**Gaining Political Capital through Social Capital: Inclusion in Policy-Making and
Network Embeddedness of Immigrants' Associations in Spain**

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ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes the relevance of network embeddedness and social capital in allowing immigrants' associations to gain political capital and access to policy-making in the cities of Barcelona and Madrid. With data from a survey to immigrants' associations in both locations, we examine the degree to which embeddedness in networks of links with other immigrants' associations and with autochthonous Spanish civil society organizations are consequential for the inclusion of immigrants' organizations in policy making processes. The results show that immigrants' organizational social capital is critical in facilitating their intermediation function *vis à vis* political institutions and decision-makers, further and beyond their access to financial and human capital.

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INTRODUCTION

The integration of immigrants into the societies where they come to settle has become a widely contested topic of public debate in most western democracies. Both media commentators and scholars frequently express their worries about what they evaluate as a limited degree of social, cultural, and political integration of immigrant-origin communities in receiving societies. Most recently, this debate has become particularly intense within political science due to the pessimistic outlook portrayed by two very prominent scholars (Huntington 2004; Putnam 2007).¹

Underlying these debates is a common preoccupation about—as well as a certain desire to shape—the policies that governments at various levels should enact to encourage immigrants' integration into the receiving society. In what regards addressing collective needs and identities, should public policies actively promote integration through sponsoring immigrants' associations and their capacity to self-organize? Is it better—in the long run—to avoid having explicit integration policies and let immigrants seek their own resources to form associations? Or are active multicultural policies that encourage certain forms of immigrant organizing more effective in reducing conflict and empowering migrant groups?²

Scholars are far from reaching an agreement as to whether multicultural policies are more effective than 'assimilationist' ones in empowering and incorporating migrant

populations to the polity of the countries where they live, or whether they result in greater ethnic segregation (see, e.g., Koopmans 2003, 2010; Parekh 2008; Duyvendak, Pels and Rijkschroeff 2005). Some argue that multicultural policies are beneficial for the incorporation of migrants and ethnic minorities to the extent that they nurture the self-organization of migrants in associations and provide institutional channels for their participation in policy-making (see Fennema and Tillie 2001; Bloemraad 2005, 2006).

Indeed, these questions lie at the core of current lay and scholarly debates on the public management of immigration, and this is not the place to address them properly.³ Yet, what all these various models of migrant integration would probably share is a general and vague notion that migrants' social and cultural integration is—at least to a certain extent—favored by their political incorporation to the public arena (see Jones-Correa 1998). Certainly, active engagement in electoral politics is among the most successful mechanisms to promote the full consideration of migrant minorities as citizens worth the attention of politicians. Because parties and candidates are vote maximizers, the dynamics of electoral competition make migrant and ethnic minorities an attractive new pool of voters whose electoral preferences can be moulded to form loyal constituencies—especially when these groups are large enough to make a difference in the outcome.⁴ In this regard, the literature on political transnationalism has shown that the sustained transnational links of migrant groups contribute to the emergence of migrant political entrepreneurs that help bridging the politics of the 'homeland' with local politics (Basch, Glick-Schiller and Szanton-Blanc 1994; Guarnizo, Portes and Haller 2003; Portes and Rumbaut 2006).

But electoral politics is not the only mechanism through which this political incorporation takes place. In fact, what happens between elections should be regarded as important as electoral contests. Through lobby and advocacy activities, migrant communities who actively engage in the public arena are able to shape the real political choices that elites make. This political activity is oftentimes almost monopolized by various types of civic and advocacy organizations that act as intermediaries between the elites and the migrant groups.⁵ Attending meetings at the local council, joining stable committees that debate policy decisions, and participating in ‘crisis’ teams to solve episodes of social conflict are some of the forms in which the associations of migrants can exert a continued impact on the politics of the countries where they come to settle.

At the very least, regardless of the citizenship or incorporation model the receiving country follows, the migrant communities that are more likely to engage in such activities through their own organizations will be in a better position to further their interests and well-being. In this sense, having a say is the very first step to being able to shape policy outcomes. But voice and access are not equally distributed among social groups, or—for that matter—among civil society organizations (CSOs). Some associations actively engage in public affairs, while others refrain from politics; and even among those interested in lobbying and advocacy, some are able to build political coalitions that grant them access to policy making, while others remain marginalized. Learning more about the processes that lead some CSOs to gain greater access to policy makers, while others are less privileged in making their voices heard is, thus, key to our understanding of the biases the policy process will carry. This is particularly important in a policy sector—like immigrant integration—where

governments—national, regional, and local alike— around Europe and elsewhere are converging towards actively engaging with immigrant associations when designing their policy strategies.⁶ Yet, most of the scholarly literature has concentrated much more on describing and theorizing about what structural and institutional aspects lead to immigrants being able to successfully selforganize, and has left aside the examination of what factors make immigrant organizations more or less successful in becoming influential.⁷

What helps migrants' organizations have a say in policy making? What resources— economic, human, and social—condition their capacity to influence decision-making processes? This article underscores the role of social networks—or social capital—in advancing the empowerment of migrants' organizations, and it looks into this matter by studying these organizations in two Spanish cities: Barcelona and Madrid.

Social capital—in the form of links with other migrant organizations, and ties to mainstream political, advocacy and civil society organizations—is crucial to enhance the ability of migrant organizations to have a say in the policy process, at least in certain policy contexts. As we will show, social capital turns out to be as, or more, determining than economic and human capital as resources for policy inclusion. In contradiction with the contention of resource mobilization theory (McCarthy and Zald 1977), and of past research on the political economy of associations (Knoke 1990), financial and bureaucratic resources—though clearly important—are not the main drivers of access to the policy domain for migrant organizations in Spain. As our findings suggest, migrants' organizations social capital decisively determines their access to policy makers and decision making opportunities. This is, most likely, a

consequence of the additional information, influence and credentials that social capital provides to these social agents (see Lin 2001: 19-20), which happen to be crucial in a context of limited and imperfect information about who are the relevant interlocutors.

This article contends that in contexts—such as the immigration policy domain in Spain—where the policy process is characterized by the lack of clear procedures, structures and practices of social consultation and intermediation, social capital will emerge as one of the most relevant forms of capital for policy inclusion. Rather than relying on vast financial resources or highly skilled human resources, organizations can rely more on building and mobilizing contacts, centrality, visibility, and ‘prestige’. Their ties to a wide range of organizations and actors will render them ‘relevant’ to the eyes of policy makers, who have not established more formal mechanisms or practices of interest intermediation.

In this sense, these two case studies of the policy inclusion of migrants’ organizations in Spain illustrate those situations in which a policy field is in the making. Substantial flows of immigration to Barcelona and Madrid are a relatively recent phenomenon, as all around Spain more generally. Both cities have become one of the major immigration magnets in Spain and in Europe during the last decade, and especially in Madrid for Latin Americans from Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru). High rates of economic growth between 2000 and 2008 have attracted a large number of immigrants—mostly economic or labor migrants—whose entry to the country (regular or irregularly) was facilitated by a very open visa policy that was common for many Latin American citizens travelling to Spain.⁸ The novelty of massive immigration to these two cities and the country has meant that these inflows

have taken place in the absence of well defined policies and actions in most areas of immigration management and immigrant integration (see Morales, González and Jorba 2009).

Moreover, immigrants of Latin American origin benefit from considerable privileges in many respects. The most relevant one is the easier and quicker access to Spanish citizenship, as they are only required to document two years of continued legal residence in the country when the general rule—which applies to Moroccans, one of the largest immigrant group, among other nationals—requires ten years. Additionally, the fact that Latin American immigrants, for the most part, also speak Spanish as their mother tongue in principle facilitates their integration individually and as a group, since this endows them with easier access to various social and public resources—for example, access to the mainstream media.

On the policy making front, while border controls and entry policies are clearly an exclusive competence of the national government in Spain, regional governments are allowed to regulate on immigration issues within the limits of their own powers (health care, education, social services, etc.). However, these powers have not been extensively developed thus far, and regional governments and local governments, above all, manage daily integration issues. Moreover, whereas access to social services and welfare rights are generously granted even to undocumented immigrants by all levels of government, voting rights at the local level have not been recognized as yet for most non-EU citizens.⁹

This lack of a systematic and clearly defined model of immigration and migrant integration policy coexists with the absence of a clear model of interest mediation. Whereas trade unions and business organizations have been fully institutionalized and incorporated to the policy process through various concertation mechanisms, interest intermediation in Spain is generally not well structured for policy domains other than the labor and economic policies.¹⁰ Furthermore, the lack of structuration and habit of consultation with a wider range of organizations in most policy arenas has resulted in the omnipresence of trade unions and business associations as the main actors. This is also the case for integration policies in Madrid, and in Spain generally. The case of Barcelona slightly diverges in this regard, as the local government of this city has enacted a longstanding approach of wider consultation mechanisms through a multiplicity of consultation and participation bodies or committees that are much more inclusive, and which incorporate a wider range of civil society organizations (see Morales, González and Jorba 2009, for a detailed description).

In this article, our main aim is to assess the impact that the social capital of immigrants' organizations has on their capacity to become incorporated to the policy process. To this aim, we explicitly compare it to the effect that other organizational resources—financial and human—have for achieving the same goals. First, we discuss the role that the literature on associations has reserved to social networks and ties. Structures of social connection are generally regarded in the scholarly literature as instrumental to collective action, insofar as they foster the flow of communication and information, facilitate recruitment into action, and multiply the access to other financial resources and infrastructure.

After describing the data and the methods employed to collect them, we present our empirical findings. With multivariate regression models we show that the social capital of immigrants' associations in Barcelona and Madrid is of utmost relevance for getting access to the host country policy process. While economic capital is of only limited value to be included in policy making in these two Spanish cities, the position of migrants' organizations in the network of contacts with other migrant associations and with local autochthonous organizations has a crucial impact on their capacity to have a say in decision making processes. We conclude the paper with a discussion on why this is the case, and how can further research bring more light into this topic.

ECONOMIC, HUMAN AND SOCIAL CAPITAL: THE ROLE OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS FOR MIGRANTS' POLITICAL INCORPORATION.

Scholarship on the political economies of associations has demonstrated the relevance of three forms of capital in supporting their political mobilization and advancing their capacity to influence the policy process (Knoke 1983, 1990). Financial resources—especially in contexts where lobbying requires the mobilization of intense pressure activity—are fundamental for organizations to have a chance at mobilizing supporters. Bureaucratic structures and organizational differentiation, as well as professionalized staff are frequently necessary to mobilize the organizational and human skills that the complexities of policy intervention require. How the social capital of organizations operates for fostering or hindering access to the policy process is a much less

researched aspect (see Edwards and McCarthy 2004). Knoke (1983) shows that the type and diversity of links with sponsors has a clear impact on members' evaluations of goal effectiveness through the development of different perceptions of reputation. And, in turn, these evaluations are important for individual members' commitment and involvement in mobilization processes. Equally, Ansell (2003) illustrates how the nature of the interorganizational links between associations has an impact on their capacity to engage in collaborations with public authorities: associations that are more inclined to reach out to organizations beyond the strictly local realm are also more inclined to collaborate with governmental elites.

Yet, while various scholars acknowledge that networks and connectivity matters for organizational capacity and influence (see Diani 2003 for a summary), it is unclear what the underlying processes at work are. Information and communication flows are generally pointed at. Fennema and Tillie (1999, 2001) have argued that connections among ethnic organizations are conducive to positive effects on immigrants' participation in the host polity.¹¹ The main reason is that these links act as channels of communication that promote greater collective information and trust, and link the organizations of the newcomers to the native political elite.

High connectivity and centrality is also thought of as a mobilization resource (see various pieces in Diani and McAdam 2003) and, thus, better connected organizations are better at mobilizing supporters and forming coalitions that will enhance their ability to influence policy makers. In particular, ties with the political parties and the governmental institutions increase an organization's capacity to influence policy making (Klandermans 1989). However, given that—in one way or another—social

networks primarily act as resources, and that the value of specific resources is dependent on the cost-benefit structure of action, the impact of connectivity on organizational action and policy influence is likely to be very sensitive to the mobilization context in which these networks are embedded.¹²

A different, but related, debate focuses on the types of linkages that are more effective in promoting integrated cooperation. The debate about ‘bridging’ and ‘bonding’ social capital (Putnam 2000) has also been extended to analyses of the effectiveness of organizational activity and the implications for integration and social cohesion. Bonding social capital or ‘strong’ ties favors internal group cohesion and identity formation (Granovetter 1973, 1983), while bridging social capital or ‘weak’ ties allows communication to expand farther and to promote wider (or macro) social cohesion and exchange.¹³ Therefore, different types of embeddedness in organizational networks are likely to produce different outcomes in terms of the integration and capacity of migrants’ organizations (Jacobs and Tillie 2004).

However, it is unclear whether ‘bonding’ relationships will necessarily be detrimental for the political incorporation of migrant organizations to the host polity. While a narrow focus on identity formation might prevent them from engaging in wider political action, the scholarship on social movements has also clearly established that strong collective identities can be an asset to mobilize the less advantaged groups in society (Taylor and Whittier 1992; Friedman and McAdam 1992). Consequently, a high degree of connectivity among migrant organizations—even if only one of the multiple indicators of ‘bonding’ ties—multiplies their social capital and is likely to have an impact on their political action and effectiveness.

This review of past research on the impact of the various forms of capital and, in particular, of interorganizational networks and social capital leads us to the following expectations:

- (1) Immigrants' organizations with greater financial and human resources are more likely to be included in the policy process.
- (2) Immigrants' organizations with higher levels of social capital—in the form of collaborative ties with other immigrant organizations and with other mainstream autochthonous organizations—are more likely to be included in the policy process.
- (3) While both higher degrees of 'bridging' (i.e. with autochthonous organizations) and 'bonding' (i.e. with other immigrant organizations) social capital are expected to increase the chances of inclusion in policy making, we expect that 'bridging' connections will be more consequential than 'bonding' ones in this regard.

In the next section we describe the data and methods used to test these propositions in the empirical section of this article.

DATA AND METHODS

This study includes in the notion of 'migrants' the population of foreign birth and their immediate descendants, thus including what is commonly referred to as first and

second generations.¹⁴ Two additional definitions are fundamental in determining our selection of the organizations that were the object of analysis. First, we defined an association as ‘*a formally organized named group most of whose members—whether persons or organizations—are not financially recompensed for their participation*’ (Knoke 1986: 2). Thus, family, clans, groups of friends, commercial organizations, foundations or government agencies were not included. Secondly, we defined an association as a ‘migrant’ organization when, at least, around half of its members or half of its leadership were of migrant origin, thus including first and second generations. We, therefore, used a relatively wide definition of the term ‘migrants’ organization’ but we did not include associations mainly devoted to work with or for migrants if mostly composed by autochthonous Spaniards.

The collection of the data on migrants’ associations in Barcelona and Madrid proceeded in two stages between 2007 and 2008. First, we produced a list of all existing migrant organizations from multiple sources¹⁵—as no reliable single list is available in any Spanish city—and, at a second stage, we organized interviews with organizational leaders and administered a face-to-face questionnaire of approximately one hour of duration. We excluded from the study those organizations that were not formed by migrants and were, rather, promigrant organizations, and those that no longer existed.

In total, we detected close to 900 migrants’ organizations in the two cities during the listing phase. Many of these had disappeared, were ineligible according to our criteria, or were ‘dormant’ by the time we started fieldwork. After sifting the initial list, more than 400 organizations—223 in Barcelona and 199 in Madrid—were confirmed to be

active, and we arranged face-to-face interviews with all the eligible organizations that accepted to participate in the study, completing 163 questionnaires: 100 in Barcelona and 63 in Madrid.¹⁶ These results entail a response rate of around 45 percent in Barcelona and 32 percent in Madrid (Table 1).¹⁷ In most cases, nonresponse was due to the organizational leaders failing to keep with the appointments, refusing to participate in the study, or to the impossibility of getting accurate contact details from any member of the organization.¹⁸ The final results are, thus, likely to provide a relatively accurate picture of the migrants' organizations with some activity and visibility in both cities.

***** TABLE 1 AROUND HERE *****

Our fieldwork results suggest that the associational density of the migrant population is—as could be expected—lower when compared to that of the autochthonous population: around 1.6 associations per 1,000 migrants in Barcelona and 0.8 in Madrid, as opposed to an average 5.7 per 1,000 inhabitants when all the population is considered.¹⁹ However, as in the case for the autochthonous population, associational density is sensibly larger in Barcelona than in Madrid, a pattern consistent with the view of a more 'vibrant' associational field in the former city.

Furthermore, although Latin American organizations dominate the associational field of migrants in both cities, they are not grossly overrepresented when compared to their share in the foreign resident population (Table 2).²⁰ Indeed, non Maghrebi African associations are more numerous than the share of the corresponding population would make us expect, and there is also a substantial proportion of

associations in both cities that combine members and leaders of multiple world regions. Thus, even if Latin American organizations are more numerous, the field of migrants' associations in both cities is quite heterogeneous in its origin and composition.

***** TABLE 2 AROUND HERE *****

RESULTS

The Measurement of Policy Inclusion

Our survey enquired organizational leaders about their involvement in a number of forms of policy inclusion at the three main levels of government in Spain: local, regional and national. The questionnaire asked first whether the organization or their leaders had received an invitation to participate in the policy process through any of the multiple mechanisms that were available at each level of government and, when invited, whether they had eventually participated (Table 3). Only a limited number of migrants' organizations received requests to participate in the policy process in the two years prior to the survey, and these invitations are much more frequent at the local level of government than at the regional or national level. Yet, those that are indeed invited are very likely to accept and participate in policy decision making, as almost all associations that received an invitation declared to have participated in the end. Overall, however, 48 percent of associations in Barcelona and 68 percent in

Madrid were invited to participate in decision making structures at some level of government and similar proportions had eventually participated.

***** TABLE 3 AROUND HERE *****

As we see, overall, the degree of policy inclusion of migrants' organizations is moderate in Barcelona and a bit more common in Madrid, and is much more frequent through permanent and formal procedures—e.g., as a permanent member to a committee or advisory council—than through more informal and ad-hoc mechanisms—e.g., through occasional invitations for consultation.

In any case, it is clear that—above all—what determines participation in decision making structures is being invited to participate in the first place.²¹ So in further analyses we will concentrate on examining how different forms of capital impinge on migrants' organizations being invited to join the policy process.

The Measurement of Economic, Human and Social Capital

Unlike Edwards and McCarthy (2004), who distinguish among five forms of resources—moral, cultural, social-organizational, human and material—we focus on three main forms of capital: economic or material, human and social capital. Table 4 illustrates the limited amount of economic, human and social capital of migrants' associations in both Spanish cities.

Migrants' organizations have generally a very limited amount of financial resources available: while the average budget is around € 22,000 in Barcelona and € 59,000 in Madrid, the total budget of the median organization is of around € 3,000 in Barcelona and € 7,000 in Madrid. Furthermore, 13 percent of the interviewed associations in Barcelona claim to have no operating budget whatsoever. This large gap between the average and the median values is due to the existence of a few of organizations with very large budgets.

This lack of financial resources is reflected in the limited availability of qualified human resources, in the form of permanent and professionalized full-time staff. Only 7 percent of all migrants' organizations in Barcelona and 24 percent in Madrid have at least one full-time member of staff; and this can also be accounted for—in addition to the lack of financial capital—by the small size of the typical migrants' associations. Their average membership size is of around 700 members in Barcelona and 1,600 in Madrid, but this figure is hugely biased by a few large organizations and conceals a median membership size of around 50 individuals for the migrant organizations in Barcelona and 160 in Madrid. Hence, overall, in what regards material and human resources, migrants' organizations are substantially better-off in Madrid than in Barcelona.²²

**** TABLE 4 AROUND HERE ****

If we turn our attention to the social capital of migrants' organizations, we notice that ties with other migrant associations prevail over links with the autochthonous Spanish

organizations in Madrid but not in Barcelona. Unlike Fennema and Tillie (1999), and Fennema (2004) the primary source of our information are not interlocking directorates, nor do we have detailed information on overlapping memberships (as in Diani 2003). Our respondents were presented with a set of questions on contacts and collaborations with other organizations. First, we asked them to provide the names of the ten organizations in their respective cities—migrant or autochthonous—with which they had most contact in the past two years. In addition to this open ended question, we provided two additional questions that listed a number of local autochthonous Spanish organizations—parties, unions, environmental groups, human rights associations, anti-racism organizations, NGOs, charities, neighbourhood associations, and religious organizations—and all the migrants’ organizations that we had located during our census creation process, respectively.²³ For both sets of organizations, we asked about contact and close collaboration, but here we report only about responses regarding contact (weak ties) as it is through weak ties that information that might become useful for policy inclusion travels farther.

The average migrant organization is in contact with more than 9 other migrant organizations in Barcelona (median value of 6) and 7 in Madrid (median value of 4), while is ‘weakly’ linked to almost 10 Spanish autochthonous organizations in Barcelona (median value of 7) and with 11 in Madrid (median value of 6.5). Closer collaborations are, logically, much less frequent in all cases. In general, thus, migrants’ organizations in Barcelona would seem to be slightly better connected both with other migrant organizations and with autochthonous civil society. However, the picture is less clear than it would seem at first glance, given that 10 percent of all migrant associations in Barcelona mention no contact whatsoever with other migrant

organizations and 8 percent are not linked to any autochthonous organizations, whereas the respective figures for Madrid are 3 and 13 percent.

Further to the economic, human and social capital of migrants' organizations, four other organizational properties are thought to be relevant for the policy inclusion of these associations, and we also provide their descriptives in Table 4. On the one hand, we mentioned that immigrants of Latin American origin benefit from a certain advantage in Spain, due to sharing the same language and to the favorable nationality rules that apply to them. It would, thus, be reasonable to expect that Latino organizations might have a greater advantage when it comes to influencing the policy process in these two cities. And, as we see in Table 4, around 70 per cent of all migrants' associations we interviewed in Barcelona are of Latino origin, and so are 65 percent of those questioned in Madrid.

Additionally, the years of activity of the association, as well as their policy aims, have commonly been considered important factors for the policy action and impact of organizations (see Knoke 1990, and Diani 2003). Organizations that have been for a longer time in the public arena are more likely to be considered adequate intermediaries for the migrant constituencies. Equally, organizations whose main purpose is to influence decision making processes are also more likely to allocate the necessary organizational resources to influence policy, and to be regarded as potential representatives of migrants' preferences and demands by policy makers.

Given that massive migration flows into Spain and the two cities we study are a relatively recent phenomenon, most migrants' organizations in the city are relatively

young. More than 50 percent of them were founded after 2000, and the average age of the organizations is of 7 years in Barcelona and 10 in Madrid. Furthermore, only a limited number of migrants' organizations (less than 30 percent in both cases) have lobbying and other political activities as one of their main organizational goals. Many migrants' organizations in Madrid are primarily cultural—musical, artistic, etc.—associations that engage little in political activities; and while many others focus on issues and topics related to the migration process, they mostly regard themselves as service providers rather than as advocacy groups. Thus, the politicization of these organizations is relatively limited.

The Role of Economic, Human, and Social Capital for the Policy Inclusion of Migrants' Organizations in Madrid

Table 5 presents the results of the multivariate logistic regression models of policy inclusion on the various organizational attributes that reflect the economic, human and social capital of the interviewed migrants' associations. The table presents five different models of the variable that measure whether the association has received any invitation to participate in the policy process at any level of government or not. The first four models are nested models that show the results when different sets of variables are incorporated, while the fifth model is a more parsimonious one that excludes the indicator on lobbying activities and the one that measures the budget available to the organizations.²⁴ All the models combine the cases for Barcelona and Madrid because separate analyses yielded very similar results for both cities, both in

terms of the size and direction of the coefficients, and merging the cases makes our estimations more robust and efficient given the relatively limited number of cases.

If we focus our attention first on the control variables, a number of interesting findings emerge. First, in contrast with the expectations in the literature on the political economy of associations, the age or length of existence of migrants' organizations is pretty much irrelevant for their policy inclusion. Older organizations are not any more likely to receive invitations to participate in policy making bodies than those of more recent formation. This indicates that policy makers are not biased towards those migrants' organizations that have been in the public arena for a longer period of time, and that older organizations are not able to mobilize more resources of any sort into gaining access to the policy process.

***** TABLE 5 AROUND HERE *****

Second, contrary to what we might expect—and what most observers would predict—there is no positive bias in favor of the organizations of Latin American migrants, but interestingly quite the opposite. Associations whose leadership or membership is primarily composed of Latin Americans are less likely to be invited to participate in policy making mechanisms than the rest of migrants' organizations. This result is partly explained by the fact that the internal heterogeneity of Latin American associations in terms of their main purposes and goals is much greater than for those of other origins, as many of the former are primarily devoted to retaining the cultural traditions of these migrants. The other reason for this result lies in the fact that policy makers are very aware of the need to diversify representation in consultative bodies

and mechanisms by migrant origin, and in so doing—and given that the number of seats in these bodies are always limited—they are likely to underrepresent Latin American organizations relative to their share in the associational field and the migrant population.

Third, the fact that some migrant organizations are primarily pursuing political and lobbying activities while other associations do not view these areas of action as one of their primary concerns is not a hugely relevant factor in policy inclusion. In fact, migrants' organizations that declare 'lobbying' as one of their main activities are not more likely to receive invitations to participate in the policy process than the rest; and those that view politics as one of their main concerns are more likely to receive such invitations but just because they are also more likely to be better connected to autochthonous organizations.²⁵

Finally, although the descriptives of the variables of policy inclusion presented in Table 3 suggested that migrants' associations in Madrid are more often invited to participate in the policy process, the multivariate regressions in Table 5 introduce some doubts about the nature of this gap. Throughout models 1 to 4, the dummy variable for Madrid remains statistically not significant, and it only approaches the standard levels of significance in models 4 and 5 once all the social capital indicators are included. Thus, though these results are not very clear-cut to justify overblown conclusions, it would seem that the more frequent inclusion of migrants' organizations in Madrid than in Barcelona is partly related to the different distribution of resources of these associations in the two cities.

Turning our attention to the variables that are at the core of our concern, as we have discussed in previous sections, the resource mobilization theories put forward by social movements scholars (McCarthy and Zald 1977, Edwards and McCarthy 2004) and the literature on the political economies of associations (Knoke 1990) lead us to expect that financial and human capital will be crucial resources for policy inclusion and impact. Yet, our results show that financial or material resources have no significant effect on the likelihood of migrants' organizations receiving invitations to join the policy process in either of the two cities or when the data for both are combined.²⁶

However, the two indicators on human capital are significant and are critical resources for policy inclusion, especially the size of the membership base. As we can see in Figure 1, migrants' associations with no full-time staff have a probability of 0.55 of being invited to participate in the policy process, while those with at least one member of staff devoted full-time to their job increases that likelihood to 0.9.²⁷ Equally, the chances of being invited to participate in decision making gradually increase as the membership size does, but a very modest increase in the number of members from very few (2-3 members) to still a small group (50 members) yields a substantial increase in the probability of being invited to participate from 0.19 to 0.49.

***** FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE *****

In sharp contrast with the limited impact of economic capital, social capital indicators are clearly relevant to account for the patterns of policy inclusion of migrants' organizations in Barcelona and Madrid. Both the indicator that taps into 'bonding'

social capital (i.e. contacts with other migrant organizations), and that related to ‘bridging’ social capital (i.e. contacts with autochthonous organizations) significantly increase the chances that a migrant association will be invited to have a say in policy making, as expected. Indeed, also as hypothesized at the beginning of this piece, ‘bridging’ contacts are slightly more consequential than ‘bonding’ ones (see Figure 2). In fact, an equivalent increase in the number of contacts from 0 to 40 results in a 2.6 times increase in the probability of being invited to policy making processes when the ties are with other migrants’ organizations, and in a 4.4 increase of that same chance when the links are with autochthonous organizations.

***** FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE *****

Nevertheless, it must be noted that the impact of human capital factors is much more substantial than that of the social capital indicators we have taken into account. If we use as the baseline a ‘resourceless’ migrant organization—i.e. one with no full-time members of staff, just 3 members, no contacts with other migrant associations, and no links to autochthonous organizations—this association will have an 0.01 probability of being invited to participate in the policy process. If this organization becomes ‘resourceful’ in human capital and employs a full-time member of staff and has the membership size that marks the lower bound of the last quartile (317 members), while still having no contacts whatsoever with other migrant and autochthonous organizations, then the corresponding probability increases to 0.47. If, instead, the organization remains ‘resourceless’ in human capital but ‘resourceful’ in social capital—with a number of contacts with other migrant and autochthonous organizations that places them in the higher quartile: 13 and 15 respectively—the

chances of policy inclusion raise to only 0.35. Consequently, migrant organizations that are in the higher end of human capital resources but fail to develop a large network of contacts are more likely to be included in policy making than those that develop a large network of contacts but have limited human resources. Of course, the ideal situation is to have both, as that increases the probability of inclusion to near certainty (0.97).

In summary, our results show that the social capital migrants' organizations forge with other migrants' associations and with the receiving society actors has a crucial impact on their capacity to become engaged in policy making processes. Yet, social capital is not 'the' most valuable resource that migrants' organizations have in Barcelona and Madrid in order to have a say in the host country public arena, human resources are. While financial and material capital are of very little importance for getting access to policy making, how large is the organization's human base and how far the organization can reach to other CSOs are the most determining factors for having a say in the policy process.

DISCUSSION

Migrants' organizations in Barcelona and Madrid are only moderately included into the policy process, yet those that are benefit to a great extent from their social capital: the interconnections with other migrant and autochthonous Spanish organizations. Hence, migrant associations that are centrally located in the web of ties of all migrant

organizations in the city, and who are well connected to autochthonous CSOs are particularly advantaged for policy action and impact.

These results are especially interesting because, unlike what is expected from resource mobilization and political economy theories of organizations, older and materially resourceful associations are not particularly privileged in their access to the policy process in these two cities. Our evidence indicates that, rather than requiring a vast amount of mobilization of economic resources, gaining a voice in the decision making process in these Spanish cities requires, primarily, one full-time dedicated person and being well-connected.

How can we explain these results? Massive immigration from other countries is only a recent phenomenon in these two cities and more generally in Spain. The political elites have only recently started to design clear policy approaches to the management of immigration and migration related social problems. Immigration policies are, thus, in the making in these cities and in Spain as a whole, and there is a lack of clarity about how these policies should be designed, and what actors need to be included in decision making processes. Because most immigrants are not granted the right to vote in any elections—unless they are also Spanish nationals—the mechanisms of representation need to rely on migrants' organizations as the only intermediaries between the host political elites and the immigrants. Yet, the local elites and the public servants have a limited knowledge of the field of migrant organizations because these are usually small, quite informal and frequently invisible.

Consultation mechanisms in Spain very often operate without very clear rules and procedures about who is entitled to participate in consultation and who is not. Often, decisions about which organizations will be consulted are made on an *ad-hoc* basis; and when rules exist—as for some of the more established immigration forums at the national and regional levels—the government has an absolute discretion in the nominating process. In this context of loosely structured processes of consultation, and in a situation of limited and imperfect information about the immigrant associational field, political elites need to rely on the available proxies to make judgements about which organizations are relevant and worthy of being consulted when designing immigration policies. Migrants’ organizations who are centrally located in the network of ties among all migrant associations are the most likely to be visible to policy makers; and so are the migrant organizations that are better connected to autochthonous organizations, and especially to those that have traditionally been more active in advocacy and service provision on immigration issues.²⁸

In the absence of clear and formal procedures for public consultation on issues related to immigration policies, the visibility that strategic networking and having a dedicated staff provide become very useful assets to getting to have a say in the policy process. Moreover, because the immigration policy field is in the making, migrant organizations do not need a lot of financial resources to be granted a place in decision-making processes. They just need to be visible and prestigious. This is clearly not the case in situations where policy making is subject to formal lobbying rules and procedures—as at the European Union level, or at the federal level in the United States—and getting your voice heard will require mobilizing a substantial amount of

economic and human resources. In other contexts in which concertation and consociational practices are in place, the existence of clear rules for participating in the consultation process will require—above all—the mobilization of a sizeable constituency, or the capacity to form umbrella organizations (see Hooghe 2005 on Belgian practices).

Our results suggest that the importance of the various forms of organizational resources and capital of migrants' organizations will depend on the political context in which those associations operate. In contexts where the policy process is well structured and consultation mechanisms and practices are consolidated and formalized, migrant organizations are likely to need a substantial amount of economic and human capital to have a say. In contexts where the policy field is still in the making and consultation is unstructured and follows relatively arbitrary processes, who you know and who knows you will play a vital role. We expect that the latter situation will not be exclusive to the Spanish case, but is likely to be applicable to other European countries like Italy and Portugal that—as Spain—combine a situation of recent massive migration inflows with a tradition of loosely structured policy consultation processes. Future research that compares different contexts of policy-making and consultation procedures, or that analyzes longitudinal changes in the policy field should shed additional light into this topic.

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TABLES

Table 1. Summary of the fieldwork process and the migrant population

	Barcelona	Madrid
Eligible associations in the initial list	465	417
Final list of confirmed active associations	223	199
<i>“Mortality” rate¹</i>	<i>13%</i>	<i>11%</i>
Interviewed associations	100	63
<i>Response rates²</i>	<i>45%</i>	<i>32%</i>
Foreign-national population in 2007	245,999	469,352
Foreign-born population in 2007	286,656	551,325
<i>Estimate of the associational density of the immigrant population (per 1,000 foreign-born residents)³</i>	<i>1.6</i>	<i>0.8</i>

Source: Census list created during fieldwork with Immigrants’ Associations, Localmultidem and Capsocinmig projects (2007-2008) & local population register (*Padrón*, as of 1st January 2007).

Notes: ¹ Not active over total confirmed. ² Interviews over total confirmed active. ³ Eligible associations over total foreign-born population.

Table 2. Associations by main World regions of origin of their constituency, percentages

	Barcelona		Madrid	
	Associatio ns	Foreign Population	Associatio ns	Foreign Population
Eastern Europe	5.4	4.3	7.8	11.6
Romania	1.3	1.6	3.6	7.9
Africa	11.2	7.7	19.2	8.1
Maghreb	4.5	5.5	4.7	5.4
Latin America	62.3	54.4	63.7	62.5
Argentina	8.1	7.7	5.2	3.9
Bolivia	6.3	5.6	3.6	6.5
Colombia	4.0	5.1	9.3	6.9
Ecuador	5.8	8.7	10.4	18.9
Peru	12.6	6.7	19.2	7.4
Other mononational origins	12.6	20.6	12.4	18.9
Mixed Latin-American	13.0	--	3.6	--
Asia	16.1	14.4	5.7	6.9
China	2.2	3.7	1.0	3.5
Indian subcontinent	4.5	7.2	1.0	0.9
Philippines	5.8	2.5	2.6	1.4
Mixed origins	4.9	--	3.6	--
Migrants with autochthonous	0.9		0.5	
Various regional origins	4.0		3.1	
Total active migrant organizations (N)	100 (223)		100 (193)	

Source: Census list created during fieldwork with Immigrants' Associations, Localmultidem and Capsocinmig projects (2007-2008) & local population register (*Padrón*, as of 1st January 2007).

Table 3. Patterns of Policy Inclusion of Migrants' Organizations in Barcelona and Madrid, percentages.

	Invited to participate		Participated	
	BCN	MAD	BCN	MAD
Local level				
As a permanent (non-elected) member of a district or neighbourhood council	16	27	15	22
As a permanent (non-elected) member of a municipal council on specific issues (social services, women, education, etc.)	25	51	23	40
An occasional invitation to participate in a municipal committee to solve a specific problem	26	26	23	30
Join a municipal consultation committee or group for a specific policy or issue	28	28	27	29
Regional level				
As a permanent member of a regional council on specific issues social services, women, education, etc.)	15	43	12	35
An occasional invitation to participate in a regional committee to solve a specific problem	20	21	19	19
Join a regional consultation committee or group for a specific policy or issue	20	24	16	22
National level				
As a permanent member of a national council on specific issues (social services, women, education, etc.)	8	36	8	33
An occasional invitation to participate in a national committee to solve a specific problem	5	21	5	21
Join a national consultation committee or group for a specific policy or issue	4	27	4	25
Overall (all government levels considered)	48	68	45	67
Total number of cases	100	63	100	63

Source: Survey to Immigrants' Associations Localmultidem and Capsocinmig projects (2007-2008).

Table 4. Variable Description of Organizational Properties

Variable	Barcelona		Madrid	
	Average / Median	[Min;max] (% value=0)	Average / Median	[Min;max] (% value=0)
Forms of capital				
Total annual budget (in Euro)	22,254 / 3,000	0; 320,000 (13%)	58,597 / 6,750	300; 878,400 (0%)
Has some full-time staff	0.07 / 0	0; 1 (93%)	0.24 / 0	0; 1 (76%)
Total number of members	709 / 50	1; 8,000	1,623 / 160	5; 15,500
Indegree or 'prestige' (no. of times mentioned as a frequent contact by other migrants' associations)	9.6 / 6.0	0; 72 (10%)	7.1 / 4.0	0; 29 (3%)
No. of contacts with autochthonous Spanish organizations (outdegree)	9.8 / 7.0	0; 43 (8%)	10.7 / 6.5	0; 48 (13%)
Control variables				
Years of activity	7.3 / 6.0	0; 30 (2%)	10.1 / 7.0	1; 38 (6%)
Is a Latino organization	0.72 / 1	0; 1 (28%)	0.65 / 1	0; 1 (35%)
Lobbying is among main activities	0.22 / 0	0; 1 (78%)	0.27 / 0	0; 1 (73%)
Politics is among main areas of concern	0.21 / 0	0; 1 (79%)	0.30 / 0	0; 1 (70%)
N valid cases	100 – 87		63 – 56	

Source: Survey to Immigrants' Associations Localmultidem and Capsocinmig projects (2007-2008).

Table 5. Regressions of Invitation to Policy-Making Processes on Various Measures of Organizational Resources, Logistic Regressions

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	0.00 (0.55)	-2.5 ** (0.98)	-2.7 ** (1.03)	-3.57 ** (1.16)	-3.02 ** (0.92)
Control Variables					
Years of activity	0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
Is a Latino organization	-1.2 ** (0.48)	-1.1 ** (0.53)	-1.75 ** (0.63)	-1.5 ** (0.65)	-1.41 ** (0.57)
Lobbying is among main activities	0.86 (0.53)	0.66 (0.60)	0.31 (0.64)	0.27 (0.66)	
Politics is among main concerns	1.2 ** (0.54)	1.1 * (0.61)	1.2 * (0.63)	0.88 (0.66)	0.74 (0.59)
Madrid	0.55 (0.41)	0.28 (0.50)	0.64 (0.50)	0.86 (0.54)	0.87 * (0.49)
Financial and Human Capital					
Natural logarithm of total annual budget in Euro		0.10 (0.08)	0.09 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)	
Has some full-time staff		2.9 ** (1.2)	2.7 ** (1.2)	2.1 * (1.2)	2.2 * (1.2)
Natural logarithm of total number of members		0.35 ** (0.12)	0.34 ** (0.12)	0.36 ** (0.13)	0.35 ** (0.12)
Social Capital					
Natural logarithm of times mentioned by other migrant organizations (indegree or 'prestige')			0.60 ** (0.26)	0.45 * (0.27)	0.42 * (0.25)
Natural logarithm of number of autochthonous Spanish organizations mentioned (outdegree)				0.53 ** (0.22)	0.59 ** (0.21)
Nagelkerke R Square	0.26	0.43	0.47	0.51	0.50
Hosmer & Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Test: Chi Square (p-value)	11.9 (0.16)	8.4 (0.40)	5.9 (0.66)	14.5 (0.07)	7.4 (0.50)
Percentage of correct predictions of value=0	69	81	82	81	73
Percentage of correct predictions of value=1	66	77	74	78	75
No. of cases	130	130	130	130	142

Notes: Values are the logit coefficients, with standard errors within parentheses. Significance marked as * for $p \leq 0.10$; ** for $p \leq 0.05$

Source: Survey to Immigrants' Associations Localmultidem and Capsocinmig projects (2007-2008).

Figure 1. Comparing the independent effect of two elements of human capital on invitations to participate

Figure 2. Comparing the independent effect of two elements of social capital on invitations to participate

ENDNOTES

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¹ Putnam (2007: 142-43) provides a summary of past research making the claim that ethnic diversity reduces solidarity and the provision of public goods. See also Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner and Weinstein (2007).

² A discussion of the various models of immigrant integration can be found, for example, in Ireland (1994), Soysal (1994), Favell (1998), Heckmann and Schnapper (2003), Koopmans, Statham, Giugni and Passy (2005) and Givens (2007).

³ See the edited volume by Morales and Giugni (2010) for a more detailed assessment of the consequences of different citizenship and integration models on migrants' political incorporation.

⁴ See Leighley (2001) for an illustration of how these mechanisms of electoral competition and mobilization operate in the American context.

⁵ See Knoke and Laumann (1982) and Knoke (1990) for a general discussion of the role of associations and interest groups in the policy domains.

⁶ See, for example, the reference in a European Commission document to the need to strengthen consultation mechanisms that should include immigrant associations (Commission of the European Communities 2008: 15), and the description of the situation in 28 European countries with regard to consultation practices by MIPEX (Niessen, Huddleston and Citrin 2007).

⁷ As an example, see the various pieces in the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 2005 special issue by Bloemraad (2005), Caponio (2005), Hooghe (2005), Moya (2005) and Schrover and Vermeulen (2005).

⁸ Visa policies drastically changed during the 2000s due to the massive inflow of Latin American immigrants since the late 1990s.

⁹ There is a constitutional impediment to granting voting rights at the local level to non-nationals in the absence of bilateral international agreements for the mutual recognition of these rights. Currently, only EU citizens and Norwegians effectively have such rights. However, the Socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero has initiated the legal procedures that would allow a substantial number of, mostly Latin American, immigrants to vote in the local elections starting with the upcoming ones of May 2011. Some sources estimate the likely increase in eligible voters would be around 600,000 given that reciprocity agreements are in course or have been signed with—among others—Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay and Paraguay.

¹⁰ See Siaroff (1999) for a comparative overview of interest representation systems in OECD countries, where Spain scores lowest—together with Portugal—in what regards both corporatist and consensual/concertation arrangements of interest intermediation. Lane and Ersson (1999: 235) also score Spain with the lowest value on a similar index of corporatism.

¹¹ However, see van Heelsum (2005) for a discussion of the generalizability of Fennema and Tillie's results to other cities in The Netherlands.

¹² See Gould (1993) for a formal model illustrating this conclusion.

¹³ See Baldassarri and Diani (2007) for an interesting extension of this distinction to the nature of the relationship that is exchanged: transactions versus social bonds.

¹⁴ Although, strictly speaking, they are also migrants, we will not consider in our study foreigners born in the EU-15 countries and other advanced industrial democracies like the US, Canada or Japan.

¹⁵ The sources included all available official registers at the local, regional and national level, a number of civil society directories, information provided by the embassies and consulates, systematic internet searches, lists provided by strategic informants (eg. large promigrant NGOs, and trade unions), and snowballing from the first contacts with listed organizations and from completed questionnaires.

¹⁶ A pilot study in Madrid conducted in 2003-2004 rendered 33 additional questionnaires. However, given that the measurement of interorganizational network ties changed substantially between the pilot questionnaire and the 2007-2008 one, and because the opportunities for associations to engage in policy making mechanisms at the local level had changed somewhat (especially in Madrid) we have chosen not to include the information on those organizations in the analyses presented in this paper.

¹⁷ This response rate is rather decent when compared to a similar (but postal) survey carried out in 2003 to autochthonous associations in two districts each in Barcelona and Madrid, which only obtained a response rate of between 21 and 12 percent—depending on the district—and for which the response rates were also substantially higher in Barcelona. That study was part of the Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy project in Spain, financed by two complementary projects: project no 06/0087/2002 of the Regional Government of Madrid, and project SEC 2000-0758-C02 funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology. Both of them were coordinated by Prof. José Ramón Montero, and the authors were members of the research teams of both. For a description of the methodology of that survey see Font, Montero and Torcal (2006: Annex 2).

¹⁸ Of the remaining associations, only eleven organizations that were not interviewed were frequently mentioned—by at least five interviewed organizations. The rest were usually never mentioned or were mentioned by only one or two organizations. We made every possible effort to get an interview with these organizations, but were not able to achieve it due to failed appointments or refusals to collaborate with the study.

¹⁹ This latter figure is the average of the estimation provided by the study to local associations in the four districts of Barcelona and Madrid previously mentioned.

²⁰ The table shows the distribution by world region for all the associations listed as ‘active’ in the listing stage of fieldwork. Thus, these results reflect the general outlook of the whole target population of migrants’ associations.

²¹ Contrary to what one could expect, migrants’ associations that are more active politically or employ lobbying as one of their main repertoire actions are not substantially more likely to be invited to join policy making mechanisms. In fact, the correlation between receiving an invitation and being active in politics is 0.09 and with lobbying it is 0.12, none of them statistically significant.

²² See Morales, González and Jorba (2009) for an account of these differences.

²³ The list of Spanish organizations included some 75 names, and the list of migrants’ organizations included 280 in Barcelona and 210 in Madrid.

²⁴ These two exclusions respond to the fact that the coefficients for these two variables are clearly not significant from the first step of their inclusion in the nested models, and to the variable on budgetary capacity being missing in 12 cases. The exclusion of these two variables does not substantially change

the results when models 4 and 5 are compared but, as it increases the number of cases, it results in some coefficients becoming statistically significant.

²⁵ This is shown in the fact that this variable loses its statistical significance in models 4 and 5 when the variable that measures contacts with autochthonous organizations is included.

²⁶ We report on the results for the separate models on Barcelona and Madrid, though they are not shown here due to space constraints.

²⁷ All the estimations of probabilities have been done using a baseline ‘typical’ organization that is 6 years old, is formed by Latin American immigrants, is not active in politics, is based in Madrid, has no full-time members of staff, has 100 members, is named by 6 other migrant organizations, and names 7 autochthonous organizations. Thus, from the ‘typical’ organization that adopts the median values in all variables, probability changes are computed by changing only the value of the variable of interest and keeping the rest unaltered.

²⁸ See Caponio (2005) for a description of the Italian case, which is in many respects similar to the Spanish situation.