The Private Sector, Institutions of Higher Education, and Immigrant Settlement in Canada

The settlement sector in Canada has undergone significant transformations in recent times, most notably the imposition of neoliberal principles on service providers that has transferred a substantial amount of the immigrant selection and recruitment process from governmental agencies to third parties. This trend of devolution has accelerated with recent developments associated with Provincial Nominee Programs. By reviewing the literature related to Provincial Nominee Programs and their implementation, we illustrate how private employers and institutions of higher education are not only involved in immigrant selection but also increasingly in settlement service delivery.


Introduction
The Canadian immigrant and settlement landscape is changing. Although a large proportion of immigrants continue to settle in Canada's three largest cities -Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouvergeographical settlement patterns are shifting towards cities and provinces that have in the past received relatively few immigrants (Di Biase and Bauder 2005;Statistics Canada 2010). Much of this shift has been driven by Provincial Nominee Programs (PNPs), which enable provinces to participate in the selection of immigrants.
There has been no shortage of critiques of the PNPs for inefficiency and lack of accountability (Baglay 2012;McDonough 2008;Leo and August 2009;Baxter 2010;Carter et al. 2010;Dobrowolsky 2011), but less attention has been paid to the neoliberalization of settlement service provision that came along with the implementation of the PNPs. Canada's recent immigration approach has transferred a substantial amount of the immigrant selection and recruitment process to third parties, aiming to strengthen Canada's economy and global competitiveness (Canada's Economic Action Plan 2013;Bauder 2006). This transformation is not limited to the recruitment and attraction of immigration, but it also includes settlement services. Academic literature has extensively documented how the settlement sector is in the midst of shifting the provision of services to non-state actors, demonstrating the Canadian trajectory toward neoliberal principles of competition, flexibilization, and audit controls Baxter 2010;Lewis 2010;Palacio 2010;Cragg 2011;Dobrowolsky 2011). To further these studies, in this paper we argue that the neoliberalization of settlement provision is elevated to yet a new level through the privatization of settlement services and the enlisting of institutions of higher education in the delivery of settlement services.
This paper presents an examination and review of the current state of Canada's immigrant settlement service delivery, particularly for provincial nominees. Following Maria Grant and Andrew Booth's (2009) typology of scholarly reviews, we conducted a state-of-the-art review of peer-reviewed and "grey" literature. The objective of this state-of-the-art review is to "offer new perspectives on an issue or highlight an area in need of further research" (Grant and Booth 2009, p. 101). As our research addresses contemporary trends in a dynamic policy field, we concentrated on reviewing sources that had been published within the last 10 years and that were related to the PNPs, associated settlement services and emerging service delivery models.
In the following sections, we first present essential background information by reviewing the concepts of neoliberalism, privatization, and regionalization, and by introducing the structure of the PNPs. Then we discuss the existing Canadian model of immigrant service delivery before exploring the emerging model that involves employers and institutions of higher education. We close the paper with a discussion of these developments.

Neoliberalism and Privatization
The term neoliberalism describes a set of practices and "ideological beliefs" that have become prominent since the 1970s, and which focus on "liberating individuals from the fetters of the state and emphasizing the importance of the market" (Cragg 2011, p. 65). Neoliberalism in the 21st century continues to influence contemporary politics and society, having a significant effect on the making of public policy within all levels of the government. As David Harvey (2007: 3) explains, "almost all states, from those newly mined after the collapse of the Soviet Union to old-style social democracies and welfare states such as New Zealand and Sweden, have embraced some version of neoliberal theory." Canada is no exception in incorporating neoliberal ideology in the nation's public policy, including immigration and settlement policy.
A pivotal objective of neoliberalism is the privatization of public services (Harvey 2007). Privatization appears to be "doubly beneficial" through neoliberal perspectives as it "reduces government spending, and it opens potentially lucrative new terrain for private, profit-seeking investment" (Stanford 2008, p. 250). The late twentieth century witnessed a trend of service provision shifting from public monopolies to markets operating under the competition principle. This privatization has been presented as a "win-win situation" that is supposed to "lower costs and improve public service quality" (Hermann and Flecker 2013, p. 1). According to Sheshinski and López-Calva (2003), the four objectives of privatization programs are: "(i) to achieve higher allocative and productive efficiency; (ii) to strengthen the role of the private sector in the economy; (iii) to improve the public sector's financial health; and (iv) to free resources for allocation in other important areas of government activity (usually related to social policy)" (p. 430). These objectives appear to benefit the aims of reducing government spending and foster capital accumulation in private hands. However, there are important repercussions in terms of quality, quantity, and equity of service delivery when putting the responsibility of social policies and programs, in this case in the field of immigration and settlement, in the hands of the private sector (e.g., Richmond and Shields 2005;Evans et al. 2005;Mitchell and Shields 2010).
Canada's immigration system has followed this trend of neoliberalization and privatization. It increasingly embraces employer-driven routes towards residency, and allows employers to pick suitably trained foreign workers from a pool of applicants. This trend has been well documented in the literature (Palacio 2010;Baxter 2010;Carter et al. 2010;Moss et al. 2010;Zahtab-Martin et al. 2010;Cragg 2011;Dobrowolsky 2012;Chase 2013;Seidle 2013). Settlement services, too, are embracing neoliberal principles: an increasingly privatized immigrant settlement system has been pursued, relieving the federal government of much of its responsibility and accountability in helping to ensure the success of immigrants entering Canada. James Frideres (2006, p. 7) remarks "since the 1980's there has been a restructuring of the welfare state in favour of the neo-liberal approach that rejects state intervention with regard to immigrant integration." In particular, the PNPs exemplify Canadian immigration policy's growing reliance on neoliberal ideology, as "these programs enable provincial governments, in close partnership with private employers and other nongovernmental actors, to nominate economic immigrants and their dependents for permanent residency" (Baxter 2010, p. 2). Likewise, PNPs have also facilitated a shift of the settlement of immigrants from public and not-for-profit service providers to private sector actors. Before we examine PNPs in greater detail, however, we will first discuss the "regionalization" approach that framed the development and implementation of PNPs.

Regionalization
In 2001, Citizenship and Immigration Canada's (CIC) published the report Towards a More Balanced Geographic Distribution of Immigrants. This report discussed what both the federal and provincial jurisdictions could do to promote the dispersal of immigrants away from Canada's first-tier cities towards second-and third-tier cities, as well as to rural and remote areas (CIC 2001). The promotion of regional immigration was influenced by the need to tackle population decline in rural areas, as well as helping to boost "regional economic development" in otherwise non-traditional immigrant receiving communities (Walton-Roberts 2007, p. 14). Although immigrants in smaller Canadian cities and towns tend to have higher incomes than immigrants in a gateway city (Bauder 2003), this task of dispersing immigrants to second-and third-tier cities as well as rural and remote areas is challenging, as the majority of immigrants prefer to live in large cities (Hyndman et al. 2006). These efforts to disperse immigrants have been referred to as "regionalization" (Frideres 2006;Bruce 2007;Walton-Roberts 2007).
Regionalization policies are not necessarily associated with neoliberal ideology or practice. In fact, the attempt to manage the geographical distribution of settlement seems to contradict neoliberal market ideology, which would permit immigrants to freely locate in places where the demand for their labour is greatest. From this neoliberal perspective, regionalization policies are a distortion of the free market. However, regionalization can also be seen to dovetail well with neoliberal logics as decentralization or regionalization can also be interpreted as a cost-saving measure. The PNPs are prime examples of this practice, as more responsibility and accountability is put into the provinces' and territories hands, ultimately cutting costs for the federal government. Regionalization can subsequently provide a very good fit with neoliberal objectives (Frideres 2006;Bruce 2007;Walton-Roberts 2007;Baxter 2010;Palacio 2010;Carter et al. 2010). In fact, in this paper we argue that the manner in which regionalization policies and programs were implemented helped the federal and provincial governments to enact neoliberal principles.

Provincial Nominee Programs
The most important initiative promoting regionalization has been the PNPs (Baxter 2010;Carter et al. 2010;Lewis 2010;Pandey and Townsend 2010). Canada's immigration system has traditionally admitted permanent residents through federal immigration programs. PNPs have enabled provinces and territories to "address short-term labour shortages that are not currently being met through the federal skilled worker program" (Carter et al. 2010, p. 4). In the words of CIC (2013a, n.p.), it is essential that the nominees have "the skills, education, and work experience needed to make an immediate economic contribution to the province or territory that nominates them." The PNPs shift immigrant selection to the provincial level, and give provincial governments a voice in what kind of immigrants the province needs in terms of labour and skill. However, the federal government "retains primary control over setting national immigration policy by defining classes of admissibility and inadmissibility, and by ensuring that Canada meets its international obligations with respect to refugees" (Baxter 2010, p. 18). Table 1 displays a snapshot 1 of the immigration streams that the provinces and territories offer. "Other" includes distinct regional streams such as Alberta's Self-Employed Farmer Stream or Manitoba's Support Stream.
Since Canada's provinces and territories differ tremendously in labour needs, population growth levels, and other factors, the federal government allows the provinces and territories to customize their PNPs to suit regional economic, demographic, and social circumstances. The first federal-provincial immigration accord was with Quebec. The Canada-Quebec Accord was signed in 1991 and provided a provincial immigration scheme that gives Quebec greater power in immigration selection (Baxter 2010). In particular, it gives Quebec the exclusive responsibility of choosing newcomers and refugees who are still in their countries of origin (Gouvernment du Québec 2000). One the one hand, the Canada-Quebec Accord is similar to the PNPs in that a province chooses and accepts the newcomer based on its own criteria, with the federal government ultimately accepting the newcomer based on Canadian law. On the others hand, the Canada-Quebec Accord differs from PNPs in that it includes not only economic immigration, but also family reunification, and refugees (Gouvernment du Québec 2000). Due to substantial differences between the Canada-Quebec Accord and PNPs of other provinces, we decided to exclude Quebec from our study.
Before the PNPs were implemented, some provinces and territories had distinct agreements with the federal government pertaining to immigration. The PNPs differ from these agreements in that it gives the provincial and territorial governments a "formal role in the selection of immigrants" (Carter et al. 2010, p. 6). The first PNPs were signed in 1998 by British Columbia, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan followed by New Brunswick (1999), Newfoundland and Labrador (1999), Alberta (2002), Nova Scotia (2002), Prince Edward Island (2002), and Ontario (2007). Each PNP created its own immigration streams depending on regional economic conditions (Carter et al. 2010). Additionally, the territories have created their own programs with Yukon starting in 2001 and the Northwest Territories in 2009 (Carter et al. 2010). Nunavut and Quebec are the only exceptions that do not have PNP streams of immigration. Over the last decade, the PNP has become the second largest route to economic immigration to Canada. In 2011 more than 38,000 provincial nominees, inclusive of spouses and dependents, entered Canada (CIC 2012a). It is also the main vehicle for immigrants into Manitoba, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan, and New Brunswick (CIC 2012a).
The PNPs pioneered the practice of allowing employers to sponsor temporary foreign workers (TFWs) as provincial nominees through either the skilled or semiskilled streams. These programs are thus attractive for employers who want to keep their TFWs permanently after their initial visas expire. In this case, provincial and Streams identified through provincial and territorial PNP websites, May 2014 territorial government officials determine if the applicant meets the criteria for the stream through which they are applying (Carter et al. 2010). Once a worker is nominated, CIC requires a background check relating to health, criminality, and security before granting immigration status (Carter et al. 2010 In addition, international Master's and PhD students may become permanent residents via the numerous PNP international graduate student streams across the country. A province may nominate students if they have recently graduated from an existing graduate program within the province (normally within 2 years), have legal immigration status in Canada, and have intentions of remaining within the province, among other stipulations, depending on the provincial program. An objective of the student streams is to supply a young and educated population of immigrants to the provinces by granting permanent residency to international students who wish to remain in Canada, and the ability to reach this objective varies between provincial contexts.
Although PNPs aim to regionalize immigration, the programs cannot restrict successful nominees from moving to other provinces. Section 6, point 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms states: "Every citizen and every person who has the status of a permanent resident of Canada has the right a) to move to and take up residence in any province; and b) to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province" (Government of Canada 1982). PNPs may entice prospective immigrants to apply to a certain province or territory, but this does not necessarily mean that they will remain there (Hou 2007). Table 2 displays the varying retention rates of nominee principal applicants by province. To increase rates of immigrant retention, more effective settlement services may need to be provided that offer crucial social and economic support upon arrival to Canada (Carter et al. 2010;Theriault and Haan 2012). In the next section, we examine the current state of settlement service delivery.

Settlement Services
The delivery of settlement services involves multi-level governance "in the form of fiscal resources, cooperation agreements, or provisions for power sharing" (Tolley 2011, p. 4). The federal government presently funds the majority of settlement services involving multiple "delivery streams" (i.e., Information and Orientation, Language and Skills Development, Labour Market Participation, Community Connections, Needs Assessments and Referrals, Support Services, and Indirect Services), and "settlement program outcomes" (i.e., Orientation, Language/Skills, Labour Market Access, Welcoming Communities, Policy and Program Development) (CIC 2012c). Federal funding for settlement has tripled in the past decade (CIC 2012d). Manitoba, British Columbia, and Québec have established their own federal-provincial settlement service agreements, facilitating a federal transfer of funds to the provincial governments that then have control over the design and development of settlement services. CIC, however, has recently suspended the agreements with Manitoba and British Columbia and has repatriated all settlement service funding, with the exception of Quebec. This recentralization of settlement services is symbolic for the federal government's continual quest to assert control over the overall outcome of settlement services provision throughout Canada. The Canadian Council for Refugees (2012) expressed concern that "British Columbia and Manitoba have developed model settlement programming responsive to the needs of their particular newcomers and socio-economic contexts" (n.p.), and that returning to a recentralized structure of funding and programming could negatively affect the current progressive outcomes of these regionally distinct programs. At the provincial level, Québec has long played a key role in immigrant settlement since the establishment of its own Department of Immigration in 1968, and continues to do so with its Canada-Québec Accord (Gouvernment du Québec 2000; Baxter 2010; Chiasson and Koji 2011). The other provinces have the flexibility to add distinct programs if the province formally requests it, such as New Brunswick's francophone settlement program. In addition, all provincial and territorial governments offer provincial immigration and settlement websites.
Municipal governments are also involved in settlement as immigrants search for accommodation, enroll children in school, and engage in other local activities. However, as "creatures of the provinces" with no direct funding for settlement services, municipalities play a subordinate formal role in immigrant settlement, even though the cities and towns are "the primary recipients of immigrants to Canada" (Tolley 2011, p. 4). The 2005 Canada-Ontario-Toronto Immigration Agreement and the 2006 Canada-Ontario-Toronto Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Immigration and Settlement has given the city of Toronto more immigrant settlement responsibility (Stasiulis et al. 2011). In 2007, Edmonton followed suit to become the second Canadian municipality with such an agreement (Tossutti 2012). Toronto further blazed the path towards migrant inclusion when its City Council voted to effectively declare itself a "Sanctuary City." This new policy allows "illegalized" migrants (Bauder 2013b) living in Toronto to access municipal services without fear of detention and deportation (Bauder 2013a;Dhillon 2013). Second-and third-tier cities and towns participate in immigrant settlement as well (Chiasson and Koji 2011), though through less direct policy-driven initiatives. For example, Sherbrooke City Council has created an "Intercultural Relations and Diversity Committee," and the town of Rimouski has developed a "Welcoming Guide for Newcomers" and has adopted the "Rimouski Declaration of the Citizens Rights" (Chiasson and Koji 2011). These new developments, however small or large they may be, are symbolic of the municipalities' commitment to the settlement and integration of newcomers into their communities.
Although federal, provincial, and municipal governments provide much of the funding for settlement services, the majority of the support and services are delivered by immigrant service providers (ISPs), which receive funds from all levels of government and other stakeholders. ISPs perform a role that Jennifer Wolch (1990) has called the "Shadow State," serving as a "parallel system comprised of nongovernment organizations (NGOs) that deliver collective services formerly provided by state-run agencies" (Sadiq 2004, p. 4). Along these lines, Kareem Sadiq (2004, p. 1) argues that "Canada's settlement sector has evolved into a para-state system that is financed by contractual arrangements between the state and non-governmental settlement agencies" to deliver employment, language, housing, education, and other services to newcomers. This type of restructuring of the settlement sector has created instability, service gaps, as well as "a general diversion of precious human resources from service planning and delivery to irrational administrative burdens" (Richmond and Shields 2005, p. 518;Evans et al. 2005). This non-centralized service structure also further aggravates the spatial mismatch, defined by "the lack of congruence between the location of ISAs (immigrant settlement agencies) to the residential location of newcomers" (Sadiq 2004, p. 2; see also Lo et al. 2007;Joassart-Marcelli 2013). This geographic mismatch needs to be addressed in the context of the recent development of PNPs and the associated need for settlement services in non-traditional immigrant reception centres, in which the private sector and institutions of post-secondary education are expected to contribute to improving and expanding existing settlement services.

Emerging Models of Service Delivery
In recent years, the nature of settlement service delivery has changed considerably. For example, foreign workers under the PNP are not only dependent on employers for their immigration status, but also the provision of settlement services (Rural Development Institute 2005;Baxter 2010;Carter et al. 2010;Moss et al. 2010;Palacio 2010;Cragg 2011). In particular, the PNPs have "increased reliance on employers to provide language and settlement services, linked with possibilities for creating a vacuum in service provision where governments have derogated public responsibility and when third-party actors are absent" (Baxter 2010, p. 3). As the PNPs encourage immigration to non-traditional immigrant receiving areas, where ISPs may not be located, employers are beginningand in some cases, like Alberta, are expected (see Appendix)to provide settlement services for potential and actual nominees (as well as TFWs).
A major settlement service gap neglected by the federal government is the period of transition between when migrant workers or students possess temporary status and when they are nominated for the PNP (Baxter 2010). During this period, prospective immigrants are not eligible to receive government-funded settlement services, notwithstanding the fact they are en route to becoming a permanent Canadian resident. ISPs are available throughout Canada in both small and large municipalities, yet the feasibility for TFWs and potential and actual nominees having access to ISPs varies from region to region. Although provincial governments may be more flexible than the federal government in regulating who is receiving settlement services (Gates-Gasse 2012), the gap in service delivery has remained, resulting in the provision of these services by employers and institutions of higher education.

Employers
The Rural Employers' Information Pathway for Hiring Temporary Foreign Workers in Manitoba (Zahtab-Martin et al. 2010) encourages employers to participate in the settlement process of employees as much as possible by holding diversity and intercultural training sessions at the workplace and arranging housing for the foreign workers in the community. The important role of employers is described by Nelson Palacio's (2010) review of low-skilled provincial nominees working at Maple Leaf in Brandon, Manitoba. The employer's roles were very apparent in all aspects of the PNP settlement experience, both for the immigrant and the community. Maple Leaf recruits workers and their families from specific countries that speak particular languages to "ease the settlement planning and integration" (Palacio 2010, p. 64). For example, a majority of the TFW in Brandon comes from Spanish-speaking countries, which permits holding group sessions of orientation and language classes that require only a Spanish-to-English translator. Maple Leaf has also gone further by creating a formal settlement plan for nominees, which includes benefits such as "one month's rent, a month-long bus pass, access to the company cafeteria for one week, vouchers to purchase food, etc." (Palacio 2010, p. 64). Although Maple Leaf is doing good work on optimizing their settlement services, concerns have been raised about the unsanitary conditions of the accommodation provided (Palacio 2010). Yet it is not surprising that these conditions have not made headlines since the employment contracts of the workers are tied to their status, putting these workers in vulnerable positions until their nomination process is complete and they are granted permanent immigration status. This example demonstrates that although private employers are putting considerable effort into their PNP experience, there is still much work to do in order to ensure that the private sector is accountable for the quality and justice of their settlement services. Kataoka and Magnusson (2011) conducted another case study about immigration to Kelowna, British Columbia. They found that employers have taken a leading role in nominee settlement. For instance, a key employer in the city has been providing nominees with rental housing and a comprehensive welcome package. The Economic Development Commission of Kelowna has gone so far as to hire a staff person who has previous experience working for CIC that can support nominees in filling out immigration paperwork and referring them to different programs that would be useful in their settlement process (Kataoka and Magnusson 2011). In this example, both employers and community stakeholders have taken settlement provision into their own hands.
At the debut of Nova Scotia's PNP, the premier of the province declared that the program would be at "no extra cost to the tax payers of the province." Accordingly, the program was designed to hold both the nominees and their private employers accountable for the attraction and settlement of the newcomers (Haddow 2011). In particular, the province made a contract with a consulting firm, Cornwallis Financial Corporation, to execute the economic and business mentorship responsibilities (Haddow 2011). The economic category of the Nova Scotia PNP that was hosted by the private company failed quickly (McDonough 2008;Dobrowolsky 2011Dobrowolsky , 2012. Challenges that arose included that "the majority of business matches are not bona fide, the employment relationships which are legitimate are rarely at a middle management level as required and many of the nominees are not staying in Nova Scotia, and those that stay indicate that the program does not meet their needs." At the same time, Cornwallis Corporation "raked in almost $4 million without much show for its efforts" (Gillis 2005, p. B8, cited by Dobrowolsky 2012. Because the contract was not renewed, Cornwallis sued the Nova Scotia provincial government for "defamation, breach of contract and financial compensation" (Dobrowolsky 2012, p. 206). The economic program was terminated in 2006 (McDonough 2008;Dobrowolsky 2012). This example demonstrates that the province must closely monitor private stakeholders in order to maintain the integrity of the program and properly match nominees with relevant employers.
In Alberta's lower-skilled nominee streams, the employers are required to fill out an Employer-Driven Settlement and Retention Plan (AINP 2013, see Appendix). On the form, employers are expected to offer English as a Second Language (ESL) instruction as well as the option of providing accommodation, transportation, school enrollment for children, health care services, and financial services (AINP 2013). The provincial government asks employers to assume responsibility for settlement services for the foreign workers they are recruiting, but these employers are given a large amount of control over these services without proper evaluation or accountability.
This privatization of settlement services occurs in a context in which there may be no other options, as ISPs are often absent from smaller towns and remote areas where companies with the need for TFWs are located. The nominees' work schedule, which may include long hours and laborious work, may also not permit travel to locations where services may be offered. Baxter (2010, p. 39) suggests that the employers' heavy participation in the nominees' settlement could have positive outcomes such as "increasing employer-worker communication, building mutual respect, and strengthening norms of loyalty and reciprocity that promote worker retention." However, Baxter (2010) also acknowledges that the lack of public involvement puts the employee in a vulnerable position, and the employer may be enticed to exploit these vulnerabilities.

Institutions of Higher Education
The road to permanency through PNPs can also involve studying at a Canadian institution of higher education, as well as an application through provincial streams that target international students. Each provincial international graduate stream is unique as certain PNPs require Canadian work experience, some are employer-driven, and others require in-province education for sponsorship (Gates-Gasse 2012). Similar to TFWs, international students (along with their spouses and dependents) are ineligible for federally funded settlement services until they are granted permanent residency, which could take up to 10 years after entering the country to study (Gates-Gasse 2012).
Heather Moore (2008) examines the student-to-immigrant experience through a case study at York University in Ontario. According to Moore (2008), the process for international students to become a permanent resident can be overwhelming, which may be a reason that so many international students do not pursue permanency. While one key informant noted that the campus community's social network and informal advice led him through the process towards permanency, formal university institutions such International Student Offices (ISOs) are also a focal point for international students to become orientated at the university and to seek academic support and employment.
Although there have been instances of mentoring programs that link international students with members of the community for professional networking, universities and other institutions of higher education have the potential to assume an even greater role in delivering programs to help students achieve permanent residency (Gates-Gasse 2012). A practical example of a university becoming involved in the settlement and integration of the students and potential nominees is Newfoundland's Memorial University, which has received a grant from the provincial government to deliver the Professional Skills Development Program for International Students as well as a Family Integration Support Program (Gates-Gasse 2012). These programs' main goal is to retain international students by educating them on Canadian employment culture and practice, by helping them make connections in the community, and by providing their families with integration support through information and referrals in the community (Gates-Gasse 2012). Similarly, L'universite de Moncton in New Brunswick has delivered a program titled "Destination Emploi," which seeks to retain Francophone international students as residents in the province (Gates-Gasse 2012). The program helps international students enter the workforce and provides "additional coaching to students during their studies and assisting them with social integration into the community, encouraging New Brunswick businesses to hire international students, and educate students who are about to graduate about how to immigrate to the province" via the PNP (Gates-Gasse 2012, p. 284). These programs are located at the university campuses, funded provincially, and staffed through the university. Universities are recognizing that this kind of settlement and employment services are essential to these international students who aim to acquire permanent residency.
Yet another study examined service needs and gaps for international post-secondary students transitioning to permanent residency in Toronto, Ontario. The interviews conducted with international student advisors revealed how dynamic their role is in this process: advisors not only provide information on how to obtain a work permit, but also deal with "immigration, academic issues, personal issues, transition issues, relationship issues, sometimes housing issues, or career" (Roach 2011, p. 28). These efforts are complemented by CIC, providing workshops on pathways and procedures to permanent residency and bridging services to connect students to community organizations in the university setting (Roach 2011).
Carl Nicholson, executive director of the Catholic Centre for Immigrants in Ottawa and panelist at the 2013 OCASI Executive Director Forum, has witnessed that there are "new stakeholder groups" on the ground level of the settlement sector. "Schools, libraries, community colleges and technical institutes" are now what Nicholson referred to as "competition" in the settlement field (Nicholson 2013).

Discussion and Conclusion
As Canadian immigration policies change to increase the input from provinces and territories in the selection of immigrants, dependence on the private sector and institutions of higher education for settlement provision has also grown. This dependence, however, is not equal across Canada. Since there is no national settlement policy that specifies what settlement services must be provided to newcomers (regardless of where they are settling), a multi-tier system of settlement provision has emerged that differentiates between (1) immigrants in cities and traditional centres of reception who receive settlement services from ISPs, (2) immigrants in non-traditional settlement areas who receive settlement services from the private sector, and (3) prospective immigrants who are student at institutions of higher education.
Although our study has focused primarily on provincial and territorial nominees, the phenomenon of privatizing settlement services may also occur in light of the immanent restructuring of federal immigration programs. The new economic immigration approach "Expression of Interest" (EOI), now renamed "Express Entry" (CIC 2014) implements a "fast and flexible economic immigration system whose primary focus is on meeting Canada's labour needs" (CIC 2012b, p. 1), with intentions to "explore with provinces, territories and employers approaches to developing a pool of skilled workers who are ready to begin employment in Canada" (CIC 2013b, p. 1). The new immigration approach, which is expected to commence by the end of 2014, will allow employers to "cherry-pick" potential immigrants to fill labour shortages from a pool of skilled-worker candidates and, expectantly, have them in the labour market faster than existing immigration streams. The former immigration minister, Jason Kenney, stated that foreign workers "will go into this pool, and then employers or my department and or provinces will be able to fish out of that pool, it's like a dating site" (Chase 2013, p. 1). Clearly, Canadian immigration is heading in a direction that gives employers greater influence in selecting immigrants. Matthew Mendelsohn (2013), of the Mowat Centre for Public Policy, stated at a keynote panel of OCASI's 2013 Executive Director Forum about the new EOI stream that "having employers more engaged is better," although he recommends that it is not only important for the potential EOI immigrants to be attractive to employers, but also to municipalities and provinces. Our research has shown that the Canadian government's invitation to businesses to be partners in the immigrant selection process is also associated with granting them a greater role in settlement provision.
Neoliberal ideology is becoming more prominent in Canadian immigration and settlement policy. Competition has arisen between provinces and municipalities in immigrant attraction and retention through settlement provision. In addition, PNPs are designed to relieve the government from settlement service provision by enlisting the help of and mobilizing resources from employers and institutions of higher education. From a practical viewpoint, this offloading of settlement responsibilities can be counterproductive to the aims of regionalization. As players who have not traditionally been involved in settlement services attempt to fill the provision gaps, concerns have mounted regarding the effectiveness of service provision and its consequences. A failed integration process at the local scale due to inadequate settlement services may lead to newcomers and their family to relocate elsewhere, which would defeat one of the main purposes of the PNPs.
More worrying, however, is the continuation of the shift towards neoliberal practices in settlement service provision. While over the last decade or so, the system through which ISPs delivered services to immigrants was restructured along neoliberal ideology, the most recent trend suggests that settlement services may be taken out of the purview of ISPs altogether and allocated to the private sector and institutions of higher educationneither of which has a mandate or specialized expertise to deliver such comprehensive settlement services.