

The Party Choice Set and Satisfaction with Democracy

Ruth Dassonneville, *Université de Montréal, Canada*

and

Ian McAllister, *Australian National University*

Online Appendix

Appendix A. List of countries included

Australia 1996; Australia 2004; Australia 2007; Australia 2013; Austria 2008; Austria 2013; Canada 1997; Canada 2004; Canada 2008; Canada 2011; Switzerland 1999; Switzerland 2003; Switzerland 2007; Switzerland 2011; Germany 1998; Germany 2002; Germany 2005; Germany 2009; Germany 2013; Denmark 1998; Denmark 2001; Denmark 2007; Spain 1996; Spain 2000; Spain 2004; Spain 2008; Finland 2003; Finland 2007; Finland 2011; Finland 2015; France 2007; United Kingdom 1997; United Kingdom 2005; United Kingdom 2015; Greece 2009; Greece 2012; Ireland 2002; Ireland 2007; Ireland 2011; Iceland 1999; Iceland 2003; Iceland 2007; Iceland 2009; Iceland 2013; Israel 1996; Israel 2003; Israel 2006; Israel 2013; Italy 2006; the Netherlands 1998; the Netherlands 2002; the Netherlands 2006; the Netherlands 2010; Norway 1997; Norway 2001; Norway 2005; Norway 2009; Norway 2013; New Zealand 1996; New Zealand 2002; New Zealand 2008; New Zealand 2011; New Zealand 2014; Portugal 2002; Portugal 2005; Portugal 2015; Sweden 1998; Sweden 2002; Sweden 2006; Sweden 2014; United States of America 2004; United States of America 2008.

Appendix B. Descriptive statistics

Table 1. Summary statistics of the variables included in the analyses

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	(N)
Female	0.50	0.50	0	1	93,501
Silent generation	0.26	0.44	0	1	93,501
Baby-boomers	0.40	0.49	0	1	93,501
Generation x	0.24	0.43	0	1	93,501
Generation y	0.09	0.29	0	1	93,501
Education	3.28	1.35	1	5	93,501
Partisan (strength)	1.79	1.44	0	4	93,501
Left-right placement	5.20	2.32	0	10	93,501
Voted for winner	0.44	0.50	0	1	93,501
Turnout	0.88	0.32	0	1	93,501
ENEP	-0.03	0.76	-1.60	2.57	93,501
Polarization	0.14	0.95	-2.24	2.74	93,501
Congruence	-0.02	0.99	-4.06	1.08	93,501
Disproportionality	-0.14	0.91	-1.18	2.57	93,501
Compulsory voting	0.09	0.28	0	1	93,501
GDP growth	0.02	1.07	-3.92	2.90	93,501
Gini	-0.16	1.03	-1.96	1.96	93,501
Corruption index	-0.10	1.00	-0.81	5.11	93,501

Appendix C. Ordered logit analysis

Table 1. Mixed ordered logit model to explain satisfaction with democracy

	b	(s.e.)
Female	-0.097***	(0.013)
Generation (ref = Silent generation)		
Baby-boom	0.027	(0.017)
Generation x	0.083***	(0.019)
Generation y	0.177***	(0.026)
Education	0.081***	(0.006)
Partisanship (strength)	0.121***	(0.005)
Left-right placement	0.059***	(0.003)
Voted for winner	0.439***	(0.015)
Turned out to vote	0.134***	(0.023)
ENEP	-0.185*	(0.090)
Polarization	-0.117	(0.064)
Congruence	0.025	(0.044)
Disproportionality	-0.033	(0.099)
Compulsory voting	0.122	(0.378)
GDP growth	0.188***	(0.042)
Gini	-0.126	(0.096)
Political corruption index	-0.305***	(0.079)
Cut 1	-1.909***	(0.106)
Cut 2	0.051	(0.105)
Cut 3	3.225***	(0.106)
σ^2 elections	0.099	
σ^2 countries	0.147	
(<i>N</i>) individuals	93501	
(<i>N</i>) elections	72	
(<i>N</i>) countries	21	

Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) of random intercept ordered logit model. Significance levels * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Source: CSES Modules 1, 2, 3 and 4.

Appendix D. Effective number of legislative parties

Table 1. Mixed model to explain satisfaction with democracy

	b	(s.e.)
Female	-0.026***	(0.004)
Generation (ref. = Silent generation)		
Baby-boom	0.008	(0.006)
Generation x	0.027***	(0.007)
Generation y	0.062***	(0.009)
Education	0.029***	(0.002)
Partisanship (strength)	0.039***	(0.002)
Left-right self-placement	0.019***	(0.001)
Voted for winner	0.153***	(0.005)
Turned out to vote	0.053***	(0.008)
ENLP	-0.063	(0.035)
Polarization	-0.042	(0.022)
Congruence	0.007	(0.015)
Disproportionality	-0.029	(0.036)
Compulsory voting	0.023	(0.128)
GDP growth	0.069***	(0.015)
Gini	-0.046	(0.033)
Political corruption index	-0.114***	(0.027)
Intercept	1.404***	(0.036)
σ^2 elections	0.012	
σ^2 countries	0.017	
(N) individuals	93501	
(N) elections	72	
(N) countries	21	

Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) of linear random intercept model. Significance levels * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Source: CSES Modules 1, 2, 3 and 4.

Appendix E. Alternative sources of parties' ideological positions

Table 1. Mixed models to explain satisfaction with democracy

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	b	b	b	b
	(s.e.)	(s.e.)	(s.e.)	(s.e.)
Female	-0.029 ^{***} (0.005)	-0.033 ^{***} (0.006)	-0.033 ^{***} (0.006)	-0.033 ^{***} (0.006)
Generation (ref. = Silent generation)				
Baby-boom	0.008 (0.006)	0.015 (0.008)	0.015 (0.008)	0.015 (0.008)
Generation x	0.029 ^{***} (0.007)	0.025 ^{**} (0.009)	0.024 ^{**} (0.009)	0.025 ^{**} (0.009)
Generation y	0.063 ^{***} (0.009)	0.048 ^{***} (0.012)	0.047 ^{***} (0.012)	0.047 ^{***} (0.012)
Education	0.028 ^{***} (0.002)	0.032 ^{***} (0.003)	0.032 ^{***} (0.003)	0.032 ^{***} (0.003)
Partisanship (strength)	0.039 ^{***} (0.002)	0.047 ^{***} (0.002)	0.047 ^{***} (0.002)	0.047 ^{***} (0.002)
Left-right self-placement	0.020 ^{***} (0.001)	0.018 ^{***} (0.001)	0.018 ^{***} (0.001)	0.018 ^{***} (0.001)
Voted for winner	0.161 ^{***} (0.005)	0.138 ^{**} (0.007)	0.138 ^{**} (0.007)	0.138 ^{***} (0.007)
Turned out to vote	0.050 ^{***} (0.008)	0.096 ^{***} (0.010)	0.096 ^{***} (0.010)	0.096 ^{***} (0.010)
ENEP	-0.072 [*] (0.033)	-0.010 (0.061)	-0.050 (0.064)	-0.005 (0.061)
CMP Polarization	0.004 (0.025)			
CHES economic polarization		-0.054 ^{**} (0.019)		-0.056 ^{**} (0.019)
CHES Gal-Tan polarization			0.005 (0.014)	0.009 (0.013)
Congruence	0.004 (0.015)	0.015 (0.020)	0.016 (0.021)	0.015 (0.019)
Disproportionality	0.002 (0.033)	0.000 (0.042)	0.006 (0.044)	0.001 (0.042)
Compulsory voting	0.043 (0.126)	-0.345 (0.273)	-0.209 (0.289)	-0.305 (0.278)
GDP growth	0.075 ^{***} (0.015)	0.042 (0.034)	0.063 (0.037)	0.048 (0.035)
Gini	-0.031 (0.032)	-0.076 (0.058)	-0.081 (0.061)	-0.071 (0.058)
Political corruption index	-0.128 ^{***} (0.027)	-0.073 (0.041)	-0.095 [*] (0.046)	-0.084 (0.044)
Intercept	1.387 ^{***} (0.044)	1.563 ^{***} (0.086)	1.334 ^{***} (0.066)	1.539 ^{***} (0.092)
σ^2 elections	0.012	0.012	0.016	0.012
σ^2 countries	0.017	0.013	0.011	0.013
(N) individuals	90359	49742	49742	49742

(<i>N</i>) elections	69	40	40	40
(<i>N</i>) countries	21	14	14	14

Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) of linear random intercept models. Significance levels * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Source: CSES Modules 1, 2, 3 and 4.

Appendix F. Additional control variables

Table 1. Mixed models to explain satisfaction with democracy

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	b	b	b
	(s.e.)	(s.e.)	(s.e.)
Female	-0.026*** (0.005)	-0.033*** (0.006)	-0.030*** (0.006)
Generation (ref. = Silent generation)			
Baby-boom	0.008 (0.006)	0.013 (0.007)	0.019** (0.007)
Generation x	0.025*** (0.007)	0.018* (0.008)	0.023** (0.008)
Generation y	0.060*** (0.009)	0.061*** (0.012)	0.050*** (0.011)
Education	0.029*** (0.002)	0.024*** (0.002)	0.031*** (0.002)
Partisanship (strength)	0.039*** (0.002)	0.034*** (0.002)	0.042*** (0.002)
Left-right self-placement	0.020*** (0.001)	0.017*** (0.001)	0.014*** (0.001)
Voted for winner	0.154*** (0.005)	0.163*** (0.006)	0.145*** (0.006)
Turned out to vote	0.054*** (0.008)	0.044*** (0.010)	0.087*** (0.010)
ENEP	-0.068* (0.034)	-0.081* (0.034)	-0.066 (0.051)
Polarization	-0.038 (0.022)	-0.041 (0.025)	-0.039 (0.025)
Congruence	0.006 (0.015)	-0.021 (0.018)	0.026 (0.020)
Compulsory voting	0.002 (0.127)	-0.022 (0.112)	-0.456 (0.244)
GDP growth	0.067*** (0.015)	0.068*** (0.015)	0.031 (0.028)
Gini	-0.049 (0.032)	-0.086** (0.031)	-0.105* (0.052)
Political corruption index	-0.112*** (0.027)	-0.101*** (0.025)	-0.059 (0.038)
Disproportionality		0.019 (0.034)	-0.006 (0.039)
Average district magnitude	0.002 (0.034)		
Regional authority index		0.080* (0.032)	
Government turnover index			0.075* (0.032)
Intercept	1.400*** (0.036)	1.473*** (0.035)	1.393*** (0.039)
σ^2 elections	0.012	0.009	0.013

σ^2 countries	0.017	0.010	0.008
(<i>N</i>) individuals	91582	59324	57030
(<i>N</i>) elections	70	48	44
(<i>N</i>) countries	21	19	14

Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) of linear random intercept models. Significance levels * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Source: CSES Modules 1, 2, 3 and 4.

Appendix G. Context-level interactions and non-linear effects

Table 1. Mixed models to explain satisfaction with democracy

	Model 1		Model 2	
	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)
Female	-0.026***	(0.004)	-0.026***	(0.004)
Generation (ref. = Silent generation)				
Baby-boom	0.008	(0.006)	0.008	(0.006)
Generation x	0.027***	(0.007)	0.027***	(0.007)
Generation y	0.062***	(0.009)	0.062***	(0.009)
Education	0.029***	(0.002)	0.029***	(0.002)
Partisanship (strength)	0.039***	(0.002)	0.039***	(0.002)
Left-right self-placement	0.019***	(0.001)	0.019***	(0.001)
Voted for winner	0.153***	(0.005)	0.153***	(0.005)
Turned out to vote	0.053***	(0.008)	0.053***	(0.008)
ENEP	-0.051	(0.035)	-0.054	(0.033)
ENEP ²	-0.022	(0.023)		
Polarization	-0.049*	(0.024)	-0.017	(0.022)
Polarization ²	0.004	(0.013)		
Congruence	0.008	(0.019)	0.013	(0.015)
Congruence ²	0.002	(0.009)		
Disproportionality	-0.020	(0.034)	-0.009	(0.031)
Compulsory voting	0.020	(0.127)	0.023	(0.119)
GDP growth	0.070***	(0.015)	0.073***	(0.014)
Gini	-0.031	(0.037)	-0.051	(0.034)
Political corruption index	-0.115***	(0.027)	-0.121***	(0.026)
ENEP × Polarization			0.071**	(0.027)
ENEP × Congruence			0.009	(0.015)
Polarization × Congruence			-0.010	(0.014)
Intercept	1.413***	(0.043)	1.386***	(0.035)
σ^2 elections	0.010		0.011	
σ^2 countries	0.015		0.017	
(<i>N</i>) individuals	93501		93501	
(<i>N</i>) elections	72		72	
(<i>N</i>) countries	21		21	

Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) of linear random intercept models. Significance levels * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Source: CSES Modules 1, 2, 3 and 4.

Appendix H. Individual-level heterogeneity


Table 1. Mixed models to explain satisfaction with democracy

	Model 1		Model 2	
	b	(s.e.)	b	(s.e.)
Female	-0.026 ^{***}	(0.004)	-0.026 ^{***}	(0.004)
Generation (ref. = Silent generation)				
Baby-boom	0.008	(0.006)	0.009	(0.006)
Generation x	0.027 ^{***}	(0.007)	0.028 ^{***}	(0.007)
Generation y	0.061 ^{***}	(0.009)	0.044 ^{***}	(0.010)
Education	0.028 ^{***}	(0.002)	0.029 ^{***}	(0.002)
Left-right self-placement	0.019 ^{***}	(0.001)	0.019 ^{***}	(0.001)
Voted for winner	0.153 ^{***}	(0.005)	0.154 ^{***}	(0.005)
Turned out to vote	0.054 ^{***}	(0.008)	0.055 ^{***}	(0.008)
Partisanship (ref. = No)				
Leaner	0.061 ^{***}	(0.007)		
Partisan, not very close	0.062 ^{***}	(0.009)		
Partisan, somewhat close	0.139 ^{***}	(0.007)		
Partisan, very close	0.156 ^{***}	(0.008)		
Partisanship (strength)			0.039 ^{***}	(0.002)
ENEP	-0.047	(0.031)	-0.107 ^{***}	(0.031)
Leaner × ENEP	-0.009	(0.009)		
Partisan, not very close × ENEP	-0.019	(0.014)		
Partisan, somewhat close × ENEP	-0.029 ^{***}	(0.009)		
Partisan, very close × ENEP	-0.062 ^{***}	(0.011)		
Disproportionality	-0.022	(0.022)	-0.057 ^{**}	(0.022)
Leaner × Polarization	-0.020 [*]	(0.008)		
Partisan, not very close × Polarization	-0.014	(0.010)		
Partisan, somewhat close × Polarization	-0.024 ^{**}	(0.007)		
Partisan, very close × Polarization	-0.023 ^{**}	(0.009)		
Congruence	0.013	(0.016)	-0.012	(0.016)
Leaner × Congruence	-0.003	(0.007)		
Partisan, not very close × Congruence	-0.010	(0.010)		
Partisan, somewhat close × Congruence	-0.023 ^{***}	(0.007)		
Partisan, very close × Congruence	-0.002	(0.008)		
Baby-boom × ENEP			0.024 ^{**}	(0.008)
Generation x × ENEP			0.061 ^{***}	(0.009)
Generation y × ENEP			0.094 ^{***}	(0.011)
Baby-boom × Polarization			0.018 ^{**}	(0.006)
Generation x × Polarization			0.026 ^{***}	(0.007)
Generation y × Polarization			0.062 ^{***}	(0.010)
Baby-boom × Congruence			0.010	(0.007)
Generation x × Congruence			0.029 ^{***}	(0.007)
Generation y × Congruence			0.043 ^{***}	(0.009)
Disproportionality	-0.006	(0.033)	-0.011	(0.033)
Compulsory voting	0.004	(0.128)	0.007	(0.127)
GDP growth	0.067 ^{***}	(0.014)	0.067 ^{***}	(0.014)
Gini	-0.050	(0.033)	-0.047	(0.032)
Political corruption index	-0.112 ^{***}	(0.027)	-0.112 ^{***}	(0.027)
Intercept	1.396 ^{***}	(0.036)	1.400 ^{***}	(0.036)

σ^2 elections	0.011	0.011
σ^2 countries	0.017	0.017
(<i>N</i>) individuals	93501	93501
(<i>N</i>) elections	72	72
(<i>N</i>) countries	21	21


Note: Coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) of linear random intercept models. Significance levels * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Source: CSES Modules 1, 2, 3 and 4.

Figure 1. Interactions between partisan strength and indicators of ‘meaningful choice’



Note: Average marginal effect of ENEP, Polarization and Congruence (and 95% confidence intervals), by strength of partisanship. Estimates based on Model 1 in Table 1 in this Appendix.

Figure 2. Interactions between generations and indicators of ‘meaningful choice’



Note: Average marginal effect of ENEP, Polarization and Congruence (and 95% confidence intervals), by generation. Estimates based on Model 2 in Table 1 in this Appendix.