Peru at the UNFCCC: explaining the country’s foreign climate policy

ABSTRACT
 Peru was one of the first developing countries to commit to a voluntary emissions reduction target and is seen as a bridge builder within the UNFCCC. It played an important role in advancing the multilateral climate process between 2013 and 2015. Peru is a member of the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), a progressive coalition of countries that promotes ambitious positions within the climate regime. Although the country’s level of activism in international negotiations has markedly declined since 2016, there have been no significant changes in its foreign position. What factors explain Peru’s conciliatory and relatively progressive stance at the UNFCCC? To answer this question, I use the ‘climate commitment approach’ as analytical framework and trace the processes that link possible causes with outcomes, comparing two different periods in the trajectory of Peru’s participation in the climate regime. The study is based on semi-structured interviews, governmental publications and data, reports and studies by independent organizations, news reports, and scientific literature. It concludes that Peru’s position in the UNFCCC negotiations has been mainly determined by the dominant presence of Peru’s Ministry of Environment (MINAM) in foreign climate policy decision-making as well as of individual agents who act as climate leaders. It also points to several other factors that determine its position: the low level of interest in, or understanding of, the climate issue by domestic pressure groups; the country’s international profile; the governmental perception of economic, political, and diplomatic benefits associated with a more ambitious climate position; and the wish to access international climate financing. Key policy insights Foreign pressure and support were major pillars of the development of Peru’s foreign climate policy. Peru’s diplomatic position was profoundly shaped by the vision and interests of MINAM, which filled a political vacuum and exercised leadership in international climate negotiations. Given the ministry’s expertise, and international support for its activities, other ministries could hardly compete with MINAM for influence. Recently, the diminished authority of MINAM, the inclusion of climate change into Peru’s national policy agenda combined with domestic political turmoil, have translated into a marked decline in the country’s level of foreign activism. Peru has continued to align with AILAC due to the link between the country’s foreign trade and climate policy agendas, and to the benefits associated with a more ambitious foreign climate position, including possibilities for attracting international climate finance.


Introduction
Peru provides an interesting case study to examine the politics of climate change in the developing world. Despite having an economy dependent on extractive industries, including oil and gas, Peru became the

Analytical framework and methods
To guide my analysis of Peru's foreign climate policy, I use the 'climate commitment approach' (CCA), namely its foreign policy dimension, which was developed by Viola and Franchini (2018, pp. 17-27) in the book Brazil and Climate Change: Beyond the Amazon, along with the drivers of climate commitment listed by the authors in the same work. I trace the processes that link possible drivers or causes with outcomes (i.e. decisions and positions taken) and compare different periods in the trajectory of Peru's participation in the climate regime ( Figure 1; see also Supplementary Material (SM) 1 for an expanded explanation of both the CCA and the drivers of climate commitment).
This case study is part of a broader research project, in progress since 2019. The project focuses on the forest, energy, and climate policies of four Amazonian countries. In the case of Peru, 48 semi-structured interviews have been undertaken to date, with 26 of these focused on the subject explored here (see SM2 and SM3). Interviews were conducted with current and former Peruvian negotiators to the UNFCCC, public officials from different ministries, national and international non-governmental organization (NGO) members, Peruvian academics and environmental lawyers, past and present negotiators from the country's main allies within the UNFCCC, and AILAC's former advisers. Interviews lasted an average duration of 90 min. All participants were anonymized, which encouraged them to speak more freely. The data gathered from the interviews were triangulated with information from governmental publications, reports and studies by independent organizations, news reports, and scientific literature.

Tracing Peru's foreign climate policy profile of the period 2008-2019 2 and its antecedents
In the earliest days of climate negotiations, the National Council of the Environment (CONAM) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MINRE) were the two institutions that led the country in the UNFCCC meetingsfrom COP1, in 1995, to COP13, in 2007. Peru's participation in the climate regime during this period was irregular, even contradictory at times. This was the result of several factors: the weak preparation and prior orientation of negotiators; limited financial resources; the loss of institutional memory following the transformation of the country's environmental authority; frequent changes in the negotiating team; and the often tense and discontinuous relations between CONAM and MINRE (Ministerio del Ambiente, 2011).
A change in the capacity and positioning of Peru in the negotiations occurred in 2005, at COP11. PROCLIM, a programme financed by the embassy of the Netherlands, played a critical role in strengthening CONAM's technical capacity on climate change and building Peruvian delegates' negotiating skills in the years 2003-05. The country's more constructive foreign climate policy originated in that context, favoured also by the positive relationship between CONAM and MINRE during COP10 (2004) and COP11 (2005). It was during the run-up to COP11 that Peru began to consider the need for all countries, both developed and developing, to engage in mitigation efforts to avoid unmanageable impacts of climate change (Interview 6; Ministerio del Ambiente, 2011).
However, in the first year of the administration of President Alan García (2006García ( -2011, there was a complete rupture in the functioning of CONAM, with the replacement of both the head of the institution and the entire team working on climate change within it. This rift severely debilitated the country's environmental authority and resulted in another hiatus -COP12 (2006) and COP13 (2007)in Peru's participation in international climate negotiations (Interview 2; Ministerio del Ambiente, 2011). The foreign climate position that was in the process of being built prior to García's government was eventually renewed and consolidated by MINAM, created in 2008. During the administrations of Alan García andOllanta Humala (2011-2016), MINAM assumed a straightforward, largely uncontested, and active leading role in foreign climate policy decisionmaking and the UNFCCC meetings. Nevertheless, the ministry's initial activism and influence, and consequently that of Peru (which had constantly risen in the period 2008-2015), experienced a marked decline in the following administrations, from 2016.
3.1. 2008-2015 (COP14 to COP21): high foreign climate policy profile During the period 2008-2015, Peru enjoyed a high profile in UNFCCC negotiations. In 2008, at COP14, the country announced a voluntary mitigation pledge, thus adopting a flexible interpretation of the CBDR + RC principle. At COP15, Peru supported a bold emissions reduction target of 30% relative to the business-asusual (BAU) scenario by 2020 for the developing world (Ministerio del Ambiente, 2011). Under the Copenhagen Accord, the country pledged that by 2021 it would (a) reduce net Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry (LULUCF) emissions to zero (an ambitious commitment, as the LULUCF sector is the main source of Peruvian emissions), (b) increase the share of renewables in its energy mix to 40%, and (c) cut emissions in its waste sector by 7 MtCO2e in relation to 2000 levels (CAT, 2020).
In 2010, Peru joined the Cartagena Dialogue, a network of developed and developing countries working towards an ambitious, comprehensive, and legally binding regime in the UNFCCC. At this time, the Peruvian delegation supported a solid MRV scheme that considered the need for capacity building in developing countries and an International Consultation and Analysis (ICA) process to increase trust between the parties and maintain a sense of progress (Ministerio del Ambiente, 2011). In 2012, it joined AILAC to strengthen its voice and conciliatory positions in the negotiations (Interview 6).
In 2013, Peru was chosen to host COP20. Between 2013 and 2015, the country worked closely with the Poland Presidency of COP19 and the French Presidency of COP21 to make the road to the Paris Agreement a smooth one. At the Lima COP, in 2014, Peru promoted non-state, gender, education, and indigenous agendas. The country launched the important NAZCA (Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action) platform and worked hard on the drafting of the 'Lima Call for Climate Action', which outlined some of the main aspects of the future Paris Agreement. Additionally, supporting the idea that developing countries with the capacity to do so should contribute to climate finance, Peru pledged US$6 million to the Green Climate Fund (GCF). In 2015, at the request of the COP21 President Laurent Fabius, the country continued to play a leadership role (Watts & Depledge, 2018). Alongside its AILAC partners, Peru made substantive contributions to the Paris Agreement (Edwards et al., 2017), particularly in the areas of adaptation and financing (Interview 14).
Under the Paris Agreement, the country proposed an unconditional emissions reduction target of 20% below a BAU scenario by 2030 and a target conditional on international finance of 30% below a BAU scenario by the same year, both including LULUCF. The Climate Action Tracker (CAT, 2020) rated Peru's NDC targets as 'insufficient'consistent with global warming between 2°C and 3°C by 2100. As shall be seen, the process of building the Peruvian NDC generated an unprecedented intersectoral dialogue on climate change in the country, which explains why Peru's mitigation targets are not as ambitious as expected.

The drivers of Peru's foreign position and activism
Peru's environmental policy has been greatly influenced by external factors, a fact that should be observed in light of the country's economic integration and trade opening policy (Lanegra, 2018). Both the creation of MINAM in 2008 and the appointment of a reputable Peruvian ecologist, Antonio Brack, as Minister of Environment were a governmental response to foreign concerns over Peru's ability to comply with strict environmental standards and provisions. This occurred within the context of several international developments: the Inter-American Development Bank's loan approval for the second stage of the Camisea natural gas project; the conclusion of the Trade Promotion Agreement with the United States; and the expectation of signing a bilateral trade agreement with the European Union. Peru's foreign economic and financial relations, rather than a genuine recognition by García's administration of the need to strengthen environmental policy in the country, were the basis of MINAM's creation (Pereira & Viola, 2022;SPDA Actualidad Ambiental, 2009a).
MINAM was not the subject of much political attention at a domestic level. It was however very well received by part of the Peruvian civil society, which in 2009 assembled in The Citizen Movement Against Climate Change (MOCICC), and by national and international NGOs (e.g. the Peruvian NGO, consulting firm, and think tank Libélula; Conservation International Peru; The Nature Conservancy). It was also well regarded by indigenous communities and by some foreign governments (e.g. Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom) as well as international organizations and agencies (e.g. the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank) (Interviews 5, 6, and 9). José Alberto Garibaldi, a climate adviser to MINAM and other Latin American governments at the time, played an essential role in bringing the ministry closer to the states and institutions which were willing to assist developing countries like Peru with their climate efforts (Interview 6).
The support of domestic and international pro-climate groups, agencies, and governments was pivotal for MINAM. It provided the ministry with basic information for formulating climate policies and allowed it to implement projects, participate in discussion forums, train negotiators to the UNFCCC, and attend COP meetings (Ministerio del Ambiente, 2011). Since the budget allocated for participation in international climate negotiations was very low until the Lima COP in 2014, Peruvian negotiators depended on funds provided by embassies, international cooperation agencies, NGOs, and other entities to travel to the conferences (Durand López-Hurtado, 2014). The size and composition of the country's delegations was determined by the funding available (Interview 6).
Civil society groups and NGOs working in the country, as well as indigenous communities, provided MINAM with policy ideas that, given the stigmatization of social movements in Peruvian society, 3 the ministry presented as its own (Interview 6). NGOs and more progressive groups in general have either been the subject of tight governmental control or financially dependent on the state. Consequently, pro-environmental forces have been limited in their capacity to influence the domestic political landscape. Yet they have been included in the country's delegations to the UNFCCC and made important contributions to Peruvian participation in international climate negotiations, particularly in the first years of MINAM's existence (Interviews 6,9,and 15). Notably, during most of Ollanta Humala's presidency, the ministry was led by several figures coming from the NGO world. For example, the Minister of Environment himself, Manuel Pulgar Vidal, had been Executive Director of the Peruvian Environmental Law Society (SPDA).
The rationale behind MINAM's policy for UNFCCC meetings was that, given the high vulnerability to climate change of Peru's ecosystems and populations, the country would benefit more from participation in a highambition regime, wherein it would make generous contributions and commit to mitigation action, rather than a low-ambition regime to which it would contribute little. Moreover, national high-ambition mitigation pledges could be a means of encouraging further action by other parties (Garibaldi et al., 2014).
The balance of forces between MINREwhich has never had a very well-defined position regarding what the Peruvian foreign climate policy should consist of, and with its openness to and interest in the topic oscillating according to the vision of the officials heading the ministry in different periodsand the country's environmental authority has clearly changed with the emergence of MINAM, which became the leading actor in the definition of Peru's foreign climate policy and in driving Peruvian delegation within the UNFCCC (Interviews 4, 6, 8, 10, and 11). Given MINAM's expertise on the climate change issue and international support for its activities, MINRE could hardly compete with MINAM, with only a small bureau assigned to environmental themes (Interviews 4 and 11). Moreover, despite a more conservative 4 position by the ministry, which was closer to that of Brazil, because the Brazilian delegation was coordinating positions within the BASIC group, Peru could not easily build joint climate positions with the country (Interview 6). Additionally, considering the pragmatic and economic-oriented character of Peruvian foreign policy (Novak & Namihas, 2020), the most logical strategy for Peru would be to ally in international climate negotiations with those Latin American countries with which it maintained strong economic relations and shared a common economic policy perspective (Interviews 6 and 13). Countries such as Chile and Colombiamarket-friendly economies like Peru and the main economic partners of the country in the regionhad a more flexible, progressive stance compared with Brazil. The three countries and Mexico formed a trade bloc in 2011 named the Pacific Alliance. The organization was a project of the García administration (García Belaúnde, 2015). Consequently, MINRE eventually aligned itself with MINAM's vision and, despite some initial reluctance, accepted Peru's entrance into AILAC in 2012 (Interview 6). The conciliatory, bridge-builder strategy that Peru consolidated over this period through engaging in constructive dialogue with different groups in the UNFCCC process reflected, in turn, the strong sense of non-alignment and autonomy that has characterized the country's foreign policy (Interview 13; Novak & Namihas, 2020).
Additionally, Peru's more active, ambitious role in the international climate arena was consistent with the García administration's wish to enhance the country's visibility and prestige to show that Peru was experiencing rapid economic growth and could organize important international events. In 2008, the country successfully organized the fifth Summit of Heads of State and Government of the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean and the 16 th Leader's Meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC). The initiative that same year by MINAM's climate change team of announcing Peru's interest in hosting COP16 pleased President García. A phone call by Mexican president Felipe Calderón asking García to withdraw Peru's candidacy in favour of Mexico, and the costs associated with the event's organization, made the Peruvian president give up the idea (Interviews 6 and 12).
In 2009, following the publication of a study on the economic costs of climate change by the Central Reserve Bank of Peru (Vargas, 2009), the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) began to participate in the COP meetings, sending officials from a small bureau assigned to the climate change theme within the ministry as negotiators. In the UNFCCC meetings, MEF was particularly interested in opportunities to access climate financing and carbon-trading mechanisms. The ministry's representatives took the country's lead on finance negotiations and placed no barriers on MINAM's policy (Interviews 4 and 6). One should note, nevertheless, that MEF has been pushing for environmentally-destructive development on a domestic level (Pereira & Viola, 2022) and that the climate change office occupied a marginal place within the ministry's structure with little influence over national policies. The dominant vision within MEF was that climate change was a problem of the future, to be solved by developed countries. During García's government, attempts at developing joint domestic climate initiatives by MEF's climate change bureau and MINAM were blocked by the minister of economy and finance (Interview 6). To date, MEF has also refused to transfer the US$6 million that Peru pledged in 2014 under the Presidency of Humala to the GCF (Interviews 6 and 14; Green Climate Fund, 2020). Accordingly, it seems fair to assert that it was not MEF that supported MINAM's active climate policy during this period, but rather a small number of the ministry's employees working on the topic (Interview 6).
MINAM, MINRE, and MEF were the ministries that integrated Peruvian delegations to the UNFCCC until the country was chosen to host COP20 in 2013 (UNFCCC, 2013). From the moment Peru knew that it would organize the 2014 COP, energies were mainly channelled towards that role and, much because of the influence of MINRE's negotiators and MINAM's advisor Rosa Morales (who was the leader of the Peruvian negotiators' team between COP19 and COP21), the country's delegations gradually became more cautious on the ground. Peru pumped the brakes on some of AILAC's more ambitious proposals, which could have more violently clashed with the conservative positions of the G77+ China group (Interviews 5, 13, 14, and 15). Before that, negotiators had much more latitude at climate meetings (Interviews 1, 4, and 6).
Although Peru houses a National Commission on Climate Change (CNCC) (responsible for the creation of proposals that contribute to the definition of the country's foreign position on climate change) in which all ministries, subnational governments, the private sector, and civil society groups are represented, in practice, it has primarily functioned as a space for MINAM to present the position it prepared for the COP meetings and promote the ministry's activities (Pinto-Bazurco, 2020). Until the Lima COP, and more notably the process of building the Peruvian Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), the other ministries barely participated in discussions on climate change, as they lacked understanding and had low interest in the issue and UNFCCC negotiations. For the same reasons, the Peruvian private sector, one of the most conservative in Latin America, 5 has been a passive participant in the process (Interviews 1, 3, 4, 5, and 9). The country's business community showed some concern about the Paris Agreement. Still, the sector's anxieties were largely eased by the voluntary nature of climate pledges and the fact that the agreement contained no tools to punish parties that did not comply with their commitments (Interview 13).
A number of factors helped create a favourable context for MINAM's leadership in foreign climate policy decision-making. These included funds associated with climate change mitigation and adaptation projects that entered the country (Zevallos et al., 2014), benefiting not only MINAM but also other ministries. It also included the link (previously mentioned) between the climate and foreign trade agendas, and the country's goal (made official in 2012 and shared with other main allies in international climate negotiations) of adhering to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), achievement of which depended upon the strengthening of domestic environmental institutions and policies, among other requirements (Interviews 8,9,12,and 13).
The Lima COP awakened other Peruvian ministries than MINAM to the climate change issue, making them more aware of the close link between climate change and the sectors they managed, and of the economic, financial, and business opportunities associated with climate change mitigation and adaptation. Intersectoral discussions about building the Peruvian INDC were facilitated by the ministries' perceptions that benefits could arise from establishing climate policies and maintaining a flexible foreign position as was being built by MINAM. This perspective emerged following several contacts with these ministries by international financial and economic organizations, agencies, and foreign chambers of commerce, among others. In addition, with the assistance of international cooperation, a solid technical team was formed, and several economicallysound policy measures were presented. These were accepted by conservative ministries, such as the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM), the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC), and the Ministry of Production, all of which supported MINAM in some politically delicate discussions with MEF 6 (Interviews 4 and 12).
Lastly, the individual leadership of Ministers of Environment Antonio Brack (2008-2011) and Manuel Pulgar Vidal (2012 was also key during this period. Brack, who placed forest conservation at the top of MINAM's agenda and aimed at attracting international funds that could help the country protect its forest ecosystems, was the promoter of Peru's international climate commitment to achieve net-zero deforestation by 2021. Advised by MINAM's climate change team, the minister understood the importance of, and the opportunities that could arise from, associating forest conservation with climate change mitigation (Interviews 4 and 6). He also understood how making bold commitments at the UNFCCC could help him internally to strengthen the ministry (Interviews 8 and 11). Brack also took clever advantage of strong pressure from indigenous peoples and the fact that President García was seeking to avoid further conflict following the bloody incidents in the Amazonian province of Bagua in June 2009 to get the government's (rhetorical) support for the net-zero deforestation pledge and the creation of a publicly funded national forest conservation programme to mitigate climate change (Interviews 1 and 8; Pereira & Viola, 2022). In Bagua, there were protests against a series of presidential decrees (later reversed) that had reduced the protection of the Amazon's land as forestry areas and undermined communal tenure of land in favour of extractivist projects. This culminated in armed conflicts, which severely damaged the domestic and international image of the Peruvian government (Pereira & Viola, 2022). It was hardly a coincidence that, less than four months later, the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Antonio García Belaúnde, presented a proposal to create a tax on the sale of oil and gas to finance forest conservation and reforestation projects at the UN General Assembly (SPDA Actualidad Ambiental, 2009b). Brack's commitment to net-zero deforestation under the Copenhagen Accord, which was signed in December the same year, thus fit like a glove for a government trying to clean up its image.
In turn, Minister Pulgar Vidal made climate change MINAM's top priority. The organization of COP20 in Peru was made possible by the role that Pulgar Vidal played in winning the support of President Humala, to whom he was close, in the face of opposition by MEF, which considered the event too expensive for Peru (Interviews 5 and 6), and MINRE, which initially doubted the country's diplomatic, logistic, and financial capacity to host a COP (Interviews 6, 12, and 13). After Pulgar Vidal, domestic circumstances made the emergence of new climate leaders much more difficult.

2016-2019 (COP22 to COP25): low(er) foreign climate policy profile
During the period 2016-2019, Peru's level of activism in UNFCCC negotiations markedly declined. Peruvian negotiators became less willing to push for ambitious outcomes, particularly at COP22 and COP23, in 2016 and 2017 respectively (Interview 15). However, Peru continued, in general, to align with AILAC's positions from 2016 to 2019. Although less active and less vocal than in previous years, the AILAC group advocated for a strong set of rules, modalities, and procedures within the framework of the Paris Agreement. The group also advocated for the establishment of long-term climate strategies consistent with the achievement of the 1.5°C temperature goal by all parties by no later than 2020; the enhanced provisions of MRV; and higher tiers for the preparation of national GHG inventories, especially for critical categories (although with flexibility for developing countries) (AILAC, 2016, 2019).
Peru's contribution to the international climate debate was, however, minimal in this period. Peruvian negotiators were predominantly passive participants in defining the rules for operationalizing and implementing the Paris Agreement. They simply followed the process (Interviews 9, 10, 11, 14, and 15), focusing on the need for climate financing to enable domestic action and to prevent, manage, and compensate for loss and damage related to climate change (Ministerio del Ambiente, 2016c, 2017; SPDA Actualidad Ambiental, 2019).
In 2019, at COP25, Peru regained some of the ambition of the past. It subscribed to the 'San José Principles for High Ambition and Integrity in International Carbon Markets,' committing to adopt strict market rules regardless of what parties to the Convention negotiated. Peru was also part of the Climate Ambition Alliance, pledging to increase the level of ambition of its NDC from a 30% to a 35% emissions reduction target in 2020 and become carbon neutral by 2050 (Ministerio del Ambiente, 2020). Yet, the country was still far from reigniting the active role it had played in the previous period (Interviews 10, 12, and 15). On a domestic level, Peru made its pledge under the Paris Agreement legally binding through the regulation (DS 013-2019-MINAM) of the framework law on climate change (FL 30754), which was also approved during this period in 2018.

The drivers of Peru's foreign position and low level of activism
In July 2016, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (2016-2018), a figure who openly represented the interests of the country's economic elite, won the Peruvian presidential election. The team chosen by the new president to head MINAM was ordered to keep a low profile, both domestically and internationally, to avoid any confrontations and facilitate economic growth. The ministry also lost part of its highly qualified team of technicians and employees. As a result, MINAM became weaker and withdrew into itself (Pereira & Viola, 2022). The ministry's diminished role and capacity explains to a large extent Peru's low level of foreign climate activism during this period. Simultaneously, changes in the diplomatic staff of MINRE's environmental bureau, which had played an important, active role in the previous years in assisting MINAM during the Peruvian Presidency of COP20 (Interviews 5, 11, and 13), also affected the ministry's capacity to intervene in the climate change issue. Moreover, with MINRE headed by a more conservative faction, climate change became much less relevant for the ministry (Interview 13). In addition, the conducting of foreign climate policy became harder for Peru and other Latin American countries following the election of U.S. President Donald Trump and the dealignment of the U.S. and the European Union (Interviews 4 and 14). Yet, despite unwillingness to exert climate leadership on an international level, the new administration maintained the country's previous stance at the UNFCCC. President Kuczynski did not order MINAM's team to break with AILAC's positions. The international image of Peru as a country concerned with climate change could only benefit the government and its supporting elites. One of the president's goals, expressed at the beginning of his mandate (and which the country failed), was to make Peru a member of the OECD before 2021 (Maúrtua de Romaña, 2016). A marked shift in the country's foreign position on climate change could negatively affect Peru's image and international relations, and compromise that political aspiration. Doing so would also conflict with the increased interest of some ministries, regional governments, and private sector organizations in benefiting from international discussions on climate change.
As previously seen, the organization of COP20 in Peru and the process of building the NDC led to the inclusion of climate change in the national policy agenda (Gobierno del Perú, 2018) and made other sectors of the state aware of economic, financial, and business opportunities associated with mitigation and adaptation. Such material opportunities were made more important by the fact that international funds available for Peru had been declining due to its condition as a medium-income country (Galarza & Ruiz, 2016). Furthermore, Peru was at the end of the commodity super cycle boom, which was negatively affecting the economy. Other ministries, such as MINEM and the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI), were thus included in the country's delegations to the Convention, and MEF became more active at COP meetings. Amazonian regional governments engaged in discussions about Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) and began to interact with international donors interested in implementing forest conservation and restoration projects in the country. Some private sector representatives in search of new business opportunities also became involved in the UNFCCC process (Interviews 6 and 12).
However, as a result of greater participation by other actors, MINAM's space in foreign climate policy diminished. This partly explains why Peru continued to enjoy an overall lower profile in UNFCCC negotiations, despite interest by President Martín Vizcarra (2018-2020) (who assumed the country's lead following Kuczynski's resignation before a second presidential impeachment vote took place) and his Minister of Environment, Fabiola Muñoz, in repositioning the country as an active player in international climate discussions. Although MINAM continued to play a prominent role in the definition of Peru's position for the COP meetingsas it is the ministry with the greatest and most solid technical knowledge of the issue and the UNFCCC processwith several topics now being integrated into the agenda of other ministries, it lost some of the spaces that it had occupied in the past (Interview 12). Notwithstanding their interest in climate-related opportunities, MEF, MINEM, MINAGRI, and other ministries do not have a clear vision, position, or understanding of climate change. For example, in 2016, MEF became the designated national authority for the GCF, a role that MINAM had previously fulfilled. During the period addressed here, Peru, which had been the first Latin American country to have a project financed by the GCF (SPDA Actualidad Ambiental, 2015), did not present any projects to the Fund, as MEF was slow in dealing with the issue and MINAM no longer participated in the Fund's meetings (Interview 12; SPDA Actualidad Ambiental, 2019). Moreover, despite insistence by MINAM, MEF took two years to join the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action and has not yet become a member of the Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition (Interviews 11 and 12). These examples demonstrate MEF's lack of a defined climate strategy and clear motivation to advance the Peruvian foreign climate agenda.
Finally, it should be noted that, since 2016, Peru has lived through turbulent times, marked by deep political instability, corruption scandals, a slowdown in economic growth, as well as rising levels of crime and public insecurity. In a complex and unstable national context, much of MINAM's energy was focused on domestic policy and the country's internal problems. Indeed, during this period, Peru displayed a more low-profile foreign policy overall; domestic conditions made it difficult for national authorities to pursue an active and assertive foreign policy agenda (Interviews 11 and 13).
The approval of a framework law on climate change in 2018 and its regulation in 2019 making the Peruvian NDC legally binding should be seen in light of the following factors. First, is the role that some key figures in the organization of the Lima COP played as they remained in MINAM's climate change bureau and continued the work initiated during Humala's government to create the climate law (Ráez Luna, 2019). Second, is the recognition of the image and material benefits of establishing ambitious climate policies and laws (Merino, 2020); the decision to make Peru's NDC legally binding was taken on a ministerial technical level and not opposed by the political cabinet in consideration of those benefits (Interviews 4 and 12). Third, Peru's contribution to climate change, as frequently recalled in official communications, is smallapproximately 0.3% of global emissions (Republic of Peru, 2015)meaning that it would hardly be the subject of harsh criticism or international pressure, even if it did not comply with its climate pledges.

Discussion
From the analysis made in the previous section, several points are worthy of note and further comment.
Motivated by Peru's vulnerability to climate change and the need to assert and strengthen itself in the domestic political landscape, and supported by foreign governments and civil society organizations, MINAM was often an active, constructive player in international climate negotiations. For example, in 2010, after the disappointing outcome of the Copenhagen COP in the previous year, the ministry's negotiators assisted the Mexican Presidency at COP16 in the delicate task of reviving climate multilateralism. In 2011, at COP17, they helped promote agreement on the Durban Platform (Interviews 6 and 15). In 2015, at the Paris COP, Peruvian Minister of Environment Manuel Pulgar Vidal actively facilitated dialogue in negotiating tables and helped bring positions closer together through informal conversations in the corridors of the conference (Interview 12; Morales Saravia & Acurio, 2020). The ministry's weakened position of avoiding attention during Kuczynski's presidency coincided with a marked decline in Peru's level of activism in the climate regime.
The lower profile of MINAM, and consequently of Peru, within the UNFCCC during the period 2016-2019 was also the result of an unstable domestic context and the involvement of, and a more active role by, other ministries in the process, which replaced MINAM in several forums and discussions. These ministries had much less understanding of the climate change issue and motivation to act than MINAM. Although their involvement is necessary if Peru is to transition to low carbon development, MEF's poor performance as the country's designated authority for the GCF is an example of how greater participation by other sectors of the Peruvian state in foreign climate policy can be detrimental to climate action. This is a relevant aspect that warrants further analysis.
Peru's greater activism in international climate negotiations coincided with the period during which governments were seeking greater international visibility. This was the reason why, for example, President García, whose environmental policy was disastrous (Pereira & Viola, 2022), was willing to host a climate COP in the country. Later, President Humala was receptive to Pulgar Vidal's arguments about the diplomatic gains that organizing a successful international climate conference and helping advance negotiations could offer Peru. In the months preceding the Lima COP, a team of negotiators co-led by MINAM and MINRE worked on regional, bilateral, multilateral, and non-state levels to help build trust and consensus among the parties (Acurio, 2015). In preparation for COP21, Peru co-organized with France a number of informal meetings aimed at discussing critical points of the anticipated Paris Agreement and building momentum for climate action (IISD, 2015;Ministerio del Ambiente, 2016a). Yet domestic policies and events have often clashed with the country's constructive foreign position on climate change.
The main institutional and policy milestones within Peruvian environmental policy (such as the creation of MINAM) did not result from genuine awareness and transformation, nor from internal need, but rather from external needs (Gustafsson et al., 2020;Merino, 2020;Orihuela et al., 2021). Environmental issues are not a priority in Peru. The country has created climate plans and legal norms and commissions, but these have not translated into concrete, solid action to fight climate change (Pinto-Bazurco, 2020;Ráez Luna, 2019). On the contrary, over the past years, there have been severe environmental setbacks in the country (Dourojeanni et al., 2016;Pereira & Viola, 2022). With rising deforestation trends and an insufficient share of renewables in its energy matrix, Peru failed its Copenhagen pledges by a large margin (CAT, 2020).
The first Peruvian NDC also contained some problematic assumptions and limitations (Vázquez-Rowe et al., 2019). The BAU scenario did not account for the recent deceleration of Peru's economy (thus overestimating the volume of emissions that would likely be produced by 2030 in the absence of mitigation policies), nor did it consider the increasing trend in wildfire alerts in the country; wildfires are a significant source of GHG emissions. In addition, it assumed a uniform increase in population across Peru, despite the fact that a number of Amazonian regions have higher population growth rates compared with the national average, which has important implications for local and regional land-use changes. Simultaneously, the estimated deforestation emissions of the period 2009-2016 are higher than those mitigated in 2030 through implementation of the forestry measures included in the country's first NDC. Other relevant aspects are the omission of miningthe main source of Peru's revenue and an increasingly important driver of deforestation in the Amazonin the country's proposal and the fact that the characterization factor used in the BAU scenario to convert methane (an important GHG gas in critical sectors in Peru) into a CO 2 -equivalent did not correspond to the updated higher value provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its latest report (Vázquez-Rowe et al., 2019).
However, the adoption of a more progressive foreign position on climate change and the establishment of climate policies on a domestic level have served the interest of successive Peruvian governments in (superficially) responding to foreign processes and concerns that could hinder the country's economic and financial relations (e.g. the signing of trade agreements) as well as its political aspirations (e.g. the wish to join the OECD). These positions and policies have also strengthened Peru's international image (e.g. following the Bagua incident in 2009) and opened several doors for accessing international funds (Ministerio del Ambiente, 2016b). Yet, because Peru is a middle-income country, available climate financing will increasingly accompany higher conditions and more stringent requirements that demand actual results before payment.
Finally, a brief note on Peru's business community. The position of the private sector regarding the country's foreign policy on environmental matters is a reactionary one. Conservative pressure groups only speak out during discussions for domestic implementationhaving great power to influence the final outcome of those discussions (Crabtree & Durand, 2017;Durand, 2017)when they feel that their economic interests are at risk. If this were not the case, Peru's stance at the UNFCCC would probably be closer to that of the G77+ China group (Interviews 3 and 7).
The results of this research concur with previous studies suggesting that ideational forces, climate leadership, and the international profile of AILAC's members are key drivers of the group's position in UNFCCC negotiations (Bustos, 2018;Cavelier Adarve & Rodríguez Becerra, 2017;Edwards & Roberts, 2015). The image and material benefits associated with a more ambitious foreign position on climate change, and minimal interference by conservative domestic pressure groups in foreign climate policy decision-making, have also been identified as critical factors to explain Colombia's enthusiastic participation in the climate regime (Bustos, 2018). Given AILAC's important contributions to the UNFCCC process (Edwards et al., 2017), future research could usefully include in-depth studies of other members of the group to help identify the factors that sustain the coalition and potential points of divergence that may affect its cohesion.

Conclusion
This study investigated the drivers of Peru's foreign climate policy. It concluded that both MINAM's vision and interests, and the leadership assumed by Ministers of Environment Brack and Pulgar Vidal in particular, are key to understanding Peru's constructive position in UNFCCC negotiations. Ideational forces and climate leadership were thus strong drivers of the country's foreign climate commitment, notably during the period 2008-2015.
The study also concluded that Peru's international profile was a significant driver of its foreign climate commitment during the entirety of the period under analysis. The country's foreign economic interests, the alliances it developed with other members of AILAC outside the climate regime, and the pragmatism and autonomy of its foreign climate policy enabled MINAM's vision of what the Peruvian position in international climate negotiations should be to prevail. In addition, recognition by governments that they could improve their image both politically and economically using the climate agenda was another important driver of Peru's foreign climate commitment during the period analyzed. As also seen, especially in the years between the Lima COP and 2019, ministries such as MEF and MINEM, some Amazonian regional governments, and private sector organizations became more aware of potential economic, financial, and business opportunities associated with climate change mitigation and adaptation, and of how the foreign position built by MINAM could facilitate access to climate financing. This helps explain Peru's alignment with AILAC's positions during discussions on the Paris rulebook. Finally, the minimal interference by the Peruvian private sector in foreign climate policy decision-making is also pivotal to understanding Peru's stance within the UNFCCC.
The analysis of the Peruvian case contributes to advancing our limited knowledge of the formulation and determinants of foreign climate policy in developing countries in general and AILAC's members in particular. It also helps in understanding why AILAC has, in recent years, lost part of its activism. Less governmental interest in foreign climate policy, changes in negotiators, and a complicated political, economic, and social domestic context are common to other AILAC countries such as Colombia and Chile. These facts, in addition to budget cuts, an advisory unit that lost its most important members, and the less positive tone of negotiations following President Trump's election, have undermined and weakened the influence of AILAC. It remains to be seen whether the group will regain the level of activism it displayed in the run-up to Paris. Notes 1. The first was Argentina in 1998, during COP4 (Bouille & Girardin, 2002). 2. See SM4 for a summary timeline. 3. The 1980s' severe debt crisis, the murders of leftist leaders, and the discrediting of leftist ideologies by the Shining Path guerillas during the 1980s and the 1990s, and the repressive measures taken by the authoritarian government of Alberto Fujimori (1990)(1991)(1992)(1993)(1994)(1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000) strengthened the elite class and weakened popular movements in Peru (Crabtree & Durand, 2017;Crabtree, 2020). 4. I use the term 'conservative' to refer to actors who resist major changes in the traditional carbon-intensive development paradigm and/or oppose higher-ambition UNFCCC outcomes.
5. The most powerful interest group blocking climate action in Peru is the National Society of Mining, Petroleum, and Energy. 6. The intersectoral work to design the country's INDCs was based on the results of the PlanCC project (Gutiérrez et al., 2017). Launched in 2012, the project was part of the MAPS international programme (https://mapsprogramme.org/), implemented in Peru by the NGO Libélula with the unofficial support from specialists in MINAM, MINRE, MEF, and the National Centre for Strategic Planning (CEPLAN), and collaboration of academia, civil society, and private sector organizations. This early initiative identified 77 climate change mitigation measures that simultaneously aligned economic development with poverty alleviation; mitigation potential and costs were estimated and provided for each measure (Interview 4; Gobierno del Perú, 2015; Gutiérrez et al., 2017). In a process supported by the German Cooperation Agency, the multisectoral working group formed in 2015 to prepare Peru's pledges for the Paris Agreement reviewed and adjusted those measures, and defined the bases for governmental approval of the Peruvian INDC. Among the measures prioritized and promoted by conservative ministries were rural electrification with solar panels; firewood improved stoves; energy efficiency labelling for domestic appliances; replacement of incandescent and fluorescent lighting; metro network for the city of Lima; use of natural gas in public transportation and in substitution of coal in iron and steel kilns; and use of pozzolan instead of clinker in cement production (Interviews 4 and 12). However, the relative contribution of these measures to reduce Peru's total emissions vis-à-vis the potential of forest conservation and avoided deforestation is low.