelon Role (Tafkid Oref) including administrative soldiers stationed behind the lines (Even, 2017). Creating these designations and occasionally changing them offers another form of flexibility since it allows the allocation of different kinds of prestige according to changing circumstances. While this hierarchy based on higher the status paying off in the military and civilian worlds can be found in most militaries, its power lies in its combination with the other organizing principles.
Another incentive involves the convertibility of military into civilian skills such those obtained in telecommunications and intelligence-related military posts that translate easily into the civilian job market. Other roles that fit this mold include combat medics who can accompany school trips at a nice profit, women serving as education NCOs can covert these skills to various tour guiding and education-related jobs, and drivers of heavy vehicles are often sought after by workplaces.
As is evident from this description, Israel's conscription system is characterized by different selection criteria before enlistment, a relatively lenient exemption regime, programs grafted onto service entailing different lengths of service, and a host of voluntary routes marked by different incentives. Together, they provide the system a large measure of elasticity since built into each one of these mechanisms is the potential for change. We now move onto the contexts within which this system has evolved and which explain its emergence.

Operational Requirements
Historically, the IDF was designed to operate in high-intensity conflicts with state militaries and in harassment missions by armed guerrilla and terror groups. Since Israel last clashed with a state army during the first Lebanon war 1982, the region has seen major geostrategic shifts making the probability of a major state-on-state less likely. However, new strategic threats by various armed groups and organizations controlling territories around Israel such as Hamas and Hizballah and supported by Iran have emerged. Consequently, the IDF has had to adapt to diverse new threats while retaining its core capability in conventional high-intensity battles. The most serious are thousands of missiles located in Gaza and Lebanon aimed at Israel's population centers, tunnels for delivering militants into Israel's territory in a surprise attack, a Palestinian popular uprising, attacks carried out by terror groups, an escalation of conflict with Iran, and constant cyber-attacks (Barak et al., 2020).
To meet these challenges, the IDF has made doctrinal and organizational transformations. Still facing the potential prospect of a large war, there remains a need for a minimal mass of troops and thus downsizing formations has been accompanied by augmentation of others with increases in firepower based on many military occupations necessitating lengthy periods of training and specialization. Further, despite overall downscaling, some units have enjoyed astounding organizational growth. First are the intelligence, anti-missile, telecommunications, cyber, and drone units that have seen very significant enlargements requiring highly skilled soldiers. As in the Nordic countries (Jarvenpaa, 2016), the IDF has encouraged conscripts with potential in ITrelated areas to undertake such roles. Similarly, complex cooperation and coordination between special forces, air force, intelligence units, and civilian security actors has required troops with advanced competences and know-how (Shamir & Ben-Ari, 2016). One example of this trend is the formation in 2019 of the "multidimensional unit" combining infantry, engineering, anti-tank warfare, air, and intelligence as a laboratory for combat technological experimentation (Limor, 2020).
Second, the Home Front Command, charged with aiding government bodies and the civilian population during emergencies, has also seen significant expansion (Sher et al., 2011). While such roles existed for decades, since the Lebanon War of 2006, the Command has been enlarged, upgraded, and trained. It includes search and rescue battalions, logistics elements, or offices supporting local governments. This vast structure staffed primarily by conscripts and reservists requires a substantial quantity of troops.
A third category involves the IDF, like all militaries, experiencing increasing scrutiny and public intervention in its internal affairs (Shaw, 2005;Levy, 2012). To adapt, it has created new organizational structures or augmented older ones such as operational military law centers (Cohen & Ben-Ari, 2014) or media relations units (Shavit, 2017). Accordingly, between 2000 and 2009, the number of officers in the IDF's Military Advocate General (especially its division for international law) grew from five to thirty-five (Haaretz January 22, 2009)-relatively the largest growth of any military unit in Israel during this time. These officers study at universities before becoming conscripts and then serving as short-term regulars. Similarly, media relations functionaries have proliferated especially since the Second Lebanon War with the majority of roles filled by conscripts already well versed in today's New Media. In fact, today the IDF Spokesperson maintains an active presence in the New Media in Hebrew, Arabic, English, French, Spanish, and in Farsi.
The ever-greater differentiation and specialization of roles and units have resulted in an "incremental military" in which older forms are combined with new or renewed organizational entities depending on most roles filled by conscripts (Sher et al., 2011). This situation means that along with maintaining a steady supply of soldiers, the IDF has had to cultivate a much wider skill set than in the past and to do so efficiently and effectively. However, the emergence of Israel's system of conscription is due not only to operational factors but to other considerations.

The Market Army
Since the end of the Cold War, policymakers in all of the democracies witnessed demands for more efficient, and not only effective, state institutions. Prompted by Neo-Liberal ideas, the language of productivity, cost accounting or customer orientation has also been applied to the armed forces and to strong effect (Deitelhoff & Geis, 2009;Levy, 2010Levy, , 2019. Accordingly, such demands have also been directed at the IDF (Levy, 2019;Safrai, 2019), with some commentators asking about how efficient it is in using its material and human resources.
While some scholars argue that recruitment via the market is cheaper than conscription, given the large quantity and high quality of troops the IDF needs this is not an option (Lipschitz, 2015). Economically, the IDF's challenge is how to retain control over the supply and demand for personnel in a competitive market. In particular, because Israel's high-tech sector creates fierce competition for young talent, the country's most talented men and women are first conscripted to be assessed, selected, and trained for the demanding jobs the IDF requires. This situation means that the IDF does not have to compete against leading companies offering lucrative compensation packages thus enjoying a monopoly over personnel. Indeed, maintaining conscription assures control over recruits the IDF is interested in for operational needs and allows it to exempt or grant early discharge to those who do not fit its needs. This point is perhaps best expressed by the former Chief-of-Staff Eisenkot when he said that he is "not a feminist nor a chauvinist, I am only interested in winning a war" (Eichner, 2018). Yet, as we shall presently see, this utilitarian approach to human resources tells only part of the story.
To understand the incentive structures helping motivate and retain conscripts, one must understand how Israel has turned into a market society entailing cultural changes centered on the relations between individuals and institutions. The fundamental change is that soldiers have come to now expect an exchange with the army-manifested in choice and bargaining-as part of "contractual militarism" (Levy et al., 2007). Hence, the IDF markets many high-tech occupations as opening-up opportunities in the country's high-tech sector. Recruiters in the IDF jokingly refer to this phenomenon by the Hebrew acronym of "EMILY" which translates roughly into "what's in it for me," indicating that recruits want to know what civilian gains military service will afford them.
At the same time, many recruits voice a demand for "meaningful service" (sherut mashmauti) implying that some roles not meaningful or necessary but rather stem from the IDF's need to find positions for all recruits. When recruits speak of "meaningful service" they state their wish to serve in postings providing valuable service both to the nation and to their personal development (Gal, 1999;Rivnai Bahir & Avidar, 2017;Tiargan, 2015); they do not want to give a substantial portion of their time to the military without being certain their time is well-spent. Consequently, bargaining between individuals and the IDF refers not only to elements of limited self-interest like material benefits but post-material considerations such as self-actualization. Take the questionnaire sent to potential conscripts asking to enumerate their first three preferences for the units or occupations they would like to join (out of a list they were preselected for). Granting potential enlistees a choice before being formally drafted is further expressed in the many voluntary service routes open to conscripts that fit their interests and self-image. In fact, the web-page of the IDF induction center reveals hundreds of positions open to conscripts along with short descriptions and general details about the skills draftees need to master to be deployed in them. While elements of such selective volunteering can be, of course, found in all-volunteer forces, what is significant is that it takes placed within conscription, a system based on legally mandated mobilization backed by the coercive power of the state.
The idea at base of this exchange relationship is that if the military allows selfactualization, then conscripts will remain in service and if it does not then they may optout and find self-expression in other places. Indeed, the option not to serve has become acceptable among swaths of the population (Perez, 2018;Livio, 2012). More broadly, the exchange underlies the instituting of multiple service routes answering the motivations of enlistees. To be sure, not all soldiers are satisfied with their placement or with the work they do, but the point is that the military makes an effort to meet their choices and portray itself according to public expectations about a contractual relationship with conscripts. Many programs and routes-as the contractual exchangeeasily suit all-volunteer forces but the fact that they have been integrated "organically" into conscription hints at yet other reasons for continuing the system beyond costeffectiveness or meeting individual needs and motivations.

"A People's Army" and The Republican Ethos
Historically, the IDF was seen as defender of the country, a symbol of the nation-state and as melting pot-the veritable "People's Army" (Cohen, 2010). Additionally, military service was viewed as a route for gaining full citizenship and belonging to the political collective and for large parts of society it is still so (Ben-Porat, 2012). Today's conscription system continues to resonate with these themes albeit in changed forms (Rosman & Elisheva, 2020).

Representativeness and Fairness
The first theme involves the IDF portraying itself not as statistically representative of Israeli society but nevertheless as reflecting a wide spectrum of groups belonging to it (Lomsky-Feder et al., 2012). A perusal of the old and new media reveals a plethora of articles about troops from diverse social groups such as new immigrants, Moslems, the ultra-orthodox, women, Christians, or from disadvantaged backgrounds. These reports can be seen as attempts by the IDF to offer a picture of internal diversity, of at least recruiting some representatives of diverse groups. For instance, the slide show at the top of the IDF website offers portraits of soldiers along gender, racial, ethnic, or religious lines (Golan et al., 2017).
Moreover, as in the Nordic and Baltic countries (Poutvaara & Wagener, 2011), there is a public understanding that to be seen as fair and universal conscription must be based on conscripting as high a percentage as possible of a given cohort. Thus, despite the economic costs, the IDF recruits many individuals who then receive an early discharge. Recruiting some people exempt from service because of special needs or criminal backgrounds should be seen similarly. Reports about social diversity then, couple the theme of "universal" conscription with a response to demands for social inclusivity. Accordingly, social projects like supplementary Hebrew-language classes for new immigrants or Arabs fulfill not only the goal of assuring a functional level of Hebrew but as fulfilling a societal role. In the NATIV program taking place towards the end of mandatory service, conscripts undergo a course emphasizing Zionist values and are offered the possibility of converting to Judaism. In these ways, the IDF allows people who otherwise would not enter society as fully-acknowledged members an entryway. Another program drafts autistic youth to postings that can be converted into civilian skills (say analyzing aerial photos or optics). The SHACHAR programs (Hebrew acronym for integrating Haredi youth), allows men to serve in frameworks constructed specifically for their religious needs by being separated from women, afforded separate kitchens governed by stringent dietary requirements and allowed time for religious study. Service is usually geared towards roles that are convertible to the civilian market (electronics specialists, air-conditioning technicians, or telecommunication roles). Haredi men who serve in combat units are able to acquire enough of a secular education to return to civilian life with tools to continue their education or enter the labor force.

An Entryway to Citizenship
As is in many democracies, since Israel's independence, the primary route toward full citizenship has been conscription. This republican idea is that citizenship is awarded those willing to contribute to their country and that military service is the epitome of such willingness given that soldiers may have to sacrifice their lives (Levy, 2012). While it is now much more legitimate than in the past not to serve, the republican ethos is nevertheless still potent in contemporary Israel. This provides another reason for drafting soldiers who are financial "burdens," say individuals located near home to help their families, with medical problems or criminal backgrounds or with special needs. By recruiting them-many are posted in low-skill jobs like gardening or guarding-the IDF facilitates completing even shortened service but provides an opening in civilian society. An empirical study found that unit-level commanders often talked about accepting the burden of problematic soldiers as a way to help them become good citizens (Lomsky-Feder et al., 2012). Efforts by the gay and lesbian lobbies further underscore how conscription is perceived as a route to citizenship (Amit Kama, 2012).
The potent link between citizenship and military service is best exemplified by debates regarding three groups. The exemptions ultra-orthodox men receive often leads to their public portrayal as shirking civic responsibility thus breaching the republican contract (Levy, 2012;Stadler et al., 2008). In a different manner, recruiting women is not only cost-effective but answers calls by feminist lobbies. Initially the IDF bowed to these groups' pressure, but now actively embraces the idea of women serving in almost every military role, thereby signaling burden-sharing between men and women that resonates with gender equality (Harel-Shalev & Daphna-Tekoah, 2019;Lomsky-Feder & Sasson-Levy, 2018).
Finally, the Arab citizens of Israel exemplify how the social contract continues to be an ethno-republican one (Peled, 2012) since exemption from mandatory military service provides a means for excluding them from citizenship and benefits such as aid in mortgages, tax reductions or discharge bonuses given only to conscripts who complete a full term of service (Rosenhek, 2012).

The Model: Flexibility, Legitimation, and Institutional Autonomy
We now move on to examine how the conscription model is embedded in wider civilmilitary relations. The IDF, like all public bodies, is a legitimacy-seeking institution since legitimacy assures continued material and non-material support and the armed forces' institutional autonomy: the discretion allowed for managing relations with environments, self-regulation, professional development and leeway for action (Pion-Berlin, 1992;Catignani et al., 2021). Indeed, military autonomy has long been associated with the need for a separate culture to nurture and control the destructive potential of military power (Croissant & Kuehn, 2009). For long periods, the IDF enjoyed high institutional autonomy but today it is much more circumscribed because, like many of the armed forces of the democracies, it has become more transparent (open to external monitoring) and open (given multiple relations with outside entities) system. Yet as it lost autonomy enjoyed in earlier times, the IDF responded by devising strategies to adapt to and manage growing interference while maintaining legitimacy. Legitimacy is based on the public's willingness to accept how its military internalizes and behaves according to social and political expectations regarding operational matters, its social composition, and the treatment of soldiers and to remain legitimate, the armed forces constantly innovate and adjust to changing circumstances and norms (Safrai, 2018).
To gain legitimacy, the IDF has chosen to enjoy the advantages of both a volunteer military and a People's Army by piecemeal fashioning of a model taking advantage of both. It can portray itself as a melting pot resonating long held beliefs and earns the right to select whoever comes in its door (since it does not have to compete in the open market). By instituting selective conscription, it answers expectations about conscripting troops from various social groups, utilizing them in an effective and efficient manner and allowing youngsters choice regarding multiple routes toward interesting and challenging positions. The seeming "price" the IDF pays for this system means that it maintains the ethos of conscription by recruiting groups that it may not be economically beneficial such as ultra-orthodox or individuals with criminal backgrounds while answering other public expectations. Moreover, the practice of recruiting soldiers with welfare problems and then discharging them early is one that simultaneously answers demands about a wide recruitment of a given cohort (alluding to universalism) but also minimizes their cost. Further, drafting individual with special needs, may not be cost-effective, but answers expectations about the military's diversity and allows these soldiers to realize the republican ethos.
The multiple practices and service routes are the core of the system's flexibility because they encase talent or skill management (for operational reasons) within a legitimation regime that adapts to societal changes. In other words, the system is not only marked by a price the military pays for being "forced" to maintain conscription but rather, through it the IDF transmits multiple messages to publics that it is taking the correct measures to meet new threats and (at the same time) meeting social expectations about inclusiveness, diversity, and treatment of soldiers. Like all militaries, the IDF, in other words, conforms to certain organizational arrangements not only because of intrinsic efficiency per se (but they can be efficient), but because they are rewarded for doing so in terms of greater legitimacy. Further, the flexibility of the system lies in the model being an emergent one in which parts are constantly being formalized and institutionalized and others changed and experimented with. To return to the metaphor suggested earlier, in this "organic" system the main trunk of the tree (conscription) maintains continuity while other elements are implanted so that something new is continually developing. For example, during the 1980s when the IDF had problems recruiting physicians and engineers, it instituted new programs conveying academics through conscription and then retaining them.
Our analysis is not a rosy-eyed depiction of a smooth-running model because there are tensions built into the system. Portraying itself as a Peoples' Army and basing itself on universal conscription creates social clashes. The most overt one is the attempt to conscript ultra-orthodox men requiring separate units while retaining gender equality and opening combat positions for women. Additionally, when presenting itself as promoting women and gender minorities, the IDF must contend with allegations that allowing women in combat requires modifying physical requirements detrimental to troop-readiness. These clashes sometimes spill over into the courts. 1

Conclusion: Is the Model Applicable to Other Countries?
If our theoretical reasoning is indeed correct, we propose that it holds for other smalland medium-sized countries facing concrete threats and roughly similar economic and social change. While we cannot provide a full-fledged comparative analysis given the limits of this article, indications from other countries seem to point towards development in the same direction as Israel. Theoretically we proposed that four key drivers-threats (or their assessment), economic demands, technological advances, and social change-lead to change in force composition and specifically in recruitment systems. During this historical period such countries find it necessary to create forces combining a minimal mass of soldiers with significant components of new high-tech military occupations while addressing public demands for efficiency (not only effectiveness) and expectations centered on material and post-material values and the ideology of gender equality and social diversity. In other words, such countries must assure a minimal number of troops while guaranteeing they are trained to a professional military level while responding to social expectations about how the military uses and treats its personnel. Our model further proposes-and in this manner goes beyond previous analyses-that the outcome of these developments are differentiated forms of mandatory military service that can be only be appreciated by opening-up the "blackbox" of conscription to look at the specific arrangements instituted to answer these challenges. Specifically, these differentiated forms are expressed in a variety of selective procedures, specialized courses, promotion routes, and material and nonmaterial incentives built into conscription.
Turning to cases beyond Israel, it is readily apparent that most countries that have maintained and adapted their conscription systems face a strong perceived threat: The Nordic (as well as the Baltic) nations are all next-door neighbors of a militarily resurgent and revanchist Russia necessitating home defense. All, moreover, are marked by the advent of neo-Liberalism and its implications for governmental efficiency, transparency, and accountability. Further, their military personnel systems have been marked by experimentation and change since the end of the 1990s due to the advent of post-material values and the ideologies of gender equality and social diversity.
The Nordic countries are characterized by selective conscription due to the fact that while all men (and in Norway and Sweden also women) of an age are eligible for conscription, only around 10% of a given cohort are actually drafted (Jarvenpaa, 2016).
Moreover, these countries have some form of civilian national service equivalent to the military one. Since the mid-1990s Denmark has instituted two parallel systems: professional units alongside conscript units where draftees are chosen on the basis of a lottery (itself seen and accepted as a universal mechanism for recruitment). Once drafted, conscripts usually serve different lengths of service based on whether they remain as enlisted soldiers or progress to NCO or Officers roles or to specialties that necessitate longer training. In addition, different lengths of service hold for certain voluntary units with conscripts in the Hussar Regiment serving a year (and not four obligatory months) and those in the Royal Life Guards serving 8 months. In this manner, the country's conscription system is differentiated according to voluntary routes, length of service and symbolic incentives (special insignia for these desired units.
Norway, in turn, does not have a parallel system of conscripts and salaried volunteers from day one although this is true only of enlisted personnel and not officers. 2 As in Israel, the country's twelve-month conscription forms the basis for later recruitment to the enlisted ranks. Likewise, in a way echoing Israel, conscription is rather popular since it is seen as a mechanism for attracting the brightest youths for the military's needs and as a means for youngsters for self-improvement and excitement before adult life starts for real. Moreover, conscription is not seen as unfair by those who are drafted, since the perception is that only the most talented are recruited, a fact that has led to feminist-inspired demands that universal conscription should include women too. At the same time and in contrast to Israel, because conscription only lasts a short 12 months, the military concluded that it needs some units with higher readiness and expertise. Thus, some positions in conscripts' units with long and heavy training requirements are now staffed by regular enlisted personnel thus aiding in improving their combat readiness. In addition, Norway pays some groups of conscripts what amounts to small, but symbolically important, hardship allowances thus distinguishing them from other recruits in less burdensome roles. Finally, and again in contrast to Israel, while in the past all officers came up through the ranks, from 2015 this system was changed into a two tier one that is more akin to the British and US armed forces. Norway's adaptive system, then, displays differentiation according to type of training, material and symbolic rewards, and perceived status as well as directly addresses the demands for gender equality.
Sweden abandoned national military service in 2006 but soon experienced recruitment problems because career prospects as enlisted soldiers did not appeal to Swedish youths in sufficient numbers. Although significant numbers of youths did sign up for voluntarily military training for similar reasons that conscription is rather popular in Norway (such as excitement, self-improvement, or building-up their personal resumes), many individuals found ways to achieve such goals in civilian contexts. In addition, given Sweden's highly developed universal welfare and education systems, unlike some conscripts in Israel, Swedish recruits did not need to stay in the military to gain such benefits. For these reasons, it decided to reinstate conscription a few years later. The country's system of mandatory service again is characterized by adaptive moves to achieve a minimally necessary mass of force (heighted by the move to home defense), attending to recruits desire for meaningful and interesting service, gender ideology.
Finland is an exception in this regard since it practices what is closest to universal conscription for men. The country's concepts of Nation in Arms and a citizen army resembles Israel in many ways. However, in contrast to Israel, national service is only a short 6 months for enlisted soldiers and 12 months for officers. Because roughly 80% of men in a given cohort are conscripted, the selection is near universal. And like Norway and Israel, Finland awards small but symbolically significant amounts of extra pay for soldiers in tough, front-line roles to which recruits volunteer. Moreover, the past decade has seen calls for considering the conscription of women.
Taking a look at this group of countries together, let us underscore the following points. First, note the primacy of threat as a driver of change. Indeed, without the pressures generated by an immediate doorstep threat it is unlikely that these countries would have introduced new practices and arrangements. Second, especially in these countries we see how specific arrangements were instituted to answer public expectations. For example, conscripting women answers demands for gender equality or the recruitment of members of minorities meets expectations for greater diversity. Indeed, even Finland has seen calls for the conscription of women. Third, elements of choice and voluntarism are built into all the systems to reflect a more contractual relation between the armed forces and conscripts. Fourth, all four cases marked by incentives (material and non-material) instituted for retaining conscripts for the long periods necessary for training in some positions (like combat units and high-tech roles) and (in some cases) for assuring a return on investment in this training. And fifth, all these countries signal elements of fair sharing of the burden of conscription and in Finland, a continuation of the ethos of a "people's army." In Israel, and we suggest other countries, the advantages of maintaining a form of hybrid conscription (even though an AVF would seem economically more efficient) include the following. First, it guarantees that force level requirements will be met in case of major military emergencies. Second, it protects the armed services from market competition when it comes to high-skilled labor eagerly sought after by the private sector in some key departments of activity. And third, it provides a way for large parts of the population to participate in the public good of "defense" as represented by the armed forces and epitomized by the citizen soldier as conscript. The differentiated form of this hybridized system-offering multiple routes for service-provide it the flexibility necessary for adapting to changing circumstances. Hence, the system responds to societal demands for meaning, expressiveness and self-actualization, while maintaining high degrees of perceived fairness (rather than strict equality), addressing a still potent republican ethos, and undertaking efforts to promote social inclusivity and gender equality.
Finally, is the Israeli system-like other conscription models-but a temporary form on the way towards its transformation into an all-volunteer force? Is it a new type of recruitment system or just a temporary hybrid, something like an intermediate solution for current issues that will change in the future? To answer simply, we simply do not know. What is clearer, as we cautiously suggest, is that the flexibility necessitated by today's security and social environments lead the armed forces of many small-and medium-sized countries to adopt practices that are somewhat similar to the Israeli system. Theoretically, our argument is that these various cases display a common trajectory of change that will lead to a new more generalizable recruitment model. This trajectory applies to small countries like Israel with highly credible military threats to their very existence. Accordingly, large countries with less immediate threats will likely decide to retain their AVFs as a simpler, cost-effective and publicly more acceptable model.