Delegatio Ex Machina - Institutions Without Agency

<p dir="ltr">This article examines the disappearance of agency in institutional governance when predictive systems become the locus of delegation. <i>Delegatio Ex Machina</i> proposes that institutional authority is no longer anchored in decision-makers but in compiled rules that execute without reference to a subject. Central banks, international agencies, and automated audit systems illustrate how syntactic delegation replaces political acts with repetitive formal structures. By tracing this displacement, the paper defines a framework for understanding authority without agency and its risks for accountability in predictive societies.</p><p dir="ltr"><b>DOI</b></p><ul><li>Primary archive: <a href="https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.16949155" target="_blank">https://doi.org/<b>10.5281/zenodo.16949155</b></a></li><li>Secondary archive: <a href="https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.29987578" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.29987578</a></li><li>SSRN: Pending assignment (ETA: Q3 2025)</li></ul><p></p>