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The Intention of Intention

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Version 3 2021-12-31, 09:33
Version 2 2019-09-22, 08:04
Version 1 2019-04-11, 08:45
journal contribution
posted on 2021-12-31, 09:33 authored by Ramón CasaresRamón Casares
For Putnam in Representation and Reality, there cannot be any intentional science, thus dooming cognitive science. His argument is that intentional concepts are functional, and that functionalism cannot explain anything because "everything has every functional organization", providing a proof. Analyzing his proof, we find that Putnam is assuming an ideal interpreting subject who can compute effortlessly and who is not intentional. But the subject doing science is a human being, and we are not that way. Therefore, in order to save cognitive science, we propose to replace the ideal subject with a real and intentional human subject, and we propose to model intentionality by using a problem theory which is an intuitionist set theory where the resolving subject is a computing device. We are intentional because we are living beings, where life is the intention of not to die, so we are embodied intentions designed by evolution. We are real and then we have to compute our resolutions to the survival problem, and fortuitously we are computationally Turing complete, so our language is complete and then full and self referable. In summary, evolutionary subjectivism modeled as problem solving by computing should save cognitive science. Or, in other words, we are proposing to update Kant with Darwin and Turing.

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