SUPPLEMENTAL ONLINE MATERIAL

for

The Politicisation of European Integration in Domestic Election Campaigns

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A. Data: Coding of the Party Statements

The data used in the analysis stem from a larger dataset¹ assembled within the framework of an earlier project on the transformation of political conflict in Western Europe (Kriesi *et al.* 2006; 2008; Kriesi *et al.* 2012). The coding of the party statements in the newspapers was done sentence by sentence using the *nuclear-sentence coding method* (cf.

Kleinnijenhuis *et al.* 1997; van Atteveldt 2008: 29–33). This method represents a very flexible and inductive approach that is intended to capture the full complexity of political communications by reducing a real grammatical sentence into its elements and the relations between them. With this method, each statement is reducible to a number of nuclear sentences, the most important type being an actor-issue nuclear sentence with the basic structure actor–position (positive, negative or ambivalent)–issue (see Table A.1 for an illustration).²

TABLE A.1. AN EXAMPLE OF NUCLEAR-SENTENCE CODING

[1] While taking a clear stance in favor of the European Constitution in his speech yesterday, Edmund Stoiber carefully avoided mentioning the “Turkish question”—an issue on which his party, the CSU, is deeply divided. [2] However, the party chairman has unambiguously rejected EU membership for Turkey on several occasions before.			
Nuclear sentence	Political actor	Evaluation (position)	Political issue
No. 1.1	CSU (Stoiber)	+1.0	European Constitution
No. 1.2	CSU	0.0	EU accession of Turkey
No. 2	CSU (Stoiber)	-1.0	EU accession of Turkey

¹ Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Marc Helbling, Simon Bornschie, Timotheos Frey, Dominic Hoeglenger, Swen Hutter and Bruno Wueest. 2012. National political change in a globalising world. Supply side data on national election campaigns. University of Zurich and Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich.

² See the project codebook for an in-depth treatment of the selection criteria and the coding procedure. Data and codebook are available by the author upon request.

Issue Categorisation

TABLE A.2. ISSUE CATEGORISATION

Issue	Description
Economic liberalism	Opposition to market regulation; opposition to economic protectionism in agriculture and other sectors of the economy; support for deregulation, more competition, and privatisation.
Anti-immigration	Support for a tough immigration and integration policy
Europe	Support for European integration, including enlargement; support for EU membership in the cases of Switzerland and Austria
Welfare	Support for expansion of the welfare state; objection to welfare state retrenchment; support for tax reforms with a redistributive character; calls for employment and health care programmes
Budget	Support for a rigid budgetary policy; reduction of the state deficit; cuts in expenditures; reduction of taxes without direct effects on redistribution
Cultural liberalism	Support for the goals of new social movements (with the exception of the environment movement); support for cultural diversity, international cooperation (excluding the European Union); support for the right to abortion and euthanasia; opposition to patriotism, calls for national solidarity, defence of tradition, national sovereignty, and appeals to traditional moral values; support for a liberal drug policy
Culture	Support for education, culture, and scientific research
Army	Support for the armed forces, for strong national defence, and for nuclear weapons
Security	Support for more law and order, for fighting crime, and denouncing political corruption
Environment	Opposition to nuclear energy; support for environmental protection
Institutional reform	Support for various institutional reforms, including making modifications to the structure of the political system
Infrastructure	Support for improving roads, railways, and other physical infrastructure

The Issue of European Integration Further Differentiated

If parties are contesting over Europe in domestic election campaigns, what are they actually talking about? Table A.3, which further differentiates the coded party statements dealing with the European integration issue, provides some insights. In all countries under study, the parties mostly talk about European integration in very general terms and about the big constitutive issues (sub-category deepening, overall 61.2 percent of all European integration issue-statements). Moreover, enlargement (particularly the question of Turkey's membership) and the monetary union were able to attract significant attention in some countries. By contrast, market-making and regulation policies were rarely discussed

(each sub-category with 5.5 percent overall). This is quite unsurprising – after all, these are national elections with a large number of issues struggling for attention. Consequently, there is little room for an in-depth discussion of specific European policies.

TABLE A.3: THE ISSUE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION FURTHER DIFFERENTIATED (SUB-ISSUES)

	All	Austria	UK	France	Germany	Nether- lands	Switzer- land
Deepening	61.2	55.3	42.6	71.3	52.1	70.8	77.0
Enlargement	12.5	40.7	3.5	3.1	40.3	10.1	0.0
Market-making	5.5	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.0	1.0	23.1
Monetary union	15.4	1.8	41.5	16.7	3.8	14.4	0.0
Social regulation & redistribution	5.5	1.8	12.2	8.4	3.8	3.8	0.0
Total (%)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>N</i>	2,283	275	369	450	238	209	742

Note: *Deepening* includes EU integration in general (incl. accession), more power to EU institutions, closer police and judiciary cooperation, and common foreign and security policy. *Enlargement* includes the various rounds of enlargement and also the question of Turkey's accession. *Market-making* includes the liberalisation of goods, services, capital and labour. A crucial sub-aspect here is the *Monetary union*, which is shown separately. *Social regulation* includes market and fiscal regulations (incl. environmental protection), social protection and social sharing (incl. labour regulations, pensions), macro social redistribution (structural and cohesion funds), and common macroeconomic and industrial policy. For the theoretical rationale behind these sub-issue categories, see Hoeglinger (2015). Country-weights applied to the total column.

Non-exclusive Coding of Issue Statements

Since the basic coding units – the nuclear sentences – are semantically defined, each grammatical sentence can contain no nuclear sentence, only one or several nuclear sentences. Hence, if a party makes a statement that touches upon several issues, whether they are interconnected or not, the coding procedure is to code a nuclear sentence for each of those issues. For example, if a party says that it opposes European integration because it fears an increase in the level of immigration two separate nuclear sentences would be coded, one for European integration and the other for the issue of immigration. Another illustration of the non-exclusive character of the coding approach (taken from the project codebook):

‘The SP is committed to a reduction of working hours in order to fight unemployment’

In such cases, the two issues (‘reduction of working hours’ & ‘reduction of unemployment’) need to be coded separately, resulting in two nuclear sentences:

1. SP / is committed to (+) / reduction of working hours
2. SP / is committed to (+) / reduction of unemployment

This non-exclusive coding approach, while not solving each and every single instance in which a party’s issue statement is difficult to classify for a coder because it speaks to several ones, should effectively limit the consequences of any potential issue-overlap problem. Moreover, this problem is further limited in our specific case as the bulk of the European integration issue statements is about European integration in general and constitutive issues (see the above section), and much less frequently about specific policies (e.g., EU immigration policies), where this problem might arise.

Intercoder Reliability

In a pretest, the coefficient of reliability for the identification of the nuclear sentences was 0.77; the intercoder agreement for the actor variable was 0.88, and for the issues variable 0.85. Given the common acceptance level of 0.8 (Lombard *et al.* 2002: 600), these figures are quite acceptable. Following the pretest, supplementary training and continuous monitoring addressed remaining uncertainties. Moreover, the coding work of individual newspapers was divided among several coders to reduce any potential bias caused by individual coders.

B. Regression Analysis: Additional Material

Descriptives

TABLE A.4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE VARIABLES USED IN THE REGRESSION

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Issue emphasis (Europe)	125	0.059	0.065	0.000	0.471
Systemic Saliency (Europe)	125	0.062	0.048	0.008	0.233
Issue emphasis (Immigration)	125	0.081	0.075	0.000	0.352
Systemic Saliency (Immigration)	125	0.078	0.040	0.000	0.190
Economic left-right axis	125	-0.116	0.456	-1.000	1.000
Cultural TAN-GAL axis	125	0.165	0.423	-0.713	0.909
Ideological Extremism	125	0.424	0.378	0.001	1.512
Opposition party status	125	0.496	0.414	0.000	1.000

Residuals

FIGURE A.1: RESIDUAL VS. FITTED VALUES PLOT FULL MODEL (MODEL 5 IN TABLE 2)

Robustness Checks

TABLE A.5: REPLICATION OF THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS WITH RESTRICTED SUB-SAMPLES

	1. Without fringe parties	2. Without UK & Switzerland	3. Without influential observations
	Coeff. (S.E.)	Coeff. (S.E.)	Coeff. (S.E.)
Economic left-right axis	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.049 * (0.025)	-0.020 * (0.010)
Cultural TAN-GAL axis	-0.040 * (0.017)	-0.030 ** (0.013)	-0.028 * (0.011)
Extremism	0.015 (0.016)	-0.047 (0.034)	-0.005 (0.014)
Opposition party	-0.030 ** (0.010)	0.024 (0.030)	-0.024 ** (0.007)
<i>Decade (ref. 2000s)</i>			
1990s	0.005 (0.011)	0.020 * (0.010)	0.016 + (0.009)
1990s*Economic left-right axis	0.012 (0.029)	0.070 ** (0.024)	0.015 (0.018)
1990s*Cultural TAN-GAL axis	-0.001 (0.036)	0.017 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.021)
1990s*Extremism	-0.009 (0.039)	0.047 (0.039)	-0.005 (0.021)
1990s*Opposition party	0.023 (0.018)	-0.049 (0.033)	-0.003 (0.013)
Systemic salience	0.548 ** (0.124)	0.585 ** (0.191)	0.454 ** (0.073)
Constant	0.030 ** (0.006)	0.017 (0.011)	0.034 ** (0.006)
N	95	83	118
N parties	27	26	37
R2	0.34	0.26	.40

Significance levels: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. Adjusted robust standard errors correct for clustering.

Analysis with Restricted Sub-samples

In order to test whether the substantive conclusions were driven by particular countries in our sample, by some specific party families or by individual outlier cases, I re-estimated the original model (full model in Table 2) with restricted sub-samples (Table A.5). Overall, the results of these replications are very similar to the original analysis and continue to support the main substantive conclusions.

Model 1: Without fringe parties (populist right and radical left) as the findings might be exclusively driven by these kind of parties. Here, the coefficient for the economic left-right axis decreases and, as a consequence, loses statistical significance, suggesting that this effect is indeed largely driven by (economic leftist) fringe parties.

Model 2: Without the parties from the UK and Switzerland – two countries that are considered by some authors as outlier cases with traditionally high levels of Euroscepticism.

Model 3: Estimation omitting influential observations. Seven observations were dropped applying the criteria $|dfits| > 2 \sqrt{(k/N)}$.³ Note that while the size of the relevant coefficients decreases, they all remain statistically significant.

Alternative Estimation Strategies

A Hausman test robust to heteroscedasticity and within-group correlation (see Schaffer and Stillman 2010; Wooldridge 2002) comparing the fixed-effects with the (FGLS) random-effects model was not statistically significant ($p=0.50$). This suggests that there is no need to use a fixed effects model⁴ and there is no indication that a simple pooled OLS regression, as done in the original analysis, would produce inconsistent coefficient estimates. For all the pooled OLS regressions, the recommended cluster-adjusted/Rogers estimates of the standard errors are provided, which are consistent in the context of potential heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.

³ The dropped outlier cases were GPS 1991, LDU 1991, SVP 1995, LDU 1995, other right populists CH 1995, Conservatives 2001, and Liste Martin 2006.

⁴ Moreover, Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012: 158) argue that fixed-effects models are generally not appropriate if there is little within-cluster variation to be expected. This is certainly the case here, as we expect party characteristics to be relatively stable over time. In addition, in these circumstances, there is the serious risk that fixed-effects models greatly inflate measurement errors (as this is where a significant part of the little within-variation potentially comes from).

Table A.6 explores whether the results remain robust across various alternative estimations. I re-ran the original analysis once with *country dummies* and once with *both election and country dummies* included (estimates for the country and election dummies not reported). In the latter case, systemic salience was dropped as it is now the election dummies that control for election-specific factors. Moreover, I replicated the original analysis with the *squared dependent variable*. This transformation leads to a less left-skewed dependent variable and, consequently, residuals that display a nice normal distribution. The table also shows a replication of the original analysis using a *fractional logit model*, which takes into account the specific properties of a proportional dependent variable (see Papke and Wooldridge 1996). I also estimated bootstrapped standard errors and standard errors that account simultaneously for *clustering both within parties and within elections* using the STATA ado-file cluster2 by Mitchell A. Petersen.⁵ In all of these alternative estimations, the results are very similar to the original analysis and the substantive findings remain unchanged.

⁵ http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/petersen/htm/papers/se/se_programming.htm

TABLE A.6: ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATIONS

	Country dummies*		Country & election dummies*		Square rooted DV		Fractional Logit		Bootstrap SE estimates		‘cluster2’ SE estimates	
	<i>Coeff.</i> (<i>S.E.</i>)				<i>Coeff.</i> (<i>S.E.</i>)		<i>Coeff.</i> (<i>S.E.</i>)		<i>Coeff.</i> (<i>S.E.</i>)		<i>Coeff.</i> (<i>S.E.</i>)	
Economic left-right axis	-0.037	*	-0.032	+	-0.076	*	-1.005	*	-0.038	*	-0.038	+
	(0.018)		(0.017)		(0.036)		(0.413)		(0.018)		(0.020)	
Cultural TAN-GAL axis	-0.046	**	-0.047	**	-0.108	**	-1.076	***	-0.045	***	-0.045	***
	(0.014)		(0.016)		(0.033)		(0.259)		(0.013)		(0.012)	
Extremism	-0.017		-0.014		-0.027		-0.247		-0.011		-0.011	
	(0.019)		(0.020)		(0.048)		(0.407)		(0.019)		(0.017)	
Opposition party	-0.010		-0.007		-0.080	*	-0.490		-0.016		-0.016	
	(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.032)		(0.383)		(0.015)		(0.017)	
<i>Decade (ref. 2000s)</i>												
1990s	0.021				0.027		0.313		0.021		0.021	
	(0.018)				(0.027)		(0.252)		(0.016)		(0.017)	
1990s*Economic left-right	0.038		0.048	+	0.064		0.996	+	0.041		0.041	+
	(0.027)		(0.024)		(0.053)		(0.552)		(0.030)		(0.023)	
1990s*Cultural TAN-GAL	0.015		0.033		0.033		0.530		0.014		0.014	
	(0.021)		(0.024)		(0.049)		(0.363)		(0.025)		(0.025)	
1990s*Extremism	0.016		0.016		0.023		0.210		0.012		0.012	
	(0.033)		(0.030)		(0.064)		(0.574)		(0.033)		(0.023)	
1990s*Opposition party	-0.021		-0.024		-0.003		-0.034		-0.017		-0.017	
	(0.027)		(0.025)		(0.046)		(0.492)		(0.025)		(0.024)	
Systemic salience	0.409	**			1.138	***	7.102	***	0.474	***	0.474	*
	(0.122)				(0.197)		(1.470)		(0.120)		(0.210)	
Constant	0.044	**	0.089	*	0.178	***	-3.153	***	0.036	***	0.036	**
	(0.015)		(0.042)		(0.019)		(0.185)		(0.009)		(0.013)	
N	125		125		125		125		125		125	
N cluster (parties)	38		38		38		38		38		38 (elections 26)	
R2	0.24		0.49		0.35		-		0.22		0.22	

Note: Significance levels: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. In the pooled OLS regressions, adjusted robust standard errors correct for clustering (party; party and elections in the model estimated by cluster2.ado). Log Pseudolikelihood of the fractional logit estimation: -21. *Country and election dummies not reported.

TABLE A.7. LIST OF THE PARTIES INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS

	<i>Austria</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Netherlands</i>	<i>Switzerland</i>
<i>Communists/Left Socialists (rl)</i>			Parti Communiste Français (PCF)	Die Linke/PDS	Socialistische Partij (SP)	
<i>Greens (gr)</i>	Die Grünen/Die Grüne Alternative		Les Verts	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	GroenLinks (GL)	Grüne Partei der Schweiz (GPS), Grünliberale (GLP)
<i>Social Democrats (soc)</i>	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ)	Labour Party	Parti Socialiste (PSF), Parti Radical de Gauche (PRG)	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)	Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA)	Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz (SPS)
<i>Liberals (lib)</i>	Liberales Forum (LIF)	Liberal Democratic Party	Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF)	Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP)	Democraten'66 (D66); Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD)	Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei (FDP)
<i>Christian Democrats/Conservatives (con)</i>	Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP)	Conservative Party	Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP)	Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU); Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU)	Christen-Democratisch Appel (CDA)	Christlich-demokratische Volkspartei (CVP), Evangelische Volkspartei (EVP)
<i>Populist/Extreme Right (rr)</i>	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) & Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ)		Front National (FN)		Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) & Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)	Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP); Schweizer Demokraten (SD) & Freiheitspartei (FPS)
<i>Other</i>	Liste Martin					Landesring der Unabhängigen (LDU)

Note: A minimum of 50 issue statements in an election campaign was required for a case to be included in the analysis.

C. The Saliency of Europe across Country, over Time and by Type of Media Outlet

While Figure 2 in the article places the saliency of Europe within the broader context of the overall political agenda and shows its general development, Figure A.2 reports the saliency of European integration for each country and each election. Moreover, the saliency is indicated separately for the two different types of media outlets that were coded for each country – a quality newspaper and a tabloid. Three key points stand out when looking at the figure. First, although the overlap is far from perfect, the level of saliency of Europe in the two different media types correlates strongly ($r=0.62^{***}$). This tentatively suggests that during election campaigns, journalists' role as gatekeepers does not systematically distort the saliency of the issues on the political agenda – at least not at the level of individual media outlets. The largest discrepancy between the two types of media outlets can be found for the 1997 elections in the UK, in terms of both the share of statements on Europe (which was twice as high in the tabloid *The Sun* than in the quality newspaper *The Times*) as well as in the ranking of Europe on the political agenda (number 1 in *The Sun*, number 7 in *The Times*).

Second, the few elections in which European integration actually became a dominating issue in the campaign took place in Switzerland or the UK – with shares of around 20% and Europe being the number one issue on the political agenda in at least one of the two media outlets. In Switzerland, European integration became a major campaign issue in the first half of the 1990s, when the Swiss People's Party (SVP) won the referendum against joining the European Economic Area single-handedly and incorporated opposition to European integration as a defining issue of its programmatic profile. In the UK, the saliency of Europe increased dramatically around the turn of the century. The all-time high was reached at the 2001 elections when the Conservatives made the question of whether to adopt the euro one of their main campaign issues – yet with only modest electoral success (Evans 2002; but see Baker 2002: 324). In the subsequent elections of 2005, the saliency of Europe dropped back to a very modest level – this time, the Conservatives focused instead on the issue of immigration (Fisher 2006: 1282) while keeping fairly quiet on Europe. Hence, even in these two countries that are deemed exceptional for their Eurosceptic potential for various historical, cultural and institutional reasons (see, e.g., Díez Medrano

2003 for the UK; Kriesi 2007 and Theiler 2004 for Switzerland), the salience of Europe is not constantly high, but only shoots up on special occasions.

Third, in all countries there is considerable variation in the salience of Europe from one election campaign to the next, suggesting there is a lot of contingency at work – idiosyncratic events, campaign dynamics, and not least factors influencing the salience of other political issues (which, in turn, has an impact on the salience of Europe).

FIGURE A.2: THE SALIENCE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION OVER TIME BY COUNTRY AND MEDIA OUTLET

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