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"Rule Rationality"

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journal contribution
posted on 25.10.2016 by Yuval Heller, Eyal Winter
We study the strategic advantages of following rules of thumb that bundle different games together (called rule rationality) when this may be observed by one's opponent. We present a model in which the strategic environment determines which kind of rule rationality is adopted by the players. We apply the model to characterize the induced rules and outcomes in various interesting environments. Finally, we show the close relations between act rationality and “Stackelberg stability” (no player can earn from playing first).
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Citation

International Economic Review, 2016, 57 (3), pp. 997-1026

Author affiliation

/Organisation/COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, ARTS AND HUMANITIES/Department of Economics

Version

AM (Accepted Manuscript)

Published in

International Economic Review

Publisher

Wiley for 1. Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research Association 2. University of Pennsylvania, Economics Department

issn

0020-6598

eissn

1468-2354

Acceptance date

19/05/2016

Copyright date

2016

Available date

09/08/2018

Publisher version

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/iere.12183/abstract?systemMessage=Due+to+essential+maintenance+the+subscribe/renew+pages+will+be+unavailable+on+Wednesday+26+October+between+02:00+-+08:00+BST/+09:00+–+15:00++SGT/+21:00-+03:00+EDT.+Apologies+for+the+inconvenience.

Notes

Following the embargo period the above license applies.

Language

en

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