Pulled East. The rise of China, Europe and French security policy in the Asia-Pacific

ABSTRACT This article delivers the first post-Cold War history of how France – the European power with the largest political-military footprint in the Asia-Pacific – has responded to the national security challenges posed by the rise of China. Based upon a unique body of primary sources (80 interviews conducted in Europe, the Asia-Pacific and the United States; declassified archival documents; and leaked diplomatic cables), it shows that China’s growing assertiveness after 2009 (and national policymakers’ perceptions thereof) has been the key driver of change in French security policy in the region, pulling France strategically into the Asia-Pacific. Specifically, growing threat perceptions of China’s rise – coupled with steadily rising regional economic interests – have led Paris to forge a cohesive policy framework, the Indo-Pacific strategy, and to bolster the political-military dimension of its regional presence. By investigating this key yet neglected dimension of French and European security policies, and by leveraging a unique body of primary written and oral sources, this study fills an important gap in the scholarly literature on both European and Asia-Pacific security dynamics. The findings of this article also shed new light on the political and military assets that France can bring to bear in the formulation of a common EU security policy toward the Asia-Pacific and on the implications thereof for the prospect of a transatlantic strategy vis-à-vis China.


Introduction
How the US and Europe wrestle with the re-emergence of China in world politics will be a, if not the, defining issue for transatlantic relations in the years to come.Yet, we know little about how European major powers have dealt with the security implications of China's rise.Among them, France retains a distinct status in the Asia-Pacific.In light of its colonial past and its resulting overseas territories in the Indian and Pacific Oceans regions, its permanent seat at the UN Security Council and its nuclear power status, France is the European power with the largest diplomatic As shown by a substantial body of studies, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has displayed an increasingly assertive regional behaviour after 2009. 4rom the early 1990s to the late 2000s, the PRC abided by Deng Xiaoping's socalled '24-character strategy' of hiding its capacities, maintaining a low profile and refraining from claiming leadership. 5Its regional posture rested on several pillars, namely a growing engagement with regional organizations (e.g.ASEAN+3 and ASEAN Regional Forum), the establishment of strategic partnerships across the region, and the expansion of regional economic ties coupled with a variety of confidence-building measures. 6Starting in 2009, however, and increasingly so in the 2010s, Beijing's behaviour in the Asia-Pacific became increasingly muscular and confrontational.The PRC moved away from the low-key regional posture of the previous decade and sought to expand its geopolitical and economic clout within its home region with the goal of establishing a Sino-centric regional hegemonic order. 7While the drivers of China's rising assertiveness remain a matter of contention, they likely resulted from a combination of domestic and international factors, including its growing military capabilities, a perceived American decline after the 2008 financial crisis and the emergence of a new leadership under Xi Jinping which pursued a more ambitious foreign policy. 8rench policymakers' threat perceptions of China -and of its impact on French regional interests -have played a central role in shaping France's security policy in the Asia-Pacific.Throughout 1990s and 2000s, France exhibited low threat perceptions of China and its regional policy overwhelmingly revolved around the pursuit of its economic interests.Paris sought to foster economic and diplomatic engagement with China and the broader Asia-Pacific region, largely relying on a loose patchwork of diplomatic and economic initiatives.After 2009, however, because of rising economic interests in the region and, crucially, heightened threat perceptions of the PRC, Paris has reassessed the national security implications of China's rise.French policymakers have displayed mounting concerns over how Chinese assertiveness could undermine regional stability, the resilience of the socalled 'rules-based order' as well as regional sea lines of communications.9 Consequently, Paris has forged a new regional policy framework for the larger Indo-Pacific region through which it has pursued several interrelated goals: protect its sovereign territories in the region, uphold foundational norms of the rules-based order (freedom of navigation and the peaceful resolution of disputes), and promote regional stability so as to reduce the potential for escalation and conflict -thereby also furthering its regional economic interests.To achieve these goals, Paris has bolstered its regional presence through several lines of effort.It has expanded naval deployments, broadened its network of bilateral security partnerships and strengthened its engagement in the region's multilateral security architecture -fostering multinational cooperation both with regional states and with other western (US and European) powers.Through this enhanced regional posture, France has not aimed to balance China, an unviable objective given its capability shortfalls, the tyranny of distance, and the desire to continue to bilaterally engage Beijing.10 Rather, it has pursued the 'milieu goal' of seeking to shape the regional environment in which China's rise has unfolded.11 By doing so, Paris has also sought to define a distinct and autonomous position for itself, and for the EU more broadly, in the context of the growing US-China rivalry in the region.
This dimension of French foreign and security policy and, more broadly, of Europe's security role in the Asia-Pacific, has for long been largely neglected in the International Relations (IR) and Security Studies literature.Although a growing body of literature has touched upon various aspects of European foreign and security policies toward China and in the Asia-Pacific, these works nonetheless display several major shortcomings.
For one, they focus almost exclusively on European Union (EU)-China or EU-Asia relations, thereby largely overlooking individual and comparative analyses of 9. A 'regional order' can be defined as rule-governed interactions among states in a given region in which 'shared norms, rules, and expectations constitute, regulate, and make predictable international life;' in the Asia-Pacific, these norms and rules include the respect of sovereignty, free trade, and international law (and in particular freedom of navigation and the peaceful resolution of disputes).On the concept of tyranny of distance, see Geoffrey Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance: How Distance Shaped Australia's History (Sydney: Macmillan, 2001). 11.
national security policies. 12The management of European foreign and security policies toward China, especially in policy areas linked to national security, largely remains the prerogative of nation-states rather than of the European Union.Accordingly, it is necessary to turn the dominant analytical lens of the literature upside down and to give analytical precedence to the comparative study of national foreign and security policies. 13Secondly, the few studies that have examined the security policies toward China or the Asia-Pacific of individual European states have mostly been limited to one discrete dimension, namely arms exports. 14Finally, and crucially, the existing literature has tended to stress how European foreign policies toward the PRC have been mostly driven by economic interests rather than by security concerns -what Nicola Casarini refers to as 'the prioritization of commercial relations' as 'the basis for the upgrading of political relations.' 15 Yet, as shown in this article, in the 2010s, because of China's rising assertiveness, France's threat perceptions of the PRC have intensified and produced a significant shift in its policy in the Asia-Pacific.
Likewise, the existing literature of French foreign and security policy has largely neglected the Asia-Pacific region.Despite the rise of China and the growing strategic and economic centrality of the Asia-Pacific in world politics, virtually all academic studies of French foreign and security policy since the end of the Cold War -including in the pages of this journal -have focused on France's role in the transatlantic relationship or on its policies in the Middle East and Northern Africa. 16Yet, today, France maintains the largest political-military foothold in the Asia-Pacific among European powers.Its current overseas territories -largely the by-product of its colonial history -include, in the Indian Ocean, the island of Mayotte, the Scattered Islands and the Southern and Antarctic Lands and, in the South Pacific, New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, and Clipperton. 17As a result, France retains 7,000 military personnel stationed in the region as well as the world's second largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (after that of the US), 93% of which is located in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. 18Despite such assets, France's foreign and security policy in the Asia-Pacific remains a blind spot in the scholarly literature.
In light of these shortcomings, this article contributes to the IR and Security Studies literature by delivering the first contemporary, post-Cold War history of how France -the European power with the largest political-military footprint in the Asia-Pacific -has responded to the national security challenges posed by China's rise.By investigating this strategically crucial yet neglected dimension of French and European security policies, this study fills an important gap in the literature on both European and Asia-Pacific security dynamics.To do so, it relies on a unique body of primary written and oral sources: eighty interviews conducted in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, London, New Delhi, Seoul and Washington DC 19 ; declassified archival documents 20 ; leaked diplomatic cables 21 ; new data on French naval deployments 22 ; and a wide-ranging overview of parliamentary hearings, testimonies and reports. 23Furthermore, against the background of the intensifying US-China competition, of growing doubts over the robustness of US commitments to Europe and, more broadly, of the shifting centre of strategic gravity of world politics from the Euro-Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific, the findings of this article shed new light on the political and military assets that France can bring to bear in the formulation of a common EU security policy toward the Asia-Pacific and on the implications thereof for the prospect of a transatlantic strategy vis-à-vis China.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows.The first two sections examine the key drivers of France's security policy in the Asia-Pacific, namely its economic interests in the region and its threat perceptions of China respectively.Whereas growing economic interests have provided the underlying impetus for France's growing attention to the PRC and the Asia-Pacific, its threat perceptions of China have been the main driver of change in Paris' regional policy.The subsequent two sections show how these drivers have, in turn, caused French policy goals and its regional military presence to change over time -pulling France strategically into the Asia-Pacific.In each section, having first provided a general overview of the first two post-Cold War decades, I then conduct an in-depth analysis of the 2010s.Through this thematic and temporal organization, the article provides a systematic analysis of the historical evolution and current state of French security policy in the Asia-Pacific and sheds light on how and why 2009 marked a critical juncture that sparked a major policy shift in the subsequent decade.The conclusion assesses the 19.
Between January 2013 and June 2021, eighty interviews were conducted in Berlin, Brussels, Paris, London, Seoul and Washington DC with current and former civilian and military officials in charge of political-military and Asia-Pacific affairs in the Executive office of the President, Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministries of Defence (MoD), in the interagency coordinating bodies in charge of political-military affairs as well as in embassies (in Delhi and Seoul).In Brussels, the interviewees include officials in charge of Asia-Pacific Affairs in the EU External Action Service (EEAS) and in NATO.The article leverages previously undisclosed declassified archival documents retrieved from the Centre of Diplomatic Archives in Nantes (CADN), 'Ambassade de France à Pékin, 1989-1992ʹ, 513PO/2004038.21.Dozens of relevant cables from the State Department and the US embassies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific were found in the Wikileaks/Cablegate archive (1990-2010).Through the minutes of meetings, these cables bring to light the debates (and the key considerations therein) between French and European diplomats and their American counterparts over their respective foreign and security policies toward China.Because of space constraints, the article references only part of this large body of documents.

22.
Data retrieved from the magazine of the French Navy (Cols Bleus).

23.
The article relies on a wide-ranging examination of the statements by French policymakers in front of parliamentary committees in the National Assembly and the Senate as well as on parliamentary reports.
implications of the article's findings -and the consequence of Brexit -for greater European and transatlantic security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific to confront China's rise.

Economic interests: Asia as the new global economic hub
French economic interests in the Asia-Pacific have steadily grown throughout the post-Cold War period, including trade, investment, strategic supplies, arms sales and the exploitation of its EEZ.As the region emerged as the world's new global centre of economic gravity, its importance for France expanded.These growing economic interests drove the desire to deepen France's diplomatic and economic engagement with the PRC and the region.Yet, it is only when its threat assessment of the national security implications of China's rise intensified after 2009 that France developed a cohesive regional strategy with a strengthened political-military dimension.
While France's trade and investment in the region increased in the 1990s and 2000s, in these decades Paris was driven more by the potential for economic expansion than by its actual trade and investment deals which remained relatively limited to few countries, most notably the PRC. 24with French exports thereto increasing by France's overall trade with the Asia-Pacific did rise between 1995 and 2009, but from a low basis (from $49 bn to $112bn), while its trade with China expanded from $8 bn to $52 bn in the same timeframe. 25Likewise, French foreign direct investments (FDIs) in the Asia-Pacific remained relatively modest, representing 6,5% for France 's global FDIs in 2000, 26 with China receiving merely 0,5% of French total FDIs. 27By the mid-2000s, France ranked second and third among EU member states in terms of exports and FDIs in China respectively -far behind Germany which exported roughly as much as the whole EU in China. 28As such, French bilateral economic relations with the PRC remained, according to then President Chirac (1995-2007), 'below the potential of the two economies.' 29 In the 2010s, the emergence of the Asia-Pacific as a core hub of the global economy substantially magnified its importance for French economic interests.As the region became ever more central to international value chains and global economic flows, France reoriented its external trade thereto.By the late 2010s, the region produced 45% of the world's GDP, generated 60% of global economic growth, included two thirds of the world's population and concentrated critical sea trade routes and one third of international trade. 30Between 2010 and 2019, its overall trade with the Asia-Pacific expanded from $134 bn to $168 bn, reaching 14% of France's total trade. 31At the end of the decade, thirty percent of its exports to the region revolved around the aeronautic sector, while the PRC gradually became France's 5th largest trading partner. 32Concomitantly, the stock of FDI assets held by France in Asia-Oceania expanded sevenfold between 2000 and 2016, while its investment flows increased at an average of €4 bn per year in the same timeframe. 33By the end of the decade, France ranked second among Europeans (after Germany) in terms of turnover generated in the region. 34s a result of the growth in France's external trade with the Asia-Pacific and of its large EEZ therein, the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) in the Pacific and Indian Oceans -with 40 to 50% of global trade passing in the South China Sea through the Malacca Strait 35 -became increasingly 'vital.' 36 France came to depend ever more on maritime supplies for its imports (hydrocarbons, ores, industrial components, finished products) as well as for its exports (cereals, agricultural products, manufactured goods).37 By the mid-2010s, the containerized routes from the South China Sea to France represented more than 67% of the total containerized traffic concerning France.38 In short, the South China Sea and, more broadly, the SLOCs in the Indian and Pacific Oceans gradually emerged as a 'strategic chokepoint' for world trade and for France.39 Finally, as in previous decades, France remained highly dependent on arms exports -which represented, depending on the year, between 25% and 40% of its output.40  MoD, French White Paper on Defence and National Security, 2013, 118.PULLED EAST industry.'41 High export dependence and rising arms imports from the Asia-Pacific fuelled French economic interest in expanding arms sales to the region.42 As a result, Asia-Oceania represented almost 30% of total French arms exports between 2008 and 2017.43 As a defence official succinctly puts it, 'it is there, in the Asia-Pacific, that the potentially fastest growing arms markets are.' 44

Heightened threat perceptions: China's assertiveness
Whereas French economic interests in the region have steadily grown since the end of the Cold War, its threat assessment of China only changed after 2009.In the first two decades of the Cold War, France displayed a low threat perception of the PRC, viewing it mainly as a distant and lucrative emerging market.It is in the 2010s that Paris' threat perceptions markedly evolved, and that France reconsidered the national security implications of China's rise.This, in turn, drove a major shift in French security policy toward the region.
From the end of the Cold War to the late 2000s, French policymakers saw China as a peaceful rising power that maintained a low-key regional posture. 45ccording to General Bentégeat, former Deputy Chief of the Personal Military Staff of Presidents François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac (1993-2006), Chief of the Personal Military Staff of President Chirac (1999-2002) and then Chief of the Defence Staff (2002-2006), President Chirac 'considered that China did not pose a real danger in the region, he was convinced that China had always been a peaceful major power; at a fundamental level, he considered that China had no expansionist ambitions.' 46aris did monitor closely the trajectory of China's military modernization. 47Yet, although French defence officials acknowledged qualitative and quantitative improvements in China's military capabilities, they saw the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as remaining, overall, twenty years behind top-end western military systems. 48In the conventional realm, despite its numerical size, the PLA was seen as under-equipped and with little actual combat experience. 49One area of potential concern was in the nuclear domain.When the PRC developed intercontinental 41.Senate, 2014, 169.42.
On regional arms imports, see SIPRI, 'Trends in international arms transfers, 2018ʹ, Fact Sheet, March 2019, 9.    ballistic missiles capable of reaching France's territory in the late 1990s, the French President decided, according to one of his close advisers, to revise France's nuclear posture by enlarging the concept of deterrence to include a crisis scenario with the PRC and to adapt the reach and precision of French M51 submarine-launched ballistic missiles accordingly. 50Overall, with the exception of the nuclear domain, the reemergence of China in world politics was thus believed to have little ramifications for French national security interests.
It is after 2009, which marked a critical juncture in France's threat assessment of the PRC, that French policymakers began to re-evaluate the national security implications of China's rise.They came to see Beijing's regional behaviour as increasingly assertive which, in turn, had major implications for French interests in the region.French foreign and defence policy officials have pointed to a variety of markers of China's rising assertiveness after 2009, including China's harassment of the USNS Impeccable ocean surveillance ship, its presentation to the UN of the map of the so-called 'nine-dash line,' the expansion of Beijing's land reclamation activities in the South China Sea, intensifying tensions between the PRC and its neighbours, as well as, more broadly, its naval modernisation program. 51Paris monitored China's naval modernisation with mounting apprehension as Beijing produced, in only four years, the equivalent of the entire French Navy's fleet in terms of number of vessels and submarines. 52n line with an international pattern of mounting disquiet vis-à-vis China's behaviour, senior French officials therefore grew concerned by Beijing's expanding capabilities and assertiveness.As a MoD report puts it, 'this basic trend marks a turning point in the development of Chinese power: now endowed with unprecedented capabilities, Beijing intends to weigh more directly on global issues and to assert its strategic aspirations.' 53Specifically, while the PRC was not deemed to pose a direct military threat to Franceunlike for other regional powers -the chief concerns of French policymakers revolved around China's challenge to the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific, its contestation of foundational norms of the rules-based order and the ensuing risk of escalation and regional instability which, in turn, impacted French diplomatic, economic and security interests in the region.

50.
Interview, Paris, March 2020.The only indirect public reference to this decision is to be found in a speech by former PM Lionel Jospin (1997-2002) in which he referred to the role of nuclear deterrence in countering threats 'whatever their origin, even distant' (Address to the Institute for Higher National Defence Studies, Paris, 22 October 1999).See also Bruno Tertrais, 'French Nuclear Deterrence Policy,  Forces, and Future', FRS Research & Documents, no. 1 (January 2019), 33.

51.
Interviews with officials in the MFA and MoD, January-December 2017 and January-March 2020.MoD, Strategic Update, January 2021, 21.

China's challenge to the regional balance of power
French civilian and military leaders became increasingly wary of how PLA's military modernisation program and its growing military (especially naval) capabilities were altering the regional balance of power in a context of rising US-China competition.For Nicolas Regaud, former Assistant Director for Defence Policy at the MoD's Directorate for Strategic Affairs (DAS, 2008-2014) and later Special Representative to the Indo-Pacific of the MoD's DGRIS (2015-2019), whereas in the 2000s the Chinese military was considered a 'paper tiger -the PRC was 20 years behind us -today, it certainly depends on what sector you examine, but we have seen a phenomenal and highly concerning progress.' 54he MoD assessed that 'there had been a game changer between 2005 and 2010ʹ in China's military modernisation. 55Accordingly, in 2010, a working group on 'Chinese power' was created within the MoD -with representatives also from the MFA, the Ministry of Economics and Finance and the external intelligence agency, the Directorate-General for External Security (DGSE) -to assess China's rising economic, technological and military capabilities.Among other things, the working group's classified report evaluated the PRC's defence and technological capabilities across a variety of areas including power projection, naval, space and cyber capabilities (the report was finalized in 2011 and then updated in 2014). 56n subsequent years, French policymakers displayed rising concern over the pace of China's military modernisation. 57As a former MoD official succinctly puts it, 'we had a wake-up call, things really started to accelerate.China's power suddenly became much more concretely visible.' 58 By 2017, the Strategic Review of Defence and National Security stressed that the Chinese defence budget was 'four times that of France' compared to similar levels in the mid-2000s, and that China's military modernisation had specifically focused on 'high-end technologies' with 'the objective of dominating the South China Sea.' 59 As a consequence of this military build-up, according to a 2019 MoD strategy report, China's expanding regional might and influence had 'substantially shift[ed] the balance of power in north-east and south-east Asia, as well as in the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific.' 60 Ibid.This point was confirmed in interviews with officials in the Office of the President, MFA and MoD, Paris, January-December 2017.

56.
Interviews with former MoD officials, Paris, October-December 2017 and January-March 2020.

China's contestation of the rules-based order
In addition to reshaping the regional balance of power, China's assertive regional behaviour was also seen as directly challenging key norms of the rules-based order, most notably the peaceful resolution of disputes, freedom of navigation and overflight, and sovereignty.
French policymakers considered that China's unilateral actions in the South China Sea -such as large-scale land reclamation, the militarization of contested archipelagos, the establishment of an air defence identification zone (ADIZ) or the rejection of the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal's ruling on the territorial dispute between the PRC and the Philippines -violated the peaceful resolution of disputes.In their view, through the use of force and fait accompli tactics, China was altering the status quo and raising regional tensions. 61hey also considered that any Chinese attempt at controlling or prohibiting the access of commercial or military assets in international waters or airspace 'threatened the security of navigation and overflight.' 62 As explained by Admiral Anne Cullerre, former Head of the Defence Staff's Bureau of International Military Relations with the Asia-Pacific (2011-2012) and then Joint Commander of French Armed Forces in French Polynesia and Commander of the French Naval Forces in the Pacific (2012-2014), although China's military build-up and its regional assertive behaviour was 'not perceived as a direct military threat to our country,' it was seen as 'a threat to freedom of navigation; ' 'we do not accept restrictions on naval traffic and in the air because that is a direct attack on the freedom of navigation, and that is a red line.' 63 Besides the peaceful resolution of disputes and freedom of navigation, China was also deemed to contest French sovereignty through so-called 'hybrid tactics' activities.The combination of regular and irregular forces used by the PRC to advance its interests -as well as Chinese illegal fishing practices -were seen by French policymakers as potentially challenging France's sovereignty over its EEZ. 64A former Asia hand at the MoD stresses that, since France has the second largest EEZ in the Asia-Pacific, 'every nibble of international law on the part of China impacts our own sovereignty in our exclusive economic zones.' 65 The concern, the official adds, 'is not that China will come and invade Polynesia, but rather its regular intrusions into France's EEZ; we must uphold our sovereignty, we must protect this huge EEZ.' 66 61.
In short, in light of China's contestation of norms such as the peaceful resolution of disputes, freedom of navigation and sovereignty, the Asia-Pacific in general and the South China Sea in particular were viewed as a 'testcase' for the future of the rules-based international order.' 67

Rising risks of escalation and regional crises
The combination of China's challenge to the regional balance of power and to key norms of the rules-based order was perceived as potentially fuelling the risk of unintended escalation and crises and, more broadly, as nurturing regional instability.The risk of incidents, escalation spirals and regional crises would, in turn, affect France's diplomatic, economic and security interests in the Asia-Pacific.
For one, a regional crisis would have major implications for French economic interests in the Asia-Pacific.As a testament to Paris' rising threat perception of China, in 2012 the MoD commissioned a study on France's dependence on sea lines of communications which assessed, among other things, the economic impact for France of a crisis in the South China Sea. 68It specifically focused on the establishment of an exclusion zone for maritime traffic by the PRC therein.The report concluded that the adverse impact of such a crisis would be 'very significant' in that it would provoke the paralysis of many industries (in particular automobile and information and communication technology) as well as the cessation in the supply of certain consumer goods, thereby causing inflationary pressures. 69Accordingly, as a MFA official succinctly puts it, 'China's military modernisation does not impact directly our vital interests, but it does impact indirectly our economic interests;' accordingly, France 'does not have an interest in the destabilization of the region because this would harm our own economic interests.' 70ut a regional crisis or conflict would also have larger ramifications for Paris' diplomatic and security interests in the Asia-Pacific.It would both hinder France's capacity to deploy naval forces and impact its security relations with regional partners, including military exercises, training and capacity building efforts. 71Furthermore, a regional crisis would likely mobilize France as a member of the UN Security Council. 72As explained by a former MoD official, 'you cannot decorrelate what happens in the East and South China Seas from the rest of the international relations that France conducts as a middle power and as a member of the UN 67.
72. MoD, 2013a, 35; MoD, 2017a, 26.Security Council.You have to consider such scenario in the larger context of France's international role, of the regional balance of power and of the maintenance of international law.' 73 Overall, whereas in the first two decades of the post-Cold War era French policymakers exhibited a low threat assessment of the PRC -which was mostly viewed through economic lenses -after 2009 they displayed rising threat perceptions vis-à-vis China's rise and its regional as well as global ramifications.As a MoD official in charge of strategic affairs puts it, before 2009 'there was no real threat; there were commercial exchanges with the Asia-Pacific, and this trade steadily grew.But there was no threat.' 74hereafter, 'the rise of China changed the strategic equilibria' in the region, 'so we are adapting to it.' 75

Emerging policy framework: The Indo-Pacific strategy
As a result of these rising economic interests and changing threat perceptions, France's policy goals in the Asia-Pacific shifted accordingly.In the first two post-Cold War decades, major economic interests and low threat perceptions drove the desire to diplomatically engage China (and other emerging regional powers) and to fervently pursue economic opportunities in the region.Yet, the policy remained fickle and fragmented -with no clearly defined overarching framework and with little emphasis on security considerations.It is only when Paris' threat assessment of China's rise intensified after 2009 -while its economic interests continued to expand -that France developed a cohesive foreign policy framework, the Indo-Pacific strategy, and bolstered the political-military dimension of its regional presence.
In the 1990s and 2000s, the core policy goals pursued by Paris in the region were two-fold.From a diplomatic standpoint, the declared intent was to promote the development of a multipolar world, with 'a better balance between small and large countries.' 76This belief became a core reference point for the Sino-French bilateral relationship. 77Accordingly, for France, it was crucial to deepen its diplomatic engagement with the PRC since, for then President Jacques Chirac (1995-2007), China was 'one of the essential poles of the multipolar world which [was] taking shape.' 78 Coupled with these generic diplomatic goals, French foreign policy found its 'main and perhaps only raison d'être,' as a diplomatic cable puts it, 'in the pursuit of our economic interests and our influence on a huge market with great potential.' 79President Chirac stressed how his 'goal [was] simple: to triple, in ten years, our market shares in Asia.' 80 Overall, France's policy in the Asia-Pacific was largely driven by mercantilist interests. 81et, besides this objective, Paris' initiatives in the Asia-Pacific lacked a clearly defined policy framework and received little prioritisation in France's overall foreign policy. 82In the words of General Bentégeat, 'unlike our policy vis-à-vis the Arab world, Africa or Europe, ' 'France did not have a constructed, coherent and constant policy toward the Asia-Pacific;' the region was 'never a front-burner issue but there nonetheless were economic interests; there were very strong economic interests.' 83A former official in the Secretariat-General for National Defence (SGDN), the coordinating body for politicomilitary affairs, similarly stresses that 'France had no strategy in the Asia-Pacific.We managed the crumbs of the Empire.' 84 It is only when Paris' threat assessment of China's rise intensified after 2009 -while its economic interests continued to expand -that France gradually recalibrated its foreign policy goals in the Asia-Pacific.As it bolstered the political-military dimension of its regional engagement, Paris gradually formulated a more cohesive policy framework, the Indo-Pacific strategy.
Having finalized the first 2010 MoD working group on Chinese powerwhich, as discussed above, assessed China's growing economic, technological and military power -the MoD organized another working group, between December 2012 and April 2013, tasked with developing an action plan for France in the Asia-Pacific.Its report assessed the Asia-Pacific's strategic environment and French interests therein, discussed the extant presence of French armed forces in the region, and outlined policy recommendations. 85Building upon this report, the MoD then published a non-classified document, the 2014 France and Security in the Asia-Pacific (which was then regularly updated). 86In parallel, the 2013 White Paper on Defence and National Security significantly expanded, in comparison to previous white papers, the emphasis on the Asia-Pacific -now considered as 'a region where the risks of tension and conflict are among the highest in the world.' 87 Subsequent policy papers and strategy reports further clarified the contours of France's security policy in the region. 88n 2018, the geographical scope of the overall policy was reframed and refocused on the larger 'Indo-Pacific' so as to combine the two main areas of French involvement in the region, the Indian and the Pacific Oceans.89 France thereby followed a larger trend among several Asian and European countries, and the US-of expanding the focus of their policy around the Indo-Pacific.90 In the framework of this strategy, Paris' core policy goals revolved around protecting its sovereign territories in the region (and the populations therein), upholding key norms of the rules-based order (freedom of navigation and the peaceful resolution of disputes), as well as promoting regional stability to reduce the risk of escalation to a regional crisis or conflict -thereby also sustaining its economic interests in the region, e.g.trade, investment, strategic supplies and its EEZ.91 Overall, Paris aimed to establish its role as a 'mediating power' in the region -disentangled from mounting US-China competition -and to promote 'the emergence of a stable, multipolar regional equilibrium' so as to prevent the advent of regional hegemonic powers.92 In the words of a MoD official, Paris hoped to contribute 'to channelling the rise of China so as to avoid having a region that would completely fall under Chinese influence' as well as 'to the management of the frictions induced by the US-China competition -by this moving tectonic plate -and to minimize the ensuing shakes.' 93 As detailed below, France thereby also sought to forge a distinct and autonomous role for itself, and for the European Union, in the midst of the rising Sino-American strategic competition.

Bolstering France's political-military footprint in the Asia-Pacific
As France sharpened its regional policy goals, the instruments leveraged to implement such goals also evolved.In the first two post-Cold War decades, 87.
MoD, 2013b.because of the absence of a clearly defined overarching policy framework, Paris' engagement with the Asia-Pacific remained a 'patchwork' of limited and largely uncoordinated diplomatic and economic endeavours, with little emphasis on security initiatives. 94By contrast, as France gradually formulated its Indo-Pacific strategy in the 2010s, its regional engagement transitioned from such loose patchwork into a more cohesive policy framework, with a strengthened political-military presence in the region.
Especially after the 1995/1996 cessation of its nuclear tests in the South Pacific -which marked a turning point in France's relations with the region 95 -Paris' engagement in the Asia-Pacific throughout the 1990s and 2000s was largely limited to developing bilateral diplomatic and economic ties with the major regional powers, most notably China (together with Japan and India).In this timeframe, also referred to as the 'honeymoon' of French-China relations, 96 Paris aimed to position itself as the key political partner of Beijing within the EU and to vigorously expand bilateral economic opportunities, including arms sales. 97In the first half of the 2000s, France was the EU country to most vehemently advocate for the lifting of the EU embargo on arms sales to China.Lifting this arms embargo would remove what was considered a discriminatory and politically harmful obstacle to the deepening of Sino-French bilateral diplomatic and economic ties. 98Furthermore, in the view of the French government, if the embargo was lifted, the existing export controls systems would prevent an increase in defence exports to China and would therefore have no impact on China's military modernization nor on regional stability in East Asia 99 ; it would be merely a 'symbolic gesture.' 100

94.
The concept of 'patchwork' as applied to France's policy in the region was first used by Stares and Regaud, 'Europe's Role in Asia-Pacific Security'.

95.
The end of French nuclear tests removed a major issue of contention in France's relations with South Pacific countries (e.g.Australia and New Zealand) and, more broadly, across the Asia-Pacificthereby enabling greater diplomatic and economic cooperation in the subsequent decade.By the second half of the 2000s, however, the push to lift the embargo lost considerable momentum as a result of intense US pressure on EU member states, of London and Berlin's policy shift (who now opposed lifting the arms ban) and of China's adoption of the Anti-Secession Law (ASL) in March 2005. 101Thereafter, France maintained talking points indicating its official support for lifting the EU embargo on China while de facto abandoning the endeavour, taking no concrete initiative to achieve this goal. 102n parallel, France sought to bolster its political and economic ties also with other regional powers such as Japan and India while increasing its participation -with only partial success -in the emerging Asian multilateral structures.France developed a 'strategic partnership ' with Tokyo (1995)  103 and with New Delhi (1998) with which it later considerably deepened its defence, space and civil nuclear cooperation.104 Complementing these bilateral endeavours, France sought to nurture its political relations with China and other emerging regional powers by encouraging to the development of Asian multilateralism.After its unsuccessful attempt to apply -independently from the EU -to the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) in 1995, 105 Paris contributed to launching the Asia -Europe Meeting (ASEM), thereby opting to engage ASEAN multilateralism through the EU.106 The initiative jointly developed by France and Singapore gave birth, in 1996, to ASEM as a format for intergovernmental political, economic and cultural dialogue between Asians and Europeans.107 From Paris' perspective, contributing to the launch of the ASEM multilateral framework complemented the deepening of France's bilateral political and economic relations with China and other emerging powers.108 It is only in the 2010s, however, as France gradually developed a more cohesive policy framework -the Indo-Pacific strategy -that it concurrently strengthened the political-military dimension of its regional presence.It did so through several lines of effort: expanding its naval deployments in the region, broadening the range of bilateral security partnerships and bolstering France's participation in the regional multilateral architecture through enhanced multinational security cooperation with both regional and western (US and European) powers.In the words of a MoD official in charge of strategic affairs, China was 'the key driver of change of the strategic environment' and that required 'a more muscular French presence in the region.'109

Naval deployments and broadening the network of bilateral security arrangements
While Paris did not increase the volume of its permanently forward deployed forces in the region 110 -largely because of resource constraints and competing regional priorities -it intensified its naval deployments in the 2010s.
Even though France retained the largest European military presence in the region, it faced delicate trade-offs in the allocation of scarce resources to different regions and theatres (e.g.Afghanistan, Libya, Mali or reinforcing NATO deterrence after the Ukrainian crisis).In fact, the Asia-Pacific remained subordinated to other regions within the hierarchy of its defence planning priorities, most notably Europe, the Middle East, and Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa. 111The Defence Staff assessed that French armed forces had an operational range for high-end military interventions of roughly 5,000 km, thus reaching the north-western quadrant of the Indian Ocean. 112It was therefore within this radius that France had the capability to maintain robust defence commitments in the framework of a military coalition.By contrast, in the Asia-Pacific, France's 'defence commitments are not at the high-end of the spectrum; rather, we contribute to security through greater regional presence'. 113Accordingly, the expanding emphasis on the Asia-Pacific and the greater policy cohesiveness in French security policy did not substantially alter the overall regional prioritisation in French defence planning. 114et, within the limits of available resources and of this regional prioritisation, France intensified its naval deployments in the 2010s.Based  upon available data, Figure 1 shows the French Navy's capital ships that were deployed in the Indian and Pacific Oceans between 2012 and 2019, with an average of 3.9 deployments per year (of which on average 2 deployments were conducted with US and/or other European navies per year, as discussed below).The type and name of these capital ships -and the missions for which they were deployed -are listed in Table 1.The data were retrieved from the magazine of the French Navy, Cols Bleus (for details on the data and on France's position on freedom of navigation operations, see the Online Appendix).

Bilateral security partnerships
A second line of effort aimed at bolstering France's regional engagement has been the deepening and broadening of its network of security partnerships in the face of China's increasingly assertive behaviour.Not only did Paris strengthen its existing defence ties with Tokyo and Delhi, but it also diversified its diplomatic and security partnerships with other medium and lesser powers through strategic dialogues, military operational cooperation and arms transfers.
The political-military dimension of the Franco-Japanese relationshiprelabeled as an 'exceptional partnership' in 2013 (with annual 2 + 2 ministerial consultations since 2014) -was expanded through a variety of initiatives, including on information sharing, military technology transfers, cyber and maritime security and military exercises, among others. 115Similarly, France and India bolstered their defence and security cooperation in areas such as logistics support, maritime security, the exchange of classified information, space cooperation, military exercises and through large arms sales, including 36 Rafale fighter jets. 116As one official puts it, 'China is an implicit factor in France's capacity building with India.' 117 Besides strengthening its existing ties with these major regional powers, Paris also broadened its network of defence ties by cultivating enhanced cooperation with Australia as well as with south-east Asian countries. 118Building upon their 2009 defence cooperation and status of forces (SOF) agreement, 119 Paris and Canberra developed a 'strategic partnership' in 2012 -then elevated to an 'enhanced' strategic partnership (in 2017) -with the goal of promoting 'a stable Indo-Pacific region.' 120 In 2016, the Australian Government selected Naval Group (then called DCNS) for the so-called SEA1000 Future Submarine Program, i.e. the design of 12 Shortfin Block 1A diesel-electric submarines (SSK) for the Royal Australian Navy. 121The resulting agreement was the largest defence contract ever awarded by Canberra and the largest defence contract ever granted to a European defence company ($34.5 bn). 122The first submarine is supposed to commence service in the early 2030s, the construction of the last submarine is scheduled for the 2050s, and sustainment will continue until the 2080s. 123France and Australia thereby considerably tightened their long-term politicalmilitary relationship.
In south-east Asia, Paris elevated the bilateral relationship with Singapore to a strategic partnership in 2012, fostering cooperation in areas such as cybersecurity, joint military exercises, military-to-military exchanges and training of fighter pilots, among others. 124It also engaged in significant arms sales to the city-island (e.g.H225M helicopters, A330 MRTT air-to-air refueling aircraft and Aster SAMP/T missiles), becoming Singapore's second largest arms supplier after the US. 125Singapore also became one of France's largest partners in the field of defence research and development in areas such as radars and submarines detection. 126alaysia is France's second main security partner in south-east Asia. 127Although the two countries have not established a formal 'strategic partnership,' they have built upon previous arms sales -most notably Kuala Lumpur's acquisition of two Scorpène-class diesel-electric submarines in the 2000s -to further develop their political-military ties. 128The two countries significantly deepened their armaments cooperation to the point that, in the 2009- 2018 period, France became Malaysia's first arms supplier, transferring systems such as Gowind corvettes, A400M military transport aircraft and EC725 helicopters. 129esides Singapore and Malaysia, the two key hubs of its diplomatic and military presence in south-east Asia, France also sought to foster the development of ties with Vietnam and Indonesia.Yet, while Paris and Hanoi established a 'strategic partnership' in 2013 and signed a bilateral framework to facilitate intelligence cooperation, 130 their defence cooperation remained constrained by Hanoi's heavy reliance on Russia for its arms imports. 131With Jakarta, Paris established a 'strategic partnership,' in 2011, which focused on capacity building, training and exchange of defence officials. 132

The 'China factor' in France's security partnerships
Overall, France thus significantly strengthened and diversified its network of diplomatic and security partnerships in the Asia-Pacific.A central driver of this effort was the heightened threat perceptions, among French policymakers, of China's rising assertiveness coupled with the resulting demand pull from regional states which requested greater French engagement and capacity building efforts. 133s explained by a MoD official working on Asia-Pacific security, although Paris does 'not build a bilateral partnership exclusively in reaction to the behaviour of one country,' China's regional behaviour 'does shape our bilateral partnerships through the willingness of our regional partners to develop, for instance, their naval capabilities.'134 Christian Lechervy, former Personal Advisor for Strategic Affairs and the Asia-Pacific to President François Hollande (2012-2014), further expounds the 'China factor' in France's network of security partnerships -and specifically in its arms transfers -as follows: 'Obviously the China factor is always sitting somewhere.When Taiwan buys Mirage fighter jets from France, it is not to confront US armed forces; when  133. French threat perceptions and the demand pull from regional partners were two sides of the same coin.China's rising assertiveness caused French threat perceptions to intensify which, in turn, led Paris to bolster and diversify its network of security partnerships in the region.Concomitantly, China's muscular regional posture also caused the threat perceptions of French regional partners to intensify which, in turn, drove a 'demand pull', i.e. a growing demand by these partners for more French security cooperation and capability building efforts. 134.Interview, Paris, 21 March 2017.Malaysia buys submarines, it is not to protect fishermen in the South China Sea; and when we export submarines to Australia, we know very well that it is not to ensure Canberra against an attack from New Zealand.So, from the moment France supplies equipment of strategic superiority-e.g.combat aircraft, submarines, satellites, cruise missiles etc.-China becomes an implicit factor.' 135 A MoD official confirms that, 'whereas this enhanced political-military engagement in the Indo-Pacific is not "anti-Chinese" -it is not geared against China -clearly the actor who is changing the regional strategic environment, who is altering the balance of power, and who is pushing regional states to increase their defence spending is China.So our policy response is not "anti-Chinese", also because we would not have the resources to achieve such goal.But on the other hand, we are compelled to adapt to this changing regional security environment.' 136n short, France's threat perceptions of Chinese assertiveness -coupled with the ensuing demand pull from regional states -played an important (though not always explicit) role in driving the strengthening and diversification of French security partnerships in the region and its capacity building efforts.Concomitantly, while it had vehemently advocated for the lifting of the EU embargo on arms sales to China in the 2000s, Paris abandoned such endeavour in the 2010s, further confirming the central role of rising threat perceptions of the PRC in shaping French security policy in the region. 137

Consolidating the regional security architecture: Multilateral regimes and western security cooperation
Paris complemented these bilateral undertakings by expanding its engagement in the regional security architecture both through greater involvement in mini-and multilateral regional initiatives as well as through enhanced (though modest) cooperation with other western powers in the Asia-Pacific.The main purpose of these endeavours was, as part of the emerging Indo-Pacific strategy, to foster greater regional defence cooperation so as to uphold the key norms of the rules-based order and to preserve regional stability in the face of Chinese assertiveness.limited success). 138In the subsequent decade, Paris continued and expanded its activities in a wide variety of regional political-security regimes, technicalfunctional institutions and ad hoc fora.It did so by, among other things, annually attending Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD, since 2008), in Singapore, and the Raisina Dialogue (since 2016), in New Delhi, as well as the South Pacific Defence Ministers Meeting focused on security threats in the South Pacific.French defence officials have also regularly participated in fora such as the Asia-Pacific Chiefs of Defence Conference, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium as well as other functional organizations and minilateral groupings in the South Pacific (detailed in the Online Appendix).

Multilateral security regimes and multinational military exercises
Combined with this engagement in the region's multilateral security architecture, Paris significantly expanded its participation in multinational military exercises in the region, including on the Korean peninsula (Ulchi Freedom Guardian and Key Resolve), in the Pacific Ocean (e.g.RIMPAC, Multinational Planning Augmentation Team, Southern Katipo, etc.) and in the Indian Ocean (Papangue, Diana, Cutlass Express). 139France itself organizes several multinational exercises, most notably the Croix du Sud in the South Pacific which gathers 2,000 soldiers (including from the US and UK). 140

Western security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
In order to contribute to regional stability and to uphold key norms of the regional order, Paris also sought to deepen its security cooperation with other western powers in the Asia-Pacific, i.e. the US and European countries.(2013-2014), Mark Lippert, the Pentagon worked 'with the French bilaterally on Asia-Pacific issues,' hoping to 'increase their salience in our overall bilateral relationship with the French' while encouraging US allies and partners, such as India, Japan and Australia, 'to bring the French in more effectively.' 141 The two countries established a bilateral dialogue in 2016, the Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue (relabelled as Indo-Pacific Security Dialogue in 2018) 138.In 2007, France became the first EU country to accede to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia. 139.Regaud, 'France and Security in the Asia-Pacific', 7. 140.MoD, 'FANC: bilan de l'exercice Croix du Sud', 25 May 2018a. 141.Lippert then became US ambassador to South Korea (2014-2017).Interview, Seoul, 20 October 2016.between officials of the French MoD's DGRIS and the US Office of the Secretary of Defence (OSD).Its goal is to exchange assessments on regional security dynamics, e.g.China's behaviour in South China Sea and in the Indian Ocean and its challenge to freedom of navigation, among other issues. 142aris and Washington also expanded their operational military cooperation bilaterally as well as minilaterally with other regional powers, most notably India, Japan and Australia.From 2015 onward, France and the US have conducted deployments through the so-called Task Force (TF) 473, formed around the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, through the mission Bois Belleau 100 in the Indian Ocean as well as through the Jeanne d'Arc mission, which every year ensures the operational training of the officerscadets of the French Navy (cf. Figure 1; for more details on these deployments, see the Online Appendix).
At the minilateral level, France conducted the first trilateral amphibious exercise with the US and Japan in 2017, 143 and pursued greater trilateral cooperation with Australia and India in a variety of areas including maritime security. 144New quadrilateral military exercises have begun to emerge such as the French-led joint military exercise with the UK, the US and Japan practicing amphibious landings (in 2017) 145 and the quadrilateral naval exercise between France, Japan, Australia and the United States in the Indian Ocean in 2019. 146inally, the two countries also strengthened their intelligence cooperation.In addition to establishing a framework for enhanced intelligence cooperation between French Command of the Pacific Ocean maritime zone (ALPACI) and PACOM (relabeled INDOPACOM in 2018), 147 France deployed, from 2018 onward, a liaison officer to the US INDOPACOM.According to Admiral Cullerre who first discussed the proposal with the then-Commander of PACOM, Admiral Samuel J. Locklear (2012-2015), establishing a liaison officer would have two main purposes.First, a French presence 'in the heart of the US Defence Staff which deals with China' would facilitate intelligence sharing. 148Second, it would give greater influence and visibility to France's activities in the Asia-Pacific 'in the eyes of the Americans.' 149 Intra-European endeavours.The expanded cooperation with the US has gone hand in hand with Paris's attempts at fostering greater intra-European security dialogue, coordination and operational cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.
At the 2016 Shangri-La Dialogue, then Defence Minister (2012-2017) Jean-Yves Le Drian first called for European navies to 'coordinate in order to ensure as regular and as visible a presence as possible in the maritime areas of Asia.' 150 The proposal was reiterated by his successors in subsequent SLDs. 151eginning in the mid-2010s, the French and the British thus started conducting naval deployments in the region, with British Navy personnel and helicopters included on board during the Mission Jeanne d'Arc as well as with the Combined Task Force 150 in the Indian Ocean and with deployments in the South China Sea (see Figure 1, Table 1, and the Online Appendix).For France, one advantage of conducting naval deployments in the South China Sea in combination with other European states has been to 'defuse the tensions' with the PRC and the risk of retaliation from Beijing which often result from such deployments. 152esides the UK, Paris has also explored, bilaterally, the possibility of enlisting other European countries to conduct deployments in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, e.g.Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal or Spain, but only with marginal success. 153Germany, for its part, decided to deploy a Bayern frigate in the Asia-Pacific in 2021. 154Overall, however, developing EU deployments in the South China Sea has so far remained an elusive goal.Many countries remain reluctant to build a stronger EU naval presence (e.g. through regular deployments) in the region because of lack of interests in the Asia-Pacific, of naval capabilities and/or by fear of alienating China, with whom they maintain close economic ties. 155t the diplomatic level, discussions on how to foster greater European cooperation in the Asia-Pacific have taken place through formal EU channels, such as the Asia-Oceania Working Party (COASI) or the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), but also informal minilateral groupings such as the so-called E3 or the Quint. 156For instance, through the E3 grouping, France, Germany and the UK produced a joint statement as well as a 'note verbale' for the UN stressing the need to uphold regional stability and enforce international law in the South China Sea. 157hrough the Quint, France, the UK, Italy, Germany, and the United States (together with representatives of the European External Action Service, EEAS) have held exchanges on Chinese assertiveness and rising regional tensions, and on how to seek political support for greater cooperation or coordination in the Asia-Pacific. 158The exit of the United Kingdom from the EU (Brexit) gave new impetus to the so-called moteur francoallemand ('Franco-German engine').Paris and Berlin expanded their diplomatic cooperation (albeit with little underlying operational security cooperation) with the purpose of developing a common bilateral approach to the 'Indo-Pacific' which, over time, would lay the foundations for a European common policy in the region. 159The two countries thereby spurred-together with other member states-the development of the EU strategy for the Indo-Pacific published in 2021. 160hrough a more coordinated EU policy toward China and the Asia-Pacific, Paris hoped to reduce its exposure to potential Chinese or US pressures, and to bolster the collective leverage of the Union vis-à-vis China in the context of the unfolding Sino-American strategic competition. 161France thereby also sought to develop a distinct and autonomous role for itself and for the European Union in a world increasingly 'structured around two great poles: the United States and China.' 162 President Emmanuel Macron had indeed come to perceive the global competition between the US and the PRC as 'an established strategic fact, one that structures, and from now on will structure, all international relations.' 163In this context, Paris decided that it would neither seek to contain China nor to accommodate Beijing from a position of equidistance. 164As explained by a MFA official, 'France and the EU have developed a threefold approach to China, which is a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival; this is not the case at all with US, which is not a systemic rival.So our goal is not equidistance between the US and China, but neither is it systematic alignment with the United States; we do not always have converging interests across the board with Washington.' 165 A MoD official confirms that Paris viewed 'the Sino-American strategic rivalry as a structural feature of international politics in the years to come.It will, in some sense, define the geostrategic compass for countries like France.This said, we are clearly not looking for a middle position or a "third way" between the United States and China.The US is an ally.Diplomatically we can have different positions with Washington, but the structure of the underlying military alliance is rock solid.China is a diplomatic and economic partner.So our policy is not and cannot be equidistance but neither is it systematic alignment with the US.' 166 In fact, for President Macron, France had 'only one credible European response: that of our strategic autonomy.' 167

Conclusion
France has been pulled into the Asia-Pacific by steadily growing economic interests in the region and, crucially, by rising threat perceptions of China.As a result, Paris has come to develop an overarching policy framework, the Indo-Pacific strategy, which has translated into a strengthened political-military engagement in the region.Thereby, France aims to contribute to regional stability by expanding its presence and capacity building efforts and to uphold the rules-based order in the face of Chinese assertiveness.Today, France is the European country that has developed the most robust and cohesive strategic approach to the Asia-Pacific.Through this enhanced regional posture, France's overarching intent has not been to balance China, an unviable goal given its capability shortfalls, the tyranny of distance, and its continued engagement with the PRC.Rather, it has pursued a 'milieu goal' of seeking to shape the regional environment in which China's rise has unfolded.And by fostering greater intra-European cooperation on China and the Asia-Pacific, France has sought to carve out a distinct role for itself, and for the EU, in the context of the growing US-China rivalry in the region.In short, as a result of Beijing's growing assertiveness, France -like the other major European powers -has awakened to the security challenges posed by China's rise. 168et, despite this renewed activism, significant constraints continue to hinder the development of a common EU foreign and security policy in the Asia-Pacific and the prospects of a transatlantic strategy toward China.For one, even the European country with the largest military footprint in the Asia-Pacific faces severe resource constraints.This, coupled with competing regional priorities and defence requirements in other regional theatres, has substantially limited France's capacity to project power in the region.As a result, although France increased the number of its naval deployments, bolstered its political-military ties in the region, and broadened its engagement with multilateral regional security regimes, it did not substantially alter the overall regional prioritisation in French defence planning.And not only are these capability constraints even more severe for Europe's medium and lesser power, but Brexit further constrained the level of military capabilities that could be leveraged by the European Union in the Asia-Pacific by removing from the Union the second largest European military power.
Furthermore, even though several European countries have displayed rising security concerns about the PRC -and despite the EU's proclaimed ambition to 'project a strong, clear and unified voice in its approach to China' 169 -the European Union does not speak uniformly on security matters in the Asia-Pacific.Because of their strong economic ties with the PRC and by fear of retaliation, many countries in eastern and southern Europe remain reluctant to forge policies that could antagonize Beijing -as evidenced also in areas like 5G technology and the Belt and Road Initiative. 170n the other side of the Atlantic, despite its growing focus on strategic competition with China, Washington has long shown only desultory interest in forging a transatlantic strategy in the Asia-Pacific.Except for rare references in public statements and few isolated initiatives, Washington's efforts at bolstering security cooperation with Europeans in the Asia-Pacific remain sparse. 171Ultimately, as stressed by Kurt Campbell, the former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the Obama administration and later coordinator for Indo-Pacific affairs on the National Security Council (NSC) in the Biden administration, for years the US has 'done a poor job of really engaging strategically Europe on Asia-Pacific security issues.' 172 The combination of intra-European misalignments and capability shortfalls, and of US neglect of the old continent's potential role in the Asia-Pacific has prevented the formulation of a common transatlantic strategy toward the PRC.And while NATO has expressed growing concerns vis-à-vis China, 173 it is unlikely to provide a suitable venue for such purpose.As a NATO official put it, the Alliance 'is not intended to have a role in the Asia-Pacific; its role remains in the Euro-Atlantic area and there is no consensus today to extend that mandate beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.' 174 In the decades ahead, a central question for the states of Europe will be how to position themselves with regard to the intensifying great power competition between the United States and China.How they manage to bolster their support to their American and Asian allies and partners in confronting China's growing assertiveness, to maintain areas of diplomatic and economic engagement with the PRC, while preserving an autonomous position between Washington and Beijing will be crucial for defining their role in world politics.Only the future will tell if Europeans can come together and develop a credible role on the world stage that can tame the destabilizing consequences of mounting US-China rivalry and help prevent the ensuing possibility of great power war.
senior diplomats and with former MoD officials in office in the 1990s -2000s, Paris, January-December 2017 and March 2020.
52.Chief of the Staff of the Navy, Admiral Christophe Prazuck, Testimony before the National Assembly's Committee on National Defence and ArmedForces, 26 July 2017, 2-3.53.
, 6 July 2013.DGRIS stands for Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy.55.
, among others, MoD, 2013b, 2017a; MFA, 2018a; MFA, The French Strategy in the Indo-Pacific, 2019a; MoD, 2014a; MoD, France and Security in the Asia-Pacific, 2016; MoD, 2018c; MoD, 2019a.See also the speeches by French Defence Ministers at the Shangri-La Dialogue listed in the bibliography.

France ' s
engagement with multilateral regimes in the Asia-Pacific had begun, as previously shown, in the mid-1990s and had continued in the 2000s (with 135.Interview, Paris, 23 March 2017. 136.Interview, 10 May 2021. 137.Interviews with MFA and MoD officials, January-December 2017 and January-March 2020.Additional considerations that persuaded Paris to abandon the goal of lifting the embargo include the risk of transatlantic frictions that such move would entail and intra-European fragmentation on this issue.Meijer, 'Transatlantic Perspectives on China's Military Modernization', 39-46.

Franco-
American engagement.Paris and Washington have explored ways to expand their military and intelligence cooperation in the region.As explained by the former US Assistant Secretary of Defence for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs (2012-2013), and then Chief of Staff of the Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel 164.President Emmanuel Macron, Interview with the Atlantic Council, 5 February 2021, https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2021/02/05/emmanuel-macron-president-of-the-french-republicgave-an-interview-to-the-american-think-tank-atlantic-council 165.Interview, 8 February 2021.President Macron made a similar point in an interview with the Atlantic Council (Macron, 2021).The relabelling of China as a 'partner,' an 'economic competitor' and a "systemic rival was in line with a common decision taken at the EU level (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 'EU-China: A Strategic Outlook', 12 March 2019). 166.Interview, 10 May 2021. 167.President Emmanuel Macron, Speech at the Conference of Ambassadors, 27 August 2018.
See, e.g.Evelyn Goh, The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy and Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 7; and Barry Buzan and Yongjin Zhang, 'Introduction: Interrogating Regional International Society in East Asia', in Barry Buzan and Yongjin Zhang, eds.

Arms transfers therefore were, as a Senate report puts it, 'the necessary precondition for the survival of [France's] defence 30. See, among others, MFA, White Paper -2030 French Strategy in Asia-Oceania. Towards an Inclusive Asian Indo-Pacific Region, 2018a, 3.
Mathieu Anquez and Jean-Pierre Histrimont, Vulnérabilités de la France face aux flux maritimes, European Company of Strategic Intelligence, Report Commissioned by the MoD, 31 January 2012, 124.
Senate, Australie: quelle place pour la France dans le Nouveau monde?, Report no.222, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces, 2016, 87-88.Trading with the Enemy: The Making of US Export Control Policy toward the People's Republic of China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 248-250; and Meijer, 'Transatlantic Perspectives on China's Military Modernization', 39-48.Interviews with former MFA and MoD officials, September-December 2013.See also, e.g.US Embassy in France, 'Codel Smith Meets Chirac, French Officials'; US Embassy in France, 'France/GAERC: Agreement On Most Issues Except China Embargo', Confidential, 8 December 2006, Wikileaks/ Cablegate.For details on the revision of the Code of Conduct, see Meijer, 'Transatlantic Perspectives onChina's Military Modernization', 22-24.
100.Former MoD official, interview, Paris, 16 July 2013.The EU arms embargo on China was also seen as counterproductive in that, according to French officials, it had spurred China to indigenously develop its defence and technological industrial base.MoD official, interview, Paris, 29 July 2013.See also, e.g. then Minister of Defence Michèle Alliot-Marie (2002-2007) quoted in Peter Spiegel and John Thornhill, 'France Urges End to China Arms Embargo', Financial Times, 15 February 2005.

Table 1 .
French Navy's Capital Ships Deployed in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, 2012-2019.
120.MFA, 'Joint Statement of Enhanced Strategic Partnership Between Australia and France', 3 March 2017.See also Australian Government, 'Joint Statement of Enhanced Strategic Partnership between Australia and France', 19 January 2012; Senate, Australie, 96-103. 121.The bid also included Germany's ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) and a Japanese consortium comprising Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation.Xavier Vavasseur, 'France and Australia Reaffirm Commitment to the Attack-class Submarine Program', Naval News, 18 February 2020. 122.Xavier Vavasseur, 'Naval Group Inks Major "Attack-class" Submarine Contract with Australia', Naval News, 1 February 2020. 123.Julian Kerr, 'Attack class -Plan of Action', Australian Defence Magazine, 10 October 2019. 124.Senate, La France face à l'émergence de l'Asie du Sud-Est, 171; Singaporean MoD, 'Singapore and France Strengthen Defence Relations Through 18 th Defence Policy Dialogue', News Releases, 1 February 2019. 125.Imports from France represented between 16% and 21% of total Singaporean arms imports between 2009 and 2018 (and imports from the US between 46% and 57%).SIPRI, 'Trends in International Arms Transfers 2018ʹ, Factsheet, March 2019, 6. 126.Interview with a former defence official in Singapore, Paris, 28 April 2017. 127.Senate, 2014, 57. 128.Helping develop Malaysia's submarine force from scratch entailed a long-term technical, operational and training collaboration that helped strengthen bilateral defence cooperation over time.Interviews with a former defence attaché to Malaysia, Paris, 28 June 2017, and with a former official in the MFA's Directorate of Defence and Security Cooperation, Paris, 19 April 2017.