Verifying Properties of Hardware and Software by Predicate Abstraction and Model Checking

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Abstract

This tutorial describes automatic techniques for formally verifying hardware and software by creating Boolean abstractions of the underlying unbounded system state variables.

Keywords

Formal verification, Predicate abstraction, Model Checking, Symbolic execution, decision procedures

INTRODUCTION

The historical development of formal verification techniques for hardware and for software followed different paths. For hardware, most verification operates at the *bit level*, where the system state is represented as a finite set of Boolean state variables. Highly automated techniques, such as symbolic model checkers, have been developed to prove properties about the set of all possible reachable states of these finite-state systems. For software, classic verification operates at an *infinite-word level*, where program variables take values over infinite domains such as integers or memory addresses. For notations that support possibly recursive procedures, program execution may also create an unbounded number of variables, accessed by a stack discipline. Verification of such models typically requires proving theorems by induction, either manually or with the aid of automatic theorem provers.

In recent years, the domains of hardware and software verification have begun to converge, with hardware being modeled at more abstract levels, and with the development of techniques to extract and model check Boolean abstractions of infinite-state systems.

This presentation describes two verification tools: UCLID, a tool developed to model and verify hardware systems modeled at a word level, and SLAM, a tool developed to automatically prove properties of programs written in the C programming language. Both support *predicate abstraction* [2], in which the state of the system is characterized by a set of Boolean predicates, describing properties and relations among the state variables, yielding a Boolean abstraction of the underlying system. With UCLID, this abstraction

yields a finite-state model of the system, while SLAM supports a stack-based *Boolean Program* model. Techniques similar to those used in symbolic model checking can then be used to characterize the set of reachable states of a system. In the case of Boolean Programs, the stack can be handled by combining symbolic model checking with compiler-style dataflow analysis.

The Carnegie Mellon University UCLID Project

The UCLID verifier [7] is designed to verify infinite-state models of hardware systems. The system state consists of a set of state variables, each having a next-state function. State variables can be Boolean, unbounded integers, or functions mapping integer arguments to either integer or Boolean values. Functional state variables are useful when modeling different memory structures. For example, a random-access memory can be viewed as a function mapping an integer address to the value stored at that address. This form of modeling abstracts away many system details, such as the sizes and encodings of data words, and system parameters such as memory sizes.

System behavior is defined in terms of the next-state functions for the state variables. These functions are expressed in a notation combining Boolean operations and restricted forms of integer operations and function definitions. Abstract functional behavior is described in terms of *uninterpreted functions*, where the verifier treats a functional unit as a “black box” and must show that the system will obey the specified properties regardless of the specific function computed by the unit. Integer operations are restricted to increment, decrement, and comparison operations. These operations are used mainly when modeling the pointer behavior of different stacks and queues in the system.

UCLID supports several different verification techniques, including bounded model checking, correspondence checking, and invariant generation by predicate abstraction [3].

UCLID has been used to verify models of a number of systems, including both in-order and out-of-order processors, directory-based cache protocols, and mutual exclusion protocols.

Applying UCLID to actual hardware designs requires generating the abstract model from a register-transfer language (RTL) description. A preliminary tool has been developed for this purpose [1], but more work is required to generalize this capability.

The Microsoft SLAM Project

The SLAM verification toolkit [4][5] checks properties of programs written in C, using a combination of predicate abstraction, symbolic execution, model checking, and abstraction-refinement. The SLAM toolkit works by automatically constructing and refining abstractions called *Boolean Programs*. A Boolean Program is a C program with only Boolean variables. Each Boolean variable represents a predicate over the variables in the corresponding scope of the C program. Boolean Programs are constructed using C2BP, which implements predicate-abstraction adapted to handle software features such as procedure calls and pointers. We model check Boolean programs using the model checker BEBOP, which implements interprocedural data-flow analysis using Binary Decision Diagrams. Automatic counter-example driven refinement is done using NEWTON, which implements symbolic execution with predicate generation.

We have applied SLAM to check the use of the Windows I/O manager interface by device driver clients written both at Microsoft and by third-party software developers. The properties range from simple rules about ordering of function calls to data-dependent properties, which require the tool to keep track of value-flow and aliasing.

While the Boolean Program model is a viable approach for checking properties that are strongly dependent on control flow of sequential programs, other approaches are needed for reasoning about concurrency and deeper properties of the heap. Recently, we have started building another tool ZING[6], which has a richer modeling language with dynamically created threads and objects. ZING was initially designed as an explicit-state model checker, but we have recently added support for symbolic execution by using a

mixed state representation containing both explicit and symbolic components.

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