Foundations as sustainability partners: climate philanthropy finance flows in China

ABSTRACT Despite substantial efforts being made through public and private sources, funding for climate change mitigation falls far short of what is needed. Meanwhile, philanthropic sources have begun to emerge as important sustainability partners by connecting multiple sectors and guiding funding flows. This study provides a comprehensive overview of climate-related philanthropic foundation financing and funding in China. Using a classification framework for climate change initiatives through co-word analysis and text segmentation techniques, we conduct visualization analysis to depict the changing pattern of climate philanthropy in China by analyzing donors, subfields, and flow of funds between 2008 and 2019. We conclude by providing suggestions for funders, charities, and policymakers seeking to enhance the value of collaborative governance in addressing climate change. Key policy insights Philanthropic sources play a key role in climate change mitigation in the new mixed-actor model of climate governance in China. Climate philanthropy in China is inseparable from strong political connections and policy influence of the government. Policymakers worldwide need to pay attention to flows and gaps in philanthropic funding as part of climate finance monitoring and to stimulate data-driven decisions concerning future investments. Policymakers need to leverage the crucial role of philanthropy in connecting multiple sectors to strengthen the climate change mitigation ecosystem.


Introduction
Climate change is one of the most pressing challenges facing society today (Black et al., 2001;Dryzek et al., 2011;Liu & Espinosa, 2019). Addressing the challenge requires cross-sector endeavours (Anshelm & Hansson, 2011;Barrutia & Echebarria, 2019;Malhotra et al., 2022;Ostrom, 2010;Sayles & Baggio, 2017). The private and public sectors have mobilized to collaborate on climate funding (VanSandt & Sud, 2012); however, funding still falls far short of what is needed. An estimated USD 1.6 to 3.8 trillion is needed annually to 2050 to achieve low carbon transition (IPCC, 2018). Yet, climate finance has recently slowed in growth. In 2017/ 2018, global funding grew more than 24%, whereas the increase slowed to 10% in 2019/2020, reaching USD 632 billion (CPI, 2021). This slowdown in growth was driven largely by the global economic downturn and regulatory changes, and the COVID-19 pandemic may cause even more disruption. There is an urgent need to increase the finance available for climate change mitigation and adaptation (Roberts et al., 2021).
While major funders primarily consist of governments, regulators, development banks, and private investors, philanthropy also plays an instrumental role in shaping climate funding flows and dynamics between actors. Philanthropic foundations mobilize private finance toward climate change in part through blended finance (CPI, 2018). 1 In 2020, between USD 6 billion and 10 billion of philanthropic funding was dedicated to climate change mitigation globally, hallmarked by inflows from prolific individual philanthropists (e.g. the Bezos Earth Fund by Jeff Bezos established in 2020). Against this background, calls to shift from technocratic to community-based solutions are becoming louder (Rendon, 2022). As Roeyer and colleagues state (2020, p. 2), 'Philanthropy alone cannot end the climate crisis, but it can play an essential role in catalyzing the trillions of dollars of public sector and private sector funding needed to transition toward a low-carbon global economy. ' Philanthropic foundations are emerging as increasingly important sustainability partners by bringing together funding sources and directing funding flows (Zheng et al., 2019). Nevertheless, this 'nexus' role of foundations has received limited scholarly attention, with limited knowledge about philanthropic funding flows across time and space. In addition, while most studies investigate climate funding flows through international organizations (Backstrand, 2008;CPI, 2019;Westman & Castán Broto, 2018), we need to understand patterns in emerging economies such as China, the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases and second largest economy, to analyze climate-related efforts around the globe.
In recent decades, China's climate change governance has shifted from being state-centric toward a modern environmental state (Arantes et al., 2020;Li et al., 2017;Mol & Carter, 2006), where philanthropic foundations are increasingly influential (Lan et al., 2010). According to the most recent statistics, 47% of environmental giving in China was for climate change (Yishan Philanthropy Data Center, 2021). The Chinese government has set goals of peak carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 and achieving neutrality by 2060, making it critical to evaluate whether current funding to achieve these objectives is sufficient.
This study aims to provide the first comprehensive overview of climate-related funding in China emanating from local philanthropic foundations, which function as major sustainability partners, together with multiple other sources in the low-carbon transition process (Glasbergen et al., 2007;Westman & Castán Broto, 2018). Specifically, the study has three objectives: (1) to depict past trajectories of climate funding flows through Chinese philanthropic foundations from 2008 to 2019 by using visualization analysis (Harold et al., 2016;Luo et al., 2003); (2) to highlight the nexus role of philanthropic foundations in China that connect public and private finance sources for climate change mitigation; and (3) to discuss the applicability of these data for future use by practitioners (both funders and charities) and policymakers in the international context of collaborative governance in addressing climate change.

Climate change mitigation efforts in China
As the world's largest annual emitter of greenhouse gases, China has a critical role in global efforts to address climate change. In 2019, China emitted an estimated 27% of global net greenhouse gas emissions, nearly 2.5 times more than the United States and four times more than India or Europe (ClimateWorks Foundation, 2022). Although the Chinese government has established macro-level climate targets for the medium and long term, the transition to a zero-carbon economy still faces a major challenge as China's energy system is still largely powered by coal. Furthermore, although China's climate change governance has shifted from a wholly state-centric model toward a mixed-actor model in recent decades, climate change mitigation is complex due to the difficulty in balancing the dual goals of economic development and ecological responsibility (Wen et al., 2019;Zhang et al., 2018). Climate change also affects human migration and displacement in China (Rogers & Xue, 2015). Indeed, migration is intertwined with other sustainable development topics such as water stress, urban development, poverty alleviation, economic renaissance, and 1 Blended finance refers to 'public funds pooled with private funds, largely under private fund management, directed variously at development and environmental goals' (Bracking & Leffel, 2021, p. 6). cultural adaptation. Therefore, grand ideas and actions in China require the efforts of multiple actors in the country.

Government's role in addressing environmental concerns
The government in China has traditionally taken a central role in achieving the goal of 'ecological civilization' (shengtai wenming) (Westman & Castán Broto, 2018;Zheng et al., 2014). Multiple levels of government have implemented policies to address environmental degradation (Epstein & Segal, 2000;Hansen et al., 2018;Tian et al., 2016). For instance, the central government revised the Environmental Protection Law in 2015; finalized the timetable for reaching peak carbon by 2030 and neutralization by 2060; promoted related policies or regulations; and initiated policy experiments, sanctions, and economic incentives Wang & Qian, 2011;Westman & Castán Broto, 2018). Realizing that it would not achieve its goal of ecological civilization alone, the government allocated responsibility for some ecological governance issues to other actors and encouraged greater participation from private actors (Ko et al., 2016). The result has been a shift from the state-centric model toward new governance strategies with more partnerships.

Firms' environmental management initiatives
Firms in China engage widely in sustainable growth and CSR endeavours, driven by ecological concerns, stakeholder demands, or the pursuit of financial value (Gautier & Pache, 2015;Lantos, 2001;Porter & Kramer, 2006). The government has been influential in guiding firms' CSR inputs through legal requirements (Wang & Qian, 2011). Firms have also realized the benefits of adopting ecological strategies in their value chain management. Interestingly, more firms are turning to nonprofits as sustainability partners for exchanging ideas, promoting policies, and collaborating on projects to take advantage of their complementary resources and capabilities (Ni & Zhan, 2017).

Environmental engagement by nonprofits
The government has gradually relaxed its restrictive approach to the management of nonprofits, engaging them in connecting multiple constituents and providing supplementary public services to address gaps in service (Anheier, 2005;Hwang & Powell, 2009;Li et al., 2017;Lorch & Bunk, 2017;Ni & Zhan, 2017;Teets, 2013). Chinese nonprofits, including charities, started to grow and play more active roles after the catastrophic Wenchuan earthquake in 2008, resulting in nearly 87,000 people dead or missing (Roney, 2011). By the end of August 2020, 8,664 philanthropic organizations were registered with civil affairs departments nationwide (China Credit Trust, 2020). For climate change issues, nonprofits have become indispensable in China by sharing the ecological vision; lobbying government and formulating environment-related policies; acting as watchdog organization;, and educating the public about eco-friendly living. For example, Li et al. (2017) indicate that nonprofits improve information disclosure on the environment in urban areas. By analyzing climate initiatives in 15 cities in China, Westman and Castán Broto (2018) postulate that climate partnerships could bring benefits such as information dissemination, rule setting, technology development, and funds provision. Arantes et al. (2020) discuss how the government and nonprofits formed a collaborative governance model in waste management in Shanghai. Such collaborative networks enable the involved parties to obtain resources, realize social exchanges, and gain legitimacy in addressing complex climate change issues (Eweje & Palakshappa, 2009;Guttman et al., 2018;Koschmann, 2012).

Philanthropy in China: addressing climate change
With opening up and economic reform, the Chinese government began to encourage philanthropy. In contrast to other advanced economies, corporate donations account for the majority of charitable giving in China, at around two thirds in China compared to 5% in the U.S. (Lin et al., 2015;Zheng et al., 2019). Between 2015 and 2020, 2,836 Chinese listed corporations (38.65% of the total listed ones) participated in philanthropic giving, with total donations amounting to USD 9.81 billion (Ni et al., 2021). Nevertheless, total philanthropic giving in China was only 4.70% of that in the United States in 2021 (She & Jiao, 2021).
Among these philanthropic trends, Chinese philanthropic foundations have become a nascent sector that is influential in addressing climate change (Lan et al., 2010). 2 In China's legal system, philanthropic foundations are registered as nonprofits with charitable endowments from individuals or organizations serving philanthropic purposes. They attract public funds, identify important subfields to work in, and distribute funds through their own operations or by providing grants to other professional organizations in specific domains. 3 Overall, climate funding in China has adopted more 'informal, experimental and voluntary approaches' (Westman & Castán Broto, 2018, p. 212).
The relationship between philanthropic foundations and government varies across countries, and such difference is more evident in China given its large size. Chinese charities operate within a government-led framework and take actions synchronized with the government's agenda and goals. Essentially, Chinese charities act more like facilitators rather than promoters for climate change, tending to cooperate with the government and integrate international approaches towards addressing climate change for China's energy conservation and emission reduction (Wang & Lan, 2016). In contrast, charities in other developed areas depend less on governments. For example, charities in Australia, the European Union, and the U.S. usually act outside governmental frameworks, impose pressure on governments, and challenge governments' political positions (Bovan & Perić, 2021;Hall & Taplin, 2006;Lan et al., 2011).
Nevertheless, the scale of climate philanthropy is still disproportionately small in China. By focusing on the analysis of philanthropic funding via charities in China, we enable policymakers and practitioners to identify gaps and fill funding voids in the future. In the following sections, we first elaborate on how we constructed the classification system of climate change initiatives in China and then present the visualization results to demonstrate the dynamics of climate fund flows through local philanthropic foundations. We conclude by discussing the theoretical and practical implications of the findings, with a focus on understanding past trajectories of funding flows as well as future trends.

Methods: constructing the classification framework for climate change initiatives in China
To construct the classification framework, we followed the two steps of categorical framing: co-word analysis and text segmentation (in Figure A1, Appendix A). We outline the steps here and provide all the technical details in Appendix A. In step 1, we developed initial classification categories based on over 12,000 academic papers in English and Chinese about climate change through co-word analysis (Chen, 2006;Chen et al., 2016). We also referred to the classification framework developed by the ClimateWorks Foundation, one of the largest nonprofits specializing in climate change governance worldwide. The final classification system consists of 11 clusters of climate change initiatives and combines both academic and managerial sources of information with a higher degree of external validity and generalizability (see Figure A2, Appendix A).
In step 2, we constructed word lexicons including a keywords lexicon (Wang et al., 2015) and an exclusion words lexicon for each of the 11 derived clusters, in order to contain and exclude words for the purpose of assessing whether a related project in practice belongs to the corresponding classification. To build the lexicons, we first retrieved textual descriptions of 1,500 grants based on the annual reports of philanthropic foundations and used Python tools and Jieba word segmentation technology to perform word-cutting of the textual descriptions of grants. We then manually checked each word in the keywords lexicon and the related grant information to confirm whether the matching is accurate. If not, we moved the word from the keywords lexicon to the exclusion words lexicon. After four rounds of iterations using the information on the remaining 3,872 grants, the accuracy rate, calculated as the ratio of correctly matched keywords to the total number of keywords, was 2 Philanthropic funding for climate action between 2017 and 2020 in recent years in China is from three main sources: international and local philanthropic foundations, and official development assistance (ClimateWorks Foundation, 2022). Although international donors accounted for the largest contribution compared to the other two sources, we focus on local philanthropic foundations in this study due to their institutional newness and the data availability. 3 Overall, 80 to 85% of philanthropic foundations in China are self-operated and run grants by themselves, while the remaining foundations fund other organizations. significantly enhanced from the initial accuracy rate of 24.77% to 74.83%. Our final classification framework has 330 words in the keywords lexicon and 96 words in the excluded words lexicon. More specifically, the 11 clusters of climate change initiatives in China include clean energy, enabling environment, energy efficiency, energy saving and emission reduction, 4 food and agriculture, forests, organizational development, research, short lived pollutants, sustainable finance, and sustainable transportation.
Furthermore, we also carried out semi-structured online interviews in April and May 2022 to supplement and enhance our understanding of the findings based on co-word analysis, text segmentation, and visualization of the textual data. Our interviewees were composed of two high-impact senior executives from prominent international nonprofit organizations and one data analyst on climate change, respectively, who have over ten years of working experiences in the areas of climate change and are familiar with global and Chinese philanthropic climate actions. These interviews were between 50 and 90 min long, giving us the opportunity of confirming or triangulating some of the findings related to the derived the classification framework for climate change initiatives, climate philanthropy finance in China and globally.

Who receives the climate funding: philanthropic foundations for climate change
As of 2019, the average age of the 402 Chinese philanthropic foundations that received the climate funding was ten years, ranging from two to 37 years. Only 60 foundations were registered nationally. Only 110 foundations have official public fundraising qualifications, whereas the other 292 do not. These foundations either have a government background or were initiated by private sources. Further investigation shows that 155 foundations, accounting for 39% of the total, are connected to the Chinese government through formal political affiliation or individual politicians (Zheng et al., 2019). In our study period, these foundations were involved in climate change, funding projects in six major areas mostly concentrated in eastern China: Beijing (97 foundations), Guangdong (75 foundations), Shanghai (43 foundations), Zhejiang (23 foundations), Jiangsu (16 foundations), and Fujian (14 foundations).
We now list in Table 1 the names of the top 40 foundations (approximately 10% of the total) ranked by the total expenditure of operated projects 5 from 2008 to 2019 (The full table of the 40 foundations is in Table A3, Appendix A). The top 40 foundations vary in terms of their public fundraising qualification and government background. Of the 40, 18 foundations have a public fundraising qualification; about half (21) have a government background and half do not (19). On the one hand, the politically connected foundations are often influential and attract numerous public funds for climate change endeavours. For example, the China Green Foundation (#1) was registered in 1985 and is the oldest philanthropic foundation under the supervision of 4 Energy efficiency here refers to energy conservation of buildings, and that of household appliances or equipment in the buildings, whereas energy saving is primarily focused on other industries (also in Figures A1 and A2, Appendix A). We are grateful for one of our interviewees for differentiating these two clusters. 5 The total expenditure and revenue of all operated projects are disclosed in the annual reports of foundations. They refer to the associated costs of using equipment and materials, insurance benefits for volunteers, and other administrative expenses, as well as donations and government subsidy for the reporting year. The currency units in the following text, unless specified, are all in United States dollars (USD).  On the other hand, later on, private firms and entrepreneurs were more active in setting up philanthropic funds or participating in public-private partnership projects in low-carbon transformation and other ecological fields. For example, Inner Mongolia Lao Niu Foundation (also referred to as 'Lao Niu Foundation', #3) was established by Mr. Niu Gensheng and his family. Niu Gensheng was the founder and former chair of Mengniu Dairy Group in 2004. He and his family donated their corporate shares and the majority of their dividends to the foundation for the purpose of environmental protection and other public welfare. In contrast, the Beijing Entrepreneur Environmental Protection Foundation (also known as the SEE foundation, #4) was established in 2008 as a primary platform for over 900 entrepreneur members for engagement in environmental protection and sustainable development, and also attracts public funds. Another high-profile foundation, the Alibaba Foundation (#6), was co-established by four companies under the Alibaba Group in 2011. It promises to use 0.3% of the Alibaba Group operating income as the main source of funding for the foundation. Such a long-term, public welfare fund investment mechanism enables it to play an active role in climate change related areas such as water environmental protection, environmental protection public propaganda, and policy advocacy (Alibaba Group Holding Limited, 2020).
Interestingly, 17 foundations, accounting for 42.5% of the top 40, are registered in Beijing. It might be because the unique position of Beijing as the political and internal cooperation centre in China makes donations and implementation of climate change projects more feasible. For example, one of the industry experts we interviewed emphasized the value of political connections in these philanthropic foundations: Considering their policy influence, channel advantages, funding opportunities, and knowledge accumulation of these institutions embedded within the (political) system, I think that any organizations with planned, so-called impact on climate policy have to work with these philanthropic foundations.
Some foreign organizations do not understand such situation in China. They wonder why they have to cooperate with the Chinese government for everything. Is it mandatory?

Who gives the climate funding: donor information
Overall, these visualization results confirm that firms from the private and tertiary industries demonstrate the strongest willingness to donate to climate initiatives and participate in philanthropic projects relating to low-carbon transformation and other ecological fields. It may be that private firms are more resource constrained than SOEs and believe that environmental programmes will help reduce costs or improve market access (Ans & Pinkse, 2004;Gao & Xu, 2019). In addition, private ownership may mean these firms have more authority to make donations, whereas donations from SOEs may generate controversy.
Despite the rapid progress made by corporate donors in addressing climate change, the total amount of donations targeting climate change is still very limited. For example, Figure B1 in Appendix B shows that total donations made by Chinese listed companies increased from 2015 to 2020 (Ni et al., 2021). Notably, the areas receiving the most funds were poverty alleviation (36.61%), education (26.81%), and healthcare (24.85%). In contrast, only 2.93% of corporate donations were given to climate change-related categories between 2015 and 2020 (Ni et al., 2021).
An industry expert in the area of climate philanthropy mentioned in an interview with us that one major obstacle for private firms' engagement in this issue is funding challenges: There is too little funding (for climate change) in China. Climate change is relatively more professional, and it is linked to finance, especially mainstream finance … If there is not sufficient funding, it will be difficult. Therefore, domestic private enterprises now pay little attention to climate change.
An interviewee also cited the lack of related knowledge by private entrepreneurs as another major challenge for corporate donations for climate change: The current situation in China is that the amount of charity by the government and major companies is substantial, so the private owners sometimes get lost when overseeing these examples. Their firms are small and they do not know how to make a donation. [The truth is] they will wonder what the real value of their donations is, at a maximum of hundreds of thousands of RMB, when the invested amount by others could be in trillions. 5.4. What is the climate funding spent on: subfields of climate change initiatives Figure B2 in Appendix B shows the total expenditure for climate change through philanthropic foundations across geographic areas in China. Northern and coastal areas spend more on climate change mediation, with the top five regions being Inner Mongolia ($116.26 million), Guangdong ($46.96 million), Zhejiang ($44.71 million), Yunnan ($41.99 million), and Beijing ($41.11 million); and the bottom five being Shaanxi ($4.57 million), Hubei ($4.24 million), Shandong ($3.70 million), Heilongjiang ($3.56 million), and Jiangxi ($3.41 million). Figure 3 reveals the value of total donations and expenditure in the 11 subfields of climate change initiatives from 2008 to 2019. The graph on the upper right corner of Figure 3 indicates that both increased over time; the total amount increased 42.32 times in ten years from $2.74 million to $118.69 million for total donations and from $9.74 million to $111.34 million for total expenditure (10.43 times). In the total period, the total donations were $573 million, and the total expenditure was $687 million. In 2008 and 2009, the total expenditure was higher than the total donations, but for 2010-2011 the total donations received by foundations exceeded the total expenditure. Nevertheless, donations and expenditure both fluctuated in the period of 2012-2015, following an overall downward trend. Since then, both donations and expenditure have increased sharply. It clearly shows the growth path of climate philanthropy in China over the research sample period.
We further break down the total donations and expenditure between 2008 and 2019 into the 11 subfields in Figure 3. Among the 11 subfields, forest received the most donations ($465.70 million) and expenditure ($520.72 million), which is hundreds of times more than the least supported subfields such as sustainable finance ($0.50 million in donations) and energy efficiency ($1.27 million in expenditure). Organizational development, energy saving and emission reduction, and enabling environment are the other three subfields with the highest revenue and expenditure. Among the four subfields, forest is traditionally the most preferred field in philanthropy, and both organizational development and enabling environment belong to the category of 'strategy/policy/tools' and are focused more on improving the internal development of charities. In contrast, in the other seven climate change subfields associated with specific industry sectors such as energy efficiency (in construction), short lived pollutants, sustainable finance, sustainable transportation, food and agriculture, research, and clean energy, foundations receive much lower donations and therefore have only minor expenditure. Implementing projects in these subfields of climate change may either demand sufficient industry knowledge and experience or the subfields may be too new for philanthropic foundations.

Robustness check
To further understand whether these revealed funding flows are driven by the aims of the Chinese government, this study collected 12 reports from China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change, issued by the Ministry of Ecological Environment in China between 2008 and 2019, which described government policy and related actions across time. Using Jieba tool to extract keywords, we identified the hot spots of national policies across these years. Table B1 in Appendix B shows their frequencies and compares them with the matched keywords across the 11 subfields identified in our classification framework.
The findings in the last column of Table B1 strongly support the key role played by the government in guiding climate change funding flows in China. In particular, the keywords in the four subfields of clean energy, energy saving and emission reduction, enabling environment, and research are mentioned in government reports annually, whereas energy efficiency, sustainable transportation, food and agriculture, and sustainable finance are the least mentioned categories. They are similar to the visualization results in Figure 3.
We also compared total philanthropic giving and climate giving from 2008 to 2020 on a global basis, as well as in China and the U.S., through multiple authoritative sources of data (Table 2). In particular, columns 2-4 indicate that the average percentage of global climate giving was less than 1.4% of the total global philanthropy from 2018 to 2021. For the U.S. (see columns 5-7), due to data unavailability, we followed normal practice and approximated the total value of climate giving as that on environment and animals (ClimateWorks Foundation, 2021). The percentages between 2008 and 2020 ranged from 2.09% to 3.46% with a stable increasing trend over time. In contrast, inputs to climate change through philanthropy in China were under 2% of the total giving, which was slightly higher than the global average of 1.4% but only half of the U.S. average percentage in the past 20 years (see columns 8-10). Figure B3 in Appendix B also compares the ratio differences of GDP, total philanthropic giving, and climate giving of the top two economies in the world, the U.S. and China. The results show that despite the narrowing gap between the GDP value of the two economies (i.e. from the U.S. being 3.21 times greater than China in 2008 to 1.42 times greater in 2020), the gap in total philanthropic giving is still huge, ranging from 15.42 to 35.35 times greater in the U.S. than in China. Given errors that may occur between the regression interpolation for missing years and actual giving, the gap might be even more significant. Notably, even if the gap between the two economies has narrowed in the ecological category of giving from 73.11 times higher in the U.S. in 2008 to 34.34 times higher in 2020, China is still far behind the U.S. in terms of climate philanthropy.

Discussion
Despite substantial efforts, including those from philanthropy, to address climate change, we argue that current research foci are unbalanced and call for a deeper understanding of how philanthropy functions as a nexus for collaboration. By visualizing the funding flows of climate change mitigation through philanthropic foundations in China between 2008 and 2019, our findings offer several important contributions.

Philanthropy in the collaborative governance model of climate change
Our primary contribution lies in applying governance research to climate change initiatives (Arantes et al., 2020;Mol & Carter, 2006). In particular, we highlight the connecting role of philanthropic foundations, a fast-growing sector in climate funding in the context of an emerging country, China. In institutionalizing new governance processes, the Chinese governmentlike governments elsewherehas widened channels of participation and encouraged more actors to mitigate the negative impact of climate change. Such a collaborative governance model facilitates the participation of multiple stakeholders through interaction and shared learning (Teodoro et al., 2021). Our research on how Chinese philanthropic foundations attract substantial donations Table 2. Total philanthropy and climate philanthropy from 2008 to 2020: Global, the U.S. and China (currency unit: USD billion). (1) (2)  from multiple sources and implement projects related to climate change mitigation has enabled us to understand such collaborative endeavours. Moreover, by examining how funds are accrued and allocated to different subfields relevant to climate change, we shed light on important but neglected domains, allowing donors to tackle climate change more holistically. For example, in China, forests accounted for the most donations and expenditure of philanthropic foundations among all 11 subfields, whereas sustainable finance gained the least attention. It is a striking contrast to the focus of international philanthropic foundations who provided the least support for forests and the most for sustainable finance in China (ClimateWorks Foundation, 2022). It may be that the two funding sources are complementary. In addition, the lack of funding for sustainable finance in China, as well as for other nascent subfields of sustainable transportation and short lived pollutants, may be caused by a lack of donor knowledge for domestic donors or foundations. Overall, more professional philanthropic organizations need to emerge to encourage and enable donors to take action in these neglected fields in China.
Nevertheless, similar to its western counterparts, the philanthropic community in China is still nascent in tackling the climate emergency and faces a significant funding gap. Less than 2% of global philanthropic giving was allocated to climate change mitigation in recent years, and China is no exception (see Table 2, also in Roeyer et al., 2020). Our analysis of funding flows enables the Chinese nonprofit sector as a whole to accurately identify both existing and new funders so they can work together in climate change mitigation actions. Moreover, the sector needs to nurture its professionalism and take proactive actions in reaching out to both the government and business sectors in order to effectively play a nexus role (Zheng et al., 2019).

Government and climate change governance
As a secondary focus, our findings indicate that in China the government plays an important role in advancing good climate change governance (Westman & Castán Broto, 2018;Zheng et al., 2014). For example, many higherimpact foundations, in terms of their fundraising capacity as well as project expenditure, are politically connected (see Table 1). Due to their unique social impact, wide networks, funding sources, and field knowledge, these politically connected foundations still play important roles in combating climate change in China. Furthermore, despite the presence of the hybrid governance model, the results provide compelling support for matching areas that are hot spots with government-promoted fields (see Table B1); the subfields that are promoted by the government (including forests, clean energy, research, and organizational development) are reflected in the hot spots for funding across different years. Therefore, the government can periodically renew tools and policies to encourage climate-related efforts from multiple actors, especially corporate donors.
Overall, China's climate governance process is inseparable from strong national leadership and policy continuity. While the Chinese government has included its climate change mitigation agenda in the 14th Five-Year Plan (FYP) in March 2021, it still needs to invest a total of $15 trillion over the next 30 years to achieve carbon neutrality (Bloomberg, 2020). The government may highlight certain important entrepreneurial directions (such as sustainable finance) for practitioners to follow, thereby aiming to simultaneously achieve sound regulatory systems and a well-functioning market mechanism. Moreover, by investigating the projected trends in future global emissions, the relative prices of commodities affected by such structural changes, and the expected market opportunities for low-carbon technologies and services, the government may proactively formulate policies and regulations, guiding firms to better understand associated risks and opportunities and adjust their investments and innovation priorities.

Firms and climate change governance
As a third area of focus, this study has extended our knowledge of the role of firms in the new governance model for climate change in China. Figure 1 indicates that firms contribute over three quarters of the total climate philanthropy. Among them, contributions from private firms account for almost half of the total. Private firms have been more active than other corporate donors including SOEs in setting up philanthropic funds or participating in PPP projects relating to low-carbon transformation and other ecological fields. It is unsurprising that Chinese private firms are more likely to engage in climate philanthropy than SOEs in order to achieve both environmental and economic goals (Zhang et al., 2010). SOEs are susceptible to state influence and under stricter regulation by government agencies (Du et al., 2014;Li et al., 2015). For example, the Stateowned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) regulates the philanthropic activities of centrally-owned enterprises. In contrast, private firms have more liberty to participate in climate philanthropy.
In addition, we suggest that corporations take even greater action to address the gaps in climate change mitigation. Despite their growing awareness, firms have paid less attention or devoted less effort to climate change issues than to other social issues such as poverty alleviation or education. Furthermore, only a small proportion of listed firms in China disclose their environmental protection activities; disclosure policies regarding corporate emissions are barely satisfactory, and the use of sustainable finance as an economic tool remains insufficient. Likewise, the practice of incorporating climate change as an important aspect of companies' strategies is still lacking. Firms require technological innovation and cooperation with other sectors to introduce advanced low-carbon technologies in order to achieve the global SDGs in 2030.

Conclusion
This study examined philanthropic funding for climate change mitigation through visualization analysis of philanthropic foundations in China between 2008 and 2019. Given the scale of the global climate change challenge, individual actors lack the necessary resources or power to tackle the problem independently. The challenge requires substantial, innovative strategies reflected in multi-actor governance models and a deeper understanding of the relevant funding flows in the complex network to address climate change.
Our visualization analysis highlights a key need for policymakers: watching the flows and gaps in philanthropic funding while promoting philanthropy's crucial role in connecting multiple sectors to build up the climate change mitigation ecosystem. Local government can investigate the local situation, identify climate change subfields that are popular or in need of support, stimulate data-driven decisions, and mobilize philanthropic foundations and firms to provide related financial support. Government can also identify emerging new fields, such as green finance, and integrate them into the agenda of external communication and outreach. For some urgent issues, government can mobilize more sophisticated parties to engage in devising policy advice, in providing additional climate funding, in formulating material or intangible incentives, and in supporting breakthrough research in these areas.
Using climate philanthropy in China, this study has shown that philanthropic foundations can be an influential sector in addressing climate change. With similar data accessible from firms, private philanthropists, and the government, we would be able to outline total funding flows for climate change more comprehensively and provide more suggestions for funders, charities, and policymakers seeking to enhance the value of collaborative governance in addressing climate change. The role of international climate philanthropy in China is important, and analyses comparing domestic versus international philanthropy are a promising future research direction. Likewise, we recommend the implementation of sophisticated studies in other institutional contexts with generalizable findings, which may provide insight into climate funders' approaches to developing and implementing transformative climate strategies. In the long run, more studies on climate adaptation strategies will enable a more complete understanding of effective climate change actions.