Margaret Thatcher, British public opinion and German reunification, 1989–90

ABSTRACT Using opinion poll data collected for the United States Information Agency, the European Commission and various media organisations, this article analyses British public opinion towards German reunification in 1989 and 1990. Contrasting the public’s views with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s hostile approach towards German unity, it demonstrates that the British public were largely supportive of the principle of German reunification. Nevertheless, there was uncertainty about reunification’s consequences. Furthermore, significant generational differences existed, with Britons who experienced life during periods of war in the first half of the twentieth century expressing greater concern about the prospect of a united Germany.


Introduction
The opening of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 was a transformational moment in post-war European history. The most symbolic event of the Cold War endgame, it was the catalyst for the reunification of Germany less than a year later, on 3 October 1990. However, while German reunification brought together a divided country -and continent -it was not without controversy. Coinciding with democratisation processes across the Eastern Bloc and significant upheaval within the Soviet Union, there were fears that German reunification could unsettle these. Questions about the power of a united Germany -twice an instigator of war during the first half of the twentieth centuryresurfaced too. The prospect of reunification also raised doubts about a united Germany's future alliance membership -a feature complicated by the Federal Republic of Germany's membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the German Democratic Republic belonging to the Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, with significant steps being made towards deepening European integration, German reunification served as both a potential distraction and critical inflection point for the European Community (EC). These were all matters which the United Kingdom -twice at war with Germany earlier in the century, a founding member of NATO and, by 1989, an established EC member -had to contend with as a consequence of the processes the Berlin Wall's opening unleashed. Britain was not alone in having to confront these issues. But Britain's status as one of four occupying powers in Germany following the Second World War meant it held a privileged position and was a party to the Two Plus Four negotiations, which culminated in the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, enabling reunification to take place.
The availability of government documents and the reflections of those involved in and observing events has meant the British response to the fall of the Berlin Wall has generated rich discussion in a range of literature. 1 One overarching theme is Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's hostile attitude towards German unity. And this has led to significant criticism of the then-prime minister. This is most evident in the memoirs and post-hoc remarks of officials and witnesses to the diplomatic efforts that led to reunification. Key German and US officials reveal their frustrations with the prime minister. 2 Thatcher's colleagues in government and the Conservative Party, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) officials, and even her political advisers also offer criticism that ranges from regret through to condemnation. 3 Combining analysis of this material with a wider body of evidence, historical literature and biographies weigh in with criticism of Thatcher too. Diplomatic histories of reunification and broader literature analysing British foreign and European policy emphasise how Thatcher's stance led to her cutting an isolated figure on the international stage and that her failed diplomacy damaged Anglo-German (and Anglo-American) relations. 4 Biographies of the prime  War, 1948-1990, German Unification, 1989-1990 's View (London: I B Tauris, 1996), chs. 7-9;and Charles Powell, 'Berlin in the Cold War, 1948-1990, German Unification, 1989-1990', Witness Seminar held 16 October 2009 minister, meanwhile, stress how Thatcher's response revealed her character and anti-German prejudices. 5 While perhaps less valuable as historical sources given the extent to which the authors' subjectivities influence these personal accounts, biographies are further notable for offering explanations for Thatcher's response. Specifically, they argue that generational factors -namely Thatcher's formative years coinciding with the Second World Warinformed her hostility towards German reunification. 6 This claim offers significant inspiration for this article, which assesses whether Thatcher's attitudes reflected those of others in her generation and of her party's supporters, while also placing her concerns about reunification in a wider context. It does so by evaluating British public opinion towards German reunification. The British public's views towards German unity have heretofore received little attention, with existing literature either analysing secondary reporting of opinion polling or providing vague references to public opinion. 7 The recent digitisation of individual-level data from historical Gallup opinion polls conducted in Britain means a thorough analysis of public opinion is now possible, though. 8 Within this extensive collection, held at the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, are two polls from November 1989 and February 1990 featuring question series related to reunification. Assessed together with respondent-level data from two Eurobarometer surveys and multiple polls conducted for the United States Information Agency (USIA), as well as aggregated tables and reports from six other opinion polls, this article offers a comprehensive analysis of British public opinion towards German reunification.
The article demonstrates how, when viewed from an overall population level, Thatcher's hostile approach towards German unity seemed out of line with the views of the British public, who -as has been recognised -largely approved of reunification. 9 Her approach also seemed out of step with Conservative voters. However, like Thatcher, a significant segment of the British public was anxious about reunification's potential consequences. Particularly after the Berlin Wall fell, many saw a united Germany as a potential economic threat, while the public were divided over whether reunification necessitated deeper European integration. Most notably, concern about German unity was concentrated among those aged 55 and over. This cohort -to which Thatcher belonged and referred to in this article as the 'war generation' -boasted lived experience of conflict with Germany. For all, the Second World War will have affected them, be it through participating in conflict, suffering loss or shaping their childhood and formative  , 1948-1990, German Unification, 1989-1990 UK Gallup Poll collection, 1956-1991(Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 2022. 9 See Jackisch, Eisern gegen die Einheit,314. years. Older members, meanwhile, will have been alive for two wars Britain fought against Germany. These experiences appeared to contribute towards the 'war generation' expressing greater opposition towards the principle of reunification and increased concern about the threat a united Germany would pose. Not only were they likelier to foresee Germany as an economic threat, but this cohort were split over whether a united Germany would be a risk to European peace and represent a military threat. Considering these findings, Thatcher's concerns about reunification were thus more representative of a body of public opinion than previously recognised. 10 Altogether, the article makes a unique contribution to literature on British and international reactions to German reunification. It also adds to works on popular views of Germany in post-war Britain. 11 Finally, it contributes to the limited literature focusing on British public opinion towards post-war foreign and defence policy. 12 The article has seven sections. The first summarises Margaret Thatcher's attitudes towards German reunification. Next, the materials section introduces the surveys from which the polling data analysed in this article have been taken. The subsequent five sections analyse data on various topics related to German reunification, namely: the principle of German reunification; its timing; its potential consequences; whether a united Germany should be a member of NATO; and reunification's consequences for European integration. The conclusion then considers the broader significance of the article's findings.

Margaret Thatcher and German reunification
Dispute exists regarding the extent of Margaret Thatcher's hostility towards German reunification and whether she sought to prevent it from taking place. 13 Beyond doubt, however, is that she wanted to slow the rush to reunification and was concerned about its consequences. Her anxiety about the speed of reunification stemmed from concerns about undermining the fragile position of Soviet Union General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and the process of democratisation occurring across Central and Eastern Europe. Thatcher was also apprehensive about a united Germany's potential economic power, the potentially destabilising effect reunification would have on Europe's security architecture, and outstanding issues related to Germany's borders. Additionally, she worried that Britain's EC partners would end up seeing deeper European integrationwhich Thatcher opposed -as necessary to counteract the prospect of there being more Germany.  ': West Germany in British Perceptions, 1969-1975(Augsburg: Wißner-Verlag, 2013, 96-154. 12 See Ben Clements, British Public Opinion on Foreign and Defence Policy, 1945-2017(Abingdon: Routledge, 2020; and Anthony King and Robert Wybrow, eds., British Public Opinion on Foreign andDefence Policy, 1937-2000 Conor Cruise O'Brien was noted for his extreme opinion articles invoking the notion of a 'Fourth Reich'. 25 Nevertheless, concerns about German unity as deeply held as Thatcher's were not widely shared among elite opinion either at home or abroad. And her concerns about German power and advancing European integration as a means of constraining a united Germany set the prime minister against others within her government, as well as her international counterparts. The airing of her concerns -and the manner in which she expressed them in public and private -did not help either, and led to Thatcher cutting an isolated figure in the diplomacy that resulted in German reunification as well as being the subject of the significant contemporary and post-hoc criticism outlined in the introduction. 26 This criticism persisted thanks to the 'unrepentant' way that Thatcher discussed her approach to the question of German unity in her 1993 memoir, The Downing Street Years. 27 Thatcher's reflections emphasise, first, her views regarding the wider 'German problem' and Germany's 'national character'. 28 Thatcher also outlines what she perceived to be Germany's historical desire for expansionism -though she qualifies this by emphasising that 'economic expansion rather than territorial aggression' was 'the modern manifestation of this tendency'. 29 She then moves on to discuss the diplomacy during this period and outlines her dislike of how this was handled while criticising the actions of George Bush, François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl, her fellow Western leaders. 30 These controversial reflections have no doubt contributed to Thatcher's attitudes towards German unity receiving the level of historical interest previously outlined. The remainder of the article adds to this -albeit in a unique manner by assessing the extent to which British public opinion reflected the prime minister's views.

Materials and methods
To assess British public opinion, this article primarily draws upon respondent-level polling data available via the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research. Data from multiple surveys held at this archive have recently been converted from their antiquated column binary formats into those compatible with modern data analysis software. and ICM research organisations. 31 Additionally, the paper analyses respondent-level data from the spring and autumn 1990 Eurobarometer surveys; aggregated data tables from three Market and Opinion Research International (MORI) opinion polls conducted in November 1989, January 1990 and July 1990; research reports containing data from two NOP polls conducted in February and July 1990; and newspaper reporting of a further Gallup poll carried out in July 1990. 32 Online Appendix Table 1.1 provides technical details about the surveys, and the formats in which the data are available.
With fieldwork for all surveys conducted among nationally representative samples of the British population, robust estimates of the public's views can be inferred from the data. 33 The availability of respondent-level data and aggregated tables also means that comparisons can be made between population sub-groups. To understand the extent to which public opinion reflected Thatcher's attitudes, there is a focus on exploring differences according to generation and partisanship, with bivariate analysis carried out according to these variables. Generation is defined using variables capturing a respondent's age. In particular, this article highlights the views of those belonging to the 'war generation'. Made up of adults aged 55 and over, those belonging to this cohort will have been born in 1935 or earlier and will have been at least 10 years of age when the Second World War concluded. 34 Partisanship, meanwhile, is inferred from variables ascertaining voting intentions. 35 The questions then chosen for analysis assess public opinion regarding: the principle of German reunification; the timing of German reunification; whether a united Germany would represent a threat; whether a united Germany should be a member of NATO; and the impact of German reunification on European integration. These have been selected for three reasons. First, these were topics of high salience in the German reunification debate and represent areas of concern expressed by or attributed to Margaret Thatcher. Second, a significant volume of data regarding these topics are available. Third, space constraints mean that not all topics included in the various surveys can be covered.

A nation divided? The principle of German reunification
The British government had long supported the goal of achieving German unity by peaceful means, with this foreign policy aim accepted by both Conservative and Labourled administrations. 36 While this did not seem a realistic prospect, the events of 9 November 1989 changed that and quickly transformed reunification into a strong possibility and, soon enough, an inevitability. After the Berlin Wall fell, Margaret Thatcher may not have attempted to prevent reunification. But her concerns certainly illustrate how uncomfortable she felt about the prospect of a united Germany. This stood in contrast to the leaders of Britain's two main opposition parties. West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher reports that Labour Party leader Neil Kinnock reacted positively to the idea of reunification in a private conversation as early as 30 November 1989. 37 Meanwhile, Liberal Democrat leader Paddy Ashdown was frequently critical of Thatcher's attitude towards Germany during this period. 38 Born in October 1925, Thatcher was a decade and a half older than her rival leaders. This meant the Second World War coincided with her late teenage years and, seemingly, helped shape her views of Germany. The idea that these memories influenced Thatcher's response to reunification not only seeped into historical discussion, but they can also be found in contemporary media criticism -and mockery -of the prime minister. The latter was on display in a cartoon published in the government-supporting Daily Mail in 34 This definition is not perfect. However, it has been influenced by the availability of age-related variables in the relevant datasets and to ensure consistency of analysis. 35 Given their general importance in shaping political attitudes, online appendix tables also contain, where available, bivariate analysis according to gender, social grade and education level. Where relevant, bivariate analysis has additionally been carried out according to subject-specific attitudinal measures (such as attitudes towards NATO and European integration). 36 See Patrick Salmon, 'Preface', in ed. Salmon, Hamilton and Twigge, German Unification 1989-90, ix-xiii. 37 Genscher, Errinerungen, 676. Meanwhile, Liberal Democrat leader Paddy Ashdown was frequently critical of Thatcher's approach during this period. See Paddy Ashdown, The Ashdown Diaries, vol. 1, 1988-1997(London: Penguin, 2000, 83-4, and quotes attributed to Ashdown in George Jones, 'Thatcher Warns Bonn Against Rush to Unity', Daily Telegraph, February 19, 1990, 1. 38 See Paddy Ashdown, The Ashdown Diaries, vol. 1, 1988-1997(London: Penguin, 2000, 83-4, and quotes attributed to Ashdown in George Jones, 'Thatcher warns Bonn Against Rush to Unity', Daily Telegraph, February 19, 1990, 1. February 1990, which depicts Thatcher walking out the back door of 10 Downing Street at night towards an air-raid shelter built at the bottom of the garden. Her husband Denis is behind her, carrying a crate of gin while asking: 'Don't you think you're being just a shade over-pessimistic about German reunification, Maggie dear?' 39 Light-hearted and mocking as it is, the cartoon does hold some truth. Indeed, among others within the 'war generation', Thatcher was not alone in her unease about German reunification, as polling data show. At an overall population level, however, British public opinion largely seemed to accept the idea of German unity, with evidence showing that acceptance grew as reunification became increasingly inevitable. The five measures from surveys carried out on behalf of the USIA demonstrate this, with that undertaken prior to the opening of the Berlin Wall adding a further twist (see Table 1 and Online Appendix Table 2.1). 40 In October 1989, 70% of Britons somewhat or strongly believed East and West Germany should be united, with just 16% of the view they should remain separate. At this time, views differed little according to generation. Two months later, however, opinion had shifted and significant age divides had emerged. At an overall population level, as many believed the two states should remain separate (47%) as felt they should be united (48%). Meanwhile, 60% of those aged 55 and over felt they should remain separate, with just a third (34%) in favour of them uniting. Nevertheless, this would be the only survey that did not show an overall majority of Britons expressing a preference for a united Germany, with support increasing to 54% in December/January, 62% in February and 68% in April. In contrast, the proportions favouring separate states stood at just over a third (35%) in December/January before declining to a quarter (26%) for the two subsequent measures. The 'war generation' were still more likely to prefer they remain separate states -and to hold this view 'strongly'. But this generation did warm to the idea of the two Germanys uniting. Other demographic factors appeared to play little role in shaping opinion, though. Where such data is available, there were no major differences according to voting intention with the views of Conservative and Labour voters strikingly similar. The only obvious difference was that Labour voters were typically more inclined to 'strongly' favour a united Germany, while Conservative voters -perhaps taking cues from their party's leader -offered greater qualified support. Source: Author's analysis of USIA data.

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Daily Mail, February 20, 1990, 9. 40 Respondents were asked: 'Some people say that East and West Germany should be united to form a single state, others say that East and West Germany should remain separate states. Which view is closer to your own? Do you feel that way strongly or somewhat?' These trends were replicated in other surveys. Demonstrating that there was some level of concern about reunification, Gallup's commercial polling found the proportions arguing that a united Germany would be better from the point of view of 'Europe as a whole' were lower than those selecting this answer option when asked about the perspective of 'the Germans' (see Table 2 and Online Appendix Table 2.2). 41 Nonetheless, for both statements majorities felt that it would be better if Germany were united. Age divides were also evident, with those aged 55 and over more likely to say that it would be better if Germany remained divided at both question iterations. Nevertheless, 'united' was still the most popular response option among the 'war generation'.
Although their trend series are limited to two measurements, MORI (see Online Appendix Tables 2.3 and 2.4) and Eurobarometer (see Online Appendix Table 2.5) data also show increases in support for the principle of reunification over time, as well as weaker support among the 'war generation'. 42 Asking whether respondents favoured or opposed 'the formation of one nation by the unification of East and West Germany', MORI recorded an increase in the proportion stating they were in favour from 45% in January 1990 to 59% in July. 43 Meanwhile, opposition declined from 30% to 23% and the percentage answering neither fell from 19% to 13%. 44 Conducting their first fieldwork wave in March 1990, Eurobarometer found 64% of Britons in favour of the unification of the two German states and 18% opposed. 45 Then in October, the proportion in favour increased to 72% with opposition stable (17%). 46 Across MORI and Eurobarometer surveys, the 'war generation' were more inclined to express opposition, while partisan differences were minimal. Eurobarometer data also reveal greater opposition to German Respondents were asked: 'From the point of view of the Germans/Europe as a whole, is it better for Germany to be divided or united?' 42 An NOP poll from February 1990 also provides evidence of the latter. According to this survey, 22% disapproved of German reunification, with this increasing to 48% among those aged 55 and over. See NOP Political, Social, Economic Review, Issue no. 80 (March 1990), 30, AMSR, NOR80. The exact question wording NOP used is unclear, while no detailed data tables are available in NOP's report. 43 The exact question wording was: 'Do you personally favour or oppose the formation of one nation by the unification of East and West Germany?' This question differed to that which MORI asked in November 1989. This asked: 'Do you think it would be a good idea for the two Germanys to be re-united or not'? Unlike that in January 1990 and July 1990 which included a neutral mid-point response, only binary answer options were available for this question, with 67% answering 'Yes' and 27% 'No'. 44 6% answered 'Don't know' in January compared to 5% in July. The proportion of Britons in favour of German reunification was significantly lower than in France and the United States, with opposition twice as strong. British support was most similar to that in Poland, although Polish opposition was stronger. For comparisons with opinion in France, Poland and the United States see Online Appendix Table 2.4. 45 Respondents were asked: 'Are you personally in favour of, or opposed to, the unification of the two German states?' 46 There was a decline in the proportion answering 'Don't know' from 17% to 12%. For comparisons with opinion in other member states see Online Appendix Table 2.5 . reunification among Britons who saw EC membership as a bad thing -a sign that anti-EC sentiment and anti-German prejudice were linked.

A speedy reunion? The timing of German reunification
The speed with which the reunification of Germany occurred surprised all actors involved and witnesses to events. And for Margaret Thatcher, attempting to slow the pace of reunification was seen as vital so as not to destabilise either Gorbachev's position or the process of democratisation in Central and Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, it is not possible to ascertain directly whether the British public were concerned about the speed of reunification. But measures are available gauging when the public felt reunification was likely to take place. From these, there is clear evidence that events shifted perspectives. However, while the public came to see that reunification was going to occur sooner than many initially felt likely, there still existed a sense that it would take years, not months. A more drawn-out process -in line with what the prime minister wanted -was therefore something that the British public expected.
Conducted before the Berlin Wall was opened, the October 1989 USIA survey asked respondents: 'How likely is it that German reunification will occur within the next ten years?' Opinion in Britain was split about something that, at this point, was only a theoretical prospect (see Table 3 and Online Appendix Table 3.1). Gallup's commercial surveys conducted in November 1989 and February 1990 then included a similar question, albeit asking about the likelihood of reunification occurring within five years' time (see Table 3 and Online Appendix Table 3.2). 47 The USIA and Gallup data are not directly comparable. However, the opening of the Berlin Wall did appear to make the British public feel a united Germany was a more immediate prospect. In November, a quarter (24%) replied that it was very likely Germany would be united within five years, a third saw it as being fairly likely, 23% saw it as not very likely and 12% as not at all likely. When this question was repeated in late February, another clear shift was recorded. By then, a majority (56%) believed that reunification was very likely to occur within five years, with a further three in 10 (29%) seeing it as fairly likely. Demonstrating that the The question asked: 'How likely do you think it is that Germany will be united within the next 5 years: very likely, fairly likely, not very likely or not at all likely?' All but those answering 'very likely' were asked a subsequent question about the likelihood of reunification occurring within the next 10 years, with another question -following the same logic -asking about reunification taking place within the next 20 years. Data presented here only relate to the first iteration of this question.
British public considered the prospect of a united Germany to be a foregone conclusion, fewer than one in 10 felt it was now unlikely. The pace of change was picked up by some within British society more than others, too. By February, the 'war generation' were more inclined to feel that Germany would very likely be united within five years -a feature that suggests their greater opposition to the principle of reunification generated concern about its speed.
The British public therefore increasingly viewed German reunification as an inevitability. Yet, the prospect of this occurring in 1990 seemed far off. From a historian's perspective, it is frustrating that, rather than a time period occurring sooner, Gallup's two commercial surveys also asked about the probability of reunification taking place in 10 and 20 years' time. Fortunately, however, a USIA survey spanning from mid-December 1989 to January 1990 included a different question, asking respondents whether they thought reunification would most likely take place within one year, three years, 10 years or never (see Online Appendix Table 3.3). This again confirms that the British public foresaw a drawn-out process. In response, only 5% felt reunification would likely occur within one year, a third (32%) selected within three years and 44% within 10. Meanwhile, 8% felt it would never occur -with this answer, unsurprisingly, being more popular among Britons who preferred to see East and West Germany remain as separate states (15%). 48

A threat? The spectre of German power
As well as upending the post-war settlement in Europe, German reunification raised questions about the future power of a united Germany. Like the prime minister and many within her Cabinet, a significant proportion of the British population will have had personal memories of their country being at war with Germany, while those not old enough to have lived through conflict will have been children or grandchildren of those who did. Linked to this, that the Federal Republic of Germany had not officially recognised the Oder-Neisse line as demarcating German territory from that of Poland was also cause for concern at an elite level. It was therefore little surprise that with reunification moving onto the agenda, opinion polls included questions about whether a united Germany would again pose a military threat. While the spectre of Germany's aggressive past was revived, there was also much discussion -at a time when the EC was taking initial concrete steps towards establishing economic and monetary union (EMU) -about the economic threat a united Germany would pose. Although a more benign threat, German economic dominance was a real concern -and lay at the heart of Nicholas Ridley's comments to The Spectator, which forced his resignation from Cabinet. Questions about this form of power were therefore also frequently asked. Suggesting that contemporary discourses about Germany's power were stronger than historical ones, the British public were more likely to view a united Germany as a potential economic rather than a military threat. However, the 'war generation' were split over the potential for the latter.

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The availability of this answer option potentially influenced opponents of German unity to respond with their general preference regarding reunification in mind, as opposed to their prediction of when it would likely occur.
USIA surveys conducted in October 1989 and February 1990 gauged whether the British public thought it was likely that a united Germany would pose an economic and military threat to Britain (see Table 4 and Online Appendix Table 4.1). 49 The fall of the Berlin Wall clearly sharpened focus on these issues as threat perceptions increased significantly. Still, at both points in time greater proportions felt that a united Germany would likely pose an economic compared to a military threat. Indeed, it is striking that in February 1990 the proportion thinking a united Germany would very likely be an economic threat (25%) was significantly greater than the proportion who felt this was not at all likely (14%). In contrast, these figures were reversed for the perception of a united Germany representing a military threat.
The 'war generation' were likelier to foresee a united Germany as both an economic and a military threat. But, suggesting the importance of their earlier lived experiences, differences in opinion compared to younger age groups were more pronounced for the prospect of Germany being a military threat. Attitudes towards reunification were an unsurprising dividing line too, with threat perceptions significantly more prevalent among those preferring that East and West Germany remain as separate states. Among this cohort, in February 1990 the proportions seeing a united Germany as a likely military and economic threat outweighed the proportions who felt these were unlikely. In comparison, supporters of reunification were split as to whether a united Germany would pose an economic threat, with this belief clearly not being something that deterred a large number of people from supporting reunification. However, supporters of reunification clearly rejected the idea that Germany would pose a military threat.
Similar trends played out in other data. Gallup's two commercial polls found opinion split as to whether a united Germany would pose an economic threat to Western Europe (see Table 5 and Online Appendix Table 4.2). 50 In contrast, at both points in time around half felt a united Germany would not pose a military threat, with around a third of the view that it would. Differences in the balance of opinion between the 'war generation' and younger cohorts were again apparent: the elder generation were more inclined to feel Source: Author's analysis of USIA data. 49 The questions asked: 'In your opinion, how likely is it that a reunified Germany would present an economic/military threat to Britain -is it very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely or not likely at all?' The February 1990 survey referenced 'to the UK' rather than 'to Britain'. 50 The questions asked: 'Do you think that a united Germany would or would not pose an economic threat to western Europe?', and 'Do you think that a united Germany would or would not pose a military threat?' a united Germany would pose an economic threat, while they were divided on the question of Germany posing a military threat.
Assessing this subject using a different approach, MORI polls conducted in January and July 1990 found around half of Britons would be worried if 'a reunified Germany would become the dominant power in Europe', with just over a third saying they would not be (see Table 6 and Online Appendix Table 4.3). 51 At a sub-group level, in addition to the 'war generation', Conservative voters were somewhat more inclined to be worried, with Labour supporters' concern around the population average. MORI then used a subsequent question to ascertain reasons for respondents' worry. 52 This elicited slightly greater concern about a return of Nazism than a united Germany's economic strength (see Table 6 and Online Appendix Table 4.4). 53 In both waves around half of worried Britons felt a reunified Germany may lead to the return of Nazism, while between twofifths and a half were worried because Germany's economy might become too strong. In January, 28% were concerned Germany might try to expand its territory, with this rising  This asked: 'Some people have said that a reunified Germany would become the dominant power in Europe. If this were to happen, would you be worried, or not?' In January British opinion was in line with that in France. In contrast, more than two-thirds of Polish respondents (69%) expressed that German dominance in Europe would worry them. For comparisons with opinion in France, Poland and the United States see Online Appendix Tables 4.3.   52 This asked: 'Would you say you are worried because Germany may try to expand its territory again, or because the German economy may become too strong, or because it may lead to a revival of Nazism, or for some other reason?' 53 Framing the question around Germany becoming 'the dominant power in Europe', as well as the fact the response options were prompted, potentially helps explain this.
to 41% in July. 54 Worried members of the 'war generation' were more likely to fear a return of Nazism. Meanwhile, a partisan divide appeared to exist, with worried Labour voters more likely to mention a revival of Nazism and worried Conservatives more concerned about Germany's economic potential. Where these differences stemmed from is uncertain, though the general higher salience of economic matters among Conservative supporters can perhaps be linked to this. 55 Further questions tested whether Germany would threaten peace in Europe, with age a clear driver of opinion on this. MORI's July survey after the Ridley affair found 30% agreed and 62% disagreed that 'a united Germany will pose a serious threat to peace in Europe in the future' (see Online Appendix Table 4.5). The 'war generation' were divided over this question, with younger cohorts overwhelmingly disagreeing. Age divides were also apparent in NOP's survey carried out after Ridley's provocative comments (see Online Appendix Table 4.6). When asked: 'Do you think that a united Germany could pose a threat to European peace?', 29% said yes and 62% said no; among those aged 55 and over 37% said yes and 53% said no. 55

A united Germany and NATO
The most delicate aspect of the Two Plus Four negotiations centred around a united Germany's alliance membership. The primary source of difficulty stemmed from the Soviet Union, which sought to forestall NATO's eastward expansion and preserve the Warsaw Pact. However, in line with the stance of the United States, for Thatcher and the British government there was a steadfast view that a united Germany must be a NATO member. Indeed, it was British insistence that the Two Plus Four Treaty specified measures regarding the stationing of NATO forces in the Länder that made up East Germany which threatened to delay its signing. 56 The idea that it was important for a future united Germany to be a member of NATO was also shared by strong majorities of the British public in 1989-90 -a feature that reflects the strong importance the British public attached to the alliance. 57 Five measures from USIA surveys, whose fieldwork spanned from October 1989 through to June 1990, demonstrate this. 58 No fewer than two-thirds of Britons felt German NATO membership to be very or somewhat important (see Table 7 and Online Appendix Table 5.1). The proportion identifying this as unimportant was greater in all measures recorded after the opening of the Berlin Wall compared to that taken in October 1989 (9%). However, this grew to no more than a quarter, with the increased 54 Responses to this question in Britain in January differed markedly to those in France, where a majority (55%) felt Germany's economy may become too strong. In Poland, concerns about territorial expansion (54%) were as prevalent as worries about the possible return of Nazism (53%). For comparisons with opinion in France, Poland and the United States in January 1990 see Online Appendix Tables 4.4. Political, Social, Economic Review 82 (July 1990), 12, AMSR, NOR82. 56 Sarotte, Not one Inch, 102-4. 57 Across the post-war period, polling had found a consistent strong majority of Britons of the view that NATO was essential for the country's security. See Clements,British Public Opinion, In October 1989 the question wording was: 'In your opinion, how important is it to our country's security that Germany remain within NATO, that is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation of Western Europe, the US and Canada -is it very important, somewhat important, not very important or not at all important?' Subsequently, the first part of the question was altered to: 'In your opinion, how important is it to our country's security that a united Germany be a member of NATO?' incidence of this opinion a likely consequence of a change in how the question was framed. At a sub-group level, the importance attached to a united Germany's NATO membership differed most according to views of NATO -and it was this that seemingly drove younger adults' greater inclination to feel German NATO membership was not important. 59 It was the case, however, that among those of the view that NATO was no longer essential to Britain's security or who opposed Britain's membership, opinion was split regarding the importance of a united Germany being a member.

NOP
The strong belief that a united Germany should be a NATO member is also confirmed by MORI's January 1990 poll, in which 61% said they would prefer to see a reunified Germany as part of NATO, with 22% stating a preference for a neutral Germany (see Online Appendix Table 5.2). 60 With this question also fielded in France and the United States (as well as Poland), British opinion can be compared with that elsewhere. And of the three NATO members in which the survey took place, the British were the strongest supporters of a united Germany being part of the organisation. This is perhaps unsurprising given that France remained outside of NATO's military command. But it is striking that the preference for German NATO membership was greater among the British than the US public, even though both nations' governments were unequivocal in their insistence that a united Germany should be a member of the alliance. 61 This strong preference co-existed with a perception that a united Germany might not ally with the West, though. In November 1989 and February 1990, Gallup asked who the public thought a united Germany would ally with (see Table 8 and Online Appendix  Table 5.3). 62 Although not explicitly linked to security matters, it is likely that most answered this question with NATO in mind. Opinion was similar across both measures. A united Germany allied with Eastern Europe was clearly out of the question. Yet the proportion foreseeing a neutral Germany was similar to the figure who thought Germany would ally with Western Europe -a sign that there was some public concern about Germany's future intentions.

German reunification and European integration
The fall of the Berlin Wall also came at a time of important developments in the process of European integration. The 1986 Single European Act had initiated the liberalisation of the internal European market -a goal which Margaret Thatcher and her government strongly supported. 63 But Thatcher opposed the prospect of integration in the realm of social policy as well as moves towards establishing political union and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Furthermore, by the point at which reunification came onto the agenda, she had become openly critical of the aims of the entire European integration project. 64 The push to establish EMU gained momentum more or less concurrently with the drive to German reunification though, with the Delors Report published in April 1989 and a majority of member states -not including Britain -voting to convene an intergovernmental conference (IGC) on EMU at the December 1989 Strasbourg European Council. 65 The reunification process also coincided with renewed Cabinet tensions over British participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) -a more limited form of monetary cooperation. Disputes over this contributed towards Thatcher demoting Geoffrey Howe from foreign secretary to leader of the House of Commons and deputy prime minister in July 1989, as well as Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson's resignation in October 1989. By April 1990, however, Lawson's successor John Major had persuaded Thatcher to reverse her opposition towards ERM entry and Britain joined on 8 October 1990 -five days after German reunification took place. 66

62
The exact question wording was: 'Assuming that West and East Germany were to be united and thinking of the long run, do you think that the United Germany would ally themselves with Western Europe, with Eastern Europe and Russia, or be neutral?' 63 Albeit largely a consequence of her general antagonism towards deeper European integration, Thatcher thus strongly opposed the notion that more Europe was required to counteract there being more Germany. Based on data from MORI's January poll though, the British public were split over this matter, with 39% saying the prospect of a united Germany made it more acceptable for the EC to become a closer political union and 45% answering that German reunification made no difference (see Online Appendix Table 6.1). 67 At a time when public attitudes towards European integration differed little according to party support, this split in opinion was replicated across partisan divides. 68 There were minimal age differences too -again reflecting general attitudes towards integration at the time -although it was the case that younger Britons (52%) were more inclined to believe German reunification made no difference, while the 'war generation' (43%) and 35-54 year olds (41%) were slightly more likely to feel that reunification made political union more acceptable.
Views on the broader implications of German reunification for European integration are also available from the spring 1990 Eurobarometer. Of the questions included, two stand out for their value. In response to the first, 35% of Britons felt that 'a unified Germany can be integrated into the EC without any problem', while 28% believed 'German unification will interfere with the process of European integration' (see Online Appendix Table 6.2). 69 Responses differed little across age and partisan divides. However, attitudes towards reunification impacted the public's views. Reflective of their pessimism about the prospect of a united Germany, around two-thirds who opposed reunification (63%) felt it would interfere with the integration process. In contrast, half of those in favour (49%) thought a united Germany could be integrated into the EC without any problem. Attitudes towards EC membership also guided opinions. A plurality who saw Britain's EC membership as a bad thing (41%) said that reunification would interfere with European integration. Meanwhile, 42% who considered EC membership to be a good thing believed that a united Germany could be integrated into the EC without issue.
The second question asked respondents: 'Thinking of urgent political objectives, which of these is more important to you: the unification of the two German states or the completion of the Single European Market by the beginning of 1993?' Around half (47%) said completing the Single Market while three in 10 (31%) selected German reunification (see Online Appendix Tables 6.3). 70 A two-thirds majority (67%) who opposed reunification answered that the completion of the Single Market was more important, while opinion was split among those in favour.

67
Respondents were asked: 'In your view does the prospect of a united Germany make it more or less acceptable for the European Community to become a closer political union, or does it make no difference?' One in ten (10%) felt it made the EC becoming a closer political union less acceptable, and 7% said they did not know. For comparisons with opinion in France, Poland and the United States see Online Appendix Tables 6.1. 68 Flickinger, 'British Political Parties'. 69 This asked: 'Thinking of the possible effects of political developments in Germany on European integration, which of the following statements come closest to your own personal opinion?' 28% replied that they had not thought about the matter, with 9% responding 'don't know'. For comparisons with opinion in other member states see Online Appendix Table 6.2. 70 One in 10 were undecided, with 12% answering 'don't know'. For comparisons with opinion in other member states see Online Appendix Table 6.3.
Meanwhile, those seeing EC membership as a good (54%) and bad thing (41%) were both more likely to believe completing the Single Market was of greater importance, albeit to different degrees.
Surveys covering the Ridley affair then dealt with the links Nicholas Ridley made between EMU and German reunification. MORI, NOP and Gallup all included questions asking whether the public agreed or disagreed with Ridley's remark that moves towards EMU were 'all a German racket designed to take over the whole of Europe'. 71 The balance of opinion for all three questions was similar, with between a quarter and a third agreeing, and more than half disagreeing (see Table 9, and Online Appendix Tables 6.4 and 6.5). All three surveys revealed an age divide, with MORI and Gallup finding greater levels of agreement among the 'war generation' and NOP reporting weaker disagreement among older adults. 72 MORI and Gallup found partisan divides too, with Conservative voters seeming to rally behind the views of a minister belonging to the party they supported.
MORI and Gallup also tested attitudes towards Ridley's statement that 'being bossed by a German -it would cause absolute mayhem in this country'. 73 According to MORI, a third said Ridley was right to say this, with three-fifths (61%) of the view he was wrong (see Online Appendix Table 6.6). Gallup found 36% agreeing and 52% disagreeing that EC efforts -led by Germany -to impose 'tight financial discipline' would cause mayhem in Britain (see Online Appendix Table 6.7). 74 Both surveys again found greater agreement among the 'war generation' and Conservative voters.

Conclusion
By analysing attitudes towards German unity beyond just the elite level, this article makes a novel contribution to the literature on the British response to German reunification. In particular, the article has shown that hostility towards German unity of the type Margaret Thatcher expressed was not the dominant view among the overall British public. Aside Table 9. Agreement with Nicholas Ridley that EMU 'a German racket to take over Europe? (July 1990 "This is all a German racket designed to take over the whole of Europe. It has to be thwarted." Do you agree or disagree with Mr. Ridley?' Gallup asked whether respondents agreed or disagreed that: 'Proposals for European monetary union [are] "all a German racket to take over Europe." ' See Anthony King, Germans Trusted by Most Britons', Sunday Telegraph, July 15, 1990, 3. The exact NOP question wording is unclear. See NOP Political, Social, Economic Review, no. 82 (July 1990), 10-12, AMSR, NOP82. 72 See NOP Political, Social, Economic Review, no. 82 (July 1990), 10-12, AMSR, NOP82. No detailed data tables are available, with the analysis contained in the NOP report focusing on the fact disagreement was strongest among 18-34year-olds. 73 MORI's question tested this statement in more general terms, asking: 'Nicholas Ridley has also said: "Being bossed by a German . . . would cause mayhem in this country". Do you think Mr. Ridley was right or wrong to make such a statement?' In comparison, Gallup's question framed this statement more around EMU, by asking whether respondents agreed with the statement: 'If [the European] Community led by Germany imposed tight financial discipline on Britain, "it would cause absolute mayhem" in Britain.' 74 See Anthony King, 'Germans Trusted by Most Britons ', Sunday Telegraph, July 15, 1990, 3. This idea may still have existed among a minority. But counter to the argument that Ramsden presents, it was significantly less prevalent among those unborn in 1945 when compared to their elders.
Finally, the article adds to knowledge of British public opinion on foreign policy. Ben Clements' recent monograph makes a significant contribution towards this field, providing a longitudinal analysis of public opinion on foreign and defence policy on six themes -foreign and defence policy as an issue area, the United States and NATO, European integration, overseas aid, defence spending and nuclear weapons, and military intervention. By incorporating analysis of public opinion towards the implications of German reunification for NATO and European integration, the article reinforces Clements' arguments on two of these matters. 81 Through analysing public opinion towards a single foreign policy event, the article then extends Clements' work through filling a gap he identifies. While analysing broad topics, in his conclusion Clements reflects that 'more in-depth analyses of British public opinion' and 'more thematically or temporally focused studies of particular case studies, issues or periods of government or prime ministerial tenure' would offer 'fruitful area[s] for future scholarly research'. 82 With the attention generated by Margaret Thatcher's response towards German unityand with German reunification representing a crucial moment at the end of the Cold War -public opinion towards this subject represents an interesting case study too. Now with a significant amount of respondent-level data from historical Gallup opinion polls conducted between 1955 and 1991 available to the research community, hopefully this article will encourage further interest in British public attitudes towards foreign and defence policy matters during the Cold War.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s). The desire to see a reunified Germany as part of NATO can be seen as consistent with the strong public support that NATO has received in Britain. Meanwhile, the division over whether German reunification necessitated more Europe reflected the general British coolness towards advancing integration. See Clements, British Public Opinion on Foreign and Defence Policy, Clements, British Public Opinion on Foreign and Defence Policy, 256-7.