State Formation in the Hebrew Bible: An Institutional Economic Perspective

This article analyzes the changing approach to state formation in the stories of Joshua, Saul, David and Solomon. These stories are here scrutinized for features of emerging constitutional and institutional economic governance. This article inquires as to why initially a rather federalist structure under Joshua emerged, one that subsequently was replaced by more formally coordinated, hierarchical governance structures. It focuses on attack/defense costs and transaction costs that explain the emergence of state structures and their evolution over time. In addition, institutional economic concepts of political governance (that overcome anarchy and organize wealth creation in society) are projected to state formation in the Hebrew Bible. In this way, this article traces the early, yet pseudo-modern, economic history of a theory of state formation.


Introduction
This article develops the key thesis that the early history of modern economic theory of state formation emerged in the Hebrew Bible: the Hebrew Bible anticipated contemporary, 'modern' political and institutional economic theory of how agents initially escape out of anarchy and violence, the 'Hobbesian war', and of how society prevents a relapse into this sour state.
My economic reconstruction is textual in nature, treating the Hebrew Bible as 'prose ction'. I am interested neither in questions of redactional analysis, such as which writers compiled the Bible, nor in questions of actual historical fact which ask if the Hebrew Bible could be regarded as a depiction of 'real' events in space-time. Instead, I follow a 'narrative approach', which has made considerable inroads even into biblical analysis. 2 The implied textual understanding of the Hebrew Bible needs to be kept in mind even though I may not subsequently use explicit phrases in every sentence such as 'the text of the Hebrew Bible says' or 'as depicted in this story' (throughout this article, and in my other research, too 3 )-unless I explicitly state the opposite.
I mentioned that my analysis of the Hebrew Bible is non-historical. Nevertheless, a historical dimension enters my analysis, especially in normative perspective, and this relates back to motives, themes and reasons as to why the Hebrew Bible was written. In normative perspective, manifold governance principles result from an economic reconstruction of the Hebrew Bible, especially pertaining to the political governance of a society. Figuratively expressed, Bible stories advise how political economic history is to be made (in case a governance problem was resolved in the text) or how history is not to be made (in case a governance problem was unsuccessfully dealt with). Robert Alter hints at such a different historic purpose of the Hebrew Bible, too, albeit in theological perspective. 4 Therefore, the Hebrew Bible can be interpreted as an institutionally economic grounded, quasi-legal resource, which is beyond merely learned and verbally transmitted custom but as such cannot be considered as 'law' in the modern sense. This coincides with Hodgson's argument that law existed long before its explicit, constitutional and legalistic codi cation. 5 Indeed, the Hebrew Bible can be interpreted as a link-a largely institutionally economic motivated one, as I argue-in the development from mere custom to 'law' in the modern sense. I further elaborate on this thesis by introducing concepts of state formation and subsequently apply them to the Hebrew Bible.
Four reasons led to my focus on the stories of Joshua, Saul, David and Solomon. First, these stories are revealing regarding the institutional governance of a newly settled and newly formed state because evolving governance structures are chronologically closely tied together. The Hebrew Bible is quite explicit as to why-for institutional economic governance reasons, so I argue-state and governance structures changed from Joshua to Saul, from Saul to David, and then from David to Solomon.
Second, under Joshua's, Saul's, David's and Solomon's leadership, the Israelites faced the problem of how to establish governance structures for a settled society. This was not the case in the Exodus stories. As interesting as Moses' problem of organizing a journey for a large, unsettled community may be for understanding institutional governance, 6 for reasons of choice and focus this is not the topic of the present study.
Third, there is no doubt that other stories of the Hebrew Bible, in particular the nal stories of Genesis and the rst few of Exodus, also hold important lessons regarding state formation and economic performance of a society. However, again for reasons of choice and focus, they could not be dealt with in this study.
Finally, as much as Deuteronomy (16.18-18.22), prior to the book of Joshua, normatively sketched out some of the institutional structures the Israelites should set up, 7 this discussion does not say anything about processes of state formation and how institutional structures were actually established 'from the time' of Joshua onwards. This latter issue lies at the heart of the present study, and, as indicated, I have followed here an institutional and constitutional economic approach, one which only recently has begun to make inroads into studies of the Hebrew Bible. 8 Mayes clearly argued in this connection that Deuteronomy did not actually represent a constitution in itself but rather a 'resource to give objective grounding to…a constitution or legislation'. 9 The idea of the 'resource' basically implies a normative mandate-which stories, from the book of Joshua onwards, translated into concepts of nation-building and state formation.
My subsequent analysis proceeds in various steps. First, I set out key questions and key concepts of an economic approach to state formation. Following on in the 'main' parts of the study, I analyze state formation in the stories that involve Joshua, Saul, David and Solomon. Changes to state structures as these stories unfold, and patterns in institutional economic theory building that can be identi ed in these texts, serve to explain changes to governance. As my analysis grows more detailed, further institutional and constitutional economic concepts will be de ned.

De ning the Nature of the State and State Formation
The purpose of this section is not to provide any de nite answers as to what a state is or to what state formation amounts to. Rather, I would like to arrive at some kind of 'de nitional conclusions', if this is feasible at all, as a result of my analysis.
Weber revamped a de nition of the state by focusing on the means a modern state uses but not its ends. 10 His analysis of the state commenced with the insight that a situation of violence precedes the formation of a 'state'. Otherwise, he could not have discussed questions of legitimate, monopolized use of force and violence by a state. 11 For the purposes of the present study, Weber's key concepts need to be economically 'enhanced', especially regarding the meaning of 'community', and a 'state using legitimate force and violence'.
In contrast to Weber, Buchanan's constitutional economics explicitly conceptualizes a process showing how an initial, anarchic state of nature, in which no social order existed and total war (i.e. the war of all) quite literally reigned, could be overturned by the principal participants involved on economic grounds, that is, on the grounds of their selfinterest. The idea of a 'community' is to be understood as a group of individual, rational economic actors who all make claims to the same property, for example, a territory.
A key insight generated by Buchanan is that it is ultimately to the mutual advantage of the principal actors involved to lay down their weapons because they can save on attack/defense costs in this way. In this respect, a constitutional economic 'capitalist' approach has nothing to do with the 'violent establishment of private property' or the 'origins of capital in a process of bloody violence and expropriation', as Marxian analyses suggest. 12  Buchanan makes in this connection the vital distinction between the protective state and the productive state. 13 The protective state imposes rules or 'the institutions of "law" broadly interpreted', including the neutral, fair enforcement of law. This enforcement task regarding 'law' and rules is decided upon and assigned to the protective state in constitutional contract, as potential members of a community are engaged in a disarmament contract, 14 leaving behind the 'war of all', and transferring 'the monopoly of violence', as Weber might call it, 15 to the protective state. Buchanan's approach bears comparison in this respect to the Marxian goal to prevent all-controlling leviathans and other oppression through rulers, including those who oppress in the name of God. 16 Wallis and North's understanding of the 'state' as the community that negotiates ('organizes') ways out of anarchy through the setting up of state structures and enforcement agencies, 17 points in a similar direction, as does Auster and Silver's understanding of this aspect of the state as a ' rm' that specializes in both 'protective' and 'punitive services'. 18 Although the protective state limits individual liberties through rules, essentially it is these rules that guarantee individual freedom-within their agreed parameters of course. Through the protective state, legal rights (in property and in property exchange) are secured for all members of the community for an 'inde nite future'. 19 Even so, Buchanan stresses that readjustments in constitutional contract may become inevitable over time, in order to prevent a relapse into anarchy-should distances between rulers and subjects widen over time. 20 Protective state structures necessitate a referee or 'judge' enforcing laws through economic sanctioning mechanisms, but the protective state does not cover the process through which a community collectively chooses or further legislates itself regarding 'public goods' and the spending of taxation. The latter relates, as Buchanan reminds us, to the productive state, which tends to be the traditional domain of economic analysis, as, for instance, acknowledged by Auster and Silver. 21 However, the creation of rules for taxation, how and why taxes can be lowered or raised by the productive state, are decided by the collective in the initial constitutional contract as 'part of' the protective state. Much criticism of political economy 22 tends to be unclear regarding this vital distinction of Buchanan.
Different types of economic gains explain how and why the protective state and the productive state develop: rst, the protective state allows individual participants to save on attack and defense costs when leaving behind the war of all. An initial disarmament contract, so Buchanan argues, enables this. In this connection for instance a ruler has to be prevented, through constitutional governance structures, from being able to con scate ad hoc the property of citizens. 23 Second, the guarantee of property rights, rules of taxation and so on, as laid down in protective state structures, provide stability and economic ef ciency for private market exchange. In the tradition of North, one can argue they lower transaction costs and foster economic growth. In this manner, the protective state encourages economic activity within the con nes of the productive state, enabling agents to reap mutual gains from trade (pro ts). Third, the provision of public goods, such as 'national defense', 'infrastructure investments' and so on through taxation further facilitates individual 'rent-seeking', individuals reaping pro ts at the post-constitutional, 'productive state' level in private market exchange. 24 To sum up, for the purpose of an economic reconstruction state formation is analyzed as happening on grounds of self-interested choice that yields mutual gains for those involved (through lowering attack/defense costs; lowering transaction costs; and generating shared trade pro ts). 25 Buchanan's analysis is especially relevant to reconstructing state formation in the Hebrew Bible because of his focus on the non-ideal 'status quo' as a starting point for elaborating on how state structures can be set up and changed over time. For the present study, this appears highly relevant since the status quo is shifting: what re ects a revision of the status quo in the outcome of the Joshua stories is the input to a discussion of a-possibly still imperfect-status quo of contracting over state formation in the Saul stories, and so on.
On this basis, rst I examine how and why the society of Joshua established itself, and how the understanding of society and social order changed as the different stories unfolded. Second, speci c state functions are examined regarding the protective state ('law') and how the securing of property rights were handled (including the issue of the 'ruler', and the selection of who would rule), on the one hand, and how the productive 24 Reasons are given as to why state functions evolved, from the reigns of Joshua, to Saul, to David, to Solomon. This discussion focuses on constitutional and institutional economic arguments of state formation, or to be more precise, on a changing understanding of state formation which was legitimized on economic grounds ('mutual gains').

The Change of Ruler from Moses to Joshua: Re-settlement
Deuteronomy (34.1-4) is very clear that Joshua-Moses' successorconfronted a different institutional governance problem as compared to that of Moses. Whereas under Moses' leadership the key purpose of institutional governance had been to organize the exodus journey through uncertain territory, under Joshua's leadership the new purpose was to conquer the Promised Land, distribute land among the Israelite tribes, and establish governance rules for the newly formed state.
With the change of ruler from Moses to Joshua, the expectation of more democratic governance almost immediately arose. Moses had belonged to the House of Levi, which Jacob had condemned because of their violent tendencies. This condemnation carried signi cant institutional overtones (Gen. 49.6). Moses then indeed showed a peacedestroying approach in his negotiations with Egypt (driven by a God who was even more antagonistic) but also when Moses ruled the exodus journey in a rather autocratic, opportunistic manner which favored his tribe, the Levites. 26 A democratic structure had existed at the beginning of the exodus journey, at a time when Moses still discussed with the elders and rstborns of all tribes problems of institutional governance (Exod. 4.27-31). Then, tribal community and an 'assembly-like' state governance structure prevailed. However, Moses disposed of this approach, and he is subsequently accused in the Hebrew Bible of favoritism and nepotism (Num. 16. 3,[9][10]15 29 Even in these stories, the Israelites and how they were organized did not match a categorization of foraging people, or what Olson calls a primitive, community-oriented, hunter-gatherer band. 30 If Olson's model of a rebel setting himself up as a dictatorial ruler 31 was applied to any of the stories from the Exodus stories onwards, it would certainly t the case of Moses' leadership. However, even for Moses and his tribe (the Levites), quali cations apply: we are only dealing with a 'quasi'-stationary rebel since the Israelite society was on the move.
Also, defense for the other tribes of Israel was not provided by the Levites. Such an economic contribution of the dictator is of key importance in Olson's model, 32 the rest of the society being 'taxed' for this defense contribution of the 'dictators'. Since the other tribes of Israel provided defense for the group as a whole (including the Levites), one could even interpret this as an especially 'cunning' type of exploitation, with the downtrodden victims having to form an army. Furthermore, productivity gains for the populace from having a dictator were strongly limited during the exodus journey since plant cultivation was not feasible. Only some limited shepherding took place. This further constrains the application of Olson's model.
Moses' autocratic approach to legislative, executive and jurisdictional governance disadvantaged the other tribes of Israel. A considerable 'distance' existed between the rulers (Moses and the Levites) and those who were governed (the other tribes of Israel). Regarding such 'distances' in civil rights, Buchanan argues that either the enforcement of the status quo has to be bolstered (in order to maintain an existing distance) or else a basic constitutional agreement among group members has to be renego- tiated in order to reduce an existing distance to acceptable limits for all, thus altering the understanding of the legitimizing community. 33 Purely on transaction cost grounds, one could advance the hypothesis that for the ef cient organization of foraging of large groups in hostile territories, Moses' 'dictatorial' approach had certain bene ts. However, ultimately Buchanan's, North's, or Olson's studies provide various economic insights as to why democracies emerge out of dictatorships and Hobbesian leviathans (as discussed below for the Hebrew Bible).
In contrast to Moses' Levite origins, Joshua belonged to the House of Joseph (and Ephraim) which Jacob had highly blessed (Gen. 48.14; 49.22-26), as Jacob had announced that their descendants would become a group of nations (Gen. 48. 19). 34 With these genealogies of the Hebrew Bible in mind, a different approach to involving community and to setting up state governance could be expected under Joshua.
The Hebrew Bible indicated early on that the continued protection of the Levites' domination after the exodus journey would not be its favored route for institutional governance. Also, on cost grounds, the institutional domination of the Levites and the implied protection of the status quo could be considered to be an economically inef cient solution for a settled society, for example, with issues arising such as the distribution of land, the securing of property rights in land, or the defense of land. Economic historic research hints at this theoretical issue. 35 God's approach to institutional involvement also seemed to change. God urged Moses to approve of Joshua as his successor because Joshua was 'a man in whom is the spirit' (Num. 27.18)-by inheritance the spirit of Joseph, I would add here, with all the institutional, genealogical implications to governance this had. The God-concept, understood as an ultimate, supervisory idea for grounding governance, began to move away from the vengeful, antagonistic God of the Exodus stories.

State Formation under Joshua: The (Re-)introduction of the Assembly
After the exodus journey, the most crucial issue for the Israelites was to regain their claimed homeland. Joshua's approach to acquiring land was more typical of the House of Levi rather than that of the House of Joseph. No cooperation concept with other tribes and nations is visible, with very rare exceptions (see below). What Buchanan calls the 'natural distribution state' or the 'Hobbesian jungle' 36 fully emerges at this stage. Briend speaks of a 'vision of violence'. 37 As Buchanan describes, natural distribution states are unstable because of the constant attack and defense attempts that characterize such states as well as the costly investments parties have to allocate to attack and defense in order to retain what they claim as their property. He introduces in this connection the idea of a scarce 'good x' that is somehow distributed between two warring parties. 38 Ultimately, so Buchanan argues, warring parties will engage, for economic reasons, in cooperative negotiations regarding a fairer distribution of contested property-because mutual gains can be realized, both parties reducing costs regarding the predation and defense of 'good x'.
Under Joshua, 'good x' can be interpreted in a rst step as scarce, fertile land (in the Jordan Valley), as 'territory', and the kind of governance problems this implied both among the Israelite tribes and among Israel and other nations who made claims to the Promised Land, or were neighbors to the Promised Land. Both internal and external 'predation' threatened to appear.
Joshua, in complete contrast to Moses' approach, began to involve all Israelite tribes in constitutional (re-)arrangements that concerned the setting up of new state organization structures. As noted, Buchanan is quite outspoken here on grounds of attack/ defense costs and on practical grounds, stating that a renegotiation of the basic constitutional contract is 36 the only solution. 39 The 'assembly' was (re-)introduced as a governance mechanism, being comprised of 'elders, leaders, judges, and of cials' of all the Israelite tribes (Josh. 8.33; 9.14-15; 20.4; 23.1-2; 24.1). In this respect, a basic state structure of the 'protective state' at a constitutional level 40 (i.e. the assembly) was the object of agreement among the ones who were to be governed ('the people'). 41 By introducing the assembly, Joshua succeeded not only in involving all the tribes of Israel in institutional governance but also in preventing the status quo from lapsing back into destructive anarchy. Civil war is a real threat, as Buchanan warns, when changes to institutional governance are made. Such changes became unavoidable once the Israelites reached the Promised Land with questions of territorial distributions arising, coupled with issues of how to acquire land from and defend land against other nations.
In effect, it was the assembly, operating at least as a quasi-democratic forum, which (re-)asserted its monopoly on constitutional contracting, including the use of 'violence' through the 'protective state'. Such constitutional contractual agreement to maintaining and changing the status quo is essential. 42 So it can be seen, in the book of Joshua, the institutional governance of the Israelites began to be legitimized, once again, more through a Lockean constitutional contract that closely follows Buchanan's conception of constitutionalism rather than the kind of autocratic, possibly even dictatorial, Hobbesian 'slave contract' or 'state banditry' that can be attributed to institutional governance under Moses. 43 This is a fundamental meta-theoretical insight into the conceptual stance and political, normative nature of the Hebrew Bible. This shows very early roots of economic concepts on how democracy emerges out of dictatorships or 'Hobbesian jungles'.
Despite this, the assembly still suffered under signi cant governance de cits. A 'twelve-tribe league' 44 emerged under Joshua's reign rather than an integrated, smoothly functioning nation. Childs  Being more speci c, Joshua failed to set up integrative mechanisms for drawing together and running the Israelite community as one state. Executive governance problems and transaction cost inef ciencies existed regarding common tasks (for 'public goods' and how to collect taxes for their provision). The existing governance structures invited 'anarchy' and self-interested maneuvering among the Israelite tribes. The kinds of property or 'goods x' that had been safeguarded through the 'twelve-tribe league' (the way land was split and land governance happened through the assembly) were something like 'tribal independence', 'tribal democracy' and 'tribal security', loosely adjudicated by the assembly, but not 'national security', 'national democracy' and 'national independence'. 'Good x' can here, for instance, be further speci ed as tribal manpower that has to be allocated to shared defense tasks, as in the formation of a standing army.
These 'national' goods were under threat continually from warring adjacent nations and those nations whom the Israelites had evicted from the Promised Land. Civil war among the Israelites was another possibility, especially since national security, national democracy and national independence had not been secured. Clearly, the tribes had a common interest to cooperate regarding the shared provision of the defense of territory or the maintaining of democracy, since this allowed not only Israel as a collective group but also individual tribes to reduce costs for setting up institutional structures to provide these goods. However, for these two goods (i.e. national defense; maintaining of independence) con icting interests already existed. For example, from the point of view of individual tribes, it made good economic sense to opt out, on grounds of self-interest, from defense tasks once it became apparent that the attack of an external or internal aggressor was not aimed at their own territory. Regarding 'national independence', problems of self-interested maneuvering could be expected to be even more divisive.
Buchanan predicts in this respect that ultimately the potential for cost savings would induce interacting parties, in this instance the Israelite 45. Childs, Old Testament Theology, pp. 113, 115. tribes, to change their institutional structures. I will discuss this below when institutional structures under Saul's, David's and Solomon's reign are analyzed.
As much as internally a condition of anarchy and civil war was reduced under Joshua, at the international level, no cooperation was established. No economic gains from cooperation or disarmament were realized other than one minor exception as described in ch. 9 of Joshua: God had directed the Israelites not to make peace treaties with nations that occupied the Promised Land but to evict them-and this instruction, which still re ected the 'spirit' of Moses (e.g. renewed in Josh. 23.7, 12; 24. [19][20], largely explains the antagonistic stance of the Israelites against other nations. However, the Gibeonites succeeded, by means of deception, in holding on to their territory in the Promised Land. Since Joshua (or more precisely: the elders of Joshua's assembly) had agreed to a peace treaty with the Gibeonites by an oath to God, they were stuck with this institutional arrangement. As a result, a cooperative and mutually bene cial agreement, resulting in economic gains for both parties, was set up between the Gibeonites and the Israelites.

State Formation under Saul: Emerging Kingship and Defense Integration
As noted, under Joshua, the problems surrounding 'goods x' national defense, national independence and national democracy had remained. The only coordination mechanism for common defense tasks that could possibly be said to have existed under Joshua was the assembly. Calling upon the assembly, however, was a rather time-consuming, costly endeavor and it still invited strategic maneuvering among the Israelite tribes regarding who would cooperate with whom when it came to defense tasks. The idea of the community re ected a collection of twelve loosely connected independent groups, who put their own interests rst. Only if all the tribes were targeted by one aggressor could cooperation be expected to materialize regarding the common sharing of defense tasks, but even this was rather costly while being time consuming and complicated to organize because independent armies had to be merged into one.
Regarding the maintaining of democracy, problems of institutional governance showed similar features as compared to the defense problem. The problem regarding the maintaining of independence, however, was more acute since it cut at the very heart of basic rights for maintaining tribal identity versus national identity. Clearly some major con icting interests could be expected, despite the common history of the tribes and the manifestation of a shared religion in the course of the exodus journey.
Buchanan speaks in this connection of an 'adjudication role of the collectivity'. 46 By this he meant that con icts needed to be settled through an agreement process which involved all warring factions, yet one that was not settled top-down, authoritatively and without legitimation by any possibly existing state structures. For the circumstances described in the Hebrew Bible at this point, a state structure did not exist that could legitimately (in a Lockean sense) swiftly settle con icts. As discussed, Joshua had introduced the assembly, which was a very loose, highly 'federalist' government structure. After the autocracy of Moses, federalism may have been taken a step too far. The status quo of governance was in this respect rather imperfect when Joshua exited the stage.
After Joshua's reign, this problem was not immediately addressed. In the book of Judges, an escalating situation developed in which the Israelite tribes, led by judges and prophets, sometimes succeeded and sometimes failed to hold on to their territory in the Promised Land. A period of anarchic instability set in-Israel 'had no king; everyone did as he saw t' (Judg. 21.25, and also 19.1). 47 The Hebrew Bible underlines at this point the danger of emerging democracies relapsing into what Buchanan calls 'natural distribution states' or Olson terms 'competitive theft by many roving bandits'. 48 This situation also compares to what others abstractly model in a modern context as 'phase II' in a process of a society emerging out of anarchy, this phase being de ned by 'thieving and raiding' and the 'decentralized defense of resources'. 49 Economic gains from cooperation that is organized through state structures are then forsaken.
Even civil war as a consequence of lacking institutional coordination is reported at this point; for instance, in Judges (ch. 19), the Israelite tribes call on the assembly to set up an internal army to ght against one of their own tribes, the Benjaminites. A societal monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within society is unclearly set out. The assembly, an essentially legislative mechanism, had to be called upon in order to deal with a problem of law enforcement, at the level of the executive, protective state. The Hebrew Bible, understood as a state formation theory, provides in this respect insights into 'the fundamental problem of how the state achieves a monopoly on violence'. 50 Saul, the appointed leader of the Israelites after Joshua, had to deal with these institutional problems of how to unite the individual tribes and how to acquire a 'monopoly on violence' for the state. Metaphorically, this is illustrated for defense tasks when the Israelite tribes need to unite to confront an external opponent. Saul cuts up two oxen and sends the pieces to all tribes of Israel. This was done as a draconic appeal and yet an economic threat too: 'This is what will be done to the oxen of anyone who does not support Saul… Then the terror of the Lord fell on the people and they turned out as one man' (1 Sam. 11.7-8).
This episode highlighted various issues. First, the Israelites were not yet institutionally united in any kind of national sense. Time-consuming and costly maneuvering went on regarding national defense. The organization of a state 'monopoly on violence' and how to use this against internal factions, other states, nations and so on did not exist (1 Sam. 11.7-8; 24.1; 31.1-2).
Second, Saul had to draw on metaphysical support to make the Israelites cooperate and transfer tribal defense responsibilities to Saul. God's involvement re ects a pre-modern approach to institutional governance, relying on the 'shivering human being' before God, as Buchanan critically brands this approach, 51 and it also compares to a spiritually claimed but earthly and often economically motivated role of the Church in medieval government organization, as economic historians have outlined. 52 Nevertheless, and this is revealing, economic threats and sanctions were in place too. The economic nature of the spiritual threat (or 'sanction') manifested itself in the threatened killing of livestock of Israelite farmers.
Third, Saul had acquired his position as leader of the Israelites on legitimate grounds, the 'people' (the Israelite tribes) appealing to Samuel to appoint a 'king' as their leader. The governance structure of the 50 . 10.25), written down on a scroll; but understood as economic theory of state formation, it left-apart from the organization of national defense tasks-a void at the level of state government that was executed by the kingship especially for national democracy, and national independence.
Saul basically acted as what North and his colleagues might describe as a 'military specialist'. 54 Elements of the protective state were realized regarding law enforcement that concerned the good 'national defense'. In addition to this, there was now a split function of power at the highest level of Israel, Saul being the military-political leader while Samuel was the highest priest and spiritual leader of Israel. Samuel was de facto the 'leader of the Church', being in charge of a good 'national identity' relating to religious belief. Most importantly, Samuel was 'supervisor' of Saul. It is insightful in this connection, from a genealogical institutional position, that Samuel was also a member of the House of Joseph and Ephraim. In contrast, Saul belonged to the House of Benjamin, which had been strongly condemned by Jacob (and which had incited civil war among the Israelites in Judg. 19; see also 2 Sam. 20.1). To some extent the question arises as to why, from a genealogical point of view, Saul had been chosen to become king in the rst place. Various arguments apply.
First, Samuel remained the high priest of Israel during Saul's reign as king, providing supervision and control of Saul. Second, and possibly more importantly, by choosing Saul, the Hebrew Bible ultimately seemed to be making a point as to why members of the House of Benjamin, similar to those of the House of Levi, were at best transitionally but not ultimately suited to lead Israel. Indeed, Saul was deselected as king for failing to obey God's commands, and Samuel organized his removal.
The subsequent civil war-like situation between David-Saul's successor as king of Israel-and Saul, who continued to make claims to the kingship, was then resolved in David's favor (1 Sam. 18.7-31.6; 2 Sam. 2.8-5.5). It is also insightful in this connection that David genealogically belonged to the House of Judah, which Jacob had praised 53. Olson, 'Dictatorship'; North and Weingast, 'Constitutions and Commitment'. 54. North, Wallis and Weingast, Violence and Social Order, p. 18. almost as highly as the House of Joseph. The furthering of state formation and the development of institutional governance therefore seemed to be set on a constructive path again.

State Formation under David: Emerging Government Hierarchy
In the early days of David's reign, civil war with Saul destabilized Israel. Once again inevitably civil war-like anarchy erupted when David's son Absalom declared himself king (2 Sam. 15.10-18.16). This battle for the throne was ultimately resolved in David's favor, but initially David as the then highest judge had not neutrally enforced legal sanctions (as, for instance, set out by Deut. 22.28-29) when his family members had broken laws (i.e. the rape of Tamar by David's son Amnon, who was subsequently killed for this deed by Absalom). This hints that the improper, nepotistic enforcement of a state monopoly on violence, as held by David, led to challenges to this monopoly (through civil war).
After the Levites' deselection (1 Sam. 2.12-3.14), high priests, such as Samuel, basically performed the Levites' functions (as priestly leaders of Israel, as tax collectors of priestly offerings, and as administrators of religious law), in addition to political functions, such as the supervision of the king. However, regarding institutional governance a vacuum still existed, especially for the productive state. David then introduced 'productive state structures' (in the sense of Buchanan 55 ), referring to the provision of public goods-in exchange for taxes.
A bureaucracy of of cials is referred to in 2 Samuel (8. [15][16][17] tional complexity increased and we can observe decentralization tendencies, which constrained the 'capitalists' at the top. This is in opposition to suggestions of Gottwald or Boer, 57 and this hierarchical approach was different to the autocratic approach of Moses or the (possibly too) federalist one of Joshua.
Hierarchical bureaucratic development in itself resolved coordination problems and the remaining problem of potential anarchy, and it did so by reducing transaction costs. It also lowered transaction costs regarding the securing of property rights in private market exchanges: bureaucracy as such restrains the ruler from being able to renege on property rights promises to subjects. I will discuss this in more detail below since the Solomon stories are even more explicit in this respect. Interestingly, other governance functions, for instance the bureaucracy of religious governance, were only called upon in interactions between God and David, though David did not actually introduce such structures. God especially asked David to build a house for him and for the ark (2 Sam. 7.5-6). This in effect would have implied a more stringent bureaucratic control of spiritual, religious leadership functions (and tax collection through the priests, too). However, this project was not realized under David (see also 1 Kgs 3.2).
Regarding the initial establishment of jurisdictional functions and government hierarchy, we can also refer to Hodgson and the idea that a switch from custom to law is accompanied by the bureaucratic stratication of society and the development of judicial institutions and a juridical authority. 58 This can already be seen in the David stories, though it became more explicit in the Solomon stories. This insight also has meta-theoretical implications regarding a normative function of stories of the Hebrew Bible for political leaders.
Importantly, David's monarchy answered to the 'people' and the 'elders' (2 Sam. 19.9-11). This showed that constitutional democratic, legislative structures like the assembly had not been given up under David's reign and that changes to such structures were still sanctioned by the 'people'. My interpretation is here more positive than the suggestion of the emergence of forced labor under David and of the political reign of David in opposition to his people, as suggested by West. 59  On a less favorable note, the issue of establishing sustainable relationships with neighboring tribes and nations, both at an economic and military level, was never resolved under David. His approach to handling other nations still employed the belligerent approaches of Joshua and Saul (e.g. 2 Sam. 10.7-11.1).

State Formation under Solomon: The Full Monarchic Hierarchy and Economic Growth
Solomon advanced institutional reform internally, regarding the nal appeasement of the Israelite tribes and the widening bureaucratic governance of the Israelite society, and externally, regarding governance structures that now involved other nations, with international trade blossoming. Economic growth and rising wealth is visible not only for Israel but also for the nations with whom Israel traded. Can we explain these developments in institutional economic terms? Or, do we have to fall back exclusively on conventional interpretations (including critical Marxist ones 61 ) which attribute Solomon's success to his 'proverbial' wisdom (1 Kgs 4.34)?
As North and Weingast outlined for seventeenth-century England, 'for economic growth to occur [in a society] the sovereign or government must not merely establish a set of rights, but must make a credible commitment to them'. 62 Property rights in exchange must be guaranteed. Such a commitment to upholding property rights can be provided, according to North and Weingast, either by the leader consistently setting an 60. Buchanan, Freedom in Constitutional Contract, p. 287. 61. I question in this connection that 'All that Solomon does economically is done "in wisdom" ' (Jobling, 'Forced Labor', p. 66). At least, I would try to conceptualize this process economically, through institutional economics, and claim that such rationalization (which Jobling, 'Forced Labor', p. 66, may critically even call the 'commodi cation of wisdom', a term used by him, albeit in a different context) is enlightening and indeed 'ideal' (in Jobling's sense, 'Forced Labor', p. 66): yielding prosperity for all (mutual gains). This conceptual strategy generates in my view a more convincing argument regarding 'ideal', societal bene ts of the 'commodi cation of wisdom', which Jobling contests for Solomon's economic success (the success being only 'non-ideal', 'real' in Jobling's terms, re ecting forced labor and labor alienation, as in a Marxist critical reading).
62. North and Weingast, 'Constitutions and Commitment', p. 803. example of 'responsible behavior' or the ruler subjecting himself/herself to a set of rules that he/she cannot violate. North and Weingast question the suggestion that rulers throughout the long history of societal development have ever managed consistently to 'self-bind' themselves. 63 Is the Solomon story in this respect 'just' an exceptional and possibly naïve, uncritical example of a 'responsible leader' generating economic growth and wealth? Or, can we project North and Weingast's critical line of reasoning to the Solomon story, that institutional economic reform restricted the ruler and that this fostered economic growth, wealth, and freedom? I examine these questions, rst, by searching for a key feature of a modern economy-specialization and division of labor; 64 second, by identifying economic growth, rising wealth ('mutual gains') and political freedom in the Solomon story, which North and Weingast or Buchanan view as an outcome of successful, modern institutional and constitutional economic reform; 65 and third, by addressing the fundamental issue of whether property rights were indeed economically secured through institutional reform, rather than through having a wise ruler who consistently resisted-through 'responsible behavior'-reneging on property rights promises made to subjects.

a. Specialization and Division of Labor
Rising specialization and division of labor occurred: Solomon developed the bureaucratic strati cation of the Israelite society, which David had begun. Solomon was the high judge as well as the highest political, jurisdictional and religious leader of his kingdom (1 Kgs 3.28; 10.9). He further set up state structures relating to the priesthood, which had been lost in the wake of the deselection of the Levites. The building of the temple in Jerusalem is here the strongest evidence, this temple becoming the center not only of spiritual leadership but also of legal, institutional governance Furthermore, an intricate bureaucratic hierarchy emerged that involved widespread delegation of political functions regarding administration, recording, military, governance and supervision of newly formed districts, personal advisory to the king, palace management, and labor management (1 Kgs 4.1-6). Specialization and division of labor even extended in international perspective: foreign labor was imported because of the specialized skills it possessed (1 Kgs 9.11, 27). This rise in specialization and division of labor may already imply growing economic development and a rise in societal wealth. Next, I examine this issue explicitly.

b. Taxation, Growth, Wealth, and Political Freedom
Clearly the king accumulated substantial economic gains, or what has been abstractly referred to as the accumulation of 'privileges' on the side of a kingship. 67 This included a large court with many wives; and taxation supplied Solomon with a constant source of income for funding the protective and the productive state: the people provided 'tribute' to Solomon (1 Kgs 4.7, 21).
In order to explain in economic terms why the people accepted Solomon as ruler, they must have gained more than they lost through Solomon's policies. Savings in attack and defense costs regarding the resolution of anarchy (civil war; attack by external forces), as advocated by Buchanan, are one key consideration. Other reasons relate to rising prosperity that is generated through private market exchange in a society that is well protected from internal and external raiders. 68 Olson critically reviews this as 'banditry' at the top of a state: through taxation. However, such 'state banditry' bene ts the people, the ruler protecting the people from 'other' bandits, for instance, through an army. 69 North and Weingast develop in this connection the related argument that transaction costs are lowered for private market exchanges (by a ruler self-binding himself/ herself, as reviewed further below). The resulting increases in wealth (realized through more ef cient private market exchanges) together with cost savings on predation and attack, must more than compensate the taxation costs and other costs imposed by the ruler. Solomon's policies seemed to ensure that the Israelites bene ted more than they lost (1 Kgs 4.20). In general, their livelihood was secured and their 'happiness' was maintained: 'The king made silver as common in Jerusalem as stones' (1 Kgs 10.27). Or: 'The people of Judah and Israel were as numerous as the sand on the seashore; they ate, they drank and they were happy' (1 Kgs 4.21-22). As Buchanan or similarly Williamson stresses, 70 the generation of mutual gains (albeit not necessarily equal gains) is essential for institutional economic governance to materialize and to be sustained in an organization or society. Jobling concedes in this connection that Solomon's reign yielded prosperity on all sides. 71 Such sharing of wealth disproves, in textual perspective, the Marxian expectation of a capitalist process of 'primitive accumulation', which grounds the 'origin of capital in a process of bloody violence and expropriation'. 72 I am equally loath in this regard to attribute a 'pre-capitalist', 'tributary' societal system to the Solomon stories, in which a 'strong state and upper classes dominated the majority of people through taxes, rents and debts'. 73 In my view, the system was openly 'capitalist' yet democratic and pluralistic (see also below).
Contrary to the historically rationalized expectation of Auster and Silver for ancient kings, it was not the case at this point that 'authority [to rule] owed from the worship of the sacred re'. 74 It was economic welfare in society that legitimized the kingship instead of religion in a spiritual, supernatural sense. Religious artifacts, like Solomon's temple, were an expression of wealth.
Under Solomon, a rise in wealth went hand in hand with a rise in freedom. Pluralism was mastered as an interaction condition: Solomon was married to an Egyptian; he built temples for the foreign gods of his many foreign wives and Solomon even worshipped these foreign gods (1 Kgs 11.1-2, 4-7). Bureaucratic strati cation of religious leadership is implied: a 'pluralistic framework of late pre-exilic Judah' emerged, as Mayes commented in historic economic perspective, 75 and which many theologians and biblical scholars have branded as folly and sinful. 76 Personal belief systems, including religious belief, are in such a pluralistic society subordinated to the private level and the economic sphere dominates this kind of society. 77 What North and Weingast might call 'political freedom' 78 and what they identi ed as a key feature of successful institutional economic reform-in a modern society-emerged at this point in the stories.

c. Institutional Reform, Decentralization and the Securing of Property Rights
Was the rise in wealth and freedom/pluralism due to effective economic guarantees of property rights, or do we have to fall back exclusively on interpretations that favor Solomon's wise leadership, with him consistently exhibiting 'responsible behavior'? The economic guarantee of property rights can be identi ed in various ways.
On a rst point, Solomon's society reached a high degree of bureaucratic strati cation and hierarchical delegation. A state in the sense of a 'unitary, intentional actor, a sovereign, rule-making organization', as Anderson puts it in historic perspective for the early Greek state, 79 then existed in this story from the Hebrew Bible. Rather than ruling as a natural persona, Solomon ruled through a hierarchy of of cials, as a bureaucratic persona. 80 Authority over structural arrangements, which involved property rights allocations, was removed from the center, from the natural persona 'Solomon'. Such hierarchical delegation can be interpreted as an institutional economic mechanism of a leader economically constraining himself from con scating or changing property rights ad hoc. The economic rationale that is attributed in this way to bureaucratic, hierarchical organization (1) does not predominantly follow Weber but more the tradition of Williamson's economic rationalization of organizational hierarchy, and (2) is non-Marxist in nature, arguing for decentralization, delegation and shared wealth creation rather than centralization and class exploitation as a feature of the Solomon stories. 81 The hierarchical guarantee of property rights led to the fostering of capitalist, non-tributary modes of production (at the 'productive state' level) and I strongly contest Gottwald's hypothesis in this regard. 82 On a second point, Solomon broke down tribal features for organizing his society. He formed twelve districts which did not strictly follow the tribal allocation of land as it had been set out under Joshua. These districts possessed a degree of governmental independence and had property rights secured for themselves in terms of what they produced through agriculture, craftsmanship, and so on (1 Kgs 4.25). Also, the tax policy introduced by Solomon was fair in so far as each district was required to provide tributes to Solomon for one speci c calendar month. The transition to settlement was now complete and economic reasons for this process, which secured property rights, can be projected to the Hebrew Bible. 83 Contrary to Master's historic analysis of ancient Israel, 84 the kingdom was unquestionably established in territorial terms at this point of storytelling. Through breaking down tribal barriers and providing a fair tax policy from the outset, Solomon removed himself, again through institutional reform, from the temptation to change taxation rules ad hoc or to favor his tribe, for instance, through lower taxation or even tax exemptions. 85 On a third point, Solomon appeased international relations. He established 'peace on all sides' (1 Kgs 4.24 bene cial to all parties involved). Like Joseph, Solomon married an aristocratic Egyptian woman, which yielded a political alliance with Egypt. There were manifold contractual trade relationships with other nations; for instance, the king of Tyre contributed to the building of the temple in Jerusalem and he had men working as sailors on Solomon's trade ships (1 Kgs 9.11, 27); there were trade exchanges between Solomon and the Queen of Sheba (1 Kgs 10.2, 10, 13); the Hebrew Bible refers to 'Arabian kings' (1 Kgs 10.14), and also to 'Kue', the 'Hittites' and the 'Arameans' (1 Kgs 10.28-29), as well as more generally to 'traders and merchants' (1 Kgs 10. 15,29).
Property rights were considerably strengthened through international institutional reform. 86 Property rights were at least much more secure than in preceding stories when (internal and external) wars reigned. Such security in property rights lowers transaction costs for private market exchange, and subsequently contributes to economic growth and rising prosperity for a society (see above also). 87 In conclusion, and to underline the point that we are dealing with a free society, Solomon remained answerable to the 'people', as a legitimating source of the kingship and of a societal contract between king and people. The quasi-parliamentary mechanism of the assembly is explicitly mentioned in the Solomon stories, in 1 Kings (8. 1-5, 14, 22), and subsequent stories also con rm this (1 Kgs 12.6). Comparable to Anderson's assessment of the Greek assembly in antiquity, 88 the people remained the constraining foundation of political governance. Fundamentally, we are dealing with a constitutional monarchy that answered to the people. Some of Olson's, Barzel's or Grossman's comments on the bandit-like nature of a ruling thief running a society, who is not directly accountable to the people, 89 are overly pessimistic, even appearing misguided when projected to the stories discussed above.
The stories that immediately followed in the aftermath of Solomon's reign con rm legitimization through the people, too: his successor, Rehoboam, was swiftly deposed by the people for new, unreasonable tax demands and for changes to labor force practices (1 Kgs 12.14, 16). 90 Only then do we see the appearance of a 'tributary' productive systemagainst which the people revolted, with anarchy erupting and the formerly integrated Israelite state splitting up (1 Kgs 12.18). 91 This rebellion and the basic economic reasons for a break-down in cooperation compare to what happened between Egypt and Israel at the beginning of the Exodus stories. 92 This outcome compares to the Marxian concept of 'primitive accumulation' when a 'capitalist' engages in self-destructive, exploitative labor processes and expropriation. However, as critical as Marx may be in this connection, equal criticism would be forthcoming from Smith, or any modern constitutional and institutional economists: it is because of the giving up of mutually advantageous, institutional economic ('nontributary') policies, as they could be so fundamentally attributed, in the tradition of Buchanan, North, Weingast, or Williamson to the Solomon stories, that cooperation broke down when Rehoboam ruled.

Conclusion
Initially, particularly under Joshua and Saul, anarchy both internally and externally threatened the young Israelite society. The Hebrew Bible provides in this respect a warning against the vision of 'idealized libertarian anarchy' being a credible model of social institutional governance. The economic theory of state formation which emerged from the Joshua stories onwards underlines this skepticism of Buchanan. 93 As the stories progressed, anarchy and the 'Hobbesian jungle' were brought under control, societal contracting and institutional governance being built up. This implied the lowering of attack/defense costs regarding the securing of property rights when a society leaves behind the 'war of all'.
Conceptual roots of a theory of state formation relate under Joshua to the land distribution problem and how comparatively democratic state governance mechanisms (the assembly) were introduced. The approach was probably too federalist, since integrative mechanisms required for common tasks such as the defense of land or the maintaining of democracy had not been set up. Under Saul this problem was gradually resolved, the Israelites being merged into a uni ed army. The vision of an organizing community was thereby extended from a representative decisionmaking forum (the assembly) to a pool that offered resources ('human capital') for common tasks, such as defense.
That the condition of anarchy is always 'present' in society, as Buchanan stresses, 94 and that its resolution was only temporary is demonstrated by the events after Solomon's death, with existing cooperation generating policies being given up and Israel rapidly disintegrating. A meta-theoretical implication here is that the text is rather modern, therefore questioning, for instance, Gottwald, 95 regarding its application of economic methods for portraying problems of con ict and anarchy in society, especially between rulers and the 'people'.
Once threats of anarchy had been considerably reduced in the wake of the Joshua and Saul stories, other state governance issues, which relate to the speci c rights a ruler (the king) would hold in terms of jurisdictional or executive powers, were dealt with: under David and Solomon, bureaucratic structures were introduced that provided a governmental apparatus. Solomon developed this apparatus in great depth, but more importantly, Solomon succeeded for the rst time (after the Joseph story of Genesis) in maintaining mutually bene cial relationships with other nations. Therefore, the David stories and even more so the Solomon stories addressed the institutional problem of establishing a settled society from a different perspective. The focus of societal contracting shifted away from the protective state (and its focus on resolving anarchy and lowering attack/defense costs) to the productive state (and its focus on wealth 94. Anderson, 'Greek State', p. 4, understates this point by looking at modern states which show few signs of coercion or anarchy (because, so I would argue, they have established a functioning protective state). However, once the protective state is undermined in modern states, for whatever reason, a rise in anarchy and a consequent rise in coercive state measures or the renegotiation of constitutional contract can be expected. Jobling is more critical in this respect and much closer to Buchanan, although Jobling analyses from a critical Marxist perspective ( creation and lowering transaction costs for private market exchanges). Savings in transaction costs in private market exchanges could be seen most explicitly in the Solomon stories, with property rights being guaranteed by constraining rulers in different respects (e.g. through bureaucratic hierarchy, alliances, trade contracts, etc.), in both national and international perspective. Then, the economics of division of labor and of trade in private goods came into full bloom. In this regard, the Hebrew Bible anticipated, at least to some degree, Adam Smith's writings on how the division of labor and the institutionally secured liberalization of trade within a nation and among nations would bene t all parties involved and lead to 'wealth for all' (i.e. 'mutual gains', 'wealth of nations'). 96 A 'step theory' on state formation emerges in the Hebrew Bible, issues of anarchy primarily being dealt with in the Joshua and Saul stories (with a focus on the protective state), while the David and Solomon stories focused on division of labor, societal strati cation and emerging government hierarchy (the focus shifting to the productive state, albeit not exclusively). An economic reconstruction of the Hebrew Bible holds in this respect important clues regarding the questions raised by Seagle, Hodgson, or Allen as to how we can understand processes of state formation and how state formation theory can explain such processes. 97 As a by-product of the political and economic international opening up of the Israelite society under Solomon, pluralism arose. This was in sharp contrast to earlier periods. 98 Solomon actively supported this development. Ultimately, he is even described as having worshipped many different gods. Some interpreters have reviewed this very critically. In contrast to this, an institutional economic reconstruction attests to the existence at this point in the stories of a democratically governed, pluralistic and free society. This value-diverse society became feasible-even necessary-because of the institutional economic changes pioneered by Solomon. 96. The only comparable examples that we nd in this respect in the Hebrew Bible are the Joseph stories. A hero-thesis and a climax-thesis can be attributed to these two stories (Wagner-Tsukamoto, God an Economist, and 'Genesis of Cooperation'). Future research can deepen these insights through a comparative analysis of the Joseph stories and the Solomon stories.
97 Finally, it is important to remember that at all points during the reigns of Joshua, Saul, David and Solomon, leaders remained answerable to society, to the 'people' as the Hebrew Bible generally put it, or the 'elders' and other members of the assembly, as they were singled out. This implies a democratic model of a constitutional contract between the people and its leadership, ultimately the monarch (in the stories that involve Saul, David and Solomon). 99 In line with this governance issue and the remarks made on the mastering of anarchy, the emergence of governmental hierarchy, the negotiation of international trade treaties, and the development of a pluralistic free society, we can trace-grounded in a non-positivist, interpretative, 'textual' epistemology-the early beginnings of an economic theory of state formation in the Hebrew Bible. A meta-theoretical implication is the view expressed herein that, contrary to the skepticism of modern writers on the state and society, and on the emergence of a debate on state formation (including economically inspired ones 100 ), the Hebrew Bible reveals a critical and modern-institutionally economic groundedapproach to questions of how the state is ruled and whether this is tolerated by 'society', the people, as an economically legitimizing force.
The ease with which textual events of the claimed archaic, and supposedly pre-modern documents comprising the 'Hebrew Bible' can be reconstructed through contemporary, 'modern' institutional economics raises fundamental questions regarding the early history of institutional economic theory formation. We have to re-evaluate our understanding of 'modernity' (especially in relation to 'antiquity'), 'economic progress in modern times', and the claimed emergence of enlightenment concepts by Buchanan or North and Weingast, 101 in the economic tradition of Smith, only from the outgoing Middle Age onwards.
I fully agree with West that 'models [theory] matters' 102 when interpreting the Hebrew Bible. An institutional economic reconstruction of the Hebrew Bible here adds a new perspective. It supports Buchanan's call to revive political economic theory in its very classical, Smithsonian understanding. 103 On grounds of the analysis undertaken in this study, this can even be further extended in a fundamental, historic perspective by critically asking in which society and for which society the Hebrew Bible was written. The suggestion that we can understand the Hebrew Bible as an early, modern predecessor of Smithsonian political economics can here be supported on at least two fronts; rst, by outlining the strong roots of Buchanan's, North and Weingast's, or Williamson's research in the tradition of Smith; and second, by looking at Smith's work itself, extracting the many institutional and constitutional economic points which he made, and which match well with the reconstruction undertaken in this study.
This also counteracts Marxian claims, often directed at Smith, 104 that Smith's economics were only context-speci c and could not be generalized across time and across societies. The conceptual ease with which an institutional and constitutional economic reconstruction of the Hebrew Bible succeeds in incorporating Smithsonian ideas, for a time and society 'altogether different' from Smith's contemporary context, puts such claims into perspective. Further research needs to be done to develop fully such critical analysis. 105