ELECTORAL ALLIANCES, ESTABILITY OF ELECTORAL OFFICE AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURE OF PROVINCES: the cases of Buenos Aires, Córdoba and San Luis (1993-2009)

2017-05-01T02:50:48Z (GMT) by Lucas González Belén Cáceres
<p></p><p>Why some governments spend more money in public goods than others do? Why does social expenditure vary? This study analyzes some key factors that explain the variation in social expenditure in Argentine provinces. These provinces were studied because they have a huge autonomy regarding the decision of the amount of money to be used in social expenditure and because there is a great variation in these amounts. Based on original data of Argentine provinces budget from 1993 to 2009, and using descriptive statistics and analyzes of three key cases (the provinces of Buenos Aires, San Luis and Cordova), we demonstrate in this study that social expenditure increases as costs for electoral and government alliances, as well as the alternation and rotation of key positions in government, decreases. This article discusses the results in the three Argentine provinces studied and explores the implications of the discussion about the political determinants of social expenditure and the design of social policies, especially in developing countries and federal democracies.</p><p></p>