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Hybrid Quantum-Classical Neural Network for Cloud-supported In-Vehicle Cyberattack Detection

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Abstract— A classical computer works with ones and zeros, whereas a quantum computer uses ones, zeros, and superpositions of ones and zeros, which enables quantum computers to perform a vast number of calculations simultaneously compared to classical computers. In a cloud-supported cyber-physical system environment, running a machine learning application in quantum computers is often difficult, due to the existing limitations of the current quantum devices. However, with the combination of quantum-classical neural networks (NN), complex and high-dimensional features can be extracted by the classical NN to a reduced but more informative feature space to be processed by the existing quantum computers. In this study, we develop a hybrid quantum-classical NN to detect an amplitude shift cyber-attack on an in-vehicle control area network (CAN) dataset. We show that using the hybrid quantum-classical NN, it is possible to achieve an attack detection accuracy of 94%, which is higher than a Long short-term memory (LSTM) NN (87%) or quantum NN alone (62%)

Index Terms— Cloud, Cyberattack, Quantum Computing, Quantum Neural Network

I. INTRODUCTION

The decoherence and mechanical errors in quantum computers can make it harder for the existing quantum computers to learn the underlying data pattern, affecting the performance [1]. With the recent advancement of near-term quantum processors, it is possible to use a combination of classical and quantum computers to reduce errors. In a hybrid quantum-classical setup, some computations are performed in quantum computers, and some are performed in classical computers. Such a setup can be used in a cloud-based cyber-physical systems (CPS) environment, where a control area network (CAN) bus is connected to the cloud using a CAN logger attached to the OBD-II port of a vehicle. The CAN logger provides CAN bus data to the cloud to run multiple CPS applications in the cloud while meeting the delay requirements (e.g., data upload and download delay) of the vehicle's operation (Figure 1) [2][3]. In this letter, the hybrid quantum-classical cyberattack detection application will run in the cloud to detect a cyberattack on the in-vehicle CAN bus. We consider an amplitude shift cyberattack, where an attacker can compromise an electronic control unit (ECU) locally or remotely and can perform an amplitude shift attack on the in-vehicle CAN bus. The complex nature of the amplitude shift attack that randomly changes the data field of a CAN frame makes it difficult to detect the attack. Studies showed that CAN

Fig. 1. Cloud-supported framework for in-vehicle cyberattack detection.

bus used in existing vehicles do not have sufficient security features [4] [5], and the security can be improved using machine learning (ML) models. The study by Song et al. shows an accuracy of 99% in detecting denial of service (DoS) attacks using ML models [5]. The recent study by Khan et al. shows a detection accuracy of 87.8% on detecting amplitude shift attacks using a deep neural network (DNN) [4]. To improve the attack detection accuracy, we combine a quantum machine learning method, more specifically a quantum NN, with a classical NN. By leveraging the advantages of the near-term quantum computers, the study by Farhi & Neven presented a general quantum NN architecture that was able to classify a handwritten digit dataset (i.e., MNIST) [6][7]. However, using such a quantum-only approach yields a lower classification

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accuracy. A recent study shows the use of a hybrid quantum-classical NN approach can achieve a higher classification accuracy [8]. However, this approach has not been applied in a cloud-based in-vehicle cyberattack detection system. Using a cloud-based hybrid quantum-classical NN, we can overcome the existing limitations of quantum computers and develop a quantum computing application for in-vehicle cyberattack detection. The objective of this study is to evaluate the performance of a cloud-supported hybrid quantum-classical neural network for amplitude shift attack compared to an existing LSTM NN or a quantum NN alone. The Section II and III discuss the amplitude shift attack model and the dataset used in this experiment. Different types of NN models for cyberattack detection are discussed in Section IV. Findings from our experiment are discussed in Section V. Finally, conclusions and future research directions are discussed in Section VI.

II. ATTACK MODEL

We create the amplitude shift cyberattack following the study by Khan et al. [4]. In the amplitude shift attack, the amplitude of a feature of the in-vehicle network data is shifted (up or down) by a random constant value within a time interval. This random value can be both positive and negative, which is added to the original values of a feature. This simulates the scenario when an ECU is compromised by malware injection, which alters the course of ECU execution by adding or changing the amplitude of the output signal from an ECU. Although the amplitude of a feature changes in this attack, due to the addition of a constant value to the amplitude of a signal, the trend of variations over time remains unchanged. This complex cyberattack is more difficult to detect by the traditional cyberattack detection system, as the trend remains the same for the compromised feature.

III. DATASET

To create an attack dataset, we first require an in-vehicle dataset which is attack-free. We have used one dataset created by the Hacking and Countermeasure Research Lab (HCRL) containing CAN data logged from a KIA soul vehicle [9]. The HCRL raw dataset contains different fields such as CAN ID, DATA and Timestamp. A generic Database CAN (DBC) file is used for decoding the raw CAN bus data. The DBC file is collected from the OpenDBC repository [10]. The decoding information in the DBC file is used to convert data bits into feature values. The features contain data from different in-vehicle sensors, as shown in Table I. The HCRL dataset contains 13 features with 95,200 timesteps (each timestep is 0.1s). These features correspond to different in-vehicle sensor

TABLE I
FEATURES IN HCRL DATASET

Feature no.	Feature name	Value range
1	TQI_COR_STAT	0.00-3.00
2	TQI_ACOR	0.00-99.61
3	N	0.00-16383.75
4	TQI-EMS11	0.00-99.61
5	TQFR	0.00-99.61
6	VS	0.00-254.00
7	BRAKE_ACT	0.00-3.00
8	TPS	0.00-104.69
9	PV_AV_CAN	0.00-99.61
10	TQI_MIN	0.00-99.61
11	TQI-EMS16	0.00-99.61
12	TQI_TARGET	0.00-99.61
13	TQI_MAX	0.00-99.61

values. We have used amplitude shift attack in our earlier study [4], where the amplitude of a feature in the CAN dataset is shifted (up or down) by a random value within a time interval. Although the amplitude of a feature changes in this attack, the trend of variations over time remains unchanged. Using this attack, we create an attack dataset from the attack-free HCRL dataset. All features are compromised for one interval in the training dataset and another interval in the testing dataset. As a result, each feature is attacked once in training, and once in testing. The data from other features remain unchanged during attack on one feature. More details about the attack dataset can be found in Table II.

TABLE II
DETAILS OF ATTACK DATASET

	Total no. of timesteps	Timesteps of attack on each feature	No. of total attack labels	No. of total non-attack labels
Train	60000	2000	26000	34000
Test	35200	1000	13000	22200

IV. CYBERATTACK DETECTION

In our hybrid quantum-classical NN (Figure 2), first, we preprocess the in-vehicle CAN bus dataset and construct a CAN image dataset [5].

We perform feature extraction using classical convolution neural network (CNN) from a 13x13 input, convert the output of size 4x4 from the classical CNN into 16 qubit quantum data

Fig. 2. Hybrid quantum-classical neural network.

with 1 additional qubit as control qubit, and use the quantum data into a quantum NN to detect an in-vehicle cyberattack. A measurement is performed from the quantum NN to obtain a classical output of 1 (i.e., attack) or 0 (i.e., no attack).

A. Data preprocessing

We take the CAN attack dataset created in [4] and construct a 13x13 CAN image from 13 consecutive CAN frames, where each row represents a single CAN frame and each column represents a data feature. We consider a 13x13 CAN image as we have 13 data features in our dataset following the similar method presented in [4]. The constructed CAN image dataset is represented by $D = \{(X_m, y_m)\}_{m=1}^M$, where X_m is a 13x13 CAN image, with a label $y_m \in \{0,1\}$ representing no attack and attack image., and M is the number of total samples in D . Table II shows a total of 95,200 CAN frames (60,000 training and 35,200 test data) are available. As we take 13 CAN frames stacked up vertically to create a 13x13 CAN image, the size of the final dataset is reduced by a factor of 13 times. Therefore, the final dataset contains 7,000 images (as $95,200/13 \approx 7,000$). We divide the total images of $M=7000$ into 80% training dataset (i.e., 5,600 images) and 20% testing dataset (i.e., 1,400 images).

B. Feature extraction using classical neural network

As presented in [5], we also use a CNN for extracting the features from a 13x13 CAN image and producing a 4x4 reduced image. Following [5], the feature extraction from CNN can be represented as follows:

$$L_{4 \times 4} = L_{d-1} \circ L_{d-2} \circ L_{d-3} \dots L_1 \circ L_0 \quad (2)$$

$$L_l: x_{l-1} \rightarrow x_l = \varphi(W_l x_{l-1} + v_l) \quad (3)$$

Where, $L_{4 \times 4}$ is the output of a CNN, d is the total number of layers, L_l is the l^{th} layer of the CNN, x_{l-1} and x_l are the input and output vectors of L_l , W_l is the weight, v_l is a bias vector and φ is a nonlinear function. Hyperparameters, such as d , W_l and v_l are optimized during the training phase on the training dataset for accurate classification.

C. Quantum encoding

To perform quantum operations (e.g., unitary operations, such as rotation and phase flip of qubits), we need to convert the classical data into quantum data. We perform a quantum basis encoding to represent the classical data into quantum data [7]. In a quantum basis encoding, each encoded quantum state is the bit-wise translation of classical binary data to the corresponding qubit of the quantum system. Here, each classical data is a N -bit binary string: $x^m = (b_1, \dots, b_N)$ with $b_i \in \{0,1\}$ for $i = 1, \dots, N$. N features are represented with a binary string (i.e., each bit means if the feature is present or not present). The binary image, x^m is produced from $L_{4 \times 4}$ using binary thresholding with a value of 0.5. Figure 3 shows the classical binary image before performing quantum encoding. Each input data, x^m , can be directly mapped to the quantum

state $|x^m\rangle$. Following [7], the entire dataset can be represented in superpositions of computational basis states as

$$|D\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{M}} \sum_{m=1}^M |x^m\rangle \quad (4)$$

Each data sample can be represented as follows:

$$|x^m\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{N}} \sum_{i=1}^N |b_i\rangle \quad (5)$$

Where, N is the number of bits (i.e., 16 in our case), b_i is a binary value represents if a feature is present or not, and $|b_i\rangle$ is the corresponding quantum qubit of the classical bit b_i .

Fig. 3. Example of CAN feature image.

D. Classification using quantum neural network

With quantum encoded data, we train the parameterized quantum NN [6]. Following [6], the parameterized quantum NN performs unitary operations, such as rotation, phase flip, on qubits and can be represented as follows:

$$Q = Q_{q-1} \circ Q_{q-2} \dots Q_1 \circ Q_0 \quad (5)$$

$$Q_m: |\phi\rangle \rightarrow y = U(w)|x^m\rangle \quad (6)$$

Where Q is a binary output with $\{0,1\}$, where 0 and 1 represent no attack and attack detected, respectively; Q has q number of layers, $U(w)$ is a unitary operation on $|x^m\rangle$ with a weight w , and y is the output after performing the unitary operation $U(w)$.

V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

We compare the performance of the hybrid quantum classical NN with the quantum NN alone and LSTM based NNs. Each NNs gives an output to classify attack as 1 or no attack as 0. For the quantum only NN, we have resized the 13x13 CAN image to 4x4 image, which is used as the input. The LSTM NN are developed following the study [4] having same model architecture. All NNs are developed using TensorFlow-quantum library available in google cloud platform [6]. We have executed our Hybrid quantum classical NNs and Quantum only NN models in the Cirq simulator provided by TensorFlow-quantum, and it represents an ideal noise-free quantum computer. We have performed the hyperparameter optimization such that we obtain the best cyberattack detection accuracy for each type of NNs. The

optimized hyperparameters for each type of NNs are show in Table III. The source code in uploaded at GitHub [11].

TABLE III
OPTIMIZED HYPERPARAMETERS OF DIFFERENT NEURAL NETWORKS (NNs)

Hyperparameters	Hybrid Quantum-Classical NN	Quantum-only NN	LSTM NN
Number of qubits	17	17	N/A
Number of epochs	20	50	100
Number of layers	6	7	3
Batch size	1	8	32
Total trainable parameters	96	128	1,090,049

VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

As, the amplitude shift attack detection falls into a binary classification model (i.e., attack or no-attack), we used the classification accuracy as the performance metric with the following equation:

$$Accuracy = \frac{TP + FN}{TP + TN + FN + FP} \quad (7)$$

Where TP = number of true positives, TN = number of true negatives, FP = number of false positives, and FN = number of false negatives. Figure 4 shows the attack detection accuracy on the training dataset and testing dataset. For both the training and testing dataset the hybrid quantum-classical NN shows 98.7% and 93.9% accuracy, respectively, whereas the quantum-only NN [7] shows 85.7%, and 62.0% accuracy on the training dataset and testing dataset, respectively. With the LSTM NN [4], the attack detection accuracy is 99.9% and 87.8% on the training and testing dataset, respectively. Here, the classical NN-based feature extractor was able to extract the features and the quantum neural network was able to perform more accurate attack detection. The feature map extracted from the classical NNs, CNN in this case, allowed the parameterized quantum neural network to explore the neighboring features in an exponentially large linear space, potentially allowing our hybrid-classical NN to capture the patterns in the dataset (i.e., statistical distributions) more efficiently than LSTM NN and quantum NN alone.

Fig. 4. Comparison of cyberattack detection accuracy for Hybrid quantum classical NN, Quantum NN and LSTM NN.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

In a cloud-supported CPS environment, a hybrid-classical NN performs better in detecting an in-vehicle cyberattack compared to a quantum neural network, and a LSTM NN, as a hybrid-quantum NN, can capture the complex pattern of a cyberattack more efficiently. However, this study only demonstrates the use of quantum computers for amplitude shift cyberattack, which can be extended to detect other types of cyberattacks and computational performance will be conducted in future studies using real quantum computers.

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