ONLINE APPENDIX

for

The differentiated politicisation of European tax governance

Henning Schmidtke

Dependent Variable: Evaluations of and Demands on EU tax Governance

Selection of articles

The study considers media debates in the quality press of Germany, Ireland and Switzerland; two opinion-leading centre-left and centre-right quality newspapers per country are examined to identify EU tax governance-related content (see Table A.1). This sample seems uncontroversial if one keeps in mind that it does not aim at a ‘representative’ coverage of the ideological spectrum or of regional media landscapes but focuses on the opinion leaders at the national level.

TABLE A.1
NEWSPAPER CHARACTERISTICS AND AVAILABILITY

Newspaper (Country)	Political Orientation	Circulation Size^a	Daily news Hole^b	Data Availability^c
Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ; Germany)	Centre-left	429,476	192	1995-2011
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ; Germany)	Centre-right	384,895	192	1981-2011
Irish Independent (II; Ireland)	Centre-left	134,836	91	2003-2011
Irish Times (IT; Ireland)	Centre-right	99,347	116	1982-2011
Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ; Switzerland)	Centre-left	154,707	120	1994-2011
Tagesanzeiger (TA; Switzerland)	Centre-right	210,665	127	1999- 2011

^a Circulation size refers to average circulation over the period of analysis reported by the newspaper.

^b ‘News hole’ refers to the average number of articles per day over one randomly constructed week for the entire period of analyses.

^c Data availability indicates the period of time over which newspapers are provided by online databases (Factiva, LexisNexis and individual newspaper archives).

The textual material was retrieved from electronic newspaper databases in a two-step procedure. First, I developed routines for automated searches in the data bases that are broad enough to identify all pertinent content and exclude as much as possible irrelevant articles. The list of search words is based on preliminary studies and pre-tests and results in the following search routines:

TABLE A.2
SEARCH ROUTINES

German	(steuer* or Mehrwertsteuer* or Besteuer* or Umsatzsteuer* or Einkommensteuer* or Einkommenssteuer or Unternehmenssteuer* or Unternehmensteuer* or Unternehmensbesteuer* or Körperschaftssteuer* or Körperschaftsteuer or Zinssteuer* or Quellensteuer* or Europasteuer* or Ökosteuer* or Mineralölsteuer* or Doppelbesteuer*) near6 (europ* or EU or E.U. or EuGh*)
German FAZ ^a	(steuer* or Mehrwertsteuer* or Besteuer* or Umsatzsteuer* or Einkommensteuer* or Einkommenssteuer or Unternehmenssteuer* or Unternehmensteuer* or Unternehmensbesteuer* or Körperschaftssteuer* or Körperschaftsteuer or Zinssteuer* or Quellensteuer* or) and (europ* or EU or E.U. or EuGh*) (Europasteuer* or Ökosteuer* or Mineralölsteuer* or Doppelbesteuer*) and (europ* or EU or E.U. or EuGh*)
English	tax* near6 (europ* or EU or E.U.)

^a FAZ is not part of Factiva or Lexisnexis but provides its own database which cannot handle longer search routines and complex operators. Hence the search routine was split into two parts and the NEAR operator was substituted by the AND operator. To guarantee comparability, the proximity of search terms was checked through human coding in the selection process.

The automated searches were not performed for the complete calendar years 1981 through 2011, but for four randomly ‘constructed’ weeks per newspaper and year. This sampling strategy provides a representative sample from a large ‘population’ of articles, without limiting searches to the title pages or specific sections of the newspapers examined, and hence enables plausible inferences for entire countries and years on the basis of the sample. For each

year in the time period examined, one constructed week per quarter was used. The weeks were constructed by randomly selecting one Monday, one Tuesday, one Wednesday, one Thursday, one Friday and one Saturday from the respective quarter. This procedure ensures that all weekdays (with the exception of Sundays) are equally represented and no bias is created by the preponderance of particular weekdays (as the volume and content of newspaper coverage often differs between them). Similar to the construction of sampling frames for cross-country survey research, the procedure was performed for each newspaper independently. To guarantee the representativeness of the procedure, I compared the number of articles identified by the search routines per year and for the constructed weeks. For all newspapers the resulting numbers are highly correlated indicating the representativeness of the sampling technique ($r = 0.98$, $n = 175$, $p < 0.01$).

A second manual step (reading articles and selecting the pertinent ones) was necessary to exclude irrelevant material. All articles in the corpus at least touch upon the issue of EU tax governance. The corpus comprises 707 statements in 577 articles.

Coding Procedure, Main Variables and Examples

To gauge the salience, polarisation and actor expansion of EU tax governance in the mass media, I apply a combination of political valuation analysis (Schmidtke and Nullmeier 2011; Schneider et al. 2007) and claims-making analysis (Koopmans and Statham 1999, 2010) because both approaches are analytic descriptive tools tailored to describe who and what is present in the public sphere (Statham and Trenz 2013: 970). In combination both approaches target those elements of public debate that form the core of politicisation. They identify and describe public speech acts that problematize and contest a given issue by either looking at diagnostic assessments (political valuation analysis) or by analysing prescriptive statements – i.e. articulations of demand, calls to action or proposals – that may follow from valuation.

Both claims analysis and political valuation analysis take individual statements by public actors as the unit of analysis. These statements are identified and described by means of a stylised grammar which consists of three core elements: A speaker uttering the valuation or the claim, the object of valuation or claim and the justification given, when a speaker takes a position. Furthermore, valuation statements are marked by a clearly identifiable positive/negative thrust and claims may include the addressee of a claim.

I distinguish four types of justifications to gauge the effect of national economic and socio-cultural conditions:

- **Economic-nationalist:** National economic interests and cost-benefit calculations
Example: Valuation of an EU tax policy by the Irish government: ‘The Government fears the plan would undermine tax competition and its own 12.5 per cent corporate tax rate, which has supported the Republic's economic success’ (Irish Times, 23/04/2008)
- **Economic-cosmopolitan:** Europe-wide or global economic interests and cost-benefit calculations
Example: Claim by Dominique Strauss-Kahn: ‘a more integrated and centralised fiscal framework could deliver higher and more stable growth for Europe’ (Irish Times, 15/09/2010)
- **Cultural-Nationalist:** National ideas and values and questions of national self-determination and identity
Example: Evaluation of proposals to change EU decision rules in taxation by Mary Harney: ‘I do not believe that it is appropriate that the EU should tell nations what taxes to have, what public spending to have once we fulfil the Maastricht criteria’ (Irish Times, 17/05/2001)
- **Cultural-Cosmopolitan:** European or global ideas and values and references to a community beyond individual member states.
Example: Evaluation of a proposal for European financial transaction tax: ‘Aid agencies, have been arguing for some years that such a tax would help boost development aid and overcome the effects of donor fatigue’ (Irish Times, 01/10/2011)

The coding was done by the author on the basis of a comprehensive codebook detailing all variables and coding rules (available upon request).

Independent Variables

Formal Authority Transfer

The measure of formal authority (general and tax specific) builds on Börzel’s (2005: 221) ‘scope of authority’ indicator. Drawing on a list of policy areas, Börzel proposes to rank the degree to which the political authority in these policy areas is centralised at the European level according to the respective decision making procedures. She distinguishes between six degrees of centralisation that vary in terms of the participation of supranational bodies in the

decision making process (agenda setting and decision making), the decision making rules (unanimity or majority voting), and the application of judicial review (see Table A.3).

TABLE A.3
MEASUREMENT OF FORMAL POLITICAL AUTHORITY

Degree of Centralisation	Score
No coordination at EU level	0
Intergovernmental coordination (main body decision by unanimity vote, no involvement of supranational bodies)	1
Intergovernmental cooperation (main body decision by unanimity vote, shared right of initiative of supranational bodies, consultation of supranational bodies during legislation, restricted judicial review)	2
Joint decision making I (main body decision by unanimity and consultation of supranational bodies, exclusive right of initiative of supranational body, full judicial review)	3
Joint decision making II (co-legislation of main body and other supranational bodies, decisions taken by majority, exclusive right of initiative of supranational bodies, full judicial review)	4
Supranational centralisation (unilateral decision by supranational bodies, no involvement of state representatives, full judicial review)	5

Source: (Börzel 2005: 221)

Scores on the overall authority of the EU in Germany and Ireland result from adding up individual policy area scores provided by Leuffen et al. (2013: 20). As 18 issue areas are rated, the overall political authority score ranges from zero for no political coordination to 90 for complete supranationalisation (see Table A.4).¹ Scores for EU external governance in Switzerland are based on the same metric, as the Bilateral Treaties I and II between Switzerland and the EU are mainly based on the EU's *acquis communautaire* and are managed by Joint Committees, whose competences resemble what Börzel calls intergovernmental coordination (see table A.5).

¹ I acknowledge that adding up scores on an ordinal scale is formally not appropriate. Yet, the results can still be considered to illustrate the changing overall authority of the EU.

TABLE A.4
FORMAL EU AUTHORITY

Issue Area	1981 Treaty of Rome (1958)	1987 Single European Act (1986)	1993 Maastricht Treaty (1992)	1999 Amsterdam Treaty (1997)	2003 Nice Treaty (2001)	2010 Treaty of Lisbon (2009)
Security & defence	0	1	1.5	2	2	2.5
Economic external relations	1.5	1.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5
Criminal & domestic security	0	0	1	2	3	4
Civil law	0	0	3	3.5	4	4
Macroeconomic policy & employment	1.5	1.5	1.5	3.5	3.5	3.5
Monetary policy	1	1	4	5	5	5
Taxation	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
Economic freedoms	2	4	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5
Competition & industry	2	2	3	3	4	4
Environment & consumer protection	0	3	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75
Occupational health & safety standards	0	4	4	4.5	4.5	4.5

TABLE A.4 CONTINUED
FORMAL EU AUTHORITY

Issue area	1981 Treaty of Rome (1958)	1987 Single European Act (1986)	1993 Maastricht Treaty (1992)	1999 Amsterdam Treaty (1997)	2003 Nice Treaty (2001)	2010 Treaty of Lisbon (2009)
Energy & transport	2	2	2	2	2	4
Labour	1	1	3.5	4	4	4
Culture	0	0	1	1	1	4.5
Welfare	0	0	3	4	4	4
Research & development	0	3.5	3.5	4	4	4
Agriculture	3	3	3	3	3	4.5
Territorial, economic, and social cohesion	1.5	3	3.25	3.75	4	4
Total	17	32	50.5	58.5	61.25	69.75

TABLE A.5
EU FORMAL EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE IN SWITZERLAND

Issue Area	1972 Free Trade Agreement	2002 Bilateral I (1998)	2005 Bilateral II (2004)
Security & defence	0	0	0
Economic external relations	1	1	1
Criminal & domestic security	0	1	1
Civil law	0	0	0
Macroeconomic policy & employment	0	1	1
Monetary policy	0	0	0
Taxation	0	0	1
Economic freedoms	0	1	2
Competition & industry	1	1	1
Environment & consumer protection	0	1	1
Occupational health & safety standards	0	0	0
Energy & transport	0	1	1
Labour	0	0	1
Culture	0	0	1
Welfare	0	0	1
Research & development	0	1	1
Agriculture	0	1	1
Territorial, economic, and social cohesion	0	0	1
Total	2	9	15

EU tax legislation

The measure for EU tax legislation, utilises the dataset compiled by Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2011) which analyses EU's legally binding legislative acts in the area of taxation between 1958 and 2007. I have extended this dataset to include all tax legislation up until 2011.² It provides information on the frequency and scope of EU tax legislation. The dataset shows how many legislative acts are issued per year and which areas of taxation are targeted. In terms of areas of taxation, it distinguishes four main tax areas which make up the

² I thank Hendrik Jacobsen for excellent research assistance with the dataset.

major share of most OECD-states' tax base: individual income, corporate income, value added tax, excises (for an overview of the data see Figure A.1)

FIGURE A.1
FREQUENCY AND SCOPE OF EU POLICY OUTPUT

Notes: The top plot shows the number of legislative acts per year and the bottom plot displays tax areas, in which this legislation was issued (IIT= individual income taxation, CIT= corporate income taxation, VAT= value added tax, Misc= miscellaneous taxes).

Socio-Cultural Conditions

The socio-cultural context is operationalised on the basis of an attitudinal proxy. The measure for the share of exclusive nationalists and cosmopolitans builds on World Value Survey (WVS) and European Values Study (EVS) data. It utilises a question item on territorial attachment. Respondents were asked the following question:

To which of these geographical groups would you say you belong first of all? And the next? (1) The locality or town where you live; (2) State or region of country where you live; (3) [The US] as a whole*; (4) [North America]*; (5) The world as a whole.* [*substitute your own nation and continent for these].

Taken together, the WVS and EVS data provide complete time series for all three selected countries. Exclusive nationalists are identified by subtracting from the group of respondents,

who see themselves as belonging primarily to the nation (answer 3), those respondents who choose their continent (4) or the world (5) as their second territorial identity. Those respondents who see themselves as belonging primarily to their continent or the world are classified as cosmopolitans irrespective of their second choice (for a similar approach see Jung 2008: 585).

To gauge the vote share of radical right parties, I follow the classification of parties in the selected countries provided by Norris (2005: 54-57), who identifies a number of radical right parties in Switzerland and Germany, but does not find similar parties in Ireland. Vote shares at national elections are taken from official German (Bundeswahlleiter 2013) and Swiss (Das Schweizer Parlament 2013) sources (see Table A.6 and A.7)

TABLE A.6
VOTE SHARE OF GERMAN RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES

Election Year	NPD	REP	DVU	Total
1980	.1	0	0	.1
1983	.15	.0	.0	.15
1987	.55	.0	.0	.55
1990	.7	1.9	.0	2.6
1994	.0	1.8	.0	1.8
1998	.2	2.05	.6	2.85
2002	.3	.35	0	.65
2005	1.7	.35	0	2.05
2009	1.65	.25	.1	2

Notes: NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands; National Democratic Party of Germany), REP (Die Republikaner; The Republicans), DVU (Deutsche Volksunion; German People's).

TABLE A.7
VOTE SHARE OF SWISS RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES

Election Year	SVP	EDU	LdT	SD	FPS	Total
1983	11.1	.4	-	3.5	-	15
1987	11	.9	-	2.9	2.6	17.4
1991	11.9	1	-	3.4	5.1	21.4
1995	14.9	1.3	.95	3.13	3.98	24.26
1999	22.56	1.25	.88	1.84	.87	27.4
2003	26.8	1.26	.35	.96	.19	29.56
2007	29.1	1.28	.57	.54	.1	31.59
2011	26.6	1.26	.79	.2	-	28.85

Notes: SVP (Schweizerische Volkspartei; Swiss People's Party), EDU (Eidgenössische Demokratische Union; Union of Federal Democrats), LdT (Lega die Ticinesi; Ticino League), SD (Schweizer Demokraten, Swiss Democrats), FPS (Freiheitspartei der Schweizer, Freedom Party)

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