Supplementary File of "Why Climate Commitments Fail: Modelling Egocentric Governance and Incentive Misalignment under the Paris Agreement"
This repository contains the complete set of supplementary materials for the manuscript "Why Climate Commitments Fail: Modelling Egocentric Governance and Incentive Misalignment under the Paris Agreement", submitted to Nature Climate Change. The dataset includes simulation scripts, processed and raw outputs, strategic actor typology classifications, entropy-calibrated payoff matrices, dynamic trajectory clusters, and source-verified policy texts (NDCs and LT-LEDS from 73 countries). All materials were developed to analyse systemic incentives and typological governance behaviour under climate stress, enabling reproducible insight into short-termism, defection dynamics, and resilience thresholds.
The archive includes:
- Cleaned semantic data from national climate commitments
- Entropy-weighted payoff structures
- Game-theoretic simulation outputs in R
- Typology evolution visualisations and clustering logic
- Full methodological documentation and codebook references
No funding was received for this research. All files are released under a CC-BY 4.0 license for academic and non-commercial use.
For detailed guidance on using the materials, refer to the included README.txt.
